ll4

LOKNATH PADHAN

BIRENDRA

KUMAR SAHU January 1.6. 1974

[P. N.

BHAGWATI AND l'. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.)

Representation of the People Act (43 ofl951) s. 116A-Electlon petiti'on challe,.g· ing respondent's electlon to State Legislative Assembly-Dismissed-Dissolution of Assembly pending appeal to this Court-Effect on appeaf.

The appellant filed an ekction petition challenging the election of the respondent to the State legislative Assembly alleging that there was a substising contract, entered into by the respondent in the course of his trade and business, with the State Government, for the e'l(ecution of works undertaken by the Government, and that therefore he was disqualified under s .. 9A of the Representation of the People Act,

1951. The High Court dismissed the petition holding that the contracts were not undertaken by the respondent in his individual capacity in the course of his trade and business but were on behalf of the Gram Panchayat of which he was the Naib Sarpanch, and also that the contracts had been fully carried out by the respondent long before the date of his nomination and that therefore, the Explanation to s. 9A was appli cable and took his case out of tLe section. While the appeal was pending in thi'i C-0urt the State Legislative Assembly was dissolved under An. 174(2)(6) of the Con .. stitution. The respondent raised the preliminary objection at the hearing of the appeal that in view of the dissolution of the assembly it was academic to decide whether or not the respondent was disqualified under the section. .o

HELD : The law relating to abatement of election petitions is exhaustively dealt with in Chap.· VI of Part IV flf the Act and since there is nothing in the Act which provides for abatement of election petitions when the legislature is dissolved the dis

o1ution does not result .in the abatement of an election petition. But the question in the present case is not whether the appeal has abated on the dissolution of the State Assembly, but whether in view of the dissolution of the State Assembly, it has become academic to decide the appeal. In the instant case, even if it is found that the respondent was disqualified under s. 9A it would have no practical consequence, because invalidation of his election after the dissolution of the State Assembly, unlike the case of invalidation for corrupt practice, woulJ have no effect whatsoever. Therefore, the State Legislative assembly having been dissolved during the pendency of the appeal it is now wholly academic to consider whether the respondent was disqualified under s. 9A at the date of his nomination and since that is the only ground on which the election of. the respondent is challanged it would be fl' tile to hear the appeal on n1erits. [ll7D-E; 1200] ·

ShN1dhan Singh v. Mahan Lal, [1959} 3 S.C.R. 417, followed.

CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDlCTION : Civil Appeal No. 644 of 1972 From the judgment and order dated the !st February 1972 of the Orissa High Court in Election Petition No. 3 of 1971.

Gobind Das, and P. H. Parekh for the appellant.

Narayan Nettar, V.J. Francis and B. Kanta Rao, fo~ the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BHAGWATI J.-This ajli'eal is preferred under s. 116A of the Representation of.the Peo;>le Act, 1951 (hereinaf; er referred to as the Act) agamst the Judgment of the Onssa High Court d1smissmg an election petition filed by the appellant challenging the election of the respon- H dent to the Orissa Legislative Assembly from Melchhamunda constituency in Sambhali)ur di; trict of the State of Orissa.

LOKNATH v. B. K. SAHU (Bhagwati, !.) 11 5

The facts giving rise to the appeal may be briefly stated as follows: There were general elections to the Orissa Legislative Assembly sometimes in the beginning of March 1971. The last date for filing nomination papors was fixed on 7th February, 1971 and on or before that date the appellant and the respondent both filed their respective nomination papers for the seat from Melchhamunda constituency.

On 9th February, 1971, which was the date fixed for scrutiny of the nomination papers, the appellant raised an objection against the nomination of the respondent on the ground that he was disqualified under s. 9A of the Act. Section 9A provides inter a/ia that a person shall be disqualified if, and for so long as, there subsists a contract entered into by him in the course of his trade or business with the appropriate Government for the execution of any works undertaken by that Government.

There is an explanation to this section which says that where a contract has been fully performed by the person by whom it has been entered into with the appropriate Government, the contract shall be deemed not to subsist by reason only of the fact that the Government has not performed its part of the contract either wholly or in part. The allegation of the appellant was that the respondent had entered into five contracts with the Government of Orissa for the executio11 of works undertaken by that Government and these contracts were still subsisting and the respo11dent was, therefore, disqualified from contesting the election under s. 9A. This objection raised on behalf of the appellant was overruled by the Returning Officer and the nomination of the respondent was accepted. The polling thereafter took place on 5th March, 1971 and the respondent was declared elected on I Ith March,

1971. The appellant thereupon filed an election petition ill the High Court of Orissa calling in question the election of the respondent on the ground that he was disqualified from bdng elected as a member by reason of s. 9A. The case of the appellant, as laid down in the election petition, \vas that, at the date of nomination five contracts \\'ere subsisting between the respondent and the Government of Orissa in respect of the following works entrusted through the Gaisilet Panchayat Samiti : (1) construction of the Mahila Samiti building at Borumunda,

(2) construction of the community recreation centre at Borumunda,

(3) construction of the village level lady worker's quarter at Borumunda, (4) construction of a package village level worker's quarter at Gaisilet and (5) construction of the Borumunda canal, and on account of the subsistance of these five contracts the disqualification under s. 9A was attracted. Though the appellat)t relied on subsistance of these five contracts in the election petition, he conceded at the time of the arguments that contracts (4) and (5) may not be taken into account and rested his case solely on the ground that contracts (I) to (3) were subsisting between the respondent and the Government of Orissa.

The respondent denied that he had entered into any of these contracts with the Government of Orissa in the course of his trade or business or that any such contract was subsisting between him and the Government of Orissa at the date of nomination. The respondent aliened that the works undertaken by him under contracts (I) to (3) were part of the Second Five Year Plan and they were to be carried out by the Gram Panchayat on the basis of 50% subsidy from the Government and 50 % contribution by the people in terms of money or labour and

it was as leader of the people and Naib Sarpanch that he had under- A taken these works on behalf of the Gram Panchayat and not in his individt:al capacity in course of his trade or business. The contention of the respondent, therefore, was that s. 9A had no application in his case. It was also urged by the respondent that in any event these contracts had been fully performed by him before the date of nomination and his case was, therefore, covered by the Explanation to s. 9A.

The respondent also contended in the alternative that even if the stand B taken by the Block Development Officer on behalf of the Gaisilet Panchayat Samiti was correct, namely, that the respondent had failed to carry out his obligations under thse contracts and the Government of the Gaisilet Partchayat San1iti. had, therefore, becon1e entitled to recover the amount advanced to the respondent and for that purpose issued the requisitions for certificate of recovery on 8th January, 1967, the case of the respondent was outside s. 9A because in that .

C event the contracts were discharged by breach prior to 8th January, 1967 and were no longer subsisting at the date of nomination. The High Court trying the election petition took the view that the contracts in question were not undertaken by the respondent in his individual capacity in course of his trade or business, but they were undertaken on behalf of the Gram Panchayat in terms of the schemes envisaged in the Se"ond Five Year Plan as the respondent was the leader of the D people and Naib Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, and the disqualification under s. 9A was, therefore, not attracted in the case of the respondent. The High Court also held, relying on the evidence of two witnesses, that the contracts had been fully carried out by the respondent Jong before the date of nomination and the Explanation was, therefore, applicable and that took the case of the respondent out of the inhibition of s. 9A. The view taken by the High Court E thus was that the respondent was not disqualified from contesting the election under s. 9A and on this view the High Court dismissed the election petition. Hence the present appeal under s. l 16A of the Act.

Whilst the appeal was pending in this Court, the Orissa Legislative Assembly was dissolved by the Governor on 3rd March, 1973 under F Art. 174(2)(b) of the Constitutioi1. The respondent, therefore, raised a preliminary objection at the hearing of the appeal before us that in view of the dissolution of the Orissa Legislative Assembly, it was acadeinic to decide whether or not the respondent was disqualified from being a candidate under s. 9A and we should accordingly decline to hear the apal on merits. The argu1nent of the respondent \Vas that unless there is a living issue between the parties the Court would not G proceed to decide it : it would not occupy its time by deciding what is purely an academic question which has no sequitur so far as the position of the parties is concerned. Here, contended the respondent. even if the appellant was able to satisfy the Court that on the date of the nomination, the respondent was disqualified under s. 9A, it would be a futile exercise, because the Orissa Legislative Assembly being dissolved, the setting aside of the election of the respondent would H have no meaning or consequence and hence the Court should refuse to embark on a <liscussion of the merits of the question arising in the appeal. We think there is great force int''' preliminary contention

.,,-,

LOKNATII v. B. K. SAHU (Bhagwati, J.) 117

urged on behalf of the respondent. It is a well settled practice recognised and followed in .India as well as England that a Court should not undertake to decide an issue, unless it is a living issue between the partios. If an issue is purely academic in that its decision one way or the other would have no impact on the position of the parties, it would be waste of public time and indeed not proper exercise of authority for the Court to engage itself in deciding it.

Speaking of the House of Lords, Viscount Simon, L.C. said in the course of his speech in Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Jervis (I) "I do not think that it would be a proper exercise of the authority which this House possesses to hear appeals if it occupies time in this case in deciding an acade- . mic question, the answer to which cannot affect the respondent in any

way", and added : "-it is an essential quality of an appeal fit to be disposed of by this House that there should exist between the parties to a matter in actual controversy which the House undertakes to decide as a living issue". This statement must apply equa1ly in case of exercise of appellate jurisdiction by this Court. It would be clearly futile and meaningless for the Court to decide an academic question, the answer to which wquld not affect the position of one party or the other. The Court would not engage in a fruitless exercise. It would refuse to decide a question, unless it has a bearing on some right or liability in controversy between the parties. If the decision of a question would be wholly ineffectual so far as the parties are concerned, it would be not only unnecessary and pointless but also inexpedient to decide . it and the Court would properly.decline to do so. In the present case, the Orissa Legislative Assembly being dissolved, it has become academic to consider whether on the date when the nomination was filed, the respondent was disqualified under s. 9A. Even if it is found that he was so disqualified, it would have no practical 9onsquence, because the invalidation of his election after the dissolution of the Orissa Legislative Assembly would be meaningless and ineffectual. It would not hurt him. The disqualification would only mean that he was not entitled to contest the election on the date when he filed his nomination. It would have .no consequences operating in future. It is pos- F sible that the respondent had a subsisting contract with the Govern- . ment of Orissa at the date of nomination, but that contract may not be subsisting now. The finding that the respondent was disqualified would be based on the facts existing at the date of nomination and it would have no relevance so far as the position at a future point of time -· -- may be concerned, and threfore, in view of the dissolution of the Orissa

. Legislative Assembly; it would have no practical interest for either of the parties. Neither would it benefit the appellant nor should it affect the respondent in any practical sense and it would be wholly academic to consider wl1ether the respondent was disqualified on the date of nomination.

The position might be different if the allegation against the respondent were of corrupt practice. Then it would not be academic to consider whether or not the respondent was guilty of the corrupt practice charged against him, because. a finding of

{I) [1944! A. C. 111.

corrupt practice has serious consequences. If the respondent is found guilty of corrupt practice during the election, not only his election would be declared void, but he would also incur certain electoral disqualifications.

Sec. SA provides that a person found guilty of a corrupt practice by an order under s. 99 shall be disqualified for a priod of six years from the date on which that order takes effect. The purity of elections is of utmost importance in a democratic set up and the law has, therefore, taken serious note of practice in elections and laid down a disqualification for a period of six years on an order being made by the High Court recording a finding of corrupl practice at the time of disposing of the election petition. It is, therefore, obvious -that when a corrupt practice is charged against the respondent in art election petition. the trial of the election petition must proceed to its logical end and it should be determmed whether the corrupt practice was committed by the respondent or not.

As pointed out by this Court in Sh:odhan Si11gh v. Mohan Lal (1) "no one can be allowed to corrupt the course of an election and get away with it either by resigning his membership or because of the fortuitous circumstance of the assembly having been dissolved. The public are interested in seeing that those who had corrupted the course of an election are dealt \Vith in accordance \Vith law." The decision of the question whether corrupt practice was committed by the respondent or not would not, therefore, be academic and the Court would have to decide it, even if in the n1eantin1e the Legislature is dissolved. That was precisely the view taken by this Court in Sheodhan

Sinh v. Mohan Lal (l). In that case the election of the respondent to the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly was challenged by the appellant in an election petition on the ground that the respondent was guilty. of corrupt practice during the election. The Uttar Pradesh LegislatiYe Assembly was dissolved by the President during the pendency of the election petition before the High Court and a preliminary objection was, therefore, raised on behalf of the respondent that the election petition had ceased to be maintainable on account of the dis~ solution of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly. The High Court rejected the preliminary objection but on merits it took the view that corrupt practice was not proved and accordingly dis1nissed the election petition. The appellant thereupon preferred as appeal to this Court and in the appeal also the same prelin1inary objection was repeated on beholf of the respondent. This Court negatived the preliminary objection. Hegde, J., speaking on behalf of the Court emphasised that the charge against ·.., the respondent was of corrupt practice and pointed out that if the creation of the appellant that the respondent \Vas gujJty of corrupt practice \Vas found to be true, then not only his election would be declared void but he would also be liable to incur certain sectoral disqualification, and therefore. in the interest ofpuritv of elec:ions it was necessary that "those who had corrupted the cours~ of an election are dealt with in accordance with law", and this purpose would stand defeated if the election petition were held to become infructuous on the dissolution of the Assembly. The learned Judge then proceeded to consider the relevant elections of the Act and after

'(1) [19591 3 S.C.R. 417.

'LOKNAm v. B. ii. SAHU (Bhaf{Wati, !.) 119

referring to them, summarisd his conclusion by saying : "From the above provisions it is seen that in an election petition the contest is really between the constituency on the one side and the person or persons complained of on the other. Once the machinery of the Act is moved by a candidate or an elector, the carriage of the case does not entirely rest with the petitioner. The reason for the elaborate pro, isions noticed by us earlier is to ensure to the extent possible that the persons who offered the election law are not allowed to avoid the consequences of their misdeeds." It will he seen that the emphasis in this decision was on the fact that the charge against the respondent was of corrupt practice and it was in this context that the Court held that where corrupt practices is alleged against the respondent in an election petition, the dissolution of the Legislature during the pendency of the election petition does not render it infructuous. We fail to see how the ratio of this decision can have any application in the pres, ent case.

Here there is no charge of any corrupt practice against the respondent.

The 011ly ground on which the election of the respondent is sought to be invalidated is that he was disqualified at the date of nomination under s. 9A. This disqualification does not involve any act corrupting the course of an election. It has no other consequence than that of making the particular election void. It does not entail any electoral disqualification for the future. There is, therefore, no analogy between the two situations and this decision cannot be called in aid by the appellant.

The appellant, however, relied on the following observations in this decision and contended that these observations clearly lay down that an election petition does not become infructuous on the dissolution of the Legislature and the petioner is entitled to have the decision of the Court upon it, notwithstanding the dissolution of the Legislature : ·

"The election petitions in this country are solely regulated by statutory provisions. Hence unless it is shown that some statutory provision directly or by necessary implication prescribes that the pending election petitions stand abated beca"se of the dissolution of the Assembly, the contention of the respondent cannot be accepted".

''.The law relating to withdrawal and abatement of election petitions is exhaustively dealt with in Chapter JV of Part VI of the Act. In deciding whether a petition has abated or not we cannot travel outside the provision providing for the dropping of an election petition for any reason other than those mentioned therein. The act does not provide for the abatement of an election petition either when the returned candidate whose election is challenged resigns or when the assembly is dissolved. As the law relating to abatements and withdrawal is exhaustively dealt with in the Act itself no reliance can be placed on the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code nor did the learned Counsel for the respondent bring to our notice any provision in the Civil Procedure Code under which the election petition can be held to have abated"

We fail to see how these observations can be of any help to the appellant. They deal with a totally different contention than the one advanced before us. It may be noted that in this case the charge against the respondent was of corrupt practice and it could not, therefore, be successfully urged on behalf of the respondent that the decision of the question arising in the appeal had become academic on the dissolution of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly. The only contention which the respondent was, therefore, left with and which he could possibly advance was that an election petition must be held to abate on the dissolution of the Legislature and it was this contention which was dealt with and negatived in these observations.

This Court pointed out that the law relating to abatement of election petitions is exhaustively dealt with in Ch. IV of Part VI of the Act and since there is nothing in the Act which provides for abatement of an election petition when the Legislature is dissolved, it must be held that the dissolution of the Legislature does not result in abatement of the election petition. We express our whole hearted concurrence with this view. But the question before us is not whether the appeal in the present case abated on the dissolution of the Orissa Legislative Assembly.

That is not the contention raised on behalf of the respondent. The respondent does not say that the appeal has abated and must, therefore, be dismissed. What the respondent contends is that in view of the dissolution of.the Orissa Legislative Assembly, it has become academic to decide the appeal and hence we should decline to hear it. That is a wholly different contention which is not covered by the observations quoted above. We do not, therefore, think this decision throws any light on the 0 c::tention raised before us. It does not compel us to take a different view from the one we are inclined to take on principle.

We are, therefore, of the view that, the Orissa Legislative Assembly being dissolved during the pendency ofthis appeal, it is now wholly academic to consider whether the respondent was disqualified under s. 9A at the date of nomination and since that is the only ground on which election of the respondent is challenged, we think it would be futile to hear this appeal on merits. We accordinely dismiss the appeal with no orders as to costs all throughout. -

V.P.S.

Appeal dismissed,

ll4

LOKNATH PADHAN

BIRENDRA

KUMAR SAHU

January 1.6. 1974

BHAGWATI

l'. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.

Representation of the People Act

s. 116A

Representation of the People Act

s. 9A

s. 9A

s. 9A

CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDlCTION

Gobind Das

P. H. Parekh

Narayan Nettar

V.J. Francis

B. Kanta Rao

BHAGWATI

s. 116A

Orissa Legislative Assembly

9th February, 1971

s. 9A

Section 9A

Government of Orissa

s. 9A

5th March, 1971

High Court of Orissa

s. 9A

Borumunda

Gaisilet

s. 9A

Naib Sarpanch

s. 9A

s. 9A

8th January, 1967

s. 9A

s. 9A

s. 9A

s. 9A

3rd March, 1973

Art. 174(2)(b)

s. 9A

s. 9A

England

Viscount Simon

s. 9A

s. 99

Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly

Hegde

s. 9A

s. 9A


MURTHY MATCH WORKS, ETC. ETC. v.

THE ASSTT. COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, ETC.

January 11, 1974

[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.]

Cemral Excise &: Salt Act, 1944-S. 37 and the , notification issued thereunderwhether court Cll/I review legislative Judgment-Constitution of India-Reasonable classification of principles for determining.

The match industry in India has grown over the decides. From the p:>int of view of manufacturing techniques the safety match industry comprises of two distinct categork-:s: the machanised soctor occupied by a few big manufacturen and the non-mechanised sector comprising varying sizes of production units.

The Government classified the safety match manufacturers into four categories depending on the quantitY turn out and other relevant factors. But the Tariff rommis<; ion recommended the abolition of sulrclassification for the purpose of levying eKcise duty and s1,1ggested separate scales of excise duty to be levied for four classes of units, namely, A, B, C and D. Based on these recommendations the slab system of excise duty was abandoned by the Government and the category wise rate wa'l adopted, As a mutt of the adoption of the differential duty scheme the advantages offered to the •c• group went to the 'B' group which in turn resulted in fall in production.

It also generated pscudo-C category producers from out of the erstwJ.ile B category which ultimately eliminated C category producers. The Government, therefore, withdrew the tax concession to C category and eq:J.1ted it with B category.

The Government of India had from time .to time issu::d notifications under s. 37 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. The notification issued in 1967 levied excise duty on the basis of manufacture of matches of which "any process is ordiM

narily carried on with the aid of power". As a result of this notification the B and C categories of old were now treated equally. The change in classification of the manufacturers was based on the use of power which in turn had a rational relation to the techniques and processes of production and their ability to bear the burden of the levy, This was done on th~ basis of recom'll'!ndations of the Central Excise Re-organisation Committee.

The High Court refused to strike down the notification. It was contended in this Court that this unsocialistic step had left the small producers in the cold and virtually compelled them to retire from the industry and is thus discriminatory.

Dismissing t, he appeals to this Court,

HELD ; This is a criticism of legislative judgment, not a ground of judicial review. The Court is being invited to compel the legislative and executive wings to classify but from the judicial insPection -tower the court may only search for arbitrary and irrational classification and its obverse, namely, capricious uniformity of treatment where a crying dissimilarity exists in reality. Unconstitutionality and not unwdom of a legislation is the narrow area of judicial review. [129 EJ

The question of classification is primarily for legislative judgment and ordinarily does not become a judicial question. The power to classify being extremely broad and based on diverse considerations of executive pragmatism the judicature cannot rush in where even the legislature warily treads. All these operational restraints on judicial power must weigh more emphatica1Iy where the subject is taxation. [130 E]

It is equally well settled that merely because there is room for classifkation it does not follow that legislation without classification is always unconstitutional.

The court cannot strike down a law because it 1i8.s not made the classification which commends to the court as proper. Nor can the legislative power be said to have been unconstitutionally exercised because within the class a sub-classification was reasonable but has not been made. [130 HJ

ln the resent ca"t:, a pertinent prir.ciple of differentiation, which is vi.>ibl;' linked to production prowes. has been adopted in the broad classification of power-users and manual manufacturers. It is irrational to castigate this b:isis a" unre.11. [131 CJ

K.T. Moopi/ A'air v. Start of Kera/a, [19611 3 S.C.R. 77, State of K?rala v. Haii K. Haji Kuuy }/aha, C. As Nos. 1052 etc. of 1968; iudgment daud August 13, 1968 and Khandige Shain Bitar v. The Agricultural Income Tax Officer, [1963] 3 S.C'.R. 809, 817, followed.

Clv1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1752 to 1769. of 1970

From the Judgment and Order dated the 24th April, 1970 of the Mardas High Court in Writ Petitions No;. 239, 346, 999, 1000, 1007,

1030, 1071, 1101, 1102, 1223, 1242, 1270, 1271, 172.4, 1725, 1748, 2640 and 3252 of 1969.

Y. S. Chitle, V. M .. Ganpule, K. R. Choudhury and K. Rajendra Choudhury, for the appellants.

L. N. Sinha, Solicitor General of India, S. P. Nayar, and M. N.

Shroff, for the respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KRISHNA IYER, J.-The core of the contention urged by the appellants in these various appeals filed by certificate under art. l33(l)(a) & ( c) of the Constituticm is that the excise duty on matches sought to be levied on these medium-sized manufacturers of Shivakashi wears the mask of equality but in its true face bears the marks of unequal justice violative of art. 14 of the Constitution of India.

.>hri Chitale, learned counsel for the appellants, has focused his arguments on one grievance only and, we think, with good reason that the discriminatory fiscal treatment of his clients is unconstitutional, the vice being treatment of dissimilar categories similarly. To co1npress his \\'hole argument in a single sentence, it is that the appellants, small n1anufacturers of matches, ha\'e been subjected by the impugned notification to excise duty at the san1e onerus rate as has been applied to larger producers, wilfully indifferent to a historically well recognised classification between the smaller and the larger group of, n1atch manufacturers, and the injury sustained flows from this failure to classify and deal differentially with sets of producers who are unequal in their economic capabilities in the matter of production and marketing - a sort oftrau111atic egality. Jn brief, equal treat1nent of unequal groups n1ay spell invisible yet substantial discri1nination with consequences of unconstitutionality. That dissimilar things should not be treated similarly in tho name of equal justice is of Aristotelian vintage and has been, by in1plication, enshrined in our Constitution.

The facts which unfold the case of the appellants may now be set out. The match industry in India has grown over the decades anJ Shivakashi occupies an important place in the production geography of matches. From the point of view of manufacturing techniques, the safety match industry in our country comprises two distinct categories the mechanised sector occupied by a few big whales and the non-

mechanised sector co1nprising va1y1ue, :oi1Lt::oi u1 production units ranging. from the small fry organised on a cottage industry basis to considerable producers \\lho have developed 1nanufacturing and marketing muscles sufficient to compete with the power-using big four-the WIMCO, the AMCO, the ESAVI, and the Pioneer. The Tariff commission.

Report on rhis industry has stated :

"llnlike units in the mechanised sector \Vhich have power driven equipment for carrying out all the imp.Jrtant operations. including manufacture of splints and veneers, fra1ne filling dipping, box making, etc., those in categories 'B' and c follow alniost identical 1nanufacturing process, obtaining their splints and veneers from outside suppliers and getting such important operations as box-making and frame tilling done by outside don1estic labour on piecerate basis. Only such of the processes as dipping, box tilling, banderolling and packing which under

-'!xcise or Explosive Act regulations cannot be entrusted to outside labour are carried out in the factory sheds of the units and the workers employed for these also are mostly paid on piece-rate basis. All the operations, whether, undertaken in the factory premises or passed on to outside piece-work labour to be carried out in the homes of the latter conjointly with other members of the family. are done by manual process. The same system is followed by 'D' category units as well, except those spon ored by K. & V. I. C. some of which manufacture their own splints and veneers."

Classified on the basis or quantity turn-out and other germane factors, a fourfold categorisation into 'A', 'B', 'C' and 'D' was extent in the industry roughly corresponding to the techniques of production and the use of power adopted by each. The Tariff Commission explained this aspect and reported on the operation of the differential excise levy system on producticn and trade practices. Counsel for the appellants has rested his case of discrimination by subversive equality or rather non-discrin1ination where a deserving differentiation is the desideratum, on the findings of the Tariff Commission report. We might as well give copious but relevant excerpts from it to discern the foun<lationi of the argument. The Report runs on to state :

"As indicated in Appendix II, according to the excise tariff classification units in the match industry now stand grouped intofourclas5:es, na1nely 'A', 'B', 'C'and'D' not on any technological differentiation but on the basis of output-'A' class comprising factories whose annual output exceeds 4,000 million match_ sticks,' B' class co1nprising factories whose annual output exceeds 500 million match sticks but does not exceed 4,000 million match sticks, 'C' class comprising factories whose annual output exceeds 50 million match sticks but does not exceed 500 million 111atch sticks and 'D' class comprising factories whose ann- al output does not exceed 50 million match sticks. According to this classification the factories belonging to WIMCO, AMCO and ESA VI fall under category 'A', the rest comprising the units

:124 SUPREME COUl<.T REPORTS [ 1974 l 3 S.C.R.

in the non-mechanised sector fall under the other three cate- A gories, namely 'B', 'C', and

4D' ~

"Selling systen1 :

(iv) Small producers.-The system of selling adopted by these n1anufacturers varied according to their status and financial resources. The system almost universally followed by such producers is to make outright sales, without any discount or commission to wholesalers, both out-station and local. The bigger, among such producers belonging to category 'B' are reported in some cases to sell as well through dealers and sole selling agents.

Many of them have also got their own depots and regular stockists in a li1nited number of out-station centres. As regards 'C' and 'B'class producers, the system of sales covers the following variants according to facilities available to them : (i) outright sales to wholesale merchants, local or out-station; (ii) sales through joints schemes of depots which stock different brands from several producers; (iii) sales by sending goods in their own vans in bulk to distributors and dealers in nearby states: and (iv) sales through their own salesman who deliver goods in local markets on the shopkeepers on bicycles (a special feature of 'D' class units).

From the replies received by us from units in the small scale ser.:tor it \VOuld appear that those in category 'B' situated in the Shivakasi/SatturiKovilpatti area have over somt years in the past established contacts and <level oped a fairly wide selling system enabling them to cater to the markets in distant States including West Bengal, U.P., Delhi, Gujarat and practically all the States in the South. The size of their operations has all along enabled them to undertake supply in wagon loads at the concessional rates, which is an in1portant consideration for developing distant markets to be served by rail transport."

"Although they are not comparable to WIMCO in having a country-, vide distributive organisation, these units evinced till recently all the symptoms of a steady and healthy development, some of them having reached the maximum limit (4,000 million sticks) of Category 'D' with a reputation for their brands in far olf markets. They had the resources to support this progressive development and a few of them have represented that with an imprO\ernent of !he climate of the trade which has been completely vi!iated by the slab system of excise duties (see paragraph 11) and given necessary facili!ies they would be able to reestablish the markets ihey had assiduously b11ilt up and even initiate a schen1e of gradual mechanisation of important processes in their fac!orie's for the betterment of the quality of their products, In the present context, it is worth taking no!c of the fact that the credit for an expanding market for matches produced in the non-meclrnnised sector is attributable largely lo the sales

rtdeavours of factories \.vhich had gro\vn to be "B' class units that had riecessary resources for the purpose .and \Vere able the nmintain quality."

* * * *

A "In contrast to the 'B' class units, the selling system of those in category 'C' betokens a position of serious weakness. Except the C' class units which have been brought into existence by fragmentation of bigger units and still operate under the protecting wing of the sponsor (see paragraph l l), the new-comers in this class who have no tradition, functions mostly with meagre financial resources and have no comparable advantage. Unable B to sell their output in wagon loads they are compelled to dispose of it to local financing-cum-trading agencies at rock bottom prices dictated by the latter for what has now come to be called consignments of

1'assorted labels". This, in effect, involves a complete surrender by the 'C' class producers to the benefit of differential excise rebate allowed to them to the detriment of others a1 well. The low purchase prices of the goods enable C such agencies to send consignments of mixed brands to distant places in wagon-loads and find a market by offering to the

wholesalers there extren1ely competitive rates ris-a-vis the usual rates charged by 'B' class units, the retail selling prices being the same for both. Our examination of the problem of the small scale units in category 'C' indicates that basically their problem is not different from other small industdes suffering similar D exploitation by middlemen. As in other cases they can best be extricated from the grip of the middlemen by the establishment of suitable sales co-operatives. We dra\\' the attention of the State Governn1ents to th.is problem for initiating necessary measures for the purpose, particularly of the Govern1nent of Madras, as the concentration of such units is in that State where the problem presents itself in the most acute forn1, but offers favourable E prospects for the establishment of several full-fledged sales cooper.:i.tives \vith adequate niembership."

' • • • 'There is sufficient eviderice to indicate that the effects have been quite widespread and recourse has been taken to fragmentation on a fairly extensive scale."

• • • • "The Sivakasi Chamber has stated as follows "Jn the face of such unhealthy competition from 'C' factories and the disadvantages over 'A', the 'B' is unable to market its production resulting in heavy accumulation of stocks. It is now felt by 'B' class factories that there is no other salvation for them except to convert "B' into 'C' class factories in benami names. as fev.' have since done. It may be pointed out that 16 long established 'B' factories have reduced themselves to 'C' class with effect from ]st April, 1963 in this Division alone in addition to the numerous factories \Vho have already converted fron1 'B' to 'C'." As regards similar fragmentation of the larger units in category 'C' almost identical views have been expressed by the Tirunelevely Match Association, representing 150 'C' class match factories, in the following words :'"In view of the vast difference of excise duty between !st and 3rd slab of excise duty in 'C' Class there is a tendency and prectice among the manufacturers to work in the first slab only and to stop therewith. Jn this way starting of small new units with the motive to enjoy rebate in the first slab

of excise duty has become common and_this has clearly resulted A in loss of revenue, as well as working of units in less than the permitted c101city. It hs been brought to our notice that the situation has deteriorated to such an ex1ent as a result of the slab system that some erstwhile 'B' units have suspended their manufacturing activities altog<ther and instead found it more profitable to pltronise a number of newly established 'C' class units. Their taking over the products of the latter in their new role as a trading- B cum-financing agency has been facilitated by their established market connections and resourcefulness.

Instances of 'B' category units owned by individual proprietors downgrading themselves into category 'C' and having a number of 'C' class units set up in the name of near relations have also been noticed by us in the course ofour visits to factories in the Sivakasi/Sattur/ Kovilpatti area. The allegations about extensive fragmentation C were not denied by anybody at the public inquiry."

• • • • "The volume of evidence, both direct and indirect, that we have received in this connection fully testifies to the fact that large scale fragmentation of 'B' and 'C' class units has taken place directly as a result of the slab system-all motivated by the attraction offered by the large duty differential of 65 np for the lowest slab rate under category 'C'" .

• • • • "From the evidence received by us "B" and "C" class units have tooffer their match boxes generally at a discount of Rs. 2 to Rs. 3 per bundle of 5 gross boxes, i.e. at about 40 to 60 nP. per gross less than the price charged by WIMCO. While the quality <Jf matches produced by 'B' class manufacturers has the reputation of being generally good and comparable to WIMCO's matches, the 'C' class units do not have such reputation in the market. The 'C' class manufacturers are handicapped by a further disadvantage on account of the lower scale of their production, inasmuch as they cannot usually offer a wagon-load of matches at a time for despatch to the upcountry markets for sale and have generally to bear the central sales tax. After carefully considering all aspects of the case including estimates of costs of the manufacturers, we are of opinion that a differential of 20 nP. in the rates of excise duty per gross of match boxes between 'A' and 'B' class units and a differential of 30 nP. between 'B' and 'C' -class manufacturers 'Yould be quite adequate to safeguard their

respctive interests. On similar considerations a differential of 35°nP. between 'C' and 'D' class units would also be justified. For reasons stated in paragrap~1 11 and as stressed therein. we are definitely against continuance of the slabs introduced in classes "A', 'B' and 'C' carrying differential rates of excise duty, hich have. entailed serious repercussions on the entire industry.

We, therefore, recommend the following scales of excise duty to b, levied for the" four classes respectively : For 'A' clas Rs.4.60 For 'B' class

R~.4.40 For 'C' class Rs.4.10 For •o• class . .

Rs.3. 75

per gross b3xcs per gross boxes per gross boxes per gross boxes

The Tariff Commission recommended the abolition of sub-classification for the purposes of excise duty and suggested separate scales of excise duty to be levied for the four classes of units, namely, 'A', 'B'; 'C' and 'D'. Based on these recommendations, the slab svstem of excise duty was abandoned by Government and the category-wise rate was adopted. The impact on production of the differential duty fCheme was a process of splintering of the 'B' group to inhale the advantages offered to the 'C' group resulting in a reduction in total production, thanks to the thinning tendency in the 'B' group. Indeed, the fiscal misdirection, by showing concessional rates to the 'C' category as against 'B' category, generated pseudo-'C' category producers from out of the erstwhile 'B' category so that the bona fide small scale manufacturers falling in the 'C' category were flooded out. Moreover, the genuine 'C' category manufacturers were exploited by the middlemen who snapped up the margin of tax concession for themselves, defeating the object of concessional duty for the small producer. This dilemma induced Government to revise its fiscal thinking and led to the impugned notification which withdrew the tax concession to the 'C' category and equated it with the 'B' category.

Section 3 of the Central Excise and salt Act, 1944 empowers the levy and collection of duties on goods produced or manufactured in the

State, the rate being set forth in the First schedule to the Act. Item 38 in the First Schedule relates to matches. Section 37 contains the rulemaking power and s. 37(1) confers power on the Central Government by rules to exempt any goods from the whole or any part of the duty imposed by the Act. Under this power the Central/Government issued a notification adopting a "classification" approach for extending concessional rates. Originally, a broad classification was made as between matches manufactured by use of machinery and thosey other means.

Among the second category a sub-classification was made as 'B', 'C' and 'D' for the purposes of concessional rates. In 1966,!a uniform leavy

of Rs. 4 15 per gross of match boxes was made doing away with 'B' to '0' classes. In 1967 this position was revised by notification No. 162 of 1967, which is challeged before us. It reads :

"In , exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (I) of rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1955, and in supersession of the Notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue and Insurance) No. I l 5/67 Central Excise, dated the 8th June, 1967, the Central Government hereby exempts matches specified in column (2) of the Table below, falling "under Item No. 3t! of the First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 (I of l 944) and cleared by any manufacturer for home consumption, from so much of the duty of excise leviable thereon as is in excess of the rate spocified in the corresponding entry in column (3) of.the said table :

category.

TABLE

Description of matches' Rate (Rs per gross of boxes 50 mat~ cho1 each)

Matches in or in relation to the manufacture of which any process is ordinarily carried on with the aid of power 4 60 B 2.

Matches in or iTI relation to the manufacture of which no process is ordinarily carried on with the aid of power

Provided that--

4·30

(!) Matches referred to in category 2 and cleared for home consumption during the financial year from a factory frm which the total clearance of matches d'uring that year is not, as per declaration made by the manufacturer under this notification, estimated to exceed 75 million matches, shall be allowed to be cleared at the rate of Rs. 3 ·75 per gross of boxes 30 matches each, upto 75 million matches and the quantity of matches, if any, cleared in excess, and upto 100 million matches shall be allowed to be cleared at the rate of Rs. 4 30 per gross of . boxes of 50 matches each; and if the clearance in such factory exceeds 100

million matches during the financial year, tile manufacturer.shall be required to pay at the rate of Rs. 4 30 per gross of boxes of

50 matches each, on the entire quantity cleared during the :financial year . ..... "

The upshot of this system of duty is that 'B' and 'C' categories of old will now be treated equally and the grievance of the petitioners, who are 'C' category manufacturers is that clubbing them together with the far stronger 'B' type manufacturers is virtually condemning them to gradual extinction. Treating unequals as equals and compelling both lo bear equal burdens is to show the 'C' type manufacturers the way out. It is urged that the test of capacity of each group in the industry to bear the levy, recognised in the past and approved in the Tariff Commission Report, is given the go-bye now.

The contention, in reply, by the State is that at present the classification of the manufacturers is based on the use of power which in turn has a rational relation to the techniques and processes of production and their ability to bear the burden of the levy. It is further argued that the Government did give effect to the recommendations of the Tariff Commission regarding the four-fold classification but, finding certain evils developing, the Central Excise Re-organisation Committee went into the subject and suggested methods to re-orient the scale and scope of excise duty. This Committee's report led to the current notification and the dichotomy between mechanised and non-mechanised industry proceeds on a rational differentia which has a substantial relation to the legislative end.

There is no doubt that in the past among the non-mechanised manufacturers of matches a further classification based ori viability

had ben made. It is also true that the financial resources, the capacity to command a market on their own without depending on intermediaries, etc., marked off the 'B' category from the 'C' category. But then experience gathered subsequently disclosed certain evils which the State took note of and endeavoured to set right. Ultimately, the present notification was issued obliterating the distinction which gave a concessional edge to the 'C' group over the 'B' group.

The learned counsel for the appellants persuasively pleaded that this unsocialistic step has left the small producers like his clients in the cold and virtually compelled them to retire from the industry. May be, there is force in this grievance. Instead of protecting the tiny manufacturer from the injurious intermediary and inhibiting the larger producer from resorting to the device of self-division and other makebelieve tactics, the State has resorted to a policy of equal levy from both which, according to the counsel, hits the poor and helps the better-off. This is a criticism of legislative judgment, not a ground of judicial review.

We agree that bare equality of treatment regardless of the inequality of realities is neither justice nor homage to the constitutional principle.

Anatole France's cynical statement comes to our mind in this context :

"The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." ·

The forensic focus turns on unconstitutional non-classification of the 'B' and 'C' categories and the vice of lugging an non-mechanised producers together into one mass. The Court is being invited to compel the legislative and executive wings to classify, but we feel that from the judicial inspection tower the Court may only search for arbitrary and irrational classification and its obverse, na1nely, capricious unifonnity of treatment where a crying dissimilarity exists in reality.

Right at the threshold we must warn ourselves of the limitations of judicial power in this jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Stone of the Supreme Court of the United States has delineated these limitations in United States v. Butler(') thus :

"The power of courts to declare a statute unconstitutional is subject to two guiding principles of decision which ought never to be absent from judicial consciousness. One is that courts are concerned only with the power to enact statutes, not with their wisdom. The other is that while unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon our exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint. For the removal of unwise laws from the statute books appeal lies not to the courts but to the bcllot and to the processes of democratic government." In short, unconstitutionality aitd not unwisdom of a legislation is the narrow area of judicial review. Jn the present case unconstitu-

(IJ 297 U.S. 1=56 Sup.Ct.312=80 L.cd.477 (1936)=Amcrican Constitutioftal Law-4hird cdn. by Trcsolini and Shapiro.

IO-M852 SupC!/74

130 SUPREME COURT llEPOllTS [ 1974 l 3 s.c.11.

tiooality is alleged as springing from lugging together two dissimilar A categories of match manufacturers into one compartment for like treatment.

C.Crtain principles which bear upon classification may be mentioned here. It is true that a State may classify persons and objects for the purpose of legislation and pass laws for the purpose of obtaining revenue or other ot•jects. Every differentiation is not a discrimination. ll But classification can be sustained only if it is founded on pertinent and real differences as distinguished from irrelevent and artificial ones.

The constitutional standard by which the sufficiency of the differentia which form a valid basis for classification may be measured, has been

repeatedly stated by the courts. If it rests on a difference which bears a fair and just relation. to the object for which it is proposed, it is con·

stitutional. To put it differently, the means must have nexus with C the ends. Even so, a large latitude is allowed to the State for classification upon a reasonable basis and what is reasonable is a question of practical details and a variety of factors which the court will be re- .Juctant and perhaps ill-equipped to iqvestigate. Jn this imperfect world .perfection even in grouping is an ambition hardly ever accomplished.

In this contest, we have to remember the relationship between the legislative and judicial departments of government in the detem1ina- D tion of the validity of classification. Of course, in the last analysis courts possess the power to pronounce on the constitutionality of the acts of the other branches whether a classification is based upon substantial <lifferences or is arbitrary, fanciful and consequently illegal, At the same time, the question of classification is primarily for legislative judgment and ordinarily does not become a judicial question.· A power to classify being extremely broad and based on diverse considerations of executi\'e £ praiimatism, the judicature cannot rush in where even the legislature warily treads. All these operational restraints on judicial power must weigh more emphatically where the subject is taxation.

One facet of the equal protection clause, upheld by the Indian Courts and relevant to the present case, is tha.t while similar things must be treated similarly, dissimilar things should not be treated simi- F larly. There can be hostile discrimination while maintaining a facede of equality. Procrustean cruelty cannot be equated with guarantee of <Constitutional equality, and we have to examine whether such is the lot

-0f the appellants.

This Court has in several rulings highlighted this sensitive under-

ide of equal protection. Indeed, the complaint of the petitioners is G that by abolition of the difference in fiscal burden between categories a and 'C' an insidious subversion of equal treatment has been effected.

Another proposition which is equally settled is that merely because there is room for classification it does not follow that legislation without classification is always unconstitutional. The court cannot strike down a law because it has not made the classification which commends H to the court as proper. Nor can the legislative power be said to have , been unconstitutionally exercised because within the class a sub-classi

licatiou was reasonable but has not been made.

~!CRlHY MATCH WORKS"· COLLECTOR, EXCISB (Krislz11a Iyer, I.) 131

!tis well-established that the modern State, in exercising its sovereign power of taxation, has to deal with complex factors relating to the objects to be taxed, the quantum to be levied, the conditions subject to which the levy has to be made, the social and ec-0nomic policies which the tax is designed to subserve, and what not. In the famous words of Holmes, J., in Bai11 Peanut Co. v. Pinson( I):

"We must remember that the machinery of Government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints."

In the present ease, a pertinent principle of differentiation, which is visibly linked to productive prowess, has been adopted in the broad classification of power-users and manual manufacturers. lt is irrational to castigate this basis as unreal. Indeed, the soundness of this distinction is not denied. The challenge is founded on the failure to miniclassify between large and small sections of manual match manufacturers. But ours is not to reason why, that being a policy decision of Government dependent on pragmatic wisdom playing on imponderable forces at work. Our jurisdiction halts where the constitutional touchstone of a rational differentia having a just relation to the legislative and of revenue raising is satisfied. Gratuitous judicial advice on the socialistic direction of fiscal policy is de trop. We desist from that enterprise and leave the petitioners and men of his ilk to seek other dcmooratic remedies in that behalf, it being beyond our area nonnaliy to demolish the tax structure because microclassification among a Jarge group has not been done by the State.-. Absolute jutil:c to ,,;\ry producer is a selfdcfeating adventure for any adn1inistration and genera I direction, not minute classification, is aH that can he attc1nptcd. For these reasons v.e find oursel\'cs in agreement 'vith t11e High Court in its rufusal to strike dO\Vn the notification under S. 3 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944.

Before concluding 've n1ay 1nakc a passing reference to the l~\V decisions' cited by appellants' counsel. In K. T. Moopil Nair Y. Slate o/'Kera/a(2), Sinha, C.J., emphasized that art. 14 may be violated C\'eti though the law may, on the face, be equal if in substance unequal things are treated equally. In Stare of Kera/av. Haji K. Haji K11tty Nalwl'), Shah J., observed : '"There objects, persons or transactions essentially dissi1nHar arc treated by the imposition of a uniforn1 tax, <liscrin1ination 1nay result, for, in our Yie\\', refusal to make a ratjonal classlfioation may itself in some cases operate as denial of equality.') G A similar view has been taken in Kilandige Slzam Bhat v. Tile Agri<'11it11ra/ Income Tax Officer(').

It is sound law that refusal to 1nakc rational classification 'here grossly dissimilar subjects are treated by the law violates the mandate of art. 14. Even so, where the limited classification adopted in the prc- :; ent case is based upon a reieyt.!nt differcntia \Vhich has a nexus to tliG

H ilJ [19301 1s2 us 49'J; 501.

t~) [1961] 3 S.C.R. i7.

(3) C.As. Nos. 105:! etc. of 1968; judgm;:nt datl!J ,\ugLht 13, 1968.

(4) [1963) 3 S.C.R. 809, 817.,

legislative and of taxation, the court cannot strike down the law A on the score that there is room for further classification. Refusal to classify is one thing and it bears on constitutionality, not launching on micro-classification to work out perfect justice is left to executive expediency and legislative judgment and not for forensic wisdom.

"The relationship between the legislative and judicial departments of go1ernme11t in the determination of the validity of classification is wellsettled ...... the authorities state with unanimity that the question B of classification is primarily for the legislature and that it can never become a judicial question except for the purpose of determining, in any given situation, whether the legislative action is clearly unreasonable.

The legislative classification is subject to judicial revision only to the extent of seeing that it is founded on real distinctions the subjects classified, and not on artificial or irrelevant ones used for the purpose of vading the constitutional prohibition." (Ame•ican Jurisprudence C 2d : vol. 16; para 496).

"In a classification for governmental purposes there cannot be an exact exclusion or inclusion of persons and things. The constitutional command for a state to afford equal protection of the law sets a goal not attainable by the invention and application of a precise formula.

Classification in law, as in the other dapartments of knowledge D or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they ag1ee with one another in certain particulars, and differ from other things in those partic.ulars. It is ahnost impossible in some matters to foresee and provid, e for every imaginable and exceptional case, and a legislature ought not to be required to do so at the risk of having its legislation declared void, although appropriate and proper upon the general subject upon which such legislation is to E act, so long as there is no substantial and fair ground IQ say that the 'tatute makes an unreasonable and unfounded general classification, and thereby denies to any. person the equal protection of the laws. Hence, a large latitude is allowed to the states for classification upon any reasonable basis, and what is reasonable is .a

question of practical details into which fiction cannot enter." (ibid: para 504).

We have said enough to delineate the finer frontiers of the jurisdic; tion of the court and the legislature. Having sensitive regard to the obligation of the State to bring the law, including the tax law, into pulsing relationship with life, including the life of the country's economy, we.see nothing so grossly unfair as to attract the lethal power of the court to strike down the notification under challenge.

We dismiss the appeals but in the circumstances without costs to the respondents.

P.B.R.

Appeals dismissed

MURTHY MATCH WORKS, ETC. ETC

January 11, 1974

V. R. KRISHNA IYER

R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.

Salt Act, 1944

S. 37

Constitution of India

India

Government of India

s. 37

Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944

Y. S. Chitle

V. M .. Ganpule

K. R. Choudhury

K. Rajendra Choudhury

L. N. Sinha

S. P. Nayar

M. N.

Shroff

KRISHNA IYER

Shivakashi

art. 14

Constitution of India

Chitale

WIMCO

AMCO

ESAVI

Tariff Commission

Shivakasi

SatturiKovilpatti

West Bengal

U.P.

Delhi

Gujarat

Madras

st April, 1963

Tirunelevely Match Association

Sivakasi

Sattur/

Kovilpatti

Section 3

Central Excise and salt Act, 1944

First Schedule

Section 37

s. 37(1)

Central Government

Central/Government

Central Excise Rules, 1955

8th June, 1967

Anatole France

Stone

Supreme Court of the United States

S. 1

Trcsolini

Shapiro

~!CRlHY MATCH WORKS

Holmes

S. 3

Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944

K. T. Moopil Nair

Sinha

art. 14

Shah

art. 14

[1963) 3 S.C.R. 809


ARVIND MOHAN SINHA

1'.

AMULYA KUMAR BISWAS & ORS.

January 17, 1974

[S. N. DWIVEDI AND Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]

Probation of o.f(enders Act, 20of1958-Whetiier applies to offe11ces 1u1der Customs Act, 1962, and offences under Part XII-A. Defence of India Rules, 1962. ·

Defence of India Rules, 1962, r. 1261 and J26P-'Gold' if Includes smuggled gold.

On the question (1) whether the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, app1ies to offences under Customs Act, 1962, and to those under Part XU-A of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, relating to Gold Control, and (2) \Vhether under the scheme of the Gold Control Rules, smuggled gold is not comprehended under r. 126p.

HELD: (1) These ac n1ostly economic offences which in conceivable cases, may pose a grave threat to the economy and the security of the country. They arc fundamentally of a different genre and are calculated to involve consequences of a far reaching character as compared with the offences under the general law of crimes. But every contravention of the Customs Act or the Gold Control Rules cannot, without more, t.e assumed to be fraught with consequences of national dimensions. The words of s. 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act are wide and would include even offences under the Custo1ns ACt and the Gold Control Rules.

Though r.126p(2) (ii) of the Defence of India Rules prescribes a n1inimum sentence of 6 n1onths, it cannot override the provision"S of the Probation of Offenders A.ct.

[136G]

(a) The Probation of Offenders Act is a reformative mensure ::?.nd its object is to reclaim ainateur offenders who, if spared the indignity of incarceration, can be usefully rehabilitated in society. A jai1 terin would normally be enough to wipe out the stain of guilt but the sentence which society passes on convkts is rele11tless. ln recalcitrant cases punislunent bas to be deterrent so that others similarly minded l'nay warn thcn1selves of the hazards of taking to a career of crime. But the novice,.

s in the present case, \vho strays into the path or crin1e ought, in the interest of society, to be treated as being socially sick. The ignon1iny con1monly associated with a jail tcnn and the social stigma which attaches to convicts often render the remedy worse than the disease. Crhnes are not always rooted in criminal tendencies and their origin n1ay lie in psychological factors induced by hunger. \Vant and poverty.

The Act recognises the importance of environmental influence in the commission of crimes and prescribes a remedy whereby the offender can be reformed and rehabilitated in society. An attitude of social 1.kfiance and recklessness which comes to a convict who, after a jail ter1n, is apt to think that he has nothing n1ore to lose or fear, may breed a litter of crime. The object of the Act is to nip that attitude io the bud.

[137A]

Rata11 lal v. State of Punjab, [1964] 7 S.C.R. 676 and l:slter Dat v. Tlze State of Punjab, A.l.R. 1972 S.C. 1295, followed.

(b) There is no foundation for the fcilr that offenders released on probation n1ay hold the society to ransom and that society n1ay therefore look upon the release of offenders on probation as the triumph of criminals over the \veaknesses of law.

An offender released on probation is convicted but not forthwith. sentenced in the sense of penal laws. Section 4(1) of the Act pro\'ides that instead of sentencing the offender "at once" the court may direct his release on his entering into a bond to receive a sentence when called upoQ. during the probationary period and in the mean time to keep the-peace and be of good beba\'iour. Thus it is only in a limited sense, though a socially significant. sense. that the Act constitutes an exception to the broaa and general principle of criminal law that a sentence shall follow on conviction.

The discretion vested in the trial court in thi~ behalf must of course be e:terciscr.l

~1ccording to rules of reason and justice depending on the circumstances of each case. but the Magistrate had called for the report of the Probation Officer and it was

134 SUPREME COUllT REPORTS [ 19741 3 s.c.~.

on the basis of that roport that the respondents were released on probation and the Hi, gb Court has upheld the exercise of that discretion. There is no reason to interfere with the concurreni factual evaluation of the ci=mstances of the case. (137GJ Jal Narain\', Tiie Municipal Corporation of Delhi, A.l.R. 1972 S.C. 2607, referred to.

(2) The High Court erred in holding that the legislature could not have in I ended that a person in possession of smuggled gold should make a declaration in regard thereto. (140AJ

(a) Under r. l26I of the Gold Control Rules (of Defence of India Rules) every person must, within the stipulated period, make a declaration to the administrator as to the guantity, description and other prescribed particulars of gold owned by him. Failure or omission to do so, without reasonable cause, is made punishable by r. 126(1)(i). Possession of gold in contravention of any provision of Part XllA is made punishable by Rule l26P(2)(il). The definition of 'Gold' in r. l26A (d) is couched in wide tenns and it does not make any distinction between smuggled gold and gold lawfully possessed. (140Gl

(b) The intention of the legislature must be gathered primarily and principally from the words used by it and the definition of •gold' carves out no exception in favour of smuggled gold. It would be surprising that the obligation to declare gold should be imposed on lawful possessors of gold but should leave untouched the possession by smugglers or their agents of gold smuggled into the country. [140BJ

(c) Under the definition Gold means gold and it should not be read as 'gold means gold but shall not include smuggled gold". To put such a construction on the definition is to coin a ew definition and therefore to legislate. [140C]

(d) The word 'gold' is used at several plaoes in the Gold Control Rules and it is a well recognised rule of construction that the same word should receive the same meaning in collocation. It is manifest from the language, intendment and scheme of these Rules that the word •gold' covers not only gold which is lawfully possessed but gold in any form orshape and whether possessed lawfully or otherwise.

['40D)

.K. Yisluum1oorthi v. State of Mysore & Anr., 1971 (2) Mys. L. J. 261, approved.

CruMiNAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. 114 & 115of1970

From the Judgment and Order dated the 28th November, 1969 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision Case Nos. 635 and 636 of 1969.

S. N. Prasad and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant.

The respondents did not appear {in Cr. A. 114 & 115/701.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered bv.

CHANDRACHUD, J.-These appeals are brought by leave granted by the High Court of calcutta under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution.

Cr. A. No. 114o/1970:'0n May 29, 1968 gold bars and sovereigns G bearing foreign markings were seized from the respondents by customs officers, Calcutta. Respondents were charged under section 135, Customs Act, 1962 for being in possession of goods which they had reason to believe to be liable to confiscation under section 111 of that Act. It was alleged that the goods were imported into India without the requisite permit and without payment of duty and were therefore liable to confiscation under section l ll(d) of the Customs Act. The H respondents were illso charged under Rules 126P(l)(i) and 126P(2){ii) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, for failure to make a declaration in respect of the gold found in their possession.

A. M,' SINHA v. A, K. BISWAS (C/randrachud, /,)

13S

The respondents pleaded guilty to the charges . but -cited facts in extenuation of the oft'cnccs. The learned Presidency Magistrate, 8th Court, Calcutta, convicted them of the offences of which they were charged but he directed, on the faith of a report made by the Probation otlicer, that they should be relcascd under section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 on their executing a bond of Rs. 1000/- each with one surety in like amount, undertaking to appear and receive the sentence whenever called upon and to keep peace and be of good behaviour for a period of two years. Respondents ate young boys nonnally engaged in agriculture. To us they seem to be carriers who were carrying the gold for a small tip but the learned Magistrate believed their defence that they had purchased the gold for the marriage of the sister of one of them. The gold which was of the value of about Rs. 7800/- was already confiscated in the proceedings under the Customs Act.

The appellant, an Assistant Collector of Customs, filed. on behalf of the Department a revision application (No. 635 of 1969) in the High CoUrt of Calcutta against the judgment of the learned Magistrate. ·

Liller, it was converted into an appeal under section 11(2) of the Probation of Offenders Act.

The High Court disposed of three matters by a common judgment which -is reported in Aravlnda Mohan Sinha v. Prohlad Chandra Samanta(I) Two out of these are before us; the third, Criminal Appeal No. 113 of

1970 is reported to be unready. The High Court held in the matter under consideration that though Rule 126PP(2)(ii) of the Defence of India Rules prescribes a minimum sentence of imprisonment for a term of not less than 6 months", it cannot override the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act and therefore it was competent to the learned Magistrate to release the respondents under that Act.

The only question in this appeal is whether the Probation of Offenders Act,20 of 1958, can apply to offences under the Customs Act, 1962 and to those under Part-XII-A of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, intituled "Gold Control".

Section 135(bXii) of the Customs Act, 1962, under which the respondents have been convicted prescribes a punishment of 2 years imprisonment or fine or both for acquiring possession of or for being in any way concerned in carrying, keeping etc. any goods which a perron knows or has reason to believe to be liable. to confiscation under section 111. Under section 11 l(d), goods imported contrary to any prohibition imposed by or under the Customs Act or by any other law

arc liable to confiscation. The offence comitted by the respondents consists in their being in possession of or in purchasing the gold bearing foreign markings which was evidently imported into India without a valid permit issued by the Reserve Bank of India, an act prohibited by section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. On the prosecution leading evidence to establish the ingredients of this offence, respondents pleaded guilty to the chore.

111 4. I. R. 1970 Cal. 437.

136. suPREME COURT REPORTS [ 19741 3 's.C.R.

Rule 126P(l){i) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 provides to A the extent material that whoever omits or fails to make a declaration as required by Rule 126 I without a reasonable cause shall be punishable with imprisorunent for a term which may extend to one year or a fine or with both. The relevant part of Rule 126 I provides that every person shall within the specified period make a declaration to the Administrator in the prescribed form as to the quantity of gold, other than ornaments owned by him. Rule 126P (2)(ii) provides that whoever B has in his possession or under his control any quantity of gold in contravention of the provisions of Part XII-A ("Gold Control"), shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term of not less than 6 months and not more than 2 years and also with fine. Respondents had made no declaration of the gold in their pos•ession and pleaded no reasonable ; oause for omitting to do so. They pleaded guilty to these charges as ~· c

The Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, received the assent of the President on May 16, 1958 and was published in the Gazette of India on May 19, 1958. Section 3 of the Act confers power on the court to release certain offenders after admonition. Under section 4(1):

"When any person is found guilty of having committed an D offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once E to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the Court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour."

We are unable to accept the appellant's contention that the proba- F tion of Offenders Act can have no application to offences consisting of the contravantion of the Cuitoms Act or the "Gold Control" Rules contained in Part XII-A of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. True, that these offences are fundamentally of a different genre and are calculated to involve consequences of a far-reaching character as compared with offences under the general law of Crimes. These are mostly economic offences which in conceivable cases may pose a grave threat G to the economy and the security of the country. But every contravention of the Customs Aci or the "Gold Control" Rnles cannot, without more, be assnmed to be fraught with consequences of national dimensions. The broad principle that punishment must be proportioned to the offence is or ought to be of universal application save where the statute bars the exercise of judicial discretion either in awarding punishment or in releasing an offender on probation in lieu of sentencing H him forthwith. The words of section 4(1) of the Probation of offender• Act are wide and would evidently include offences under the customs Act and the Gold Control Rules.

A. M. S!Nllh v. A.•: BlSWAS (Chamlrachud, J.) 137

The Probation of Offenders Act is a reformative measure and its object is to reclaim amateur offenders who, if spared the indignity of incarcaration, can be usefully rehabilitated in society. A jail term should. normally be enough to wipe out the stain of guilt but the sentence which the society passes on convicts i' relentles.<. The ignominy commonly associated w_ith a jail term and the social stigma which attaches to convicts often render the remedy worse than the disease and the very purpose of punishment stands in the danger of being frustrated.

In recalcitrant cases, punishment has to be deterrent so that others similarly minded may warn themselves of the hazards of taking to a career of crime. But the novice who strays into the path of crime ought, in .the interest of society, be treated as being socially sick. Crimes are not always rooted in criminal tendencies and their origin may lie in psychological factors induced by hunger, want and poverty. The Probation of Offenders act recognises the importance of environmental influence in the commission of crime' and prescribes a remedy whereby . the offender can be reformed and rehabilitated in society. An attitude of social defiance and recklessness which comes to a convict who, after a jail term, is apt to think that lie has no more to lose or fear may breed a litter of crime. The object of the Probation of Offenders Act is to nip that attitude in the bud. Winifred A. Elkin describes probation as a system which provides a means of re-education without the necessity of breaking up the offender's normal life and removing him from the natural surroundings of his home.! Edwin E. Sutherland raises it to a status of a convicted offender.2

. The probationary system in our country is sometimes described as a boon of political freedom but that does less than justice to true history. The Dharmashastras did not ordain similar punishment for similar offences irrespective of the antecedents and the physical and mental condition of the offender.3 Dr, P. K. Sen has pointed out in his Tagore Law Lectures on "Penology Old and New" (1943) (p. JlO) that the directions given by the ancient law-givers in the matter of punishment compare favourably with the advanced modern systems as regards the relevance of the objective circumstances attendant on the commission of the crime and the subjective limitations of offenders.

Probationary laws were passed by several erstwhile provinces prior to Independence but their'provisions were seldom enforced in practice.

Section 562, Code of Criminal Procedure, also contains a provision enabling the court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct instead of sentencing them at once.

There is no foundation for the fear that offenders released on probation niay hold the society to ransom and the society may therefore look upon the release of offenders on probation as the triumph of criminals over the weaknesses of law. An offender released on probation is convicted bnt not forthwith sentenced in the sense of penal laws.

Ui;1der the disposition made by the court the sentence is suspended

(I) English Juvenile Courts (1938) page 162.

(2) Principles of Criminology, 4th Edn. (1947) page 383.

(3) History of Dharmashastra by Dr. P. V. Kane, Vol. Ill p. 392 (1946 Ed.).

138 St'PltEME COURT JtEPOJtTS £ 1974 I 3 s.c.11.

during the period of probation. Section 4(1) of the Act provides that instead of sentencing the offender "at once'', the court may direct his release on his entenng into a bond to "receive sentence when called upon" during the probationary period and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. Thus it is only in a limited, though a socially significant, sense that the Act constitutes as exception to the broad and general principle of criminal law embodied, for example, in sections 245(2); 258(2), 306(2) and section 309(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, that a sentence shall follow on a conviction.

The provisions of the Act are indeed of such beneficence that in RataJI Lal v. States of Punjab(I) this Court remanded a matter to the High Court with a direction that the High Court or the Sessions Court should consider whether the Act should not be applied to an accu.<ed who was ccinvicted on a date prior. to the date on which the Act was brought into operation in the particular area and even though such a prayer was not made to the Sessions Court or in revision to the High Court and could not, of course, be made in the trial court. Subba Rao !· who gave the majority judgment said : "The Act is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offepder than to puni'h pim." Raghubar Dayal J. dissented on the point whetlu!I> the Act could be applied to an accused who was convicted before it came into force. ·

In /sher Das v. The State of Pwijab(2) the trial court released on probation an offender who was convicted under section 7(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The High Court set aside that order and sentenced the accused to imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 1000/-. In default of the payment of fine the accused was ordered to undergo imprisonment for a further period of a month and a half. Setting aside the order of the High Court this Court restored that of the Magistrate with the observation that though adulteration of food was a menace to public health, the application of the Probation of Offenders act could not be excluded in cases of persons found

guilty of food adulteration.

In Jai Narai11 v. The Municipal Corporatio11 f Delhi,(l) the principle laid down in !sher Das's case was affirmed but on the facts of the case this Court refused to release on probation an offender who was convicted for adulterating 'Patisa' by using a non-permitted coal tar dye.

This decision only shows that whether the benefit of the Act should be extended in any praticular case must depend on the circumstance of that case.

There can therefore be no legal impediment in applying the provisions of the Probati.on of offenders Act to the respondents. Whether

(2) A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1295.

(3) A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2607.

A. M. Sf.'IH~ I'. A. x. BISWAS (Clw11drac/111d, /.) 13!>

on the facts and ircumstances of the case the respondents may be

eleased <;>n probal!on cannot. be put in issue at this late stage because 1t was neither urged 1n the tnal court nor before the High Court that

y reason of the. antecedents or the propensities of the respondents it was not expedient to extend to them the benefit of the Act. The discretion vested in the trial court in this behalf must of course be exercised according to rules of reason and justice but the learned Magis" Irate had called for the report of the Probation Officer and it was on the basis of. that report that the respondents were released on probation. The High Court has upheld the exercise of that discretion and we see n? reason to interfere with the concurrent factual evaluation of the c1rcu!"stances of the case. Accordingly we confirm the judgment of the Htgh Court.

Criminal Appeal No. 115 of 1970: On June 27 1968 three bars of foreign gold were found on. the person of the rspondent. He pleaded guilty at the trial w!1ereupn the learned Presidency Magistrate, 6th Court, Calcutta convicted him under section 135, Customs Act. 1962 and under Rules 126 P (l)(i} and 126 P (2)(ii) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. The respondent was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 150forthe offence under the Customs Act and a fine of Rs. 100 for the offence under Rule 126 P (l)(i). No separate sentence was imposed for the offence under Rule 126 P(2)(ii).

In appeal the High Court of Calcutta confirmed the conviction and sentence under the Customs Act. Regarding the contravention of the two Rules, the High Court held that 110 declaration need have been made by the respondent to the Administrator, as the gold of which the respondent was in possession was smuggled gold and not "legal" gold. According to the High Court "the legislature never expected that smuggled gold would be declared". The High Court therefore set aside the conviction and sentence in1posed on the respondent for contravention of the "Gold Control" Rules.

Part XII-A "Gold Control" (consisting of Rules 126A to 126Z) was inserted in the Defence of India Rules, 1962 by G. S. R. 89 dated January 9, 1963. Rule 126A (d) defines gold for the purposes of Pan XIIA thus:

"gold" means gold, including its alloy, whether virgin. melted, remelted, wrought or unwrought, in any shape or form, of a purity of not less than nine carats and includes any gold coin (whether legal tender or not), any ornament and any other article of gold;"

Some of the other Rules in Part Xl!A provide as follows to the extent material. Under Rule 126, every person must within the stipulated period make a declaration to the Administrator as to the quantity, description and other prescribed particulars of gold owned by him.

Failure or omission, without reasonable cause, to make such a declaration is made punishable by Rule 126 P (l)(i). Possession of gold in contravention of any provision of Part XIIA is made punishable by Rule 126 P(2)(ii).

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[ 1974] 3 S.C.R.

We see no justification in the scheme of the Rules for the view taken by the High Court that smuggled gold is not comprehended within Rule 126P of the Gold Control Rules. The definition of "gold" in Rule 126A (d) is couched in wide terms and it does not make any distinction between smuggled gold and gold lawfully possessed. The High Court says that the legislature could not have intended that a person in possession of smuggled gold should make a declaration in regard thereto.

The intention of the legislature must be gathered primarily and prin- -cipally from the words used by it and the definition of "gold" carves -0ut no exception in favour of smuggled gold. Secondly, if the intention -0f the legislature as reflected in the scheme of a law is to control the meaning of the words used in a particular Section or Rule, it strikes us .as Sllrprising that the obligation to declare gold should be imposed on lawful possessors of gold but should leave untouched the possession by smugglers or their agents of gold smuggled into the country. Under the definition contained in Rule 126A (d), "gold means gold" and no. rule of statutory construction can permit the definition to be altered materially so as to read: "Gold means gold but shall not include smuggled gold". To put such a construction on the definition is to coin a new definition and therefore to legislate.

The word "gold" is used at several places in Part XIIA and it is a well-recognised rule of construction that the same word should receive the same meaning in a collocation. Rule J26A (c)(ii) defines a dealer .as a person who carries on the .business of buying, selling, supplying etc. gold for the purpose of making ornaments. Ruic 126 B(l)(a) provides that a dealer shall not make or manufacture any article of gold other than ornament; sub:cJause (b) prov.ides that a efiner shall not make or manufacture any article of gold other than primary gold; sub-clause (c) provides that no other person shall make or manufacture any article of gold, unless the dealer, refiner or such other person is authorised by the Administrator to make or manufacture such an article. Rule 126C provides that no dealer shall .make and no person shall place any order for making an ornament containing gold of a purtiy exceeding 14 carats. Rule 126D contains a prohibition on loans being granted on the security of gold unless such gold is included in a declaration made under Rule 1261. Rule J26F requires e, ery dealer and refiner to submit a return in regard to the gold in his possession of control. Under Rule !26G dealers and refiners must keep an account of the gold bought or sold by them. Rule J26H provides that no dealer Or refinery shall have in his possession or under his control any gold which has not been included in the return which he is required to submit under the Rules. Rule 1261, with which we are directly concerned 1n this case, provides that every person other'than a dealer or a refiner, -shall within the stipulated period mal<e a declaration to the Administ, rator as to the quantity, description and other particulars of gold

other than ornament), owned by him. Clause (3) of this Rule provides (that .no person who is required to make a declaration, shall acquire any gold other than ornament except by succession or under a permit granted by the Administrator. Rule 126L confers power under the authority of the Administrator to seize any gold in respect of which the provisions of Part XIIA are contravened. Under Rule 126 M gold thus

I•'

.... M. SINHA v . .... K •. BISWAS (Chandrachud, I,) 141

seized is liable to confiscation. Rule 126P (l)(i) makes failure or omission to make a declaration as i:equired by Rule 1261 punishable. Rule !26P (2) (ii) prescribes punishment for possessian of gold in contravention of the provisions of Part XIIA.

It is manifest from the language, intendment and the scheme of these Rules that the word "gold" covers not only gold which is lawfully possessed but gold in any form or shape and whether possessed lawfully or otherwise. In the economic context in which Part XIIA was inserted into Defence of India Rules in 1963, it is impossible to hold that the legislature wanted to regulate the possession and control of gold lawfully possessed as distinguished from smuggled gold. It seems to us cle.ar that the prohibition in regard to the manufacture of articles of gold would apply even to articles made out of smuggled gold and it would be no defence for a dealer, refiner or for any other person to say that he had not contravened the provisions of Rule 126B because he had made an article out of smuggled gold.

Such a defence, we suppose, would be all the worse for him. Similarly, it would be no defence to a charge under Rule 1260 to say that a loan was advanced on the pledge of smuggled gold. The various Rules which we have set out above make it clear that the object of introducing Part XllA is, as shown for example by Rule 126H, that if any gold is acquired a declaration has to be'made in regard thereto, no matter how or by what means it is acquired. We are therefore unable to agree with the High Court that the respondent was not liable to make under Rule 1261 a declaration as to the gold in his possession and that therefore Rule 126P is not attracted. The view taken by a teared single Judge of the High Court of Mysore in K. Vis/mumoort/ii v. State. of Mysor<

& Anr.(1) that "gold" as defined in Part XIIA includes smuggled gold is, in our opinion, correct. We are not concerned in this case to determine whether on the particular facts of the case the Mysore High Court was right in refusing to apply section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act to the case before it.

The order of the learned Magistrate convicting and sentencing the respondent under section 135 of the Customs Act as also under Rule 126P of the Defence of India Rules must therefore be restored.

V.P.S.

Appeals allowed.

0) (1971) 2 Mys. L. J. 261.

ARVIND MOHAN SINHA

AMULYA KUMAR BISWAS & ORS

January 17, 1974

S. N. DWIVEDI

Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.

Customs Act, 1962

Defence of India Rules, 1962

Defence of India Rules, 1962

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958

Customs Act, 1962

s. 4(1)

Probation of Offenders Act

ACt and the Gold Control Rules

Probation of Offenders Act

[1964] 7 S.C.R. 676

Section 4(1)

137GJ Jal Narain\

Defence of India Rules

Calcutta High Court

S. N. Prasad

S. P. Nayar

CHANDRACHUD

High Court of calcutta

Article 134(1)(c)

Calcutta

section 135

Customs Act, 1962

section 111

India

Customs Act

Defence of India Rules, 1962

section 4(1)

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958

Customs Act

High CoUrt of Calcutta

section 11(2)

Probation of Offenders Act

Probation of Offenders Act

Probation of Offenders Act

Customs Act, 1962

Section 135(bXii)

Customs Act, 1962

section 111

section 11

Customs Act

Reserve Bank of India

section 8(1)

Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947

Defence of India Rules, 1962

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958

May 16, 1958

May 19, 1958

Section 3

section 4(1)

section 4(1)

customs Act

Probation of Offenders Act

Probation of Offenders act

Probation of Offenders Act

Winifred A. Elkin

Edwin E. Sutherland

Dharmashastras

P. K. Sen

Section 562

Code of Criminal Procedure

Dharmashastra

P. V. Kane

Section 4(1)

sections 245(2)

section 309(2)

Code of Criminal Procedure

Subba Rao

Raghubar Dayal

section 7(1)

Probation of Offenders act

!sher Das

June 27 1968

section 135

Customs Act

Defence of India Rules, 1962

Customs Act

High Court of Calcutta

Customs Act

Defence of India Rules, 1962

January 9, 1963

High Court of Mysore

Mysore High Court

section 4

Probation of Offenders Act

section 135

Customs Act