CHAWLA AND ANOTHER v.

STATE OF HARYANA

February 12, 1974 [V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.l

Criminal law-Practice and Procedure-Seritence of /; fe imprisonment for murder. when may be 1ranted. ·

Six. accUsed were charged with the murder of three persons. Two of the ac.:used-tbe appellants-were convicted of murder of two of -the deceased, n:spectively and were sentenced to death by the High Court in appeal.

The other four accused were sentenced to life imprisonment.

In appeal to this Court, regarding the sentence of death passed on the two appellants,

HELD : The death sentence should be commuted to imprisonment for life. for the following reasons :-

(a) It was probable that the tragedy was provoked or precipitated by the blame-worthy and intransigent conduct of the deceased in regard to the retaining or taking possession of the land that had been finally allotted to the accused by the Consolidation autbprities. and over which land, there were disputes between the accused and the deceased.

fb) The first appellant was rcs,:ionsible for causing only one out of the 3 fatal injuries received by the deceased for_ whose murder be was convicted.

Probably, that was the only blOw given by him to tho deceased, while the remaining 6 punctured wounds were all caused by the other accused who were awarded the lesser sentence.

( c) The appellants are immature youths who appear to have acted at the E instigation of their elder.

(d) The appellants must have suffered prolonged mental torture on account of their beinS: constantlI haunted by the spectre of death for one year and 10 , months ever since they were sentenced to death by the trail court.

Moreover the Court has now a discretion to award either of the two penalties prescribed under s. 302, Penal Code, and death sentence is now exacted only where the murder was perpetrated with marked brutality. [346 E-347 CJ

Y; v; an Rodrick v. Tiie State of West Be11gal, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1584; Gurd; p Singh v, State of PunitJb, A.l.R. 1971 S.C. 2240, State of Maharashlra v.

Mang/ye Dhavu Kongll, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1797, State of B/har v. Pa.rhupatl Singh and another, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. Ga/anand and ors. v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 695, and Ediga A.namma v. State of A.ndhra Pradesh, Cr. A. 67/73 decided on 11·2·74, followed.

Brij Bhukhan and ors. v. State of U.P. A.I.R.~ 1957 S.C. 474, Mil:Jlll and anr. <tc. v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1959, S.C. 572 and Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P.

G Cr. L.J. 370 (S.C.), referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criniinal Appeal No. 109 of 1973.

Appeal by Special leave from the judgment and order dated the 13th November, 1972 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 493 of n and Murder Reference No. 21 of H 1972.

N. S. Das Bahl, for the appellants.

V. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·

SARKARIA J.

The facts giving rise to this appeal by special leave are as under : Jagga had thret sons; Bishna, Ram Lal and Har Lal.

Ram Dia, Dal Singh and Ran Singh deceased were the sons of Bishna. Ram Lai and his sons, Chawla and Dhanna Har Lal, his son, Puran, and Har Lal's grandson, Mukhtiara are the accused in this case. ' During consolidation operations in their village, Deora, dispute arose between Ram Lal and Har Lal on one side and Bishna on the other, over the allotment of a plot, measuring 4' acres. This plot was allotted by the Consolidation Officer to Bishna but in revision the Additional Director, Consolidation on May 4: 1968, set asid~ the Order ct the Consolidation Officer and allotted it to Ram Lal and Har Lal, accused. Bishna died and the deceased succeeded him. Aggrieved, the deceased persons moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for bringiqg up and quashing the order of the Director.

The High Court dismissed this petition on July 14, 1971 and upheld the order of the Director. On October 4, 1971, the Assistant Collector made an order that, in implementation of the order of the Director of Consolidation, the land be demarcated at the spot and possession delivered to the allottees. It was further directed that the land be mutated in favour of the allottees.

On October 5, 1971, the Kanungo, in compliance :with the Assistant Collector's order, demarcated the land at the spot and delivered symbolical possession

. 129 129 1:9 1211 d H of Klla Nos. -7-. ffi'J' 14 . 16 as those fields were un er crop. e

delivered actual possession of the other fields, comprised in the allotment, which were not nder crops, including I<hasra No. W, to the accused, Ram Lal and Har Lal. The deceased persons, however, did not submit to this symbolical and actual delivery of possession. They instituted a suit in the Civil Court at Kaithal and obtained an ex parte interim injunction restraining the accused from taking possession of the land. This injunction was served on Ram Lal accused on November 5, 1971.

On November 11, 1971, Ram Dia, Dal Singh and Ran Singh deceased, went to the fields with their ploughs. Dal Singh started reaping chari crop, Ran Singh started ploughing the field, while Ram Dia went on a round of the field. At about 11 a.m., all the six accused, in a body reaChed the field.

Puran and Ram La1 were armed with Suas (iron-spiked sticks) , Dhanna with a Gandasa, and Har Lal, Mukhtiara and Chawla with Jathis. On reaching the spot, Har Lal exhorted his companions to kill the deceased. Thereupon, Chawla, Puran and Ram Lal gave blows with their respective weapons to Ram Dia, Ran Singh came to the rescue of his brother. Thereupon, Dhanna and Mukhtiara assaulted him with their respective weapons. Dal Singh interceded but all the six accused belaboured him. The occurrence was witnessed by Smt. Mali Nasib Singh and Shadi who had run to a safe distance and stood ther~. After the assault, the accused ran away taking their weapons with them. Ram Dia died at the spot. Dal Singh succumbed to

his injuries after his admission in the Civil Hospital Kaithal, while Ran

Singh expired in Medical College/Hospital, Rohtak on November 13, 1971.

The Sessions Judge convicted and sentenced Chawla, Puran and Mukhtiara accused to death under s.302/34, Penal Code. He further convicted them under s.302/149 on three counts and sentenced them each to imprisonment for life. A conviction under s.148, Penal Code with a sentence of one year's imprisonment each was also recorded.

The remaining accused were also convicted under ss. 302/149 and 34 and 148, Penal Code and on the capital charge sentenced to imprisonment for life, each.

On appeai, the High Court commuted the death sentence of Puran to one of imprisonment for life on the ground that it was not known as to which of the three fatal injuries to Ram Dia had been caused by Puran. It confirmed the death sentences of Chawla and Mukhtiara, for committing the murders of Ram Dia, and Ran Singh, respectively. The conviction of Ram Lal, Har Lal and Dhanna under ss.302/149 was a1so maintained.

Special Leave in this case was granted only with regard to the capital sentence inflicted on Chawla and Mukhtiara, appellants.

Mr. Behal, learned arnicus curiae has urged that the death senten ces were not justified because of these alleviating circumstances :-

(a) The cause of the tragedy can be traced to the unreasonable, stubborn, and blame-worthy conduct of the deceased in retaking or retaining possession of the land that after a protracted litigation, had been finally allotted and made over to the accused party by the Director of Consolidation. The violence seems to have erupted because of the wrongful act of the deceased in ploughing Kila No. 612 etc., actual possession of which had been duly delivered by the Consolidation Authorities, earlier to the accused party. Ram Dia armed with a stick was on guard duty while the other deceased were 'ploughing or sowing in the dis puted land. Ram Dia provoked the assault by dealing blows with a stick to Har Lal accused.

(b)

(c)

Jn the case of Chawla appellant, it was not clear whether any fat'al injury to Ram Dia was caused by him. Jn any case, it was unreasonable to mark him out for capital punishment for inflicting only one of the three fatal injuries with a Iathi, when the coaccused to whom the punctured, fatal wounds were attributed, have been awarded the lesser penalty.

That Chawla and Mukhtiara appellants are raw youths, aged 25 and 24 ye.ars •. respectiv7Iy, who probably acted under the inst1gat10n of their father; and that the death sentence has been hovering over their heads for an agonisingly long period of about 1 year

CHAWLA v. HARYA~A (Sarkaria, J.) 343

and I 0 months.

The above circumstances, according to Mr. Behal, taken separately as well as collectively, furnish sufficient ground for mitigation of the capital sentence.

Reference has been made to the decisions of this Court in Vivialn Rodrick v. The State of West Bengal;(') Gurdip Singh v. State of Punjab;(') State of Maharashtra v. Naglya Dhavu Kongil;(I') State iii Bihar v. Pashupati Singh and another(') and Gajanand and ors. v. State of U.P.( 5 )

On the other hand, Mr. Vikram Mahajan. learned Counsel for the State vehemently contends that none of the circumstances pointed cut bv Mr. Behal .is a good extenuating factor.

It is emphasisetl that ti; c accused \vent armed \Vith a determination to kill the deceased

prsons and they succeeded in their nefarious design. This \VJS a cas~

or cold-11loooed triple murder and no leniency in the matter of sent, nce was called for.

It is argued that the mere fact that the murders were committed at the exhortation of the eldest accused Har Lal, was no _ground in law for not inflicting the capital sentence on the appellants.

He has further pointed out that the mere fact that a period of obout 1 year and 10 months has elapse'd since the award of the capital sentence, which is mainly due to the protracted proceedings, is no :; round for reducing the capital sentence.

In support of his arguments. learned Counsel has relied on Brij Bhu.khan and ors. v. State of U1 P.;(') Mizaji and anr. etc. v. State of U. P.( 7 l; Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P.(').

Tn:e, according to the finding of the courts beiow, the occurrence !ook place ctuallv in Kila No. 611, anti not in Kila No. 6/2, which v:as in dispute.

The very numbering of these fields by the Settlement

uthorities shov.s that thev are sub divisions or parts of the same J;:iJa "" 6 The disputed land was thus intermin.2led with the plot cf occurrence.

The deceased were feeling aggrieved by the partition ond all.otmcnt of this land .including Kila 6.

Indeed. despite the conclusion of the dJSpute by the consolidation authorities, the deceased ·,; ere keeping it alive.

The Kanungo's Report (Ex.PJJ). dated Octol::cr 5. 1971. whereby Possession of the disputed land was delivered !(] the accused Part~. shows that Kila No. 612 in Rectangle No. 129

"as one. nf those tlisputed plots. the actual possession oi which had

~ef ciel1vcred to the accused party.

It was the prosecution case,

~et

1 ~~~; j~ 0g~~ tfoe the assalt. Ram Singh was ploughing to sow the di~Putcd land an'~'kaabuttmg hchri from the field adjacent to 'ibly to keeii a watch aginst ;~ was avmg a round. of he fields. posunder s 14? Cr p C he_ accusd. Chawla tn his cxaminatinn- ----·- -- _..... . . eave t is version of the incident-- (!) A. 1. R.-197Ts. c. t584

(21 A. T. R. 1971 S. C. 2240 '

(3) A. T. R. t972 S. C. 1797

(41 A. T. R. S. C. 2699 '

(51 A.J.R. 1954 S.C. 695.

(61 A. T. R. 1957 S. C. 474

(7\ A. I. R. 1959 S. C SP

(8) Cr. 1. J. 370 (S. C.l. -

... , .. Ram Dia asked us to give up the possession of the land and hand over the same to him. We told him that he could take back the possession in the same way as the _possession had been delivered to us by the Tehsil\lar, Girdawar and Patwari.

At this, Ram Dia said that he would take the p0ssession forcibly.

We told him that we would not hand over the passession by force.

On the day <>f orcurrcnce. Ram Dia a_nld his brothers started ploughing the land and uprooting the crops sown by us, with the help .of two ploughs.

At sun-rise, Har Lal armed with a lathi, I armed with a two-pronged iailv and Ram Lal armed with a lathi were i:oing on th.; road from Deora Lo Ujana to go to our field ..... -... Har Lal icild us that it seemed to him that the larrJ in dispute-was being ploughed by the deceased.

Har Lal went and stood in front of the bullocks and told Ram Dia that he should have been satisfied after cultivating the land since the consolidation and that he should desist from ploughing the land and destroying the crop.

At this Ram Dia gave a lathi blow which hit Har Lal on the right hand.

At this, Har Lal, Ram Lal and myself gave injuries with our respective weapons. . . . . .

We got Har Lal medically examined . ... "

Though this version of the accused was not sufficient to make out :a case of private defence:_ yet, coupled with the Kanunos report,

Ex.PH. and the surrounding circumstances, it strongly points to the .conclusion that the tragedy was 'probably precipitated by the deceaseld's

insistence on cultivation and possession of the disputed land indudling those fields of which actual possession had been dulv delivered by the consolidation authorities to the accused.

The appellants had the order of Additional Director of Consolidation in their favour in respect of the land in dispute. The deceased challenged that order by a writ petition under Article 226 in the High Court which dismissed the same and uoheld the order of the Director.

Therafter. on October

5. 1971. in imolementatiop of the Director's order, symbolical pos- •ession of that part of the land which was under crops, and actual possession of the fields which were vacant. was delivered, to the accused. It seems that the deceased urlder the cloak of an cx-parte interim injunction obtained by them on November 4, 1971, were detern1ined to retain or retake possession even of those fields of which actual possession had been--de)ivered to the accused party by the consolidation authorities.

This takes us to the next circumstance stressed by Mr. Behal.

Chawla has been awarded the capftal sentence for the murder of Ram Dia. The part ascribed to the appellant by the witnesses, who admittedly had run away to some distance at the commencement . of the assault. was that he had inflicted a fatal blow with a 1athi on the deceased.

Dr. Raj Gupta who conducted the autopsy, testified that there were eight iil.iuries in all on the dead-bodv of Ram Dia, out of which, six were punctured wounds.

Injury No. 6

E '

F -

was an abrasion on the left fore-arm. Injury No. 8 was a depression of the frontal and parietai bones. All the injuries, colleclIely, in the opinion of the Doctor, w_ere . sufficient t<>. cause death m the ordinary course of nature. It is miury 8 which wa~ attnbutcd _by

the witnesses to Chawla, apl"'ant. Jn the exanunatt0n-m-ch1et, the Doctor did not say that this injury was by itself, fatal.

Jn. cross-examination in the Committal Court, she said that injuries I, 2 and 4. individually, as well llS collectively, could cause death. t the trial, Dr. Raj Gupta chang~ this version and said that injuries 1, 4 and 8 were individually _sufliciet. in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. She excluded rniury. No. 2 from the category of fatal injuries, and, in its pl_ace, substituted injury No. 8. If the.

Doctor's former statement made in the Committal Court was correct,. then injury 8 was not a fatal injury and the three fatal injuries (J, 2 and 4) were punctured \\'OUnds which could have b<en caused by Ram Lal and Puran only, who were armed with sharp-pointed: weapons.

Further, in the . Co'!"rriittal Court, Dr. Gupta had clearly testified tlrnt none of the 8 injuries found on the body of. Ram Dia had been caused with a .blunt weapon.

On this point, also, she took up a different position at the trial and sar..l that injury 8 might have been caused with a lathi.

In any case, apart from • a. minor abrasion on the left fore-arm which could have been the result of a fall, there was only one injucy on the body of Ram Dia, caused with a lathi. It could not be said that Chawla played the dominant role in the assault. His prt, if not less, was in no way greater than that of Har Lal and Ram Lal who had caused the fatal punctured wounds.

We have referred to the contradictory positions taken by themedical officer. not to show _that Chawla could not be convicted

.. und'r s 302. Penal Code, but to appreciate his precist role in the

assault on Ram Dia. for the purpose of sentence, only. From Dr.

Guotas evidence it is clear that he had caused only one injury, with a lathi, to Ram Dia and his part in the assault. if not less, was in no wa, greater than that of Har Lal and Ram Lal who had caused no. jess thnn f-ix injuries, includinl! two fatal, to the deceased.

Furthet circumstance which deserves consideration is that these raw vouths. Chawla and Mukhtiara. appear to haw acted under the

instigation of their elder. Har Lal.

till anoher factor to be taken into account in prescribing the pumshment ts that death penalty has been brooding over the heods of. these youngmen for an agonisingly long period.

Tlt'y were committed for trial two Years in February 1972 and were condemned to eath by th~ tria! court in April f972.

By cold logic, this circumstai, cc. as " rmt:gattng factor. more often than aot, being the unwarranted result of Law's delays, is vulnerable. But humane considerations of administering justice tempered with mercy have impelled the courts to recognise it as an ameliorating circumstance In the last half a century, the science of criminology has taken greai strides.

There has been rethinking about crime and punishment.

The process is con-.

tinuino.

Winds of compassion for the criminal blowing the world over, are attecting Jaw and logic, the Judge and the Legislator, alike.

Draconicn notions and retributive relics of lex elionis are yielding to "Mankind's concern for Charity". ln every creature, ''born but to die", it is "blindness to the future, kindly given" that keeps life going.

But in u condemned man, the Book of Fate open before him consrantly telling of the doom prescribed, the life-stream of hopes and aspirations rapi~ Jy starts drying under the excruciating heat of the mental. desert. W1tn

passaoe of time, the prisoner painfully awaiting execution, become:; no bcttcr than a "life-less" mummy.

It was in this perspective that tilis Court in Slate of Bihar v. Pashupati Singh and anr. (supra), ruled 1hat if there has beep. a long interval between the date of the offence and the consideration of appeal by the Supreme Court. the

capital sentence few the c001mission of an offence under s. 30'.:, Penal Code for which the accused has undergone a long period of mental agonv, the sentence of death may not be exacted.

A simila:· note was struck bv a Bench of this Court, constimted by both oi us, in Ediga Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh(').

Parliament also has taken note of the current penological thought.

Before Criminal Amendment Act 26 of 1955, for the offence of murder, death sentence w.'IS the rule and transportation for life an exception. anld if the lesser penalty was to be awarded, then subsection (5) of s. 367, Code of Criminal Procedure required reasons I<> be given.

By Act 26 of 1955, this sub-s. ( 5) was recast and the requirement of giving reasons for the lesser punishn1ent, \\'US done away with.

The former rule is thus no longer oporative. The Court .has now a discretion to award either of the two penalties prescribed under s. 302, Penal Code. Death sentence is now exacted onlv where the murder was perpetrated with marked brutality.

Parliament has passed the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, which is coming into force shortly.

In it, the position is reverse of what it was before the Amendment of 1955.

After this Bill becomes !aw. it will be obligatory for the court to give reasons if the death sen-· tence is to be inflicted.

The Penal Code Bill, 1955, which is on th' anvil, reserves capital punishment for only a few types of murders.

We have referred to the modern penologicaJ thought and current legislative trends not with a view to decide this case on the basis of what is yet. in embryo, but to have a proper perspective for appreciating of the CIIcumstances which have been urged in this case in mitigation of the sentence.

To sum up, these are :

(a) There was some probability of the tragedy having been. provoed or precipitated by the blame-worthy and 1ntrans1gent conduct of the deceased in regard to the retaining or retaking possession of the land H WC A. 67(73;.Jeeided on ll-2-74.

that had been finally allotted to the accused by the consolidation authorities.

(b) Chawla appellant was responsible for causing only one out of the three fatal injuries received by Ram Dia, deceased. Probably, that was the only blow given by him to the deceased, while the remaining six

B punctured wounds were all caused by the other accused who have been awarded the lesser sentence.

(c) Chawla and Mukhtiara, appellants are Immature youths who appear to have acted at the instigation of their elder, Har Lal.

(d) Prolonged mental torture suffered by Chawla and Mukhtiara on account of their being constantly haunted by the spectre of death for the last one year and

10 months.

Perhaps, none of the above circumstances, taken singly and judged rigidly by the old Draconian standards, would be sufficient to justify

the imposition of the lesser penalty; nor are these circumstances ade- D quate enough to palliate the offence of murder. But in their totality, they tilt the judicial scales in favour of life rather then putting it out.

The circumstances considered above have long been recognised by courts as valid grounds for mitigating the sentence. They are not innovations. Formerly what was in the penumbra of extenuation, "dim-described", now, in the twilight of compassion, has become clearly discernible.

Before we part with this judgment, we may in fairness to the learned Counsel for the State, note it here that the rulings cited by him turn on their own facts. In Mizaji's case and Jagmohan Singh's case (supra), the accused were awarded capital sentences as they were found guilty of having fired the fatal shots with fire-arms. In Brij Bhukhan's case (supra), the victim had been dragged out of his own house and mercilessly beaten .. Such is not the case here.

For the foregoing reasons, while maintaining the convictions of the appellants, we would allow the appeal and commute the death sentences of the appellants to that of imprisonment for life on each count. The sentences shall run concurrently.

V.P.S.

Appeal c; l/owed.

CHAWLA AND ANOTHER

STATE OF HARYANA

February 12, 1974

V. R. KRISHNA IYER

R. S. SARKARIA, JJ

s. 302

Penal Code

N. S. Das Bahl

V. C. Mahajan

R. N. Sachthey

SARKARIA

Jagga

Bishna

Ram Lal

Har Lal

Ram Dia

Dal Singh

Ran Singh

Ram Lai

Chawla

Dhanna Har Lal

Puran

Mukhtiara

Deora

Bishna

May 4: 1968

Art. 226

July 14, 1971

October 4, 1971

October 5, 1971

Kanungo

Civil Court at Kaithal

November 5, 1971

November 11, 1971

Puran

Ram La1

Dhanna

Mali Nasib Singh

Shadi

Civil Hospital Kaithal

Ran

Singh

November 13, 1971

Chawla

Penal Code

Penal Code

ss. 302

Penal Code

Mukhtiara

Behal

Vikram Mahajan

Ram Singh

s 14

Girdawar

Deora Lo Ujana

Kanunos

Article 226

October

5. 1971

November 4, 1971

Raj Gupta

Chawla

It is miury 8 which wa~ attnbutcd by

the witnesses to Chawla, apl"'ant.

Raj Gupta

t the trial, Dr. Raj Gupta chang~ this version and said that injuries 1, 4 and 8 were individually sufliciet.

Gupta

s 302

Penal Code

Guotas

Supreme Court

s. 30

Penal Code

Before Criminal Amendment Act

s. 367

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 302

Penal Code

Penal Code

Mizaji

Jagmohan Singh

Brij Bhukhan


SUPERINTENDENT & REMEMBERANCER OF LEGAL A

AFFAIRS,. WEST BENGAL. .

S. K. ROY February 12, 1974.

f.M. H. BEG, Y. V. CHANDRACHUD AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.] B

~Vest Bengal Crin1i11al. Law A1nend1ne11t (Special Court) let, 1949-Jtein 2 of the Schedule read wtth s. 409 J.P.C.-What constitutes criminal breach of lrlHf.

The respondent, a public servant, was tried by a Special Court constituted under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949, for collecting premiums and issuing receipts on behalf of LI.C. in respect of the policies of some Pakistani Policy Holders. He was charged for criminal breach C of trust in respect of such premium5 by making false adjustments of receipts of such premiums through the Bank in Pakistan in relevant books of accounts.

Item 2 of the Si;:hedule in the Act describes the offence as an "offence punishable u/s. 409 l.P.C. if committed by a public servant or by an agent of the Government in respect of property with which he is entrusted.

The Special Court came to the conclusion that the respondent purported to act, at the relevant time, as a public servant, but as no money was entrusted to D the respondent in his capacity as a public servant, the respondent was entitled to an aquittal for an alleged offence punishable u/s. 409 I.P.C. under the proviso to sec. 4(1) of the Act, there -could be no conviction for that offence.

Against the acquittal of the respondent, the Legal Remembrancer of West Bengal filed an appeal before the High Court. The High Court also held that !he respondent, having no power to receive money in cash from the policy holders did not act in his capacity of a public servant while he received the money from the policy holders in cah in Caolcutta.

Although it did not quash the order of E acquittal, the apparent result of its findings was that the trial of the respQndent,

bing without jurisdiction, was null and void, so that the respondent could be retired.

The only question for decision was whether the respondent be said to be acting in his capacity as a public servant when he received the monies from the policy-holders which he misappropriated. Allowing the appeal.

HELD : (i) The gravamen of the offence of Criminal breach of trust is the F dishonest misappropriation of the money or property which comes into the possession or under the control of a public servant who has the ostensible authority to receive it, even though, technically speaking, from the point of view of the distribution of departmental duties under internal rules of an office, it may not be within the scope of his authority or duty to accept the money. The fact that a public servant acts fraudulently in the exercise of his duties as a public servant to get dominion or control over some property will be an aggra\ating and not an exculpating circumstance. The ";:ntrustment" results from what !he person G handing over money or property is made to think, understand and believe about the purpose for which he hands over money or p_roperty to a p1;1blic servnt. If this takes place because of and due to the exercise of the offic1al authonty, the requirements of S. 409 I.P.C. are satisfied. To constitute an offence u/s 409, I.P .C., it is not required that misappropriation must necessarily take place after the <.:reation of a legally correct entrustment or dominion over property. S. 409

covers both types of cases. that is. those where the receipt of property is itself fraudulent or those where the public servant misappropriates it. All that is required is "cntrustment". [353 Bl B

(II) In the present case, there is evidence and findings of the Special Court to show that the respondent was actually representing to the policy-holders that

Ill '

•. •

. \ ' ' E

SUPDT. LEGAL AFFAIJl.S V. S. IC. ROY (Beg, /.) 349

they could their ;-~::nu in Cal'1utta to him and he iliued receipts pur4 porting to act in bis o capacity. 11lere is, therefore, nexus between the actll!ll official copacity and tho conduct of tho Respondent to hold the Respondent suiltf of the ol!ence u/s 409 !.P.C. which could be tri~ by the special court. l3SS A-BJ

(State of U.P. and Ors, V. lJabu Ram Upadliya [1961) 2 SCR 679 and.S. N.

Pnri V. State "I Rajasthan [19721 3 S.C.R. 497 referred to.)

CRIMINAL AP!'ELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal appeal No. 189 of In~

I , From the Judgment and Order dated the 19th February, 1970 of the Calcutta High Court in Govt. Appeal No. 7 of 1964.

P. K. Chatterjee and G. S .. Chatterjee, for the Appellant.

Hardayal Hardy and S.11/cumar Ghose for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG, / •. This is an appeal on a certificate of fitness of the case for aPP"al to this Court granted by the Calcutta High Court under Arti• c!e 134 t 1) ( c) of the Constitution of India.

The Respondent was tried Jiy a Special Court constituted under the West Bellltal Criminal I,.aw Amendment (Special Courts) Act XXI of 1949 (Hereinafter referred to 11_8 'the Act'), which empowers the Spe cia1 Court. set up under it .. !Ji try offences mentioned in the Scheduled annexed to the _Act. Item 2 of the.schedule is :

"An offence punis]\ab1e under section 409 I.P:c. if committed by a public seryl!Jlt or by a person dealing with property belonging to government as an agent of gavernment in respect of property with which he is entrusted or over which he has domain in his capacity of a public servant or in the !Way of his business as such agent".

The proviso to Section 4(1) of the Act reads asfollows:

"Provided that when . trying any case, a Special C011rt may also try any offenece other than an offence specified in the schedule, with which the accused may under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be charged at the same trial".

The Special-Court framed the following charge against the respondent:

"That you, between 12th May, 1958 and 7th May, 1959 .Hindustan Building 9iJcutta, btljng a Pub. Servant, to wit,

Supdt of Pakistan Section (Pak Unit) of H'mdustan Co-of)erarative Life Insurance Society, Unit of LIC of India Calcutta and in that capacity entrusted with or with domition ove; .the premiums of some Pakistan Policy Holders, amounting to . about Rs. 2350-49 np., collecte\i by you directedly from

these policy-holders or their representatives viz. 6 •. 7. 8, and 15 and other, under receipts 6 (Ext. 3 series other than Ex. 315) issued by you on behalf of the said LIC in respect, of the Policies of those policy-holders committed Criminal breach of trust in respect of such preiums by making false . adjustments of recaipt of such amounts through the Bank in

lO~L9S4 Sup CI/74

Pakistan in relevant books (Exts. 5, 8, and 9 series) and thereby committed an otfence punishable under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the jurisdiction of this Court." No other charge was framed.

The Special Court recorded findings of fact on the strength of the admitted position that the respondent was serving as a Superintendent of the Pak Section of the Hindustan Cooperative Life Insurance Society which was a unit of the Life Insurance Corporation Calcutta during the period to which the charge relates, and of receipts given by the respondent himself for monies paid to him in Calcutta coupled with entries in the premium register folio in the handwriting of the respondent, falsely showing that the ambllllts realised by the respondent had not been paid by the policy holders so that their names appeared in the "Demand List".

The Special Court had forn.mlated two point for determination as follows :

 "(1 ) whether the accused. was the Superintendent of Pakistan Section (Pak Unit.} of Hindustan Cooperative Life .Iniurance Society between 12th May 1958 and 7th of May 1959?

(2) Whether he, being in any manner entrusted with domination over property in the capacity of a public servant, committed criminal breach of trust in respect of that property"?

On point No. I, it held :

"It has been established by the evidence on record, beyond any shadow of 'doubt, 'that during the relevant period the accused was serving as Superintendent of Pakistan Section of

Ifindustan Cooperative Life Insurance Society, a Unit of L.I.C. in Calcutta.

This Unit was known as "Pak Unit." On point No. 2, it held.:.

"The evidence on record, both oral and documentary, is overwhelming to show that the accused, as Superintendent of Pak Unit of Hindustan Cooperative Insurance Society in Calcutta, directly realised premiums in cash front some Pakistani Policy Holders and misappropriated the amounts after making false entries in some of the relevant registers and accoimt papers maintained in his section of the l'l1Juranee Society." v Thus, it is clear that the Special Court came to the conclusion that the capacity in which the respondent purported to act, when receiving the moneys which he misappropriated, was that of "Superintendent of the Pak Unit of Hindustan Cooperative Life Insurance Society in Calcutta," a part of the Life Insurance Corporation of India at the relevant time. It was this capacity which enabled the respondent to put forward his authority to receive the sums of money, and, therefore to realize the amounts paid by the deceived policy holders who .•ppeared as witnesses and were rightly believed by the Special Court

despite the denial. of the respondent that he did not personally receive the amounts but had, mechanically and in good faith, signed the receipts put up before him by Clerks. The respondent's suggestions\ that it may have been the Clerks who had received monies anct thus deceived him as well as the policy holders, wa.~ rightly rejected Q}' the Special Court. Nevertheless, the Special Coud came to the conclusion that, as no money was entrusted to the respondent in his capacity as a public servant, the respondent was en\!tled to an acquittal for an alleged offience punishable under Section 409 Indian Penal Code. It also held that, as no alternative charge could be framed under section 406 I.P.C. under the proviso to Section 4(!) of the Act, there could be no conviction for that offence. 'It held that an alternative charge could not be framed by it in addition to the charge under Section 409 I.P.C. on the same facts and also that a Special Court could not, after taking cognisance of an offence mentioned in the schedule, convict the accused for a different offence in the alternative. For that very reason, it also refused to apply Section 403 I.P.C. under the proviso to Section 4(1) of the Act. ·

The Legal Remembrance of West Bengal had appealed to the D High Court against the respondent's acquittal. It appears that there the Counsel for the State did not challenge the finding that the respondent had no authority to receive cash payments of premiums. It was conceded that this was not his duty as a Superintendent. It also quoted the following finding of the Special Court :

, E

"It further appears from the evidence on record that the Pak Unit had no authority to make any such collection of premiums. The Pakistani Policy holders could not even make any cash pa}'ments of premium in the cash counter of the Hindustan Insurance Society. The Pakistani policy holders, of course, could transfer thejr policies to Indian Unit with the permission of the two Governments the Indian Government and the Pakistan Government and after showing satisfactorily the certificates of migration from Pakista.n to India.

Unless he became an Indian National be could not make such transfer of policies. If such transfer was made the policy went out of the administrative control of the Pak Unit."

After citing item No. 2 of the schedule set out above, the High Court went on to observe that the following three conditions are G required for an offence punishable under Section 409 Indian Penal Code:

"(i) That the o:ffence is committed by a public servant. (ii) The offence had been committed by the public servant acting in his capacity as a public servant. (iii} The property in respect of which the offence is committed must have been entrusted to him or that he had domination over that property in bis capacity as a pnblic servant."

It held that the prosecution had to show that the en.trusted property or dominion over property "in any manner whatsoever" was secured by the respondent "in his capacity as a public servant." It then observed that "to that extent" the provisions in Section 409 I.P.C. were distinguishable from the offence specified as item 2 in the Schedule. Further more. it held that the Special Court had "rightly decided that the respondent having no power to receive money in cash from the policy holders did not act in his capacity o.f a public servant while he received tlie money from the policy holders in cash in Calcutta." It also observed:

"It is quite possible that the respondent.had deceived the policy holders when he received cash mny from them elu ding them to believe that those were vahd payments towards premium and the payees had been put to damage, loss and harm which make him liable to be proceeded against for cheating. But when it is found that the respondent had acted clearly beyond and outside Ms duties as a Public servant having well defined duties which do not include cash receipt of premium, the offence which he committed is not criminal breach of trust punishable under section. 409 I. P. C. within the meaning of item No. 2 in the schedule of Act XXI of 1949, the Court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial as the offence does not fall within the schedule : the proper course for the learned Judge was to discharge the respondent".

Although it did not quash the order of acquittal, the apparent result of its findings was that the Trial of the respondent, being without jurisdiction, was null and void so that the respondent could be retired.

We are unable to concur with the view of the High Court that the ingredients of the offence specified as item 2 of the schedule differ in: any respect from those required by Section 409 I. P. C. for the conviction. of a public servant who com!Ilits criminal misappropriation in respect of property which has been entrusted to him or over which he acquires dominion or control in any manner as a public servant.

All that the entry in the schedule purports to do is to indicate that offences punishable under Section 409 I.P.C. triable by the Special Courts are limited to those of criminal breach of trust committed by public servants in their capacities as public servants and do not embrace offences by other classes of persons mentioned in Section 409

I.P.C.

The only question which arises for decision in the case before us is : could the respondent be said to be acting in his capacity as a public servant when he received the monies from policy holders which he misappropriated? Obviously, the offence punishable under Section 400 I. P. C. is not within the scope of the prescribed duties or authority of the public servant. The law does not authorise any public servant --0r, for that matter, anybody else-to commit a crnninal breach of trust. There are, however, two distinct parts involved in the commission of the offence of criminal breach of trust. The first consists of the creation or an obligation in relation to the property over which dominion or control is acquired by the accused. The second is a mis-

SUPOT. LEGAL AFFAIRS V. S. K. ROY (Beg, J:) 353

appropriation or dealing with the property dishonestly and contrary to the terms of th~ obligation created.

In the case of an offence by a public servant punishable under section 409 I. P. C. the acquisition of dominion or control over the property must also be in the capacity of a public servant punishable under section 409 I. P. C. the acquisition of a public servant, to get the control or dominion over property annexed with an obligation. The gravamen of the offence 1s the dishonest misappropriation of the money or property which comes into the possession or under the control of a public servant who has the ostensible authority to receive it even though, technically speaking, from the point of view of the distribution of departmental duties under internal rules of an office, it may not be within the scope of his authority or duty to accept the money.

The fact that a public servant acts fraudulently in the exercise of his duties as a public servant to get dominion of control over some property will be an aggravating and not an exculpating circumstances. The "entrustment" results from '!Yhat the person handing over money or property is made to think, understand, and believe about the purpose for which he hands over money or property to a public servant.

If this takes place because of an due to the exercise of the official authority the requirements of Section 409 I. P. C. are satisfied. There may be cases in which a person who parts with property to a public servant may have done so for reasons or in a manner so completely disconnected with the official capacity of the public servant that it may not be reasonably possible to conceive of it as an offence connected with or committed in the course of perf.ormance of any official duty at all so that official capacity becomes really irrelevant. Ordinarily, it is the ostensible or apparent scope of public servant's authority when receiving propert~ and not its technical limitations, under some internal rules of the department or office concerned, and the use made by the servant of his actual official capacity which would, in our opinion, determine whether there is a sufficient nexus or connection between the acts complained of and the official capacity so as to bring within the ambit of section 409 Indian Penal Code.

It is true tqat there is the finding of the Special Court, quited by the High Court and set out above by us, that Pakistani policyholders could not have made any transfer of their policies to the Indian Unit of the Hindustan Insurance Society without producing certificates of migration and obtaining the permission of both Indian and Pakistani Governments. But, there is evidence and there are findings on it given by the Special Court that the respondent was actually representing to the policyholders that they could make their payments in Calcutta to him and he issued receipts purporting to act in his official capacity. In other words, he misused his official capacity, and, under its garb and the column of his office, obtained payments and issued receipts. 'The policyholders did not know the correct position and would not have made payments to the respondents but for the .possession and use by him of his official capacity. We think that there is sufficient ostensible nexus between the actual official capacity and the conduct of the respondent for us to hold that the entrustment or dominion was obtained by the respondent over monies of policyholders in his official capaclty or as a public servant who, consequently, became

SUPREME COURT REPORT~

[ 1974 J 3 5.C.R.

charged with the duty, as a public servant, and, indeed, even more so as a public servant, to act honestly with regard to sums thus received by him.

To constitute an offence under section 409 I. P. C. it is not required that misapprepriation must necessarily take place after the creation of a legally correct entrustment or dominfon over property. The entrustments may arise in "any manner whatsoever".

That manner may or may not involve fraudulent conduct rif the accused. Section

409 I. P. C. covers dishonest misappropriation in both types of cases, that is to say those where the receipt of property is itself fraudulent or improper and those where the public servant misappropriates what may have been quite properly and innocentlv received. All that is required is what may be described as "entrustment" or acquisition of dominion cover property in the capacity of a public servant who, as a result of it, becomes charged with a duty to act in a particular way, or at least honestly.

A case cited before us, to support the contention that acquisition of dominion or possession and control over property by an accused would even if wrongful, be an "entrustment" or create an obligation D the violation of which, by misappropriation, would be punishable under Section 409 I.P.C. if the accused used his official capacity to obtain the property, was : State of U.P. & Ors.

Vs. Babu Ram Upadhya.

Again, in S. N. Puri Vs. State of Rajastha11, this Court, after referring to decisions of different High Courts on the subject, held, that "the expression "entrusted" is used in Section 409 I.P.C. in a wide sense and include all cases in which property is voluntarily handed over for a specific purpose and is dishonestly disposed of contrary to the terms on which possession has been handed over."

The obligation to act in a certain manner with regard to or to deal honestly with property, over which a public servant obtains dominion or control by the use of his official capacity, may arise either expressly or impliedly.

Even if the respondent or the life Insurance Corporation, on whose behalf the respondent had purported to act, had not, at the time of receipt of money from a policyholder, the legal right to receive it, the respondent, who had certainly been entrusted with it by the policyholders by reason of his official capacity, should have cor rectly shown it in the account books which ought not to have been falsified by him. It could not be contended that even a mistaken receipt of money in official capacity does not create an obligation upon the receiver as a public servant.

We think that it is enough if the payment is made by a person dealing with a public servant in his capa /city as a public servant even if it is made on an erroneous assumption which the public servant concerned does nothing to remove. Section

409 l.P.C. seems to us to be meant for the protection, among others, of those sJealing with public servants purporting to have the authority to act in a certain way in exercise of their official capacities. A legal

defect in the scope of the ostensible authority of a public servant does not prevent an entrustment to or an obligation to be fastened upon a public servant in his capacity as a public servant if the facts of the case establish, as they do in the case before us, the required nexus or connecticn between acts which create the obligation and the capacity. We, therefore, hold that the respondent is guilty of an offence punishable under section 409 J.P .C. which could be tried by the Special Court.

Mr. Hardy, appearing for the respondent, contended that, although there could be a doubt whether the case would fall under Section 409 I.P.C. there could bo no such doubt that the respondent was guilty of an offence punishable under Section 403 I.P.C. He also invited our attention to certain facts : that, the offence was comn1itted more than 15 years ago; that, the respondent is now about 64 years in age; that, he was dismissed as a result of the misappropriation committed by him.

He submitted that we at this stage, convit the responde.1t under section 403 I.P.C. and then impose a fine upon him instead of sending him to jail now.

He also indicated that the respondent was a refugee from Pakistan who had apparently acted under the stress of straitened circumstances. We do not find all these facts mentioned in the judgments of the two Courts which were examined by us. However, in view of the fact that the offence was committed long ago, we think that a less severe sentence than we would have otherwise awarded will meet the ends of justice. -

Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the orders of the Spedal Court and the High Court. We convict the respondent under section 409 I.P.C. and we sentence him to one year's rigorous imprisonment and lo pay a fitle of Rs. 2,000/-, and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo six mo_nth's further rigorous imprisonment.

S.C.

Appeal allowed.

SUPERINTENDENT & REMEMBERANCER OF LEGAL AFFAIRS,WEST BENGAL

S. K. ROY

February 12, 1974

f.M. H. BEG

Y. V. CHANDRACHUD

R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.

s. 409

Pakistan

s. 409

s. 409

I.P.C

sec. 4(1)

West Bengal

Caolcutta

S. 409

I.P.C

s 409

S. 409

s 409

State of U.P.

[1961) 2 SCR 679

P. K. Chatterjee

G. S .. Chatterjee

Hardayal Hardy

Constitution of India

section 409

Section 4(1)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898

12th May, 1958

7th May, 1959

.Hindustan Building 9iJcutta

LIC

section 409

Indian Penal Code

Calcutta

12th May 1958

7th of May 1959

Life Insurance Corporation of India

Section 409

Indian Penal Code

section 406

I.P.C

Section 4(!)

Section 409

I.P.C

Section 403

I.P.C

Section 4(1)

Hindustan Insurance Society

India

Indian Government

Pakistan Government

Section 409

Indian Penal Code

Section 409

I.P.C

Section 409

Section 409

I.P.C

Section 409

I.P.C

Section 400

V. S. K. ROY

section 409

section 409

Section 409

section 409

Indian Penal Code

section 409

Section

409

Section 409

I.P.C

Babu Ram Upadhya

Section 409

I.P.C

Section

409

section 409

Hardy

Section 409

I.P.C

Section 403

I.P.C

section 403

I.P.C

section 409

I.P.C


RAGHUBIR SINGH v.

STATE OF HARYANA

February 12, 197 4.

[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.)

Murder-Death penalty when ca11 be reduced to life in1prisonn1ent.

The appellant developed illicit intimacy with the deceased.

When the

deceased feigned pregnancy and pressed him to marry her, he gave er a deadly poison mixed in milk. On the dea:th of the deceased he wrappecJ the d-.!ad body in a-blanket.and Left it in a railway compartment. He was cOD\'icted and senteDced to death.

On appeal to this Court on the question of sentence :

HELD : While murder in its aggravated form and in the absnce of extenuat ing factors connected with crime, criminal or legal process, still is condignly visited with death penalty, a compassionate alternative of life im, P.risonment in all other circumstances is gaining judicial ground. [357 G-H]

Iri the instant case a few ameliorative features fall to be noticed since judicial temper has more components than indignation against murder.

The D appellant is in his twenties, not irrelevant in considering death sentence.

He was a married man.

He was promiscuous with women, a salacious sin for which the deceased was a contributory. Tue latter's pressure to get him to marry her must have planted the seed of murderous thought in him.

He bargained for romance, encouraged by the victim but her pretended pregnancy upset. the appellant.

Some planning and treachery have aggravated the crime.

Yet another circumstance is that the man was sentenced to death nearly two years ago and the_ spectre of death penalty must have tormented his ouL Taken E separately, none of these matters may suffice to commute but the conspectus of factors, personal and social, tilt th_e scales in favour -Of life term. [357 El

CIUMINA!. APPELLATE JURISDICTION ;. Criminal Appeal No. 124 of 1973. ·

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 30th November, 1972 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal F Appeal No. 632 of 1972 and Murder Ref. No. 27 of 1972.

Nuruddin Ahmed and S. K. Mehta, for the appellant.

Gautam Goswami and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KRISHNA IYER, J. A young woman was vomitted into death by a young man by giving her a cup of milk mixed with a lethal dose of stricnine. He, along with two others, bundled the cadaver into a Delhibound train but the coach cleaner discovered it, the police unearthed the crime, the court convicted the culprits awarding capital sentence to the killer and lighter punishments to the two accessories after the fact, under s. 201, I.P.C. Special leave has been granted to the only appellant on the sole ground of sentence and so our scrutiny is confined to the circumstances of the crime and criminal and the penological propriety of inflicting the higher or lesser punishment.

' '

RAGHUBIR SINGH v. HARYANA (Krishna Iyer, I.) 357

Twenty six-years-old Raghubir Singh-the appellant-was a lesser official in the Malaria Eradication Department in Gorior, a village in Rajasthan. He became friends with a veterinary official, Sri Sharma, P.W. 13, and by a concatenation of innocent circumstances the appellant came into carnal comity with Kailashw'ati, the 2nd accused, a midwife in a local hospital. Later, the appellant was transferred to a viUage Mandhapia in the Family Planning Department where he came across Sushma Thomas, a nurse in the same department. Prurient Raghubir picked up a liaison with this malayalee belle older to him by five years and-going by the medical evidence, not a virgin. She seems to have feigned pregnancy probably to force a matrimony for which Raghubir was reluctant.

After many twists and turns of events, on June 6, 1971, the appellant secured half a grain of stricnine hydrochloride from Sharma, the friend, on the pretext that it was needed for killing stray dogs. This Sharma's naivete in supplying poison looks suspicious and it is for Government to look into, remembering that he was more than a dispensing cheiuist in this case.

Anyway, the amorou.s pair spent the night of the 10th June at the quarters of the 2nd accused, and the appellant brought milk for the deceased who consumed the cup of death. After agonising hours of vomitting struggle, she breathed her last, was wrapped in a blanket and given a railway burial.

The criminal act was treacherous murder and deserved the sterner sentence. But a few ameliorative features fall to be noticed since judicial temper has more components than indignation against murder.

The convict is in his twenties1 not irrelevant in considering death sen tence. He is said to be a married man.

He was promiscuous with women, a solacious sin for which the deceased was a contributory. The latter's pressure to get him to marry her must have planted the seed of murderous thought in him. He bargained for romance, encouraged by the victim but the pregnancy-though pretended-in a society which views unmarried .mothers as vicious upset the appellant.

These have no bearing on guilt at all but attenuate the lethal touch of the sentence.

Some planning and treachery have aggravated the crime, which also must not be ove\:looked. Yet another circumstance.

The man was sentenced to death as early as 23rd May, 1972, and for twenty months the spectre o( death penalty must have tormented his soul. Taken separately, none of these may suffice to commute but the conspectus .of factors, personal and social, tilt the scales in favour of a life term, We have in another case discussed at some kngth how modern penology leans less towards death penalty and the winds of criminological change blow over Indian statutory thought.

While murder in its aggravated for.m and in the absence of extenuating factors connected with crime, criminal or legal process, still is condignly visited with death penalty, a compassionate alternative of life imprisonment in all other circumstances is gaining judicial ground. Taking an overall view of forensic clemency we modify the death sentence and direct the appellant to uffer imprisonment for life.

P.B.R.

Appeal allowed in part.

RAGHUBIR SINGH

STATE OF HARYANA

V. R. KRISHNA IYER

R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.

Nuruddin Ahmed

S. K. Mehta

Gautam Goswami

R. N. Sachthey

KRISHNA IYER

s. 201

I.P.C

Raghubir Singh

Gorior

Rajasthan

Sharma

Kailashw'ati

Sushma Thomas

Prurient Raghubir

Raghubir

June 6, 1971

Sharma

23rd May, 1972


BANW ARI DASS

SUMMER CHAND AND ORS.

February 13, 1974 (V. R. KRIS8NA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.j

Delhi Muncipal COrporation Act, 1951-Ss. 17 and 19-Scope of-Words and phrases-Meaning of 'have been' and being'-Recrimimnion-Eltction- Petirion to declare election void and to declare the petitioner elected-Returned candidate if can plead that petitioner was guilty of corrupt practire.

The appellant and the respondent contested election to' a ward in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi in which the appe1lant was declared elected.

Respondent no. 1 filed an election petition challenging the appellant's election on the grouhd of corrupt practice and prayed that he be declared duly elected under s. 19(l)(c) of the Corporation Act.. The appellant on the other band contended that since the respondent was guilty of corrupt practices be had become disentitled to be declared elected. The Election Tribunal held that the appellant was not entitled to raise such a plea. On appeal lhe High Court held that in the absence of a specific rrovision in the Corporation Act corre!iponding to s. 97 of the Representation o People Act, 1951 the returned. candidate was not entitled to recriminate on the grounds contained in s. 17 of the Corporation Act.

Section 9(1) (d) of the Corporation Act enacts that a 'person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a councillor, or alderman if he has, in proccediitgs for questioning the validity or regularity of an election. been found to /la1•e bee11 guilty of any corrupt practice ..• Section 17 enacts 1he grounds on which the election could be deClared void. One of such grounds in s. 17( 1) (a) is that "on the date of his election a returned candidate was not qualified or was disqualified to be chosen as a councillor." ·

On the question whether in an election petition under the Act for getting an election declared \'Oid and for a further declaration that the petitioner himself had been duly elected, the returned candidate is entitled to plead and prove that the petitioner .was guilty of corrupt practice in the .election in question, and was therefore not entitled to be declared as duly elected, Dismissing the appeal to this Court, Hr10 : ( 1} There is no provisiOn in the Corporation Act corresponding to s. 97 of the Representation of People Act expressly giving a riaht of recrimination to the returned candidate. The effect of th! word "being" in the opening sentence of s.9( 1) appears to have been largely off-set Uy the use of the wors "to have been guilty" in cl.(d). The meaning of the phrase "have been". ts "immediately prior to a specific time''. If the phrase "found to have .beei:i guQty" in s.9(1)(d) is construed in the context of cl._(a) of s.17(1), then It will mean

"found to have been guilty at t/le time of election, and immdiately preceding the election." The .right o recriminate cannot be legitimately spc4ed !>ut of s._9(1)(d) without doing violence to its language or .unduly stretching 1t.

[364 F]

(2) The inquiry of. , the .Dis.trit Judge, w.o is. th~ cfoction tribunal, at the trial of an election petition 1s hm1ted to the 1nvesttga!1on of those matters on!Y \Vhich will enable hin1 to make theorders specified in s.19(1). But where m a composite petition relief _is claimed t.hat. the petioner e d~Jare~ elcted in place (Ii the; returned candidate, the D1stnct Judge ts t~ 1nvest1~te if either of the two conditions for the grant of a further declaration specttied 10 s.19(2). is made ouf namely: (a) "-'hether in fact the petitioni:r received a maiority r~~ tile valiJ votes, or (b) whether the pet.itioner WO!Jl~ have but fo, r tbe votes obtained by the returned candidate, obta1ne~ a ma1onty f the valtd vte&. , In such a composite position apart from rebutting the allegations mad~ against h1b' in the petition all that the returned candidate can further shew is that t e

BANWARI PASS v. SUMMER CHAND (Sarkaria, !.) 359

petitioner did not in fact receive the majority of valid votes and is therefore, not entitled to the further declaration of his due election. In the absence of a provision specifically conferring such a right, the returned candidate cannot alJege and prove further that even if the petitioner had obtained a majority of valid 'Votes, he could not be granted the declaration of his due election because he had committed corrupt practices.

Such plea and proof will, in reality, be in the nature of a counterattack, not necessary for legitimate defence.

[365 C]

(3) In the light of the we11-established principles the court cannOt bridge the gap or supply this apparent omission in the Corporation Act with rgard to a returned candidate's claim to recriminate, by importing principles of common law or equity, the maxim casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris relinqitur being in-applicable to the construction of election statutes.

A right to file an election petition or a recriminatory petition being a mere creature of statute, unkno"'n to common law, the appellant, in the absence of a clear statutory provision, is not entitled to recnminate on any of the grounds mentioned in s. 17.

[366 D]

(b) If the failure to comply strictly with the requirements of a statutory provision as to recrimination precludes the returned candidate from rccriminat ing. a fortiori, in the absence of such a statutory provision in an election law, the returned candidate has no right to recriminate.

[367 DJ

P. Malai Chami v. M. Andi Ambalas & Ors. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2077 and labar Singh v. Genda Lal [1964]6 S.C.R. 54, followed.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 893 of 1973.

From the judgment and order dated the 18th April, 1973 of the Delhi High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 289 of 1972.

L. M. Sinhvi, S. S. Dhanduja and K. B. Rohatgi, for the appellant.

E ._

0. P. Malhotra, Sat Pal, K. N. Sehgal and N. S. Das Behl, for respondent No. 1.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SARKARIA, J. The principal question that falls to be determined in this appeal on certificate, is : whether in an election petition under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (for short, the Corporation Act), for getting an election declared void and for a further declaration that the petitioner himself had been duly elected, the returned .candidate is entitled to plead and prove that the petitioner was guilty of corrupt practice in the election in question, and was therefore not entitled to be declared as duly elected ?

The material facts bearing on this question may now be stated :

The elections to the Delhi Municipal Corporation were held on May 2, 1973. Appellant, Benarsi Dass and Sumer Chand, Respondent 1 and others contested the election fteim Ward No. 51. The appellant secured 3974 valid votes as against 3882 valid votes obtained. by Respondent 1. The appellant was declared duly elected.

. Respondent 1 filed an election petition under s. 15 of the Corporatton Act. beore th~ Election Tribunal (District Judge)_ to challenge

he electron mter ali~ ?n the ground of corrupt practices particularised

m para 9 o~ the petition. Apart from getting the election of the returned candidate declared void, the election-petitioner prayed that he

be declared duly elected to the Municipal Corporation under s. 19 ( 1) ( c) of the Corporation Act.

In his written statement, the Returned Candidate raised some preliminary objections (which have not been pressed before us) and traversed the allegations in the election petition. He further pleaded under the caption "Additional Pleas" that since the petitioner was guilty of the corrupt practices, particularised in the written statement, he .bad become disentitled to be declared elected.

The District Judge held that the appellant was not entitled to plead and prove in reply to the election petition that the petitioner was also guilty of corrupt practices. To impugn those orders of the District Judge, the appellant moved the High Court by a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge who tried the application negatived the contentlbn of the appellant and dismissed the writ application with these observations :-

"The petitioner may show that the Respondent No. 1 did not obtain a majority of valid votes. This is the legitimate defence. But he cannot go further and show that even if the Respondent No. 1 has obtained a majority of votes, the Respondent No. 1 is not entitled to be declared to be duly elected candidate because he committed corrupt practices. An election petition to declare the election of a returned candidate void lies only when the election is notified and published under s. 14 of the Act. Since the election of the Respondent No. 1 has not been so published under section 14 of the Act, the petitioner does not have the right to challenge, it by proving corrupt practices against Respondent No. l ".

Aggrieved, the appellant carried an appeal under cl. 10 of the Letters Patent to the Division Bench of the High Court. The Bench dismissed the appeal holding that in the absence of a specific provision in the Corporation Act corresponding to s. 97 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Returned Candidate is not entitled to recriminate on th!Vgrounds contained in s. 1 7 of the Corporation Act. It was noticed that if at all there was a conscious omission in the Corporation Act, about the Returned Candidate's right to recri!!.J.inate, the Court was not empowered to supply that omission.

The High Court, however, granted the certificate under Article 133(1) of the Constitution.

Hence this appeal.

According to the relevant statutory provisions in Chapter Ir of the Corporation Act, the Councillors are chosen by direct election on the basis of adult suffrage from various wards into which Delhi has been divided.

The normal term of office of a Councillor is four years Crom the date of publication Qf the result of his election.

The persons entitled to vote at election of Councillors are the persons registered, by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1950 as voters at elections to the House of the People for the area comprised in a ward.

BANWAIU DASS v. SUMMER CHAND (Sarkaria, /.)

According to section 8 :

"a person shall not be qualified to be chosen as a Couacillor unless his name is registered as an elector in the electoral roll for a ward''.

Section 9 lays down disqualifications for membership of Corporation. Its material part reads :

"9(1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as. and for being, a councillor, or alderman--

( a) to (c) x x x

(d) if he has, in proceedings for questioning the validity or regularity of an election, been found to have been guilty of-

(i) any corrupt practice, or

(ii) any offence punishable under section 171E or section l 71F of the Indian Penal Code or any offence punishable under section 29 or clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 30 of this Act, unless a period of five years has elapsed since the date of the finding or the disqualification has been removed either retrospectively or prospectively by the Central Government

(e) to (1) x x

K Section 14 enjoins that the names of all persons elected as councillors or aldermen shall, as soon as may be, after such election, be published by the Commissionedn the Official Gazette. Sections 15 to 21 relate to disputes regarding elections. The mandate of s. 15 (1) is that no election of a councillor or alderman shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to the court of District Judge, Delhi within 15 .days from the date of the publication of the result of F the election under s. 14. Sub-s. (2) provides :

"An election petition calling in question any such election may be presented on one or more of the. grounds specified in section 17-

(a) by any candidate at such election

(b) (i) in the case of an election of a Councillor, by an eleetor of the ward concerned;

. (ii) in the case of an election of an alderman, by any councillor."

Its sub-section ( 4) requires that :

H "An election petition-

( a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies;

(a) shall, with sµfficient particulars, set forth the ground . or grounds on which the election is called in question; and

( c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the mauner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure l 908, for the verification of pleadings."

The relief that may be claimed by the petitioner is indicated ia s.

B . 16(1) which says:

"A petitioner may claim-

(a) a declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidates is void, and

(b) in. addition thereto, a further declaration that he him- C self or any other _candidate has been duly elected."

Section 17 indicates the grounds on which an election can be declared void. One of such grounds vide clause (a) of s. 17 (I) is "that on the date of his election a returned candidate was not qualified or was disqualified, to be chosen as a councillor or, as the case may be, as an alderman under this Act". Another ground in clause (b) is of corrupt D practices committed by a returned candidate or his agent or other person with his eonsent. Section 18 applies the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the trial and disposal of an election petition "as far as it can be made applicable". Section 19 enumerates ti e nature of orders which the District Judge can make at the coni:lusion of the trial of an election petition. It reads : ·

"19 ( 1) At the coi,:iclusion of the trial of an election petition, the court of the District Judge shall make an order-

(a) dismissing the election petition; or

(h) declaring the election of all or JUIY of the returned candidates to be void; or ·

( c) declaring the election of all or any of the returned candidates to be void and the petitioner and any other caadidate to have been duly elected.

(2) If any person who has filed an election petition has, in additiori to calling in question the election of the returned candidate, claimed . declaration that he himself or any other candidate hlll! been duly elected and the court of the district judge is of opinio, n- ( a) that in fact the petitioner or such other candidate received a majority of the valid votes, or .

(b) that but for the votes obtained by the returned candidate the petitjoner or such other candidate would have ob- H tained a majority of the valid votes, the court shall, after declaring the election of the returned candidate to be void, de-

A clare the petitioner or such other candidate, as the case may be, to have been duly elected."

Section 21 says :

"(!) An order of the court of the district judge on an election petition shall be final and conclusive.

(2) An election of a councillor or an alderman not called in question in accordance with the foregoing provisions shall be deemed to be good and valid election."

The provisions of ss. 9,15(1), 16(1), 17(1), 19(1), 19(2) of the Corporation Act are more or less parallel to those in Sections 9A, 18, 84, 101, 98 and 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for Short the People Act) respectively. It will be seen that a provision corresponding to s. 97 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 is conspicuous by its absenoe from the Corporation Act, though the latter enactment was placed on the statute book in 1957.

Dr. Singhvi, learned Counsel for the appellant, vehemently contends that a right to plead and prove thai the election-petitioner himself was guilty of corrupt practice and, as such, was disqualified to be declared to have been duly elected has been given by s. 9(1) (b) of the Corporation Act to the returned candidate. Section 9, it h mabtained, applies to all stages of an election petition, and, if at the time of granting relief in an election petition, a returned candidate can show that the petitioner had committed corrupt practices in the election in question, then the colirt will not grant him the declaration that he has been duly elected. Stress has been laid on the word 'being' in section 9 ( 1) (b) . Learned Counsel further maintains that in interpreting the provisions of the Corporation Act, two principles have to be kept in view. The first is ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy). The argument is that once it is conceded that th~ returned candidate has a right to plead that the petitioner had incurred any of the disqualifications enumerated in s. 9, he cannot be debarred from leading evidence to substantiate that plea. It is contended that if the returned candidate is not permitted to lead evidence to establish such a counter-allegation, in defence, to a composite election petition of this nature, he will be leftwithout any remedy because s. 21(1) will make the order of the District Judge in the petition final and conclusive, while sub-s.(2) of the same section will bar any other procedure for impeaching the election of the election-petitioner on the ground that he has committed a corrupt practice. It is added the remedy provided ins. 33 will also be not open to the returned candidate after the decision of the election petition. In any case, the remedy in s. 3.3 (3) is too circuitous illusory and inadequate. '

The second principle relied on by the Counsel is the Mischi<i Rule as enunciated in Heydon's case(1), that the court should make such H construction as shall suppress the mischief,. and advance the remedy.

The main object of these statutory provisions, it is urged, is to ensure

(1) (1584) 3 Co. Rep. J

purity of the elections, and if the returned candidate is not allowed to A expose the corrupt practices committed by the election-petitioner, himself, it would defeat that object of the statute.

The other grounds of appeal have not been pressed before us.

Mr. 0. P. Malhotra, learned Counsel for the respondents, submits that in clause (d) of s. 9(1), the words "to have been" read together with clause (a) of s. 17(1) put it beyond doubt that this particular disqualification must have been incurred or in existence at the date of the poll or election. The plea sought to be established by the returned candidate, according to the Counsel, is a plea of recrimination, and the Corporation Act does not contain any provision analogous to s. 97 of the People Act, giving him such a right. The only remedy of the returned candidate, says the Counsel, is to avail of the machinery of s. 33(3).

In approaching the matter under consideration, we must first appreciate the true nature of the plea set up by the returned candidate.

What the appellant seeks is in substance, a right to give evidence to prove that the election of the election-petitioner would have been void on account of corrupt practices committed by him in the election, if he had. been the returned candidate and a petition had been presented calling in question his election. Although Dr. Singhvi is reluct; mt to style this plea as one of recrimination, the nature of the plea or the right claimed is too obvious to be concealed. To all intents and purposes, it is a plea of recrimination of the type mentioned in s. 97 of the People Act, 1951. It is in the nature of a counter-petition Qn , the ground of corrupt practices under clause (b) of s. 17 ( 1) and not on' the ground of the petition-or being disqualified at the date of the election, which is a distinct and separate ground under clause (a) of s. 17(1).

There is no provision in the Corporation Act corresponding to s. 97 of the People Act, expressly giving a right of recrimination lo the returned candidate. The question therefore, is; Can such a right be legitimately spelled out of s.9(1) (d)? The entire argument of Dr. Singhvi . has been built upon the edifice of the word "being" in the opening sentence of s.9(1). But the effect.of the word "being" appears to have been largely off'set by the use of the words "to have been guilty" in clause (d). Stroud's Judicial Dictionary P.'.ves the meaning of the phrase "have been'' as "immediately prior to~ specific time". In Re storie,(1) a scheme for the management of the Charity declared that the boys should be chosen from those boys "who shall have been three years at the Free School". A complaint was made that an undue election had been made. On appeal, Lord Justices Knight Bruce and Turner, construing the scheme, held that only those boys were eligible "who fwd been three years at the school at the time of, and immediately preceding the election". (Emphasis supplied).

In tho instant case, also, if the phrase "found to have b..""en guilty" in s.9(1)(d) is construed in the context of clause(a) of s.17(1), then

(I) (IS6t) 30, L. J. Ch. 193;

E ·'

' '

on the analogy o( Re Storie, it will mean "found to have been guilty at 1he 1i111e of the e/ec1io11, and immediately preceding the election".

Thus a right to recriminate cannot be legitimately spelled out of s. 9( 1) ( d) without doing violence to its language or unduly stretching it.

The above interpretation fits better in the general scheme of the Corporation Act.

As will be apparent from s.19, quoted earlier, the tribunal i.e. the District Judge can pass only three kinds of final orders indicated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of that section.

The District Judge's inquiry at the trial of an election petition is, rherefore, limited to the investigation of those matters only which will enable

him to make the orders specified in s.19(1). But, where in a composite petition, like the one in the present case, relief is claimed that the petitioner be declared elected in place of the returned candidate, the District Judge is to investigate if either of the two conditions for the grant of a further declaration, specified ins. 19(2) is made out. That is to say, he has to confine his enquiry to the determination of either of these two questions namely : (a) whether in fact the petitioner received a majority of the valid votes, or (b) whether the petitioner would have but for the votes obtained by the returned candidate, obtaind a majority of the valid votes. Rule 68 (I) of the Rules framed under the Corporation Act, defines 'valid vote' as "every ballot paper which is not rejected under Rule 67 shall be counted as one valid vote". The concept of validity of votes is different from that of corrupt practices defined in s. 22 on the basis of which an election petition can be instituted. In such a composite petition, apart from rebutting the allegations made against him in the petition, all that the returned candidate can further show is that the petitioner did not in fact receive the majority of valid votes and is therefore, not entitled to the further declaration of his due election.

Jn the absence of a provision specifically conferring such a right, the returned candidate cannot allege and prove further that even if the petitioner had obtained a majority of valid votes, he could not be granted the declaration of his due election because ho had committed corrupt practices. Such plea and proof will, in reality, be in the nattKe of a counter-attack, not necessary for legitimate defence.

Having seen that there is no provision in the Corporation Act which specifically or by inevitable implication gives to a returned candidate a right to recriminate. the further question to be determined is : Whether the court is competent to provide this casus. omissus by invoking the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium or Mischief Rule or other principles of common law ? ·

It. appears to us that the answer to this question must be in the negative.

This Court has repeatedly held that 'an election cont<'t is not an action at law or a suit in equity but a purely statutory pr<Y".eeding unknown to comr_n!'n law and te court possesses no. common Jaw powers.' Statutory provts1ons of election law are to be stnctly construed and its requirement strictly observed. In P. Malai Chami v. M. AndiAmbalam and ors.,(') this Court speaking through Alagiriswami J., again pointed out:

(I\ A. I .. R. 1973 S. C. 2077. 1 l-L954Sup.Cf/74

"Courts in general are averse to allow justice to be defeated on a mere technicality. But in deciding an election petition, the High Court is merely a tribunal deciding an election dispute.

Its powers are wholly the creature of the statute under which it is conferred the power to h.ear election-petitions."

It must be remembered-to use the oft-quoted words of Grover /. in Taunton's ca.\'e( 1)-

"that although the object of the statute by which the election tribunals were created was to prevent corrupt practices, still the tribunal is a judicial, and not an inquisitorial one, it is a. court to hear and determine according to law, and not a commission armed with powers to enquire into and suppress corruption." In the light of these well-established principles, it is clear that the court cannot bridge the gap or supply this apparent omission in the Corporation Act with regard to a returned candidate's claim to recriminate, by importing principles of common law or equity, the maxim casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur being inapplicable to the construction of election statutes. A right to file an election petition or a recriminatory petition which, in substance, is a counter-election-petition, being the mere creature of statute, unknown to common law, the appellant, in the absence of a clear statutory provision, is not entitled to recriminate on any of the grounds mentioned in section 17-_ . -- We do not think it necessary to notice all the authorities cited at the bar or to dilate on this point further. We will close the discussion by referring to labar Singh v. Genda Lal('), wherein Gajendragadkar C.J. clarified the nature of the right of recrimination thns :

"There are, however, cases in which the eledtion petition makes a double claim; it claims that the election of the returned candidate is void, and also asks for a declaration that the petitioner himself or some other person has been duly elected. It is in regard to such a composite case that s. 100 as well as s. 101 would apply, and it is in respect of the additional claim for a declaration that some other candidate bas been duly elected that s. 97 comes into play. Section 97 (1) thus allows the returned candidate to recriminate and. raise pleas in support of his case that the other person i~: whose favour a declaration is claimed by the petition cannot be said to be validly elected, and these wold be pleas of a.ttack and it would be open to the returned candidate to take these pleas, because when he recriminates, he really becomes a counterpetitioner challenging the validity of the election of the alternative candidate. The result of s. 97 (1), therefore, is that 1i1 dealing with a composite election petition, the Tribunal enquires into not only the case made out by the petitioner, but also the -"(!) 20 M & H. p. 74.

(2) [t96l] ~' S. C.R. 54

counter-claim made by the returned candidate. That being the nature of the proceedings contemplated by s. 97 (1), it is not surprising that the returned candidate is required to make his recrimination and serve notice in that behalf in the manner and within the time specified bys. 97(1) proviso and s.97(2).

If the returned candidate does not recriminate as required by s. 91, then he cannot make any attack against the alternative claim made by the petition. In such a case, an enquiry would be held under s. 100 so far as the validity of the returned candidate's election is concerned, and if as a result of the said enquiry a declaration is made that the election of the returned candidaie is void, then the Tribunal will proceed to deal with alternative claim, but in doing so, the returned candidate will not be allowed to lead any evidence because he is precluded from raising any pleas against the validity of the claim of the alternative candidate." (emphasis supplied)

Although the above observations were made in a case. under the People Act, but the principle enunciated therein applies with greater force to the problem in hand. If the failure to comply strictly, with the requirements of a statutory provision as to recrimination, precludes the returned candidate from recriminating, a fortiori, in the absence of such a statutory provision in an election law, the returned candidate has no right to recriminate.

For the foregoing reasons, we would affirm the view taken by the Division Bench of"the High Court in regard to the returned candidate's claim to recriminate.

Before parting with this judgment, we will like to emphasise the desirability of making a clear provision, corresponding to s. 97 of the People Act, 19 51 in the Corporation Act specifically conferring a right of recrimination on the returned candidate in an election-petition in which the petitioner, in addition to getting the election of the returned candidate declared void, seeks a further declaration that he or some other candidate has been duly elected. One of the primary objects of these provisions relating to corrupt practices, is to ensure purity of the elections. If corrupt practices committed by the returned candidate are abhorrent to that object, so are the corrupt practices indulged in by the petitioner or any other candidate and his agent in favour of whom the further declaration of the doe election is claimed, What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. According to the learned Counsel for the Respondent, the returned candidate would be entitled to get the petitioner disqualified by moving the Commissioner under s. 33 which inter alia provides that "if any question arises as to whether a councillor or an alderman has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in s. 9, the Commissioner shall refer the question to the District Judge of Delhi for his decision and the decision of the District Judge shall be final. Assuming-not holding-that s. 33 provides for

impeaching the election of a candidate declared duly elected under s. 19 (I) ( c), on the ground of corrupt practices committed by him, the remedy provided appears to be cumbersome, circuitous and dialtory involving multiplicity of proceedings. The duplication of judicial proceedings by compelling the aggrieved petitioner to start a fresh challenge against the respondent after the formality of his being made councillor is published, not only defeats the object of an early determination regarding the purity of the election but also renders the proceeding ineffective for the very reason of the long delay. Again, tbe time that may be taken for the reference to the District Judge under .s. 33 and the time consumed for the preliminaries before a trial begins or gains momentum can all be eliminated if there is provision, as in the Peoples'

Rcpresenttion Act, for recrimination.

We express the hope that the Commissioner, in the evtnt of a challenge being made to the respondent's election on the ground of corruption, will not delay a reference to the District Judge wh0 certainly will go into the legal and factual questions involved on which we pronounce no opinion.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

P.B.R.

Ap, eal dismissed.

BANW ARI DASS

SUMMER CHAND AND ORS

1974 (V. R. KRIS8NA IYER

R. S. SARKARIA, JJ

Delhi Muncipal COrporation Act, 1951

Ss. 17 and 19

s. 19(l)(c)

s. 97

Representation o People Act, 1951

s. 17

Section 9(1)

Section 17

s. 17( 1)

is no provisiOn in the Corporation Act

s. 97

s.9( 1)

s. 17

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

L. M. Sinhvi

S. S. Dhanduja

K. B. Rohatgi

P. Malhotra

Sat Pal

K. N. Sehgal

N. S. Das Behl

SARKARIA

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957

Delhi Municipal Corporation

May 2, 1973

Benarsi Dass

Sumer Chand

s. 15

s. 19

Article 226

s. 14

section 14

cl. 10

s. 97

Representation of the People Act, 1951

s. 1

Article 133(1)

section 8

Section 9

section 171E

Indian Penal Code

section 29

section 30

Central Government

Section 14

Sections 15 to 21

s. 15

District Judge, Delhi

s. 14

section 17

the Code of Civil Procedure

Section 17

s. 17

Section 18

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Section 19

Section 21

ss. 9

Sections 9A, 18, 84, 101, 98 and 100

Representation of the People Act, 1951

Short the People Act

s. 97

Representation of the People Act, 1951

Singhvi

s. 9(1)

Section 9

section 9

s. 9

s. 21(1)

s. 3

Heydon

0. P. Malhotra

s. 9(1)

s. 17(1)

s. 97

s. 33(3)

s. 97

People Act, 1951

s. 17

s. 17(1)

is no provision in the Corporation Act

s. 97

Stroud

Knight Bruce

Turner

s. 9( 1)

s. 22

Alagiriswami

Grover

Taunton

section 17

Gajendragadkar

s. 100

s. 101

s. 97

Section 97

s. 97

s. 97

s. 91

s. 100

s. 97

s. 33

s. 9

District Judge of Delhi

s. 33

s. 19

s. 33