SOM PARKASH

STATE OF DELHI

January 25, 1974

[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ. ')

Preventwn of Corrupt/011 Act, 1947_,.S(l)(d) and S(Z)-Whether trapping of co"upt officials q polluted procedure-Whether inlestigating officers a suspect specles-

WhetMr chemical test reliable.

The appellant, an Inspector of Central Excise, was charged under s.161, I.P.C. and S.S(l)(d) read with s.5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Ac~ 1947for having acoepted a bribe. He was convicted and sentenced by the Special ]udge. Tho High Court confirmed the conviction but reduced the sentence to one year's imprf .. sonment.

Th~ allegation against the appellant was that he accepted a sum of Rs. SO/- as iilegal gratification, At the instance of the complainant the raiding police party passed on to the appellant currencr notes. worth Rs. 50 smeared with a chemical substance. On recovery of the money from his pocket traces of the chemical subs. tance were found n his fingers his kerchief and his trouser pocket.

It was contended (i) that trapping of corrupt officials in the usual course is a pot .. luted procedure (ii) the investigating officers arc a susp.ect species and (iii) the chemical test was not reliable.

Dismissing the appeal to this Court, HELD: It is not possible to accede to the theory that the trapping of corrupt officials in the usual course is a pol1uted procedure. Our social milieu is so vitiated by a superstitious belief that any official can be activised by illegal gratification, so confidential is the technique of giye and take in which the white.collar offender is an adept and so tough is the forensic problem of proof beyond reasonable doubt by good testimony in this area that the only hope of tracking down the tricky officers is by lying traps and creating statutory presumptions. Condemn2tion of all traps and associate witnesses is neither pragrnatic nor just. nor is it. fair to denounce -all public servants indiscriminately. Judjcial attitudes have to be discriminating. An awk'ard judicial conscience and an alert critical appraisal are the best tools in this process.

[202 G; 203 A]

(ii) Courts are aware of the exaggerated criticisms of the police force as a whole and of the reluctance of the framers of the Criminal Procedure Code to trust state .. ments recorded by police investigators, but these are, partly at least, the hangover of the British past. Today trust begets trust and the higher officers of the Jildian police, especially in the Special Police Establishment, deserve better credence. [203 DE]

(iii) The evidence furnished b~ norganic chemistry often outwits the technology of corrupt officials, provided no aiternative reasonable possibility is made out. It is but meet that science-oriented detection of crime is made a massive programme of police work, for in our technological age nothing more primitive can be conceived of than denying the discoveries of the sciences as aids to crime suppression and nothing cruder can retard forensic efficiency than swearing by traditional oral evidence only thereby discouraging liberal use of scientific research to prove guilt. {204 EJ

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 143 of 1970.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 31st October, 1969 of the Delhi High Court at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 70 of 1967.

The appellant appeared in person.

H. R. Khanna and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KRISHNA IYER J. The appellant, a quondam inspector of Central Excise, has argued his case with perspicacity and plausibility, taking liberal advantage of our solicitude for giving this lay man a lengthy hearing. The charge broadly stated, is one of corruption falling under s.161,1.P.C. ands. 5(J)(d), read with s.5(2), of the prevenion of Corruption Act, 1947 ; the proof of guilt is built on a trap laid by the Special police Establishment, apparantly clinched by processes of chemical detection ; and the uphill task of the accused is to challenge in this Court, under art. 136, the concurrent findings upholding his culpability. Undaunted he has attempted to explain the incriminating evidence with adroitness worthy of a better cause and has taken us critically through the testimony of the P. W.s in an effort to substantiate a credible case for his exculpation.

Now, the story, P, W. 1, a young man in his late twenties, had started a small factory in Shadara, called Uma Engineering Corporation, for making insulated copper cables, around June, 1965., The whole process, except fitting the rubber insulation, was done m his premises and for this latter purpose the semi-finished goods used to be taken to another factory in Delhi. Insulated coils being dutiable articles, the Excise authorities had to issue gate passes for removal of even half finished items. According to a certain practice that prevailed till a little before the alleged commission of the offe11ce, when the article was not fully manufactured, its removal for the completion of the process was permitted without levy of duty in advance and gate passes were issued on this basis. However. this was a doubtful procedure and the accused did insist, at a certain stage, tha:t even removal for further processing was permissible only on payment of duty, thus antagonising P. W. I and hampering his business. Eventually. the Assistant Collector, as per Exhibit D-1, upheld the accuS.d's standand directed duty paid clearance or adherence to the system of bounds for payment later, according to r. 56 A of the relevant rules.

Apart from this, even duty paid finished goods could not leave the factory premises before a proforma ( c.J. Ex. D-2) was filled in, verified by the Excise inspector and signed by him. The embryonic industrialist, P., W. 1, when faced with the insistence on duty payment madeci>ntact> with the accused and was asked to initiate himself into the magical

means of getting things done through monthly payments of Rs. l 00/· as "speed money". Being too virgin for this way to prosperity, P.W. I reacted by making a bee 'line to Sri Waswani, the Deputy Superintendent, Central Excise, with little benefit. Again, on August 4, 1965, he met the accused for getting him to verify the statement of manufac.tured goods to pay the duty thereon, but was turned' back, the softening sum of Rs. 100/- not having been offered.

We now move to the critical phase, On August 6, 1965, P. W. 1 goes to the office of the accused to get clearance of 2 finished bundles of cables. The demand for money is repeated but by this time P. W. 1 acquires skill in courtship and bargains for a smaller sum of Rs. 501 .

Whereupon the accused signs the challan for the deposit of the excise duty on these finished products (vide Ex. P. 4). The bribe,

according to the understanding, is fixed to be paid next day in the afternoon. At this stage, P. W. 1 changes his mind and discloses his bosom to the S. P. E. Officers the next morning at Kotah House \Ex. P. 5).. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, P. W. 7, swings rnto action with professional p; oficiency. Two officials, P. W. 3 and P. W. 4, from two different omces, are fixed up to witness the search, the programme of trapping is finalised and dramatised, the signal and other details worked out, the 5 currency notes making up Rs. 50/- smeared with phenolphthalein powder and the visible chemical reaction when even small particles thereof are dipped in sodium carborate solution demonstrated. The "raiding party" troops out after these preliminery operation are put down in Ex. P. 6.

Now the scene shifts to the factory. The accused arrives, coca cola is served, the treacherous notes are passed and put into his gulltble pockets by the unsuspecting accused, and then the sequence of rap on the door, the police presence, the surrender by the startled appellant of the tell-tale currency, his hands, kerchief and inner Ii.Ding of the trouser pocket betray him when. dipped in acidic solut.10n and the game is up. Such is the prosecution version substantially testified to by the witnesses. The inexorable course of the law takes the accused to the special Judge who convicts him, the High Court affirms the gulit but reduces the sentence to one year's imprisonment.

The arguments in this Court, if confined to facts only under art.

I 36, have as much chance as the proverbial camel through the eye of a needle. The power, extraordinary in amplitude but exceptional in its exercise, goes into action only to avert miscarriage of justice and rarely operates to undo concurrent findings of fact, if perversity is not present.

Yet, the contentions have been ingeniously and hopefully presented.

The basic attack has been on the morally murky mechanism of criminal trap. Who has not-our legends say, even rishis have-succumbed to attractive temptation in loneliness laid ? And courts have frowned upon evidence procured by such experiments since the participents are prone to be over-anxious and under-accrupulous and the victims are caught morally unawares. Even so, there are traps and traps.

Where you intercept the natural course of the corrupt stream by setting an invisible contraption, its ethics is above board. On the contrary, to test the moral fibre of an officer whose reputation is suspect, if you Jay a crime mine which explodes when he, in 3. weak moment, walks on it the whole scheme is tainted. Of course, our social milieu is so vitiated by a superstitious belief that any official can be activised by illegal gratification, so confidential is the technique of give and take ii\ which the white collor offender is adept and so tough is the forensic problem of proof beyond reasonable doubt by good testimony in this area, that the only hope of tracking down the tricky officers is by laying traps and creating statutory presumptions. Even Kautilya has stated that "just as fish moving under water cannot possibly be found out either as drinking or not drinking water so government servants cannot be found out while taking money." Ex-cathedra condemnation

of all traps and associate witnesses is neither pragmatic nor just, nor is it fair to denounce all public servants indiscriminately. Judicial attitudes ha'e to be discriminating, as has happened in this case. The High Court has, after careful study, chosen to accept the bona ./ides of the trap and its author Bishnoi, a senior police official of the S.P.E

(P. W. 7).

We cannot accede to the theory that the trapping of corrupt officials, in the usual course. is a polluted procedure.

The appellant has cited decisions in support of his plea that traps are tainted and trap witnesses are unworthy. The rulings do not go so far and merely indicate the need for caution and corroboration depending on the circumstances of each case. An awakened judicial c0nscience and an alert critical appraisal are the best tools in this pro-· cess.

The appellant's general denunciation of investigating officers as a suspect species also ill merits acceptence. The demanding degree of proof traditionally required in a criminal case and the devaluation suffered by a witness who is naturally involved in the fruits of his investi gati\e efforts, suggest the legitimate search for corroboration from an independent or unfaltering source-human or circumstantial to make judicial cortitude doubly sure. Not that this approach casts any pejorative retlection on the police officer's integrity, but that the hazard of holding a man guilty on interested, even if honest, evidence may impair confidence in the system of justice. We are aware of the exaggerated criticisms of the police force as a whole and of the reluctance of the framers of the Criminal Procedure Code to trust statements recorded by police investigators bµt these are, partly at least, the hangover of the British past. To-day, trust begets trust and the higher officers of the Indian Police, especially in the Special Police Establishment deserve better credence. We are certainly inclined not to swallow the evidence of P Ws. 7 and 8 without scrutiny but after having heard the appellant at length, we are prepared to agree with the High Court that the evidence of P.Ws.7 and 8 are substantially correct.

Even here, we must underscore the importance of the findings of the trap e\periment, since they go a long way to underwrite the veracity of the prosecution story.

Before considering this facet of the case, we may as well brietly refer to P. Ws. I, 3 and 4. P.W. I is the main medium for the bribe ;; iving. He admittedly has animus against the accused. His station in life does not di>pel suspicion and so we have to be sceptical. His deposition has been read again before us and nothing to brand him a liar has come out. Were the case to hang on his single testimony the fate of the case might have been different. There was P. 'W. 4 who' deposed to the receipt and pocketing of the tainted notes by the appellant. Before us it has been argued with vehamence that P. W. 4

was not creditworthy as on one or two previous occasions also he was joined. by the police 'to witness such traps, that his house itself was searched by the C.B I., and that he contradicts the other witnesses in respect of some facts. These points were canvassed .before the courts below and were found, for good reaons, of no coMequence in 1ffecting the veracity of his testimony. P. W. 4 was a gazetted officer

fo another department, not chosen by P. W. 7, but directed to go by 'his boss to attend the trap. True, his house was raided but this was done

long after the occurrence, and by another wing of the C. B. I. His presence, in the room, at the time of the alleged passing of the money by Om Prakash wa~ admitted by the appellant. P. W. 4 had no animus against the appellant, nor any acquintance. much less affinity with Om Parkash. No mortal attach on the integrity or probability of the testimony of P. W. 4-none that will warrant the subversion of the conclusion reached by the courts below-has been succe3sfully made.

The evidence of P. W. 4 coupled with that of P. W. I, was itself sufficient to establish the acceptance. of the tainted currency notes by the appellant from Om Prakash, which was a pivotal fact of the prosecution case.

Then, there was the evidence of P. W. 3, apart from that of the pcilice efficers.

But the outstanding circumstances, most damaging to the accused, flow from the trap. The rival case of the accused is that no money was given to him but P. W. I, who had to make good his story. placed the notes on the chair and pretended to the police that he bad paid the accused. Of course, the oral evidence of P. Ws. I and 4. by itself, -if believed, as rightly believed by the High Court, proves the passing of 0 the money to the accused and its production by him when challenged by P. W. 7. The fact is indisputable that the hands, the h>ndkerchief and the inner lining of the trouser pocket of the accused turned violet when dipped in soda ash solution. From this the State counsel argues that on no hypothesis except that the notes emerged from the accused' pocket or possession can the triple colour change be accounted for.

The evidence furnished by inorganic chemistry often outwits the techno- E logy of corrupt officials, provided no alternative reasonable possibility is made out. The appellant offers a plausible theory. P. W. I kept the notes with him and his hands thus carried the p<>wder. 'He gave a bottle of coke to the accused and the bottle thus transmitted particles of phenolph-tha.lein to the latter's hands. He (the accused) wiped his face with the kerchief and put it into his trouser pocket thus contaminating the lining with the guilty substance. Moreover, the F inner lining was dipped by P. W. 7 with his hands which had the powder.

Thus, all the three items stand explained, according to him. These Iecondite possibilities and likely freak. have been rejected by both the courts and we are handly persuaded into hostility to that finding It is but meet that science-oriented detection of crime is made a massive programme of police work, for in our technological' age nothing more primitive can be conceived of then den)_'ing the discoveries of the G sciences as aids to crime suppression and nothing cruder can retard forensic efficiency than swearing by traditional oral evidence only thereby disc<iuraging the liberal use of scientific research to prove gllilt.

One submission made by the appellant remains to be noticed.

He urged that after Ex. D-1, no Excise Inspector could ha.'O given the H semi-finished cables free exit and if duty had to be paid nothing was gained by giving the bribe.

Bribes are not charity but shrewd business and therefore the motive for P. W. 1 to pay, linked as it was with

.. ' c

I_ E

SOM PARKASH v. DEL!Il (Krishna Iyer.I.) 205

hope of getting duty-free gate pass, did not exist. This approach has a flaw. Bribes are paid not only to get unlawful things done but to get lawful things done promptly since time means money. He..,, we must remember t_hat gate passes and pro formas have to be signed by the excise inspector, and signatures can carry a price. While_ we do ndt accept generalisation about corruption in the country, we may excerpt a couple of foot-notes from Gunnar Myrdal's "Asian Drama"

only to point out that the modus nperandi of corrupt officials may take the course of accepting money for doing what is lawful more quickly.

We would, however, repeat that we dissociate ourselves from any impression that the book may otherwise give. The foot-notes read :

"The London Times (August 5, 1964) reports : "Many oi these instances of bribery are those in which the citizen pays in order to get what he is entitled to anyway, and some students of Indian affairs have argued that this is a necessary and not harmful lubricant for a cumbersome administration ....•. this corruption is "simply a way that citizens have found of building rewards into the admmistrative structure in the absence of any other appropriate incentive system.".

"As a means of accelerating the sluggish, meandering circulation of a file within a department this might be all very well; but speed money, belying the name, actually has the effect of a brake on adminiFtration, slowing it down even further.

Delay will deliberately be caused in order to invite payment of a bribe to accelerate it again."

In this very case, on the ill-starred day, duty had been fully paid and only his signature to the pro forma had to be appended for which the bribe was sought. We have little hesitation in taking the view that "speed money" is the key to getting lawful things done in good time and "operation signature", be it on a gate pass or a pro forma, can delay the movement of goods, the economics whereof induces investment ir> bribery.

Every pass and pro forma tempts and every discretionary power induces illicit demands, given a declining ethos where giving and taking of illegal gratification is looked upon as an inevitable evil which has wme to stay-more and more inevitable and Jess and less evil, as the habit catches on. Producers depend for their rolling capital on quiclc turn-over which is clogged when forms and passes to be signed by officials are is.ued with purposeful reluctance and official slow motion becomes the signal for use of that paper lubricant which on expanding class of businessmen blessed with dubious morals consider an invisible component of the cost of production and a widening circle of officials gifted with low key consciem:es regard as the unobjectionable art of oking out untaxed additions to their emoluments.

Maybe, this exaggerated version of the sitiiation is but the folklore of corruption but knocks the bottom of the appellant's. plea against motive.

To sum up, we see no good ground to over-turn the factual findings recorded by the trial judge and affirmed on appeal.

The Central Law Commission considering white-collar crime as . a serious menace has made a report on tho subject, and the Senthanan

'Committee ha• much earlier highlighted the dangers in this area.

In this social context judicial severity cannot err on the high side, and we think the "ends of justice" referred to by the High Court for toning down the sentence is perhaps an error on the side of leniency. If at all, intensive efforts to track down bigger corruption must be made ; but courts cannot slow down because bigger criminals are not caught although public morals is boosted better by one big fish being caught in the criminal not. than by a hundred small fry perishing ashore However, since the State has not quarrelled with the reduction of sentence by way of appeal we leave the matter well alone.

The appellant must now surrender to serve the balance term if anv because we dismiss the appeal. - C

P.B.R.

Appeal disn1is5cd.

SOM PARKASH

STATE OF DELHI

January 25, 1974

V. R. KRISHNA IYER

R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.

I.P.C

Jildian police

Delhi High Court at New Delhi

H. R. Khanna

R. N. Sachthey

KRISHNA IYER

Corruption Act, 1947

art. 136

Shadara

Uma Engineering Corporation

Delhi

Waswani

August 4, 1965

August 6, 1965

Kautilya

Bishnoi

S.P.E

C.B I.

Om Prakash

Om Parkash

Gunnar Myrdal

While we do ndt accept generalisation about corruption in the country, we may excerpt a couple of foot-notes from Gunnar Myrdal's "Asian Drama"

only to point out that the modus nperandi of corrupt officials may take the course of accepting money for doing what is lawful more quickly.

August 5, 1964

Central Law Commission


I 207

GENERAL MANAGER, SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY

SECUNDRABAD AND ANR ETC.

A.V.R. SIDDHANTI AND ORS. ETC.

January 30, 1974

[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.]

Constit111ion of India-Art. 14 & 16-Vio/atlon of equal treatment and discrim 1nation.

Since common question of law arise in the these a(>p!als, a comm:>n judg~nt was delivered to dispose of these appeals. The facts 1n C. A. No. 1937/72 are as folJows:- During the last world war, Indian Raily opened grain shops to Supply foo::lgrains at cost priced to its employees througout the country. Slf for this temporary grainshop complex was drawn from 3 different sourccs:-{1) Temporary employees selected through the Joint Selection Commission etci who re initially appointed in the pennanent departments but later transferred to grain shop compleJJ:

(ii) Temporary selected initially for permanent departments but posed straightway in the Grain Shop Department and (iii) Temporary employees recruited from th~ 'Open Market' for the Grain Shop Department. Respondent no. 1 to 9 beloage1 to Category lll.

D After the emergency was over, Railway authorities decided to wind up the grarn shop Department and to absorb its staff in permanent departments of the Railway and accordingly respondent no, 1 to 9 were also absorbed in various departments.

On November 2nd, 1967, th~ Railway Board in partial modification of its earlier proceeding directed that the seniority of temporary Grain Shop Staff consequent on their absorption in the absorbing departments should be regulated on the basis of their date of actual absorption in those departments and not on the basis as if they had been absorbed in those departments right from the beginning of service.

On January 13, 1961, the Railway Board issued a 'clarification' that the seniority of the Grain-Shop staff of category III should be fixed from the date of their absorption

in a JCmlaDCnt dcPartment, irrespective of their length of service in the Grain-Shop Department, with regard to category I, it was laid down that temporary staff who were initially appointed in the permanent department and were then transferred to the Grain Shop dcpartment-\vould not have their seniority affected by their transfer to the Grain Shop Department. It was further stated that seniority of category I [ should be fix~ with reference to the date of thei~ joining the Grain Shop Department.

The validity of the above decision dt. November 2, 1957, and January 13 1961 of the Board had been questioned on the ground that they discriminate against' the employees of category III and, as such, violate the guarantee of equal treatment enshrined in Art. 14 and 16 othe Constitution. The learned single judge of the High Court accepted the contenttons of respandents nos. I to 9 and struck down the impugned proceedings.

On appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the de; ision of th:: triaJ court and observed that when all the members of the Grain Shop Dpartment G ae.a!>sord in ditfernt departr, nents' of the Raif:way there cnnot be further

d1v1ding line between direct recruits and those appa1nted through selection Board as that would clearly .be a denial of equal oppartunity to persons similarly situate.:1,

On appeal before this court, the appellants raised two preliminary points-(i) that there were Jachcs on the part of the respondents to file the writ petitions 8 to 11 years after the issue of the ii:npugned decisions (ii) the petition.s id not implead about J 20 employees who were hkely to affect and therefore non-J01ndcr of parties is fa.ta! to the petition.

Dismissing the appeals,

HELD: (i) Since !he appellants did not conas~ the pqint at the k>wer cJurt5:, they cannot be pcnn1tted to rcsurrect before this Court. ·

(ii) In the present case, the relief is claimed only against the Railways which has been pleaded through its representative. No list of order fixing seniority or the petitioners vis-a-vis particular individuals, persuant to the impugned decisions, is being challenged. The employees who were likely to be affected as a result of the re.adjustment i;-if the petitioners' seniority in accordance with the principles laid down in the Boards' decision of October 16. 1952, were at the most, proper parties and not necessary parties, and their non-joinder could not the fatal to the writ pctition.[213A]

Padam SinghJhina v. Union of India and ors C. A. No. 405/67 decided by Supremc- Court on 14-8-1968, discussed and distinguished.

The rule enunciated in B. Gopa/aiah & Ors. V. Government of Andhra Pradesh A. I. R. 1969 A. P. 204 J. S. Sachdeva & Ors v. Reserve Bank of India, "New Delhi, I. L. R. (1973) II Delhi 392 and Mohan Chandra Joshi v. Union of India & Ors.

Civil Writ No. 650 of 1970 decided by Delhi High Court, approved.

(iii) On merits, it was arguedthat while employees or categories (i) and (ii) had a right as a part of their service conctitions to get themselves abso(bed and assigned their due seniority, on the abolit_ion or the grain shop department, no such right existed in the case of ad hoc recruits belonging to category III.

The main question in the present case is ''were the three categories after their transfer of chief recruitment of the Grain Shop Department fused into a single integ rated claSs1 having the same conditions of service;"

It is quite clear that after their direct recruitment to the Grain Shop Department, the personnel coming from sources ii) and (iii) had shed their genetic peculiarities and became members of the same class governed by the same conditions of service. For the purpose of absorption seniority, promotion etc .• in rcgulaf department, tbererore. they were entitled to be treated alike. Therefore, the impugned directions dated Nov. 2, 1957 and January 13. 1961, excepting in so far as they relate to personnel of category I is arbitrary and violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of !he Constitutions. {215C} Roshatt Lal Tandon v. U11io11 of India, [1968] 1 S. Co R. 185, referred to.

(iv) Jn C. A. 1938 of 1972, 2 employees M & B exchanged placed by mutual con sent on a joint application. The result was that 7 was transferred and posted at Gundur and was given the 445 the place in the order of seniority held by B among the cICrks in the Grain Shop Department ofBazwade District. Later on a result of the impugned decisions taken by the Railway Board on November 2, l9S7 and January 13, 1961. M. was relegated to a lower position in the Seniority List of Commen:ial Clerks. He appealed to the Railway List of Commercial Clerk3.

Hi: appealed to the Railway authorities but did not set any redress. Later, he filed a petition before: the High Court. The wut petition \vas allowed by the High Court and bence the appeal. Following the a6ove dccisJ.bn it was also held that the impugned order where M's seniority was revised and lowered. was invalid .and a rule was issued directing the appellant to restore and refix the pl:tce pn M. in List of seniority as on De~:cmber 31, 1958. Appeal dismissed.

C1v1L APPELLATE JuR1sm•:noN : Civil Appeals Nos. 1937 and 1938 of 1972.

Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated Isl September, 1971 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court at Hyderabad in Writ Appeals Nos. 689 of 1970 and 38 of 1971.

G. L. Sanghi and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant.

Mrs. Shyamla Pappu and J. Ramamurthi, for respondent Nos. 1-15 & 17-22 (in c. A. 1937/72) and for the respondent (in C.A.

193~/72)

J. Ramamurthi for the Interveners (in C.A. 1937 of 1972).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-

SARKARIA J.-These appeals by special leave are directed against two inter-linked judgments of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.

It will be convenient to dispose them of by this common judgment.

CENTRAL RAILWAY v. A. v. R. SIDOHANTI (Sarkaria, /.) 209

A Respondents I to 9 in Civil Appeal No. 1937 of 1972 made a pc tition (W. P. 1145 of 1969) under Article 226 of the Constitvtion in the High Court for the issue of a writ of Mandamus directing the present appellants (the General Manager, South Central Railway and the Secretary, Railway Board) to fix. the inter-se seniority of the writ petitioners as per original proceed1gs, dated October _16, 1952, of the Railway Board, and to further direct them not to give effect to B the subsequent proceedings dated November 2, 1957 and January 13, 1961, of the Board issued by way of "modification" and "clari fication" of its earlier proceedings of 1952.

During the last World War, there was acute shortage of foodgrains and other necessaries of life. At the suggestion of B. N. Rau Com mittee, grain shops for the supply of foodgrains at cost price to its C employees were opened by the Indian Railways on an extensive scale throughout the country. Staff for this temporary Grain-Shop Com plex was drawn from three different sources :

i) Temporary employees who on being seleckd through the Joint Selection Commission or Staff Selection Board were initially appointed in the permanent De D partments and were thereafter transferred to the Grain

Shop Department.

(ii) Temporary employees selected by the Selection Board or the Selection Commission for permanent Departments but posted straightaway in the Grain Shop Department without being first appointed in the depart E ment for which they were originally selected, and

(iii) Temporary employees directly recruited by the Deputy General Managers to the Grain Shop Department from the open market.'

Respondents I to 9 in this appeal belong to category (iii).

F After the emergency was over, on the recommendation of a high powered committee, it was decided to gradually wind up the Grain

Shop Department and to absorb its staff in the permanent Depart

ments of the Railway. For this purpose, the Railway Board took several policy decisions commencing from August 24, 1948.

Of these, the .fiC't which is relevant as furnishing the background of the decisions in question,. is dated February 3, 1949 (Exh. P)., whereby the G temporary Grain Shop Staff was to be grouped as under :

(a) those who were recruited prior to and were in service on September 15, 1945, and

(b) those who were recruited on or after September 15, 1945.

With regard to group (a), it.was directed:

"No age restrictions will apply in considering such em ployees for absorption in other departments, but the minimum educational qualification should not be relaxtd .... 15-M852SupCl/74

There is, however, no objection to the staff concred being permitted to apply to the Railway Service Comrruss10n for employment in posts advertised by them, in which case, for the purpose of the maximum age limit they can deduct the period of their continuous temporary service in the grainshop department from their present age. No employee should be retrenched unles. he refused to accept the alternative employ ment that is off<red to him by the Railway Administration".

As regards (b) it was laid down : "Although no undertaking has been given about their con tinued retention in service, it is the Board's .desire that these staff also should be absorbed against suitable vacancies on the same lines as the staff recruited before this date, subjecr' to the condition that neither the restrictions required nor the-educational qualifications required nor the restrictions regarding the maximum age limit will be relaxed except in the latter case, to the extent of their continuous temporary service rendered by them of the Railway.

Such staff, will, however, be considered for absorption only after the staff referred to in item

(a) above have been offered employment."

(e) "Jn all cases other things bejng equal due consideration should be given to the length of service of the staff concerned." This order further provided :

"(6) ..... . permanent or temporary staff of other de partments on loan to the Grainshop Department should be returned to their parent departments if unfilled posts exist and if this is found to be administratively convenient, so as to reduce the number of grainshop staff who be surplus immediately .... "

(7) .....•.•.•..•..•.•.•.. "

(emphasis supplied)

Next, in importance, is the Railway Board's order No. E. 48. REI/ 1/3. of October 16, 1952 issued in supersess on o its previous orders.

This order 1s the sheet-anchor of the respondents' case. Its material F part runs as under :

"· ...... In supersession of the Board's orders con tained in item (iii) of their letter No. E. 48.

REl/l/3A of 6-7-1949, laying down the method for the absorption and

xat!on of pay of ex-Grain Shop Staff who were officiating m higher grades but were absorbed in other Departments in G lower grades, it has now been decided that the pay of all such

taff as . well as those appointed in the intermediate grades, Irrespective of the fact that they were absorbed either before or after 6-7-1949 should be fixed on their absorption in the regular Departments in accordane<: with the iJWtructions contained in their letter No. E. 45 RE. 13/3 dated 27-7-46, and the staff concerned paid the arrears due on this account.

2. It has further been decided by the Board that such staff should not get any preferential treatment other than for

CENTRAL RAILWAY v. A. v. R. 'i!DDHANTI (Sarkaria, !.)

21 J

fixation of pay and obtaining alternative employment i.e. they should not be given seniority for purposes of confirmation by virtue of their pay being fixed at a higher stage in the absorbing Department over unconfirmed men in that Department who had longer service but whose pay was less. They should be given only such seniority which they would have got had they been absorbed in the absorbing Department right from the beginning of service."

On the representation made by the National Federation of Indian Railwaymen, the Railway Board, reconsider<d its decision of October 16, 1952 regarding counting of past temporary service for the purpose of fixing seniority of 'open market' recruits. This reconsidered decision was put in the communication dated November 2, 1957 C whereby the Railway Board, in partial modification of its proceeding of October 16, 1952, directed "that the seniority of temporary Grain- Shop Staff consequent on their absorption in the absorbing departments should be regulated on the basis of their date of their actual absorption in those departments and not on the basis as if they had been absorbed in those departments in right from the beginning of service".

On January 13, 1961, the Board issued a "clarification" that the seniority of the Grain-Shop staff of category (iii) should be fixed from the date of their absorption in a permanent department, irrespective of their length of service in the Grain-Shop department. With regard to category (i), it was_ laid down that temporary staff who were initially appointed in the permanent departments and were then E transferred to the Grain Shop department would not have their seniority affected by their transfer fo the Grain Shop department.

It was further stated that seniority of category (ii) should be fixed with reference to the date of their joining the Grain Shop Department.

The validity of the above decisions dated November 2, 1957 and January 13, 1961 of the Board has been questioned on the ground F that they discriminate against the employees of category (iii} and, as such, violate the guarantee of equal treatment enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Mainly relying upon two Single Bench judgments-one of the Madras High Court in W.P. No. 3110 of 1965 and the other of the Bombay High Court in Misc. Petition No. 321 of 1964, decided on G March 15, 1967-the learned Single Judge who tried the wTit petition, accepted the contentions of Respondents I to 9 and struck down the impugned proceedings.

Aggrieved by that judgment, the Railway carried an appeal under Clause 15 of the ktters Patent to the Division Bench of the High Court, which dismis; ed the same with these observations :

H "What has been held by their Lordships in Roshanlal's case applies with equal force to the case on hand. Here also there was already an integrated service namely the Grain Shop

Department service and all the members of this Service were absorbed in difforent Departments, and after absorpt10n, there cannot be a further dividing line between direct recruits drawn from open market and those appointed through selection Boards as that would clearly be a denial of equal opportunity to persons similarly situated in the matter of further promotion on the basis of their seniority, among other grounds.

Since the absorption of direct recruits and others is from the integrated Grain Shop Department, no discrimination cal! be shown on the ground of differences that existed between various ,,

sources prior to the recruitment to the Grain Shop Department for the purpose of fixing seniority." It is against this judgment that Civil Appeal No. 1937 of 1972 has been preferred.

Mr. G. L. Sanghi, learned Counsel for the appellants, has raised two preliminary objections. The first is that the writ petition was filed 8 to 11 years after the issue of the impugned decisions, and as such, was liable to be dismissed on the score of latches alone.

The second is that the writ petitioners did not implead about 120 employees who were likely to be affected by the decision in this case.

Those employees, proceeds the argument, were necessary parties and their non-joinder is fatal to the. petition. In support of this contention, Counsel has .cited Padam Singh Jhina v. Union of India and ors (!).

Neither of these objections appears to be tenable.

Though the plea of latches was taken in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Railway before the High Court, yet it appears that the pomt \Vas not canvassed at the time of arguments either before the learned Smgle Judge or the Division Bench in the Letters Patent appeal. The appellants therefore cannot be permitted to resurrect in thfs Court the same objection which they had apparently abandoned in the High Court.

As regards the second objection, it is to be noted that the decisions of the Railway Board impugned in the writ petition contain administrative rules of general. application, regulating absorption in permanent departments, fixation of seniority, pay etc. of the employees o~ the erstwhil~ Grain Shop departments. The Responden.t~-pelit10ners are impeaching the validity of thofe policy G decisions on the ground of their being violatiYe of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The proceedings are an; iJogous to those in which the constitutionlity of a statutory rule regulating seniority of government .servants is assailed. In uch proceedings the necessary parties to be 1mpleaded are those agamst whom the relief is sought, and in whose absence no effective decision can be rendered by the Court. fn . the present case, the relief is claimed only against the Railway H which has been 1mpleaded through its representative. No list or

(1) C.A. No.405 of 1967 decided by Supreme Court on 14-8-1967.

C2NTRAL RAILWAY v. A. v. II. SIDDHANTI (Sarkaria, /.) 213

order fixing seniority of the petitioners visavis particular individuals pursuant to the impugned decisions, is being challenged. The em ployees who were likely to be affected as a result of the re-adjustment of the petitioner's seniority in accordance with the principles laid down in the Board's decision of October 16, 1952 were, at the most, proper parties and not necessary parties, and their non-joinder could not be fatal to the writ petition.

The ratio of this Court's decision in Padam Singh Jhina's case

(supra) is not applicable to the facts of the instant case. Jhina's contention was that he had been ma/a fide reduced in the list of seniority, from the 5th to the 7th place and that one Prem Sagar had been placed above him in contravention of the Rules.

The validity or vires of the Rules was not in question. All the persons whose placement in the seniority list was controverted were not impleaded, and as such, had no opportunity of replying to the case set up by Jbina, and, in the absence of porsons directly affected, it was not possible for the Court to adjudicate the matter. The ratio of Jhina's case does not help the appellant. The cases relevant for our purpose are B. Gopalaiah and Ors. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh; (l) J. S. Sachdev and Ors. v. Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi (2) and Mohan Chandra Joshi v. UnionoflndiaandOrs('}. We approve oi the rule enunciated on this point in those cases.

On merits, Mr. Sangbi has, by and large, adopted the reasoning of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in General Manager, Southern Rai/w3y v. Venkataraman (4), which had, in Letters Patent Appeal reversed tbe judgment of the Single Judge, relied upon in the instant case by the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

It is contended that the standards, qualifications for eligibility and the conditions governing the employees recruited through the Staff

Selection Board or Joint Service Commission from sources (i) and

(ii) were different from those of 'open-market' recruits. According to the learned Counsel, the personnel drawn from source (iii) were temporarily engaged as an ad hoc measure, without regard for age and educational qualifications, to meet the emergency and could not thetcfore be compared and equated with the employees of requisite qualifications belongmg to categories (i) and (ii) recruited or selected in the normal way through Selection Boards for regular departments.

The point pressed into argument is that while employees of categories

(i) and (ii) bad the assurances or right as a part of their service conditions that on the abolition of the Grain Shop Department, they would be absorbed and assigned their d11e seniority, in the per.manent de partment in or for which they were initially appointed or selected, no such right or assurance existed in the case of ad hoc recruits belong ing to category (iii) who were given the benefit of their services in the

(I) A. I. R. 1969 A. P. 204.

(2) ILR(1973) II Delhi 322.

(3) Civil Writ No. 650 of 1970 decided by Delhi High Court. (4} (1970] II Labour L•w Journal 76.

Grain Shop Department, only as a matter of grace, subsequently on absorption in permanent departments.

It iS not correct to say that all the employees of category (iii) we(ll sub-standard in educational qualifications.· Severai persons in that. category satisfied the educational !!Orms. For instance, Sidhanti Respondent was F.A., while the minimum educational qualification requisite for the post of a Commercial Clerk was Matriculation or equivalent examination. Though sufficient data has not been brought on the record on the basis of which a firm finding can be given, yet three copies of notices (uncertified) have been filed by the Respon- . dents which indicate that at some stage educational qualifications had been relaxed to meet the extraordinary demand for personnel to man the posts of Ticket collectors and Guards etc. Regarding education, all that was required of the candiaates was a "working

knowledge of English". It was quite possible, that in categories (ii) and (iii), also, there were some whose qualifications were not in accord with the preScribed norms. Educational qualifications being less than the requisite minimum was therefore not a feature, peculiar to category (iii), only. Indeed, it is not the case of the appellants that the classification of the grain-shop staff envisaged in th~ impugned proceedings, for the purpose of absorption and seniority i.n per manent departments,· has been made on the basis of educational qualifications.

The fundamental right of equality means that persons in like situation, under like circumstances are entitled to be treated alike. "The Constitutional Code of Equality and Equal Opportunity", observed this court in State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki. Nath Khosla and others(I), ''is a charter for equals". So long as employees similarly circumstanced in the same class of service are treated alike,-the question of hostile discrimination does not arise.

The equality of opportunity for purposes of seniority, promotion and like matters of employment is available only for persons who fall substantially, within the same class or unit of service:· The guarntee of equality is not applicable as between members of distinct and different classes of the service. The Constitution does not command that in all matters of employment absolute symmetry be main tained. A wooden equality as between all classes of employees regardless of qualifications, kind of jobs, nature of responsibility and performance of the employees is not intended, nor is it practicable if the administration is to run. Indeed, the maintenance of such a 'classless' and undiscerning 'equality' where, in reality, glaring in-· equalities and intelligible differentia exist, will deprive the guarantee of its practical content. Broad classification baied on reason; executive pragmatism and experience having a direct relation with the achievement of efficiency in admini.stration, is permissible. That is to say? easoble dassifition accordi':'g to some priciple, to recogmse mtellig1ble mequabt1es or to avoid or correct mequalitics

(1) Civil Appeal No. 2134 of 1972 decided on 26-9-1973.

CENTRAL RAILWAY l'. A. V. R. S!DDHANTI (Sarkaria, J.) 215

is allowed, but not miniclassification which creates inequality among the similarly circumstanced members of the same class or group.

In the light of the above principles it will be seen that the pivotal question in the present controversy is: Were the three categories after. their transfer or direct recruitineuts, as the case n1ay he, to the Grain Shop Department fused into a single integrated class having the same conditions of service ? Or, did they continue dissimilarly-as they started-in three separate compartments ?

While there is ground to hold that category (i) never lost its distinctive birth-marks, no material has been placed before us on the basis of which it could be said that categories (ii) and (iii), after their direct recruitn1ent, had not con1pletely Jost their genetic peculiarities in the common unified stream of Grain-Shop service.

The special feature of personnel of category (i), was that they had been initiaUy appointed against substantive vacancies in permanent departments of the Railway. They did not come to the temporary Grain Shop Department of their own volition or option, but by transfer or on loan under peremptory orders of their superior officers. They could not be placed in a worse position or treated differently in the matter of tenure than their colleagues who fortuiously continued in the permanent Departments. It was but fair and reasonable that, on the abolition of the Grain Shop Department, they should be sent back to the permanent Departments, whence they came, and given credit of their initial service in those Departments for the purpose of permanent absorption and seniority.

Even from the deficient material placed before us, it is clear that personnel from source (i) have always been treated as a distinct unit having a status skin to that of persons on loan or transfers for a period from a permanent De .. partment to a temporary .Department. Consequent upon their decision to gradually wind up the Grain Shop Department, the first step taken by the Railway Board as per para 6 of their communication dated February 3, 1949 (reproduced in a foregoing part of this judgment), was to return all temporary or permanent staff that had come on loan to the Grain Shop" to their parent departments.

It is note-worthy that the directions in para 6 of the communication, dated February 3, 1949, were not superseded by the proceedings, dated October 16, 1952, which are the foundation of the Respondent's claim. Cfause (1) (i) of the impugned communication, dated January 13, 1961, IS no more than a reiteration, in an amplified form, of the diection in Para 6, of the communication of February 3, 1949., The duecllon of ?ctober, 16, 1952 regarding fixation of pay and semonty of the ex Gram Shop staff on their absorption in regular departments, were , obscure ad _vague on two points. Firstly, it was

ot clear whether tne ex Gram Shop staff governed by those directions mcluded the temporary st<tlf who Jiad been initially appointed in permanent departments and were there-after transferred for some period to th~, Grain-Shop department.

Secindl.y, "the beginning of the service m the last sentence of those directions was susceptible \lftwo constructions. In the restricted sense, it could mean beginning

of the service in the Grain-Shop Department. In the wider sense, A it would include in the case of transferees' to the Grain-Shop, the beginning of their service in the permanent department whence. they came. Clause (I) (i) of the communication of January 13, 1961 clarified those aspects, The differential treatment of the personnel belonging to category (i). for the purpose of fixing seniority envisaged in clause (I) (i) of the communication of January 13, 1961, thus, rests on a sound rational basis and does not offend Articles 14 B and 16 of the Constitution.

To this extent, for reasons stated above, we endorse the view taken by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in General Manager Southern Railway, Madras v. T. K. Venka/araman(supra).

But what has been said above in regard to category (i) does not hold good in the case of the other two categories. Excepting that they were recruited by two different, methods, in all other respects, these two categories were similrly situated. The mere fact that the names of persons in category (ii) were borne on a list of candidates prepared by the Selection Board for recruitment to regular Departments, did not give them a right to preferential treatment qua those in category

(iii) in the matter of absorption and seniority in such departments.

We have porused Paras 302, 303 and 304 of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual, Chapter III, 2nd Edition, relied up6n by Mr.

Sanghi. These are not statutory provisions.

Even so, there is nothing in the!h to show that a person selected for a permanent department, by the Selection Board or Commission, gets a right to be appointed merely because of such selection and placement of his name on the select-list. He gets only a spes i.e. bare chance of appointment and that too if the appointing authority so desires and a vacancy is available for him. All that the said provisions say, in substance, is that after their appointment, their inter se seniority will be fixed with reference to their positions in the merit list prepared by the Selection Board.

Despite repeated queries, the appellants have not placed any document or material nor referred to any rule, policy decision or other official record to support their contentions that even after their recruitment to Grain-Shop Department, categories (ii) and (iii), continued as distinct entities having different conditions of service. Appellants' failure to furnish such material is sought to be justified on the ground that the burden of proving that the impugned proceedings suffer from the vice of discrimination, was on the respondents.

True, that the initial onus of showing that the proceedinii o~ 1957 and 1961, in question, were discriminatory and as such, VJolat1ve of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, was on the respondents; but in the peculiar circumstances of the case, such onus had been prima facie discharged by them. Their claim to relief is founed on the Railway Board's own decision of October 16, 1952, which proceeds on an in-built postulate and implied admission that all the personnel recuited to the Grain-Shop . department were members o~ the sam.e class or llnit of service, and as such entitled alike to the fixation of their

CENTRAL RAILWAY v. A. v. R. S!DDHANTI (Sarkaria, /.) 217

seniority with reference to "the beginning of their service". It was then the turn of the Board to show that the inference arising from its admission, or treatment of all persons directly recruited, as members of one unified service of the Grain Shop Department was wrong.

Conscious of the necessity of resolving the problem in a just, practical manner, avoiding a doctrinaire approach, we wanted to have some idea of the nature and magnitude of the impact which the decision of this case might indirectly or incidentally have on the employees who, during the interregnum, got promoted or confirmed on the basis of the impugned directions. We, therefore, indicated at the outset that as a matter of concession, we would be disposed to allow the appellants to produce even at that stage, after due notice to the other side, documentary evidence or material, if any, in their possession or control, which would help substantiate their contention. The opportunity was not availed of by the appellants. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that after their direct recruitment to the Grain Shop Department the personnel corning from sources (ii) and (iii) had shed their genetic peculiarities and become members of the same class or unit governed by the same conditions of service. For the purposes of. absorption, seniority, promotion etc. in regular departments, therefore, they were entitled to be treated alike.

The impugned directions of 1957 and 1961, in so far as they pertain to categories (ii) and (iii), are hit by the rule in Roshan Lal Tandon v.

Union of India (I) according to which once the persons coming or recruited to the service, from two different sources-in that case promotees and direct recruits-are absorbed into one integrated class with identical service conditions, they cannot be discriminated against with reference to the original source, for the purposes of further promotion to the higher grade. What was said about further promotion in Roshan Lal Tandon's case (supra) is equally applicable to absorption and seniority in the instant case.

For the foregoing reasons, we would hold that the discrimination envisaged in the impugned directions dated November 2, 1957 and January 13, 1961, excepting in so far as they pertain to personnel of category (i) is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

In the result we dismiss the appeal with costs throughout and affirm the decision of the High Court except to the extent indicated above. ---------- (!) [1968] I s: C.R. \85.

In Civil Appeal 1938 of 1972, arising out of Writ Petition No. 952 of 1966, Respondent Manickyarn was originally employed as a Commercial Clerk on December 4, 1944 in the Southern Railway and was posted at Rayapuram. One Balasubramaniarn, was then a clerk in the Grain Shop Department in Bezwada District and posted at Gudur.

In 1950, Manickyam and Balasubramaniam made joint application for mutual transfer. This application was allowed and, in consequence, Manickyarn and Balasubramaniarn exchanged places.

Manickyam was therefore transferred and posted on August 10, 1950 at Gudur and was given the 445th place in the order of seniority among the clerks in the Grain Shop Department of Bezwada District. This was the rank and position in the seniority formerly held by Balasubramaniam. Subsequently, as a result of the impugned decisions taken by the Railway Board on November 2, 1957 and January 13; 1961, Manickyam was relegated to a Jower position in the seniority list of Commercial Clerks. He appealed against this fixation of seniority to the Railway Authorities who dismissed the same. Manickyam then moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for bringing up and quashing the order dated May 24, 1966 of the Di_visional Commercial Superintendent, Southern Railway, Vijawada, in so far as it related to the promotion of Respondents 2 to 8 to the senior time scale of Rs. 205-280 and directing Respondent No.

I (Divisional Superintendent, Southern Railway, Vijayawada) to promote the petitioner to the said scale. giving him a place in the seniority immediately above Respondents 2 to 8 and to pass such further order as may be necessary.

In the counter-affidavit filed by the appellant, it was averred that Manickyam and Balasubramaniam were mutually transferred to Bezwada District and Rayapuram District and assigned each other's places i.e. 445th and 60Jst places in the seniority among the Commercial Clerks in Bezwada District a_nd Rayapuram District, respectively, on the basis of an agreement between them. It was further stated that on July 18, 1955 Manickyam made an application requesting that he should be given all those benefits which had been made available to ex . Grain Shop clerks. This application was declined -because the petitioner had himself accepted his transfer to Bezwada on the condition of getting 445th place in the sel'iotity. It was, however, admitted that in pursuance of the Railway Board's orders dated November 2, 1957 , the seniority of all Grain-Shop clerks working as Commercial Clerks was revised in 1965, and on such reVISIOn Manickyam's. seniority was also revised as he had come to Vijayawada District in mutual exchange with Grain !lfi.op Employee. It was

CENTRAL IWLWAY v. A. v. R. SIDDHANTI (Sarkaria, I.) 219

added that he was given what he really deserved under the rules and agreement.

From the pleadings and the contentions canvassed, it was clear that Manickyam's grievance was against the validity of the Railway Board's Orders dated November 2, 1957 and January 13, 1961 on .the basis of which his seniority was, in fact, revised and downgraded.

The learned single Judge who tried the writ ptition found that since the classification envisaged in the Railway Board's Orders dated November 2, 1957 and January 13, 1961 were d.iscriminatory, arbi trary and unconstitutional, the impugned orders, also, whereby Manickyam's seniority was revised down were invalid. In the re suit, the Writ Petition was allowed and a writ of Mandamus directing the appellant to give Manickyam 92nd place immediately above Pothuraju, No. 93, and to the then Respondents 2 to 8 from 96th to 195th places in the list of seniority published as on December 31, 1958, was issued. It was further directed: "If as a result of the restoration of the petitioner's seniority as per the above order, he is. entitled to any promotion to a higher scale of pay, I direct that the first respondent should give him the benefit of such promotion:' The Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the Divisional Superintendent of the Railway (the Respondent) was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. Hence this app>al by the Railway.

Learned eounsel for the appellant raised the same preliminary objections and canvassed the same contentions which were a<!vanced in Civil Appeal 1937 of 1972. For reasons given in that appeal, we would overrule the objections, negative the contentions and hold that since .the questioned directions of November 2, 1957 and January 13, 1961, in so far as they related to the employees of ex-Grain Shop recruited from sources (ii) and (iii) were violative of Article 16 of the Constitution, the impugned order whereby Manickyam's seniority was revised and lowered, in pursuance of those directions, was also invalid.

A Mandamus shall therefore, issue directing the appellant to restore and refix the place of Manickyam in the list of seniority as on December 31, 1958, in accordance with the Railway Board's directions of October 16, 1952 and taking into account other relevant considerations, but ignoring the directions contained in the Board's communication of November 2, 1957 and January 13, 1961 to the <:xtent they have been held to be unconstitutional and invalid. If as a result of the refixation of his seniority as directed, Manickyam becomes entitled to be promoted or to be considered for promotion,

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1974 J 3 S.C.lt.

he shall be so promoted or considered for promotion on an actual A or notional basis, with effect from the date on which such promotion or consideration for promotion, as the case may be, falls due.

With. the slight modification, indicated above, we dismiss this appeal. Appellant shall pay the costs of Respondent Manickyarn, in this Court.

s.c.

Appeals dismissed.

852 SCl/14-2500-20-6-75-GIPF.

....

V.R. SIDDHANTI AND ORS. ETC

January 30, 1974

V. R. KRISHNA IYER

R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.

Art. 14 & 16

November 2nd, 1967

January 13, 1961

November 2, 1957

January 13 1961

Art. 14 and 16

October 16. 1952

Supremc- Court

Delhi High Court

Nov. 2, 1957

January 13. 1961

Arts. 14 and 16

Gundur

ofBazwade District

November 2, l9S7 and

G. L. Sanghi

S. P. Nayar

Shyamla Pappu

J. Ramamurthi

J. Ramamurthi

SARKARIA

Article 226

B. N. Rau Com mittee

Indian Railways

August 24, 1948

February 3, 1949

September 15, 1945

October 16, 1952

Articles 14 and 16

Madras High Court

Bombay High Court

March 15, 1967

Clause 15

Roshanlal

G. L. Sanghi

Articles 14 and 16

Supreme Court

Padam Singh Jhina

Jhina

Jbina

Sangbi

Andhra Pradesh High Court

Grain Shop Department

CENTRAL RAILWAY l'. A. V. R. S!DDHANTI

Sarkaria

ctober, 16, 1952

Articles 14

Sanghi

Articles 14 and 16

Roshan Lal Tandon

Articles 14 and 16

Manickyarn

Balasubramaniarn

Bezwada District

Gudur

Manickyam

Balasubramaniam

Manickyarn

August 10, 1950

January 13; 1961

Article 226

May 24, 1966

Rayapuram District

Bezwada

July 18, 1955

Vijayawada District

Pothuraju

December 31, 1958

Article 16