GURDIT SINGH AND OTHERS

STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS

April 10, 1974

(K. K. MATHEW AND A, ALAG!RISWAMI, JJ.]

PepJu Tenancy and Agricuilural La11ds Act, 19SS-As amended by Act 16 <>! 1962 introducinl! Sec. 32~DD(b)-Retrospective effect of-Determination of

sztrplus area-Prei•ious order declaring no surplus land on basis of judgment and decree of Civil -court-Whether ca11 be reviewed Ullder Sec. 32~DD(b} Natural iusltce .

. Judgment-Connotation of-Interpretation Qf statutes--Object of provision is circumscribed by the language of the section. ·

The lands in question were bequeathed to appellants 2 and 3, sons of the first appellant, by their grandfather. After the death of the testator mutations in favour of appellants 2 and 3 were effected in the revenue records in 1939. 'Ibe first appellant managed to get the mutation of the land in bis name in 1944 for the reason that he wanted to get licence for a gun. Jn 19SS, when lhe Act came into force, the first appelJant was shown to be the owner of the land in the revenue records.

On October 30. 1956 the Act was amended so as to impose

a ceiling on the holding of land. [)

Appellants 2 and 3 filed a suit in the civil court for a declaration that the Jand belonsed to them and that there v."as no transfer of the land to the first appellant. 'Ibe latter, who was the only defendant, did not contest the suit and it was decreed on February 14, 1961. Thereafter, in proceedings under the Act, by order dated March 28, 1961 the CoUector declared on the basis of the jadgment and decree of the civil court that there was no surplus land in the ownership and pOssessiOh of th~ first appellant.

The Act was amended by Act 16 of 1962 and S. 32-DD was introduced into the Act with retrospective effect from October 30, 1956, i.e. the date of the earlier arnednment. Section 32-DD rOYided inter alia that for the purposes of determining the surolu:; area of any penon, any judgrnent, decree or order of n Court obtained after the commencement of the amending Act of 1956 and having lhe effect of diminishing the area of such person which could have been declared as his surpJn, area shall be ignored.

The Collector, acting purportedly

undr Sec. 15 of the Punjab land Revenue Code reviewed bis order dared farch 28, 1961. By order dated May 20, 1963 be refused to give effect to the judgment and decree by ignoring them as enjoined by ction 32-DD and included the land in the hQ)ding of the first appellant.

The appellnnts fited a writ petition -in the lligh Court to quash this \'.>rder.

Tiie Hilb Court overruled the contentions of the appellants und di, missed iln: writ petition.

Before this Court. the appellants raised the same contentions. namely : (i) that the. Co1lector had no jurisdiction to review his order dated

farch 28. 1961; Oil that lhe order in review-was passed without notice lo the appellants; and (iii) lhat. in any event. the iudgn1ent of the civil court was not of the nature.contemplated by section 32-DD.

Allowing th~ appeal,

flELD: (1) The order of the Collector dated March 28, 1961, was in perfectly

valid 1>ne wh'n h \\"as pas-red.

No one challeng!d that order and it became final for alt p; irposes. Th: Collector cou1d not have anticipated th~ enactmnt of thp sectioa with rtff'Mpecthe effect and passed the order conformtn& to its provisions. we cannot subscrib.! to the view that the order of th~ Col!cctor passed H bn MarCh 28, 1961, became null and void merely hcauie he failed to takeint<' account the provision~ of Sec. 32-DD even if bv virtue of the fiction it is to be assumed that the section was on the statute book when he passed it. Vle do not

A think that we can extend the ratio of thedecision in the Anisminic case (infra) to a case where the provision overlooked during the course of the enquiry \vas not on the statute book but was beaotten and brought into being sub&equently, though with retrospective vitality. The order of the Collector dated March 28, 1961 cannot, therefore, be regarded as null a_nd void. There was no proviM.on in the amending At wPich enabled the_ Collector to review it, We cannot stretch the fiction of retrospectivity so far as to make the order nuU and void witbOut further ado. [899 D-900 B] B

Anmini1: Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commissio11, [1967] 3 W.L.R. 382, distingQished. •

(II) we are also not satisfied that the Collector was acting in comonance with ihe principles of natural justice when he passed the order dated May 20, 1963, as he gave no opportunity to appellants 2 and 3 of being heard. The fact that the first appellant was heard before that order was J)assed is of no moment because the persons who were. vitally concerned in re-opening the case wre appeIJants 2 and 3. Admittedly, no notice of the proceedings to re-open the case was given to them.

If notice had been given to them, they could have shown the true nature and character of the jadgment of the civil court . upon which they re!fed. [900 B-D]

(111) Nor are we satisfied that every judgment which has the apparent effect of diminishing the area of land of a person would be within the ambit of S. 32- DD(b ). The judgment of the civil court adjudicated on the rights of the parties as they existed before the suit and' when it declared that the mutation was effected not with the idea of transferring the properly to the first appellant but for some other reason. the. effect of the declaration was that there was no real transfer Qf

the property in favour of the first appellant and that the property remained always in the ownership of appellants 2 and 3, notwithstanding the purported transfer evidenced by the mutation in the revenue records.

It is impermisible to give the wide Janguage employed in clause (b) of Sec. 3200 an unconfined operation. If the effect of the judgment is only to declare that the land never belonged to the first appellant, it has not the effect of diminishing the area of land in his possession. The ob; E:ct of this provision in an Act like the one under consideration is to prevent circumvention of its provisions by dubious and indirect methods.

Rut that is no reason why we should put a construction upon the section which its language can hardly bear. The High Court went wrong in assuming that the Collector was right when he ignored the judgment by his order dated May 20, 1963 on the ground that it had effect of diminishing the area of the first appellant which could have been declared as his surplus.

[900 F- 901 G]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1897 of 1967.

From the Judgment and Order dated the 27th September, 1966, of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in Civil Writ No. 1371 of 1963.

S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagara; a, M. Qamaruddill and Vinod Dhawan, for the appellants.

V. C. Mahajan, O. P. Sharma and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MATHEW, J. The first appellant is the father of appellants 2 and 3.

The property in question belonged to the father of first appellant. By a will executed by him, he bcqu•athed the property to appellants 2 and 3. After the death of the tastator, mutations in favour of appellants 2 and 3 were effected in the revenue records in the year 1996 B.K. (1939). The first appellant managed to get the mutation of the land

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1974] 3 S.C.R.

in his name in 1944 for the reason that he wanted to get licence for a gun. In 19.55; when the Pepsu Tanancy and Agricultural Lands Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) came into force, the first appellant was shown to be the owner of the land in the revenue records. Chapter IV-Ai of the Act was inserted by Pepsu Act No. 15 of 1956 on October 30, 1956 and by s. 32A of this chapter, ceiling was placed on the holding of land.

A suit was filed by appellants 2 and 3 for a declaration that the land belonged to them, thal the mutation of the land in the name of the first appellant in the revenue records was for the purpose of enabling him to obtain a gun licence and that there was no transfer of the land to first appellant. The first appellant was the only defendant in the suit. He did not contest the suit and it was decreed on February 14, 1961. A few weeks later, the question of declaration of the surplus area of the land in the hands of tQ.e first appellant came up for consideration before the Collector of Bhatinda. On the basis of the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court that there was no transfer of the land to the first appellant, the Collector, by his order dated March 28, 1961, declared that there was no surplus land in the ownership and possession of the first appellant.

The Act was amended by Act No. 16 of 1962 and s. 32-DD was introduced into the Act with retrospective effect fro1n October 30,

1956. That section reads:

"32-DD. Future tenancies iu surplus area and certaill judg1nents etc. to be ignored-Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, for the purposes of determining the surplus area of any person-

(a) a tenancy created after the commenceinent of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second A,.mendment) Act, 1956, in any area of land which could have been declared as the surplus area of such person; and

(b) any judgment, decree or order of a court or other authority, obtained after the commencement of that Act and having the effect of diminishing the area of such person which could have been declared as his surplus area shall be ignored."

The Collector thereupon made a reference presumably under s. 15 G of the Punjab Land Revenue Code for sanction to the Commissioner of Patiala to review his order dated March 28, 1961, as it omitted to include the land in question in the holding of the first appellant on the basis of the judgment and decree.

The sanction was given, the Collector reviewed the order and he refused to give effect to the judgment and decree by ignoring them as enjoined by s. 32-DD and included the land in the holding of the first appellant.

The appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court of Punjab to

1 quash this order. Before the High Court, three contentions were raised

by the appellants : ( 1) that the Collector had no jurisdiction to review' his order dated March 28, 1961; (2) that the order in review was passed without notice. to the appellants; and ( 3) that, in any event, the judgment of the civil court only made a declaration as regards rights of the parties on the date of the suit and it was not, therefore, a judgment of the nature contemplated bys. 32-DD. The High Court overruled all the contentions and hdd that the order of the Collector was rendered null and void by virtue of the provisions of s. 32-DD and, therefore, the Collector had the power to determine by his order dated May 29, 1963, the surplus area after ignoring the judgment and decree.

The High Court said that since mandatory provisions of s. 32-DD which has retrospective operation were not taken into consideration, the order passed by the Collector on March 28, 1961 was non est as being one made without jurisdiction and that, the order dated May 20, 1963, must° be deemed to be the order determining the holding of the first appellant for the purpose of the Act as amended.

We are not satisfied that this is a correct approach'to the question.

The Collector purport\'d to act under s. 15 of the Land Revenue Code, which, obviously, has no application. The High Court did not rest its decision on s. 15 of the Punjab Land Revenue Code for holding that Collector had jurisdiction to pass the order dated May 20, 1963. When the Collector passed the order dated March, 28, 1961 determining the surplus area in the hands of the first appellant, he took into consideration the effect of the judgment of the civil court declaring that the muta_ tion of the name of the first appellant in the revenue record was effect- ed only to enable him to obtain a gun licence. That order of the .Collector dated March 28, 1961 was a perfectly valid one when it was passed. No one challenged that order and it became final for all purposes.

It was only when s. 32-DD was incorporated in the Act with retrospective effect from October 3p, 1956 that the question arose whether that order was valid.· Tpe Collector could not have anticipated the enactment of the section with retrospective effect and passed the order conforming to °its provisions. It is rather curious that the draftsman of the amending Act No. 16 of 1962 did not incrporate a provision for re-opening orders. already passed before s. 32-DD came to be enacted as that section was made retrospectiv0. We cannot subscribe to the view that the order of the Collector passed on March 28, 1961 became null and void merely because he failed to take into account the provisions of s. 32-DD even if by virtue of the fiction it is to be assumed that the section was on the statute book when he passed it. We are aware that in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission(') the House of Lords has held that even if a tribunal had jurisdiction to enter upon an enquiry, the fact that it overlooked an applicable mandatory provision in the course of the enquiry would denude it of its jurisdiction; but we doubt whether that principle has any application in a case when the provision overlooked was not in actual existence at the time when the inquiry was conducted and the order was 'J>assed. In other words, we do not think that we can extend the ratio of the decision in that case to a case where the provision overlooked during the course of the inquiry

(!) (1967) 3 W.L.R. 382,

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1974] 3 S.C.ll.

was not on the statute book but was begotten and brought into being subsequently, though with retrospective vitality. The imagination sometimes has to boggle before .stark reality. The order of the Collector dated March 28, 1961, cannot, therefore, be regarded as null and void.

It was a valid order when it was passed, and there was no provision in the amending Act which enabled the Collector to review it; We cannot stretch the fiction so far as to make the order null and void without further ado.

We are also not satisfied that the Collector was acting in consonance with the principles of natural justice when he passed the order dated May 20, 1963, as he gave no opportunity ta appellants 2 and 3 of being heard. The fact that the first appellant was heard before that order was passed is of no moment because the persons who were vitally concerned in re-opening the case were appellants 2 and 3. Admittedly, no notice of the prcr.eedings to re-open the case was given to them. It is not for us to speculate what defences were available to them and whether the defences available would have materially affected the des tiny of the decision. We do not think it necessary to decide in this case whether the failure to observe the rule audi a/teram partem "Would per se vitiate an crder or whether it is also necessary to show prejudice to the person affected resulting from the failure to observe the rule.

Suffice. it to say that in the present case we are of the view that if notice had been given to appellants 2 and 3. they could, at any rate, have shown the true nature and character of the judgment of the civil court upon which they relied.

It is relevant to note that the judgment itself was not challenged as collusive by the respondents. We are quite aware that the defendant in the suit in which the judgment was obtained, namely, the first appellant, did not put forward any contention. But it would be rash to jump to the conclusicl!l from the mere fact that no defence was put forward by the

first appellant in the suit that the decree was obtained collusively. U!ider s. 43 of the E.vidence Act, a person who is not a party to a judgment can show that it was obtained by fraud or collusion. No such attempt was made in this case. ·

Nor are we satisfied that every judgment which has the apparent effect of diminshing the area of land of a person would be within the ambit of s. 32-DD(b). Generally speaking. a judgment adjudicates on the rights of the parties as they existed before the suit in which it was obtained.

A judgment is an aftlrn1ation of a relation between a particular pre dicate and a particular subject. So. in law. it is the affirmation by the G law of the legal consequences attending a proved or admitted state of facts. It is always a declaration that a liability, recognised as within the jural spJ; i<; re, does or does not exist. A judgment. as the culmination of the action, declares the existence of the right, recognizes the commission of the injury. or negatives of the allegaticn of one or the other(').

A judgment of a court is an affirmation, by the authorised societal H agent of the state. speaking by warrant of law and in the name of the

(I) See Black on Judgments, Vol. 1, 2nd ed., pp. 1-2.

. -:-.

GURD!T SINGH v. PUNJAB (Mathew, /.) 901

state, of the legal consequences attending a proved or admitted state of facts. Its declaratory, determinative and adjudicatory function is its distinctive characteristic. Its recording gives an official certification to a pre-existing relation or establishes a new one on pre-existing grounds(').

The judgment of the civil court with which we are concerned, adjudicated on the rights of the parties as they existed before the suit and when it declared that the mutation was effected not with the idea of transferring the property to the first appellant but for some other reason, the effect of the declaration was that there was no real transfer of the property in favour of the first appellant and that the property remained always in the ownership of appellants 2 and 3, notwithstanding the purported transfer evidenced by the mutation in the revenue records. It is impermissible to give the wide language employed in clause (b) of s. 32-DD an unconfined operation. When a transfer or mutation is made on account of fraud or mistake and if a suit is filed for a declaration that the transfer or mutation was made on account of fraud or mistake and a judgme, nt obtained, certainly the judgment would not have the effect of diminishing the area of a person which could have been declared as a surplus area within the meaning of s. 32-DD (b). The legal effect of such a declaration would be that the transferee or the person in whose name the mutation was effected had no right in the property. The land must have belonged to the first appellant prior to the judgment in crder that it might be postulated that the judgment has the effect of diminishing the total area in his hands. To put it differently, prior to the judgment, the land must have belonged to him in order that it may be said that the effect of the judgment is to diminish the area of his holding. If the effect of the judgment is only tci declare that the land never belonged to the first appellant, it has not the effect of diminishing the area of land in his possession. We are aware that the object of this provision in an Act like the one under consideration is to prevt circumvention of its provisions by dubious and indirect methods. But that is no reason why we should put a construction upon the section which its language can hardly bear. It wculd have been open to the respondents to allege and prove that the judgment was obtained collusively. But that could have been done only after notice to appellants 2 and 3 and atfer giving them an opportunity of being heard. Therefore, to say, as the High Court has said, that no prejudice was caused to appellants 2 and 3 fci" want of an opportunity to them of being heard, is neither here nor there. We think the High Court went wrong in assuming that the Collector was right whert he ignored the judgment by his order dated May 20, 1963 on the ground that " had the effect c{ diminishing the area of the first appellant which could have been declared as his surplus.

We, therefore, set aside the order of the High Court and allow the appeal. We make no order as to costs.

S.B.W.

Appeal allowed.

~-- - (I) See Borchard, "Declaratory Judgments", 2nd ed., pp. 8~10 .

GURDIT SINGH AND OTHERS

STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS

April 10, 1974

K. K. MATHEW

Sec. 32

Sec. 32

October 30. 1956

February 14, 1961

March 28, 1961

S. 32

October 30, 1956

Section 32

Sec. 15

section 32

MarCh 28, 1961

Sec. 32

May 20, 1963

S. 32

Sec. 3200

S. K. Mehta

K. R. Nagara

M. Qamaruddill

Vinod Dhawan

V. C. Mahajan

O. P. Sharma

R. N. Sachthey

MATHEW

s. 32A

Bhatinda

s. 32

October 30,

1956

s. 15

Patiala

s. 32

High Court of Punjab

s. 32

s. 32

s. 15

s. 15

March, 28, 1961

s. 32

October 3p, 1956

s. 32

s. 32

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1974] 3 S.C.ll

s. 43

s. 32

state

s. 32

s. 32

Borchard


ANIL KUMAR BOSE

.v.

STATE OF BIHAR

April 10, 1974

[H. R. KHANN1" AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ, J

Penal .Code....:...$. 420--G11i!1J intention an essential ingredient of offence of cheating-mens rea.

The appellants. an accountant and a cashier, along with another person, were !"1.Ccused of preparing false pay bills and disbursing the amounts drawn from Lhe treasury iO a'ictitious pet'sons.

The Sessions Judge convicted and sentenced them under S. 420. read with s. 34, I.P.C. Oil appeal, the High Court confirmed the convictions and sentences passed against both of. them.

On further appeal to this Court,

Allowing the appeals,

HELD : For lhe purpos~ of holding the appellants guilty the evidence adduc_ ed mst establish beyond reasonable doubt mea11s rra on their part. [904 E]

On the evidence all that could be :oaid at the highest was that it was a faiiurc Qn the 'part of the accountant to perform his duties or to observe the rule:; of procedure laid down in he duty chart in a proper manner and may therel'ore be an administrative lapse on his part.

Without, however, anything more it will not be correct to impute guilty intention which is an essential ingredien1 of the offence of cheating. [905 D]

The material b.!fore the High Court together with the significant observations made byit against. the Superintendent and Deputy Superintendent do make out a case for giving bnefit of reasonable doubt to the cashier as well. It is not possible to hold that the requisite means J'ea had been established against him.

[906 Fl

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 223 and.224 of 1970. Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 4th August 1970 of the Patna High Court in Cr!.

Appeals Nos. 213 and 236 of 1967.

S. Ba/akrishnan, N. M. Ghatate and B. Chakravarti, for the appel !ant (in Cr!. A. No. 223/70).

Nuruddin and S. M. Singh for the appellant (in Cr!. A. No. 224 of 1970).

R. C. Prosad for the Respondent (in Cr!. A. No. 223/70).

D. Gobrurdhan for the Respcndent (in Cr!. A. No. 224/70).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

GoswAMI, J.

These appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment of the Patna High Court convicting the two appellants and another under section 420/34, Indian Penal Code. They have each been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one ye"r and a fine of Rs. 200/-, in default regorous imprisonment for six months.

Dr. Rama Shankar (PW 14) and Dr. Ram Balak-Singh (PW 4) were

A. K. BOSE v. BilIAR (Goswami,].) 903

A House Physicians and Dr: Saile'ndra Kumar (PW 5) was a Hcu>e Surgeon in the Durbhanga Medical College Hospital. Hospital House Surgeons or House Physicians are usually appointed for different sections of the Hospital by the Superintendent of the Hospital for a period of six months, January to June and July to December and their monthly emoluments total Rs. 125/-; Rs. 75/- towards stipend and Rs. 50 as

diet allowance.

. The prosecution case is that for the month of March 1963 a fictitious pay bill for Rs. 125 /- . was prepared in the name of Dr.

Rama Shankar, who had worked only for six months up to December, 1962 and had made over charge in January 1963. A similar pay bill for March 1963 was prepared for Dr. Sailandra Kumar, who was working in Ear, Nose and Throat Department, but this bill was prepared in the Pediatric Sectic1I1. Likewise another fictitious pay bi!J for the same month was prepared in the name of Dr. Ram Balak Singh, although he never joined that post and he was substituted by Dr. Rana Chandraketu. The amounts of the three aforesaid pay bills were drawn from the Treasury and disbursed to fictitious persons.

The letters of appointment and the joining reports of the various House Staff were as usual sent to the Accounts Department for preparation of the pay bills. •

Y ogesh Prasad Thakur was the Bill Clerk, who has not appealed against his conviction. The Accountant, Raghunath Prasad and the Cashier, Anil Kumar Bose, are the twci appellants before ns. Criminal Appeal No. 223 of 1970 is by Anil Kumar Bose and Criminal Appeal No. 224 of 1970 is. by Raghunath Prasad. Both these appeals are heard together and are disposed of by this common i1ldgment.

According to the rules of procedure, such pay bills used to be prepared by the Bill Clerk, checked by the Accountant and then placed for signature before the Superintendent of the Hospital. After his signature, the bills were handed over to the peon of the Hospital who took these to the Treasury and after collecting the money therefrom made over the same to the Cashier, who made relevant entries in his cash Book and other connected registers. Then, in accordance with the Acquittance Roll, the money used to be disbursed to the various persons who signed in token of receipt of the amounts on the Acquittance Roil. After disbursement of the money, a certificate used to be given by the Deputy Suprinten.dent to the effect that the money had been disbursed in his presence. ·

Some time in may 1963, in the course of preparation of the Annual Establishment Return for submission, to the Accountant General, Bihar, the Head Clerk, Bhola Nath Jha (PW 3) noticed that in the Acquittance Roll for March 1963, there were names of more Housemen than the sanctioned strength. After enqlliry by several officers at different levels, an information was lodged to the police who ultimately submitted a charge-sheet again.st the two appellants and Yogesh Prasad Thakur, the Bill Clerk. The accused were tried by

the Court of Sessions .ending in their conviction under section 420/ A 34 I.P.C. The High Court orJ appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence.

Hence these appeals by special leave.

We are not concerned with tne conviction of the Bill Clerk, Yogesh PrasadThakur, who accepted the same.

The defence of the Accountant, Raghunath Prasad, is that these bills did not pass through him and so he had no knowledge about the correctnjess of the same and they were directly put up before the Superintendent of the Hospital for his signature arid he signed them. Thereafter these were sent to the Treasury for encashment arid after that he had nothing to do with those. pay bills.

The defence of the Cashier, Anil Kumar Bose, is that he has nothing to do with the preparation of the bills. He came into the picture when the entire cash of these bills and other bills was handed over to him and he disbursed the money in accordance with the Acquittance Roll, as prepared by the Accounts Department. He did not know these three Doctors personally and h.e was not guilty of cheating.

Since the Bill Clerk's conviction stands, it may be accepted that he prepared the three fictitious biils .with ~· view to cheat the Govern~ ment.

We are now concerned whether the two appellants also are guilty under section 420 /34 I.P.C.

For the purpose of holding them guilty, the evidence adduced must establish, beyond reasonable doubt, mens rea on their part. We will, therefore, consider the case of each appellant from that aspect.

With regard to the Accountant, Raghunath Prasad, the c_vidence relied upon by the High Court for its conclusion of guilt of this appellant may be set out in its own words :

"Ext. I is the duty chart of the Accountant. The first item of this chart is 'Sole in charge of accounts and to exercise general supervision on all staff worki11g under him for the efficient working of the Accounts Section'. The third item of this chart is 'To complete the Bill Book and get it checked and signed by the Dy. Superintendent'. I must point out that this duty has not been performed by the. Accountant in the case of these disputed bills. Tne hfth item of his duty is 'To put up all salary bills prepared by the dealing assistant daily before the Superintendent'. The Superintendent, PW 9 Dr. Safdar Ali Khan has stated that the Accountant is responsible for keeping the Acquittance Roll in order ....

It is stated in paragraph 21 that the Accountant should check the b; I! and then place for signature of higher .officers.

Of course, it 1s in evidence that the Superintendent had asked the office to place all bills for his signature in the office on his table and no clerk should stand there when he

- /

A. K. BOSE v. BIHAR (Goswami,/.) 905

would sign on those bills. This direction is clearly against item No. 5 of the Duty Chart of ihe Accountant. I do not know for what purpose he made this il\novation in the pr~ cedure. But this procedure would not absolve the Accountant of his duty to check the pay bills and other bills before sending them to the Superintendent. ....... It is further interesting to note that the disputed pay bills do not bear the initial or signature of the Accountant below the signature of the Superintendent. . . . . . As the evidence shows, the Accountant did not purposely sign on these forged bills with \1 view to get himself absolved of the responsibility ....... .

As a matter of course, the work of this Accountant was to get pay bills prepared, check them and then put up before the Superintendent for his signature so that after obtaining his signature the bills may be sent to the treasury for encashment".

On the above evidence at the highest it was a failure on the part of the Accountant to perform his duties or to observe the rules of procedure laid down in the Duty Chart in a proper manner and may, therefore, be an administrative lapse on his part about which we are not o required to pronounce any opinion in this case.

Without, however, anything more we do not think it will be correct to impute to this appellant a guilty intention which is one of the essential ingredients of the offence of cheating under seetion 420 I.P.C.

Apart from this, the High Court is not correct and indeed had no material to hold that "the Accountant did not purposely sign on these forged bills with a view to get himself absolved of the responsibility". The evidence of the Superin- E tendent, which is extracted above, runs counter to that conclusion.

With regard to the other appellant, the Cashier Anil Kumar Bose, we may read what the High Court has relied upon for its finding :

"Cor.1ing to the case of the Cashier, I find that his Duty Chart is Ext. 1/1. His first duty is 'Daily receipt and disbursement of cash'. A note in this Duty Chart shows 'To be solely responsible for the performance of above duties' ....

The Deputy Superintendent (PW 6) has stated in paragraph 8 of his depo$ition that it was the duty of the Cashier to see that the payment was made to the correct or right person.

Of course, in the Duty Chart jt is not written in so many words.

But as his duty was to disburse the money, this disbursement was to be made in a bona fide manner, that is, after due enquiry about the payee, if the latter is not known to the Cashier.

In case of P.W. 5 one payment was made on the 5th April for the month of March and the next payment to a person of that name was 111ade on 10th April, that is, only after five days.

The Ca, hicr ought to have detected this if his case of bona {ides is to be accepted.

The argument advanced on his behalf is that it was not possible for him to know all the Housemen. It may be so, but he cannot be allowed to take shelter thai he paid the money without ascertaining who was the real recipient. It was also the

practice to make the payment in presence of the Deputy Superintendent and then to take his initial below the seal, that, is, rubber stamp. In these disputed cases no such signature was obtained of the Deputy Superintendent, and there is no explanation as to why this was not done.

The Deputy Superintendent has clearly stated that against these disputed entries his signature was not obtained and no rubber stamp concerning the payment was affixed •..• In my opinion, therefore, the Cashier also cannot claim to be absolved of the charge against him. It was his duty to have seen that the payment was made to the correct person. It is not clear in evidence that these payments were made in presence of the Deputy Superintendent of. the said Hospital. , The witnesses have spoken only about the usual practice".

The learned Judge of the High Court made a significant observation in the following terms :'- '

"l am constrained to remark that both, the Superintendent and the Deputy Superintendent have shown carelessness in their duties and these things came to happen because of the latitude which they had given to these employees. "Had the Superintendent been careful to see whether the signa- . ture of the Accountant was given in the pay bills, he must have detected that in the disputed pay bills there was no signature of the Accountant, and that should have aroused his suspicion about the correctness of the pay bills".

Even on the finding of the High Court, there was nothing in the Duty Chart that the duty of the Cashier was to see that the payment was made to the correct or right person. There is further no evidence that these three Doctors were known to the Cashier.

On the other hand, the High Court has not absolutely repelled the argument advanced on his behalf that it was not possible for him to know all the Housemen.

The High Court has come to an adverse conclusion against him on account of his not properly "ascertaining who was the_ real recipient" of the money before he disbursed t!Je same.

The material before the High Court together with the significant observation against the Superintendent and the Deputy Superintendent do make out a case for giving benefit of reasonable doubt to the Cashier as well.

On the e\1dence which the High Court has relied upon against hitn, it is not possible to hold that the requisite mens rea has been established against this accused.

As observed in the case of the Accountant, it may be at the highest a case of an error of judgment or breach of performance of duty which, per se, cannot be equated with dishonest intention to establish the charge under section 420 l.P.C. In the result, the appeals ·<ire allowed.

The judgment of the High Court so far .as these two appellants are concerned is set aside.

The two appellants herein are <icquitted of the charge and shall be discharged from their bail bonds.

P.B.R.

App.eals allowed.

E >

ANIL KUMAR BOSE

STATE OF BIHAR

April 10, 1974

P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ

S. 420

s. 34

I.P.C

S. Ba

N. M. Ghatate

B. Chakravarti

Nuruddin

S. M. Singh

R. C. Prosad

D. Gobrurdhan

GoswAMI

Patna High Court

section 420

Indian Penal Code

Rama Shankar

Ram Balak-Singh

Saile'ndra Kumar

Durbhanga Medical College Hospital

Rama Shankar

Sailandra Kumar

Ram Balak Singh

Rana Chandraketu

Prasad Thakur

Raghunath Prasad

Anil Kumar Bose

Bihar

Bhola Nath Jha

Yogesh Prasad Thakur

section 420

I.P.C

Yogesh PrasadThakur

section 420

I.P.C

Safdar Ali Khan

I.P.C

Anil Kumar Bose

section 420


STATE OF IDMACHAL PRADESH & ANR.

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC .

. April 10. 1974

B (A. N. RAY, C.J., Y. V. CHANDRACHUD AND V. R. KRISHNA !YER, JJ.j

Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1956, ~·. 82(6)-Punjab officers allocated to Himachal Prade.sh-Mode of integration of Punjab o{!icers and Himachal Pradesh officers.

The. app.el!ants were upgraded fro~ the post of Sub-Inspectors to Inspectors of. tax<it1on in the for!ller State of PunJab on 1st April, 1966.

They were ullocat ed tQ the State of H1machal Pradesh on 1st November, 1966, the appointed day under the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966. The respondents were Excise Sub- In'.:.pectors in Himachal Pradesh on that date.

On 14th February, 1967, the Central Government gave instructions for equating posts for the purpose of integration .in the services.

On the 26th Arri!, 1969, th;! Central Govern1nent wrote to the State Government that 45 posis of Excise and Taxatfon Sub- Inspect?fS in Himac.hal Pradesh may be abolished and in their place 33 posts of Excise and Taxation Jnspectors may be created. The State Government gave effect to the directions of the Central Government and upgraded the Excise Sub- Inspectors to Inspectors, with effect from 1st I\fay, 1969. Thus, the upgrading was done with the sanction of the Central Government in accordance with the provisions of s. 82(6) of the Act. On 29th May, 1971 the State of Himachal Pradesh, by an execulive decision. changed the date of upgrading of the respondellts from 1st May, 1969 to tst April, 1966.

The State prepared two seniority lists in one of which one of the, appellants was mentioned along with the officers of Himachal Pradesh, and in the other~ the other appellants were shown as juniors to the officers of Himacha1 Pradesh.

The State Government also appointed four Excise Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh as Assistant Excise and Taxation Officers.

The appellants challenged (a) the change in the date of promoti6n of the officers of Himachal Pradesh to 1st April, 1966, (b) the two seniority lists and

(c) the four promotions as Assistant Excise and Taxation Officers.

The High Court set aside the two seniority lists and the four promotions and gave the follo\ving directions regarding the preparation of seniority lists, namely,

(i) that the appellants should be equated with the Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh that is. that all inspectors of Himachal Pradesh should be taken as Excise and Taxation Inspectors and that their cadre should be taken as joint;

(ii) that the date of continuous ani:iointment in an equated post shall govern the seniority, (iii) that specific approval of the Central Government is to be takenunder s. 82(6) if the date of upgradation is to be fixed as 1st April, 1966; and

(iv) that the rules of promotion to th~ Posts of Assistant Excise and Taxation Officers should be prepared after getting the approval of the Central Government.

Jn appeal to this Court, the appelTants contended that the directions given regarding the preparation of seniority lists should be set aside. on the ground that the appellants were deprived of their quota of promotion under r.6 of Class 111-A Punjab Rules, 1956, that the posts of Excise Inspectors and Taxation Inspectors belonged to different cadres, that the appellants belonged to the Taxation Cadre, and that for oromotion under the Punjab Rules, 3 years continuous ser- H vice as Inspectors was sufficient.

HELD : (I) If the State Government of B.imachal Prdesh wished to cbang.r the date of upgradation to 1st April, 1966 the State Government cannot do so without the sanction of the Central Government under s. 82(6) of the Act.

The State of Himachal Pradesh not only set at naught the direction of the

Central Government, but by givins a retrospective validation to the date up- A gradation, changed the con 'ltions of services of the appellants to their dis .1dvantage.

Hence lhe direction :hat if the State Government wanted to alter the date of upgrdation of posts of Himachal Pradesh Sub-Inspector;; to 1st April,

1966, i.he :; ancbon of the Central Government should have been obtained is correct. [912 D-E, 913 HJ

(2) The other direction given by the High Court that the rules for promotion lo the post of Excise and Taxation Inspector shall be finalised after getting the B approval Of the Central Government is also correct. [913 H]

(3) If the State Government wishes to equate the appellant~ with lhe Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh the State of llimachal Pradesh will have 1.0 follow the provisions of the State Reorganisation Act in that b::half.

The date of continuous appointment of appellants and the respondents in the equated posts will also have to 00 in compliance with the provisions of the Act.

The appellants were also not heard regarding equation of posts and with regard to the seniority lists.

Therefore, all facts and circumstances affecting the servict: C conditions of Jnsnectors of both the States will have to be placed by lhe State Government befOre the Central Government for the decision and approval of the latter under s. 82(6). [912 E-F; 913 E-FJ

CtVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :-Civil Appeals Ne$. 1324 and 2648 of 1972. "'

From the Judgment and Order dated the 10th August, 1971 of D tho Himachal Pradesh High Court at Simla in Civil Writ Petition No. 113 of 1970.

V. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant (in C.A. 1324 /72 and for respondents 1-3 (ia C. A. 2648).

S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja, M. Qamuruddin for the respondents E 2-Jl (in C.A. 1324/72> and for the appellant (in C. A. 2648).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-

RA Y, C. J.-These two appeals are by certificate from the common judgment dated 10 August, 1971 of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh.

The State and the Taxation Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh arc the appellants inl Civil Appeal No. 1324 of 1972. The ten appellants i11 Civil Appeal No. 2648 of 1972 are Taxation Inspectors of the former State of Punjab. They were allocated to Himachal Pradesh because of reorganisation of the State of Punjab. The first seven appellants were confirmed as Taxation Inspectors.

The other three appellants were Taxation Inspectors but were not confirmed in that post.

The appellants in the former State -of Punjab were SubInspectors of Taxation. On 1 April, 1966 the appellants were upgraded from the pos! of Sub-Inspectors to Inspectors of Taxation. When the appellants "vere allocated to Himachal Pradesh on the appointed day on 1 Novemher, 1966 they were Inspectors of Taxation.

The respondents were Excise Sub-Inspectors in Himachal Pradesh on the appoin!ed day.

The respondents were upgraded from the position of Excise JnS P'ctors to Inspec'ors with effect from 1 May, 1969. That upgrading

\ i

A was with the sanction and under the directions of the Central Government iii accordance with the provisions of section 82 ( (;) of the Piinjab Reorganisation Act 1966 referred to as the Act. On 29 May, 1971 the State of Himacbal Pradesh by an executive. decision changed the date of upgrading of the respondents from 1 May, 1969 IQ l. April,

1966. This 11pgriiding was done by the State of Himachal Pradesh ·

8 without sanction and direction of the Central Go\'errunent under section 82 (6) of the Act.

The preent question which falls for consideration is whether the conditions of servi"C of the appellll!ltS have been changed to their disadvantage by the executive decision of the State of Himachal Pradesh on 29th May, 1971 tq upgrade the posts of Sub, Inspectors of C Excise Departent of Himachal Pradesh to Inspectors with effect from 1 April, 1966. The corollary to this question is whether the executive decision of the State of Himachill Pradesh is invalid by reason of noncompliance with the provisions contained in section 82 ( 6) of the Act.

The appellants impeached the two seniority lists prepared by U1e State.

In one of the seniority lists appellant Jadgish Ram has been mentioned along with Excise Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh. The other appellants who were confirmed Taxation Inspectors have en shown in the second impeached seniority list as juniors to several unconfirmed Sub-Inspectors of Excise and Taxation belonging to Himachal Pradesh.

The appellants contend that they never worked on the Excise side.

They further allege that their ca<lte was different from . that of Taxation Inspectors.

The appellants imP, ugned the second seniority list on the ground that the Excise and Taxation Sub- Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh were treated at par with Taxation Inspectors of the former State of Punjab. In the sec.end seniority list there is a note to the effect that Excise and Taxation Sub.JtllpeCtors of Hima<:hal Pradesh WC!'.• being promoted and confirmed with effect from 1 April, 1966, add their cases were sent to the .Ministry of Home Affairs for necessary orders. The appellants impeached this note as illegal.

The contention of the appellants is that the promotion and confirmation of Excise Sub-Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh could not take place with. retrospective effect so as to prejudice the rights of the appellants.

 The grievance of the appellants is that the seniority list of Taxption Inspectors should have been prepared separately. The appellan!s contend that while they were in the former State of Punjab they belonged to Taxation Cadre and there was a quota fixed in the Punjab Excise and Taxation Service Cass III-A Rules 1936 in their favour for promotion as. Excise and Taxation Officers. The appellants cont.end that they have been deprived of this quota benefit as they were placed in a joint list along with unconfirmed Excises illllpeCtotll of H Himachal Pradesh.

The .state of Hima1:hal Pradesh appointed four Excise 111$1l1Cklrs as Assistant Exicse and Taxation Officers. The appellants challenged

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1974] 3 S.C.R. ~'. those four. appointments and contended. that the benefit of promotion A saould have been given. to the appellants. .

The principal contention of the appeliants is that section s2(6) of the Act prohibits any change in the conditions of service of th.e appellants which are disadvantageous to them without prior sanction of the Central Government. The State of Himachal Pradesh after the reorganisation on 1 Novemb", 1966 asked for directions of the Central Government with regard to tipgradation of Excise and Taxation Sub- Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh. . ·

The Central Government gave instructions in a letter dated 14 February, 1967 for equating posts for the purpose of integration in the services. The four factors for determining the equation of a post are : first, the nature and duties of a post; second, the responsibilities and powers exercised by the officer holding the post and the extent of territorial or other charge .held or responsibilities discharged; third, the minimum qualifications, if any, prescribed for recruitment to the post; and, fourth, the salary of the post. The Central Governmnet in the said letter dated 14 February, 1967 further said that two factors would be taken into account for determination of relative seniority.

First is the len!gth of continuous service whether temporary or perma nent in the equivalent post; this should exclude periods for which an appointment is held in a purely stop-gap or fortuitous arrangement.

Second is the age of the person.

Other factors being equal seniority may be determined on the basis of age.

It is also important to consider the letter dated 26 April, 1969 written by the Central Government to the State Government. There were 45 posts of Excise and Taxation Sub-Inspectors in Himachal Pradesh. The Central Government stated that those 45 posts of Sub-

Inspectors might be abolished and in their place 33 posts of Excise . and Taxation Inspectors might be created. The new posts of Excise and Taxation Inspectors were to be 'offered to the existing incumbents of the posts of Excise a, nd Taxa'ion Sub-Inspectors in order of seniority.

The Central Government stated that the order would take effect from 1 May, 1969: ·

The State, Government by letter dated 19 July, 196.9 gave effect to the directions of the Central Government. The Lieutenant Governor was pleased to accord sanction to the creation of 33 permanent posts of Excise Inspectors in the scale of Rs. 150-10-200/10-300 in the Excise and Taxation Department, Himachal Pradesh with effect from 1 May, 1969.. . . .

Consequent upon the abolition of 12 permanent pbsts of Taxation Sub-Inspectors under the Excise and Taxation Department, Himachal Pradesh with effect from 1 May, 1969, 8 Excise and Taxation Sub Inspectors were rendered surplus and they were appointed as Taxation Inspectors. against 8 temporary posts of Inspectors created for. survey work.

E )

::I'he Central .Government directed and. sanctioned that Sub-Inspectors orHjmachal Pradesh .could be promoted as Inspectors with effect from 1 May, 1969. The State of Himachal Pradesh implemen, ted that .direction of the Central Government. Later on the St.ate of Himachal Pradesh superseded the previous order and promoted Su 1>·

Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh as Inspectors with effect from 1 April,

1~66. The 'appellants contend that the State Qf Himachal Pradesh thereby not only violated the direction of the Central Government under section 82 of the Act but also changed the conditions of service of the appellants to their disadvantage without obtaining the sancti9n of the Central Goverpment.

One of the contentions of the appellants in the High Court was that in Himachal Pradesh the posts of Excise Inspectors and Taxation Inspectors bolonged to different cadres. The appellants contended that in Himachal Pradeh posts were sanctioned separately for the Taxation and the Excise Departments. The State on the other hand contended that there was one common cadre of Excise and Tax.tation Inspectors.

The High Court found that the apP, Cllants belonged to the separate cadre of .Taxation .Inspectors at the t1ine when they were a!lgcated to Himachal Pradesh.

Jn Punjab it is also found by the High Court as n fact that there were two cadres and the appellants did not belong to the cadre of Excise Inspectors.

The appellants relied on Rule 6 of Class III'A Punjab Rules, 1956.

Under that rule when any vacancy occurs the Government E shall determine in what manner it shall be filled provided that 50 per 'cent of the vacancies shall be filled by direct appointment, 25 % by promotion of Taxation Inspectors, 12i% by transfer of members of the ministerial establishment of the Excise and Taxation Department.

The appeliants, therefore, contend that 25 % promotion quota of the post of Assistant Excise and Taxation Officers should go to Taxation Inspectors and in this manner the Excise Wpectors could not be F p1omoted.

Further, the appellants contend .that the date of substantive appointment should be taken. into consideration for determination of seniority.

The Himachal Pradesh Excise and Taxation Department Inspectorate Class Ill Service Recruitment, Promotion and certain Conditions of Service Rules, 1963 are relied on by the appellants. Rule 12(2) states that subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3), permanent officers of each grade shall be ranked senior to persons who are officiating in that grade. Rule 9 of the Punjab Rules, 1943 on which the apoellants relied .sta'ed thar the seniority of members of the services in so far as eac:1 class of post specified in Appendix 'A' therefo is concerned. be determined. by the date of their substantive. aooointment to a nost in that cla% provided that if two or more members are confirmed in tliai same class of pest on the same date, their seniority shall be determined by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner w.hose decision hall .be final. ·

15-'.~ ISup.Cl/75

912 SUPREM~ COURT UPORtS [1974] 3 s.c.11.

The contention of the appellants is that under their conditioal of service when they weto allocated to Himachal Pradesh, on ti" *!'P"i&. ,. ted. date 1 November, 1966 they were conlirmed Taxation Inspectors with effect from 1 April, 1966 in t~ former State of Punjab. In accordance with the directions of the Central Government contained in the letter dated 14, February, 1967 the appellants contend that tb; date of sub; tantive appointment, viz., 1 April, 1966 is therefore to be considered for seniority as well as promotion. For promotion the appellants contended that Class III-A Punjab Rules provided three years continuous service as Inspector to be sufJicient. Confirmed Inspectors would be senior to unconfirmed Inspectors. In. this background the appellants contend that the seniority list wrongly shows that appellant No. 1 was placed along with the Excise Inspectors and in the other seniority list all Inspectors of Punjab were equated with Sub-lnspectors of Himachal Pradesh. Further, it is contended that Sub-Inspectors of 1-limachal Pradesh who were unconfirmed were made senior to the appellants.

On behalf of the State it was contended that the employees _of Hima. cha! Pradesh could be given the same benefit of Inspectors by varying the conditions of service which were to their benefit and the sane- D lion of the Central Government under section 82(6) of the Act would not be required for that purpose. It is also said that the conditions of service which govern the appellants who were employees of tho

former S!nte of Punjab were not varied to their disadvantage. This contention is utterly unsound. The seniority list bas been prepared by giving the employees of Himachal Pradesh the benefit of the date of upgradation as 1 April, 1966. The Government of India sanctioned E the date 1 May, 1969. The State of Himachal Pradesh is not only setting at naught the direction but is giving a retrospective validation

to the date of upgradation. That is a lll'atter which changes the conditions of service of the appell1111ts. The appellants are deprived of their continuous period of service. The appellants are deprived of their quota of promotion.

The appellants were not heard with regard to equatiOll!l of posts of Excise Inspectars and Taxation Inspectors. The F appellants were not heard with regard to their seniority list.

The appellants, therefore, rightly contend that the conditions of service applicable to them before the appointed day have beerl altered to their disadvantage without the previous approval of the Central Gomnment. Again, if the State of Himaeha! Pradesh wants to equate

Taxation Inspec!ors with Excise Inspectors the approval of the Cen- G tral Go-nment will be required because the appellants may represent their case of promotion quota under these Rules.

The High Court correctly held that if the State Government wanted to alter the upgradation of the pos!s of Himachal Pradesh Sub-Inspeo. tors with effect from I April,. 1966, the sanction of the Central Gov

crmncnt was to be obtained. The High Court rightly set aside the II exec-utive decision changing the date of promotion of Himachal Pra deSh Snb-Tnspectors from 1 May, 1969 to 1 April, 1966 and !he seniority lists as well as the four promotions.

H. P STAtE v. UNION (Ra;)', CJ.) 913

TITe a!'pellants contended that the directions given by the High \ Co11rt Witlr reprd to preparation of seniority lists should be t ~.

The dittctions given by the High (:ourt were these. The appellants should be equated with the Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh and thereby the High Court held that all Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh; 'lihould be taken as Excise and Taxation Inspectors and their cadre should be taken as joint. The second direction is that the date of c<1Dtinuous appointment in an equated pot shall goern the seniority as provided in the letter dated 14 February, 1967 of the Central Government, The third direction is that specific approval of the Central Government is to be taken under section 82(6) of the Act if the date of promotion or upgradation from the post of Sub-Inspectors is fixed as 1 April,

1966. The fouirth direction is that the Rules for promotion to the posts of Assistant Excise and Taxation Officers should be prepared and the same shall be finalised after getting the approval of the Central Government.

The appellants main contention is that there were two distinct cadres of Inspectors in Hiinachal pradesn before reorganisation, viz., one cadre of Taxation Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors and the other D cadre of Excise Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors. The respondents on the other hand contended that there was 'one .cadre in Himachal Pradesh.

It was also the contention of the respondents that there was unification' of cadres in Himachal Pradesh before the reorganisation of the State.

If the State of Himachal Pradesh. wishes to change the _date of upgradation of Himachal Pradesh Sub-Inspectors to 1 April, 1966 the State Government canilot do so without sanction of the Central Government under section' 82 ( 6) of the .. Act. If the State Government wishes to equate the appellants with the Inspectors of Himchal Pradesh the State of Himachal Pradesh will have to follow the• provisions of the Slates Reorganisation Act in that behalf. The date of continuous appointment of the appellants and the respondents in the equated 'post will also have to be in compliance with the provisions of the States Reorganisation Act.

All facts and circumstances affecting the service conditions of Inspectors of both the States will have .to be placed by the S•ate Government before the Central Government for decision of the Central G Government whether it should give approval .under section 82(6)-of

the Act. to upgradation of Sub Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh with effect from 1 April 1966.

The direction given by the High Court that the State Government shall obtain approval of the Central Government under section 82(6) of the Act in regard to the date of Promotion or upgradatiori' ot Sub- H Inspectors is correct and upheld.

The other direction given by th~ .

High Court that the Rules for promotion to the post of Excise and'· Taxation Inspectors shall be finalised after getting the approval of the Central Government is correct and upheld.

For these reasons the appeal of the State is . dismissed. The appeaJ. .of the appellants is accepted in part. Equation of the appellants with t1ie Inspectors of HimacbaJ". Pradesh and the date of continuoµs appointment in equated posts can. be only in accordance with the wovisions. of. the Punjab Reorganisation Act. parties wHI pay a0<L!>ear their own costs

V.; P.S.

Appeal dismissed.

STATE OF IDMACHAL PRADESH & ANR

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC

April 10. 1974

B (A. N. RAY, C.J.

Y. V. CHANDRACHUD

Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1956

Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966

Central Government

s. 82(6)

29th May, 1971

State of Himachal Pradesh

Himachal Pradesh

Himacha1 Pradesh

s. 82(6)

Punjab Rules, 1956

State Government of B.imachal Prdesh

s. 82(6)

State of Himachal Pradesh

State of llimachal Pradesh

s. 82(6)

V. C. Mahajan

R. N. Sachthey

S. K. Mehta

K. R. Nagaraja

M. Qamuruddin

RA Y

section 82

Piinjab Reorganisation Act 1966

29 May, 1971

State of Himacbal Pradesh

Central Go\'errunent

section 82

1 April, 1966

State of Himachill Pradesh

section 82

Jadgish Ram

.state of Hima1:hal Pradesh

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1974] 3 S.C.R.

1 Novemb", 1966

14 February, 1967

26 April, 1969

1 May, 1969

State, Government

19 July, 196.9

Central

State of Himachal Pradesh

State Qf Himachal Pradesh

section 82

Central Goverpment

Himachal Pradeh

Punjab Rules, 1956

Punjab Rules, 1943

Punjab

section 82(6)

Government of India

State of Himaeha! Pradesh

section 82(6)

Himchal Pradesh

States Reorganisation Act

section 82(6)

section 82(6)

High Court that the Rules

Punjab Reorganisation Act