{"document_id": "1974_3_114_120_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "ll4\n\nLOKNATH PADHAN\n\nBIRENDRA\n\nKUMAR SAHU January 1.6. 1974\n\n[P. N.\n\nBHAGWATI AND l'. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.)\n\nRepresentation of the People Act (43 ofl951) s. 116A-Electlon petiti'on challe,.g· ing respondent's electlon to State Legislative Assembly-Dismissed-Dissolution of Assembly pending appeal to this Court-Effect on appeaf.\n\nThe appellant filed an ekction petition challenging the election of the respondent to the State legislative Assembly alleging that there was a substising contract, entered into by the respondent in the course of his trade and business, with the State Government, for the e'l(ecution of works undertaken by the Government, and that therefore he was disqualified under s .. 9A of the Representation of the People Act,\n\n1951. The High Court dismissed the petition holding that the contracts were not undertaken by the respondent in his individual capacity in the course of his trade and business but were on behalf of the Gram Panchayat of which he was the Naib Sarpanch, and also that the contracts had been fully carried out by the respondent long before the date of his nomination and that therefore, the Explanation to s. 9A was appli cable and took his case out of tLe section. While the appeal was pending in thi'i C-0urt the State Legislative Assembly was dissolved under An. 174(2)(6) of the Con .. stitution. The respondent raised the preliminary objection at the hearing of the appeal that in view of the dissolution of the assembly it was academic to decide whether or not the respondent was disqualified under the section. .o\n\nHELD : The law relating to abatement of election petitions is exhaustively dealt with in Chap.· VI of Part IV flf the Act and since there is nothing in the Act which provides for abatement of election petitions when the legislature is dissolved the dis\n\no1ution does not result .in the abatement of an election petition. But the question in the present case is not whether the appeal has abated on the dissolution of the State Assembly, but whether in view of the dissolution of the State Assembly, it has become academic to decide the appeal. In the instant case, even if it is found that the respondent was disqualified under s. 9A it would have no practical consequence, because invalidation of his election after the dissolution of the State Assembly, unlike the case of invalidation for corrupt practice, woulJ have no effect whatsoever. Therefore, the State Legislative assembly having been dissolved during the pendency of the appeal it is now wholly academic to consider whether the respondent was disqualified under s. 9A at the date of his nomination and since that is the only ground on which the election of. the respondent is challanged it would be fl' tile to hear the appeal on n1erits. [ll7D-E; 1200] ·\n\nShN1dhan Singh v. Mahan Lal, [1959} 3 S.C.R. 417, followed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDlCTION : Civil Appeal No. 644 of 1972 From the judgment and order dated the !st February 1972 of the Orissa High Court in Election Petition No. 3 of 1971.\n\nGobind Das, and P. H. Parekh for the appellant.\n\nNarayan Nettar, V.J. Francis and B. Kanta Rao, fo~ the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-This ajli'eal is preferred under s. 116A of the Representation of.the Peo;>le Act, 1951 (hereinaf; er referred to as the Act) agamst the Judgment of the Onssa High Court d1smissmg an election petition filed by the appellant challenging the election of the respon- H dent to the Orissa Legislative Assembly from Melchhamunda constituency in Sambhali)ur di; trict of the State of Orissa.\n\nLOKNATH v. B. K. SAHU (Bhagwati, !.) 11 5\n\nThe facts giving rise to the appeal may be briefly stated as follows: There were general elections to the Orissa Legislative Assembly sometimes in the beginning of March 1971. The last date for filing nomination papors was fixed on 7th February, 1971 and on or before that date the appellant and the respondent both filed their respective nomination papers for the seat from Melchhamunda constituency.\n\nOn 9th February, 1971, which was the date fixed for scrutiny of the nomination papers, the appellant raised an objection against the nomination of the respondent on the ground that he was disqualified under s. 9A of the Act. Section 9A provides inter a/ia that a person shall be disqualified if, and for so long as, there subsists a contract entered into by him in the course of his trade or business with the appropriate Government for the execution of any works undertaken by that Government.\n\nThere is an explanation to this section which says that where a contract has been fully performed by the person by whom it has been entered into with the appropriate Government, the contract shall be deemed not to subsist by reason only of the fact that the Government has not performed its part of the contract either wholly or in part. The allegation of the appellant was that the respondent had entered into five contracts with the Government of Orissa for the executio11 of works undertaken by that Government and these contracts were still subsisting and the respo11dent was, therefore, disqualified from contesting the election under s. 9A. This objection raised on behalf of the appellant was overruled by the Returning Officer and the nomination of the respondent was accepted. The polling thereafter took place on 5th March, 1971 and the respondent was declared elected on I Ith March,\n\n1971. The appellant thereupon filed an election petition ill the High Court of Orissa calling in question the election of the respondent on the ground that he was disqualified from bdng elected as a member by reason of s. 9A. The case of the appellant, as laid down in the election petition, \\vas that, at the date of nomination five contracts \\\\'ere subsisting between the respondent and the Government of Orissa in respect of the following works entrusted through the Gaisilet Panchayat Samiti : (1) construction of the Mahila Samiti building at Borumunda,\n\n(2) construction of the community recreation centre at Borumunda,\n\n(3) construction of the village level lady worker's quarter at Borumunda, (4) construction of a package village level worker's quarter at Gaisilet and (5) construction of the Borumunda canal, and on account of the subsistance of these five contracts the disqualification under s. 9A was attracted. Though the appellat)t relied on subsistance of these five contracts in the election petition, he conceded at the time of the arguments that contracts (4) and (5) may not be taken into account and rested his case solely on the ground that contracts (I) to (3) were subsisting between the respondent and the Government of Orissa.\n\nThe respondent denied that he had entered into any of these contracts with the Government of Orissa in the course of his trade or business or that any such contract was subsisting between him and the Government of Orissa at the date of nomination. The respondent aliened that the works undertaken by him under contracts (I) to (3) were part of the Second Five Year Plan and they were to be carried out by the Gram Panchayat on the basis of 50% subsidy from the Government and 50 % contribution by the people in terms of money or labour and\n\nit was as leader of the people and Naib Sarpanch that he had under- A taken these works on behalf of the Gram Panchayat and not in his individt:al capacity in course of his trade or business. The contention of the respondent, therefore, was that s. 9A had no application in his case. It was also urged by the respondent that in any event these contracts had been fully performed by him before the date of nomination and his case was, therefore, covered by the Explanation to s. 9A.\n\nThe respondent also contended in the alternative that even if the stand B taken by the Block Development Officer on behalf of the Gaisilet Panchayat Samiti was correct, namely, that the respondent had failed to carry out his obligations under thse contracts and the Government of the Gaisilet Partchayat San1iti. had, therefore, becon1e entitled to recover the amount advanced to the respondent and for that purpose issued the requisitions for certificate of recovery on 8th January, 1967, the case of the respondent was outside s. 9A because in that .\n\nC event the contracts were discharged by breach prior to 8th January, 1967 and were no longer subsisting at the date of nomination. The High Court trying the election petition took the view that the contracts in question were not undertaken by the respondent in his individual capacity in course of his trade or business, but they were undertaken on behalf of the Gram Panchayat in terms of the schemes envisaged in the Se\"ond Five Year Plan as the respondent was the leader of the D people and Naib Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, and the disqualification under s. 9A was, therefore, not attracted in the case of the respondent. The High Court also held, relying on the evidence of two witnesses, that the contracts had been fully carried out by the respondent Jong before the date of nomination and the Explanation was, therefore, applicable and that took the case of the respondent out of the inhibition of s. 9A. The view taken by the High Court E thus was that the respondent was not disqualified from contesting the election under s. 9A and on this view the High Court dismissed the election petition. Hence the present appeal under s. l 16A of the Act.\n\nWhilst the appeal was pending in this Court, the Orissa Legislative Assembly was dissolved by the Governor on 3rd March, 1973 under F Art. 174(2)(b) of the Constitutioi1. The respondent, therefore, raised a preliminary objection at the hearing of the appeal before us that in view of the dissolution of the Orissa Legislative Assembly, it was acadeinic to decide whether or not the respondent was disqualified from being a candidate under s. 9A and we should accordingly decline to hear the apal on merits. The argu1nent of the respondent \\Vas that unless there is a living issue between the parties the Court would not G proceed to decide it : it would not occupy its time by deciding what is purely an academic question which has no sequitur so far as the position of the parties is concerned. Here, contended the respondent. even if the appellant was able to satisfy the Court that on the date of the nomination, the respondent was disqualified under s. 9A, it would be a futile exercise, because the Orissa Legislative Assembly being dissolved, the setting aside of the election of the respondent would H have no meaning or consequence and hence the Court should refuse to embark on a <liscussion of the merits of the question arising in the appeal. We think there is great force int''' preliminary contention\n\n.,,-,\n\nLOKNATII v. B. K. SAHU (Bhagwati, J.) 117\n\nurged on behalf of the respondent. It is a well settled practice recognised and followed in .India as well as England that a Court should not undertake to decide an issue, unless it is a living issue between the partios. If an issue is purely academic in that its decision one way or the other would have no impact on the position of the parties, it would be waste of public time and indeed not proper exercise of authority for the Court to engage itself in deciding it.\n\nSpeaking of the House of Lords, Viscount Simon, L.C. said in the course of his speech in Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Jervis (I) \"I do not think that it would be a proper exercise of the authority which this House possesses to hear appeals if it occupies time in this case in deciding an acade- . mic question, the answer to which cannot affect the respondent in any\n\nway\", and added : \"-it is an essential quality of an appeal fit to be disposed of by this House that there should exist between the parties to a matter in actual controversy which the House undertakes to decide as a living issue\". This statement must apply equa1ly in case of exercise of appellate jurisdiction by this Court. It would be clearly futile and meaningless for the Court to decide an academic question, the answer to which wquld not affect the position of one party or the other. The Court would not engage in a fruitless exercise. It would refuse to decide a question, unless it has a bearing on some right or liability in controversy between the parties. If the decision of a question would be wholly ineffectual so far as the parties are concerned, it would be not only unnecessary and pointless but also inexpedient to decide . it and the Court would properly.decline to do so. In the present case, the Orissa Legislative Assembly being dissolved, it has become academic to consider whether on the date when the nomination was filed, the respondent was disqualified under s. 9A. Even if it is found that he was so disqualified, it would have no practical 9onsquence, because the invalidation of his election after the dissolution of the Orissa Legislative Assembly would be meaningless and ineffectual. It would not hurt him. The disqualification would only mean that he was not entitled to contest the election on the date when he filed his nomination. It would have .no consequences operating in future. It is pos- F sible that the respondent had a subsisting contract with the Govern- . ment of Orissa at the date of nomination, but that contract may not be subsisting now. The finding that the respondent was disqualified would be based on the facts existing at the date of nomination and it would have no relevance so far as the position at a future point of time -· -- may be concerned, and threfore, in view of the dissolution of the Orissa\n\n. Legislative Assembly; it would have no practical interest for either of the parties. Neither would it benefit the appellant nor should it affect the respondent in any practical sense and it would be wholly academic to consider wl1ether the respondent was disqualified on the date of nomination.\n\nThe position might be different if the allegation against the respondent were of corrupt practice. Then it would not be academic to consider whether or not the respondent was guilty of the corrupt practice charged against him, because. a finding of\n\n{I) [1944! A. C. 111.\n\ncorrupt practice has serious consequences. If the respondent is found guilty of corrupt practice during the election, not only his election would be declared void, but he would also incur certain electoral disqualifications.\n\nSec. SA provides that a person found guilty of a corrupt practice by an order under s. 99 shall be disqualified for a priod of six years from the date on which that order takes effect. The purity of elections is of utmost importance in a democratic set up and the law has, therefore, taken serious note of practice in elections and laid down a disqualification for a period of six years on an order being made by the High Court recording a finding of corrupl practice at the time of disposing of the election petition. It is, therefore, obvious -that when a corrupt practice is charged against the respondent in art election petition. the trial of the election petition must proceed to its logical end and it should be determmed whether the corrupt practice was committed by the respondent or not.\n\nAs pointed out by this Court in Sh:odhan Si11gh v. Mohan Lal (1) \"no one can be allowed to corrupt the course of an election and get away with it either by resigning his membership or because of the fortuitous circumstance of the assembly having been dissolved. The public are interested in seeing that those who had corrupted the course of an election are dealt \\Vith in accordance \\Vith law.\" The decision of the question whether corrupt practice was committed by the respondent or not would not, therefore, be academic and the Court would have to decide it, even if in the n1eantin1e the Legislature is dissolved. That was precisely the view taken by this Court in Sheodhan\n\nSinh v. Mohan Lal (l). In that case the election of the respondent to the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly was challenged by the appellant in an election petition on the ground that the respondent was guilty. of corrupt practice during the election. The Uttar Pradesh LegislatiYe Assembly was dissolved by the President during the pendency of the election petition before the High Court and a preliminary objection was, therefore, raised on behalf of the respondent that the election petition had ceased to be maintainable on account of the dis~ solution of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly. The High Court rejected the preliminary objection but on merits it took the view that corrupt practice was not proved and accordingly dis1nissed the election petition. The appellant thereupon preferred as appeal to this Court and in the appeal also the same prelin1inary objection was repeated on beholf of the respondent. This Court negatived the preliminary objection. Hegde, J., speaking on behalf of the Court emphasised that the charge against ·.., the respondent was of corrupt practice and pointed out that if the creation of the appellant that the respondent \\Vas gujJty of corrupt practice \\Vas found to be true, then not only his election would be declared void but he would also be liable to incur certain sectoral disqualification, and therefore. in the interest ofpuritv of elec:ions it was necessary that \"those who had corrupted the cours~ of an election are dealt with in accordance with law\", and this purpose would stand defeated if the election petition were held to become infructuous on the dissolution of the Assembly. The learned Judge then proceeded to consider the relevant elections of the Act and after\n\n'(1) [19591 3 S.C.R. 417.\n\n'LOKNAm v. B. ii. SAHU (Bhaf{Wati, !.) 119\n\nreferring to them, summarisd his conclusion by saying : \"From the above provisions it is seen that in an election petition the contest is really between the constituency on the one side and the person or persons complained of on the other. Once the machinery of the Act is moved by a candidate or an elector, the carriage of the case does not entirely rest with the petitioner. The reason for the elaborate pro, isions noticed by us earlier is to ensure to the extent possible that the persons who offered the election law are not allowed to avoid the consequences of their misdeeds.\" It will he seen that the emphasis in this decision was on the fact that the charge against the respondent was of corrupt practice and it was in this context that the Court held that where corrupt practices is alleged against the respondent in an election petition, the dissolution of the Legislature during the pendency of the election petition does not render it infructuous. We fail to see how the ratio of this decision can have any application in the pres, ent case.\n\nHere there is no charge of any corrupt practice against the respondent.\n\nThe 011ly ground on which the election of the respondent is sought to be invalidated is that he was disqualified at the date of nomination under s. 9A. This disqualification does not involve any act corrupting the course of an election. It has no other consequence than that of making the particular election void. It does not entail any electoral disqualification for the future. There is, therefore, no analogy between the two situations and this decision cannot be called in aid by the appellant.\n\nThe appellant, however, relied on the following observations in this decision and contended that these observations clearly lay down that an election petition does not become infructuous on the dissolution of the Legislature and the petioner is entitled to have the decision of the Court upon it, notwithstanding the dissolution of the Legislature : ·\n\n\"The election petitions in this country are solely regulated by statutory provisions. Hence unless it is shown that some statutory provision directly or by necessary implication prescribes that the pending election petitions stand abated beca\"se of the dissolution of the Assembly, the contention of the respondent cannot be accepted\".\n\n''.The law relating to withdrawal and abatement of election petitions is exhaustively dealt with in Chapter JV of Part VI of the Act. In deciding whether a petition has abated or not we cannot travel outside the provision providing for the dropping of an election petition for any reason other than those mentioned therein. The act does not provide for the abatement of an election petition either when the returned candidate whose election is challenged resigns or when the assembly is dissolved. As the law relating to abatements and withdrawal is exhaustively dealt with in the Act itself no reliance can be placed on the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code nor did the learned Counsel for the respondent bring to our notice any provision in the Civil Procedure Code under which the election petition can be held to have abated\"\n\nWe fail to see how these observations can be of any help to the appellant. They deal with a totally different contention than the one advanced before us. It may be noted that in this case the charge against the respondent was of corrupt practice and it could not, therefore, be successfully urged on behalf of the respondent that the decision of the question arising in the appeal had become academic on the dissolution of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly. The only contention which the respondent was, therefore, left with and which he could possibly advance was that an election petition must be held to abate on the dissolution of the Legislature and it was this contention which was dealt with and negatived in these observations.\n\nThis Court pointed out that the law relating to abatement of election petitions is exhaustively dealt with in Ch. IV of Part VI of the Act and since there is nothing in the Act which provides for abatement of an election petition when the Legislature is dissolved, it must be held that the dissolution of the Legislature does not result in abatement of the election petition. We express our whole hearted concurrence with this view. But the question before us is not whether the appeal in the present case abated on the dissolution of the Orissa Legislative Assembly.\n\nThat is not the contention raised on behalf of the respondent. The respondent does not say that the appeal has abated and must, therefore, be dismissed. What the respondent contends is that in view of the dissolution of.the Orissa Legislative Assembly, it has become academic to decide the appeal and hence we should decline to hear it. That is a wholly different contention which is not covered by the observations quoted above. We do not, therefore, think this decision throws any light on the 0 c::tention raised before us. It does not compel us to take a different view from the one we are inclined to take on principle.\n\nWe are, therefore, of the view that, the Orissa Legislative Assembly being dissolved during the pendency ofthis appeal, it is now wholly academic to consider whether the respondent was disqualified under s. 9A at the date of nomination and since that is the only ground on which election of the respondent is challenged, we think it would be futile to hear this appeal on merits. We accordinely dismiss the appeal with no orders as to costs all throughout. -\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed,", "total_entities": 54, "entities": [{"text": "ll4\n\nLOKNATH PADHAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LOKNATH PADHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BIRENDRA\n\nKUMAR SAHU", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIRENDRA KUMAR SAHU", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 1.6. 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ll4\n\nLOKNATH PADHAN\n\nBIRENDRA\n\nKUMAR SAHU January 1.6."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "l'. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 707, "end_char": 739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1145, "end_char": 1150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act,\n\n1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act,\n\n1951"}}, {"text": "VI of Part IV flf the Act and since there is nothing in the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1657, "end_char": 1720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2189, "end_char": 2194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VI of Part IV flf the Act and since there is nothing in the Act", "statute": "VI of Part IV flf the Act and since there is nothing in the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2586, "end_char": 2591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VI of Part IV flf the Act and since there is nothing in the Act", "statute": "VI of Part IV flf the Act and since there is nothing in the Act"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDlCTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2842, "end_char": 2870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDlCTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Gobind Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3020, "end_char": 3030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gobind Das, and P. H. Parekh for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. H. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3036, "end_char": 3048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gobind Das, and P. H. Parekh for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Narayan Nettar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3069, "end_char": 3083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narayan Nettar, V.J. Francis and B. Kanta Rao, fo~ the respondent."}}, {"text": "V.J. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3085, "end_char": 3097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narayan Nettar, V.J. Francis and B. Kanta Rao, fo~ the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. Kanta Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3102, "end_char": 3114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narayan Nettar, V.J. Francis and B. Kanta Rao, fo~ the respondent."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3181, "end_char": 3189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-This ajli'eal is preferred under s. 116A of the Representation of.the Peo;>le Act, 1951 (hereinaf; er referred to as the Act) agamst the Judgment of the Onssa High Court d1smissmg an election petition filed by the appellant challenging the election of the respon- H dent to the Orissa Legislative Assembly from Melchhamunda constituency in Sambhali)ur di; trict of the State of Orissa.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3226, "end_char": 3233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Orissa Legislative Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3729, "end_char": 3756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11 5\n\nThe facts giving rise to the appeal may be briefly stated as follows: There were general elections to the Orissa Legislative Assembly sometimes in the beginning of March 1971."}}, {"text": "9th February, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4029, "end_char": 4047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 9th February, 1971, which was the date fixed for scrutiny of the nomination papers, the appellant raised an objection against the nomination of the respondent on the ground that he was disqualified under s. 9A of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4233, "end_char": 4238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4251, "end_char": 4261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4957, "end_char": 4977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allegation of the appellant was that the respondent had entered into five contracts with the Government of Orissa for the executio11 of works undertaken by that Government and these contracts were still subsisting and the respo11dent was, therefore, disqualified from contesting the election under s. 9A. This objection raised on behalf of the appellant was overruled by the Returning Officer and the nomination of the respondent was accepted."}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5162, "end_char": 5167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5th March, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5345, "end_char": 5360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The polling thereafter took place on 5th March, 1971 and the respondent was declared elected on I Ith March,\n\n1971."}}, {"text": "High Court of Orissa", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5483, "end_char": 5503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant thereupon filed an election petition ill the High Court of Orissa calling in question the election of the respondent on the ground that he was disqualified from bdng elected as a member by reason of s. 9A. The case of the appellant, as laid down in the election petition, \\vas that, at the date of nomination five contracts \\\\'ere subsisting between the respondent and the Government of Orissa in respect of the following works entrusted through the Gaisilet Panchayat Samiti : (1) construction of the Mahila Samiti building at Borumunda,\n\n(2) construction of the community recreation centre at Borumunda,\n\n(3) construction of the village level lady worker's quarter at Borumunda, (4) construction of a package village level worker's quarter at Gaisilet and (5) construction of the Borumunda canal, and on account of the subsistance of these five contracts the disqualification under s. 9A was attracted."}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5637, "end_char": 5642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Borumunda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5966, "end_char": 5975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant thereupon filed an election petition ill the High Court of Orissa calling in question the election of the respondent on the ground that he was disqualified from bdng elected as a member by reason of s. 9A. The case of the appellant, as laid down in the election petition, \\vas that, at the date of nomination five contracts \\\\'ere subsisting between the respondent and the Government of Orissa in respect of the following works entrusted through the Gaisilet Panchayat Samiti : (1) construction of the Mahila Samiti building at Borumunda,\n\n(2) construction of the community recreation centre at Borumunda,\n\n(3) construction of the village level lady worker's quarter at Borumunda, (4) construction of a package village level worker's quarter at Gaisilet and (5) construction of the Borumunda canal, and on account of the subsistance of these five contracts the disqualification under s. 9A was attracted."}}, {"text": "Gaisilet", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6183, "end_char": 6191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant thereupon filed an election petition ill the High Court of Orissa calling in question the election of the respondent on the ground that he was disqualified from bdng elected as a member by reason of s. 9A. The case of the appellant, as laid down in the election petition, \\vas that, at the date of nomination five contracts \\\\'ere subsisting between the respondent and the Government of Orissa in respect of the following works entrusted through the Gaisilet Panchayat Samiti : (1) construction of the Mahila Samiti building at Borumunda,\n\n(2) construction of the community recreation centre at Borumunda,\n\n(3) construction of the village level lady worker's quarter at Borumunda, (4) construction of a package village level worker's quarter at Gaisilet and (5) construction of the Borumunda canal, and on account of the subsistance of these five contracts the disqualification under s. 9A was attracted."}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6322, "end_char": 6327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Naib Sarpanch", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7248, "end_char": 7261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent aliened that the works undertaken by him under contracts (I) to (3) were part of the Second Five Year Plan and they were to be carried out by the Gram Panchayat on the basis of 50% subsidy from the Government and 50 % contribution by the people in terms of money or labour and\n\nit was as leader of the people and Naib Sarpanch that he had under- A taken these works on behalf of the Gram Panchayat and not in his individt:al capacity in course of his trade or business."}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7459, "end_char": 7464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7688, "end_char": 7693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of the Gaisilet Partchayat San1iti", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7962, "end_char": 8007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also urged by the respondent that in any event these contracts had been fully performed by him before the date of nomination and his case was, therefore, covered by the Explanation to s. 9A.\n\nThe respondent also contended in the alternative that even if the stand B taken by the Block Development Officer on behalf of the Gaisilet Panchayat Samiti was correct, namely, that the respondent had failed to carry out his obligations under thse contracts and the Government of the Gaisilet Partchayat San1iti."}}, {"text": "8th January, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8167, "end_char": 8184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "had, therefore, becon1e entitled to recover the amount advanced to the respondent and for that purpose issued the requisitions for certificate of recovery on 8th January, 1967, the case of the respondent was outside s. 9A because in that ."}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8225, "end_char": 8230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8813, "end_char": 8818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9160, "end_char": 9165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9287, "end_char": 9292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "3rd March, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9521, "end_char": 9536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whilst the appeal was pending in this Court, the Orissa Legislative Assembly was dissolved by the Governor on 3rd March, 1973 under F Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 174(2)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9545, "end_char": 9559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9850, "end_char": 9855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10365, "end_char": 10370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10886, "end_char": 10893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is a well settled practice recognised and followed in .India as well as England that a Court should not undertake to decide an issue, unless it is a living issue between the partios."}}, {"text": "Viscount Simon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11280, "end_char": 11294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Speaking of the House of Lords, Viscount Simon, L.C. said in the course of his speech in Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Jervis (I) \"I do not think that it would be a proper exercise of the authority which this House possesses to hear appeals if it occupies time in this case in deciding an acade- ."}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12711, "end_char": 12716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14469, "end_char": 14474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16426, "end_char": 16460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Uttar Pradesh LegislatiYe Assembly was dissolved by the President during the pendency of the election petition before the High Court and a preliminary objection was, therefore, raised on behalf of the respondent that the election petition had ceased to be maintainable on account of the dis~ solution of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16833, "end_char": 16838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hegde, J., speaking on behalf of the Court emphasised that the charge against ·.., the respondent was of corrupt practice and pointed out that if the creation of the appellant that the respondent \\Vas gujJty of corrupt practice \\Vas found to be true, then not only his election would be declared void but he would also be liable to incur certain sectoral disqualification, and therefore."}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18939, "end_char": 18944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IV of Part VI of the Act and since there is nothing in the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21677, "end_char": 21739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22962, "end_char": 22967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_121_132_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "MURTHY MATCH WORKS, ETC. ETC. v.\n\nTHE ASSTT. COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, ETC.\n\nJanuary 11, 1974\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.]\n\nCemral Excise &: Salt Act, 1944-S. 37 and the , notification issued thereunderwhether court Cll/I review legislative Judgment-Constitution of India-Reasonable classification of principles for determining.\n\nThe match industry in India has grown over the decides. From the p:>int of view of manufacturing techniques the safety match industry comprises of two distinct categork-:s: the machanised soctor occupied by a few big manufacturen and the non-mechanised sector comprising varying sizes of production units.\n\nThe Government classified the safety match manufacturers into four categories depending on the quantitY turn out and other relevant factors. But the Tariff rommis<; ion recommended the abolition of sulrclassification for the purpose of levying eKcise duty and s1,1ggested separate scales of excise duty to be levied for four classes of units, namely, A, B, C and D. Based on these recommendations the slab system of excise duty was abandoned by the Government and the category wise rate wa'l adopted, As a mutt of the adoption of the differential duty scheme the advantages offered to the •c• group went to the 'B' group which in turn resulted in fall in production.\n\nIt also generated pscudo-C category producers from out of the erstwJ.ile B category which ultimately eliminated C category producers. The Government, therefore, withdrew the tax concession to C category and eq:J.1ted it with B category.\n\nThe Government of India had from time .to time issu::d notifications under s. 37 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. The notification issued in 1967 levied excise duty on the basis of manufacture of matches of which \"any process is ordiM\n\nnarily carried on with the aid of power\". As a result of this notification the B and C categories of old were now treated equally. The change in classification of the manufacturers was based on the use of power which in turn had a rational relation to the techniques and processes of production and their ability to bear the burden of the levy, This was done on th~ basis of recom'll'!ndations of the Central Excise Re-organisation Committee.\n\nThe High Court refused to strike down the notification. It was contended in this Court that this unsocialistic step had left the small producers in the cold and virtually compelled them to retire from the industry and is thus discriminatory.\n\nDismissing t, he appeals to this Court,\n\nHELD ; This is a criticism of legislative judgment, not a ground of judicial review. The Court is being invited to compel the legislative and executive wings to classify but from the judicial insPection -tower the court may only search for arbitrary and irrational classification and its obverse, namely, capricious uniformity of treatment where a crying dissimilarity exists in reality. Unconstitutionality and not unwdom of a legislation is the narrow area of judicial review. [129 EJ\n\nThe question of classification is primarily for legislative judgment and ordinarily does not become a judicial question. The power to classify being extremely broad and based on diverse considerations of executive pragmatism the judicature cannot rush in where even the legislature warily treads. All these operational restraints on judicial power must weigh more emphatica1Iy where the subject is taxation. [130 E]\n\nIt is equally well settled that merely because there is room for classifkation it does not follow that legislation without classification is always unconstitutional.\n\nThe court cannot strike down a law because it 1i8.s not made the classification which commends to the court as proper. Nor can the legislative power be said to have been unconstitutionally exercised because within the class a sub-classification was reasonable but has not been made. [130 HJ\n\nln the resent ca\"t:, a pertinent prir.ciple of differentiation, which is vi.>ibl;' linked to production prowes. has been adopted in the broad classification of power-users and manual manufacturers. It is irrational to castigate this b:isis a\" unre.11. [131 CJ\n\nK.T. Moopi/ A'air v. Start of Kera/a, [19611 3 S.C.R. 77, State of K?rala v. Haii K. Haji Kuuy }/aha, C. As Nos. 1052 etc. of 1968; iudgment daud August 13, 1968 and Khandige Shain Bitar v. The Agricultural Income Tax Officer, [1963] 3 S.C'.R. 809, 817, followed.\n\nClv1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1752 to 1769. of 1970\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated the 24th April, 1970 of the Mardas High Court in Writ Petitions No;. 239, 346, 999, 1000, 1007,\n\n1030, 1071, 1101, 1102, 1223, 1242, 1270, 1271, 172.4, 1725, 1748, 2640 and 3252 of 1969.\n\nY. S. Chitle, V. M .. Ganpule, K. R. Choudhury and K. Rajendra Choudhury, for the appellants.\n\nL. N. Sinha, Solicitor General of India, S. P. Nayar, and M. N.\n\nShroff, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-The core of the contention urged by the appellants in these various appeals filed by certificate under art. l33(l)(a) & ( c) of the Constituticm is that the excise duty on matches sought to be levied on these medium-sized manufacturers of Shivakashi wears the mask of equality but in its true face bears the marks of unequal justice violative of art. 14 of the Constitution of India.\n\n.>hri Chitale, learned counsel for the appellants, has focused his arguments on one grievance only and, we think, with good reason that the discriminatory fiscal treatment of his clients is unconstitutional, the vice being treatment of dissimilar categories similarly. To co1npress his \\\\'hole argument in a single sentence, it is that the appellants, small n1anufacturers of matches, ha\\'e been subjected by the impugned notification to excise duty at the san1e onerus rate as has been applied to larger producers, wilfully indifferent to a historically well recognised classification between the smaller and the larger group of, n1atch manufacturers, and the injury sustained flows from this failure to classify and deal differentially with sets of producers who are unequal in their economic capabilities in the matter of production and marketing - a sort oftrau111atic egality. Jn brief, equal treat1nent of unequal groups n1ay spell invisible yet substantial discri1nination with consequences of unconstitutionality. That dissimilar things should not be treated similarly in tho name of equal justice is of Aristotelian vintage and has been, by in1plication, enshrined in our Constitution.\n\nThe facts which unfold the case of the appellants may now be set out. The match industry in India has grown over the decades anJ Shivakashi occupies an important place in the production geography of matches. From the point of view of manufacturing techniques, the safety match industry in our country comprises two distinct categories the mechanised sector occupied by a few big whales and the non-\n\nmechanised sector co1nprising va1y1ue, :oi1Lt::oi u1 production units ranging. from the small fry organised on a cottage industry basis to considerable producers \\\\lho have developed 1nanufacturing and marketing muscles sufficient to compete with the power-using big four-the WIMCO, the AMCO, the ESAVI, and the Pioneer. The Tariff commission.\n\nReport on rhis industry has stated :\n\n\"llnlike units in the mechanised sector \\Vhich have power driven equipment for carrying out all the imp.Jrtant operations. including manufacture of splints and veneers, fra1ne filling dipping, box making, etc., those in categories 'B' and c follow alniost identical 1nanufacturing process, obtaining their splints and veneers from outside suppliers and getting such important operations as box-making and frame tilling done by outside don1estic labour on piecerate basis. Only such of the processes as dipping, box tilling, banderolling and packing which under\n\n-'!xcise or Explosive Act regulations cannot be entrusted to outside labour are carried out in the factory sheds of the units and the workers employed for these also are mostly paid on piece-rate basis. All the operations, whether, undertaken in the factory premises or passed on to outside piece-work labour to be carried out in the homes of the latter conjointly with other members of the family. are done by manual process. The same system is followed by 'D' category units as well, except those spon ored by K. & V. I. C. some of which manufacture their own splints and veneers.\"\n\nClassified on the basis or quantity turn-out and other germane factors, a fourfold categorisation into 'A', 'B', 'C' and 'D' was extent in the industry roughly corresponding to the techniques of production and the use of power adopted by each. The Tariff Commission explained this aspect and reported on the operation of the differential excise levy system on producticn and trade practices. Counsel for the appellants has rested his case of discrimination by subversive equality or rather non-discrin1ination where a deserving differentiation is the desideratum, on the findings of the Tariff Commission report. We might as well give copious but relevant excerpts from it to discern the foun<lationi of the argument. The Report runs on to state :\n\n\"As indicated in Appendix II, according to the excise tariff classification units in the match industry now stand grouped intofourclas5:es, na1nely 'A', 'B', 'C'and'D' not on any technological differentiation but on the basis of output-'A' class comprising factories whose annual output exceeds 4,000 million match_ sticks,' B' class co1nprising factories whose annual output exceeds 500 million match sticks but does not exceed 4,000 million match sticks, 'C' class comprising factories whose annual output exceeds 50 million match sticks but does not exceed 500 million 111atch sticks and 'D' class comprising factories whose ann- al output does not exceed 50 million match sticks. According to this classification the factories belonging to WIMCO, AMCO and ESA VI fall under category 'A', the rest comprising the units\n\n:124 SUPREME COUl<.T REPORTS [ 1974 l 3 S.C.R.\n\nin the non-mechanised sector fall under the other three cate- A gories, namely 'B', 'C', and\n\n4D' ~\n\n\"Selling systen1 :\n\n(iv) Small producers.-The system of selling adopted by these n1anufacturers varied according to their status and financial resources. The system almost universally followed by such producers is to make outright sales, without any discount or commission to wholesalers, both out-station and local. The bigger, among such producers belonging to category 'B' are reported in some cases to sell as well through dealers and sole selling agents.\n\nMany of them have also got their own depots and regular stockists in a li1nited number of out-station centres. As regards 'C' and 'B'class producers, the system of sales covers the following variants according to facilities available to them : (i) outright sales to wholesale merchants, local or out-station; (ii) sales through joints schemes of depots which stock different brands from several producers; (iii) sales by sending goods in their own vans in bulk to distributors and dealers in nearby states: and (iv) sales through their own salesman who deliver goods in local markets on the shopkeepers on bicycles (a special feature of 'D' class units).\n\nFrom the replies received by us from units in the small scale ser.:tor it \\VOuld appear that those in category 'B' situated in the Shivakasi/SatturiKovilpatti area have over somt years in the past established contacts and <level oped a fairly wide selling system enabling them to cater to the markets in distant States including West Bengal, U.P., Delhi, Gujarat and practically all the States in the South. The size of their operations has all along enabled them to undertake supply in wagon loads at the concessional rates, which is an in1portant consideration for developing distant markets to be served by rail transport.\"\n\n\"Although they are not comparable to WIMCO in having a country-, vide distributive organisation, these units evinced till recently all the symptoms of a steady and healthy development, some of them having reached the maximum limit (4,000 million sticks) of Category 'D' with a reputation for their brands in far olf markets. They had the resources to support this progressive development and a few of them have represented that with an imprO\\ernent of !he climate of the trade which has been completely vi!iated by the slab system of excise duties (see paragraph 11) and given necessary facili!ies they would be able to reestablish the markets ihey had assiduously b11ilt up and even initiate a schen1e of gradual mechanisation of important processes in their fac!orie's for the betterment of the quality of their products, In the present context, it is worth taking no!c of the fact that the credit for an expanding market for matches produced in the non-meclrnnised sector is attributable largely lo the sales\n\nrtdeavours of factories \\.vhich had gro\\vn to be \"B' class units that had riecessary resources for the purpose .and \\Vere able the nmintain quality.\"\n\n* * * *\n\nA \"In contrast to the 'B' class units, the selling system of those in category 'C' betokens a position of serious weakness. Except the C' class units which have been brought into existence by fragmentation of bigger units and still operate under the protecting wing of the sponsor (see paragraph l l), the new-comers in this class who have no tradition, functions mostly with meagre financial resources and have no comparable advantage. Unable B to sell their output in wagon loads they are compelled to dispose of it to local financing-cum-trading agencies at rock bottom prices dictated by the latter for what has now come to be called consignments of\n\n1'assorted labels\". This, in effect, involves a complete surrender by the 'C' class producers to the benefit of differential excise rebate allowed to them to the detriment of others a1 well. The low purchase prices of the goods enable C such agencies to send consignments of mixed brands to distant places in wagon-loads and find a market by offering to the\n\nwholesalers there extren1ely competitive rates ris-a-vis the usual rates charged by 'B' class units, the retail selling prices being the same for both. Our examination of the problem of the small scale units in category 'C' indicates that basically their problem is not different from other small industdes suffering similar D exploitation by middlemen. As in other cases they can best be extricated from the grip of the middlemen by the establishment of suitable sales co-operatives. We dra\\\\' the attention of the State Governn1ents to th.is problem for initiating necessary measures for the purpose, particularly of the Govern1nent of Madras, as the concentration of such units is in that State where the problem presents itself in the most acute forn1, but offers favourable E prospects for the establishment of several full-fledged sales cooper.:i.tives \\vith adequate niembership.\"\n\n' • • • 'There is sufficient eviderice to indicate that the effects have been quite widespread and recourse has been taken to fragmentation on a fairly extensive scale.\"\n\n• • • • \"The Sivakasi Chamber has stated as follows \"Jn the face of such unhealthy competition from 'C' factories and the disadvantages over 'A', the 'B' is unable to market its production resulting in heavy accumulation of stocks. It is now felt by 'B' class factories that there is no other salvation for them except to convert \"B' into 'C' class factories in benami names. as fev.' have since done. It may be pointed out that 16 long established 'B' factories have reduced themselves to 'C' class with effect from ]st April, 1963 in this Division alone in addition to the numerous factories \\Vho have already converted fron1 'B' to 'C'.\" As regards similar fragmentation of the larger units in category 'C' almost identical views have been expressed by the Tirunelevely Match Association, representing 150 'C' class match factories, in the following words :'\"In view of the vast difference of excise duty between !st and 3rd slab of excise duty in 'C' Class there is a tendency and prectice among the manufacturers to work in the first slab only and to stop therewith. Jn this way starting of small new units with the motive to enjoy rebate in the first slab\n\nof excise duty has become common and_this has clearly resulted A in loss of revenue, as well as working of units in less than the permitted c101city. It hs been brought to our notice that the situation has deteriorated to such an ex1ent as a result of the slab system that some erstwhile 'B' units have suspended their manufacturing activities altog<ther and instead found it more profitable to pltronise a number of newly established 'C' class units. Their taking over the products of the latter in their new role as a trading- B cum-financing agency has been facilitated by their established market connections and resourcefulness.\n\nInstances of 'B' category units owned by individual proprietors downgrading themselves into category 'C' and having a number of 'C' class units set up in the name of near relations have also been noticed by us in the course ofour visits to factories in the Sivakasi/Sattur/ Kovilpatti area. The allegations about extensive fragmentation C were not denied by anybody at the public inquiry.\"\n\n• • • • \"The volume of evidence, both direct and indirect, that we have received in this connection fully testifies to the fact that large scale fragmentation of 'B' and 'C' class units has taken place directly as a result of the slab system-all motivated by the attraction offered by the large duty differential of 65 np for the lowest slab rate under category 'C'\" .\n\n• • • • \"From the evidence received by us \"B\" and \"C\" class units have tooffer their match boxes generally at a discount of Rs. 2 to Rs. 3 per bundle of 5 gross boxes, i.e. at about 40 to 60 nP. per gross less than the price charged by WIMCO. While the quality <Jf matches produced by 'B' class manufacturers has the reputation of being generally good and comparable to WIMCO's matches, the 'C' class units do not have such reputation in the market. The 'C' class manufacturers are handicapped by a further disadvantage on account of the lower scale of their production, inasmuch as they cannot usually offer a wagon-load of matches at a time for despatch to the upcountry markets for sale and have generally to bear the central sales tax. After carefully considering all aspects of the case including estimates of costs of the manufacturers, we are of opinion that a differential of 20 nP. in the rates of excise duty per gross of match boxes between 'A' and 'B' class units and a differential of 30 nP. between 'B' and 'C' -class manufacturers 'Yould be quite adequate to safeguard their\n\nrespctive interests. On similar considerations a differential of 35°nP. between 'C' and 'D' class units would also be justified. For reasons stated in paragrap~1 11 and as stressed therein. we are definitely against continuance of the slabs introduced in classes \"A', 'B' and 'C' carrying differential rates of excise duty, hich have. entailed serious repercussions on the entire industry.\n\nWe, therefore, recommend the following scales of excise duty to b, levied for the\" four classes respectively : For 'A' clas Rs.4.60 For 'B' class\n\nR~.4.40 For 'C' class Rs.4.10 For •o• class . .\n\nRs.3. 75\n\nper gross b3xcs per gross boxes per gross boxes per gross boxes\n\nThe Tariff Commission recommended the abolition of sub-classification for the purposes of excise duty and suggested separate scales of excise duty to be levied for the four classes of units, namely, 'A', 'B'; 'C' and 'D'. Based on these recommendations, the slab svstem of excise duty was abandoned by Government and the category-wise rate was adopted. The impact on production of the differential duty fCheme was a process of splintering of the 'B' group to inhale the advantages offered to the 'C' group resulting in a reduction in total production, thanks to the thinning tendency in the 'B' group. Indeed, the fiscal misdirection, by showing concessional rates to the 'C' category as against 'B' category, generated pseudo-'C' category producers from out of the erstwhile 'B' category so that the bona fide small scale manufacturers falling in the 'C' category were flooded out. Moreover, the genuine 'C' category manufacturers were exploited by the middlemen who snapped up the margin of tax concession for themselves, defeating the object of concessional duty for the small producer. This dilemma induced Government to revise its fiscal thinking and led to the impugned notification which withdrew the tax concession to the 'C' category and equated it with the 'B' category.\n\nSection 3 of the Central Excise and salt Act, 1944 empowers the levy and collection of duties on goods produced or manufactured in the\n\nState, the rate being set forth in the First schedule to the Act. Item 38 in the First Schedule relates to matches. Section 37 contains the rulemaking power and s. 37(1) confers power on the Central Government by rules to exempt any goods from the whole or any part of the duty imposed by the Act. Under this power the Central/Government issued a notification adopting a \"classification\" approach for extending concessional rates. Originally, a broad classification was made as between matches manufactured by use of machinery and thosey other means.\n\nAmong the second category a sub-classification was made as 'B', 'C' and 'D' for the purposes of concessional rates. In 1966,!a uniform leavy\n\nof Rs. 4 15 per gross of match boxes was made doing away with 'B' to '0' classes. In 1967 this position was revised by notification No. 162 of 1967, which is challeged before us. It reads :\n\n\"In , exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (I) of rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1955, and in supersession of the Notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue and Insurance) No. I l 5/67 Central Excise, dated the 8th June, 1967, the Central Government hereby exempts matches specified in column (2) of the Table below, falling \"under Item No. 3t! of the First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 (I of l 944) and cleared by any manufacturer for home consumption, from so much of the duty of excise leviable thereon as is in excess of the rate spocified in the corresponding entry in column (3) of.the said table :\n\ncategory.\n\nTABLE\n\nDescription of matches' Rate (Rs per gross of boxes 50 mat~ cho1 each)\n\nMatches in or in relation to the manufacture of which any process is ordinarily carried on with the aid of power 4 60 B 2.\n\nMatches in or iTI relation to the manufacture of which no process is ordinarily carried on with the aid of power\n\nProvided that--\n\n4·30\n\n(!) Matches referred to in category 2 and cleared for home consumption during the financial year from a factory frm which the total clearance of matches d'uring that year is not, as per declaration made by the manufacturer under this notification, estimated to exceed 75 million matches, shall be allowed to be cleared at the rate of Rs. 3 ·75 per gross of boxes 30 matches each, upto 75 million matches and the quantity of matches, if any, cleared in excess, and upto 100 million matches shall be allowed to be cleared at the rate of Rs. 4 30 per gross of . boxes of 50 matches each; and if the clearance in such factory exceeds 100\n\nmillion matches during the financial year, tile manufacturer.shall be required to pay at the rate of Rs. 4 30 per gross of boxes of\n\n50 matches each, on the entire quantity cleared during the :financial year . ..... \"\n\nThe upshot of this system of duty is that 'B' and 'C' categories of old will now be treated equally and the grievance of the petitioners, who are 'C' category manufacturers is that clubbing them together with the far stronger 'B' type manufacturers is virtually condemning them to gradual extinction. Treating unequals as equals and compelling both lo bear equal burdens is to show the 'C' type manufacturers the way out. It is urged that the test of capacity of each group in the industry to bear the levy, recognised in the past and approved in the Tariff Commission Report, is given the go-bye now.\n\nThe contention, in reply, by the State is that at present the classification of the manufacturers is based on the use of power which in turn has a rational relation to the techniques and processes of production and their ability to bear the burden of the levy. It is further argued that the Government did give effect to the recommendations of the Tariff Commission regarding the four-fold classification but, finding certain evils developing, the Central Excise Re-organisation Committee went into the subject and suggested methods to re-orient the scale and scope of excise duty. This Committee's report led to the current notification and the dichotomy between mechanised and non-mechanised industry proceeds on a rational differentia which has a substantial relation to the legislative end.\n\nThere is no doubt that in the past among the non-mechanised manufacturers of matches a further classification based ori viability\n\nhad ben made. It is also true that the financial resources, the capacity to command a market on their own without depending on intermediaries, etc., marked off the 'B' category from the 'C' category. But then experience gathered subsequently disclosed certain evils which the State took note of and endeavoured to set right. Ultimately, the present notification was issued obliterating the distinction which gave a concessional edge to the 'C' group over the 'B' group.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellants persuasively pleaded that this unsocialistic step has left the small producers like his clients in the cold and virtually compelled them to retire from the industry. May be, there is force in this grievance. Instead of protecting the tiny manufacturer from the injurious intermediary and inhibiting the larger producer from resorting to the device of self-division and other makebelieve tactics, the State has resorted to a policy of equal levy from both which, according to the counsel, hits the poor and helps the better-off. This is a criticism of legislative judgment, not a ground of judicial review.\n\nWe agree that bare equality of treatment regardless of the inequality of realities is neither justice nor homage to the constitutional principle.\n\nAnatole France's cynical statement comes to our mind in this context :\n\n\"The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.\" ·\n\nThe forensic focus turns on unconstitutional non-classification of the 'B' and 'C' categories and the vice of lugging an non-mechanised producers together into one mass. The Court is being invited to compel the legislative and executive wings to classify, but we feel that from the judicial inspection tower the Court may only search for arbitrary and irrational classification and its obverse, na1nely, capricious unifonnity of treatment where a crying dissimilarity exists in reality.\n\nRight at the threshold we must warn ourselves of the limitations of judicial power in this jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Stone of the Supreme Court of the United States has delineated these limitations in United States v. Butler(') thus :\n\n\"The power of courts to declare a statute unconstitutional is subject to two guiding principles of decision which ought never to be absent from judicial consciousness. One is that courts are concerned only with the power to enact statutes, not with their wisdom. The other is that while unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon our exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint. For the removal of unwise laws from the statute books appeal lies not to the courts but to the bcllot and to the processes of democratic government.\" In short, unconstitutionality aitd not unwisdom of a legislation is the narrow area of judicial review. Jn the present case unconstitu-\n\n(IJ 297 U.S. 1=56 Sup.Ct.312=80 L.cd.477 (1936)=Amcrican Constitutioftal Law-4hird cdn. by Trcsolini and Shapiro.\n\nIO-M852 SupC!/74\n\n130 SUPREME COURT llEPOllTS [ 1974 l 3 s.c.11.\n\ntiooality is alleged as springing from lugging together two dissimilar A categories of match manufacturers into one compartment for like treatment.\n\nC.Crtain principles which bear upon classification may be mentioned here. It is true that a State may classify persons and objects for the purpose of legislation and pass laws for the purpose of obtaining revenue or other ot•jects. Every differentiation is not a discrimination. ll But classification can be sustained only if it is founded on pertinent and real differences as distinguished from irrelevent and artificial ones.\n\nThe constitutional standard by which the sufficiency of the differentia which form a valid basis for classification may be measured, has been\n\nrepeatedly stated by the courts. If it rests on a difference which bears a fair and just relation. to the object for which it is proposed, it is con·\n\nstitutional. To put it differently, the means must have nexus with C the ends. Even so, a large latitude is allowed to the State for classification upon a reasonable basis and what is reasonable is a question of practical details and a variety of factors which the court will be re- .Juctant and perhaps ill-equipped to iqvestigate. Jn this imperfect world .perfection even in grouping is an ambition hardly ever accomplished.\n\nIn this contest, we have to remember the relationship between the legislative and judicial departments of government in the detem1ina- D tion of the validity of classification. Of course, in the last analysis courts possess the power to pronounce on the constitutionality of the acts of the other branches whether a classification is based upon substantial <lifferences or is arbitrary, fanciful and consequently illegal, At the same time, the question of classification is primarily for legislative judgment and ordinarily does not become a judicial question.· A power to classify being extremely broad and based on diverse considerations of executi\\'e £ praiimatism, the judicature cannot rush in where even the legislature warily treads. All these operational restraints on judicial power must weigh more emphatically where the subject is taxation.\n\nOne facet of the equal protection clause, upheld by the Indian Courts and relevant to the present case, is tha.t while similar things must be treated similarly, dissimilar things should not be treated simi- F larly. There can be hostile discrimination while maintaining a facede of equality. Procrustean cruelty cannot be equated with guarantee of <Constitutional equality, and we have to examine whether such is the lot\n\n-0f the appellants.\n\nThis Court has in several rulings highlighted this sensitive under-\n\nide of equal protection. Indeed, the complaint of the petitioners is G that by abolition of the difference in fiscal burden between categories a and 'C' an insidious subversion of equal treatment has been effected.\n\nAnother proposition which is equally settled is that merely because there is room for classification it does not follow that legislation without classification is always unconstitutional. The court cannot strike down a law because it has not made the classification which commends H to the court as proper. Nor can the legislative power be said to have , been unconstitutionally exercised because within the class a sub-classi\n\nlicatiou was reasonable but has not been made.\n\n~!CRlHY MATCH WORKS\"· COLLECTOR, EXCISB (Krislz11a Iyer, I.) 131\n\n!tis well-established that the modern State, in exercising its sovereign power of taxation, has to deal with complex factors relating to the objects to be taxed, the quantum to be levied, the conditions subject to which the levy has to be made, the social and ec-0nomic policies which the tax is designed to subserve, and what not. In the famous words of Holmes, J., in Bai11 Peanut Co. v. Pinson( I):\n\n\"We must remember that the machinery of Government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints.\"\n\nIn the present ease, a pertinent principle of differentiation, which is visibly linked to productive prowess, has been adopted in the broad classification of power-users and manual manufacturers. lt is irrational to castigate this basis as unreal. Indeed, the soundness of this distinction is not denied. The challenge is founded on the failure to miniclassify between large and small sections of manual match manufacturers. But ours is not to reason why, that being a policy decision of Government dependent on pragmatic wisdom playing on imponderable forces at work. Our jurisdiction halts where the constitutional touchstone of a rational differentia having a just relation to the legislative and of revenue raising is satisfied. Gratuitous judicial advice on the socialistic direction of fiscal policy is de trop. We desist from that enterprise and leave the petitioners and men of his ilk to seek other dcmooratic remedies in that behalf, it being beyond our area nonnaliy to demolish the tax structure because microclassification among a Jarge group has not been done by the State.-. Absolute jutil:c to ,,;\\ry producer is a selfdcfeating adventure for any adn1inistration and genera I direction, not minute classification, is aH that can he attc1nptcd. For these reasons v.e find oursel\\'cs in agreement 'vith t11e High Court in its rufusal to strike dO\\Vn the notification under S. 3 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944.\n\nBefore concluding 've n1ay 1nakc a passing reference to the l~\\V decisions' cited by appellants' counsel. In K. T. Moopil Nair Y. Slate o/'Kera/a(2), Sinha, C.J., emphasized that art. 14 may be violated C\\'eti though the law may, on the face, be equal if in substance unequal things are treated equally. In Stare of Kera/av. Haji K. Haji K11tty Nalwl'), Shah J., observed : '\"There objects, persons or transactions essentially dissi1nHar arc treated by the imposition of a uniforn1 tax, <liscrin1ination 1nay result, for, in our Yie\\\\', refusal to make a ratjonal classlfioation may itself in some cases operate as denial of equality.') G A similar view has been taken in Kilandige Slzam Bhat v. Tile Agri<'11it11ra/ Income Tax Officer(').\n\nIt is sound law that refusal to 1nakc rational classification 'here grossly dissimilar subjects are treated by the law violates the mandate of art. 14. Even so, where the limited classification adopted in the prc- :; ent case is based upon a reieyt.!nt differcntia \\Vhich has a nexus to tliG\n\nH ilJ [19301 1s2 us 49'J; 501.\n\nt~) [1961] 3 S.C.R. i7.\n\n(3) C.As. Nos. 105:! etc. of 1968; judgm;:nt datl!J ,\\ugLht 13, 1968.\n\n(4) [1963) 3 S.C.R. 809, 817.,\n\nlegislative and of taxation, the court cannot strike down the law A on the score that there is room for further classification. Refusal to classify is one thing and it bears on constitutionality, not launching on micro-classification to work out perfect justice is left to executive expediency and legislative judgment and not for forensic wisdom.\n\n\"The relationship between the legislative and judicial departments of go1ernme11t in the determination of the validity of classification is wellsettled ...... the authorities state with unanimity that the question B of classification is primarily for the legislature and that it can never become a judicial question except for the purpose of determining, in any given situation, whether the legislative action is clearly unreasonable.\n\nThe legislative classification is subject to judicial revision only to the extent of seeing that it is founded on real distinctions the subjects classified, and not on artificial or irrelevant ones used for the purpose of vading the constitutional prohibition.\" (Ame•ican Jurisprudence C 2d : vol. 16; para 496).\n\n\"In a classification for governmental purposes there cannot be an exact exclusion or inclusion of persons and things. The constitutional command for a state to afford equal protection of the law sets a goal not attainable by the invention and application of a precise formula.\n\nClassification in law, as in the other dapartments of knowledge D or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they ag1ee with one another in certain particulars, and differ from other things in those partic.ulars. It is ahnost impossible in some matters to foresee and provid, e for every imaginable and exceptional case, and a legislature ought not to be required to do so at the risk of having its legislation declared void, although appropriate and proper upon the general subject upon which such legislation is to E act, so long as there is no substantial and fair ground IQ say that the 'tatute makes an unreasonable and unfounded general classification, and thereby denies to any. person the equal protection of the laws. Hence, a large latitude is allowed to the states for classification upon any reasonable basis, and what is reasonable is .a\n\nquestion of practical details into which fiction cannot enter.\" (ibid: para 504).\n\nWe have said enough to delineate the finer frontiers of the jurisdic; tion of the court and the legislature. Having sensitive regard to the obligation of the State to bring the law, including the tax law, into pulsing relationship with life, including the life of the country's economy, we.see nothing so grossly unfair as to attract the lethal power of the court to strike down the notification under challenge.\n\nWe dismiss the appeals but in the circumstances without costs to the respondents.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeals dismissed", "total_entities": 69, "entities": [{"text": "MURTHY MATCH WORKS, ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MURTHY MATCH WORKS, ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE ASSTT. COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE ASSTT. COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 11, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 96, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 11, 1974\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 141, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Salt Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 176, "end_char": 181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Salt Act, 1944", "statute": "Salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 270, "end_char": 291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 372, "end_char": 377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The match industry in India has grown over the decides."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 917, "end_char": 919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1567, "end_char": 1586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India had from time .to time issu::d notifications under s. 37 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944."}}, {"text": "s. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1638, "end_char": 1643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1651, "end_char": 1684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Excise Re-organisation Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2209, "end_char": 2249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The change in classification of the manufacturers was based on the use of power which in turn had a rational relation to the techniques and processes of production and their ability to bear the burden of the levy, This was done on th~ basis of recom'll'!ndations of the Central Excise Re-organisation Committee."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitle", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4720, "end_char": 4732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitle, V. M .. Ganpule, K. R. Choudhury and K. Rajendra Choudhury, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "V. M .. Ganpule", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4734, "end_char": 4749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitle, V. M .. Ganpule, K. R. Choudhury and K. Rajendra Choudhury, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K. R. Choudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4751, "end_char": 4766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitle, V. M .. Ganpule, K. R. Choudhury and K. Rajendra Choudhury, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K. Rajendra Choudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4771, "end_char": 4792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitle, V. M .. Ganpule, K. R. Choudhury and K. Rajendra Choudhury, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "L. N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4815, "end_char": 4826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, Solicitor General of India, S. P. Nayar, and M. N.\n\nShroff, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4856, "end_char": 4867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, Solicitor General of India, S. P. Nayar, and M. N.\n\nShroff, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "M. N.\n\nShroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4873, "end_char": 4886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, Solicitor General of India, S. P. Nayar, and M. N.\n\nShroff, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4954, "end_char": 4966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-The core of the contention urged by the appellants in these various appeals filed by certificate under art."}}, {"text": "Shivakashi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5210, "end_char": 5220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l33(l)(a) & ( c) of the Constituticm is that the excise duty on matches sought to be levied on these medium-sized manufacturers of Shivakashi wears the mask of equality but in its true face bears the marks of unequal justice violative of art."}}, {"text": "art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5317, "end_char": 5324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5332, "end_char": 5353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chitale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5362, "end_char": 5369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".>hri Chitale, learned counsel for the appellants, has focused his arguments on one grievance only and, we think, with good reason that the discriminatory fiscal treatment of his clients is unconstitutional, the vice being treatment of dissimilar categories similarly."}}, {"text": "WIMCO", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7228, "end_char": 7233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from the small fry organised on a cottage industry basis to considerable producers \\\\lho have developed 1nanufacturing and marketing muscles sufficient to compete with the power-using big four-the WIMCO, the AMCO, the ESAVI, and the Pioneer."}}, {"text": "AMCO", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7239, "end_char": 7243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from the small fry organised on a cottage industry basis to considerable producers \\\\lho have developed 1nanufacturing and marketing muscles sufficient to compete with the power-using big four-the WIMCO, the AMCO, the ESAVI, and the Pioneer."}}, {"text": "ESAVI", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7249, "end_char": 7254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from the small fry organised on a cottage industry basis to considerable producers \\\\lho have developed 1nanufacturing and marketing muscles sufficient to compete with the power-using big four-the WIMCO, the AMCO, the ESAVI, and the Pioneer."}}, {"text": "Tariff Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8730, "end_char": 8747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tariff Commission explained this aspect and reported on the operation of the differential excise levy system on producticn and trade practices."}}, {"text": "Shivakasi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11451, "end_char": 11460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the replies received by us from units in the small scale ser.:tor it \\VOuld appear that those in category 'B' situated in the Shivakasi/SatturiKovilpatti area have over somt years in the past established contacts and <level oped a fairly wide selling system enabling them to cater to the markets in distant States including West Bengal, U.P., Delhi, Gujarat and practically all the States in the South."}}, {"text": "SatturiKovilpatti", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11461, "end_char": 11478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the replies received by us from units in the small scale ser.:tor it \\VOuld appear that those in category 'B' situated in the Shivakasi/SatturiKovilpatti area have over somt years in the past established contacts and <level oped a fairly wide selling system enabling them to cater to the markets in distant States including West Bengal, U.P., Delhi, Gujarat and practically all the States in the South."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11649, "end_char": 11660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the replies received by us from units in the small scale ser.:tor it \\VOuld appear that those in category 'B' situated in the Shivakasi/SatturiKovilpatti area have over somt years in the past established contacts and <level oped a fairly wide selling system enabling them to cater to the markets in distant States including West Bengal, U.P., Delhi, Gujarat and practically all the States in the South."}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11662, "end_char": 11666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the replies received by us from units in the small scale ser.:tor it \\VOuld appear that those in category 'B' situated in the Shivakasi/SatturiKovilpatti area have over somt years in the past established contacts and <level oped a fairly wide selling system enabling them to cater to the markets in distant States including West Bengal, U.P., Delhi, Gujarat and practically all the States in the South."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11668, "end_char": 11673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the replies received by us from units in the small scale ser.:tor it \\VOuld appear that those in category 'B' situated in the Shivakasi/SatturiKovilpatti area have over somt years in the past established contacts and <level oped a fairly wide selling system enabling them to cater to the markets in distant States including West Bengal, U.P., Delhi, Gujarat and practically all the States in the South."}}, {"text": "Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11675, "end_char": 11682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the replies received by us from units in the small scale ser.:tor it \\VOuld appear that those in category 'B' situated in the Shivakasi/SatturiKovilpatti area have over somt years in the past established contacts and <level oped a fairly wide selling system enabling them to cater to the markets in distant States including West Bengal, U.P., Delhi, Gujarat and practically all the States in the South."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14773, "end_char": 14779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We dra\\\\' the attention of the State Governn1ents to th.is problem for initiating necessary measures for the purpose, particularly of the Govern1nent of Madras, as the concentration of such units is in that State where the problem presents itself in the most acute forn1, but offers favourable E prospects for the establishment of several full-fledged sales cooper.:i.tives \\vith adequate niembership.\""}}, {"text": "st April, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15713, "end_char": 15727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be pointed out that 16 long established 'B' factories have reduced themselves to 'C' class with effect from ]st April, 1963 in this Division alone in addition to the numerous factories \\Vho have already converted fron1 'B' to 'C'.\""}}, {"text": "Tirunelevely Match Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15955, "end_char": 15985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards similar fragmentation of the larger units in category 'C' almost identical views have been expressed by the Tirunelevely Match Association, representing 150 'C' class match factories, in the following words :'\"In view of the vast difference of excise duty between !"}}, {"text": "Sivakasi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17250, "end_char": 17258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Instances of 'B' category units owned by individual proprietors downgrading themselves into category 'C' and having a number of 'C' class units set up in the name of near relations have also been noticed by us in the course ofour visits to factories in the Sivakasi/Sattur/ Kovilpatti area."}}, {"text": "Sattur/", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17259, "end_char": 17266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Instances of 'B' category units owned by individual proprietors downgrading themselves into category 'C' and having a number of 'C' class units set up in the name of near relations have also been noticed by us in the course ofour visits to factories in the Sivakasi/Sattur/ Kovilpatti area."}}, {"text": "Kovilpatti", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17267, "end_char": 17277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Instances of 'B' category units owned by individual proprietors downgrading themselves into category 'C' and having a number of 'C' class units set up in the name of near relations have also been noticed by us in the course ofour visits to factories in the Sivakasi/Sattur/ Kovilpatti area."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20789, "end_char": 20798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Excise and salt Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20806, "end_char": 20839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21006, "end_char": 21020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Excise and salt Act, 1944", "statute": "the Central Excise and salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "Section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21041, "end_char": 21051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Excise and salt Act, 1944", "statute": "the Central Excise and salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "s. 37(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21086, "end_char": 21094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Excise and salt Act, 1944", "statute": "the Central Excise and salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21116, "end_char": 21134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 37 contains the rulemaking power and s. 37(1) confers power on the Central Government by rules to exempt any goods from the whole or any part of the duty imposed by the Act."}}, {"text": "Central/Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21244, "end_char": 21262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under this power the Central/Government issued a notification adopting a \"classification\" approach for extending concessional rates."}}, {"text": "Central Excise Rules, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21882, "end_char": 21908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue and Insurance) No. I l 5/67 Central Excise", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21984, "end_char": 22069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads :\n\n\"In , exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (I) of rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1955, and in supersession of the Notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue and Insurance) No."}}, {"text": "8th June, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22081, "end_char": 22095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I l 5/67 Central Excise, dated the 8th June, 1967, the Central Government hereby exempts matches specified in column (2) of the Table below, falling \"under Item No."}}, {"text": "First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22222, "end_char": 22277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Anatole France", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26496, "end_char": 26510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anatole France's cynical statement comes to our mind in this context :\n\n\"The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.\" ·"}}, {"text": "Stone", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27317, "end_char": 27322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Stone of the Supreme Court of the United States has delineated these limitations in United States v. Butler(') thus :\n\n\"The power of courts to declare a statute unconstitutional is subject to two guiding principles of decision which ought never to be absent from judicial consciousness."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27330, "end_char": 27364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Stone of the Supreme Court of the United States has delineated these limitations in United States v. Butler(') thus :\n\n\"The power of courts to declare a statute unconstitutional is subject to two guiding principles of decision which ought never to be absent from judicial consciousness."}}, {"text": "S. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28227, "end_char": 28231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Trcsolini", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28308, "end_char": 28317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Trcsolini and Shapiro."}}, {"text": "Shapiro", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28322, "end_char": 28329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Trcsolini and Shapiro."}}, {"text": "~!CRlHY MATCH WORKS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31755, "end_char": 31774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~!CRlHY MATCH WORKS\"· COLLECTOR, EXCISB (Krislz11a Iyer, I.) 131\n\n!"}}, {"text": "Holmes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32176, "end_char": 32182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the famous words of Holmes, J., in Bai11 Peanut Co. v. Pinson( I):\n\n\"We must remember that the machinery of Government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints.\""}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33731, "end_char": 33735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33743, "end_char": 33776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. T. Moopil Nair", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33888, "end_char": 33905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In K. T. Moopil Nair Y. Slate o/'Kera/a(2), Sinha, C.J., emphasized that art."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33929, "end_char": 33934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In K. T. Moopil Nair Y. Slate o/'Kera/a(2), Sinha, C.J., emphasized that art."}}, {"text": "art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33958, "end_char": 33965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944", "statute": "the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34133, "end_char": 34137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Haji K. Haji K11tty Nalwl'), Shah J., observed : '\"There objects, persons or transactions essentially dissi1nHar arc treated by the imposition of a uniforn1 tax, <liscrin1ination 1nay result, for, in our Yie\\\\', refusal to make a ratjonal classlfioation may itself in some cases operate as denial of equality.')"}}, {"text": "art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34663, "end_char": 34670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944", "statute": "the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "[1963) 3 S.C.R. 809", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 34945, "end_char": 34964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_133_141_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "ARVIND MOHAN SINHA\n\n1'.\n\nAMULYA KUMAR BISWAS & ORS.\n\nJanuary 17, 1974\n\n[S. N. DWIVEDI AND Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]\n\nProbation of o.f(enders Act, 20of1958-Whetiier applies to offe11ces 1u1der Customs Act, 1962, and offences under Part XII-A. Defence of India Rules, 1962. ·\n\nDefence of India Rules, 1962, r. 1261 and J26P-'Gold' if Includes smuggled gold.\n\nOn the question (1) whether the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, app1ies to offences under Customs Act, 1962, and to those under Part XU-A of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, relating to Gold Control, and (2) \\Vhether under the scheme of the Gold Control Rules, smuggled gold is not comprehended under r. 126p.\n\nHELD: (1) These ac n1ostly economic offences which in conceivable cases, may pose a grave threat to the economy and the security of the country. They arc fundamentally of a different genre and are calculated to involve consequences of a far reaching character as compared with the offences under the general law of crimes. But every contravention of the Customs Act or the Gold Control Rules cannot, without more, t.e assumed to be fraught with consequences of national dimensions. The words of s. 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act are wide and would include even offences under the Custo1ns ACt and the Gold Control Rules.\n\nThough r.126p(2) (ii) of the Defence of India Rules prescribes a n1inimum sentence of 6 n1onths, it cannot override the provision\"S of the Probation of Offenders A.ct.\n\n[136G]\n\n(a) The Probation of Offenders Act is a reformative mensure ::?.nd its object is to reclaim ainateur offenders who, if spared the indignity of incarceration, can be usefully rehabilitated in society. A jai1 terin would normally be enough to wipe out the stain of guilt but the sentence which society passes on convkts is rele11tless. ln recalcitrant cases punislunent bas to be deterrent so that others similarly minded l'nay warn thcn1selves of the hazards of taking to a career of crime. But the novice,.\n\ns in the present case, \\vho strays into the path or crin1e ought, in the interest of society, to be treated as being socially sick. The ignon1iny con1monly associated with a jail tcnn and the social stigma which attaches to convicts often render the remedy worse than the disease. Crhnes are not always rooted in criminal tendencies and their origin n1ay lie in psychological factors induced by hunger. \\Vant and poverty.\n\nThe Act recognises the importance of environmental influence in the commission of crimes and prescribes a remedy whereby the offender can be reformed and rehabilitated in society. An attitude of social 1.kfiance and recklessness which comes to a convict who, after a jail ter1n, is apt to think that he has nothing n1ore to lose or fear, may breed a litter of crime. The object of the Act is to nip that attitude io the bud.\n\n[137A]\n\nRata11 lal v. State of Punjab, [1964] 7 S.C.R. 676 and l:slter Dat v. Tlze State of Punjab, A.l.R. 1972 S.C. 1295, followed.\n\n(b) There is no foundation for the fcilr that offenders released on probation n1ay hold the society to ransom and that society n1ay therefore look upon the release of offenders on probation as the triumph of criminals over the \\veaknesses of law.\n\nAn offender released on probation is convicted but not forthwith. sentenced in the sense of penal laws. Section 4(1) of the Act pro\\'ides that instead of sentencing the offender \"at once\" the court may direct his release on his entering into a bond to receive a sentence when called upoQ. during the probationary period and in the mean time to keep the-peace and be of good beba\\'iour. Thus it is only in a limited sense, though a socially significant. sense. that the Act constitutes an exception to the broaa and general principle of criminal law that a sentence shall follow on conviction.\n\nThe discretion vested in the trial court in thi~ behalf must of course be e:terciscr.l\n\n~1ccording to rules of reason and justice depending on the circumstances of each case. but the Magistrate had called for the report of the Probation Officer and it was\n\n134 SUPREME COUllT REPORTS [ 19741 3 s.c.~.\n\non the basis of that roport that the respondents were released on probation and the Hi, gb Court has upheld the exercise of that discretion. There is no reason to interfere with the concurreni factual evaluation of the ci=mstances of the case. (137GJ Jal Narain\\', Tiie Municipal Corporation of Delhi, A.l.R. 1972 S.C. 2607, referred to.\n\n(2) The High Court erred in holding that the legislature could not have in I ended that a person in possession of smuggled gold should make a declaration in regard thereto. (140AJ\n\n(a) Under r. l26I of the Gold Control Rules (of Defence of India Rules) every person must, within the stipulated period, make a declaration to the administrator as to the guantity, description and other prescribed particulars of gold owned by him. Failure or omission to do so, without reasonable cause, is made punishable by r. 126(1)(i). Possession of gold in contravention of any provision of Part XllA is made punishable by Rule l26P(2)(il). The definition of 'Gold' in r. l26A (d) is couched in wide tenns and it does not make any distinction between smuggled gold and gold lawfully possessed. (140Gl\n\n(b) The intention of the legislature must be gathered primarily and principally from the words used by it and the definition of •gold' carves out no exception in favour of smuggled gold. It would be surprising that the obligation to declare gold should be imposed on lawful possessors of gold but should leave untouched the possession by smugglers or their agents of gold smuggled into the country. [140BJ\n\n(c) Under the definition Gold means gold and it should not be read as 'gold means gold but shall not include smuggled gold\". To put such a construction on the definition is to coin a ew definition and therefore to legislate. [140C]\n\n(d) The word 'gold' is used at several plaoes in the Gold Control Rules and it is a well recognised rule of construction that the same word should receive the same meaning in collocation. It is manifest from the language, intendment and scheme of these Rules that the word •gold' covers not only gold which is lawfully possessed but gold in any form orshape and whether possessed lawfully or otherwise.\n\n['40D)\n\n.K. Yisluum1oorthi v. State of Mysore & Anr., 1971 (2) Mys. L. J. 261, approved.\n\nCruMiNAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. 114 & 115of1970\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated the 28th November, 1969 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision Case Nos. 635 and 636 of 1969.\n\nS. N. Prasad and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant.\n\nThe respondents did not appear {in Cr. A. 114 & 115/701.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered bv.\n\nCHANDRACHUD, J.-These appeals are brought by leave granted by the High Court of calcutta under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution.\n\nCr. A. No. 114o/1970:'0n May 29, 1968 gold bars and sovereigns G bearing foreign markings were seized from the respondents by customs officers, Calcutta. Respondents were charged under section 135, Customs Act, 1962 for being in possession of goods which they had reason to believe to be liable to confiscation under section 111 of that Act. It was alleged that the goods were imported into India without the requisite permit and without payment of duty and were therefore liable to confiscation under section l ll(d) of the Customs Act. The H respondents were illso charged under Rules 126P(l)(i) and 126P(2){ii) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, for failure to make a declaration in respect of the gold found in their possession.\n\nA. M,' SINHA v. A, K. BISWAS (C/randrachud, /,)\n\n13S\n\nThe respondents pleaded guilty to the charges . but -cited facts in extenuation of the oft'cnccs. The learned Presidency Magistrate, 8th Court, Calcutta, convicted them of the offences of which they were charged but he directed, on the faith of a report made by the Probation otlicer, that they should be relcascd under section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 on their executing a bond of Rs. 1000/- each with one surety in like amount, undertaking to appear and receive the sentence whenever called upon and to keep peace and be of good behaviour for a period of two years. Respondents ate young boys nonnally engaged in agriculture. To us they seem to be carriers who were carrying the gold for a small tip but the learned Magistrate believed their defence that they had purchased the gold for the marriage of the sister of one of them. The gold which was of the value of about Rs. 7800/- was already confiscated in the proceedings under the Customs Act.\n\nThe appellant, an Assistant Collector of Customs, filed. on behalf of the Department a revision application (No. 635 of 1969) in the High CoUrt of Calcutta against the judgment of the learned Magistrate. ·\n\nLiller, it was converted into an appeal under section 11(2) of the Probation of Offenders Act.\n\nThe High Court disposed of three matters by a common judgment which -is reported in Aravlnda Mohan Sinha v. Prohlad Chandra Samanta(I) Two out of these are before us; the third, Criminal Appeal No. 113 of\n\n1970 is reported to be unready. The High Court held in the matter under consideration that though Rule 126PP(2)(ii) of the Defence of India Rules prescribes a minimum sentence of imprisonment for a term of not less than 6 months\", it cannot override the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act and therefore it was competent to the learned Magistrate to release the respondents under that Act.\n\nThe only question in this appeal is whether the Probation of Offenders Act,20 of 1958, can apply to offences under the Customs Act, 1962 and to those under Part-XII-A of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, intituled \"Gold Control\".\n\nSection 135(bXii) of the Customs Act, 1962, under which the respondents have been convicted prescribes a punishment of 2 years imprisonment or fine or both for acquiring possession of or for being in any way concerned in carrying, keeping etc. any goods which a perron knows or has reason to believe to be liable. to confiscation under section 111. Under section 11 l(d), goods imported contrary to any prohibition imposed by or under the Customs Act or by any other law\n\narc liable to confiscation. The offence comitted by the respondents consists in their being in possession of or in purchasing the gold bearing foreign markings which was evidently imported into India without a valid permit issued by the Reserve Bank of India, an act prohibited by section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. On the prosecution leading evidence to establish the ingredients of this offence, respondents pleaded guilty to the chore.\n\n111 4. I. R. 1970 Cal. 437.\n\n136. suPREME COURT REPORTS [ 19741 3 's.C.R.\n\nRule 126P(l){i) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 provides to A the extent material that whoever omits or fails to make a declaration as required by Rule 126 I without a reasonable cause shall be punishable with imprisorunent for a term which may extend to one year or a fine or with both. The relevant part of Rule 126 I provides that every person shall within the specified period make a declaration to the Administrator in the prescribed form as to the quantity of gold, other than ornaments owned by him. Rule 126P (2)(ii) provides that whoever B has in his possession or under his control any quantity of gold in contravention of the provisions of Part XII-A (\"Gold Control\"), shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term of not less than 6 months and not more than 2 years and also with fine. Respondents had made no declaration of the gold in their pos•ession and pleaded no reasonable ; oause for omitting to do so. They pleaded guilty to these charges as ~· c\n\nThe Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, received the assent of the President on May 16, 1958 and was published in the Gazette of India on May 19, 1958. Section 3 of the Act confers power on the court to release certain offenders after admonition. Under section 4(1):\n\n\"When any person is found guilty of having committed an D offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once E to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the Court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.\"\n\nWe are unable to accept the appellant's contention that the proba- F tion of Offenders Act can have no application to offences consisting of the contravantion of the Cuitoms Act or the \"Gold Control\" Rules contained in Part XII-A of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. True, that these offences are fundamentally of a different genre and are calculated to involve consequences of a far-reaching character as compared with offences under the general law of Crimes. These are mostly economic offences which in conceivable cases may pose a grave threat G to the economy and the security of the country. But every contravention of the Customs Aci or the \"Gold Control\" Rnles cannot, without more, be assnmed to be fraught with consequences of national dimensions. The broad principle that punishment must be proportioned to the offence is or ought to be of universal application save where the statute bars the exercise of judicial discretion either in awarding punishment or in releasing an offender on probation in lieu of sentencing H him forthwith. The words of section 4(1) of the Probation of offender• Act are wide and would evidently include offences under the customs Act and the Gold Control Rules.\n\nA. M. S!Nllh v. A.•: BlSWAS (Chamlrachud, J.) 137\n\nThe Probation of Offenders Act is a reformative measure and its object is to reclaim amateur offenders who, if spared the indignity of incarcaration, can be usefully rehabilitated in society. A jail term should. normally be enough to wipe out the stain of guilt but the sentence which the society passes on convicts i' relentles.<. The ignominy commonly associated w_ith a jail term and the social stigma which attaches to convicts often render the remedy worse than the disease and the very purpose of punishment stands in the danger of being frustrated.\n\nIn recalcitrant cases, punishment has to be deterrent so that others similarly minded may warn themselves of the hazards of taking to a career of crime. But the novice who strays into the path of crime ought, in .the interest of society, be treated as being socially sick. Crimes are not always rooted in criminal tendencies and their origin may lie in psychological factors induced by hunger, want and poverty. The Probation of Offenders act recognises the importance of environmental influence in the commission of crime' and prescribes a remedy whereby . the offender can be reformed and rehabilitated in society. An attitude of social defiance and recklessness which comes to a convict who, after a jail term, is apt to think that lie has no more to lose or fear may breed a litter of crime. The object of the Probation of Offenders Act is to nip that attitude in the bud. Winifred A. Elkin describes probation as a system which provides a means of re-education without the necessity of breaking up the offender's normal life and removing him from the natural surroundings of his home.! Edwin E. Sutherland raises it to a status of a convicted offender.2\n\n. The probationary system in our country is sometimes described as a boon of political freedom but that does less than justice to true history. The Dharmashastras did not ordain similar punishment for similar offences irrespective of the antecedents and the physical and mental condition of the offender.3 Dr, P. K. Sen has pointed out in his Tagore Law Lectures on \"Penology Old and New\" (1943) (p. JlO) that the directions given by the ancient law-givers in the matter of punishment compare favourably with the advanced modern systems as regards the relevance of the objective circumstances attendant on the commission of the crime and the subjective limitations of offenders.\n\nProbationary laws were passed by several erstwhile provinces prior to Independence but their'provisions were seldom enforced in practice.\n\nSection 562, Code of Criminal Procedure, also contains a provision enabling the court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct instead of sentencing them at once.\n\nThere is no foundation for the fear that offenders released on probation niay hold the society to ransom and the society may therefore look upon the release of offenders on probation as the triumph of criminals over the weaknesses of law. An offender released on probation is convicted bnt not forthwith sentenced in the sense of penal laws.\n\nUi;1der the disposition made by the court the sentence is suspended\n\n(I) English Juvenile Courts (1938) page 162.\n\n(2) Principles of Criminology, 4th Edn. (1947) page 383.\n\n(3) History of Dharmashastra by Dr. P. V. Kane, Vol. Ill p. 392 (1946 Ed.).\n\n138 St'PltEME COURT JtEPOJtTS £ 1974 I 3 s.c.11.\n\nduring the period of probation. Section 4(1) of the Act provides that instead of sentencing the offender \"at once'', the court may direct his release on his entenng into a bond to \"receive sentence when called upon\" during the probationary period and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. Thus it is only in a limited, though a socially significant, sense that the Act constitutes as exception to the broad and general principle of criminal law embodied, for example, in sections 245(2); 258(2), 306(2) and section 309(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, that a sentence shall follow on a conviction.\n\nThe provisions of the Act are indeed of such beneficence that in RataJI Lal v. States of Punjab(I) this Court remanded a matter to the High Court with a direction that the High Court or the Sessions Court should consider whether the Act should not be applied to an accu.<ed who was ccinvicted on a date prior. to the date on which the Act was brought into operation in the particular area and even though such a prayer was not made to the Sessions Court or in revision to the High Court and could not, of course, be made in the trial court. Subba Rao !· who gave the majority judgment said : \"The Act is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offepder than to puni'h pim.\" Raghubar Dayal J. dissented on the point whetlu!I> the Act could be applied to an accused who was convicted before it came into force. ·\n\nIn /sher Das v. The State of Pwijab(2) the trial court released on probation an offender who was convicted under section 7(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The High Court set aside that order and sentenced the accused to imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 1000/-. In default of the payment of fine the accused was ordered to undergo imprisonment for a further period of a month and a half. Setting aside the order of the High Court this Court restored that of the Magistrate with the observation that though adulteration of food was a menace to public health, the application of the Probation of Offenders act could not be excluded in cases of persons found\n\nguilty of food adulteration.\n\nIn Jai Narai11 v. The Municipal Corporatio11 f Delhi,(l) the principle laid down in !sher Das's case was affirmed but on the facts of the case this Court refused to release on probation an offender who was convicted for adulterating 'Patisa' by using a non-permitted coal tar dye.\n\nThis decision only shows that whether the benefit of the Act should be extended in any praticular case must depend on the circumstance of that case.\n\nThere can therefore be no legal impediment in applying the provisions of the Probati.on of offenders Act to the respondents. Whether\n\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1295.\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2607.\n\nA. M. Sf.'IH~ I'. A. x. BISWAS (Clw11drac/111d, /.) 13!>\n\non the facts and ircumstances of the case the respondents may be\n\neleased <;>n probal!on cannot. be put in issue at this late stage because 1t was neither urged 1n the tnal court nor before the High Court that\n\ny reason of the. antecedents or the propensities of the respondents it was not expedient to extend to them the benefit of the Act. The discretion vested in the trial court in this behalf must of course be exercised according to rules of reason and justice but the learned Magis\" Irate had called for the report of the Probation Officer and it was on the basis of. that report that the respondents were released on probation. The High Court has upheld the exercise of that discretion and we see n? reason to interfere with the concurrent factual evaluation of the c1rcu!\"stances of the case. Accordingly we confirm the judgment of the Htgh Court.\n\nCriminal Appeal No. 115 of 1970: On June 27 1968 three bars of foreign gold were found on. the person of the rspondent. He pleaded guilty at the trial w!1ereupn the learned Presidency Magistrate, 6th Court, Calcutta convicted him under section 135, Customs Act. 1962 and under Rules 126 P (l)(i} and 126 P (2)(ii) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. The respondent was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 150forthe offence under the Customs Act and a fine of Rs. 100 for the offence under Rule 126 P (l)(i). No separate sentence was imposed for the offence under Rule 126 P(2)(ii).\n\nIn appeal the High Court of Calcutta confirmed the conviction and sentence under the Customs Act. Regarding the contravention of the two Rules, the High Court held that 110 declaration need have been made by the respondent to the Administrator, as the gold of which the respondent was in possession was smuggled gold and not \"legal\" gold. According to the High Court \"the legislature never expected that smuggled gold would be declared\". The High Court therefore set aside the conviction and sentence in1posed on the respondent for contravention of the \"Gold Control\" Rules.\n\nPart XII-A \"Gold Control\" (consisting of Rules 126A to 126Z) was inserted in the Defence of India Rules, 1962 by G. S. R. 89 dated January 9, 1963. Rule 126A (d) defines gold for the purposes of Pan XIIA thus:\n\n\"gold\" means gold, including its alloy, whether virgin. melted, remelted, wrought or unwrought, in any shape or form, of a purity of not less than nine carats and includes any gold coin (whether legal tender or not), any ornament and any other article of gold;\"\n\nSome of the other Rules in Part Xl!A provide as follows to the extent material. Under Rule 126, every person must within the stipulated period make a declaration to the Administrator as to the quantity, description and other prescribed particulars of gold owned by him.\n\nFailure or omission, without reasonable cause, to make such a declaration is made punishable by Rule 126 P (l)(i). Possession of gold in contravention of any provision of Part XIIA is made punishable by Rule 126 P(2)(ii).\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nWe see no justification in the scheme of the Rules for the view taken by the High Court that smuggled gold is not comprehended within Rule 126P of the Gold Control Rules. The definition of \"gold\" in Rule 126A (d) is couched in wide terms and it does not make any distinction between smuggled gold and gold lawfully possessed. The High Court says that the legislature could not have intended that a person in possession of smuggled gold should make a declaration in regard thereto.\n\nThe intention of the legislature must be gathered primarily and prin- -cipally from the words used by it and the definition of \"gold\" carves -0ut no exception in favour of smuggled gold. Secondly, if the intention -0f the legislature as reflected in the scheme of a law is to control the meaning of the words used in a particular Section or Rule, it strikes us .as Sllrprising that the obligation to declare gold should be imposed on lawful possessors of gold but should leave untouched the possession by smugglers or their agents of gold smuggled into the country. Under the definition contained in Rule 126A (d), \"gold means gold\" and no. rule of statutory construction can permit the definition to be altered materially so as to read: \"Gold means gold but shall not include smuggled gold\". To put such a construction on the definition is to coin a new definition and therefore to legislate.\n\nThe word \"gold\" is used at several places in Part XIIA and it is a well-recognised rule of construction that the same word should receive the same meaning in a collocation. Rule J26A (c)(ii) defines a dealer .as a person who carries on the .business of buying, selling, supplying etc. gold for the purpose of making ornaments. Ruic 126 B(l)(a) provides that a dealer shall not make or manufacture any article of gold other than ornament; sub:cJause (b) prov.ides that a efiner shall not make or manufacture any article of gold other than primary gold; sub-clause (c) provides that no other person shall make or manufacture any article of gold, unless the dealer, refiner or such other person is authorised by the Administrator to make or manufacture such an article. Rule 126C provides that no dealer shall .make and no person shall place any order for making an ornament containing gold of a purtiy exceeding 14 carats. Rule 126D contains a prohibition on loans being granted on the security of gold unless such gold is included in a declaration made under Rule 1261. Rule J26F requires e, ery dealer and refiner to submit a return in regard to the gold in his possession of control. Under Rule !26G dealers and refiners must keep an account of the gold bought or sold by them. Rule J26H provides that no dealer Or refinery shall have in his possession or under his control any gold which has not been included in the return which he is required to submit under the Rules. Rule 1261, with which we are directly concerned 1n this case, provides that every person other'than a dealer or a refiner, -shall within the stipulated period mal<e a declaration to the Administ, rator as to the quantity, description and other particulars of gold\n\nother than ornament), owned by him. Clause (3) of this Rule provides (that .no person who is required to make a declaration, shall acquire any gold other than ornament except by succession or under a permit granted by the Administrator. Rule 126L confers power under the authority of the Administrator to seize any gold in respect of which the provisions of Part XIIA are contravened. Under Rule 126 M gold thus\n\nI•'\n\n.... M. SINHA v . .... K •. BISWAS (Chandrachud, I,) 141\n\nseized is liable to confiscation. Rule 126P (l)(i) makes failure or omission to make a declaration as i:equired by Rule 1261 punishable. Rule !26P (2) (ii) prescribes punishment for possessian of gold in contravention of the provisions of Part XIIA.\n\nIt is manifest from the language, intendment and the scheme of these Rules that the word \"gold\" covers not only gold which is lawfully possessed but gold in any form or shape and whether possessed lawfully or otherwise. In the economic context in which Part XIIA was inserted into Defence of India Rules in 1963, it is impossible to hold that the legislature wanted to regulate the possession and control of gold lawfully possessed as distinguished from smuggled gold. It seems to us cle.ar that the prohibition in regard to the manufacture of articles of gold would apply even to articles made out of smuggled gold and it would be no defence for a dealer, refiner or for any other person to say that he had not contravened the provisions of Rule 126B because he had made an article out of smuggled gold.\n\nSuch a defence, we suppose, would be all the worse for him. Similarly, it would be no defence to a charge under Rule 1260 to say that a loan was advanced on the pledge of smuggled gold. The various Rules which we have set out above make it clear that the object of introducing Part XllA is, as shown for example by Rule 126H, that if any gold is acquired a declaration has to be'made in regard thereto, no matter how or by what means it is acquired. We are therefore unable to agree with the High Court that the respondent was not liable to make under Rule 1261 a declaration as to the gold in his possession and that therefore Rule 126P is not attracted. The view taken by a teared single Judge of the High Court of Mysore in K. Vis/mumoort/ii v. State. of Mysor<\n\n& Anr.(1) that \"gold\" as defined in Part XIIA includes smuggled gold is, in our opinion, correct. We are not concerned in this case to determine whether on the particular facts of the case the Mysore High Court was right in refusing to apply section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act to the case before it.\n\nThe order of the learned Magistrate convicting and sentencing the respondent under section 135 of the Customs Act as also under Rule 126P of the Defence of India Rules must therefore be restored.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\n0) (1971) 2 Mys. L. 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"start_char": 15442, "end_char": 15468, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Winifred A. 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Kane, Vol."}}, {"text": "Section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17463, "end_char": 17475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 245(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17924, "end_char": 17939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 309(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17960, "end_char": 17974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17976, "end_char": 18002, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18592, "end_char": 18601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subba Rao !·"}}, {"text": "Raghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18894, "end_char": 18908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghubar Dayal J. dissented on the point whetlu!I> the Act could be applied to an accused who was convicted before it came into force. ·"}}, {"text": "section 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19145, "end_char": 19157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court remanded a matter to the High Court with a direction that the High Court or the Sessions Court should consider whether the Act", "statute": "Court remanded a matter to the High Court with a direction that the High Court or the Sessions Court should consider whether the Act"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19165, "end_char": 19206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19646, "end_char": 19672, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "!sher Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19836, "end_char": 19845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Jai Narai11 v. The Municipal Corporatio11 f Delhi,(l) the principle laid down in !"}}, {"text": "June 27 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21327, "end_char": 21339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "115 of 1970: On June 27 1968 three bars of foreign gold were found on."}}, {"text": "section 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21527, "end_char": 21538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21540, "end_char": 21551, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21612, "end_char": 21640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21720, "end_char": 21731, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21884, "end_char": 21906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal the High Court of Calcutta confirmed the conviction and sentence under the Customs Act."}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21955, "end_char": 21966, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22527, "end_char": 22555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 9, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22577, "end_char": 22592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Part XII-A \"Gold Control\" (consisting of Rules 126A to 126Z) was inserted in the Defence of India Rules, 1962 by G. S. R. 89 dated January 9, 1963."}}, {"text": "Possession of gold in contravention of any provision of Part XIIA is made punishable by Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23306, "end_char": 23398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28807, "end_char": 28827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view taken by a teared single Judge of the High Court of Mysore in K. Vis/mumoort/ii v. State."}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29063, "end_char": 29080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are not concerned in this case to determine whether on the particular facts of the case the Mysore High Court was right in refusing to apply section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act to the case before it."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29112, "end_char": 29121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We are therefore unable to agree with the High Court that the respondent was not liable to make under Rule 1261", "statute": "We are therefore unable to agree with the High Court that the respondent was not liable to make under Rule 1261"}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29129, "end_char": 29155, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29263, "end_char": 29274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We are therefore unable to agree with the High Court that the respondent was not liable to make under Rule 1261", "statute": "We are therefore unable to agree with the High Court that the respondent was not liable to make under Rule 1261"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29282, "end_char": 29293, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_142_151_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "B. M. LAKSHMANAMURTHY v.\n\nTHE EMPLOYEES' STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION,\n\nBAN GALORE January 21, 1974\n\n(P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, S, N. DwiVEDI AND .p, K. GOSWAMI, JJ.) B\n\nEmployees' S!alt lii~UI'allce Act-S, 2(9Xii) & 2(13)-' EmploY\"' & 'il•unUime .employers' mean1111 & sco~ of. ·\n\nThe appellaut's firm was carrying on the businesS of manufacturing and exporting polished granite memorial stones. The finn was a factOrY both. under the Factories Act as well as under the Employees• State Insurance Act.· Adjacent to tbis factory . was another factory situated on the appellant's .!aDd leased out C to two contractors who employed SO workers it\\ their factory for the pllrJ)Q1es of cutting and .dressing .the granite stones,. The gi'anite stones unloaded outside .the factory by the lorries were brought on the portion or the leased land and after cuttins them they were sent back to the appellant's factory whu'e they were and polished. The Employees' State Insurance Corporation claimed from the appelJaot a certain sum as the firms contribution on account of the workers employed by the two contractors described as 'immediate employers' under the Act. The Employees' 'State I.osurance Court held that the contractors were not 'imte employers'\n\nwithin the meaning of s. 2(13) of the Employees' State Insurance Act and that they\n\n D were independent contractors. On appeal the High Court held that the apcl.lant was a principal . employer and the contractors were the immediate employers under the Act. The High Court also held that the workers under the contractors were employees within the meaning of s. 2(9)(ii) of the Act.\n\nDismissing the appeal, to this Court, HELD : (1) The underlying aim of the Act is to insure the employees against various risks to their life, health and well being and the charge is upon the principal E -employer even though be may get his usual work done through an intermc:diary who is described in the Act as 'immediate employer'. Anydispute between the priDcipal .employer and the immediate employer has to be settled between themselves\n\nJ~ l1ors, the employees and the Act charges the principal employer with the liability to pay the contribution not only of its own but also that of trle employees subject to his right to deduct the employees' contribution from their wages under s. 40(2) of the Act. [147A]\n\n(2) On the findings of fact the work undertaken by the contractor's in the adjoin- 'ing vicinity is preliminary or incidental to the work in the principal employer F factory turning out the finished product for export. The work in the_ two places bas\n\nintimate correlation and is a piece of an inte(:tated whole and the saJd work y .tbe .contractors through their labOur is ordinarily part of the work of the pnnctpal 1\"actory undertaken by the contractors. Their factory is situated in the premises of the appellant's factory which, according to the definition clause, includes tile p~- cincts thereof. In the instant case on an examination of the site plan and the eVIdence it is evidnt that there is a definite environmental as well as fu!lCtional unitY between the two portions, namely, tbe main factory and the contractors' factory with G the precincts even though separated by a wall in which there was a df:?Or whi<:h tiOnletimcs was closed. The work tmdertaken by the contractors and catr1ed on tn their portion of the area is surely componental to make it a part of the complelt whole. The principal requirement of the definition namely, that .the work or the .construction is undertaken on the premises of the factory is satisfied in the present .case. It therefore follows that the two contractors arc 'if'\\llllediate emloyers' with.in the meaning of s. 2(13) and the workers employed for c_utmg and ~g the gran1te stones by the immediate employers are employees w1thm s. 2(9Xu) of the Act. [t48BJ H\n\nEmployees' Stme lrlsiWWlCC Corporation, &mbay v. Ra11um (Chiltur Harilltlr Jycr), ll957)1 L.L.).~67, Nagpur Electric Iigllt and Power Co. Ltd. v. Rqional Direc: .lOr D~I]Jlorees State [I!Silrai!Ce CrJrporatirm, Etc., [1967] 3 s.c.R. 92, Employees.\n\nB. M. LAKSHMANAlUli.THY v. E.S.J.C. (GOSlami, /.) t 4 3\n\nState lnsuNmce Corporation, v. Peter Sewi11g Macllilz~ Co. etc. A.I.R. 1970 Delhi 182, and M/s Hind11sta11 Construction Co. Ltd. v. l)np/o; es' State l11surance Corporatiorr, (1966) I.L.R. 18 Assam & Na; aland 87, rd'mcd to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTfON: Civil Appeal No. 1626 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated the J4th October, 1966 of the High O>urt of Mysore at Bangalore in Misc. First Appeal No. 124 of 1966.\n\nM. Natesan and Saroja Gopalkrislma11, for the appellant Gobi11d Das and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGoSWA.W, J.-The appellant and his brother, Srinivas:unurthy are partners of a firm carrying on the business of manufacturing and exporting of polished granite memorial stones in the name and style of Messrs Narayauaswami & Sons. The firm is admittedly a factory both under the Factories Act as weU as under the Employees State 1 nsurance Act (briefly the Act). The appellant claims to directly employ about 35 persons in his factory and has been payil'lg contribution under the Act on their account. It is stated that adjacent to his own factory there is another factory situated on the appellant's land leased out by him to two person:;, Chidambarchari and Shankarsubbacbari (hereinafter referred to as the <.'Ontractors). The contractors employ about 50 workers in their factory for purposl!s of\n\ncutting aud dressing the granite stones. The lorry drivers bring granite from the surrounding areas and unload them outside the factory. The contractors get these to their portion of the leased land for cutting them. After cutting these are sent back to tl1e appe1lant's factory where these are designed and polished and thereafter exported.\n\nThe Employees' State Insurance Corporation (briefly the COiporation) applied to the Employees' State Imurance Court at Bangalore (briefly the Court) for recovery of an amount of Rs. 8893/- bt-ing the employees' contribution payable by the appellant for the period com\n\nmencing from 27-7-1958 to 31-1·1964 on account of the workers employed by the two contractors described as 'immediate employers.'\n\nunder the Act. The court decided against the Corporation holding that the contractors were not 'immediate employers' within the meaning of section 2 (13) of the Act and they were independent (.'0 ntractors and hence the appellant was not the principal employer in respect of the employees working under the contractors. The Corporation appealed to the High Court of Mysore against the aforl!said order under section 82(2) of the Act. The High Court held that the appellant was the principal employer and the ontractors were the immediate employers under the Act. The High Court further held that. the workers under the contractors were employees \\\\ ithin 1 he mcanmg of section 2 (9) (ii) of the Act. The High C'ourt thus accepted the appeal of the Corporation. Hence thi5 appeal by p.:-rial leave.\n\nfore the court evidnce was given by both sides and the fo llo ll'ing find1ngs of the court arc adverted to by the High Court : ('\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974 ] 3 S.C.R.\n\n\"All that can be said to have been proved by the applicant corporation in this case is that RWs 2 and 3 (the contractors) work at a place belonging to the respondent and execute part of the work which is necessary to manufacture the final finished product for sale. All that can be said to have been proved in this case is that the contractors are doing some\n\nwork which would be the foundation for the work that is finally done by the respondent\" After examining the evidence the High Court also found as follows :-\n\n\"There is evidence to shew that these employees (under the contractors) aie employed in connection with the work of the respondent-fac!ory\".\n\nThe respondent in the High Court's judgmeilt refers to the appellant herein. As stated earlier, the High Court answered both the questions in favour of the Corporation.\n\nThe same points are raised for cons'ideration in this appeal and Mr. Nates an on behalf of the appellant submits that the contractors owned a separate factory and are independent contractors and cannot be held to be 'immediate employers' within the meaning of section 2(13) of the Act and hence the appellant is not liable as principal employer to pay the contribution on account of the persons working under the contractors.\n\nBefore we deal with 1he \\jUestions of Jaw raised in this appeal, it will be appropriate to refer to the material provisions of the Act.\n\nThe Act, as it appears from the preamble, is passed \"to provide for certain benefits to employees in case of sicknes. maternity and employment injury and to make provision for certain other matters in relation thereto\". Section2 contains the definitions. By section 2 (4) \"contribution\"· means the sum of money payable to the Corporation by the principal employer in respect of an employee and in eludes any am(}unt payable by or on behalf of the employee in accord ance with the pro'lisions of this Act.\" By secti(}n 2 (9) \"employee\" means any person employed for wages in or in connection with the\n\nwor~ of a factory or establishment to which this Act applies and-\n\n(i) who is. directly employed by the principal emp\\(}yer on any\n\nwork of, or incidental or preliminary to or connected with the work of, the factory or establishment, whether such work is done by the employee in the factory orestablishment or elsewhere; or\n\n(ii) who is employed by or through an immediate employer on the premises of the factory or establishment or under the supervision of the principal employer or his agent on work which is ordinarily part or the work of the factory\n\norstatihn, tent or which is preliminary to the work carried on m or met dental to the purpose of lhe factory or establishment; * • • •\n\nI I\n\n. .\n\nB, M. L~SHMANAMUUHY v. E.S.LC. (Goswami, /.) 145\n\nBy section 2(12) \"factory .. means any premises including the precincts thereof whereon twenty or more persons are employed or were employed for wages on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being oarried on with the aid of power or is ordinarily so carried on.\n\nBut does not in. elude a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 or a railway running shed\". • • • • By section 2(13) ••immediate employer\", in relation to employees. employed by or through aim, means a person who bas undertaken the execution, on the premises of a factory or an establishment to\n\nwhich this Act, applies or under the supervision of the principal employer or his agent, of the whole or any part of any work which is ordinarily part of the work of the factory or establishment of the principal employer or is preliminary to the work carried on in, or incidental to the purpose of, any such factory or establishment, and includes a person by whom the services of an employee who has entered into a contract of service with him are temporarily lent or let on hire to the principal employer\".\n\nBy section 2(14) \"insured person\" meant a person who is or wa& an employee in respect of whom contributions are or were payable under this Act and who is, by reason thereof, entitled to any of the benefits provided by this Act\".\n\nBy section 2(17) \"principal employer .. means-\n\n(I} in a factory, the owner or occupier of the factory and in E eludes the manaiing agent of such owner or occupier, the legal representative of a deceased owner or occupier, and where a person bas been named as the manager of the factory undor the factories Ac.t. 1948, the penon so\n\nnamed\" .\n\n• • Chapter IV deals with eontributions.\n\nThe opening section 38 provides that-\n\n• •\n\n• 'subject to the provisions of this Act, all employee' in factories, or establishments to which this Act applies shall be insured in the manner provided by this Act.\" • • • • :By Section 39(1) \"the contribution payable under this Act in respect of an employee shall comprise contribution payable by the employer (hereinafter referred to as the employer's contribution) and contribution payable bY. the employee (hereinafter referred to as the employee'& contribution) and 6hall be paid to the Corporation''\n\nBy section 40 (l) \"the principa} employer shall pay in respect of every employee, whether directly employed by him or by or through\n\nan immediate employer, both the employer's contribution and the employee's contribution\". ll--M852S, uPCI/74\n\nus SUPREME COURT RBPOilTS\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C.R •.\n\nBy section 42(2) \"Con.tribution (both .the -employer-'s-contribution A. and the employee's contribution) baH be payable by .the principal employer for each week in respect of the whole or part of whic.h wages are p:tyable to the employee and not otherwise\".\n\n_Section 43 and section 97 empower the Corporation . to make regulations. Under section 44 every principal and immediate em~ ployer has, to submit returns o the Corporation.and maintain legisn ters and records.\n\nSection 68 provides for Corporation'srights where a.principal.em~ ployer fails or neglects to pay any contribution. By .section .;72 an employer is barred from reducin~ wages by reason only of his. liability tp pay contribution;\n\nChapter VA provides for. certain transitory provisions. The opening section 73A provides for emloyer's special contribution. ·\n\nChapter VI deals with a.djudication of disputes and claims~ UndJr section 74 (l) Employee's Insurance Court is. constituted.\n\nInter-alia under section 75 (!)'\"If any question. or dispute arises as to- ·\n\n(a) wether aQy person is 3:n rriployee within the maning_ of th1s Act or whether he IS hable to j)llY the employes.· contribution, or • • • *\n\n(d) the person who is or was the principal employer in respect\n\nof any employee; * • • \"' such question or dispute ...... shall be deCided by the.Eployees• Insurance Court in tccordtnce with the provisions of this Act.\"\n\nUnder section 75(1) (g), inter-alia; any dispute between a principal employer and an immediat~ employer shall also be dedded by the court. Under section 75 (2) (b) any claim by principal employe~: to recover contributions from any immediate employer shall also b!! decided by the Employees' . Insurance Court. By section 75 (3) jurisdiction of a civil court i~ . barred regardfng, amongst others, any question or dispute as specified in the section.\n\nSection 82 provides for appeals and under aub, section..(2) .. thereof an appeal shall lie to the H)gh Court from an erder of the Employees' Insurance Court if it involves a substantial question of law.·\n\nChapter VII provides for different penalties.\n\nUnder Chapter VIII (Miscellaneous). 11ection 9-4 provides, inter alia, that contributions due to the Corporation shall have priority over all other debts.\n\nThe Act is thus a beneficial piece of soci1tl curity legislation in the interest of labour in factories at the first instance and with power to extend to other establishments. Provisions of the Act will have to be construed with that end in view to promote the schemes and avoid\n\n' I \"'!, .,\n\n'· I\n\n, I, . : \\· ..\n\n,~:~\n\nA ·~\n\n' .,\n\nB t\n\n1: '\n\n~ '! c L\n\nf F I\n\n~· M. LAKSHMANAMURTHY v. E.S.t.C. (Goswami, J.) 147\n\nthe mischief. F!om some o~ the material provisions set ot the underly!ng.aim of the Act IS to insure the employees against ab?ve, risks to their hfe, l1ealth and .welt being and the cllarge . vanohus · 1 I h 1 h JS upon t e pnnc1pa emp oyer eyen t oug.t e ay gt his usual work done through n mtermed.Jary, who JS dcscnbed m the Act as 'immediate mploer .\n\nAny d1 pute between tl1e principal employer and the Immtd1ate epfyerAJ~ to ?e settled bc_tcel!- themselves, de !Jors, the m~ ?yees an 1e c . C1arges the pnnc1pa! employer with the l1abihty to pay. the connbt10n not only of its own but also that of the employe:s subject to h1s ngh! to deduct the employees' contribution from their wages under sect10n 40 (2) of the Act. There is a quicker mode of recovery as ar:ears of land revenue under section 45B and 73D. Chapte~ V_A provides for transitory provisions and by ect!on 73A every pnnc1pal employer shall have to pay a special contribution\n\ni~ Iie!-1 of the employer's conributio_n payable under Chapter IV. Adjudication of all kinds of specified drsputes are also intended to be expeditiously disposed, of by the court constituted under section 74.\n\nSuch disputes include a dispute between a principal employer and an\n\nmmediat~ employer as noticed .earlir. Civil courts' jurisdiction JS barred m respect of matters specified m the Act. There is onlv one sp:cia! type of appeal to the High Court and that also in a restricted form. -The Act insists on compliance with its provisions on pain of penalties and the contributions due to the corporation have priority over other debts.\n\nKeeping in view the scheme and the principal object of the Act, we 'will now examine the questions of law raised in this appeal. The definition of the 'immediate employer' under section 2 (13), omitting what is not necessary for our purpose, is as follows:-\n\n\" 'immediate employer', in relation to employees employed by or through him, means a person who has under~ taken the execution, on the premises of a factory ..•..... to which this Act applies ...... of the whole or any part of . any work which is ordinarily part of the wok of the. fatory or establishment of the princ.; ipal employer or JS prel!mmary to the work carried on in, or incidental to the purpose of, any such factory •.•....•... . . .. ••..••. \"\n\nThat the app:Uant, who is the principal employer, has factory where granite memorial stones are manufactured for expot Js beyod question. The ftnished articles are the dressed and polished gramte stones. The raw material is the stone from the quarry-brouht therefrom, cut to sizes, dressed, po!i:>hed and then exported: he other factory of the contractors on the leased land of the pnncJp:tl employer, adjoining the latter's f.'lctory, is reg.istcred under tl:e Facton~:s Act in the year J 963.\n\nAlthough admtttcdly a factor), thec is no evidence on the record that the contractors pay nny conn~ bulion under the Act or have been even ch.argetl sepnrately as pnncipal employers so far as their so called dm:ct mploy':es are cn~ ceroed. The principal employer, the appellant, 1s. mlong a cla1m\n\nwhich, if correct, will make the contractors also pnnc1pal employers liable under the Act. But it is easy for the appellant to make such\n\n:'\" -.~ I .,. , .•. ·. \"\" .. •\" ..,.~ . • • , • . ...... , .. ........ ...\n\n.' I ' •\n\n~ \" .. . .. . t . .. .. .. !. . -· . . -\n\nI l\n\n{ I I ! ! l I\n\nl . '\n\nSUPREME OOURT REPORTS . { 1974) 3 S.C.Il.\n\na claim to avoid his personal liability which, in aU fairness to labour, should have been settled by impleading the contractors as parties in order to make the entire position clear. It is not necessary for u11 to examine whether this is a mere device of the principal employer to a void his liability under the Act.\n\nWe agree with the High Court that on the findings of fact the work undertaken by the contractors in the adjoining vicinity, even thouah their factory may have been subsequently registered under the factories Act, is preliminary or incidental to the work in thC' principal emplo yer-factory turning out the finished product for export. The work in the two places has an intimate correlation and is a piece of an integrated whole and the said work by the contractors through their labour is ordinarily part of the work of the principal-factory undertaken by the contractors. Their factory is situated in the premises of the appellant's factory which according to the definition clause includes the precincts thereof. It, therefore, follows that the two contractors are 'immediate employers• within the meaning of section 2 (13) and the workers employed for cutting and dressing the granite stones. by the immediate employers are employees within sectioq 2 (9) (ii) of the Act, being employed through the immediate employers on the premises of the factory including the precincts thereof.\n\nThe fact that in 1963 the contractors' factory Was separately refistered under the Factories Act or that, after meeting the prior reqwrements of the principal employer, work of some other parties was also\n\npermissible, does not, in our opinion, militate against the predominant purposes of the work of the contractors being part and parcel of the main work of the principal employer-factory for which the contractors mainly work.\n\nA &Ood deal of argument is advanced with regard to the expression \"oa the premises of a factory\" in the definition clause of \"immediate\n\nemployer\" under section 2 (13). The word \"premises\" according to the dictionary means house or building with its ground or other apurtenances. The premises include under section 2 (13) the pre cints thereof. The word \"precincts\" means the environs. This Court in A.rdeshir H. Bhiwandiwala v. The State ofBombay(l) dealt with the term \"premises\" in the definition of factory under section 2(m) of the Factories Act and after noticing its meanin& in various Law Lexicons and dictionaries observed:-\n\n\"The word \"premises\" bas•now come to refer to either land or buildings or to both, depending on the context ..•... \" It is therefore clear that tl', e word \"premises\" is a generic term meaning open land or land with buildings or buildings alone.\"\n\nThe contention in that ease that the word ''premises\" must be\n\nrstricted to mean buildings and not taken to cover open lands as well was repelled.\n\nIn the instant case, on an examination of the site plan (Ext. P-1) and the evidence, it is evident there is a definite environmental as well as functional unity between the two portions, namely, the main\n\n(1) tl9ilJ 3 S.C.R. ~92.\n\nB. M. LAKSHMANAMURTHY v; E.S.I.C. (Goswami, J.) 149\n\nfactory (Portion A) and the contractors' factory with the precincts (Portion B) even though separated by a wall in which there was a door which sometimes was closed. The work undertaken by the contractors and carried on in their portion of the area is surely componental to make it a part of the complex whole. The principal requirement of the definition, namely, that the work or the construction is undertaken on the premises of the factory and about which both sides join issue, is satisfied in the present case onthe evidence on records and we hold accordingly. We are also satisfied that the workers under the contractors are employees employed by the principalemployer through the 'immediate employers' on the premises of the factory in work which is ordinarily the normal work of the factory or is, at any rate, preliminary to the work or which is certainly incidental to the purpose of the main factory of the appellant.\n\nMr. Natesan laid great stress upon the requirement of a unity of control of the principal employer over the manufacturing process of the work: undertaken by the contractors, but it will be obvious from the facts found ana the evidence noted below that the work is done on the premises of the factory. We need not examine this aspect in detail in view of the uncontradicted evidence of PW-1 as follows:-\n\n\"Thc work: done in the Factory consisted of manufacture of granite stone9 for export. I found raw stones lying all over the surrounding area. I found that raw stones were moved to the premises marked Bin Ex. P. 1. I found that about\n\n50 penons working at the spot. I learnt from the partners those 50 persons had been employed by two or three contractors. Cutting and dressing of the stones were done by those fifty men. There were (1) sand blasting machine belonging to the partners and (2) Electric blower. Power was used in these machines. After the stones are cut and dressed, they are removed to premises A for designing and polishing. Final touches are then given to them in the premises B. They are again brought back to premises A for packing and despatching. The premises A and B belong to the partners. Only a wall separated the two premises. There was a connecting -door which appeared to have been closed\".\n\nAgain RW-2 also deposed that \"it is since last three years that, I undertook: the work of the second party\" i.e. the appellant. R Wl\n\n(partner of the appellant) stated as follows in cross-examination:\n\n\"Ex. P. 4 is the copy of the letter dated 19-3-63 written by P.W. 1 to me for copy of the agreement and plan. Ex. P. 5 is my interim reply ..............•. By Factory premises in Ex. P. 5, I meant both the portions A and B in Ex. p. I\".\n\nMr. Natesan has referred to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Bombay v. Raman (Cizittur\n\nHarihar Iyer)(') but the High Court dealt in that case with the definition of \"employee\" prior to the amendment of the Act in 1966 and is of no\n\n-~------\n\n(1) [1957] I L .L.J. 267.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 19741 3 s.C.R.\n\naid to counsel. This case was also distinguished by this Court in Nagpur Electric Light & Power Co. Ltd. v. Regional Directcr Employees\n\nState Corporation, Etc.(l) Counsel also relied upon a decision of the Delhi High Court in Employees' State Insurance Corporation\n\nv. Peter Sewing Machine Co. etc.(2), dealing with the definition of 'factory' under section 2 (12) of the Act. The High Court, inter alia, was posing a question in that case as to whether the whole or any part of the work of the contractors there consisted of any work which was ordinarily a part of the work of the factory or establishment of the principal employer and answered it in the negative on the finding of facts in that case \"that the contractors, manufacture their goods independently and not as a part ofthe goods manufactured by the Peter Sewing Machine Company\". On the facts of this case that question does not arise and we express no opinion thereon.\n\nThe decision is therefore, of no aid to the appellant in this case.\n\nThe learned counsel further draws our attention to M/s Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v .. Employees' State Insurance Corporation(l) in which case the High Court remanded the matter to find out \"whether\n\nthe work done at te site can be regarded. . as a manufacturing , process .......... \" We, owever; do not fail to notice that the judgment did not take note of the corri.plete definition of \"employee''under section 2 (9), the first P.art of which is joined by a conjunctive 'and' with two claus, es. Further the High Court is not correct in thinking that the. definition of the word \"factory\" under the Factories Act \"is. same\" as that of \"factory'' under the Employees' State Insurance Act wtich is of wider amplitude with an expanding horizon of objectives in the latter Act. It is riot necessary, however, to consider in this case if these factors may have affected the decision in the above case.. At any rate, the appellant does not derive any aid from this decision. .\n\nThe next decision in Nagpur Electric Light & Power Co., Ltd. (supra), relied upon by .the appellant for the construction of the definition of \"employee\" nder section 2 (9) {i) of the Act is not of assis' tance to him since we are dealing with a case under section 2(9) (ii).\n\nWe, of course, notice that the High Court in this case held as follows at page 20 of the judgment :-\n\n\"From the foregoing, it is clear that the contractors have been executing the work .which is ordinarily part of the work of the factory and that within the premises of the respondent- G factory\".\n\nThe definition clauses of \"immediate employer\" [section 2 (13)J and \"employee\" [section 2 (9) (11)], contain the expression \"on the premises of a factory\" and not within it. Even so as detailed above after examining the evidence ourselves, we are ~!early of opinion\n\n(1) [19~71 (3) S.C.R. \"92.\n\n(2) AIR 1970 Delhi 182,\n\n(3) [1966J LL.R., 18 Assam & Nagaland 87.\n\nB, M. LAUHMANAMURTHY V. E, S.LC. (Goswami, /,) 151\n\nthat the work of the contractors was undertaken by them on the premises of the factory which may not be the same thing as in or within the factory. We are further of the view that the entire site of the factory is a composite one containing portions A as well as B and there is no doubt that the contrar.tors are the. 'immediate empll?yers' within th~ meaning of section 2 (13) of the Act and the workers employedby them are \"employees\" under the Act.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 82, "entities": [{"text": "B. M. LAKSHMANAMURTHY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. M. LAKSHMANAMURTHY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE EMPLOYEES' STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION,\n\nBAN GALORE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE EMPLOYEES' STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION, BANGALORE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 21, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 98, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. M. LAKSHMANAMURTHY v.\n\nTHE EMPLOYEES' STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION,\n\nBAN GALORE January 21, 1974\n\n(P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, S, N. DwiVEDI AND .p, K. GOSWAMI, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. DwiVEDI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.N. DWIVEDI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. GOSWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 144, "end_char": 159, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 430, "end_char": 443, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 476, "end_char": 495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Employees' State Insurance Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 935, "end_char": 973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Employees' State Insurance Corporation claimed from the appelJaot a certain sum as the firms contribution on account of the workers employed by the two contractors described as 'immediate employers' under the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 2(13)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1263, "end_char": 1271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Insurance Act", "statute": "State Insurance Act"}}, {"text": "State Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1290, "end_char": 1309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(9)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1599, "end_char": 1610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Insurance Act", "statute": "State Insurance Act"}}, {"text": "s. 40(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2311, "end_char": 2319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(13)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3702, "end_char": 3710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(9Xu)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3820, "end_char": 3829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. Natesan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4609, "end_char": 4619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Natesan and Saroja Gopalkrislma11, for the appellant Gobi11d Das and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "M. Natesan"}}, {"text": "Saroja Gopalkrislma11", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4624, "end_char": 4645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Natesan and Saroja Gopalkrislma11, for the appellant Gobi11d Das and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Gobi11d Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4665, "end_char": 4676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Natesan and Saroja Gopalkrislma11, for the appellant Gobi11d Das and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4681, "end_char": 4692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Natesan and Saroja Gopalkrislma11, for the appellant Gobi11d Das and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "GoSWA.W", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4759, "end_char": 4766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGoSWA.W, J.-The appellant and his brother, Srinivas:unurthy are partners of a firm carrying on the business of manufacturing and exporting of polished granite memorial stones in the name and style of Messrs Narayauaswami & Sons."}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5036, "end_char": 5049, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chidambarchari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5398, "end_char": 5412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is stated that adjacent to his own factory there is another factory situated on the appellant's land leased out by him to two person:;, Chidambarchari and Shankarsubbacbari (hereinafter referred to as the <.'Ontractors)."}}, {"text": "Shankarsubbacbari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5417, "end_char": 5434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is stated that adjacent to his own factory there is another factory situated on the appellant's land leased out by him to two person:;, Chidambarchari and Shankarsubbacbari (hereinafter referred to as the <.'Ontractors)."}}, {"text": "Employees' State Imurance Court at Bangalore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5985, "end_char": 6029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Employees' State Insurance Corporation (briefly the COiporation) applied to the Employees' State Imurance Court at Bangalore (briefly the Court) for recovery of an amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "27-7-1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6183, "end_char": 6192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8893/- bt-ing the employees' contribution payable by the appellant for the period com\n\nmencing from 27-7-1958 to 31-1·1964 on account of the workers employed by the two contractors described as 'immediate employers.'"}}, {"text": "31-1·1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6196, "end_char": 6205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8893/- bt-ing the employees' contribution payable by the appellant for the period com\n\nmencing from 27-7-1958 to 31-1·1964 on account of the workers employed by the two contractors described as 'immediate employers.'"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6440, "end_char": 6449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6653, "end_char": 6673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Corporation appealed to the High Court of Mysore against the aforl!said order under section 82(2) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 82(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6709, "end_char": 6722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6971, "end_char": 6980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nates", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8173, "end_char": 8178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same points are raised for cons'ideration in this appeal and Mr. Nates an on behalf of the appellant submits that the contractors owned a separate factory and are independent contractors and cannot be held to be 'immediate employers' within the meaning of section 2(13) of the Act and hence the appellant is not liable as principal employer to pay the contribution on account of the persons working under the contractors.", "canonical_name": "M. Natesan"}}, {"text": "section 2(13)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8364, "end_char": 8377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8926, "end_char": 8935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10023, "end_char": 10036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mines Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10400, "end_char": 10415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2(13)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10455, "end_char": 10468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mines Act, 1952", "statute": "the Mines Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "section 2(14)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11160, "end_char": 11173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mines Act, 1952", "statute": "the Mines Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "section 2(17)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11390, "end_char": 11403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mines Act, 1952", "statute": "the Mines Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11784, "end_char": 11794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 39(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11996, "end_char": 12009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12328, "end_char": 12338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT RBPOilTS\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C.R", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12571, "end_char": 12610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ll--M852S, uPCI/74\n\nus SUPREME COURT RBPOilTS\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C.R •.\n\nBy section 42(2) \"Con.tribution (both .the -employer-'s-contribution A. and the employee's contribution) baH be payable by .the principal employer for each week in respect of the whole or part of whic.h wages are p:tyable to the employee and not otherwise\"."}}, {"text": "section 42(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12618, "end_char": 12631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12875, "end_char": 12885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12890, "end_char": 12900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12954, "end_char": 12964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13086, "end_char": 13096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 73A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13384, "end_char": 13395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13510, "end_char": 13520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13587, "end_char": 13597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Insurance Court in tccordtnce with the provisions of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13947, "end_char": 14008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 75(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14018, "end_char": 14031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Insurance Court in tccordtnce with the provisions of this Act", "statute": "Insurance Court in tccordtnce with the provisions of this Act"}}, {"text": "section 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14157, "end_char": 14167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Insurance Court in tccordtnce with the provisions of this Act", "statute": "Insurance Court in tccordtnce with the provisions of this Act"}}, {"text": "section 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14325, "end_char": 14335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Insurance Court in tccordtnce with the provisions of this Act", "statute": "Insurance Court in tccordtnce with the provisions of this Act"}}, {"text": "Section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14463, "end_char": 14473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Insurance Court in tccordtnce with the provisions of this Act", "statute": "Insurance Court in tccordtnce with the provisions of this Act"}}, {"text": "section 45B and 73D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16080, "end_char": 16099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16429, "end_char": 16439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17051, "end_char": 17060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uant", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17604, "end_char": 17608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the app:Uant, who is the principal employer, has factory where granite memorial stones are manufactured for expot Js beyod question."}}, {"text": "factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19237, "end_char": 19250, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19850, "end_char": 19859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Was separately refistered under the Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20173, "end_char": 20222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20710, "end_char": 20719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Was separately refistered under the Factories Act", "statute": "Was separately refistered under the Factories Act"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20864, "end_char": 20873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Was separately refistered under the Factories Act", "statute": "Was separately refistered under the Factories Act"}}, {"text": "section 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21074, "end_char": 21086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Was separately refistered under the Factories Act", "statute": "Was separately refistered under the Factories Act"}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21094, "end_char": 21107, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Natesan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22806, "end_char": 22813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Natesan laid great stress upon the requirement of a unity of control of the principal employer over the manufacturing process of the work: undertaken by the contractors, but it will be obvious from the facts found ana the evidence noted below that the work is done on the premises of the factory.", "canonical_name": "M. Natesan"}}, {"text": "19-3-63", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24370, "end_char": 24377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. 4 is the copy of the letter dated 19-3-63 written by P.W. 1 to me for copy of the agreement and plan."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24612, "end_char": 24629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Natesan has referred to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Bombay v. Raman (Cizittur\n\nHarihar Iyer)(') but the High Court dealt in that case with the definition of \"employee\" prior to the amendment of the Act in 1966 and is of no\n~------\n\n(1) [1957] I L .L.J. 267."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 19741 3 s.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24882, "end_char": 24916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 19741 3 s.C.R.\n\naid to counsel."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25273, "end_char": 25282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Peter Sewing Machine Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25736, "end_char": 25764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, inter alia, was posing a question in that case as to whether the whole or any part of the work of the contractors there consisted of any work which was ordinarily a part of the work of the factory or establishment of the principal employer and answered it in the negative on the finding of facts in that case \"that the contractors, manufacture their goods independently and not as a part ofthe goods manufactured by the Peter Sewing Machine Company\"."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26338, "end_char": 26347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26534, "end_char": 26547, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26608, "end_char": 26621, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Nagpur Electric Light & Power Co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26928, "end_char": 26967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next decision in Nagpur Electric Light & Power Co., Ltd. (supra), relied upon by .the appellant for the construction of the definition of \"employee\" nder section 2 (9) {i) of the Act is not of assis' tance to him since we are dealing with a case under section 2(9) (ii)."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27065, "end_char": 27074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Insurance Act wtich is of wider amplitude with an expanding horizon of objectives in the latter Act", "statute": "State Insurance Act wtich is of wider amplitude with an expanding horizon of objectives in the latter Act"}}, {"text": "section 2(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27163, "end_char": 27175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Insurance Act wtich is of wider amplitude with an expanding horizon of objectives in the latter Act", "statute": "State Insurance Act wtich is of wider amplitude with an expanding horizon of objectives in the latter Act"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27530, "end_char": 27539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Insurance Act wtich is of wider amplitude with an expanding horizon of objectives in the latter Act", "statute": "State Insurance Act wtich is of wider amplitude with an expanding horizon of objectives in the latter Act"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27562, "end_char": 27571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Insurance Act wtich is of wider amplitude with an expanding horizon of objectives in the latter Act", "statute": "State Insurance Act wtich is of wider amplitude with an expanding horizon of objectives in the latter Act"}}, {"text": "M. LAUHMANAMURTHY V.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27848, "end_char": 27868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B, M. LAUHMANAMURTHY V. E, S.LC. ("}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28260, "end_char": 28269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_152_199_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "STATE OF PUNJAB (NOW HARYANA) AND ORS.\n\n'II.\n\nAMAR SINGH AND ANOTHER\n\nJanuary 21, 1974\n\n[D. G. PALEJCAR, V. R. KRISHNA lYEil AND R. S. SARIWUA, JJ.)\n\nPunjab Security of Land Tenures Act (10 c-f 1953) Ss. lOA and 18- Scope o/.\n\n Interpretation of Statutes.\n\nSection JOA(b) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenu.a Act, 1953, provides that no transfer or other disp01ition of land which is comprised in a surplus area [as defined in s. 2(Sa)[, at the commencement of the Act, aball affect the utilization thereof for the resettlement of e.iected tenants; and s. lOA(c) provides that for the purpose of determining the surplus area, any judgment, decree or order of a court or otMr fllltlwrity, which diminishes the surplus area, shall be ignonld. Under the Act, landowners who had land in excess of the 'permissible aree' coluld reserve for themselves lands to the extent of the permissible area; and the relit, excluding the pertni.uible area of the tenants, was the surplus area of the landoWner. Section 18 prolde3 that a teoant who baa been in conttnuous occupation of the land comprised ln his tenancy for a tirlnimum period of 6 Y~. shall be entitled to base from the landowner, the land eo held by him.\n\nAt tbe coi1UJiencement of the Act. on April IS, 1933, a landowner owned three items of property which did not fom1 part of her area. One of the item& wa• under her self-cultivation while there weft tenants on the other' two. Thoao tenants later gave up possesalon llPd abandoned the laD<b. The landowner made a sift of the 3 itema to her daushtc:.r, wo 10ld them to her husba.Dd an4 his brothet-; the Jst and 2nd xesponl!ents respecUvcly.\n\nThe Collector (Surplus Area), while detenninins the surplus area of the IIUldowne.r, iJDORCI tho gifu and ulcs. and in eluded t.be 3 items tn' tbe landowner's swplus area. The mpoodents appealed to the Commissioner. TheY also applied to the Aai&tant Collector under s. 18, for purchase of the lands in their posse.1Sion on the ground of continuous occupation for 6 years. The applications were allowed on the basis of a compromise between tbe applicants (respondents) and the landowner, and the respondents paid the\n\npurch~~5e price determined by the Assistant Collector. On the basis of those pur chase orders, the Commissioner, set aside the order of the Collector (Surplus Area) declaring the surplus area of the landowner, and directed him to inquire into the matter afresh. The Collector (the Al'.stt. Collector who had allowed the purchases by the respondents had by then become Collector (Surplus Area)) thereupon determined the surplus area of the landowner under s. lOA( c). He, however, held that the leases granted to the respondents were collusive and that the orders of purchase under s. 18 were ineffective, and included the 3 items apin in the landowner's surplus area.\n\nThe High Court allowed the Writ Petitions of the respondents on the ground that the authority acting under s. lOA( c) could not ianore the purchase orders passed under s. 18.\n\nAllowing the appeals to this Court,\n\nHELD : Pe, Palekar and Krishna Iyer, 11. (Satl:aria J. dissenting) : l(a) The public policy of s. lOA cannot be outwitted by consent rs calculated to defeat the provision, and, without the statutory authority charscd with the inquiry being satisfied about the bonafides of and eligibility for, the purchase. (17SG)\n\nWhen high public policy finds expression in socio-economic legislation contractual arrangements between interested individuals, sanctified into consent or com promise decrees or orders cannot be binding on te instrumentalities of the State called upon to enforce the statute, although the tnbunals, enjoined to .enforce the Jaw, may \\,<Ike probative note of the rec:itals in such compromise or consent statements\n\nin proof of facts on which their jurisdiction depends. Neither the materials on\n\nj I I\n\nPUNJAB V. AMAA SINGH 153\n\nrecord in the present cnse, nor the recitals in th c · of the judicial mind. (174CJ ' e ompromlse, d1sclose the application\n\n(b) It was found by the Collector (Sur tu A have been collusively got op to dwindle the u s 1 rca) tht the le3scs in question !he landowne.r had conspired with her son-in-l~~ s :n~~ ob theh landownr and that m contraventiOn of the Jaw Fur!hcr S 18 a r n 1 1s rot er to rct:un the area tenants. In th! present cae the lea' PP lcs on Y to persons who are legally the property to her daughter' Also e was ranted _by the lando~>.-ncr after gifting tion by the tenant; but the Collccto; f~~d:hon rqUIes 6 years continuous occupa-. the period at the time of their application undcrtSe rlc8spoTndhcntsrdha~ nt CC?mphlc.tcd null\"ty Th \"t ld · eo cr m .act IS t us a 1 • ere ore, 1 cou not be contended that the orders of purchase in favour of the rcspo_ndcnts passed by the concerned officer under s 18 h d b fi 1 and not havmg been t a \"d b. d h a ecomc na . sc Sl e m t e other authority determining the surplus ar.:a.\n\n(c) There is no provision ins. 18 to gi; c notice to the Collector who is to declare the surplu~ area and so, the Stat~ (represented by the Collector). which is itally conceme~ m the resettlment of eJ<:Ctcd tenants by utilising the surplus area, bas no OpportunitY to present 115 .case aga1nst the fraudulent character o[ the proceed in~ nder s. 18 before the Assistant ~Hector. The State, not being a party to that onkr, many case, canryot be b<; und by 1t, wh:u.:vcr may b: the cffc;; t as between the p.rt ies to those procccdmgs. Smcc the State 1s not 1\\ party it has no eight or appa l or rcviw [172Bj • .\n\n18_ (!) The authority under s. lOA ll_!aY ignore the orJcr or the authority umkr s.\n\n(a) There is an npnarcnt conflk\"t bctwL-en Ss. 10 and 18 anli the bic judicial approach. shuhJ be to harmon_i-c the two sections. The major premise of statutory constructiOn IS that the rule ol law mu't run close to the rule of life anJ the court\n\nmul reJd i.nro an enactment, l; ngu; g.: pcrmitdng, the meaning which promotes.. th~ bcmgnant mtent of the lcs~1:won in pro:ferene to the one which pervertS the s.:h.:rr.e !lf the 6tatute. The objL\"CtS of tbe a1:rarian reform undeclyins the Act are :(a) to Jmpa_rt security of tenure; (b) to make the tiLlc:r the owrn!r; and (c) to trim large l.1nd\n\nholdmgs. thus creating peasant proprietorships ensuring even dbtribution or bnd OW!ll\"rshlp. The intendment of the statute is that reservation was to be made by a lndo~ ncr to enable 'clf-<:ulti, ation, anc.l so, landowners could cjL'Ct tenants. Out, SlllCc agr.1ri.an tcfonn mut promote not eviction but s,-curity or tl:nul\"\\:, it txcamc ary for the State to create surplus urea of a consid.:rablc e:'l.tcnt, so that, th.:\n\nciC1c:d tcnnts could be rehabilitated on such surplu$ lanu.~. enjoying lix:ity of tcnr.: and paying rent to the owrn!rs. The suc.;..-ss of the: s.:hcme <kpcnds on pr.:wnms lc; akagcs through privat~ alienations, collusive n~~>arlis and d-.-.:r.:cs and the hk~. an.! w, care was wken in s. JOA(c) to interdict alienations nod to isn t?r~ d,'CC\\:L'S and orders which diminhhcd the surplus pool. Such a strategic provLSH>n must rive a benignantly sp:~.cious comtruction. [l60H, J6lf, 157Hj\n\n{b) There i~ no force in the contcntiun that th.: bcndit under s. lS wouiJ b.: ccmpktcly nullified and oblih:ratcd if s. l OA(cl wen: to pn:vail nc.l uppl)\" to (l(\\).:r>\n\nunder i. 18.\n\nThotgh S. lOA I c) u..c! the words ·hull be ignorcd' it is no.t C\\'UY onkr under 1. J 8 that would hav.:: to be: ignored but <>nly thl>Sc: ordcn 1\\ htch hl\\C th.: df,'Ct of dimini, hinllthe )Urplus urea. The pc:r.on \"'ho i:s ctltitkd to pun:ha\": undcr ' l~ l$ a pcron la\\\\{ully inducted on the land ~~~ t1 tenant. !h~ C:l_~.,. unJ.:~ , th_e $Cl1wn would be, (i) or tenant~ who ure eligible to purcha-.: .~Y v1rtue ot )trs ontt nuoul o.::cupation of lanJ in their pcrmis.ibl~ ur.:.t, anli (u) of t.:n:nts n.\"'.:ttl~ l'n 'urplu1 uro:a of the landowner aftcr 6 yean cnntinuous occup; rtion. The: rurcha~ in the: lit>t caliC being from th~ tt\"nant\"s po:~1iibl.: ~1'\\:a .i~ !lutsillc: t.h.: surpiiJ!! ar<~ of the landowner and d~ not have the ellt of <hmm.•shln~ th.: J.mdo-..nr ~_ur Jlllli an:a Jn the .oeconJ cav: th.: purcha-e fulfils the obJeCt of the: stalutc ol maktng f-..: tiller the owner The pricirul cutcgorY aliver..cly atli:ct.:d wouiJ be post stat t • b \" I t ants who ho-..e\\cr do no Jtl}f)' collusive tenanl:i and per hap• some ona .. ._ . en • • be 1 d lb<rve sympathy since th.:y dama~:e the pro~J'C'IS of d•_splac.:J persons to h r~~ I! • S\"tion 18CJ)(iii) liPPJ.rently contemplates purch~ ngts fr persJns fn d!se f ~~~ion when the Act c-Jme into fore.:, but the cxceptton a~ In!~ 0 Y. th\n\nth:.c p.; on~ who had been lkprived of lh.:ir rights by unJUSt cv1c11on prtor to c A-:t comin~ into force. (169!-H70D}\n\nl-54 IU:PRBME COURT RliPORT&\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\n(3). The purchase order by the Assistan, t Collto~ under s. 18 .was riJhtly ignored A by the Collector (Surplus Area). as 'other authi>nty'm s. lOA( c) lJICludes the officers u; tder s,. 18. :rhe plain meaning of the sub-sectio!l s tha.t any order by an.r authonty which shrmks the surplus area of the landowner IS mvalid to the extent llud down in that clause, and orders under s. 18, if they diminish the surplus area suffer the same fate .. The High Court was wrong in inferring from the statement of oJ:)jects and tea•\n\nsons that 'other authorities' ins. 10A(c) are arbitrators or such'likeagencies and not authorities under the Act. The objects and reasons relating to the! clause of a bill may be read for finding the object of the law and not to control its amplitude. The purpose as revealed in the statement of objects is that the legislature wanted to ensure B the iMulnerability of the surplus pool provision to attacks; by ignoring judicial and quasi-judicial orders of every sort. This object of s. 10A(c) cannot be fulfilled unless the widest meaning were given to the expression 'court or other authority'. Nor is there any basis for truncating the ambit of 'other authority'. 'Other authority' is every other authority within or without the Act. [168F, 169B, 171AB]\n\n(4) Further, the expression 'transfer or other disposition of land' in s. JOA(b) C covers leases, which by very definition, are a species of transfer of land. In the ptesent case, the lands in dispute fell outside the landowner's reserved area and were therefore included in her surplus area .. The first respondent, to be entitled to be a lessee, must prima facie show that the alienation in his favour, as a lessee, does not violates, lOA(b) which prohibits all transfers and other dispositions which diminish . the surplus area of the landowner. Under s. 2(1), the word 'landowner' includes\n\nalso the Jessee and the permissible area of the tenant is excluded from the surplus area of the landowner. Merely because of the outstanding leases in favour of the prior tenants at the. commencement of the Act, the two items wbich were earlier D leased to tenants do not ipso facto fall outside the surplus area of the landowner.\n\nThat would be so only if they are comprised in the permissible area of the tenant on the relevant date but there is no evidence to that effect. In relation to the prior tenants no such claim has been set up by the first respondent, and the first respondent was not a transferee from the prior tenants, but a de novo tenant. After the prior tenants gave up possession the lands came into tile actual possession -of the landowner and the leases were extinguished. It follows, that one item was always in the possession of the landowner and other two came into her possession subsequent to the coming into force of the Act, that those three items of property should be comput, E ed as part of the landowner's surplus area, and that s. 1 OA(b) operates to invalidate the alleged leases to the respondents, since they diminish the surplus area of the land\n\nowner. The respondents, therefore, had no right, as tenants; to purchase under s.\n\n18. [1670, 167H-I68D]\n\n(5) I.t could not be contened that even if leases are prohibited by s, JOA(b) the sub-section does not affect mvoluntary transfers and that since a purchase under s. 18, effects an involuntary transfer it is n?t affected by s. 1QA(b). The three sub- F clauses of s. lOA, read together, show that 1f the landowner by any act or omission of his suffered a iminution in the surplus area by a transfer: voluntary or otherwise contrary to the nght of the State Government to dispose of it, .such a transfer is liable\n\nt~ be set aside. . The expression 'transfer' is wide enough to cover transfers by operatiOn of law, as m the present case, un<; ler s. 18. To uphold the contention of the respondents that involuntary transfers are not affected would stultify s, lOA and the scheme of the statute altogether as they would diminish the available surplus area of a landowner. Moreover, special exclusion to save transfers by way of G inheritance and compulsory land acquisition by the State would be supererogatory had involuntary transfers been automatically excluded. from s. JOA(b). (172Hl\n\nThe Court expre_ssed the hope that land reform measures would be quickly implemented, because, 10 the present case, more than a score of years notwitbstandfug the processes of fixing 'reserved areas and surplus areas' on the strength of which alone confirrnent of proprietary rights on tenants and resettlement of a ejected tenanb could proceed, are still lingering. [176C] H\n\nMam &i v, State of Punjab I.LR. (1969) 2 Pun. & Har. 680; 682-683, over-ruled.\n\n.-J\n\nl'UNJAB V. AMAR SINGH 155\n\n. Chari v. Seshadri [1973] 11S.C.C. 761, Bahadur Singh v.f.Muni [ubrat P?69J 2 S.C.R. 432, Kaushalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal, [1969] 2.S.C.R. 1048.and Feroz1 /AI Jain v. Man Mal {1970] 3 S.C.C.t181, referred to.\n\nPer Sarkaria J. (dissenting) :\n\n(1) (a)\" The Collector (Surplus Area) would be entitled to ignore the order of the Asstt. Collector under S. 18 independently of s. lOA of the Act if the order bsed on the compromise is void and a nullity. But if it is only voidable or erroneous~ Jt could be avoided only by way of appeal review or revision or in other appropnae pro ceedings, known to law and the Collector (Surplus Area) could go behtnd tt only when it is so set aside, or if the provisions of s. lOA entitle him to do so.\n\n(b) An order is null and void if the quasi-judicial ttibunal passing it lacks in herent jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. In the .present ca_se, the Assistant Collector who made the order under s. 18 was duly mvested Wllh jurisdiction under the section. The respondents were . tenants and merely because theY were related to the landowner they could _not be denied the rights and privileges under the Act. The allegattns in the purchase application about the applicants' being in continuous upatu; m\n\nof the lands comprised in their tenancy for the requisite period, coupled wtth adml~ sion by the landowner in the compromise, furnished sufficient material on the bas1s of wh1ch the autho, rity could hae been satisfied about the existence of all the facts essential for the exercise of his jurisdiction under s. 18. (191F, 192E]\n\n(c) It is not correct to say, that on the facts of the instant case the Assistant Collector passed the orders solely on the basis of the compromise without appl.Ying his mind to the facts of the case. Application of mind is evident from the crrcumstance that he assessed the price to be paid by each of the applicants who thereafter did so. The mere fact that he did not record a finding in so many words tht he was satisfied from such and such material in regard to the existence of the basic conditions necessary for making the order under s. 18 did not render hill order a nullity when such .• material was otherwise evident on the record. Therefore, the order uqaer s. 18 was not 'a nullity and it could not be ignored as non-est by the Collector (Surplus Area). [192E]\n\nK. K. Chari v., R. M. Seshadri [1973]1 SCC 761, Nagindas Ramdas v. Da/patram lclrchram Civil Appeal No. 2479/72 decided on 30-11-1973, Smt. Ujjom Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 S.C. 1621=[1963)1 SCR 778 and Ittyavira Mathai v.\n\nVarkey Varkey, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 907 (910)=[1964]1 SCR 495, followed.\n\n(d) The Collector (Surplus Area) and the Collector acting under s. 18, are coordinate .authorities exercising separate and distinct jurisdictions. lf one feels that a certa1 !1 order passed by the other in the exercise of his distinct jurisdiction is err on\n\neus 1t was open to that authority to get it rectified in the appropriate manner pro-\n\nVIded by the Act, that is, by way of appeal, review or revision. The provisions in regard to appeal, review and revision against an order of the Assistant Collector under s. 18 are, under ss. 24 and 2S of the Act ss. 80 to 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. There is nothing in the Act or the Rules framed under the Act, or in the Tenancy Act, as to who can file an appeal or revision against the decision or order. of the Collector exercising jurisdiction under s. 18; and, in view of the long pract!ce thre could be no doubt that the State Government or its department\n\nan, 1f aggneved or.prejudiced by such a decision, go in appeal or revision against Jt. A person who 1s not a party to a decree or order, may with the leave of the Appellte Court prefer an appeal and as a rule, leave will not be refused to a penon who IDJght have been made a party to the proceedings. In any case, the State or the. deparyment culd. have .JI?Oved the Financial Commissioner to set right the ille ga}liY or l!flpropnety , m re~~10n. The Financial Commissioner under the Tenancy ct has Wide owers .m re~Is!on to correct errors committed by the inferior authorities l_lnd. there IS no time bm1t to the exercise of the revisional power. Once the ppbcation of te. tennt under s. 18 has been allowed and the order ill not set aside m l, IP.peal or revision, It om~ final and remains immune to an attack against its \":3hd1ty on aqy ground, mcl?dmg that of collusion, before the coordinate authorities under the Act deali11g With the question of the determination of surplus area.\n\nIn the present ase th~ c;:ollector (Surplus Area) could not go behind the orders under s. 18 or himself Sit tn appeal over them, especially when the officer who passed the two nlrs happended to be the s!!m~ rsqp. (194q\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nAmir Chand v. State of Haryana 1971 PIJ. 449, Securities Insurance Co. [1894] 2 Ch. 410, Province of Bombay v. W. I. Automobile Association A.I.R. 1949 Born.\n\nA 141, Heera Singh v. Veerka, A.I.R. 1958 Raj. 181, Shivaraja v. Siddamma A.I.R. 1963 Mys, 127, Executive Officer v. Raghavan Pil/ai A.I.R. 1961 Kera!a 114, B., an Infant, [1958J 1 Q. B. 12; Govinda Menon v. Madhvan Nair AJ.R. 1964 Kerala 235(DB), Punjab State v. Dr. Iqbal Singh [1965] Punjab Law\n\nJourna1110, Mam Raj and ors v. State of Punjab J.L.R. [1969] 2 Punj. and Haryana 680 and Shyamlal v. State ofGu}arat, [1965]2 S.C.R. 4571 referred to.\n\n(2) Th~ view taken by the High Court with regard to the interpretation and mter-relation of s. lOA and s, 18 is sound and therefore s. 18 prevails overs. lOA and so, the authority under s. 1 OA cannot ignore the order of the authority under s. 18. [197B]\n\n(a) The two canons of interpretation applicable to the statute are, (i) if choice lies between two alteraative constructions, that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncer. tainty friction or confusion into the working of the system and, (ii} if there is an apparent confiict between different provisions of the same enactment they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect may be given to both. [19 SE]\n\nKing Empror v. Bri Lal Sarma [1944]49 CWN 178 {PC)=72 lA 57, referred to.\n\n(b) Section 18 is designed to promote one of the primary objects of the Act, namely, of procuring ownership of the land to the tiller on easy terms. The self sufficing machinery of this section is available for purchase of their tenancies to D the tenants inducted before or after April IS, 1953, by the landowner, equally with tenants settled by the Government on the surplus area. The Act does not ta!.e\n\naway the right of the landowner to induct tenants on such area. Every sale made by the operation of s. IS in favour of a tenant admilled by the landowner on the surplus area, causes diminution of the surplus area or affects the utilisation thereof by the Government. Under s. 10A(c) every judgment, decree or order of a court or the authority, which diminishes the surplus area shall be ignored.\n\nIf sales in favour of tenants inducted by the landowner after April IS, 1953 were to be ignored under s. JOA(c) then it will reduce the wrking of the system of the E Act to a mockery, because it will present the spectcle of manifest contradiction and absurdity of an Act giving a right with one hand and taking it away by another.\n\nThe adoption of such an interpretation may not completely obliterate s. 18 but it will certainly truncate it, with reference to the category of tenants inducted by the landowner after AprillS, 1953. (1950]\n\n(3) The conflict between the two provisions can be avoided only if the\n\neneral words 'other authority' ins. lOA( c) are'I'ead ejusdem generiswith the specific words 'jud!!IIlent, decree or order of a court' which immediately precede them.\n\nF Thus construed, the general words 'or other authority' will not take in an authority exercising jurisdiction under s. I 8 of the Act. [196BC}\n\n(4) The lease created by the landowner in the present case, ceased to subsist as oon .as the Collector made orders of purchase under s. 18 in favour of the respondent.\n\nThe question whether the extinct lease which preceded the purchase orders was a transfer or not, did not therefore survive for decision. [l97A]\n\nBMjafl Lal v. Pufljab State [1968] 70 I.L.R. 664, Bishan Singh v. Punjab State [1968] 47 LLt284 and Labhmi Bai v. State of Haryana {1971] LXXIII Punj. L.R. 815, referred to.\n\nFurther the land comprised in the lease of the prior tenants was far less than their permiSible limit and the High Court rightly presumed that the lands were within their permjaible area. since there was no evidnce that they held any other land. Surplus area has to be determined, as appears fro!YJ s. 19F, with refrence to the situation as on AprillS, 1953, when the Act came mto force. The d1sputd iand beld by the prim: tenants was within their pennissible area an~ therefore tt\n\ncould not be included m the surplus area of the landowner. At the ttme when the\n\nCollector (Surplus Area) took up derermination of the surplus area, these lands were still comprised in a tenancy though under a different tenant, namely the first\n\nPUNJAB v. AMAR SINGH (Krishna lyer, /.) 15 7\n\nTCSpondent. Such change of the tenant does not amout .to a future acqsition\n\nof land, comprised in that tenancy, by the landowner Within the contemplation of s. l9A or s. 19B of th~ Act. [197HI98D]\n\nBhagwan Da.s v. The Stare.of Punjab, [1966} 2 SCR SJJ, followed.\n\nHarchand Sillgh v. PUfliab Slate, (1964) 66 P.L.R. 285; 1963 P.LJ. 144, approved\n\n(5) The expression 'transfer and other disposition of land' in s. IOA(b) does not include completed sales eff~ under s. 18.\n\nTe w~!ds 'transfer or other ciisposition of land' must be restricted to volu!!taiY dtsposttions of land made by the landowner and cannot be extended to cover mvoluntaz\":ot' transfers brought about by operation of law or circumSta~ beyond the control of the landowner. This is the only reasonable interpretation of the words 'transfer or other disposition of land' ins. lOA (b) which is consistent wit~ s.l8 and can reconcile and keep effective\n\nboth the sections. The two types of mvoluntary transfers, namely compulsory acquisition o! land by Gornmcnt or by an heir by inheritance are only illustrative of the intention of the le&tSlature. [196 D}\n\nCIVIL APPELLA TB JUPJSDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos •. 1755 and 1756 of 1967.\n\nFrom the judgment and order dated the 4th October, 1966 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 854 and 855 of 1963.\n\nv. c. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellants.\n\nS. K. Dhingra for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of D. G. PALEKAR and V. R. XJUSHNA IYER., JJ. was delivered by Krishna Iyer, 1. R. S. SARKAIUA, J. ga.ve a dissenting\n\nOpinion.\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. These two appeals by the State of Haryana challenge the High Court's approach to an interpretation of twocrucial provisions of a land reforms law, namely, ss. 10-A and 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (X of 1953) 1953 (for short called \"the Act\"). Counsel for the appellants complains that if the view upheld by the High Court of subordinating s. 10-A to s. 18 were not upset by this Court, large land holders may extricate their surplus land in excess of the ceiling\n\nset, through legal loopholes, such as have been practised in the present case.\n\nIf make-believe deals and collusive proceeding, he argues, may maneouvre through tlie legal net\n\ncast by s. 10-A of the Act interdicting alienations and orders which diminish the surplus pool intended for re-settlement by\n\nthe State of ejected tenants,- the agrarian reform mea!lure would'\n\nbe reduced to a paper tiger or socio-economic eyewash. Certainly land reforms are so basic to the national reconstruction of the ne.; order envisaged by the Constitution that the issue raised in this case desene!l our anxious attention.\n\nWe have to bear in mind the a, tivist, though inarticulate, major premise of statutory construction that the rule of law must run close to the rule of life and. the court must read into an enactment, language permitting that meaning which promotes the benignant intent of the legislatio~\n\nin preference to the one which perverts the scheme of the statute\n\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\non imputed legislative presumptions and assumed social vales valid in a prior era. An aware court, informed of this adaptatiOn\n\nin the rules of forensic interpretation, hesitates to nullify the plain object of a land reforms law unless compelled by its language, and the crux of this . case is just that accent when double possibilities in the chemistry of construction crop up.\n\nA breif survey of the relevent facts leading up to the legal controversy. seeking resolution in these appeals will help focus forensic attention. on the. provisions of the Act which bear upon the is.sue. A lady by name Lachhman had considerable agricultural property, far in excess of the relatively liberal ceiling set by the Act which came into force on April 15, 1953. She had a daughter Shanti Devi and son-in-law Amar Singh, respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1755 of 1967, whose brother Indraj is the respondent in the connected appeal No. 1756 of\n\n1967. AnneKure (B) to the writ petitions is an order dated May 11, 1962 passed under the Act and the Rules by the Collector (Surplus Area) Sirsa. It is this order which has been succesfully attacked in the writ petitions and is the subject-matter of the present appeals. The facts stated therein have not been reversed in the judgment of the High Court a1_1d we have to proceed on the assumption that those statements are correct. We are concerned with three khasras Nos. 177, 265 and 343, in all over 131 acres of land. At the commencement of the Act, khasra No. 1.77 was under Mst. Lachhman's selfcultivation but there were two tenants. under her, Chandu and Sri Chand, on other two plots. Together, these three plots constitute a large slice out of her surplus areas and are now claimed by the respondents, Amar Singh and Indraj, as their own under a purchase ordered by the Assitant Collector who is the competent authority under s. 18 of the Act (Annexure A to the writ petitions) Appellant's counsel urges that the history of the derivation of title of thse claimants needs to be sceptically studied, the relationship of the parties being that of mother and daughter, son-inlaw and brother and the heavy impact being slicing off a good chunk from the surplus area, otherwise available for re-settlement of evicted tenants.\n\nAt the outset it must be mentioned that the two tenants, Chandu and Sri Chand who. were on the land on the determinative date (April 15, 1953) presumably showed no. interest in claiming rights granted to tenants under the Act, which were subject, of course, to their possessing lands less. than the permissible 'area'.\n\nWe have no information in this case what the total extent of lands in the possession of these two tenants was and whether they had chosen to keep other lands in preference to the ones under Mst. Lachhman.\n\nWe need not speculate on how or why they left the suit plots but may note that they were on the holding on the key date in 1953 and if later they did not keep their possession (abandoned or surren dered) the tenancy terminated and on the facts of this case the lands came into the actual possession of the land holder, Mst.\n\nLachhman, no Gther legal inference being possible than that the\n\n~.1AB ll. SINGH (Kri.rlma lyer, ]. ) 159\n\nleases were extiogqished and the lands reverted to the landlady on general princii>!es of taw. In short, we have to proceed on the assiirpption that one .. plt, namely, khasra No. 177 had always been inthe se1fcultivation of the landlady and that thetwoteoa'ntcd plots, namely, kha.sras' Jl.fos. 265 and 343, cae into the khas pos.session of th'e .lanl!lady subsequent to the cruc1al date. Apprehe.ndmg the statutory peril to these lands which were admittedly outside her\n\n\"reser:ve,(f areas\" Mst. Lachhman went through the exercise of making a gift of the three lands to her daughter Smt. Shanti (vide mutation No: 445 decided on December 24, 1953 and referred to in Annexqre B). Subsequently, jt is seen that A mar Singh, husband of Shant i and Indrj. brotlier of Amai Siqgh purported to apply for purchase of the titt'dholders rigbt in these three plots under s. 18 of the Act making Lachlunan and Shanti co-respondents and alleging that they were tenants • qualified .for the statutory benefit.\n\nThe Assistllili eollector before whom the application was made for pur~ chase under a; ta h.as said in Annexure 'A' to both t; b.e writ petitions that these-· tl'O l!ldies \"are said to be big land-owners but had not got thjs li'nd ived for their own purpose\". Curiously enough, in both the purchase Petitions the parties avoided even an enquiry by the Mi~ COllector as is evident from he fotlowing statement from Attfte:ruro 'A',\n\n\"Before Ul~ proceedings could start. the pllrties have come to .b; r~ apd they ve actually put n court a compromise deed which they, have backed up by theu statements,\" May be, because th~ dubious moves if exposed to . the examination Of an -of!cer miht, prove a fiasco, the close reiations who figurecS petrtioner and respondents . lulled the Assistant Coliector iJJto rtte<:himically_ acting on the compromise without enquiring into any ot:the eligibility factors before a purchase could be orde'red.\n\nTiier&w another set of filets . which needs mention at this stage.\n\nEven -bofo~ tile purchase l'roceedings were initiated by the writ petitionora •. the Collector bad, as early as. April 1961, declared the surplui.)lrea of Lachhinan ignoring alienations and including the three khastta.numbeis: . But on appeals carried both by the landholder and her son-inlaw and his brother the Commissioner ordered a further en':luiry. Meanv.:hile, purchase proceedings were started and by a qutck mpromtse, . orders: of purchase were obtained, But. all these . py~ exercis~ in .. futility becase t~~ Collector,\" Surplus Area, agaut 1gnrt!d . the lease$ to the wnt petlttoners as coJlusive and the orclers f.purcbase as iheffective in the impugned order, Annexure B Howeve~ the . .l; figli urt ·~~ ide Annexure n so that the petitioners. before 1t. : ttie son-in-Jaw. and his brother, . were restored to their\n\npurcases. and the State lost the lands from the surplus pool. The a~~ State canvasses the correctness of the supersession of s. 18 and . of certain 9ther legal reasOBiog approved by the Coui:t as its impact on. the working of the land reform scheme would disa_strous. ~!J!yV; ay, the . law laid down. in this -case was affirmed by .a Full Bench of that C:(lurt. Having regard to all those circumstances a aeries analysis and attempt at harmooisatign .of-the' various provisiona of the Act is necessary now.\n\n160 SUPREME COURT llEPOllT~ [ 1974) 3 S.c.L\n\nA flash back to the geneti<: evolution of the act and the legislative mutations by amendatory efrort to make the law effective, and to unmake judicial decisions which weakened the working of it will help understand the current bio-chemistry of the Act.\n\nAny interpretation unaware of the living aims ideology and lepl anatomy of an Act will miss its soul substance-a fiaw which we feel, must be avoideil particularly in socio-Economic legislation with a dynamic will and mission. Now to the legis lation itself. A brief introduction is found in the reference order of the Full Bench (Shamsher Bahadur, J.) in Mam Raj v. State D/\n\nPutjab : (1)\n\n\"The Act passed on 15th of April, 1953, w.as not the first legislation on the subject and tlie contours of many of the concepts had already taken shape in the two earlier enactments on the subject, namely, the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act, 1950 (Act No. 22 of 1950) and Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Amendment Act, 1951 (President's Act 5 of 1951).\n\nThe Act, which at once consolidated and amended the existing law on the subject, was. designed \"to provide for the security of land tenure and other incidental matters ...\n\nAs is clear from the preamble, the primary object was the protection of tenants whose ejectments recently from holdings held by landowners owning vast tracts of lands, had taken place on a massive scale: In restoring the rights of tenants ejected after 1 Sth of August, 1947, care was taken that landlords with small holdings were not subjected to harassment by the tenants. For this reason, the concepts of \"small landowner\", ''permissible area\" and ''reservation\" were introduced.\n\nA small landowner was described as a person whose entire holding in the State of Punjab did not exceed the permissible area which though fixed at 100 standard acres in the Act of 1950 was reduced to 30 standard acr-es in the Act. A Landowner owning larger areas was entitled to reserve the permissible area, and many of the provisions of the Act dealt with the manner and exercise of this right of reservation. The right of the landowner to eject tenants from thereserved or permissible areas was recognized in the Act though under section 9-A(introduced by Punjab Act 11 ofl955) the tenants liable to ejectment on this score had to be accommodated in surplus areas, a minimum period of ten years' tenancy was fixed under section 7 in respect of tenants who were in occupation of land outside the. reserved areas and the right of the tenants who had been ejected after the 15th August, 1947, for restoration to the tenancies was recognised. Provisions were made for the exercise of the other rights of the tenants, the most important of these being the right to purchase the leased lands under section 18 of the Act... The triple objects of the agrarian reform projected by the Act appear to be (a) to impart security of tenUie (b) to make the tiller the owner, and (c) to trim large land holdings, setting sober ceilings. To convert these political slogans into legal realities to combat the evil of mass evictions, to create peasant proprietorships and to ensur~ even dis-\n\n(!) l.L.R, (1969j 2 Pun. &. Har. 680; 682-683.\n\nPUNJAB v. AMAlt SINGH (Krishna lyer, ], ) 161\n\ntribution of land ownerships a statutory scheme was fashioned, the cornerstone of which was the building up of a reservoir of land carved out ofthe large landholdings and made available for utilization by the State for re-setting ejected tenants.\n\nThe scheme of agrarian re-organisation contemplated by the statutes is simple. The legislature fixed a limit on ownership expressively described as \"permissible area\" land-owners who exceeded this area were allowed to reserve for thernceJves the best lands they desired to keep and this parcel or parcels of land was meaning fully designated as \"reserved area\". Of course, if he failed to intimate his selection within six months from the commencement ofthe Act to the Patwari concerned, the prescribed authority was empowered to select the parcel or parcels of land whirh such person was entitled to retain for himself. The legislature found that many land-owners had failed to make the reservation in time and so by the Amending Act 46 of 1957 a further period of six months from the commencement of the later Act was given for selecting the land/lands they meant to keep, and further again gave the prescribed authority power to select the parcel or parcels of land on behalf of the defaulting landholders. The intendment of the statute was that the reserved area was to be selfcultivated and so land-owners were competent to eject tenants from the reserved area, although, generally speaking, evictions had been barred. As a matter of fact, landholders were directed to start selfcultivation within six month5 from the date of reservation or the date on which they got possession by eviction. Small holders, i.e., persons who owned less than the permissible area were not only not disturbed\n\nby the statute in regard to their ownership but were also allowed to evict tenants from their parcels of land so that they may also become self-cultivators. This process of making the proprietor cultivator naturally would result in the co-existence of possession and ownership at the cost of ejectment of tenants from their holdings. Since agrarian reform must promote not eviction of lessees but security of tenure for them it became necessary for the State to create a considerable surplus pool of lands coughed up by large owners who held beyond the permis~ sible areas. All the tenant refugees from resumed lands were to be rehabilitated on surplus lands and such tenants, enjoying fixity of tenure would continue to pay rents to the owners. Another limb of the peasant proprietorship plan was the conferment of the right to purchase the landlord's right on long-standing tenants with six years continuous occupancy. If the scheme in the book had worked well on the ground the Act would have paved the way for a new rural map of economic relations even though the problem of the landless poor may perhaps have survived.\n\nSuch was the conspectus of the legislative scheme.\n\n1t is obvious that this blue-print for a peaceful transformatioJt of agrarian relations assumes the availability of a large surplus area on which the State can settle tenants from the reserved areas and small landholders' holdings. Thus the key to the success of the scheme is the maximising of the surplus land reservoir and sealing off legal leakages 12--3S2SupCf}74\n\n162 SUPDME COUit.T ltBPOJ.TS l 19741 3 s.c.a.\n\nthroup private alicnatio_ns, coliusive orders and decrees and the like, aDd so care was taken to interdict alienations and ignore decrees and orders which diminished the surplus pool. ·\n\nAt this stage it may be useful to sketch out the broad outlines of the statute with . scif..c reference to its provisions and changes. The.\n\nAct of 1953 had be m amended often, for the professed reason, atleast once, that judicia) pronouncements have had the effect of defeating the objectives with which the law was enacted. Substantial amen'.lm.ents were made in 1955, 1957 and 1962. The objects and reasons of Punjab Act 14 of 1962, which brought in certain significant restrictions on alienations and acquisitions of large landholders starts off in the statement of objects thus :\n\n\"Some of the recent judicial pronouncements have the effect {)(defeating the objectives with which the Punb Security of land\n\nTenurei Act, 1953, was enacted and amended from time to time.\n\nIt was intended that the surplus area of every land-owner recorded as such in the revenue records should be made utilisable for the\n\nsettlnt of. ejected tenants.\" Certain specific decisions and their impact on the legislative operation were mentioned, and then the statement of objects proceeded:\n\n\"In order to evade the provisions of s. t().A of tho Parent Act interested persons, being relations, have obtained decrees of courts for diminishing the surplus area. Clause (4) of the Bill seek& to provide that such decrees should be ignored in computing the surplus area.\" We mention this only to emphasize that the legislature has been anious to guard against erosion of the surplus pool by alienatory maneouvres or even decrees and orders obtained through judicial or quasi-judicial\n\nprocesses.\n\nTho Act defines \"permissible area\" \"in relation to land-owner or a tenant as 30 standard acres and where such 30 standard acres on bein1 converted into ordinary acres exceed 60 acres, such 60 acres.\" (s. 2(3). Tho landlord who has a vaster extent may utilise the specific lands he wants to keep for himself and this is called \"reserved area.\" Section 2(4) defines \"reserved area\" as \"the area lawfully reserved under the PunjaQ Tenants (Security of Tenures Act) 1950 (Act XXU of 1950), as amended by President's Act of 1951, ..... \" The area other than tho reserved area, i.e. tho balance left over, is defined as \"surplus area\". Section 2 (5-a') defines \"surplus area\" a concept introduced by Act XI of 1955. It is useful to extract the definition which runs thus :\n\n\"Surplus Area\" means the area other than the reserved area, and. where, no area has been reserved, the area in excess of the p:rmissible area selected under section 5-B or the area which is deemed to be surplus area under sub-section ( 1) of section 5-C and inctuds th: area in excess of the permissible area selected aruf.cr section 19-B; but it will not include a tenants permissible area, :\n\nPUNJAB V, AMAR SINGH (Krisfma lyer, /.) 163\n\nProvided that it wm include the reserved area, or part thereof, where such area or part has not been brought under self-cultivation within six months of reserving the same or getting possession thereof after ejecting a tenant from it, whichever is later, or if the land-owner admits a new tenant, within three years of the expiry of the said six months\".\n\nAt this stage it may be mentioned that land-owner is not only entitled to self-cultivate his reserved area but is obliged to do so within the period stipulated in the proviso to s.2(5-a) lest such un-self-cuJtivated land become surplus area. But for fear that absentee landlordii may pretend to be self-cultivating while really leasing out their lands to close relations, the statute defines \"self cultivation\" as cultivation by the land-owner personally or through his wife or children or through prescribed relations. It may be noted that a son-in-law is not one of those relations (1•ide rule 5 of the Punjab Security of land Tenures Rules, 1956.).\n\nSections 5, 5-A and 5-B deal with the reservation of land by large landholders and the procedure in that behalf. What is. important to note is that in the present case the landholder has made her reservation and the properties in dispute fall outside it and are therefore included in the surplus area. Immunity from eviction of tenants. is conferred by s. 9 but li landlord is entitled to eject a tenant from the area reserved under this Act. However, such ejectment shall not be given effect to by way of dispossession unless the displaced tenant \"is accommodated on a surplus area in accordance with the provisionsofs. 10-A or ..... .'\n\nOf coure. if the tenant is a close relation of the landlord within the prescribed category this protection does not enure to him as per the second proviso to s. 9-A. It is noteworthy that a son-in law is not one such relative. It is obvious that a large number of tenants would be ejected by small landholders and large landholders from their reserved areas under s. 9 of the Act. Naturally, legislative concern for their rehabilitation found expression in s. 10-A(a) which rulls thus :\n\n\"10-A(a) The State Government or any officer\"\"-empowercd by it in this behalf, shall be competent to utili2'e any surplus area for the resettlement of tenants ejected, or to be ejected, under clause {i) of sub-section (I) of s. 9.\"\n\nThe success of the scheme, therefore, depends on the extent of the surplus -pool. For one thing, large landholders, when deprived of their excess areli, as well as small landholders, in order to be viable, have to secure actual possession of what they are eligible to keep, this being the legislative justice shown to land-owners by the Act. Actual possession could follow only if the potential for re-settlement of dispossessed tenants were sufficent. That is why the legislature has jealously protected the surplus pool which plays a pivotal role in the whole programme. For this purposes. 10-A(b) was brought in in 1955 and it reads :\n\nSUPREM~ COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\n \"10-A(b) Notwithstanding anything contained i~ any other law for the time being in force and save in the case of land acquired by the State Government under any law for the time being in force or by an heir by inheritance no transfer or other disposition of land which is comprised in a surplus area at the commencement oft his Act, shall affect the utilization there of in clame (a).\"\n\nPlainly, there is a wide interdict against any transfer of other disposition of land comprised in the surplusarea, if it will affect the utilisaticm thereof for the re-settlement of tenants ejected or to be ejected under cl. (i) of sub-s. (1) of s. 9. Such a strategic provision which takes care ofthe surplus reservoir ofland must receive a benignantly spacious construction. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the expression \"transfer or other disposition of land\" must definitely cover leases which, by very definition, are a species of transfer of land. It looks as if other devices were resorted to by large land-owners to defeat the surolus area scheme of s. 10-A.\n\nCourts and other authorities were approached and, through their processes, decrees and orders were secured whereby lands out of the surplus area could be salvaged by the land-owner. The legislature finding this anti-ceiling phenomenon clamped down a blanket ban on the adverse operation of \"any judgment, decree or order of a court or other authority, obtained after the commencement of this Act and having the effect of diminishing\" the area of a person which could have been declared as his surplus area. Section 10-A(c) may be usefully reproduced in this context;\n\n\"10-A(c) For the purposes of determining the siuplus area of any person under this section, any judgment, decree or order of a court or other authority, obtained after the commenment of this Act and having the effect of diminishing the area of such person which could have been declared as his sllrplus area shall be ignored.\" It is extremely important to remember that while this provision was enacted in 1962 and while s. 10-A(b) prohibiting alienations was passed in 1955, both these provisions were given retrospective effect as from the decisive date, namely, April 15, 1953. The deep concern of the legislature is clear from all this.\n\nRight from the beginning one: of the primary objects of the statute had been to enable tnant.s to purchase the Landlord's right and become full owners and m th1s behalf was enacted s. 18 which has figured very much in the controversy in these appeals. It states :\n\n\"18(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any Jaw, usage or contract, a tenant of a.lamJ-owner other than a small land-owner-\n\n(i) who has been in continuous occupation of the land comprised in his tenancy for a minimum period of six years,\n\no~·\n\n(ii) .. -.\n\n(iii) ... :\n\nD '\n\nPUNJAB V. AMAR SINGH (Krishna lyer, J.)\n\nshall be entitled to purchase from the land-ownt'r the land so held by him but not included in the reserved area of the landowner, in the case of a tenant fa1ling within clause (i) or clause\n\n(ii) at any time, and in the case of a tenant falling within clause {iii) within a period of one year from the date of commencement\n\nof this Act: Provided that ....\n\nProvided further that. ... \" The further sub-sections of s. 18 deal wit:1 the process of purcnase. the Assistant Collector being the authority empowered to order such purchase.\n\nIn the appeals before us there is an apparent competition for pri~ macy between s. 18 and s. 10-A(b) and (c), and perhaps it may be relevant to refer to s. 23 also. This last section reads:\n\n\"No decree or order of any court or authority and no notice of ejectment shall be valid save to the extent to which it is consistent with the provisions of this Act.\"\n\nAs we will presently see we are called upon to reconcile the claims and contentions put forward by either side on the strength of the provisions we have just mentioned.\n\nLet us interpret and apply the law to the facts of this case. The learned judge, Narula, J., stated at the outset:\n\n\"I have to take the fact as found by the Collector for the purposes of determining the surplus area of the landowner and consequently for determining the rights of the petitioners so far as they are sought to be interfered with by the impugned order.\"\n\nWe agree. The same judge formulated the legal questions failing for decision in these words:\n\n(I) Whether the expressions \"transfer\" or \"other disposition of land\" in clause (b) of section 10-A of the Act, include involuntary transfer of a part of the holding of a landowner by operation of an order forcing the landowner to sell a part of his holding to a tenant under section 18 of the Act;\n\n(2) Whether the order of any other authority referred to in clause (c) of section 10-A of the Act includes an order of the authorities under the Act itself passed under section 18 thereof in favour of a tenant, which order has become final either at its original stage or at the appellate or revional stage; and\n\n(3) In case of conflict between section 10-A and section 18 of the Act, which of the two provisions has supervening effect or overrides the other.\"\n\nWe do not wholly agree with this itemisation but it is good enough to focus attention of the relevant area of legal controversy. One further point pressed in both courts may be noticed, viz., that the order of purchase of the concerned officer not having been set aside binds the other\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 19741 3 s.C.R.\n\nauthority determining the surplus area and so the question is whether one officer under the Act could ignore an order by another officer under a different provision of the Act, having regard to comity of courts and jurisdictions. As indicated already, the principal discussion in the judgment under appeal has turned on the claim to primacy of s. 18 as against s. 10-A and so it is as well that we state right now what stand we propose to take in resolving apparent conflicts in the provisions of a socially-oriented, project-implementing legislation. Every such statute has a soul and an integrated personality-minor deformities may mar this unity, especially when piecemeal amendments and unskilled drafting occur. The basic judicial approach must be to discover this soul of the law and strive to harmonise the many limbs to subserve the pervasive spirit and advance th<: social project of the enactment. Seeming confrontations between provisions must be resolved into a cooperative co-existence. This interpretative activism persuades us in this case to reconcile what the High Court has conceived to be a conflict between s. 10-A and s. 18.\n\nHere, there are 3 khasra nos., two of which (nos. 265 and 343) were outstanding on tenancy with Chandu and Sri Chand at the relevant date, April 15, 1953 (which admittedly, is the date with reference to which \"permissible area\", \"reserved area\" and \"surplus area\" have to be fixed). The third item, khasra no. 177, had on the relevant date been with the landowner directly. The High Court treats them as two categories, not without reason. What was with tenants on the relevant date may well be part of their permissible area since 'landowner' in s.2(1) includes a lessee. Moreover, a permissible area of a tenant is excluded by definition from 'surplus area', obviously because the tenant can stabilise himself on his permissible area and it is not intended to dislodge him therefrom for re-settling other tenants under s. 10-A. Therefore, Narula, J., concludes:\n\n\"A survey of the above-mentioned provisions ofthe Act leave no doubt that if Chandu and Sri Chand who were the tenants of the land now comprised in the tenancy of Amar Singh on Aprill5, 1953, had continued to be the tenants of that parcel of land, subsequently the land in their tenancy could not be included in the permissible area of the landowner. On the other hand it would have been the right of Chandu and Sri Chand to either get the said land declared as heir own permissible area or to exercise their right under section 18(1) of the Act by making an application under sub-section (2) thereof to purchase the said parcel ofland.''\n\nThe learned Judge procee_!is to negative the argument that the legal result is different when the sitting tenants on the relevant date have quit and new tenants have been inducted subsequently; \"Surplus area and permissible area of a land-owner has to be determined in view of the situation as it existed on the 15th of April, 1953 and subsequent alienations have to be completely ignored.. Though subsequent acqui sitions by the landowner may in certain circumstances be included in the surplus area as accretions, no such thing can happen in respect of that parcel of land which could not be included in the sur~\n\nPUNJAB V. AMAR SINGH (Krishna lyer, ].) 161\n\nplus area of the landowner on 15th of April, 1953, which was aga.in not with the landowner on the date when the Collector sought to determine his/her surplus area. In other words, once a piece of land is excluded from the surplus area of a landowner on account of its forming the subject matter of the holding of a tenant in occupation (who is not related to the landowner in the prohibited manner) on the 15th of April, 1953, the mere subsequent change of the holder of the tenancy will not make the tenancy premises revert to the surplus area of the landowner.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that the land comprised in Khasras Nos. 265 and 343 (subject matter of the tenancy in favour of Amar Singh) could not fall within the definition of surplus area in the hands of the landowner and Section 10-A of the Act could not apply to it.\"\n\nWe are afraid there is a fallacy in this reasoning. It is true that a mere change in tenancy by transfer of the lease as such, as distinguished from a landlord inducting a new tenant on land the prior lease over which has been terminated and possession restored to the lanlord, may not perhaps offend s.lO-A although situations may arise even in such cases leading to a different conclusion. We need not investigate this possibility further. In the present case, the exclusion of the two khasras from the surplus atea depends on their being part of the permissible area of Chandu and Sri Chand. To salvage the lease in his favour, Amar Singh, the new tenant, must prima facie show that this alienation does not violate s.lO-A(b) which prohibits all transfers and other dispositions which diminish the surplus area of the landowner concerned. He has, therefore, to make out (a) that the demised lands do not form part of the landlord'~. surplus area or (b) that, as was vehemently argued but may with little legal qualms be rejected, a lease is not a 'transfer or other disposition of property'. The High Court has disposed ofthis latter submission with the simple but impeccable observation\"that the creation of a lease is a transfer or a demise referred to in s.l 05 of the Transfer of Property Act admits of no doubt\". The purpose of the prohibitive provision is to strike at every alienatory essay and the natural meaning of 'transfer' or other disposition of land. apart from the contextual compulsion, embraces leases. The contention that even wide words must oblige the landlord's plea for a narrow meaning, viz., absolute transfer of ownership, is beyond us to accept.\n\nDo the lands, khasras nos. 265 and 343, because of outstanding\n\nleses on April IS, 1953, swim out of the surplus area ipso facto'! We thmk not. For that they must be comprised in the permissible area.\n\nof the tenant. Here we have no information placed by him who wants to prove it affirmatively that these plots lie within the permissible area of 30 standard acres, by definition of Chandu and Sri Chand. That they id not cotinue in possession after the Act is not disputed. If that were m PC!Ssess10n of other lands either as owners or tenants, and such holdmg. wa~ 30 acres or more, it was open to them to relinquish\n\nthse lands be1g.m excess of their permissible area, in which case, not bemg the permtss1ble area of the tenant and being in excess of the reserved area of the landlord, these lands would be surplus area of the landlord withi_n te definition under s.2(5-a). In the absence of proof that\n\nhe_Iands m dtsp.ute were comprised in the permissible area ofthe prior.\n\nIt lS not possible to hold that they do not come within the\n\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nsurplus area of thelandlord, Mst. Lacchman. On the contrary, the likely inference flowing from the disappearance from the scene of Chandu and Sri Chand their failure to claim to remain as tenants or to purchase is that these were not their permissible area. It is not as if every bit of land that is with a tenant on the relevant date is his permissible area.\n\nIt has to fulfil the requirement of s.2(3). No such test has been satisfied here. Nor can it. be argued that even if a tenant gives up his interest in the holding the statute will haunt him with rights. 'Permissible area' is not a concept in the abstract but, as s.2(3) mentions, is 'in relation to a landowner or a tenant'. In relation to Chandu and\n\nSri Chand no claim: to permissible area or consequential rights has been set up and Amar Singh is not a transferee from them but a de novo tenant. It fo1lows that the two khasras should be computed as part of the surplus area of Mst. Lacchman and s.lO-A(b) operates to invalidate the alleged lease to Amar Singh as its clear impact is to diminish the surplus area of the landowner. He had, therefore~ no right as a tenant to purchase under s. 13.\n\nThe more serious question raised turns on the effect of the purchase orders, Annexure A, on s.lO-A(c). The High Court reasoned-and this was repeated before us as counsel's argument-that while it is true that for determining the surplus area of a person 'any judgment, decree or order of a court or other authority' obtained after the commer.cement of the Act and having the effect of diminishing his surplus area 'shan be ignored', this mandate does not apply to orders of authorities under the Act, like the Assistant Collector exercising powers under s. 18. The learned judge quotes the object ofs. 10-A(c):\n\n\"In order to evade the provisions of section 10-A of the parent Act interested persons, being relations, have obtained decrees of Courts for diminishing the surplus area. Clause 4 ofthe Bill seeks to provide that such decrees should be ignored in computina the surplus area.\" ·\n\nFrom this the Court infers that 'other authorities' in s. 10-A(c) are arbitrators or-such like agencies and not authorities under the Act.\n\nIt is useful to read the objects and reasons relating to the clause of a bill to illumine the idea of the law not to control its amplitude. Moreover, the purpose, as revealed in the statement of object is plain.\n\nThe legislature wanted to insure the invulnerability of the surplus pool provision to attacks, by ignoring judicial and quasi-judicial orders of every sort. In this behalf two provisions were made namely ss. 1 0-A. and s. 23, primarily the former. In fact, we are conrned only with s. 10-A(b) and (c).\n\nThe High Court has taken the view that s. 10-A(b) cannot affect involuntary transfers and since a purchase effected . under s. 18 effects an involuntary transfer it is not hit by s. 10-A(b). The further view taken is that the expression \"other authority\" ins. lO-A(~) refers cnJy to authorities other than those under the Act; the Assistant Collector who has ordered the purchase under s. 10 being outside s. 10-A(c), : his order cannot be ignored by the Collector on the strength of S. 10-A :(c). .A third point converging to the same conclusion taken by the\n\nl>~JAB v. AMAR SINGH.(Krishna lyer, 1.) 169\n\nCourt is that when an order under s. 18 hasbecome final, the Collector acting under s. IO..A(c) canrtot but be bound by jt until it is set . aside in appeal or revision or other appropriate proceedings even though the Assistant Collector's order under s. 18 was passed on a compromise between the parties. ·\n\nWe may now consider the soundness of these grounds separately. The object o1 s. lOA(c) cannot~ fulfilled unless the widest meaning were given to the expression \"court or other authority\".\n\nNor is there any basis for. truncatin8' the ambit of other authority\" in the manner the High Court has done. \"Other authority\" is every other authority within or withc.ut the Act. The reason given by Narula, J., to exclude the officer passing orders under s. 18 from ''other a:utho . rities\" is that \"the result would be that the benefit sought to be conferred\n\nby s. 18 on the tenants would be completely nullified and obliterated\".\n\nIn this connection he further observed :\n\n\"In every case, order under section 18 of the Act, would be passed after the Act came into force. If an order under section 18 has to be ignored by the operation of clause (c) of section 1 O..A, every order under section 18, must be ignored while daclaring the permissible area of tbe Landowner. There is no discretion in the authorities to apply the provisions of clause (c) of s. IO..A or not to apply them.\n\nThe provision is mandatory, if, therefore, clause (c) of section l()..A could be utilised for abrogating the effect of an order under sertion 18 of the Act, the whole scheme of the Act of distribution of land to. the tenants and for conferring a right on a tenant to purchase the land within the limits of permissible area, would be flouted.\"\n\nHaving gtven serious consideration to the pros and cons we are not satisfied that this argument is valid; on the contrary, if upheld it .may stultify s. lO..A and the scheme of the statute ahogtther. Obviously, if every order of purchase sanctioned under s. 18 can successfully diminish surplus area of a landowner, a spate of such, orders would be procured by. previous arrangement between the landowner and his nominee tenants or even bona fide alienees. The present case is a capital illustration of the fraud and collusion that inay follow on such an interpretation. Indeed, there is no provision ins. 18 to give notice to the Collector wb is to declare the surplus.area and so the State which is vitally concerned in the re-settlement of ejected tenants utilising the surplus area has no opportunity to present its case against the fraudulent character of the proceedings under s. 18 before the Assistant Collector. -The State, not being a party to that oroer, in any case cannot be bound by it, whatever may be the effect as between the parties to those proceedings. We are concerned here with a challenge by the State to the efficacy of the order, Annexure A, and so we cannot muzzle the plea of the Stafe that the order under s. 18 is void if there are good grounds to hod with it.\n\nNor is there force in the argumet that benefit under s. 18 would be ~<completely nullified and obliterated\" if s. IO..A(c) were to apply to it. It is w:rong for the Court to have said that \"in very\n\n170 SUPltEME COUltT REPORTS [ 1~74] 3 s.C.R.\n\ncase \" orders under s. 10 would have to be ignored. That is not the result of s. 10-A. All the three sub-clauses of that section read together show that if the landlord by any act or omission of his suftered a diminution in the surplus area by a transfer, voluntary or otherwise, in favour of another, contrary to the right of the State Govenrment to dispose of it, such a transfer nly is liable to be set aside. The tenants described ins. 18 in whose favour the authority sanctions the purchase of the land are not transferees whose transfers have to be set aside as being contrary to the right of the State Government. Actually, the bulk of the cases under s. 18 would be by tenants who are eligible to purchase\n\nby virtue of six years' continuous occupation under s. 18(1). Their purchases would often be from land which is their per.r.nissible area.\n\nEvery tenant with six years' ending. be it before or after the commencement of the Act, will be entitled to buy the ownership. Of course, if he is within the reserved area he is liable to be evicted even before he purchases but if he is outside the landlord's reserved area J.te can move for purchase. Such a purchase being from the permissible area of the tenant is outside the surplus area of the landlord and does not diminish \"the area of such person which could have been declared as his surplus area\".\n\nEx hypothesi \"surplus area\" excludes a tenant's permissible area. Therefore, even if that land falls outside the reserved area of the landowner, if it is within the tenant's permissible area, its purchase by the tenant cannot diminish the landowner's surplus area. (emphasis supplied)\n\nAnother substantial category, who may buy under s. 18 without reducing the surplus area, is the re-settled tt>nants. When the State acting under s. 10-A(c) accommodates an ejected tenant the utiHzation of the surplus land pro tanto is fulfilled.\n\nSuch a rehabilitated tenant of the landlord, after the six years' term, can qualify to buy under s. 18. Such a purchase only fulfils the second object of the Statute of making the tiller the owner and does not in any way diminish the surplus area of the landlord. For, with the re-settlement of an ejected tenant that land, for all practical purposes, is no longer available for the only purpose for which the surplus pool is meant, viz., re-settlement of ejected tenants. Thus, it is clear that s. 18 is not rendered otiose by the view that orders thereunder which diminish the surplus area are bad for violation of s. 10-A(c).\n\nIndeed, the principal category adversely affected by our view would be post-statutory collusive tenants, who are in most cases likely to be brought in by landlords experimentally to rescue those lands from the surplus pool, and even in bonafide cases they do not deserve sym pathy since they damage the prospects of displaced tenants from being re-settled.\n\nIt may as well be noted here that the person who is entitled to purchase under s. 18 is a tenant. i.e. a person lawfully inducted\n\nou the land as a tenant. Once a land is held to be part ofthe surplus land of the landlord, it rests with the State Government for being dig. posed of for resettlement of tenants and any disposition of the same by the landlord after Aprill5, 1953 would be invalid against the State Government's claim to dispose of it. That is the effect of s. 10-A(a) & (b). Therefore, in respect of any land to which the State Government makes a claim for resettlement, on the ground of its being surplus\n\nPUNJAB V. AMAl. SINGH (Krishna lyer, /.) 1711\n\nland, any person inducted by the landlord after AprillS, 1953 would\n\nhave no title to it as a tenant and, would not be able to avail of s. 18~ To sum up, the 'other authorities' in s. 10-A(c) include officers under s. 16. Secondly, the plain meaning of s. 10-A('c) is that any or&:r by any authority which shrinks the surplus area of the landlord Js. invalid to the extent laid down in that clause. Thirdly, orders under s. 18 if they diminish the surplus area suffer the same fate and Annexre 'B' fails to shield Mst. Lacchman's lands against orders re-settlmg ejected tenants thereon.\n\nShri Dhingra relied on Sahib Ram v. The Financial Commissioner.\n\nPunjab (1) but that decision only rules that a tenant, who completes\n\nhts 6 years qualifying occupation required by s. 18 after AprillS, 1953is not excluded. Vaidialingam, J., took care to refer to the case uner appeal now before us (Amar Singh's case) and said that it dealt w1th the scope of s. 10-A aild did not bear upon the point before them.\n\nThe last point urged by Shri Dhingra for the respondent-nd accepted by the High Court-is that the order, Annexure A, havm.g become final could not have been ignored in Annexure 'B'. Here 1t serves the discussion to remember that the leases in question have been found by the Collector to have been collusively got up to dwindle the surplus area of the landowner.~The Collector in Annexure 'B' finds:\n\n\"., •• and it is crystal clear that Amar Singh and Indraj had not been in continuous cultivating possession of this land for full six years, the other copy of Khasra Girdawari put in this case and which is to be found at page 27 of the file, shows the possession over this land of Indraj and Amar Singh only from the year 1957-58, and so their possession over it for full :oix years is rtot complete as yet.\"\n\nHe has also stated that he was convinced \"that the landowner has\n\nconspied \":ith her. son-in-law Amar Singh and his brother Indraj to retam thts area m contravention of the law.\" A third pregnant fact is that the proceedings under s. 18 were prima facie collusive, and to burke an enquiry into the eligibility of the alleged tenants to\n\npurcase under s. 18 an expedient was resorted to. \"Before the proceedmgs could start\" says Annexure 'A', \"the parties have come to terms and they have actually put in court a compromise deed which they have backed up by their statements.\" Thus no finding on the basic .facts of entitlement to purchase have bee~ recorded by the authonty under s. 18 because he has merely stated in Annexure 'A'.\n\n\"As per statements of the parties, I allow Amar Singh to purchase the land in suit.\"\n\n. These fact~ hae to be assumed since a controversy thereon in the wnt court or m this Court cannot be permitted; We are, therefore, concerned t.o see whether on such a factual basis any legal consequences conwellmg th.e court to uphold Annexure 'A', and thus judicially condomng. what 1s a fraud on the statutory schee, follow.\n\n(1) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 7911\n\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C, R,\n\nAn order like Annexure 'A' ordinarily binds the parties only and A here the State which is the appellant is seriously prejudiced by that Qrder but is not a party to it. Therefore, it cannot bind the State proprio vigore.\n\nIt was argued by Shri Dhingra that the State could have moved by way of appeal or review and got the order set aside if there was ground and that not having done so it was bound by the Qrder. As a matter of fact, the State, which is not a party to the proceedings, does not have a right of appeal. The ordinary rule is that B only a party to a suit adversely affected by the decree or any of his representatives-in-interest may file an appeal. Under such circumstances a person who is not a party may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court \"if he would be prejudicially affected by the judgment and if it would be binding on him as res-judicata under Explanation 6 to s. 11.\" (see Mul\\a-Civil Procedure Code-13th edn., vQL 1., 421). Section 82 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, which C may perhaps be invoked by a party even under the Act, also speaks of applications by any party interested. Thus, no right of review or of appeal under s. 18 can be availed of by the State as of right.\n\nIf the State is not precluded from proving the invalidity of Annexure 'A', it is clear that the said order is unsustainable. Section\n\n18 applies only to tenants, i.e., not anyone who claims to be, but D legally is one. Here who has granted the lease ? Mst. Lacchman?\n\nHow could she, after gifting away to her daughter? And no lease from daughter Shanti is set up although obscurely both mother and daughter are made respondents. Secondly, s.18 qualifies for purchase only those tenants who had 6 years continuous occupation. Here,. on the Collectors finding, Amar Singh and1ndraj came by possessiOn only in 1957-58 and, as he points out in Annexure 'B', the six year E period is not complete at the time of application. The reason why even before the proceedings began parties presented a compromise and avoided an enquiry is not far to seek. In short, the State could and did mke out the incompetence of the respondents to purchase under s. 18 and Annexure 'A', being also stricken by the vice of s. 10-A (b) and (c). ·\n\nShri Dhingra urged that s.l8(l)(iii) did contemplate purchase rights for persons who had no possession when the Act came into force and their purchases must necessarily diminish the surplus area.\n\nThis seeming attractiveness vanishes when we notice that s.18(1) (ii) and (iii) provide for two classes of hard cases where unjust evictions prior to the Act coming into force had deprived them of their rights.\n\nFor all practical purposes the Act clothes them with such rights as they would have enjoyed had they not suffered unjust evictions.\n\nThat is why specific provision was made ins. 18 for them. The exception proves the rule. The paramountcy of s. 10-A cannot be subverted by illegitimate use of the processes under s. 18.\n\nPurchsses under s. 18 being involuntary, s. 10-A(b) ould not b~ lJit, as it deals only with voluntary transfers, accordng to Shn Dhir.gra. While we need not finally pronounce on th1s argument, it is worthy of note that the expression 'transfer' is wide enough to (; o.er !ransfers by operation of law unless expressly excluded as\n\nPUNJAB V. AMAR SINGH (Krishna [yer, J.) 173\n\ns. 2{d) of the Transfer of Property Act. Moreover, special exctu~ sions to save transfers by way of inheritance and compulsory land acquisition by State have been made which would have been supererogatory had involuntary transfers automatically gone out of the pale of s. IO~A(b).\n\nAnother argument was suggested that the order even though passed on a compromise was as valid and binding as one passed on contest.\n\nMay be that as a broad proposition one may assent to it. But where a compromise goes against a public policy prescription of a statute or a mandatory direction to the Court to decide on its own certain foundational facts, a ra.ti cannot operate to defeat the requirement as specified or absolve the court from the duty. The resultant order will be ineffective. After all by consent or agreement, parties cannot achieve what is contrary to law and a decree merely based on such agreement cannot furnish ajudicialamuletagainst statutory violation.\n\nFor, 'by private agreement' converted into a decree, parties cannot empower themselves to do that which they could not have done by Drivate agreement alon~·. (see Mulla, C. P. C., vol. II, P 1300). The true rule is that \"the contract of the parties is not tfie less a contract,\n\nand subject to the inc.idents of a contract, because there is superadded the command of the Judge\". The learned author, Mulla, in his Com~ mentary on Order XXIII r. 3(CivilProcedure Code, vol.ll, pp. 1299~\n\n1300) cites many authorities for this proposition and observes :\n\n0 \"If a decree is passed under this rule on a compromise wl1ich is not lawful, the Court should not enforce thedecreeinexecution proceedings. Thus, asale of anoffice attached to a temple is against public policy. Hence, if in a suit against the holder of such an office a compromiseisarrived at whereby the holder of the office consents to the office being sold in satisfaction of the debt due to the plaintiff, and a decree is passed on the compromise, the Court should not withstanding the consent decree refuse to sell the office in execution. It is clear that if the matter had rested in contract only, the Court could not have enforced the sale in a suit brought for that purpose. The mere fact that the contract is embodied in a decree does not alter the incidents ofthe contract.\"\n\nIt may be right.to conclude that any authority, like the Collector here, enjoined to apply s. lO.A(b) and (c) may decline to act on a compromise which has ripened into an order if the agreement between the parties disposes of proPerty in violation of a statutory man~ date. He can and must lift the veil and look the agreement of the parties in the face. The vice of contravention of s. 10-A(b) is writ large in Annexure 'A.' ·\n\nA few decisions of this Court bearing on the efficiencY of consent decrees were cited at the bar and they are exhaustively dealt with in\n\nChari l'. Seshadri(l), The other rulings of this Court-7c1ll rendered under the Rent Control Law-are .Bahadur Sing/1 v. Mrmi Subrat(2)\n\n(1) [1973}1 s.c.c. 761.\n\n(2) (1969] 2 S.C.R. 432.\n\nSUPREMJ! COUJilT REPORTS\n\n{19741 3 S.C.~\n\nKaushalya Dvi v. K.L. BaJtsal(l), and Ferozi LalJain v. Mtm Ma/{2).\n\nThe core principle or ratio that is revealed in these casesisthatin cases\n\nwhere a statute, embodies a pub\\ic policy and consequentially prescti bes the presence of some conditions for grant of reliefs, parties cannot by-passthelawbythe exercise of a consent decree or order, and mere :; udicial imprimature may not validate suchdecree or orderwherethe :Court or tribunal is not seen to have applied its mind to the existence of those conditions and reached its affirmative conclusion thereon. 'Suchmindlessorders are a nullity but wherethestageoftheproceed- 'irigs, the materials on record. and/or the recitals in the razi disclose the application of the judicial mind, the order is beyond collateral attack merely on the score that it does not ritualistically write into 1he judgment what is needed by the statute. The important facet of the law clarified in these decisions is that where high public policy finds expression in socio-economic legislation contractual arrange- ments between interested individuals sanctified into consent or com- -promise decrees or orders cannot be binding on instrumentalities of the State called upon to enforce the statute, although the tribunals enjoined to enforce the law may take probative note of the recitals 1n such compromise or consent statements in proof of facts on which 1heir jurisdictions may have to be exercised. Further, if there is no evidence either by way of admissions in consent statements and razis or otherwise on the record, the reliefs sanctioned by the statute cannot be granted and orders or decrees which purport to grant them sans -proof of the legal requirements will be a nullity.\n\nIn Kaushalya De vi v. K. L. Bansal (1) the Court was concerned with a suit for eviction under the Rent Control law. On being satisfied abJut the statutory grounds the Court could decree possession. The plantiff set out tw,:, grounds both of which were denied in the written\n\ntate'?nt. When th~ leading> of the landlord and the tenant wre tn thtg state, bJth plrties filed a compromise memo in and by Which\n\nthy agreed to the p1sing of a decree of eviction against the tenant.\n\nRepresentations to the same effect were also made by the counsel for b:>th pltties. The court passed the following order :\n\n''In view of th: statem:nt of the parties' counsel and the written compromise, a decree is p1ssed in favour of the plaintiff. against the defendant.\" The tanant did not vacate the premises within the time mentioned as\n\n~.!r the compromise mm:>. On the other hand, he filed an application under. s. 47, C.P.C., pleading that the decree is void as being in\n\nontraveutlon of s . 13 f the D.:lhi statute. The High Court held that the decree as a. nulht~, a~ the order was passed solely on the basis of th.e comromtse wthout mdicating that any of the statutory grounds\n\nmnt10ed m s. 13 eXISte~. Following the decision in Bahadur Singh v. Munt Subrat(wpra), th1s Court upheld the order of the High Court.\n\n. In Ferozi L, al Ja1it v. Mail Ma/(2), the landlord's grounds for eviction were demed by the tnnt but !hey reported compromise with\n\nprayer for a decree for ev1ct1on.\n\nThts Court ruled ---------\n\n(1) [1969] 1 S.C.Jt 1048.\n\nll) [1970] 3 s.c.c. 181.\n\nPUNJAB v. AMAI SINGH (Krishna lytr, /.) 175\n\n\"From the facts mentioned earlier. it is seen that at no stage, the Court was caJled upon to apply its mind to the question wheather the alleged subletting is true or not. Order made by it does not show that it was satisfied that the subletting complained of has taken place, nor is there any other material on record to show that it was so satisfied. It is clear from the record that the court had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. That being so there can be hardly any doubt that the court was not competent to pass the impugned decree. Hence the decree under execution must be held to be a nullity.\"\n\nIn both these cases the decrees based solely on the razi and without the courts applying their mind; were a nullity. The order of the Assistant Collector, Annexure 'A', bears resemblance to the situation in these two cases. On the other hand K. K. Chari's case (supra) is a s-tudy in contrast. There was plethora of evidence to prove the ground of eviction and the court directed eviction based on the terms of the compromise and after making a reference to the provisions for eviction. Vaidialingam, J., has explained this aspect elaborately.\n\nThe order, Annexure 'A', was passed before evidence was let in because even before the trial began parties reported comptomise and gave statement accordingly. Not a word is to be found in the order indicating the court's mind adverting to the requirements of s. 18 of the Act, the contrary being the evidence. Indeed, unlike in K. K.\n\nChari's case, no material existed on record to warrant a finding (a) regarding the tenancy, (b) continuous occupation for over 6 'years,\n\n(c) the surplus area being unaffected. Nor even recitaJs amounting to admissions on facts of entitlement to purchase were made. The order was a nullity, denuded of evidence and absent judicial satisfaction. Strictly speaking, collusive razis cannot affect the State which has the right to utilise surplus lands for re-settling tenants.\n\nCertain proceedings, e.g. election petitions and actions under s. 92, C.P.C., once set in motion, transcend private interests and public authorities cannot pass orders on collusive representations without regard\n\nt<> public interest or independent satisfaction. Annexure 'A' ex facie was a nullity. It is unfortunate that the Assistant Colleetor has, with insipient insoucianc~, lent his authority to a compromise, where care and conscientiousness would have avuted the error.\n\nWe are satisfied that Annexure 'A' js unavailing against the State and its officers in accommodating ejected tenants on the lands in question.\n\nThe public policy of s. 10-A cannot be outwitted by consent orders calculated to defeat the provision and without the statutory authority charged with the enquiry being satisfied about the bona fides of and eligibility for the purchase. So viewed, the respondents in these appeals cannot on the strength of the purchase orders exclude those l!lands from the operation of s. 10-A(a) of the Act .\n\n. The legislature, chared with the constitutional mandate of art. 38 and art. 39 has passed the Act and amended it from time to time in furtherance of the major purpoe of distributive jlli'tice. The judicial wing of the State, viewing the law in the same wave-length,\n\n. 176\n\nSUPREME COVRT REPORTS,\n\n[ 1974 J 3 S.C.R.\n\ninterpret~ and applies it. But the Executive instrumentlllity of the State bas an activist role to play if the arm of the law were not to bang limp , al).d social justice is not to be a cynical phrase. Good laws and:-_coirect interpretations are not enough. Quick, conscientious and public minded enforcement of the provisions is the responsibility of Government and its officers. In the present case the Assistant Collector's order, Annexure 'A', has fortified an attempted fraud on the statute.\n\nIt wa~ stated at the Bar that a score of years notwithstanding, the processes of fixing reserved areas. and surplus areas on the strength of which alone conferment of proprietory right on tenants and re-settlement of ejected tenants could, proceed, are still lingering.. If this is true Government has much to ans'Yer for and litigation abounds where delays in executive enforcement occur.\n\nWe expect that this land reform measure will not be a slow motion picture but a strict and swift procedure so that parties affected may know where they stand. There is an 'executive' dimension to law's delays which defeats the rule of law. It must be remembered that the third reading of a bill and the last appeal in court are not the final scene in the drama of law and society. A post-audit on the enforcement of social legislation, all social scientists will agree, is a material asi:>ect of law in action, inter-alia to avoid the administrative cutting edge of the law becoming blunt.\n\nWith these hopeful observations we allow the State appeals but we direct that in the circumstance parties will bear their costs throughout.\n\nSARKAlUA J.-I have gone through the judgment prepared by E my learned brother, Krishna Iyer J. Since I cannot fully liUbs.cribe to the reasoning and the view taken therein, I have thought it fit to record my own opinion separately.\n\nThese two appeals (Nos.· 1755 and 1756 of 1967) on certificate granted under Art. 133(1Xc) of the Constitution by the Punjab High Court, raise questions with regard to the interpretation and inter- F relationship of the provision of Sections 2(5-a}, 10-A and 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (X of 1953) (for short, the Act).\n\nThe questions for determination, as formulated by the High Court,· are :\n\n\"(i) Whether the expression \"transfer\" or ''other diposition\n\nof land\" in clause (b) of section 10-A of the Act., includes involuntary transfer of a part of the holding of a Iandow- G ner by operation of anorder forcing the landowner to r:ell a part of his holdi11g to a tenant under section 18 of the Act;\n\n(ii) Whether the order of any \"other authority\" referred t~ in clause (c) of section 10-A of the Act includes an order of the authorities under the. Act itself passed under section 18 thereof in favour of a tenant, which order has become H final either at its original stage or at the appellate or revision~! stage; and\n\nPUNJAB V, AMAR SINGH (Sarkaria, J.) 177\n\n(iii) In case of conflict between section IO.A and section 18 of the Act, which cf the two provisions has supervening effect or overrides the other.\"\n\nTo the above, I may add a fourth question which arises in Amar Singh's case (C.A.l755 of 1967) and has been dealt with by the High Court.\n\n(iv) Whether any land held by tenants on April 15, 1953 within\n\nthe permissible area of those tenants, can be included in the 'surplus area' of the landowner, if, at the time the surplus area collector takes up the determination of the matter, that land is found to be comprised in the tenancy of persons other than the original tenants.\"\n\nThe material facts are these:\n\nOn April 15, 1953 when the Act came into force, Smt. Lachhrnan (hereinafter referred to as the 'landowner') owned 101 6 standard acres, equivalent to 404 10 ordinary acres, of land in the revenue estates of two villages, namely, Darba Kalan and Nahran Wali. Out of thi~ holding of the landowner, we are concerned only with Field Nos. 177, 265 and 343, situate in the area of Darba Kalan.\n\nOn the determinative date (April 15, 1953), Field No. 177 measuring 64 bighas and 12 biswas which is the ubject maHer of C. A. 1756/67, was in the personal cultivation of the landowner, while Field Nos. 265 and 343, measuring 67 bighas and 19 biswas were in the occupation of two tenants, namely, Sri Chand and Nathu. lt is not clear . from the record whether the landowner had made the reservation or selection of her permissible area in the prescribed manner, within time.\n\nBut the learned Counsel for the parties before us are agn:ed that Field Nos. 265, 343 and 177 in question do not form a part of her reserved or permissible area.\n\nIt appears from the Smplus Area Collector's order that in 1955 (vjde mutation No. 144), the landowner tried to gift this land in favour of her daughter Shanti Devi, who, in turn, attempted tc sell the same to her husband, Amar Singh, and the latter's brother, Indraj. These alienations were ignored by the Surplus Area collector as per his order dated April 24, 1961, while declaring the surplus area of the landowner. Against that order, Amar Singh and Indraj carried an appeal to the Commissioner.\n\nThe landowner :dso preferred a separats appeal.\n\nOn May 2, 1961, Amar Singh made an application under s. 18 of the Act bt:fore the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, for purchase of the land comprised in Field Nos. 265 and 343, on the ground that he has been in its continuot!S occupation as a tenant for the requisite period.\n\nA similar application was made on the same date, by his brother, Indraj, for the purchase of Field No. 177.\n\nAfter servjng notice on all concerned, Shri HardyaJ Singh, Assitant Colkctor 1st Grade allowed these applications on September 15, 1961, on the basis of a compromise between the applicants and the landowner. In compliance with that order, Amar Singh, dtpo::itrd in the Treasury,\n\nI!-352SCI/74\n\nt78\n\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nRs. 13,590/- which had been determined a!\\ th~ purchase price by the said Collector. lndraj also in his case deposited the price assessed by the Collector.\n\nThe effect of these prcc\"dings and the order of the Collector was that Amar Singh and Indraj the tenantf, in the words of s. 18, itself, '\"shall be deemed to have become the owners of the land\".\n\nThe Commissioner on Dccembr 21, 1961, taking notice of the statutory purcha$Cs of these fields by Amar Singh and Indraj under s. 18, ;:Uowed their ap})fal u.nd remanded the case to the Collector for de noro enquiry regarding the area in occl.ipation of Amar Singh and Jndraj as tenants under the landowner.\n\nAfter the remand, in the course of de noro enquiry, the same Oftker.\n\nShri Hardya] Singh, as Collector, Sutplus Area, passed the impugned order, dated May 1 I, 1962, whereby he declared 408 JO ordinary acres equal to I OJ 61 standard acres as the surplus area of Smt.\n\nLachhman and includ(d in that area the land in question (comprised in Field Nos. 265, 343 and 177) of which according to his earlier order Amar Singh and Indraj were deem, d to have become owners by pur- -chase under s. 18.\n\nHe ignored his order, dated September 15, 1961 On the ground that Amar Singh and Indraj has not ben in continuous occupation of these fields as tenants for the full terms of six year~ .and that \"in fact the landowner has conspired with her son-in-law.\n\nAmar Singh, and his brother, Indraj, to retain this area in contravention of the law\". lt was added that the said crder was based on a ccmpromise and was a \"collusive one''.\n\nAmar Singh and lndraj filed two separate writ petitions under Art. 226 of the constitution for the grant of a writ of certiorari for bringing up and quashing the order, dated May 11, 1962, of the Surplus Area Collector and for a writ of Mandamus directing the re~ pondent State no~ to disposx-ss them from the fields purchased by them under s. I 8.\n\n'Jhe High CGurt by its common Judgment, dated Octobr 4, 1966, .answered the _three qucsti(, ns referred to above, as under;\n\n\"(i) The expressions, \"transfer\" nnd \"othcr disposition of land''\n\nin clau$e (b) of section 1 0-A of the Panjab Security of Land Tenures Act 10 of 1953, do not includ.e completed >:lks cfrectcd under s. I!! of the Act;\n\n(ii) In exercise of the powers confnr(d by clause (c) of section\n\n10-A or the Act. the authorities under the Act cannot exclude from consideration and order of the Assistant Collector or Collector under section 18 of the Act, where by a part of the holding oft he landowner has vested nbsolutely in the erstwhile tenant; and\n\n(iii) If any conflict were t:<..ectcd between section 10-A and\n\nsectiO!l 18 of the Act, the special provision of law contained in the latter section wotild override the earlier a11d general prc, viion:'\n\nPUNJAB V. AMAR SINGH (Sarkaria, /,) 179\n\nRegarding Question (iv) in Amar Singh's case, it was held that since Field Nos. 265 and 343 were, on April 15, 1953, comprised in the tenancy of Sri Chand and Nathu as part of their permissible area they could not, in view of the definition given in s. 2 (5-a), be included • in the surplus ara of the landown:!r, and the subsequent change of the holder of the tenancy did not make the tenancy land revert to the Surplus Area. That was, according to the High Court. an additional reason why s. 10-A was not attracted in Amar Singh's case.\n\nfn order that the questiom raised in these appeals may be considrred in the proper perspective, it is necessary to notice briefly the object the !:C~1eme and the relevant provisions of the Act. '\n\nChronologicalJly, the Act is not the first measure enacted bv the State to give effect to its policy of abolishing intermediaries and regulation of agricultural tenancies with the object of securing tellUre or pro:::uring ownership of land to the titter.\n\nThe first piece of legislation was the Punjab Tenants (Security .of Tenure) Act, 1950.\n\nThe contour~ of the concepts \"prmissible area\" and \"reserved area\" first made their appearance in this s.tatute.\n\nUnder that Act, a landowner was entitled to reserve 100 standard acres for his self-cultivation ; and the protection against eviction was not available to tenants on the reserved area.\n\nThe 1950 Act was amended by Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Amendment Act, 1951 which reduced the permissible area of a landowner to 50 standard acres, and extended the tenure of the tenants from 4 to 5 years.\n\nThe Acts of 1950 and 1951, were repealed and replaced by Act 10 of 1953 with which we are concerned.\n\nThe preamble says that the Act is a piece of legislation \"to provide for the security of land tenure and other incidental matters\".\n\nThe Act cl<Jssifies landowners into \"small landowners\" and ·\"other landowners\".\n\nA \"small landown::r\" as defined in s. 2(2), means a landowner whose entire land doe5 not exceed the \"permissible area\".\n\nOwners other than\n\nmall landowners fall in the second category. \"Landowner'' mean~ a person defined as such in the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (Act xvn of 1887) and also includes an \"allottee\" and \"ks$ee\" as defined in clauss (b). and (c) repctively, of section 2 of the East Punjab Displaced Persons (L'lnd Rs'!ttkment) Act, 1949.\n\nUnder the Explanation added to the claue, a mortgagee, in respect of the land mortgaged with possession is also to be deemed a 'landowner'. \"Landowner\" is not comPrehensively defined in the Land Reve11ue Act. clause t2) of Sec. 3 of that Act makes it clear that \"landowner\" docs not include a tenant.\n\nThus, it is to be 11oted that lesses from the landowner (being other thn thoe falling under s. 2(e) of the Land Resettlement Act, 1949) do not come within the definition cf \"landowner'' giv'en in the Act.\n\nThe fivefold object of the Act, endorsed by Subba Rao J. (as he then was) speaking for this Cottrt in Gurbax Singh v: State of Punjab(1) is toil) [1967] I, S.C.R. 926.\n\nI 8 0\n\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\n(i) provide a permissile area of 30 standard acres to a landowner/tenant which he can retain for elf cultivation;\n\n(ii) provide ecurity of tenure to tenants by reducing their liability to ejectment as specified in s. 9 ;\n\n(iii) ascertain surplus areas and ensure re-settlement of ejected tenants on those areas ;\n\n(iv) fix maximum rent payable by tenants; and\n\n(v) confer rithts on tenants to pre-empt and purchase their tenancies in certain .circutmtances.\n\nWe are primarily concerned with the provisions relating to (i),\n\n(iii) and (v).\n\nWhat is to be borne in mind is that while self-contained and comprehensive provisions in Section 17 and 18 fer effective achievement of object (v) were made from tne very inception of the Act,\n\noiect (iii) did not asume shape and contant tiJI Punjab Act XI of 1955 was enacted.\n\nThe concepts 'permissible area' and 'reserved area' were reshaped by the Act of 1953. 'Phsmissible area' in relation to a landowner or a tenant has been defined to mean \"30 standard acres and where such 30 standard acres are being converted into ordinary acres exceed 50 acres, such 60 acres\". 'Reserved area' as defined in s. 2(4)\n\nmean \"area lawfully reserved under the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act, 1950 (Act XXII of 1950), as amended by President's Act of 1951, hereinafter refemd to as the \"195C-Act or under this Act\".\n\n\"Reserved area\" is dealt with in sections 2, 5, 5-B, 9 and 18 of the Act.\n\nSection 5 lays down that \"any landowner who owns land in excess of the permissible area may reserve out of the entire land held by him in the State of Punjab as landowner, any parcel or parcels not exceeding the permissible area by intimating this selection in the pre~· cribed form and manner to the patwari of the estate in which the land reserved is situate or to such other authority as may be prescribed within six months from the date of the commencement of the Act\". Since, for one reason or the other many landowners could uot exercise their right of reservation within the period of six months originally fixed by the 1953 Act, Sections 5-A, 5-B and 5-C were in\n\nerted by the Amending Act 46 of 1957 which came into force on December 20, 1957. Section 5-B enacts that \"a landowner who has not exercised his right of reservation under this Act, may select his permissible area and intimate the selection to the prescribed authority within the period specified in sec. 5-A and in such form and manntr as may be prescribed\". The requisite form was prescribed by Punjab Government Notification No. 3223-LR-II-57;1624 published in the Gazette Extraordinary of March 22, 1958, consequently, a landowner could make the selection of his permissible area within six montf1s of date.,\n\nIn. Gurbax Singh v. Stattof Punjab (supra), this Court held that •selection' in s. 5-B is similar to 'reservation' in s. 5 and that, in terms,\n\nPUNJAB v. AMAR' SINGH (Sarkaria, J.) 181\n\ns. 5-B gives the landowner another chance to make the reservation if he had not exercised his right of reservation earlier \"Pnder s.5. It was clarified that \"reservation\" and \"selection\" involve the same process and indeed, to some extent, they_ are convertible, for, one can reserve land by selecti!)n and another select land. by reservation.\n\nThus if the right of selection is exercised under s. 5-B, by the landonwer, his permissible area would become his 'reserved area'; to that extent, the two concepts would represent one and the same thing.\n\nThe next provision to be noticed is in s. 9 which says inter alia that 'no landowner shall be competent to eject a tenant except when such tenant is a tenant on the area reserved under this Act or is a tenant of a small landowner\". Its sub-s. (2) provides that ''notwithstanding anything contained hereinbefore a tenant shall also be liable to be ejected from any area which he holds in any capacity whatever in excess of the permi.>sible area.''\n\nBefore proceeding to s. 18, it will. be proper at this stage to advert to the concept \"surplus area\". This concept was born in 1955 when Act XI of that year inserted in the principal Act general provisons including s. 2(5-a) which (as modified by a subsequent Act) runs thus:\n\n\"Surplus area\" means the area other than the reserved area, and, where, no area has been reserved. the area in excess of the permissible area selected under s. 5-B or the area which is deemed to be surplus area under (1) of section 5-C (and includes the area in excess of the permissible area selected under section 19-B) but it will not include a teniuit's permissible area;\n\nProvided that it will include the reserved area, or part threof, where such area or part has not been brought under self-cultivation within six months of reserving the same or getting possession thereof after ejecting a tenant from it, whichever is later, or if the landowner admits a new tenant, within three years of the expiry of the said six months: (emphasis supplied).\n\nThis definition will be considered further while dealing with proposition (iv). At this place it will be sufficient to have a general idea of the inter-relationship of \"permissible area\" and \"surplus area\", and the right of the landowner to deal with the surplus area. A full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Dhaunkal v. Ma11 Kauri, (1) speaking through Meltar Singh C. J. summed up the inter connection between these concepts thus: ·\n\n\"Accordjng to these provisions (of sections 5, 5-A 5-lJ, 5-C read with Rule 6 of the 1956 Rules framed under the Act) a landowner or a tenant who has more than 30 standard acres of land has to select or reserve his permissible area and the excess is available as surplus area. The Colletor attending to such cases\n\nhas to determine, therefore, three things; (a) the permissible\n\n{I) (!970) LXXII PLR 882.\n\n\n[ 19741 3 S.C.R.\n\narea of a landowner, (b) the permissible area of a tenant, and (c) the surplus area. The details for the determination of these matters are to be found in 1956 Rules ..... .\n\nRule 6 ...... is really material .......... No doubt in the Act, there is no specific provision which says that a decision has to he given by any authority whether a permissible area has or has not been rightly reserved or selected by a landowner or tenant concerned; but when the provisions of the Act with the rules are considered, it becomes plain that while determining the surplus area with a landowner or a tenant the question of his permissible area comes to be determined ...... so that, if there is a question in regard to the validity of reservation or selection of permissible area, it must come for consideration before the Collector when he disposes of the surplus area of a particular landowner or tenant ........ \"\n\n(Parenthesis added).\n\nDeclaration of 'surplus area' does not have the effect of expropriating the landowner of that area. The only effect of such declaration is that the Government gets a right to utilize the surplus ara, if necessary, for settlement of ejected tenants. The tenants, thus settled on the surplus land become by operation of law, the tenants of the landowner. They are bound under the rules, to attorn and pay rent to the landowner. The latter's rights of ownership remain intact, who is even entitled to evict the settlec! tenants in certain contingencies specified in the Act. The landowner's right to transfer the surplus area is also not taken away, but the transferee even if a small landowner, will not be rid of the liability to accommodate evicted tenants whom the Government may wish to resettle undcrs. 10-A(a). The Act does not take away the right of the landowner to induct tenants on such area, or the rights of the tenants so inducted, to purchase the land under s. 18 if it has continuously remained comprised in their tenancy for the requisite period.\n\nsction 9(1) (i) provides for eviction of a tenant frol the area of a landowner reserved under the Act. Section 9-A safeguards such a tenant against dispossession of his tenancy so long as he is not accommodated on a surplus area or other land by the State Government. There is a positive indication in the 2nd proviso to s. 9-A that a landowner has a right to induct tenants on his land even after the commencement of the Act. The Proviso says \"that if a tenancy commences after the commencement of this Act, and the tenant is also an owner and is related to his landlord in the manner prescribed, he shall not be entitled to the benefit of this section\".\n\nNow let us have a close look at the provisions of s. 18, which, as amended by Punjab Act Il of 1955 runs thus:\n\n\"18 (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law usage or contract, a tenant of a landowner other than small landowner-\n\n(i) who has been in continuous occupation of the land comprised in his tenancy for a minimum period of six\n\nyears, or\n\nPUNJAB V. AMAR SINGH (Sarkaria, J.)\n\n(ii) who has been restored to h:s tenancy under the provisions of this Act and whose periods of continuous occupation of the land comprised in his tenancy immediately before ejectment and immediately after restoration of his tenancy together amount to six years or more, or {iii) who was ejected from his tenancy after the 14th day of August 1947 and before the commencement of this Act, and who was in continuous occupation of the land comprised in his tenancy for a period of six years or more immediately before his ejectment,\n\nshall be entitled to purchase from the landowner the land so held by him but not included in the reserved area of the landowner, in the case of a tenant faUing within dause(i) or clause ( ii) at any time, and in the case of a tenant falling within clause\n\n(iii) within a period of one year from the date of the commencement of this Act;\n\nPro\\idetl ..\n\nProvided further ....\n\n(2) A tenant desirous of purchasing land under subsection (1) shall make an application in writing to an Assistant Collector of First Grade having jurisdiction over the land concerned, and the Assistant Collector, after giving notice to tht\"\n\nlandowner and to all other persons interested in the land and after making such inquiry as he thinks fit, shall determine (formerly the word was 'fix') the average of the prices obtaining E for similar land in the lccality during I 0 years immediately preceding the date on wilich the application is made.\n\nXXX XX XX\n\n~) ux u\n\n(b) On the purchase price or the first instalment thereof, as the case may be, being deposited, the F tenant shall be deemed to have become the owner of the land, and the Assistant Collector shall where the tenant is not already in possession, and subject to the provisions of the Punjab Tenancy Act (XVI of 1887) put him in possession thereof.\n\n(c)\n\n(5) to (7)\n\nX x''\n\nThis section is the keystone of the arch of peasant-proprietors' complex which the Act seeks to build. The non-obstante clause with which the section starts, indicates the overriding operation of its provisions. It provides a self-sufficing machinery enabling tenants to purchase lands comprised in their tenancies. B;-oadly speaking, the existence of three conditions is necessary for the exercise of this.\n\nright. They 'are: (a) the landowner whose area is sought to be purchased is not a 'small landowner' i.e. one owning less than 30 standard acres. (b) the land to be purchased does not form a part of the 'reserved\n\n\n[ 1974 J 3 S.C R.\n\narea' of the landlord which has become fixed by reservation under s. 5, or selection under s. 5-B: (c) the applicant has been in continuous occupation of the land, as a tenant, for a period of six yea.-~ or more on the date of the application.\n\nFor our purpose, condition (b) is the most important. By excluding a landowner's reserved permissible area from the operation of s. 18, it confines a tenant's right of purchase to that land which either falls .within the 'surplus area' of the landowner, or, was on April 15, 1953 within the 'pennissible area' of that tenant.\n\nAs observed by this Court in Sahib Ram v. Financial Commissioner, Punjab and Ors.(l)\n\n\"Under s. 18(1) three categories of tenants have been given a right to purchase from the landowner the land so held by him.\n\nThey are :\n\n(i) a tenant who has been in continuous occupation of the land for a minimum period of six years ;\n\n(ii) a tenant restored to his tenancy under the Act and whose period of continuous occupation of the land comprised in his tenancy immediately before ejectment and after restoration amounts to six years or more ; and\n\n(iii) a tenant who was ejected from his tenancy after-August 14, 1947 arid before Apri115, 1953, and who was in continuous occupation of the land comprised in his\n\ntenancy for a period of six years or more immediately before his ejectment.\"\n\nCategory (iii) bas become extinct and clause (iii) of s. 18(1) has become redundant because the exercise of the rig_ht of purchase by this category was limited to a period of one year, only, after the commencement of the Act.\n\nOnly a small number of cases fall under <.:ategory (ii).\n\nMost of the tenant-purchasers belong to category\n\n(i) which may be further divided into these sub-categories : ·\n\n(a) Tenants who were on the land on April 15, 1953 and continued to be in occupation of their land for the requisite period upto the date of the application : ·\n\n(b) Tenants who were inducted on the surplus area by the landowner sometime. after the determinative date and who thereafter remained in continuous occupation of the land for the requisite term ;\n\n(c) Tenants who were resettled on the surplus area by the Government, and thereafter remained in continuous occupation of the land for the requisite period.\n\nQuite a number of tenants who )nvoke s. 18, come under subcategory (b).\n\nIn the instant case, Amar Singh and Indraj are tenants\n\n(1) [1970] 3 S.C. R. 796 at p. 805.\n\n\\ A\n\nPUNJAB l'. AUAR SINGH (Sarkaria, ].) 185\n\nof this sub-category. In Sahib Ram's case (supra) also, this Court was dealing with a case of tenants of this sub-category. Vaidialingam J. speaking for the Court, enunciated the Jaw on the point, thus :\n\n\"So.far as we could see there is no prohibition under the Act placing any restrictions against the right of the landowner creating new tenancies after the date of the Act.\n\nIn fact, the second proviso to s. 9-A clearly indicates to the contrary.\n\nIt deals with contingency of tenancy coming into force after the commencement of the Act.\n\nSection 18(1)(ii) gives a right to tenant to .purchase the land ; and that right has to be examined when an application under s. 18 is made and cannot be deemed on the ground that he was not a tenant for more than six years on April I 5, 1953. There is no limitation placed under clause (i) of s. 18(1) that the tenant who exercises his right should be a tenant on the date of the Act or that he should have completed the period of six years on April\n\n15. 1953 and there is no warrant for reading ins. 18(1)(i) clauses which it does not contain. It is enough if the continuous period of six years has been completed on the date when the tenant files the application for purchase of the land\".\n\nThe Validity or otherwise of the orders of purchase rra1e under s. 18 by the Collector in favour of Amar Singh and Jndraj will be discussed a little later, at its appropriate place. Suffice it to say here, that in view of the law settled in Sahib Ram's case (supra), Amar Singh and Jndraj provided the other conditions were satisfied-would be entitled. to purchase the land. comprised in their tenancies notwithstanding the fact that the said land was a part of the surplus area of the landowner and these tenat:cies were created by her after Apri115, 1953 ..\n\nIt will now be appropriate to examine s. 10-A. 1t is one of the important sections, the interpretation of the provisons of which is in question.\n\nIt reads :\n\n10-A(a) The State Government or any Officer empowered by\n\nit, in this behalf, shall be competent to utilise any surplus area or the resettlement of tenants ejected, or to be ejected, under clause (i) of sub-section (I) of section 9.\n\n(b) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, and (save in the case of land acquired by the State Government under any law\n\nfor the time being in force or by any heir by inheritance) no transfer or other disposition of land which is om prised in a surplus area at the commencement of this Act, shall affect !he utilization thereof in clause (a).\n\nExplanation-Such utilization of any surplus area will not affect the right of the landowner to receive rent fro)1l the tenant so settled.\n\n\n[ 1974) 3 S.C.R.\n\n(c) For the purposes of determining surplus area of any person under this section, any judgment, decree or order of a court or other authority, obtained after the commencement of this Act and having the effect of dim nishing the area of such person which could have been declared as his surplus area shall be ignored.\"\n\nSection 10-A with its sub-clauses (a) and (b) was added by Punjab Act XI of 1955.\n\nPunjab Act 4 of 1959 inserted the saving clause (withia brackets) in clause (b) Later Punjab Act 14 of 1962, inserted clause (c) and gave retrospective effect to all the provisions of s. 1 0-A from April 15, 1953.\n\nThe Statement of Objects and Reasons published in the Punjab Gazette Extraordinary on April 16, 1955, lists among others, the main objects of Act XI of 1955 :\n\n\"to prevent large scale ejectment of tenants to introduce new concepts of surplus area and its utilization by the State Government for the resettlement of ejected tenants .... to coordinate the e:ectment of tenants with their resettlement on surplus area .... to prevent sales and other dispositions of land adversely affecting the continuance of tenancies and the extent of available surplus area ; to reduce the period (from J 2 to 6 years) entitling a tenar, t to purchase the land comprised in his renancy an.d to provide for easier terms of purchase ; and other incidental matters.\n\nThe professed object of the concept en \"Surplus area\" and resettling ejected tenants on such area finds its manifestation in the insertion of s.2(5-A) and s. 10-A(a) ; while the object of entitling tenants to purchase their tenancy lands on easier terms is reflected in the amenJments made in s. 18.\n\nAccording to the Statement of Objects and Reasons published in Punjab Gazette Extraordinary, dated April 27, 1962, the main purpose the Amending Act 14,. of 1962 was two-fold : the First was to neutralize the effect of certain decisions and to plug the loopholes revealed in the interpretation among others, of sections 2(5-a), 6, 10-A\n\n(b), 18, 19-B. Among those decisions was one of the Financial Com missioner holding that section 6 did not protect the claim of tenants under section 18 to purchase the proprietary rights in respect of the land held by them in tenancy. The secoizd was to ignore in computing the surplus area ''decrees of courts for diminishing the surplus area\" which \"interested persons, being relati\\es, have obtained.\" \"i11 order to evade the provisions of Section 10-A the parent Act\" That was why clause (c) was inserted in s. 10-A.\n\nI have referred in extenso to the Objects and Reasons. which led t<> these Amendments to show that while the Legislature was anxiO!JS to preserve surplus area for settlement of evicted tenants and for that pur pose enacted s. lOA, it did not in its wisdom, think it fit, to curtail the ambit of s.l8 so as to exclude tenants inducted by the landowner on the surplus area from purchasing their tenancy lands through the mac:tinery of this section.\n\nSo far as the right to purchase their\n\n<.1•\n\nB ...\n\nPUNJAB ~·. AMAR SINGH (Sarkaria, J.) 187\n\ntenancies is concerned, tenants inducted by the landowner and tenants settled by the Government, on the surplus area, n:main on an equal footing. The Amendments did not in relation to the new Section 10-A, relegates. 18 to a position of \"subordinate alliance\".\n\nThe non-obstante clause of s. 18 has not been touched. Indeed, the amendments of s.\n\nI~ inter alia, by providing for easier terms of purchase and reducing the qualifying period from 12 to 6 years, have made the machinery of the section more comprehensive, efficient and attractive for tenants desirous of purchasing their tenancies .\n\nThe Amendments have not changed the basic scheme of the Act,. according to which, the jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority assessing the surplus area under ss. 5-B and 5-C read with Rule 6 of the 1956\n\nRules, and acting under s. I 0-A is distinct and separate from the jurisdiction of the Assistant Collector I st Grade dealing with an application under s. 18. \"Collector\" has been defined by Rule 2(iii-A)\n\nof the 1956 Rules. to mean \"the CoiJector of the district or any other officer not below the rank of Assistant Collector 1st Grade empmrered in this beha(( by Gorernmen('. (emphasis supplied) Rule 4-B provides that the Prescribed Authority for the purposes of Section 5B(2) and Section 5-C shall be (i) the Collector if the lands ownfd or held by the landowner or tenant are situate in one district : and (ii) the Special.\n\nCollector-as defined in Rule 2(iv)-if the lands sc owned or held are situated in more than one district. Section 1 8(2), howe.vcr, confers the jurisdiction to try and determine applications for purchase made undEr that section specifically, on Assistant Collector of First Gn:de.\n\nAn order of the prescribed Authority made undn the afcrcaid proyisions has been made appealable under Sub-Rule (8) of Rule 6 ; whereas the provision in regard to appeal, review and revision again:>.t an order of the Asistant Collector First Grade made under s. 18. by virtue of Section 24 of the Act, the same as provided in .ss. 80, 81, 83 and 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887.\n\nSction 80 of the Tenancy Act provides for \"Appeals\", s. 82 for \"Rev Jew'' and s. 84 for ''Revisions\". Sections 81 and 83 of that Act relate to limitation and computation of limitation for Appeals and applications for review. Under s. 82 of Tenancy Act, Revenue Officers have the powers of reversing their own orders and thoe of their predecessors, if no appeal against those orders has been fikd. In the case of Assistant Collectors of all Grades, the exercise of this power i~\n\nalwys subject to the previous sanction of the Collector. Though a penod of 90 days for making an application for review is provided in\n\nsub-lausc b)_ of tle proviso to s. 82(1), yet no limitation has been prov1ded .wJtlun wh_Jch a Revenue Officer may suo moto review or move\n\nfor sanctton to rev1ew an order. Under s. 84 the Commissiontr ami the Financial Commissioner have the concurrent revisional jurisdiction. The revisional powers of the Financial Commissioner under\n\ns. 84 are in no way le.ss. extensive than those of the High Court under ! 15 of. the Code of CJVJI Procedure. In a sense, his revisional powen. are wtder. He has power to revise an order against which an appeal lies (sec Amir Chand v. State of Haryana (I) decided by a Division.\n\n(1) 1971 P.L.J. 449.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1974] 3 S.C.Il.\n\n Bench. of the Punjab and Haryana High cOurt. No. statutory limitation for making an application for revision has been provided, but as a matter of practice the revision-petitions are ordinarily not entertained after a period of 90 days unless sufficient cause for the delay is shown. The Financial Commissioner can interfere in revision suo Jnoto at any time, if the circumstances of the case so warrant.\n\nThere is nothing in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder or in tke Tenancy Act saying as to who can file an appal or revision against ihe decision or order of the Collector exercising jurisdiction under s. 18.\n\n-But in view of the long array of judicial decisions including that of the Financial Commissioner, there can be no doubt that the State Government or its Department can, if aggrieved, or prejudiced by such a .decision, go in appeal or revision against it.\n\nFirstly there is a catena of authorities which, following the doctrine -of Lindley L.J. in re Securities Insurance Co.(l) have laid down the rule that a person who is not a party to a decree or order may with the leave of the Court, prefer an app.::al from such decree or order if he' .. 'is either bound by the order or is aggrieved by it or is prejudicially .affected by it.\" As a rule, leave to appeal will not be refused to a person who might have been made ex nominee a party-see Prm•ince of Bombay\n\nv. W. I. Automobile Associatio11(2) Heera Singh v. Veerk4(3) and .Shivaraja v. Siddamma(~); Executive Officer v. Raghal'an Pillai.(S) Jn\n\nreB. an lnfant (6): Govinda Menon v. Madhavan Nair (1).\n\nSecondly, the ruling of the Financial Commissioner in P1111iab State v. Dr. Iqbal Silzgh (8), whih is binding on all the authorities and Revenue Officers exercising jurisdiction under the Act clinches the rn tt!r.\n\nTim~. th de.::ision of the Special Collector declaring surplus are-a was reversed by the Additional Commissioner. The State, filed .against that decision of the Additional Commissioner, a revisionptition before the Financial Commissioner. Objection was taken with regard to the competency of the State to file that petition, on two grounds :\n\n(i) that the order was appealable and the revision was incompetent F and;\n\n(ii) that the State was not a party to the original proceeding.\n\nThe Financial Commissioner treated the revision as an appeal, and .overruled the objection in these terms :\n\n\"The argumnt on behalf of the Respondents overlooks\n\nth~ fact that the Revenue Officers act in a quasi-judicial capacity deciding such cases and if the Punjab State is aggrieved by their orders it is as much entitled to contest them through a\n\nrmdy provided under the law as private parties are. In fact.\n\nthre will be no justification for discrimination against the Punjab\n\n(I) [1894] 2 Ch. 410.\n\n(3) A.l.R. 1958 Raj. 181.\n\n(S) A.l.R. 1961 Kcrala 114. {7) A.T.R. 1964 Kerala 23S(DB).\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1949 Bom. 141.\n\n(4) A.I.R. 1963 Mys. 127. (6). [l958] Q.B. 12.\n\n(S) [1965] Puajub Law Je>urnal 1\\C.\n\n1: i·\n\n• F\n\nPUNJAB V. AMAR SINGH (Sarkaria, J.) 189\n\nState in this regard and for holding that it suffers from any dis~ ability in the matter of agitating against dtcisions \\\\'hich are to to detriment.\" The above being in accord with the general principles settled by the long chain of authorities, noticed earlier, appears to be a correct exposition of the law on the point.\n\nIn the present case, neither the landowner, nor the State made any attempt to get the decision, dated 15~9~1961 of the Collector under s. 18 set aside or modified by way of appeal, reviewor revision or other appropriate proceedings. In a sense, therefore, that decision had become final and conclusive.\n\nThe stage is now set for examining the contentions canvassed at. the bar with regard to the correctness or otherwise of the findings of the High Court.\n\nMr. Mahajan, learned Counsel for the appellant~State contends that the Collector, , Surplus Area had rightly ignored the sale orders dated September 15, 1961, of the Collector purportedly passed under s. 18, in favour of Amar Singh and Indraj and that the view taken by\n\nthe High Court is wrong, because--\n\n(a) the lease made by the landowner in favour of these Respon~\n\ndents, was itself a \"transfer of land\" effecting the utilization of surplus area, and as such, was hit by clause (b) of of s. 10-A, and the orders obtained on the basis of that lease could not stand on a better footing;\n\n(b) the expression \"transfer\" in clause (b) of this section includes. involuntary transfers, also, brought about by operation of law, with only two exceptions which are specifically mentioned in that clause;\n\n(c) these orders were consent orders and were not based on any independent finding of the Collector as to the existence of the the essential condition viz., that the applicants were in continuous occupation of the lands, as tenants, for the requisite t>eriod, but were the result of compromise and collusion ·\n\nbetween the landlady and her relation-tenants, and as sucl1, were null and void ;\n\n(d) these orders had the effect of diminbhing the surplus area and as such, were orders of \"other authority\" hit by clause\n\n(c) of s. 10-A;\n\n(e) Section 18 has to be construed in a manner which does nor\n\nd<:f.::at the object of s. 10-A. These two sections can be\n\nreconciled only if the operation of s. 18 is confir.ed to those purchases which do not adversely affect the extent or utilization of surplus area.\n\nIn reply, Mr. S. K. Dhingra, !earned Counsel for the respondent~,. nuintains that a \"leue\" cannot be regarded as a \"lransf.;:; r or tlispo~ sition oftand\" within the meaning of clause (b) of s. 10-A, because according to its general scheme and object, the Act not only recognise\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS .\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe right of a landowner to create new tenancies on his surplus area after Aprill5, 1953, but further gives to such a tenant the right to _purchase his tenancy under l.\" 18. Reliance has been placed on this Court's decision in Saheb Ram's case (supra).\n\nLaying stress on the omission of the word \"lease\" from clause (b) of s. 10-A. Counsel has referred to the use of the word\"lease\"in addition to the word''transfer\" in somewhat similar provision relating to future acquisitions in s.l9-A and 19-B, to show that whenever the Legislature intended to bring a \"''lease\" within the sweep of such a provision. it expressly did so.\n\nReiterating the reasoning of the High Court, Mr. Dhingra submits that a \"sale\"made in accordance with an order of the Collector under s. 18 cannot be ignored by the Prescribed Authority, Surplus Area, either as a \"transfer\" under clause (b) or as an order of \"other authority\" under clause (c) of s. 10-A. Any other interpretation. according to the Counsel, will render nugatory s. 1 S which is a self contained provision intended to achieve one of the primary objects of the Act. [n support of these arguments, reliance has been placed on a later Full Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Mam Raj and ors. v. State of Punjab (1) which affirmed the propositions of law laid down in the judgment under appeal Shyamlul v. Statr• ()j Gujarat (2) was also cited.\n\nReplying to Mr. Mahajan's contention (c), Counsel submits that this was not a case where the orders of the Collector passed under s. 18 could be a.id to be a nullity. The Khasra Girdawari before the Col lector wit11 the admission of the landowner, superadded, was suffi- -cient material, on the basis of which the Collector making the -orders of purchase in favour of the tenants could be satisfied about their being in continuous occupation of their tenancy lands for the requisite period. Great emphasis has been placed on the fact that in reply to the writ petition of Amar Singh, the State in their writtet\\ -statement had admittedAmar Singh's averment as to his being a tena\n\nnt of the land for the requisite period. Even the Surplus Area Authority, it is pointed out, conceded in his impugned order that according to the copy of the Kha3ra Girdawari on the file, Amar Singh and Tndraj were in occupation of the land as tenants since 1957-58, though such occupation was held to be of less than six years.\n\nIn 'these circumstances proceeds the argument, the order dated Septemher 15,1961, passed by the Collector under s. I 8, on the basis of com- -promise, could not be treated as totally void and non-{.?st; at the most they were erroneous-orders passed by the Collector in the exercise of the distinct jurisdiction particularly conferred on him by s. 18(2).\n\nThe only remedy-adds the Counsel-of the aggri.!ved person or the 'State was by way of appeal or revision as provided by the statute and since those orders were not so challenged, they had become final.\n\nThe Prescribed Authority, Surplus Area-it is emphasised, while -assessing the surplus area, had no jurisdiction to sit in appeal or revi- sion over the orders of the Asstt. Collector, lst Grade passed under\n\n'S. 18.\n\n(l) l.L.R. (l969)2, Punj. and Haryana 680.\n\n(2) ll965) 2 S.C.R. 457.\n\n c\n\nPUNJAB v. AMAR SINGH (Sarkaria, /.) 191\n\nReference in this behalf has been made toss. 24 and 25oft he Act, ss. 80 to 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act and R.K. Chari v. Seshadri;\n\n(1) Mohanla/ v.\n\nGonka(2); Dhaunkal v. Man Kmtri (3) and Mam Raj v. Punjab State (supra).\n\nIt will be appropriate to take contention (c), first, canvassed by Mr. Mahajan because it is the linch-pin of the entire case.\n\nThe question is, whether the compromise order~. were wholly void or merely voidable. 1f they were of the former kind, they would be a nullity which does not from its very nature needs setting aside, and consequently, they could be treated as non-existant whenever and wherever their legality comes in question.\n\nAnd, the Prescribed Authority Surplus Area would be entitled to ignore such orders as non-est indt!pendently of the provisions of s. 10-A. In that view of the matter, the necessity of determining as to whether those orders are hit by clauses (b) and (c) of that section would not arise.\n\nIf the orders were of the latter type, i.e. voidable or erroneous, passed by the Asstt. Collector acting within his jurisdiction under s. 18, they could be avoided or questioned only by way of appeal; review or revision as provided by the statute or in other appropriate proceedings known to law, and the Prescribed Authority or Collector, Surplus Area would not be entitled to go behind them and question their validity or propriety. He shall have to accept them as they are. l n that view of the matter, the question wit\\ still remain whether such an order of the Assistant Collector passed by him in the exercise of his-jurisdiction in favour of a tenant under s. 18, can be ignored as a \"transfer\" under clause (b) or as an order of \"other authority\" under clause (c) of s. 10-A on the ground that it adversely affects the utilization or extent of surplus area.\n\n• An order is null and void if the quasi-judicial tribuna\\ passing it lacks inherent jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.\n\nSuch was not the case here. The Assistant Collector who made the orders dated September 15, 1961. was .duly invested with the quasijudicial jurisdiction under s. 18(2). All the jurisdictional facts for making the orders 1.1nder that section existed.\n\nThere is no dispute that Smt. Lachhman was not a \"small landowner\". 1 t is common ground that Field Nos.263, 343 and 177 did not fall within her reserved area. It was not controverted that in May 1961. when the purchase applications were made, Field Nos. 263 and 343 were comprised in the tenancy of Amar Singh and Field No. 177 in that of Tndraj. According to the obsen, atipn of the Surplus Area Collector, the copy of the Khasra Girdawri on the file showed that their possession as te.nants was from 1957-58 i.e. for about 4t years only. preceding the applications and thus according to him they had failed to show their continuous posSession for the requisite period of six years. It is important\n\n(I) [1968J 2 S.C.R. 848.\n\n\n(3) {1970] LXXII P.L.R. 882 (F.B.).\n\n\n[ 19741 3 S.C.R.\n\nto note further that Amar Singh in para 2 of his writ petition pleaded:\n\n\"That on the 2nd of May 1961, the petitioner having been in continuous occupation of land comprised in his tenancy for a period of six years applied under s. 18 of the .... Act for purchase of the above land, and by his order dated 15th September 1961, Shri Hardial Singh, Assistant Collector lst Giai!, Sira District Hissar, allowed the petitioner to pur~ chase the above land at a price of Rs. 13,590/-.... '' This averment of Amar Singh was admitted in the counteraffidavit filed on behalf of the State in thf, se terms :\n\n\"Para 2 cf the petition is admitted\"\n\nIn the written statement fikd by the State-apart from a general\n\nstatement that \"in view of the facts explaim:d by the Collector in his C order dated 11-5-62 the surplus area .... has been rightly declared\"- it was not spE.cifically pleadd that the purchase order dated S(ptember\n\n15, 1961, made by the Collector under s. IS was coliusive, void or without jurisdiction on the ground that Amar Singh and Indraj had not been in occupation of these fidds for the full statutory period. Nor could Amar Singh and Indraj be denild the status of 't<:nants' and th~ rights :>.nd privikgcs attaching tht.rdo, m'rdy lxcausc thty were rc- D lated to the landowner, the 'son-in-law' and 'son-in-law's brother\n\nnot bing among the \"relativfs\" prescritxd in Rule 5 of the 1956 Rules, whose cultivation [in view of s. 2(9) of the Act] may be deemed to be the \"self-cultivation\" of the landc, wner.\n\nTo sum up, the allegation in the purchase applications about the applicants' being in continuous cccupation of these fields comprised E in their tenancies for the requiite period, coupled with the Khasra Girdawri on file and the admissions made by the landlady in the compromi::e, furnishd sufficient material-on the basis of which the Assistant Collector, at the time of making the orders of purchase on September 15, 1961, could have been satisfied about the existence of all the facts essential for tht(exercise of his jurisdiction under s. J 8, It is not correct to say that on the facts of the instant case, the Assistant F Collector pa<>sed those orders solely on the basis of the compromise, without applying his mind to the case. Application of mind is evident from the circumstance that the Assistant Collector further assessed the price to be paid by each ofthe applicants w~()-tJtereafter, deposited the same in the Government Treasury on September 29, 1961. And. it was on the makingofS.uchdcpl)iitstbat the respond.mts were deemed to be the own;::rs of those fields. Themere fact that the Assistant Collec- G tor did not record a finding in so many words that, he was satisfied from such and such mall:rial in regard to the existence of the basic conditions ncctssary for making the order 1mder s. IS, did not render his order a nullity when such material was othf.rwisc evident .on the\n\nrcord.\n\nIn the view I take I am fortifild hy the decision of this Court in H K. K. Chari v. R.N. Seshadri ('). That was a case Q( a. compromise\n\n(J) [ 1973] ! s.c.c. 76\\.\n\nPUNJAB V. A}tAR SINGH (Sarkaria, J.) 193\n\norder of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court under s. 10 of the Madras Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. But by analogy, the ratio of that decision is an apposite guide for the present case. There\n\nthe landlord brought an action under said Rent Act, for eviction of his tenant, Seshadri from a house on the ground that he required it for his bona fide use and occupation.· The tenant at first controver~ ted the landord's claim but subsequently, both the parties filed a com~\n\npromise in terms of which the court passed a decree of e'viction. The tenant resisted the execution of that decree, on the ground that the de~\n\nree was based on compromise or consent without the court having satis fied itself by an independent consideration regarding the bona fide requirement of the property by the landlord for his own occupation; and as such the decree contravened s. 10 of that Act, and was a nullity.\n\nThe Bench unanimously rejected this objection of the judgement-debtor tenant. Vaidialingam J. (Dua J. concurring) laid don the law thus:\n\n\"The true position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the juri~ dictional fact viz., the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned ins. 10 were shown to have existed when the Cot.irt made the order. Satisfaction of the Court, which is no doubt a pre-requisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation borne out by a judicial finding. If at some stage the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it, before the parties invited it to pass an order in tenils of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was )l!lssed\".\n\nThe above principle was reiterated and applied by this Court in Nagindas Ramdas v. Da/patram lchchram (1),\n\nJudged by the basic principle enunciated in the above decisions, the order dated September 15, 1961 passed by the Assistant Collector under s. 18, was not a nullity which could be ignored as non est by the\n\nPrescribed Authority. Even if those orders were erroneous, they could be impeached only by way of appeal etc. as provided in the Act because the error was committed by the <;:ollector within the exercise of his jurisdiction. A court or any quasi-judicial tribunal acting within its jurisdiction can decide rightly as well as wrongly. To use the felicitious words of S. K. Das J. vide Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar\n\nPradeh (2), such administrative bodies, or officers acting in judicial capacity\" are deemed to have been invested with the power to err within the limits of their jurisdiction\" and their decisions must be accepted as valid unless set aside in appeal. This general principle was reiterated by this Court in Ittayavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey (3) as under ~\n\n\"It is well settled that a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and over the parties thereto, though\n\n(l) Civil Appeal No. 2479/72 decided on 30.1l.73.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1621 ={1963]1, SCR 778.\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 907(910)=[1964]1, SCR 495. 14-M852Sup.CJ/74\n\n194 SUPREME COUllT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C.!..\n\nbound to decide right may dfcide wrong and that even though it decided wrong it would not be doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do. It had the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit ; md over 1 he party and, therefore, merely because it made an error in deciding a vital issue in the suit, it cannot be said that it has actd beyond its jurisdiction.\n\nAs has often b'en said courts have jurisdiction to decide right or to deeide wro .1g and even though they decide wrong the decrees rendered by them cannot be treated as nullities ..•..... It merely makes an error of law (which) can be corrected only (on appeal) in the manner laid down in the Civil Procedure Code.\" The above principle are applicable with greater force to the present case. The Prescribed Authority, surplus Area, and the Collector competent to make an order under s. 18 are both Assistant Collectors of the Ist Grade, that is coordinate authorities exercising separate and distinct jurisdictions.\n\nOne cannot sit in appeal or revision over the orders of the other.\n\nIf one feels that a certain order passed by the other in the exercise of distinct jurisdiction is erroneous it is open to get it rectified in the appropriate manner provided by the Act i.e. by way of appeal, review or revision.\n\nAs has already been observed earlier, the State or the Department. if aggrieved or prejudiced by a decision of an authority under this Act can avail of the remedy of appeal available under the Act in any case, it can move the Financial Commissioner to set right the ille!lality or\n\nimpropriety in revision. The Financial Commissioner it may be recalled h;1s wide powers in revision to correct such errors committed by the inferior authorities in the exercise of their jurisdiction and there is nd time limit to the exercise of this reysional pgwer by the Financial Commissioner.\n\nSection 25 of the Act provides : \"Except in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the validity of any proceedings of order taken or made under this Act shall not be called in question in any court or before any other authority.\n\nOn analysis of the section it is clear that it gives a two fold mandale.\n\nOn one. hand it debars the jurisdiction of courts or other authorities to question the validity of any proceeding or order taken or made\n\nunder the Act and on the other it prohibits the impeachment of such vrders or proceedings in a manner which is not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Tt indicates that decisions of the authorities under the Act can be challenged only by way of appeal review or revision as provided in ss. 80,. 81, 82, 83 and 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, made applicable by s. 24 of the Act or in the Rules made under the Act.\n\nThe Punjab and Haryana High Court has consistently taken this view. The Full Bench in Dhankel v. Man Kauri (supra) also held that the Assistant Collector while dealing with the purchase application under s 18 has no jurisdiction to sit in appeal or revision over the order of the Surplus Area Collector passed in surplus area proceeding and he has no jurisdiction to ignore that order.\n\nPUNJAB v. AMAR SINGH (Sarkaria, 1.) 195\n\nThe rule equally holds good in the converse. In the Full 1\\::a.ch decisioni n Mam Raj v. Punjab State (sul)ra) it was held that once an application of the tenant under s. 18 has been allowed and the other is not set aside in appeal or revision, the same become;; final\n\nand remains immune to an attack against its validity on any ground including that of collusion, before the co-ordinate authorities under the Act dealing with the question of determination of surplus area. 1fl may say so with respect this proposition laid down by the Full Bench is unexceptionable.\n\nThe above being the law on the point, it is clear that the orders dated September 15, 1961 not having been impeached by way of appeal, review or revision as provided by the statute or in other proceedings recognised by law, had become final and conclusive and the Prescribed Authority, Surplus Area was bound to accept them as valid.\n\nHe could not go behind them or himself sit in appeal over them. It was aU the more disconcerting in this case because the Collector who passed the orders under s. 18 and the Collector who ignored those orders as\n\nPrescribed Authority, Surplus Area happened to be the same Officer.\n\nThis takes me to the next question viz, if the orders dated September 15, 1961 were not a nullity could they be ignored under s. 10 A on the 2!'0und that they amounted to \"transfer\" or orders of\"other authority\" affecting the utilisation or causing the diminution of surplus area?\n\nBefore embarking upon a consideration of this question, it is necessary to remember two fundamental canons of interpretation applicable to such statutes. The first is that if choice lies between two alternative constructions, \"that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or C()nfusion into the working of the system\" (see Maxwell 12th Edn. page 45) . The second is that if there is an apparent conflict between different provisions of the same enactment, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect may be given to both (see King Emperor v. Behari La! Sharm!l (1).\n\nLet us now apply the above principles to the construction of ss. 10-A and 18. It has already been noticed that s. 18 is designed to promote one of the primary objects of the Act viz., of procuring ownership of land to the tiller on easy terms. It has also been seen that the self-sufficing machinery of this section is available for purchase of their tenancies to the tenants indcted before or after April15, 1953, by the landowner on land not bemg a part of his permifsible area, equally with tenants settled on such area by the Government. In a way, every sale made by the operation of s. 18 in favour of tenant admitted by the land-owner on his surplus area, causes diminution of the surplus area or affects the utilisation thereof by the Government. If such sales were to be ignored under s. 10-A, then it wiU reduce the working of the system of the Act to a mockery. It will mean \"war\" between sections 18 and 10-A. Such a construction of the Act will present a spec-\n\n(1) 1944 [49) C. W. N. 178 P. C.=72 T. A. 57.\n\n\ntacle of manifest contradiction and absurdity of an Act giving right by one band and taking away the same by another. The adoption of such an interpretation may not completely \"obliterate\" s. 18, as the High Court has said, but it wiiJ certainly truncate it. A 'potent and substantial limb of s. 18, which according to the ruling of this Court in Sahib Ram's case (supra) entitles the category of tenants inducted by the landowner after April 15, 1953 to purchase their tenancies, would stand-as it were-\"amputated\" by judicial operation such an interpretation will run counter to the fundamental principles of construction. The conflict between the two provisions can be avoided only if we read the general words other authority\" in cl. (c) of s. 10-A, ejusdem generis with the specific words \"judgment, decree or order of a court\", which immediately precede them. Thus construed, these general words \"or other authority\" will not take in an authority exercising jurisdiction under s. 18(2) of the Act.\n\nNor can the words \"transfer or other disposition of land\"\" in clause\n\n(b) of s. 10-A, be construed to include a transfer which results by the process of s. 18. The meaning of these words must be restricted to volitional dispositions of land made by the landowner, and cannot be extended to cover involuntary transfers brought about by operation of law or circumstance beyond the control of the landowner. The two type of involuntary transfers, namely, acquisition of land by Government under legal compulsion or by an heir by inheritance which were inserted by the Amending Act 4 of 1959 in the saving clause of this provision and were later given a retrospective effect from April 15, 1953, are only clarificatory or illustrative of the original intent of the Legislature. These two instances are not exhaustive of the involuntary transfers which are outside the sweep of clause (b).\n\nThis interpretation of \"transfer\" has been consistently adopted by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in several cases. Some of them in which involuntary transfers of a kind other than those specifically mentioned in the saving clause of clause (b) came up for consideration are reported in Bhajan Lal v. Punjab State(I) & Bislzan Singh v. Punjab\n\nState (2), This case decided by Mahajan J. proceeds on an interpretation of the same words used in s. 32-FF of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1953, which is in pari materia with s. 10-A of the Punjab Act; Lakshmi Raj v. State uf Haryana (3).\n\nThe above is the only reasonable interpretation of the words \"transfer or other disposition of land\" in s.JO-A(b) which lS consistent with l the content and object of s.I8, and can reconsile and keep effective both the sections.\n\nThough the contention of Mr. Dhingra that the words \"transfer or other disposition\" in the said clause(b) do not embrace within their scope tenancies or leases created by the landowner-because such a right of the landowner is recognised by the Act vide Sahib Ram's case (supra)-is not altogether without force, yet I do not think it necessary\n\n(1) (1968) 70 P.L.R. 664.\n\n(2) (1968) 47 LLT 284.\n\n(3) (1971) LXXIII Punjab L. R. 815.\n\nPUNJAB V. AMAR SINGH (Sarkaria, ].) 197\n\nto decide that point. The lease created by Snit. Lachchman ceased to subsist as soon as the Collector made the orders of purchase under s. 18 in favour of the erstwhile tenants. The question, whether the extinct lease which preceded the purchase orders was a \"transfer\" or not, does not, therefore, survive for decision.\n\nIn the light of what has been said abOve, I am firmly of the opinion that the view taken by the High Court with regard to the interpretation and inter.relationship of ss.IO.A and 18 is sound and the answers given by it to the first three questions of law set out at the commencement of this judgment, are correct. I would, therefore, uphold the same.\n\nNow I turn to question No. 4, which arises in Amar Singh's case only.\n\nIt is common ground that Field Nos. 265 and 343. on April15, 1953, were comprised in the tenancy of Sri Chand and Nathu. The total area of these two fields is 67 bighas and 19 biswas equivalent to 42 ordinary acres, approximately. It is apparent from the record that the land in these two fields is entirely Barani and has no irrigation facilities, whatever. According to the scale adopted by the Collector, Surplus Area, for such land, these 42 ordinary acres will make 10 5 standard acres. The total area of Smt. Lachchman which has been found surplus is about 80 stanard acres. The land comprised in these two fields is thus only one-eiglith of her surplus area.\n\nAt no stage before the High Court was it contended that Sri Chand and Nathu held or owned in the state any other land apart from the said fields. In this Court, also, either in the grounds of appeal or otherwise, no such allegation or contention has been made. The \"permissiable area\" which can be held or retained by a tenant under the Act is 30 standard acres. That is to say, the permissible limit of the area which could be held in common by Sri Chand and Nathu, was 60\n\nstandard acres. Since it has been no-body's case that Sri Chand and Nathu held any other area, and the land comprised in these two fields being 10.5 standard acres, was far less than their permissible limit, the High Court presumed-and I think, not wrongly that Field Nos. 265 and 343 were held by the tenants Sri Chand and Nathu within their perffiissible area.\n\nIt is well settled that surplus area has to be determi:ted with reference to the situation as it obtained on April 15, 1953 \\\\hen the Act came into force. This proposition is clear from s.l9-F, also, which says that the Prscribed Authority shall be competent to determine the surplus area, referred to in s. 10-A, of a landowner out of the lands owned by such land-owner immediately before the commencement of the Act. If there still remained any -doubt on this point, the same must be deeed to have been authoritatively dispelled by the decision of this Court m BhagwanDas v. The State ofPunjabtl). A plainreadingofthe\n\ndenition of 'surph, ts area' in s.2(5-a) which has been quoted in a foregomg part of thts JUdgment, shows that land held by a tenant within\n\n(11 [1966) 2 S. C. R. 511.\n\n19R\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1974 1 3 s.C.It.\n\nhis permissible area, cannot be included in the surplus area of the landowner. Since on the determinative date i.e. 15-4-53, Field Nos. 265 and 343, measuring 10·5 standard acres only, were held by the tenants, Sri Chand and Nathu, within their permissible area, these\n\nfield~ could not, in view of the mandate of s. 2(5-a), be included in the 'surplus area' of Smt. Lachchman. At the time, when the Surplus\n\nArea Collector took up determination of the surplus area (which as pointed out in Dhannkal's case (supra) implies incidental verificatioa of the permissible areas of the landowner and the tenants, also) these fields were still comprised in a tenancy, though the holder of the tenancy was a different tenant. In these circumstances, the change of the tenant will not make these Fields accrete to the surplus area of the landowner.\n\nSuch change of the tenant does not amount to a future \"acquisition of land comprised in that tenancy by the landowner within the C\\}mtemplation of ss .. 19-A or 19-B of the Act. Such a situation came up for cJnsideration before a Division Bench (consisting of Sharma and Khosla JJ) of the Punjab High Court in Harchand Singh v. Punjab State. (1) Sharma J. who spoke for the Bench, made these observations:\n\n.. There can be no doubt that in the instant case the surplus :-.rea was to be determined on the date the Act came into force i.e. 15th April 1953, and further that the area in the cultivating p0ssession of a tenant if within the prescribed limit was also to be excluded from consideration. Section 10-A governs the dis position of land which was comprised in a surplus area at the commencement of the Act and not the land which was not surplus on that date or had become surplus after the coming into force of the Act. The latter case was evidently covered by ss. l 9-A and 19-B of the Act. ............. the mere change in tenancies will not attract the provisions of these sections provided the area which the tenant conies to occupy thereby does not exceed the permissible area. By changing a tenancy a landlord also can\n\nn:Jt be said to have acquired the land comprising the tenancy because the land (which) belonged to him before hand continued to belong to him after the change in tenancy. The term \"acquire\"' has not been defined in the Act and so we have to accept its dictionary meaning as, \"To make property one's own. To gain per manently. It is regularly applied to permanent acquisition· (Bouvier's Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopaedia, Eighth Edition, Vol. I. P. 114)\"\n\n(1) 0964) 66 P.L.R. 285; 1963 P.L.J. 144.\n\nPUNJAB V. AMAR SINGH (Sarkaria, }.) 199\n\nA These observations, in my opinion, contain a correct statement of law on the point.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, I would hold that these two fields could not be included in the surplus area of the landowner, Smt. Lachman and s.lO-A was not attracted to a disposition of these fields either by B an order made under s. 18 or otherwise.\n\nIn the result, I would dismiss both these appeals, leaving the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.\n\nORDER\n\nIn acordance with the Judgment of the majority, the appeals are allowed, but in the circumstances, the parties will bear their costs throughout.\n\nV.P.S.", "total_entities": 437, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB (NOW HARYANA) AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB (NOW HARYANA) AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AMAR SINGH AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMAR SINGH AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 21, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 86, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AMAR SINGH AND ANOTHER\n\nJanuary 21, 1974\n\n[D. G. PALEJCAR, V. R. KRISHNA lYEil AND R. S. SARIWUA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(Sa)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 428, "end_char": 436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act", "statute": "Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act"}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 994, "end_char": 1004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act", "statute": "Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1912, "end_char": 1917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2744, "end_char": 2749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3000, "end_char": 3005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Palekar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3056, "end_char": 3063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Allowing the appeals to this Court,\n\nHELD : Pe, Palekar and Krishna Iyer, 11. ("}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3068, "end_char": 3080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Allowing the appeals to this Court,\n\nHELD : Pe, Palekar and Krishna Iyer, 11. (", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "aria", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3092, "end_char": 3096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Satl:aria J. dissenting) : l(a) The public policy of s. lOA cannot be outwitted by consent rs calculated to defeat the provision, and, without the statutory authority charscd with the inquiry being satisfied about the bonafides of and eligibility for, the purchase. ("}}, {"text": "s 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4104, "end_char": 4107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4257, "end_char": 4261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4804, "end_char": 4808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5271, "end_char": 5276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5311, "end_char": 5316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State, not being a party to that onkr, many case, canryot be b<; und by 1t, wh:u.:vcr may b: the cffc;; t as between the p.rt ies to those procccdmgs."}}, {"text": "Ss. 10 and 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5668, "end_char": 5681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7663, "end_char": 7666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8850, "end_char": 8855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9172, "end_char": 9177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10A(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9802, "end_char": 9811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10631, "end_char": 10638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11732, "end_char": 11736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.\n\n18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11934, "end_char": 11940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12124, "end_char": 12129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1Q", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12185, "end_char": 12190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12606, "end_char": 12611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Per Sarkaria", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13747, "end_char": 13759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Sarkaria J. (dissenting) :\n\n(1) (a)\" The Collector (Surplus Area) would be entitled to ignore the order of the Asstt."}}, {"text": "S. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13885, "end_char": 13890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14486, "end_char": 14491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15102, "end_char": 15107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15665, "end_char": 15670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15793, "end_char": 15798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30-11-1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16021, "end_char": 16031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2479/72 decided on 30-11-1973, Smt."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16269, "end_char": 16274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16721, "end_char": 16726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 24 and 2S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16738, "end_char": 16751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 80 to 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16763, "end_char": 16775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16783, "end_char": 16807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "is nothing in the Act or the Rules framed under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16815, "end_char": 16870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17014, "end_char": 17019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is nothing in the Act or the Rules framed under the Act", "statute": "There is nothing in the Act or the Rules framed under the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17810, "end_char": 17815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is nothing in the Act or the Rules framed under the Act", "statute": "There is nothing in the Act or the Rules framed under the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18200, "end_char": 18205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19116, "end_char": 19121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19170, "end_char": 19174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19225, "end_char": 19230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19894, "end_char": 19904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10A(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20570, "end_char": 20579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21095, "end_char": 21100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21751, "end_char": 21756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22406, "end_char": 22412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23050, "end_char": 23056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23346, "end_char": 23351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "c. Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24226, "end_char": 24236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. c. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellants.", "canonical_name": "c. Mahajan"}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24241, "end_char": 24255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. c. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. K. Dhingra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24278, "end_char": 24291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Dhingra for the respondents.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Dhingra"}}, {"text": "D. G. PALEKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24330, "end_char": 24343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of D. G. PALEKAR and V. R. XJUSHNA IYER.,", "canonical_name": "D. G. PALEKAR"}}, {"text": "V. R. XJUSHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24348, "end_char": 24366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of D. G. PALEKAR and V. R. XJUSHNA IYER.,"}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKAIUA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24407, "end_char": 24421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. S. SARKAIUA, J. ga.ve a dissenting\n\nOpinion."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24456, "end_char": 24468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KRISHNA IYER, J. These two appeals by the State of Haryana challenge the High Court's approach to an interpretation of twocrucial provisions of a land reforms law, namely, ss.", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "State of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24498, "end_char": 24514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KRISHNA IYER, J. These two appeals by the State of Haryana challenge the High Court's approach to an interpretation of twocrucial provisions of a land reforms law, namely, ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24628, "end_char": 24634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24830, "end_char": 24835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24841, "end_char": 24846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25140, "end_char": 25145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lachhman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26538, "end_char": 26546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A lady by name Lachhman had considerable agricultural property, far in excess of the relatively liberal ceiling set by the Act which came into force on April 15, 1953.", "canonical_name": "Lachlunan"}}, {"text": "April 15, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26675, "end_char": 26689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A lady by name Lachhman had considerable agricultural property, far in excess of the relatively liberal ceiling set by the Act which came into force on April 15, 1953."}}, {"text": "Shanti Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26710, "end_char": 26721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She had a daughter Shanti Devi and son-in-law Amar Singh, respondent in Civil Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Shanti Devi"}}, {"text": "Amar Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26737, "end_char": 26747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She had a daughter Shanti Devi and son-in-law Amar Singh, respondent in Civil Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "A mar Singh"}}, {"text": "Indraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26808, "end_char": 26814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1755 of 1967, whose brother Indraj is the respondent in the connected appeal No."}}, {"text": "AnneKure", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26876, "end_char": 26884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AnneKure (B) to the writ petitions is an order dated May 11, 1962 passed under the Act and the Rules by the Collector (Surplus Area) Sirsa."}}, {"text": "May 11, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26929, "end_char": 26941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AnneKure (B) to the writ petitions is an order dated May 11, 1962 passed under the Act and the Rules by the Collector (Surplus Area) Sirsa."}}, {"text": "Sirsa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27009, "end_char": 27014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AnneKure (B) to the writ petitions is an order dated May 11, 1962 passed under the Act and the Rules by the Collector (Surplus Area) Sirsa."}}, {"text": "Chandu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27520, "end_char": 27526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "under her, Chandu and Sri Chand, on other two plots.", "canonical_name": "Chandu"}}, {"text": "Sri Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27531, "end_char": 27540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "under her, Chandu and Sri Chand, on other two plots."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27804, "end_char": 27809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28257, "end_char": 28263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the outset it must be mentioned that the two tenants, Chandu and Sri Chand who.", "canonical_name": "Chandu"}}, {"text": "Shanti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29748, "end_char": 29754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti (vide mutation No: 445 decided on December 24, 1953 and referred to in Annexqre B).", "canonical_name": "Shanti Devi"}}, {"text": "December 24, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29789, "end_char": 29806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti (vide mutation No: 445 decided on December 24, 1953 and referred to in Annexqre B)."}}, {"text": "A mar Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29869, "end_char": 29880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, jt is seen that A mar Singh, husband of Shant i and Indrj.", "canonical_name": "A mar Singh"}}, {"text": "Shant i", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29893, "end_char": 29900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, jt is seen that A mar Singh, husband of Shant i and Indrj.", "canonical_name": "Shanti Devi"}}, {"text": "Amai Siqgh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29924, "end_char": 29934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "brotlier of Amai Siqgh purported to apply for purchase of the titt'dholders rigbt in these three plots under s. 18 of the Act making Lachlunan and Shanti co-respondents and alleging that they were tenants • qualified .for the statutory benefit."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30021, "end_char": 30026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lachlunan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30045, "end_char": 30054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "brotlier of Amai Siqgh purported to apply for purchase of the titt'dholders rigbt in these three plots under s. 18 of the Act making Lachlunan and Shanti co-respondents and alleging that they were tenants • qualified .for the statutory benefit.", "canonical_name": "Lachlunan"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32116, "end_char": 32121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shamsher Bahadur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33128, "end_char": 33144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A brief introduction is found in the reference order of the Full Bench (Shamsher Bahadur, J.) in Mam Raj v. State D/\n\nPutjab : (1)\n\n\"The Act passed on 15th of April, 1953, w.as not the first legislation on the subject and tlie contours of many of the concepts had already taken shape in the two earlier enactments on the subject, namely, the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act, 1950 (Act No."}}, {"text": "15th of April, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33207, "end_char": 33226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A brief introduction is found in the reference order of the Full Bench (Shamsher Bahadur, J.) in Mam Raj v. State D/\n\nPutjab : (1)\n\n\"The Act passed on 15th of April, 1953, w.as not the first legislation on the subject and tlie contours of many of the concepts had already taken shape in the two earlier enactments on the subject, namely, the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act, 1950 (Act No."}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33505, "end_char": 33524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1 Sth of August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33981, "end_char": 34002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "designed \"to provide for the security of land tenure and other incidental matters ...\n\nAs is clear from the preamble, the primary object was the protection of tenants whose ejectments recently from holdings held by landowners owning vast tracts of lands, had taken place on a massive scale: In restoring the rights of tenants ejected after 1 Sth of August, 1947, care was taken that landlords with small holdings were not subjected to harassment by the tenants."}}, {"text": "State of", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34284, "end_char": 34292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A small landowner was described as a person whose entire holding in the State of Punjab did not exceed the permissible area which though fixed at 100 standard acres in the Act of 1950 was reduced to 30 standard acr-es in the Act."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34293, "end_char": 34299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A small landowner was described as a person whose entire holding in the State of Punjab did not exceed the permissible area which though fixed at 100 standard acres in the Act of 1950 was reduced to 30 standard acr-es in the Act."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34744, "end_char": 34753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34934, "end_char": 34943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35090, "end_char": 35102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "reserved areas and the right of the tenants who had been ejected after the 15th August, 1947, for restoration to the tenancies was recognised."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35306, "end_char": 35316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tenurei Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40020, "end_char": 40037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41082, "end_char": 41089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41224, "end_char": 41236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Security of Tenures Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41318, "end_char": 41341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": 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"STATUTE", "start_char": 43050, "end_char": 43093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 5, 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43098, "end_char": 43111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Security of land Tenures Rules, 1956", "statute": "the Punjab Security of land Tenures Rules, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43451, "end_char": 43455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Security of land Tenures Rules, 1956", "statute": "the Punjab Security of land Tenures Rules, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43895, "end_char": 43899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Security of land Tenures Rules, 1956", "statute": "the Punjab Security of land Tenures Rules, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44101, "end_char": 44105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44194, "end_char": 44199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44450, "end_char": 44454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45772, "end_char": 45776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46192, "end_char": 46197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46709, "end_char": 46719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47191, "end_char": 47196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47593, "end_char": 47598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PUNJAB V. AMAR SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47973, "end_char": 47993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iii) ... :\n\nD '\n\nPUNJAB V. AMAR SINGH (Krishna lyer, J.)\n\nshall be entitled to purchase from the land-ownt'r the land so held by him but not included in the reserved area of the landowner, in the case of a tenant fa1ling within clause (i) or clause\n\n(ii) at any time, and in the case of a tenant falling within clause {iii) within a period of one year from the date of commencement\n\nof this Act: Provided that ....\n\nProvided further that. ... \"", "canonical_name": "PUNJAB V. AMAR SINGH"}}, {"text": "Krishna lyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47995, "end_char": 48007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iii) ... :\n\nD '\n\nPUNJAB V. AMAR SINGH (Krishna lyer, J.)\n\nshall be entitled to purchase from the land-ownt'r the land so held by him but not included in the reserved area of the landowner, in the case of a tenant fa1ling within clause (i) or clause\n\n(ii) at any time, and in the case of a tenant falling within clause {iii) within a period of one year from the date of commencement\n\nof this Act: Provided that ....\n\nProvided further that. ... \"", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48429, "end_char": 48434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48630, "end_char": 48635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48640, "end_char": 48645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48703, "end_char": 48708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Narula", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49160, "end_char": 49166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned judge, Narula, J., stated at the outset:\n\n\"I have to take the fact as found by the Collector for the purposes of determining the surplus area of the landowner and consequently for determining the rights of the petitioners so far as they are sought to be interfered with by the impugned order.\""}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49629, "end_char": 49639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49818, "end_char": 49828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49916, "end_char": 49926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50011, "end_char": 50021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50187, "end_char": 50197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50204, "end_char": 50214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50975, "end_char": 50980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50992, "end_char": 50997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51758, "end_char": 51763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51770, "end_char": 51775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52325, "end_char": 52331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52599, "end_char": 52604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Aprill5, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52820, "end_char": 52833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover, a permissible area of a tenant is excluded by definition from 'surplus area', obviously because the tenant can stabilise himself on his permissible area and it is not intended to dislodge him therefrom for re-settling other tenants under s. 10-A. Therefore, Narula, J., concludes:\n\n\"A survey of the above-mentioned provisions ofthe Act leave no doubt that if Chandu and Sri Chand who were the tenants of the land now comprised in the tenancy of Amar Singh on Aprill5, 1953, had continued to be the tenants of that parcel of land, subsequently the land in their tenancy could not be included in the permissible area of the landowner."}}, {"text": "section 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53164, "end_char": 53177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54727, "end_char": 54737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56051, "end_char": 56075, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.2(5-a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57320, "end_char": 57328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57910, "end_char": 57916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58137, "end_char": 58143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58666, "end_char": 58671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59227, "end_char": 59232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59322, "end_char": 59332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59456, "end_char": 59464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59619, "end_char": 59624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60121, "end_char": 60126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60136, "end_char": 60141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60199, "end_char": 60204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60259, "end_char": 60264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60344, "end_char": 60349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60399, "end_char": 60404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60606, "end_char": 60611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60626, "end_char": 60631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 10", "label": 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"regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62014, "end_char": 62024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62811, "end_char": 62816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63439, "end_char": 63444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63790, "end_char": 63795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63900, "end_char": 63905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64112, "end_char": 64117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64170, "end_char": 64175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": 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"metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67449, "end_char": 67454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67782, "end_char": 67787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67827, "end_char": 67832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67861, "end_char": 67866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67899, "end_char": 67904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68067, "end_char": 68072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dhingra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 68239, "end_char": 68246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Dhingra relied on Sahib Ram v. The Financial Commissioner."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68415, "end_char": 68420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vaidialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68457, "end_char": 68469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vaidialingam, J., took care to refer to the case uner appeal now before us (Amar Singh's case) and said that it dealt w1th the scope of s. 10-A aild did not bear upon the point before them."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68593, "end_char": 68598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Khasra Girdawari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69208, "end_char": 69224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and it is crystal clear that Amar Singh and Indraj had not been in continuous cultivating possession of this land for full six years, the other copy of Khasra Girdawari put in this case and which is to be found at page 27 of the file, shows the possession over this land of Indraj and Amar Singh only from the year 1957-58, and so their possession over it for full :oix years is rtot complete as yet.\"", "canonical_name": "Khasra Girdawari"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69690, "end_char": 69695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69810, "end_char": 69815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70139, "end_char": 70144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 S.C.R. 7911", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 70612, "end_char": 70632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71560, "end_char": 71565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 71579, "end_char": 71599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71625, "end_char": 71635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 71643, "end_char": 71667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71828, "end_char": 71833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887", "statute": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "Section\n\n18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72004, "end_char": 72015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887", "statute": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "Lacchman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72136, "end_char": 72144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lacchman?", "canonical_name": "Lachlunan"}}, {"text": "s.18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72318, "end_char": 72322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887", "statute": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72818, "end_char": 72823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72877, "end_char": 72882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73155, "end_char": 73162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73551, "end_char": 73556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73622, "end_char": 73627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73646, "end_char": 73651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73671, "end_char": 73676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74006, "end_char": 74010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 74021, "end_char": 74045, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mulla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75367, "end_char": 75372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned author, Mulla, in his Com~ mentary on Order XXIII r. 3(CivilProcedure Code, vol.ll, pp."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76693, "end_char": 76698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1969] 2 S.C.R. 432", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 77041, "end_char": 77060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79722, "end_char": 79727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 79729, "end_char": 79734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80002, "end_char": 80007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "K. K. Chari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 81314, "end_char": 81325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand K. K. Chari's case (supra) is a s-tudy in contrast.", "canonical_name": "K. K.\n\nChari"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81876, "end_char": 81881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. K.\n\nChari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 81945, "end_char": 81957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, unlike in K. K.\n\nChari's case, no material existed on record to warrant a finding (a) regarding the tenancy, (b) continuous occupation for over 6 'years,\n\n(c) the surplus area being unaffected.", "canonical_name": "K. K.\n\nChari"}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82490, "end_char": 82495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 82497, "end_char": 82502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83070, "end_char": 83075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83420, "end_char": 83425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "art. 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83506, "end_char": 83513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83518, "end_char": 83525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SARKAlUA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85385, "end_char": 85393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SARKAlUA J.-I have gone through the judgment prepared by E my learned brother, Krishna Iyer J. Since I cannot fully liUbs.cribe to the reasoning and the view taken therein, I have thought it fit to record my own opinion separately.", "canonical_name": "SARKAlUA"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1Xc)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85695, "end_char": 85708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86120, "end_char": 86130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86316, "end_char": 86326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86417, "end_char": 86427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86513, "end_char": 86523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PUNJAB V", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86661, "end_char": 86669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "stage; and\n\nPUNJAB V, AMAR SINGH (Sarkaria, J.) 177\n\n(iii) In case of conflict between section IO.A and section 18 of the Act, which cf the two provisions has supervening effect or overrides the other.\"", "canonical_name": "PUNJAB V"}}, {"text": "AMAR SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86671, "end_char": 86681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "stage; and\n\nPUNJAB V, AMAR SINGH (Sarkaria, J.) 177\n\n(iii) In case of conflict between section IO.A and section 18 of the Act, which cf the two provisions has supervening effect or overrides the other.\"", "canonical_name": "A mar Singh"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86753, "end_char": 86763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lachhrnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 87416, "end_char": 87425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lachhrnan (hereinafter referred to as the 'landowner') owned 101 6 standard acres, equivalent to 404 10 ordinary acres, of land in the revenue estates of two villages, namely, Darba Kalan and Nahran Wali.", "canonical_name": "Lachlunan"}}, {"text": "Darba Kalan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 87592, "end_char": 87603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lachhrnan (hereinafter referred to as the 'landowner') owned 101 6 standard acres, equivalent to 404 10 ordinary acres, of land in the revenue estates of two villages, namely, Darba Kalan and Nahran Wali."}}, {"text": "Nahran Wali", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 87608, "end_char": 87619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lachhrnan (hereinafter referred to as the 'landowner') owned 101 6 standard acres, equivalent to 404 10 ordinary acres, of land in the revenue estates of two villages, namely, Darba Kalan and Nahran Wali."}}, {"text": "Nathu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 88063, "end_char": 88068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "265 and 343, measuring 67 bighas and 19 biswas were in the occupation of two tenants, namely, Sri Chand and Nathu."}}, {"text": "April 24, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 88743, "end_char": 88757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These alienations were ignored by the Surplus Area collector as per his order dated April 24, 1961, while declaring the surplus area of the landowner."}}, {"text": "May 2, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 88944, "end_char": 88955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 2, 1961, Amar Singh made an application under s. 18 of the Act bt:fore the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, for purchase of the land comprised in Field Nos."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88994, "end_char": 88999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "HardyaJ Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 89370, "end_char": 89383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After servjng notice on all concerned, Shri HardyaJ Singh, Assitant Colkctor 1st Grade allowed these applications on September 15, 1961, on the basis of a compromise between the applicants and the landowner.", "canonical_name": "HardyaJ Singh"}}, {"text": "September 15, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 89443, "end_char": 89461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After servjng notice on all concerned, Shri HardyaJ Singh, Assitant Colkctor 1st Grade allowed these applications on September 15, 1961, on the basis of a compromise between the applicants and the landowner."}}, {"text": "lndraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 89729, "end_char": 89735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lndraj also in his case deposited the price assessed by the Collector."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89923, "end_char": 89928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dccembr 21, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 90017, "end_char": 90033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner on Dccembr 21, 1961, taking notice of the statutory purcha$Cs of these fields by Amar Singh and Indraj under s. 18, ;:Uowed their ap})fal u.nd remanded the case to the Collector for de noro enquiry regarding the area in occl.ipation of Amar Singh and Jndraj as tenants under the landowner."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90123, "end_char": 90128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jndraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 90265, "end_char": 90271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner on Dccembr 21, 1961, taking notice of the statutory purcha$Cs of these fields by Amar Singh and Indraj under s. 18, ;:Uowed their ap})fal u.nd remanded the case to the Collector for de noro enquiry regarding the area in occl.ipation of Amar Singh and Jndraj as tenants under the landowner."}}, {"text": "Hardya] Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 90380, "end_char": 90393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Hardya] Singh, as Collector, Sutplus Area, passed the impugned order, dated May 1 I, 1962, whereby he declared 408 JO ordinary acres equal to I OJ 61 standard acres as the surplus area of Smt.", "canonical_name": "HardyaJ Singh"}}, {"text": "May 1 I, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 90456, "end_char": 90469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Hardya] Singh, as Collector, Sutplus Area, passed the impugned order, dated May 1 I, 1962, whereby he declared 408 JO ordinary acres equal to I OJ 61 standard acres as the surplus area of Smt."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90791, "end_char": 90796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 91227, "end_char": 91237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amar Singh and lndraj filed two separate writ petitions under Art.", "canonical_name": "A mar Singh"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91289, "end_char": 91297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91786, "end_char": 91795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91979, "end_char": 91990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92125, "end_char": 92135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92294, "end_char": 92304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92743, "end_char": 92747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92984, "end_char": 92989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 93938, "end_char": 93957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94440, "end_char": 94447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1951", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 94641, "end_char": 94670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94782, "end_char": 94791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887", "statute": "the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95084, "end_char": 95090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887", "statute": "the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "s. 2(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95255, "end_char": 95262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887", "statute": "the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "Land Resettlement Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 95270, "end_char": 95297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95413, "end_char": 95422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fivefold object of the Act, endorsed by Subba Rao J. (as he then was) speaking for this Cottrt in Gurbax Singh v: State of Punjab(1) is toil) [1967] I, S.C.R. 926."}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95778, "end_char": 95782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Resettlement Act, 1949", "statute": "the Land Resettlement Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Section 17 and 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96193, "end_char": 96210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Resettlement Act, 1949", "statute": "the Land Resettlement Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "JI Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 96344, "end_char": 96357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96707, "end_char": 96714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "JI Punjab Act", "statute": "JI Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "sections 2, 5, 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96953, "end_char": 96969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "JI Punjab Act", "statute": "JI Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96995, "end_char": 97004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "JI Punjab Act", "statute": "JI Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "Sections 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97632, "end_char": 97642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 20, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 97729, "end_char": 97746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since, for one reason or the other many landowners could uot exercise their right of reservation within the period of six months originally fixed by the 1953 Act, Sections 5-A, 5-B and 5-C were in\n\nerted by the Amending Act 46 of 1957 which came into force on December 20, 1957."}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97748, "end_char": 97757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97966, "end_char": 97972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 22, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 98159, "end_char": 98173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3223-LR-II-57;1624 published in the Gazette Extraordinary of March 22, 1958, consequently, a landowner could make the selection of his permissible area within six montf1s of date.,"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98360, "end_char": 98364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98398, "end_char": 98402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98466, "end_char": 98470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98596, "end_char": 98599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98861, "end_char": 98865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99055, "end_char": 99059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99485, "end_char": 99490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act XI of that year inserted in the principal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99601, "end_char": 99650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(5-a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99679, "end_char": 99688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act XI of that year inserted in the principal Act", "statute": "Act XI of that year inserted in the principal Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99898, "end_char": 99902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act XI of that year inserted in the principal Act", "statute": "Act XI of that year inserted in the principal Act"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99965, "end_char": 99974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act XI of that year inserted in the principal Act", "statute": "Act XI of that year inserted in the principal Act"}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100049, "end_char": 100059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act XI of that year inserted in the principal Act", "statute": "Act XI of that year inserted in the principal Act"}}, {"text": "Punjab and Haryana High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 100779, "end_char": 100808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Dhaunkal v. Ma11 Kauri, (1) speaking through Meltar Singh C. J. summed up the inter connection between these concepts thus: ·\n\n\"Accordjng to these provisions (of sections 5, 5-A 5-lJ, 5-C read with Rule 6 of the 1956 Rules framed under the Act) a landowner or a tenant who has more than 30 standard acres of land has to select or reserve his permissible area and the excess is available as surplus area."}}, {"text": "Meltar Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100857, "end_char": 100869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Dhaunkal v. Ma11 Kauri, (1) speaking through Meltar Singh C. J. summed up the inter connection between these concepts thus: ·\n\n\"Accordjng to these provisions (of sections 5, 5-A 5-lJ, 5-C read with Rule 6 of the 1956 Rules framed under the Act) a landowner or a tenant who has more than 30 standard acres of land has to select or reserve his permissible area and the excess is available as surplus area."}}, {"text": "sections 5, 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100974, "end_char": 100987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103262, "end_char": 103267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103457, "end_char": 103466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103675, "end_char": 103679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104061, "end_char": 104066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sarkaria", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104406, "end_char": 104414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now let us have a close look at the provisions of s. 18, which, as amended by Punjab Act Il of 1955 runs thus:\n\n\"18 (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law usage or contract, a tenant of a landowner other than small landowner-\n\n(i) who has been in continuous occupation of the land comprised in his tenancy for a minimum period of six\n\nyears, or\n\nPUNJAB V. AMAR SINGH (Sarkaria, J.)\n\n(ii) who has been restored to h:s tenancy under the provisions of this Act and whose periods of continuous occupation of the land comprised in his tenancy immediately before ejectment and immediately after restoration of his tenancy together amount to six years or more, or {iii) who was ejected from his tenancy after the 14th day of August 1947 and before the commencement of this Act, and who was in continuous occupation of the land comprised in his tenancy for a period of six years or more immediately before his ejectment,\n\nshall be entitled to purchase from the landowner the land so held by him but not included in the reserved area of the landowner, in the case of a tenant faUing within dause(i) or clause ( ii) at any time, and in the case of a tenant falling within clause\n\n(iii) within a period of one year from the date of the commencement of this Act;\n\nPro\\idetl ..\n\nProvided further ....\n\n(2) A tenant desirous of purchasing land under subsection (1) shall make an application in writing to an Assistant Collector of First Grade having jurisdiction over the land concerned, and the Assistant Collector, after giving notice to tht\"\n\nlandowner and to all other persons interested in the land and after making such inquiry as he thinks fit, shall determine (formerly the word was 'fix') the average of the prices obtaining E for similar land in the lccality during I 0 years immediately preceding the date on wilich the application is made.", "canonical_name": "SARKAlUA"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106975, "end_char": 106979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107000, "end_char": 107004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107283, "end_char": 107288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107574, "end_char": 107582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 14, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 108076, "end_char": 108091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are :\n\n(i) a tenant who has been in continuous occupation of the land for a minimum period of six years ;\n\n(ii) a tenant restored to his tenancy under the Act and whose period of continuous occupation of the land comprised in his tenancy immediately before ejectment and after restoration amounts to six years or more ; and\n\n(iii) a tenant who was ejected from his tenancy after-August 14, 1947 arid before Apri115, 1953, and who was in continuous occupation of the land comprised in his\n\ntenancy for a period of six years or more immediately before his ejectment.\""}}, {"text": "s. 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108318, "end_char": 108326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109217, "end_char": 109222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 S.C. R. 796", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 109313, "end_char": 109333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sahib Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 109418, "end_char": 109427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sahib Ram's case (supra) also, this Court was dealing with a case of tenants of this sub-category.", "canonical_name": "Sahib Ram"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109802, "end_char": 109806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18(1)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109936, "end_char": 109953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110062, "end_char": 110067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April I 5, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 110163, "end_char": 110178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 18(1)(ii) gives a right to tenant to .purchase the land ; and that right has to be examined when an application under s. 18 is made and cannot be deemed on the ground that he was not a tenant for more than six years on April I 5, 1953."}}, {"text": "s. 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110230, "end_char": 110238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April\n\n15. 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 110381, "end_char": 110396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no limitation placed under clause (i) of s. 18(1) that the tenant who exercises his right should be a tenant on the date of the Act or that he should have completed the period of six years on April\n\n15."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110694, "end_char": 110699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111229, "end_char": 111234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111571, "end_char": 111580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112447, "end_char": 112457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Act XI of 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 112506, "end_char": 112527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Later Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 112610, "end_char": 112626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112714, "end_char": 112718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Later Punjab Act", "statute": "Later Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "April 16, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 112831, "end_char": 112845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Statement of Objects and Reasons published in the Punjab Gazette Extraordinary on April 16, 1955, lists among others, the main objects of Act XI of 1955 :\n\n\"to prevent large scale ejectment of tenants to introduce new concepts of surplus area and its utilization by the State Government for the resettlement of ejected tenants .... to coordinate the e:ectment of tenants with their resettlement on surplus area .... to prevent sales and other dispositions of land adversely affecting the continuance of tenancies and the extent of available surplus area ; to reduce the period (from J 2 to 6 years) entitling a tenar, t to purchase the land comprised in his renancy an.d to provide for easier terms of purchase ; and other incidental matters."}}, {"text": "s.2(5-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113635, "end_char": 113643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113648, "end_char": 113653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113786, "end_char": 113791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 2(5-a), 6, 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114105, "end_char": 114127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114220, "end_char": 114229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114273, "end_char": 114283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114575, "end_char": 114585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114644, "end_char": 114649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 115154, "end_char": 115160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the right to purchase their\n\n<.1•\n\nB ...\n\nPUNJAB ~·.", "canonical_name": "PUNJAB V"}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115388, "end_char": 115398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115485, "end_char": 115490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115953, "end_char": 115958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116151, "end_char": 116156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5B(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116465, "end_char": 116478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116483, "end_char": 116492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116734, "end_char": 116743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117168, "end_char": 117173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117188, "end_char": 117198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 80, 81, 83 and 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117236, "end_char": 117257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 117265, "end_char": 117289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117345, "end_char": 117350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887", "statute": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117370, "end_char": 117375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887", "statute": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "Sections 81 and 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117394, "end_char": 117412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887", "statute": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "s. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117523, "end_char": 117528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887", "statute": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "s. 82(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117939, "end_char": 117947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887", "statute": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118086, "end_char": 118091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887", "statute": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118244, "end_char": 118249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887", "statute": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "is nothing in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder or in tke Tenancy Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 119000, "end_char": 119074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119199, "end_char": 119204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is nothing in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder or in tke Tenancy Act", "statute": "There is nothing in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder or in tke Tenancy Act"}}, {"text": "Lindley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119539, "end_char": 119546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Firstly there is a catena of authorities which, following the doctrine -of Lindley L.J. in re Securities Insurance Co.(l) have laid down the rule that a person who is not a party to a decree or order may with the leave of the Court, prefer an app.::al from such decree or order if he' .. 'is either bound by the order or is aggrieved by it or is prejudicially .affected by it.\""}}, {"text": "Revenue Officers exercising jurisdiction under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 120301, "end_char": 120355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122081, "end_char": 122086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 122407, "end_char": 122414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Mahajan, learned Counsel for the appellant~State contends that the Collector, , Surplus Area had rightly ignored the sale orders dated September 15, 1961, of the Collector purportedly passed under s. 18, in favour of Amar Singh and Indraj and that the view taken by\n\nthe High Court is wrong, because--\n\n(a) the lease made by the landowner in favour of these Respon~\n\ndents, was itself a \"transfer of land\" effecting the utilization of surplus area, and as such, was hit by clause (b) of of s. 10-A, and the orders obtained on the basis of that lease could not stand on a better footing;\n\n(b) the expression \"transfer\" in clause (b) of this section includes.", "canonical_name": "c. Mahajan"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122604, "end_char": 122609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122897, "end_char": 122902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123729, "end_char": 123734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123743, "end_char": 123753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123826, "end_char": 123831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123898, "end_char": 123903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. K. Dhingra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124024, "end_char": 124037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply, Mr. S. K. Dhingra, !", "canonical_name": "S. K. Dhingra"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124201, "end_char": 124206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Saheb Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 124560, "end_char": 124569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance has been placed on this Court's decision in Saheb Ram's case (supra).", "canonical_name": "Sahib Ram"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124656, "end_char": 124661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125094, "end_char": 125099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125257, "end_char": 125262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125339, "end_char": 125343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125868, "end_char": 125873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "admittedAmar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 126365, "end_char": 126383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Great emphasis has been placed on the fact that in reply to the writ petition of Amar Singh, the State in their writtet\\ -statement had admittedAmar Singh's averment as to his being a tena\n\nnt of the land for the requisite period."}}, {"text": "Kha3ra Girdawari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 126577, "end_char": 126593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even the Surplus Area Authority, it is pointed out, conceded in his impugned order that according to the copy of the Kha3ra Girdawari on the file, Amar Singh and Tndraj were in occupation of the land as tenants since 1957-58, though such occupation was held to be of less than six years.", "canonical_name": "Khasra Girdawari"}}, {"text": "Tndraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 126622, "end_char": 126628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even the Surplus Area Authority, it is pointed out, conceded in his impugned order that according to the copy of the Kha3ra Girdawari on the file, Amar Singh and Tndraj were in occupation of the land as tenants since 1957-58, though such occupation was held to be of less than six years."}}, {"text": "Septemher 15,1961,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 126812, "end_char": 126830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 'these circumstances proceeds the argument, the order dated Septemher 15,1961, passed by the Collector under s. I 8, on the basis of com- -promise, could not be treated as totally void and non-{.?st; at the most they were erroneous-orders passed by the Collector in the exercise of the distinct jurisdiction particularly conferred on him by s. 18(2)."}}, {"text": "s. 18(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127093, "end_char": 127101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127516, "end_char": 127521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 80 to 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127705, "end_char": 127717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128434, "end_char": 128439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128727, "end_char": 128732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129256, "end_char": 129261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129367, "end_char": 129372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129758, "end_char": 129766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Khasra Girdawri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 130275, "end_char": 130290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the obsen, atipn of the Surplus Area Collector, the copy of the Khasra Girdawri on the file showed that their possession as te.nants was from 1957-58 i.e. for about 4t years only.", "canonical_name": "Khasra Girdawari"}}, {"text": "2nd of May 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 130721, "end_char": 130736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[ 19741 3 S.C.R.\n\nto note further that Amar Singh in para 2 of his writ petition pleaded:\n\n\"That on the 2nd of May 1961, the petitioner having been in continuous occupation of land comprised in his tenancy for a period of six years applied under s. 18 of the .... Act for purchase of the above land, and by his order dated 15th September 1961, Shri Hardial Singh, Assistant Collector lst Giai!,"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130863, "end_char": 130868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hardial Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 130966, "end_char": 130979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[ 19741 3 S.C.R.\n\nto note further that Amar Singh in para 2 of his writ petition pleaded:\n\n\"That on the 2nd of May 1961, the petitioner having been in continuous occupation of land comprised in his tenancy for a period of six years applied under s. 18 of the .... Act for purchase of the above land, and by his order dated 15th September 1961, Shri Hardial Singh, Assistant Collector lst Giai!,", "canonical_name": "HardyaJ Singh"}}, {"text": "Sira District Hissar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 131012, "end_char": 131032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sira District Hissar, allowed the petitioner to pur~ chase the above land at a price of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 2(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132071, "end_char": 132078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 29, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 133105, "end_char": 133123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Application of mind is evident from the circumstance that the Assistant Collector further assessed the price to be paid by each ofthe applicants w~()-tJtereafter, deposited the same in the Government Treasury on September 29, 1961."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133827, "end_char": 133832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "landlord brought an action under said Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 133989, "end_char": 134035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seshadri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 134065, "end_char": 134073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There\n\nthe landlord brought an action under said Rent Act, for eviction of his tenant, Seshadri from a house on the ground that he required it for his bona fide use and occupation.·"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134649, "end_char": 134654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There\n\nthe landlord brought an action under said Rent Act", "statute": "There\n\nthe landlord brought an action under said Rent Act"}}, {"text": "Dua", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134783, "end_char": 134786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vaidialingam J. (Dua J. concurring) laid don the law thus:\n\n\"The true position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the juri~ dictional fact viz.,"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135823, "end_char": 135828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136256, "end_char": 136265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To use the felicitious words of S. K. Das J. vide Smt.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Dhingra"}}, {"text": "30.1l.73", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 136832, "end_char": 136840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2479/72 decided on 30.1l.73."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137858, "end_char": 137863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138869, "end_char": 138879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139612, "end_char": 139618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 139646, "end_char": 139670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139691, "end_char": 139696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887", "statute": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "s 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139949, "end_char": 139953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887", "statute": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140341, "end_char": 140346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887", "statute": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141237, "end_char": 141242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141485, "end_char": 141490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142459, "end_char": 142465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142509, "end_char": 142514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April15, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 142798, "end_char": 142811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has also been seen that the self-sufficing machinery of this section is available for purchase of their tenancies to the tenants indcted before or after April15, 1953, by the landowner on land not bemg a part of his permifsible area, equally with tenants settled on such area by the Government."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142986, "end_char": 142991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143191, "end_char": 143196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 18 and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143297, "end_char": 143315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143609, "end_char": 143614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143713, "end_char": 143718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144165, "end_char": 144170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144403, "end_char": 144411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144502, "end_char": 144507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144578, "end_char": 144583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145690, "end_char": 145697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some of them in which involuntary transfers of a kind other than those specifically mentioned in the saving clause of clause (b) came up for consideration are reported in Bhajan Lal v. Punjab State(I) & Bislzan Singh v. Punjab\n\nState (2), This case decided by Mahajan J. proceeds on an interpretation of the same words used in s. 32-FF of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1953, which is in pari materia with s. 10-A of the Punjab Act; Lakshmi Raj v. State uf Haryana (3).", "canonical_name": "c. Mahajan"}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145757, "end_char": 145762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government under legal compulsion or by an heir by inheritance which were inserted by the Amending Act", "statute": "Government under legal compulsion or by an heir by inheritance which were inserted by the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "FF of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 145763, "end_char": 145819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145851, "end_char": 145856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "FF of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1953", "statute": "FF of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Snit. Lachchman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 146662, "end_char": 146677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lease created by Snit."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146755, "end_char": 146760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "FF of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1953", "statute": "FF of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Lachchman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 147879, "end_char": 147888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lachchman which has been found surplus is about 80 stanard acres.", "canonical_name": "Lachlunan"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149175, "end_char": 149180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2(5-a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149523, "end_char": 149531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1966) 2 S. C. R. 511", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 149636, "end_char": 149657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "15-4-53", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 149823, "end_char": 149830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since on the determinative date i.e. 15-4-53, Field Nos."}}, {"text": "s. 2(5-a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150021, "end_char": 150030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dhannkal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 150198, "end_char": 150206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time, when the Surplus\n\nArea Collector took up determination of the surplus area (which as pointed out in Dhannkal's case (supra) implies incidental verificatioa of the permissible areas of the landowner and the tenants, also) these fields were still comprised in a tenancy, though the holder of the tenancy was a different tenant."}}, {"text": "Sharma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 150807, "end_char": 150813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a situation came up for cJnsideration before a Division Bench (consisting of Sharma and Khosla JJ) of the Punjab High Court in Harchand Singh v. Punjab State. ("}}, {"text": "Khosla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 150818, "end_char": 150824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a situation came up for cJnsideration before a Division Bench (consisting of Sharma and Khosla JJ) of the Punjab High Court in Harchand Singh v. Punjab State. ("}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 150836, "end_char": 150853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a situation came up for cJnsideration before a Division Bench (consisting of Sharma and Khosla JJ) of the Punjab High Court in Harchand Singh v. Punjab State. ("}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151245, "end_char": 151255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PUNJAB V. AMAR SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 152286, "end_char": 152306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PUNJAB V. AMAR SINGH (Sarkaria, }.)", "canonical_name": "PUNJAB V. AMAR SINGH"}}, {"text": "Lachman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 152541, "end_char": 152548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lachman and s.lO-A was not attracted to a disposition of these fields either by B an order made under s. 18 or otherwise.", "canonical_name": "Lachlunan"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152643, "end_char": 152648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_200_206_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "SOM PARKASH\n\nSTATE OF DELHI\n\nJanuary 25, 1974\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ. ')\n\nPreventwn of Corrupt/011 Act, 1947_,.S(l)(d) and S(Z)-Whether trapping of co\"upt officials q polluted procedure-Whether inlestigating officers a suspect specles-\n\nWhetMr chemical test reliable.\n\nThe appellant, an Inspector of Central Excise, was charged under s.161, I.P.C. and S.S(l)(d) read with s.5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Ac~ 1947for having acoepted a bribe. He was convicted and sentenced by the Special ]udge. Tho High Court confirmed the conviction but reduced the sentence to one year's imprf .. sonment.\n\nTh~ allegation against the appellant was that he accepted a sum of Rs. SO/- as iilegal gratification, At the instance of the complainant the raiding police party passed on to the appellant currencr notes. worth Rs. 50 smeared with a chemical substance. On recovery of the money from his pocket traces of the chemical subs. tance were found n his fingers his kerchief and his trouser pocket.\n\nIt was contended (i) that trapping of corrupt officials in the usual course is a pot .. luted procedure (ii) the investigating officers arc a susp.ect species and (iii) the chemical test was not reliable.\n\nDismissing the appeal to this Court, HELD: It is not possible to accede to the theory that the trapping of corrupt officials in the usual course is a pol1uted procedure. Our social milieu is so vitiated by a superstitious belief that any official can be activised by illegal gratification, so confidential is the technique of giye and take in which the white.collar offender is an adept and so tough is the forensic problem of proof beyond reasonable doubt by good testimony in this area that the only hope of tracking down the tricky officers is by lying traps and creating statutory presumptions. Condemn2tion of all traps and associate witnesses is neither pragrnatic nor just. nor is it. fair to denounce -all public servants indiscriminately. Judjcial attitudes have to be discriminating. An awk'ard judicial conscience and an alert critical appraisal are the best tools in this process.\n\n[202 G; 203 A]\n\n(ii) Courts are aware of the exaggerated criticisms of the police force as a whole and of the reluctance of the framers of the Criminal Procedure Code to trust state .. ments recorded by police investigators, but these are, partly at least, the hangover of the British past. Today trust begets trust and the higher officers of the Jildian police, especially in the Special Police Establishment, deserve better credence. [203 DE]\n\n(iii) The evidence furnished b~ norganic chemistry often outwits the technology of corrupt officials, provided no aiternative reasonable possibility is made out. It is but meet that science-oriented detection of crime is made a massive programme of police work, for in our technological age nothing more primitive can be conceived of than denying the discoveries of the sciences as aids to crime suppression and nothing cruder can retard forensic efficiency than swearing by traditional oral evidence only thereby discouraging liberal use of scientific research to prove guilt. {204 EJ\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 143 of 1970.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 31st October, 1969 of the Delhi High Court at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 70 of 1967.\n\nThe appellant appeared in person.\n\nH. R. Khanna and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER J. The appellant, a quondam inspector of Central Excise, has argued his case with perspicacity and plausibility, taking liberal advantage of our solicitude for giving this lay man a lengthy hearing. The charge broadly stated, is one of corruption falling under s.161,1.P.C. ands. 5(J)(d), read with s.5(2), of the prevenion of Corruption Act, 1947 ; the proof of guilt is built on a trap laid by the Special police Establishment, apparantly clinched by processes of chemical detection ; and the uphill task of the accused is to challenge in this Court, under art. 136, the concurrent findings upholding his culpability. Undaunted he has attempted to explain the incriminating evidence with adroitness worthy of a better cause and has taken us critically through the testimony of the P. W.s in an effort to substantiate a credible case for his exculpation.\n\nNow, the story, P, W. 1, a young man in his late twenties, had started a small factory in Shadara, called Uma Engineering Corporation, for making insulated copper cables, around June, 1965., The whole process, except fitting the rubber insulation, was done m his premises and for this latter purpose the semi-finished goods used to be taken to another factory in Delhi. Insulated coils being dutiable articles, the Excise authorities had to issue gate passes for removal of even half finished items. According to a certain practice that prevailed till a little before the alleged commission of the offe11ce, when the article was not fully manufactured, its removal for the completion of the process was permitted without levy of duty in advance and gate passes were issued on this basis. However. this was a doubtful procedure and the accused did insist, at a certain stage, tha:t even removal for further processing was permissible only on payment of duty, thus antagonising P. W. I and hampering his business. Eventually. the Assistant Collector, as per Exhibit D-1, upheld the accuS.d's standand directed duty paid clearance or adherence to the system of bounds for payment later, according to r. 56 A of the relevant rules.\n\nApart from this, even duty paid finished goods could not leave the factory premises before a proforma ( c.J. Ex. D-2) was filled in, verified by the Excise inspector and signed by him. The embryonic industrialist, P., W. 1, when faced with the insistence on duty payment madeci>ntact> with the accused and was asked to initiate himself into the magical\n\nmeans of getting things done through monthly payments of Rs. l 00/· as \"speed money\". Being too virgin for this way to prosperity, P.W. I reacted by making a bee 'line to Sri Waswani, the Deputy Superintendent, Central Excise, with little benefit. Again, on August 4, 1965, he met the accused for getting him to verify the statement of manufac.tured goods to pay the duty thereon, but was turned' back, the softening sum of Rs. 100/- not having been offered.\n\nWe now move to the critical phase, On August 6, 1965, P. W. 1 goes to the office of the accused to get clearance of 2 finished bundles of cables. The demand for money is repeated but by this time P. W. 1 acquires skill in courtship and bargains for a smaller sum of Rs. 501 .\n\nWhereupon the accused signs the challan for the deposit of the excise duty on these finished products (vide Ex. P. 4). The bribe,\n\naccording to the understanding, is fixed to be paid next day in the afternoon. At this stage, P. W. 1 changes his mind and discloses his bosom to the S. P. E. Officers the next morning at Kotah House \\Ex. P. 5).. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, P. W. 7, swings rnto action with professional p; oficiency. Two officials, P. W. 3 and P. W. 4, from two different omces, are fixed up to witness the search, the programme of trapping is finalised and dramatised, the signal and other details worked out, the 5 currency notes making up Rs. 50/- smeared with phenolphthalein powder and the visible chemical reaction when even small particles thereof are dipped in sodium carborate solution demonstrated. The \"raiding party\" troops out after these preliminery operation are put down in Ex. P. 6.\n\nNow the scene shifts to the factory. The accused arrives, coca cola is served, the treacherous notes are passed and put into his gulltble pockets by the unsuspecting accused, and then the sequence of rap on the door, the police presence, the surrender by the startled appellant of the tell-tale currency, his hands, kerchief and inner Ii.Ding of the trouser pocket betray him when. dipped in acidic solut.10n and the game is up. Such is the prosecution version substantially testified to by the witnesses. The inexorable course of the law takes the accused to the special Judge who convicts him, the High Court affirms the gulit but reduces the sentence to one year's imprisonment.\n\nThe arguments in this Court, if confined to facts only under art.\n\nI 36, have as much chance as the proverbial camel through the eye of a needle. The power, extraordinary in amplitude but exceptional in its exercise, goes into action only to avert miscarriage of justice and rarely operates to undo concurrent findings of fact, if perversity is not present.\n\nYet, the contentions have been ingeniously and hopefully presented.\n\nThe basic attack has been on the morally murky mechanism of criminal trap. Who has not-our legends say, even rishis have-succumbed to attractive temptation in loneliness laid ? And courts have frowned upon evidence procured by such experiments since the participents are prone to be over-anxious and under-accrupulous and the victims are caught morally unawares. Even so, there are traps and traps.\n\nWhere you intercept the natural course of the corrupt stream by setting an invisible contraption, its ethics is above board. On the contrary, to test the moral fibre of an officer whose reputation is suspect, if you Jay a crime mine which explodes when he, in 3. weak moment, walks on it the whole scheme is tainted. Of course, our social milieu is so vitiated by a superstitious belief that any official can be activised by illegal gratification, so confidential is the technique of give and take ii\\ which the white collor offender is adept and so tough is the forensic problem of proof beyond reasonable doubt by good testimony in this area, that the only hope of tracking down the tricky officers is by laying traps and creating statutory presumptions. Even Kautilya has stated that \"just as fish moving under water cannot possibly be found out either as drinking or not drinking water so government servants cannot be found out while taking money.\" Ex-cathedra condemnation\n\nof all traps and associate witnesses is neither pragmatic nor just, nor is it fair to denounce all public servants indiscriminately. Judicial attitudes ha'e to be discriminating, as has happened in this case. The High Court has, after careful study, chosen to accept the bona ./ides of the trap and its author Bishnoi, a senior police official of the S.P.E\n\n(P. W. 7).\n\nWe cannot accede to the theory that the trapping of corrupt officials, in the usual course. is a polluted procedure.\n\nThe appellant has cited decisions in support of his plea that traps are tainted and trap witnesses are unworthy. The rulings do not go so far and merely indicate the need for caution and corroboration depending on the circumstances of each case. An awakened judicial c0nscience and an alert critical appraisal are the best tools in this pro-· cess.\n\nThe appellant's general denunciation of investigating officers as a suspect species also ill merits acceptence. The demanding degree of proof traditionally required in a criminal case and the devaluation suffered by a witness who is naturally involved in the fruits of his investi gati\\e efforts, suggest the legitimate search for corroboration from an independent or unfaltering source-human or circumstantial to make judicial cortitude doubly sure. Not that this approach casts any pejorative retlection on the police officer's integrity, but that the hazard of holding a man guilty on interested, even if honest, evidence may impair confidence in the system of justice. We are aware of the exaggerated criticisms of the police force as a whole and of the reluctance of the framers of the Criminal Procedure Code to trust statements recorded by police investigators bµt these are, partly at least, the hangover of the British past. To-day, trust begets trust and the higher officers of the Indian Police, especially in the Special Police Establishment deserve better credence. We are certainly inclined not to swallow the evidence of P Ws. 7 and 8 without scrutiny but after having heard the appellant at length, we are prepared to agree with the High Court that the evidence of P.Ws.7 and 8 are substantially correct.\n\nEven here, we must underscore the importance of the findings of the trap e\\periment, since they go a long way to underwrite the veracity of the prosecution story.\n\nBefore considering this facet of the case, we may as well brietly refer to P. Ws. I, 3 and 4. P.W. I is the main medium for the bribe ;; iving. He admittedly has animus against the accused. His station in life does not di>pel suspicion and so we have to be sceptical. His deposition has been read again before us and nothing to brand him a liar has come out. Were the case to hang on his single testimony the fate of the case might have been different. There was P. 'W. 4 who' deposed to the receipt and pocketing of the tainted notes by the appellant. Before us it has been argued with vehamence that P. W. 4\n\nwas not creditworthy as on one or two previous occasions also he was joined. by the police 'to witness such traps, that his house itself was searched by the C.B I., and that he contradicts the other witnesses in respect of some facts. These points were canvassed .before the courts below and were found, for good reaons, of no coMequence in 1ffecting the veracity of his testimony. P. W. 4 was a gazetted officer\n\nfo another department, not chosen by P. W. 7, but directed to go by 'his boss to attend the trap. True, his house was raided but this was done\n\nlong after the occurrence, and by another wing of the C. B. I. His presence, in the room, at the time of the alleged passing of the money by Om Prakash wa~ admitted by the appellant. P. W. 4 had no animus against the appellant, nor any acquintance. much less affinity with Om Parkash. No mortal attach on the integrity or probability of the testimony of P. W. 4-none that will warrant the subversion of the conclusion reached by the courts below-has been succe3sfully made.\n\nThe evidence of P. W. 4 coupled with that of P. W. I, was itself sufficient to establish the acceptance. of the tainted currency notes by the appellant from Om Prakash, which was a pivotal fact of the prosecution case.\n\nThen, there was the evidence of P. W. 3, apart from that of the pcilice efficers.\n\nBut the outstanding circumstances, most damaging to the accused, flow from the trap. The rival case of the accused is that no money was given to him but P. W. I, who had to make good his story. placed the notes on the chair and pretended to the police that he bad paid the accused. Of course, the oral evidence of P. Ws. I and 4. by itself, -if believed, as rightly believed by the High Court, proves the passing of 0 the money to the accused and its production by him when challenged by P. W. 7. The fact is indisputable that the hands, the h>ndkerchief and the inner lining of the trouser pocket of the accused turned violet when dipped in soda ash solution. From this the State counsel argues that on no hypothesis except that the notes emerged from the accused' pocket or possession can the triple colour change be accounted for.\n\nThe evidence furnished by inorganic chemistry often outwits the techno- E logy of corrupt officials, provided no alternative reasonable possibility is made out. The appellant offers a plausible theory. P. W. I kept the notes with him and his hands thus carried the p<>wder. 'He gave a bottle of coke to the accused and the bottle thus transmitted particles of phenolph-tha.lein to the latter's hands. He (the accused) wiped his face with the kerchief and put it into his trouser pocket thus contaminating the lining with the guilty substance. Moreover, the F inner lining was dipped by P. W. 7 with his hands which had the powder.\n\nThus, all the three items stand explained, according to him. These Iecondite possibilities and likely freak. have been rejected by both the courts and we are handly persuaded into hostility to that finding It is but meet that science-oriented detection of crime is made a massive programme of police work, for in our technological' age nothing more primitive can be conceived of then den)_'ing the discoveries of the G sciences as aids to crime suppression and nothing cruder can retard forensic efficiency than swearing by traditional oral evidence only thereby disc<iuraging the liberal use of scientific research to prove gllilt.\n\nOne submission made by the appellant remains to be noticed.\n\nHe urged that after Ex. D-1, no Excise Inspector could ha.'O given the H semi-finished cables free exit and if duty had to be paid nothing was gained by giving the bribe.\n\nBribes are not charity but shrewd business and therefore the motive for P. W. 1 to pay, linked as it was with\n\n.. ' c\n\nI_ E\n\nSOM PARKASH v. DEL!Il (Krishna Iyer.I.) 205\n\nhope of getting duty-free gate pass, did not exist. This approach has a flaw. Bribes are paid not only to get unlawful things done but to get lawful things done promptly since time means money. He..,, we must remember t_hat gate passes and pro formas have to be signed by the excise inspector, and signatures can carry a price. While_ we do ndt accept generalisation about corruption in the country, we may excerpt a couple of foot-notes from Gunnar Myrdal's \"Asian Drama\"\n\nonly to point out that the modus nperandi of corrupt officials may take the course of accepting money for doing what is lawful more quickly.\n\nWe would, however, repeat that we dissociate ourselves from any impression that the book may otherwise give. The foot-notes read :\n\n\"The London Times (August 5, 1964) reports : \"Many oi these instances of bribery are those in which the citizen pays in order to get what he is entitled to anyway, and some students of Indian affairs have argued that this is a necessary and not harmful lubricant for a cumbersome administration ....•. this corruption is \"simply a way that citizens have found of building rewards into the admmistrative structure in the absence of any other appropriate incentive system.\".\n\n\"As a means of accelerating the sluggish, meandering circulation of a file within a department this might be all very well; but speed money, belying the name, actually has the effect of a brake on adminiFtration, slowing it down even further.\n\nDelay will deliberately be caused in order to invite payment of a bribe to accelerate it again.\"\n\nIn this very case, on the ill-starred day, duty had been fully paid and only his signature to the pro forma had to be appended for which the bribe was sought. We have little hesitation in taking the view that \"speed money\" is the key to getting lawful things done in good time and \"operation signature\", be it on a gate pass or a pro forma, can delay the movement of goods, the economics whereof induces investment ir> bribery.\n\nEvery pass and pro forma tempts and every discretionary power induces illicit demands, given a declining ethos where giving and taking of illegal gratification is looked upon as an inevitable evil which has wme to stay-more and more inevitable and Jess and less evil, as the habit catches on. Producers depend for their rolling capital on quiclc turn-over which is clogged when forms and passes to be signed by officials are is.ued with purposeful reluctance and official slow motion becomes the signal for use of that paper lubricant which on expanding class of businessmen blessed with dubious morals consider an invisible component of the cost of production and a widening circle of officials gifted with low key consciem:es regard as the unobjectionable art of oking out untaxed additions to their emoluments.\n\nMaybe, this exaggerated version of the sitiiation is but the folklore of corruption but knocks the bottom of the appellant's. plea against motive.\n\nTo sum up, we see no good ground to over-turn the factual findings recorded by the trial judge and affirmed on appeal.\n\nThe Central Law Commission considering white-collar crime as . a serious menace has made a report on tho subject, and the Senthanan\n\n'Committee ha• much earlier highlighted the dangers in this area.\n\nIn this social context judicial severity cannot err on the high side, and we think the \"ends of justice\" referred to by the High Court for toning down the sentence is perhaps an error on the side of leniency. If at all, intensive efforts to track down bigger corruption must be made ; but courts cannot slow down because bigger criminals are not caught although public morals is boosted better by one big fish being caught in the criminal not. than by a hundred small fry perishing ashore However, since the State has not quarrelled with the reduction of sentence by way of appeal we leave the matter well alone.\n\nThe appellant must now surrender to serve the balance term if anv because we dismiss the appeal. - C\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal disn1is5cd.", "total_entities": 32, "entities": [{"text": "SOM PARKASH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SOM PARKASH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF DELHI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF DELHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 25, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 45, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SOM PARKASH\n\nSTATE OF DELHI\n\nJanuary 25, 1974\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ. ')"}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s.161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 355, "end_char": 360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 362, "end_char": 367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 393, "end_char": 399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Jildian police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2459, "end_char": 2473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Today trust begets trust and the higher officers of the Jildian police, especially in the Special Police Establishment, deserve better credence. ["}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court at New Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3301, "end_char": 3330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 31st October, 1969 of the Delhi High Court at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "H. R. Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3402, "end_char": 3414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Khanna and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3419, "end_char": 3433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Khanna and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3500, "end_char": 3512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER J. The appellant, a quondam inspector of Central Excise, has argued his case with perspicacity and plausibility, taking liberal advantage of our solicitude for giving this lay man a lengthy hearing."}}, {"text": "s.161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3774, "end_char": 3779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3812, "end_char": 3818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3840, "end_char": 3860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4072, "end_char": 4080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Shadara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4460, "end_char": 4467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, the story, P, W. 1, a young man in his late twenties, had started a small factory in Shadara, called Uma Engineering Corporation, for making insulated copper cables, around June, 1965.,"}}, {"text": "Uma Engineering Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4476, "end_char": 4503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, the story, P, W. 1, a young man in his late twenties, had started a small factory in Shadara, called Uma Engineering Corporation, for making insulated copper cables, around June, 1965.,"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4733, "end_char": 4738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The whole process, except fitting the rubber insulation, was done m his premises and for this latter purpose the semi-finished goods used to be taken to another factory in Delhi."}}, {"text": "Waswani", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6128, "end_char": 6135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Being too virgin for this way to prosperity, P.W. I reacted by making a bee 'line to Sri Waswani, the Deputy Superintendent, Central Excise, with little benefit."}}, {"text": "August 4, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6211, "end_char": 6225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, on August 4, 1965, he met the accused for getting him to verify the statement of manufac.tured goods to pay the duty thereon, but was turned' back, the softening sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "August 6, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6451, "end_char": 6465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We now move to the critical phase, On August 6, 1965, P. W. 1 goes to the office of the accused to get clearance of 2 finished bundles of cables."}}, {"text": "Kautilya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9888, "end_char": 9896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even Kautilya has stated that \"just as fish moving under water cannot possibly be found out either as drinking or not drinking water so government servants cannot be found out while taking money.\""}}, {"text": "Bishnoi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10416, "end_char": 10423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has, after careful study, chosen to accept the bona ./ides of the trap and its author Bishnoi, a senior police official of the S.P.E\n\n(P. W. 7)."}}, {"text": "S.P.E", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10457, "end_char": 10462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has, after careful study, chosen to accept the bona ./ides of the trap and its author Bishnoi, a senior police official of the S.P.E\n\n(P. W. 7)."}}, {"text": "C.B I.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13198, "end_char": 13204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the police 'to witness such traps, that his house itself was searched by the C.B I., and that he contradicts the other witnesses in respect of some facts."}}, {"text": "Om Prakash", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13740, "end_char": 13750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "True, his house was raided but this was done\n\nlong after the occurrence, and by another wing of the C. B. I. His presence, in the room, at the time of the alleged passing of the money by Om Prakash wa~ admitted by the appellant.", "canonical_name": "SOM PARKASH"}}, {"text": "Om Parkash", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13872, "end_char": 13882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "much less affinity with Om Parkash.", "canonical_name": "SOM PARKASH"}}, {"text": "Gunnar Myrdal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17324, "end_char": 17337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While we do ndt accept generalisation about corruption in the country, we may excerpt a couple of foot-notes from Gunnar Myrdal's \"Asian Drama\"\n\nonly to point out that the modus nperandi of corrupt officials may take the course of accepting money for doing what is lawful more quickly."}}, {"text": "August 5, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17648, "end_char": 17662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The foot-notes read :\n\n\"The London Times (August 5, 1964) reports : \"Many oi these instances of bribery are those in which the citizen pays in order to get what he is entitled to anyway, and some students of Indian affairs have argued that this is a necessary and not harmful lubricant for a cumbersome administration ....•. this corruption is \"simply a way that citizens have found of building rewards into the admmistrative structure in the absence of any other appropriate incentive system.\"."}}, {"text": "Central Law Commission", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19961, "end_char": 19983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Law Commission considering white-collar crime as ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_207_220_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "I 207\n\nGENERAL MANAGER, SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY\n\nSECUNDRABAD AND ANR ETC.\n\nA.V.R. SIDDHANTI AND ORS. ETC.\n\nJanuary 30, 1974\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.]\n\nConstit111ion of India-Art. 14 & 16-Vio/atlon of equal treatment and discrim 1nation.\n\nSince common question of law arise in the these a(>p!als, a comm:>n judg~nt was delivered to dispose of these appeals. The facts 1n C. A. No. 1937/72 are as folJows:- During the last world war, Indian Raily opened grain shops to Supply foo::lgrains at cost priced to its employees througout the country. Slf for this temporary grainshop complex was drawn from 3 different sourccs:-{1) Temporary employees selected through the Joint Selection Commission etci who re initially appointed in the pennanent departments but later transferred to grain shop compleJJ:\n\n(ii) Temporary selected initially for permanent departments but posed straightway in the Grain Shop Department and (iii) Temporary employees recruited from th~ 'Open Market' for the Grain Shop Department. Respondent no. 1 to 9 beloage1 to Category lll.\n\nD After the emergency was over, Railway authorities decided to wind up the grarn shop Department and to absorb its staff in permanent departments of the Railway and accordingly respondent no, 1 to 9 were also absorbed in various departments.\n\nOn November 2nd, 1967, th~ Railway Board in partial modification of its earlier proceeding directed that the seniority of temporary Grain Shop Staff consequent on their absorption in the absorbing departments should be regulated on the basis of their date of actual absorption in those departments and not on the basis as if they had been absorbed in those departments right from the beginning of service.\n\nOn January 13, 1961, the Railway Board issued a 'clarification' that the seniority of the Grain-Shop staff of category III should be fixed from the date of their absorption\n\nin a JCmlaDCnt dcPartment, irrespective of their length of service in the Grain-Shop Department, with regard to category I, it was laid down that temporary staff who were initially appointed in the permanent department and were then transferred to the Grain Shop dcpartment-\\vould not have their seniority affected by their transfer to the Grain Shop Department. It was further stated that seniority of category I [ should be fix~ with reference to the date of thei~ joining the Grain Shop Department.\n\nThe validity of the above decision dt. November 2, 1957, and January 13 1961 of the Board had been questioned on the ground that they discriminate against' the employees of category III and, as such, violate the guarantee of equal treatment enshrined in Art. 14 and 16 othe Constitution. The learned single judge of the High Court accepted the contenttons of respandents nos. I to 9 and struck down the impugned proceedings.\n\nOn appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the de; ision of th:: triaJ court and observed that when all the members of the Grain Shop Dpartment G ae.a!>sord in ditfernt departr, nents' of the Raif:way there cnnot be further\n\nd1v1ding line between direct recruits and those appa1nted through selection Board as that would clearly .be a denial of equal oppartunity to persons similarly situate.:1,\n\nOn appeal before this court, the appellants raised two preliminary points-(i) that there were Jachcs on the part of the respondents to file the writ petitions 8 to 11 years after the issue of the ii:npugned decisions (ii) the petition.s id not implead about J 20 employees who were hkely to affect and therefore non-J01ndcr of parties is fa.ta! to the petition.\n\nDismissing the appeals,\n\nHELD: (i) Since !he appellants did not conas~ the pqint at the k>wer cJurt5:, they cannot be pcnn1tted to rcsurrect before this Court. ·\n\n(ii) In the present case, the relief is claimed only against the Railways which has been pleaded through its representative. No list of order fixing seniority or the petitioners vis-a-vis particular individuals, persuant to the impugned decisions, is being challenged. The employees who were likely to be affected as a result of the re.adjustment i;-if the petitioners' seniority in accordance with the principles laid down in the Boards' decision of October 16. 1952, were at the most, proper parties and not necessary parties, and their non-joinder could not the fatal to the writ pctition.[213A]\n\nPadam SinghJhina v. Union of India and ors C. A. No. 405/67 decided by Supremc- Court on 14-8-1968, discussed and distinguished.\n\nThe rule enunciated in B. Gopa/aiah & Ors. V. Government of Andhra Pradesh A. I. R. 1969 A. P. 204 J. S. Sachdeva & Ors v. Reserve Bank of India, \"New Delhi, I. L. R. (1973) II Delhi 392 and Mohan Chandra Joshi v. Union of India & Ors.\n\nCivil Writ No. 650 of 1970 decided by Delhi High Court, approved.\n\n(iii) On merits, it was arguedthat while employees or categories (i) and (ii) had a right as a part of their service conctitions to get themselves abso(bed and assigned their due seniority, on the abolit_ion or the grain shop department, no such right existed in the case of ad hoc recruits belonging to category III.\n\nThe main question in the present case is ''were the three categories after their transfer of chief recruitment of the Grain Shop Department fused into a single integ rated claSs1 having the same conditions of service;\"\n\nIt is quite clear that after their direct recruitment to the Grain Shop Department, the personnel coming from sources ii) and (iii) had shed their genetic peculiarities and became members of the same class governed by the same conditions of service. For the purpose of absorption seniority, promotion etc .• in rcgulaf department, tbererore. they were entitled to be treated alike. Therefore, the impugned directions dated Nov. 2, 1957 and January 13. 1961, excepting in so far as they relate to personnel of category I is arbitrary and violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of !he Constitutions. {215C} Roshatt Lal Tandon v. U11io11 of India, [1968] 1 S. Co R. 185, referred to.\n\n(iv) Jn C. A. 1938 of 1972, 2 employees M & B exchanged placed by mutual con sent on a joint application. The result was that 7 was transferred and posted at Gundur and was given the 445 the place in the order of seniority held by B among the cICrks in the Grain Shop Department ofBazwade District. Later on a result of the impugned decisions taken by the Railway Board on November 2, l9S7 and January 13, 1961. M. was relegated to a lower position in the Seniority List of Commen:ial Clerks. He appealed to the Railway List of Commercial Clerk3.\n\nHi: appealed to the Railway authorities but did not set any redress. Later, he filed a petition before: the High Court. The wut petition \\vas allowed by the High Court and bence the appeal. Following the a6ove dccisJ.bn it was also held that the impugned order where M's seniority was revised and lowered. was invalid .and a rule was issued directing the appellant to restore and refix the pl:tce pn M. in List of seniority as on De~:cmber 31, 1958. Appeal dismissed.\n\nC1v1L APPELLATE JuR1sm•:noN : Civil Appeals Nos. 1937 and 1938 of 1972.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated Isl September, 1971 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court at Hyderabad in Writ Appeals Nos. 689 of 1970 and 38 of 1971.\n\nG. L. Sanghi and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant.\n\nMrs. Shyamla Pappu and J. Ramamurthi, for respondent Nos. 1-15 & 17-22 (in c. A. 1937/72) and for the respondent (in C.A.\n\n193~/72)\n\nJ. Ramamurthi for the Interveners (in C.A. 1937 of 1972).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nSARKARIA J.-These appeals by special leave are directed against two inter-linked judgments of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.\n\nIt will be convenient to dispose them of by this common judgment.\n\nCENTRAL RAILWAY v. A. v. R. SIDOHANTI (Sarkaria, /.) 209\n\nA Respondents I to 9 in Civil Appeal No. 1937 of 1972 made a pc tition (W. P. 1145 of 1969) under Article 226 of the Constitvtion in the High Court for the issue of a writ of Mandamus directing the present appellants (the General Manager, South Central Railway and the Secretary, Railway Board) to fix. the inter-se seniority of the writ petitioners as per original proceed1gs, dated October _16, 1952, of the Railway Board, and to further direct them not to give effect to B the subsequent proceedings dated November 2, 1957 and January 13, 1961, of the Board issued by way of \"modification\" and \"clari fication\" of its earlier proceedings of 1952.\n\nDuring the last World War, there was acute shortage of foodgrains and other necessaries of life. At the suggestion of B. N. Rau Com mittee, grain shops for the supply of foodgrains at cost price to its C employees were opened by the Indian Railways on an extensive scale throughout the country. Staff for this temporary Grain-Shop Com plex was drawn from three different sources :\n\ni) Temporary employees who on being seleckd through the Joint Selection Commission or Staff Selection Board were initially appointed in the permanent De D partments and were thereafter transferred to the Grain\n\nShop Department.\n\n(ii) Temporary employees selected by the Selection Board or the Selection Commission for permanent Departments but posted straightaway in the Grain Shop Department without being first appointed in the depart E ment for which they were originally selected, and\n\n(iii) Temporary employees directly recruited by the Deputy General Managers to the Grain Shop Department from the open market.'\n\nRespondents I to 9 in this appeal belong to category (iii).\n\nF After the emergency was over, on the recommendation of a high powered committee, it was decided to gradually wind up the Grain\n\nShop Department and to absorb its staff in the permanent Depart\n\nments of the Railway. For this purpose, the Railway Board took several policy decisions commencing from August 24, 1948.\n\nOf these, the .fiC't which is relevant as furnishing the background of the decisions in question,. is dated February 3, 1949 (Exh. P)., whereby the G temporary Grain Shop Staff was to be grouped as under :\n\n(a) those who were recruited prior to and were in service on September 15, 1945, and\n\n(b) those who were recruited on or after September 15, 1945.\n\nWith regard to group (a), it.was directed:\n\n\"No age restrictions will apply in considering such em ployees for absorption in other departments, but the minimum educational qualification should not be relaxtd .... 15-M852SupCl/74\n\nThere is, however, no objection to the staff concred being permitted to apply to the Railway Service Comrruss10n for employment in posts advertised by them, in which case, for the purpose of the maximum age limit they can deduct the period of their continuous temporary service in the grainshop department from their present age. No employee should be retrenched unles. he refused to accept the alternative employ ment that is off<red to him by the Railway Administration\".\n\nAs regards (b) it was laid down : \"Although no undertaking has been given about their con tinued retention in service, it is the Board's .desire that these staff also should be absorbed against suitable vacancies on the same lines as the staff recruited before this date, subjecr' to the condition that neither the restrictions required nor the-educational qualifications required nor the restrictions regarding the maximum age limit will be relaxed except in the latter case, to the extent of their continuous temporary service rendered by them of the Railway.\n\nSuch staff, will, however, be considered for absorption only after the staff referred to in item\n\n(a) above have been offered employment.\"\n\n(e) \"Jn all cases other things bejng equal due consideration should be given to the length of service of the staff concerned.\" This order further provided :\n\n\"(6) ..... . permanent or temporary staff of other de partments on loan to the Grainshop Department should be returned to their parent departments if unfilled posts exist and if this is found to be administratively convenient, so as to reduce the number of grainshop staff who be surplus immediately .... \"\n\n(7) .....•.•.•..•..•.•.•.. \"\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\nNext, in importance, is the Railway Board's order No. E. 48. REI/ 1/3. of October 16, 1952 issued in supersess on o its previous orders.\n\nThis order 1s the sheet-anchor of the respondents' case. Its material F part runs as under :\n\n\"· ...... In supersession of the Board's orders con tained in item (iii) of their letter No. E. 48.\n\nREl/l/3A of 6-7-1949, laying down the method for the absorption and\n\nxat!on of pay of ex-Grain Shop Staff who were officiating m higher grades but were absorbed in other Departments in G lower grades, it has now been decided that the pay of all such\n\ntaff as . well as those appointed in the intermediate grades, Irrespective of the fact that they were absorbed either before or after 6-7-1949 should be fixed on their absorption in the regular Departments in accordane<: with the iJWtructions contained in their letter No. E. 45 RE. 13/3 dated 27-7-46, and the staff concerned paid the arrears due on this account.\n\n2. It has further been decided by the Board that such staff should not get any preferential treatment other than for\n\nCENTRAL RAILWAY v. A. v. R. 'i!DDHANTI (Sarkaria, !.)\n\n21 J\n\nfixation of pay and obtaining alternative employment i.e. they should not be given seniority for purposes of confirmation by virtue of their pay being fixed at a higher stage in the absorbing Department over unconfirmed men in that Department who had longer service but whose pay was less. They should be given only such seniority which they would have got had they been absorbed in the absorbing Department right from the beginning of service.\"\n\nOn the representation made by the National Federation of Indian Railwaymen, the Railway Board, reconsider<d its decision of October 16, 1952 regarding counting of past temporary service for the purpose of fixing seniority of 'open market' recruits. This reconsidered decision was put in the communication dated November 2, 1957 C whereby the Railway Board, in partial modification of its proceeding of October 16, 1952, directed \"that the seniority of temporary Grain- Shop Staff consequent on their absorption in the absorbing departments should be regulated on the basis of their date of their actual absorption in those departments and not on the basis as if they had been absorbed in those departments in right from the beginning of service\".\n\nOn January 13, 1961, the Board issued a \"clarification\" that the seniority of the Grain-Shop staff of category (iii) should be fixed from the date of their absorption in a permanent department, irrespective of their length of service in the Grain-Shop department. With regard to category (i), it was_ laid down that temporary staff who were initially appointed in the permanent departments and were then E transferred to the Grain Shop department would not have their seniority affected by their transfer fo the Grain Shop department.\n\nIt was further stated that seniority of category (ii) should be fixed with reference to the date of their joining the Grain Shop Department.\n\nThe validity of the above decisions dated November 2, 1957 and January 13, 1961 of the Board has been questioned on the ground F that they discriminate against the employees of category (iii} and, as such, violate the guarantee of equal treatment enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nMainly relying upon two Single Bench judgments-one of the Madras High Court in W.P. No. 3110 of 1965 and the other of the Bombay High Court in Misc. Petition No. 321 of 1964, decided on G March 15, 1967-the learned Single Judge who tried the wTit petition, accepted the contentions of Respondents I to 9 and struck down the impugned proceedings.\n\nAggrieved by that judgment, the Railway carried an appeal under Clause 15 of the ktters Patent to the Division Bench of the High Court, which dismis; ed the same with these observations :\n\nH \"What has been held by their Lordships in Roshanlal's case applies with equal force to the case on hand. Here also there was already an integrated service namely the Grain Shop\n\nDepartment service and all the members of this Service were absorbed in difforent Departments, and after absorpt10n, there cannot be a further dividing line between direct recruits drawn from open market and those appointed through selection Boards as that would clearly be a denial of equal opportunity to persons similarly situated in the matter of further promotion on the basis of their seniority, among other grounds.\n\nSince the absorption of direct recruits and others is from the integrated Grain Shop Department, no discrimination cal! be shown on the ground of differences that existed between various ,,\n\nsources prior to the recruitment to the Grain Shop Department for the purpose of fixing seniority.\" It is against this judgment that Civil Appeal No. 1937 of 1972 has been preferred.\n\nMr. G. L. Sanghi, learned Counsel for the appellants, has raised two preliminary objections. The first is that the writ petition was filed 8 to 11 years after the issue of the impugned decisions, and as such, was liable to be dismissed on the score of latches alone.\n\nThe second is that the writ petitioners did not implead about 120 employees who were likely to be affected by the decision in this case.\n\nThose employees, proceeds the argument, were necessary parties and their non-joinder is fatal to the. petition. In support of this contention, Counsel has .cited Padam Singh Jhina v. Union of India and ors (!).\n\nNeither of these objections appears to be tenable.\n\nThough the plea of latches was taken in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Railway before the High Court, yet it appears that the pomt \\Vas not canvassed at the time of arguments either before the learned Smgle Judge or the Division Bench in the Letters Patent appeal. The appellants therefore cannot be permitted to resurrect in thfs Court the same objection which they had apparently abandoned in the High Court.\n\nAs regards the second objection, it is to be noted that the decisions of the Railway Board impugned in the writ petition contain administrative rules of general. application, regulating absorption in permanent departments, fixation of seniority, pay etc. of the employees o~ the erstwhil~ Grain Shop departments. The Responden.t~-pelit10ners are impeaching the validity of thofe policy G decisions on the ground of their being violatiYe of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The proceedings are an; iJogous to those in which the constitutionlity of a statutory rule regulating seniority of government .servants is assailed. In uch proceedings the necessary parties to be 1mpleaded are those agamst whom the relief is sought, and in whose absence no effective decision can be rendered by the Court. fn . the present case, the relief is claimed only against the Railway H which has been 1mpleaded through its representative. No list or\n\n(1) C.A. No.405 of 1967 decided by Supreme Court on 14-8-1967.\n\nC2NTRAL RAILWAY v. A. v. II. SIDDHANTI (Sarkaria, /.) 213\n\norder fixing seniority of the petitioners visavis particular individuals pursuant to the impugned decisions, is being challenged. The em ployees who were likely to be affected as a result of the re-adjustment of the petitioner's seniority in accordance with the principles laid down in the Board's decision of October 16, 1952 were, at the most, proper parties and not necessary parties, and their non-joinder could not be fatal to the writ petition.\n\nThe ratio of this Court's decision in Padam Singh Jhina's case\n\n(supra) is not applicable to the facts of the instant case. Jhina's contention was that he had been ma/a fide reduced in the list of seniority, from the 5th to the 7th place and that one Prem Sagar had been placed above him in contravention of the Rules.\n\nThe validity or vires of the Rules was not in question. All the persons whose placement in the seniority list was controverted were not impleaded, and as such, had no opportunity of replying to the case set up by Jbina, and, in the absence of porsons directly affected, it was not possible for the Court to adjudicate the matter. The ratio of Jhina's case does not help the appellant. The cases relevant for our purpose are B. Gopalaiah and Ors. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh; (l) J. S. Sachdev and Ors. v. Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi (2) and Mohan Chandra Joshi v. UnionoflndiaandOrs('}. We approve oi the rule enunciated on this point in those cases.\n\nOn merits, Mr. Sangbi has, by and large, adopted the reasoning of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in General Manager, Southern Rai/w3y v. Venkataraman (4), which had, in Letters Patent Appeal reversed tbe judgment of the Single Judge, relied upon in the instant case by the Andhra Pradesh High Court.\n\nIt is contended that the standards, qualifications for eligibility and the conditions governing the employees recruited through the Staff\n\nSelection Board or Joint Service Commission from sources (i) and\n\n(ii) were different from those of 'open-market' recruits. According to the learned Counsel, the personnel drawn from source (iii) were temporarily engaged as an ad hoc measure, without regard for age and educational qualifications, to meet the emergency and could not thetcfore be compared and equated with the employees of requisite qualifications belongmg to categories (i) and (ii) recruited or selected in the normal way through Selection Boards for regular departments.\n\nThe point pressed into argument is that while employees of categories\n\n(i) and (ii) bad the assurances or right as a part of their service conditions that on the abolition of the Grain Shop Department, they would be absorbed and assigned their d11e seniority, in the per.manent de partment in or for which they were initially appointed or selected, no such right or assurance existed in the case of ad hoc recruits belong ing to category (iii) who were given the benefit of their services in the\n\n(I) A. I. R. 1969 A. P. 204.\n\n(2) ILR(1973) II Delhi 322.\n\n(3) Civil Writ No. 650 of 1970 decided by Delhi High Court. (4} (1970] II Labour L•w Journal 76.\n\nGrain Shop Department, only as a matter of grace, subsequently on absorption in permanent departments.\n\nIt iS not correct to say that all the employees of category (iii) we(ll sub-standard in educational qualifications.· Severai persons in that. category satisfied the educational !!Orms. For instance, Sidhanti Respondent was F.A., while the minimum educational qualification requisite for the post of a Commercial Clerk was Matriculation or equivalent examination. Though sufficient data has not been brought on the record on the basis of which a firm finding can be given, yet three copies of notices (uncertified) have been filed by the Respon- . dents which indicate that at some stage educational qualifications had been relaxed to meet the extraordinary demand for personnel to man the posts of Ticket collectors and Guards etc. Regarding education, all that was required of the candiaates was a \"working\n\nknowledge of English\". It was quite possible, that in categories (ii) and (iii), also, there were some whose qualifications were not in accord with the preScribed norms. Educational qualifications being less than the requisite minimum was therefore not a feature, peculiar to category (iii), only. Indeed, it is not the case of the appellants that the classification of the grain-shop staff envisaged in th~ impugned proceedings, for the purpose of absorption and seniority i.n per manent departments,· has been made on the basis of educational qualifications.\n\nThe fundamental right of equality means that persons in like situation, under like circumstances are entitled to be treated alike. \"The Constitutional Code of Equality and Equal Opportunity\", observed this court in State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki. Nath Khosla and others(I), ''is a charter for equals\". So long as employees similarly circumstanced in the same class of service are treated alike,-the question of hostile discrimination does not arise.\n\nThe equality of opportunity for purposes of seniority, promotion and like matters of employment is available only for persons who fall substantially, within the same class or unit of service:· The guarntee of equality is not applicable as between members of distinct and different classes of the service. The Constitution does not command that in all matters of employment absolute symmetry be main tained. A wooden equality as between all classes of employees regardless of qualifications, kind of jobs, nature of responsibility and performance of the employees is not intended, nor is it practicable if the administration is to run. Indeed, the maintenance of such a 'classless' and undiscerning 'equality' where, in reality, glaring in-· equalities and intelligible differentia exist, will deprive the guarantee of its practical content. Broad classification baied on reason; executive pragmatism and experience having a direct relation with the achievement of efficiency in admini.stration, is permissible. That is to say? easoble dassifition accordi':'g to some priciple, to recogmse mtellig1ble mequabt1es or to avoid or correct mequalitics\n\n(1) Civil Appeal No. 2134 of 1972 decided on 26-9-1973.\n\nCENTRAL RAILWAY l'. A. V. R. S!DDHANTI (Sarkaria, J.) 215\n\nis allowed, but not miniclassification which creates inequality among the similarly circumstanced members of the same class or group.\n\nIn the light of the above principles it will be seen that the pivotal question in the present controversy is: Were the three categories after. their transfer or direct recruitineuts, as the case n1ay he, to the Grain Shop Department fused into a single integrated class having the same conditions of service ? Or, did they continue dissimilarly-as they started-in three separate compartments ?\n\nWhile there is ground to hold that category (i) never lost its distinctive birth-marks, no material has been placed before us on the basis of which it could be said that categories (ii) and (iii), after their direct recruitn1ent, had not con1pletely Jost their genetic peculiarities in the common unified stream of Grain-Shop service.\n\nThe special feature of personnel of category (i), was that they had been initiaUy appointed against substantive vacancies in permanent departments of the Railway. They did not come to the temporary Grain Shop Department of their own volition or option, but by transfer or on loan under peremptory orders of their superior officers. They could not be placed in a worse position or treated differently in the matter of tenure than their colleagues who fortuiously continued in the permanent Departments. It was but fair and reasonable that, on the abolition of the Grain Shop Department, they should be sent back to the permanent Departments, whence they came, and given credit of their initial service in those Departments for the purpose of permanent absorption and seniority.\n\nEven from the deficient material placed before us, it is clear that personnel from source (i) have always been treated as a distinct unit having a status skin to that of persons on loan or transfers for a period from a permanent De .. partment to a temporary .Department. Consequent upon their decision to gradually wind up the Grain Shop Department, the first step taken by the Railway Board as per para 6 of their communication dated February 3, 1949 (reproduced in a foregoing part of this judgment), was to return all temporary or permanent staff that had come on loan to the Grain Shop\" to their parent departments.\n\nIt is note-worthy that the directions in para 6 of the communication, dated February 3, 1949, were not superseded by the proceedings, dated October 16, 1952, which are the foundation of the Respondent's claim. Cfause (1) (i) of the impugned communication, dated January 13, 1961, IS no more than a reiteration, in an amplified form, of the diection in Para 6, of the communication of February 3, 1949., The duecllon of ?ctober, 16, 1952 regarding fixation of pay and semonty of the ex Gram Shop staff on their absorption in regular departments, were , obscure ad _vague on two points. Firstly, it was\n\not clear whether tne ex Gram Shop staff governed by those directions mcluded the temporary st<tlf who Jiad been initially appointed in permanent departments and were there-after transferred for some period to th~, Grain-Shop department.\n\nSecindl.y, \"the beginning of the service m the last sentence of those directions was susceptible \\lftwo constructions. In the restricted sense, it could mean beginning\n\nof the service in the Grain-Shop Department. In the wider sense, A it would include in the case of transferees' to the Grain-Shop, the beginning of their service in the permanent department whence. they came. Clause (I) (i) of the communication of January 13, 1961 clarified those aspects, The differential treatment of the personnel belonging to category (i). for the purpose of fixing seniority envisaged in clause (I) (i) of the communication of January 13, 1961, thus, rests on a sound rational basis and does not offend Articles 14 B and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nTo this extent, for reasons stated above, we endorse the view taken by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in General Manager Southern Railway, Madras v. T. K. Venka/araman(supra).\n\nBut what has been said above in regard to category (i) does not hold good in the case of the other two categories. Excepting that they were recruited by two different, methods, in all other respects, these two categories were similrly situated. The mere fact that the names of persons in category (ii) were borne on a list of candidates prepared by the Selection Board for recruitment to regular Departments, did not give them a right to preferential treatment qua those in category\n\n(iii) in the matter of absorption and seniority in such departments.\n\nWe have porused Paras 302, 303 and 304 of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual, Chapter III, 2nd Edition, relied up6n by Mr.\n\nSanghi. These are not statutory provisions.\n\nEven so, there is nothing in the!h to show that a person selected for a permanent department, by the Selection Board or Commission, gets a right to be appointed merely because of such selection and placement of his name on the select-list. He gets only a spes i.e. bare chance of appointment and that too if the appointing authority so desires and a vacancy is available for him. All that the said provisions say, in substance, is that after their appointment, their inter se seniority will be fixed with reference to their positions in the merit list prepared by the Selection Board.\n\nDespite repeated queries, the appellants have not placed any document or material nor referred to any rule, policy decision or other official record to support their contentions that even after their recruitment to Grain-Shop Department, categories (ii) and (iii), continued as distinct entities having different conditions of service. Appellants' failure to furnish such material is sought to be justified on the ground that the burden of proving that the impugned proceedings suffer from the vice of discrimination, was on the respondents.\n\nTrue, that the initial onus of showing that the proceedinii o~ 1957 and 1961, in question, were discriminatory and as such, VJolat1ve of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, was on the respondents; but in the peculiar circumstances of the case, such onus had been prima facie discharged by them. Their claim to relief is founed on the Railway Board's own decision of October 16, 1952, which proceeds on an in-built postulate and implied admission that all the personnel recuited to the Grain-Shop . department were members o~ the sam.e class or llnit of service, and as such entitled alike to the fixation of their\n\nCENTRAL RAILWAY v. A. v. R. S!DDHANTI (Sarkaria, /.) 217\n\nseniority with reference to \"the beginning of their service\". It was then the turn of the Board to show that the inference arising from its admission, or treatment of all persons directly recruited, as members of one unified service of the Grain Shop Department was wrong.\n\nConscious of the necessity of resolving the problem in a just, practical manner, avoiding a doctrinaire approach, we wanted to have some idea of the nature and magnitude of the impact which the decision of this case might indirectly or incidentally have on the employees who, during the interregnum, got promoted or confirmed on the basis of the impugned directions. We, therefore, indicated at the outset that as a matter of concession, we would be disposed to allow the appellants to produce even at that stage, after due notice to the other side, documentary evidence or material, if any, in their possession or control, which would help substantiate their contention. The opportunity was not availed of by the appellants. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that after their direct recruitment to the Grain Shop Department the personnel corning from sources (ii) and (iii) had shed their genetic peculiarities and become members of the same class or unit governed by the same conditions of service. For the purposes of. absorption, seniority, promotion etc. in regular departments, therefore, they were entitled to be treated alike.\n\nThe impugned directions of 1957 and 1961, in so far as they pertain to categories (ii) and (iii), are hit by the rule in Roshan Lal Tandon v.\n\nUnion of India (I) according to which once the persons coming or recruited to the service, from two different sources-in that case promotees and direct recruits-are absorbed into one integrated class with identical service conditions, they cannot be discriminated against with reference to the original source, for the purposes of further promotion to the higher grade. What was said about further promotion in Roshan Lal Tandon's case (supra) is equally applicable to absorption and seniority in the instant case.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we would hold that the discrimination envisaged in the impugned directions dated November 2, 1957 and January 13, 1961, excepting in so far as they pertain to personnel of category (i) is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nIn the result we dismiss the appeal with costs throughout and affirm the decision of the High Court except to the extent indicated above. ---------- (!) [1968] I s: C.R. \\85.\n\nIn Civil Appeal 1938 of 1972, arising out of Writ Petition No. 952 of 1966, Respondent Manickyarn was originally employed as a Commercial Clerk on December 4, 1944 in the Southern Railway and was posted at Rayapuram. One Balasubramaniarn, was then a clerk in the Grain Shop Department in Bezwada District and posted at Gudur.\n\nIn 1950, Manickyam and Balasubramaniam made joint application for mutual transfer. This application was allowed and, in consequence, Manickyarn and Balasubramaniarn exchanged places.\n\nManickyam was therefore transferred and posted on August 10, 1950 at Gudur and was given the 445th place in the order of seniority among the clerks in the Grain Shop Department of Bezwada District. This was the rank and position in the seniority formerly held by Balasubramaniam. Subsequently, as a result of the impugned decisions taken by the Railway Board on November 2, 1957 and January 13; 1961, Manickyam was relegated to a Jower position in the seniority list of Commercial Clerks. He appealed against this fixation of seniority to the Railway Authorities who dismissed the same. Manickyam then moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for bringing up and quashing the order dated May 24, 1966 of the Di_visional Commercial Superintendent, Southern Railway, Vijawada, in so far as it related to the promotion of Respondents 2 to 8 to the senior time scale of Rs. 205-280 and directing Respondent No.\n\nI (Divisional Superintendent, Southern Railway, Vijayawada) to promote the petitioner to the said scale. giving him a place in the seniority immediately above Respondents 2 to 8 and to pass such further order as may be necessary.\n\nIn the counter-affidavit filed by the appellant, it was averred that Manickyam and Balasubramaniam were mutually transferred to Bezwada District and Rayapuram District and assigned each other's places i.e. 445th and 60Jst places in the seniority among the Commercial Clerks in Bezwada District a_nd Rayapuram District, respectively, on the basis of an agreement between them. It was further stated that on July 18, 1955 Manickyam made an application requesting that he should be given all those benefits which had been made available to ex . Grain Shop clerks. This application was declined -because the petitioner had himself accepted his transfer to Bezwada on the condition of getting 445th place in the sel'iotity. It was, however, admitted that in pursuance of the Railway Board's orders dated November 2, 1957 , the seniority of all Grain-Shop clerks working as Commercial Clerks was revised in 1965, and on such reVISIOn Manickyam's. seniority was also revised as he had come to Vijayawada District in mutual exchange with Grain !lfi.op Employee. It was\n\nCENTRAL IWLWAY v. A. v. R. SIDDHANTI (Sarkaria, I.) 219\n\nadded that he was given what he really deserved under the rules and agreement.\n\nFrom the pleadings and the contentions canvassed, it was clear that Manickyam's grievance was against the validity of the Railway Board's Orders dated November 2, 1957 and January 13, 1961 on .the basis of which his seniority was, in fact, revised and downgraded.\n\nThe learned single Judge who tried the writ ptition found that since the classification envisaged in the Railway Board's Orders dated November 2, 1957 and January 13, 1961 were d.iscriminatory, arbi trary and unconstitutional, the impugned orders, also, whereby Manickyam's seniority was revised down were invalid. In the re suit, the Writ Petition was allowed and a writ of Mandamus directing the appellant to give Manickyam 92nd place immediately above Pothuraju, No. 93, and to the then Respondents 2 to 8 from 96th to 195th places in the list of seniority published as on December 31, 1958, was issued. It was further directed: \"If as a result of the restoration of the petitioner's seniority as per the above order, he is. entitled to any promotion to a higher scale of pay, I direct that the first respondent should give him the benefit of such promotion:' The Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the Divisional Superintendent of the Railway (the Respondent) was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. Hence this app>al by the Railway.\n\nLearned eounsel for the appellant raised the same preliminary objections and canvassed the same contentions which were a<!vanced in Civil Appeal 1937 of 1972. For reasons given in that appeal, we would overrule the objections, negative the contentions and hold that since .the questioned directions of November 2, 1957 and January 13, 1961, in so far as they related to the employees of ex-Grain Shop recruited from sources (ii) and (iii) were violative of Article 16 of the Constitution, the impugned order whereby Manickyam's seniority was revised and lowered, in pursuance of those directions, was also invalid.\n\nA Mandamus shall therefore, issue directing the appellant to restore and refix the place of Manickyam in the list of seniority as on December 31, 1958, in accordance with the Railway Board's directions of October 16, 1952 and taking into account other relevant considerations, but ignoring the directions contained in the Board's communication of November 2, 1957 and January 13, 1961 to the <:xtent they have been held to be unconstitutional and invalid. If as a result of the refixation of his seniority as directed, Manickyam becomes entitled to be promoted or to be considered for promotion,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1974 J 3 S.C.lt.\n\nhe shall be so promoted or considered for promotion on an actual A or notional basis, with effect from the date on which such promotion or consideration for promotion, as the case may be, falls due.\n\nWith. the slight modification, indicated above, we dismiss this appeal. Appellant shall pay the costs of Respondent Manickyarn, in this Court.\n\ns.c.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\n852 SCl/14-2500-20-6-75-GIPF.\n\n....", "total_entities": 81, "entities": [{"text": "207\n\nGENERAL MANAGER, SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY\n\nSECUNDRABAD AND ANR ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GENERAL MANAGER, SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY SECUNDRABAD AND ANR ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V.R. SIDDHANTI AND ORS. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.V.R. SIDDHANTI AND ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 30, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 30, 1974\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 142, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 166, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 14 & 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 192, "end_char": 204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 2nd, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1317, "end_char": 1335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 2nd, 1967, th~ Railway Board in partial modification of its earlier proceeding directed that the seniority of temporary Grain Shop Staff consequent on their absorption in the absorbing departments should be regulated on the basis of their date of actual absorption in those departments and not on the basis as if they had been absorbed in those departments right from the beginning of service."}}, {"text": "January 13, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1724, "end_char": 1740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 13, 1961, the Railway Board issued a 'clarification' that the seniority of the Grain-Shop staff of category III should be fixed from the date of their absorption\n\nin a JCmlaDCnt dcPartment, irrespective of their length of service in the Grain-Shop Department, with regard to category I, it was laid down that temporary staff who were initially appointed in the permanent department and were then transferred to the Grain Shop dcpartment-\\vould not have their seniority affected by their transfer to the Grain Shop Department."}}, {"text": "November 2, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2437, "end_char": 2453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "November 2, 1957, and January 13 1961 of the Board had been questioned on the ground that they discriminate against' the employees of category III and, as such, violate the guarantee of equal treatment enshrined in Art."}}, {"text": "January 13 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2459, "end_char": 2474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "November 2, 1957, and January 13 1961 of the Board had been questioned on the ground that they discriminate against' the employees of category III and, as such, violate the guarantee of equal treatment enshrined in Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2652, "end_char": 2666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 16. 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4212, "end_char": 4228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The employees who were likely to be affected as a result of the re.adjustment i;-if the petitioners' seniority in accordance with the principles laid down in the Boards' decision of October 16."}}, {"text": "Supremc- Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4432, "end_char": 4446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "405/67 decided by Supremc- Court on 14-8-1968, discussed and distinguished."}}, {"text": "14-8-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4450, "end_char": 4459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "405/67 decided by Supremc- Court on 14-8-1968, discussed and distinguished."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4766, "end_char": 4782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "650 of 1970 decided by Delhi High Court, approved."}}, {"text": "Nov. 2, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5757, "end_char": 5769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, the impugned directions dated Nov. 2, 1957 and January 13."}}, {"text": "January 13. 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5774, "end_char": 5790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, the impugned directions dated Nov. 2, 1957 and January 13."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5884, "end_char": 5899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gundur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6164, "end_char": 6170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result was that 7 was transferred and posted at Gundur and was given the 445 the place in the order of seniority held by B among the cICrks in the Grain Shop Department ofBazwade District."}}, {"text": "ofBazwade District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6285, "end_char": 6303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result was that 7 was transferred and posted at Gundur and was given the 445 the place in the order of seniority held by B among the cICrks in the Grain Shop Department ofBazwade District."}}, {"text": "November 2, l9S7 and", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6379, "end_char": 6399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later on a result of the impugned decisions taken by the Railway Board on November 2, l9S7 and January 13, 1961."}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7271, "end_char": 7283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "G. L. Sanghi"}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7288, "end_char": 7299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Shyamla Pappu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7326, "end_char": 7339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. Shyamla Pappu and J. Ramamurthi, for respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "J. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7344, "end_char": 7357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. Shyamla Pappu and J. Ramamurthi, for respondent Nos.", "canonical_name": "J. Ramamurthi"}}, {"text": "J. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7454, "end_char": 7467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1-15 & 17-22 (in c. A. 1937/72) and for the respondent (in C.A.\n\n193~/72)\n\nJ. Ramamurthi for the Interveners (in C.A. 1937 of 1972).", "canonical_name": "J. Ramamurthi"}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7558, "end_char": 7566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nSARKARIA J.-These appeals by special leave are directed against two inter-linked judgments of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "SARKARIA"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7910, "end_char": 7921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. N. Rau Com mittee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8581, "end_char": 8601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the suggestion of B. N. Rau Com mittee, grain shops for the supply of foodgrains at cost price to its C employees were opened by the Indian Railways on an extensive scale throughout the country."}}, {"text": "Indian Railways", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8696, "end_char": 8711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the suggestion of B. N. Rau Com mittee, grain shops for the supply of foodgrains at cost price to its C employees were opened by the Indian Railways on an extensive scale throughout the country."}}, {"text": "August 24, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9824, "end_char": 9839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For this purpose, the Railway Board took several policy decisions commencing from August 24, 1948."}}, {"text": "February 3, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9950, "end_char": 9966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is dated February 3, 1949 (Exh."}}, {"text": "September 15, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10110, "end_char": 10128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "whereby the G temporary Grain Shop Staff was to be grouped as under :\n\n(a) those who were recruited prior to and were in service on September 15, 1945, and\n\n(b) those who were recruited on or after September 15, 1945."}}, {"text": "6-7-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12840, "end_char": 12848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "well as those appointed in the intermediate grades, Irrespective of the fact that they were absorbed either before or after 6-7-1949 should be fixed on their absorption in the regular Departments in accordane<: with the iJWtructions contained in their letter No."}}, {"text": "27-7-46", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13000, "end_char": 13007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13/3 dated 27-7-46, and the staff concerned paid the arrears due on this account."}}, {"text": "National Federation of Indian Railwaymen", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13732, "end_char": 13772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the representation made by the National Federation of Indian Railwaymen, the Railway Board, reconsider<d its decision of October 16, 1952 regarding counting of past temporary service for the purpose of fixing seniority of 'open market' recruits."}}, {"text": "October 16, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13822, "end_char": 13838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the representation made by the National Federation of Indian Railwaymen, the Railway Board, reconsider<d its decision of October 16, 1952 regarding counting of past temporary service for the purpose of fixing seniority of 'open market' recruits."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15384, "end_char": 15402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15483, "end_char": 15500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mainly relying upon two Single Bench judgments-one of the Madras High Court in W.P. No."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15547, "end_char": 15564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3110 of 1965 and the other of the Bombay High Court in Misc."}}, {"text": "March 15, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15613, "end_char": 15627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "321 of 1964, decided on G March 15, 1967-the learned Single Judge who tried the wTit petition, accepted the contentions of Respondents I to 9 and struck down the impugned proceedings."}}, {"text": "Clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15836, "end_char": 15845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Roshanlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16005, "end_char": 16014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aggrieved by that judgment, the Railway carried an appeal under Clause 15 of the ktters Patent to the Division Bench of the High Court, which dismis; ed the same with these observations :\n\nH \"What has been held by their Lordships in Roshanlal's case applies with equal force to the case on hand.", "canonical_name": "Roshan Lal Tandon"}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16944, "end_char": 16956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. G. L. Sanghi, learned Counsel for the appellants, has raised two preliminary objections.", "canonical_name": "G. L. Sanghi"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18476, "end_char": 18494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19011, "end_char": 19024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No list or\n\n(1) C.A. No.405 of 1967 decided by Supreme Court on 14-8-1967."}}, {"text": "14-8-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19028, "end_char": 19037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No list or\n\n(1) C.A. No.405 of 1967 decided by Supreme Court on 14-8-1967."}}, {"text": "Padam Singh Jhina", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19589, "end_char": 19606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ratio of this Court's decision in Padam Singh Jhina's case\n\n(supra) is not applicable to the facts of the instant case."}}, {"text": "Jhina", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19675, "end_char": 19680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jhina's contention was that he had been ma/a fide reduced in the list of seniority, from the 5th to the 7th place and that one Prem Sagar had been placed above him in contravention of the Rules."}}, {"text": "Prem Sagar had been placed above him in contravention of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19802, "end_char": 19868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jbina", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20084, "end_char": 20089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All the persons whose placement in the seniority list was controverted were not impleaded, and as such, had no opportunity of replying to the case set up by Jbina, and, in the absence of porsons directly affected, it was not possible for the Court to adjudicate the matter."}}, {"text": "Sangbi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20547, "end_char": 20553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On merits, Mr. Sangbi has, by and large, adopted the reasoning of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in General Manager, Southern Rai/w3y v. Venkataraman (4), which had, in Letters Patent Appeal reversed tbe judgment of the Single Judge, relied upon in the instant case by the Andhra Pradesh High Court.", "canonical_name": "Sangbi"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20818, "end_char": 20843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On merits, Mr. Sangbi has, by and large, adopted the reasoning of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in General Manager, Southern Rai/w3y v. Venkataraman (4), which had, in Letters Patent Appeal reversed tbe judgment of the Single Judge, relied upon in the instant case by the Andhra Pradesh High Court."}}, {"text": "Grain Shop Department", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22181, "end_char": 22202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Grain Shop Department, only as a matter of grace, subsequently on absorption in permanent departments."}}, {"text": "26-9-1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25307, "end_char": 25316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2134 of 1972 decided on 26-9-1973."}}, {"text": "CENTRAL RAILWAY l'. A. V. R. S!DDHANTI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25319, "end_char": 25357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CENTRAL RAILWAY l'."}}, {"text": "Sarkaria", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25359, "end_char": 25367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. R. S!DDHANTI (Sarkaria, J.) 215\n\nis allowed, but not miniclassification which creates inequality among the similarly circumstanced members of the same class or group.", "canonical_name": "SARKARIA"}}, {"text": "ctober, 16, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28064, "end_char": 28080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ctober, 16, 1952 regarding fixation of pay and semonty of the ex Gram Shop staff on their absorption in regular departments, were , obscure ad _vague on two points."}}, {"text": "Articles 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29178, "end_char": 29189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sanghi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30094, "end_char": 30100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have porused Paras 302, 303 and 304 of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual, Chapter III, 2nd Edition, relied up6n by Mr.\n\nSanghi.", "canonical_name": "Sangbi"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31405, "end_char": 31423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Roshan Lal Tandon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33926, "end_char": 33943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What was said about further promotion in Roshan Lal Tandon's case (supra) is equally applicable to absorption and seniority in the instant case.", "canonical_name": "Roshan Lal Tandon"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34273, "end_char": 34291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Manickyarn", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34577, "end_char": 34587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "952 of 1966, Respondent Manickyarn was originally employed as a Commercial Clerk on December 4, 1944 in the Southern Railway and was posted at Rayapuram.", "canonical_name": "Manickyarn"}}, {"text": "Balasubramaniarn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34711, "end_char": 34727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Balasubramaniarn, was then a clerk in the Grain Shop Department in Bezwada District and posted at Gudur.", "canonical_name": "Balasubramaniarn"}}, {"text": "Bezwada District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34778, "end_char": 34794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Balasubramaniarn, was then a clerk in the Grain Shop Department in Bezwada District and posted at Gudur."}}, {"text": "Gudur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34809, "end_char": 34814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Balasubramaniarn, was then a clerk in the Grain Shop Department in Bezwada District and posted at Gudur."}}, {"text": "Manickyam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34826, "end_char": 34835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1950, Manickyam and Balasubramaniam made joint application for mutual transfer.", "canonical_name": "Manickyarn"}}, {"text": "Balasubramaniam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34840, "end_char": 34855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1950, Manickyam and Balasubramaniam made joint application for mutual transfer.", "canonical_name": "Balasubramaniarn"}}, {"text": "Manickyarn", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34950, "end_char": 34960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was allowed and, in consequence, Manickyarn and Balasubramaniarn exchanged places.", "canonical_name": "Manickyarn"}}, {"text": "August 10, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35051, "end_char": 35066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manickyam was therefore transferred and posted on August 10, 1950 at Gudur and was given the 445th place in the order of seniority among the clerks in the Grain Shop Department of Bezwada District."}}, {"text": "January 13; 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35384, "end_char": 35400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, as a result of the impugned decisions taken by the Railway Board on November 2, 1957 and January 13; 1961, Manickyam was relegated to a Jower position in the seniority list of Commercial Clerks."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35630, "end_char": 35641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 24, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35707, "end_char": 35719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manickyam then moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for bringing up and quashing the order dated May 24, 1966 of the Di_visional Commercial Superintendent, Southern Railway, Vijawada, in so far as it related to the promotion of Respondents 2 to 8 to the senior time scale of Rs."}}, {"text": "Rayapuram District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36307, "end_char": 36325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter-affidavit filed by the appellant, it was averred that Manickyam and Balasubramaniam were mutually transferred to Bezwada District and Rayapuram District and assigned each other's places i.e. 445th and 60Jst places in the seniority among the Commercial Clerks in Bezwada District a_nd Rayapuram District, respectively, on the basis of an agreement between them."}}, {"text": "Bezwada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36435, "end_char": 36442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter-affidavit filed by the appellant, it was averred that Manickyam and Balasubramaniam were mutually transferred to Bezwada District and Rayapuram District and assigned each other's places i.e. 445th and 60Jst places in the seniority among the Commercial Clerks in Bezwada District a_nd Rayapuram District, respectively, on the basis of an agreement between them."}}, {"text": "July 18, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36564, "end_char": 36577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further stated that on July 18, 1955 Manickyam made an application requesting that he should be given all those benefits which had been made available to ex ."}}, {"text": "Vijayawada District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37144, "end_char": 37163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "seniority was also revised as he had come to Vijayawada District in mutual exchange with Grain !"}}, {"text": "Pothuraju", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38077, "end_char": 38086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the re suit, the Writ Petition was allowed and a writ of Mandamus directing the appellant to give Manickyam 92nd place immediately above Pothuraju, No."}}, {"text": "December 31, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38198, "end_char": 38215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "93, and to the then Respondents 2 to 8 from 96th to 195th places in the list of seniority published as on December 31, 1958, was issued."}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39133, "end_char": 39143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_221_257_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "2:21\n\nMANGALORE GANESH BEED! WORKS ETC. ETC.\n\nUNION OF INDIA ETC.\n\nJanuary 31, 1974.\n\nIA. N, RAY, C.J., H. R. KHASNA, K. K. MATHEW, A. ALAGIRISWAMI\n\nAND p, N. BHAGWATI, JJ.]\n\nBcedi and Cigar Workers (Condition of Employment) A.ct, 196&.:-.f.r. 3, 4, 2(g)(a), 2(g)(li), 2(m), 26, 27 and 31onstitutional validity ofon' s1#Utiou of India, 1950-Art&. 14, 19(1)(g)-Legislative competence-14.ct if falls within Entry 24 List II or Entries 22, 23 pnd 24 of List Ill, Seventh Schedule-Rules laying down the mtJximum percentage of Beedis which can\n\nbe rejected, validity of-Sec. 37(3) i/ unworkable.\n\nInterpretation-Reports of Conimission.J and Committees-Adniissibilily i11 evidence about the prev, ailing system and condition,, of industry.\n\nThe beedi industry is widespread in the - country. Three systelns are adopted for the manufacture of becdis. First. th.: factory system in whkh the workers gather and work in a factory under the supervision Of the manttfacturer who .is the owner of factory. Secondly, the contract system of em ployment wherein the proprietor gives the middleman quantities of beedi lea ves and tobacco. The contractor manufactures beedis by employing di. eclly labourers or by distributing material amongst the home workers. The third system is that of the out workers. They roll beedis out of tobacco aBd beedi leaves suppli~ by the proprietor without the agem; y of middle man.\n\nThe special feature of the industry is the manufacture of beedis through E . contractors and by distributing work in private dwelling houses where the workers take raw-material given by the employers of contractors. The relationship between employers and employees is not well defined. The application of the Factories Act bas always met with difficulties. .The labour in the ·\n\nindustry is unorganised and is not able to look after its own interests, The industry is highly mobile, The attempts of i!IOme of the states to legislate in thi?.l behalf have not been successful. Anxiety has been expressed by several committees and commissions, appointed by the Central Government and some F of the State Government, to introduce ome regulation in the em11l .... ver-cmrloyee relatiohship and to obtain certain benefits to the employees which have been denied to them. They have reported extremely unsatisfactory and. unheu.ltby working conditions long hours of work with low wages and anrestricted emuloyment of wofnen and children. It was found that the contract\n\notnd bOme work systems enriched th~ nro; Jrictor <:t th! expense of 1h Woi kers and al-so deprived the worker':! of th;! b.lrgaining power in regard to conditions of labour.\n\nG It. is in this background that the Becdi an9 Cigar Workers (Conditfoni!I. of f::mployment) Act, 1966, came into existence. The Act was passd to pro'ftde fer the welfare of workers in Beedi and Cigar establishments and to regulate\n\nlb~ conditionc; of their work. and for matters connected therewith.\n\n. The ne.titioner, i and the appellants, proprietors of beCdi fat!ori~' a.nd own-rs of trac!I! mark.and ome home workers. !mpl\"ached the const1tuh.onahty of the Act.\n\nThey contended; (i) being a legislation for regulating \"beedi .and c.igar indutry it fell under Entrv 24 Ust TI o.f the &-vf\"nth Srhedul\"' an~. thre .. fore .Parlj:iment had. oJegi.slative C?mpcti:ice to., enact the. mea~r~~ <!.~).Sec tions 3. and 4 of Act wh1rh required hcen~ in reo; nec;:t. of, .tn<'ftriij PTC:'\n\nmises violate.d Art~.~.19(1).{p.) and. 14 slnc~ .. they.confrre.d ~!1{ettered pwers on the licensing p, utbority. without the rcqms1te safeguards: (111) the provu1ons.\n\n2-954 SCI/74\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n( 1974 J 3 S.C.R.\n\nof section 2(g)(a), 2(g)(b} and 2(m') read with section 2(c) and (f) created a totally artificial and fictional definition of employer and thereby imposed vicarious liabilities upon a manufacturer of and trader in beedies in respect of diverse matters which entailed civil and criminal liabilities and thereby imposed unreasonable restrictions on the manufacturers in their right to carry on trade ::.nd business; (iv) sec. 26 and 27, dealing with lcavo and wages. during leave pedod. cast unreasonable burden and imposed obligations which were not cap<1ble of fulfilment and thus violated Art. 19(1)(f) and (g), and, in any event. th= section'i were unenforceable with regard to hom! workers ant thciefOrc violated Art. 19(l)(f) and (g) so far as the same were applied 'to home workers; (v) Sec, 31 which provided for one month's wages in lieu of notice of dismissal was an unreasonable restriction;\n\n(vi) Rule 37 of the Maharashtra Rules and nlle 29 of the Mysore Rules, dealing with rejection of substandard beedies, framed under s. \" of the Act, imposed unreasonable restriction on the beedi and cigar manufacturers; and (vii) Sec. 37(3) which made provision for maternity benefits to women employed in an establishment\n\nwas unworkable.\n\nHELD : (Per Ray, C.J., Khanna, Mathew, and Dhagwati, JJ) : Parlia ment has legislative competence for enacting the law and the provisions of the Act are valid and do not offend any provision of the Constitution.\n\nPrevious material in the shape of reports of commissions to review the working of the industry is adffiissible in evidence about the prevailing systen1 and conditions of industry.\n\nSlate of Madras v. Rajagopalan, [1955} 2 S.C.R. 541, referred to.\n\n(i) The Act does not fall within entry 24 List II or c_ntries 7 and 52 in List I. The tn1e nature and character of the legislation is for enforcing better conditions of labour amongst those Whft are engaged in the manufacture of heedis and cigars.\n\nIt, therefore, falls within entries 2, 23 and 24. in List III. The Act, in pith and substance is for welfare of labour. [233H, 234E]\n\n(ii) Sections 3 and 4 of the Act arc not violative of Arts. 19(1)(g) and E 14.. These sections do not confer unfettered p0wers on the licensing authority without the requisite safegilards. The power to grant or refuse a licence is sufficiently controlled by necessary guidance. There are safeguards preventing the abuse of power. The right Of appeal is a great safeguard. There is machinery as weU as procedure for determining the grant or refusal of a licence,\n\n(2358-C]\n\n(iii) The provisions of Sections 2(g)(a), 2(g)(b) and 2(m) are constitutionally valid and do not imposo any unreasonable restriktion on the manufac F turer or trade-mark holder. There cannot be any question of unreasonableness in cases where the manufactur@ or trade-mark holders themselves emploY labour, because, there is direct relationship of master an(i servant.\n\nWhen the contractors engaged Jabour for the principal employer the lia, bility flrisct: by reason of contract labour engas; ed for or on behalf of Principal cmploYcr.\n\nWhere the contractor engages labour for the manufacturer it is not unreasonable restriction to impose liability on the manufacturr for the labour engaged by the manufacurer through the contractor.\n\nWhen the con- G tractor engages labour for and on his own behalf and supplies the fini<; hed product to the manufacturer )le will b~ the principal employer in relation to\n\nsucl~ Ia9our and the: manufacturer will not be responsible for implementing the nrovisions of the Act With regard to such Jabour emoloyl\"d by the contract. It will be a question of fact in each case as to who is the person for whom the contract labour is engap:ed.\n\nIf an independent Contractor em., loy! labour for himself the:· liability will attach to him as the nrincipal employer and: not to the manufacturer. The Act thus fastens liability on the t'Crson who himself engages labour or the person for whom or on whose behalf H labour ii engaged or where a person haa ultimate control over the affain of the establishment by rea.\\On of advancement of money or-of substantial interest -in' the control of the affairs of thC establishment. '(2370. F:. 241A)\n\nMANGALORE BEED! WORKS V. UNION 223\n\n(iv) The provisions of sccti.ons 26 and 27 arc applicabl~ to home workers und workers in industrial premises and are also capable of being made applicable .wiout any reasonable. restriction on the employers. -As a matter of fact Jt. is found that borne workers can turn out 700 to 1000 beedies a day.\n\nThe minimum wages prescribed by various states for these home workers are between Rs. 2 to Rs. 4.30 'for rolling 1000 beedis. It will, therefore, not cause unrcasonabl€'. financial burden on account of leave wages. Tho home workers . will get wages for the leave period corresponding to the number of beedies manufactured by him for a particular employer. The hours of work will be immaterial because if he works for less number of hours he will obtain lesser pa_yment.\n\nThere will be no difficulty in computing was for the annual leave period. The home worker will get leave wages corresponding to his actual earnings just asi the worker in the industrial premises will get leave wages corresponding to his full-time earning, The basis of calculation of wages in the case of home workers_ is thedaily average of his total full time earnings for the days he has worked duri:'g the month immediately preceding bis .leave, [248C-DJ\n\n(v) The provisions contained in s. 31 cannot be said to be unreasonable restrictions. Section 2(rr) of the Industrial Disputes Acts defines wages. Some aid can also be had from the definition ot wages in the Payment of Wages Act that wages include leave wages. Therefore, the word 'wages' in sec 31 of the Act will mean wages which are calculated under s. 27 of the Act.\n\nThe calculation can be made both iil respect of workers in industrial premises and home workers in establishments.\n\n[248G]\n\n(vi) The rules are valid on the ground that the maximum limit of 5 per cent for the rejection of Bcedis is based on experience in the industry, and, secondly, the employer can reject more than 5 per cent by raising a dispute before the appropriate authority. Rules about rejection and fixing maximum limit of S p_er cent are reasOnable and fair. The rules are intended to eliminate explqitation of illiterate workers who are mostly women.\n\n[250A)\n\n(vii) The reasonableness of section 37(3) hasnot been challenged. There is no difficulty with regard to the working of the Maternity Benefits Act, 1961, in regard to maternity benefits to women employer in an establishment.\n\n[252DJ\n\nCllinta1nan Rao & A11r. v, The Stflte of Madhya Pradesh, [1958] S.C.R. 134,0; Birdliichand. Sharma v. Firt Civil Judge Nagput & Ors. [1961] 3 S.C.R.\n\n161. Bl!ikuse Yamas Kshatriya (P) Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr. [19611 1 S.C.R. 860, distinguished.\n\nShanker Balaji Waji v. State of Maharashtra, [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 249, held inapplicable.\n\nDewan Mahideen Saheeb v. UnitM Bidi Workers Union Salem [19641 7 S.C.R. 646 Cliintaman Rao's case: Silver Jubilee Tailoring House &: Ors. v.\n\nChief Inspectors of Shpps and EstAbUshment & Anr. referred to.\n\nSyed Saheb & Sons v. State of Mysore (1972) Mysore Law Journal 450, ; ipproved.\n\nAbdul Aue< Sahib and Sons, etc. v, The Union of India, [1973] I! M.L.J, 126, Chnablzai Purshi>ttam Patel, Beedi Manufqcturers of BllandartJ & Ors v.\n\nState of Maharashlra, [1972) 1 L.L.J. 130; Chirukandtth Chandrastkharan v.\n\nUnion of India [1972} I L.L, J, 340, and Civil Appeals Nos, 1972 and 1968 of 1971 (Andhra Pradesh), over ruled.\n\nAL~; GRlsWAMI, J, (concurring) : The Act is the result of a. co!llpromise between the original intentions of the Government and the od1fibon.s they H . had to make in the proposed measure as a result of cor'.cess1ons intended to\n\nbring home worken within the scope of the Act, The original intention was not to permit becdi rolling in private homes which \":'ill involve thounds of\n\nlabourers in thousands of far-fiung homes and the difficulty of applying the\n\n\n[ 1974 J 3 S.C.R.\n\nprovisions of the measure to them. ThC result is an Act which is likely to give . rise to . many difficulties in its actual working.\n\nIt is obvious on a reading of the measure that its purpose is to rope in every possible person whO. Could be brought in as an employer.\n\nBut the result of the definition.• 1I'L thC Act is that everybody w-0uld be a principal employer and contractor ahd every labour will be contract labour.\n\n[252H] Clause 2(g)(b) is intended to cover cases where a person runs business Bcnami. There can be no objection to such a provision. But merely because a person lends or advances money or supplies goods he cannot be called an employer.\n\nThe words in.cl. 2(g)(b) \"who has by reason of his advancing\n\n1noney~ supplying goods or otherwise a substantial interest in the control of affairs of any establishment\" should be struck down, When section 26 pro vides that every employee in an establishment should be allowed in a calendar year leave with wages at the rate of 1 day for every 20 days of work per.; formed by him during the previous calendar year it leads to real difficulty.\n\nThe question is what i~ the \\Vage which has to be paid to him during the period of leave.\n\nA home worker might work for 1 hour on one day, 8 hours on ;.1nother day and not at all for a number of days, What would be the wages payable to him? The difficulty of applying the Maternity Benefit Act is\\again apparent How can the provisions be applied to women who cannot be said to employed continuously for ;.i certain period before the confinement?\n\nUnder section 31, no employer shall dispense with the services of an employee\n\nwho has been employed for a period of 6 months or more except for a rea sonable cause and without giving such employees at least one month's notice or wages in lieu of such notice. It is not clear as to who will be the employer competent to dispense with the ervices of the employee.\n\n[254A.\n\n2SSC, c56BI\n\nWhile Courts should give effect to the intentions of the legislature it can be' -done only if that is possible without doing violence to the actual language. tiI the statute. The various definitions plainly soek to rope in everybody who has anything to do with the manufacture of beedies and while trying to give effect to the penal provisions in the statute considerable difficulties will\n\narc._ There will on the one hand be the actual occupier of the inctustrial premises. There will be on the other hand a person who might have advanced 1noncy to him anti supplied goods to him and therefore may be substantially interested in its control. The actual occupier himself might be\" a contractor nnd in .that case he as well as a person on whose behalf beedis are manufactured would be liable. Who in that C3Se, would b~ actually liable ?\n\n[254C] The objection is not to an)' of the provisions on the i::rounds of unreason-\n\n~1blcness or unconstitutionality. Nobody can dispute the ne'ed for setting right\n\nthe evils. But, good intentions should not result in a legislation which v:ould become ineffective and lead to a lot of fruitless litigation over the years.\n\nIf has to be held in agreement with the majority of the High Courts that r-cctions 26. 27. 31 and 37(3) do not apply to the home workers.\n\nIt woul<l be ood in the interest of all concerned if the Act is amended as early as\n\npcsible to remove all ·.ihe lacunae and th-e difficulties pointed out. The diftl~ c111ties have arisen bccauSe of an attempt blindly to apply t_he provision. .. which \\Viii be quite workable if ther :ire applied to conditions where the Factory Act woril<l be applic::ble.\n\n[256FJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1553, 1614- 1618, 1769.of 1971and1131-1133 and 1440 of 1972. ·\n\n<From the Judgment and Order dated. the 24th June, 1971.of the Mysore High Court at Bangalore in Writ Petitions Nos. 806, 837, 1152, 1486, 1592, 1638, 1896, 159, 4152 and 3W of 1970 and 1456 of\n\n1971).\n\nH Civil Appeals Nos. 2516-2523, 2560, 2569, 2661-2164 of 1912 and 66-69, 72-75, 1307, 854-856, 857-859, 1203 and t204 of 1973.\n\nMANGALOltE lll!mX WORICS v. UNION 225\n\n.. ·(Frem tile iuclgment and O!Qci: .dated .the $th September, 1972 of the Madias High Court in Writ Peiitiolis No&. 227, 4tZ, 2631 of 1969, 2692,2693,2695,2696,2698of1968,2680,2683,2688;2689,2691, 34n, 3478 of 1968, 531, 849, 1065 of 1969, 2681; 3480 o{ 1968, 40, 169 of 1969, 2854, 2856, 2855 of 1968, 4~8 of 1969, 2847, 2849, 2850, 2853 of 1968, 3268 of 1968, 211. 231, 276 of 1969, 2701, 2797 of B i968, 212 of 1969, 2684 and 2763 of 1968). · ·\n\nWrit Petitions Nos. 127-132 of 1972 •.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights). ·\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 307-311 of 1972.\n\n(AilJleals by Special Leave from the Judgment 'lllld Order dated the 30th November, 1971 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application Nos. 2501 of 1968, 78~, 2848, 2845 and 2846 of 1969) ..\n\nCivil Appeal No. 585 of 1971:\n\n(Frblil the Judgment and order dated the 14th/15th October, 1970 D of the. (JUjata! High Court at Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application No'. 872 of 1968). ·.\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 1864-1873 of 1971 and 173 of 1973:\n\n(From the Judgment and order dated the 16th/17th July, 1970 of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench at Nagpur} iin Special Ovil\n\nAppHcationJlNos. 391 to 393 of 1969, 409 of 1968, 451, 453, 513, and 514 of 1969 and 453 of 1969). Civil Appeals Nos. 1972-1988 of 1971.\n\n(From. the Judgment and Order dated the 26th August, 1970 of the Andl\\ra Piadl'Sh High Court at Hyderabad in Writ Petitions Nos. 2587, 2818, 3007, 3009, 3058, 3156 3254, 31>18, 3776, 3824; 3825, 3826, 1 4364, 4'53, 5013, 5J74 of 1963 and 1235 of 1969).\n\nMr .. Soll Sorabjee with Mis M: Ramachahdran, Salindra Swarup, I ... B. Dadachanii, 0. C. Mathur 4c Ravinder Narain for the Appellan.t\n\n(in CAs: 1553171) & for Petitioners.\n\n. M/s M. Ramochandran, Salindra Swarup, I. B. Dadachanji, 0. C.\n\nG Mathur 4c Ravinder Narain for the Appellant (in CA 1769171).\n\nMr. K. N. Bhat, for the Appellant (iii CA. 1614171).\n\nMis D. V. Ptitel (m C.A. 1615).and S. V. Gupte (in C.A. 1616). with Mis M. Ramachahdran, T. S.l'ai and A. S. Nambiar for the Appellants' (in CA'S. 1615 & 1616171).\n\n'lflk T. S~ Pai, M. Ramachahdrait and A. S. Nambiar for the Aplf pellants (in CAs. 1617-1618171). ·\n\nMi.~. Jl'tintit!P'~ wlih Mr. A.$, Namb/r fot m Amilants (in Ch. 266t-Cl411Z, 66'69/73 lllld857-859; 12<13' Ii 1204173)':\n\n\n[ 1974 J 3 S.C.R.\n\nMr. Vineet Kumar for the Appellant (in CAs. 1131-1133 & 1440/ 72 and for Appellants (in CA 585/71).\n\nMr. K. K. Venugopal with Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnart for the Appellant (in CAs. 2516-23/72).\n\nMr. K. K. Venugopal with K. R. Nambiar for the Appellant in CAs. 2560-69/72 & 72 75/73).\n\nMr. Niren De with Mr. P. Paramashwara Rao for Respondent No. 1.\n\nMr. Niren De with Mis R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar for Respondent No. 1 (in CAS. 1614, 1616-1618/71, 1131-1133 & 1440/72 and for Respondent No. 2 (in CA 1615/71).\n\nMr. M. Veerappa, for Respondent No. 1 (in CAs. 1553, 1614, 1616,\n\n1769) and for Respondents No. 1, 3, 4 and 5 (in CA. 1615), for Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 (in CAs. 1617-18) for Respondent (in CAs. 1131, 1132 & 1440), for respondent Nos. 2-3 (In CA. 1133) and for Respondent No. 2 (In WPs. 127-128172).\n\nMr. S. Govind Swaminadhan with Mr. A. V. Rangam and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for Respondent No. 2 (in CAs. 2516-23 2560-69, 2661- 64, 66-69, 72-75, 854-59 & 1203-1204) and for Respondent (in CA. 1307/73).\n\nMr. K. S. Ramamurthy with Mr. A. T. M. SamjJath for the Appellant (in CA. 1307).\n\nM/s. K. s~ Ramamurthy and Mr. Y. S. Chitale with Mis T. s: Pai E and A. S. Nambiar for the Petitioner in (WP. 127).\n\nMr. Y. S. Chitale with M/s M. Ramchandran, T. S. Pai and A. S.\n\nNambiar for t)lc Petitioner (in WP. 128).\n\nMis M. Ra111achandran, T. S. Pai and A. S. Nambiar for the Petitioner (in WP. 129).\n\nMr. A. S. Na111biar for the Petitioner (in WP. 130).\n\nMr. Niren De with Mis P. Parameshwara Rao, R. N. Sachthey, and S. P. Nayar for the Appellants (in CAs. 1972-88/71) and for Respondent No. I (in WP. 127-128).\n\nMr. D. V. Patel with Mr. P. H. Parekh and Mrs. Sunanda Bhandar~\n\nfor the Appellants (in CA. 307-311172).\n\nMr. Niren De and Mr. M. C. Bhandare (for the State of Maharashtra in CA. 307 & 311) with Mis R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar for Respondents Nos. 1-4 (in CAs. 307-308).\n\nMr. Niren De with Miss S. Chakravarthy and Mr. R. H. Dhebar (for the State of Gujarat, Mis R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar for Respondent Nos. 1-3 (in CA. 585).\n\nMr. Niren De (For Union, of India in CA. 1864171), Mr. M~C.\n\nBhandare, (for the State-of-Maharashtra in CAs. 1864-1873), with Mis\n\nMANGALORE BEED! WORKS V. UNION {Ray, CJ.) .2 21 .\n\nR. N. Sachthey, and S. P. Nayar for the Appellants (in CA. 1864 to 1873/71) and for Respondent No. 2 {in CA. 173/73).\n\nMr. M. N. Phadke with Mr. Rameshwar Nath for Respondents Nos. 1-2 (in CA. 1871) and for Appellant (in CA. 173).\n\nMr. Rameshwar Nath, for Respondents No. 1 (in CAs. 18~9) B and for Respondents Nos. 3, 5-9, 1.1-13, 15-17 and 20 (in CA. 1871).\n\nMr. M. Krishna Rao with Mr. B. Kant<1 Rao for Respondent No. 7.\n\nMis Narayan Nttttr and Ram Shtsh for the Intervenrs-Dharwar Distt. Beedi Workers' Union, Hubli and Anr. (in CA. 1553).\n\nMr. R. P. Kapoor for Mr. /. N. Shroff for Interv., ner-Statc of c Madhya Pradesh (in CA. 1769).\n\nMis S. R. Bommai, I. B. Dadachanji and P. C. Bhartari for lntervener-Puttappa Veerappa etc. (in CA. 1553),\n\nMr. Rameshwar Nath for Intervener (in CA. 1864).\n\nThe Judgment ct A. N. RAY, C.J., H. R. KHANNA, K. K. MATHEW and P. N. BHAGWATI, JJ. was delivered by RAY C.J. A. ALAGIRISWAMY, J. aave a separate Opinion.\n\nRAY, C.J. The provisions of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditoin of Employment) Act, 1966 refemid to as the Act are impeached as unconstitutional in these petitions and appeals.\n\nBroadly stated, the Act is challenged on these grounds. First, Parliament has DCI legislative competence to enact this measure. It is a legislation for regulating beedi and cigar industry.\n\nTherefore, it falls under Entry 24 in State List II. Second, the restrictions imposed by the Act violate freedom of trade and business guaranteed under Article 19(i)(g.).\n\nThe Act imposes unreasonable burdens in cases where a manufacturec or trade mark holder of beedi has no master and servant relationship and no effective control . on independent cyllltractors or home-workers. The manufacturer or trade mark holder ; s rendered liable as the principal employer of contract labour. Third, section 4 of the Act imposes conditions which are arbitrary, excessive extraneous.\n\nFourth, Section 7(i)(c) regarding entry into industrial premises, sections 26, 27 regarding annual leave with wages, section 31 regarping ohe months's wages in lieu of notice, section 37 regarding application of Maternity Benefits Act, 1961 and the rules for rejection of beedis are unconstitutional. These provisions are unreasonable restrictions on the freedclm of trade and business.\n\nThe petitioners and the appellants are of two characters. The majority are proprietors of beedi factories s¢ owners trade mark registered under the Trade Marks Act in relation to heedis. Some are home WCll'kers.\n\nThe bccdi industry is widespread in this Country, The manufacture of bc:ecli is done in ~. The tobacco is blended often y.oith some other ingredient. A small quantity of it is put .on the bcedi leaf which\n\n228 Sl!PllEME COUll.T Rl!POllTS\n\n. [ 1974 J 3. S.C, R.\n\nis previously wet to render it llex.ible to prevent any Crushing of leaf and is also cut to si~. .TU .. beedi leaf is then rolled keepilig the . tobacco within it and its ends are then closed. . The beedis thus rolled are collected and warmed or roasted after which they are ready for packing, labelling and sale. Where the proprietor owns a trade mark, the 11rade mark labels are affixed to the individual beedis as also on the packel!J.\n\nThe work of wetting and cutting of the wrappec leaves is one of the items of work in the process. Pciwer is seldom employed for the purpo6e. The industry depends entirely upon human labour. If more than 20 workers are employed in a particular place for the manufacture of beedis, the provisions of the Factories Act; 1940 will apply to the premises.\n\nThree systems are adopted in the manufacture of beedis.\n\nFirst, is the factc.ry system. There the manufacture is an owner of the factory.\n\nWorkers gather and work under his supervision as his emplo; yees.\n\nSecond is the contract system of employment. That is the most prevalent form.\n\nUnder this sys1em, the propriettor gives to the middlemen quantities of beedi leaves and tobacco. The contractor on receiving the materials manufactures beedis (i) by employing directly labourers and manufacturing beedis or (ii) by distributing the material& amongst lhe home workers, as they are called, mostly women who mnaufactllre beedis in their own homes with the assistani:e of other members of their family including children. The third system is that the outworkers. They roll beedis out of the tobacco and heedi leaves supplied by the proprietor himself without the agency of middlemen. The beedis thus supplied whether by the outviorkers or contractors are roasted, labelled and. packed by the proprietor and sold to the public.\n\nUnder these systems, the contractor engages labourers less than the statutory number to escape the application of the Factories Act .. Theze is a fragmentation of the place of manufacture of beedis with a view\n\nto evading the factory legislation. Sometimes there is no definite F relatictnship of master and servant between the actual worker and the ultimate proprietor.\n\nBranch managers of contractors are often men of straw. The proprietor will not be answerable for the wages of the outworkers because there is no privily of contract between them. A large body of actual workers are illiterate women who could with impunity be exploited by the proprietoPS and Contractors. There is in this background an indiscriminate and undetectable employment of G child labour. The contractor being himself dependent on the proprietor has little means to have any organized system. Women and inllrm persons can earn something by rolling beedis.\n\nThe dependence of these people particularlv the women shows that they have little bargaining power against powerful prpprietnrs or contractors.\n\nA typical contractor agrees with the proprietor to purcha_.e tobacoo H and to pay fcir it at the ruling rate and to supply the proprietor with such quantlty of beedis 8S will be llxed. by the proprietor. Re also unchetalccs not to use any tObiicoo odler than that supplied by the '\n\nMANGALORE BEED! WORICS V. UNION (Ray, C.J.) 229\n\nproprietor.\n\nThe proprietor has the authority to send his representative to inspect the place or places of manufacture.\n\nThe contractor undertakes not to enter into any agreement of similar nature with any. o!J:!er concern to make beedis,. The agreement stipulates that the contractor\n\nwilrbe'the sole employer answerable in.regard to the disputes raised by the workers.\n\nThere was a Royal Commission on Labour in India in 193 l. The findings were these. The making of beedi is an industry widely spread over the country. It is partly carried on in the home but mainly in the workshops in the bigger cities and towns.\n\nEvery type of building is used, but small workshops preponderate. It is there that the graver problems mainly raise. Many of these places are small airless boxes.\n\nThere are no windows where workers are crowded.\n\nThere are dark semi basements with lamp and floors. Sanitary conveniences and arrangements for removal of refuses are practically absent. Payment is by piece rate. The hours are unregulated. Many smaller workshops are open day and night. There are no intervals for meals. There are no weekly holidays.\n\nIn 1944, the Government of India appointed a Ccltnmittee under the Chairmanship of Shri D. V. Rege to investigate conditions of industrial labour. The report referred to the contract system whereby the factory owner engaged a large number of middlemen supplied them with raw materials and purchased finished products from them.\n\nThe report found that unhealthy working conditions, long hours of work, employment of women and children, deduction from wages and tho sub-contract system of organisation required immediate attention.\n\nIt was desirable to abolish outworker system and to encourage establishment of big industries if protective labour legislation was to be enforced with success.\n\nIn 1946, the Government of Madras appointed a Court of Inquiry into Jabour conditions in beedi, cigar, snuffcuring and tanning industries.\n\nThere were 90,000 workers depending on beedi industry in Madras.\n\nOf these, 26,500 workers were women.\n\nEmployment of children in the Industry was universal. 2/5ths of the total workers were children. Home workers were predominant. . There were fulltime wor.kers but they were paid less than fair wages.\n\nWorking conditions were extremely unsatisfactory from the standpoint of floor space, sanitation, ventilation and lighting.\n\nIn 1954, the Government of India appointed Shri Natraj Inspector. of Factories to assess the situation with a view to affording maximum legislative protection to the workers.\n\nThe Report was as follows.\n\nAlthough the number of workers engaged in the manufacture of beedi exceeded one lakh, only 17,544 were employed in factories.\n\nThe contract and home work systems enriched proprietor at .the expense of the worker and also deprived the latter of his bargaining power in regard to conditions of labour.\n\nThe poverty as well as illiteracy of. the workers was taken advantage of by the employers.\n\nThere were long hours of.work with low wages, deplorable working conditions and unrestricted employment of women and children.\n\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nThe entire beedi industry was unorganiscd and scattered over the entire state, employing a large force of women. It called for radical reforms in the organisation.\n\nThere was reluctance of the manufacturer to provide certain amenities to the workers such as rest sheds. canteens, creches, ambulance room, etc. Under the indirect employment system conditions obtaining in the industry were still worse. The middlemen contractors did not observe any higher standards in the premises than in those under the manufacturers.\n\nThe Payment of Wages Act applied to factories, but it was difficult to detect violations of the Act because the prescribed registers were not maintained.\n\nThe Madras Maternity Benefit Act which applied to factories was rendered practically ineffective as far as petty industry was concerned because there was no record to prove that women were employed.\n\nThe Report stated that the employers succeeded in organised circumvention of all existing legislation by resorting to splitting up of their factories into smaller units run by contractors who had no knowledge in respect of\n\nworkin!! places .\n\n. The conditions in working places were bad.\n\nThe Report suggested licensing of premises to fix responsibility of the employer for maintenance of minimum standards of ventilation, lighting and sanitation in working places.\n\nThe employment of women and children, wai:es and wage structure in the industry were all considered by the Committee.\n\nThe Committee recommended solution of unhealthy working conditions under miserable environments, long working hours with its attendant evils. unregulated employment of women and children and deduction from wages.\n\nThe contract of home work system of employment was found to be designed solely for the promotion of trade but not the industry of which the labour forms the integral part. It was, therefore, expected that the beedi industry should carry the labour along with it as it developed and was organised in such manner that it discharged its social and moral responsibilities towards the workers.\n\nIt is in. this background that the Act came into existence.\n\nIn Srate of Madras v. Rajagopalan, [19551 2 SCR 541 this Court held that the previous material in the shape of Reports of Commissions of review the working of the industry was admissible in evidence about the prevailing system and conditions of industry.\n\nThe Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, .J 966 is an Act to provide for the welfare of the workers in beedi and cigar establishments and to regulate the conditions of their work and for matters connected therewith. The special feature of the industry was the manufacture of beedis through contractors and by distributing work in the private dwelling house, where the worker.s took raw materials given by the employers of contractors.\n\nThe relationship between employers and employees was not well defined. The application of the factories Act met with difficulties.\n\nThe labour in the industry was unorganised and was not able to look after its own interests.\n\nThe industry was highly mobile.\n\nThe attempt of some of the States . to legislate in this behalf was not successful.\n\nThe necessity for central\n\nMANGALORE BEED! WOUS V. UNION (Ray, C.J.) 231\n\nlegislation was felt.\n\nA bill was mooted to provide for the regulation of the contract system of work, licensing of beedi and cigar industrial premises and matter like health, hours of work, spread over, rest periods, over time, annual leave with pay, distribution of raw materials cic.\n\nThe anxiety was expressed by several Committees to introduce some regulation in the employer-employee relationship and to obtain certain benefits to the employees which were denied to them.\n\nThe so-called contractor or the employer as styled by the employees has been a matter of some concern to the employees as well as to the State. There were certain good and bad points about the systems that were prevalent in the manufacture of beedi. The contractor was very often a man of straw. He was said to be the.creation of the principal employer who put him forward on many occasions as a screen to avoid his own responsibility towards the employees.\n\nAnother broad grievance was that there was double c.hecking and rejection of beedis or double cbbat, out of which the second chhat at the principal employer's place was invariably in the absence of the employee.\n\nThis chhat was alleged to be most irrational and depending upon the whim of the employer.\n\nAs far as the house work system was concerned there was an advantage to the employee with some kind of disadvantage to the employer.\n\nPersons who could spare time in their houses but could not move out for the purpose of employment got ready employment and could supplement their income from agriculture or other sources.\n\nThey were in a position to work as and when leisure was available. and like a factory employee there was no dgour of attending the factory or work at stated time and fur stated number of hours. It appeared that pilfering was a vice of this industry.\n\nBy pilfering tobacco which is the most valuable ingredient, the employees were able to earn' some income by again rolling it into bcedis and selling them.\n\nThe relationship bctwee11 the proprietor, middlemen and outworkcrs came up for consideration in this Court in Chintaman Rao & Anr.\n\nv. The .State of Madhya Pradesh [19581 SCR 1340. The proprietor of a beedi factory was prosecuted under the Factories Act for noncompliance with the provisions of that Act.\n\nThe proprietor pleaded that the workers were not under his employment.\n\nThe contention was that the sattedars who were found in the factory were independent contractors and not workers.\n\nThe management issued tobacco and sometimes beedi leaves to sattedars who manufactured beedis in their own factories or by an arrangement with a third party.\n\nThe sattedars collected the beedis thus made and supplied to the factories for a consideration_. It was held that the sattedars were independent contractors and not the agents.\n\nThe enforcement of factory and labour legislation could be rendered impossible by adopting the simple device of disintegrating what normally will be a factory.\n\nThe legislature wanted to regulate the contract system.\n\nThe legislation did not want to stop the contract system.\n\nThe provisions in the Act recognised the contractor as a part and parcel of the boedi industry.\n\nThe contractor is referred to where the terms 'contract labour' or 'principal employer' of 'employer' have been defined.\n\nSeveral functions which the employer. has to perform are also performed by the contractor. He delivers tobacco and leaves to the home worker and collects the rolled beedis\n\n\"Z3-2 SUPREME COURT Rl!PORTS\n\n[ 1974 J 3 S.C.R.\n\n, after application of cbhat.\n\nHe makes payment to them. Therefore, the contractor has been retained as an integral part though the attempt is to eliminate the vices which crept into the industry.\n\nThe Madras High Court in M/s. K. Abdul Azeez Sahib and Sons, .Four Horse Beedi Manufacturers, Vellore-4 and Ors. v. The Union of .India (1973) II M.L.J. 126 held the definitions of employer and prin- .cipal employer in Section 2 (g) (a) and 2(m) of the Acfto be valid but held that sections. 26 and 27 of the Act are wholly unnforceablc .against tho trade mark holders whether with reference tel\" Mme work- .ers or with referenoe to employees .working in any industrial premises.\n\nThe Madras High Court held that since a worker in a beedi intlustry is not required to work regularly for any prescribed period of hours in a day or even day after day for any date specified period, from the very nature of the case, the provisions in the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 are unworkable with regard to such home workers, a:iid, therefore, they will have no application to them.\n\nThe Madras High Court held that section 7(1) (c), 7(2), 26, 27,.31, and 37 (3) in so far . as they relate to home workers are ultra. vires and illegal and unenforceable against trade mark holders in beedis and contractors in the manufacture of beedis.\n\nThe Madras High Court held that section 7(1)(c), 7(2). 26 and 27 are ultra vires and illegal and unenforceable against the ptitioiJer who are manufacturers .of cigar or .cigar rollers.\n\nThe Bombay High Court in Mis. Chotabhai Purushottam Pate/ ..\n\nBeedi Manufacturers of Bhandara & Ors. v. slate of Maharashtra by Secretary, Industries and Labour Department, Sachivalaya, Bombay & Ors. (1\"972) I L.L.J., 130 held that the provisions of section 2(g) (a) and 2(m) of the Act are invalid t0 be in exc., ss of the requirements -of the situation because if the principal .employer is fared with the proposition of bearing all the civil and criminal responsibilities of omission .and. commission of contractors under him the inevitable result will be that the manufacturer will give up the Gharkata system and may think of some other system less onerous under the Act. The Bombay High Court also said that the words \"in relation to other labour\" contained in section 2(g) (b) are to be deleted.\n\nThe Bombay High Court further held that the provisions of sections 26 and 27 of the Act will not apply to home workers at all.\n\nThe Mysore High Court in P. Syeii Saheb & Svns. v. State of Mysore (1972) Mysore Law Journal 4~0 held that sections 3 and 4 of the Act are constitutional and not violative of Articles .14 and 19 (l)(g) of the Constitution. Section 3 of the Act prohibitS establishment of an industrial premfaes without obtainin~ a licence grantee! under the Act.\n\nSection 4 of the Act provides for the procedure for the issue. renewal and cancellation of a licence.\n\nThe Mysore High Court further held that sections 26 and 27 of the Act are not unreasonable restrictions and it is possible to find out whether a home worker has. qualified himself for annual leave and it is possible to make up for the lost wages.\n\nThe Mysore High Court also held that section 31 of the Act is valid and Rule 29 does not impose tinreasonable restrii:' tion by' compelling the employer to aceept be'edis when they are sub'\n\nMANGALORE BEED! WORKS V. UNION (Ray, C.J.) 233'\n\nstandard and the sub stand.ard beedis and cigars exceed 5 per cent. If\n\nthe employer finds that the sub standard beedis and ci2ars are above 5 per cent then he has to refer the matter to the Inspector.\n\nThe Kerala High Court in Chirukandeth Chandrasekharan v. Unionc of India (1972) 1 L.L.J. 340 held that the provisions of sections. 2(g)(a), 2(m) 3, 4, 21, 26 and 27 of the Act impose unreasonable restrictions on business or trade and are violative of Article 19 ( 1 )(J()\n\nof the Constitution.\n\nThe Kerala High Court held that the words \"in relation to .other labour\" occurring in section 2(g) (b) have also to. he deleted.\n\nThe Kerala High Court held sections 3 and 4 to be valid.\n\nThe Kerala-High Court held that sections 26 and 27 will not apply to home workers. The Kerala High Court struck down rule 29 of the Kerala Rules on the ground that imposition of 5 per cent on the maximum amount of rejection is an arbitrary percentage.; Kerala Rule 29 stated that no employer shall ordinarily reject more than 2-5 per cent.\n\nThe provision states that there can be rejection up to 5 per cent for reasons recorded. in writing.\n\nThis imposition of 5 per cent limit in the proviso was contrued by the Kerala High Court to be unreasonable in.as much as the quality•of beedis would go down if the workers are assured that more than 5 per cent will not be rejected.\n\nThe Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil Appeals Nos. 1972 and 1988 of 1971, hekl. that sections 3 and 4 of the Act offend Articles 14 and 19 ( 1) (g) of the Constitution and are, therefore, void ..\n\nThe Andhr<t Pradesh High Court came to the conclusion that the provisions contained in sections 3 to 27 of the Act do not apply to home workers.\n\nThe High Court held that the Act is applicable to an in- E . dependent contractor where he is employing labour for and on his own behalf. There he is the principle employer. No artificial relationship of master and servant arises as a result of the operation of the. definitions in section 2(g) (a) (b) and 2(m) of the Act. The Gujarat High Court, in Civil Appeal No. 585 of 1971, upheld the provisions of the Act to be constitutional.\n\nThe first contention on behalf of the petitioners and the appellants is that the Act of 1966 is invalid on the ground of lack of legislative competence.\n\nThe High Courts of Madras, Kerala, Gujarat, Mysore and Andhra Pradesh have rightly beld the Act to have constitutional competence. Counsel on .behalf of the petitioners contended that entry 24 in list fl is the only legislative Entry for the piece of Legislation.\n\nEntry 24 speaks of industries subject to the provisions of Entries 7 and 52 of list J. Entry 7 in List I speaks of Industries declared by\n\nParliament .by .law to be necessary. for the purpose of defence or for the prosection of war. Entry 52 in List I speaks of Jndusfries the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliame.nt by law to be expedient in the public interest. The legislation in. the present case\n\ndoes_n0t fall within Entry 24.in .List II or Entries 7 and 52 fu List.I.\n\nEntry 24 in List III. speaks of Labour including conditions of work, provident funds, employers' libiljty, workmen's .compensation, . invali-. dity and old:age .pension~ and maternity benefits. The .Act is for welfare of.lal>our. It is not an.Act.f-Or, indqstries.\n\nThe.tru~ !)llture \\Ind. character of the legislation, -how.s that it is for enforcing better-\n\n234 sunEME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974 J 3 S.C.R.\n\n1.::onditiorts of labour amongst those who are engaged in the manufacture of beedis and cigars.\n\nThe scheme of the Act relates to provisions regarding health and welfare, conditions of employment, leave with wages, extension of benefits by applying other Act to Labour.\n\nTo illustrate section 28 of the Act extends benefits of the Payment of Wages Act to industrial premises, Section 31 of the Act provides for security of service, Section 37 of the Act extends the benefit of Industrial Standing Orders Act, 1946. Again, section 37 (3) of the Act makes provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act applicable to every establishment.\n\nSection 3 8 ( 1) of the Act applies the safety provisions contained in Chapter IV of the Factories Act to industrial premises.\n\nSection 39(1) of the Act makes the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7 applicable to matters arising in respect of every industrial premises.\n\nSection 39(2) of the Act provides thai disputes between an employee and an employer in relation to issue of raw materials, rejection of beedis and cigars, payment of wages for the beedis and cigars rejected by the employer, shall be settled by such authority as the State Government may specify. An Appeal is provided to the appellate authority whose decision is final.\n\nSection 39(1) of the Act applies to industrial premises.\n\nSection 39(2) of the Act applies to every establishment.\n\nThe Act speaks of licensing of industrial premises.\n\nThe benefits under the Act are extended to both industrial premises and establishments.\n\nEstablishments mean also places where home workers work.\n\nThe pith and substance of this Act is regulation of conditions of employment in the beedi and cigar industry.\n\nThe Act deals with particular subject matter as regards the establishments and industrial premises.\n\nThese matters are regulation of conditions of employment in the industry and the industrial relations between the employer and the employee.\n\nEntries 22 to 24 in List III are wide enough to cover this piece of labour welfaJ:e measure.\n\nEntry 22 deals with labour welfare.\n\nEntry 23 deals with social security, employment and unemployment.\n\nEntry 24 deals with welfare of labour including conditions of work, provident funds, employer's liability, workmen's compensation, invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits. The Act. is valid and falls within Entries 22, 23, and 24 of List III.\n\nSections 3 and 4 of the Act were challenged as violative of Article 19 ( 1) (g) and Article 14 on account of procedural unreasonableness and conferment of unfettered powers on the licensing authority without the requisite safeguards.\n\nThese two. sections require licence in respect of industrial premises.\n\nTh_e provisions are applicable both to trade mark holders as well as contractors.\n\nThere is no difficulty with regard to manufacturers to obtain licence in respect of industrial premises.\n\nIf contractors are employers of. Jabour for and on their own behalf, the contractors will have to obtain licences for manufacture of beedis in industrial premises.\n\nThe relevant authorities have to refer to certain matters in the grant of refusal of a licence.\n\nThese matters as set out in section 4 of the Act are (a) suitabilityof.tbe place of premises which is proposed to be used for the manufacture of beedi .or cigar or both (b) the previous experience of the applicant, (c) the\n\nE .\n\nMANGALOl\\E BEEDI WORKS V. UNION (Ray, C.l.) 235\n\nfinancial resources of the applicant including his. financial capacity to meet the demands arising out of the provision of the laws for the time being in force relating to the welfare of labour (d) whether the application is made bonafide on behalf of, the applicant himself or aoy other person and ( e) welfare of the labour for the locality in the interest of the public generally and such other matters as may be prescribed.\n\nThe licensing authority is required to communicate. his reason in writing when he refuses to grant a licence.\n\nSection 5 of the Act provides an appeal to the appellate authority against such order.\n\nThe power to grant or refuse a licence is sufficiently controlled by necessary guidance. There are safeguards preventing the abuse of power. The right to appeal is a great safeguard.\n\nThe various matters indicated in ; ection 4 in regard to the grant of licence indicate not only the various features which are to be considered but also rule out any arbitrary act.\n\nThere is machinery as well as procedure for determining the grant of refusal of a licence.\n\nThe application for grant of a licence is. to be determined on objective consideration as laid down in the section. There ts :neither unfairness nor unreasonableness in sections 3 and 4 of the Act.\n\nD The validity of the Act was challenged on the principal ground that the Act imposed unreasonable restrictions on the manufacturers in their right to carry on trade and business in the manufacture of beedis and cigars.\n\nThe unreasonable restriction was said to be the imposition of vicarious liability on the manufacturers for acts and omissions in case of independent contractors through whom they get beedis and cigars and over whose employees they do not have any control and with whom they do not come in contract. The provisions of section 2(g) (a) and 2(m) read with sections 2(e) and (f) of the Act are said to create a totally artificial and fictional definition of employer and thereby to cast vicarious liabilities upon a manufacturer of and trader in beedis in respect of diverse matters which entail civil aod criminal liabilities. Liabilities are imposed on manufacturer or trader in beedis in respect of home workers whom it is said, they cannot control.\n\nThe home workers are in thousaods. It is impossible for a manufacturer to have aoy idea of the identity of the persons rolling beedis or the premises where they work.\n\nRaw materials are delivered to workers to do the work of rolling the beedis himself and not having done by any other person. It is, therefore, said there is no rational basis for iQlposing vicarious liability. Though liabilities and obligations are great in relation to contract labour there ;, said to be no corresponding creation of rights which normally exist in employer in respect of his employees. The cumulative effect aod.impact of the various provisions of the Act imposing liability on the manufacturer is said to render it impossible for the maoufacturer or trader to carry on his business. From a commercial pc!int of view, the restrictions are said to be drastic and unreasonable.\n\nThe Act defines in section 2(e) contract labour meaoing aoy per- H son engaged or employed in any premises by or through a contractor with or without the knowledge of the employer in any manufacturing process. Section 2(f) of the Act defines employee to mean a person employed directly or through any agency whether for wages or not in\n\n236 51JPB.l!ME COUllT llEl'Dllts\n\n[19741 3 S.C:R.\n\nany establishment to do any work skilled and unskilled and includes A . (i) any labonr who is given raw materials by an employer or a contractor for bemg made into beedi and cigar or bolh at home (hereinafter referred to in this Act as 'home worker' and (ii) any person not employed by an employer or a contractor but working with the pennission of, or under agreement with, the employer or contractor.\n\nSection 2(g) of the Act defines \"employer\" to mean (a) in relation to contract lat>our the principal employer, and ( o J in telation to other B labour,. the person who has the ultimate control over the affairs of any establishment or who has, by reason of his advancing money, supplying goods or otherwise, a sub.stantial interest in the control of the affairs of any establishment, and includes any other person to whom the affairs of the establishment are entrusted, whether such other person is called the managing agent, manager, superintendent or by a .. 1 other name.\n\nSection 2(m) of the Act defines 'principal employer' to mean C a person for whom or on whose behaH any contract labour is engaged or employed in an establishment. section 2(h) of the Act defines 'establishment' to mean any place or premises including the precincts thereof in which or in any part of which any manufactnring process connected with the. making of beedi or cigar or both is being or is ordinarily, carried cin and includes an industrial premise...\n\nSection 2(i) of the Act defines 'industrial premises' to mean any place or premises in which any industry or manufacturing process connected with the making of beedi or cigar or both is being or is ordinarily, carried on with or without the aid of power. ·\n\nThese definitions indicate these features.\n\nFirst, there are workers in industrial pren'tises and workers in establishment.\n\nSecond, the Act recognises home workers.\n\nThird, the Act recognises contract labour by or through contractor.\n\nFourth, .. any person who is given raw materfals by an .employer or a contractor is an empl0y, e ... Ag•in. any person thougll not employed by an employer or a contractor but working with the permission or. under agreement with the employer or a contractor is an employee .. Fifth, in relation to .:ontract labour the principal employer is a person for whom and on whose beh'lf labour is engaged or e, mployed in an establishment.\n\nSixth, the employer in relation to other labour is a person who has ultim1te con(rol over the\n\naffair~ of any establishment or who has by reason of advancing money, 5Uj>ply goods. or otherwise a substantial interest in the affairs Of ar, y establishment.\n\nThe two classes of employers are broadly defined as the employer and the prindpal employer.' The first kind is the manufacturer who di.r\"<; tlV employs. labour. mob a manufacurer becomes. an employer w1thm tho moanmg Of SectJon ~(g)(b) '?f ~e Act ;>y ongag1ng l1bour.\n\nThe econd class of employer 1s ·(he prmc1pal employer who through a C<, Jutractcr as defined in section 2(a) of the Act engages labour whh is J.; nown. •s contract lab:our.\n\nThis hbour <s engaged by. or, on !)<; half 9f !11~ ma.r, i; factµter whobecomesJho principal .employer • .ThC\n\nthird. cate~<iry of employer Js. a contractor. who engages !\"hour .for exec.iti, rtg, work for and GI). his own behalf.· Such a cont!actor. may undertake work from a manufacturer or a .trade mark holder but he\n\nii \"' '\n\nMANGALORE BEED! WORKS V. UNION (Ray, C.l.) 237\n\nbecomes the principal employer in relation to contract labour on the ground that the labour is engaged for and on his own behalf.\n\nThe fourth class of employer is where a contractor becomes what is known as sub-contractor, of a contractor. A contractor in such a case would ask the sub-contractor to engage labour for and on behalf ,, f the contractor. Jn such a case the contractor would be the principal employer because the sub-Contractor is engaging contract labour for and on behalf of the contractor who is the principal empluyer.\n\nThe fifth class of employer is where a person by reason of advancing money or supplying goods or otherwise having a substantial interest in the control of any establishment becomes the employor of labour.\n\nTo illustrate, a mortgagee in possession of an industrial premises, a hypo• thecatce of goods manufactured ip industdal premises or in a.ny establishment,· a financier in relation to a manufacturer or a contractor or a sub-contractor may become employer by reason of such consideration mentioned in the Act.\n\nIii cases where the manufacturer or trade mark holder himself employs labour there is direct relationship of master and servant and therefore liability is attracted by reason of that relationship.\n\nThere cannot be any question of unreasonableness in such a case.\n\nIn the second category the manufacturer of trade mark bolder engages contract labour through a contractor and he becomes the princ; pal employer.\n\nThough such labour may be engaged by a contractor with or without the knowledge of the manufacturer or trade mark holder, this contract labour is engaged for the principal employer who happens to be the trade mark holder or the manufacturer. The liability arises by reason of coptract labour engaged for or on behaH of the principal employer.\n\nJn tlie tHird category, the contractor becomes the principal employer because the contractor engages labour for or on his own behalf. Where the contractor engages labour for the manufacturer it is not unreasonable restriction to impose liability on the rr.ar.ufacturer fer the labour .engaged by the manufacturer through the contractor.\n\nIt is important to notice that the Act fastens liability on the person who himself engages labour or the person for whom and on whose behalf Jabour is engaged or where a person has ultimate control over the affairs of the establishment by reason of advancement of money or of substantial interest in the control of the affairs of the establishment. ·\n\nTherefore, the manufacturers or trade mark hoidcrs have liability in respect o! workers who are directly employed by them or who are employed by them through contractor>.\n\nWorkers at the indu>trial premises do not present any problem.\n\nThe m 1aufacturer or trade mark holder will observe all the provisions of the Act by reason of employing .such labour in the industrial premises.\n\nWhen the rnamxfacturer engages labour through the contractor the labour is engaged on behalf of the manufacturer, and the latter has therefore liability to such contract labour. It is only when the contractor engages labour for or on his own behalf and supplies the finisheJ product to the\n\nmmufacturer that he will be the principal employer in relation to such labour and the manufacturer will not be responsible for implementinJ\n\n3-954SCin4\n\n\n[ 19741 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe provisions of the Act with regard to such labour employed by the contractor. If the right of rejection rests with the manufacturer or trade mark holder, in such a case the contractor who will prepare b(ledis through the contract Jabour will find it difficult to establish that he is the independent contractor. If it is a genuine sale transaction by the contractor to the manufacturer or trade mark holder it will point in the direction of an independent contractor.\n\nThis Court in Dewan Mohideen Sahib v. United Bidi Workers' Union Salem, [19641 7 S.C.R. 646 said that the so called independent contractor in that case was supplied with tobac;:o and leaves and was paid certain amounts for the wages of the workers employed and for his own tr.ouble.\n\nThe so called independent contractor was merely an employee or an agent of the appellant in that case. The so called independent contractor had no independence at all. The proprietor could at his own choice supply raw niatcrial or refuse to do so. . The contractor had no rigbt tg_ insist on supply of raw materials to him.\n\nThe work was distributed between a number of so called i11dependent contractors, who were told to employ not more than 9 persons at one place to avoid regulations under the Factories Act.\n\nThis Court held that the relationship of master and servant between the appellant and the employees employed by the indep, ndent contractor was established in that case. If it is found that manufacturers or trade mark holders are not responsible_ on the ground that the person with whom they are dealing are really independent contractors then such independent contractors will have tu be consideroo as principal employers within the meaning of the At ..\n\nThe contention on behalf of the petitioners and the appellants is that in common law a person cannot be made respqnsible fDr actions oi an independent contractor and that he should not be penalised for the contravention of any law by an independent contractor is to be examined in view of the language employed in defining the expressions cqntract labour, contract, establishment, employer and principal employer. It was particularly said that when home workers were given tobacco and leaves directly by the manufacturers the home workers would not be under their control and the manufacturers should not be made responsible for providing any amenities or .leave facilities for those home workers.\n\nThis Court in Silver Jubilee Tailoring House & Ors. v.\n\nChief Inspector of Shops and Establishments & Anr. (Civil Appeal No.\n\n1706 o( 1969 decided on 25th September, 1973) discussed the question as to whether employer employee relationship existed between the tailoring house and the workers in that case. The definition of a person employed in that case was a person wholly or principally employed therein in connection with the business of the shop.\n\nThe workers were paid on piece rate basis.\n\nThey attended the shops if there was work.\n\nThe rate of wages paid to the workers was not uniform.\n\nThe rate depended upon the skill of the worker and the nature f the work.· .Th~ workers were given cloth for stitching. They1 were to, d how the slttchmg was to be done.\n\nIf they did not stitch it\n\nMANGALORE BEED! WORKS V. UNION (Ray, C.J.) 2 39\n\naccording to the instructions, the employer rejected the work.\n\nThe worker was asked to re-stitch. If the work was not done according to the instruction no further work was given to a worker.\n\nA worker did not have to make an application for leave if he did not come to the shop on a day. If there was no work, the employee was free to leave the shop. All the workers worked in the shop.\n\nSome worker< could take cloth for stitching to their homes.\n\nMathew, J. speaking tor the Court referred to the dedsions of this Court and English and American decisions and came t<) these conclusions. First, in recent years the control test as traditionally formulated has not been treated as an exclusive test. Control is an important factor. Second, the organisation test, viz., that the workers attend the shop and work there is a relevant factor. If the employer provides the equipment this is some indication that the contract is a contract of service. If the other party provides the equipment this is some evidence that he is an independent contractor. No sensible inference can be drawn from the factor of equipment where it is customary for servants to provide for their own equipment.\n\nLittle weight can today be put upon the provisions of -tools of minor character as opposed to plant and equipment on a large scale.\n\nThird, if the employer has a right to reject the end product if it does not conform to the instructions of the employer and direct the worker to re-stitch it, the element of control and supervision as formulated in the decisions of this Court is also present.\n\nFourth, a person can be a servant of more than one employer. A servant need not be\n\nunder the exclusive control of one master. He can be employed under more than one employer.\n\nFifth, that the \\mrkers are not obliged to work for the whole day in the shop is not very material. In the .. ultimate analysis it would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case in determining the relatioship of master and servant.\n\nThe present legislation is intended to achieve welfare benefits and amenities for the labour. That is why the manufacturer or trade marks holder becomes the principal employer though he engages contact labour through the contractor. He cannot escape liability imposed on him by the statute by stating that he has engaged the Jabour through a contractor to do the work and therefore he is not responsible for the labour. The contractor in such a case employs the Jabour only for and on behalf of the principal employer.\n\nThe contractor being an agent of the principal employer for manufacturing beedis is amenable to the control of principal employer. That is why the statute says that even if the contract engages labour without the knowledge of the m ployer the principal employer is answerable for such labour because the labour is engaged for or on his behalf. The act and the Rules thereunder prescribe maintenance of Jog books and registers, Where the manufacturer or the trade mark holder engages labour directly, the manufacturer maintains registers and Jog books. Where the manufacturer engages contract labour through a contractor the manufacturer will require the contract or to maintain such log books of the contract labour and through such books and registers Will keep control over not only the contractors but also the labour.\n\n240 SUPREM]l COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 19741 3 S.C.R.\n\nThe principal employer is the real master of the business. He has real control of the business.\n\nHe is held liable because he exercises supervision and control over the labour employed for and on his behalf by contractor.\n\nThe benefits of the welfare measure reach the workmen only by direct responsibility of the principal employer.\n\nThe basis of the welfare measure is in the interest of the workers with regard to their health,. safety and wages including benefits of leave am! family life.\n\nThe Bombay High Court and the Kerala High Court struck down the provisions contained in sections 2(g) (a) and 2(m) of the Act in regard to the principal employer being liable for contract labour as an unreasonable restriction o-:i. the manufacurer's right to carry on business.\n\nThis view proceeds on the basis that the principal employer is liable for acts of the independent contractor. The Act does not define an independent contractor, nor mention the independent contractor.\n\nThe Act speaks of the principal employer in relation to contract labour and employer in relation to other labour.\n\nWhen a contractor engages labour for or on behalf of another person that other person becomes the principal employer.\n\nThe Attorney General rightly said that if it were established on the facts of any particul.ar case that a porson engaged labour for himself he would be the principal employer of contract labour. In such an instance there is no question of agency on behalf of another person.\n\nIn cases where an industrial manufacturer finds it convenient to give work on contract rather than do it employing his own man he cannot have the advantages of employing the labour without corresponding obligations. If the contractors could be made responsible for the working conditions of labour or their wages or their leave or their other benefits than no question would arise.\n\nIt is not uncommon for labourers to work for a contractor on terms which are designed to satisfy the law that they are not servants but independent contractors.\n\nIn the present case, it is not material to find out as to who can be called an independent contractor. It can be said that independent contractors are those who employ labour for and on behalf of themselves in so far as the present Act is concerned.\n\nThe only scope for inquiry is whether a person has employed labour for and on his own behalf. If the answer be in the affirmative then such a contractor would be a principal employer within the meaning of section 2(g) (a).\n\nft appears that the principal employer or the employer, as the case may be, is liable on the ground that the labour is employed for or on behalf of the principal employer or the employer.\n\nIn relation to contract labour the principal employer is the person for whom or on whose behalf any contract labour is engaged in any establishment. An employer in relation to other labour is the person who has the ultimate control over the affairs of any establishment or has a substantial interest in the control of the affairs of any establishment as defined in section 2(g) (b) of the act.\n\nThere is no vicarious liability in the case of the principal employer or in the case of employer The Act does not define an independeni contractor.\n\nThe Act does not prevent an independent contractor from being the principal employer in relation to contract labour.\n\nIt will , bo a question o( fact in each case as to\n\nMANGALORE BEED! WORKS v. UNION (Ray, C./.) 241\n\nwho is the person for whom or on whose behalf contract labour is engaged. If such a contractor who is referred to as an independent contractor employs labour for himself the liability will attach to him as the principal employer and not to the manufacturer or trade mark holder.\n\nThere is no restriction on the right of the manufacturer or the trade mark holder to carry on business.\n\nThey are liable under the Act for contract labour employed for or on behalf of them.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons the provisions of the Act in particular contained in sections 2(g) (a), 2(g) (b) and 2(m) are constitutionally valid and do not impose any unreasonable restriction on the manufacturer or trade mark holder.\n\nOn behalf of the petitioners and the appellants, it is said that section 26 of the Act gives substantive rights with regard to leave and section 27 of the Act is the procedural part in computing wages.\n\nThe contention advanced was that section 26 of the Act speaks of employees in an establishment and, therefore, these sections do not apply to home workers.\n\nThe contentions are that sections 26 and 27 of the Act cast an unreasonable burden and impose obligations which are not practically capable of fulfilment and are thus violative of Articles 19 (I)\n\n(f) and (g) of the Constitution.\n\nIn any event sections 26 and 27 of the Act are said to bo unenforceable in regard to home workors and are, therefore, violative of Articles 19(1) (f) and (g) so far as the same are applicable to home workers.\n\nThese two sections deal with leave and wages during leave period.\n\nBroadly stated, section 26 allows leave at the rate of one day for every 20 days of work performed by an adult omployee during the previous calender year. In the case of a young person 1eave is at the rate ot one day for very 15 days of work during the previous calender year.\n\nThere are provisions as to calculation of leave which are not material in the present case.\n\nUnder section 27 of the Act an employee shall be paid at the rate equal to the daily everage of his full time earning for the days on which he had worked during the month immediately preceding his leave exclusive of any overtime earnings and bonus but inclusive of darness and other allowances.\n\nThere are two explanations.\n\nThe first explanation states that the expression \"total full time earning\" includes cash equivalent to the advantage accruing through the concessional sale to employeei of foodgrains and other articles, as the employee is for the time being entitled to, but does not include bonus.\n\nThe second explanation states that for the purpose of determining the wages payable to a home worker during leave period or for the purpose of payment of maternity benefit to a woman home worker \"day\" shall mean any period during \\Yhich such home worker was employed, during a period of twenty four hours commencing at midnight, for making beedi or cigar or both.\n\nThe word \"establishment\" is defined in section 2(h) of the Act to mean any place or premises including the the precincts in which or in any part of which any manufacturing process connected with the making of beedis or cigars or both is carried on and it includes an industrial premises.\n\nSection 2(i) of the Act defines \"industrial premises\" to 1mean any place or premises not being a private dwelling house where\n\n\n[ 19741 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe industry or manufacturing process of making beedis or cigar is carried on.\n\nAn Employee is defined in section 2(f) of the Act to mean any person employed directly or through any angency in any establishment and include any labour who is given raw materials by an employer or a contractor at home referred to as the home worker and person employed by an em.iloyer or a contractor but working at the premises with the employer or contractor.\n\nTherefore, the words 'employed in an establishment' in section 26 of the Act are refe.rable to borne workers as well. The second explanation to section 27 of the Act also speaks of determination of wages payable to borne worker during leave period.\n\nIt was said that the words \"total full time earnings\" occurring in section 27 of the Act were inapplicable to home workers for these reasons.\n\nFirst a home worker with the assistance of his family members could collect large earnings in a month preceding the month in which he would take leave.\n\nThis was said to be an unreasonable restriction on an employer inasmuch as a home worker would not work hard or perhaps at all for a considerable period of time and would work only in the month preceding which he would take leave.\n\nIt is not possible for a home worker to increase his earnings because the employer will have control over raw materials supplied to home worker as also on the daily turnover.\n\nAn employer is in a position to prevent malpractices or abuse of taking more materials to make a higher income.\n\nIt is also reasonable to hold that an employer will not allow an employee on increasing the income.\n\nIt was secondly said that section 27 of the Act did not prescribe the minimum number of days an employee should work before he was entitled to annual leave wages.\n\nReference was made to section 79 (I) of the Factories Act 1948 which provides for 240 days of work as minimum for entitlement of annual leave.\n\nThe provisions in section 26 of the Act is that for every 20 days one day's leave is allowed.· If any worker does not work hard one will not be entitled to leave as conteplated in the Act.\n\nThe basis of calculating one day's leave for every 20 days of work is also adopted in the case of Government servants. (See Central Civil Service Leave Rules, 1972 Rules 26 and 2(m).\n\nInstead of being unreasonable it can be said to be an impetus to a servant to put in the maximum of work in order to obtain the maximum amount of leave.\n\nThe entitlement to leave under section 27 of the Act is based on the number of days of actual work. It is, therefore, not an unreasonable restriction on the employer.\n\nThirdly it is said that the payment of leave wages at the rate equal to the daily average of his total full time earnings in the case of home workers is unreasonable.\n\nReference is made to section 22 of the Act which speaks of notice of periods of work in industrial premises. ec tion 22 of the Act is not applicable to home workers. In the case of home workers it is said that they are free to do work at any time and for any length of time in a day even for 24 hours a day. It is, therefore said . that it will be difficult to calculate the total full time earnings of home workers.\n\nMANGALORE BEEDI WORKS V. UNION (Ray, C.J.) 243\n\nThe works in section 27 of the Act are \"total full time earnings\".\n\nOne meaning of the words in the case of home workers wiII be daily average hours of work done by home worker during the last month be fore leave provided such average does not exceed the daily period of work as prescribed in a notice under section 22 of the Act.\n\nSuch a construction would give not only full meaning to the words \"full time earnings\" but would also place home workers and workers in industrial premises in the same position with regard to their leave wages.\n\nIt wiII not cast unreasonable burden on the employer in the form of leave wage> disproportionate to the amount of work done by the home w<lrkers.\n\nAnother meaning is that the total full time earnings would be the actual total earnings as far as the workers in industrial premises as well as home workers are concerned.\n\nWith regard to the second meaning the words \"full time\" wiII not have any restriction as to hours of work.\n\nThe result may be that a home worker may have lqnger hours of work and larger income compared with the worker in the industrial premises, but such longer hours of work can be controlled by an employer both with regard to giving raw materials and allowing longer hours of work.\n\nAs a matter of fact it is found that home workers can turn out 700 to 1000 pieces a day.\n\nThat is the view expressed in the Report of the Royal Commission on labour in India 1931 as also the Labour Investigation Committee Report 1944 and the Report of the Court of Enquiry appointed by the Government of Madras, 194 7.\n\nThe minimum wages prescribed by various states for these home workers are between Rs. 2 to 4.30 for rolling 1000 pieces.\n\nTherefore, the Financial burden on account of leave wages will not be higher to constitute any unrea>onable restriction.\n\nThe Bombay High Court in the present appeals said that the provisions of sections 26 and 27 of the Act constitute unreasonable restriction not only with regard to home workers but also with regard to employees in industrial establishment.\n\nThe reason given is that if employees in industrial premises do not choose to work for all days for the full hours notified it will be equally impossible to determine what his full time earnings will be and what his daily average of the full time earnings for the days on which he worked during the preceding month will be.\n\nThe Mysore High Court in the present appeal correctly said that the home workers will get wages for the leave period corresponding to the number of beedis manufactured by him for a particular employer.\n\nThe hours of work will in that case be immaterial, because if he worked for less number of hours he would obtain lesser payment.\n\nThere will thus be no difficulty in computing wages payable for the annual leave period.\n\nThe Jwme worker will get leave wages corresponding to his actual earn ing just as the worker in the industrial premises will get leave wages corresponding to his full time earnings.\n\nThe Andhra Pradesh High Court in the present appeal said that home workers carry on their rolling work at homes which are neither establishments nor industrial premises.\n\nThe word ''establishment\" as defined in section 2(h) of the Act , relates to home workers as well. It\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1974 I 3 s.C.ll.\n\nis only industrial premises as defined in section 2(i) of the Act which excludes private dwelling houses.\n\nThe home workers are not required to work for a specified number of hours a day.\n\nThe fact that sections 17 to 23 of the Act can have no application to home workers but only to persons employed in industrial premises does not tender sections 26 and 27 of the Act inapplicable to home workers.\n\nThe express language of section• 26 and 27 of the Act is relateable to home workers.\n\nThey work in establishments. The daily average of total full time earnings for the days worked during the month immediately preceding the leave is applicable to home workers. l t is because payment to home workers is made at piece rate, viz., for the number of beed'is rolled. The Madras High Court sai<\\ that sections 26 and 27 of the Act have imposed unreasonable restrictions on manufacturers in regard to employees rn industrial premises.\n\nThe Madra.\n\nHigh Court held that for working 11 days a worker would be entitled to one day as annual leave with wages.\n\nThe Act does not say so.\n\nThe Act provides that any fraction of leave for half a day or more will be treated as one day's iull leave.\n\nTherefore, if on a calculation of entire leave at the rate of one day for every 20 days of work, there is any fraction of more than one day's leave so calculated or earned it would be treated as one day.\n\nIt is only where there is fraction of leave earned that for such 11 days work one day's leave is to be given. It is not same as providing one day's leave for working only 11 days in all cases.\n\nThe entitlement under the Act to one day's leave for every 20 days show; that the period of 20 days is a minimum period prescribed for earning one day's leave.\n\nThe structure of sections 26 and 27 of the Act is two-fold.\n\nFirst, so far as workers employed in industrial premises are concerned they are entitled to annual leave with wages provided they work for at least 20 days a year, for full hours work specified in the notice.\n\nTl1erefore, sections 26 and 27 of the Act will not apply to workers in industrial premises who have not worked for full working hours according to the notice for 20 days a year.\n\nSecond, sections 26 and 27 of the Act will apply to home workers who work at least 20 days a year and the day within the expression 20 days will mean any period of day because there is no notified hours of work.\n\nIn view of the fact that the two sections are applicable both to workers in industrial premises and home workers the expression \"'total fu11 time earnings\" occurs in section 27 of the Act.\n\nSection 11 deals with working hours.\n\nSection 22 speaks of notice of periods of work.\n\nSections I 7 and 22 refer to industrial premises and are therefore not applicable to home workers.\n\nThe total full time earning; for workers in industrial premises will attract the specified periods of work conten1plated in section 22 of the Act.\n\nWith regard to a home worker the wages during leave period will be calculated with reference to the daily average of his total full time earnings for the days on which he had worked during the preceeding month.\n\nIn the case of home workers it will be the average of 30 days earnings.\n\nTo illustrate, if the worker has earned different sums on different days during the month the sums will be added for the purpose of arriving at an average.\n\nThe computation\n\nMAlloALORE BEED! WORKS V. UNION (Ray, C.J.) 245\n\nin the case of home workers will be first with reference to the total earning during the month and full time earning' is the average thereof.\n\nThe second explanation to section 27 of the Act shows that for the purpose of determining the wages payable to home worker during leave period day sball mean any period during which such home worker, was employed during any period of 24 hours.\n\nTherefore, so far as the home worker is concerned day shall mean a.ny period.\n\nThe manner in which leave wages for workers in industrial premises and home workers are to be calculated may be illustrated with reference to the beedis and Cigar workers (Conditions of Employment) Mysore Rules, 1969.\n\nSection 44(2) of the Act provides that the State Government my make rules inter alia for the records and reister they shall maintain in establishments in compliance with the provISions of the Act and the rulos thereunder.\n\nEstablishment means both industrial premiaes .and any private house where the home workers carry on their work, Rule 33 of the Mysore Rules framed under the Act speaks of maintenani:e of records and registers in Form No. XIIJ. Form No.\n\nXIII has 8 columns as the muster roll of employees in industrial premises. Rule 33 (2) of the Mysore Rules speaks of records for home workers in Form No. XIV.\n\nThere are four columns showing the date, whether work was done, number of beedis manufactured and the wages received.\n\nAt tl!e foot of Form XIV it shows the total number of days worked in the month.\n\nTherefore, in the case of home workers wages are calculated on the basis of these records, namely, the number of days worked and second the amount of wages received.\n\nIn the case of home worker hours of work are not necessary. In the 'case of employee industrial premises columns 8 and 9 show)nter alia the group, relay, shift number and period work.\n\nWith regard to home workers payment is made at the rate of 1000 pieces of beedis.\n\nLeave with wages in the case of home workers is on that basis of payment. The log book is a form of guarantee and security for both the employer and the worker in regard to quality of work and relative payment.\n\nReference was made to four earlier decisions of this Court for the F purp6se of showing that sections 26 and 27 are inapplicable to home workers.\n\n\nreference to the Factories Act.\n\nSections 79 and 80 of the Factories Act were considered there.\n\nThese two sections are in similar language to section 26 and 27 of the Act.\n\nThe only difference is that unlike section 79 of the Factories Act, in section 26 of the Act there is no requirement of working for 240 days a calendar year for entitlement to annual\n\n!ave and further thafin section 26 of the Act the words used are \"employee\" in place of the word 'worker' and the word \"establishment\" in place of the word \"factory\" in the Factories Act.\n\nIn Chintaman Rao (supra) case this Court held that the three ingredients and concepts of employment are, first there must be an employer, second, there must be an employee and the third, there must\n\n\n[ 1974 J 3 S.C.R.\n\nbe a contract of employment, In Chintaman Rao case (supra) certain A independent contractors known as Sattedars supplied beedis to the Manager of a beedi factory.\n\nThe Sattedars manufactured the beedis in their own factories or they entrusted t)ie work to third parties. The Inspector of Factories found in the beedUactory certain sattedars who came to deliver beedis manufactured by them. The owner of the factory was prosecuted for violation of sections 62 and 63 of the Factories Act for failure to maintain the register of adult workers. It was held B that the Sattedars and their \"coolies (sic) were not workers within the definition of section 2(1) of the Factories Act.\n\nThe ratio was that the Sattedars were not under the control of the factory management and could manufacture beedis wherever they pleased. Further the 'coolies'\n\n(sic) were not employed by the management through the Sattedars.\n\n'Jn Birdhichand Sharma case (supra) the appellant employed C workmen in factory.\n\nThe workmen were not at liberty to work at their houses.\n\nPayment was made for piece rates according to the amount of work done. The workmen applied for leave for 15 days. The appellants did not pay their wages.\n\nThe appellant contended that the workmen were not workmen within the meaning of the Factories Act. It was held that the workmen could not be said to be independent C!Jnlractors but were workmen within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Facto- D ries Act.\n\nA distinction was sought to be drawn between workmen and independent contractors. It was heldthat the workmen could come and go when they liked, they were piece rate workers within the meaning of the Factories Act. If the worker did not reach factory before midday he would be given no work.\n\nHe was ti:> work at the factory.\n\nHe could not work elsewhere.\n\nHe would be removed if he was absent for 8 days.\n\nHis attendance was noted. If his work did not come up to E the standard the pieces prepared would be rejected.\n\nThe leave provided under section 79 of the Factories Act was held to be a matter of right when a worker had put in a minimum number. of working days.\n\nIn Shankar Ba/aji Waje case csupra) it was held that the labourers who used to roll beedis in the factory were not workers within the meaning of the Factories Act.\n\nBirdhichand Sharma case (supra) was distinguished on the facts.\n\nThe minority view was that the workers in F Shanker Balaji Waje case (supra) were of the same type as Birdhichand Sharma case (supra). In Shankar Ba/aji Waje case (supra) the majority view was that there was contracts of service.\n\nThe worker ' was not bound to attend the factory for any fixed hours.\n\nHe could be absent from the work any day he liked and for ten days without informing the appellant.\n\nHe had to take permission if he was to be absent for more than 10 days.\n\nThe worker was not bound to roll G beedis ot the factory.\n\nHe could do so at home with the permission of the appellant.\n\nThere was no actual supervision.\n\nBeedis not up to the standard could be rejected.\n\nWorkers were paid at fixed rates.\n\nIn Bhikuse Yamase case (supra) this Court had to consider whether a notification under section 85 of the Factories Act giving the beedi rollers benefits provided to workers in the Fectories Act was valid.\n\nH Beedi rollers were refused benefits by the owners of beedi manufacturing establishments. Therefore, the State Government issued notification under section 85 of the Factories Act Section 85 of the Factories Act\n\nMANGALORB BEED! WORKS V. UNION (Ray, C./.) 247\n\nprO\\ \"ko Jiat the State Governm, .it may declare that all or any of the provisc•>ns of the Act shall apply to any place where a manufacturing process is carried on notwithstanding that the number of persons employed therein is Jess than the number specified in the definition of factory or where the persons working therein are not omployed by the owner but are working with the permission of, or under agreement with, such owner. The State Government designated certain places to be deemed factory and t!te persons working there to be deemed workers.\n\nThis Court said that extension of the benefits of the Factories Act to premises and workers not falling strictly within the purview of the Factories Act is intended to serve the same purpose. On this reasoning the provisions for the benefit of deemed workers were held to be reasonable within the meaning of Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution.\n\nThese four decisions were relied on liy counsel for the petitioners and the appellants fo show that home workers would not be entitled to leave on the ground that sections 26 and 27 of the Act were unworkable In regard to home workers and constituted unreasonable restrictions.\n\nThe imposition of liability to afford to home workers benefits like annual leave with wages cannot be said to be unreasonable restriction on the right of the owner to carry on his business. In the Act, the word\n\n\"employee\" includes a home worker .. The word \"establishment\" applies to a private house.\n\nThe second explanation to section 27 of the Act indicates that a home worker is dealt with by the section. Sections 26 and 27 of the Act are to be read together.\n\nJn Birdhichand Sharma case (supra) this Court held that if a worker had put in a number of working days he would be entitled to leave.\n\nThis Court did not go into a question as to what the meaning of the word \"day of work\" would be to entitle a worker annual leave under section 79 of the Factories Act in Birdhichand Sharma case (supra).\n\nJn the present case the Act contemplates that ho ce workers are at liberty to work at any time and for any number of h\"urs a day. The Act cannot be said to be not applicable to home worlcers. The Act has made a distinction between the two types of workers and has made the Act applicable to both the types of workers. Even with regard to workers in industrial premises where period of work is notified it is not obligatory on the part of the employer to allow an employee to work in the industrial premises for the whole of the notified period of work ..\n\nThe employee can be asked to work for the whole of the notified period of work which will not exceed 9 hours a day or 48 hours a week as provided in section 17 of the Act.\n\nIn Shankar Ba/aji Waje case (Supra) the majority view was that the expression \"total fnll time earnings\" mean earnings in a day by working full time on that day and full time was to be in accordance with the period given in the notice displayed in the factory for the particular day.\n\nOn that ground the workers in Shankar Ba/aji Waje case (supra) were held not be entitled to wages for the leave period because such wages could not be calculated when t!1e terms of work were such that they could come andgo when they Jiked and no period of work was mentioned with respect to workers., The majority view in Shanker Balaji Waje case (Supra) will not apply to sections 26 and 27 of the Act because the home workers are entitled to wages during the leave period and such wages do not in the case of home workers depend upon the consideration\n\n\n[ 1974 J 3 S.C.R,\n\nwhether a particular home worker woks for a whole of the notified period of work. The basis of calculation of wages in the case of home workers is the daily average of his total full time earnings for the days on which he haq worked during the month immediately preceding his leave. If a home workers does full time work by rolling out 1000 piecei he will get corresponding amount of wages. Both the factory workers in industrial premises and home workers in establishments are similarly placed by proper control over or regulation of .supply of raw materials to home workers. Just as the total fu11 time earnings of the worker in an industrial premises are calculated with eference to hours of work each day, similarly the full time earnings of the home workers are calculated by the earnings of each day which are kept under control by supply of measured raw materials to produce the requisite number of beedis which a worker can produce a day within his hours of work in the establishment. So far as home workers are concerned, the payment is made at piece rate and it is not material in their case about specifi\"d hoers of work because they will get lesser payment if they will not work for the same number of hours as worker in industrial premises.\n\nThe provisions of sections 26 and 27 are applicable to home workers and workers in industrial premises are also capable of being made applicable without any reasonable restrictions on employers.\n\nIt has been contended that section 31 of the Act which provides one month's notice in lieu of notice of dismissal was an unreasonable restriction.\n\nThe reason advanced was that the Act has not dfined the word \"wages\" and therefore it is not possible to calculate wages. Section 27 of tl:e Act prescribed the rate for calculating wages during the period of leave.\n\nSection 39 (I) of the Industrial Disputes Act applies to matters in respect of every industrial premises.\n\nSection 2(rr) of the Industrial Disputes Act defines wages. The defination of wages in the Industrial disputes Act applies to workers in industrial premises contemplated by the Act.\n\nHome workers are not included in industrial preuises because they work in private dwelling house which are establishments. The defination of wages in the Industrial Disputes Act will apply to workers who are paid on monthly basis. Section 28 ( 1) of the Act empowers the State Government to direct that the provisions of tlie Payment of Wage_s Act, 1936 shall apply to employees in establishments to which the Act applies. Section 2(6) of the payment of wages Act defines \"wages\" tq include inter alia any remuneration to which the person employed is entitled in respect of any leave period.\n\nSome aid may be had from the definition of wages in the Payment of Wages Act. viz. wages include leave wages.\n\nTherefore, the word \"wages\" in section 31 of the Act will mean wages which are calculated under section 27 of the Act . This can be calculated both in the cases of workers in industtial premises and home workerSin establishments.\n\nTherefore, the proivsions contained in section 31 of the Act cannot be •.aid to be unreasonable restrictions.\n\nThe Petitioners and the appellants next contended that Rule 37 of the Maharasthra Rules and Rule 29 of the Mysore Rules framed under section 44 of the Act imposed unreasonable restrictons on the beedi an~ cigar manufacturers.\n\nRule 37 of the Maharashtra Rules\n\nMANGALORE BEEDI WORKS V. UNION (Ray, C.J.) 249\n\nprovides that no employer or contractor shall ordinarily reject as substandard or chhat or otherwise more than 5 percent of the beedis or cigars of both received from the worker including a home worker. Rule 37(2) of the Maharashatra Rules further provides that where any beedi or cigar ls rejected as sub-standard or chhat or otherwise on any ground other than the ground of wilful negligence of the worker, the worker shall be paid wages for the pieces so rejected at one half of the rates at which wages are payable to him for the beedis or cigars or both which have not been so rejected. ·\n\nRule 29 of the Mysore Rules provides that no employer or contractor shaR ordinarily reject an sub-standard or chhat or otherwise more than 2 per cent of the beedis or cigars or both received from the worker including a home worker. It is also provided there that the employer or contractor may effect such rejection upto 5 per cent for reasons to be recorded and communicated in writing to the worker.\n\nRule 29 of the Kerala Rules is identical to Rule 29 of the Mysore Rules except that instead of 2 per cent it provides for 2.5 per cent as a limit for rejection.\n\nThe Kerala High Court held that Kerala rule 29 fixes arbitrary percentage and is not in the interest of the general public. The inpos1tion of 5 per cent by the proviso to Rule 29 was said by the Kerala High Court to be arbitrary. It was said that the percentage of rejection might be higher than 5 per cent but the fixed limit of 5 per cent would have this bad consequence. It is that quality of beedis would go dewn if the workers were assured that more than 5 per cent would not be rejected.\n\nThe Mysore High Court rejected the contention that Mysore Rule 29 imposes an unreasonable restriction. The reason given by that High Court was as follows. The argument that sub-standard beedis or cigar; in excess of 5 per cent cannot be rejected by the employer is unsound.\n\nOrdinarily 2 per cent rejection is permitted. Rejection upto 5 per cent is permissible only after recording reasons therefore. But if the employer finds that the quantity of sub-standard beedis is about 5 per cent, the matter is to be referred to the Inspector. Therefore, Rule 29 does not compel the employer to accept sub-standard becdis when the rejection is above 5 per cent.\n\nThe Bombay High Court upheld Rule\" 37 of the Maharashtra Rules which allows rejection of more than 5 .per cent. The 5 per cent reje:tion is said by the Bombay High Court to he an outer limit.\n\nIt does not mean according to the Bombay High Court that the rejection mu1t b' 5 per cent. It is said that the contractors by reason of their experieRce will find 5 per cent rejection to be reasonable. The experience suggests that the outer limit of 5 per cent is fairly reasonable. It is difticult to imagine that no limit should be fixed. The Bombay High Courrfurther found that even for sub-standard beedis there is a market though at a lesser rate.\n\nThe Bombay High Court further found that pilfering of tobacco was an accepted vice of the industry. Inspi\\e of .that melollv rejection in the industry hardly exceeded 3 per cent. The Bombay High Court found 5 per cent rejection to be reasonable.\n\n250 SUPRE~1 E C't1 '.\n\nREPORTS\n\n[ 19741 3 S.C.R.\n\nThe maximum limit of 5 per cent for the rejection of beedis is therefore, based on experience in tl1c industry and secondly the employe; ca!' reject m?re than 5 per cent by raising a dispute before the appropnate authonty.\n\nOn behalf of the petitioners and the appellants it was said that the word \"sub-standard\" by itself would offet no guidance for rejection and confer arbitrary power. Section 39(1) of the Act provides that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act shall apply to matters arising in respect of every industrial premises and section 39(2) (~) 'of the Act provides that notwithstanding any thing contained in sub-section (1) a dispute between an employer and employee relating to the payment of wages for beedi or cigar or both rejected by an employer shall be settled by such authority and in such manner as the State Government may by Rules specify in that behalf.\n\nSection 44(2) (r) of the Act provides for making of rules with regard to the manner in which sorting or rejection of beedi or cigar or both and disposal of rejected beedi or cigar or both shall be carried out.\n\nThe Mysore Rule 27 provides that any dispute between an employer and employee in relation to rejection by the employer of beedi or cigar or both make by an empfoyee may be referred in writing by the employer or the employee or employees to the Inspector for the area who shall after making such enquiry as he may consider necessary and after giving the parties an opportunity to represent their respective cases, decide the dispute and record the proceedings in form X.\n\nFor01 X relates to record of decision of Order. Various particu-' Jars, inter alia, are substance of the dispute, substance of the evidence taken and findings and statement of the reasons therefor.\n\nThere is also a rihgt of appeal from the decision of the Inspector to the Chief lnspector: It therefore apears that the Rules about rejection and fixing maximum limit of 5 per cent are reasonable and fair. First, experience in the industry as recorded in the Report of Minimum Wages Committee supports such limit of 5 per cent as normal and regular. Second, inspite of 5 per cent maximum limit it is permissible to the employer to reject more than 5 per cent. For that a dispute is raised before the appropriate authorities set up under the Rules. The State Government under Sections 44(2) (r) and (s) of the Act is empowered to make Rules in respect of the manner in which sorting or rejection of beedi or cigar or both and disposal of rejected beedi or cigar or both shall be carried ollt and the fixation of maximum limit of rejection of beedi or cigar or both manufactured by an employee. Section 39(2) of the Act provides that a dispute between an employer and employee relatin~ inter alia to rejection by the employer of beedi or cigar or bo)h made by an employee and the payment of wages for beedi or cigar rejected by the employer shall be settled by such authority and in such manner as the State Goverment may by Rules specify in that behalf.\n\nRule 27 of the Mysore Rules as well as Rule 27 of the Kerafa Rules provide that a disoute hetweon an employer and employee or employees in relation to rejection by the employer of beedi or cigar or the payment of wages for the becdi or cigar rejected by the employer may be referred in writing by the employer or employee to the Iaspector for the area.\n\nThe Inspector after hearing the parties shall decide the issue. The aggrieved party has the right of Apeal to the Chief Ipector.\n\nMANGAWRE BEED! WORJ:S v. UNION (Ray, CJ,) 251\n\nUnder Rule 29 of the Mysore Rules rejection of more than 2 per cent and upto 5 per cent is required to be for reasons in writing. Rule 37 of the Maharashtra Rules provides for rejection upto 5 per cent without any obligation to give reasons. It was said by the petitioners that the Mysore and Kerala Rules fixed the limit for rejection but the Maharashtra Rule did not do so. Both the Rules fixed 5 per cent as the maximum limit for rejection. The Mysore and the Kerala Rules have nothing corresponding to Maharashtra Rule 37(2) requiring payment at half the rates for beedis rejected as sub-standard, if. the same was not due to the wilful negligence of the employee. It was, ther<\"lore,\n\nsaid that either up to 5 per cent rejection under Maharashtra Rllle 37 or rejection of more than 5 per cent the employer was under an abligation to make payment at half of the rate as rejected beedis if such rejection was not due to the willuI negligence of the employee.\n\nIt has, therofore, to be ascertained as to whether the Rules prohibit employer from rejecting more than 5 per cent even ; r they are {ound to be sub-standard l!_nci seconclly whether the requirement to pay wages at one half of the rate for the rejected beedis is a reasonable restriction.\n\nThe Rules provide tor rejection upto 5 per cent. The Rules\n\nfurther used the word 'ordinarily' in regard to such rejection.\n\nIn case of rejection of more than 5 per cent Rule 27 of the Mysore Rules and Rule 3 7 of the Maharashtra Rules provide for raising of a dispute in regard to such rejection. The dispute contemplated is in relation to rejection of beedis and the payment of wages for the rejected beedis.\n\nThe word \"rejection\" and \"rejected\" indicate that the dispute is raised because of the rejection of beedis. The contention advanced on behalf of the Petitioner that before a dispute is raised on rejection is possible is erroneous. The dispute arises because of rejection.\n\nTherefore, Rules 27 and 29 of the Mysore Rules and Rule 27 of the Kerala Rules do not impose any unreasonable restricton on the right of rejection.\n\nMaharashtra Rule 27 also permits rejection of more than 5 per cent and raising of disputes. The contention on behalf of the petitioners that the Maharashtra Rule which requires payment at one .half of the rate for the rejected beedis on any ground other than the ground of wilful negligence of the worker is an unreasonable restriction is not correct.\n\nThe Bombay High Court correctly held that the experience in the industry is that there is a market for sub-standard beedis. It is also reasonable to hold that home workers will be interested in seeing that the beedis are not sub-standard because in the process home workers would be earning less.\n\nThe Maharashtra Rule is intended to eliminate exploitation of illiterate workers who are mostly women.\n\nThe Rules with regard to rejection are, therefore, reasonable. It is also open to the employers to raise dispute for rejection above 5 per cent,\n\nThe Petitioners and the appellants challenged section 37(3) of the Act as unworkable. That sub-section provides that the provisions of the Maternity Benefit. Act, 1961 shall' apply to every establishment as if such establishment were an establishment to which the said 1961 Act had been applied by notification unde.r section 2(i) of 'he said 1961 Act. The proviso to section 3 7 ( 3) of the Act states thal Maternity Benefit Act in its application to a home worker shall apply subject\n\n.~.\n\n\n[ 1974 J 3 S.C.R.\n\nto certain modifications.\n\nThe Madras High Court upheld the contention and said that since a worker in a beedi industry is not required to w.ork regularly for any prescribed perio:I of hours in a day or even day after day for any specified period, from the very nature of the case, provisions of the said l % l Act are unworkable with regard to such home workers. It may.be stated that the reasonableness of section 37(3) of the Act was not challenged.\n\nAn argument which was submitted was !hat it was difficult to locate home workers.\n\nThat argument was not pressed in this Court.\n\nThe provisions of the said 1961 Act in sections -4 &nd 5 thereof deal with prohibition of employment of, or work by, women, prohibited during certain peri\":I and right of payment of maternity benefit Section 4 of the 1961 .Act does not present any difficulty because it speaks of prohibition of work by a women in any establishment during .six months immediately following the day of her delivery.\n\nFurther, section 4 provjdes that on a request being made by a pregnant woman she will not be required to do work of an arduous nature or work which involves long hours of standing and that period is one month immediately precedi~ the period of six weeks before the date of her expected delivery.\n\nSection 5(2) of the said 1961 Act provides that no women shall be en.titled to maternity benefit unless she has actually worked in any establishment f6r a period of not less than 160 days, in the twelve months immediately preceding the date of her expected deJivery.\n\nThere is no difficulty with regard to working of these sections in regard to maternity benefits to women employed in an establishment.\n\nFor these reasons, we hold that Parliament had legislative compe- 4 .tence in making this Act and the provisions of the Act are valid and do not offend any provisions of the Constitution.\n\nThe Writ Petitions Nos. 127-132 of 1972 are dismissed.\n\nThe Judgments of the Madras High Court, Bombay High Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court are set aside, and Civil Appeals Nos. 2516-23, 2560-69, 2661-64 of 1972, 66-69, 72-75, 1307, 854-56 • . 857-59, 1203 and 1204 of 1973, 307-311 of 1972 and 173 of 1973 are dismissed.\n\nThe State of Maharashtra and the Union of India F appeals against the judgements of the Bombay High Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court being Civil Appeals Nos. 1864-73/ l 9 71 and 1972-86/1971 respectively are accepted.\n\nThe appeals from the Judgement of the Gujarat High Court and Mysore High Courts being Civil Appeals Nos. 585/1971 and 1553, 1614-18, 1769/1971, 1131- 33 and 1440 of 1972 respectively are dismissed. The parties will pay and bear their own costs.\n\nALAGIRISW AMI, J .-I am substantially in agreement with the judgment delivered by my Lord, the Chief Justice, but I think it is necessery to add a few words to clarify certain matters in view of the complications that are likely to arise .otherwise. The Act is the result of a compromise between the original intcQtions of the Government and the modifications they had to make in the proposed measure as a result of eoo<:asions intended to bring the home workers within the scope Ii the Act. The original intention wa~ not to permit beedi rolling in private homes which will involve thousands of labourers in thousands\n\nMANGALORE BEEl:'I WORKS v. UNION (Alagiriswpmi, /.) 253\n\nA of far-flung homes and the difficulty of applying the provisions of the measure to them. The result is an Act which is likely to give rise to many difficulties in its actual working. It is obvious on a reading of the measure that its purpose is to rope in every possible person who could be brought in as an employer. But the resuft of the definitions in the Act is that every body would be a principal employer, e!l'ployer\n\nand contractor and every labour will be contract labour.\n\nTake the definition of the word \"contractor\". In so far as it says that -it means \"a person who, in relation to a manufactt.tring process, undertakes to produce a given result by executing the work\" it is not objectionable and refers to a contractor ordinarily understood.\n\nBut when the words \"through contract labour\" are added it leads to complications. \"Contract labour\" is defined as \"any person engaged or employed in any premises by or through a contractor\". Therefore, all labour employed by a contractor is contract labour. If any manufac- ·\n\nturer employs any person through a contractor, the labour would be contract labour .. Then again \"contractor\" alsoeans \"a person who engages labour for any manufacturing process in a private dwelling house\". In such a case even a principal employer who engages labour for any manufacturing process would be a contractor. The further definition of the word \"contractor\" includes a sub-contractor, agent, munshi, thekedar or sattedar. These are obviously included to cover a class of persons dealt With by this Court in certain decisions including Chintaman Rao's Case (1958 SCR 1340). An \"employer\" is defined to .be, in relation to contract labour, the principal employer.\n\nI have already pointed out that contract labour would include labour employed even by the manufacturer himself direct. \"Principal employer\" is defined as \"a Jl!'rson for whom or on whose behalf any contract labour is engaged or employed in art establishment\". Therefore, when contract labour is employed for a person he is principal employer. When contractlabour is engaged or employed on behalf of a person he is also a principal employer. What distinction could be made between the two is a little difficult to understand. However, in the second part of definition of \"employer\" in relation to labour other than the contract labour in clause 2(g) (li)-though in view of what I have said earlier it is difficult to see what that other labour could be-there can be no objection to the person who has the ultimate control over the affairs of any establishment being considered the employer, as also any person to whom the affairs of the establishment are entrusted, whether such other person is called 'the managing agent, manager, superintendent, or by any other name. But to call a person who has, by reason of his advancing\n\nmoney, supplying goods or otherwise, a substantial interest in the control of the affairs of any establishment, also an employer is very difficult to justify. It is apparently intended to cover cases where a person runs business benami i.e. in another's name. There can be no objection to such a provision.\n\nBut merely because a person lends or advances money or supplies goods he cannot be called an employer. He may have a substantial interest in the control of-the affairs of the manufacturing establishment in the sense that the security for the money ad\n\nmnced depends upon the manufacturing establishment being run properly or even in the sense that a person supplying goods might also be 4-l954Sup .C.L /74\n\n\n( 19741 3 S.C.R.\n\ninterested in the control-of the affairs because he may be supplying good; on credit. I think the words \"or who has, by reason of his advancing money, supplying goods or otherwise, a substantial il)terest in the control or the affairs of any establishment\" should be struck down.\n\nThe interpretation placed upon the expression \"employer\" by me learned Attorney General does not really flow from the various definitions in the Act. I think it is not without significance that the learned Attorney General put forward this interpretation because it is only on that basis that the Act could be workable at all. While I realise that courts should give effect to the intentions of the legislature, it can be done only if that is possible without doing violence to th.e actual language of the statute. The various definitions plainly seek to rope in everybody who has anything to do with the manufacture of beedies and while trying to give effect to the penal provisions in the statute considerable difficulties will arise. There will on the one hand be the actual occupier of the industrial premises. There will be on the other hand a person who might have advanced money to him and supplied goods to him and therefore may be substantially interested in its control. The actual occupier himself might be a contractor and in that case he as well as the person on whose behalf beedies are manufactured would b~\n\nliable. Who, in that case, would be actually liable? I do not agree with the view taken by the Bombay High Court that the Act exhibits an intention to retain the system of contractors. It only takes notice of the existence of the system of contractors and it appears to me that by making the principal employer responsible in every case it is actually trying to force the principal employer to undertake the work of manufacture himself rather than give it to contractors because in any case he would be ultimately liable financially and otherwise to everyone of the workmen employed.\n\nQuite possibly if an independent contractor is one of the type envisaged by the Madras High Court in its judgment in Abdul Aziz Sahib & Sons v. Union of India (1973 2 MLJ 126) that is, of a person buying the materials from the person whom it calls the trade mark holder and then selling the beedies to him, he could be called an independent contractor. But he is actually a manufacturer himself in that case. He may be selling the beedies manufactured by him not to one person but to many persons. The conditions in the beedi indu'- try being that the actual person who ultimately sells the beedies to the public emp1oys various n1eans by which he does not take any responsibility for the welfare of the workers employed in the industry, the Act proceeds on the basis rhar he must be n1ade responsible. I find it difficult to accept the contention of the learned Attorney General that tho criterion adopted by the Madras High Court is both wide as well as re5trictive.\n\nIt can h.: said to be \\vide or restricted, as one choose to call it, only if one cavisa~s a situation like the one in Dewall Mohitken's cave (1964 7 SCR 646). But then if the so called contractor\n\nis really a benami for the manufacturer there is no difficulty in holding the manufacturer rrponsible.\n\nThe main cor.tenlions put forward on behalf of the various appellants are rearding the provisions of ss. 26. 27, 29, 31 and 37 of the Act and Rule 37 of the Maharashtra Rules and the corresponding rules\n\nMANGALORE BEED! WORKS v. UNION (A/agirisw(lmi, J.) 255\n\nmade by the various other States.\n\nThe very convincing reasons and the criticism made by the various appellants were not met by the argu-· meats advanced by the learned Attorney General. It is now well established from the Chintama11 Rao\"s case (supra), Shankar Balaji's case (1962 Supp. I SCR 249) and Bhikuse's case (1964 1 SCR 860)\n\nthat in this industry even people working in factories belonging to manufacturers come as they like, go as they like, work on some days even for one hour a day, and there are no fixed hours of work.\n\nThis sort of situation exists mainly due to the fact that the payment is made to the worker on a piece rate, and the work is also carried on as a parttinie occupation. What applies to them applies with greater force to the home workers. Therefore when section 26 provides that every employee in an establishment (which will include a dwelling house) shall be allowed in a calendar year leave with wages at the rate of one day for every twenty days of work performed by him during the previous calendar year, it leads to real difficulty. There may not be much point in the criticism that whereas the Factories Act provides for annual leave only for person who had worked for 240 days in a year this Act provides for one day's leave for every 20 days during which they have worked. It may be possible for the contractor to know on how many days the home worker has worked from the log book maintained by him.\n\nBut what is the wage which has to be paid to him during the period of leave ? That term is not defined in the Act and it is not permissible to refer to other Acts in order to understand the meaning of that term. Even if we take it to be what it means in popular ufage\n\nit is not possible to say what arc the wages in the case of a home worker. A home worker might work for one hour on one day, eight hours on another day and not at all for a number of days. What would be the wages payable to him ? I am not canvassing the reasonableness of this provision but of the difficulty in giving effect to the provision. The same criticism applies to various other provisions contained in that section. Section 27 provides that for the leave allowed to an emplovee under section 26 he shall be paid at the rate equal to the daily average of liis total full-time earnings for the days on which he had worked during the month immediately preceding his leave exclusive of any overtime earnings and bonus but inclusive. of dearness and other aUowances.\n\nThe term \"Full-time earnings\" has been interpreted in Shankar Balaii\"s anti Bhikuse\"s cases. If it is not applicable to an emolovee of the tv, e of Pandurang in Shunkar Balaji's\n\nca\" surelv it cannot apply to a home worker. This difficulty is not got over by Explanation fl which describes a \"day\" as any period\n\ndurin~ which the home worker was employed during a period of twenty-four hours.\n\nThat does not help in calculating the full-time earnings.\n\nAgain. what meaning arc \\VC to give to the term 'fuiltimc earnings when there is no perio/J of work at all and there ore no fixed hours of working in the case of a home worker ? J am not satisfied with the learned Attorny General's interpretation of section 23 that h is not permissible after this Act came into. force for anv worker of the type of Pandurarig in Shankar Balaji's case to work under the conditions described iri that case. If a person should not be employed in an industrial premises except in accordance with the notice of work displayed in the premises under section 22, it\n\nSUPREME COURT REP OR TS [ 1974 l 3 S.C.ll.\n\ndoes not mean that he cannot work for less than the period mentioned in th~ notice of work. -bnli if he is employed for a longe~ tilill' than that mentioned in the notice of work would the occupier of the industrial premises make himself liable to-be proceeded against.\n\nJn anv case even if that interpretation is correct that cannot apply tO a home worker.\n\nThe difficulty of applying the provisions of the Maternity Benefits Act is again apparent.\n\nThe very. purpose of allowrng . the home workers to work in their homes bemg that the work $l! rolling beed1es is light work, which men and women can do in their homes during their spare hours, the provision of the Maternity Benefits Act r\"\"\n\ngarding women not being allowed to do at.duous labour for a certain period before deliverv arld after de_livery is not apparent. And how can the provision be applied to women who cannot be said to be, so to say, employed continuousy for a certain period before the confinement.\n\nUnder section 31 no employer shall dispense with the services of an employee who has be.en employed for a period of six mo)lths or more, except for a reasonable cause, and without giving such employees at least one month's notice or wages in lieu of such notice.\n\nIs it enoueh that the emplo.yee has been employed for a period of six months if he has been working for one or two days every month during those six months, and in any case how are his wages in lieu\n\nof notice to be determined ?\n\nAnd who would be the \"employer competent to dispense with the services of the employee\"? If a contractor dispenses :with the services of an employee in contravention of section 31 and is convicted utiler section 33 for the first time, would the principal employer be liable to imprisonment if there is a second prosecution?\n\nThese are some of the problems which are likely to arise in actual working of the Act.\n\nI must make it clear that my oojectiott is not to any of the provisions on the ground of their -Im-reasonableness or constitutionality.\n\nThe long abstracts which the learned Attorney General read from the Report of the Royal Commission on Labour, the Rege Committee Report, and the Reports of Dr. B. V. N. Naidu and Mr. M. A.\n\nNatarajan depict the miserable conklitions in which the workers int the industry work.\n\nNobody can dispute the need !or setting right those evils.\n\nBut good il!(enti<; ms should not result in a legislation which would become ineffective a.nd lead to a lot of fruitless litiga\"\n\ntion over the years. I think it Js necessary to utter a word of caution lest the fact that we upholkl the vafidity of the Act as such should be interpteted by various courts §.nd tribunals as sanctioning one interpretation or the other of the various provisions.\n\nThat would be opening up the pandora's box of litigation.\n\nI would therefore hold in a2rcement with the maiority of the High Courts that sections 26, 27. 31 and 37(3) do not apply to home workers.\n\nAnd finallv as re£ards Rule 37 of the Maharashtra Rules, it was accepted by the appellants as reasonable if it is interpreted as mean-\n\nMANGALORE BEED! WORKS v. UNION (A/agiriswami, J.) 257\n\nin2 that ordinarily chhat up tQ five per cent could be rejected, but hiRher thaa that is. rejected it woo1tl be subject to a decision by the\n\nInspector.\n\nIt was said that_ to make the rejection of chhat in excess of five per cent. to depend uori the decision by the Inspector would make all those beedies usless becatlse they have got .to be heated immediately so that the beedies may not be spoilt because of the moisture.\n\nI think that interpretation is correct and the other States mav amend . the RUies so as to bring it in line with the Mabarashtra Rule.\n\nI have tried to interpret the various provisions of the Act not in order to consider the; irconstitutionality or the reasonableneS6 of the restrictions as reflecting on the constitutionality, but of thefr interprtation in so far as they'ar~ likely to lead to difficulties in actual application of the provisio_ns of the Act.\n\nI think it would be good in the interest of all concerned if the Act is amended as early as possible to remove all the lacunae and the , difficulties pointed out above. These difficulties have arisen oecause of an attempt blindly 10 apply the provisions, w)lich would be quite workable if they are applied to conditions wh•e the Factories Act would \\je applicable, where the Jabour is regular in its attendance every day as well as over a period, to conditions f work which are vastly tlifferent as: well as to people who work at home without, a conscious attempi to mould them to suit those conditions.\n\nThe sooner that is done the better for all concerned.\n\nP.H.P.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 345, "entities": [{"text": "21\n\nMANGALORE GANESH BEED! WORKS ETC. ETC.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANGALORE GANESH BEEDI WORKS ETC. 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"end_char": 107021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ALAGIRISW AMI, J .-I am substantially in agreement with the judgment delivered by my Lord, the Chief Justice, but I think it is necessery to add a few words to clarify certain matters in view of the complications that are likely to arise .otherwise."}}, {"text": "clause 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110032, "end_char": 110043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Attorney General does not really flow from the various definitions in the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 111608, "end_char": 111685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Attorney General put forward this interpretation because it is only on that basis that the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 111743, "end_char": 111837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dewall Mohitken", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 114334, "end_char": 114349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It can 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"regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There may not be much point in the criticism that whereas the Factories Act", "statute": "There may not be much point in the criticism that whereas the Factories Act"}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116984, "end_char": 116994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shankar Balaii\"s", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 117317, "end_char": 117333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The term \"Full-time earnings\" has been interpreted in Shankar Balaii\"s anti Bhikuse\"s cases.", "canonical_name": "Shankar Ba/aji Waje"}}, {"text": "Pandurang", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 117411, "end_char": 117420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If it is not applicable to an emolovee of the tv, e of Pandurang in Shunkar Balaji's\n\nca\" surelv it cannot apply to a home worker."}}, {"text": "Shunkar Balaji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 117424, "end_char": 117438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If it is not applicable to an emolovee of the tv, e of Pandurang in Shunkar Balaji's\n\nca\" surelv it cannot apply to a home worker."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117966, "end_char": 117976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118293, "end_char": 118303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REP OR TS [ 1974 l 3 S.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 118309, "end_char": 118350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If a person should not be employed in an industrial premises except in accordance with the notice of work displayed in the premises under section 22, it\n\nSUPREME COURT REP OR TS [ 1974 l 3 S.C.ll."}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119332, "end_char": 119342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": 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V. N. Naidu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 120530, "end_char": 120544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The long abstracts which the learned Attorney General read from the Report of the Royal Commission on Labour, the Rege Committee Report, and the Reports of Dr. B. V. N. Naidu and Mr. M. A.\n\nNatarajan depict the miserable conklitions in which the workers int the industry work."}}, {"text": "M. A.\n\nNatarajan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 120553, "end_char": 120569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The long abstracts which the learned Attorney General read from the Report of the Royal Commission on Labour, the Rege Committee Report, and the Reports of Dr. B. V. N. Naidu and Mr. M. 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{"document_id": "1974_3_258_266_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "SHAIK HANIF, GUDMA MAJHI & KAMAL SAHA\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\nFebruary 1. 1974\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. $<RKAR!A, JJ.]\n\nMaintenpnce of lnterna/ Security Act-If counter-affidavit to be sworn by the District Magislrate himself and under what circumstances-\"Veterati copper wire stealer\"-meaning of.\n\nSince the matters are similar, the facts of W.P. No. 1679 of 1973 are as follows:-\n\nThe petitioner was arrested u/s. 3, sub section (1) and (2) of the Main- C tenu-nce of Internal Security Act, 197 l. The grounds of detention were that the petitioner, on 3-7-72, alongwith _his associates kept concealed 20 bundles of Telegraph copper wire in.his court-yard under ground with a view to dispose the san1e at an opportune moment. The said telegraph wire were recovered ::in 3-7-72 on the basis of -t, he confession made by his associates. Tho petitioner was, therefore, arrested because he was acting in a manner prejudicial to the nlaintenance of supplies and services essential to the community,\n\nThe detcnti_on. order was challenged on various grounds :-Ci) That the D counter-affidavit on behalf of the State of West Bengal was sworn by the Depuly Secretary and not by the District Magistrate, on the basis of whose subjective satisfaction the detention order was made and therefore, it waa illegal.\n\n(ii) From the .counter-affidavit, it was clear that there were \"reliable ink:rmmions'' and material other than the solitary ground of detention comn1unic:1ted to the detenn and so, the detenu was unable to make an effective representation. Therefore, the detention order was violative of clause (5) of E Art. 2.2 of the Constitution of India etc.\n\nAllowing the petition:>,\n\nHELD ; ( 1) When a Rule Nisi is issued in a habeas corpus petition, it is incu1nbent i; pon the State to satisfy the court that the detention of the petit:onr was legal and in conformity not only with the mandatory provisions cf Lhe Act, but is also in accord with the requirements of Cl. (5) of Art. 22 of the Constitution. 1262 E] F\n\nN1rm1ja11 Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2215, referred to.\n\nf2) Since the Court is precluded from testing the sub; ective satisfaction of the dct<iining authority by objective standards. it is all the more desirable that in response to the Rule Nisi, the counteraffidavit on behalf of the State should be sworn to by the District Magistrate or the authority on whose subjecJive s:.tisfacrion the detention order was made.\n\nIf for sufficient reason shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the 3.ffidavit of the person .who passed the 1etcn!ion order could not be furnished, the counter-affidavit should be sworn by so'11e responsible officer who personally dealt with the case in the Govt.\n\nSecretariat elc.\n\n[262 E-F]\n\nIn the present case, the deponent did not swear that he had at any rele\\a1n tin1e personally dealt with the case of the detenu and secondly, 1hc explanation given for not furnishing the affidavit of the District Magistrate due to his transfer from that District, was far from satisfactory.\n\nRan; it Dain v. State of West Bengal A.I.R, 1972 S.C. 1753 and J. N. Ro}'\n\nv. Sta:e of West Bengal A, I.R, 1972 S.C. 2143 referred to.\n\nHANtF ETC. v. WEST BENGAL (Sarkaria, I.) 259\n\n(3) The failure to _furnish the counter-affidavit of the Magistrate who passed the. order of detention is an impropriety. However, in most cases, it may not be of much consequence; but in a few cases, for instance. where mala {ides or extraneous considerations are attributed to .the detaining authority, it may, ta.ken in conjunction with other circumstances, assume the shape of a serious infifi'-.iity.\n\n[263 CJ\n\n(4) In the counter-affidavit, it was mentioned that the detenu was a \"veteran copper wire stealer'' and there were \"reliable informations'' before the District Magistrate. Those reliable informatioris were withheld. The words\n\n\"veteran copper wire stealer'' also implied a long course of repetitive thievery of copper-wir~. it is manifest that but fo~ those ''reliable information'' showing that lhe detenu was repeatedly and habitually stealing copper wire, the District fagistrate might not have passed the detention order in question.\n\nFurther, from the 'Criminal Biography' supp tied by the State, it was clear that all material prticulars of the ground of detention necessary to enable the detenu to make an effective representation were not communicated to the detenu.\n\nHence, the impugned order of dtention is violative of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution and therefore, liable to be quashed.\n\nSimilarly, the other two petitions were also allowed on the ground that material particulars were not communicated to the detenues and therefore, the , detentions were illegal. [263 G- 264 CJ\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 1679, 1662 and 1681 of 1973.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution for issue of a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus.) R. K. Jain, amicus curiae for the Petitioner.\n\nM. M. Kshatriya and G. S. Chatteriee for the Respondent.\n\nE The Judgment of the Court w, as delivered by\n\nSARKARtA J.-This judgment will dispose of all the three petitions above-mentioned under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. It will be convenient to first take up Writ Petition No. 1679 of 1973.\n\nThe petitioner Shaik Hanif, aged 40 years, was arrested on February 23, 1973 in pursuance of a detention order, dated February 19, 1973, passed by the District Magistrate, West Dinajpur in West Bengal under sub-s. (I) read with sub-s. (2) of s.3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (for short, 'the Act'). On February 19, 1973, the District Magistrate reported about his detention to the State Government whic~ approvd it on March 1, 1973. The detenu made a representation which was rejected by the State Government on April 5, 1973 and forwarded to the Advisory Board for consideration. The Board reported to the State Government on April 24, 1973 that there was sufficient cause for the detention.\n\nThereupon the Government confirmed the order of detention under s.12(1) of the Act and directed that the detention of the petitioner would continue \"till the expiration of 12 months from the date of his detenlion or until the expiry of Defence of India Act of 1971 whichever is later.\"\n\nThe grounds of detention as conveyed to the detenu under H. 8(1), read as under :\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19741 3 S.C.ll.\n\n\"You are being ileiained in pursuance of a detention order ........... on the ground that you have been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the .community, as evidenced by tbo particulars given below :\n\nOn 3·7-72 at dead of night you along with your asse>- ciates kept concealed 20 bundles ol Telegraph copper wire weighing 2 qutls. 60 kgs. in your court-yard under earth with a view to dispose of the same in opportune moment.\n\nThe said Telegraph copper .wire were recovered on 3-7-72 on the basis of the confeilsion of your associates. The ponce seized those copper wire and arrested your asa<>- ciate but you evaded arrest. This activity of yours serioUSly\n\naffected one of the essential services to the community by disrupting Telegraph facilities to the public and !bus you acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.\n\nYou are hereby informed that you may make a representation to the State Government against the detention order ....... your case shalt be placed before the Advisory Board within thirty days from the date of your detention under the order.\n\nYou are also informed that under Section 11 ...... . (Act 26 of 1971) the Advisory Board, shall if you desi{j: to be heard, hear you in person . .. \"\n\nSd/- \"· L. Gupta E 19-2-73.\n\nDistrict Magistrate, West Dinajpur, Balurghat\".\n\nIn answer to the Rule Nisi issued by this Court, Shri Sukumar Sen, Deputy Secretary, Home (Special) Department, Government of West Bengal filed the counter-affidavit, explaining that the district Magistrate who passed the order of detention ••is. at present not available Joc\n\naffrming the affidavit as he has been transferred from the said Di• F trict\".\n\nJn para 4 of the affidavit, it is stated :\n\n\"It appears from the records that after receiving reliable information relating to the illegal anti-<1ocial and prejudicial activities of the above-nanJ_d detenu-petitioner relating to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, the said District Magistrate of West Dinajpur G passed order of detention against him under the provisions of the sairl Act.\" In para 7, it is averred :\n\n'.'I further state that it appears from the record that the petitioner is a veteran copper wire stealer. It was. found on 3-7-72 that the petitioner and his associates kept concealed H about 20 b.]l!ldles of telegraph cable wire undergrl>und in the court-yard of his house with a view to dispose the same at opportune moment. The said removal of copper wire from .\n\nthe telegraph lines resulted in disruption of telegraph service and he was detained under the said Act\".\n\nIn paragraph 9 of the affidavit it is inter alia stated that the \"statements made in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are based on information derived from the records kept in the office of the State Government in its Home Department (Special Section), which .I verily believe to be true.\"\n\nMr. R. K. Jain, who assisted the Court as amicus curiae advanced these contetions in support of the petition : ( 1) After the issue of Rule Nisi by this Court, it was incumbent upon the Respondent-State to satisfy the Court about the legality of the detention by producing the affidavit of the District Magistrate who had passed the detention order.\n\nThe counter-affidavit of the Deputy Secretary who did not personally deal with the case at any stage, is no substitute !or the affidavit of the District Magistrate on the basis of whose subjective satisfaction, the detention has been effected. The omission to file the counter-affidavit of the District Magistrate coupled with the oth,:r circumstances of the case, shows that the detention order was po;; ed in an utterly casual way, without application of mind and it was therefore, illegal; (2) From the counter-affidavit of the Deputy Secretary, it appears that there were \"reliable informations\" and material (other than the solitary ground of detention communicated to the detenu) before the detaining authority on the basis of which it was satisfied that .the petitioner was a \"veteran copper wire stealer\" and had been indulging in \"illegal anti-social activities prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community\". Since the nondisclosure of that information or material to the detenu is not sought to be justified under clause ( 6) of Article 22, on the ground of 'ts being facts which the detaining authortiy considers to be against the public interest to disclose, it was incumbent upon the authority to communicate the detenu that information and material in full. Since\n\nthis was not done, the detenu was unable to make an effective re\" presentation. Tl]e detention order was thus violative of the mandate of clause (5) of Article 22, and liable to be struck down on that score;\n\n(3) The Act is violative of Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution because its :-\n\n(a) .Section 3 makes no provision for an objective determination of the truth of the allegations that form the basis of action under that section;\n\n(b) Section 8 does not provide for consideration of the representation of the detenu by .an impartial body in accordance with the principles of natural justice;\n\n( c) Section II enables the Advisory Board to base its report on the matetrial received by the Board from the Officer passing the order of detention without the said report being disclosed to tlle detenu and without affording him an opportunity to controvert the contents of the said report;\n\n( d) Sections II and 12 empower the Advisory Board and the A State Government, as the case may be, to take into consideration materials and information without giving the detenu an opportunity to make his submissions with regard to those materials or to adduce evidence to disprove the allegations levelled against him.\n\n(4) (a) The continuance of Emergency in as much as it suspend; Fundamental Rights, indefinitely under an executive fiat is unconstitutional. What the Parliament cannot destroy in exercise of its amendatory powers under Article 368, ll fortiori, th~ President cannot bury by embalming and encasing the same in a Proclamaiion of Emergency.\n\nFundamental Rights guaranteed under Article 19 arc essential features of the Constitution ana their indefinite suspension under the cloak of Emergency, amounts to their destruction; (b) Jn forming an opm1un as to the necessity of proclaiming Emergency under Article 352 of the Constitution, the President has to act on certain objective facts open to judicial scr'!tiny. The war having ended more than two years ago, there is no justification for continuing the Proclamation of Emergency.\n\nWe will take up contentions (I) and (2) together.\n\nAs \"as pointed out by this Court in Naranjan Singh v. State of\n\nM~.dhya Pradesli,(1) where in a habeas, corpus petition a Ruic Nisi is issued. it is incumbent upon the State to satisfy the Court that the detention of the petitioner was legal and in conformity not only with the mandatory provisions of the Act, but is also in accord with the requirements implicit in clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution.\n\nSince the Court is precluded from testing the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority by objective standards. it is all the more desirable that in response to the Rule Nisi the counter-affidavit on behalf of the State should be sworn to by the District Magistrate or the authority on whose subjective satisfaction the detention order under s.3 was passed. If for sufficient reason shown to the satisfaction of the Court, the affidavit of the person who passed the order of detention under s.3 cannot be furnished, the counter-affidavit should be sworn by some responsible officer who personally dealt with or processed the case in the Government Secretariat or submitted it to the Minister or other Officer dulv authorised under the rules of business framed by the Governor under Article 166 of the Constitution to pass orders on behalf of the Government in such matters.\n\nJn the instant case, the counter-affidavit of Shri Sukumar Sen Deputy Secretarv. Home. suffers from two infirmities.\n\nFirstly, the deponent does not swear that he had at any relevant time personallv dealt with the case of the detenu.\n\nHe has verified the correctnets of the avcrn1cnts in his affidavit on the basis of facts gathered from the official records. Secondlv. the explanation given for not furnishing the affidavit of the District Magistrate who had passed the detention order,\n\nis that the Magistrate has been transferred from that District. The explanation is far from being satisfactory.\n\n---rn:A:.1~~1912-s~. ms.\n\nIn Ranjit Dam v,.State of West Bengal,( 1) the reason given for not making the counter-affidavit by the Magistrate himself, who had passed the detention order, was that he had since then been appointed as Secretary of the State Electricity Board. It was held that the reason given was not satisfactory. \"Shri Sukumar Sen is incharge of a specially created cell in the Government Secretariat of West Bengal, which maintains the records of all persons detained under the Act. It is true that a similar reason given for not furnishing the affidavit of the Magistrate who passed the impugned order, was accepted by this Court in J. N. Roy v. State of West Bengal,(') and instead, the counteraffidavit of the Secretariat official specially entrusted with detention cases was deemed sufficient. But that was so be<ltllse nothing turned. on it. Nevertheless, the failure to furnish the counter-affidavit of the\n\nMagll; trate. who passed the order of detention, is an impropriety. In most cases, it may not be of much consequence but in a few ca.ses, for instance. where mala {ides or extraneous consideratfuns are attributed to the Magistrate or the detaining authority, it may, taken in conjunction \\Vith other circumstances, assume the shape of a serious. infirmity, leading the Court to declare the detention illegal.\n\nIn the present case, too, the mere omission to file the affidavit of the District.\n\nMagistrate does not vitiate the detention orders.\n\nBut it is a circumstance, among others, in the light of which contention (2) is to be appreciated.\n\nThe Act restricts citizens' personal liberty \\vhich is a fundamental; right under the Constitution. It has therefore to be construed strictly, as far as possible, in Javour of the citizen and in a manner that does not restrict that right to an extent greater than is necessary to cffec.:tuate that object.\n\nThe provisions of the Act have, therefore, to be applied with watchful care and circumspection. lt is the duty of the court to 1 see that the efficacy of the limited yet crucial. safeguards provided in the law of preventive detention is not lost in n1echanical routine, dun casualness and chill indifference on the part of the authorities entrusted with their application. Let us therefore see whether there has been such a careful and strict compliance with the legal procedure in the instant case.\n\nJn the counter-affidavit, the Deputy Secretary has inter alia stated that the petitioner is a \"veteran copper wire stealer\" and there were \"reliatle informations\" before the District Magistrate about his antisociaJ activities prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and l:iCrvices essential to the community. \"Veteran copper wire stealer'' irnplies a long course of repetitive thievery of copper-wire.\n\nNo-one is born a knave; it takes time for one to become so.\n\nIt is manifest that but for those \"reliable informations\" showing that the detenu was repeatedly and habitually stealing copper wire, the District Magistrate might not have passed the detention order in question. Those \"reliable informations\" were withheld.\n\nNo privilege under clause (6) of Article 22 has been claimed in respect of them.\n\nEven the main ground viz. that the petitioner is a \"veteran copper wire stealer\" was not, as such,.\n\n(I) A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 1753.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1972 S.C. 2143.\n\n.communicated to the detenu. The ground intimated was that \"you have been acting in a manner prejudicial to the Maintenance of Supplies and Services essential to the community\". Only one solitary instance of the recovery of stolen copper-wire from the petitioner's house on 3-7-1972 was conveyed to the detenu.\n\nLearned Counsel for the State has been fair enough to collect and place before us what the Deputy Secretary in his counter-affidavit called \"reliable informations\" on the basis of which the District Magistrate ordered the detention. In this, under the caption \"Criminal Biography\", is mentioned inter a/ia, how the petitioner with his associates organised a gang to steal telegraph copper wire systemati- .cally.\n\nFrom what has been said above, it is clear as day light that all material particulars of the ground .of detention which were necessary to enable .. the detenu to make an effective representation, were not communicated to him.\n\nThe impugned order of detention i; thus violative of Article 22(5) of the Constitution, and is liable to be .quashed on that score alone.\n\nIn view of the above finding, it is not necessary to decide the .remaining contentions canvassed by Mr. Jain.\n\nNow we take up Writ Petition No. 1662 of 1973.' In this case also, Shri Sukumar Sen, Deputy Secretary in his counter-affidavit .averred that the detenu was a \"veteran copper wire stealer\" and that the District Magistrate, Burdwan, had passed. the order of the petitioner's detention on receipt of reliable information about the illegal, anti-social and prejudicial activities of the petitioner.\n\nHere also, al! the 'material information' showing or even alleging how the -petitioner was a \"veteran copper wire stealer\" was not communicated to him.\n\nOnly two instances .of theft of electric copper wire which took place on November 6, 1971 and November 25, 1971 were intimated to him.\n\nLearned Counsel for the State has placed for our perusal a copy of History Sheet of the detenu OJI receiving which, the District Magistrate had passed the impugned order of detention.\n\nAmong other facts, it is mentioned therein that on November 3, 1973, also, the petitioner alongwith his two associates had committed theft of electric copper wire measuring 125 ft. from the electric poles near Hatgarui and a case under section 379. Penal Code was registered in Polic~ Station Asansol on the same date, relating to this theft. It is further stoled that \"from his boyhood the petitioner started mixing up with anti-social elements, wagon-breakers and in course of time, he along with his .associates, indulged in. thefts of iron materials, copper-wire and other forms of crime\".\n\nAll this matter including that concerning the theft dated November 3, 1973, was admittedly not communicated to the detenu.\n\nIts no111disclosure to the dctenu is not being justified as privileged under Article 22(6}. Thus in this case also, all the material or adequate particulars relatable to the ground intimated, were not conveyed to the detenu. ft is not possible to predicate how far the mind of the detaining authority was influenced in passing the order of detention !by the uncommunlcated material.\n\nBy this omission, the petitioner's\n\nHANIF ETC. v. WEST BENGAL (St1rkaria, J.) 265.\n\nconstitutional right of making an effective representation was seriously. jeopardised.\n\nIn the result the detention of the petitioner (Gudma Majhi) must be held to be illegal.\n\nIn Writ Petition No. 1681 of 1973, the ground of detention as. comn1unicated to the petitioner, Kamal Saha, ran as under :\n\n'That on 10-12-1972 at about 19-30 hrs. you and your a'8ociates being armed with daggers put all the passengers to tear of death of a !Ind Class Compartment of 162 Dn. train at New Barrackpore R.S. and committed robbery in respect of one bundle of woollen Shawl containing 90 pieces valued at Rs. 9500/- from Galam Kadar Kashmiri of 96 Ripon Street Calcutta-16, you were subsequently arrested. 44 pieces of shawl valued a Rs. 4500/- were recovered later on. Your action caused panic, confusion and disturbed pub-- lie order then and there, you have thus acted in. a manner preJudicial to the maintenance of public order\".\n\nIn Pora 7 of counter-affidavit, Shri Sukumar Sen, Deputy Secretary stated :\n\n\" .... that it appears from the records that tho petitioner 1s a veteran Railway Criminal. and was indulging in cnmmitt~ ing robbery in running sub-urban trains. It appcors that on 10-12-1972 at about 19-30 hours the petitioner and his associates armed with daggers, committed robbery in a III class Railway Compartment ...... \"\n\nThe history-sheet communicated by the Superintendent of Police to the detaining authority states that \"he formed and organised a gang and started <; Pmmitting robbery in Sealdah Bongaon Railway Section.\n\nThis gang is so desperate that no body of the locality resists them, even if they commit robbery and. other offences even in their very presence. They always move with deadly weapons such as pype-guns, daggers. bombs etc. by which they intimidate the local people.\"\n\nThereafter, instances of two robberies committed by him along with his associates. on January 30, 1972 and August 1, 1972, are mentioned.\n\nThe particulars of any past crime committed by him, which were necessary for showing how he was a veteran railway criminal, were not communicated to the detenu.\n\nIn respect of the uncommunicated material, ncr privilege under Art. 22(6) was claimed.\n\nSUPRE.'\\IE COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nfn the absence of those material particulars, the detenu could not A .exercise his constitutional. right of making an effective representation.\n\nJn oter words, the grounds communicated to the petitioner suffered from vagueness.\n\nFor the reasons aforesaid, all the three petitions are allowed ond the petitioner in each of them is directed to be set at liberty forthwith.\n\nNothing in this judgment, however, shall preclude the State Gov, rnment/District Magistrate. if so advised, from passing fresh orders of the detention of the petitioners or any of them, after full and meticulous compliance with the procedure prescribed by Jaw.\n\ns.c.\n\nPetitions allowed. c", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "SHAIK HANIF, GUDMA MAJHI & KAMAL SAHA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHAIK HANIF, GUDMA MAJHI & KAMAL SAHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHAIK HANIF, GUDMA MAJHI & KAMAL SAHA\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\nFebruary 1."}}, {"text": "February 1. 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 77, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHAIK HANIF, GUDMA MAJHI & KAMAL SAHA\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\nFebruary 1."}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 417, "end_char": 421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "3-7-72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 775, "end_char": 781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said telegraph wire were recovered ::in 3-7-72 on the basis of -t, he confession made by his associates."}}, {"text": "the State of West Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1104, "end_char": 1128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1610, "end_char": 1616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1626, "end_char": 1647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1976, "end_char": 1983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4478, "end_char": 4488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4819, "end_char": 4829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "R. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4903, "end_char": 4913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Jain, amicus curiae for the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Jain"}}, {"text": "M. M. Kshatriya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4950, "end_char": 4965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Kshatriya and G. S. Chatteriee for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatteriee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4970, "end_char": 4986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Kshatriya and G. S. Chatteriee for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "SARKARtA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5056, "end_char": 5064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E The Judgment of the Court w, as delivered by\n\nSARKARtA J.-This judgment will dispose of all the three petitions above-mentioned under Article 32 of the Constitution of India."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5144, "end_char": 5154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5162, "end_char": 5183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shaik Hanif", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5272, "end_char": 5283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner Shaik Hanif, aged 40 years, was arrested on February 23, 1973 in pursuance of a detention order, dated February 19, 1973, passed by the District Magistrate, West Dinajpur in West Bengal under sub-s. (I) read with sub-s. (2) of s.3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (for short, 'the Act')."}}, {"text": "February 23, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5316, "end_char": 5333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner Shaik Hanif, aged 40 years, was arrested on February 23, 1973 in pursuance of a detention order, dated February 19, 1973, passed by the District Magistrate, West Dinajpur in West Bengal under sub-s. (I) read with sub-s. (2) of s.3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (for short, 'the Act')."}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5499, "end_char": 5502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5510, "end_char": 5552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "February 19, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5580, "end_char": 5597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 19, 1973, the District Magistrate reported about his detention to the State Government whic~ approvd it on March 1, 1973."}}, {"text": "March 1, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5696, "end_char": 5709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 19, 1973, the District Magistrate reported about his detention to the State Government whic~ approvd it on March 1, 1973."}}, {"text": "April 5, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5790, "end_char": 5803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detenu made a representation which was rejected by the State Government on April 5, 1973 and forwarded to the Advisory Board for consideration."}}, {"text": "April 24, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5905, "end_char": 5919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board reported to the State Government on April 24, 1973 that there was sufficient cause for the detention."}}, {"text": "s.12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6036, "end_char": 6043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6208, "end_char": 6228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "3·7-72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6640, "end_char": 6646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"You are being ileiained in pursuance of a detention order ........... on the ground that you have been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the .community, as evidenced by tbo particulars given below :\n\nOn 3·7-72 at dead of night you along with your asse>- ciates kept concealed 20 bundles ol Telegraph copper wire weighing 2 qutls."}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7589, "end_char": 7599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sukumar Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7839, "end_char": 7850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In answer to the Rule Nisi issued by this Court, Shri Sukumar Sen, Deputy Secretary, Home (Special) Department, Government of West Bengal filed the counter-affidavit, explaining that the district Magistrate who passed the order of detention ••is.", "canonical_name": "Sukumar Sen"}}, {"text": "R. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9355, "end_char": 9365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. R. K. Jain, who assisted the Court as amicus curiae advanced these contetions in support of the petition : ( 1) After the issue of Rule Nisi by this Court, it was incumbent upon the Respondent-State to satisfy the Court about the legality of the detention by producing the affidavit of the District Magistrate who had passed the detention order.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Jain"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10779, "end_char": 10789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11171, "end_char": 11181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11256, "end_char": 11274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11316, "end_char": 11325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11463, "end_char": 11472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12385, "end_char": 12395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What the Parliament cannot destroy in exercise of its amendatory powers under Article 368, ll fortiori, th~ President cannot bury by embalming and encasing the same in a Proclamaiion of Emergency."}}, {"text": "Article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12454, "end_char": 12465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12610, "end_char": 12620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 352", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12832, "end_char": 12843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13496, "end_char": 13506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13880, "end_char": 13883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14029, "end_char": 14032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14320, "end_char": 14331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sukumar Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14464, "end_char": 14475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the instant case, the counter-affidavit of Shri Sukumar Sen Deputy Secretarv.", "canonical_name": "Sukumar Sen"}}, {"text": "Government Secretariat of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15409, "end_char": 15446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Sukumar Sen is incharge of a specially created cell in the Government Secretariat of West Bengal, which maintains the records of all persons detained under the Act."}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18158, "end_char": 18168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "3-7-1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18640, "end_char": 18648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Only one solitary instance of the recovery of stolen copper-wire from the petitioner's house on 3-7-1972 was conveyed to the detenu."}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19372, "end_char": 19385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19562, "end_char": 19566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the above finding, it is not necessary to decide the .remaining contentions canvassed by Mr. Jain."}}, {"text": "District Magistrate, Burdwan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19770, "end_char": 19798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case also, Shri Sukumar Sen, Deputy Secretary in his counter-affidavit .averred that the detenu was a \"veteran copper wire stealer\" and that the District Magistrate, Burdwan, had passed."}}, {"text": "November 6, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20191, "end_char": 20207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Only two instances .of theft of electric copper wire which took place on November 6, 1971 and November 25, 1971 were intimated to him."}}, {"text": "November 25, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20212, "end_char": 20229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Only two instances .of theft of electric copper wire which took place on November 6, 1971 and November 25, 1971 were intimated to him."}}, {"text": "November 3, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20490, "end_char": 20506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Among other facts, it is mentioned therein that on November 3, 1973, also, the petitioner alongwith his two associates had committed theft of electric copper wire measuring 125 ft."}}, {"text": "Hatgarui", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20649, "end_char": 20657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from the electric poles near Hatgarui and a case under section 379."}}, {"text": "section 379", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20675, "end_char": 20686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20688, "end_char": 20698, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Asansol", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20732, "end_char": 20739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Penal Code was registered in Polic~ Station Asansol on the same date, relating to this theft."}}, {"text": "Gudma Majhi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21761, "end_char": 21772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result the detention of the petitioner (Gudma Majhi) must be held to be illegal."}}, {"text": "Kamal Saha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21899, "end_char": 21909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "comn1unicated to the petitioner, Kamal Saha, ran as under :\n\n'That on 10-12-1972 at about 19-30 hrs."}}, {"text": "10-12-1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21936, "end_char": 21946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "comn1unicated to the petitioner, Kamal Saha, ran as under :\n\n'That on 10-12-1972 at about 19-30 hrs."}}, {"text": "New Barrackpore R.S.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22104, "end_char": 22124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "train at New Barrackpore R.S. and committed robbery in respect of one bundle of woollen Shawl containing 90 pieces valued at Rs."}}, {"text": "Calcutta-16", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22276, "end_char": 22287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9500/- from Galam Kadar Kashmiri of 96 Ripon Street Calcutta-16, you were subsequently arrested."}}, {"text": "January 30, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23514, "end_char": 23530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on January 30, 1972 and August 1, 1972, are mentioned."}}, {"text": "August 1, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23535, "end_char": 23549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on January 30, 1972 and August 1, 1972, are mentioned."}}, {"text": "Art. 22(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23792, "end_char": 23802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_267_278_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "PHIROZE BAMANJI DESAI\n\nCHANDRAKANT M. PATEL & ORS.\n\nFebruary 4, 1974\n\n[P. N. BHAGWAT! AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.]\n\nf!on1bay. Rents Hotel and Lodging Hollse Rates (Control) Act (57 of 19' I), Sections 13( l)fg), 13(2) and 29(3 )-ReaJonable and bona/ide require- 1nent of preniises for personal use and occupation-Juridical possession of other pren1ises\n\n1by landlord-Whether can be1 taken into account in determining need of landlord.\n\nBon1ba)' Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, Sec. 29(3) Rev(sional p\"wers of the High Court--Scope-Hig.h Court can interfere only if tfiere is n1iscarriage of justice due to n1istake I of law-Finding of lower court a_f to bona fide require1ne111 and greater hardship to Jandlord-lnter- Jerence by High Coutt by reappreciating evidence not pennissible.\n\nThe appellant was the owner of -two bungalows, called \"'Truth Bungalow'' and ''Hill Bungalow''\n\n1 in. Navsari, South Gujarat. The Truth Bungalow consisted of only one tenement \\Yith a separate room on the ground floor which was in the possession of the <1.ppell<int, The rest of the Truth Bungalow wl:iiCh had been let out to a tenant who subsequently surrendered possession was given on leave-and-licence to one B in 1967.\n\nThe Hill Bungalow consisteJ of two tenements, one on the ground fioOI' and the other on the first floor.\n\nThe first floor is occupied by S, the mother of the appellant since the last seyeral years.\n\nShe was paying a sum of Rs. 50/- p.m. to the appellant for the occupation of the first floor.\n\nThe ground floor of the Hill Bungalow was let out by the appellant to one M in 1957 at a rent of Rs. 65/- p.m.\n\nM died in September 1966 leaving behind him his widow, respondent No. 5, his son, Resp. No. 1 and his daughter, respondent No. 2.\n\nSometime prior to the death of M respondent Nos. 3 and 4 together with the members or their respective families had come to reside in the ground floor pren1ise.;;, After the death of M they continued to stay with respondent No. 1, Respondent Nos. 2 and 5, however, left the ground floor premises and went away from Navsari soon after the death of M. Th! l!Ppellant by a notice elated 15-10-1966 terminated the tenancy of respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 5. on the ground that they had unlawfully sub-let the ground floor premises to respondents Nos. 3 and 4 within the meaning of sec. 13(1)(e) of the Act.\n\nHowever. the respondents failed to hand over vacant possession of the ground floor prernises to the appellant. Therefore, on 18-1-1967, the appellant filed a suit for e\\iction under sec. 13( l)(e) of the Act. The appel !ant was carrying on his profession as an Architect and Consulting Engineer in Bombay since 1960, \\\\hen he retired from Army SerVice.\n\nHe lived in a flat in Bombay for \\\\hich he paid Rs. 475/- p.m. The principal area of his work in the earlv stages of hi\" career was Rombay and South Gujarat but by\n\nbout the middle of I96!l, hie; work in Bombay practicalJy dwindled to nil find his profesc; ionnl r!Cti,-ities became confined almost exc!usively to South Gnj:i-::at.\n\nThe appellant accordingly decided to settle down in Navsarj which was bis natiYe place where hie; mother was living for last several yenr<J and frotn where he would be able to carry on his profession conveniently. cccnonically and \\\\ith ad\\'ar.tage.\n\nThe appellant accordingly at, nended the .J:?laint in lhe pendinc. suit with the ]eave of the Court introducing an add1t1onal ground that he reasonably t•nd bD.\":.1 fide required the groun~ floor premises for his personal use and occupation and was, therefore, entitled . to recover possession u/s 13(l)(g) of the Act. Respondent N.o~. 2 .and S did not contest the suit of the appellant as they \\Vere not residing tn the groun:l floor premises and the main aefen:e \\Vas on behalf of respondent Nos. 1, 3 nnd 4,\n\nwho denied the allegations made in the plaint and disputed .the grounds on which possession was sought to be iecovered by the appellant.\n\nThe trial Court on consideration of the evidence led on behalf of the appellant and respondent nos. 1,3 and 4, took the view that the appellant had not established that respondents nos. 3 a)ld 4 were sub-tenants of respondent no.1 and, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to recover possession of the ground floor prernises on the ground of unlawful sub-letting.\n\nHowever, the trial court held that the evidence on record was sufficient to establish that the appellant reasonably and bona tide required the ground floor premises for personal use and occupation and it WJS also dear from the evidence that greater hardship would not be caused to respondent nos. 1, 2 and 5 by passing a decree for eviction than what would be caused to the appellant by refusing to pass it. The trial Court passed a decree for eviction against the respondents.\n\nOn appeal by the respondents. nos. 1 to 4. to the Distnct Cl)urt, the District Judge confirmed the decree for eviction anQ. dismissed the appeal.\n\nThis led to the filing of Revision Application before the High Court u/s 29(3) of the Act, The High Court intedered with the findings of the District Judge on both the questions, namely, reasonable and bona fide requirement for personal use and occuption as also greater hardship and held on reappreciation of the evidence that the appellant had failed to establish that he reasonably and bona fide required the ground floor premL'; es for his personal use and occupation and in any event, greajer hardship would be caused to respondent no. 1 by passing a decree for eviction than by refusing to pass it. The High Court accordingly set aside the decree for eviction and dismissed the suit of the appe11ant.\n\nOn appeal by special leave to this Court, the appellant contendeJ that in reversing the findings of the District Judge on the aforesaid questions, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction u/s 29(3), since both these tindings were tinding~ of fact which did not suffer from any mistake of law and the jurbdiction of the High Court under that section was limited only to exam1n1ng whether the decision of the District Judge was \"according to law''.\n\nHELD : ( 1) The High Court was. on the evidence of record, in error in reversing the findings of fact recorded by the District Judge.\n\nFor the purpose of determining whether the requirement of the appellant for the ground floor premises was reasonable and bona fide, what was necessary to be considered wa\" not whether the appeliant ¥.'as juridically in possession of the Truth Bungalow but whether the Truth Bang:alow was available to the appellant for occupation so that he could not be said to need the ground Hoor premises. If the Truth Bungalow was in occupation of B on leave an.ct licence, it was obviously not available to the appellant for occupation and 1t could not be taken into account for negativing the need of the appellant for the round floor premises.\n\nThe finding of the District Judge on the question of reasonable and bona fide requirement was clearly one of fact.\n\nThe Dist. Judge did not misdirect himself in regard to the true meaning of the word \"require\" in sec. 13(1) (g) and interpreted it correctly to mean that there must be an element of need before a landlord can be said to ''require\" the premises for his own use and occupation.\n\n[274 CJ\n\nIt is not enough that the landlord should merely desire to use and occupy the premises, What is necessary is that he shou.ld need thef!l for his own use and occupation. _ This was the correct test applied by the D1stt.\n\nJudge fo the facts found by him. Therefore, it was not competent f'!r th~ Htg~ Court in the exercise of its re,•isional power under sec. 29(3) to 1ntertcre with thts findi11p br reappreciating the evidenc~. The High <; ourt\\i 1e,1p11r<>.isal of the\n\n; vidence JH':ri substitution of its own finding~ of fact 1n place vf .tat reached by the D:-'1.-..ct Jadge was clearly cntside the scope of the rev1s1onal power U/'i 29(3). [274 E}\n\n'l\"l:e Hi,.h Court can interfere with the decision of the lower court u/s 29(3} only~ if there is mis-carriage of justice due to mistake of law. e HW1 <.:ourt cannot re-assess value of_ the evidence and interfere with a finding\n\nG '\n\nof fact merely because it thinks that the appreciation of the evidence by the lower court is wrong and the lower Court should have reached a different conclusion of fact from what it did.\n\nL273 F]\n\nHari Shankar v. Rao Girdharilal Choudhury [1962] Supp, 1 S.C.R. 933, Bt>II & Clo. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj [1938] 40 Bom, L. R. 125 and Puranchand V. Motilal [!963] Supp. 2 s.C.R. 906 relied on.\n\n(2) On the question of greater hardsip, the District Judge decided against the respondents on the view that as soon as the landlord establishes that he rcsasonbly and bona fide requires the premises for his own use and occupation, the burden of proving the greater hardship by passing a decree for eviction than refusing to pass it is on the tenant and if the tenant fails to discharge this burden by producing proper evidence, a decree for eviction must go against him. This view in regard to the burden of proof is not correct law.\n\n[276 CJ\n\nKelly v. Goodwin,\"'[1947] All Engl. Report g10, distinguished.\n\n1.\\1/s. Central Tobacco Co. v. Chandra Prakash, Civil Appeal No. 1175/69 dated 23-4-69, followed.\n\nThe High Court was consequently justified in interfering with th~ finding ret:orded by the District Judge on the question of greater hardship and arriving at its own finding on the basis of the correct principle laid down: by this Court.\n\nBut the High Court fell into an error in appreciating the evidence and coming to the conclusion that greater hardship would be causea to respondent No.\n\nI by passing a decree for eviction than by refusing to pass it. There was no evident:e to support this finding by the High Court. The evidence was entirely the other way.\n\n[277 C]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2208 of 1972.\n\n(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 3rd Apiil. 1972 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Revision Application No. 325 of 1970).\n\nR. M. Mehta, S. K. Dholakia and R. C. Bhatia, for the Appellant.\n\nC. S. Rao, for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgmfnt of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.\n\nThis appeal, by special leave, arises out of a suit filed by the appellant to recover possession of certain premises from the respondents.\n\nIn order to appreciate the contention that has been raised in the appeal, it is necessary to notice the facts giving rise to the appeal in some detail.\n\nThe appellant is the owner of two bungalows in Navsari, a town G situate in South Gujarat.\n\nOne bungalow is known by the name of Truth Bungalow while the other is known by the name of Hill Ilungalow.\n\nThe Truth Bungalow consists of only one tenement with a separate room on the ground floor.\n\nIt was common ground between the parties and that appears clearly from the evidence and h•s also been found by the High Court as well as the lower courts, that this separate room on the ground floor of the Truth Bungalow was at all material H times in the possession of the appellant.\n\nThe rest of the Truth Bungalow was, some two and a half to three years prior to the recording of the evidence, let out to a tenant, but after a period of about one year and a quarter the tenant surrendered possession and thereafter it was ·- .. 5-L954Sup,.C.L/74 0\n\ngivn by the appellant to one Dr. 'Bharucha on leave anu licence on payment of compensation of Rs. 50/- per month.\n\nThe appellant in his evidence could not stale precisely when this leave and liccn:.:e was granted by him. lfe said that it was given in January 1966 or it n1av be in January 1967.\n\nWe shall, foi the purpose of this appeal, proceed on th~ basis that it 1, vas given in January 1967, for that would bt: Ji1ore favourable to the respondent than taking January J 966 as the time when _it \\Vas granted.\n\nDr. Bharucha was thus in occupation o[ the Truth Ilungalow, barring the ground floor ioon1 in the possession of the appellant, from January 1967 on leave and licence from the appellant.\n\nThe Hill Bungalow consists of two tenanments; one on the ground lloor and the other on the first floor.\n\nThe first floor is occupied by Suonabai, the 1nother of the appellant since the last several years. Si1c is an old lady, aged about 82 years at the time of giving evidence but. as the evidence shows, age docs not seem to have withered a\\vuy her interest in life.\n\nThere was some controversy before the lo\\·; cr courts as to whether in respect of the lirst floor occupied by her, Soonobai ,-,,.:; a tenant or a Jiccncee of the appellant. The lower courts held that she\n\na tenant, while the High Court took the view that she was• a Jicencee.\n\nWe shall presently examine this controversy but one thing may be made clear at this stage namely, that Soonabai was paying a sum .of Rs. 50/-\n\npcr month to the appell•nt for the occupation of the first fl<1or 4n.:J receipts in respect of such payments were produced by the appellant. The ground floor of the Hill Bungalow was let out by the appellant to one Mahendra Prasad as far back as 1957 at a rent of Rs: 65/- per month.\n\nMahendra Prasad died in September 1966 leaving him surviving as his legal representatives his widow the fifth respondent. his son the first respondent and his daughter the second respondent.\n\nSometime prior to the death of Mahendra Prasad, respondents 3 and 4 together with the members of their respective families had come to reside in the gtounJ floor premises and after the death of Mahendra Pr,1sad, they continued to stay With the first respondent.\n\nThe second and the fifth respondents, however, left the ground floor premises and went. away front Navsari soon after the death of Mahendra Prasad.\n\nThe appellant, by a. notice dated 15th October, 1966, terminated the tenancy of respondents I, 2 and 5 on the ground that they had unlawfully sub-Jet the ground floor premises to respondents 3 and 4.\n\nThough the tenancy in respect of the first floor premises was thus terminated by the appellant, the respondents failed to hand over vacant possession of the ground floor premises to the appellant and the appellant was accordingly constrained to file regular suit No. 26 of 1967 in the co!lrt of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Navsari on 18th January 1967. -The\n\nground on which possession was souglit by the appellant in the plaint as originally framed was unwawful sub-letting by respondent> I, 2 and 5 to respondents 3 and 4 which is a ground of eviction under s. 13 (I)-\n\n( e) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Rent Act).\n\nThe appellant was-carrying on hls nrafession as archi.tect and consu 1ting engineer in Bombay since 1960 when he retired from Army <ervice.\n\nHe lived in a flat in Bombay for which he paid a rent of Rs. 475 /- per\n\nY'.'\n\nmonth, The principal area of work in the early stages of his professional career was Bombay and South Gujarat but by abodt .tile middle of 1968 his v.ork in Bombay practically dwindled to nil and his professional activities became confined almost exclusively to South Gujarat. The appellant found that in the circumstances tbl'r<; was no point in his continumg to hw in Hombay and pay a hi!lh .rent of Rs. 475/- per month which was a serious drain on his purse.\n\nThe appellant accordingly decided 10 settle down in Navsari which was his native place, where his mother was living for the last several years und from where he would be able to carry on his profession convenie01iy, economically and with advantage.\n\nNow, the suit filed by the appellant against the respondents for possession of the ground floor premises was already pending and the appellant, therefore, with the leave of the Court, amended the plaint in that suit introducing an additional ground that the appellant reasonably and bona. fide required the ground floor premises for his personal use and occupation and was, therefore, entitled to recover possession under s. 13 ( 1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act. .\n\nRespondents 2 and 5 did not contest the suit of the appellant as they were not residing in the ground floor premises and the main defence was on behaH of 1es11ondents 1, 3 and 4 who denied the allegations made in the plaint and ilisputed the grounds on which possession was sought to be recovered by the appellant.\n\nThe trial court, on consideration of the evidence led on bhalf of the appellant and respondnts 1, 3 and 4, took the view that, though respondents 3 and 4 together with the members of their respective families were residing in the ground floor premises with the first respondent, it was not established by the appellant that they were subtenants of the first respondent and the appelant was, therefore, not entitled to recoverpossession of the ground floor premises on the ground of unlawful sub-letting.\n\nHowever, so far as the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement for personal use and occupation was concerned, the trial court held that the evidence Cil record was sufficient to establish that the appellant reasonably and bonu fide required the ground floor premises for personal use and occupation and it\\ was 11lso clear from the evidence that greater hardship wuuld not be caµsed to respondents 1, 2 and 5 by passing a decree for eviction than wliat would be caused to the appelant by refusing to pass it.\n\nThe trial cutlet accordingly passed a d.ecree for eviction against the re; pondcnts.\n\nRespondents 1 to 4 being aggrieved by the decree for eviction preferred an appeal in the District Curt, Bulsar.\n\nThe District Judge, who heard the appeal, found himself in complete agreement with the conclusions reached by the trial court and he accordingly confirme<J t.he\n\ndecree for eviction and dismissed the apneal.\n\nThis le~ to tlie filing of a revision application before the High Court under s. 29. <u'i-s. (3) of the Bombay Rent Act. The High .Court in revision interfered with the findings of the District Judge on both the questions, nnmcly, reasonable and bona fide requirement for personal use anrl occuoathin as als.o greater hardship and held. on an aoprcciation of the evidc\"rc. that the appi; llant had failed to es'.abli<h tht he reasonablv anrl hn''\" de required the ground floor premises for hts own use and occupation and\n\nin any event the evidence showed that greater hardship would he caused to the first respondent by passing a decree for eviction than by refusing to pass it.\n\nThe High Court, accordingly, set aside the decree for eviction and dismissed the suit of the appellant.\n\nHence the present appeal by special leave obtained from this Court. .\n\nThe main ground on which the appellant attacked the judgment of the High Court was that in reversing the findings of the District Judge on the question of reasonable and bona fide requirement for personal use anJ occupation as also on the question of greater hardship, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under s. 29, subs. (3), since both these findings were findings of fact which did not suffer from any mistake of law and the jurisdiction of the High Court under that section was limited only to examining whether the decision of the District Judge was \"according to law\". The High Court, it was contended, could not interfere under s. 29, sub-s .. (3) with findings of fact recorded by the District Judge unless it could be shown that they disc!OBed an error of law in arriving at them, which according to the appellant, was not the position in the present case.\n\nThis contention raises a question as to the true scope and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction of the Higl) Court under s. 29, sub-s. (3). Fortunately this question is not devoid of authority. There are sections in other rent control legislations couched in identical language and they have received judicial interpretation at ti)e hands of this Court.\n\nThe first decision to which we may refer in this connection is Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhllrilal Chaudlwry('). The secfion which fell for consideration in this case was s. 35, sub-s. (!) of the Delhi and Ajmet Rent Control Act, 1952 which was in the same terms as s. 29, sub-s. (3) of our Act.\n\nSection 34 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 corresponded to our subss. (I) and (2) of s. 29.\n\nExplaining the scops of s. 35, snb-s. (I) in the context of s. 34, Hidayatullah, J., (as he then was) said on behalf of the majority of the Court :\n\n\"Section 35 is undoubtedly worded in general terms, but it does not create right to have the case reheard, as was supposed by the learned Judge.\n\nSection 35 follows s. 34, where a right of appeal is conferred; but the second subsection of that section says that no second appeal shall lie. . . . .\n\nThe phrase \"according to Iilw\" refers to the decision as a w'1ole, and is not to be equated to errors of law or of fact simpliciter. It refers to the overall decision, which must be accbrding to law which it would not be, if there is a miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law. The section is thus framed to confer larger powers than the power to correct error of jurisdiction to which s. 115 is limited. But it must not be overlooked that the section-in spite of its apparent width of language where it confers a power on the High Court to pass such order as the High Court might think fit-is controlled by the openine words. where it says that tho High Court may send for the record of the case to satisfy itself that the decision is \"according to kl\\\\···.\n\nIt s!an; s to rca;;0n that\n\n(l) [1962] Supp. I S. C. R. 933.\n\nP. B. DllSA:I V. C. M. PATEL (Bhagwati, /.) 273\n\nif It was considered necessary that there should be a rehearing, a right of appeal would be a more appropriate remedy, but the Act says that there is to be no further appeal.\"\n\nThen the learned Judge quoted in extenso the following observations of Beaumont, C.J., in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemrai( 1) in relation to s. 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act which was almost in the same terms ass. 35, sub-section (1) :\n\n\"The object of s. 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law.\n\nThe section does not enumerate the cases in which the Court may interfere in revision, as does s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and I certainly do not propose to attempt an exbasutive definition of the circumstances which may jusiify such interference; but instances which readily occur to the mind .are cases in which the Court which made .the order had no jurisdiction or in which the Court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a burden of proof has been heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders.\n\nWhe1ever the court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to Jaw, then the court can interfere.\n\nBut, in my opinion, the Court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at.\"\n\nand recorded that these observations had the full concurrence of the majority for whom he was speaking. This view was reaftirmed by Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) speaking on behalf of this Court in Puranchand v. Moti/al('), where the same section 35, sub-s.\n\n(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act again came up for consideration.\n\nThe scheme and language of s. 29, sub-s. (3) of our Act being identical with that of s. 35, sub-s. (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, the same view must also govern the interpretation of s. 29, sub-s. (3) of our Act. The High Court can, therefore, interfere with the decision of the lower court under s. 29, sub-s. (3). only if there is . miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law.\n\nThe High Court canot reassess the value of the evidence and interfere with a finding oi fact merely because it thinks that the appreciation of the evidence by the lower court is wrong and the lower court should have reached a different conclusion of fact from what it did : in other W•)rds, the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusions of fact in place of those reached by the lower court. Bearing in mind this limited scope and ambit of the revisional power of the High Court .under s. 29, subs (3) we may now proceed to consider whether the High Court acted within its jurisdiction in setting aside the\n\ndecision of the District Judge.\n\n(1) [1938] 40 ,!lorn. L. R. 125\n\n(2) [19631 Supp. 2 S. C. R. 906.\n\nNow the decision of the District Judge was based on two findings recorded by him in favour of the appellant.\n\nOne was that the appellant reasonably and bonti fide required the ground tloor premises for his own use and occupation, and the other was that greater hardship would be caused to the first respondent by passing a decree. for eviction than what would be caused to the appellant by refusing to pass it. Both these findings were interefered with by the High Cotirt and the que~ tion is whether the High Court was within its power in doing so. Taking up first for consideration the finding that the appellant reasonably and bona fide required the ground floor premises for his own use and occupation, it may be pointed out straight away that this finding was clearly one of fact.\n\nThe District Judge did not misdirect himself in regard to the true meaning of the word 'requires' in s. 13(1) (gy and iliterpreted\n\nit correctly to mean that there must be an element of need before a landlord 'can be said to 'require' premises for bis o\\vn use and occupation. It is not enough that the landlord should mrely desire to use and occupy the premises.\n\nWhat is necessary is that' he should need them for his own use and occupation.\n\nThis was the llorrect test applied by the District Judge to the facts found by him. lf he had applied a wrong test on a misconstruction of the word 'requires', the finding recorded by him would have been vitiated by an errQr of law.\n\nBut the correct test having been applied, the finding of the District Jugc that the appellant reasonably and bona {Uk requife4 the ground floor premises for his own use and occupation was unquestionably a finding of fact and it was not competent to the High Court, in the exercise of its revisional power under s. 29, sub-s. (3), to interfere' with this finding by reappreciating the evidence.\n\nBut, though such an exercise was not permissible, the High Court embarked on a reappraisal of the evidence and iaking th.e view that the finding of fact reached by the District Judge was not correct, substlluttd its_ own finding of fact in place of ihat reached by the Distric:t J'udge.\n\nThat was clearly outside the scope and ambit of ihe revisional power of the High Court under s. 29, sub-s. (3).\n\nBut even apart from acting outside the limits of its rtvisional power under s. 29, subs. (3), the High Court '!)'as, in our opinion, OD the evidence on record, in error in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the District Judge.\n\nSo fat as the first tloor of the Hill Bungalow was concerned it was admittedly in the possession of Soonabai, ihe mother of the appellent.\n\nThe District Judge held. agreoing with the view taken by the trial court, that Soi>nabai was a tenant of the appellant paying a relit of Rs. SOIper month.\n\nThe High Court observed that this view taken by the District Judge was contrary to the evidence on record and relied for this purpose on a statement made by the appellant in cross examination that what his mother paid was compensation and not rent. It is true that this statement was made by ihe appellant in cross examination, but DO undue reliance can be placed on •uch statement made by a lay man who WOl,\\ld not ordinanly be expected to recognize the fine distinction between compensation and rent, which has continually baffled even lawyers and judges. when we find that there was at least one rent receipt produced by Soonabai which clearly showed that what was being paid by her was rent and not compensation.\n\nThere was here documentary evidence in ihe s\\lape of rent\n\nreceipt •s against oral imperfectly understood admission made by the\n\nappellant, which supported the view taken by the Oistrict j uag,: that Soonabai was a tenant and not a licencee uf the appellant and the High Court was in error in upsetting this view taken by the Dhi..rict Judge.\n\nNow, if Soonabai was a tenant of the appellant, she could tell the .appellant rhar she would continue to live on the first floor alone as 'he\n\nhad been doing and would not allow the appellant together with his wife and children to live with her on a permanern basis.\n\nThat was the mode of life to which Soonabai was accustomed for tho Ja3t several years and even if it were possible tor the appellant to impose himself together with his wife and children on her on the first floor, he xightly. and legitimately did not choose to do so and that could not Ix: regarded as unreasonable on his part.\n\nThe High Court then proceeded to c<., nsider the availability of the Truth Bungalow and observed that since the Truth Bungalow was given on leave and licence to Dr. Bharucha, it was in the possession of the appellant and largely on the basis of this view the High Court came to the conclusion that the requirement of the appellant for the ground floor premises was not reasonable and bonafide. Now, it is true that when premises are given on leave and licence, the licensor continues, from a juridical point of view, to be in possession of the premises and tl; le licencee is merely given occupation, and therefore, strictly speaking the High Court was right in observing that the Truth Bungalow, which was given on leave and licence to Dr. Bharucba, was in the possession of the appellant. But for the purpose of determining whether the requirement of the appellant for the ground floor pren1ises was .reasonable and bonafid~. what is necessary to be considered is not whether the appellant was juridically in possession of the Truth Bungalow, but whether tb Truth Bungalow was available to the appellant for occupation so that he could not be said .to need the ground floor premises. If the Truth Bungalow was in occupation of Dr. Bharucha on leave and 1iccnc~, it was obviously not available to the appellant for occupation and it could not be taken into acconnt for negativing the need of the appellant for the ground floor premises. The aopellant could not obtain for himself the occupation of the Truth Bilngalow unless he terminated the leave and licence of Dr. Bharchau and compelled him to vacate the occupation of the Truth Bungalow. That might involve a long litigation with Dr. Bharucha. As against that, a suit for eviction was already pending against the respondents in respect of the ground floor premises and it would certainly be more reasonable to pursue that litigation rather than to start a new one. Besides, the appellant chose to have possession of the ground floor premises because he wanted to be near his mother who was living on the first floor. It is tmo that one room on the ground floor of Truth Bungalow was in possession of the appellant, but that could hardlv ho sufficient for his accommodation.\n\nThe High Court also observed that one room on the ground floor of the Hill Bungalow _was in th~ possession of the appellant, but this observation seems to be contrarx to the evidence on record. There was only one garage on the ground floor of the Hill Bungalow and that garage was, according to the appellant, in the joint possession of the appellant and the fust respondent.\n\nwhile according to the respondents, it was exclusively in the possession of the first respondent. It was nobody's case that this garage was in the exclusive possession of the appellant. Moreover, it was only a garage and not. a room and it could not be availed by the appellant for his occupation. It will, therefore, be seen that the evidence on record was sufficient to show that the requirement of the ground floor premises by the appellant was reasonable and bonafide and the High Court was in error ill taking a contrary view and disturbing the finding recorded by the District Judge. ·\n\nSo far as the finding on the question of greater hardship is concerned, the District Judge decided against the respondents on the view that as soon as the landlord establishes that he reasonably and honafide requires the premises for his own use and occupation. the burden of proving that greater hardship .wouJd be caused by passing a decree for eviction than by refusing to pass it is on the tenant and if the tenant fails to discharge this burden by producing proper evidence, a decree for eviction must go against him .. This view in regard to the hurden of proof, no doubt, prevailed at one time in various High Courts on the basis of the decision of the Court of Appeal in England in Kelly v.\n\nGoodwin(') but it can no longer be regarded as correct after the decision of this Court in M/s. Central Tobacco Co. v.\n\nChandra Prakash(').\n\nThis Court speaking through Mitter, J., pointed out in that case, while discussing s. 21 ( 4) of the Mysore Rent Control Act; 1961, and what was said there must apply equally in relation to s. 13(2) of the Bombay Rent Act, which is in identical terms:-\n\n\"We do not find ourselves able to accept the broad proposition that as soon as the landlord establishes his need for additional accommodation he is relieved of all further obligation under s. 21 sub-s. ( 4) and that once the landlord's need is accepted by the court all further evidence must be adduced by the tenant if he claims protection under the Act.\n\nEach party must adduce evidence to show what hardship would be caused to him by the granting or refusal of the decree and it will be for the court to determine whether the suffering of the tenant, in case a decree was made, would be rnOrc than that of the landlord by its refusal.\n\nThe whole object of the Act is to provide for the control of rents and evictions, for the leasing of buildings etc. and s. 21 specifically enumerates the grounds which alone will entitle a landlord to evict his tenant. Cl. (h) of s. 21 contains one of such grounds, namely, that the premises are reasonably and bonafide required by the landlord for occupation by himself. The onus of proof of this is certainly on the landlord. We see no sufficient reason for holding that once that onus is discharged by the landlord it shifts to the tenants making it obligatory on him to show that greater hardship\n\n(I) [19471 All Eng. Report 810.\n\n(2) Civil Appeal 1175 of 1969, date 23-4-1969.\n\nwould be caused to him by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. In our opinion both sides must adduce all relevant evidence before the court; the landlord must show that other reasonable accommodation was not available to him and the tenant must also adduce evidence to that effect.\n\nIt is only after shifting such evide, nce that the court must form its conclusion on consideration of all the circumstances of the of the case as to whether greater hardship would be caused by passing. the decree than by refusing to pass it.\"\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that the District Judge placed the burden of proof wrongly on the respondents and the finding of fact arrived at by him on the question of greater hardship was vitiated by a mistake of law.\n\nThe High Court was consequently justified in interfering with the finding recorded by the District Judge and arriving at its own finding on the basis of the correct principle laid down by this Court.\n\nBut the High Court, in our opinion, fell into an error in appreciating the evidence and coming to the conclusion that greater hardship would be caused to the first respondent by passing a decree for eviction than by refusing to pass it. There was no evidence at all to support this finding reached by the High Court. The evidence was entirely the other way. The appellant stated in his evidence that he would suffer considerable harship both financial and in the way of his profession if he was denied possession of the ground floor premises. This was true because the entire field of work of the appellant was now confined to South Gujarat and it was obvious that he would be able to. carry on his profession conveniently, economically and with advantage, if he could live in Navsari which is situate in South Gujarat. Moreover, in view of the shift in his field of work from Bombay to South Gujarat, it was unnecesary for the appellant to continue to live in Bombay and pay a high rent of Rs. 475/- per month _which was a serious drain on his purse. There can, therefore, be no doubt that if a decre for eviction were not passed in his favour, the appellant would suffer real hardship. Now, as against this evidence on the part of the appellant, no evidence at all was led on behalf of the respondents to show that the !st respondent would suffer any hardship if a decree for eviction were passed against him. The evidence, thus, was only in one direction and it unquestionably established that greater hardship would not be caused to the first respondent by passing a decree for eviction than what would be caused to the appellant by refusing to pass it. The High Court was, therefore, clearly wrong in reversing this finding of fact recorded by the District Judge.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that the High Court was in error in setting aside the decree for eviction passed against the respondents. We would\n\naccordingly allow tho appeal. set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the decreefor eviction passd against the respondents. V./e may, however, point out that in the course of the hearing before us the learned counsel on behalf of the appellant made an offer that the appellant \\Vould b.:: ,.,.-; Hing io ,£:i\\\\~ one roon1 on the ground floor of the Truth .Bungalo\\v which is in his possession to the first respondent on a rent of Rs. 15 - per llll'llth. ii the first respondent accepts this offer within a. per~'Jd of thre::: n1::'!nti1s from today. We, therefore. dirct that if the first respondent expresses his willingness to take this roo:n on rent from the appellant at the rate of Rs. 15 per month within a period of three months from today, the appellant shall let it out to the 1st respondent at the rent of R,. I Sfper month. There will be no order as to costs all throughout.\n\nS.B.W.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 87, "entities": [{"text": "PHIROZE BAMANJI DESAI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PHIROZE BAMANJI DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRAKANT M. PATEL & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHANDRAKANT M. PATEL & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 4, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 68, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 4, 1974\n\n[P. N. BHAGWAT!"}}, {"text": "P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Sections 13( l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 187, "end_char": 202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 29(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 492, "end_char": 502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Navsari", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2077, "end_char": 2084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 and 5, however, left the ground floor premises and went away from Navsari soon after the death of M. Th!"}}, {"text": "M. Th! l!Ppellant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2109, "end_char": 2126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 and 5, however, left the ground floor premises and went away from Navsari soon after the death of M. Th!"}}, {"text": "15-10-1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2146, "end_char": 2156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l!Ppellant by a notice elated 15-10-1966 terminated the tenancy of respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "sec. 13(1)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2334, "end_char": 2347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "18-1-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2486, "end_char": 2495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, on 18-1-1967, the appellant filed a suit for e\\iction under sec."}}, {"text": "sec. 13( l)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2543, "end_char": 2557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2659, "end_char": 2665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ant was carrying on his profession as an Architect and Consulting Engineer in Bombay since 1960, \\\\hen he retired from Army SerVice."}}, {"text": "Navsarj", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3100, "end_char": 3107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant accordingly decided to settle down in Navsarj which was bis natiYe place where hie; mother was living for last several yenr<J and frotn where he would be able to carry on his profession conveniently."}}, {"text": "s 13(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3595, "end_char": 3605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 29(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5016, "end_char": 5023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 29(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5843, "end_char": 5850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7085, "end_char": 7095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 29(3) to 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7626, "end_char": 7641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "23-4-69", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9238, "end_char": 9245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1175/69 dated 23-4-69, followed."}}, {"text": "R. M. Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10048, "end_char": 10059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. M. Mehta, S. K. Dholakia and R. C. Bhatia, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Dholakia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10061, "end_char": 10075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. M. Mehta, S. K. Dholakia and R. C. Bhatia, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R. C. Bhatia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10080, "end_char": 10092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. M. Mehta, S. K. Dholakia and R. C. Bhatia, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "C. S. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10114, "end_char": 10123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. S. Rao, for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10190, "end_char": 10198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgmfnt of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.\n\nThis appeal, by special leave, arises out of a suit filed by the appellant to recover possession of certain premises from the respondents."}}, {"text": "Bharucha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11376, "end_char": 11384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.L/74 0\n\ngivn by the appellant to one Dr. 'Bharucha on leave anu licence on payment of compensation of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Bharucha"}}, {"text": "Suonabai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12179, "end_char": 12187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first floor is occupied by Suonabai, the 1nother of the appellant since the last several years.", "canonical_name": "Suonabai"}}, {"text": "Soonobai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12527, "end_char": 12535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was some controversy before the lo\\·; cr courts as to whether in respect of the lirst floor occupied by her, Soonobai ,-,,.:;", "canonical_name": "Suonabai"}}, {"text": "Soonabai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12792, "end_char": 12800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We shall presently examine this controversy but one thing may be made clear at this stage namely, that Soonabai was paying a sum .of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Suonabai"}}, {"text": "Mahendra Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13047, "end_char": 13062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ground floor of the Hill Bungalow was let out by the appellant to one Mahendra Prasad as far back as 1957 at a rent of Rs: 65/- per month.", "canonical_name": "Mahendra Pr,1sad"}}, {"text": "Mahendra Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13117, "end_char": 13132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahendra Prasad died in September 1966 leaving him surviving as his legal representatives his widow the fifth respondent.", "canonical_name": "Mahendra Pr,1sad"}}, {"text": "Mahendra Pr,1sad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13503, "end_char": 13519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sometime prior to the death of Mahendra Prasad, respondents 3 and 4 together with the members of their respective families had come to reside in the gtounJ floor premises and after the death of Mahendra Pr,1sad, they continued to stay With the first respondent.", "canonical_name": "Mahendra Pr,1sad"}}, {"text": "18th January 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14262, "end_char": 14279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "26 of 1967 in the co!lrt of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Navsari on 18th January 1967."}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14488, "end_char": 14493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "South Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15108, "end_char": 15121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "month, The principal area of work in the early stages of his professional career was Bombay and South Gujarat but by abodt .tile middle of 1968 his v.ork in Bombay practically dwindled to nil and his professional activities became confined almost exclusively to South Gujarat."}}, {"text": "Navsari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15361, "end_char": 15368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant accordingly decided 10 settle down in Navsari which was his native place, where his mother was living for the last several years und from where he would be able to carry on his profession convenie01iy, economically and with advantage."}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15981, "end_char": 15986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17847, "end_char": 17852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18941, "end_char": 18946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19267, "end_char": 19272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19620, "end_char": 19625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20022, "end_char": 20027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi and Ajmet Rent Control Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20047, "end_char": 20085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20117, "end_char": 20122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi and Ajmet Rent Control Act, 1952", "statute": "the Delhi and Ajmet Rent Control Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20148, "end_char": 20158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi and Ajmet Rent Control Act, 1952", "statute": "the Delhi and Ajmet Rent Control Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20166, "end_char": 20204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20247, "end_char": 20252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952", "statute": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20279, "end_char": 20284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952", "statute": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20315, "end_char": 20320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952", "statute": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20322, "end_char": 20334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Explaining the scops of s. 35, snb-s. (I) in the context of s. 34, Hidayatullah, J., (as he then was) said on behalf of the majority of the Court :\n\n\"Section 35 is undoubtedly worded in general terms, but it does not create right to have the case reheard, as was supposed by the learned Judge."}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20405, "end_char": 20415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952", "statute": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20550, "end_char": 20560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952", "statute": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20569, "end_char": 20574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952", "statute": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Iilw", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20728, "end_char": 20732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The phrase \"according to Iilw\" refers to the decision as a w'1ole, and is not to be equated to errors of law or of fact simpliciter."}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21095, "end_char": 21101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952", "statute": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Beaumont", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21828, "end_char": 21836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then the learned Judge quoted in extenso the following observations of Beaumont, C.J., in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemrai( 1) in relation to s. 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act which was almost in the same terms ass."}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21898, "end_char": 21903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22024, "end_char": 22029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22254, "end_char": 22260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22264, "end_char": 22291, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23268, "end_char": 23277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view was reaftirmed by Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) speaking on behalf of this Court in Puranchand v. Moti/al('), where the same section 35, sub-s.\n\n(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act again came up for consideration."}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23377, "end_char": 23387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23408, "end_char": 23440, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23502, "end_char": 23507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23560, "end_char": 23565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23585, "end_char": 23623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23678, "end_char": 23683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952", "statute": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23792, "end_char": 23797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952", "statute": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24401, "end_char": 24406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952", "statute": "the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25511, "end_char": 25519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26400, "end_char": 26405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26865, "end_char": 26870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26961, "end_char": 26966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Soonabai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27220, "end_char": 27228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So fat as the first tloor of the Hill Bungalow was concerned it was admittedly in the possession of Soonabai, ihe mother of the appellent.", "canonical_name": "Suonabai"}}, {"text": "Soi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27339, "end_char": 27342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "agreoing with the view taken by the trial court, that Soi>nabai was a tenant of the appellant paying a relit of Rs."}}, {"text": "nabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27343, "end_char": 27348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "agreoing with the view taken by the trial court, that Soi>nabai was a tenant of the appellant paying a relit of Rs."}}, {"text": "Bharucba", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29816, "end_char": 29824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, it is true that when premises are given on leave and licence, the licensor continues, from a juridical point of view, to be in possession of the premises and tl; le licencee is merely given occupation, and therefore, strictly speaking the High Court was right in observing that the Truth Bungalow, which was given on leave and licence to Dr. Bharucba, was in the possession of the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Bharucha"}}, {"text": "Truth Bilngalow", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30578, "end_char": 30593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The aopellant could not obtain for himself the occupation of the Truth Bilngalow unless he terminated the leave and licence of Dr. Bharchau and compelled him to vacate the occupation of the Truth Bungalow."}}, {"text": "Bharchau", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30644, "end_char": 30652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The aopellant could not obtain for himself the occupation of the Truth Bilngalow unless he terminated the leave and licence of Dr. Bharchau and compelled him to vacate the occupation of the Truth Bungalow.", "canonical_name": "Bharucha"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32955, "end_char": 32962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the burden of proving that greater hardship .wouJd be caused by passing a decree for eviction than by refusing to pass it is on the tenant and if the tenant fails to discharge this burden by producing proper evidence, a decree for eviction must go against him .. This view in regard to the hurden of proof, no doubt, prevailed at one time in various High Courts on the basis of the decision of the Court of Appeal in England in Kelly v.\n\nGoodwin(') but it can no longer be regarded as correct after the decision of this Court in M/s. Central Tobacco Co. v.\n\nChandra Prakash(')."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33145, "end_char": 33151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court speaking through Mitter, J., pointed out in that case, while discussing s. 21 ( 4) of the Mysore Rent Control Act; 1961, and what was said there must apply equally in relation to s. 13(2) of the Bombay Rent Act, which is in identical terms:-\n\n\"We do not find ourselves able to accept the broad proposition that as soon as the landlord establishes his need for additional accommodation he is relieved of all further obligation under s. 21 sub-s. ( 4) and that once the landlord's need is accepted by the court all further evidence must be adduced by the tenant if he claims protection under the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33200, "end_char": 33205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33307, "end_char": 33315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33560, "end_char": 33565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34130, "end_char": 34135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34240, "end_char": 34245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "23-4-1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34681, "end_char": 34690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Civil Appeal 1175 of 1969, date 23-4-1969."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_279_286_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "KANU SANYAL\n\nDIST. MAGISTRATE, DARJEELING & ORS.\n\nFebruary 5, 1974\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, 1950, Art. 32-Petition for the issue of writ of habeas corpus-Date with reference to which legality of detention 1nay be tested.\n\nPriso11ers (Attendant:e in Courts) Act, 1955 s. b and its proviso-Scope of.\n\nThe petitioner was remanded to the District Jail, Darjeeling, in connection with certain offences. Thereafter, two charge sheets were filed against him and others for various offences under the I.P.C., which were triable exclusively by a Sessions Court, before the Special Magistrate, Visakhapatnam, '.fhe Special Magistrate issued a warrant for the production of the petitioner in his Court, under s. 3(2) of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955, and the officer in charge of the Dt. Jail Darjeeling, sent the petitioner to the Court of. the Special Magistrate, Visakhapatnam. The petitioner was then remanded to t.he Central Jail. Visakhapatnam, pending the disposal of the committal proceedings.\n\nIn a petition for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner contended that his initial detention in the Dt. Jail, Darjeeling, was illegal, because, (l)(a) it was violative of Art. 22(1), (b) the concerned Magistrace in Darjeeling had no jurisdiction to try the Offences in connection with which be was detained in Darjeeling and hence could not order detention beyond 15 days; 3.nd (2) the officer In charge of the Dt. Jail, Darjeeling should have refused to comply with the warrant for production issued by the Special Magistrate, Visakhapatnam, by reason of s. 6 of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act. •\n\nHELD: ( 1) As regards the earliest date With reference to which the legality of detention challenged iri.- a habeas corpus proceeding may be - exa~ .mined, there are 3 views, namely, (a) that it is the date on which the application for habeas corpus is made to the Court, (b) that it is the date of the return, and (c) that it is the date of hearing. Whichever be the correct view, the earliest of the dates would be the date of filing of the application for habeas corpus. In the present case, the application was filed after the petitioner was ordered to be detained in the jail at Visakhapatnam. Assuming that there was some infirmity_ in the detention in the jail at Darjeeling, that cannot irlvalidate the subsequent detention of the petitioner in the jail at Visakhapatnam. The legality of the detention at Visakbapatnam has. to be judged on its owp. merits. Therefore, it is unnecessary to examine the' legality of the detention of the petitioner in the jail at Darjeeling. [283 D-284 CJ\n\n(2) Under s. 3(1) of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, the order contemplated is an order by a civil or criminal court, for the production of a detained person for. giving evidence.\n\nBut the order contemplated, by s. 3(2) is an . order of prqduction of a person for answering a charge in a criminal court. Under s. 5, when an order of production is made under s. 3(1) or (2), tJie officer in charge of a prison shall cause the detained Person to be taken to the court where his attendance is required. Under s. 6, such officer shall -abstain 'from complying with the order of production in certain circumstances. 1'.he pi'oviso to the sCctio'n carves out an exception if the 3 conditions foi' its applicability, laid down in the proviso, are satisfied. _The first con~ dition is that order of production should be by a criminal court and the nd is that tlfe detained person should not be unfit to be removed, and the\n\n!bird is that the plaoc where the evidence of the detained person is required A 1s not more than S miles from the priso.n where he is confined.\n\n(285 A-0]\n\nIn the present case, the first two conditions are satisfied. The 3rd condi- 1ion can have nO application where an order is made by a criminal court under '8. 3(2) requiring production for answering a charge.\n\nThe fulfilment ot the first two conditions would, in such a case, be sufficient to attract the appli cability of the Proviso, and to take the case out of s. 6. Therefore, the officer in charge of the jail at Darjeeling waS bound to send the petitioner B to the Co.urt at Visakhapatnam and he acted according to law.\n\nThe subsequent detention in the jail at Visakhapatnam pending trial must be held-to be valid and a writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted where a person is committed to jail custody by a competent court by an Order which, prima facie, does not appear to be without jurisdiction or wholly illegal.\n\n[285 H-286 G]\n\nB~ R, Rao v. State of Ori.na, A.I.R. 1971 S.C.· 2197, followed.\n\nORIGINAL JUR:ISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 205 of 1973.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution of India for issue of a writ in the nature of babeas corpus.\n\nN. H. Hingorani, for the petitioner.\n\nP. K. Chatterjee, Sukumar Basu and G. S. Chatterjee, for respon. dents Nos. 1-5.\n\nP. Ram Reddy and I'. P. Rao, for respondent No. 6.\n\nB. D. Sharma and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 7.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by E\n\nBHAGWAT!, I .. This is a writ petition by the petitioner under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the legality of his detention h1 the Central Jail, Vizakhapatnam and praying for a writ of hebeas corpus for setting him at liberty forthwith.\n\nThe petitioner is one of the acknowiedged leaders of the Naxalite movement which originated in the area within Naxalbari, Kharabari and Phansidewa police sta- F lions in Siliguri Sub-DiVision of Darjeeling District of West Bengal some ten years ago.\n\nThe movement represents armed revolt of the peasantry against exploitation by landholders and it seeks to achieve its end by violent means calculated to overthrow the democratic process.\n\nThe petitioner, as one of the top leaders of this movement, was engaged in violent and anti-social activities and was for quite some time underground evading arrest by the police. Eventually on 19th G August; 1970 the petitioner was arrested by the police alongwith some of his associates from a hideout within the jurisdiction of Phansidewa police station. A huge quantity of arms, ammunition and explosives was found with the petitioner and his associates at the time Of the arrest. Phansidewa PS case No. 3 was accordingly registered against the petitioner on 19th August, 1970 under s.5 of the Explosive Substances Act, s. 25(1) (a) of the Arms Act and ss. 120B, 121A, 122, H 309 and 402 of the Indian Penal Code. There was also another case, namely, Phansidewa P.S. Case No. 28 registered against the petitioner on 29th June, 1967. under s. 412 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal\n\nCode. That case was under investigation at the time when the petitioner was arrested. Immediately after his arrest, on the same day, 'i.e., !9th August, 1970, the petitioner was produced before the Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Siliguri. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed an order of remand directing that the petitioner be detained in the District Jail, Darjeeling and that he should be produced before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Darjeeling, The petitioner was accordingly produced before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Darjeeling from time to time and orders of remand were passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Darjeeling at the interval of every fourteen days since the investigation in P.S. Case No. 28 dated 29th June, 1967 and P.S.\n\nCase No. 3., dated 19th August, 1970 was not complete. It appears that on 16th January, 1970 first information report in respect of certain criminal offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioner and a large number of other co-conspirators was lodged in Parvathipurillll police station and after the completion of the investigation, two chargesheets were filed against the petitioner and other 139 accused in the Court of the Special Magistrate, Visakhapatnam on I; Zth October, 1970 charging them with offences under s. 120B read with ss. 302, 395, 397, 121, 122, 123, and 124A of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe offences charged under these two chargesheets were triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, and therefore, inquiry proceedings under Ch. XVlll of the Cods of Criminal Procedure were initiated by the Special Magistrate, Visakhapatnam. Since the !'Otitioner, who was accused No. 138 in thee two criminal cases, which were numbered as P.R.C. Nos. 1 and 2 of 1971, was under remand in the District Jail, Darjeeling pending investigation of the two Phansidewa P.S.\n\ncases, the Special Magistrat~, Visakhapatnam issued on 30th May, 1972 a warrant for production of the petitioner in .his Court under s. 3, sub-s, (2) of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955.\n\nThe officet in-charge of the District Jail, Darjeeling, in obedience to this warrant for production, sent the petitioner to the Court of the Special Magistrate, Visakhapatnam on 14th June, 1972 and imme diately on arrival, the .petitioner was produced In the court of the\n\npecial Judge, Visakhapatnam on 17th June, 1972. The petitioner was remanded by. the Special Judge, Visakhapatnam from time to time pending tho disposal of the committal proceedings and pursuant to the orders of remand, the petitioner was detained in the Central Jail, VisakhapatniUll.\n\nOn 6th January, 1973, whilst under detention in the Central Jail Visakhapatriam, the petitioner preferred a writ petition under Art'.\n\n3 2 of the Constitution in this Court challenging the legality of his detention right from the time of its inception and praying that he may be set free by issue of a writ of habaas corpus. The District Magi•-\n\ntrate, Darjeeling, the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrates, Si!iguri, Kurseon and Darjeeling, the State of West Bengal, the Superintendent Central Jail, Visakhapatnarn and the Post Master General, West Bengal were made respondents to the writ petition. This Court ordered a rule nisi to be issued on the writ petition but directed that the uetitionr 1;1eed not be produced in person. The District Magistrate, Dar1eelmg and the State of West Bengal filed their return to the rule\n\nni>i on 19th April, 1973 and the Superinlendent of Central Jail, Visakhapatnam filed his return to foe rule m'si on ! Ith May, 1973. When the writ petitiJn reached he:•r.ng, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner rai:; ed a contention that the writ petition could not be heard by the Court unless the petitioner \\Vas produced in person and his argument was that once rule nisi was issued, the Co~1rt was b:Jund. to order production of the petitioner. Since this contention raised an important question of law affecting the practice of the Court while dealing With petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, the Division Bench hearing the writ petition refrrred this question for decision by the Constitution Bench. The writ petition was thereafter placed before the Constitution Bench and by a judgment delivered by the Constitution Bench on 11th September, 1973, it was held that it was competent to the Court to dispense with the production of the body of the person detained while issuing rule nisi, and the rule nisi could be heard without requiring the body of the person detained to be brought before the Court.\n\nOn this view being taken by the Constitution Bench, the writ petition again came back to the Division Bench for final disposal. In the meantime the committal proceedings which were being held by the Special Judge, Visakhapatnam against the petitioner and his other associates concluded and by an order dated 12th July, 1973 the petitioner and 66 other accused were commited to the court of Sessions to stand their trial for various offences.\n\nThe trial of this Sessions Case, being Sessions Case No. 46 of 1973, is still pending against the petitioner in the Court of the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam and the petitioner is under detention in the Central Jail, Viskhapatnam pursuant to the orders made by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam pending trial.\n\nThe learned counsel appearing on behalf of the potitioner put forward three grounds challenging the legality of the detention of the petitioner and they may be briefly summarised as follows :\n\nA The initial detention of the petitioner in the District Jail, Darjeeling was illegal because he was detained without being informed of the grounds for his arrest as required by cl (iJ of Art. 22 of the Constitution;\n\nB. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Darjeeling h.ad no jurisdiction to try the two Phansidewa P.S. cases against the petitioner and he could not, therefore, authorise the detention of •h~ petitioner urtdcr s. 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a term exoeeding fifteen days in the whole.\n\nIt was only the Sub Divisional Magistrate Siliguri who had jurisdiction to try the two Phansidewa P.S. cases and he alone could remand the petitioner to custody after the expiration of tic initial ncriod of fifteen davs under s. 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The orclers of remand under which the petitioner was dcttiined in the District Jail; Darjeeling were, however, made by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Darjeeling and the detention of the petitioner in ; the Disttict Court, Darjeeling was, therefore illegal.\n\nC. The officer in charge of the District Jail, Darjeeling was bound to abstain from compiying with the warrant for production issued by the Special Judge, Visakhapatnam by reason of s. 6 of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, l 955 and the production of the petitioner before the Special J ndge, Visakhapatnam pursuant to such warrant for production and his detention in the Central Jail, Visakhapatnam were consequently without the authority of law.\n\nRe : Grounds A and H.\n\nThese two grounds relate exclusively to the legality of the initial detention of the petitioner in the District Jail. Darjeeling.\n\nWe think i; unnecessary to decide them.\n\nIt is now well settled that the earliest date with reference to which the legality of detention challenged in a habeas corpus proceeding may be examined is the date on which the application for habeas corpus is made to the Court.\n\nThis Court speaking through Wanchoo, J., {as he then was) said in A. K. Gopala11 v.\n\nGovernment of India( 1) :. \"It is well settled that in dealing with the petition for habeas .corpus the Court is to soc whether the detention on the date on which tile application is made to the Court is legal, if nothing more has intervened betw, en the date of the application and the date or hearing\".\n\nJn two early decisions of this Cou.rt, however, namely, Naranjan Singh v. State of Punjab(') and Ram Narain Singh\n\nv. State of Delhi(') a slightly different view was expressed and that view was reiterated by this Court in B. K Rao v. State of Orissa(') where it was said : \"In habeas corpus the Court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the retnrn and not with reference to the institution of the proceedings\". And yet in another decision of this Court in Talib Husain v. State of Jammu &\n\nKashmir(') Mr. Justice Dua, sitting as a Single Judge, presumably in the vacation, observed that \"in habeas corpus proceedings the Court has to consider the legality of the detention on the date of the hearing\".\n\nOf these three views taken by the Court at different times, the second appears to be more in consonance with the law and practice in England and may be taken as having received the largest meltl!ure of approval in India, though the third view also cannot be discarded as incorrect, because an inquiry whether the detention is legal or not at the date of hearing of the application for habeas corpus would be quite relevant, for the simple reason that if on that date the detention is legal, the Court cannot order release of the person detained by issuing a writ of habeas corpus. But, for the purpose of the present case, it is immaterial which of these three vieV.S is accepted as correct, for it is clear that, whichever be the correct view, the earliest da•e with reference to which the legality of detention may be examined is the date of filing of the application for habeas corpus and the Court is not. to quote the words of Mr. Justice Dua in B. R. Ran v. State nf\n\nOri.'<a.(1 ) \"concerned with a date prior to the initiatiOn of the proceed.\n\n(I) [1966]2 S. C.R. 427 f2) [1952] S. C.R. 395\n\n(3) [1953] S. C.R. 652\n\n(4) A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 2197\n\n(5) A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 62\n\nings for a writ of habeas corpus\". Now th~ writ petition in the present case was filed on 6th January, 1973 and on that date the petitioner was in detention in the Central Jail, Visakhapatnam. The initial detention of the petitioner in the District Jail, Darjeeling had come to an end long before the date of the filing of the writ petition. It is, therefore, unnecessary to examine the legality or otherwise of the detention of the petitioner in the District Jail, Darjeeling. The only question that calls fqr consideration is whether the detention of the petitioner in the Central Jail, Visakhapatnam is legal or not.\n\nEven if we assume that grounds A and B are well founded and there was infirmity in the detention of the petitioner in the District Jail, Darjeeling, that cannot invalidate the subsequent detention of the petitioner in the Central Jail, Visakhapatnam. See para 7 of the judgment of this Court in B. R. Rao v. State of Orissa,(4). The legality of the detention of the petitioner in the Central Jail, Visakhapatnam would have to be judged on its own merits. We, therefore, consider it unnecessary to embark on a discussion of !!founds A and B and decline to decide them.\n\nRe : Ground 'C'\n\nThe only question which, therefore, requires to be considered is whether the detention of the petitioner in the Central Jail, Visakhapatnam is illegal. Now the legality of this detention is challenged on the ground that by reason of s .. 6 of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955 the officer in charge of the District Jail, Darjeeling was bound to abstain from complying with the warrant for•production issued by the Special Magistrate, Visakhapatnam and was not entitled to send the petitioner to the Court of Special Magistrate, Visakhapatnam in compliance with such warrant for production. This ground is wholly without substance. It overlooks the Proviso to s. 6 of the Act. In .order to arrive at a proper interpretation of s. 6 with the Proviso, it is necessary to have a look at ss. 3 and 5 as well.\n\nSub-s. (I) of s. 3 provides that any civil or criminal court may, if it thinks that the evidence of any person confined in any prison is material in any matter pending before it, make an order in the form set forth in the First Schedule, directed to the officer in charge of the prison. It is clear from this sub-section as well as the form set out in the First Schedule that the order contemplated by this subsection\n\nis an order for production of a person detained in any prison for giving evidence and. such an order may be made by a civil court or a criminal court. Section 3, sub-s. (2) provides for a different sitnation. It says that any criminal court may, if a charge of an offence against a person confined in any prison is made or pending before it make an order in the form set forth in the seco'nd Schedule directed to the omccr in charge of the prison. The order contemplated in this sub-section-and that is evident also from the form ser forlh in the Second Schedule--is an order of production for answering a charge and exhypothesi that can only be by a criminal court.\n\nThe warrant for production in the present case was under s. 3, sub-s. (2) as the petitioner was admittedly required to be produced before the Special\n\nMagistrate, Visakhapatnam for answering the charges against him.\n\nA_,\n\nK. SANYAL v. DIST. MAGISTRATE (Bhagw(lti, J.) 285\n\nNow, when an order of production is made under sub-s. ( 1) or sub-s.\n\n(2) oLs. 3, what is to happen? That is provided irr s. 5 which says that upon delivery of such order of productiQn to the officer in charge of the prison, that officer shall cause the person named in the order to be taken to the Court in which his attendance is required so as to be present in the Court at the time mentioned in the order. The main part of s. 6, however, sets out certain circumstances in which the offi cer in cuarge of the prison shall abstain from complying With the order of production. It reads :\n\n\"6. Officer in charge of prison when to abstain from carrying out order-Where the person in respect of whom an order is made undet , section 3-\n\n( a) is, in accordance with the rules made in this behalf, declared to be unfit to be removed from the prison where he is confined by reason of sickness or other infirmity; or\n\n(b) is under committal for trial; or\n\n( c) is under remand pending trial or pending a preliminary investigation; or\n\n(d) is in custody for a period which would expire before the expiration of the time required for removing him under this Act and for taking him back to the prison in which he is confined; the officer in charge of the prison shall abstain from carry~ ing out the order and shall send to the Court from which the order had been issued a statement of reasons for so abstaining : \"\n\nBut there is a proviso to this section which carves out an exception in the following terms :\n\n\"Provided that such officer as aforesaid shall not abstain where-\n\n(i) the order has been made by a criminal Court; and\n\n(ii) the person named in the order is confined under committal for trial or under remand pending trial or pending a preliminary investigation and is not declared in accordance with the rules made in this behalf to bo unfit to be removed from the prison where he is confined by reason of sickness or other infirmity; and\n\n(iii) the place, where the evidence of the person named in the order is required is not more than fives miles distant from the prison in which he is confuied.\"\n\nNow there can be no dispute that the petitioner in respect of whom the warrant for production was issued by the Special Magistrate, Visa• 6--L954Sup.C. 1./74\n\nkhapatnam under s. 3, sub-s. ( 2) was under remand pending preliminary investiga_tion in the two Phansid.ewa PS cases, and therefore, under the main provision in s. 6, the officer in charge of the District Jail, Darjeeling was bound to abstain from complying with the warrant for production. unless, of-course, the Proviso was applicable.\n\nThe Proviso lays down three conditions for its appl_icabi!ity.\n\nThe two conditions set out in els. (il. and (ii) were admittedly satisfied.\n\nThe only guestion could be about the condition in cl. (iii), but that condition has obviously no application in case of an order of production under sub-s. (2) of s. 3.\n\nClause (iii) posits an order of production for giving evide11ce made under sub-s. ( lJ of s. 3. t is only where such an order of production is made that the condition in\n\ncl. (iii) can apply. It can have no application where an order is made by a criminal court under sub-section (2) of s. 3 requiring produetio11 for answering a charge. In such a case, the condition in l. (iii) would be wholly jnapproJ?iate and wold not ave to ?• sal!sfied.\n\nThe fulfilment of the cond1l!ons set out m els. (I) and (11) would in that case be sufficient to attract the applicability of the Proviso. Here the warrant for production was admittedly issued under sub-s. (2) of s. 3 and therefore the only requirement for bringing the Proviso into operation waz the fnlfilment of the conditions set out in els. ( i) and (ii) . These two conditions were clearly satisfied and the Proviso was accordingly attracted and it took the case out of the main provisio11 in s. 6.\n\nThe officer in charge of the Dislrict Jail, Darjeeling was, therefore, bound to send the petitioner to the Court of the Special Magistrate.\n\nVisakhapatnam in compliance with the warrant for production and he acted according to law in doing so.\n\nThe production of the petitioner before the Special Judge, Visakhapatnam, conld not, . therefore, be said to be illegal and his subsequent detention in the Central Jail, Visakhapatnarn, pursuant to the orders made by the Special Judge, Visakhapatnam, pending trial must be held to be valid.\n\nThis Court pointed QUt in B. R. Rao v. State of Or4'sa( 4) that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted \"where a person is committed to jail custody by a competent court by an order wbich prima 'facie does not appear to be without jurisdicition or wholly illegal\".\n\nThe prese.nt case is clearly covered by these obse_rvations and the petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habetM corpus to free him from detention.\n\nThe writ petition is accordingly dismissed and the rule nisi is discharged.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nPetition disnzissed.\n\n\" G", "total_entities": 109, "entities": [{"text": "KANU SANYAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KANU SANYAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DIST. MAGISTRATE, DARJEELING & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DIST. 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H. Hingorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4811, "end_char": 4826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. H. Hingorani, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4849, "end_char": 4865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chatterjee, Sukumar Basu and G. S. Chatterjee, for respon.", "canonical_name": "P. K. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Sukumar Basu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4867, "end_char": 4879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chatterjee, Sukumar Basu and G. S. Chatterjee, for respon."}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4884, "end_char": 4900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chatterjee, Sukumar Basu and G. S. Chatterjee, for respon.", "canonical_name": "P. K. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "P. Ram Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4931, "end_char": 4943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Ram Reddy and I'."}}, {"text": "I'. P. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4948, "end_char": 4958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Ram Reddy and I'."}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4983, "end_char": 4995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5000, "end_char": 5011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5145, "end_char": 5152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "19th G August; 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5962, "end_char": 5981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eventually on 19th G August; 1970 the petitioner was arrested by the police alongwith some of his associates from a hideout within the jurisdiction of Phansidewa police station."}}, {"text": "Phansidewa police station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6099, "end_char": 6124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eventually on 19th G August; 1970 the petitioner was arrested by the police alongwith some of his associates from a hideout within the jurisdiction of Phansidewa police station."}}, {"text": "Phansidewa PS", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6253, "end_char": 6266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Phansidewa PS case No."}}, {"text": "19th August, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6331, "end_char": 6348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 was accordingly registered against the petitioner on 19th August, 1970 under s.5 of the Explosive Substances Act, s. 25(1) (a) of the Arms Act and ss."}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6355, "end_char": 6358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Explosive Substances Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6366, "end_char": 6390, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 25(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6392, "end_char": 6400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6412, "end_char": 6420, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 120B, 121A, 122", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6425, "end_char": 6444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6467, "end_char": 6484, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "29th June, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6588, "end_char": 6603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "28 registered against the petitioner on 29th June, 1967."}}, {"text": "s. 412", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6611, "end_char": 6617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6628, "end_char": 6633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sub-Divisional Magistrate Darjeeling", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7162, "end_char": 7198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed an order of remand directing that the petitioner be detained in the District Jail, Darjeeling and that he should be produced before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Darjeeling, The petitioner was accordingly produced before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Darjeeling from time to time and orders of remand were passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Darjeeling at the interval of every fourteen days since the investigation in P.S. Case No."}}, {"text": "16th January, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7484, "end_char": 7502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on 16th January, 1970 first information report in respect of certain criminal offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioner and a large number of other co-conspirators was lodged in Parvathipurillll police station and after the completion of the investigation, two chargesheets were filed against the petitioner and other 139 accused in the Court of the Special Magistrate, Visakhapatnam on I; Zth October, 1970 charging them with offences under s. 120B read with ss."}}, {"text": "Parvathipurillll police station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7675, "end_char": 7706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on 16th January, 1970 first information report in respect of certain criminal offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioner and a large number of other co-conspirators was lodged in Parvathipurillll police station and after the completion of the investigation, two chargesheets were filed against the petitioner and other 139 accused in the Court of the Special Magistrate, Visakhapatnam on I; Zth October, 1970 charging them with offences under s. 120B read with ss."}}, {"text": "I; Zth October, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7884, "end_char": 7904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on 16th January, 1970 first information report in respect of certain criminal offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioner and a large number of other co-conspirators was lodged in Parvathipurillll police station and after the completion of the investigation, two chargesheets were filed against the petitioner and other 139 accused in the Court of the Special Magistrate, Visakhapatnam on I; Zth October, 1970 charging them with offences under s. 120B read with ss."}}, {"text": "s. 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7939, "end_char": 7946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 302, 395, 397, 121, 122, 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7957, "end_char": 7989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8007, "end_char": 8024, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "District Jail, Darjeeling", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8421, "end_char": 8446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and 2 of 1971, was under remand in the District Jail, Darjeeling pending investigation of the two Phansidewa P.S.\n\ncases, the Special Magistrat~, Visakhapatnam issued on 30th May, 1972 a warrant for production of the petitioner in .his Court under s. 3, sub-s, (2) of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955."}}, {"text": "30th May, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8552, "end_char": 8566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and 2 of 1971, was under remand in the District Jail, Darjeeling pending investigation of the two Phansidewa P.S.\n\ncases, the Special Magistrat~, Visakhapatnam issued on 30th May, 1972 a warrant for production of the petitioner in .his Court under s. 3, sub-s, (2) of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8630, "end_char": 8634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8654, "end_char": 8696, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrates, Si!iguri, Kurseon and Darjeeling", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9627, "end_char": 9696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Magi•-\n\ntrate, Darjeeling, the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrates, Si!iguri, Kurseon and Darjeeling, the State of West Bengal, the Superintendent Central Jail, Visakhapatnarn and the Post Master General, West Bengal were made respondents to the writ petition."}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9702, "end_char": 9722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Magi•-\n\ntrate, Darjeeling, the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrates, Si!iguri, Kurseon and Darjeeling, the State of West Bengal, the Superintendent Central Jail, Visakhapatnarn and the Post Master General, West Bengal were made respondents to the writ petition."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9801, "end_char": 9812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Magi•-\n\ntrate, Darjeeling, the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrates, Si!iguri, Kurseon and Darjeeling, the State of West Bengal, the Superintendent Central Jail, Visakhapatnarn and the Post Master General, West Bengal were made respondents to the writ petition."}}, {"text": "District Magistrate, Dar1eelmg", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9992, "end_char": 10022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Magistrate, Dar1eelmg and the State of West Bengal filed their return to the rule\n\nni>i on 19th April, 1973 and the Superinlendent of Central Jail, Visakhapatnam filed his return to foe rule m'si on !"}}, {"text": "19th April, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10092, "end_char": 10108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Magistrate, Dar1eelmg and the State of West Bengal filed their return to the rule\n\nni>i on 19th April, 1973 and the Superinlendent of Central Jail, Visakhapatnam filed his return to foe rule m'si on !"}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10782, "end_char": 10800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since this contention raised an important question of law affecting the practice of the Court while dealing With petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, the Division Bench hearing the writ petition refrrred this question for decision by the Constitution Bench."}}, {"text": "11th September, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10929, "end_char": 10949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petition was thereafter placed before the Constitution Bench and by a judgment delivered by the Constitution Bench on 11th September, 1973, it was held that it was competent to the Court to dispense with the production of the body of the person detained while issuing rule nisi, and the rule nisi could be heard without requiring the body of the person detained to be brought before the Court."}}, {"text": "12th July, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11514, "end_char": 11529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime the committal proceedings which were being held by the Special Judge, Visakhapatnam against the petitioner and his other associates concluded and by an order dated 12th July, 1973 the petitioner and 66 other accused were commited to the court of Sessions to stand their trial for various offences."}}, {"text": "Court of the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11765, "end_char": 11825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "46 of 1973, is still pending against the petitioner in the Court of the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam and the petitioner is under detention in the Central Jail, Viskhapatnam pursuant to the orders made by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam pending trial."}}, {"text": "Second Additional Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11933, "end_char": 11980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "46 of 1973, is still pending against the petitioner in the Court of the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam and the petitioner is under detention in the Central Jail, Viskhapatnam pursuant to the orders made by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam pending trial."}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12379, "end_char": 12386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Darjeeling", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12416, "end_char": 12453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22 of the Constitution;\n\nB. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Darjeeling h.ad no jurisdiction to try the two Phansidewa P.S. cases against the petitioner and he could not, therefore, authorise the detention of •h~ petitioner urtdcr s. 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a term exoeeding fifteen days in the whole."}}, {"text": "s. 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12613, "end_char": 12619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12627, "end_char": 12653, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sub Divisional Magistrate Siliguri", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12719, "end_char": 12753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was only the Sub Divisional Magistrate Siliguri who had jurisdiction to try the two Phansidewa P.S. cases and he alone could remand the petitioner to custody after the expiration of tic initial ncriod of fifteen davs under s. 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."}}, {"text": "s. 344", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12929, "end_char": 12935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12943, "end_char": 12969, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Disttict Court, Darjeeling", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13177, "end_char": 13203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The orclers of remand under which the petitioner was dcttiined in the District Jail; Darjeeling were, however, made by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Darjeeling and the detention of the petitioner in ; the Disttict Court, Darjeeling was, therefore illegal."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13411, "end_char": 13415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13423, "end_char": 13459, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Special J ndge, Visakhapatnam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13515, "end_char": 13544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. The officer in charge of the District Jail, Darjeeling was bound to abstain from compiying with the warrant for production issued by the Special Judge, Visakhapatnam by reason of s. 6 of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, l 955 and the production of the petitioner before the Special J ndge, Visakhapatnam pursuant to such warrant for production and his detention in the Central Jail, Visakhapatnam were consequently without the authority of law."}}, {"text": "District Jail. Darjeeling", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13813, "end_char": 13838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Re : Grounds A and H.\n\nThese two grounds relate exclusively to the legality of the initial detention of the petitioner in the District Jail."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14141, "end_char": 14148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court speaking through Wanchoo, J., {as he then was) said in A. K. Gopala11 v.\n\nGovernment of India( 1) :. \""}}, {"text": "Dua", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15060, "end_char": 15063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And yet in another decision of this Court in Talib Husain v. State of Jammu &\n\nKashmir(') Mr. Justice Dua, sitting as a Single Judge, presumably in the vacation, observed that \"in habeas corpus proceedings the Court has to consider the legality of the detention on the date of the hearing\"."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15383, "end_char": 15390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of these three views taken by the Court at different times, the second appears to be more in consonance with the law and practice in England and may be taken as having received the largest meltl!ure of approval in India, though the third view also cannot be discarded as incorrect, because an inquiry whether the detention is legal or not at the date of hearing of the application for habeas corpus would be quite relevant, for the simple reason that if on that date the detention is legal, the Court cannot order release of the person detained by issuing a writ of habeas corpus."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15464, "end_char": 15469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of these three views taken by the Court at different times, the second appears to be more in consonance with the law and practice in England and may be taken as having received the largest meltl!ure of approval in India, though the third view also cannot be discarded as incorrect, because an inquiry whether the detention is legal or not at the date of hearing of the application for habeas corpus would be quite relevant, for the simple reason that if on that date the detention is legal, the Court cannot order release of the person detained by issuing a writ of habeas corpus."}}, {"text": "Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17885, "end_char": 17927, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "District Jail, Darjeeling", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17957, "end_char": 17982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now the legality of this detention is challenged on the ground that by reason of s .. 6 of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955 the officer in charge of the District Jail, Darjeeling was bound to abstain from complying with the warrant for•production issued by the Special Magistrate, Visakhapatnam and was not entitled to send the petitioner to the Court of Special Magistrate, Visakhapatnam in compliance with such warrant for production."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18310, "end_char": 18314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18377, "end_char": 18381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18434, "end_char": 18445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18470, "end_char": 18474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18678, "end_char": 18692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18812, "end_char": 18826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19026, "end_char": 19035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19422, "end_char": 19437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19600, "end_char": 19604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Special\n\nMagistrate, Visakhapatnam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19685, "end_char": 19719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The warrant for production in the present case was under s. 3, sub-s. (2) as the petitioner was admittedly required to be produced before the Special\n\nMagistrate, Visakhapatnam for answering the charges against him."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19938, "end_char": 19942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20243, "end_char": 20247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20539, "end_char": 20548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22097, "end_char": 22101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22243, "end_char": 22247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22725, "end_char": 22729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22822, "end_char": 22826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23019, "end_char": 23023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23390, "end_char": 23394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23676, "end_char": 23680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_287_293_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "SWANTRAJ & ORS.\n\n\\ v.\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nFebruary 5, 1974\n\n(V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.)\n\nDrugs a11d Cosmetics Act, (23 of !940), S. IS(IJ(c)-'Stocked for sale', if uicludes. te1nporary storage for sale not at the place of storage but elsewhere-\n\nWhe!her fonns for licnces provided are intlexible or suitable licences with nrodificat101is can be. issuel/.\n\nSection 18(c) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, provides that no\n\nprsn -shall manufacture for sale, or sell, or stQck or exhibit. for sale .or\n\ndistribute any drug except under a Jicence and s. 27(b) provides for punish- . ment for its contravention.\n\nThe appeJJant was a wholesale dealer and distributor of drugs and bad\n\n_te _necessary licences prescribed under the Act. Itbad also the necessary\n\nlicences autbo!ising i~ to sell, stock oi exhibit for sale or distribute by wholesale through its motor van. The appellant booked certain drugs by tony but as the motor van was delayed, the drugs were reteasCd from the Jorry and temporarily kept in the godown of a local drugs dealer.\n\nOn the questiOns, ( 1) whether the licence which permitted stocking and selling in a specified vehicle, covered the brief interval of storage in the god own before loadirig on to the appeilanfs van, and ( 2) whether the act of the appellant in temporarily storing drugs, not for immediate sale there, but for ultimate sale in various parts of the State,· is contrary to s. 18(c) and punishble under s. 27(b),\n\nHEID: ( l) (a) A licence in_ terms for a vehicle cannot do duty for one to keep druJS in a fixed place.\n\nAssuming that none of the prescribed forms provide for an itinerant wholesale distributor and that it would be impossible to furnish the very ma.ny possible places where for short intervals drugs may\n\nhave to be stored awaiting the arrival of the van, an argumentunJ ab. incon- \"Veniend cannot be a defence; if the law requires a 'licence for aplace and\n\ndrup are lept in such a place without the licence, even as a stop-gap arrangement. The paramount purpose of regulation through licensing is, to set in motion vigilant medical watch over the proper protection of drugs and medi .. cines. verification of the expiry of the time of their efficacy, and t~.e jection of spuriou.11 products. If god.owns, temporary stores etc .• can be unhcensed, 1heY can become foci of -dubious, deceptive and harmful drugs. Therefore, levery place Whre stornge is made must be licensed.\n\n[290 D-F; 292 A-OJ -\n\n(b) The rules made under the Act, while they visualise wholesale distrl- \"bution licences, the. forms hve not provided fOr licences for . mobile vans or\n\ndistn\"bution depots so essential for a wholesale <futribution system. The . licence aivcn to the appellants' vehicle is an improvised innovation without the. law. There is no express power to thus modify the forms or innovate according to need. But such an authority to grant sutable Hcen11es under rr. 61 and '62 (proviso), including the wayside depots or 'emergency' stores,\n\ncoUld be implied. The appellant should therefore have applied fOr and\n\nobtain~ the n'ecessary Jiccnc~ for the temporary storge. (291 C-HJ\n\n(LIJw Lexicon of British- India comiltd and edited by Ramanati1a1 Ai}'ar, sale there' or. stocked for sale elsewhere later'. TDe Central Governmen.t should'.howevtr clarify the rules and nrovide for al'?nropriate forms .. The first interpretation permits abuse through loophole~,. while the .seCQDd llJ<!llens ~P 'but\" caSts on the dealer the burden. of. obta1n1ng more licences. Since nsk\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( ft974 l 3 S.C.It.\n\nof life and health is avoided by the latter interpretation, it must be held that\n\nth~ storage, even though for short spelJs \"and on ad hoc basis\n\n1 and without intent to sell at that place but as part of the sales business, comes within stocking for sale in s. IS(c) dOd r. 62.\n\n[293 C-EJ\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JuR1smcTioN : Criminal Appeal No. 177 of 1970.\n\nFrom the judgment and order dated the 7th August 1969 of the Bombay High Court in (Nagpur Bench) at Nagpur in Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 1968.\n\nS. C. Manchanda and 0. P. Verma for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Bharldare and M. N. Shroff, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of .the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J .-Every legislation is a social document and judi< cial construction seeks to decipher the statutory mission, language permitting, taking the cue from the rule in Heydon's( 1) case of suppressing the evil and advanciRg the remedy. The .Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (the Act, for short) is a life-saving statute one of the provisions of which, together with a bunch of rules and fotms, falls for interpretation and application to the substantially admitted facts set out concisely in the order granting certificate of fitness to appeal.\n\nThe Bench projected the factual-legal issue in these words :-\n\n\"It is not in dispute that the petitioners have a wholesale dealers' licence to stock .durgs at Bombay and hve a further licence to distribute the drugs through the motor van throughout the territory of the state of Maharashtra.\n\nAccordingly, their motor van started filled with drugs and reached the Vidarbha area.\n\nThe petitioners booked certain drugs for which they have already a licence to distribute, by lorry to Y eotmal.\n\nThe idea was that the moto~ van, which was touring the Vidarbha area, should reach Yeotmal by about the time when the goods were due to arrive and the person in charge of the motor van would collect the drugs so hooked from the lorry and distribute them as per instructions given by the firm.\n\nBut Ul)fortunately the motor van was delayed by about three days nd one of the partners of the petitioner-firm who was movmg , with the van, went ahead of Yeotmal, rleased the goods 'from the transport operator and temporanly kept them m\n\nthe godown of a local drugs dealer. .Th~ intention was to load the van with those drugs and distnbute the drugs as permitted by the licence.\n\nIn, the appeal in this Court, these facts have .bec_n found as pleaded by the accused persons. However, 1t 1s held that the temporary deposit of the goods _in the godown of a local drugs dealer amounts to stocking for sala as ccntcmplated. by clause (c) of section 18 of the Drugs\n\n.(1) 3 co:R~-; a-Maxwcll n the interPretation ofStatutes-12 Edition-p .. 40:\n\nSWANTRAJ v. MAHARASHTRA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 289.\n\nand Cosmetion Act, 1940.\n\nFor the purpose of stocking the drugs, either for sale or for distribution, the accused persons had no licence for the premises at Y eotmal and this act amounted to a breach of the conditions of the licence and, as such, breach of rule 62, amounting to an offence under section 27 (bl of. the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.\n\nThe point, whether a temporary deposit of drugs or temporary retention of drugs in a place outside Bombay for which place the petitioners have no licence to stock the goods, amounts to stocking for sale or distribution, is a point of law which appears to us of general importance.\"\n\nC The appellant :has been concurrently convicted but hopefully challenged. Sec. 18 (e) of the Act forbi0s manufacture for sale or sell or stock. or exhibit for sale, or distribute any drug without licence under this Chapter (Ch. IV). Sec. 27 (b) is the penal provision for contravention of the provisions of Ch. IV of the Act or the rules made thereunder.\n\nRule 62 is claimed to have been violated and so may be read here together with the sister rule, i.e. R. 6 ! : D\n\n\"61. Forms of licences to sell drugs-·\n\n(I) A licence to sell, stock or exhibit for sale, or distribute drugs other than those specified in Sc.hedules C and C\n\n(I) by retail, on restricted licence or by wholesale shall be issued in Form 20, 20-A or 20-li as the case may be.\n\nProvided that a licence in form 20-A shall be valid for only such drugs as are specified in the licence :\n\n(2) A licence to sell, stock or exhibit for sale, or distribute drugs specified in Schedules C and C(') by retail, on restricted licence or by wholesale shall be issued in Form 21, 21-A or 21-B as the case may be:\n\nProvided that .a licence in form 21-A shall be valid for only such drugs as are specified in the licence.\n\n62. Sale at more than one place-If drugs are sold or stocked .. for sale at more than one place, separate application shall be made, and a separate licence shall be issued, in respect of each such place :\n\nG Provided that this shall not apply to itinerant vendors who have no specified place of business and who will be licensed to conduct business in a particular area within the jurisdiction, of the licensing authority.''\n\nThe appellant is a wholesale dealer and distributor-and has a licence for his Bombay shop in Form 20B and another in Form 21B, H one for drugs specified in C and C (1) Schedules and the other for\n\nother drugs (Ex. 37 and 38). The firm has one more licence issued under R.61(2) in Form 218 authorising it to sell, stock or exhibit for\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C, R.\n\ntlet' or tstribute by wholesale on the premises situated at through . . a 10~ agan o. MHR 1279 in the state of Maharashtra . the fohllo0wmg categories of drugs specified in Schedule c and C(l)' to t e rug Rules, 1945 :-\n\n- Categories of drugs: for items of Schedule C(l) drugs not requiring Cold Storage.\n\n_ 2. Thi~ lience shall be in force for two years from the date 0£ issue of this licence:\n\n3. Ti~ licence is subject to the conditions stated below and to 11\\e Prov1s1ons of the Drugs Act, 1940 and the rules thereunder.\n\nThe question is wether !he act of the appellant in temporarily stor- 1_ng df?gs, not for mimediate sale there but mtended for ultimate sale m various parts of the Stae,_is. contrary to sec. l~(c) and punishable under Sec. ~7 \\b)? Even f 1t 1s, an Ex. 39, which permitted stockmg and selltng m the specified vehicle of the accused, cover the brief mterval of storage between taking delivery from the railway or other public transport and loading into the appellant's mobile van ?\n\nAgreeing with the High Court, we may make short shrift of the second contention first. If a brief storage for sale in the circumstances of this case necessitates a licence a legal issue we will examine separately-does Ex. 3 9 fill the bill ? A licence in terms for a vehicle cannot do duty for one to keep drugs in a fixed place. The grievance\n\nasuming it to be real, that none of the prescrib.ed forms provide for an itinerant wholesale distributor or that it would be a fantastic possibility to furnish the possible places-likely to be numerous-where for short intervals drugs may have to be stored awaiting the arrival of the van, is no defence. If the law asks for a licence for a place and you do not have it and still keep the articles there you are asking for criminal trouble, whether it is a stopgap stocking or not.\n\nThe argumentum ab inconvenienti affords no answer. The Act mandates the taking of a licence for every place where you stock drugs for sale, the words of Sec.18(v) and rule 62 being plain and admitting of no exceptions.\n\nYou ask four questions.\n\nIs it a drug? If it is, is it stored in a place or is it in transit ? If it is stored in a place is the storag~ for sale? If it is, a licence for that place--\n\nhalf way house, may be-is the only answer to a prosecution. 1:herc is none here ex confessio.\n\nOf course, what looms large then ts as to whether sch a stop gap storing is one for sale.even if, admittedly. no sale is intended in that drug shelter?\n\nCounsel for the State Shri Bhandare counters the argument of absence of prescribed forms and difficulties in mentioning many places for temporary storage of drugs, in two ways. Firstly, statutory forms are samples for guidance, not exhaustive prescriptions unamcnable to addition modification or improvisation as the circumstances require. The forms in the appendices to the Civil Procedure Code illustrate this point. Of course, it is not as sample as that. Sec. 18 which regulates manufacture and sale of drugs prohibits these activities \"except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence\n\nisscd for such purpose ...... \" No inflexible fonnula nor petrified\n\nSWANTllAJ v. MAHAllASHTRA (Krish11a Iyer, I.) 29 [\n\nform is built into the section, suitable forms dictated by pragmatic considerations and conditions of business being not ruled out. The rules, however, are a little confusing .\n\nRule 2(b) defines 'Form' as a form set forth in Sch. A and does not profess to be illustrative and that Schedule applies 6 forms under R. 61 (1) and (2) and none for peripatetic wholesale distributors who may. transport to and stock in central places and radiate from there to remote retailers.\n\nThe licence Ex. 39 for the accused's vehiele is an improvised innovation without the law but prompted by practical sense. The sub-rules of Rs. 61 state that licences there under shall be issued in forms 20A, B and C, 21A, B and C. Rule 62 leaves no rocm for variations to suit exigenciCll' although its proviso envisages licences for itinerant vendors for an area and R 62A takes cognisance Of. travelling agents and itinerent Venaors who are required to take licences in Form 21A. But it is a glaring deficiency that while the rules visualise wholesale distribution licences the forms do not spell out licences for mobile vans or distribution depots so essential for a wholesale distribution system. There is no doubt that if a scientific system of over-seeing wholesale . distribution and a viable scheme of protected distribution is to be devised, licences for large and wellequipped conveyances ancl storage depots is desirable, nay, necessary.\n\nIndeed, storage in transit must also be licensed so that medicines du not suffer in the process.\n\nAt present, no rules take care of transit by road or rail. .Actually, cold storage or air-conditioned facilities for sensitive medicines are scarce in nationalised and private transpor11\n\n; e)'Vices and the drugs legislation winks at. it. Likewise, the fo; ms do not provide for storage depots or medical vans for wholese supplies. Social guilt attaches to legal lacunae, the' community beg the victim.\n\nArguments in this case have exposed these shortfalls m the Jaw and we state them for legislative attention.\n\nThe statUtory scheme does provide for retail and wholesale saks and storages for sale. It does prescribe forms for itinerant retailers for specified areas, travelling representatives supplying samples and the like. But storage for sale in mobile wagons or vans resorted to by wholesalers is not expressly covered by statutory forms .. That is why Ex, 39 is an adaptation not found in the fasciculus of prescribed forms. There is no express power to modify the forms conferred by the rules, or innovate according to need, desirable though it is.\n\nAs the Jaw now stands, we are disinclined to invalidate Bx. 39. qn the other hand the Act and the rules must prevail over the forms and, therefore ;_,. are inclined to overlook the technical deficiencies in the rules' and, nf.ling _the law to save life, uphold the implied athc:··\n\nrity to grant swtllble licences under R. 61 and 62 (prov1So) een .1f liberties have to be taken with those given !n Schedule A., Thi> wll! extend to grant of such licences for way side depots or emergency stores. But li.cences there must be for every storage for sale (S. 18(C) •\n\nSri .Manchanda's plea that licences should not be insisted on for every place of make-shift storage in a far-tlung area served bv .~\n\nwholesaler may look wasonabte.\n\nThe police power of the State J,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1974 J 3 S.C.ll.\n\nexercised to ensure safe and potent drugs for a people peculiar[y\n\nsusceptibl~ to ailments and largely ignorant of health hazards. The paramount purpose of regulation through licensing is, inter alia, to set in motion vigilant medical watch over the proper protection of drugs and medicines and the verification of the expiry of their life and the spuriousness of the products. If godowns, temporary stores anJ depots can remain unlicensed, they escape official attention and can deteriorate into foci of dubioµs or .deceptive drugs harmful to society.\n\nEvery place where storage for sale is made must be licensed.\n\nThat is the plain meaning of Sec. 18 ( c) in fulfilment of the clear puQOS<', the sensitive defence of the sick.\n\nThe only surviving issue is whether the medicines in this case were stocked for sale in the house of Jaswani at Y ootmal. Admittedly, they were kept not for sale in those premises. Admittedly, they were meant for sale c>entually to rural retailers elsewhere. lf so, were they stocked for sale? Either contention has some claims to acceptance but what must tilt the balance is the purpose of the statute, its potential frustration and judicial avoidance of the mischief by a construction whereby the means of licensing meet the ends of ensuring pure and potent remedies for the people. This liberty with language is sanctified by great judges and textbooks. Maxwell (') instructs us in these words :-\n\n\"Th•re is no doubt that 'the office of the Judge is, to make such construction as will suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress all evasions for the continuance of the mischief.' To carry out effectually the object of a statute, it must be so construed as to defeat all attempts to do, or avoid doing, in an indirect or circuitous manner that which it has prohibited or enjoined : quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur et omne per. quod devenitur ad il/ud.\n\nThis manneP of construction has two aspects.\n\nOne is that the courts, mindful of the mischief rule, will not. be astute to narrow the language of a statute so as to allow persons within its purview to ascape its net. The other is that the statute may be applied to the substance rather than the mere form of transactions, thus defeating any shifts and contrivances which parties may have devised in the hope of thereby falling outside the Act. When the. courts find an attempt at concCalment, they will, in the words of Wilmot C.J., 'brush away the cobweb varnish, and shew -the transactions in their true light.\" This benignant 1ule originated four hundred years ago in Heydcm's case which resolved -\n\n\"that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered: (!st). What was the comon law before\n\n(1) Manwcll on the lnterprctati1:>n of Statutes12th Edition p. 137.\n\nsWANTRAJ v. MAHARASHTRA (Krishna Iyer,!.) 293\n\nthe making of the Act.\n\n(2nd) .\n\nWhat was the misch1d and defect for w;1ich the common Jaw. did not provide. (3rd).\n\nWhat remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth.\n\nAncl, (4th). The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such ccmstruction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privata commodo, and. to add force. and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true mtent oflhc makers of the Act, pro bono publico.\"\n\nif.any godown, depot or premises become the nidus of spurious, time-expired or unscientifically stored drugs, can they be allowed to escape the coils of the penal Jaw on the plea that they are not to be sold there, without great peril to patients? . Then legal shelter for spurious drug rackets would be judicially ensured. And this colours construction.\n\nStocke<l for sale there and then? or io be sold certainly but elsewhere later? are the two alternatives flowing from the language of Sec. 18 (1) ( c) .\n\nThe former permits abuse througti loopholes, the latter ugh tens up but loads the dealer\\ with expenses and need for more hC-'nces.\n\nSince risk to life and health is avoided by the latter interpretation, we hold 'that the storage, even though for short spells and on d:i\\ /we basis and without intent to sell at that place but as part of !he sales business, comes within the scupe of \"storage for sale' in Sec. 18(c) artd R. 62. To loosen the Jaw m its\n\njoints is to play wilh life and therefore anti-humanist.\n\nOn the admitteu facts, the offence is not serious . On the face of it, the law is a little defective. Our interpretation makes the accused guilty and clarifies the legal position although the Central Government wi)I do well to tidy •lp and tighten the provisions by a close. second took at the Jaw in tho book. We need ha•aly say that a law 1s eec tive not b, Y making it perfect on paper but by providing a sufficient and conscientious cadre of officers.\n\nThe sentence is light but here it is enough. We dismiss the appeal for the reasons . above set out.\n\nV .. P. S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 45, "entities": [{"text": "SWANTRAJ & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SWANTRAJ & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 5, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 61, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\ v.\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nFebruary 5, 1974\n\n(V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 18(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 376, "end_char": 389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 397, "end_char": 426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 27(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 571, "end_char": 579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 18(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1435, "end_char": 1443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1464, "end_char": 1472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. C. Manchanda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4079, "end_char": 4094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Manchanda and 0."}}, {"text": "P. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4102, "end_char": 4110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Verma for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Bharldare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4131, "end_char": 4146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bharldare and M. N. Shroff, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4151, "end_char": 4163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bharldare and M. N. Shroff, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4230, "end_char": 4242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of .the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J .-Every legislation is a social document and judi< cial construction seeks to decipher the statutory mission, language permitting, taking the cue from the rule in Heydon's( 1) case of suppressing the evil and advanciRg the remedy.", "canonical_name": "Krish11a Iyer"}}, {"text": "Heydon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4409, "end_char": 4415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of .the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J .-Every legislation is a social document and judi< cial construction seeks to decipher the statutory mission, language permitting, taking the cue from the rule in Heydon's( 1) case of suppressing the evil and advanciRg the remedy."}}, {"text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4482, "end_char": 4511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4943, "end_char": 4949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bench projected the factual-legal issue in these words :-\n\n\"It is not in dispute that the petitioners have a wholesale dealers' licence to stock .durgs at Bombay and hve a further licence to distribute the drugs through the motor van throughout the territory of the state of Maharashtra."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5063, "end_char": 5074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bench projected the factual-legal issue in these words :-\n\n\"It is not in dispute that the petitioners have a wholesale dealers' licence to stock .durgs at Bombay and hve a further licence to distribute the drugs through the motor van throughout the territory of the state of Maharashtra."}}, {"text": "Vidarbha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5148, "end_char": 5156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, their motor van started filled with drugs and reached the Vidarbha area."}}, {"text": "Yeotmal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5360, "end_char": 5367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The idea was that the moto~ van, which was touring the Vidarbha area, should reach Yeotmal by about the time when the goods were due to arrive and the person in charge of the motor van would collect the drugs so hooked from the lorry and distribute them as per instructions given by the firm."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6209, "end_char": 6219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6337, "end_char": 6349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by clause (c) of section 18 of the Drugs\n\n.(1) 3 co:R~-; a-Maxwcll n the interPretation ofStatutes-12 Edition-p .. 40:\n\nSWANTRAJ v. MAHARASHTRA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 289.", "canonical_name": "Krish11a Iyer"}}, {"text": "Cosmetion Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6365, "end_char": 6384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6657, "end_char": 6667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cosmetion Act, 1940", "statute": "Cosmetion Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6680, "end_char": 6709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7070, "end_char": 7077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Sec. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7229, "end_char": 7236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Schedule C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9230, "end_char": 9240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Drugs Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9456, "end_char": 9471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec.18(v)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10959, "end_char": 10968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhandare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11486, "end_char": 11494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel for the State Shri Bhandare counters the argument of absence of prescribed forms and difficulties in mentioning many places for temporary storage of drugs, in two ways."}}, {"text": "Sec. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11918, "end_char": 11925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krish11a Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12161, "end_char": 12174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "18 which regulates manufacture and sale of drugs prohibits these activities \"except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence\n\nisscd for such purpose ...... \" No inflexible fonnula nor petrified\n\nSWANTllAJ v. MAHAllASHTRA (Krish11a Iyer, I.) 29 [\n\nform is built into the section, suitable forms dictated by pragmatic considerations and conditions of business being not ruled out.", "canonical_name": "Krish11a Iyer"}}, {"text": "S. 18(C)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15318, "end_char": 15326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".Manchanda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15334, "end_char": 15344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But li.cences there must be for every storage for sale (S. 18(C) •\n\nSri .Manchanda's plea that licences should not be insisted on for every place of make-shift storage in a far-tlung area served bv .~\n\nwholesaler may look wasonabte."}}, {"text": "Sec. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16217, "end_char": 16224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jaswani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16403, "end_char": 16410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only surviving issue is whether the medicines in this case were stocked for sale in the house of Jaswani at Y ootmal."}}, {"text": "Maxwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16959, "end_char": 16966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maxwell (') instructs us in these words :-\n\n\"Th•re is no doubt that 'the office of the Judge is, to make such construction as will suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress all evasions for the continuance of the mischief.'"}}, {"text": "Wilmot", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18003, "end_char": 18009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "courts find an attempt at concCalment, they will, in the words of Wilmot C.J., 'brush away the cobweb varnish, and shew -the transactions in their true light.\""}}, {"text": "Heydcm", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18154, "end_char": 18160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This benignant 1ule originated four hundred years ago in Heydcm's case which resolved -\n\n\"that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered: (!"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18665, "end_char": 18675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth."}}, {"text": "Sec. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19639, "end_char": 19646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 18(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20065, "end_char": 20075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20363, "end_char": 20381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our interpretation makes the accused guilty and clarifies the legal position although the Central Government wi)I do well to tidy •lp and tighten the provisions by a close."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_294_301_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, TIRUPATHI\n\nTIRUMALAI TIRUPATHI DEVASTHANAM\n\nFebruary 6, 1974\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI AND P. K. GOSWAMI. JJ.]\n\nMadras District Municipalities Act, 1920-S. 83(l)(b)-Wllt't.her Tirumaltd .Tirupathi Devasthana1n New Choultry is exempt front. property tax,\n\nThe. plaintiff/respondent filed a suit in the court of Subordinate Judge, for a declaration that the building, known as ·~Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam New Choultfy'' is exempt from property tax u/s. 83(1)(b) .of the Madras\n\nDistrict Municipalities Act, 1920 and for directing the defendant, the Muni- C cipal Council, Tirupathi, to refund the. sum of Rs. 22,306.40 paid under protest.\n\nAccording to the plaintiff, the said building is a free Devasthanam Cboultry intended purely for the convenienee of the visiting pilgrims and therefore, exempt from property tax.\n\nThe defendants' case is that while pilgrims are accommodated in the ground floor free of charge, the rooms in the first floor are rented out to pilgrims and __ others. Further, the plaintiff waS deriving a very large income from the various stalls and shops situated inside the premises D of the choultry and therefore not exempt from tax.\n\nThe learned Sub-Judge dismissed the 90.it but on appeal, the High Court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court and decreed the plaintiff's suit holding that the plaintiff is Cntitled to exemption under s. 83 of the Act.\n\nS. 83(1) of the Act provides as follows :-\n\n''The following building and lands shall be exempt from the property tax :-\n\n(a) ......\n\n(b) choultries for the occupation of which no rent is charged and choultries the rent charged for the occupation of which is used exclusively for charitable purposes;\" Dismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD: (i) The word \"choultry\" is not' defined in the Act. the word\n\nhowever~ means a shelter or resting place for travellers.\n\n(Law Lexicn11 of British Tndia Co111.pilcd a11d edited by RiinUinatha Aiyar, 1940 Ed,)\n\n(ii) Chouiiry .is indeed an ancii;.nt institution and is principally meant for lodging of pilgnms and travellers. It is conceivable that in 1884,, when. the first Municipal Legislation was passed in Madras1 such institutions were some G hun1ble sheds; but in course of time, such institutions grew in size and more and more demands were made oI them for comfort and convenience Of the pilgrims. Therefore, it would be necessary to look at the institution from the point of view of the predominnnt intention which guides the building up of the complex as a whole.' ·\n\n(iii) In the present case, the choultry cannot be divorced from the other offices, shi:>os and concerns which are mainly located within its precincts in H order to render much-needed services to the pilgrims.\n\nIt is clear that lhe\n\nentir~ income is used exclusively for the purpose of the choultry which is indeed a charitable purpose. Therefore, the case f<i1ls squarely under sec.\n\nSI ( l)(b) and therefore exempt fron1 property tax.\n\nMIJN!CIPAL COUNCIL v. T. T. DBVASTHANAM (Goswami,/.) 295.\n\nKtsarpalli A.ntaneyufu and another v. Eluru Mr111icipalily by its Executive- Offectr. Tire conunissioner a11d a1101f1er, [1964] I.L.R. Anctfua Pradesh (Part lV) 379, Sri Kayakaparameswari Anna Satranz. represented by the Secretary, Sri Bmchil Venkateswarlu v, The Vijayawada Municipalily, represented by its Ex\"utit'e Officer. The Municipal Co1nmissioner [1959] 2 And.bra Weekly Reporter, 325; Kandandarani Pillai v. The Municipal Council, Trichinopoly, [1933)\"\n\n65. M.W. 678 and Pandaras!lnnadhi, Tiruvan11amalai Adhinam v. The Corpo\"4 rancn of Madras, [1941] 2 M.L.I. 544, rcfed to and distinguished.\n\nCmL APPEL'LATE JuR1sn1n10N : Civil Appeal No. 568 of 1969.\n\nFrom the judgment and decree dated. the 27th February, 1968 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal No. 117 of 1963.\n\nJ;.i M. Nattsan, K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekheran, for the appellant Krishnarao, E. Kalyanaram and G. N. Rao, for the respondent. c\n\nThe Judgment of the. Court was delivered by\n\nGOSWAMI, J.-This appeal by the defendent in the original •uit is by certificate grantect by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh to appeal against the judgment and decree of the said Court of 27th February, '\n\n1968. The facts may briefly be stated.\n\nThe respoqdent (hereinafter to be described as the plaintiff) is the Tirumalai Tirupathi Devasthanarn represented by its executive officer.\n\nThe plaintiff instituted a suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge, .Chittoor, on 10th March, 1961, praying for a declaration that the building known as 'Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam New Choultry\" situated within the area of the Municipal Council Tirupathi (hereinafter described as the defendant) bearing assessment No. 5361 of Tirupati Municipality, is exempted from property tax under section 83 ( 1) (b) of the Madras District Municipalities Act 1920 (Madras Act V of 1920) , briefly the Act, and for directing the defendant to refund the sum of Rs. 22,306.40, the amount of tax so far paid under protest. It appears that the plaintiff paid property tax in respect of this building for several years under protest and without prejudice to its right to file a suit. After the plaintiff failed to get redress from the authorities, thQ suit was filed.\n\nThe plaintiff states in the plaint \"that the silk! building is a free Devasthanamas choultry intended purely for the convenience of the pilgrims visiting the famous Holy Shrine of Sri Venkateswara Swami at Tirumala and other Devasthanams attached to the. plaintiff Devasthanams and is used solely and exclusively for the said purpose and no other\". The plaintiff further, inter alia, avers in para 7 of the plaint as follows :-\n\n\"The defendant has failed to itote and take into consideration, as it ought to have the !ct that the canteen, the Firewood stores, the Transport Office Workshop, Garages, the galvanised Iron Sheet sheds for parking the Transport vehicles, the Railway Booking Office, .the Mysore Government Trao8port Office, the Devasthana.ms Sanitary Inspector's Office, ihe Enquiry Office, Garages of cars, shed for Water pump, Laundry, Hair-cutting Saloon, the Post Office and\n\nFree Medical Dispensary, are all located within the schedule A mentioned premise~ only with a view to providing conveniences which the plaintiff is under a statutory obligation to provide to the visiting pilgrims without deriving any rents, returns, profits or other receipts.' 1\n\nThe defendant resisted the suit. It denied in the written state men! that the building \"is an out and out free Choultry\". The defendant B further avers that \"while pilgrims are accommodated in the ground :floor portion of the Choultry free of charge, the rooms in the first floor are rented out to Pilgrims and others. Further in the mam building, .as well as in the other buildings within die compound of the chouitry, there are several shops, stalls and offices. . There is the canteen, which • admittedly caters not only to the pilgrim visitors staying in the choultry but also to the general public.\n\nThere is a brass vessel shop, a fire C wood depot, a Transport Office, a motor workshop with 9 garages, a Railway Booking Room\", a Mysore Transport Office Room, the Sanitary Inspector's Office Room, Enquiry Office, 6 gara.ges, (2) residential portions for Superintendent, .a water pump shed, a laundry, a barber shop, and a Post Office. It will be seen that the busine!ls in several of the above shops and stalls and the amenities provided therein are not solely connected with the purpose of either the. choultry or the\n\nD . worship in the temple. The plaintiff is deriving a very large income from the said stalls and shops ........ The annual rental value of the \"building was calculated only after excluding the portions tlrat are beior\n\nused for the purposes of the free choultry\".\n\nBy consent of parties, a large number of documents were marked as exhibits, and the plaintiff examined only the Superintendent of the E New Choultry as the s01e witness while the defendant did not adduce' any oral evidence. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit observing as follows :-\n\n\"On considering all these aspects I am of opinion that neither the several offices and shops situated within the premises of the choultry, nor the furnished rooms in the F main choultry are entitled\" to exemption from property tax under section 83 of the Madras District Municipalities Act\".\n\nThe Trial Court relied upon the decisions in Sri Ka1iyak1Jparame.- wari Anna Satram, represented by the Secretary, Sri Batchu Venkatesswar v. The Vi; ayawada Municipality, represented by its Executive Officer, the Municipal Commissioner(') and Madura Municipal G Council through its Commissioner, Rajiah D. Paul v. Madura etc., Devasthanams represented by its Executive Officer, R. S. Nayudu( 1)\n\nand rejected the plaintiff's claim. On appeal by the plaintiff to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, the Division Bench reversed the judgment H and decre_e of the Trial Court and decreed the plaintiff's suit holding that the plaintiff is entitled to exemption under section 83 of the Act.\n\n(I) 1959 (2) Andhra Weekly Reporter 325.\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1942 Madras 658.\n\nThe evidence in the case is absolutely one sided and there is noo controversy about the facts.\n\nThe High Court has found that \"there is only one institution, one building and that building provides for rest of the. pilgrims who visit the place and the pilgrims are numerous to common knowledge. It is not enough to have merely accommodation in building but the people would like to have other amenities and it is the other amenities that are provided as stated above. Therefore we have to treat all these including the rooms as one single unit which is intended for resting of the pilgrims who visit the place and should not as the lower court did, separate these amenities from the main institution. No rent is charged except in one cas~ where there ii one brass co-operative store which pays Rs. 30 /- per month towards rent.\n\nIn this case the test laid down for deciding whether the institution is a choultry or not is fully satisfied as there is much accommodation in the ground and first floor for resting place. What is objected to and contended is that it ceases to be a choultry with all these amenities provided there. In our opinion if the institution is essentially one for providing rest and shelter for pilgrims, the mere fact that there are amenities attached to the institution should not detract from its being a choultry.\n\nOn the other hand it amplifies and provides more comforts to the pilgrims without charging anything for them\". The High Ccurt also found that \"the amount collected for services and other amenities is far less and it is not sufficient to meet the expenditure to run the choultry .......... What is derived by the choultry is only an amount of Rs. 15000/- and odd which is service charges. But over and above that a large amount which equals double the amount . is spent. The charges, therefore, must necessarily, have been spent and are spent, as accounts show, for purposes of charity and whatever is collected, whether from the cooperative society at the rate of Rs. 30/-\n\nper mensem or service charges levied from the pilgrims, it is only a small amount. All this amount is. not sufficient lo. meet the annual expenditure of the institution and the balance must come from the pocket of the Devasthanam.\n\nIt is therefore difllcult to accept the contention that there is no proof that the collections were applied exclusively for the choultry. The expenditure is one, the institution is one and the collections are also exclusively for services connected with the institution and not by way of rent. All these indicate and point to the conclusion that the collections are applied only for purposes of charity.\n\nIt is not a business and the institution is not making any profit and profit-motive is not behind the actions of the Devasthanam in levying small charges for the service< rendered. All these charges are meant mainly for the 30 rooms in the first floor.\"\n\nThe High Court came to the above findings and also noticed \"that the learned Subordinate Judge over-looked the fact that there were rooms on the ground floor and they are also used for the pilgrims'.\n\nII Mr. Natesan, learned counsel for the appellant, subniit< that the plaintiff cannot in law claim exemption under section 83 ( 1) (b) of the Act. We may, therefore, read the material provisions . in the section with which we are concerned :\n\n83 ( 1) \"The following buildings and lands shall be A exempt from the property tax :- x x x x\n\n(b) choultries for the occupation of which no rent is charged and choultrics the rent charged for the occupation of which is used exclusively for charitable purposes;'' /\n\nx x x x\n\n'The word \"choultry\" is not defined in the Act.\n\nThe word is defined in the Law Lexicon of British India compiled and edited by Ramanatha Aiyar, 1940 edition, as follows :-\n\n\"Choultry : Chatram, A choultry is a corruption of chavadi. It means a shelter or resting place for travellers.\n\nA chathram (corruption of the Sanskrit Sathram) is a house where pilgrims and travellers arc fed\".\n\nIn the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, choultry is described as an Anglo-Indian word \"being corruption of Telugu chawadi\" and its 1neaniog is given as \"A caravanserai\". In Wilson's Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms, second edition, page 108, the word is given in different forms such as Chawati or Chauti, corruptly, Choltry or Choultry and the meaning is given as \"A public lodging place, a >helter\n\nfor travellers\".\n\nThe earliest Act on the subject in Madras is the Madras District Municipalities Act of J 884.\n\nEven there under section 63 (1). amongst others, choultries were exempted from payment of tax on\n\nbuildings and lands. The word choultry was not defined even in that Act. The present Act of 1920 has repealed the aforesaid old Act under section 2 read with Schedule I. In the absence of a statutory definition in the Act, recourse has to be taken to the meaning attributed to the word in the dictionaries and the law lexicons as well as to the popular concept of the term. Choultry is indeed an ancient institution and is principally meant for lpdging of pilgrims and travellers. 1t is conceivable that in 1884, when the first municipal legislation was passed in Madras. such institutions were some humble sheds and other structures to enable the pilgrims to stay for a short while when they came to visit temples and other religious places. This institution, like similar others elsewhere, has come to stay as a symbol of religious and charitable disposition of human mind translated into physical manifestation in the shape of safe shelter for the pilgrims. As man advances and ideas grow and expand, with his ver increasing desire for comfort and convenience, the. shape of the choultry must needs also change.\n\nIt is, therefore, only to be expected that with the growing funds of the Devasthanams, such choultries will be constructed in a modern way catering to the needs and requirements of the pilgrims and visitors of all classes in a self-contained unit or complex. It would be necessary to look at the institution from the point of view of the predominant intention which guides the building up of the complex as a whole.\n\nD :\n\nThe object for which a choultry is built is advanced and facilitated by making provisions for so many incidental conveniences which the visitors and pilgrims coming from far and wide may need in order to make their short stay in the neighbourhood of the .temple comfortable and convenient from all points of view so that they are not required to go to and fro and face difficulties. The concept of a choultry to-day may, therefore, be completely different from that with which one may be familiar a hundred years ago. There must, however, be no idea of profit motive in running or administering a choultry.\n\nBesides the expenditure for running a choultry with amenities should not be made with an idea to realise it from the visitors using the same.\n\nJn other words, the choultry must in truth and reality bear the hallmark of a charitable institution and should not partake of the character of a hotel run for profit. The aP.pellant concedes that the first floor as well as the ground floor of the building which are used for lodging of the pilgrims may be exempted from tax and indeed tax has not been realised in respect of the rooms on the ground floor of the choultry. The appellant, however, ubmits that the offices, shops and\n\no!ller concerns some of which are located in the choultry and others within the campus, cannot be considered as part and parcel of the choultry and, therefore, are not exempt from tax.\n\nWe have examined • the entire evidence in this case and have given careful consideration to the findings of the High Court with regard to the same'l>t1ond are clearly of opinion that the choultry cannot be divorced from the other offices, shops and concerns which are mainly located within its precincts in order to render much-needed and other necessary services to the pilgrims coming to pay homage to the Holy Shrine of Sri Venkateswara Swami. fa the absence of a precise definition of the word \"choultry\" in the Act exduding such offices, shops and concerns in the precincts, we are unable to restrict the term \"choultry\" in the context of the economic development and improved standard of living of our people, to only that portion of the building which is directly used for lodging of visitors and pilgrims. We are, therefore, ot the view that the High Court is right in holding that the appellant is not entitled to charge tax on the choultry as claimed.\n\nUnder section.Bl of the Act, property tax is leviable if the Municipal' Council by resolution determines that it shall be levied on buildings and lands within the municipal limits save and except those exempted by or under the Act or any other law.\n\nThen section 83 provides forgeneral exemption under various heads and categories.\n\nThere are exceptions within exceptions in section 83 itsel! with a proviso and explanation with which we are not directly concerned in this appeal. Some light is, however, thrown by explanation to section 83 which it may be appropriate tQ quote :\n\n\"Explanation-The exemption granted under this section shall not extended to residential quarters attached to schools and colleges not being hostels or to residential quarters attached to hospitals, dispensaries and libraries\".\n\nSimilarly there is a proviso in the section with reference to clauses (a), (c) and (e) to the effect that nothing contained in thes.c clauses\n\n\"shall be deemed to exempt from property tax any building or land for which rent is payable by the person or persons using the same for the purposes referred to in the said clauses\". Nothing similar to this has been superimposed upon the exemption allowed under the Act to choultries .inder section !B ( 1) (b) and the matter is kept unabridged even without attempting to define the word and there 1s no carving out of any exception within the exception as in the case of schools, hospitals, etc.\n\nEven then a line will have to be drawn to distinguish between what is incidental or subservient to the main object and purpose of the choultry and the oblique motive of profit-making to deprive the Municipality of its rightful dues.\n\nIt is well recognised that there is no equity or morality about a tax and a taxing statute or provision has to be construed strictly on its plain meaning where possible. Similarly who so ever claims exemption from tax under the law, has to estab1ish his own case as falling within the exemption clau'Se. In case of any ambiguity the benefit will, however, go to the tax payer ..\n\nNot being unmmdful to the above principles, we arc unablo to hold in this case that the New Choultry with iIS expending beneficial complex, as established m the evidence, not viable by itself but maintained in a substantially large measure out of the Dcvasthanam funds predominent)y in the interest of numerous visiting pilgrims from far and wide, is not exempt from tax under sccllon 83(1) (b).\n\nIn the view we have taken about the choultry in this cast\\, 1we hold that there is no evidence to show that any rent as such is charged for the occupation of the choultry and the minimal service cltitrges even for the rooms in the first floor cannot be treated as rent.\n\nThere is only evidence of realisation of rent of Rs. 30/- per month from the . braSs cooperative store within the campQ.S,. but that is a very insignificant item when we consider that everything else is found by the High Court to be rent-free.\n\nThe evidence has established that the entire income from whatever sources from the choultry is not sufficient for the maintenance of the same.\n\nIt is, therefore, obvigus that the entire income, including even the nominal rent charged from the brass cooperative store, is used exclusively for the purpose of the choultry which is indeed a charitable purpose.\n\nThe case, therefore, falls squarely under section 83 (I) (b) of the exemption clause:\n\nThe appellant relied. upon a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High G Court in Kesarapalli Anjaneyulu and Another v. Eluru Munii:ipality,\n\nby it• Executive Officer, The Commissioner and Another('), where the question arose as to whether a portion of choultry, which is used for shops, can be brought within the purview of section 83 (1) (b) of this very Act.\n\nThe High Court held that the clause is attracted only to cases where rent is charged in regard to a building used as a cboultry i.e. where tent is collected from persons who temporarily occupy H\n\n(t) (t964) I. L. R. Andhra Pradesh (Part IV) 379.\n\n, D\n\nthe rooms, such as pilgrims and travellers, and it hs no. applicatio~ to cases where the building is not used as a choultry. It is not _posSIle to find from the very short judgment in this case as to the entire ir cumstances with regard to the connection of the_ shops with the choultry.\n\nThe decision is, therefore, not of much assistance to the appellant and we express no opinion on its correctness.\n\nThe next decision cited by the appellant is in the case of Sri Kanyakaparameswari Anna Satram (supra). In this case ten buildings that were involved in the suit were situated outside the choultry building.\n\nIt was alleged in the plaint that these ten buildings were rented and the income realised therefrom was used and applied for maintaining the choultry.\n\nThe High Court. held that \"the exemp'.ion is only to choultrics ancj if a building does not satisfy the definition of a houltry, it is not entitled to the exemption.\n\nAny building or house property acquired by the plaintiff-committee cannot be called a choultry, and if the plaintiff-committee should acquire a cinema-houoo and appropriate the 1nco:n< therefrom for the charitable p 1rpose\", ic cannot be said that lhc cinema-house is a choullry.\n\nThe High Court relied upon two decisiuns of the Madras High Court in Kodandaram Pillai v.\n\nThe Municipal Council, Trichinopoly,(') and Pandarasannadhi, Tirul'annamalai Adhi- 11am v. The Corporation of Madras(') . . The facts of this case arc entirely different from those of the present case where shops, o'.lices and other concerns ar<, intended to provide facilities and amenities to pilgrin1sand travellers staying in the choultry without there being any motive of profit-making and aie therefore part of the choultry.\n\nThe appellant also relied upon MUllicipal Councii, Pal11i v.\n\nSri Dlzandayuthapa•i Devasthanam Pal11i( 3 ), where the High Court was\n\ndealing with the words \"places set apart for public worship and either actually so used or used for another purpose\" under section 83( I) (a) of th~ Act with which we are not concerned.\n\nThe decision is, therefore, of no assistance to the appellant. the appellant also relied upon R•jahmundry Municipal Council v. Tripurari Mallf); yya('). The High Court on the particular facts and circumstances of the case held :\n\n\"If the property is a choultry when the tax accrues due then the. tax cann9t be levied. If it is not a choultry on that\n\ndate, being used for other purposes, then the tax is leviable ev.en though in the past the prO]Jerty had been a choultry aud might become one again in the future\".\n\nThis decisicn is also, therefore, of no assistance to the appellant.\n\nAt any rate, we have looked at the matter from a.n entirely different angle. and. have come to the conclusion that section 83 (l )(b) is\n\nattaced m .thts case. . The appeal is, therefore, dismissed and the plambff's suit, IS decreed as held by the High Court.\n\nWe wiil however,. make no order as to costs in this appeal. '\n\nS.C.\n\nA ppea/ dismiHfrJ~\n\n(I) A. I. R. 1933 Madras 782: (1933) 65 M. L. J. 678.\n\n12) A. I. R. t J41 Madras 908 : (1941) 2 M. L. J. 544.\n\nOJ A. I. R. 194t Madras 185.\n\n(4) A. I. R. 19i8 Madras 923 .. 7-!.954SuoCI /74", "total_entities": 54, "entities": [{"text": "MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, TIRUPATHI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, TIRUPATHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "TIRUMALAI TIRUPATHI DEVASTHANAM", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Tirumalai Tirupathi Devasthanarn", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 6, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 79, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, TIRUPATHI\n\nTIRUMALAI TIRUPATHI DEVASTHANAM\n\nFebruary 6, 1974\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI AND P. K. GOSWAMI."}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. K. GOSWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 83(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 163, "end_char": 174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920", "statute": "Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "s. 83(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 463, "end_char": 474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920", "statute": "Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "District Municipalities Act, 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 491, "end_char": 524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1389, "end_char": 1394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras\n\nDistrict Municipalities Act, 1920", "statute": "the Madras\n\nDistrict Municipalities Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "S. 83(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1408, "end_char": 1416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras\n\nDistrict Municipalities Act, 1920", "statute": "the Madras\n\nDistrict Municipalities Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "Chouiiry", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1953, "end_char": 1961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Law Lexicn11 of British Tndia Co111.pilcd a11d edited by RiinUinatha Aiyar, 1940 Ed,)\n\n(ii) Chouiiry .is indeed an ancii;.nt institution and is principally meant for lodging of pilgnms and travellers."}}, {"text": "Madras1", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2147, "end_char": 2154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the first Municipal Legislation was passed in Madras1 such institutions were some G hun1ble sheds; but in course of time, such institutions grew in size and more and more demands were made oI them for comfort and convenience Of the pilgrims."}}, {"text": "Kayakaparameswari Anna Satranz", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3181, "end_char": 3211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tire conunissioner a11d a1101f1er, [1964] I.L.R. Anctfua Pradesh (Part lV) 379, Sri Kayakaparameswari Anna Satranz.", "canonical_name": "Kayakaparameswari Anna Satranz"}}, {"text": "M. Nattsan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3801, "end_char": 3811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J;.i M. Nattsan, K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekheran, for the appellant Krishnarao, E. Kalyanaram and G. N. Rao, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "K. Jayaram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3813, "end_char": 3823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J;.i M. Nattsan, K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekheran, for the appellant Krishnarao, E. Kalyanaram and G. N. Rao, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. Chandrasekheran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3828, "end_char": 3846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J;.i M. Nattsan, K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekheran, for the appellant Krishnarao, E. Kalyanaram and G. N. Rao, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Krishnarao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3866, "end_char": 3876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J;.i M. Nattsan, K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekheran, for the appellant Krishnarao, E. Kalyanaram and G. N. Rao, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "E. Kalyanaram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3878, "end_char": 3891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J;.i M. Nattsan, K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekheran, for the appellant Krishnarao, E. Kalyanaram and G. N. Rao, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "G. N. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3896, "end_char": 3905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J;.i M. Nattsan, K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekheran, for the appellant Krishnarao, E. Kalyanaram and G. N. Rao, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "GOSWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3975, "end_char": 3982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court was delivered by\n\nGOSWAMI, J.-This appeal by the defendent in the original •uit is by certificate grantect by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh to appeal against the judgment and decree of the said Court of 27th February, '\n\n1968."}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4071, "end_char": 4099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court was delivered by\n\nGOSWAMI, J.-This appeal by the defendent in the original •uit is by certificate grantect by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh to appeal against the judgment and decree of the said Court of 27th February, '\n\n1968."}}, {"text": "Tirumalai Tirupathi Devasthanarn", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4290, "end_char": 4322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respoqdent (hereinafter to be described as the plaintiff) is the Tirumalai Tirupathi Devasthanarn represented by its executive officer.", "canonical_name": "Tirumalai Tirupathi Devasthanarn"}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, .Chittoor", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4414, "end_char": 4442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff instituted a suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge, .Chittoor, on 10th March, 1961, praying for a declaration that the building known as 'Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam New Choultry\" situated within the area of the Municipal Council Tirupathi (hereinafter described as the defendant) bearing assessment No."}}, {"text": "Tirupati Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4696, "end_char": 4717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5361 of Tirupati Municipality, is exempted from property tax under section 83 ( 1) (b) of the Madras District Municipalities Act 1920 (Madras Act V of 1920) , briefly the Act, and for directing the defendant to refund the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4755, "end_char": 4765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras District Municipalities Act 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4782, "end_char": 4821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Act V of 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4823, "end_char": 4843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Venkateswara Swami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5405, "end_char": 5423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "building is a free Devasthanamas choultry intended purely for the convenience of the pilgrims visiting the famous Holy Shrine of Sri Venkateswara Swami at Tirumala and other Devasthanams attached to the."}}, {"text": "Tirumala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5427, "end_char": 5435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "building is a free Devasthanamas choultry intended purely for the convenience of the pilgrims visiting the famous Holy Shrine of Sri Venkateswara Swami at Tirumala and other Devasthanams attached to the."}}, {"text": "s01", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7944, "end_char": 7947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8315, "end_char": 8325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madura Municipal G Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8615, "end_char": 8641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Trial Court relied upon the decisions in Sri Ka1iyak1Jparame.- wari Anna Satram, represented by the Secretary, Sri Batchu Venkatesswar v. The Vi; ayawada Municipality, represented by its Executive Officer, the Municipal Commissioner(') and Madura Municipal G Council through its Commissioner, Rajiah D. Paul v. Madura etc.,"}}, {"text": "R. S. Nayudu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8750, "end_char": 8762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Devasthanams represented by its Executive Officer, R. S. Nayudu( 1)\n\nand rejected the plaintiff's claim."}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9033, "end_char": 9043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Devasthanam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11362, "end_char": 11373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "meet the annual expenditure of the institution and the balance must come from the pocket of the Devasthanam."}}, {"text": "Natesan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12244, "end_char": 12251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II Mr. Natesan, learned counsel for the appellant, subniit< that the plaintiff cannot in law claim exemption under section 83 ( 1) (b) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12352, "end_char": 12362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramanatha Aiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12884, "end_char": 12899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The word is defined in the Law Lexicon of British India compiled and edited by Ramanatha Aiyar, 1940 edition, as follows :-\n\n\"Choultry : Chatram, A choultry is a corruption of chavadi."}}, {"text": "Wilson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13318, "end_char": 13324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Wilson's Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms, second edition, page 108, the word is given in different forms such as Chawati or Chauti, corruptly, Choltry or Choultry and the meaning is given as \"A public lodging place, a >helter\n\nfor travellers\"."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13605, "end_char": 13611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The earliest Act on the subject in Madras is the Madras District Municipalities Act of J 884."}}, {"text": "section 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13682, "end_char": 13692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13901, "end_char": 13910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13921, "end_char": 13931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17939, "end_char": 17949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18059, "end_char": 18069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18214, "end_char": 18224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21062, "end_char": 21072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High G Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21152, "end_char": 21179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "upon a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High G Court in Kesarapalli Anjaneyulu and Another v. Eluru Munii:ipality,\n\nby it• Executive Officer, The Commissioner and Another('), where the question arose as to whether a portion of choultry, which is used for shops, can be brought within the purview of section 83 (1) (b) of this very Act."}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21426, "end_char": 21436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kanyakaparameswari Anna Satram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22183, "end_char": 22213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next decision cited by the appellant is in the case of Sri Kanyakaparameswari Anna Satram (supra).", "canonical_name": "Kayakaparameswari Anna Satranz"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22975, "end_char": 22992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court relied upon two decisiuns of the Madras High Court in Kodandaram Pillai v.\n\nThe Municipal Council, Trichinopoly,(') and Pandarasannadhi, Tirul'annamalai Adhi- 11am v. The Corporation of Madras(') . ."}}, {"text": "section 83( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23707, "end_char": 23721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24472, "end_char": 24482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_302_312_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "HINDUSTAN\n\nHOSI~'RY INDUSTRIES\n\nF. H. LALA AND ANOTHER\n\nFebmary 8, I974\n\n[S. N. DWIVEDI AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.]\n\nBo111b.ay [ndustrial -Rf!lations Act, 1946-:-w'orkmen's de1nand for rew.wnn of basic wages and dearness allowance of timt-rated and pitct-ratcd workers with retrospectil'f' eflect-Co11ct>pts of 111'11!rnun1 wage, fair wage, and livl\"g wnJ:e.\n\nPrinciples of wage fixation.\n\nCo11s!itutio11 of /f1dai .A rt. 136-Practice-Principlts go1•erni11g interference C with awards of Industrial Tribunals-Power not to ht exercised so as (o co111ert Suprcnie Court into a court of appeal.\n\nOn a demand by the Mill Mazdoor Sabha for the revision of basic wages for time-rated and piece-rated workers and for the rev1s1on of dearness nllowance, reference was made to the Industrial Court Maharashtra u/s 73-A of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. The Court follnd that on the face of it, the wages provided for the work.men of the factory were inadequate and low and i; ven in a loss-making concern, such wages have to b! raised: The Court further held that although the business was started by the appellant in 1967, it had earned profits of Rs. 1,51,000/- in 8 months of 1967 with a capital of Rs. 2,28,000/-. The appellant Company also earned profits of Rs. 1,88,000/- on the capital of Rs. 3,42,000/- in 1~68. The Court, therefore, held that the appellant-company was prosperous and its financial position was sound so as to tak:e the burden of the revision of pay scitles and dearness allowance.\n\nThe J ndustrial Court fixed the minimum Wages at Rs. S /- and fixed bigher wacs in a graded ntanner to the maximum. of Rs .. 8.SO per day.' The Tribunal also granted for every rise of 10 _points or part thereof, above the index bracket 621-630, dearness allowance @ lOP per day.\n\nThe wages of the piece-rated workers were raised by 30 per cent.\n\nOn appeal by special leave to this Court, the apllant raised the following contentions : (i) the Tribunal erred in ignoring the difference between ntinimum wage and fair wage; it was infact granting fair wage .and did not take into account the well-settled relevant factors in making the award; (ii) the tribunal absolutely ignored the aspect of the capacity of the appellant to bear the burden of the additional rise in -wages on account of the award; (iii) there is no justi- F fication whatsoever for allowing the present increase of wages without following :1ny piinciple and :ven higher than the statutory minimum waae fixed in respect of iJther industrits in the state.\n\nfhe Sabha, on the other hand, submitted as follows: {i) the Tribunal has awllrdcd only minimum wage; (ii) even if it is assumed that the wage awarded is a little higher than the minimum: \"'age, it is certainly tower than the lowest level of the fair wage; and (iii) in order to allow the wage increases the Tribunal had before it materials from the evidence famished in the Strctchlon A.ward G ::i.s well as the trend of wage rates with which the Tribunal must be ex:pectcd to be familiar, in the region and in the ind1,1stry.\n\nDismissine, the appeal,\n\nHELD: (i) From a perusal of the award it is clear that the Tribunal was coni dering the case from h~ poinf of_ view of .grantina omethiog hig_her than ~c subsistence or bare m1n1mum wage bordenng on fair waac. 'Ilus conc1us1on has been reached since th.! yardstick of the present award is the Stretchlon H awai-o which was seeking to determine some kind of fair wage, [307Cl\n\n(ii) from an ex:amiation of lhe decisions of this Court, it is clear that the floor _level is the bare minimum wage or subsistence wage.\n\nIn fix.in~ this\n\nwage: Industrial Tribunals will. ave to consider the position from the Point\n\nf VIC\\\\'.. of the wokcr. 1!1e capacity of the employer to pay sch a wage being irrelevant.\n\nThe fair wage also must take note of the economic reality of the situation and the minimum needs of the working class having a fair sized falilily with, an eye to the prc!ervation of his efficiency as a work.er. [310D)\n\nExprtss Newspaptrs (Prii-att) Ltd. and a11other v. Union of India and othtrl fl9.S9] S.C.R. 12, Mtsser.f. Crown Al1a11itti1u11 Works v. Their Workmen [1958] S.C.\"R. 651 quoted in [1953] S.C.R. 12, Kama11i Metals a11d Alloys Ltd. v.\n\nTl1tir Workmen [1967) 2 S.C.R. 463/467 Hydro Engineers (Pl't.) Ltd. v. Thr Work, nu:ri {1969] I L.L.J. 713/716 Mfs Jaydip Industries, Tlia11t v.\n\nT!te Workmen [1972] 1 L.L.J. 244/247 V. U11ic/1oyi v.\n\nState of Kuala [1962] J S.C.R. 951, quoted in [1972] 1 L.L.J. 244/247 and MIS Uniclie111 Laborat\"ries Ltd. v. The Workmen [1972) 1 L.L.J. 5161590/591, referred to.\n\nPiece-rate is what is paid by results or outturn of work.\n\nThere is greater consideration to quantity in fiXing piece-rates in some particular types of work in some industries with a guaranteed minimum.. The same standard may not be appropriate in all types of piece work. Factors such as the importance of man rather than the machine employed. correlation of piece-rates with time-rates of•the same or similar class of workers. special skill of the. worker with or without machine. the time factor in work and payment of a guaranteed ruinimuin will have to be considered.\n\nThere may be a -misty penumbra which has got lo be P.ierced through upon all available materials on record and also on what the Tnbunal, in fairness, can lay its hands on, with notice to the p<irties. for the purpose of fixing the piece-rates balancing all aspects.\n\nThe central figure in the adjudication, however, is the wage-earner who should have a fair deal in the bargain in a rCal sense as far as can be without at the same time ignoring the vital interests of the industry whose viability and prosperity ure ulso the\n\nmainstay of labour. [310G]\n\n(iii) 4tt 136 of the Constitution does not create a right of appeal in favour of any person. Jt confers power on the court which should not be so exercised\n\nas to convert the court into a court of appeal. Though Art. 136 is couched in the Widest terms. it is necessary for this Court to exercise its dicretionary jurisdiction only in cases where awards are made in violation of the principles of natural justice. causing substantial and grave injustice to parties or raises. an important principle of industrial Jaw requiring elucidation and final dech.1011 by this Court or discloses such othei exceptional or special circumstances which merit the consideration of this Court.\n\nTaking a comprehensive view of the facts and circumstances of the case, no intervention is called for with th\\! <1wanl.\n\n13 l!E]\n\nBengal C./iemical and PIUlnnaceutical Works Ltd. v. Their Workn1en, [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 136, !cfcrred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 548 of 1970.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Award dated the 29th Janu ary, 1970 of the Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Bombay, in rder-. ence (IC) N.o. 2 of J 969.\n\nG. B. Pai, Prakash Mehta., 0. C. Mathur an<l P. C. Bhartari. for G the appeUant.\n\nfl. K. Sowani, P. H. Parekh and S. Bhandare, for the rospondent.\n\nThe Judgme11t of the Court was delivered by-\n\nGoswAMI, J. This appeal by special ]eave is directed against an award of the Industrial Court. Maharashtra (hereinafter referred to for brevity as the Tribunal) of 29th January, 1970.\n\nThere was a reference by the Mill Mazdoor Sabha, Bombay (briefly the Sabha) under section 73A of the Bombay T ndustrhl Relations Act~ 1946, in\n\nSUPRE].!E COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974-J 3 S.C, R •.\n\npursuance of a notice of change dated 22nd August, 1968. The .Sabha. demanded revised, basic wages for the time-rated workme)l of several categories and also a rise of 50% in the wage of th• piccerated workers in the Consumers' Price Index bracket 621--030 (old series).· The Sabha also demanded dearness allowance of iO paise per day for every rise of 10 points or part thereof abov.e the said stab.\n\nThey also claimed the benefits retrospeetively fr0m 1st June, 1968.\n\nThe Sabha submitted its statement of claim on 14th February, 1969.\n\nIt appears that the appellant is a . partnership firm which was constituted and commenced production in April 1967. Tne lirm manufactures and sells nylon and hosiery goods such as socks, undergarments, and tbe like. It is registered with the Maharashtra State.\n\nDirectorate of Industries as a small scale industry.\n\nPrior to April 1967, .all the partners of .the appellant were partners of a firm knOwn as M/s. Hindustan I:Iosfory Factory. That firm again was constituted and commenced business on and from 15th December, 1963, after the dissolution of India I:Iosiery Factory on 14th December, 1963, due to . differences amongst the partners.\n\nOn the same date, some other partners of India I:Iosiery Factory constitu•ed another firm k, nown as Stretchlon Private Ltd. While Stretchlon Private Ltd. continued to function, I:Iindustan I:Iosiery Factory was closed in August 1966 and the appellant constituted and commenced business in the name_ and style of I:Iindustan I:Iosiery Industries with effect from 17th April, 1967, on which date another firm also commenced business. under the name and style of I:Iindustan I:Iosiery Mills.\n\nI.t appears that all these three firms, namely, Stretchlon Private Ltd., the appellant and the Hindustan I:Iosiery Mills are off shoots of tbe India I:Iosiery Fac• tory with a complement of 800 workmen which was actually the pioneer in tbe industry.\n\nThe Sabha contended before the Tribunal that the consolidated wages paid to the employees were extremely low.\n\nAccording to the Sabha, tbe time-rated workmen got as tow a wage of Rs. 2.50 per day a.nd never higher than Rs. 3.50 per day.\n\nThe piece-rated wor ker9, who, according to the Sabha, are skilled workers, earned between Rs. 6Jand Rs. 7fper day. The Sabha, therefore, claimed a revision of the wages _of both the categories.\n\nThe appellant resisted the claim. According to tbe appellant,. it is a new concern and has employed some of the workers of the Hin dustan Hosiery Factory. The average dat1y wages of the piece-rated .iobs vary from Rs. 6Jto Rs. I 0120 per dav and are adequate. The work involved in the jobs is not of highly skilled nature. The aopeltant further contended that the compaay was only of two years standing and the wages prud by it are higher than those earned bv em ployees of other concerns in the industry. Its financial position also cannot be assessed as it is hardly two years old.\n\nThe demands are excessive and the appellant cannot bear the additional burden arising -0ut of these demands.\n\nHJNDUSTAN HOSIERY INDUSTRIES v. F. H. LALA (Goswami, J.) ! :ios\n\nThe appellant has in its employme.nt about 250 workers. . The Tribunal had before it a statement (Ext. C-2) filed by the appellant showing the number of employees receiving wages below Rs\" 51per day, another statement (Ext. C-3) with regard to the o'.her employees and also the books filed by the appellant and observed that many of the piece-rated and time-rated employees got as low a wage as Rs. 4.60 per day and Rs. 2.50 per day respectively.\n\nIt, therefore, held that \"on the face of it the wages provided for the workmen of the factory appear to be inadequate and low and even in a lossmaking concern such wages have to be raised\".\n\nThe appellant started its business on 17th April, 1967.\n\nThe Tribunal found from the sta'.emcnt, Ext. U-1, filed by the Sabha regarding its financial position that the appellant \"earned substantial profits in the period of 8 months in 1967 and in 1968\". The Tribunal found that during' the period of 20 months since April, 1967, the appellant has earned a profit of Rs. 1,51,000jin eight months of 1967 and Rs. 1,88,000jin 1968.\n\nThese profits are after deduction of depreciation, interest and .bonus.\n\nThe Tribunal observed that the appellant having a capital of Rs. 2,28,000Iin 1967 and Rs. 3,42,0001- .in '1968 was prosperous and. i's financial position was sound.\n\nTne Tribunal also observed that \"the wages paid to the employees on the piece-rate and the time. rate are very low and require revision\".\n\nThe appellant wanted the Tribunal to follow the wage scale of William Industries submitted by the appellant as per Ext.C-1.\n\nBut the Tribuual in the absence of any details with regard to the fina11cial p0sition of ti1at company or its profit making capacity, did not consider it appropriate to consider that as a comparable unit.\n\nThe Sabha, on the other hand, contended that the appellant was more prosperous than Stretchlon Private Ltd. and produced an award of the Industrial Court in the case of Stretchlon Private Ltd. dated 10th April, 1967, published in the Maharashtra Gazette of 11th May, 1967. It appears that the demand for increase of wages in the case of Stretchlon Private Ltd. was mnde in 1966 within three years of its functioning from 15th December, 1963, and before the Industrial Court in that case profit and loss accounts for the years 1963-64 and 1964-65 were made available.\n\nIt further appears that in the said award the Industrial Court took nole of the position of three other smaller concerns, some of which were even running at a loss and still were paying wages higher than the Stretchlon Private Ltd. The Industrial Court. therefore. awarded Rs. 5/- per day \"as a reasonable and fair minimum wage to the Stretch- Jon employees of the lowest category in the Consumers' Price Index bracket 621-630\".\n\nAlthough the Sabha in this case has asked for different rates of basic wages for employees in five categories the Tribunal directed that the first 13 categories being the lowest potld workers should receive Rs. 51per day in the Index bracket 621-630.\n\nThe nel; t group serial Nos. 14 to 19 were given Rs. 5.50 per day in the same l>raket, serial Nos. 20-21 were given Rs. 7/- per day, serial No. 22 Rs. 7.50 per day and serial No. 23 Rs. 8.50 per day in the af'?resaid bracket.\n\nThe Tribun.al also. granted for every rise of 10 pomts or part thereof, aboe the mdex bracket 621-630, dearness allowance at the rate of 10 paise per .day.\n\nWi!h regard IQ the claim for\n\nSUPR~ME COURT 11.EPORTS\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\n5()% rise in piece-rates, the Tribunal only granted 30% in the Index bracket 621-630 and the same dearness allowance as above. The Tribunal also granted the benefits retorspectively with effect from I st February, 1969.\n\nIt is contended on behalf of the appellant that the Tribunal erred in ignoring the difference between minimum wage and fair wage.\n\nIt is submitted that tlie Tribunal was in fact granting fair wage and did not take into account the well-settled relevant factors into consideration in making the award.\n\nThe appellant emphasises that the Tribunal absolutely ignored the aspect of the capacity of the appellant to bear the burden of the additional rise in wages on account of this award. The appellant also submitted that the Tribunal ought not to have ignored the settlement with regard to wage arrived at by the Hindustan Hosiery Mills with the Sabha. lly that settlement, the said partnership firm constituted by the other group of partners of Hindustan Hosiery Factory agreed with the Sabha to give an increase of Re. 1 /\" per day in the wages of the workers getting Rs. 5/- per day or less and an increase of 50 paise pe~ day in the wages of the workers getting more than Rs. 51per clay.\n\nThe appellant was prepared to allow this increase which would have imposed an additional burden of Rs. 56,022/- pcr year\n\nThe respondent, on the other hand, submits that the Tribunal has awarded only minimum wage.\n\nEven if it is '15Sumed' that the wage awarded is a little higher than the minimum wage, it is certainly lower than the lowest level 'of the fair wage.\n\nThe learned counsel submits that in order to allow. the wage increase the Tribunal had before it materials from _the evitlence furnished in the Stretchlon award as well as the trend of wage rates with which the Tribunal must be expected to be familiar in the region.and in the industry.\n\nIt is well seJtled that no industry can be allowed to carry on its business if itis unable to pay the minimum wage to its employees. The iiluustry with which we are concerned is, however, not a scheduled industry in Which the State Government has fixed any minimum wage under the Minimum Wages Act.\n\nThe appellant submitted from certain GaZ.elte Notifications the minimum rates of wages prescribed by the State Government fu case of some eight different industries between the years 1969 and 1972 where the monthly wages have been fixed between Rs. 90/- and Rs. 128/- per month.\n\nThe appellant submits that there is no justification whatsoever for allowing the present increase of wages without following any principle and even higher than the statutory minimum wage fixed in respect of other industries in the Statec In the written statement filed before the Court the Sabhastated in paragraphs 5 and 6 .s follows :-\n\n\"5. The present wages of botli the piece-rated and timerated workers are excessively low and are much lower thali those considered to be the absolute minimum payable by any employer to his workers in the Bombay Region.\n\nThese wages are also much lower than those paid by comparable concerns in the Industry.\n\nHINDUSTAN HOSIERY INDUSTlllES v. F: H. LA'LA {Goswami, J.) 307\n\n6. The Second Party Concern is well in a position to bear the additional burden that may be placed upon it by the revision of the wages and the grant of dearness allowance as demanded by the Sabha\".\n\nThe appellant, however, in para 5 of their written statement before the Tribunal stated that it could not \"bear the additional burden which may arise on account of the revision of wages and D.A. as demanded by the first party and submits that for awarding wages and also D.A. it is not only the. ability but also the stability of the concern which shpuld be considered by this Honourable Court\".These being the rival contentions of the parties before the Tribunal, it was required to consider whether it was a ease of bare minimum wage or some thing higher than it.\n\nFrom a perusal of the award, we are clearly of opinion that the Tribunal 'was considering the Gase from the point of view of grant- ; ng something higher than the subsistence or bare minimum wage bordering on fair wage.\n\nWe have reached this conclusion since the yardstick of the present award is the Stretchlon Award which was obviously seeking to determin.e rather some kind of fair wage as will be clear from the following extract from that Award :-\n\n\"It (the company) can, therefore offer to pay higher minimum wages to lowest category of employees.\n\nOn due consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances I find that Rs. 51per day should be the reasonable and fair minimum wage to the lowest category of employees of the company\".\n\nComing to the piece; ates also the Tribunal di.d not give any specific reasons for awarding 30% increase as against the demand of the Sabha. fru: 50% rise in addition to Dearness Allowance.\n\nThe Tribunal, however, observed that \"this increase would give adequate average daily earnings to the piece-rated employees. This increase would bring the emoluments near the level of minimum '\\\"age payable in the region and it would not place a very heavy burden on the\n\nemployer~'. We will now consider the principles settled by this Court in the matter of wage fixation. In Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd., and Ant>!IU!r v. TM Union of India and 0tMrs(1 ), this Court was considering in an exhaustive judgment, inter alia, the concept of minimum wage, fair wage and living wage and approvingly quoted from page 9, para 10, of the Report of the Committee on Fair Wages, to the following effect:\n\n\"We consider that a minimum wage must provide not merely for the bare sustenance of life but for the preservation of the efficiency of the worker.\n\nFor this purpose, the minimum wage must also provide for some measure of education, riiedical requirements and amenities\".\n\nThis Court further observed : ''There is also a distinction between a bare subsistence or toinimum wage .and a statutory minimum wage.\n\nThe\n\n(I) [1959] S.C.R. 12. 83-86.\n\nformer is a wage which would be sufficient to cover the bare physicai needs of a worker and his family, that.is a rate which hasgot to be paid to the worker irrespective of the capacity of the industry to pay. If an industry is unable to pay to its workmen at least a bare minimum wage it has no right to exist\". (See Messrs Crown Aluminium Works. v.\n\nTheir Workmen(').\n\nIt was further observed :\n\n\"The statutory minimu, m wage however is the minimu1n which is prescribed by the statute and it may be higher than the bare subsistence or minimum wage, providing for some measure of education, medical requirements and amenities, as contemplated above. . . . . . . . . . While the lower limit of the fair wage must obviously be the minimum wage, the upper limit is equally .. set by what may _broadly be called the capacity of industry to pay. 'fhis will pepend not only on the present economic position of the industry but on its future prospects ........ It will be noticed that the \"fair wage\" is thus a mean between the living wage and the minimum wage and even the minimum wage contemplated above is something more than the bare minimum or subsistence wage which would. be sufficient to cover the bare physical needs of the worker and his family, a wage which woul<) provide also for the preservation of the efficiency of the worker and for some measure of education, medical requirements and amenities\" .............. This concept of minimum wage is in harmony with the advance of thought in all civilised countries and approximates to the statutory minimum wage whkb the State should strive to achieve having regard to the Directive Principle of State Policy mentioned above\". ft was further observed :\n\n\"It will also he noticed that the content of the expression \"minimum wage\", *fair wage' and 'living wage' is not fixed and static.\n\nIt varies and is bound to vary from time to time.\n\nWith the growth and development of national economy, living standards would improve and so would our notions about the respective categories of wages expend and be more progressive\".\n\nIn Kwnani Metals & AJloys Ltd. v. Their Workmeri( 2 ), this - Court observed as follows :- . \"Fixation of a wage-structure is always a delicate task because a balance has to be struck between the demand of social justice which requires that the workmen should receive their proper share of the national income which they help to produce with a view to improving their standard of living, and the depletion which every increase in wages makes. in the profits as this tends to drivert 'capital from industry into other channels thought to be more profitable.\n\nThe task ·-(I) [t95B] S.C.R. 651 quoted in [t959] S.c.R. !2. (2) 11958] 2 S.C.R. i63, 467.\n\nis not rendered any the easier because conditions vary from region to region, industry to industry and establishment to establishment.\n\nTo cope with these differences certain principles on which wages are fixed have been stated from time to time by this Court. Broadly speaking the first principle is lhat there is minimum wage which, in any event, must be paid, irrespective of the extent of profits, the financial condition of the establishment or the availaliility of workmen on lower wages. This minimum wage is independent of the kind of industry and applies to all alike big or small. It sets the lowest limit below which wages cannot be allowed to sink in all humanity.\n\nThe •econd principle is that wages must be fair, that is to say, suflicient!Y high t? provide a standard family wih food, sheJte:, clothmg, medical care and educal!On of children appropriate to the work- 1nan but not at a rate exceeding his wage earning capacit.Y in the class of establishment to which he belongs. A fair\n\nwage is thus related to the earning capaci; y .and th~ :ivorkload. It must, however, be realised that _fair. wae .ts not 'iiving wage' by which is meant a wage which ts sufficient o provide not only the essentials abov~-:nentioned . but a fatr measure of frugal comfort with an ab1hty to provide .f'!r old age and evil days.\n\nFair wage lies between the. ; nm1mum wage, which must be paid in any event, and the hvmg wage, which is the goal\"\n\nIn Hydro (Engineers) (Private) Ltd. v. Their Workmen,(') this Court obser.ved as follows : -\n\n\"lt is thus clear that the concept of minimum wages does take in the factor of the prevailing cost of essential commodities whenever such minimum wage is to be fixed.\n\nThe idea of fixing such wage in the light of cost of living at a\n\nparticular juncture of time and of neulralizing the rising prices of essential commodities by linking up scales of minimum wages with the cost of living index cannot, therefore, be said to be alien to the concept of a minimum wage\".\n\nIn M /s. Jaydip Industries, rhana v. The Workmen,(') this Court rctcrred to the observation in an earlier decision of this Court in U.\n\nUnichoyi v. State of Kera/a, (3 ) as follows :-\n\n\"Sometimes the minimum wage is described as a bare minimum wage in order to distinguish it from the wage structure which is 'subsistence plus' or fair wage, but too much emphasis on the adjective 'bare' in relation to the minimum wage is apt to lead to the erronous assumption that the maintenance wage is a wage which enables the worker to cover his bare physical needs and keep himself just above starvation.\n\nThat clearly is not intended by the concept of minimum wage.\n\nOn the other hand, since the capacity of the employer to pay is treated as irrelevant, it is but right il)[T969]1T. i..-J:-713; 716..\n\n(2) [[19721 IL. L. J. 244, 217. (J) [1902] [ S. C.R. 957 quoted in [1972] IL. L. J. 244, 247.\n\nthat. no addition should be made to the components of the A minimum wage near the lower level of the fair wage but the\n\ncontens of this concept must ensure for the cmplyec not only his sustennce and that of his family but must also preserve his efficiency as a worker\".\n\nJn M/s Unichem Laboratories Ltd. v The Workmen(') this Gourt further observed as follows :- B\n\n.\"In the fixation of wages and dearness allowance the legal position JS well established that it has to be done on an\n\n1dust_ry-cum-region. basis having due regard to the financial capacity of the umt under consideration. . . . . . Industrial adjudication should always take into account, when revising the wage structure and granting dearness allowance the problem of the additional burden to be imposed o~ the employer and ascertain whether the employer can reasonably be called upon to bear such burden ...... As pointed out in Greaves Cotton and Co. and others v. Their Workmen (') . One of .. tbo principles to be adopted in fiixing wages and dearness allowance is that the Tribunal should take into account the wage scale and dearness allowance -prevailing in comparable concerns carrying on the same industry in the region\".\n\nFrom an examination of the aecisionS of this Court, it is clear that the floor level is the bare mir)imum wage or subsistence wage.\n\nJn lixing this wage, Industrial Tribunals will have to consider the position from the point of view of the worker; the capacity of the employer to pay such a wage being irrelevant.\n\nThe fair wage also most take note of the economic reality of the situation and the minimum needs of the worker having a fair-sized family with an eye to the pre~ scrvation of his. efficiency as a worker.\n\nWage fi0ation is an important subject in ·, ny social welfare progrc, mme.\n\nWage cannot be fixed in a vacuum and has necessarily to take note of so many factors from real life a worker lives, or is reaso nably expected to live or to look forward to with hope and fervency ir..the entire social context. It is obvious that some principles have to be evolved from the conditions and circumstances of actual life.\n\nPiece rate is what is paid of results or outturn of \\VOrk which is nften described as a \"task\".\n\nThere is greater consideration to quantity in fixing piece rates in some particular types of work in some indus:\\rics with a guaranteed minimum. The same standatd mav not b, appropriate in all types of piece work With reference to particular work the importance of man rather than the machine enwloyed may have to be dealt with differently. Even in piece rates it will be necessary to look aroll!ld to find some correlation with time rates of the same or similar class. of workers, for example, the contribution of the worker to the job, the nature of tile work. the part\n\n(Ii [1972] 1 L L. J. 57~, 590, 591. m [19641 S S. C.R. 362 quoted in [1972] I L. L. J. 576.\n\npla)ed by the machine, the incentive Io work and above all protection against any creation of industrial unrest bec.ause of the existence side by sid' o[ two categories of workers, particularly if there is no pbssibility ol transfer of labour from one type of work to the other from time to time. Again tliere may be some work where special skill of the worker with or without machine may be necessary and that factor will have to be then considered. It will vary from indus-· try to industry and from the process to another. No hard and fast rule can be laid down nor is it possible or helpful. The Tribunal, in \"\" industri:il adjudication. will have to see that piece-rates do not drive workers to fatigue to the limit o! exhaustion and hence will keep an eye on the time factor in work. Then again a guaranteed minimum mav also have to be provided so that for no fault of a diligent worker he docs not stand to lose on any account. There may be a misty penumbra which has got to be pierced through uponal! available materials on record and also on what the Tribunal, in fairness. can lav its hands pn, with notice to the parties, for the pur- P<l!>e of fixing the piece-rates balancing all aspects.\n\nWe have only indicated broadlv the bare outlines o! approach in a inatter so involved and sensitive as wage fixation particularly when no one at the orcscnt time can shut one's eyes to the rising spiral of prices of essential c-0mmodities.\n\nThe central figure in the adjudication, how-· ever. is the wage-earner who should have a fair deal in the bargain in a real sense as far as can be without at the same time ignoring the vital interests of the iiidustrv whose viability and prosperity are also the mainstay of labour.\n\nHow the various competing claims have to be balanced in a given case should mainly be the function of an imoortia! adjudicator in an industrial proceeding unless the legislature chooses to adopt other appropriate means and methods.\n\nArticle 136 of the Constitutiord!oes not create a right of appeal in favour of anv person.\n\nIt conf'ers power on the Court which should not he so exe1cised as to convert the Court into a Court of appeal. \"Industrial Disputes Act is intended to be a seif-contained one and it seeks to achieve special justice on the basis o! collective bargaining. conciliation and arbitration'.. Awards are _given on circumstances occuliar 10 each dispute and th.e tribunals are, to a large extent, free from the restrictions of technical consitlerations imposed on courts.\n\nA free and liberal exercise of the power under Article 136 may mate•\n\nriallv affect the fundamental basis of such decisiors. namely. quick solution to such disputes to . achieve industrial peace.\n\nThough Article 136 is couched in widest terms, it is necessary for this Court to exercise its discretionat'V jurisdiction only in cases where awards arc made in violation of the principles of natural justice, causing\n\nsubstantial and iuave injustice to oarties or raises an imoortant princiole of industrial law requiring elucidation and final decision by this Court or disclosure~ such other exceptional or special circwnstances which merit the CC!Usideration of this Court\". per Subba Rao.\n\nJ. in IBeneal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Thrir WorkmPn(I). None of the_ arj!11ments raised by the appellant sllould br ufficient to persuade the Court to inteqlOse relief in its fnvour\n\n(I) (1959] Supp. 2s: c. R: t36 at 140.\n\n'°n. the facts and circumstances_ of this case. It is not quiic correct to say that the Industrial Court bas not followed the principles of wage-revision expounded by this Court.\n\nThe lndustrial Court ha;; taken into account the prevailin_g minimum wa_ge rates in the region, .and the. capacity of the appellant lo bear the burden of th~ increased wages.\n\nCounsel for the appellant could not show to us that the wall\" rates fixed by the lndustri_al Court arc unfair for the appellant . or thrit it cannot bear the load of increased wa.ges. -The wages of the piece rated workmen had to be increased in line with the in- .creased wages of the time-rated workmen with the object of avoiding .discrimination and heart-burning among workers and maintenance of industrial peace among them.\n\nTaking a comprehensive view of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that no intervention is called for 'Yith the award.\n\nIn the result, the appeal is dismissed.\n\nWe will. however, make no order as to costs in thio .appeal.\n\n:S.B.W.\n\nAppeal llis111isfed.", "total_entities": 44, "entities": [{"text": "HINDUSTAN\n\nHOSI~'RY INDUSTRIES", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HINDUSTAN HOSIERY INDUSTRIES", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "F. H. LALA AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "F. H. LALA AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Febmary 8, I974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 71, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HINDUSTAN\n\nHOSI~'RY INDUSTRIES\n\nF. H. LALA AND ANOTHER\n\nFebmary 8, I974\n\n[S. N. DWIVEDI AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. N. DWIVEDI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.N. DWIVEDI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Industrial Court Maharashtra", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 768, "end_char": 796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a demand by the Mill Mazdoor Sabha for the revision of basic wages for time-rated and piece-rated workers and for the rev1s1on of dearness nllowance, reference was made to the Industrial Court Maharashtra u/s 73-A of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act."}}, {"text": "s 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 799, "end_char": 803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4079, "end_char": 4081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1967) 2 S.C.R. 463", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4246, "end_char": 4265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5937, "end_char": 5945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. B. Pai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6858, "end_char": 6867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai, Prakash Mehta.,"}}, {"text": "Prakash Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6869, "end_char": 6882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai, Prakash Mehta.,"}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6888, "end_char": 6897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur an<l P. C. Bhartari."}}, {"text": "P. C. Bhartari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6903, "end_char": 6917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur an<l P. C. Bhartari."}}, {"text": "K. Sowani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6944, "end_char": 6953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Sowani, P. H. Parekh and S. Bhandare, for the rospondent."}}, {"text": "P. H. Parekh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6955, "end_char": 6967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Sowani, P. H. Parekh and S. Bhandare, for the rospondent."}}, {"text": "S. Bhandare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6972, "end_char": 6983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Sowani, P. H. Parekh and S. Bhandare, for the rospondent."}}, {"text": "GoswAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7052, "end_char": 7059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgme11t of the Court was delivered by-\n\nGoswAMI, J. This appeal by special ]eave is directed against an award of the Industrial Court."}}, {"text": "Mill Mazdoor Sabha, Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7266, "end_char": 7292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a reference by the Mill Mazdoor Sabha, Bombay (briefly the Sabha) under section 73A of the Bombay T ndustrhl Relations Act~ 1946, in\n\nSUPRE].!E COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974-J 3 S.C, R •.\n\npursuance of a notice of change dated 22nd August, 1968."}}, {"text": "section 73A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7319, "end_char": 7330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14th February, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7945, "end_char": 7964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sabha submitted its statement of claim on 14th February, 1969."}}, {"text": "Tne lirm", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8083, "end_char": 8091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tne lirm manufactures and sells nylon and hosiery goods such as socks, undergarments, and tbe like."}}, {"text": "Directorate of Industries", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8229, "end_char": 8254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Directorate of Industries as a small scale industry."}}, {"text": "Stretchlon Private Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8713, "end_char": 8736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same date, some other partners of India I:Iosiery Factory constitu•ed another firm k, nown as Stretchlon Private Ltd. While Stretchlon Private Ltd. continued to function, I:Iindustan I:Iosiery Factory was closed in August 1966 and the appellant constituted and commenced business in the name_ and style of I:Iindustan I:Iosiery Industries with effect from 17th April, 1967, on which date another firm also commenced business."}}, {"text": "I:Iindustan I:Iosiery Industries", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8925, "end_char": 8957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same date, some other partners of India I:Iosiery Factory constitu•ed another firm k, nown as Stretchlon Private Ltd. While Stretchlon Private Ltd. continued to function, I:Iindustan I:Iosiery Factory was closed in August 1966 and the appellant constituted and commenced business in the name_ and style of I:Iindustan I:Iosiery Industries with effect from 17th April, 1967, on which date another firm also commenced business."}}, {"text": "17th April, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8975, "end_char": 8991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same date, some other partners of India I:Iosiery Factory constitu•ed another firm k, nown as Stretchlon Private Ltd. While Stretchlon Private Ltd. continued to function, I:Iindustan I:Iosiery Factory was closed in August 1966 and the appellant constituted and commenced business in the name_ and style of I:Iindustan I:Iosiery Industries with effect from 17th April, 1967, on which date another firm also commenced business."}}, {"text": "I:Iindustan I:Iosiery Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9073, "end_char": 9100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "under the name and style of I:Iindustan I:Iosiery Mills."}}, {"text": "Hindustan I:Iosiery Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9198, "end_char": 9223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.t appears that all these three firms, namely, Stretchlon Private Ltd., the appellant and the Hindustan I:Iosiery Mills are off shoots of tbe India I:Iosiery Fac• tory with a complement of 800 workmen which was actually the pioneer in tbe industry."}}, {"text": "Sabha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9640, "end_char": 9645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The piece-rated wor ker9, who, according to the Sabha, are skilled workers, earned between Rs."}}, {"text": "Hin dustan Hosiery Factory", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9915, "end_char": 9941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it is a new concern and has employed some of the workers of the Hin dustan Hosiery Factory."}}, {"text": "William Industries", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12057, "end_char": 12075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant wanted the Tribunal to follow the wage scale of William Industries submitted by the appellant as per Ext."}}, {"text": "10th April, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12525, "end_char": 12541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sabha, on the other hand, contended that the appellant was more prosperous than Stretchlon Private Ltd. and produced an award of the Industrial Court in the case of Stretchlon Private Ltd. dated 10th April, 1967, published in the Maharashtra Gazette of 11th May, 1967."}}, {"text": "11th May, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12583, "end_char": 12597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sabha, on the other hand, contended that the appellant was more prosperous than Stretchlon Private Ltd. and produced an award of the Industrial Court in the case of Stretchlon Private Ltd. dated 10th April, 1967, published in the Maharashtra Gazette of 11th May, 1967."}}, {"text": "15th December, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12747, "end_char": 12766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the demand for increase of wages in the case of Stretchlon Private Ltd. was mnde in 1966 within three years of its functioning from 15th December, 1963, and before the Industrial Court in that case profit and loss accounts for the years 1963-64 and 1964-65 were made available."}}, {"text": "1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\n5", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14017, "end_char": 14034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hindustan Hosiery Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14865, "end_char": 14888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant also submitted that the Tribunal ought not to have ignored the settlement with regard to wage arrived at by the Hindustan Hosiery Mills with the Sabha."}}, {"text": "Hindustan Hosiery Factory", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14998, "end_char": 15023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lly that settlement, the said partnership firm constituted by the other group of partners of Hindustan Hosiery Factory agreed with the Sabha to give an increase of Re."}}, {"text": "Which the State Government has fixed any minimum wage under the Minimum Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16116, "end_char": 16197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17023, "end_char": 17029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present wages of botli the piece-rated and timerated workers are excessively low and are much lower thali those considered to be the absolute minimum payable by any employer to his workers in the Bombay Region."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30513, "end_char": 30524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30718, "end_char": 30741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31118, "end_char": 31129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31275, "end_char": 31286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31749, "end_char": 31758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "per Subba Rao."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_313_314_EN", "year": 1974, "text": ".. c\n\nSASTHI KEOT\n\nTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\nFebruaryS, 1974\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S: SARKARIA, JJ.]\n\nMaintenance of ltuernal Security Act, 1971 s. 3(3)-Vagueness of grounds_: Opportunity 11ot afforded for making representation-Effect of.\n\nPursuant to an order of detention issued under s. 3(1) read withs. 3(2) of the _Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 the petitioner was detained. One of the grounds of detention, which wei$hed with the detaining authority, the Government and the Advisory Board was that the petitioner was a \"man of desperate habits and dangerous character and also prone to committing theft of undergrou.nd cables\".\n\nAllowing the petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution,\n\nHELD: The order of detention_ is in violation of both ArL 22(5) of the Constitution and s. 3 (3} of the Act and therefore must be quashed: Thegrounds \"desperate habits\" and \"dangerous character'.' cannot be regarded as any~ thing but vague grounds.\n\nApart from the vice of vagueness every desparate or dangerous man cannot be run down under s. 3 of the Act.\n\nMoreover, the vitat yet injurious dossier about the petitioner has not been communicated to him and' opportunity afforded for making a proper representation.\n\n[314 B]\n\nCRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 1697 of 1973.\n\nUnder Art. 32 of the Constitution for. issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus.\n\nSadhu Sinph. for tho petitioner.\n\n/)a/ip Sin11h ami G. S. Chatter; ee, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J .-The petitioner has moved this Court under art 32 of the Constitution for the issuance of a writ of habeas carpus, he being under detention by order of the District Magistrate, Burdwan, under sub-s.(1), read with sub-s.(2) of s. 3 of MISA (Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971). Various grounds, similar to those considered by us in Bhut Nath Mate v. Slate of West Bengal( 1), have beerr\n\nurged, and our conclusions thereon are similar to those we hav~ already express:d in the other writ petitions.\n\nIt is important to note that in the aflidavit-in-opposition, filed 011 behalf of the respondent we find a statement as under :\n\n\"! further state that it appears from the records that the detenue petitioner is a man of desperate habits and dangerous character and also prone to committing theft of underground tele-communication cable.\"\n\nCt) Writ Pctitio; N;-1456 or-i91J; judgment delivered on February 8, 1974.\n\n31~\n\nSUPRE~1E COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nThis has been relied upon by the State as additional ground 111 A support of the detention, apart from the theft of cables, recited in the detention order and repeated in tho counter affidavit. Counsd camlidl; admitted that this additional circumstance had been placed bdorn the\n\nState Government and the Advisory board, and certainly was before the District Magistrate when he passed the detention order.\n\nIt i' perfectly plain that the authorities have been influenced by the 1cpon of lhe police that the petitioner was \"a man of desperate habits and 8 uangeruus character and also prone to committing theft of underground cables.\" We do not regard 'desperate habits' and 'dangerous .:haractcr\" aS anything but yague. Apart from the vice of vagueness which perhap~ may not matter so far as the satisfaction of the authorities is concerned. every desperate. or dangerous man cannot be run down under s. 3 of th...:: MISA. Moreoy, cr, this vital yet injurious dossier about the petitioner has not hecn communicated to him and opportunity afforded for making C a proper representation contra. Therefore there is violation both of art. 22(5) of the Con, titution and of s.3(3) of the Aet. In this vie1L we are constrained to quash the dctcn.tion order on the petitioner and direct his release. ·\n\nP.B.R.\n\nPetition allowed.\n\n...", "total_entities": 22, "entities": [{"text": "c\n\nSASTHI KEOT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SASTHI KEOT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S: SARKARIA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Maintenance of ltuernal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151, "end_char": 158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Maintenance of ltuernal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "Maintenance of ltuernal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 293, "end_char": 300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Maintenance of ltuernal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "Maintenance of ltuernal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 326, "end_char": 368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 681, "end_char": 688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 799, "end_char": 803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1052, "end_char": 1056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1310, "end_char": 1317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Sadhu Sinph", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1392, "end_char": 1403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sadhu Sinph."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1528, "end_char": 1540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J .-The petitioner has moved this Court under art 32 of the Constitution for the issuance of a writ of habeas carpus, he being under detention by order of the District Magistrate, Burdwan, under sub-s.(1), read with sub-s.(2) of s. 3 of MISA (Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971)."}}, {"text": "art 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1588, "end_char": 1594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1771, "end_char": 1775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1785, "end_char": 1827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "February 8, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2446, "end_char": 2462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ct) Writ Pctitio; N;-1456 or-i91J; judgment delivered on February 8, 1974."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3413, "end_char": 3417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MISA. Moreoy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3429, "end_char": 3441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or dangerous man cannot be run down under s. 3 of th...:: MISA."}}, {"text": "art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3641, "end_char": 3651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3680, "end_char": 3686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_315_328_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "BHUT NATH METE\n\nTHE ST ATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\nFebruary 8, 1974.\n\n[V. R. KRISHNAlYER AND R. S. S•RKARIA, JJ.]\n\nMai:11teli!'1ce of 1'1ternal Security Act! 19?1-s. 3-Continuance of c111erze11cy no.t a 1usl1C1able issue-Order of dettntion rf bad because crhnlnal prosmllions fculed-lf Govenment should pass a speak111g ordtr-Con1m,, nication of facts cornerstone of right of representation-Poverty and illiteracy if relevant to s. 3.\n\nThe petitioner was detained under s.3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1_971 on the ground that he broke open wagons and looted wheat and tea.\n\nThe reoort which was sent by the Police to the District Magistrate was forwarded to the Government and the Board. It contained information that the petitioner was -poor and illiterate, had associates in notorious wagonbrcakers and anti-!OC'ial clements, had developed the spirit of lawlessness and aptitude for antisocial activities and that many of the reported and unreported cases of recent and criminal activities existed to his credit besides the instances communicated to the detcnu.\n\nIt was contended that ( 1) there was np real emergency and yet the proclamation of emergency remained unrctracted with consequential peril to fundamental rights; (2) that sections 3(3) and 10 of the Maintenance of Internal\n\nSeurity Act violated art. 22(5) of the Constitution; (3) that the order was n1ale fide because it was made after and on account of the discharge of the petitioner in the relative criminal cases; (4) that a seeaking order should be passed by the government or by the Advisory Board while apprcving or advising\n\ncontinuance of detention and (5) that some irrelevant and uncommunicated ch:irges had influenced the authority, vitiating the Q,!'der of detention.\n\nAllowing the petition,\n\nHELD : ( 1) Academic exercise in constitutional law arc not for courts but jurists and it is not possible to hold that \"the continuance of emcrgcnc}' was void.\n\nIt is outside the orbit of judicial control and wandering into the paral)Olitical sector. The argument is political, not a justiciable issue and the appeal should\n\nb~ to the polls and not to the courts. [321 H]\n\nRex v. Govtr11or of Wormwood Scrubbs. Prison, [1920] 2 K.B. 305, Tlzt kill!! v. Halliday, [1917) A.C. 260, 270 and Ri11gka11 v. Goi•er11mtnt of Malaysia,\n\n[1970] A.C. 379: 390; 391; referred to.\n\n(2) There is no inconsistency with or erosion of the opportunity of making a representation against the order. The soul of art. 22 is the fair cance to be heard on all particulars relied on to condemn the detenu to preventive confinement.\n\nBut sec. 3(3) does not and cannot trap.scend this trammel and never states that particulars conveyed to governent and evenally t? the Board may\n\nbe behind the back of the detenu. Reading the provisions liberally and as owing allegiance to Art. 22(5), it is right to say that all particulars transmitted under s.3(3) beyond the groun~ of detentioQ must in no way detract from the effectiveness of the deter.n's right of representation about them. The guarantee of Art. 22(5) colours the con:; truction of s. 3.\n\n[324 ~-C]\n\n( 3) It is not correct to saY th\"at the order of detention was bad because the criminal prosecutions have failed.\n\nIt is well-settled that even U!15uccessful judicial trial or proceeding would not operate as a bar to a detention order or render it niafa .fide.\n\n(324 E-G]\n\nSub.-ati v. State of Wev Bengal, [19731 3 S.C.C. 2SO, M. S. K!ian v. C. C. l'.ozr. A.I.R. 1972 S.C. !670 and Ramesliwar Lnl v. State of B11tar,. [1968] 2 S.C.R. SOS;511, followed.\n\n( 4) The~ is no substance in the argument that a speaking order should be passed by government or by the Advisory Board while approving or advising con_tinuance of detention. altough a brief exprCS!!ion of the principal reasons is desirable. The commurucatlon of grounds, the nght to make representation and the consideration thereof by the Advisory Board made up of men with judicial\n\nexperie~~· .te subject matter being the deprivation of freedom, clearly implies a qua51~1udic1al approach.\n\nThe bare bones of natural ~Usticc in this context 11eed not b~ clotht:d with the ample flesh of detai1ed hearing and elaborate reasoning.\n\nA speaking order, like a regular judicial performance, is ni:ither necessary nor feasible.\n\nA harmonious reconciliation between the claims of security. of the nation and the liberty of the citizen through tho process of effective representation before deprivation and fair consideration by the executive\n\nand the Advisory Board are the necessary components of natural justice, no n1ore.\n\n[326 F] ·\n\n(5) The detention was illegal for denial of opportunity. to make effective representatio11. Sec. 3(3) read with Art. 22(5) stands contravened and the right to represent rendered barren. Particulars prejudicial to the detenu played over lhe judgment of the authorities but lh.! pethioner never kn.!W ot such injurious information, and could not answer back.\n\nCommunication of facts is the cornerstone of the right of representation and orders passed on uncommunicated n1aterials are unfair and illegal.\n\nPoverty and illiteracy are irrelevant to s. 3.\n\nThe spirit of lawlessness and aptitude for antisocial activities are neither here nor there vis-avis s.3. Other reported and unreported instances, though relevant, are kept back from the petitioner. r328 B]\n\nORIGINAL JUR!5DICT!ON : Writ Petition No. 1456 of 1973.\n\nUnder .Article 32 of the Constitution for issue of a writ in tho nature of habeas corpus.\n\nS. J. S. Fernandez, for the petitioner.\n\nP. K. Chakr.iv.irty, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by E\n\nKRtSHNA IYER, J.-The petitioner, undergoing inhibitive incarceration in West Bengal, seeks this Court's writ to be liberated on grounds of substantive innocence and processual injustice.\n\nJudicial vigilance is the price of liberty and freedom of the person is a founding faith of our Republic. So it behoves us to examine the legal circum\n\nstances of the detention in the light of the constitutional constraints F under art. 22 and the procedural safeguards of the Act (the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971).\n\nA brief calendar bearing on the landmark events, giving the core facts relevant to the legality of the detention, is nec,, ssary right at the beginning. The order of the District Magistrate. Burdwan, which cast the petitioner into jail. recit<; d that hc; was 'satisfied' that w!th. a. view G to preventing the petitioner from atmg m ay manner prc1ud1~1l to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to te com1nun!tY the direction for detention under s. 3 of the Act was bemg made, impeccably adhering to the mantra of the law; The gro.unds which induced the authority's adsfaction were concom~; antly furn1scd as r_equ1.ed hy s. 6(1 ), read withs. 3(2), of the Act. You are bemg det1med. rus tho communication .... on the grounds that you have been acting m H a manner prejudicial to th' supplies and services essential to the c~ inuoity as evidenced by :he particulars given below :-\" Three specific instances were set out of November 21, 1971, November 24. 1971 aml\n\nn. N. ~!EH v. W£SI DENGAL (Krishna Iyer,/.) 317\n\nJanuary 13, 1972-all over seven months prior to the detention orderalleging that the petitioner and his associates (not named) broke open wagons and 'looted' wheat and tea.\n\nThere is also a statement that 'the said activity of yours thus attracts Sec. 3(1) (a) (iii) of the ... Act.\"\n\nIt is a trifle mystifying that the detention order is passed many months after the three crmlinal break-ins, and equally strange it is that the prisoner is arrested only on February 22, 1973, many months after the order of detention was passed, there being no justification of abscondence.\n\nLong before the grounds of detention were served on the detcnu (February 22, 1973) the State Government had approved the District Magistrate's order which it did on September 2, 1972. Shortly\n\nthereafter, the State Government placed the case of the detenu before the Advisory Board under s. 10 of the Act, although the actual deten tion was effected only in 1973. The affidavit-in-opposition by the Deputy Secretary to Government does not explain these time fags between the prejudicial acts and the preventive detention order; and between lhe order and the detention. The petitioner's averment in this context becomes disturbingly meaningful, for, according to him, the instances were false and when he was prosecuted in Court, the cases ended in his favour.\n\nHe has stated in his representation to the Advisory Board that \"over the grounds No. 1, 2 and 3 Burdwan P. S. Case No. G.R.P.S. No. 10(11)71, 9(11)71, and 6(1)72 was started. The petitioner was arrested in connection with aforesaid case.\n\nBut as the charges are false, so no prima facie case was established against the petitioner was discharged by the learned S.D.J.M., Burdwan.\n\nBut soon as the petitioner was discharged from the case, the petitioner again arrested and arbitrarily detained under MIS Act.\"\n\nWe will consider these aspects in a little detail later.\n\nSullico it to say that the Advisory Board considered the representation of tl1e detenu and the material placed before it by the State, and concluded on April 28, 1973 that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner.\n\nThereafter, by order dated May\" 7, 1973, the State Government continued the detention \"until the expiration of twelve months from the date of his detention or until the expiry of D.l. Act, 1971, whichever is 1ater.\"\n\nBoth the State Government and the Advisory Board had before them, while deciding on the propriety of the detention, the criminal biography of the petitioner, and, indeed, counsel for the State fairly stated that the opinion and the advice were based upon the specific instances furnished to the petitioner in the grounds of detention. as well as on the dossier furnished by the Superintendent of Police, a copy of which has been produced in Court. It looks as if this is a routine procedure and there is a proforma for the history sheet. Column 7 thereof, apart from setting out the three instances communicated to the detenu also mentions certain relevant and injurious circumstances relating to the petitioner, which may be extracted here :\n\n\"The subject Bhut Nath Mete s/o L. Sambhu Nath Mete of Belari. P.S. Ausgram, Dist. Burdwan, was born in a poor 8-L954SupCl/74\n\nfamily.\n\nHe got no education in his childhood.\n\nHe worked as a day labour.\n\nHe used to mix up with the notorious wagon breakers and anti-social elements.\n\nThis inspired in him the criminal propensities which shaped his future careet.\n\nBut to his association with the railway criminals and . antisocial elements he developed the spirit of lawlessness and acquired special aptitude for anti-social activities _and actg prejudicial to the n1aintcnance of supplies and services essn tial to the con1munity.\n\nFor fear of assault and manhandhn! none of the local people dare to say anything against him and his associates to the Police or to any authority as a result of which many cases remain unreported to the Police.\n\nBesides many of the reported and unreported cases some of the instances of his recent anti-social and criminal activities which were prejudicial to the maintenance of the supplies and services essential to the community are m('.:ntioned below . ... \" It is apparcnt,-and indeed it is not denied,-that the total impact of these materials on the District Magistrate, the State Government and the Advisory Board, resulted in the initial detention and subsequent continuation in incarceration.\n\nWe have now to sec what the grounds of challenge are and the sustainability thereof in the eye of the law and the Constitution.\n\nBefore getting to grips with the contentions we may indicate the constitutional dimensions of the freedom of which the judges are, in part, sentinels on the qui vive. Civil liberty, a constitutional guarantee, is a strange bed-fellow with detention without trial, a British bequest.\n\nBegun from the days of the East India Company, our freedom lighters, including the Father of the Nation, have endured its repressive imppct and s.o when the sombre, colonial story came to a close, our founding fathers enshrined freedom of the person as a fundamental right.\n\nBut as realists they know that we became free amidst blood bath and chaos and the environs of belligerency.\n\nThe delicate balance between security and liberty had to be kept, conscious that, in the contemporary world, war is to peace near allied and 'this pertition do their bounds divide' and the defenses of a nation can be destroyed and the morale of its people broken not only by external aggression but also by internal disruption.\n\nThe sensitive underside of the nation can be wounded by those who break up public order, breach State security, blow up essen tial supplies and services; and so, as an unhappy necessity, preventive detention. apart from punitive prison term, was recognised and provided for.\n\nBeing committed to the rule of law, primary article of faith, the framers of the Constitution mistrusted uncanalised power in the Executive and wrote into the paramount law provisions regulating preventive detention and proclamations of emergencies.\n\nAfter all, Lord Acton's dictum that absolute power corrupts absolutely was for them no new knowledge, and Lord Atkin 's great words in Li>'ersidge v.\n\nAnderson('1) that amid the clash of arms the laws are not silent, that\n\n(I) [1942] A. C. 205\n\nD 8\n\nthey may be changed, but they speak same language in war and peace, reverberated in their ears.\n\nTherefore, where freedom is in pent and justice is threatened the citizen shall receive the fullest protection from the Court within the four corners of art. 22, benignantly stretched, and the safeguards of the A.ct liberally interpreted-within legitimate limits.\n\nThe worth of the human person is a cherished value carefully watched over by the Court. Such is the judicial perspective in the application of art. 22 to the MISA, which it contains, controls and animates.\n\nIndeed, this Court, by a series of creative pronouncements has built into vast powers vested in the Administration by the MISA and its predocessors legal bulwarks, breakraters and blinkers which have largely humanised the harsh authority over individual liberty otherwise exercisable arbitrarily byexecutive fiat.\n\nIn this case, we arc conccrneU \\vith a limited canvass, for, in a sense, the court's control through rcview is peripheral. processual and yet crucial.\n\nThe area of judicial 'cmbudsmania' which obtrudes into our attention in the present case relates to the observance of natural justice to the partial but compclsory extent the law of the Constitution and the law under the Constitution, obligate.\n\nThere is a limited 'judicialisation' of administrative acts that art. 22 insists on, which is express, explicit and mandatory and admits of no exceptions.\n\nArticle 22(5) is principled and pragmatic, flexible but firm and enforces the right to be heard without over-loading the administrative process with judicial trappings. It reads :\n\n''(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.\" -\n\nThe fundamental constitutional mandates are that the authority (a) shall communicate to the detainee 'the grounds on w/1ich the order bas been made'-nothing less than all the material grounds which operate to create that subjective satisfaction in the authority which spells su•- pension of the citizen's liberty-and (b) shall afford him the ear/its! opportunity of making a representation against the order-no avoidable delay, no shortfall in the material communicated shall disable the prisoner making an early, yet comprehensive say on every particular or fact which has influenced the detainer or other body to order, approve or advice the deprivation of an individual's freedom.\n\nSuch is the fairness and justice 'untouchably' entrenched in art. 22( 5) when administrative action preventively drowns a sacred human right in the name or public good and organised society.\n\nThe power and its limits co-exist in constitutional amity and the MJSA has effectuated this great policy ins. 3(1) and (3) read with ss. 5(1) 10 and ll(i) and (ii). Tho\n\nhumanist restraint so woven into the law against executive extravagance or indifference must be strictly applied since casual and careless and\n\nuninformed disposal of other's freedom is to break faith with the constitutional tryst.\n\nThe admonition of Patanjali Sastri, C.J., is inspirational :\n\n\"Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and such meagre safeguards as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be 1ealously watched and enforced by the Court. In this case, the petitioner has the right, under article 12(5), as interpreted by this Court by a majority, to be furnished with particulars of the grounds of his detention \"sufficient to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may give relief to him.\n\nWe are of opinion that this constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained, subject of course to a claim of privilege under clause ( 6) of article 22.\"( 1).\n\nThe strict construction of the statute setting tho court's face sternly against encroachment on individual liberty, keeping the delicate balance between social security and citizens' freedom, is perfectly warranted by this Court's observation in Kishori Mohan Bera v. State of West Bengal(') ;\n\n\"The Act confers extraordinary power on the executive to detain a person without recourse to the ordinary laws of th0 land and to trial by courts.\n\nObviously, such a power places the personal liberty of such a person in extreme peril against which he is provided with a limited right of challenge only.\n\nThere can, therefore, be no doubt that such a law has to be strictly construed. Equally, also, the power conferred by such a law has to be exercised with extreme care and scrupulously witliin the bounds laid down in such a law.\"\n\nIn a sense this approach is only an application of the insistnce of fairness when power is exercised to effect other's rights, particularly the most sensitive of all rights-personal freedom.\n\nNatural justice is the index of fairness, although as Sachs, L.J., indicated in In re-Pargemon Press Ltd.(•) : \"In the application of the concept of fair play there must be real flexibility so that very different situations may be met without producing procedures unsuitable to the object in liand\". lu A. K. Krapak v. Union of India(') this Court qualified:\n\n\"The concept of rule of law would lose its validity if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duly of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting Judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously.\" After all, one conld never be too just or too fair when dealing with civil liberty.\n\n(!) Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj .v State of Delhi (1953] S. C.R. 708.\n\n(2) A.!. R. 1972 S. C. 1749.\n\n(3) [1971] I Ch. D. 368.\n\n(4) A. I. R. 1970 SC 150,\n\nWith these background observations, the statutory 'musts' of the MISA may now be delineated.\n\nWe are concerned, as earlier stated, only with some aspects of the preventive detention jurisprudence, in the present case, and we confine ourselves to them.\n\nThe District Magistrate should be bona fide satisfiod about the prejudicial activities of the detainee. Absence of bonafides in this context does not mean proof of malice, for an order can be malafide although the officer is innocent. The important point is that the satisfaction of the public functionary, though subjective, must be real and rational, not colourable, fanciful, mechanical or unrelated to the objects enilmerated in s. 3 (I) of the Act. Viscount Haldane, L.C., in Shearer v. Shields(') drew the line neatly thus :\n\n\"Between malice in fact and malice in law there is a broad distinction which is not peculiar to any particular sys tern ot jurisprudence. A person who infiicts an injury upon another person in contravention of the law is not allowed. to say that he did so with an innocent mind; he is taken to know the law, and he must act within the law.\n\nHe may, therefore, be guilty of malice in law, although, so far as the state of his mind is concerned, he acts ignoraniJy, and in that sense innocently.\"\n\nThe attack on the order of detention has been delivered on the following grounds : (I) that the grounds are ambivalent, vague and void; (2) that the particulars suffer from insufficient communication thus crippling the constitutional right of representation; (3) that the detention is ma/a fide having been made with ulterior and extraneous purpose of making up for the discharge of the petitioner in the criminal cases; (4) that a few acts of theft, not proximate in time to the detention order after judicial proceedings had failed, have no rational relation to potential prejudicial activities to stanch which it professes to have been made; (5) that the materials impelling the detention order and supplied to tbe Government and the Board add substantially to tlie facts disclosed tq the detenu thus hitting him below the belt and denying him the plenary opportunity to answer the uncommunicated but damaging charges with a futuristic import; (6) that the MISA violates art. 22(5) and is unconstitutional; aI?J (7) that the detention has been arbitrary and may continue indefinitely if the Proclamation of Emergency becomes a constant fact of constitutional life and must therefore be regarded as unconstitutional.\n\nThe last two were urged in another habeas corpus application heard shortly before this one and arc dealt with in a way here also.\n\nWe have to reject summarily the last submission as falling outside the orbit of judicial control and wandering into the para-political sector. It was argued that there was no ffal emergency and yet the Proclamation remained unretracted with consequential peril to fundamental rights. In our view, this is a political, not justiciable issue and the appeal should be to the polls and not to the courts. The traditional\n\n(I) [1914] A. C. 808.\n\nview, sanctified largely by some American decisions, that political questions fall outside the area of judicial review, is not a constitutional taboo but a pragmatic response of the court to the reality of its inadequacy to decide such issues and to the scheme of the constitution which has assigned to each branch of government in the larger sense a certain jurisdiction.\n\nOf course, when a problem-which is essentially and basically constitutional-although dressed up as a political question,, is appropriately rais<>J before court, it is within the power of the judges to adjudicate. The rule is one of self-restraint and of subject-matter, practical sense and respect for other branches of government like the Legislature and the Executive. Even so, we see no force in the plea.\n\nTrue, an emergency puts a broad, blanket blindfolding of the. seven liberties of art. 19 and its baseless prolongation may devalue democracy.\n\nThat is a political matter do hors our ken, for the validity of the proclamation turns on the subjective satisfaction of the President that a grave emergency, of the kind mentioned in Part XVIII, or its imminent danger, exists.\n\nIn Rex v. Govemor of Wornwood Scrubbs Prison(') the Earl of Reading observed, on a similar contention:\n\n\" ... even if it is material to consider whether the military emergency has come to an elld, it is not a matter which this Court can consider; whether the emergency continues to exist or not it is for the executive alone to determine ..... \"\n\nThe argument of abuse of power was urged in England but repelled.\n\nIn The King v. Halliday(') Lord Dunnedin met it thus :\n\n\"That is true.\n\nBut the fault, if fault there be, lies in the fact that the British Constitution has entrusted to the two Houses of Parliament, subject to the assent of the Killg, an absolute power untrammelled by any written instrument obedience to which may be compelled by some judicial body.\n\nThe danger of abuse in theoretically present : practically, as things exist, it is in my opinion absent.\"\n\nAnd Lord Wright in Liversidge v. Anderson(') added effect to the point in these words :\n\n\"The safeguard of British liberty is in the good SCllS• of the people and in the system of representative and responsible government which has evolved. If extraordinary powers are here given, they are given because the emergency is extraordinary and are limited to the period of the emergency.\" Of course, the British have no written constitution but the argument rcn1ains.\n\nIn the recent ruling of the Privy Council in Hinakan v. Government of Malaysia(<), the vires of a proclamation of emergency was put in issue as unconstitutional and a fraud on power. The Judicial Committee made short shrift of the submission in these words :\n\n(I) [1920] 2 K. B. 305.\n\n(.1) [1942] A. C. 206.\n\n(2) [1917] A. C. 260, 270.\n\n(4) [1970) A. C. 379; 390; 391.\n\nA \"Although an \"emergency\" to be within the article must\n\nbe not only grave but such as to threaten the security or economic life of the Federation or any part of it, the natural meaning of the word itself is capable of covering a very wide range of situations and occurrences, epidemics and the collapse of civil government.\"\n\n\"'It is not for their Lordships to criticise or comment upon the wisdom or expediency of the steps taken by the Government of Malaysia in dealing with the constitutional situation which had occurred in Sarawak, or to inquire whether that situation could itself have been avoided by a different approach.\"\n\n\"These were essentially matters to be determined according to the judgment of the responsible Ministers in the lights of their knowledge and experience.\n\nAnd although the Indonesian Confrontation had then ceased, it was open to the Federal Government, and indeed its duty, to consider the possible consequences of a period of unstable government in a State that, not so long before, had been facing the tensions of Confrontation and the subversive activities associated with it. That the appellant regarded the foderal Government's actions as aimed at himself is obvious and perhaps natural; but he has failed to satisfy the Board that the steps taken by the Government, including the proclamation and the impugned Act, were in fraudum legis or otherwise unauthorised by the relevant legislation.\"\n\nJusticiability was left open is that case but the limits of judicial propriety were ciearly drawn. The U.S. Supreme Court has frowned on forensic examination of subjects of politics and policy which belong to the other branches of government although in Baker v. Carr(' )-a landmark ruling -and Gray v. Senders(2 ), constitutional questions with considerable political consequences were boldly handled. Even the Viet Nam. war came for judicial consideration. But this large and sensitive deba.te about t.he court's power hardly arises here because basically it is a matter least fit for adjudication by judicial methods and materials, and clearly the onus of establishing the effective end of emergency and absence of any grounds whatever for the subjective satisfaction of thePresident, heavy as it is, has hardly been discharged.\n\nAcademi.c exercises in constitutional law are not for courts but jurists and we decline to hold the continuance of emegency void.\n\nNor are we impressed with the argument thats. 3(3) ands. 10 violate art. 22(5) of the Constitution. The vice, according to counsel, is that the detaining authority forwards to Government not merely the grounds of detention but \"such other particulars as in his opinion have\n\n(I) 369 u. s. 186 (1962)\n\n(Z) 372 U. S. 363 (1963)\n\na bearing on the matter\"·-which matter may be beyond what is communicated to the detenu. If so, the effective opportunity to make representations against such extra material is absent and the right under art. 22(5) is stultified.\n\nNo doubt, the soul of art. 22 is the fair chance to be heard on all parti1lars relied on to condemn the detenu to preventive confinement.. B t s. 3(3) does not-eannot-transcend this trammel and never state that particulars conveyed to Government and eventually to the Board may be behind the back of the detenu.\n\nReading the provisions literally and as owing allegiance to art. 22(5), it is right to say that all particulars transmitted under s. 3(3) beyond the grounds of detention must, if they ha\\le a bearing on the determination to detain, in no way detract from the effectiveness of the detenu 's right of representation about them.\n\nThe guarantee of art. 22 ( 5) colours the construction of s. 3. So viewed, there is no inconsistency with or erosion of the 'opportunity of making a representation against the order'.\n\nWhether, in this case, any unconstitutional deficiency in communication of such material has occurred will be tested later.\n\nIs there any substance in the grievance that order is ma/a fide, made after and on account of the discharge of the relative criminal cases ? The detention is not punitive but preventive and the District Magistrate's order recites to that effect.\n\nIn this case, the petitioner's representation mentions the cases challaned and the discharge of the accused by the court in regard to the very incidents pressed into service to found the detention order.\n\nThe long interval between the incidents and the orders lends probability to the petitioner's plea that there were cases which ended in his favour, particularly because no denial nor explanation is forthcoming on these aspects in the return.\n\nThe question is whether for the reason that criminal prosecutions have failed the detention order is bad.\n\nWe think not, and there is authority for it. jq Subrati v. State of West Bengal(') this Court rejected ari identical argument, the purposes of preventive detention being different from conviction and punishment and subjective satisfaction being enough in the former while proof beyond reasonable doubt being necessary in the latter. \"The Act creates in the authorities concerned a new jurisdiction to make orders for preventive detention on their subjective satisfaction on grounds of suspicion of commission in future of acts prejudicial to the community in general.\n\nThis jurisdiction is different from that of judicial trial in courts for offences and of judicial orders for prevention of offences.\n\nEven unsuccessful judicial trial or proceeding would, therefore, not operate as a bar to a detention order, or render it male fide.\n\nThe matter is also not res integra.\" In M. S. Khan v.\n\nC. C. Bose(2 ) a similar view was expressed and now a host of decisions had made the legal position unchallengeable.\n\nA note of caution, however, needs to be struck since absolute scrupulousness iS expected of authorities exercising this exceptional power.\n\nThis is not a power to put behind bars anyone you regard as dangerous or rowdyish or irrepressible or difficult of being got rid of by proof of guilt in court.\n\nThis is an instrument for protecting the community against specially\n\n(t) [t973J J sec 2so.\n\n(2) A. l. R. 1972 S. C. 1670.\n\nB. N. METE v. WEST BENGAL (Krish'!a Iyer,/.) 325\n\ninjurious types of anti-social activity statutorily enunciated. If xtra\n\nneous motives adulterate the use of power, the court must nullify 1t.\n\nObservations in Rameshwar Lal v. Stale of Bihar(') serve as a warning:\n\n\"The appellant was tried for .the offence and acquitted as far back as February 1967. This ground discloses carelessness which is extremely disturbing.\n\nThat the detaining authority does not know that the appellant was tried and acquitted months before, and considers the pendency of the case against him as one of the grounds of detention shows that due. care and attention is not being paid to such serious matters as detention without trial. If the appellant was tried and acquitted, Government was required to study the judgment of acquittal to discover whether all these allegations had any basis in fact or not.\n\nOne can understand the use of the case lf the acquittal was technical but not when the case was held to be false.\"\n\nAfter all, however well-meaning Government may be, detention power cannot be quietly used to subvert, supplant or to substitute the punitive law of the Penal Code. The immune expedient of throwing into a prison cell one whom the ordinary law would take of, merely because it is irksome to undertake the inconvenience of proving guilt in court is unfair abuse. To detain a person after a court has held the charge false is to expose oneself to the'Criticism of absence of due care and of rational material for subjective satisfaction. After all, the res ponsible officer, aware of the value of civil liborty even for undesirable persons, must make a credible prediction of the species of prejudicial activity in s. 3 ( ll before shutting up a person. It may perilously hover around illegality, if a single act of theft or threat, for which a prosecution was launched but failed, is seized upon after, say, a year or so, for detaining the accused out of pique. The potential executive tendency to shy at courts for prosecution of ordinary offences and to rely ene rously on the easier strategy of subjective satisfaction is a danger to the democratic way of life. The large number of habeas corpus petitions and the more or less stereotyped grounds of detention and inaction by way of prosecution, induce us to voice this deeper\n\nconcern. Moreover, a criminal should not get away with it as an unconvicted detenu if the rule of law is a live force.\n\nThe ritualistic recital of one or two thefts followed by incantatory statutory phrases in the order, unsupported even by the affidavit of th~ detaining authority may in some circumstances lead to an inference that the order is in fraudum legi~. In the pre<ent case such an argument has been made but we are not satisfied that there was foul exercise of power merely because the courts have discharged the accused or a competent affidavit has not been filed. True, we should have expected an 3ffidavit from the detaining authority but even that is felt too inconvenient and a Deouty Secretay who merely peruses the records and swears an affidavit in every case is the poor proxy. Why is\n\n(I) [1968] 2 S. C.R. 505; 511.\n\nan affidivit than needed at all? The fact of subjective satisfaction, solemnly reached considering relevant and excluding irrelevant facts, sufficient in degree of danger and certainty to warrant pre-emptive casting into prison, is best made out by the detaining District Magistrate, not one who professionally reads records and makes out a precis in the form of an affidavit. The purpose is missed, goin!l by the seriousness of the matter, the proof is deficient, going by ordinary rules of evidence, and the Court is denied the benefit of the word of one who takes responsibility for the action, if action has to be taken against the detainer later for misuse. We are aware that in the exigencies of administration, an officer may be held up far away, engrossed in other important work, thus being unavailable to swear an affidavit. The next best would then be the oath of one in the Secretariat who officially is cognisant of or has participated in th.e process of aoproval hy Govemn1-ent-not one who, long later, reads old files and gives its gist to the court. Mechanical means are easy but not legitimate. We emphasize this infirmity because routine summaries of files, marked as affidavits, appear in the returns to rules nisi, showing scant courtesy to the constitutional gravity of deprivation of civil liberty.\n\nIn some cases, where a valid reasn for the District Magistrate's inability to swear affidavits directly has been furnished, this Court has accepted the concerned Deputy Secretary's affidavit. This should, however, b' the exception, not the rule. We may . refer in this context to the rulings in Raniit Dam/v. State of West Bengal, ('), J. N. Roy v. State of West Bengal,( 2 ) and Shaik Hanif and others v. State of West Bengal.(')\n\nWe need not proceed further with this aspct, in the ultimate view we take on this writ petition.\n\nWe are not oersuaded that a speaking order should be passed by Government or bv the Arlvisorv Board while approving er advising continuance of detention although a brief expression of the principal reasons is desirable.\n\nThe communication of grounds, the right to make reoresentation and the consideration thereof by the Advisory body made up of men with judicial experience the subject-matter being the deprivation of freedom, clearly implies a quasi-judicial approach.\n\nIndeed, where citizen's rights are affected by an autho ritv. the auestion is not so mueh the mould into which the nature of the act should be fitted but the nature of the consequence which obligates impartiality, judicial evaluation and reasoned conclusion on facts. a' distinruished from oolicv formulation and zealous implementation regardless of two sides and weighing of evidence.\n\nThe bare bones of natural justice in this context need not be clothed with the amole flesh of dotailed hearing and elaborate reasoning. It must be self-evident from the order that the substance of the charge and the essential answer in the representation have been impartially couslden•d.\n\nWe do not think that a speaking order like a regular judicial performance is either necessary or feasible.\n\nArticle 22(5)\n\nA.!. R. (1972) SC 1753.\n\n(2) A. I. R. (1972) SC 2t43. (3) Writ Petition> Nos. 1679 etc; judment on Feburary 1, 1974.\n\nalso does not compel us to reach a different conolusioa.\n\nAlter all, we must remember that a harmonious reconciliation between the claims of security o[ the nation and the liberty of the citizen through the process of effective representation before deprivtion and fair consideration by the Executive and the Advisory Board are the necessary components of p.a, tural justice.\n\nNot mere. !n times of emergencv, security Of the State and essential supplies and ervices\n\nof the co1nmunitv assume great importance and dcn1Dnd quicker action. .At the same time. we cannot underrate tho right of the citizen and cannot for, get the wotlds of Justice Jackso~1 in Knufl v.\n\nS/111,11ghnassy : ( ')\n\n\"Security is like liberty in that many arc the crimes committed in its name. Tfie menace to the security o[ this countrv. be it j!feat as it may, from this girl's admission is as nothing compared to the menace to free institutions inherent in procedures on .this pattern .... Ihe plan\n\nthat evidence of guilt must be secret is abhorrent to free men, because it provides a cloak for the malevolent, the misinformed, the meddlesome and the corrupt to play the role or informer ur1':1etected and uncorrected.\"\n\nWhtt.t has to be underscored is the obligation to nlak~ a ftr communication of the J?rounds ::i.nd the particulars sufficint 'lo enable the detainee to explain his innocence.\n\nFaceless infortncr.s flourish \\vhere confrontation by cross-examination is absent, and orders \\\\'ith ihc inscrutable face of a sphinx arc not uncon1mon where subjective satisfaction is sufficient.\n\nAll the more reason why there should be a meaninµ:fullVco1nprehensivc furnishing of essential oarticulars so that the exe~Utive acncics may be rigorously held to the standards implkld by the courts in art. 22(5). Otherwise, in th\" language of Justice Frankfurther. \"he that take> the procedural sword shall perish with that sword.\" Administrative absolution is incongruous with our constitutional scheme.\n\nIf control of liberty in an emergency-Barbed-wire entanglements of freedom by the executivc--is neccssarv. control of control iq in son1c tnctisurc healthy hccause nower in the miniens of govcrnn1cnt can be 'of an cncroachin2 nature;.\n\nReference \\Vas ffiade at the bar in ihis context to Allen's \"Law an<l Orders\", an'J Markose's \"Judici\"l Control of Adn1; nistrative Action·\n\nIn the petitioner's case the gravamen of his grievance is that some irrelevant and uncommunicated char.ees have influenced the autho , rity, vitiating the order. We would not view with unconcern viola~ tion on this score, if made out. It is common ground that the police have sent to the District Magistrate (who in turn has forwarded to the Government and the Board) a blistering bio-data.\n\nIt states that la) he is ooor and illiterate. (bl has associates in notorious wagon breakers and anti-sccial element. ( c) has d\"vclopcd spirit of lnwlcssness and aptitude for anti-social activities. (d) many of the\n\n(1) 338 u. s. 537.\n\n328 SUPREl\\.lE COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974 J 3 S.C.R.\n\nreported and unreported .c_ascs of recent anti-social and criminal activities exist to his credit besides the instances on1municatcd to the detenu. Fairly considered, this report has . been present to the minds of the authorities but withheld from the affected party. Poverty and illiteracy are outraJ(eouslv irrek:vant to s. 3. l'he spirit of lawlessness and aptitude for anti-social activities. are neither here nor there >'is-a-ris s. 3. 'Other repoz:ted and unreported' instances thou2h relovant are kept ba-\"'k from the petitioner. If such be the case. s. 3 ( 3). read with art. 22 ( 5), stands contravened and the right to represent rendered barren. . And yet particulars prejudicial to the detenu played over the judgment of the authorities but the petitioner never knew of such injurious information, and could not answer back. This Court in many weighty pronouncements over two decades has strcssd::I that art. 22 ( 5) vests a real, not illusoi'}' right, that communication of facts is the corJ:i~Tstone of the right of representation and or<lrs based on uncommunicated materials arc unfair anc.I illegal.\n\n Before parting with tltis case/ we wish to express our disquiet that more theft even of coppe'r wire9 unless in association with other facts may \"not give rise to an inference of proclivities of the type mentioned in s.3 (1). Some proximity in time between the acts and\n\nthe order. some indicatiOJ:!S of activities disrupting supplies am.I services to the community and more 'trendy' behaviour warranting preventive measures. must be available before the extreme step of detention without trial is clamped down.\n\nA sober prognosis by the District j\\1a2istra1e of. the detainee\"S dangerous behaviour must be wellgrounded, even if impervious to judicial probe. We cannot dismiss as accidental that in this area of the Jaw. in two leading case~. t\\VO judges, Bose. J ., and Bhagwatliy. J., have referred to the Bestill~\n\nnot that \\ve exoress our approbation of its use.\n\nExecutive care ~nd Advisory Board's vigilancerue the hoodul sentinals checking on the misaoolication of the MISA. unwittingly to rob the people of the Republic of civil liberties.\n\nWe may emphasise that to minimise processual justice to mere communication and conseauent--representation is not to reduce that prescription _.to a rooe\n\n0 of sand. and to make subjective satisfaction a sufficient pre-requisite to detention is not to reduce judicial review to a brutum fulmen.\n\nWe hold that the detention in this case is illegal for opportunity to make effective representation and direct petitioner be set free.\n\nP. B. R.\n\ndenial of that the\n\n- c", "total_entities": 88, "entities": [{"text": "BHUT NATH METE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUT NATH METE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE ST ATE OF WEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 8, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHUT NATH METE\n\nTHE ST ATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\nFebruary 8, 1974."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 421, "end_char": 425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 462, "end_char": 465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 3(3) and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1246, "end_char": 1266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1320, "end_char": 1330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2474, "end_char": 2481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2595, "end_char": 2604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2830, "end_char": 2840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2900, "end_char": 2906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3054, "end_char": 3064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3095, "end_char": 3099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4691, "end_char": 4700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4711, "end_char": 4721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5143, "end_char": 5147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5251, "end_char": 5254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5422, "end_char": 5432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. J. S. Fernandez", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5506, "end_char": 5524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. J. S. Fernandez, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chakr.iv.irty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5547, "end_char": 5566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chakr.iv.irty, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "E\n\nKRtSHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5632, "end_char": 5647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by E\n\nKRtSHNA IYER, J.-The petitioner, undergoing inhibitive incarceration in West Bengal, seeks this Court's writ to be liberated on grounds of substantive innocence and processual injustice."}}, {"text": "art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6055, "end_char": 6062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6109, "end_char": 6151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "District Magistrate. Burdwan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6325, "end_char": 6353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of the District Magistrate."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6615, "end_char": 6619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "s. 6(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6791, "end_char": 6799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer,/.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7161, "end_char": 7176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1971 aml\n\nn. N. ~!EH v. W£SI DENGAL (Krishna Iyer,/.) 317\n\nJanuary 13, 1972-all over seven months prior to the detention orderalleging that the petitioner and his associates (not named) broke open wagons and 'looted' wheat and tea."}}, {"text": "Sec. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7430, "end_char": 7439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 22, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7641, "end_char": 7658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is a trifle mystifying that the detention order is passed many months after the three crmlinal break-ins, and equally strange it is that the prisoner is arrested only on February 22, 1973, many months after the order of detention was passed, there being no justification of abscondence."}}, {"text": "September 2, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7924, "end_char": 7941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Long before the grounds of detention were served on the detcnu (February 22, 1973) the State Government had approved the District Magistrate's order which it did on September 2, 1972."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8047, "end_char": 8052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Burdwan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8891, "end_char": 8898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But as the charges are false, so no prima facie case was established against the petitioner was discharged by the learned S.D.J.M., Burdwan."}}, {"text": "April 28, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9240, "end_char": 9254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sullico it to say that the Advisory Board considered the representation of tl1e detenu and the material placed before it by the State, and concluded on April 28, 1973 that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner."}}, {"text": "\" 7, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9355, "end_char": 9364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, by order dated May\" 7, 1973, the State Government continued the detention \"until the expiration of twelve months from the date of his detention or until the expiry of D.l."}}, {"text": "Bhut Nath Mete", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10299, "end_char": 10313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Column 7 thereof, apart from setting out the three instances communicated to the detenu also mentions certain relevant and injurious circumstances relating to the petitioner, which may be extracted here :\n\n\"The subject Bhut Nath Mete s/o L. Sambhu Nath Mete of Belari.", "canonical_name": "BHUT NATH METE"}}, {"text": "Belari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10341, "end_char": 10347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Column 7 thereof, apart from setting out the three instances communicated to the detenu also mentions certain relevant and injurious circumstances relating to the petitioner, which may be extracted here :\n\n\"The subject Bhut Nath Mete s/o L. Sambhu Nath Mete of Belari."}}, {"text": "Acton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13289, "end_char": 13294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After all, Lord Acton's dictum that absolute power corrupts absolutely was for them no new knowledge, and Lord Atkin 's great words in Li>'ersidge v.\n\nAnderson('1) that amid the clash of arms the laws are not silent, that\n\n(I) [1942] A. C. 205\n\nD 8\n\nthey may be changed, but they speak same language in war and peace, reverberated in their ears."}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13384, "end_char": 13389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After all, Lord Acton's dictum that absolute power corrupts absolutely was for them no new knowledge, and Lord Atkin 's great words in Li>'ersidge v.\n\nAnderson('1) that amid the clash of arms the laws are not silent, that\n\n(I) [1942] A. C. 205\n\nD 8\n\nthey may be changed, but they speak same language in war and peace, reverberated in their ears."}}, {"text": "art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13773, "end_char": 13780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14028, "end_char": 14035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14870, "end_char": 14877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14961, "end_char": 14974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 22( 5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16227, "end_char": 16238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MJSA", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16424, "end_char": 16428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The power and its limits co-exist in constitutional amity and the MJSA has effectuated this great policy ins."}}, {"text": "ss. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16491, "end_char": 16499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16779, "end_char": 16795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The admonition of Patanjali Sastri, C.J., is inspirational :\n\n\"Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and such meagre safeguards as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be 1ealously watched and enforced by the Court."}}, {"text": "article 12(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17093, "end_char": 17106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17528, "end_char": 17538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sachs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18622, "end_char": 18627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Natural justice is the index of fairness, although as Sachs, L.J., indicated in In re-Pargemon Press Ltd.(•) : \"In the application of the concept of fair play there must be real flexibility so that very different situations may be met without producing procedures unsuitable to the object in liand\"."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20168, "end_char": 20172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Viscount Haldane", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20189, "end_char": 20205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Viscount Haldane, L.C., in Shearer v. Shields(') drew the line neatly thus :\n\n\"Between malice in fact and malice in law there is a broad distinction which is not peculiar to any particular sys tern ot jurisprudence."}}, {"text": "art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21737, "end_char": 21747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23420, "end_char": 23427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24102, "end_char": 24109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Rex v. Govemor of Wornwood Scrubbs Prison(') the Earl of Reading observed, on a similar contention:\n\n\" ... even if it is material to consider whether the military emergency has come to an elld, it is not a matter which this Court can consider; whether the emergency continues to exist or not it is for the executive alone to determine ..... \"\n\nThe argument of abuse of power was urged in England but repelled."}}, {"text": "Dunnedin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24157, "end_char": 24165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The King v. Halliday(') Lord Dunnedin met it thus :\n\n\"That is true."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24313, "end_char": 24323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the fault, if fault there be, lies in the fact that the British Constitution has entrusted to the two Houses of Parliament, subject to the assent of the Killg, an absolute power untrammelled by any written instrument obedience to which may be compelled by some judicial body."}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24594, "end_char": 24600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And Lord Wright in Liversidge v. Anderson(') added effect to the point in these words :\n\n\"The safeguard of British liberty is in the good SCllS• of the people and in the system of representative and responsible government which has evolved."}}, {"text": "Government of Malaysia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25859, "end_char": 25881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"'It is not for their Lordships to criticise or comment upon the wisdom or expediency of the steps taken by the Government of Malaysia in dealing with the constitutional situation which had occurred in Sarawak, or to inquire whether that situation could itself have been avoided by a different approach.\""}}, {"text": "Sarawak", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25949, "end_char": 25956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"'It is not for their Lordships to criticise or comment upon the wisdom or expediency of the steps taken by the Government of Malaysia in dealing with the constitutional situation which had occurred in Sarawak, or to inquire whether that situation could itself have been avoided by a different approach.\""}}, {"text": "U.S. Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26955, "end_char": 26973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The U.S. Supreme Court has frowned on forensic examination of subjects of politics and policy which belong to the other branches of government although in Baker v. Carr(' )-a landmark ruling -and Gray v. Senders(2 ), constitutional questions with considerable political consequences were boldly handled."}}, {"text": "art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27884, "end_char": 27894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 186", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28102, "end_char": 28108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28128, "end_char": 28134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28347, "end_char": 28357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28396, "end_char": 28403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28517, "end_char": 28524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28747, "end_char": 28757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28817, "end_char": 28824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29031, "end_char": 29038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29072, "end_char": 29076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31518, "end_char": 31523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32712, "end_char": 32722, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33271, "end_char": 33275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1968] 2 S. C.R. 505", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 34699, "end_char": 34719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37836, "end_char": 37849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39742, "end_char": 39752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Frankfurther", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39792, "end_char": 39804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Otherwise, in th\" language of Justice Frankfurther. \""}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40944, "end_char": 40950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41325, "end_char": 41329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41437, "end_char": 41441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41560, "end_char": 41564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41581, "end_char": 41588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41917, "end_char": 41924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42336, "end_char": 42339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42875, "end_char": 42879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in two leading case~. t\\VO judges, Bose."}}, {"text": "Bhagwatliy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42890, "end_char": 42900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Bhagwatliy."}}, {"text": "MISA", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 43095, "end_char": 43099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Executive care ~nd Advisory Board's vigilancerue the hoodul sentinals checking on the misaoolication of the MISA."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_329_339_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "EDIGA ANAMMA\n\nSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\nFebruary 11, 1974.\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.]\n\nCri111i1wl Law-Practice and Pror:edure--Of]ence of 11111rdeJ--Circu111sta11c,•s justifying lesser sentence.\n\nThe appellant, a rustic young .woman, flogged out of her husband's house by her father-in-law, was living with her parents with her only child.\n\nShe committed a premeditated, cleverly planned murder of another young woman and her child became of rivalry between the appellant and the murdered woman for tb.e affections of an illicit lover.\n\nThe Sessions court awarded the death iiCDtence and the High Court confirmed.\n\nC In appeal to this Court.\n\nHELD: The death sentence must be dissolved and life sentence substituted.\n\n(i) Modern penology regards crime and criminal as equally material when the right sentence has to be picked out although in our processual system there is neither comprehensive provision nor adequate machinery for collection and presentation of social and personal data of the culprit to the extent required in the verdict on sentence, However, in the Criminal Procedure Bill, 1973, Parliament has wisely written into the law a post conviction stage when the judges shall \"hear the accused 011 the question of sentence and then pass settence on him according to law.\" r334 Cl\n\nThe unn1istakable shift in legislative en1phasis is that life imprisonn1ent for murder is the rule and capital sentence the exception to be resorted to for reasons to be stated.\n\nThe disturbed conscience of the state on the vexed question of legal threat to life by way of death sentence has sought to express itself legislatively, the stream of tendency being towards cautious partial abolition and the retreat from total retention.\n\n[336 HJ\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure Section 367(5) as amended by Act 26 of 1955; Criminal Procedure Bill, 1973, Sections 235, 238 and 354(3); lndian Penal Code (Amendment) Bill, 1972, SCction 122, referred to.\n\n(ii) The case on hand has to be disposed of under the present Code and the Court has to fall back upon the method of judicial hunch in imposing or avoiding capital sentence aided by such circumstances as are present on the record introduced for the purpose of proving guilt. [334 DI\n\n(iii) In the present case the criminal's social and personal factors, . her fen1inity and youth, her unbalanced sex and expulsion from the conjugal home and being the mother of a young boy-these individually inconclusive and cumulatively marginal facts and circumstances tend towards awarding of life imprisonment. [339 B-Cl\n\nFurther, the Sessions Judge pronounced the death penalty on DeL\"Cmber, 31, 1971 and the appeal is being heard in February 1974. This prolonged agony has ameliorative impact according to the rulings of this Court.\n\nPiara Dusad/1 v. Efnoeror A.I.R. t 944 F.C.I.; N. Sreeramula v. State of Andhra Pradesl1, 1973 C.L.J. 1773; State of Bihar ''- Pasl1upati Si11glt, A.l.R.\n\nI 973 S.C. 2699. referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 1973.\n\nH Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 24th March, 1972 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 1972 and Referred Trial No. I of 1972.\n\nR. P. Kathuria, an1icus curiae for the appellant.\n\nP. Ram Reddy and P. P. Rao for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered bv\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.\n\nIn a rural region of Andhra Pradesh Frendian fury cl'. explosion of sex jealousy expressed itself in 2 gruesome murder of a young woman and her tender child by the accused, a young woman, with an only child en years old, all, because notwithstanding both being married, they had invested amorous affections in a middle-aged libertine, P.W. 16, conveniently a widower.\n\nIt is an admitted fact that the accused, although married, was keeping illicit relations with P.W. 16, a shepherd, but she discovered that lately her paramour was on flirting contacts with the deceased.\n\nThis knowledge angered her so much that she extinguished the life of her rival on November 4 .. 1971 in the afternoon in a jungle, manipulating her murderous venture so cleverly that for a time people thought that she was the murdered and searched for her body. Closer enquiry revealed that the victim was Ansuya and the other innocent one her baby less than two years old.\n\nShri Kathuria, appearing as an1icus curiae, has presented a pr.instakingly meticulous argument on behalf of the prisoner, who bas bocn condemned to death by the courts below. It is but meet that we '1pprcciate the industrious advocacy enthusiastically made by this young advocate.\n\nBy sundown on November 4, 1971 a cadaver was found in a field outside the village of Konapur, Medak District, Andhra Pradesh. The deceased was a damsel who was first mistaken to be the accused because her face had been burnt out of recognition and on her body was found clothing which belonged to the accused-a device resorted to, as later evidence discloses, by the accused to throw enquirers off the scent.\n\nOn November 8, 1971 the dead body of a baby, Nirmala. daughter of Ansuya, the deceased, was recovered from the sand bed of a stream near the field.\n\nInvestigations disclosed that Anamma, the accused, was the perpetrator of this fiendish crime. She was duly prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to death for the offence of murder and life imprisonment for secreting evidence of the crime, under s.201. I.P.C. An appeal by the accused and a referred trial under the Code resulted in a Bench of the High Court affirming the guilt and upholding the sentence.\n\nA jail appeal has come before us, argued by Shri Kathuria as amicus curiae.\n\nThe people involved are more or less primitive rustics and sex inhibitions do not appear to have interdicted private philandering.\n\nThe prisoner bad been married to P. W. 7 of Ankenpally, three miles distant from Konapur where her parents. resided.\n\nCarnal knowledge with p. W: 16 developed even when she was in her husband's house and she manifested her passion by stealing gold rings from the house of one Rachappa to make it over to P. W. 16 as a memento of her illicit love.\n\nIndeed, this little stealing, induced by her improper\n\nA relations with P. W. 16, was discovered. She suffered flagellation from her father-in-Jaw for this act, and her father, P. W. 2, removed her to his own house as a sequel.\n\nThe setting of Konapur did not stand in the way of her continued intimacy with P. W. 16, who responded\n\nby shifting to this village himself.\n\nII The deceased, Ansuya, was the wife of P. W. I 2 who was, as\n\nill-luck would have it, the neighbour of the accused's family. Opportunity tempted and Ansuya also established erotic contact with that lascivious, P.W. 16. The prisoner, in due course, came to know about the shifting of affections by her paramour who tried to bluff her in vain.\n\nFired by jealously the prisoner fixed her mind upon liquidating her rival.\n\nOn November 4, 1971 at about 3 p.m. the ill-starred Ansuya had left for the fields taking the baby with her.\n\nThe accused tempted and shadowed her, with some clothes from her house to be washed in the the village stream. P. W. I 5, P. W. 4 and P. W. 13 have given testimony which, if believed, will show that the accused end the deceased were seen together in the fatal field at about 5 p.m., the V'1Y the mother and child died.\n\nIt is said that the accused had removed a chisel from her house as she prooeeded to the field and used it to lethal purpose. The medical evidence shows that Ansuya and Nirmala were stabbed to death with a chisel identified by the accused's own father, P. W. 2, and the blacksmith who made it, P. W. 15.\n\nApparently overborne with uncontrollable hatred for the woman who hijacked her paramour's sexual affection, the accused bad planned to kiil with cunning. The manner of stabbing to death was bad enough; it was more brutal for her to have disfigured the face o! the victim which was found burnt.\n\nWith a view to mislead and thereby evade ca<y detection she removed from the deceased's body her clothes and clothed it with a langha belonging to herself. She removed the child's\n\n't!otly, wrapped it in a piece of cloth brought by her and buried it beneath the river sand. Thereafter she made towards the house of P.W. 11, her uncle, told P.W. 16 what she had done and pressed him to elope with her. The sense of safety of P.W. 16 prevailed over his urge for sex relations with this girl and so he declined to follow her. The desparate woman left for her husband's village, while a search for her was being made by P. W. 2, her father.\n\nThe dead body in the field was found covered with the accused's clothing ond beguiled by this circumstance P. W. 2 reported to the police Patel, P.W. 5 (Ex. P 1) that his daughter had been murdered. perhaps by her father-in-law. Taken in by this report, the Patel informed the police and the Sub-Inspector, P. W. 26, proceeded to the scene of occurrence, held inquest and sent the body for postmortem examination. P. W. 22, the doctor, did the autopsy in the afternoon of November 5, 1971 and the body was brought back to Konapur by sundown.\n\nThe Inspector of Police took over the investigation, took into custody the clothes near the scene and questioned a number of persons in the village.\n\nThe tragic body was being made ready for cremation when the Patel of village Ankanpally,. P.W. 10,\n\nmoved down to the place with the accused, to the bewilderment of the people gathered.\n\nMeanwhile, P. W. 12, the husband of Ansuya finding his wife and child missing, went in search of them in vain'.\n\nThe tidings came of the dead body and the revelation that it was not that of the accused, as originally suspected.\n\nSo apprehension turned on the dead body being that of Ansuya. They went to the place but it was night and the next morning, i.e., November 6, 1971, P. W. 12-· the husband-and P. W . 13-the mother-in-law-examined the corpse and to their shock discovered it to be the body of Ansuya.\n\nA Panch nama, P-10, was prepared. P. W. 12 reported to the police officer, P.W. 27 (Ex.P-2) and investigations revived in the new direction.\n\nP. W. 27 sent for the accused, who wanted to see her son, and they all met at the police station. P .W. 16 turned up at the police station, and breaking down perhaps under the stress of all that had happened, the accused said that she would confess.\n\nEx. P-7. the confession, was recorded which led to the discovery of the child's body, the bundle containing the burnt clothes and chisel, etc. (Ex. P-8). The langha of the accused was also recovered (Ex. P-9). Post-mortem was done over the body of the child, the accrised was arrested and eventually she was charged with offences under s. 302 ands. 201, I.P.C\n\nOf course, there is .no direct evidence in the asc but the prosecu tion has placed a clinching wealth of circumstances and an extrajudicial confession to p. w. 16 to substantiate its version. It is trite law that Ex. P-7, the confession made while in police custody, is inadmissible except to the narrow extent salvaged by discoveries made in terms of s. 27 of the Evidence Act. We are left, therefore, with the confessional statement made to P. W. 16 orally. If it can be invested with veracity the guilt of the accused is virtually made out. But it is common-place law-and vehemently urged-that a retracted confession made orally to a near-villain like P. W. 16, who had reason to play for safety, was liab~ to be rejected without a second look at the statement.\n\nThe High Court-and the Sessions Court-have considered the many weaknesses relating to this confession.\n\nThose defects have been pointed as deadly by counsel for the appellant. We are satisfied that the credence given to it by the courts below cannot be treated as strange or otherwise seriously erroneous.\n\nCertainly he had no illfeeling for the accused and nothing palpably improbable has been made out fa the spontaneous unburdening of her bosom by the accused in\n\ndistre~, hastening to her paramour after the murder in the hope that she would now vanish with her lover, and telling him the murderuus truth.\n\nMarginal mistrust generated by counsel's argument is inadequate to reject the testimony of P.W. 16. However, there are circumstances attaching to his whereabouts and the slight delay in his\n\nstatemer.t to the police and the dubiety of his character which permitted his openly wearing a stolen gold ring received from another man's wife. It is but fair, therefore, for the Court to search fo1 convincing orroboration. The precedents cited before us by counsel for the appellant take us no further than the need to ask for satisfactory reinforcement of a retracted confession. not too good to be treated 3< su!lidcnt in itself to fasten the guilt.\n\nEDIGA ANAMMA v. A. P. STATE (Krishna Tyer, /,) 333\n\nWe are, therefore, thrown to the task of evaluating the circums.. lances and the extent to which they buttress up the sclfincriminatiou content in the confession.\n\nMotive by itself is not much, particularly in the absence of direct evidence, but in the company of other factors it plays a probative role.\n\nThe discovery of the child's dead body and the clothes belonging to the accused, as well as the chisel of P. W. 2, the father, which was admittedly missing, are a clear pointer to the guilt, although by then1selves do not cover the entire distance from \"may be\" to \"mu.st be\" in the proof of guilt.\n\nThe noose of guilt is tightened by the testimony of P. Ws. 4, 13 and 15. P. W. 13, the mother-inl~)V of Ansuya, deposed that the deceased, her daughter-in-law, went out to fetch vegetables from the fields and the accused was seen following her with a bundle of clothes to wash them in the stream.\n\nP, W. 15, an apparently disinterested inan, speaks of having seen the accused at Khallam at about 5 p.m. near where the deceased also was.\n\nAlthough the trial court did not choose to believe him, the appellate court thought that it was not risky to rely on his testimony. P. W. 4 also swore to having seen the accused at Khallam at about sundown on the relevant date.\n\nThis shepherd also states that he saw the deceased collecting firewood near about there and heard the cries of a girl.\n\nThere has been a detailed discussion of the evidence of these witnesses by the High Court and notwithstanding the attempt elaborately made by Shri Kathuria, the evidence of these witnesses has not been fractured or rendered incredible.\n\nThe fact that the accused was seen last with the deceased in a place where and at a time when few others were around, the fact that the deceased's body was covered cleverly by the clothes of the accused-foolishly, as we now see by hind-sight-the discovery of telltale clothes off the baby's body, the lethal chisel, her blood-stained skiri concealed in the bush, all strongly probabilise the truth of the confession. In a well-considered judgment the learned Judges of the High Court have covered all the relevant evidence and reached the unhesitating conclusion that the accused had done to death Ansuya and Nirmala. Shri Kathuria's persistent effort to attack almost every part of the prosecution evidence testifies to his industry, which we appreciate, but hardly carries conviction. All the circumstances converge towards the focal point of guilt of the accused, her fatuous assumption that others would be deceived along a wrong trail has failed, and the impending cremation which would have blotted out a vital evidence was averted and truth has come out. We have hardly any doubt that the conviction deserves to be confirmed.\n\nCounsel for the State correctly drew our attention to the great limitations on the exercise of the extraordiilary jurisdiction under art. 136 of the Constitution, particularly, when dealing with the con current findings of fact.\n\nHe is right in contending that We should dismiss arguments which nibble at the credibility of witnesses.\n\nBut finding the case hanging on a retracted extra-judicial confession from 9 L9;4 Sup Cf)74\n\na person who does not necessarily inspire great confidence, corroborJ.ted only by circumstantial evidence, we thought it proper to make a conscientious search to see if truth had been reached and n1iscarriage of justice averted.\n\nWe are satisfied, as already stated, that the accused's guilt, to the extent human instruments can apprehend, has been made out.\n\nGuilt once established, the punitive dilemma begins. The choice between death penalty and life term-has to be made in a situation which is not altogether satisfactory. Modern penology regards crime and criminal as equally material when the right sentence bas to be picked out, although in our processual system there is neither comprehensi~· provision nor adequate machinery for collection and presentation of the social and personal data of the culprit to the extent required in the verdict on sentence.\n\nHowever, in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, about to come into force, Parliament has wisely written into the law a post-<:onviction stage when the Judges shall \"hear the accused on the question of sentence and then pass sentence on him according to law.\" (s. 235 & s. 248).\n\nThe case on hand has to be disposed of under the present Code and we have to fall back upon the method of. judicial hunch in imposing or avoiding capital sentence, aided by such circumstances as are present on the record introduced for the purpose of proving guilt.\n\nWe are aware that in Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P.(1), there was an argument about the absence_ of procedure laid down by the law for determining whether the sentence of death or something less is appropriate in the case.\n\nThe Court viewed this criticism from the constitutional angle and observed :\n\n\"The Court is primarily concerned with all the facts and circumstances in so far as they are relevant to the crime and how it was committed and since at the end of the trial he is liable to be se_ntenced, all the facts and circumstances bearing upon the crime are legitimately brought to the notice of the court. Apart from the cross-examination of the witnesses, the Criminal Procedure Code requires that the accused must be questioned with regard to the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence. He is also questioned generally on the case and there is an opportunity for him to say whatever he wants to say. He has a right to examine himself as a witness, thereafter, and give evidence on the material facts.. Again he and his counsel are at liberty to address the court not merely on the question of guilt but also on the question of sentence.\n\nIn important cases like murder the court always gives a chance to the accused to addre'8 the court on the question of sentence.\"\n\n...\n\n\"The sentence follows the conviction, and it is true that H no formal procedure for producing evidence with reference ---\n\n(I) (1973} I S. C. C. 20.\n\n10 the sentence is specifically provided. The reason is that relevant facts and circumstances impinging on the nature and circumstances of the crime are already before the court.'' ·\n\nIn any scientific system which turns the focus, at the sentencing stage, not only on the crime but also the criminal, and •eeks to personalise the punishment so that the reformatory component is as much operative as the deterrent element, it is essential that facts of a social and personal nature, sometimes altogether irrelevant if not injurious at the stage of fixing the guilt, may have to be brought to the notice of the Court when the actual sentence is determined.\n\nThe prisoner is a young womaµ of 24 flogged out of her husban~'s house by the father-in-law, living with her parents with her only ch.ild, - sex-starved and single. The ethos of the rural area where the episode occurred does not appear. to have been too strict or inhibitive in matters of sex, for the deceased and the accused v.ere both married and still philandered out of wedlock with P. W. 16, a middle-aged widower who niade no bones about playing the freelance romancer simultaneously with them.\n\nTherefore, the accused incautiously slipped down _into the sex net spread by P. W. 16, and while entangled and infatuated, discovered in the deceased a nascent rival.\n\nWith th., reckless passion of a jealous mistress she planned to liquidate her competitor and crudely performed the double murder, most foul.\n\nPerhaps it may be a feable extenuation to remember that the accused is a young woman who attended routinely to tbe choreo of domestic drndgery and allowed her flesh to assert itself salaciously when invited by uncensured opportunity for lonely meetings with P. W. 16. It may also be worth mentioning that, apart from her youth and womanhood, she has a young boy to look after. What may perhaps be an extrinsic factor but recognised by the court as of humane significance in the sentencing context is the brooding horror of 'hanging' which has been haunting the prisoner in her condemned cell for over two years. The Sessfons Judge pronounced the death penalty on December 31, 1971, and we are now in February 1974.\n\nThis prolonged agony has ameliorative impact according to the rulings of this Court. The leading case in Piara Dusadh v.\n\nEmperor(') was relied upon by this Court in N. Sreerarnula v.\n\nState of Andhra Pradesh( 2 ). \"The following passage from the Federal\n\nC.Ourt decision is telling :\n\n\"In committing the offence the appellant must have been actuated by jealousy or by indignation either of which would tend further to disturb the balance of his mind. He has beides been awaiting the execution of this death sentence for over a year. We think that in this case a sentence of transportation for life would be more appropriate than the sentence of death.\" ·\n\nm A. I. R. [1944] F. C. L\n\n(2) (1974) c. L. J. 1775.\n\nThe decision in State of Bihar v. Pashupati Singh(') strikes a similar note. Although this consideration is vulnerable to the criticism made' by counsel for the State that as between two capital sentence cases that which is delayed in its ultimate disposal by the courts receives \\he less terrible punishment while the other beard with quick despatch, for that very reason, fails to relieve the victim from condemnation to death.\n\nIn tjiis unclear situation it is unfortunate that there are no penological guidelines in the statute for preferring the lesser sentence, it being left to ad hoc forensic impressionism to decide for life or for death.\n\nEven so, such sentencing material as we have been able to salvage from the guilt material in the paper book persuades us to award life imprison• ment to the prisoner and modify to that extent the death sentence imposed by the courts below.\n\nIt behoves us to indicate why we .have chosen this course. In the twilight of Jaw in this area, we have been influenced by the seminal trends present in the current sociological thinking and penal strategy in regard to murder. We have also given thought to the legal changes wrought into the penal code in free India. We confess to the impact made on us by legislative and judicial approaches made in other countries although we have warned ourselves against transplanting into our country concepts and experiences valid in the West\n\nIt cannot be en1phas.ised too often that crime and punishment are functionally related to the society in which they occur, and Indian conditions and stages of progress must dominate the exercise of judicial discretion in this case.\n\nIn India the subject of capital punishment has abortively como before Parliament earlier, although our social scientists have not made any sociological or statistical study in depth yet. On the statutory side there has been a significant change since India became free. Under s. 367(5} of the Criminal Procedure Code, as it stood before its amendment by Act 26 of 1955, the normal rule was to sentence to death a person convicted for murder and to impose the lesser sentence for reasons to be recorded in writing.\n\nBy amendment, this provision was deleted with the result that the court is now free to award either death sentence or life imprisonment, unlike formerly when death was the rule and life term the exception, for recorded reasons. In the new Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 a grat change has overtaken the law. Section 354 (3) reads :\n\n\"354(3) When the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, , the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such sentence.\"\n\nThe unmistakable shift in legislative emphasis is that life imprisona ment for murder is the rule. and capital sentence the exception to be\n\n(1) A. I. R. 1973 S. C. 2699.\n\nresorted to for reasons to be stated. In this context it may not be out of place to indicate-not that it is conclusive since it is now tentativethat under the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Bill, 1972, s. 302 of the Penal Code has been substituted by a less harsh provision limiting death penalty to a few special cases (vide s. 122 of the new bill).\n\nIt is obvious that the disturbed conscience of the State on the vexed question of legal threat to life by way of death sentence has sought to express itself legislatively, the stream of tendency being towards cautious, partial abolition and a retreat frohl total retention.\n\nJagmoha11 Singh(1) has adjudged capital sentence constitutional and whatever our view of the social invalidity of the death penalty, personal predilections must bow to the law as by this Court declared, adopting the noble words of Justice Stanley Mosk of California uttered in a death sentence case : \"As a judge, I am bound to the law as I find it to be and not as I fervently wish it to bo\". (The Yale Law Journal. Vol. 82, No. 6, P.l 138). Even so, when a wise discretion vests in the court, what arc the guidelines in this life and death choice? The humanism of our Constitution, echoing the concern of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is deeply concerned about the worth of the human person.\n\nIgnoring the constitutional content of Anderson('), and Furman('), the humanist thrust of the judicial vote against cruel or unusual punishment cannot be lost on the Indian judiciary. The deterrence strategists argue that social defence is served only by its reten tion,-thanks to the strong association between murder and capital\n\npunishmnt in the public imagination,-while the correctional therapists urge the reform of even murderers and not to extinguish them by execution. History hopefully reflects the march of civilization from terrorism to humanism and the geography of death penalty depicts retreat from country after country. The U.K. and the U.S.A. are notable instances.\n\nAmong the socialist nations it has been restricted to very aggravated forms of murder. The lex talionis principle of life for life survives in some States still, only to highlight that in punitive practice, as in other n1attcrs we do not live in 'one world' but do Jnove zigzag forward to the view that the uniquely deterrent effect of death penalty is, in part, challenged by jurists, commissions and statistics.\n\nBut as a counterweight we have what an outstanding justice of the Ontario appeal court said some years ago(') :\n\n\"The irrevocable character of the death penalty is a reason why all possible measures should be taken against injustice-not for its abolition. Nowad?ys, with the advent of armed criminals and the substantial increase in armed robberies, criminals of long standing if arrested, must expect long sentences.\n\nHowever, if they run no risk of hanging, when found guilty of murder, they will kill policemen and witnesses with the prospect of a future no more unhappy, as one of them put it. than being fed, lodged, and clothed for the rest of their Jives.\"\n\n(I) 119731 1 s. c. c: :o.\n\n(3) 408 U S-218\n\n(2) JOO California Reporter 152\n\n(4) Capital Punishrnenl-Thorstn Sellin p, 83\n\nThe final position, as we see it, is neither with the absolute abolitionist nor with the Mosaic retributionist. Jt is relativist, and humanist, conditioned by the sense of justice and prevailing situation of the given society. In England, men once believed it to be just that a thief should lose his life (as some Arab Chieftains do to-day) but the British have gone abolitionist now without regrets. In contemporary India, the via media of legal deprivation of life being the exception and long deprivation of liberty the rule fits the social mood and realities and the direction of the penal and processual laws.\n\nWhile deterrence through threat of death may still be a promising •trategy in some frightful areas of murderous crime, to espouse a monolithic theory of its deterrent efficacy is unscientific and so we think it right to shift the emphasis, to accept composite factors of penal strategy and not to put all the punitive eggs in the 'hanging' basket but hopefully to try the humane mix.\n\nWe assume that a better world is one without legal knifing of life, given propitious social changes. Even so, to sublimate savagery in individual or society is a long experiment in spiritual chemistry where moral values, socio-economic conditions and legislative judgment have a role.\n\nJudicial activism can only be a signpost, a weather vane, no more. We think the penal direction in this jurisprudential journey points to life prison normally, as against guillotine, gas chamber, electric chair, firing squad or .hangmen's rope. 'Thou shalt not kill' is a slow commandment in law as in life, addressed to citizens as well as to States, in peace as in war.\n\nWe make this survey to justify our general pr<0ference wheres. 302 keeps two options open and the question is of great moment.\n\nLet us crystallise the positive indicators against death sentence under Indian Law currently. Where the murderer is too young or too old, the clemency of penal justice helps him. Where the offender suffers from socio-economic, psychic or penal compulsions insufficient to attract a legal exception or to downgrade the crime into a lesser one, judicial commutation is permissible. Other general social pressures, warranting judicial notice, with an extenuating impact may, in special cases, induce the lesser penalty. Extraordinary features in the judicial process, such as that the death sentence has hung over the head of the culprit excruciatingly long, may persuade the court to be compassionate. Likewise, if others involved in the crime and similarly situated have received the benefit of life imprisonment or if the offence is only constructive, being under s. 302 read with s. 149, or again the accused has acted suddenly under another's instigation, without premeditation, perhaps the court may humanely opt for life, even like where a just cause or real suspicion of wifely infidelity pushed the criminal into the crime. On the other hand, the weapons used and the manner of their use, the borrandous features of the crime and hapless, helpless state of the victim, and the like, steal the heart of the law for a sterner sentence. We cannot obviously feed into a judicial comput.er all such situations since they are astrological imponderables in an imperfect and undulating society. A legal\n\npolicy on life or death cannot be left for ad hoc mood or individual predilection and so we have sought to objectify to the extent possible, abandoning retributiv-o ruthlessness, amending the deterrent creed and accenting the trend against the extreme and irrevocable penalty of putting out life.\n\nHere, the criminal's social and personal factors are less harsh, her leminity and youth, her unbalanced sex and expulsion from the conjugal home and being the mother of a young boy-these individually inconclusive and cumulatively marginal facts and circumstances tend towards award of life imprisonment. We realise the speculative nature of. the correlation between crime and punishment in this case, as in many others, and conscious of fallibility dilute the death penalty. The larger thought that quick punishment, though only a life term, is more deterrent than leisurely judicial death award with liberal interposition of executive clemency, and that stricter checking on illicit weapons by the police deters better as social defense against murdetous violence than a distant death sentence, is not an extraneous component in a court verdict on form of punishment.\n\nWe have indicated enough to hold that, marginal vaccilation notwithstanding, the death sentence must be dissolved and life sentence substituted. To this extent the appeal is allowed, but otherwise the conviction is confirmed.\n\nK.B.N.\n\nAppeal allowed in part.", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "EDIGA ANAMMA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 12, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "EDIGA ANAMMA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 11, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 56, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "EDIGA ANAMMA\n\nSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\nFebruary 11, 1974."}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1119, "end_char": 1129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(i) Modern penology regards crime and criminal as equally material when the right sentence has to be picked out although in our processual system there is neither comprehensive provision nor adequate machinery for collection and presentation of social and personal data of the culprit to the extent required in the verdict on sentence, However, in the Criminal Procedure Bill, 1973, Parliament has wisely written into the law a post conviction stage when the judges shall \"hear the accused 011 the question of sentence and then pass settence on him according to law.\""}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1757, "end_char": 1783, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 367(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1784, "end_char": 1798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 235, 238 and 354(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1860, "end_char": 1888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1897, "end_char": 1907, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "R. P. Kathuria", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3219, "end_char": 3233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. P. Kathuria, an1icus curiae for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Ram Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3270, "end_char": 3282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Ram Reddy and P. P. Rao for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. P. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3287, "end_char": 3296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Ram Reddy and P. P. Rao for the respondent."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3362, "end_char": 3374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered bv\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.\n\nIn a rural region of Andhra Pradesh Frendian fury cl'."}}, {"text": "November 4 .. 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4035, "end_char": 4053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This knowledge angered her so much that she extinguished the life of her rival on November 4 .. 1971 in the afternoon in a jungle, manipulating her murderous venture so cleverly that for a time people thought that she was the murdered and searched for her body."}}, {"text": "Ansuya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4259, "end_char": 4265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Closer enquiry revealed that the victim was Ansuya and the other innocent one her baby less than two years old."}}, {"text": "Kathuria", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4333, "end_char": 4341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Kathuria, appearing as an1icus curiae, has presented a pr.instakingly meticulous argument on behalf of the prisoner, who bas bocn condemned to death by the courts below."}}, {"text": "November 4, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4624, "end_char": 4640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By sundown on November 4, 1971 a cadaver was found in a field outside the village of Konapur, Medak District, Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Konapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4695, "end_char": 4702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By sundown on November 4, 1971 a cadaver was found in a field outside the village of Konapur, Medak District, Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Medak District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4704, "end_char": 4718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By sundown on November 4, 1971 a cadaver was found in a field outside the village of Konapur, Medak District, Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4720, "end_char": 4734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By sundown on November 4, 1971 a cadaver was found in a field outside the village of Konapur, Medak District, Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "November 8, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5023, "end_char": 5039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 8, 1971 the dead body of a baby, Nirmala."}}, {"text": "Nirmala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5065, "end_char": 5072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 8, 1971 the dead body of a baby, Nirmala."}}, {"text": "Anamma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5199, "end_char": 5205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Investigations disclosed that Anamma, the accused, was the perpetrator of this fiendish crime."}}, {"text": "s.201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5413, "end_char": 5418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5420, "end_char": 5425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Rachappa", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6060, "end_char": 6068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Carnal knowledge with p. W: 16 developed even when she was in her husband's house and she manifested her passion by stealing gold rings from the house of one Rachappa to make it over to P. W. 16 as a memento of her illicit love."}}, {"text": "Ansuya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6520, "end_char": 6526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II The deceased, Ansuya, was the wife of P. W. I 2 who was, as\n\nill-luck would have it, the neighbour of the accused's family."}}, {"text": "Nirmala", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7522, "end_char": 7529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The medical evidence shows that Ansuya and Nirmala were stabbed to death with a chisel identified by the accused's own father, P. W. 2, and the blacksmith who made it, P. W. 15."}}, {"text": "Patel", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8729, "end_char": 8734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dead body in the field was found covered with the accused's clothing ond beguiled by this circumstance P. W. 2 reported to the police Patel, P.W. 5 (Ex."}}, {"text": "Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8849, "end_char": 8854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Taken in by this report, the Patel informed the police and the Sub-Inspector, P. W. 26, proceeded to the scene of occurrence, held inquest and sent the body for postmortem examination."}}, {"text": "November 5, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9063, "end_char": 9079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. W. 22, the doctor, did the autopsy in the afternoon of November 5, 1971 and the body was brought back to Konapur by sundown."}}, {"text": "Ankanpally", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9361, "end_char": 9371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tragic body was being made ready for cremation when the Patel of village Ankanpally,."}}, {"text": "November 6, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9830, "end_char": 9846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They went to the place but it was night and the next morning, i.e., November 6, 1971, P. W. 12-· the husband-and P. W ."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10712, "end_char": 10718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10730, "end_char": 10735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11089, "end_char": 11094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Khallam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13798, "end_char": 13805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P, W. 15, an apparently disinterested inan, speaks of having seen the accused at Khallam at about 5 p.m. near where the deceased also was."}}, {"text": "Nirmala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15052, "end_char": 15059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a well-considered judgment the learned Judges of the High Court have covered all the relevant evidence and reached the unhesitating conclusion that the accused had done to death Ansuya and Nirmala."}}, {"text": "art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15710, "end_char": 15718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16888, "end_char": 16917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17131, "end_char": 17137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "s. 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17140, "end_char": 17146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "December 31, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20998, "end_char": 21015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sessfons Judge pronounced the death penalty on December 31, 1971, and we are now in February 1974."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22963, "end_char": 22968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have also given thought to the legal changes wrought into the penal code in free India."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24897, "end_char": 24914, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24939, "end_char": 24945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24953, "end_char": 24963, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 122", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25063, "end_char": 25069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagmoha11 Singh(1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25364, "end_char": 25381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagmoha11 Singh(1) has adjudged capital sentence constitutional and whatever our view of the social invalidity of the death penalty, personal predilections must bow to the law as by this Court declared, adopting the noble words of Justice Stanley Mosk of California uttered in a death sentence case : \"As a judge, I am bound to the law as I find it to be and not as I fervently wish it to bo\". ("}}, {"text": "Stanley Mosk", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25603, "end_char": 25615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagmoha11 Singh(1) has adjudged capital sentence constitutional and whatever our view of the social invalidity of the death penalty, personal predilections must bow to the law as by this Court declared, adopting the noble words of Justice Stanley Mosk of California uttered in a death sentence case : \"As a judge, I am bound to the law as I find it to be and not as I fervently wish it to bo\". ("}}, {"text": "California", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25619, "end_char": 25629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagmoha11 Singh(1) has adjudged capital sentence constitutional and whatever our view of the social invalidity of the death penalty, personal predilections must bow to the law as by this Court declared, adopting the noble words of Justice Stanley Mosk of California uttered in a death sentence case : \"As a judge, I am bound to the law as I find it to be and not as I fervently wish it to bo\". ("}}, {"text": "Anderson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26111, "end_char": 26119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ignoring the constitutional content of Anderson('), and Furman('), the humanist thrust of the judicial vote against cruel or unusual punishment cannot be lost on the Indian judiciary."}}, {"text": "Furman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26128, "end_char": 26134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ignoring the constitutional content of Anderson('), and Furman('), the humanist thrust of the judicial vote against cruel or unusual punishment cannot be lost on the Indian judiciary."}}, {"text": "U.K.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26713, "end_char": 26717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The U.K. and the U.S.A. are notable instances."}}, {"text": "U.S.A.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26726, "end_char": 26732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The U.K. and the U.S.A. are notable instances."}}, {"text": "Capital Punishrnenl-Thorstn Sellin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27918, "end_char": 27952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(I) 119731 1 s. c. c: :o.\n\n(3) 408 U S-218\n\n(2) JOO California Reporter 152\n\n(4) Capital Punishrnenl-Thorstn Sellin p, 83\n\nThe final position, as we see it, is neither with the absolute abolitionist nor with the Mosaic retributionist."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28190, "end_char": 28197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In England, men once believed it to be just that a thief should lose his life (as some Arab Chieftains do to-day) but the British have gone abolitionist now without regrets."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30612, "end_char": 30618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30629, "end_char": 30635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_340_347_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "CHAWLA AND ANOTHER v.\n\nSTATE OF HARYANA\n\nFebruary 12, 1974 [V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.l\n\nCriminal law-Practice and Procedure-Seritence of /; fe imprisonment for murder. when may be 1ranted. ·\n\nSix. accUsed were charged with the murder of three persons. Two of the ac.:used-tbe appellants-were convicted of murder of two of -the deceased, n:spectively and were sentenced to death by the High Court in appeal.\n\nThe other four accused were sentenced to life imprisonment.\n\nIn appeal to this Court, regarding the sentence of death passed on the two appellants,\n\nHELD : The death sentence should be commuted to imprisonment for life. for the following reasons :-\n\n(a) It was probable that the tragedy was provoked or precipitated by the blame-worthy and intransigent conduct of the deceased in regard to the retaining or taking possession of the land that had been finally allotted to the accused by the Consolidation autbprities. and over which land, there were disputes between the accused and the deceased.\n\nfb) The first appellant was rcs,:ionsible for causing only one out of the 3 fatal injuries received by the deceased for_ whose murder be was convicted.\n\nProbably, that was the only blOw given by him to tho deceased, while the remaining 6 punctured wounds were all caused by the other accused who were awarded the lesser sentence.\n\n( c) The appellants are immature youths who appear to have acted at the E instigation of their elder.\n\n(d) The appellants must have suffered prolonged mental torture on account of their beinS: constantlI haunted by the spectre of death for one year and 10 , months ever since they were sentenced to death by the trail court.\n\nMoreover the Court has now a discretion to award either of the two penalties prescribed under s. 302, Penal Code, and death sentence is now exacted only where the murder was perpetrated with marked brutality. [346 E-347 CJ\n\nY; v; an Rodrick v. Tiie State of West Be11gal, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1584; Gurd; p Singh v, State of PunitJb, A.l.R. 1971 S.C. 2240, State of Maharashlra v.\n\nMang/ye Dhavu Kongll, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1797, State of B/har v. Pa.rhupatl Singh and another, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. Ga/anand and ors. v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 695, and Ediga A.namma v. State of A.ndhra Pradesh, Cr. A. 67/73 decided on 11·2·74, followed.\n\nBrij Bhukhan and ors. v. State of U.P. A.I.R.~ 1957 S.C. 474, Mil:Jlll and anr. <tc. v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1959, S.C. 572 and Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P.\n\nG Cr. L.J. 370 (S.C.), referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criniinal Appeal No. 109 of 1973.\n\nAppeal by Special leave from the judgment and order dated the 13th November, 1972 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 493 of n and Murder Reference No. 21 of H 1972.\n\nN. S. Das Bahl, for the appellants.\n\nV. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·\n\nSARKARIA J.\n\nThe facts giving rise to this appeal by special leave are as under : Jagga had thret sons; Bishna, Ram Lal and Har Lal.\n\nRam Dia, Dal Singh and Ran Singh deceased were the sons of Bishna. Ram Lai and his sons, Chawla and Dhanna Har Lal, his son, Puran, and Har Lal's grandson, Mukhtiara are the accused in this case. ' During consolidation operations in their village, Deora, dispute arose between Ram Lal and Har Lal on one side and Bishna on the other, over the allotment of a plot, measuring 4' acres. This plot was allotted by the Consolidation Officer to Bishna but in revision the Additional Director, Consolidation on May 4: 1968, set asid~ the Order ct the Consolidation Officer and allotted it to Ram Lal and Har Lal, accused. Bishna died and the deceased succeeded him. Aggrieved, the deceased persons moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for bringiqg up and quashing the order of the Director.\n\nThe High Court dismissed this petition on July 14, 1971 and upheld the order of the Director. On October 4, 1971, the Assistant Collector made an order that, in implementation of the order of the Director of Consolidation, the land be demarcated at the spot and possession delivered to the allottees. It was further directed that the land be mutated in favour of the allottees.\n\nOn October 5, 1971, the Kanungo, in compliance :with the Assistant Collector's order, demarcated the land at the spot and delivered symbolical possession\n\n. 129 129 1:9 1211 d H of Klla Nos. -7-. ffi'J' 14 . 16 as those fields were un er crop. e\n\ndelivered actual possession of the other fields, comprised in the allotment, which were not nder crops, including I<hasra No. W, to the accused, Ram Lal and Har Lal. The deceased persons, however, did not submit to this symbolical and actual delivery of possession. They instituted a suit in the Civil Court at Kaithal and obtained an ex parte interim injunction restraining the accused from taking possession of the land. This injunction was served on Ram Lal accused on November 5, 1971.\n\nOn November 11, 1971, Ram Dia, Dal Singh and Ran Singh deceased, went to the fields with their ploughs. Dal Singh started reaping chari crop, Ran Singh started ploughing the field, while Ram Dia went on a round of the field. At about 11 a.m., all the six accused, in a body reaChed the field.\n\nPuran and Ram La1 were armed with Suas (iron-spiked sticks) , Dhanna with a Gandasa, and Har Lal, Mukhtiara and Chawla with Jathis. On reaching the spot, Har Lal exhorted his companions to kill the deceased. Thereupon, Chawla, Puran and Ram Lal gave blows with their respective weapons to Ram Dia, Ran Singh came to the rescue of his brother. Thereupon, Dhanna and Mukhtiara assaulted him with their respective weapons. Dal Singh interceded but all the six accused belaboured him. The occurrence was witnessed by Smt. Mali Nasib Singh and Shadi who had run to a safe distance and stood ther~. After the assault, the accused ran away taking their weapons with them. Ram Dia died at the spot. Dal Singh succumbed to\n\nhis injuries after his admission in the Civil Hospital Kaithal, while Ran\n\nSingh expired in Medical College/Hospital, Rohtak on November 13, 1971.\n\nThe Sessions Judge convicted and sentenced Chawla, Puran and Mukhtiara accused to death under s.302/34, Penal Code. He further convicted them under s.302/149 on three counts and sentenced them each to imprisonment for life. A conviction under s.148, Penal Code with a sentence of one year's imprisonment each was also recorded.\n\nThe remaining accused were also convicted under ss. 302/149 and 34 and 148, Penal Code and on the capital charge sentenced to imprisonment for life, each.\n\nOn appeai, the High Court commuted the death sentence of Puran to one of imprisonment for life on the ground that it was not known as to which of the three fatal injuries to Ram Dia had been caused by Puran. It confirmed the death sentences of Chawla and Mukhtiara, for committing the murders of Ram Dia, and Ran Singh, respectively. The conviction of Ram Lal, Har Lal and Dhanna under ss.302/149 was a1so maintained.\n\nSpecial Leave in this case was granted only with regard to the capital sentence inflicted on Chawla and Mukhtiara, appellants.\n\nMr. Behal, learned arnicus curiae has urged that the death senten ces were not justified because of these alleviating circumstances :-\n\n(a) The cause of the tragedy can be traced to the unreasonable, stubborn, and blame-worthy conduct of the deceased in retaking or retaining possession of the land that after a protracted litigation, had been finally allotted and made over to the accused party by the Director of Consolidation. The violence seems to have erupted because of the wrongful act of the deceased in ploughing Kila No. 612 etc., actual possession of which had been duly delivered by the Consolidation Authorities, earlier to the accused party. Ram Dia armed with a stick was on guard duty while the other deceased were 'ploughing or sowing in the dis puted land. Ram Dia provoked the assault by dealing blows with a stick to Har Lal accused.\n\n(b)\n\n(c)\n\nJn the case of Chawla appellant, it was not clear whether any fat'al injury to Ram Dia was caused by him. Jn any case, it was unreasonable to mark him out for capital punishment for inflicting only one of the three fatal injuries with a Iathi, when the coaccused to whom the punctured, fatal wounds were attributed, have been awarded the lesser penalty.\n\nThat Chawla and Mukhtiara appellants are raw youths, aged 25 and 24 ye.ars •. respectiv7Iy, who probably acted under the inst1gat10n of their father; and that the death sentence has been hovering over their heads for an agonisingly long period of about 1 year\n\nCHAWLA v. HARYA~A (Sarkaria, J.) 343\n\nand I 0 months.\n\nThe above circumstances, according to Mr. Behal, taken separately as well as collectively, furnish sufficient ground for mitigation of the capital sentence.\n\nReference has been made to the decisions of this Court in Vivialn Rodrick v. The State of West Bengal;(') Gurdip Singh v. State of Punjab;(') State of Maharashtra v. Naglya Dhavu Kongil;(I') State iii Bihar v. Pashupati Singh and another(') and Gajanand and ors. v. State of U.P.( 5 )\n\nOn the other hand, Mr. Vikram Mahajan. learned Counsel for the State vehemently contends that none of the circumstances pointed cut bv Mr. Behal .is a good extenuating factor.\n\nIt is emphasisetl that ti; c accused \\vent armed \\Vith a determination to kill the deceased\n\nprsons and they succeeded in their nefarious design. This \\VJS a cas~\n\nor cold-11loooed triple murder and no leniency in the matter of sent, nce was called for.\n\nIt is argued that the mere fact that the murders were committed at the exhortation of the eldest accused Har Lal, was no _ground in law for not inflicting the capital sentence on the appellants.\n\nHe has further pointed out that the mere fact that a period of obout 1 year and 10 months has elapse'd since the award of the capital sentence, which is mainly due to the protracted proceedings, is no :; round for reducing the capital sentence.\n\nIn support of his arguments. learned Counsel has relied on Brij Bhu.khan and ors. v. State of U1 P.;(') Mizaji and anr. etc. v. State of U. P.( 7 l; Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P.(').\n\nTn:e, according to the finding of the courts beiow, the occurrence !ook place ctuallv in Kila No. 611, anti not in Kila No. 6/2, which v:as in dispute.\n\nThe very numbering of these fields by the Settlement\n\nuthorities shov.s that thev are sub divisions or parts of the same J;:iJa \"\" 6 The disputed land was thus intermin.2led with the plot cf occurrence.\n\nThe deceased were feeling aggrieved by the partition ond all.otmcnt of this land .including Kila 6.\n\nIndeed. despite the conclusion of the dJSpute by the consolidation authorities, the deceased ·,; ere keeping it alive.\n\nThe Kanungo's Report (Ex.PJJ). dated Octol::cr 5. 1971. whereby Possession of the disputed land was delivered !(] the accused Part~. shows that Kila No. 612 in Rectangle No. 129\n\n\"as one. nf those tlisputed plots. the actual possession oi which had\n\n~ef ciel1vcred to the accused party.\n\nIt was the prosecution case,\n\n~et\n\n1 ~~~; j~ 0g~~ tfoe the assalt. Ram Singh was ploughing to sow the di~Putcd land an'~'kaabuttmg hchri from the field adjacent to 'ibly to keeii a watch aginst ;~ was avmg a round. of he fields. posunder s 14? Cr p C he_ accusd. Chawla tn his cxaminatinn- ----·- -- _..... . . eave t is version of the incident-- (!) A. 1. R.-197Ts. c. t584\n\n(21 A. T. R. 1971 S. C. 2240 '\n\n(3) A. T. R. t972 S. C. 1797\n\n(41 A. T. R. S. C. 2699 '\n\n(51 A.J.R. 1954 S.C. 695.\n\n(61 A. T. R. 1957 S. C. 474\n\n(7\\ A. I. R. 1959 S. C SP\n\n(8) Cr. 1. J. 370 (S. C.l. -\n\n... , .. Ram Dia asked us to give up the possession of the land and hand over the same to him. We told him that he could take back the possession in the same way as the _possession had been delivered to us by the Tehsil\\lar, Girdawar and Patwari.\n\nAt this, Ram Dia said that he would take the p0ssession forcibly.\n\nWe told him that we would not hand over the passession by force.\n\nOn the day <>f orcurrcnce. Ram Dia a_nld his brothers started ploughing the land and uprooting the crops sown by us, with the help .of two ploughs.\n\nAt sun-rise, Har Lal armed with a lathi, I armed with a two-pronged iailv and Ram Lal armed with a lathi were i:oing on th.; road from Deora Lo Ujana to go to our field ..... -... Har Lal icild us that it seemed to him that the larrJ in dispute-was being ploughed by the deceased.\n\nHar Lal went and stood in front of the bullocks and told Ram Dia that he should have been satisfied after cultivating the land since the consolidation and that he should desist from ploughing the land and destroying the crop.\n\nAt this Ram Dia gave a lathi blow which hit Har Lal on the right hand.\n\nAt this, Har Lal, Ram Lal and myself gave injuries with our respective weapons. . . . . .\n\nWe got Har Lal medically examined . ... \"\n\nThough this version of the accused was not sufficient to make out :a case of private defence:_ yet, coupled with the Kanunos report,\n\nEx.PH. and the surrounding circumstances, it strongly points to the .conclusion that the tragedy was 'probably precipitated by the deceaseld's\n\ninsistence on cultivation and possession of the disputed land indudling those fields of which actual possession had been dulv delivered by the consolidation authorities to the accused.\n\nThe appellants had the order of Additional Director of Consolidation in their favour in respect of the land in dispute. The deceased challenged that order by a writ petition under Article 226 in the High Court which dismissed the same and uoheld the order of the Director.\n\nTherafter. on October\n\n5. 1971. in imolementatiop of the Director's order, symbolical pos- •ession of that part of the land which was under crops, and actual possession of the fields which were vacant. was delivered, to the accused. It seems that the deceased urlder the cloak of an cx-parte interim injunction obtained by them on November 4, 1971, were detern1ined to retain or retake possession even of those fields of which actual possession had been--de)ivered to the accused party by the consolidation authorities.\n\nThis takes us to the next circumstance stressed by Mr. Behal.\n\nChawla has been awarded the capftal sentence for the murder of Ram Dia. The part ascribed to the appellant by the witnesses, who admittedly had run away to some distance at the commencement . of the assault. was that he had inflicted a fatal blow with a 1athi on the deceased.\n\nDr. Raj Gupta who conducted the autopsy, testified that there were eight iil.iuries in all on the dead-bodv of Ram Dia, out of which, six were punctured wounds.\n\nInjury No. 6\n\nE '\n\nF -\n\nwas an abrasion on the left fore-arm. Injury No. 8 was a depression of the frontal and parietai bones. All the injuries, colleclIely, in the opinion of the Doctor, w_ere . sufficient t<>. cause death m the ordinary course of nature. It is miury 8 which wa~ attnbutcd _by\n\nthe witnesses to Chawla, apl\"'ant. Jn the exanunatt0n-m-ch1et, the Doctor did not say that this injury was by itself, fatal.\n\nJn. cross-examination in the Committal Court, she said that injuries I, 2 and 4. individually, as well llS collectively, could cause death. t the trial, Dr. Raj Gupta chang~ this version and said that injuries 1, 4 and 8 were individually _sufliciet. in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. She excluded rniury. No. 2 from the category of fatal injuries, and, in its pl_ace, substituted injury No. 8. If the.\n\nDoctor's former statement made in the Committal Court was correct,. then injury 8 was not a fatal injury and the three fatal injuries (J, 2 and 4) were punctured \\\\'OUnds which could have b<en caused by Ram Lal and Puran only, who were armed with sharp-pointed: weapons.\n\nFurther, in the . Co'!\"rriittal Court, Dr. Gupta had clearly testified tlrnt none of the 8 injuries found on the body of. Ram Dia had been caused with a .blunt weapon.\n\nOn this point, also, she took up a different position at the trial and sar..l that injury 8 might have been caused with a lathi.\n\nIn any case, apart from • a. minor abrasion on the left fore-arm which could have been the result of a fall, there was only one injucy on the body of Ram Dia, caused with a lathi. It could not be said that Chawla played the dominant role in the assault. His prt, if not less, was in no way greater than that of Har Lal and Ram Lal who had caused the fatal punctured wounds.\n\nWe have referred to the contradictory positions taken by themedical officer. not to show _that Chawla could not be convicted\n\n.. und'r s 302. Penal Code, but to appreciate his precist role in the\n\nassault on Ram Dia. for the purpose of sentence, only. From Dr.\n\nGuotas evidence it is clear that he had caused only one injury, with a lathi, to Ram Dia and his part in the assault. if not less, was in no wa, greater than that of Har Lal and Ram Lal who had caused no. jess thnn f-ix injuries, includinl! two fatal, to the deceased.\n\nFurthet circumstance which deserves consideration is that these raw vouths. Chawla and Mukhtiara. appear to haw acted under the\n\ninstigation of their elder. Har Lal.\n\ntill anoher factor to be taken into account in prescribing the pumshment ts that death penalty has been brooding over the heods of. these youngmen for an agonisingly long period.\n\nTlt'y were committed for trial two Years in February 1972 and were condemned to eath by th~ tria! court in April f972.\n\nBy cold logic, this circumstai, cc. as \" rmt:gattng factor. more often than aot, being the unwarranted result of Law's delays, is vulnerable. But humane considerations of administering justice tempered with mercy have impelled the courts to recognise it as an ameliorating circumstance In the last half a century, the science of criminology has taken greai strides.\n\nThere has been rethinking about crime and punishment.\n\nThe process is con-.\n\ntinuino.\n\nWinds of compassion for the criminal blowing the world over, are attecting Jaw and logic, the Judge and the Legislator, alike.\n\nDraconicn notions and retributive relics of lex elionis are yielding to \"Mankind's concern for Charity\". ln every creature, ''born but to die\", it is \"blindness to the future, kindly given\" that keeps life going.\n\nBut in u condemned man, the Book of Fate open before him consrantly telling of the doom prescribed, the life-stream of hopes and aspirations rapi~ Jy starts drying under the excruciating heat of the mental. desert. W1tn\n\npassaoe of time, the prisoner painfully awaiting execution, become:; no bcttcr than a \"life-less\" mummy.\n\nIt was in this perspective that tilis Court in Slate of Bihar v. Pashupati Singh and anr. (supra), ruled 1hat if there has beep. a long interval between the date of the offence and the consideration of appeal by the Supreme Court. the\n\ncapital sentence few the c001mission of an offence under s. 30'.:, Penal Code for which the accused has undergone a long period of mental agonv, the sentence of death may not be exacted.\n\nA simila:· note was struck bv a Bench of this Court, constimted by both oi us, in Ediga Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh(').\n\nParliament also has taken note of the current penological thought.\n\nBefore Criminal Amendment Act 26 of 1955, for the offence of murder, death sentence w.'IS the rule and transportation for life an exception. anld if the lesser penalty was to be awarded, then subsection (5) of s. 367, Code of Criminal Procedure required reasons I<> be given.\n\nBy Act 26 of 1955, this sub-s. ( 5) was recast and the requirement of giving reasons for the lesser punishn1ent, \\\\'US done away with.\n\nThe former rule is thus no longer oporative. The Court .has now a discretion to award either of the two penalties prescribed under s. 302, Penal Code. Death sentence is now exacted onlv where the murder was perpetrated with marked brutality.\n\nParliament has passed the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, which is coming into force shortly.\n\nIn it, the position is reverse of what it was before the Amendment of 1955.\n\nAfter this Bill becomes !aw. it will be obligatory for the court to give reasons if the death sen-· tence is to be inflicted.\n\nThe Penal Code Bill, 1955, which is on th' anvil, reserves capital punishment for only a few types of murders.\n\nWe have referred to the modern penologicaJ thought and current legislative trends not with a view to decide this case on the basis of what is yet. in embryo, but to have a proper perspective for appreciating of the CIIcumstances which have been urged in this case in mitigation of the sentence.\n\nTo sum up, these are :\n\n(a) There was some probability of the tragedy having been. provoed or precipitated by the blame-worthy and 1ntrans1gent conduct of the deceased in regard to the retaining or retaking possession of the land H WC A. 67(73;.Jeeided on ll-2-74.\n\nthat had been finally allotted to the accused by the consolidation authorities.\n\n(b) Chawla appellant was responsible for causing only one out of the three fatal injuries received by Ram Dia, deceased. Probably, that was the only blow given by him to the deceased, while the remaining six\n\nB punctured wounds were all caused by the other accused who have been awarded the lesser sentence.\n\n(c) Chawla and Mukhtiara, appellants are Immature youths who appear to have acted at the instigation of their elder, Har Lal.\n\n(d) Prolonged mental torture suffered by Chawla and Mukhtiara on account of their being constantly haunted by the spectre of death for the last one year and\n\n10 months.\n\nPerhaps, none of the above circumstances, taken singly and judged rigidly by the old Draconian standards, would be sufficient to justify\n\nthe imposition of the lesser penalty; nor are these circumstances ade- D quate enough to palliate the offence of murder. But in their totality, they tilt the judicial scales in favour of life rather then putting it out.\n\nThe circumstances considered above have long been recognised by courts as valid grounds for mitigating the sentence. They are not innovations. Formerly what was in the penumbra of extenuation, \"dim-described\", now, in the twilight of compassion, has become clearly discernible.\n\nBefore we part with this judgment, we may in fairness to the learned Counsel for the State, note it here that the rulings cited by him turn on their own facts. In Mizaji's case and Jagmohan Singh's case (supra), the accused were awarded capital sentences as they were found guilty of having fired the fatal shots with fire-arms. In Brij Bhukhan's case (supra), the victim had been dragged out of his own house and mercilessly beaten .. Such is not the case here.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, while maintaining the convictions of the appellants, we would allow the appeal and commute the death sentences of the appellants to that of imprisonment for life on each count. The sentences shall run concurrently.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal c; l/owed.", "total_entities": 82, "entities": [{"text": "CHAWLA AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHAWLA AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF HARYANA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 12, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 58, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHAWLA AND ANOTHER v.\n\nSTATE OF HARYANA\n\nFebruary 12, 1974 [V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.l\n\nCriminal law-Practice and Procedure-Seritence of /; fe imprisonment for murder."}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1773, "end_char": 1779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1781, "end_char": 1791, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "N. S. Das Bahl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2787, "end_char": 2801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Das Bahl, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "V. C. Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2824, "end_char": 2837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2842, "end_char": 2856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2925, "end_char": 2933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·\n\nSARKARIA J.\n\nThe facts giving rise to this appeal by special leave are as under : Jagga had thret sons; Bishna, Ram Lal and Har Lal."}}, {"text": "Jagga", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3007, "end_char": 3012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·\n\nSARKARIA J.\n\nThe facts giving rise to this appeal by special leave are as under : Jagga had thret sons; Bishna, Ram Lal and Har Lal."}}, {"text": "Bishna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3029, "end_char": 3035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·\n\nSARKARIA J.\n\nThe facts giving rise to this appeal by special leave are as under : Jagga had thret sons; Bishna, Ram Lal and Har Lal.", "canonical_name": "Bishna"}}, {"text": "Ram Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3037, "end_char": 3044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·\n\nSARKARIA J.\n\nThe facts giving rise to this appeal by special leave are as under : Jagga had thret sons; Bishna, Ram Lal and Har Lal.", "canonical_name": "Ram Lal"}}, {"text": "Har Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3049, "end_char": 3056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·\n\nSARKARIA J.\n\nThe facts giving rise to this appeal by special leave are as under : Jagga had thret sons; Bishna, Ram Lal and Har Lal."}}, {"text": "Ram Dia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3059, "end_char": 3066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Dia, Dal Singh and Ran Singh deceased were the sons of Bishna.", "canonical_name": "Ram Lal"}}, {"text": "Dal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3068, "end_char": 3077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Dia, Dal Singh and Ran Singh deceased were the sons of Bishna."}}, {"text": "Ran Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3082, "end_char": 3091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Dia, Dal Singh and Ran Singh deceased were the sons of Bishna.", "canonical_name": "Ran\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Ram Lai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3126, "end_char": 3133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Lai and his sons, Chawla and Dhanna Har Lal, his son, Puran, and Har Lal's grandson, Mukhtiara are the accused in this case. '", "canonical_name": "Ram Lal"}}, {"text": "Chawla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3148, "end_char": 3154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Lai and his sons, Chawla and Dhanna Har Lal, his son, Puran, and Har Lal's grandson, Mukhtiara are the accused in this case. '", "canonical_name": "Chawla"}}, {"text": "Dhanna Har Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3159, "end_char": 3173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Lai and his sons, Chawla and Dhanna Har Lal, his son, Puran, and Har Lal's grandson, Mukhtiara are the accused in this case. '"}}, {"text": "Puran", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3184, "end_char": 3189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Lai and his sons, Chawla and Dhanna Har Lal, his son, Puran, and Har Lal's grandson, Mukhtiara are the accused in this case. '", "canonical_name": "Puran"}}, {"text": "Mukhtiara", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3215, "end_char": 3224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Lai and his sons, Chawla and Dhanna Har Lal, his son, Puran, and Har Lal's grandson, Mukhtiara are the accused in this case. '", "canonical_name": "Mukhtiara"}}, {"text": "Deora", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3307, "end_char": 3312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During consolidation operations in their village, Deora, dispute arose between Ram Lal and Har Lal on one side and Bishna on the other, over the allotment of a plot, measuring 4' acres."}}, {"text": "Bishna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3372, "end_char": 3378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During consolidation operations in their village, Deora, dispute arose between Ram Lal and Har Lal on one side and Bishna on the other, over the allotment of a plot, measuring 4' acres.", "canonical_name": "Bishna"}}, {"text": "May 4: 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3563, "end_char": 3574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This plot was allotted by the Consolidation Officer to Bishna but in revision the Additional Director, Consolidation on May 4: 1968, set asid~ the Order ct the Consolidation Officer and allotted it to Ram Lal and Har Lal, accused."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3777, "end_char": 3785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 14, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3905, "end_char": 3918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court dismissed this petition on July 14, 1971 and upheld the order of the Director."}}, {"text": "October 4, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3960, "end_char": 3975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 4, 1971, the Assistant Collector made an order that, in implementation of the order of the Director of Consolidation, the land be demarcated at the spot and possession delivered to the allottees."}}, {"text": "October 5, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4245, "end_char": 4260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 5, 1971, the Kanungo, in compliance :with the Assistant Collector's order, demarcated the land at the spot and delivered symbolical possession\n\n."}}, {"text": "Kanungo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4266, "end_char": 4273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 5, 1971, the Kanungo, in compliance :with the Assistant Collector's order, demarcated the land at the spot and delivered symbolical possession\n\n.", "canonical_name": "Kanungo"}}, {"text": "Civil Court at Kaithal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4785, "end_char": 4807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They instituted a suit in the Civil Court at Kaithal and obtained an ex parte interim injunction restraining the accused from taking possession of the land."}}, {"text": "November 5, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4961, "end_char": 4977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This injunction was served on Ram Lal accused on November 5, 1971."}}, {"text": "November 11, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4983, "end_char": 5000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 11, 1971, Ram Dia, Dal Singh and Ran Singh deceased, went to the fields with their ploughs."}}, {"text": "Puran", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5274, "end_char": 5279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Puran and Ram La1 were armed with Suas (iron-spiked sticks) , Dhanna with a Gandasa, and Har Lal, Mukhtiara and Chawla with Jathis.", "canonical_name": "Puran"}}, {"text": "Ram La1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5284, "end_char": 5291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Puran and Ram La1 were armed with Suas (iron-spiked sticks) , Dhanna with a Gandasa, and Har Lal, Mukhtiara and Chawla with Jathis.", "canonical_name": "Ram Lal"}}, {"text": "Dhanna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5336, "end_char": 5342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Puran and Ram La1 were armed with Suas (iron-spiked sticks) , Dhanna with a Gandasa, and Har Lal, Mukhtiara and Chawla with Jathis."}}, {"text": "Mali Nasib Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5792, "end_char": 5808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mali Nasib Singh and Shadi who had run to a safe distance and stood ther~. After the assault, the accused ran away taking their weapons with them."}}, {"text": "Shadi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5813, "end_char": 5818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mali Nasib Singh and Shadi who had run to a safe distance and stood ther~. After the assault, the accused ran away taking their weapons with them."}}, {"text": "Civil Hospital Kaithal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6029, "end_char": 6051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dal Singh succumbed to\n\nhis injuries after his admission in the Civil Hospital Kaithal, while Ran\n\nSingh expired in Medical College/Hospital, Rohtak on November 13, 1971."}}, {"text": "Ran\n\nSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6059, "end_char": 6069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dal Singh succumbed to\n\nhis injuries after his admission in the Civil Hospital Kaithal, while Ran\n\nSingh expired in Medical College/Hospital, Rohtak on November 13, 1971.", "canonical_name": "Ran\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "November 13, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6117, "end_char": 6134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dal Singh succumbed to\n\nhis injuries after his admission in the Civil Hospital Kaithal, while Ran\n\nSingh expired in Medical College/Hospital, Rohtak on November 13, 1971."}}, {"text": "Chawla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6180, "end_char": 6186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sessions Judge convicted and sentenced Chawla, Puran and Mukhtiara accused to death under s.302/34, Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "Chawla"}}, {"text": "s.302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6231, "end_char": 6236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6241, "end_char": 6251, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6285, "end_char": 6290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6380, "end_char": 6385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6387, "end_char": 6397, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6514, "end_char": 6521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6542, "end_char": 6552, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss.302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7008, "end_char": 7014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mukhtiara", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7145, "end_char": 7154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Special Leave in this case was granted only with regard to the capital sentence inflicted on Chawla and Mukhtiara, appellants.", "canonical_name": "Mukhtiara"}}, {"text": "Behal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7173, "end_char": 7178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Behal, learned arnicus curiae has urged that the death senten ces were not justified because of these alleviating circumstances :-\n\n(a) The cause of the tragedy can be traced to the unreasonable, stubborn, and blame-worthy conduct of the deceased in retaking or retaining possession of the land that after a protracted litigation, had been finally allotted and made over to the accused party by the Director of Consolidation."}}, {"text": "Vikram Mahajan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9172, "end_char": 9186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. State of U.P.( 5 )\n\nOn the other hand, Mr. Vikram Mahajan."}}, {"text": "Ram Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11142, "end_char": 11151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Singh was ploughing to sow the di~Putcd land an'~'kaabuttmg hchri from the field adjacent to 'ibly to keeii a watch aginst ;~ was avmg a round.", "canonical_name": "Ran\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "s 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11313, "end_char": 11317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Girdawar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11878, "end_char": 11886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We told him that he could take back the possession in the same way as the _possession had been delivered to us by the Tehsil\\lar, Girdawar and Patwari."}}, {"text": "Deora Lo Ujana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12318, "end_char": 12332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "road from Deora Lo Ujana to go to our field ..... -... Har Lal icild us that it seemed to him that the larrJ in dispute-was being ploughed by the deceased."}}, {"text": "Kanunos", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13015, "end_char": 13022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though this version of the accused was not sufficient to make out :a case of private defence:_ yet, coupled with the Kanunos report,\n\nEx.", "canonical_name": "Kanungo"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13542, "end_char": 13553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October\n\n5. 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13650, "end_char": 13666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on October\n\n5."}}, {"text": "November 4, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13967, "end_char": 13983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems that the deceased urlder the cloak of an cx-parte interim injunction obtained by them on November 4, 1971, were detern1ined to retain or retake possession even of those fields of which actual possession had been--de)ivered to the accused party by the consolidation authorities."}}, {"text": "Raj Gupta", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14502, "end_char": 14511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Raj Gupta who conducted the autopsy, testified that there were eight iil.iuries in all on the dead-bodv of Ram Dia, out of which, six were punctured wounds."}}, {"text": "Chawla", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14973, "end_char": 14979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is miury 8 which wa~ attnbutcd by\n\nthe witnesses to Chawla, apl\"'ant."}}, {"text": "Raj Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15239, "end_char": 15248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t the trial, Dr. Raj Gupta chang~ this version and said that injuries 1, 4 and 8 were individually sufliciet."}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15816, "end_char": 15821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co'!\"rriittal Court, Dr. Gupta had clearly testified tlrnt none of the 8 injuries found on the body of."}}, {"text": "s 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16582, "end_char": 16587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16589, "end_char": 16599, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Guotas", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16709, "end_char": 16715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From Dr.\n\nGuotas evidence it is clear that he had caused only one injury, with a lathi, to Ram Dia and his part in the assault."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18785, "end_char": 18798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a long interval between the date of the offence and the consideration of appeal by the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18862, "end_char": 18867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18872, "end_char": 18882, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Before Criminal Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19188, "end_char": 19217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19398, "end_char": 19404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before Criminal Amendment Act", "statute": "Before Criminal Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19406, "end_char": 19432, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19732, "end_char": 19738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before Criminal Amendment Act", "statute": "Before Criminal Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19740, "end_char": 19750, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Parliament has passed the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19844, "end_char": 19899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20146, "end_char": 20156, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mizaji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22304, "end_char": 22310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mizaji's case and Jagmohan Singh's case (supra), the accused were awarded capital sentences as they were found guilty of having fired the fatal shots with fire-arms."}}, {"text": "Jagmohan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22322, "end_char": 22336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mizaji's case and Jagmohan Singh's case (supra), the accused were awarded capital sentences as they were found guilty of having fired the fatal shots with fire-arms."}}, {"text": "Brij Bhukhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22473, "end_char": 22485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Brij Bhukhan's case (supra), the victim had been dragged out of his own house and mercilessly beaten .. Such is not the case here."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_348_355_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "SUPERINTENDENT & REMEMBERANCER OF LEGAL A\n\nAFFAIRS,. WEST BENGAL. .\n\nS. K. ROY February 12, 1974.\n\nf.M. H. BEG, Y. V. CHANDRACHUD AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.] B\n\n~Vest Bengal Crin1i11al. Law A1nend1ne11t (Special Court) let, 1949-Jtein 2 of the Schedule read wtth s. 409 J.P.C.-What constitutes criminal breach of lrlHf.\n\nThe respondent, a public servant, was tried by a Special Court constituted under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949, for collecting premiums and issuing receipts on behalf of LI.C. in respect of the policies of some Pakistani Policy Holders. He was charged for criminal breach C of trust in respect of such premium5 by making false adjustments of receipts of such premiums through the Bank in Pakistan in relevant books of accounts.\n\nItem 2 of the Si;:hedule in the Act describes the offence as an \"offence punishable u/s. 409 l.P.C. if committed by a public servant or by an agent of the Government in respect of property with which he is entrusted.\n\nThe Special Court came to the conclusion that the respondent purported to act, at the relevant time, as a public servant, but as no money was entrusted to D the respondent in his capacity as a public servant, the respondent was entitled to an aquittal for an alleged offence punishable u/s. 409 I.P.C. under the proviso to sec. 4(1) of the Act, there -could be no conviction for that offence.\n\nAgainst the acquittal of the respondent, the Legal Remembrancer of West Bengal filed an appeal before the High Court. The High Court also held that !he respondent, having no power to receive money in cash from the policy holders did not act in his capacity of a public servant while he received the money from the policy holders in cah in Caolcutta.\n\nAlthough it did not quash the order of E acquittal, the apparent result of its findings was that the trial of the respQndent,\n\nbing without jurisdiction, was null and void, so that the respondent could be retired.\n\nThe only question for decision was whether the respondent be said to be acting in his capacity as a public servant when he received the monies from the policy-holders which he misappropriated. Allowing the appeal.\n\nHELD : (i) The gravamen of the offence of Criminal breach of trust is the F dishonest misappropriation of the money or property which comes into the possession or under the control of a public servant who has the ostensible authority to receive it, even though, technically speaking, from the point of view of the distribution of departmental duties under internal rules of an office, it may not be within the scope of his authority or duty to accept the money. The fact that a public servant acts fraudulently in the exercise of his duties as a public servant to get dominion or control over some property will be an aggra\\ating and not an exculpating circumstance. The \";:ntrustment\" results from what !he person G handing over money or property is made to think, understand and believe about the purpose for which he hands over money or p_roperty to a p1;1blic servnt. If this takes place because of and due to the exercise of the offic1al authonty, the requirements of S. 409 I.P.C. are satisfied. To constitute an offence u/s 409, I.P .C., it is not required that misappropriation must necessarily take place after the <.:reation of a legally correct entrustment or dominion over property. S. 409\n\ncovers both types of cases. that is. those where the receipt of property is itself fraudulent or those where the public servant misappropriates it. All that is required is \"cntrustment\". [353 Bl B\n\n(II) In the present case, there is evidence and findings of the Special Court to show that the respondent was actually representing to the policy-holders that\n\nIll '\n\n•. •\n\n. \\ ' ' E\n\nSUPDT. LEGAL AFFAIJl.S V. S. IC. ROY (Beg, /.) 349\n\nthey could their ;-~::nu in Cal'1utta to him and he iliued receipts pur4 porting to act in bis o capacity. 11lere is, therefore, nexus between the actll!ll official copacity and tho conduct of tho Respondent to hold the Respondent suiltf of the ol!ence u/s 409 !.P.C. which could be tri~ by the special court. l3SS A-BJ\n\n(State of U.P. and Ors, V. lJabu Ram Upadliya [1961) 2 SCR 679 and.S. N.\n\nPnri V. State \"I Rajasthan [19721 3 S.C.R. 497 referred to.)\n\nCRIMINAL AP!'ELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal appeal No. 189 of In~\n\nI , From the Judgment and Order dated the 19th February, 1970 of the Calcutta High Court in Govt. Appeal No. 7 of 1964.\n\nP. K. Chatterjee and G. S .. Chatterjee, for the Appellant.\n\nHardayal Hardy and S.11/cumar Ghose for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG, / •. This is an appeal on a certificate of fitness of the case for aPP\"al to this Court granted by the Calcutta High Court under Arti• c!e 134 t 1) ( c) of the Constitution of India.\n\nThe Respondent was tried Jiy a Special Court constituted under the West Bellltal Criminal I,.aw Amendment (Special Courts) Act XXI of 1949 (Hereinafter referred to 11_8 'the Act'), which empowers the Spe cia1 Court. set up under it .. !Ji try offences mentioned in the Scheduled annexed to the _Act. Item 2 of the.schedule is :\n\n\"An offence punis]\\ab1e under section 409 I.P:c. if committed by a public seryl!Jlt or by a person dealing with property belonging to government as an agent of gavernment in respect of property with which he is entrusted or over which he has domain in his capacity of a public servant or in the !Way of his business as such agent\".\n\nThe proviso to Section 4(1) of the Act reads asfollows:\n\n\"Provided that when . trying any case, a Special C011rt may also try any offenece other than an offence specified in the schedule, with which the accused may under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be charged at the same trial\".\n\nThe Special-Court framed the following charge against the respondent:\n\n\"That you, between 12th May, 1958 and 7th May, 1959 .Hindustan Building 9iJcutta, btljng a Pub. Servant, to wit,\n\nSupdt of Pakistan Section (Pak Unit) of H'mdustan Co-of)erarative Life Insurance Society, Unit of LIC of India Calcutta and in that capacity entrusted with or with domition ove; .the premiums of some Pakistan Policy Holders, amounting to . about Rs. 2350-49 np., collecte\\i by you directedly from\n\nthese policy-holders or their representatives viz. 6 •. 7. 8, and 15 and other, under receipts 6 (Ext. 3 series other than Ex. 315) issued by you on behalf of the said LIC in respect, of the Policies of those policy-holders committed Criminal breach of trust in respect of such preiums by making false . adjustments of recaipt of such amounts through the Bank in\n\nlO~L9S4 Sup CI/74\n\nPakistan in relevant books (Exts. 5, 8, and 9 series) and thereby committed an otfence punishable under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the jurisdiction of this Court.\" No other charge was framed.\n\nThe Special Court recorded findings of fact on the strength of the admitted position that the respondent was serving as a Superintendent of the Pak Section of the Hindustan Cooperative Life Insurance Society which was a unit of the Life Insurance Corporation Calcutta during the period to which the charge relates, and of receipts given by the respondent himself for monies paid to him in Calcutta coupled with entries in the premium register folio in the handwriting of the respondent, falsely showing that the ambllllts realised by the respondent had not been paid by the policy holders so that their names appeared in the \"Demand List\".\n\nThe Special Court had forn.mlated two point for determination as follows :\n\n \"(1 ) whether the accused. was the Superintendent of Pakistan Section (Pak Unit.} of Hindustan Cooperative Life .Iniurance Society between 12th May 1958 and 7th of May 1959?\n\n(2) Whether he, being in any manner entrusted with domination over property in the capacity of a public servant, committed criminal breach of trust in respect of that property\"?\n\nOn point No. I, it held :\n\n\"It has been established by the evidence on record, beyond any shadow of 'doubt, 'that during the relevant period the accused was serving as Superintendent of Pakistan Section of\n\nIfindustan Cooperative Life Insurance Society, a Unit of L.I.C. in Calcutta.\n\nThis Unit was known as \"Pak Unit.\" On point No. 2, it held.:.\n\n\"The evidence on record, both oral and documentary, is overwhelming to show that the accused, as Superintendent of Pak Unit of Hindustan Cooperative Insurance Society in Calcutta, directly realised premiums in cash front some Pakistani Policy Holders and misappropriated the amounts after making false entries in some of the relevant registers and accoimt papers maintained in his section of the l'l1Juranee Society.\" v Thus, it is clear that the Special Court came to the conclusion that the capacity in which the respondent purported to act, when receiving the moneys which he misappropriated, was that of \"Superintendent of the Pak Unit of Hindustan Cooperative Life Insurance Society in Calcutta,\" a part of the Life Insurance Corporation of India at the relevant time. It was this capacity which enabled the respondent to put forward his authority to receive the sums of money, and, therefore to realize the amounts paid by the deceived policy holders who .•ppeared as witnesses and were rightly believed by the Special Court\n\ndespite the denial. of the respondent that he did not personally receive the amounts but had, mechanically and in good faith, signed the receipts put up before him by Clerks. The respondent's suggestions\\ that it may have been the Clerks who had received monies anct thus deceived him as well as the policy holders, wa.~ rightly rejected Q}' the Special Court. Nevertheless, the Special Coud came to the conclusion that, as no money was entrusted to the respondent in his capacity as a public servant, the respondent was en\\!tled to an acquittal for an alleged offience punishable under Section 409 Indian Penal Code. It also held that, as no alternative charge could be framed under section 406 I.P.C. under the proviso to Section 4(!) of the Act, there could be no conviction for that offence. 'It held that an alternative charge could not be framed by it in addition to the charge under Section 409 I.P.C. on the same facts and also that a Special Court could not, after taking cognisance of an offence mentioned in the schedule, convict the accused for a different offence in the alternative. For that very reason, it also refused to apply Section 403 I.P.C. under the proviso to Section 4(1) of the Act. ·\n\nThe Legal Remembrance of West Bengal had appealed to the D High Court against the respondent's acquittal. It appears that there the Counsel for the State did not challenge the finding that the respondent had no authority to receive cash payments of premiums. It was conceded that this was not his duty as a Superintendent. It also quoted the following finding of the Special Court :\n\n, E\n\n\"It further appears from the evidence on record that the Pak Unit had no authority to make any such collection of premiums. The Pakistani Policy holders could not even make any cash pa}'ments of premium in the cash counter of the Hindustan Insurance Society. The Pakistani policy holders, of course, could transfer thejr policies to Indian Unit with the permission of the two Governments the Indian Government and the Pakistan Government and after showing satisfactorily the certificates of migration from Pakista.n to India.\n\nUnless he became an Indian National be could not make such transfer of policies. If such transfer was made the policy went out of the administrative control of the Pak Unit.\"\n\nAfter citing item No. 2 of the schedule set out above, the High Court went on to observe that the following three conditions are G required for an offence punishable under Section 409 Indian Penal Code:\n\n\"(i) That the o:ffence is committed by a public servant. (ii) The offence had been committed by the public servant acting in his capacity as a public servant. (iii} The property in respect of which the offence is committed must have been entrusted to him or that he had domination over that property in bis capacity as a pnblic servant.\"\n\nIt held that the prosecution had to show that the en.trusted property or dominion over property \"in any manner whatsoever\" was secured by the respondent \"in his capacity as a public servant.\" It then observed that \"to that extent\" the provisions in Section 409 I.P.C. were distinguishable from the offence specified as item 2 in the Schedule. Further more. it held that the Special Court had \"rightly decided that the respondent having no power to receive money in cash from the policy holders did not act in his capacity o.f a public servant while he received tlie money from the policy holders in cash in Calcutta.\" It also observed:\n\n\"It is quite possible that the respondent.had deceived the policy holders when he received cash mny from them elu ding them to believe that those were vahd payments towards premium and the payees had been put to damage, loss and harm which make him liable to be proceeded against for cheating. But when it is found that the respondent had acted clearly beyond and outside Ms duties as a Public servant having well defined duties which do not include cash receipt of premium, the offence which he committed is not criminal breach of trust punishable under section. 409 I. P. C. within the meaning of item No. 2 in the schedule of Act XXI of 1949, the Court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial as the offence does not fall within the schedule : the proper course for the learned Judge was to discharge the respondent\".\n\nAlthough it did not quash the order of acquittal, the apparent result of its findings was that the Trial of the respondent, being without jurisdiction, was null and void so that the respondent could be retired.\n\nWe are unable to concur with the view of the High Court that the ingredients of the offence specified as item 2 of the schedule differ in: any respect from those required by Section 409 I. P. C. for the conviction. of a public servant who com!Ilits criminal misappropriation in respect of property which has been entrusted to him or over which he acquires dominion or control in any manner as a public servant.\n\nAll that the entry in the schedule purports to do is to indicate that offences punishable under Section 409 I.P.C. triable by the Special Courts are limited to those of criminal breach of trust committed by public servants in their capacities as public servants and do not embrace offences by other classes of persons mentioned in Section 409\n\nI.P.C.\n\nThe only question which arises for decision in the case before us is : could the respondent be said to be acting in his capacity as a public servant when he received the monies from policy holders which he misappropriated? Obviously, the offence punishable under Section 400 I. P. C. is not within the scope of the prescribed duties or authority of the public servant. The law does not authorise any public servant --0r, for that matter, anybody else-to commit a crnninal breach of trust. There are, however, two distinct parts involved in the commission of the offence of criminal breach of trust. The first consists of the creation or an obligation in relation to the property over which dominion or control is acquired by the accused. The second is a mis-\n\nSUPOT. LEGAL AFFAIRS V. S. K. ROY (Beg, J:) 353\n\nappropriation or dealing with the property dishonestly and contrary to the terms of th~ obligation created.\n\nIn the case of an offence by a public servant punishable under section 409 I. P. C. the acquisition of dominion or control over the property must also be in the capacity of a public servant punishable under section 409 I. P. C. the acquisition of a public servant, to get the control or dominion over property annexed with an obligation. The gravamen of the offence 1s the dishonest misappropriation of the money or property which comes into the possession or under the control of a public servant who has the ostensible authority to receive it even though, technically speaking, from the point of view of the distribution of departmental duties under internal rules of an office, it may not be within the scope of his authority or duty to accept the money.\n\nThe fact that a public servant acts fraudulently in the exercise of his duties as a public servant to get dominion of control over some property will be an aggravating and not an exculpating circumstances. The \"entrustment\" results from '!Yhat the person handing over money or property is made to think, understand, and believe about the purpose for which he hands over money or property to a public servant.\n\nIf this takes place because of an due to the exercise of the official authority the requirements of Section 409 I. P. C. are satisfied. There may be cases in which a person who parts with property to a public servant may have done so for reasons or in a manner so completely disconnected with the official capacity of the public servant that it may not be reasonably possible to conceive of it as an offence connected with or committed in the course of perf.ormance of any official duty at all so that official capacity becomes really irrelevant. Ordinarily, it is the ostensible or apparent scope of public servant's authority when receiving propert~ and not its technical limitations, under some internal rules of the department or office concerned, and the use made by the servant of his actual official capacity which would, in our opinion, determine whether there is a sufficient nexus or connection between the acts complained of and the official capacity so as to bring within the ambit of section 409 Indian Penal Code.\n\nIt is true tqat there is the finding of the Special Court, quited by the High Court and set out above by us, that Pakistani policyholders could not have made any transfer of their policies to the Indian Unit of the Hindustan Insurance Society without producing certificates of migration and obtaining the permission of both Indian and Pakistani Governments. But, there is evidence and there are findings on it given by the Special Court that the respondent was actually representing to the policyholders that they could make their payments in Calcutta to him and he issued receipts purporting to act in his official capacity. In other words, he misused his official capacity, and, under its garb and the column of his office, obtained payments and issued receipts. 'The policyholders did not know the correct position and would not have made payments to the respondents but for the .possession and use by him of his official capacity. We think that there is sufficient ostensible nexus between the actual official capacity and the conduct of the respondent for us to hold that the entrustment or dominion was obtained by the respondent over monies of policyholders in his official capaclty or as a public servant who, consequently, became\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT~\n\n[ 1974 J 3 5.C.R.\n\ncharged with the duty, as a public servant, and, indeed, even more so as a public servant, to act honestly with regard to sums thus received by him.\n\nTo constitute an offence under section 409 I. P. C. it is not required that misapprepriation must necessarily take place after the creation of a legally correct entrustment or dominfon over property. The entrustments may arise in \"any manner whatsoever\".\n\nThat manner may or may not involve fraudulent conduct rif the accused. Section\n\n409 I. P. C. covers dishonest misappropriation in both types of cases, that is to say those where the receipt of property is itself fraudulent or improper and those where the public servant misappropriates what may have been quite properly and innocentlv received. All that is required is what may be described as \"entrustment\" or acquisition of dominion cover property in the capacity of a public servant who, as a result of it, becomes charged with a duty to act in a particular way, or at least honestly.\n\nA case cited before us, to support the contention that acquisition of dominion or possession and control over property by an accused would even if wrongful, be an \"entrustment\" or create an obligation D the violation of which, by misappropriation, would be punishable under Section 409 I.P.C. if the accused used his official capacity to obtain the property, was : State of U.P. & Ors.\n\nVs. Babu Ram Upadhya.\n\nAgain, in S. N. Puri Vs. State of Rajastha11, this Court, after referring to decisions of different High Courts on the subject, held, that \"the expression \"entrusted\" is used in Section 409 I.P.C. in a wide sense and include all cases in which property is voluntarily handed over for a specific purpose and is dishonestly disposed of contrary to the terms on which possession has been handed over.\"\n\nThe obligation to act in a certain manner with regard to or to deal honestly with property, over which a public servant obtains dominion or control by the use of his official capacity, may arise either expressly or impliedly.\n\nEven if the respondent or the life Insurance Corporation, on whose behalf the respondent had purported to act, had not, at the time of receipt of money from a policyholder, the legal right to receive it, the respondent, who had certainly been entrusted with it by the policyholders by reason of his official capacity, should have cor rectly shown it in the account books which ought not to have been falsified by him. It could not be contended that even a mistaken receipt of money in official capacity does not create an obligation upon the receiver as a public servant.\n\nWe think that it is enough if the payment is made by a person dealing with a public servant in his capa /city as a public servant even if it is made on an erroneous assumption which the public servant concerned does nothing to remove. Section\n\n409 l.P.C. seems to us to be meant for the protection, among others, of those sJealing with public servants purporting to have the authority to act in a certain way in exercise of their official capacities. A legal\n\ndefect in the scope of the ostensible authority of a public servant does not prevent an entrustment to or an obligation to be fastened upon a public servant in his capacity as a public servant if the facts of the case establish, as they do in the case before us, the required nexus or connecticn between acts which create the obligation and the capacity. We, therefore, hold that the respondent is guilty of an offence punishable under section 409 J.P .C. which could be tried by the Special Court.\n\nMr. Hardy, appearing for the respondent, contended that, although there could be a doubt whether the case would fall under Section 409 I.P.C. there could bo no such doubt that the respondent was guilty of an offence punishable under Section 403 I.P.C. He also invited our attention to certain facts : that, the offence was comn1itted more than 15 years ago; that, the respondent is now about 64 years in age; that, he was dismissed as a result of the misappropriation committed by him.\n\nHe submitted that we at this stage, convit the responde.1t under section 403 I.P.C. and then impose a fine upon him instead of sending him to jail now.\n\nHe also indicated that the respondent was a refugee from Pakistan who had apparently acted under the stress of straitened circumstances. We do not find all these facts mentioned in the judgments of the two Courts which were examined by us. However, in view of the fact that the offence was committed long ago, we think that a less severe sentence than we would have otherwise awarded will meet the ends of justice. -\n\nAccordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the orders of the Spedal Court and the High Court. We convict the respondent under section 409 I.P.C. and we sentence him to one year's rigorous imprisonment and lo pay a fitle of Rs. 2,000/-, and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo six mo_nth's further rigorous imprisonment.\n\nS.C.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 90, "entities": [{"text": "SUPERINTENDENT & REMEMBERANCER OF LEGAL A\n\nAFFAIRS,. WEST BENGAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUPERINTENDENT & REMEMBERANCER OF LEGAL AFFAIRS,WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. K. ROY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. K. ROY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 12, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 96, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. ROY February 12, 1974."}}, {"text": "f.M. H. BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y. V. CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 153, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 260, "end_char": 266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 742, "end_char": 750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was charged for criminal breach C of trust in respect of such premium5 by making false adjustments of receipts of such premiums through the Bank in Pakistan in relevant books of accounts."}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 869, "end_char": 875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1289, "end_char": 1295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1296, "end_char": 1301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sec. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1324, "end_char": 1333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1462, "end_char": 1473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the acquittal of the respondent, the Legal Remembrancer of West Bengal filed an appeal before the High Court."}}, {"text": "Caolcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1734, "end_char": 1743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he respondent, having no power to receive money in cash from the policy holders did not act in his capacity of a public servant while he received the money from the policy holders in cah in Caolcutta."}}, {"text": "S. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3149, "end_char": 3155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3156, "end_char": 3161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3205, "end_char": 3210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "S. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3371, "end_char": 3377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4068, "end_char": 4073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "State of U.P.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4135, "end_char": 4148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l3SS A-BJ\n\n(State of U.P. and Ors, V. lJabu Ram Upadliya [1961) 2 SCR 679 and."}}, {"text": "[1961) 2 SCR 679", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4180, "end_char": 4196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4458, "end_char": 4474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chatterjee and G. S .. Chatterjee, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "G. S .. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4479, "end_char": 4497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chatterjee and G. S .. Chatterjee, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Hardayal Hardy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4519, "end_char": 4533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardayal Hardy and S.11/cumar Ghose for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "S.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4538, "end_char": 4542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4784, "end_char": 4805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5167, "end_char": 5178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5485, "end_char": 5497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5695, "end_char": 5727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "12th May, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5851, "end_char": 5865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Special-Court framed the following charge against the respondent:\n\n\"That you, between 12th May, 1958 and 7th May, 1959 .Hindustan Building 9iJcutta, btljng a Pub."}}, {"text": "7th May, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5870, "end_char": 5883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Special-Court framed the following charge against the respondent:\n\n\"That you, between 12th May, 1958 and 7th May, 1959 .Hindustan Building 9iJcutta, btljng a Pub."}}, {"text": ".Hindustan Building 9iJcutta", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5884, "end_char": 5912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Special-Court framed the following charge against the respondent:\n\n\"That you, between 12th May, 1958 and 7th May, 1959 .Hindustan Building 9iJcutta, btljng a Pub."}}, {"text": "LIC", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6412, "end_char": 6415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "315) issued by you on behalf of the said LIC in respect, of the Policies of those policy-holders committed Criminal breach of trust in respect of such preiums by making false ."}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6731, "end_char": 6742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6750, "end_char": 6767, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hindustan Cooperative Life Insurance Society", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7005, "end_char": 7049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Special Court recorded findings of fact on the strength of the admitted position that the respondent was serving as a Superintendent of the Pak Section of the Hindustan Cooperative Life Insurance Society which was a unit of the Life Insurance Corporation Calcutta during the period to which the charge relates, and of receipts given by the respondent himself for monies paid to him in Calcutta coupled with entries in the premium register folio in the handwriting of the respondent, falsely showing that the ambllllts realised by the respondent had not been paid by the policy holders so that their names appeared in the \"Demand List\"."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7101, "end_char": 7109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Special Court recorded findings of fact on the strength of the admitted position that the respondent was serving as a Superintendent of the Pak Section of the Hindustan Cooperative Life Insurance Society which was a unit of the Life Insurance Corporation Calcutta during the period to which the charge relates, and of receipts given by the respondent himself for monies paid to him in Calcutta coupled with entries in the premium register folio in the handwriting of the respondent, falsely showing that the ambllllts realised by the respondent had not been paid by the policy holders so that their names appeared in the \"Demand List\"."}}, {"text": "Hindustan Cooperative Life .Iniurance Society", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7645, "end_char": 7690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Hindustan Cooperative Life .Iniurance Society between 12th May 1958 and 7th of May 1959?"}}, {"text": "12th May 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7699, "end_char": 7712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Hindustan Cooperative Life .Iniurance Society between 12th May 1958 and 7th of May 1959?"}}, {"text": "7th of May 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7717, "end_char": 7732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Hindustan Cooperative Life .Iniurance Society between 12th May 1958 and 7th of May 1959?"}}, {"text": "Ifindustan Cooperative Life Insurance Society", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8121, "end_char": 8166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, it held :\n\n\"It has been established by the evidence on record, beyond any shadow of 'doubt, 'that during the relevant period the accused was serving as Superintendent of Pakistan Section of\n\nIfindustan Cooperative Life Insurance Society, a Unit of L.I.C. in Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Life Insurance Corporation of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8978, "end_char": 9013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v Thus, it is clear that the Special Court came to the conclusion that the capacity in which the respondent purported to act, when receiving the moneys which he misappropriated, was that of \"Superintendent of the Pak Unit of Hindustan Cooperative Life Insurance Society in Calcutta,\" a part of the Life Insurance Corporation of India at the relevant time."}}, {"text": "Section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9881, "end_char": 9892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9893, "end_char": 9910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9978, "end_char": 9989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9990, "end_char": 9995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 4(!)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10018, "end_char": 10030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10184, "end_char": 10195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10196, "end_char": 10201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10438, "end_char": 10449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10450, "end_char": 10455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10478, "end_char": 10490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Hindustan Insurance Society", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11125, "end_char": 11152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Pakistani Policy holders could not even make any cash pa}'ments of premium in the cash counter of the Hindustan Insurance Society."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11228, "end_char": 11233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Pakistani policy holders, of course, could transfer thejr policies to Indian Unit with the permission of the two Governments the Indian Government and the Pakistan Government and after showing satisfactorily the certificates of migration from Pakista.n to India."}}, {"text": "Indian Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11287, "end_char": 11304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Pakistani policy holders, of course, could transfer thejr policies to Indian Unit with the permission of the two Governments the Indian Government and the Pakistan Government and after showing satisfactorily the certificates of migration from Pakista.n to India."}}, {"text": "Pakistan Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11313, "end_char": 11332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Pakistani policy holders, of course, could transfer thejr policies to Indian Unit with the permission of the two Governments the Indian Government and the Pakistan Government and after showing satisfactorily the certificates of migration from Pakista.n to India."}}, {"text": "Section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11770, "end_char": 11781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11782, "end_char": 11799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12390, "end_char": 12401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12402, "end_char": 12407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13992, "end_char": 14003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14326, "end_char": 14337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14338, "end_char": 14343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14561, "end_char": 14572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14574, "end_char": 14579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 400", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14845, "end_char": 14856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "V. S. K. ROY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15363, "end_char": 15375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LEGAL AFFAIRS V. S. K. ROY (Beg, J:) 353\n\nappropriation or dealing with the property dishonestly and contrary to the terms of th~ obligation created."}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15563, "end_char": 15574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15707, "end_char": 15718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16769, "end_char": 16780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17666, "end_char": 17677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17678, "end_char": 17695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19161, "end_char": 19172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19457, "end_char": 19469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20249, "end_char": 20260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20261, "end_char": 20266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Babu Ram Upadhya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20366, "end_char": 20382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Babu Ram Upadhya."}}, {"text": "Section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20563, "end_char": 20574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20575, "end_char": 20580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section\n\n409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21820, "end_char": 21832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22481, "end_char": 22492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hardy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22549, "end_char": 22554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Hardy, appearing for the respondent, contended that, although there could be a doubt whether the case would fall under Section 409 I.P.C. there could bo no such doubt that the respondent was guilty of an offence punishable under Section 403 I.P.C. He also invited our attention to certain facts : that, the offence was comn1itted more than 15 years ago; that, the respondent is now about 64 years in age; that, he was dismissed as a result of the misappropriation committed by him."}}, {"text": "Section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22668, "end_char": 22679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22680, "end_char": 22685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22778, "end_char": 22789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22790, "end_char": 22795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23097, "end_char": 23108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23109, "end_char": 23114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23734, "end_char": 23745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23746, "end_char": 23751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_356_357_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "RAGHUBIR SINGH v.\n\nSTATE OF HARYANA\n\nFebruary 12, 197 4.\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.)\n\nMurder-Death penalty when ca11 be reduced to life in1prisonn1ent.\n\nThe appellant developed illicit intimacy with the deceased.\n\nWhen the\n\ndeceased feigned pregnancy and pressed him to marry her, he gave er a deadly poison mixed in milk. On the dea:th of the deceased he wrappecJ the d-.!ad body in a-blanket.and Left it in a railway compartment. He was cOD\\'icted and senteDced to death.\n\nOn appeal to this Court on the question of sentence :\n\nHELD : While murder in its aggravated form and in the absnce of extenuat ing factors connected with crime, criminal or legal process, still is condignly visited with death penalty, a compassionate alternative of life im, P.risonment in all other circumstances is gaining judicial ground. [357 G-H]\n\nIri the instant case a few ameliorative features fall to be noticed since judicial temper has more components than indignation against murder.\n\nThe D appellant is in his twenties, not irrelevant in considering death sentence.\n\nHe was a married man.\n\nHe was promiscuous with women, a salacious sin for which the deceased was a contributory. Tue latter's pressure to get him to marry her must have planted the seed of murderous thought in him.\n\nHe bargained for romance, encouraged by the victim but her pretended pregnancy upset. the appellant.\n\nSome planning and treachery have aggravated the crime.\n\nYet another circumstance is that the man was sentenced to death nearly two years ago and the_ spectre of death penalty must have tormented his ouL Taken E separately, none of these matters may suffice to commute but the conspectus of factors, personal and social, tilt th_e scales in favour -Of life term. [357 El\n\nCIUMINA!. APPELLATE JURISDICTION ;. Criminal Appeal No. 124 of 1973. ·\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 30th November, 1972 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal F Appeal No. 632 of 1972 and Murder Ref. No. 27 of 1972.\n\nNuruddin Ahmed and S. K. Mehta, for the appellant.\n\nGautam Goswami and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. A young woman was vomitted into death by a young man by giving her a cup of milk mixed with a lethal dose of stricnine. He, along with two others, bundled the cadaver into a Delhibound train but the coach cleaner discovered it, the police unearthed the crime, the court convicted the culprits awarding capital sentence to the killer and lighter punishments to the two accessories after the fact, under s. 201, I.P.C. Special leave has been granted to the only appellant on the sole ground of sentence and so our scrutiny is confined to the circumstances of the crime and criminal and the penological propriety of inflicting the higher or lesser punishment.\n\n' '\n\nRAGHUBIR SINGH v. HARYANA (Krishna Iyer, I.) 357\n\nTwenty six-years-old Raghubir Singh-the appellant-was a lesser official in the Malaria Eradication Department in Gorior, a village in Rajasthan. He became friends with a veterinary official, Sri Sharma, P.W. 13, and by a concatenation of innocent circumstances the appellant came into carnal comity with Kailashw'ati, the 2nd accused, a midwife in a local hospital. Later, the appellant was transferred to a viUage Mandhapia in the Family Planning Department where he came across Sushma Thomas, a nurse in the same department. Prurient Raghubir picked up a liaison with this malayalee belle older to him by five years and-going by the medical evidence, not a virgin. She seems to have feigned pregnancy probably to force a matrimony for which Raghubir was reluctant.\n\nAfter many twists and turns of events, on June 6, 1971, the appellant secured half a grain of stricnine hydrochloride from Sharma, the friend, on the pretext that it was needed for killing stray dogs. This Sharma's naivete in supplying poison looks suspicious and it is for Government to look into, remembering that he was more than a dispensing cheiuist in this case.\n\nAnyway, the amorou.s pair spent the night of the 10th June at the quarters of the 2nd accused, and the appellant brought milk for the deceased who consumed the cup of death. After agonising hours of vomitting struggle, she breathed her last, was wrapped in a blanket and given a railway burial.\n\nThe criminal act was treacherous murder and deserved the sterner sentence. But a few ameliorative features fall to be noticed since judicial temper has more components than indignation against murder.\n\nThe convict is in his twenties1 not irrelevant in considering death sen tence. He is said to be a married man.\n\nHe was promiscuous with women, a solacious sin for which the deceased was a contributory. The latter's pressure to get him to marry her must have planted the seed of murderous thought in him. He bargained for romance, encouraged by the victim but the pregnancy-though pretended-in a society which views unmarried .mothers as vicious upset the appellant.\n\nThese have no bearing on guilt at all but attenuate the lethal touch of the sentence.\n\nSome planning and treachery have aggravated the crime, which also must not be ove\\:looked. Yet another circumstance.\n\nThe man was sentenced to death as early as 23rd May, 1972, and for twenty months the spectre o( death penalty must have tormented his soul. Taken separately, none of these may suffice to commute but the conspectus .of factors, personal and social, tilt the scales in favour of a life term, We have in another case discussed at some kngth how modern penology leans less towards death penalty and the winds of criminological change blow over Indian statutory thought.\n\nWhile murder in its aggravated for.m and in the absence of extenuating factors connected with crime, criminal or legal process, still is condignly visited with death penalty, a compassionate alternative of life imprisonment in all other circumstances is gaining judicial ground. Taking an overall view of forensic clemency we modify the death sentence and direct the appellant to uffer imprisonment for life.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed in part.", "total_entities": 22, "entities": [{"text": "RAGHUBIR SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBIR SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF HARYANA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Nuruddin Ahmed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2024, "end_char": 2038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nuruddin Ahmed and S. K. Mehta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2043, "end_char": 2054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nuruddin Ahmed and S. K. Mehta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Gautam Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2076, "end_char": 2090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gautam Goswami and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2095, "end_char": 2109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gautam Goswami and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2176, "end_char": 2188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. A young woman was vomitted into death by a young man by giving her a cup of milk mixed with a lethal dose of stricnine."}}, {"text": "s. 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2595, "end_char": 2601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2603, "end_char": 2608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Raghubir Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2927, "end_char": 2941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' '\n\nRAGHUBIR SINGH v. HARYANA (Krishna Iyer, I.) 357\n\nTwenty six-years-old Raghubir Singh-the appellant-was a lesser official in the Malaria Eradication Department in Gorior, a village in Rajasthan.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBIR SINGH"}}, {"text": "Gorior", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3019, "end_char": 3025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' '\n\nRAGHUBIR SINGH v. HARYANA (Krishna Iyer, I.) 357\n\nTwenty six-years-old Raghubir Singh-the appellant-was a lesser official in the Malaria Eradication Department in Gorior, a village in Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3040, "end_char": 3049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' '\n\nRAGHUBIR SINGH v. HARYANA (Krishna Iyer, I.) 357\n\nTwenty six-years-old Raghubir Singh-the appellant-was a lesser official in the Malaria Eradication Department in Gorior, a village in Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Sharma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3101, "end_char": 3107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He became friends with a veterinary official, Sri Sharma, P.W. 13, and by a concatenation of innocent circumstances the appellant came into carnal comity with Kailashw'ati, the 2nd accused, a midwife in a local hospital."}}, {"text": "Kailashw'ati", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3210, "end_char": 3222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He became friends with a veterinary official, Sri Sharma, P.W. 13, and by a concatenation of innocent circumstances the appellant came into carnal comity with Kailashw'ati, the 2nd accused, a midwife in a local hospital."}}, {"text": "Sushma Thomas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3386, "end_char": 3399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, the appellant was transferred to a viUage Mandhapia in the Family Planning Department where he came across Sushma Thomas, a nurse in the same department."}}, {"text": "Prurient Raghubir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3433, "end_char": 3450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prurient Raghubir picked up a liaison with this malayalee belle older to him by five years and-going by the medical evidence, not a virgin."}}, {"text": "Raghubir", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3649, "end_char": 3657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She seems to have feigned pregnancy probably to force a matrimony for which Raghubir was reluctant.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBIR SINGH"}}, {"text": "June 6, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3716, "end_char": 3728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After many twists and turns of events, on June 6, 1971, the appellant secured half a grain of stricnine hydrochloride from Sharma, the friend, on the pretext that it was needed for killing stray dogs."}}, {"text": "Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3797, "end_char": 3803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After many twists and turns of events, on June 6, 1971, the appellant secured half a grain of stricnine hydrochloride from Sharma, the friend, on the pretext that it was needed for killing stray dogs."}}, {"text": "23rd May, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5257, "end_char": 5271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The man was sentenced to death as early as 23rd May, 1972, and for twenty months the spectre o( death penalty must have tormented his soul."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_358_368_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "BANW ARI DASS\n\nSUMMER CHAND AND ORS.\n\nFebruary 13, 1974 (V. R. KRIS8NA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.j\n\nDelhi Muncipal COrporation Act, 1951-Ss. 17 and 19-Scope of-Words and phrases-Meaning of 'have been' and being'-Recrimimnion-Eltction- Petirion to declare election void and to declare the petitioner elected-Returned candidate if can plead that petitioner was guilty of corrupt practire.\n\nThe appellant and the respondent contested election to' a ward in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi in which the appe1lant was declared elected.\n\nRespondent no. 1 filed an election petition challenging the appellant's election on the grouhd of corrupt practice and prayed that he be declared duly elected under s. 19(l)(c) of the Corporation Act.. The appellant on the other band contended that since the respondent was guilty of corrupt practices be had become disentitled to be declared elected. The Election Tribunal held that the appellant was not entitled to raise such a plea. On appeal lhe High Court held that in the absence of a specific rrovision in the Corporation Act corre!iponding to s. 97 of the Representation o People Act, 1951 the returned. candidate was not entitled to recriminate on the grounds contained in s. 17 of the Corporation Act.\n\nSection 9(1) (d) of the Corporation Act enacts that a 'person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a councillor, or alderman if he has, in proccediitgs for questioning the validity or regularity of an election. been found to /la1•e bee11 guilty of any corrupt practice ..• Section 17 enacts 1he grounds on which the election could be deClared void. One of such grounds in s. 17( 1) (a) is that \"on the date of his election a returned candidate was not qualified or was disqualified to be chosen as a councillor.\" ·\n\nOn the question whether in an election petition under the Act for getting an election declared \\'Oid and for a further declaration that the petitioner himself had been duly elected, the returned candidate is entitled to plead and prove that the petitioner .was guilty of corrupt practice in the .election in question, and was therefore not entitled to be declared as duly elected, Dismissing the appeal to this Court, Hr10 : ( 1} There is no provisiOn in the Corporation Act corresponding to s. 97 of the Representation of People Act expressly giving a riaht of recrimination to the returned candidate. The effect of th! word \"being\" in the opening sentence of s.9( 1) appears to have been largely off-set Uy the use of the wors \"to have been guilty\" in cl.(d). The meaning of the phrase \"have been\". ts \"immediately prior to a specific time''. If the phrase \"found to have .beei:i guQty\" in s.9(1)(d) is construed in the context of cl._(a) of s.17(1), then It will mean\n\n\"found to have been guilty at t/le time of election, and immdiately preceding the election.\" The .right o recriminate cannot be legitimately spc4ed !>ut of s._9(1)(d) without doing violence to its language or .unduly stretching 1t.\n\n[364 F]\n\n(2) The inquiry of. , the .Dis.trit Judge, w.o is. th~ cfoction tribunal, at the trial of an election petition 1s hm1ted to the 1nvesttga!1on of those matters on!Y \\Vhich will enable hin1 to make theorders specified in s.19(1). But where m a composite petition relief _is claimed t.hat. the petioner e d~Jare~ elcted in place (Ii the; returned candidate, the D1stnct Judge ts t~ 1nvest1~te if either of the two conditions for the grant of a further declaration specttied 10 s.19(2). is made ouf namely: (a) \"-'hether in fact the petitioni:r received a maiority r~~ tile valiJ votes, or (b) whether the pet.itioner WO!Jl~ have but fo, r tbe votes obtained by the returned candidate, obta1ne~ a ma1onty f the valtd vte&. , In such a composite position apart from rebutting the allegations mad~ against h1b' in the petition all that the returned candidate can further shew is that t e\n\nBANWARI PASS v. SUMMER CHAND (Sarkaria, !.) 359\n\npetitioner did not in fact receive the majority of valid votes and is therefore, not entitled to the further declaration of his due election. In the absence of a provision specifically conferring such a right, the returned candidate cannot alJege and prove further that even if the petitioner had obtained a majority of valid 'Votes, he could not be granted the declaration of his due election because he had committed corrupt practices.\n\nSuch plea and proof will, in reality, be in the nature of a counterattack, not necessary for legitimate defence.\n\n[365 C]\n\n(3) In the light of the we11-established principles the court cannOt bridge the gap or supply this apparent omission in the Corporation Act with rgard to a returned candidate's claim to recriminate, by importing principles of common law or equity, the maxim casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris relinqitur being in-applicable to the construction of election statutes.\n\nA right to file an election petition or a recriminatory petition being a mere creature of statute, unkno\"'n to common law, the appellant, in the absence of a clear statutory provision, is not entitled to recnminate on any of the grounds mentioned in s. 17.\n\n[366 D]\n\n(b) If the failure to comply strictly with the requirements of a statutory provision as to recrimination precludes the returned candidate from rccriminat ing. a fortiori, in the absence of such a statutory provision in an election law, the returned candidate has no right to recriminate.\n\n[367 DJ\n\nP. Malai Chami v. M. Andi Ambalas & Ors. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2077 and labar Singh v. Genda Lal [1964]6 S.C.R. 54, followed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 893 of 1973.\n\nFrom the judgment and order dated the 18th April, 1973 of the Delhi High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 289 of 1972.\n\nL. M. Sinhvi, S. S. Dhanduja and K. B. Rohatgi, for the appellant.\n\nE ._\n\n0. P. Malhotra, Sat Pal, K. N. Sehgal and N. S. Das Behl, for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J. The principal question that falls to be determined in this appeal on certificate, is : whether in an election petition under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (for short, the Corporation Act), for getting an election declared void and for a further declaration that the petitioner himself had been duly elected, the returned .candidate is entitled to plead and prove that the petitioner was guilty of corrupt practice in the election in question, and was therefore not entitled to be declared as duly elected ?\n\nThe material facts bearing on this question may now be stated :\n\nThe elections to the Delhi Municipal Corporation were held on May 2, 1973. Appellant, Benarsi Dass and Sumer Chand, Respondent 1 and others contested the election fteim Ward No. 51. The appellant secured 3974 valid votes as against 3882 valid votes obtained. by Respondent 1. The appellant was declared duly elected.\n\n. Respondent 1 filed an election petition under s. 15 of the Corporatton Act. beore th~ Election Tribunal (District Judge)_ to challenge\n\nhe electron mter ali~ ?n the ground of corrupt practices particularised\n\nm para 9 o~ the petition. Apart from getting the election of the returned candidate declared void, the election-petitioner prayed that he\n\nbe declared duly elected to the Municipal Corporation under s. 19 ( 1) ( c) of the Corporation Act.\n\nIn his written statement, the Returned Candidate raised some preliminary objections (which have not been pressed before us) and traversed the allegations in the election petition. He further pleaded under the caption \"Additional Pleas\" that since the petitioner was guilty of the corrupt practices, particularised in the written statement, he .bad become disentitled to be declared elected.\n\nThe District Judge held that the appellant was not entitled to plead and prove in reply to the election petition that the petitioner was also guilty of corrupt practices. To impugn those orders of the District Judge, the appellant moved the High Court by a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge who tried the application negatived the contentlbn of the appellant and dismissed the writ application with these observations :-\n\n\"The petitioner may show that the Respondent No. 1 did not obtain a majority of valid votes. This is the legitimate defence. But he cannot go further and show that even if the Respondent No. 1 has obtained a majority of votes, the Respondent No. 1 is not entitled to be declared to be duly elected candidate because he committed corrupt practices. An election petition to declare the election of a returned candidate void lies only when the election is notified and published under s. 14 of the Act. Since the election of the Respondent No. 1 has not been so published under section 14 of the Act, the petitioner does not have the right to challenge, it by proving corrupt practices against Respondent No. l \".\n\nAggrieved, the appellant carried an appeal under cl. 10 of the Letters Patent to the Division Bench of the High Court. The Bench dismissed the appeal holding that in the absence of a specific provision in the Corporation Act corresponding to s. 97 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Returned Candidate is not entitled to recriminate on th!Vgrounds contained in s. 1 7 of the Corporation Act. It was noticed that if at all there was a conscious omission in the Corporation Act, about the Returned Candidate's right to recri!!.J.inate, the Court was not empowered to supply that omission.\n\nThe High Court, however, granted the certificate under Article 133(1) of the Constitution.\n\nHence this appeal.\n\nAccording to the relevant statutory provisions in Chapter Ir of the Corporation Act, the Councillors are chosen by direct election on the basis of adult suffrage from various wards into which Delhi has been divided.\n\nThe normal term of office of a Councillor is four years Crom the date of publication Qf the result of his election.\n\nThe persons entitled to vote at election of Councillors are the persons registered, by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1950 as voters at elections to the House of the People for the area comprised in a ward.\n\nBANWAIU DASS v. SUMMER CHAND (Sarkaria, /.)\n\nAccording to section 8 :\n\n\"a person shall not be qualified to be chosen as a Couacillor unless his name is registered as an elector in the electoral roll for a ward''.\n\nSection 9 lays down disqualifications for membership of Corporation. Its material part reads :\n\n\"9(1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as. and for being, a councillor, or alderman--\n\n( a) to (c) x x x\n\n(d) if he has, in proceedings for questioning the validity or regularity of an election, been found to have been guilty of-\n\n(i) any corrupt practice, or\n\n(ii) any offence punishable under section 171E or section l 71F of the Indian Penal Code or any offence punishable under section 29 or clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 30 of this Act, unless a period of five years has elapsed since the date of the finding or the disqualification has been removed either retrospectively or prospectively by the Central Government\n\n(e) to (1) x x\n\nK Section 14 enjoins that the names of all persons elected as councillors or aldermen shall, as soon as may be, after such election, be published by the Commissionedn the Official Gazette. Sections 15 to 21 relate to disputes regarding elections. The mandate of s. 15 (1) is that no election of a councillor or alderman shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to the court of District Judge, Delhi within 15 .days from the date of the publication of the result of F the election under s. 14. Sub-s. (2) provides :\n\n\"An election petition calling in question any such election may be presented on one or more of the. grounds specified in section 17-\n\n(a) by any candidate at such election\n\n(b) (i) in the case of an election of a Councillor, by an eleetor of the ward concerned;\n\n. (ii) in the case of an election of an alderman, by any councillor.\"\n\nIts sub-section ( 4) requires that :\n\nH \"An election petition-\n\n( a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies;\n\n(a) shall, with sµfficient particulars, set forth the ground . or grounds on which the election is called in question; and\n\n( c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the mauner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure l 908, for the verification of pleadings.\"\n\nThe relief that may be claimed by the petitioner is indicated ia s.\n\nB . 16(1) which says:\n\n\"A petitioner may claim-\n\n(a) a declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidates is void, and\n\n(b) in. addition thereto, a further declaration that he him- C self or any other _candidate has been duly elected.\"\n\nSection 17 indicates the grounds on which an election can be declared void. One of such grounds vide clause (a) of s. 17 (I) is \"that on the date of his election a returned candidate was not qualified or was disqualified, to be chosen as a councillor or, as the case may be, as an alderman under this Act\". Another ground in clause (b) is of corrupt D practices committed by a returned candidate or his agent or other person with his eonsent. Section 18 applies the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the trial and disposal of an election petition \"as far as it can be made applicable\". Section 19 enumerates ti e nature of orders which the District Judge can make at the coni:lusion of the trial of an election petition. It reads : ·\n\n\"19 ( 1) At the coi,:iclusion of the trial of an election petition, the court of the District Judge shall make an order-\n\n(a) dismissing the election petition; or\n\n(h) declaring the election of all or JUIY of the returned candidates to be void; or ·\n\n( c) declaring the election of all or any of the returned candidates to be void and the petitioner and any other caadidate to have been duly elected.\n\n(2) If any person who has filed an election petition has, in additiori to calling in question the election of the returned candidate, claimed . declaration that he himself or any other candidate hlll! been duly elected and the court of the district judge is of opinio, n- ( a) that in fact the petitioner or such other candidate received a majority of the valid votes, or .\n\n(b) that but for the votes obtained by the returned candidate the petitjoner or such other candidate would have ob- H tained a majority of the valid votes, the court shall, after declaring the election of the returned candidate to be void, de-\n\nA clare the petitioner or such other candidate, as the case may be, to have been duly elected.\"\n\nSection 21 says :\n\n\"(!) An order of the court of the district judge on an election petition shall be final and conclusive.\n\n(2) An election of a councillor or an alderman not called in question in accordance with the foregoing provisions shall be deemed to be good and valid election.\"\n\nThe provisions of ss. 9,15(1), 16(1), 17(1), 19(1), 19(2) of the Corporation Act are more or less parallel to those in Sections 9A, 18, 84, 101, 98 and 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for Short the People Act) respectively. It will be seen that a provision corresponding to s. 97 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 is conspicuous by its absenoe from the Corporation Act, though the latter enactment was placed on the statute book in 1957.\n\nDr. Singhvi, learned Counsel for the appellant, vehemently contends that a right to plead and prove thai the election-petitioner himself was guilty of corrupt practice and, as such, was disqualified to be declared to have been duly elected has been given by s. 9(1) (b) of the Corporation Act to the returned candidate. Section 9, it h mabtained, applies to all stages of an election petition, and, if at the time of granting relief in an election petition, a returned candidate can show that the petitioner had committed corrupt practices in the election in question, then the colirt will not grant him the declaration that he has been duly elected. Stress has been laid on the word 'being' in section 9 ( 1) (b) . Learned Counsel further maintains that in interpreting the provisions of the Corporation Act, two principles have to be kept in view. The first is ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy). The argument is that once it is conceded that th~ returned candidate has a right to plead that the petitioner had incurred any of the disqualifications enumerated in s. 9, he cannot be debarred from leading evidence to substantiate that plea. It is contended that if the returned candidate is not permitted to lead evidence to establish such a counter-allegation, in defence, to a composite election petition of this nature, he will be leftwithout any remedy because s. 21(1) will make the order of the District Judge in the petition final and conclusive, while sub-s.(2) of the same section will bar any other procedure for impeaching the election of the election-petitioner on the ground that he has committed a corrupt practice. It is added the remedy provided ins. 33 will also be not open to the returned candidate after the decision of the election petition. In any case, the remedy in s. 3.3 (3) is too circuitous illusory and inadequate. '\n\nThe second principle relied on by the Counsel is the Mischi<i Rule as enunciated in Heydon's case(1), that the court should make such H construction as shall suppress the mischief,. and advance the remedy.\n\nThe main object of these statutory provisions, it is urged, is to ensure\n\n(1) (1584) 3 Co. Rep. J\n\npurity of the elections, and if the returned candidate is not allowed to A expose the corrupt practices committed by the election-petitioner, himself, it would defeat that object of the statute.\n\nThe other grounds of appeal have not been pressed before us.\n\nMr. 0. P. Malhotra, learned Counsel for the respondents, submits that in clause (d) of s. 9(1), the words \"to have been\" read together with clause (a) of s. 17(1) put it beyond doubt that this particular disqualification must have been incurred or in existence at the date of the poll or election. The plea sought to be established by the returned candidate, according to the Counsel, is a plea of recrimination, and the Corporation Act does not contain any provision analogous to s. 97 of the People Act, giving him such a right. The only remedy of the returned candidate, says the Counsel, is to avail of the machinery of s. 33(3).\n\nIn approaching the matter under consideration, we must first appreciate the true nature of the plea set up by the returned candidate.\n\nWhat the appellant seeks is in substance, a right to give evidence to prove that the election of the election-petitioner would have been void on account of corrupt practices committed by him in the election, if he had. been the returned candidate and a petition had been presented calling in question his election. Although Dr. Singhvi is reluct; mt to style this plea as one of recrimination, the nature of the plea or the right claimed is too obvious to be concealed. To all intents and purposes, it is a plea of recrimination of the type mentioned in s. 97 of the People Act, 1951. It is in the nature of a counter-petition Qn , the ground of corrupt practices under clause (b) of s. 17 ( 1) and not on' the ground of the petition-or being disqualified at the date of the election, which is a distinct and separate ground under clause (a) of s. 17(1).\n\nThere is no provision in the Corporation Act corresponding to s. 97 of the People Act, expressly giving a right of recrimination lo the returned candidate. The question therefore, is; Can such a right be legitimately spelled out of s.9(1) (d)? The entire argument of Dr. Singhvi . has been built upon the edifice of the word \"being\" in the opening sentence of s.9(1). But the effect.of the word \"being\" appears to have been largely off'set by the use of the words \"to have been guilty\" in clause (d). Stroud's Judicial Dictionary P.'.ves the meaning of the phrase \"have been'' as \"immediately prior to~ specific time\". In Re storie,(1) a scheme for the management of the Charity declared that the boys should be chosen from those boys \"who shall have been three years at the Free School\". A complaint was made that an undue election had been made. On appeal, Lord Justices Knight Bruce and Turner, construing the scheme, held that only those boys were eligible \"who fwd been three years at the school at the time of, and immediately preceding the election\". (Emphasis supplied).\n\nIn tho instant case, also, if the phrase \"found to have b..\"\"en guilty\" in s.9(1)(d) is construed in the context of clause(a) of s.17(1), then\n\n(I) (IS6t) 30, L. J. Ch. 193;\n\nE ·'\n\n' '\n\non the analogy o( Re Storie, it will mean \"found to have been guilty at 1he 1i111e of the e/ec1io11, and immediately preceding the election\".\n\nThus a right to recriminate cannot be legitimately spelled out of s. 9( 1) ( d) without doing violence to its language or unduly stretching it.\n\nThe above interpretation fits better in the general scheme of the Corporation Act.\n\nAs will be apparent from s.19, quoted earlier, the tribunal i.e. the District Judge can pass only three kinds of final orders indicated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of that section.\n\nThe District Judge's inquiry at the trial of an election petition is, rherefore, limited to the investigation of those matters only which will enable\n\nhim to make the orders specified in s.19(1). But, where in a composite petition, like the one in the present case, relief is claimed that the petitioner be declared elected in place of the returned candidate, the District Judge is to investigate if either of the two conditions for the grant of a further declaration, specified ins. 19(2) is made out. That is to say, he has to confine his enquiry to the determination of either of these two questions namely : (a) whether in fact the petitioner received a majority of the valid votes, or (b) whether the petitioner would have but for the votes obtained by the returned candidate, obtaind a majority of the valid votes. Rule 68 (I) of the Rules framed under the Corporation Act, defines 'valid vote' as \"every ballot paper which is not rejected under Rule 67 shall be counted as one valid vote\". The concept of validity of votes is different from that of corrupt practices defined in s. 22 on the basis of which an election petition can be instituted. In such a composite petition, apart from rebutting the allegations made against him in the petition, all that the returned candidate can further show is that the petitioner did not in fact receive the majority of valid votes and is therefore, not entitled to the further declaration of his due election.\n\nJn the absence of a provision specifically conferring such a right, the returned candidate cannot allege and prove further that even if the petitioner had obtained a majority of valid votes, he could not be granted the declaration of his due election because ho had committed corrupt practices. Such plea and proof will, in reality, be in the nattKe of a counter-attack, not necessary for legitimate defence.\n\nHaving seen that there is no provision in the Corporation Act which specifically or by inevitable implication gives to a returned candidate a right to recriminate. the further question to be determined is : Whether the court is competent to provide this casus. omissus by invoking the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium or Mischief Rule or other principles of common law ? ·\n\nIt. appears to us that the answer to this question must be in the negative.\n\nThis Court has repeatedly held that 'an election cont<'t is not an action at law or a suit in equity but a purely statutory pr<Y\".eeding unknown to comr_n!'n law and te court possesses no. common Jaw powers.' Statutory provts1ons of election law are to be stnctly construed and its requirement strictly observed. In P. Malai Chami v. M. AndiAmbalam and ors.,(') this Court speaking through Alagiriswami J., again pointed out:\n\n(I\\ A. I .. R. 1973 S. C. 2077. 1 l-L954Sup.Cf/74\n\n\"Courts in general are averse to allow justice to be defeated on a mere technicality. But in deciding an election petition, the High Court is merely a tribunal deciding an election dispute.\n\nIts powers are wholly the creature of the statute under which it is conferred the power to h.ear election-petitions.\"\n\nIt must be remembered-to use the oft-quoted words of Grover /. in Taunton's ca.\\'e( 1)-\n\n\"that although the object of the statute by which the election tribunals were created was to prevent corrupt practices, still the tribunal is a judicial, and not an inquisitorial one, it is a. court to hear and determine according to law, and not a commission armed with powers to enquire into and suppress corruption.\" In the light of these well-established principles, it is clear that the court cannot bridge the gap or supply this apparent omission in the Corporation Act with regard to a returned candidate's claim to recriminate, by importing principles of common law or equity, the maxim casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur being inapplicable to the construction of election statutes. A right to file an election petition or a recriminatory petition which, in substance, is a counter-election-petition, being the mere creature of statute, unknown to common law, the appellant, in the absence of a clear statutory provision, is not entitled to recriminate on any of the grounds mentioned in section 17-_ . -- We do not think it necessary to notice all the authorities cited at the bar or to dilate on this point further. We will close the discussion by referring to labar Singh v. Genda Lal('), wherein Gajendragadkar C.J. clarified the nature of the right of recrimination thns :\n\n\"There are, however, cases in which the eledtion petition makes a double claim; it claims that the election of the returned candidate is void, and also asks for a declaration that the petitioner himself or some other person has been duly elected. It is in regard to such a composite case that s. 100 as well as s. 101 would apply, and it is in respect of the additional claim for a declaration that some other candidate bas been duly elected that s. 97 comes into play. Section 97 (1) thus allows the returned candidate to recriminate and. raise pleas in support of his case that the other person i~: whose favour a declaration is claimed by the petition cannot be said to be validly elected, and these wold be pleas of a.ttack and it would be open to the returned candidate to take these pleas, because when he recriminates, he really becomes a counterpetitioner challenging the validity of the election of the alternative candidate. The result of s. 97 (1), therefore, is that 1i1 dealing with a composite election petition, the Tribunal enquires into not only the case made out by the petitioner, but also the -\"(!) 20 M & H. p. 74.\n\n(2) [t96l] ~' S. C.R. 54\n\ncounter-claim made by the returned candidate. That being the nature of the proceedings contemplated by s. 97 (1), it is not surprising that the returned candidate is required to make his recrimination and serve notice in that behalf in the manner and within the time specified bys. 97(1) proviso and s.97(2).\n\nIf the returned candidate does not recriminate as required by s. 91, then he cannot make any attack against the alternative claim made by the petition. In such a case, an enquiry would be held under s. 100 so far as the validity of the returned candidate's election is concerned, and if as a result of the said enquiry a declaration is made that the election of the returned candidaie is void, then the Tribunal will proceed to deal with alternative claim, but in doing so, the returned candidate will not be allowed to lead any evidence because he is precluded from raising any pleas against the validity of the claim of the alternative candidate.\" (emphasis supplied)\n\nAlthough the above observations were made in a case. under the People Act, but the principle enunciated therein applies with greater force to the problem in hand. If the failure to comply strictly, with the requirements of a statutory provision as to recrimination, precludes the returned candidate from recriminating, a fortiori, in the absence of such a statutory provision in an election law, the returned candidate has no right to recriminate.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we would affirm the view taken by the Division Bench of\"the High Court in regard to the returned candidate's claim to recriminate.\n\nBefore parting with this judgment, we will like to emphasise the desirability of making a clear provision, corresponding to s. 97 of the People Act, 19 51 in the Corporation Act specifically conferring a right of recrimination on the returned candidate in an election-petition in which the petitioner, in addition to getting the election of the returned candidate declared void, seeks a further declaration that he or some other candidate has been duly elected. One of the primary objects of these provisions relating to corrupt practices, is to ensure purity of the elections. If corrupt practices committed by the returned candidate are abhorrent to that object, so are the corrupt practices indulged in by the petitioner or any other candidate and his agent in favour of whom the further declaration of the doe election is claimed, What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. According to the learned Counsel for the Respondent, the returned candidate would be entitled to get the petitioner disqualified by moving the Commissioner under s. 33 which inter alia provides that \"if any question arises as to whether a councillor or an alderman has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in s. 9, the Commissioner shall refer the question to the District Judge of Delhi for his decision and the decision of the District Judge shall be final. Assuming-not holding-that s. 33 provides for\n\nimpeaching the election of a candidate declared duly elected under s. 19 (I) ( c), on the ground of corrupt practices committed by him, the remedy provided appears to be cumbersome, circuitous and dialtory involving multiplicity of proceedings. The duplication of judicial proceedings by compelling the aggrieved petitioner to start a fresh challenge against the respondent after the formality of his being made councillor is published, not only defeats the object of an early determination regarding the purity of the election but also renders the proceeding ineffective for the very reason of the long delay. Again, tbe time that may be taken for the reference to the District Judge under .s. 33 and the time consumed for the preliminaries before a trial begins or gains momentum can all be eliminated if there is provision, as in the Peoples'\n\nRcpresenttion Act, for recrimination.\n\nWe express the hope that the Commissioner, in the evtnt of a challenge being made to the respondent's election on the ground of corruption, will not delay a reference to the District Judge wh0 certainly will go into the legal and factual questions involved on which we pronounce no opinion.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAp, eal dismissed.", "total_entities": 128, "entities": [{"text": "BANW ARI DASS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 13, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BANWARI DASS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SUMMER CHAND AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUMMER CHAND AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "1974 (V. R. KRIS8NA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Delhi Muncipal COrporation Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ss. 17 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Muncipal COrporation Act, 1951", "statute": "Delhi Muncipal COrporation Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 19(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 702, "end_char": 713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Muncipal COrporation Act, 1951", "statute": "Delhi Muncipal COrporation Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "On appeal lhe High Court held that in the absence of a specific rrovision in the Corporation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 974, "end_char": 1070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1089, "end_char": 1094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On appeal lhe High Court held that in the absence of a specific rrovision in the Corporation Act", "statute": "On appeal lhe High Court held that in the absence of a specific rrovision in the Corporation Act"}}, {"text": "Representation o People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1102, "end_char": 1135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1220, "end_char": 1225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation o People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation o People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1251, "end_char": 1263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation o People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation o People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1545, "end_char": 1555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation o People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation o People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 17( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1644, "end_char": 1653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation o People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation o People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "is no provisiOn in the Corporation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2224, "end_char": 2262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2280, "end_char": 2285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no provisiOn in the Corporation Act", "statute": "There is no provisiOn in the Corporation Act"}}, {"text": "s.9( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2449, "end_char": 2456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no provisiOn in the Corporation Act", "statute": "There is no provisiOn in the Corporation Act"}}, {"text": "s.9(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2680, "end_char": 2689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no provisiOn in the Corporation Act", "statute": "There is no provisiOn in the Corporation Act"}}, {"text": "s.17(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2732, "end_char": 2739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no provisiOn in the Corporation Act", "statute": "There is no provisiOn in the Corporation Act"}}, {"text": "s.19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3221, "end_char": 3228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no provisiOn in the Corporation Act", "statute": "There is no provisiOn in the Corporation Act"}}, {"text": "s.19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3476, "end_char": 3483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ot bridge the gap or supply this apparent omission in the Corporation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4562, "end_char": 4635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5139, "end_char": 5144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ot bridge the gap or supply this apparent omission in the Corporation Act", "statute": "Ot bridge the gap or supply this apparent omission in the Corporation Act"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5576, "end_char": 5604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "L. M. Sinhvi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5759, "end_char": 5771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Sinhvi, S. S. Dhanduja and K. B. Rohatgi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. S. Dhanduja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5773, "end_char": 5787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Sinhvi, S. S. Dhanduja and K. B. Rohatgi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. B. Rohatgi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5792, "end_char": 5805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Sinhvi, S. S. Dhanduja and K. B. Rohatgi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Malhotra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5836, "end_char": 5847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Malhotra, Sat Pal, K. N. Sehgal and N. S. Das Behl, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Sat Pal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5849, "end_char": 5856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Malhotra, Sat Pal, K. N. Sehgal and N. S. Das Behl, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. N. Sehgal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5858, "end_char": 5870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Malhotra, Sat Pal, K. N. Sehgal and N. S. Das Behl, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "N. S. Das Behl", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5875, "end_char": 5889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Malhotra, Sat Pal, K. N. Sehgal and N. S. Das Behl, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5958, "end_char": 5966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J. The principal question that falls to be determined in this appeal on certificate, is : whether in an election petition under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (for short, the Corporation Act), for getting an election declared void and for a further declaration that the petitioner himself had been duly elected, the returned .candidate is entitled to plead and prove that the petitioner was guilty of corrupt practice in the election in question, and was therefore not entitled to be declared as duly elected ?"}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6100, "end_char": 6137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6577, "end_char": 6604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material facts bearing on this question may now be stated :\n\nThe elections to the Delhi Municipal Corporation were held on May 2, 1973."}}, {"text": "May 2, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6618, "end_char": 6629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material facts bearing on this question may now be stated :\n\nThe elections to the Delhi Municipal Corporation were held on May 2, 1973."}}, {"text": "Benarsi Dass", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6642, "end_char": 6654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appellant, Benarsi Dass and Sumer Chand, Respondent 1 and others contested the election fteim Ward No."}}, {"text": "Sumer Chand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6659, "end_char": 6670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appellant, Benarsi Dass and Sumer Chand, Respondent 1 and others contested the election fteim Ward No."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6922, "end_char": 6927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "statute": "the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7284, "end_char": 7289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7997, "end_char": 8008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8668, "end_char": 8673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8761, "end_char": 8771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8947, "end_char": 8953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9140, "end_char": 9145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9153, "end_char": 9191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9275, "end_char": 9279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9557, "end_char": 9571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "According to the relevant statutory provisions in Chapter Ir of the Corporation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9614, "end_char": 9697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10067, "end_char": 10126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10270, "end_char": 10279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1950", "statute": "the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10426, "end_char": 10435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1950", "statute": "the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 171E", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10832, "end_char": 10844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1950", "statute": "the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10869, "end_char": 10886, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10919, "end_char": 10929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1950", "statute": "the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10966, "end_char": 10976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1950", "statute": "the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11150, "end_char": 11168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and for being, a councillor, or alderman--\n\n( a) to (c) x x x\n\n(d) if he has, in proceedings for questioning the validity or regularity of an election, been found to have been guilty of-\n\n(i) any corrupt practice, or\n\n(ii) any offence punishable under section 171E or section l 71F of the Indian Penal Code or any offence punishable under section 29 or clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 30 of this Act, unless a period of five years has elapsed since the date of the finding or the disqualification has been removed either retrospectively or prospectively by the Central Government\n\n(e) to (1) x x\n\nK Section 14 enjoins that the names of all persons elected as councillors or aldermen shall, as soon as may be, after such election, be published by the Commissionedn the Official Gazette."}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11188, "end_char": 11198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 15 to 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11375, "end_char": 11392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11448, "end_char": 11453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "District Judge, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11591, "end_char": 11612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mandate of s. 15 (1) is that no election of a councillor or alderman shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to the court of District Judge, Delhi within 15 .days from the date of the publication of the result of F the election under s. 14."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11700, "end_char": 11705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11851, "end_char": 11861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12425, "end_char": 12452, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12823, "end_char": 12833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12938, "end_char": 12943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13266, "end_char": 13276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13289, "end_char": 13318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13408, "end_char": 13418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14676, "end_char": 14686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14981, "end_char": 14986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 9A, 18, 84, 101, 98 and 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15082, "end_char": 15118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15126, "end_char": 15164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Short the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15170, "end_char": 15190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15256, "end_char": 15261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Short the People Act", "statute": "Short the People Act"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15269, "end_char": 15307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Singhvi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15437, "end_char": 15444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Singhvi, learned Counsel for the appellant, vehemently contends that a right to plead and prove thai the election-petitioner himself was guilty of corrupt practice and, as such, was disqualified to be declared to have been duly elected has been given by s. 9(1) (b) of the Corporation Act to the returned candidate."}}, {"text": "s. 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15691, "end_char": 15698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15753, "end_char": 15762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16128, "end_char": 16137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Learned Counsel further maintains that in interpreting the provisions of the Corporation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16149, "end_char": 16241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16528, "end_char": 16532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Learned Counsel further maintains that in interpreting the provisions of the Corporation Act", "statute": "Learned Counsel further maintains that in interpreting the provisions of the Corporation Act"}}, {"text": "s. 21(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16829, "end_char": 16837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Learned Counsel further maintains that in interpreting the provisions of the Corporation Act", "statute": "Learned Counsel further maintains that in interpreting the provisions of the Corporation Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17254, "end_char": 17258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Heydon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17395, "end_char": 17401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second principle relied on by the Counsel is the Mischi<i Rule as enunciated in Heydon's case(1), that the court should make such H construction as shall suppress the mischief,."}}, {"text": "0. P. Malhotra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17879, "end_char": 17893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. 0."}}, {"text": "s. 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17962, "end_char": 17969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18029, "end_char": 18037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18356, "end_char": 18361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18499, "end_char": 18507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19199, "end_char": 19204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19212, "end_char": 19228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19329, "end_char": 19334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 17(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19490, "end_char": 19498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "is no provision in the Corporation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19507, "end_char": 19545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19563, "end_char": 19568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no provision in the Corporation Act", "statute": "There is no provision in the Corporation Act"}}, {"text": "s.9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19733, "end_char": 19739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no provision in the Corporation Act", "statute": "There is no provision in the Corporation Act"}}, {"text": "s.9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19861, "end_char": 19867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no provision in the Corporation Act", "statute": "There is no provision in the Corporation Act"}}, {"text": "Stroud", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20002, "end_char": 20008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stroud's Judicial Dictionary P.'.ves the meaning of the phrase \"have been'' as \"immediately prior to~ specific time\"."}}, {"text": "Knight Bruce", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20374, "end_char": 20386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal, Lord Justices Knight Bruce and Turner, construing the scheme, held that only those boys were eligible \"who fwd been three years at the school at the time of, and immediately preceding the election\". ("}}, {"text": "Turner", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20391, "end_char": 20397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal, Lord Justices Knight Bruce and Turner, construing the scheme, held that only those boys were eligible \"who fwd been three years at the school at the time of, and immediately preceding the election\". ("}}, {"text": "s.9(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20656, "end_char": 20665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.17(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20710, "end_char": 20717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20976, "end_char": 20984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21164, "end_char": 21168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21527, "end_char": 21534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22425, "end_char": 22430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Having seen that there is no provision in the Corporation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23208, "end_char": 23269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Alagiriswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24043, "end_char": 24055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this Court speaking through Alagiriswami J., again pointed out:\n\n(I\\ A. I .. R. 1973 S. C. 2077."}}, {"text": "Grover", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24494, "end_char": 24500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must be remembered-to use the oft-quoted words of Grover /. in Taunton's ca.\\'e( 1)-\n\n\"that although the object of the statute by which the election tribunals were created was to prevent corrupt practices, still the tribunal is a judicial, and not an inquisitorial one, it is a. court to hear and determine according to law, and not a commission armed with powers to enquire into and suppress corruption.\""}}, {"text": "Taunton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24507, "end_char": 24514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must be remembered-to use the oft-quoted words of Grover /. in Taunton's ca.\\'e( 1)-\n\n\"that although the object of the statute by which the election tribunals were created was to prevent corrupt practices, still the tribunal is a judicial, and not an inquisitorial one, it is a. court to hear and determine according to law, and not a commission armed with powers to enquire into and suppress corruption.\""}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25564, "end_char": 25574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25776, "end_char": 25790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We will close the discussion by referring to labar Singh v. Genda Lal('), wherein Gajendragadkar C.J. clarified the nature of the right of recrimination thns :\n\n\"There are, however, cases in which the eledtion petition makes a double claim; it claims that the election of the returned candidate is void, and also asks for a declaration that the petitioner himself or some other person has been duly elected."}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26148, "end_char": 26154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 101", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26166, "end_char": 26172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26302, "end_char": 26307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26325, "end_char": 26335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26804, "end_char": 26809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27121, "end_char": 27126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.97(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27318, "end_char": 27325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27390, "end_char": 27395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27527, "end_char": 27533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28731, "end_char": 28736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29657, "end_char": 29662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29824, "end_char": 29828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "District Judge of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29879, "end_char": 29902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the learned Counsel for the Respondent, the returned candidate would be entitled to get the petitioner disqualified by moving the Commissioner under s. 33 which inter alia provides that \"if any question arises as to whether a councillor or an alderman has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in s. 9, the Commissioner shall refer the question to the District Judge of Delhi for his decision and the decision of the District Judge shall be final."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30001, "end_char": 30006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30088, "end_char": 30093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30713, "end_char": 30718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_369_378_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "JAGDJSH PRASAD\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER\n\nFebruary 13, 1974\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKAR!A, JJ.]\n\nMainte11a11ce of Inrernat Security Act 1971, Sec. 3(1) (a) {iii)-Order of detentiori under sec. 3( I) (a) (iii)-Grou11ds-Mai11tenance of Supplies a11d Ser .. vices essential to the community-Legality of order. ·\n\nWords and phrases \"Supplies and Services\" meaning of-Constitution of India, Art. 32-Practice-Petilion for habeas corpus-Return to Rule Nisi.\n\nA/fidavit-011 behalf of State-Who should file.\n\nThe petitioner, a licensed wholesale dealer, was detained pursuant to an order passed u/s 33 of the Act by the District J.Iagistrate, Ranchi for his antisocial activity prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. The particulars of the grounds supplied to him u/s 8 stated that he was found secretly transporting 50 bags of rice in his truck at mid-night contrary to the conditions of bis wholesaler's licence and that, when caught red banded, he gave false excuses and imaginary numbers of licence dealers, some of whom on verification had no current licence and all of whom disowned the alleged purchases. The petitioner challenged the validity of the order by a petition for habeas corpus. The affidavit in return filed by the State was sworn by an Upper Division Assistant (Special) Home Department. In that affidavit the words \"and services\" after \"maintenance of supplies\", were struck off.\n\nThe petitioner raised two contentions before this Court : (i} The Distric&\n\nMaistrate was uncertain whether he was detaining the petitioner to prevent disruption of maintenance of supplies or services essential to the life of the community and such a mindless order was bad in law.\n\n(ii) Supplies and Services are two distinct concepts and though services being disrupted was one of the precise reasons for the detention, no particulars which would make out that ground, apart from the distinct ground of preventing supplies, had been given; l;1erefore, the order was illegal.\n\nDismissing the petition held :\n\nI. The District Magistrate when passing an order of detention u/s 3 of the Act bas to be fair and clear and not doubtful abrfit why he is detaining the man. \"Either or\" ill fits into s. 3, Not so, when it 1s cumulative. A man may be detained on grounds A and B but not A or B. In the present case, illicit transport of food grains in the still secrecy of night. by one whose business licence does not permit it and who gives false explanation when confronted does indulge in an activity with impact on supplies and services. Supplies and stocks if hijacked by wholesalers upsets the delicate control scheme. So also transport and delivery to each centre according to its requirements is thrown out of gear by these private operations. For example, Bihar hopping harrowingly from drought to floods, .can ill-afford to have the wheels of distribution, of which supplies and serviCes are two facets, wobble or break down. Therefore, the order of detentiol}, cannot be held to bad in economics of law. [373 D, 377 H]\n\nRa111eshwar Lal v. State of Billar [19.68] 2 S.C.R. 505 and Prabhu Dayal v.\n\nDistrict Magistrate, Kamrup, W.P. No. 1946 of 1973 dated October 11, 1973, referred to.\n\nH. Jn interpreting expressions such as \"supplies and services\" basically the statutory subjects matter colours the concept. The complex needs and amenities of modern life and the multifarious obligations of a welfare state mingle supplies and services. For example, an essential commodity is at once ..a supply and a service. The touchstone of social control is that it must be a\n\nth!ne essential f\\lr the e; x:isence of the community; when crystallised it is supphes, wh.en subhated 1t 1s services. lt depends in most cases on the angle from which you view and the lens you use. There can be no dichotomy beteen \"supplies and services\" in the special context of a State being called upon 1n an emergency to supply that primary necessity of existence, viz.., food, which is perhaps the basic service which Government must render to the people.\n\nIn the present case, the allegation is of nocturnal, illegal rice transport intercepted by officials and no vialence is done to language to describe that activity as prejudicial to supplies a •1d services.\n\nRushing food supplies to a nation ; n hunger is a composite operation of supplies and services essential to the life of the community and the order is not bad because it telescopes both. An intelligent forecast made by the District Magistrate that the detenu would break the control system and blackmarket in rice cannot be castigated as irrational.\n\n[372 C-H, 376 Fl\n\nRam Manohar Lohia V. State of Bihar and another [1966] 1 S.C.R. 709, Prablru Dayal v. Dist. Magistrate, Katnrup, W.P. No. 1496 of 1973 dt. 11-10-73 and Keshav Talpade v. Emperor A.LR. 1943 F.C.R. l, 8 distinguished on facts.\n\nIII. tObiler dicta)\n\nIt is difficult to appreciate why in return to a rule nisi in the habeas corpus motion, it is not thought serious enough even where liberty of a citizen is choked off, to get the District Magistrate to explain his subjective satisfaction and the grounds therefor.\n\nNot ven wlly he is not available, nor the next best, the oath of a senior officer in the Secretariat who had been associated with the handling\n\nof the case at Government level.\n\nMechanical affidavits, miniaturising the files D into a few par_agraphs, by some one handy in the Secretariat cannot be regarded as satisfactory. This is not a mere punctilio of procedure but a probath•e requirement of substance.\n\n[373 BJ\n\n[The above observations stand on1y as obiter dlcu' in the present case since counsel n1ade no point about 'this aspect of the affidavit.\n\nHowever, in a subsequent judgment in Mohd. Ala111 v. State of West Bengal, W.P. Nos. 1678 and 1855/1973 dt. 14-2-74, this Court comprised of the same Bench has specifically laid down th<:t the proper person to file the counter-affidavit in return to Rule E 11isi issued by the Supreme Court in hahcas corr11s petition is the District Magistrate who had passed the order of detention or a senior officer who prrsonally dealt with the case of 1he detenu in the Government Secretariat, or had to put up the file to the Minister for orders.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 1972 of 1973.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the issue of Writ in the nature of habeas corpus.\n\nFrank Anthony and S. K. Gambhir, for the petitioner.\n\nK. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by.\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. The petitioner detained by the order of the District Magistrate for anti-social proclivity prejudicial to the maintenance of supp1ies and services essential to the community challenge'i its validity in this petition for habeas corpus.\n\nMr. Frank Anthony has vigorously urged two vital defects as vitiating the detention order incarcerating the petitioner, based mainly on the unreported ruling of this Court in Prabhu Dayal v. District Magistrate, Kamrup('), the well-known Lohia( 2) case and a few other peripheral\n\n(I) w. P. No. 1496 of 1973; judgment dated October II, 1973.\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 633,\n\nA observations in other . decisions. The District Magistrate was uncertain whether he would detain the peiitioner to prevent disruption of mainten.ance of supplies or of services essential to the life of the community and such a mindless order suffered from a fatal genetic disease diagnosed by this Court in many decisions as fatal, runs the submission.\n\nNow, the admitted facts and the authoritative law and their inter- B action. It is best to begin with the impugned order itself which reads :\n\n\"No. 1182/C dated, the 9th October, 1973. Whereas I am satisfied that with a view tq preventing Shri Jagdish Prasad, Proprietor M/s Lachmi Bhandar, North Market Road,\n\nUpper Bazar, Ranchi, from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the C community, it is neceary to ¥e an order that he be detained. Now, therefore, in exereise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (2) of the Section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (No. 26-0f 1971), I hereby direct that the said Shri Jagdish Prasad be detained.\n\nHe shall be tr.eated in detention in Ranchi.Jail and classi- D lied as Class Y and. in division IB.\n\n(S. N. Sinha) District Magistrate, Ranohi.\"\n\nThe executive interdict on the trader's freedom is issued to inhibit his\n\nacting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. The semantics of 'supplies' and fservices' in this context, argued Sri Anthony, serves to sho\\V that certain activities bear upon supplies only, e.g., hoarding or blackmarketing, while other actings may disrupt services only, e.g., sabotage of railway tracks or scavenger's strike. Be argued that some misconduct may be ambidextral as for example, huge quantities of telegraph wires being poached or a railway wagon being looted in an organised manner. The cornerstone of his contention, in the first stage, is that blackmarketing in foodgrains belongs to the first species-essential supplies-and not to the second-essential services. In Rameshwar Lal v. State of Bihar( 1) this Court pointed out:\n\n\"No doubt blackmarketing has at its base a shortening of supplies because blackmarket flourishes best when the availability of commodities is rendered difficult. It has a definite tendency to disrupt supplies when scarc'ity exi..:; ts or scarcity is created artificially by hoarding to attain illegitimate profits.\n\nIndulging in blackmarketing is conduct which is prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies, It is hardly necessary to read supplies conjunctively with services, as was cqntended although cases may exist where supplies and services may both be affected. The word 'and' is not used conjunctively but disjunctively. If sweepers strike, no question of disrupting sup-\n\n(!) 11968]2 S. C. R. 505.\n\nplies arises bi.t services essential to the life of the coQlmunity will certainly be disrupted.\" The familiar imager, y in Lo hi a' s case of concentric circles in the COii text of Law and Order (the larger circle) and public order (the smaller but graver one) \\\\as projected here with a little re-adjustment. Sirnilies and metaphors ler.d liierary grace to legal argument but are apt to play tricks in areas of strict logic or cold law. Courts have to be cautious while transplanting picturesque projections from one situation to an other. So let us take an fodependent close-up of the profiles of essential 'supplies' and 'services' to discover common morphology and divergent features. Basicall:r, the statutory subject-matter colours the concept.\n\nCounsel traced th: pedigree of the Act, with special r<ferencc to. essen tial supplies and services, to substantiate his thesis of compartmentalisation and marginal overlapping. May be, counsel is right .in his contention that all supr lies are not services and Bil services ate not supplies but the complex r.eeds and amenities of modern life and the multifarious obligations of a y•elfare state mingle supplies and services so much that the concentric ci1 cle geometry becomes a misleading stroke of conceptualism in this jural larea.\n\nFor example, an essential commodity is at once a supply atd a servjce: Section 36(3) of the Defence of India Rules, 1971 defi.les it to mean :\n\n\"essential commodity\" means food, water .. fuel, light, power or any other tiring essential for the existence of the community which is notified in this behalf by Gqvernment;\" \"Light and powu\" thus are commodities; so also food and water. Yet who will deny that light is a service or drinking water, for that matter?\n\nThe touchstone ·)f social control is that it must be a: thing essential for the existence of the community; when crystallised it is supplies, when sublimated it is services. It depends in most cases on the angle from which you view and the lens you use. Food is supplies, so is shipping and wagons, ke::osine and gasoline. And yet they are services. At a feeding centre for starving children you supply food, •crve gruel. In other words, fold is supplies, feeding is services. In Blackpool Corporation v. Lo1kar('> it was held that providing housing .accommodation fell within the scope of \"supplies and services\" in Regulation 51 (1) of the Defence (General) Regulation, 1939. We see no force in the dichotomy between the two attempted by counsel in the special context of a State being called upon in an emergency to supply that primary necessity of existence, viz., food, which is perhaps the basic service which Government must render to the people. In the present case, the allegation i:: of nocturnal, illegal, rice transport, intercepted by officials, and you do no violence to language to describe that activity as prejudicial to rnpplies a'nil services.\n\nAnyway, rushing food supplies to a nation in hunger is a composite operation of supplies and services essential to the life of the community and the order is not bad .because it telescopes lx•th.\n\nShri Antho1y relied on the mental vacillation of the detaining officer as disclosed in the affidavit in return filed by the State where 'and services' is struck off after \"maintenance of supplies\". If this reftects the ·----- (!) (1948] t K.B, 349.\n\nslippery satisfaction of the District Magistrate it is unfortunate. Here some Upp\"r Division Assistant (Special), Home Department, has sworn an affidavit, not with personal knowledge but with paper wisdom.\n\nIt is difficult to appreciate why in return to a rule nisi in a habeas corpus motion, it is not thought serious enough even where liberty of a citizen is choked off, to get the District Magistrate to explain his subjective satisfaction and the grounds therefor. Not even why he is not available, not the next best, the oath of a senior officer in the Secretariat v:ho had been associated with the handling of the cas_e at Government level.\n\nMechanical affidavits, miniaturising the files into a few paragraphs, by some one handy in the Socretariat cannot be regarded as satisfactory.\n\nThis is not a mere punctilio of procedure but a proOative requirement of substance. However, in this case, counsel made no point about this aspect of the affidavit because the relevant material recited in the detention order is almost admitted in the petitioner's averments.\n\nEven so, the curious striking off in the affidavit of one ground relied on by the District Magistrate in his order is obscure.\n\nHad the authority used one or other of the grounds in the alternative, such for example as 'public order' or 'security of State' or 'maintenance of supplies', it would have failed in law.\n\nHe has to be firm and clear and not doubtful about why he is detaining the man. 'Either or' ill fits into s.3. Not so, when it is cumulative. A man may be detained on grounds A and B but not A or B. Here, the cumulative, not the alternative is the tenor of the order. Had it been otherwise due care would stand negatived and the order would fail.\n\nFundamental rights are fundamental and administrative indifference is impermissible to encroach beyond the strict Jines of the Jaw. Rameshwar Lal(') elicited some stern observations from Hidayatullah, J ., as he then was. The learned Judge said :\n\n\"However, the detention of a person without a trial, merely on the subjective satisfaction of an authority however high, is a serious matter. It must require the closest scrutiny of the material on which the decision is formed, leaving no room for errors or at least avoidable errors. The very reason that the courts do not consider the reasonableness of the opinion formed or the sufficiency of the material on which it is based, indicates the need for the greatest circumspection on the part of those who wield this power over others. Since the detenu is noi J?laced before a Magistrate and has only a right of being supphed the grounds of detention with a view to his making a representation to the Advisory Board, the grounds must not be vague or indefinite and must afford a real opportunity to make a representation against the detention. Similarly, if a vital ground is shown to be non-existing so that it could not have and ought riot to have played a part in the material for consideration, the court may attach some importance to this fact.\"\n\nThe present case hardly fails for this reason since particular< of\n\ngrons are givn V.:hich covr supplies an? services to the community, preiudtce to whteh ts the rattonale stated m the order. But it is con-\n\n(!) (1968] 2 S.C.R. 5-05.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS l 1974 J 3 S.C.ll.\n\ntended that the particulars furnished relate to supplies only and how services are affected is left vague. If one ground is vague, the order fails.\n\nIn Rameshwar Lal(') it was pointed out:\n\n\" .. where some grounds are found to be non-exis.ting or are ca\"celled or given up, the detention cannot be justified .... if the grounds are not sufficiently precise and do not furnish details for the purpose of making effective representation the det•!ntion can be questioned.\"\n\nIn this connection, Shri Anthony forcefully urged his case that services being farupted was one of the precise reasons for the detention, but no particulars which would make out that ground,. apart from the distinct ground of preventing supplies, have been given. On the reasoning in Prabhu Dayal the order is illegal, he argued.\n\nMathew, J., brought out the fatal flaw in Prabhu Dayal thus :\n\n\"The fact that one of the grounds mentions that paddy and rice had been unearthed and seized from the unauthorised possession of the petitioners from the rice mill in question on the dat1: of the detention order would not necessarily lead to the inference that the petitioners have been indulging in unauthorized milling of paddy, much less that they were smuggling the resultant rice to Maghalaya for earning undue profit.\n\nIt cannot, therefore, be said that the first ground, namely, that the petitioners are responsible for unauthorised milling of paddy and smuggling of the resultant rice to Meghalaya for earninp undue profit, is a conclusion reached from the fact\"of seizure of paddy and rice on 25-7-1973 or the seizure of rice on 16-5 l 972 from their unauthorized possession at Messrs.\n\nSriniva; Basudeo. Fancy Bazar, Gauhati.\"\n\nThese are not only cases where one of the grounds of detention was vague, but also cases where the detaining authority dicl not apply its mind at all to one of the grounds of detention. If the detaining authority had no particulars before it as regards the smuggling operation how was it possible for it to hwe been satisfied that the petitioners wore smuggling rice to Mcghalaya for earning undue profit? H there was any particular instance of smuggling of the kind in the mind of the detaining authority, it would have been possible for it to specify the particular instance at least in the grounds.\"\n\nRe[cren•:c \"as also made in the above case by the learned Judge to Keshav Ta!pad!' v. f111peror('~) wher-e. it was said :\n\n\"If a chtnining authority gave four reasons for detaining a man. 1vithout Ui.;; tinguishing between them, and any two or three cl the reasons arc held to be bad, it can never be certain to wha extent the bad reasons operated on th~ mind of the\n\n(t) 11963' 2 S.C.R. 505.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1943 F.C.ld,8.\n\nJAGDISH PRASAD v. BIHAR (Krishna lyer, /.)\n\nauthority or whether the detention order would have been made at all if only one or two good reasons had been before them.''\n\nThe Jaw is thus indubitable that if one ground is vague of denuded of any detail the order, even if other good grounds exist, is bad. The sole enquiry then is whether in substance no material has been set out here from which a rational inference regarding perverting services to the community has been given at all, as happened in Prabhu Daya/('), case.\n\nWe demur.\n\nThe order detailing grounds of detention reads thus :\n\n\"In pursuance of section 8 of the Maintenance of Iriternal Security Act, 1971 (No. 26 of 1971), Shri Jagdish Prasad, Proprietor M/s Lachmi Bhandar, North Market Road, Upper Bazar, Ranchi is informed that he has been ordoreJ to be detained in my order No. 1182/C dated 9th October, 73 on the following grounds :- !. That you on 2-10-72 .at about 12 O'Clcck at night were transporting 50 bags of rice weighing on truck No. BRV 6627 which was checked by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar, Ranchi.\n\n2. That you produced at the time of checking cash memo book and you asserted that out of 50 bags of rice seized on the said truck, 15 bags of rice were sold to Biswanath Floor Mill, Khelari, JO bags of rice to Pramod Floor Mill, Khelari and 10 bags to Shri Kundanlal Khelari.\n\n3. That in support of your assertion as stated in para No. 2 above, you produced Cash memo No. ll34 dated 2-10-73 showing sale of 15 bags of rice to M/s Biswanalh Flour Mill,\n\nKhelari and you mentioned lice11ce Nun1ber of M/s Bis\\vanath Flour as 34/69 (R). On verification by a Magistrate !st Class, Ranchi, at Khelari from Shri Jagi Ram, Proprietor of M/s Biswanath Flour Mill, Khelari. it has been established that tho licence number of the firm is 63/68 and not 34/69.\n\nSl; ri Jagi Ram has also asserted that he did not purchase any rice from you or frorn any other p1ace on 2-10-73.\n\n4. That similarly in support of assertion as stated in para 2 above, you produced Cash memo No. 1135 dated 2-10-73 showing sale of 10 bags of rice to M/s Pramod Fl.our Mill of Khelari showing their licence numher as 31 /68 (R). On actual verification at Khalari by a Magistrate I.st Class, Ranchi, from Shri Bhagwan Singh, Proprietor of M/s Pramod Flour Mill, Khelari it has been established that the licence of M/s Pramod Flour Mill, Khelari is 9/72 and not 31/69. It has also been established that M/s Pramod Flour Mill, Khelari had no license in 1969. It has also been established that on 2-10-73 M/s Flour Mill Khelari did not make any purchase of rice from you or from any other shop.\n\n(1) W.P. t496 of 1973; Judgmeot dated Ootobzr tt.1973.\n\n5. That similarly in support of your assertion as stated A. in para No. 2 above, you produced cash memo No. 1137 dated 2-10-73 showing sale of 10 bags of rice to Shri Kundan Lal of Kh, lari showing his licence number as 26/67(R). On\n\nactual verification at Khelari by a Magistrate !st Class, Ranchi, from Shri Kundan Lal of Khelari it has been established that Shri Kundan Lal of Khelari has got no foodgrain dealer's lic:ence, nor he deals in foodgrains. It has also been B establishee that the said Kundan Lal of Khelari did not purchase any rice from you on 2-10-73.\n\nIn the circumstances I am satisfied that if he is allowed to remain at large, he will indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community for prevention of such activities I consider his deten• C tion necesnary . ... \"\n\nHe who runs and reads will be satisfied, if the statements are true, -it is not for ·:he Court to investigate the veracity of these averments -that prolix particulars are communicated about the ruidnight movement of 50 bags of rice-a clandestine misadventure contrary to the conditions of this wholesaler's licence-and, when challenged, reeled D off imaginary numbers of licences of dealers some of who1n, on verifica~ tion, had no current licence and all of whom had disowned the alleged purchases. May be, the petitioner has a good defence but the imprisonment is preventive and not punitive, the conclusion is based on the executive's subjective satisfaction, not the court's objective assessment.\n\nEven the admitted facts are tell-tale. The petitioner is a licensed wholesale dealer. H' can carry on his business only at a place mentioned E in his licence and not do transport and sale qutside those premises. He can ; ell only to a.wholesale or retail merchant holding a pern1it. He shall h sue 'to every customer a correct receipt giving the name, address and licence number of the customer' and other details and keep a duplicate of toe same. On the recitals in the annexure to the order, the petitioner has. in violation of all these safeguards, attempted to run the gauntlet of the law.\n\nAn intelligent forecast made by the District F Magistrate that the detenu would break the control system and blackmarket in rice cannot be castigated as irrational. The argument is that all this is germrne 10 supplies, not services.\n\nTherefore, as earlier explained, the wfoJle order breaks down.\n\nWe do not 1!ismiss this argument as merely technical or procedural for the eloquent reason given by Mathew; J., if we may say, with deep G deference in Prcbhu Dayal's .case :\n\n\"The facts of the case might induce mournful reflection how an honest attempt by an authority charged with the duty of taking prophylactic measure to secure the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community has been frustrated by what is popularly called '<> technical H error. We ; ay and we think it is necessary to repeat, that the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from antisocial activities can never furnish an adequate reason for\n\ninvading the personal liberty of a citizen, except in accorddance with the procedure established by the Constitution and the laws.\n\nThe history of personal liberty is largely the history of insistence on observance of procedure.\n\nObservance of procedure has been the bastion against wanton assaults on personlil liberty over the years.\n\nUnder our Constitution, the only guarantee of personal liberty for a person is that he shall not be deprived of it except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The need today for maintenance of supplies and services essential to the communhy cannot be over-emphasised. There will be no social security without maintenance of adequate supplies and services essential to the community. But social security is not the only goal of good society. There are other values in a society. Our country is taking singular pride in the democratic ideals in personal liberty. It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of social security, we would sanction the subversion of this liberty. We do not pause to consider whether social security is more precious than personal liberty in the scale of values.\n\nFor, any judgment as regards that would be but a value• judgment on which opinions might differ.\n\nBut whatever be its impact on the maintenance or supplies and services essential to the community, when a certain procedure is prescribed by the Constitution or the Laws for depriving a citizen of his personal liberty, we think it our duty to see that procedur.e is rigorously observed, however strange this might sound to some ears.\"\n\nPart IV of the Constitution projects a value judgment which some jurists have interpreted to mean that in the hierarchy of human rights the right to life ranks highest and if the liberty of the few starve e life of the many the jural order may break down, an aspect on which we do not now need to speak.\n\nThe position of law is plain but docs not apply he.re .. we hae been at pains to explain that illicit transport of foodgrams m the .\"~ secrecy of night by one whose business license d.oes not. per!Dlt t\n\nand who gives false excuses when confronted, does mdulge m a~ aa:f vity with impact on supplies and services. Supplies and stoc ' hi'acked by wholesalers, upsets .the delicate control. schem.o:· So ~\n\ntrnsport and delivery to each centre accoding to its ruireen~ IS thrown out of gear by these private opet1ons. And B1har, oppmg. barrowingly from drought to tloods, can ill-afford to have the wheels\n\nof distribution, of which supplies and services are two facets, wobble or break down.\n\nAnyway, we cannot hold the order bad, in economics or Jaw.\n\nCounsel referred to the quantity being but 50 bags of rice-too small to thwart supp'ies to the community. While that is of little avail legally, it suggests cynically that larger black-marketers are easy in their bosom while deserving to be behind bars. That is not our province as judges, and ourviews as citizens are out of place.\n\nIn conclusion, we would like to express concern at prolonged detentions without trial without periodical review of each individual case in changing circumstances.\n\nThe petition fails and is dismissed. s. B. w.\n\nPetition dismissed.", "total_entities": 68, "entities": [{"text": "JAGDJSH PRASAD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAGDJSH PRASAD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 13, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 65, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JAGDJSH PRASAD\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER\n\nFebruary 13, 1974\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKAR!A, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Inrernat Security Act 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Inrernat Security Act 1971", "statute": "Inrernat Security Act 1971"}}, {"text": "sec. 3( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 204, "end_char": 214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Inrernat Security Act 1971", "statute": "Inrernat Security Act 1971"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 379, "end_char": 400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 402, "end_char": 409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 604, "end_char": 608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 818, "end_char": 821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2128, "end_char": 2131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2247, "end_char": 2251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2812, "end_char": 2817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For example, Bihar hopping harrowingly from drought to floods, .can ill-afford to have the wheels of distribution, of which supplies and serviCes are two facets, wobble or break down."}}, {"text": "October 11, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3212, "end_char": 3228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1946 of 1973 dated October 11, 1973, referred to."}}, {"text": "[1966] 1 S.C.R. 709", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4713, "end_char": 4732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6010, "end_char": 6023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14-2-74, this Court comprised of the same Bench has specifically laid down th<:t the proper person to file the counter-affidavit in return to Rule E 11isi issued by the Supreme Court in hahcas corr11s petition is the District Magistrate who had passed the order of detention or a senior officer who prrsonally dealt with the case of 1he detenu in the Government Secretariat, or had to put up the file to the Minister for orders."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6333, "end_char": 6343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6351, "end_char": 6372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6428, "end_char": 6441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony and S. K. Gambhir, for the petitioner.", "canonical_name": "Frank Anthony"}}, {"text": "S. K. Gambhir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6446, "end_char": 6459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony and S. K. Gambhir, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "K. K. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6482, "end_char": 6493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S. K. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6498, "end_char": 6509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha, for the respondents.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Sinha"}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6578, "end_char": 6590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KRISHNA IYER, J. The petitioner detained by the order of the District Magistrate for anti-social proclivity prejudicial to the maintenance of supp1ies and services essential to the community challenge'i its validity in this petition for habeas corpus."}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6835, "end_char": 6848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Frank Anthony has vigorously urged two vital defects as vitiating the detention order incarcerating the petitioner, based mainly on the unreported ruling of this Court in Prabhu Dayal v. District Magistrate, Kamrup('), the well-known Lohia( 2) case and a few other peripheral\n\n(I) w. P. No.", "canonical_name": "Frank Anthony"}}, {"text": "Jagdish Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7804, "end_char": 7818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whereas I am satisfied that with a view tq preventing Shri Jagdish Prasad, Proprietor M/s Lachmi Bhandar, North Market Road,\n\nUpper Bazar, Ranchi, from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the C community, it is neceary to ¥e an order that he be detained.", "canonical_name": "JAGDJSH PRASAD"}}, {"text": "Ranchi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7884, "end_char": 7890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whereas I am satisfied that with a view tq preventing Shri Jagdish Prasad, Proprietor M/s Lachmi Bhandar, North Market Road,\n\nUpper Bazar, Ranchi, from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the C community, it is neceary to ¥e an order that he be detained."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8132, "end_char": 8141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8149, "end_char": 8191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. N. Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8376, "end_char": 8387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(S. N. Sinha) District Magistrate, Ranohi.\"", "canonical_name": "S. K. Sinha"}}, {"text": "Anthony", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8670, "end_char": 8677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The semantics of 'supplies' and fservices' in this context, argued Sri Anthony, serves to sho\\V that certain activities bear upon supplies only, e.g., hoarding or blackmarketing, while other actings may disrupt services only, e.g., sabotage of railway tracks or scavenger's strike.", "canonical_name": "Anthony"}}, {"text": "Section 36(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11367, "end_char": 11380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11388, "end_char": 11416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Antho1y", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13124, "end_char": 13131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Antho1y relied on the mental vacillation of the detaining officer as disclosed in the affidavit in return filed by the State where 'and services' is struck off after \"maintenance of supplies\".", "canonical_name": "Anthony"}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14860, "end_char": 14863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15234, "end_char": 15247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rameshwar Lal(') elicited some stern observations from Hidayatullah, J .,", "canonical_name": "Rameshwar Lal"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15289, "end_char": 15301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rameshwar Lal(') elicited some stern observations from Hidayatullah, J .,"}}, {"text": "(1968] 2 S.C.R. 5", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16615, "end_char": 16632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS l 1974 J 3 S.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16638, "end_char": 16677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS l 1974 J 3 S.C.ll."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16832, "end_char": 16845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Rameshwar Lal(') it was pointed out:\n\n\" .. where some grounds are found to be non-exis.ting or are ca\"celled or given up, the detention cannot be justified .... if the grounds are not sufficiently precise and do not furnish details for the purpose of making effective representation the det•!ntion can be questioned.\"", "canonical_name": "Rameshwar Lal"}}, {"text": "Prabhu Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17435, "end_char": 17447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the reasoning in Prabhu Dayal the order is illegal, he argued.", "canonical_name": "Prabhu Dayal"}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17482, "end_char": 17488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mathew, J., brought out the fatal flaw in Prabhu Dayal thus :\n\n\"The fact that one of the grounds mentions that paddy and rice had been unearthed and seized from the unauthorised possession of the petitioners from the rice mill in question on the dat1: of the detention order would not necessarily lead to the inference that the petitioners have been indulging in unauthorized milling of paddy, much less that they were smuggling the resultant rice to Maghalaya for earning undue profit."}}, {"text": "Maghalaya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17933, "end_char": 17942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mathew, J., brought out the fatal flaw in Prabhu Dayal thus :\n\n\"The fact that one of the grounds mentions that paddy and rice had been unearthed and seized from the unauthorised possession of the petitioners from the rice mill in question on the dat1: of the detention order would not necessarily lead to the inference that the petitioners have been indulging in unauthorized milling of paddy, much less that they were smuggling the resultant rice to Maghalaya for earning undue profit."}}, {"text": "Meghalaya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18141, "end_char": 18150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It cannot, therefore, be said that the first ground, namely, that the petitioners are responsible for unauthorised milling of paddy and smuggling of the resultant rice to Meghalaya for earninp undue profit, is a conclusion reached from the fact\"of seizure of paddy and rice on 25-7-1973 or the seizure of rice on 16-5 l 972 from their unauthorized possession at Messrs.\n\nSriniva; Basudeo."}}, {"text": "25-7-1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18247, "end_char": 18256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It cannot, therefore, be said that the first ground, namely, that the petitioners are responsible for unauthorised milling of paddy and smuggling of the resultant rice to Meghalaya for earninp undue profit, is a conclusion reached from the fact\"of seizure of paddy and rice on 25-7-1973 or the seizure of rice on 16-5 l 972 from their unauthorized possession at Messrs.\n\nSriniva; Basudeo."}}, {"text": "16-5 l 972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18283, "end_char": 18293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It cannot, therefore, be said that the first ground, namely, that the petitioners are responsible for unauthorised milling of paddy and smuggling of the resultant rice to Meghalaya for earninp undue profit, is a conclusion reached from the fact\"of seizure of paddy and rice on 25-7-1973 or the seizure of rice on 16-5 l 972 from their unauthorized possession at Messrs.\n\nSriniva; Basudeo."}}, {"text": "Gauhati", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18372, "end_char": 18379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fancy Bazar, Gauhati.\""}}, {"text": "Mcghalaya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18753, "end_char": 18762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the detaining authority had no particulars before it as regards the smuggling operation how was it possible for it to hwe been satisfied that the petitioners wore smuggling rice to Mcghalaya for earning undue profit?"}}, {"text": "Prabhu Daya/", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19908, "end_char": 19920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sole enquiry then is whether in substance no material has been set out here from which a rational inference regarding perverting services to the community has been given at all, as happened in Prabhu Daya/('), case.", "canonical_name": "Prabhu Dayal"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20015, "end_char": 20024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maintenance of Iriternal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20032, "end_char": 20075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "9th October, 73", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20266, "end_char": 20281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1182/C dated 9th October, 73 on the following grounds :- !."}}, {"text": "2-10-72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20325, "end_char": 20332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That you on 2-10-72 .at about 12 O'Clcck at night were transporting 50 bags of rice weighing on truck No."}}, {"text": "Biswanath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20656, "end_char": 20665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That you produced at the time of checking cash memo book and you asserted that out of 50 bags of rice seized on the said truck, 15 bags of rice were sold to Biswanath Floor Mill, Khelari, JO bags of rice to Pramod Floor Mill, Khelari and 10 bags to Shri Kundanlal Khelari."}}, {"text": "Pramod Floor Mill, Khelari", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20706, "end_char": 20732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That you produced at the time of checking cash memo book and you asserted that out of 50 bags of rice seized on the said truck, 15 bags of rice were sold to Biswanath Floor Mill, Khelari, JO bags of rice to Pramod Floor Mill, Khelari and 10 bags to Shri Kundanlal Khelari."}}, {"text": "Kundanlal Khelari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20753, "end_char": 20770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That you produced at the time of checking cash memo book and you asserted that out of 50 bags of rice seized on the said truck, 15 bags of rice were sold to Biswanath Floor Mill, Khelari, JO bags of rice to Pramod Floor Mill, Khelari and 10 bags to Shri Kundanlal Khelari."}}, {"text": "2-10-73", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20879, "end_char": 20886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ll34 dated 2-10-73 showing sale of 15 bags of rice to M/s Biswanalh Flour Mill,\n\nKhelari and you mentioned lice11ce Nun1ber of M/s Bis\\vanath Flour as 34/69 (R)."}}, {"text": "Biswanalh Flour Mill", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20926, "end_char": 20946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ll34 dated 2-10-73 showing sale of 15 bags of rice to M/s Biswanalh Flour Mill,\n\nKhelari and you mentioned lice11ce Nun1ber of M/s Bis\\vanath Flour as 34/69 (R)."}}, {"text": "Jagi Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21102, "end_char": 21110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st Class, Ranchi, at Khelari from Shri Jagi Ram, Proprietor of M/s Biswanath Flour Mill, Khelari."}}, {"text": "Biswanath Flour Mill, Khelari", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21130, "end_char": 21159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st Class, Ranchi, at Khelari from Shri Jagi Ram, Proprietor of M/s Biswanath Flour Mill, Khelari."}}, {"text": "Pramod Fl.our Mill of Khelari", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21515, "end_char": 21544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1135 dated 2-10-73 showing sale of 10 bags of rice to M/s Pramod Fl.our Mill of Khelari showing their licence numher as 31 /68 (R)."}}, {"text": "Khalari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21615, "end_char": 21622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On actual verification at Khalari by a Magistrate I.st Class, Ranchi, from Shri Bhagwan Singh, Proprietor of M/s Pramod Flour Mill, Khelari it has been established that the licence of M/s Pramod Flour Mill, Khelari is 9/72 and not 31/69."}}, {"text": "Bhagwan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21669, "end_char": 21682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On actual verification at Khalari by a Magistrate I.st Class, Ranchi, from Shri Bhagwan Singh, Proprietor of M/s Pramod Flour Mill, Khelari it has been established that the licence of M/s Pramod Flour Mill, Khelari is 9/72 and not 31/69."}}, {"text": "Pramod Flour Mill, Khelari", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21702, "end_char": 21728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On actual verification at Khalari by a Magistrate I.st Class, Ranchi, from Shri Bhagwan Singh, Proprietor of M/s Pramod Flour Mill, Khelari it has been established that the licence of M/s Pramod Flour Mill, Khelari is 9/72 and not 31/69."}}, {"text": "Flour Mill Khelari", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21965, "end_char": 21983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has also been established that on 2-10-73 M/s Flour Mill Khelari did not make any purchase of rice from you or from any other shop."}}, {"text": "Kundan Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22275, "end_char": 22285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1137 dated 2-10-73 showing sale of 10 bags of rice to Shri Kundan Lal of Kh, lari showing his licence number as 26/67(R)."}}, {"text": "Khelari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22365, "end_char": 22372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On\n\nactual verification at Khelari by a Magistrate !"}}, {"text": "Prcbhu Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24699, "end_char": 24711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not 1!ismiss this argument as merely technical or procedural for the eloquent reason given by Mathew; J., if we may say, with deep G deference in Prcbhu Dayal's .case :\n\n\"The facts of the case might induce mournful reflection how an honest attempt by an authority charged with the duty of taking prophylactic measure to secure the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community has been frustrated by what is popularly called '<> technical H error.", "canonical_name": "Prabhu Dayal"}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_379_387_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "MOHD. ALAM v.\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL February 14, 1974 [V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. s. SARKARIA, JJ.]\n\nPrevention detention-' Services and Supplies' in s. 3 ( 1) (a) (Ui) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, Scope of-Detention until the expiry of the Defence of India Act. if ralid-Counter-af]idavit on behalf of State-Who should file-Duty to com1nu11icate material particulars to the detenu.\n\nThe petitioner was detained by an order passed under s. 3 (2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. The detention order was confirmed by the Government and the Government directed that the detention should continue till the expiration of 12 months from the date of detention or until the expiry of Defence of India Act. 1971, whichever is later. Twp instances of thefts of copper wire were given in the grounds of detention communicated to the detenu.\n\nHe alleged that he haclbeen wrongfully arrested and detained for 22 days in the Police Station and that thereafter the detention order was foisted on him with false and concocted charges. The counter-affidavit was filed, not by the District Magistrate who passed the order of detention; but by a Deputy Secretary in the Secretariat who bad not personally dealt with the case of the detenu, and it stated that from records it appeared that the petitioner was a \"veteran copper wire criminal\". In a petition for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus it was contended that: (1) theft of te[e.communication wires or cables, may disrupt 'services' essential to the community but had no connection with the maintenance of 'supplies', and since no particulars whatever in relation to supplies were communicated to the petitioner the ground with regard to 'supplies' is irrelevant and vague and hence the detention order was violative of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution; (2) the period of detention under the impugned order was indefinite and uncertain and infringed Art. 22(7)(b); (3) the counter-affidavit filed was not by the officer who was satisfied about the necessity of detention and was insufficient to rebut the allegations of the petitioner that his detention was on false grounds . with ulterior motives; and ( 4) the grounds of detention conveyed to the petitioner were false, vague and deficient in material particulars in that the 'reliable infor .. mation' sho.wing that he was a \"veteran copper wire criminal\" was not commu .. nicated to him.\n\nHELD: (1) The expres!ion 'supplies and services' ins. 3(1)(a)(iii) of the Act is to be construed pragmatically in the context of each case with due stress on the phrase 'essential to the life of the community'. In a few cases these expressions may carry a meaning distinct from each other. But in mast cases the same activity may equally affect supplies and services and the connotations of 'supplies' and 'services' may coincide or telescope into each other. Such will -be the case where there is large scale theft of copper wire by cutting and removing the same from the power mains or telecommunication installations or underground cables.\n\n[382 E-GJ ...\n\nJagdish Prasad v. State of Bi'har Writ Petition No. 1972 of 1973, followed Strouds' Judicial Dictionary 3rd Edn.· p. 2939 and Bfackpool Corporation v.\n\nLocker [1948] 1, K.B. 349; referred to.\n\n(2) The Period of detention fixed under the irripugned orders does not infringe the mandate of Art. 22(7)(b) of the Constitution.\n\n[383 G]\n\nFagu Shah etc. etc. v. State of West Bengal Writ Petitions Nos. 41, 106, f 13, 214, 44\\'and 621 of 1973 decided on 20!2-1973, followed.\n\n(3) The proper person to file the.counter-affidavit is the District Magistrate who had passed the order of detention under s. 3 of the Act, and, if for some good reason he is not available the affidavit of a senior officer who personally dealt with the case of the detenu in the Secretariat or had put it to the minister\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 19(4 J 3 s.C.lt,\n\nfor orders should have been filed.\n\nThese obligations stem from the well-settled A principle that once a Rule Nisi is issued on a habeas corpus motion by the Court the onus is on the State to show that the liberty of the detenu has been lakeo away in accordance with the procedure established by law and that the safeguards provided in Art. 22 and in the Act have not been transgressed or bypassed.\n\nBut for the fact that the allegations of mala {ides in the affidavit of the petitioner are imprecise and deficient in particulars the omission to furnish the affid\"Uvit of the District Magistrate might have been fatal to the. impugned order.\n\nhaik Hanif v. State of West Bengal Writ Petition No. 1679 of 1973 B followed.\n\n[384 G-385 C; 386 A-BJ\n\n(4) All the information received by the District Magistrate and the Government about repeated criminal activitiesof the detenu had contributed towards the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.\n\nBut for the detenu being, in the opinion of the detainina authonty a 'veteran or habitual copper wire criminal' the District Magistrate 1night not have taken the impugned action.\n\nBut, admittedly the whole of this m1atcrial or reliable information about the anti- C social and prejudicial activitie\": of the detenu on which the detention order was based, was not communicated to him.\n\nThe noncommunication of that material was violative of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution and the Act, inasmuch as it did not intimate to the detenu the full i::rounds or material to enable him to make an effective representation.\n\nOmission to communicate this material to the detenu must have seriously prejudiced hirnfn exercisine his constitutional right of making an effective representation and therefore the detention was illegal.\n\n[386 C-F; 3870]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 1678 and 1855 of 1973.\n\nUnder Art. 32 of the Constitution for issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus.\n\n0. P. Malviya, for the petitioners (amicus curiae)\n\nG.: S. Chatterjee, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J. As similar questions of fact and law arise in these two petitions under Article 32 of the Construction, they will be disposed of by this common judgment.\n\nPetitioner in Writ Petition No. 1678 of 1973 is in detention since January 15, 1972 in pursuance of an order dated January 14, 1972, passed under s. 3 (2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (for short, the Act) by the District Magistrate, Burdwan. The detention order as confirmed by the Government on April 12, 1972 under s. 12 (I) of the Act, directs that the detention \"will continue till the expiration of 12 months from the date of his detention or until the expiry of Defence of India Act, 1971 whichever is later.\"\n\nIn response to the Rule Nisi issued by this Court, Shri Sukumar Sen Deputy Secretary, Home (Special) Department, Governmen! of West Bengal filed a counter-affidavit in para 4 of wliich it is.J1Verred:\n\n\"It appears from the records that after receiving reliable information relating to the illegal anti-social and prejudicial actMties of the above-named detenu-petitioner relating ID the maintenance of Supplies and Services essential to the\n\ncommunity, the said District Magistrate of Burdwan Jl6SSCd\n\norder of detention against him under the provisions of the said Act.\" In para 7 of the counter, it is said that \"it appears from the records, tbat the detenu-petitioner is a veteran copper wire crimin~I.\" Two instances of thefts of copper wire or cable used for tele-communication B services, which took pl.lee on December 19, 1971 and December 22, 1971, are also mentioned. .\n\nThe grounds of detention that had been communicated to the detenu, read as under :\n\n\"(I) That on 19-12--1971 at about 00-30 hrs.\n\nYou alongwith your associates including (1) Md. Kasim son of Md. Manda! of Kashi Mohalla, P. S. Asansol, Dist. Burdwan\n\n(2) Hyder Ali son of Bachchu Md. of Talpukuria, P. S.\n\nAsansol, Dist.\n\nBurdwan, took away 40 kgs. underground copper wire cable used for the purpose of tele-communication service from St. Patric School compound, P. S. Asansol, Dist. Burdwan.\n\nAs a result of this theft important telecommunication service between Panagarh Army Base Camp and Patna \\\\'lS totally disrupted for long 6 hours causing much inconvenience to the people.\n\n(2) That between 28.30 hrs. on 22-12-71 and 00.30 hrs. on 23-12-71 you alongwith your associates including\n\n(I ) Md. Kasim son of Md. Manda! of Kasimohalla P. S. Asansol, Dist. Burdwan (2) Hyder Ali, son of Bachcha Md. of Talpukuria, P. S. Asansol, Dist. Burdwan took away 80 kgs.\n\nunderground copper wire cable used for the purpose of telecommunication service fron1 St. Patric School compound, P. S. Asansol, Dist. Burd wan. By your act important telecommunication service Panagarh between Army Base Camp and Fratna was totally disrupted for long 8 hours to the sufferings of the people.\" Mr. Malviya, who assisted the Court as amicus curiae has canvas sed these contentions :\n\n(i) The impugned order says that the petitioner has been detained \"with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of Supplies and Services essential to the community\".\n\nTheft of tele-communication wire or cables, may disrupt •services' essential to the comn1unity, but it has no connection with the maintenance of 'supplies'.\n\nIns. 3(1) (a) (iii) the conjunction \"and\" is to be read as \"or\", and \"supplies\" and \"services\" disjunc tively, being two different and distinct matters. The ground with regard to \"supplies\" is thus irrelevant and vague and since no particulars whatever u'l thh: ground were communicated to the detenu, the detention order was violative of cl. (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution;\n\n12-L954Sup a/74\n\n382.\n\n(ii)\n\n(iii)\n\n(iv)\n\nThe period of detention fixed under the impugned order is indefinite and uncertain inasmuch as it has been made co-extensive with another indefinite and .uncertain period viz., the life of the Defence of India Act., 1971. In this way, the impugned order indirectly infringes the mandate of Article 22 (7) (b) of the Constitution;\n\nThe District Magistrate who had passed the detention order, has not furnished his affidavit, nor has any satisfactory explall\\ltion been given as to why he has not done so. The stereotyped affidavit of the Deputy Seceretary who did not personally deal with the case of the detenu, at any level, is not sufficient to rebut the allegations of the petitioner that his detention has been effected on \"totally false\" grounds, with \"ulterior motives;\"\n\nThe grounds of detention conveyed to the petitioner were false, vague and deficient in material particulars.\n\nAll the material or the \"reliable information\" relating to the \"anti-social and prejudicial activities of the petitioner\", referred fo in the Deputy Secretary's affidavit, showing how the petitioner was a \"veteran copper wire criminal\", on the basis of which the District Magistrate/the Government was satisfied about the necessity of the impugned detention, was not communicated to the detenu who, in con:iequence, was deprived of his right to make an effective representation.\n\nWe will deal with the contentions ad seriatum. Contention (I) does not appear to be tenable. The expression \"Supplies\" and \"Services\" in s. 3 (1) (a) (iii) of the Act are to be construed pragmati•\n\ncally in the context of each ca~'• with due stress on the phrase\n\n\"essenfral to the life of the community\". In a few cases, these expressions may carry a meaning distinct and different from each other.\n\nFor example, a sweepers' strike may seriously disrupt the \"services\" essential to the community, but no question of disrupting \"supplies\" arises, in such a case.\n\nIn most cases, where, the same activity inay equally affect \"supplies\" and \"services\", the connotations of \"'sup ... plies\" and \"services\" may coincide or telescope into each other~.\n\nSuch will be the case where there is large scale theft of copper wire by cutting and removing the same from the power mains or telecommunica#on installations or underground cables.\n\nAccording to Strouds' Judicial Dictionary 3rd Edn. p. 2939, \"to supply\" means to \"pass anything from one who has it to those who want it\".\n\nConstrued in this sense, \"tele-communication\" is both a \"supply\" and a \"service\". So a:re. the copper wires or mains hrough which the supply is made and service conducted.\n\nThe same is true about electricity, water, light, fuel or other commodity essential for the life of the community and the medium or the mains es.<ential for their\n\nMOHD. ALAM v. WEST llENGAL (Sarkaria, /.) 383\n\nmaintenance.\n\nIn the context of the acute shortage of essential commodities, many other things such as 'food', 'copper', 'coal' etc. may partake the chatacter of \"supplies\" as Well as \"services''.\n\nThus in Blackpool Corporation v. Locker(''), it was held that the provisions of housing accommodation was within the ambit of \"supplies and services\" in Regulation 51(1) of the Defence (Gene11al) Regulation 1939.\n\nIn Jagdish Prasad v. State of Bihar('), this. Court had the occasion to consider the meaning of \"Supplies\" and \"Services\" in this statutory provision in the context of hoarding and black-marketing in foodgrains.\n\nIt is, therefore, not. necessary to dilate on this subject any further. It will be sufficient to extract here what the Bench, constituted by both of us, said on the point :\n\n\" .... all supplies are not services and all services are not supplies but the complex needs and amenities of modern life and the multifarious obligations of a weHare state mingle s11pplies and services so much that the concentric circle geometry becomes a misleading stroke of gullibility in :his jural area. For example, an essential commodity is at once a •upply and a service.\n\nSection 36(3) of the Defence of India Rules, 1971 defines it to mean:\n\n'essential commodity' means food, water, fuel, light, power or ny other thing essential for the existence of the community which is notified in this behalf by Government.\n\n'Light and power' thus are commodities; so also f<!Od and water.\n\nYet who will deny .that light is a service or drinking water, for that matter 1 The touchstone of sial control is that it mnst be a thing essential for the existence of the community; when crystallised it is supplies, when sublimated it is services .... Food is supplles, so is shipping and wagons, kerosene. and gasoline.\n\nAnd yet they are services.\"\n\nAll that we may now do is to add copper wire and cables used for tele-commuuications or power transmission to the above list of commodities, essential to the life of the community, which are at once \"supplies\" and \"seniices\" within the contemplation of s. 3 (1) (a) (iii) of the Act. The first contention of Mr. Malviya thus stands negatived.\n\nWe are unable to accept contention (ii) because this matter stands concluded by this Court's judgment in Fagu Shah etc. etc. v. State of West Bengal('). The argument therein was that the expression \"maximum period\" in Article 22(7) (b) connotes a definite period reckoned in terms of years, .iitonths or days and that no period can be said to be maximum period unless it is possible to predicate its beginning and end in terms of years, months or days and that since the determination of the period of detention, namely, expiry of Defence of India Act, 1971, is dependent upon revocation of Proclamation of Emergency, the.period\n\n(I) (1948! 1, K. B. 349.\n\n(2) Writ Petition No. i972 of 1973. {3) Writ Petitions Nos. 41, 106, 113, 214; 441 and 621 of 1973. decided on\n\n20-12-1973.\n\nfixed under s. 13 of the Act is not the maximum period as visualised by A Art. 22(7)(b). Mathew J., who spoke for the majority, negatived this contention in these terms :\n\n\" ...• ; . as the object of preventive detention is to prevent persons from acting in a manner pre-judicial to the mainte-· nance of internal security, public order or supplies or services essential to the community or other objects specified in entry 9 of List I the power to detain must be adequate in point of duration to achieve the object.\n\nAnd, how can the power be adequate in point of duration, if it is insufficient to cope with an emergency created by war or public disorder or shortage of supplies essential to the community, the duration of which might be incapable of being predicated in terms of. years, months or days even by those gifted with great prophetic vision ? If 'the maximum period' can be fixed only in terms of years, months or days certainly it would have been open to Parliament to fix a long period in s. 13 and justify it as 'the maximum period'. It would be straining the gnat and swallowing the camel if anybody is shocked by the fucation of the maximum period of detention with reference to the duration of an emergency but could stomach with complacency the fixation of maximum period, may, at fifteen or twenty years ...\n\nWe do Rot think that the Parliament in fixing the duration of the maximum period of detention with reference to an event like the cessation of the period of emergency has, in any way, abdicated its power or function. to fix the maximum period or delegated it to the President. There ca~ be uo doubt that it is Parliament that has fixed the maximum period ia s. 13 of the Act. The only question is whether, because the durationof the period is dependent upon the volition of the President, it ceases to be 'the maximum period'.\n\nWe . cannot presume that the President will umeasonably continue the Proclamation of Emergency even after the emergency has ceased to exist.\"\n\nThis takes us to contention' (iii);-··\n\n.-~··· - This objectio~-hs been repeatedly raised in habeas corpus petitions that have come up before this Bench in the last two months.\n\nIn Shaik Hanif v. State of West Bengal(') this Court had pointed out that in return to a Rule Nisi issued by this Court in a habeas corpus petition, the p:oper person to file. the counter-affidavit is the District Magistrale who had passed the order of detention under s. 3 of the Act, and, if for some good reason the Magistrate is not available, the next best thing would \\le to furnish the affidavit of a Senior Officer who personally dealt with the case of the detenu in the Government Secrclanat, or had pur it to the Minister for orders.\n\nOur ciemocratic CoffStitution inhibits blanket and arbitrary depriva- H tion of a person's liberty by authority. It guarantees. that no one shall\n\n(I) Writ Petition No. 1679 of 1973.\n\n' r\n\n~-'\n\n...\n\n~!). ALAM .v. Wf..Sr JlJ; llG,\\L ($ark11ria, /,) 38 5\n\n1\"e dc.11ri.ved (lf his personal liberty ~:; cept !, n !lcco; danc.e wilh procedure\n\nestablbd , by Ja.w: It iurd\\lof, pc:rin1ts te State, ijl l!ie h\\rger inierests of. socty, to ,51~ restrict tht J\\l.tldamentl ti&l1t tht a reasona!>le, but\n\ndelte hal; mce is maintiiil)d on a le)lal fulpri1111 between individual liberty nnd social security. The .sligl1!est deviation from or displllccmcnt or infraction or violation of tile legal ptocedure symbolised in that fulcrum, upsets the balance, intr()d11ces rror and aberration and vitiates its working.\n\nThis symbolic balailce th°'rriore has to bl! worked with utmost care and aitention. Viewed in that perspective, the requirement as to the filing of the counter-affidavit by the proper person cannot be treated as an empty formality.\n\nThis obligation stems from the well-settled principle that once a Rule Nisi is issued on habeas corpus motion, by the Court, the onus is on the State to show that the liberty of the detenu has been taken away in accordance with prci::edure established by law, and that the safeguards provided in Article 22 and in the Act, have not been transgressed or bypassed. . .\n\nJn JagdiJh Prasad v. State of Bihur (supra), also where the coun-. !er-affidavit !1ad been sworn by an Assistant of the Home Department, not wit;1 per£onal knowledge, but paper wisdom, the court, both of us, constituting the Bencl1, expressed itself in the same strain, with added emphasis, thus :\n\n\"It is difficult to appreciate why in return to a rule nisi in a habeas corpus motion, it is not thought serious enough even \"here liberty of a citizen is choked off, to et the District Magistrate to explain his subjective satisfaction and the grounds therefor.\n\nNot even why he is not available, nor the\n\nnet best, the oath of a Senior Officer in the Secretariat who had been associated with the handling of the case at Government level. Mechanical affid.avits ...... by some one handy in the Secretariat cannot be regarded . . . . . This is not a mere punctilio of procedure but a probative requirement of substance.\" In the instant oase, the Deputy Secretary who has sworn the affidavit does not aver that he had personally dealt with the case of the detenu. He has sworn the affidavit merely on the basis of paper information gathered from the official records. A stereotyped explanalion, the same which was offered in similar petitions decided by this Bench, earlier has been given for not furnishing the affidavit of the District Magistr.ate. It is stated that the Magistrate is \"preoccupied in the G matter of maintenance of law and order and procurement of rice\". Such an explanation is hardly satisfactory.\n\nIt was all the more important in this case to get the affidavit of the District Magistrate, becaus~ in this case the detenu has alleged that he had been wrongfully arrested and detained for 22 days in the police station and thereafter the detention order under the Act was foisted on him on the basis of charges which were 'totally false' and had been concocted by the police and the detaining authority from ulterior motives to cover up his initial wrongful detention. These allegations of mala fidcs may be wrong. But the best informed person to rebut the same on oath was the District Magistrate against whom they were\n\nlevelled.\n\nBut for the fact that these llegations of ma/a fides are imprecise and deficient in particulars, the omission to fµrnish the . affi~ davit of the District Magistrate itself might well have been fatal to the. impugned order. Nevertheless, it is .a circumstance to be taken into account in appreciating the next contention.\n\nThe Deputy Secretary in his affidavit has disclosed that there was \"reliable information\" and. other mraterial,-in addition. to what was comnlunicated to the detnu-lfore the detaining authorities, in regard to lhe \"anfi.social and J)rejudicial . activities\" of the petitioner showing how he was a \"veteran coPper wire criminal\".\n\nNo bodv is born a criminal, much less a habitual or \"veteran\" criminoL It takes time for one to become 50.\n\nThe adjective \"veoteran\" which is synonymous with \"habitual\" implies a long course of recurring or persistent criminal behaviour or repeated commission of crime. Surely, all the informatioo receivAf by the District Magistrate/ the Government, about the repeateli criminal activities of the detenu had contributed towards the subjective safi.sfaction of the detaining authority. It will not be extravagant to say that but for the detenu being in the opinion of the detaining authority a \"veteran\" or habitual copper wire criminal, the District Magistrate might not have taken the impugned action.\n\nAdmittedly, the whole of this material or \"reliable information\" about the \"antisocial'' and uprejudicial activities\" of the detenu that led to his detention. was not communioated to him. This illformation which was withheld was not claimed to be privileged under clause (6) of Article 22. The non-communication of that material was violative of Article 22(5l of the Constitution and the Act inasmuch as it did not intimate to the delcnu the full grounds or material to enable him to make an effective representation. The detention is thus illegal.· We, therefore, allow this petition, set aside the detention order and direct that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith.\n\nIn Writ Petition No. 1855 of 1973, Mr. O. P. Sharma, who assisted the Court as amicus curiae, has canvassed the same points which were urged by Mr. Malviya in Mohd. Alam's case (supra).\n\nThe same Deputy Secretary has filed the counter-affidavit in this case also.\n\nThe same explanation of the omission of the District Magistrate who passed the detention orde~. to file the counter has been given.\n\nJp the affidavit of the Deputy Secmtary, it is said thut the petitionet is a \"person of desperate and dangerous character\" and \"veteran copper wire stealer\". Only two instances spread over a period of about 2J months of the theft of one -valuable underground post and telegraph tele-communication cables were communicated to the detenu.\n\nBut other material on the basis of which the Dis.trict Magistrate/the Government rw.ched the conclusion that the petitioner was a \"desperate and dangerous character'' and \"veteran copper wire stealer\" was not communicated to the detenu.\n\nThe non-communication ofi this material is not sought to be justified on the ground of its being . privileged under Article 22(6).\n\nIndeed, learned Counsel for the\n\nState has been fair enough to place a copy of the material on record.\n\nIt reads :\n\n\"Jiten Ninia ...... originally hails from Dumka..\n\nHe works temporarily .... as loading cooly in the colliery. He bas got no education ...... got no landed property. He is\n\naddicted to wine and indulges in gambling in the area.\n\nThe place where he is staying being infested b;: criminals and due to his close a.ssociation with them. he devclopctl criininal propensity.\n\nHis mode of living is beyond his means and as such he started committing petty thofts against property. He came in contact with copper wire criminals o, f the locality and started committing theft in respect of P.T. tele-comrnunication cables and D.V.C. cables in the area .... He is dangerous and desperate in character ...... \"\n\nWhat has been quoted. above shows that the detaining authority must have been greatly influenced in ordering the detention by this undisclosed material. not the whole of which was germane to the grounds on which preventive detention can be. ordered under the Act.\n\nJn any case, omission to communicate this material to the detenu must have seriously prejudiced him in exercising his right of making an effective rep_resentation.\n\nWe, therefore, allow Jiten Ninia's petition llso, set aside his detention and direct that he be set at liberty forthwith.\n\nV. P. S.\n\nPetition allowed.", "total_entities": 68, "entities": [{"text": "MOHD. ALAM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 10, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHD. ALAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 14, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 53, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ALAM v.\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL February 14, 1974 [V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. s. SARKARIA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. s. SARKARIA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 175, "end_char": 217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Scope of-Detention until the expiry of the Defence of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 219, "end_char": 282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 458, "end_char": 462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Scope of-Detention until the expiry of the Defence of India Act", "statute": "Scope of-Detention until the expiry of the Defence of India Act"}}, {"text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 474, "end_char": 516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 851, "end_char": 871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1935, "end_char": 1945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(7)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2063, "end_char": 2076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Strouds", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3291, "end_char": 3298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1972 of 1973, followed Strouds' Judicial Dictionary 3rd Edn.·"}}, {"text": "Art. 22(7)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3504, "end_char": 3517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3809, "end_char": 3813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "These obligations stem from the well-settled A principle that once a Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4086, "end_char": 4159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4386, "end_char": 4393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These obligations stem from the well-settled A principle that once a Rule", "statute": "These obligations stem from the well-settled A principle that once a Rule"}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5444, "end_char": 5454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5914, "end_char": 5921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. Malviya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5998, "end_char": 6008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Malviya, for the petitioners (amicus curiae)\n\nG.: S. Chatterjee, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "P. Malviya"}}, {"text": "S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6051, "end_char": 6064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Malviya, for the petitioners (amicus curiae)\n\nG.: S. Chatterjee, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6131, "end_char": 6139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J. As similar questions of fact and law arise in these two petitions under Article 32 of the Construction, they will be disposed of by this common judgment."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6216, "end_char": 6226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 14, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6414, "end_char": 6430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1678 of 1973 is in detention since January 15, 1972 in pursuance of an order dated January 14, 1972, passed under s. 3 (2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (for short, the Act) by the District Magistrate, Burdwan."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6445, "end_char": 6449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6461, "end_char": 6503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 12, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6616, "end_char": 6630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detention order as confirmed by the Government on April 12, 1972 under s. 12 (I) of the Act, directs that the detention \"will continue till the expiration of 12 months from the date of his detention or until the expiry of Defence of India Act, 1971 whichever is later.\""}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6637, "end_char": 6642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6788, "end_char": 6814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sukumar Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6893, "end_char": 6904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In response to the Rule Nisi issued by this Court, Shri Sukumar Sen Deputy Secretary, Home (Special) Department, Governmen!"}}, {"text": "December 19, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7653, "end_char": 7670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In para 7 of the counter, it is said that \"it appears from the records, tbat the detenu-petitioner is a veteran copper wire crimin~I.\" Two instances of thefts of copper wire or cable used for tele-communication B services, which took pl.lee on December 19, 1971 and December 22, 1971, are also mentioned. ."}}, {"text": "December 22, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7675, "end_char": 7692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In para 7 of the counter, it is said that \"it appears from the records, tbat the detenu-petitioner is a veteran copper wire crimin~I.\" Two instances of thefts of copper wire or cable used for tele-communication B services, which took pl.lee on December 19, 1971 and December 22, 1971, are also mentioned. ."}}, {"text": "19-12--1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7814, "end_char": 7825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grounds of detention that had been communicated to the detenu, read as under :\n\n\"(I) That on 19-12--1971 at about 00-30 hrs."}}, {"text": "Md. Kasim", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7891, "end_char": 7900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "You alongwith your associates including (1) Md. Kasim son of Md. Manda!"}}, {"text": "Hyder Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7971, "end_char": 7980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Burdwan\n\n(2) Hyder Ali son of Bachchu Md. of Talpukuria, P. S.\n\nAsansol, Dist."}}, {"text": "P. S. Asansol", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8179, "end_char": 8192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "underground copper wire cable used for the purpose of tele-communication service from St. Patric School compound, P. S. Asansol, Dist."}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8308, "end_char": 8313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of this theft important telecommunication service between Panagarh Army Base Camp and Patna \\\\'lS totally disrupted for long 6 hours causing much inconvenience to the people."}}, {"text": "22-12-71", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8429, "end_char": 8437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on 22-12-71 and 00.30 hrs."}}, {"text": "23-12-71", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8456, "end_char": 8464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on 23-12-71 you alongwith your associates including\n\n(I ) Md. Kasim son of Md. Manda!"}}, {"text": "Fratna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8909, "end_char": 8915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By your act important telecommunication service Panagarh between Army Base Camp and Fratna was totally disrupted for long 8 hours to the sufferings of the people.\""}}, {"text": "Malviya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8993, "end_char": 9000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Malviya, who assisted the Court as amicus curiae has canvas sed these contentions :\n\n(i) The impugned order says that the petitioner has been detained \"with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of Supplies and Services essential to the community\".", "canonical_name": "P. Malviya"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9793, "end_char": 9803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10158, "end_char": 10168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11373, "end_char": 11377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13669, "end_char": 13672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 36(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13871, "end_char": 13884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13892, "end_char": 13920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14786, "end_char": 14790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Rules, 1971", "statute": "the Defence of India Rules, 1971"}}, {"text": "Fagu Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14982, "end_char": 14991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are unable to accept contention (ii) because this matter stands concluded by this Court's judgment in Fagu Shah etc."}}, {"text": "Article 22(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15095, "end_char": 15108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15408, "end_char": 15434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "20-12-1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15645, "end_char": 15655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "decided on\n\n20-12-1973."}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15670, "end_char": 15675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Defence of India Act, 1971", "statute": "Defence of India Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Art. 22(7)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15732, "end_char": 15745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Defence of India Act, 1971", "statute": "Defence of India Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15747, "end_char": 15753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mathew J., who spoke for the majority, negatived this contention in these terms :\n\n\" ...• ; ."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16627, "end_char": 16637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If 'the maximum period' can be fixed only in terms of years, months or days certainly it would have been open to Parliament to fix a long period in s. 13 and justify it as 'the maximum period'."}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16662, "end_char": 16667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17346, "end_char": 17351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18106, "end_char": 18110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19714, "end_char": 19724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23572, "end_char": 23582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "O. P. Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24010, "end_char": 24022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1855 of 1973, Mr. O. P. Sharma, who assisted the Court as amicus curiae, has canvassed the same points which were urged by Mr. Malviya in Mohd."}}, {"text": "Mohd. Alam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24130, "end_char": 24140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1855 of 1973, Mr. O. P. Sharma, who assisted the Court as amicus curiae, has canvassed the same points which were urged by Mr. Malviya in Mohd.", "canonical_name": "MOHD. ALAM"}}, {"text": "Article 22(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25061, "end_char": 25074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jiten Ninia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25194, "end_char": 25205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads :\n\n\"Jiten Ninia ...... originally hails from Dumka..\n\nHe works temporarily .... as loading cooly in the colliery.", "canonical_name": "Jiten Ninia"}}, {"text": "Dumka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25235, "end_char": 25240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads :\n\n\"Jiten Ninia ...... originally hails from Dumka..\n\nHe works temporarily .... as loading cooly in the colliery."}}, {"text": "Jiten Ninia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26345, "end_char": 26356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, therefore, allow Jiten Ninia's petition llso, set aside his detention and direct that he be set at liberty forthwith.", "canonical_name": "Jiten Ninia"}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_388_396_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "BAVA C. CHOKKAPPA MUDALJAR & ORS.\n\n1'.\n\nBAVA C. CHOKKAPPA MUDALIAR & ORS.\n\nF'ebruary 14, 1974\n\n[D. G. PALEKAR, V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.J\n\nTire Madras Hindu Religious Endownzents Act, 1926 (II of 1926)- . S. 84(1)-Scope of.\n\nSection 84(1)(b) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act,\" 1926 as amended by Act 1 O of 1946 provides that if a dispute arises as to whether a trustee is a hereditary trustee as defined in the Act or not such dispute shall be decided by the Religious Endowment Board constituted under the Act and no court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall take cognizance of such dispute.\n\nOn the question whether a dispute a's to who out of a numb!r of members of a family was entitled to succeed to an office, admitted[Y hereditary, fell within sub-cl. (b) of' 84(1),\n\nHELD : that it was ot a dispute which could be entertained by the Board.\n\nThe \\'iew expressed in Sastri An111ial v. Pral'afa1•arna Naicker, J.L.R. [1957] Madras 631 and A. Kris/11iaswa1ni Raia v. Krishna Raia, I.LR. [1967] 3 l\\1adras,\n\n495, approved. [395 Al D\n\nGopafaswami Mudaliar v, Thyagar.:1ja Mudaliar, [1951] 1\n\nM.L.J. 248 overruled.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1792 & 1793 of 1967.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 23rd March 1961 of the Madras High Court in Appeal No. 88 o[ 1958.\n\nM. Natesan, T. V. Krishnam11tthi Iyer, K. L. Rathee, Ganesan and S. Balakrishnan, for the appellant (in C.A. 1792) and for respondent no. 6 (in C.A. 1793). S. T. Desai, V. M. Tarkunde, K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekhar, for the appellant (in C.A. 1793).\n\nA. R. Somnath Iyer and S. Lakshminarasu, for respondent No. 1 (in both the appeals).\n\nA. V. Rangam and A. Subhashini, for respondent No. 4 (in both the appeals).\n\nK. Jayaram, for respondents nos. 5 & 6 (in C.A. 1992).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by PALEKAR, J. These two appeals by special leave arise out of a de.- cision of the Religious Endowment Board (hereinafter called the Board) constituted under Section 10 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 (Madras Act No. II of 1926) hereinafter called the Act. The Board gave the decision in a dispute in O.A. No. 279, of 1946 and the principal contention with which we are concerned in' these appeals'is whether the Board had jurisdiction to decide that dispute. Other points were dealt with in the course of litigation, but since the appellants are entitled to succeed on the ground that the\n\nv. s. MUDALIAll v . •. c. CHOKKAPPA (PaI.kar, J.}\n\nB~I\n\nBoard had no jurisdiction to entertaiQ the djspqte, it will not b~ necessary for us to deal with the other points. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves to the facts which bear upon the point.\n\nThe temple of Sri Tyagarajaswami at Tiruvarur in Tanjore'Distri7t is a well-known; ancient temple of the South. There are l 3 kattala1s attached to the temple-one of such kattalais being the Ultburai kattalai. This kattalai looks after the worship and festivals in the temple .\n\nThe management of this Ulthurai kattalai was vested in two Mudalir families. One was the Bava family and the other was the Vadapath1mangalam family. The two families held te office of the trusteeship by hereditary succession. Prior to 1943, the hereditary trustee representing the Bava family was one Vaitbilinga Mudaliar and the other trustee .representing the Vadapathimangalam family was Thiagaraja Mudaliar. The latter is one of the principal parties to this litigation but the litigation was really with reference to the succession to the qffice in the Bava family after Vaithilinga's death.\n\nVaithilinga died in 1943 leaving behind him surviving (1) bis widow Pappu Ammal (2) a daughter, Shivakami Ammal, by another wife ( 3) a son of this daughter named Brahadeeswaran ( 4) & ( 5) two divided brothers Gopalaswami Mudaliar and Panchapakesa Mudaliar.\n\nThe office of the trustee of the temple was an office, of prestige.\n\nAfter Vaithilinga's death Gopalaswami Mudaliar tried to instal himself as the trustee in the place of his deceased brother. But Thiagaraja Mudaliar the other trustee, did not permit him to work with him as a co-trustee. So Gopalaswami complained to the Board by an ap- '1'lication dated April 22, 1944 purporting to be under section 18 of the Act. Tbiagaraja contested the application pointing out that Gopalaswami could not succeed, as the hereditary trustee and that only the widow of Vaithilinga, viz. Pappu Ammal, should be regarded as the trustee after Vaithilinga's death. Thereafter on February 5, 1945 Gopalaswami applied u/s 42 of the Act for his appointment as an interim trustee pending the dispute about succession. being resolved in a Civil Court. He said be was the senior most male member in the Bava family and was in every way a fit and proper person to be appointed an interim trustee till bis succession to the trusteeship is declared by the Court. This application u/s 42 also was contested by Thiag~aja Mudaliar and Pappu Antmal, and on November 13, 1945 the Board dismissed. bis application u/s 42 pointing out that since the right to succession to Va1thilinga Mudaliar was in dispute the proper course for Gopalaswarni was to establish his right in a Civil Court.\n\nThe Board al•-> held that there was already a trustee functioning assisted by th~\n\nexecutive officer of the Devasthan and hence, it was not necessary to appoint Gopalaswami as a fit person u/s 42.\n\nThereafter Gopalaswami commenced two proceedings.\n\nOn April 3, 1946 he filed 0.S. No. 117 /1946 in the Court of the District Munsif, Tiruvarur for a declaration that after the death of Vaithilinga bis brother, be was entitled to the office of the hereditary trustee to the exclusion of Vaitbilinga's widow Pappu Ammal. To this suit he joined Pappu Ammal, bis younger brother Panchapakesa and Thiagaraja Mudaliar, the other trustee as co-defendants.\n\nThe other proceeding\n\nwas before the Board purporting to be one u/s 84 of the Act. This application before the Board was filed on April 11, 1946. His contention before the Board may ho set out in his own words : \"The last hereditary trustee was Bava C. Vaithilinga Mudaliar the elder brother of the petitioner and he died on April 6, 1943. On his death the petitioner (Gopalaswami) has succeeded to the office and is the next hereditary trustee.\n\nAccording to the custom prevailing in the petitioner's family and in the Ulthurai kattalai all along the hereditary trusteeship is only with male members and with the senior male member thereunder.\" To this application F'appu Ammal and his younger brother Panchapakesa were made respondents. The prayer in the application was that the Honourable Board should enquire into the matter and declare that the petitioner Gopalaswami Was the hereditary trustee of Ulthurai kat!alai in succession to late Bava Vaithilinga Mudaliar.\n\nOut of these two proceedings the suit in the District Munsif's Court was not proceeded with. It was permitted to be withdrawn on April 17, 1947 on the ground that all necessary parties had not been impleaded. Liberty to file a fresh suit was reserved.\n\nThe proceeding u/s 84 before the Board was contested by the other trustee Thiagaraja and the widow Pappu Ammal. It was specifically l> contended before the Board that the Board had no jurisdiction u/s 84 to entertain the dispute raised by Gopalaswami. The dispute was with regard to the succession to the vacant office of trusteeship in the Bava family, and such a dispute was not one falling within section 84(1) (b) of the Act which had been recently amended by Act 10 of 1946. The contention was that this was a pure dispute about succession to the office between members of the Bava family and the only remedy ppen E to Gopalaswami was to file a suit and obtain the necessary declaration.\n\nThat contention was rejected by the Board which proceeded to decide, on such evidence as was produced before it, that Gopalaswami being the eldest male member in the family was entitled to succeed to the hereditary trusteeship to the exclusion of Pappu Ammal. This decision was u/ s 84 ( 1) . Section 84 ( 2) gave a remedy to a person affected by the decision to apply within six months to the Court of the District Judge P to modify or set aside the decision. Accordingly Thiagaraja Mudaliar filed O.P. 2711948 in the court of the District Judge, East Tanjore u/s 84(2) of the Act, contending, inter alia, that the order of the Board was without jurisdiction since u/s 84(1) (b) the Board had jurisdiction only to determine the nature of the office-whether it was hereditary or not-but had no jurisdiction to decide the individual claims to hereditary trusteeship. Pappu Ammal was made one of the co-respondents.\n\nG The point raised was treated by the learned Judge as a preliminary question. He formulated that question in the following way :\n\n\"A preliminary question that arises for determination is whether the Hindu Religious Endowment Board has jurisdiction u/s 84(1) (b) to declare that the first respondent (Gopalaswami) is the hereditary trustee of the Ulthurai kettalai after the death of Bava C. Vaithilinga Muda- H liar.\" It appears that Thiagaraja was not willing to concede that the office of trusteeship was vested in the Bava family hereditarily, but for the purpose of the present dispute, he conl'eded that the Bava family\n\nv. s. MUDALIAR v. B. c. CHOKKAPPA (Pa/ekar, J.) 391\n\nhad the right to hereditary trusteeship and the last hokier of the office was Vaithilinga Mudaliar who died in 1943. So there was no dispute either before the Board or in the District Court as to the nature of office being hereditary, but the only question was as to who out of the members of the Bava family was entitled to succeed to this office after the death of V aithilinga. After dealing with the point at some length the learned District Judge by his judgment and order dated September 4,\n\n1948 gave his finding as follows :\n\n \"For the above reasons I agree with the contentions of the petitioner (Thiagaraja Mudaliar) and hold that the Religious Endowments Board had no right to decide a dispute regarding succession to a hereditary trusteeship. I, therefore, set aside O.A. No. 279/1946 (of the .Board} dated September 24, 1947 and allow the petition with costs.\"\n\nAs we shall show in due course this decision was correct. After this decision, Gopalaswami should have gone to the regular Civil Court by way of a civil suit for a declaration of his right to succeed to the office. He did not do so. He went in appeal to the High Court and, in our opinion, fought a futile litigation which has culminated in the present appeals. We will only briefly refer to that litigation.\n\nFrom the order passed! by the District Judge, two appeals were tiled in the High Court-one filed by Gopalaswami was A.A.O. No. 118/1949. The other was filed by the Board, rather curiously, and was A.A.O. 223/1949. The High Court had to consider only the preliminary question decided by the District Judge as to. whether the Board had the necessary jurisdiction. The Bench consisting of Govinda Menon and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ was of the view that u/s 84 (I) (b) of the Act, the Board was entitled to decide the dispute; and since the District Judge had not dealt with the case on merits the High Court remanded the matter to the District Judge with the following directions :\n\n\"The District Judge will, in the enquiry that would ensue, decicfll between the competing claims of the heirs of Vaithilinga Mudaliar as to who should be the hereditary trustee. The parties are at liberty to adduce such evidence as they desired.\"\n\nAfter the'.above remand Vaithilinga's daughter Shivakami Ammal and her son Brahadeeswaran, who had not been added so far as parties to the litigation, were made parties in the District Court. Thereafter Pappu Ammal field a statement in the District Court relinquishing her rights to the olliee. So the District Judge had to decide whether Gopalaswami had a preferenti, al claim to the office as against Vaithilinga's daughter and daughter's son. When the matter came up for hearip.g before. the-learned Djstrict Judge, the learned Judge, rather unaun, tably came to the conclusion that the. daughter and the daughter's son had been irnpleaded by oversight. Their names were, therefore, from the proceedings. This orc!er was passed on 9-2-1952. Thiagan.ja and the daughter and her son filed two appeals A; O. No. 239/1952 and A.O. 579/52 in the High Court against the\n\nSUPREMJ! COURT REPOHS\n\n[ 1974 I 3 S.C.R.\n\nHigh Court against the orcler of the District Judge. By a common judgment dt. 23-11-1955 the High Court against remanded the .case to the District Judge pointing out that the )earned Judge was wrong in not having beard the contentions df the daughter and daughter's son and that the claim of Gopalaswami must be adjudicated in the presence of tbe daughter and daughter's son who were most vitally interested in tbe dispute.\n\nAlter the above remand the learned District Judge by his order dt. 24-12-1956 held that Gc>palaswami Mudaliar was no.t entitled to the trusteeship and since Pappa Ammal had relinquished her claim the persons properly entitled to the office were the daughter Shivakami Ammal and her son Brahade., swaran. Thus the order of the Board in\n\n0.A. No. 279/46 declaring Gopalaswami as the hereditary trustee in -succession to Vaithilinga Mudaliar was set aside by the District Judge.\n\nIt was against this judgment of the District Judge that Gopalaswami filed appeal no. 88/1958 in the High Court. Pending that appeal he died and bis son Kalyansundram and G. Chakkappa were brought on record as bis legal representatives. The deceased brother Panchapakcsa, who was a respondent in that appeal, also got himself transposed as a co-appellant claiming the right to trusteeship in himself after the death of Gopalaswami. Panchapakesa also died. Thereupon his son P. Chakkappa was brought on record as the legal representative. Son Kalyans><ndram died and his widow Kamal Ammal was brought on record. On a detailed consideration of the questions involved the High Court (Rajagopa[an and Rajagopalan Jyyengar, JJ) reversed the finding of the District Judge and confirmed the finding of the Board that Gopalaswami was entitled to succeed as the hereditary trustee. The ourt observedi \"In this appeal we are concerned only with the question whether the order of the Hindu Religious Endowment Board declaring the right of Bava Gopalaswami with regard to the Ulthurai kattalai was well-founded or not. We are of the opinion that the said order of ihe Endowment Board in O.A. No. 279/1946 dt.\n\nSeptember 24, 194 7 is correct and that no grounds have been made. out for •etting it aside.\" The judginent of the High <;:ourt is dt. March 23, 1961. The appeals with which we are now dealing are appeals from that judgment. The first namely C.A. 1792/67 is filed by Thiagaraja Mudaliar and the second i.e. C.A. 1793/67 is filed by the daughter's son Brahadeswaran and Shivakami Ammal.\n\nAs stated at an earlier stage of the judgment we are of the view that\n\nthe Board was not entitled u./s 84 to entertain the dispute and, there- G fore, the District Judge was right in his view taken by him on 4-9-1948 that the Board had no jurisdiction to decide the individual claims to hereditary trusteeship. That finding was reversed by the High Court on 28-11-1950 and since the appeal had not been finally decided, there was no question of an appeal to this court. As the question was one of jurisdiction which _went to the root of the matter, perhaps, special leuve to appeal might have be.en granted if one were filed. But it does H not appear the.t this course was taken. Therefore, we have now to consider the question of jurisdiction and we regret very much that all this litigation for so many years has been merely a waste.\n\n)--\n\nv. s. MUDALIAR. v. B. c. CHOKKAPPA (Palekar, !.) 39 3.\n\nA Section 84 of the Act, a'!'endcd by Act 10 of 1946 reads as,\n\nfollows:\n\n\"84 (I) If any dipute _arises as to-- (a} whether an institution is a math or temple as defined in this Act,\n\n( b) whether a trustee is a hereditary trustee as defined in this Act or not, or\n\n( c) whether any property or mo:; iey endowed is a specific endowment as defined in this Act or not such dispute shall be decided by the Board and no Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall take , cognizance of any such dispute.\n\n(2) Any i>erson affected by a decision under sub-section (!) may, within six months, apply to the Court to modify or set aside such decision;\n\n( 3) From every order of a District Judge, on an application under sub-section (2) an appeal shall lie to the High Court within three months from the date of the order; ( 4) Subject to the result of an application under sub-\n\n- section (2) or of an appeal under sub-section (3), the decision of the Board shall be final.\n\nSub-Section ( 1) refers to 3 kinds of disputes which only the Board' has jurisdiction to decide. The Board is the Board constituted by the- State Government u/s 10 of the Act. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the three disputes is excluded. Section (2) gives . . a person affected by the decision of the Board to apply to the court\n\nto mod, ify or set aside such a decision. The court referred to is the court of the District Judge within whose local limits. the temple is. situoted. (sec section 9(3) of the Act.) Sub-section (3) provides for an appeal to the High Court from every order of the District Judge on an application under sub-section (2). Sub-section (4) provides_ that the decision of the Board is fina1'subject to the result of the applica!ion under sub-sections (2) and (3).\n\n__ In the present case as already pointed out Gopalaswami went before the Board with a claim that he was the hereditary trustee of the temple after the death of his elder brother Vaithilinga to the exclusion of every other member of the Bava family. He had a younger brother Panchapakesa. But Gopalaswami claimed that being the eldest male member of the family he alone was entitled. Vaithilinga had left behind him a widow, a daughter and daughter's son. But they too had to be excluded because the snccession descended by custom or usage to the eldest male member of the family. In other words, Gopalaswami's claim was a claim to succeed to the office of hereditary trusteeship to- _thc exclusion of every other member of the Bava family. No body disputed that the office held by Vaithilinga Mudaliar was that of a hereditary trustee. It appears that Thiagaraja Mudaliar hadl disputed this at an early stage but for the purpose of the present dispute he had: , .\n\nwillingly conceded that the office held by V aithilinga Mudaliar was that of a hereditary trustee. So there was , unanimity amongst all the parties that the office was on'~ of a hereditary trustee and the only dispute was who, out of the Bava family, was entitled to succeed to that office after Vaithilinga's death. In the normal course any-body making such a claim for the exclusion of others would have had to file a suit in the Civil court for a declaration that he was entitled to succeed to the office. In fact, Gopalaswami had done this by filing a suit in the court of the District Munsif. But later he withdrew the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit. No fresh suit was filed by him, apparently, because the Board before whom he went with this complaint agreed to decide the dispute inspite of the opposition of the widow Pappu Ammal and the other trustee Thiagaraja Mudaliar. The question, therefore, is whether the dispute thus raised before the Board was one which can be truly described as a dispute falling under sub-clauses (a) (b) &\n\n(c) of section 84(1) of the Act. Sub-clauses (a) & (c) had no application. The contention on behalf of Gopalaswami and his heirs was that it was a dispute falling under sub-clause (b). That was contested and we have to see whether that contest was justified.\n\nBoth the words \"trustee\" and \"hereditary truste•\" are defined under the Act. Trustee is defined in section 9 ( 13) as follows :\n\n\"Trustee means a person by whatever designation known in whom the administration of religious endowment is vested and includes any person who is liable as if he were a trustee.\" When the Act came to be amended by Act 10 of 1946 the original\n\ndefinition of \"hereditary trustee\" given in section 9(6) was recast as follows:\n\n\"Hereditary trustee\" means the trustee of a math, temple or specific endowment succession to whose office devolves by hereditary right or is regulated by usage or is specifically provided for by the founder so long as such scheme of succession is in force.\"\n\nThese two definitions were advisedly introduced in the Act, because F the Act wanted to make a clear distinction between a hereditary trustee and a non-hereditary trustee so far as the Hindu Religious endowinents were concerned. Non-hereditary trustees were subject to greater control by the Board under the Act, whereas the hereditary trustees enjoyed larger privileges and, the control over them was also much less.\n\nIt \\\\'as, therefore, expected that when the Act came into force a trustee was likely to claim that he was a hereditary trustee and if such G a dispute was raised that dispute was to be exclusively decided by the Board. In other words, if a trustee, as defined in the Act, wanted to claim that he is a hereditary trustee also as defined in the Act, it was necessary for him to approach the Board for a decision of the question land obtain a declaration that the office be held was not just of an\n\nordinary trustee but a hereditary trustee. Such a dispute can never arise when it is conceded on all hands that the office is of a hereditary H trustee. In the present case the whole question was as to who, out of a number of members of 1the Buva family, was entitled to succeed to the office of the hereditary trustee. Gopalaswami was not claiming a\n\nv. s. MUDALIAR v. B. c. CHOKKAPPA (Palekar, I.) 395 ' higher status than what he was holding.\n\nEither he was a hereditary trustee or nothing. In our opinion, the dispute raised by Gopalaswami before the Board was one which did not fall under sub-clause (b) of section 84(1) and, therefore, it was not a dispute which could be entertained by the Board.\n\nA similar question had arisen in the Madras High Court in Sastri Ammal v. Prayalavarna Naicker('). That was under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 19 of 1951 which replaced Act II of 1927 with which we are dealing. Section 57 (b) of that Act contained provisions which are similar to section 84 of the Act. Section 57 (b) read as follows :\n\n\"Subject to the rights of suit or appeal hereinafter provided the Deputy Commissioner shall have power to enquire into and decide the following disputes and, matters :\n\n(b) Whether a trustee holds or held office as a hereditary trustee.\"\n\nIt was held that a dispute between the claimants to succeed to an office which, it is admitted on all hands, is hereditary is not within the scope of section 57(b). The learned Judge observed at page 636 as follows:\n\n\"It is not enough to show that the last holder held the office as hereditary trustee. There can be no dispute about that; and there can be no need to determine that, because the dispute is only who is entitled to succeed to the hereditary office.\n\nObviously a claim to succeed to the office under such circumstances would fall outside the scope of section 57(b).\" It is rather interesting to see that the High Courfs decision in the present case which was reported in Gopa/aswami Mudaliar\n\nv. Thayagara; a Mudaliar(') was cited before the court. But the learned Judge declined to follow it on the ground that it was unhelpful in deciding the question at issue. Certain elements of distinction between the provisions of section 84 of the Actand Section 57(b) of the 1951 Act were suggested. But, with respect, we must say there is really no difference. The dispute about succession to an admittedly hereditary office is as much outside the scope of section 84(1) of the Act as of section 57(b) of the 1951 Act. Then again in A. Krishnaswami Raia v.\n\nKrishna Raja(\") the same point again cropped up u/s 57(b) of Act 19 of 1951 and the court held that the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner u/s 57(b) of the Act was' confined to a decision whether a trustee held office as a hereditary trustee. The Deputy Commissioner was not competent to go into the other question as to which one of the competing claimants was the hereditary trustee or whether the competing claimants were joint hereditary trustees. That had to be worked out in a separate suit. In our opinion, the view expressed in both these cases is correct and though they are not directly on the provisions of section 84(1) (b) of the Act we have no doubt whatsoever that the same principle applies here.\n\n(I) J. L. R. 1957 Madras 631.\n\n(2) 1951 (I) M. L. J. 248.\n\n(3) J. L. R. 1967(3) Madras, 495.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1974 I 3 S.C.lt.\n\nWhile it may well be that the Board before exercising its jurisdiction to determine the character of the trusteeship--beteditary of othermay have to decide tentatively whether the petitioner is a stranger without any locus standi or the heir to the last trustee, in this case even that provisional finding on a collateral fact is uncalled for since the issue it had to decide-hereditary trusteeship-was admitted by both sides. We make it clear that after having got the entire proceedings dismissed as without jurisdiction on the ground that no dispute regarding the herediary nature of the trusteeship at all arose it is not open to the contestant Thiagaraja Mudaliar to resile from that stand in other proceedings.\n\nIt is also obvious that our judgment is based on the Act as it was and cannot preclude action, if available, under any new or other enactment.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the Board had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute of succession.\n\nThe jurisdiction was with the ordinary Civil Courts of the land. Consequently, the decision of the High Court in A.S. No. 88/1958 dt. March 23, !961 has to be set aside, and the order passed by the District Judge of East Tanjore in O.P. No. 27 /1948 dt.\n\nSeptember 4, 1948 restored. Having regard to the course this litigation has taken, the proper order as to costs, in our opinion, would be to direct that the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal fll/01ved.", "total_entities": 136, "entities": [{"text": "BAVA C. CHOKKAPPA MUDALIAR & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAVA C. CHOKKAPPA MUDALIAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. G. PALEKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.G. PALEKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 152, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Tire Madras Hindu Religious Endownzents Act, 1926", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 84(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222, "end_char": 230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tire Madras Hindu Religious Endownzents Act, 1926", "statute": "Tire Madras Hindu Religious Endownzents Act, 1926"}}, {"text": "Section 84(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 242, "end_char": 258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tire Madras Hindu Religious Endownzents Act, 1926", "statute": "Tire Madras Hindu Religious Endownzents Act, 1926"}}, {"text": "Religious Endowments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 279, "end_char": 303, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "M. Natesan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1365, "end_char": 1375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Natesan, T. V. Krishnam11tthi Iyer, K. L. Rathee, Ganesan and S. Balakrishnan, for the appellant (in C.A. 1792) and for respondent no."}}, {"text": "T. V. Krishnam11tthi Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1377, "end_char": 1402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Natesan, T. V. Krishnam11tthi Iyer, K. L. Rathee, Ganesan and S. Balakrishnan, for the appellant (in C.A. 1792) and for respondent no."}}, {"text": "K. L. Rathee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1404, "end_char": 1416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Natesan, T. V. Krishnam11tthi Iyer, K. L. Rathee, Ganesan and S. Balakrishnan, for the appellant (in C.A. 1792) and for respondent no."}}, {"text": "Ganesan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1418, "end_char": 1425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Natesan, T. V. Krishnam11tthi Iyer, K. L. Rathee, Ganesan and S. Balakrishnan, for the appellant (in C.A. 1792) and for respondent no."}}, {"text": "S. Balakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1430, "end_char": 1445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Natesan, T. V. Krishnam11tthi Iyer, K. L. Rathee, Ganesan and S. Balakrishnan, for the appellant (in C.A. 1792) and for respondent no."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1521, "end_char": 1532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, V. M. Tarkunde, K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekhar, for the appellant (in C.A. 1793)."}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1534, "end_char": 1548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, V. M. Tarkunde, K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekhar, for the appellant (in C.A. 1793)."}}, {"text": "K. Jayaram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1550, "end_char": 1560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, V. M. Tarkunde, K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekhar, for the appellant (in C.A. 1793).", "canonical_name": "K. Jayaram"}}, {"text": "R. Chandrasekhar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1565, "end_char": 1581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, V. M. Tarkunde, K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekhar, for the appellant (in C.A. 1793)."}}, {"text": "A. R. Somnath Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1618, "end_char": 1636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. R. Somnath Iyer and S. Lakshminarasu, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. Lakshminarasu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1641, "end_char": 1657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. R. Somnath Iyer and S. Lakshminarasu, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1704, "end_char": 1716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Rangam and A. Subhashini, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1721, "end_char": 1734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Rangam and A. Subhashini, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. Jayaram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1781, "end_char": 1791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Jayaram, for respondents nos.", "canonical_name": "K. Jayaram"}}, {"text": "PALEKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1880, "end_char": 1887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PALEKAR, J. These two appeals by special leave arise out of a de.- cision of the Religious Endowment Board (hereinafter called the Board) constituted under Section 10 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 (Madras Act No."}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2036, "end_char": 2046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2054, "end_char": 2097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "PaI.kar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2525, "end_char": 2532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c. CHOKKAPPA (PaI.kar, J.}\n\nB~I\n\nBoard had no jurisdiction to entertaiQ the djspqte, it will not b~ necessary for us to deal with the other points."}}, {"text": "Tyagarajaswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2757, "end_char": 2771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The temple of Sri Tyagarajaswami at Tiruvarur in Tanjore'Distri7t is a well-known; ancient temple of the South."}}, {"text": "Tiruvarur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2775, "end_char": 2784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The temple of Sri Tyagarajaswami at Tiruvarur in Tanjore'Distri7t is a well-known; ancient temple of the South."}}, {"text": "Vaitbilinga Mudaliar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3319, "end_char": 3339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prior to 1943, the hereditary trustee representing the Bava family was one Vaitbilinga Mudaliar and the other trustee .representing the Vadapathimangalam family was Thiagaraja Mudaliar.", "canonical_name": "V aithilinga Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "Vadapathimangalam family", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3380, "end_char": 3404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prior to 1943, the hereditary trustee representing the Bava family was one Vaitbilinga Mudaliar and the other trustee .representing the Vadapathimangalam family was Thiagaraja Mudaliar."}}, {"text": "Thiagaraja Mudaliar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3409, "end_char": 3428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prior to 1943, the hereditary trustee representing the Bava family was one Vaitbilinga Mudaliar and the other trustee .representing the Vadapathimangalam family was Thiagaraja Mudaliar.", "canonical_name": "Thiagaraja Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "Bava family", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3576, "end_char": 3587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The latter is one of the principal parties to this litigation but the litigation was really with reference to the succession to the qffice in the Bava family after Vaithilinga's death."}}, {"text": "Vaithilinga", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3594, "end_char": 3605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The latter is one of the principal parties to this litigation but the litigation was really with reference to the succession to the qffice in the Bava family after Vaithilinga's death.", "canonical_name": "V aithilinga Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "Vaithilinga", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3616, "end_char": 3627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vaithilinga died in 1943 leaving behind him surviving (1) bis widow Pappu Ammal (2) a daughter, Shivakami Ammal, by another wife ( 3) a son of this daughter named Brahadeeswaran ( 4) & ( 5) two divided brothers Gopalaswami Mudaliar and Panchapakesa Mudaliar.", "canonical_name": "V aithilinga Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "Pappu Ammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3684, "end_char": 3695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vaithilinga died in 1943 leaving behind him surviving (1) bis widow Pappu Ammal (2) a daughter, Shivakami Ammal, by another wife ( 3) a son of this daughter named Brahadeeswaran ( 4) & ( 5) two divided brothers Gopalaswami Mudaliar and Panchapakesa Mudaliar.", "canonical_name": "Pappu Antmal"}}, {"text": "Shivakami Ammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3712, "end_char": 3727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vaithilinga died in 1943 leaving behind him surviving (1) bis widow Pappu Ammal (2) a daughter, Shivakami Ammal, by another wife ( 3) a son of this daughter named Brahadeeswaran ( 4) & ( 5) two divided brothers Gopalaswami Mudaliar and Panchapakesa Mudaliar."}}, {"text": "Brahadeeswaran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3779, "end_char": 3793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vaithilinga died in 1943 leaving behind him surviving (1) bis widow Pappu Ammal (2) a daughter, Shivakami Ammal, by another wife ( 3) a son of this daughter named Brahadeeswaran ( 4) & ( 5) two divided brothers Gopalaswami Mudaliar and Panchapakesa Mudaliar.", "canonical_name": "Brahadeeswaran"}}, {"text": "Gopalaswami Mudaliar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3827, "end_char": 3847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vaithilinga died in 1943 leaving behind him surviving (1) bis widow Pappu Ammal (2) a daughter, Shivakami Ammal, by another wife ( 3) a son of this daughter named Brahadeeswaran ( 4) & ( 5) two divided brothers Gopalaswami Mudaliar and Panchapakesa Mudaliar.", "canonical_name": "Gopalaswami Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "Panchapakesa Mudaliar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3852, "end_char": 3873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vaithilinga died in 1943 leaving behind him surviving (1) bis widow Pappu Ammal (2) a daughter, Shivakami Ammal, by another wife ( 3) a son of this daughter named Brahadeeswaran ( 4) & ( 5) two divided brothers Gopalaswami Mudaliar and Panchapakesa Mudaliar.", "canonical_name": "Panchapakesa Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "Gopalaswami", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4168, "end_char": 4179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So Gopalaswami complained to the Board by an ap- '1'lication dated April 22, 1944 purporting to be under section 18 of the Act.", "canonical_name": "Gopalaswami Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "April 22, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4232, "end_char": 4246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So Gopalaswami complained to the Board by an ap- '1'lication dated April 22, 1944 purporting to be under section 18 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4270, "end_char": 4280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tbiagaraja", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4293, "end_char": 4303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tbiagaraja contested the application pointing out that Gopalaswami could not succeed, as the hereditary trustee and that only the widow of Vaithilinga, viz.", "canonical_name": "Thiagaraja Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "February 5, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4538, "end_char": 4554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter on February 5, 1945 Gopalaswami applied u/s 42 of the Act for his appointment as an interim trustee pending the dispute about succession."}}, {"text": "s 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4577, "end_char": 4581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4756, "end_char": 4760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He said be was the senior most male member in the Bava family and was in every way a fit and proper person to be appointed an interim trustee till bis succession to the trusteeship is declared by the Court."}}, {"text": "s 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4932, "end_char": 4936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Thiag~aja Mudaliar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4959, "end_char": 4977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application u/s 42 also was contested by Thiag~aja Mudaliar and Pappu Antmal, and on November 13, 1945 the Board dismissed.", "canonical_name": "Thiagaraja Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "Pappu Antmal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4982, "end_char": 4994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application u/s 42 also was contested by Thiag~aja Mudaliar and Pappu Antmal, and on November 13, 1945 the Board dismissed.", "canonical_name": "Pappu Antmal"}}, {"text": "November 13, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5003, "end_char": 5020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application u/s 42 also was contested by Thiag~aja Mudaliar and Pappu Antmal, and on November 13, 1945 the Board dismissed."}}, {"text": "s 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5060, "end_char": 5064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Va1thilinga Mudaliar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5116, "end_char": 5136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bis application u/s 42 pointing out that since the right to succession to Va1thilinga Mudaliar was in dispute the proper course for Gopalaswarni was to establish his right in a Civil Court.", "canonical_name": "V aithilinga Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "Gopalaswarni", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5174, "end_char": 5186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bis application u/s 42 pointing out that since the right to succession to Va1thilinga Mudaliar was in dispute the proper course for Gopalaswarni was to establish his right in a Civil Court.", "canonical_name": "Gopalaswami Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "s 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5424, "end_char": 5428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 3, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5485, "end_char": 5498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 3, 1946 he filed 0.S. No."}}, {"text": "Vaitbilinga", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5717, "end_char": 5728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "117 /1946 in the Court of the District Munsif, Tiruvarur for a declaration that after the death of Vaithilinga bis brother, be was entitled to the office of the hereditary trustee to the exclusion of Vaitbilinga's widow Pappu Ammal.", "canonical_name": "V aithilinga Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "Panchapakesa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5806, "end_char": 5818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To this suit he joined Pappu Ammal, bis younger brother Panchapakesa and Thiagaraja Mudaliar, the other trustee as co-defendants.", "canonical_name": "Panchapakesa Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "s 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5947, "end_char": 5951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 11, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6011, "end_char": 6025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application before the Board was filed on April 11, 1946."}}, {"text": "Bava C. Vaithilinga Mudaliar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6126, "end_char": 6154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His contention before the Board may ho set out in his own words : \"The last hereditary trustee was Bava C. Vaithilinga Mudaliar the elder brother of the petitioner and he died on April 6, 1943.", "canonical_name": "Bava C. Vaithilinga Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "April 6, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6206, "end_char": 6219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His contention before the Board may ho set out in his own words : \"The last hereditary trustee was Bava C. Vaithilinga Mudaliar the elder brother of the petitioner and he died on April 6, 1943."}}, {"text": "Gopalaswami", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6250, "end_char": 6261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On his death the petitioner (Gopalaswami) has succeeded to the office and is the next hereditary trustee.", "canonical_name": "Gopalaswami Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "F'appu Ammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6547, "end_char": 6559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To this application F'appu Ammal and his younger brother Panchapakesa were made respondents."}}, {"text": "Bava Vaithilinga Mudaliar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6825, "end_char": 6850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prayer in the application was that the Honourable Board should enquire into the matter and declare that the petitioner Gopalaswami Was the hereditary trustee of Ulthurai kat!alai in succession to late Bava Vaithilinga Mudaliar.", "canonical_name": "Bava C. Vaithilinga Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "April 17, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6982, "end_char": 6996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was permitted to be withdrawn on April 17, 1947 on the ground that all necessary parties had not been impleaded."}}, {"text": "s 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7123, "end_char": 7127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Thiagaraja", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7180, "end_char": 7190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proceeding u/s 84 before the Board was contested by the other trustee Thiagaraja and the widow Pappu Ammal.", "canonical_name": "Thiagaraja Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "s 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7305, "end_char": 7309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 84(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7506, "end_char": 7519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8081, "end_char": 8085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8093, "end_char": 8103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "court of the District Judge, East Tanjore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8319, "end_char": 8360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly Thiagaraja Mudaliar filed O.P. 2711948 in the court of the District Judge, East Tanjore u/s 84(2) of the Act, contending, inter alia, that the order of the Board was without jurisdiction since u/s 84(1) (b) the Board had jurisdiction only to determine the nature of the office-whether it was hereditary or not-but had no jurisdiction to decide the individual claims to hereditary trusteeship."}}, {"text": "s 84(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8363, "end_char": 8370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 84(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8468, "end_char": 8475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Religious Endowment Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8915, "end_char": 8946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He formulated that question in the following way :\n\n\"A preliminary question that arises for determination is whether the Hindu Religious Endowment Board has jurisdiction u/s 84(1) (b) to declare that the first respondent (Gopalaswami) is the hereditary trustee of the Ulthurai kettalai after the death of Bava C. Vaithilinga Muda- H liar.\""}}, {"text": "s 84(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8966, "end_char": 8973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gopalaswami", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9016, "end_char": 9027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He formulated that question in the following way :\n\n\"A preliminary question that arises for determination is whether the Hindu Religious Endowment Board has jurisdiction u/s 84(1) (b) to declare that the first respondent (Gopalaswami) is the hereditary trustee of the Ulthurai kettalai after the death of Bava C. Vaithilinga Muda- H liar.\"", "canonical_name": "Gopalaswami Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "Bava C. Vaithilinga Muda-", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9099, "end_char": 9124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He formulated that question in the following way :\n\n\"A preliminary question that arises for determination is whether the Hindu Religious Endowment Board has jurisdiction u/s 84(1) (b) to declare that the first respondent (Gopalaswami) is the hereditary trustee of the Ulthurai kettalai after the death of Bava C. Vaithilinga Muda- H liar.\"", "canonical_name": "Bava C. Vaithilinga Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "Vaithilinga Mudaliar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9473, "end_char": 9493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that Thiagaraja was not willing to concede that the office of trusteeship was vested in the Bava family hereditarily, but for the purpose of the present dispute, he conl'eded that the Bava family\n\nv. s. MUDALIAR v. B. c. CHOKKAPPA (Pa/ekar, J.) 391\n\nhad the right to hereditary trusteeship and the last hokier of the office was Vaithilinga Mudaliar who died in 1943.", "canonical_name": "V aithilinga Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "V aithilinga", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9762, "end_char": 9774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So there was no dispute either before the Board or in the District Court as to the nature of office being hereditary, but the only question was as to who out of the members of the Bava family was entitled to succeed to this office after the death of V aithilinga.", "canonical_name": "V aithilinga Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "September 4,\n\n1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9879, "end_char": 9897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After dealing with the point at some length the learned District Judge by his judgment and order dated September 4,\n\n1948 gave his finding as follows :\n\n \"For the above reasons I agree with the contentions of the petitioner (Thiagaraja Mudaliar) and hold that the Religious Endowments Board had no right to decide a dispute regarding succession to a hereditary trusteeship."}}, {"text": "Thiagaraja Mudaliar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10001, "end_char": 10020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After dealing with the point at some length the learned District Judge by his judgment and order dated September 4,\n\n1948 gave his finding as follows :\n\n \"For the above reasons I agree with the contentions of the petitioner (Thiagaraja Mudaliar) and hold that the Religious Endowments Board had no right to decide a dispute regarding succession to a hereditary trusteeship.", "canonical_name": "Thiagaraja Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "September 24, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10214, "end_char": 10232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "279/1946 (of the .Board} dated September 24, 1947 and allow the petition with costs.\""}}, {"text": "Govinda Menon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11066, "end_char": 11079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bench consisting of Govinda Menon and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ was of the view that u/s 84 (I) (b) of the Act, the Board was entitled to decide the dispute; and since the District Judge had not dealt with the case on merits the High Court remanded the matter to the District Judge with the following directions :\n\n\"The District Judge will, in the enquiry that would ensue, decicfll between the competing claims of the heirs of Vaithilinga Mudaliar as to who should be the hereditary trustee."}}, {"text": "Basheer Ahmed Sayeed", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11084, "end_char": 11104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bench consisting of Govinda Menon and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ was of the view that u/s 84 (I) (b) of the Act, the Board was entitled to decide the dispute; and since the District Judge had not dealt with the case on merits the High Court remanded the matter to the District Judge with the following directions :\n\n\"The District Judge will, in the enquiry that would ensue, decicfll between the competing claims of the heirs of Vaithilinga Mudaliar as to who should be the hereditary trustee."}}, {"text": "s 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11132, "end_char": 11136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "9-2-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12342, "end_char": 12350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This orc!er was passed on 9-2-1952."}}, {"text": "Thiagan.ja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12352, "end_char": 12362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thiagan.ja and the daughter and her son filed two appeals A; O. No."}}, {"text": "23-11-1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12596, "end_char": 12606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23-11-1955 the High Court against remanded the .case to the District Judge pointing out that the )earned Judge was wrong in not having beard the contentions df the daughter and daughter's son and that the claim of Gopalaswami must be adjudicated in the presence of tbe daughter and daughter's son who were most vitally interested in tbe dispute."}}, {"text": "24-12-1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13010, "end_char": 13020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24-12-1956 held that Gc>palaswami Mudaliar was no.t entitled to the trusteeship and since Pappa Ammal had relinquished her claim the persons properly entitled to the office were the daughter Shivakami Ammal and her son Brahade.,"}}, {"text": "palaswami Mudaliar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13034, "end_char": 13052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24-12-1956 held that Gc>palaswami Mudaliar was no.t entitled to the trusteeship and since Pappa Ammal had relinquished her claim the persons properly entitled to the office were the daughter Shivakami Ammal and her son Brahade.,", "canonical_name": "Gopalaswami Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "Pappa Ammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13100, "end_char": 13111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24-12-1956 held that Gc>palaswami Mudaliar was no.t entitled to the trusteeship and since Pappa Ammal had relinquished her claim the persons properly entitled to the office were the daughter Shivakami Ammal and her son Brahade.,", "canonical_name": "Pappu Antmal"}}, {"text": "Brahade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13229, "end_char": 13236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24-12-1956 held that Gc>palaswami Mudaliar was no.t entitled to the trusteeship and since Pappa Ammal had relinquished her claim the persons properly entitled to the office were the daughter Shivakami Ammal and her son Brahade.,", "canonical_name": "Brahadeeswaran"}}, {"text": "Kalyansundram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13572, "end_char": 13585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pending that appeal he died and bis son Kalyansundram and G. Chakkappa were brought on record as bis legal representatives.", "canonical_name": "Kalyans><ndram"}}, {"text": "G. Chakkappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13590, "end_char": 13602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pending that appeal he died and bis son Kalyansundram and G. Chakkappa were brought on record as bis legal representatives.", "canonical_name": "G. Chakkappa"}}, {"text": "Panchapakcsa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13677, "end_char": 13689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased brother Panchapakcsa, who was a respondent in that appeal, also got himself transposed as a co-appellant claiming the right to trusteeship in himself after the death of Gopalaswami.", "canonical_name": "Panchapakesa Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "P. Chakkappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13893, "end_char": 13905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon his son P. Chakkappa was brought on record as the legal representative.", "canonical_name": "G. Chakkappa"}}, {"text": "Kalyans><ndram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13961, "end_char": 13975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Son Kalyans><ndram died and his widow Kamal Ammal was brought on record.", "canonical_name": "Kalyans><ndram"}}, {"text": "Kamal Ammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13995, "end_char": 14006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Son Kalyans><ndram died and his widow Kamal Ammal was brought on record."}}, {"text": "Rajagopa[an", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14100, "end_char": 14111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a detailed consideration of the questions involved the High Court (Rajagopa[an and Rajagopalan Jyyengar, JJ) reversed the finding of the District Judge and confirmed the finding of the Board that Gopalaswami was entitled to succeed as the hereditary trustee."}}, {"text": "Rajagopalan Jyyengar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14116, "end_char": 14136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a detailed consideration of the questions involved the High Court (Rajagopa[an and Rajagopalan Jyyengar, JJ) reversed the finding of the District Judge and confirmed the finding of the Board that Gopalaswami was entitled to succeed as the hereditary trustee."}}, {"text": "Bava Gopalaswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14447, "end_char": 14463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ourt observedi \"In this appeal we are concerned only with the question whether the order of the Hindu Religious Endowment Board declaring the right of Bava Gopalaswami with regard to the Ulthurai kattalai was well-founded or not."}}, {"text": "September 24, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14617, "end_char": 14636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "September 24, 194 7 is correct and that no grounds have been made."}}, {"text": "March 23, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14752, "end_char": 14766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 23, 1961."}}, {"text": "Brahadeswaran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14968, "end_char": 14981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first namely C.A. 1792/67 is filed by Thiagaraja Mudaliar and the second i.e. C.A. 1793/67 is filed by the daughter's son Brahadeswaran and Shivakami Ammal.", "canonical_name": "Brahadeeswaran"}}, {"text": "s 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15105, "end_char": 15109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4-9-1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15212, "end_char": 15220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As stated at an earlier stage of the judgment we are of the view that\n\nthe Board was not entitled u./s 84 to entertain the dispute and, there- G fore, the District Judge was right in his view taken by him on 4-9-1948 that the Board had no jurisdiction to decide the individual claims to hereditary trusteeship."}}, {"text": "28-11-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15362, "end_char": 15372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That finding was reversed by the High Court on 28-11-1950 and since the appeal had not been finally decided, there was no question of an appeal to this court."}}, {"text": "Section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15904, "end_char": 15914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17039, "end_char": 17043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17385, "end_char": 17397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V aithilinga Mudaliar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18697, "end_char": 18718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "willingly conceded that the office held by V aithilinga Mudaliar was that of a hereditary trustee.", "canonical_name": "V aithilinga Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "court of the District Munsif", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19222, "end_char": 19250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, Gopalaswami had done this by filing a suit in the court of the District Munsif."}}, {"text": "section 84(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19714, "end_char": 19727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20066, "end_char": 20075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20382, "end_char": 20394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Non-hereditary trustees were subject to greater control by the Board under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20907, "end_char": 20989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 84(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22205, "end_char": 22218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22335, "end_char": 22352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar question had arisen in the Madras High Court in Sastri Ammal v. 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{"document_id": "1974_3_397_426_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "ill I\n\nTRUSTEES OF PORT OF BOMBAY\n\nTHE PREMIER AUTOMOBILES LTD. AND ANOTHER\n\nFebruary 15, 1974\n\n397.\n\n[D. G. PALEKAR, V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA JJ.]\n\nBo111bay Port Trust Act 1879-S. 81-1/ a .horter period of limitation applies when rhere is short delivery and the plaintiffs do not know if the total bundle o_f oods haie actually arrived at the port of delivery.\n\nThe first plaintiff became entitled to clain1 _a_consignment of 53 bundles of mild steel plates despatched by a Japanese exporter to be delivered at the port of Bombay. The goods were discharged in the docks on 12th September 1959~ into the custody of the Bombay Port Trust. the appellant.\n\nThe goods were in4 sured and the second plaintiff was the insurer.\n\nOn September 19, 1959, delivery of the goods was apphed for and was given .but only 52 bundles.\n\nA week thereafter, the first plaintiff demanded the missing bundle but was put off from time to time by the appellant assuring that a search was in progress to trace the goods.\n\nFrom the Indian Maritime Enterprises, the agents of the Japanese vessel, the plaintiff came to know on November 7, 1959 that all the 53 bundles had been duly unloaded.\n\nThe plaintiff enquired from the appellant again on. December 5, 1959 whether the bundle had been landed; but the port authorities still informed that the missing bundle was still under search. Thereafter, on January 22, 1960, the appellant informed the first plaintiff that the bundle under reference tiad been out-turned as landed but missing.\n\nWithin a week thereafter, the first plaintiff asked for a non-delivery l:l!rtificate and the certificate was issued on March 1, 1960 and on May 12, 1960 a statutory notice under s .. 87 of the Bomhav Port Trust Act, 1879, was issued and a suit was filed for the m!sing bundle or its value by way of damages.\n\nTite defence put forward by the appellant was, that since the suit was governed by s. 87 of the Act and the cause uf action having arisen on September 19. 1959. the daim is barred by limitation because 6 nlonths had already passed from the time the first\n\ncaue of ction arose.\n\nThe secon<l plaintiff, insurer, having Paid the value of the lost articles t:::> the first nlaintiff got itself subrogated to the later's right, and they together filed the suit before the Court of Small Causes. That Court held against the appellant but the full Court in appeal reversed the judgment of the trial court and held in favour of the appellant holding that the claim was barred by limitation. The High Court, however, held in fav6ur of the plaintiff and hence the appeal to this Court.\n\nSection 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879, _provides that no uit or other proceeding shall be commenced against any person for anything done or purport~ ing to have been done. in pursuance of this Act without one month's previous notice, and not after 6 months from the accrual of the cause of. such suit or other proceeding. The question was whether the suit was for anything done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of this Act, when the action is for non :ddlvery of one out of 53 bundles.\n\nG Allowing the appeal,\n\nHELO: (1) Where a statute imposes a duty, the omission to do somethiu that ought to be done in order comoletely to perform the duty, or the conlinuin& to have any such duty unperformec( amounts to an act done or intended to be done within tho meaning of a statute which provides a special period of limitation for ~; uch an act. [403 H--4-04 Al\n\nHalsburys Laws of England, 3rd Ed. Vol. 2,.4 p. 189-190, referred to.\n\nTherefore in tho present case, the truncated limitation prescribed under the Act will apply. [415 El 13-L 954 SupCl/74\n\n(2) Sec. 87 of the Act insists on notice of one month.\n\nThis period may legitimately be tacked on to the six months period mentioned in the section (vide sec. 15(2) Limitation Act 1963. (422 G-H]\n\n(3) The starting point of limitation is the accrual of the i,,:ause of action.\n\nTwo components of the \"Cause\" are important.\n\nThe date when the plaintiff CIJ!le to know or ought to know with reasonable diligence that the goods had\n\nbeen Jandcd from the vessel into the port.\n\nTwo dear indications of when the consignee ought to know are :-( l) when the bulk of the goods arc delivered, there being short delivery leading to a suit, and (2) 7 days after knowledge of the Jan<fing of the goods suggested in Sec. 61A.\n\nWhichever is the later date ordi~\n\narily sets off the running of limitation.\n\n[422 H-423 B]\n\n(4) Letters .of assurance carinot enlarge the limitation once the goods have landed and the owner has come to know of it.\n\n[423 B-C]\n\n(5) Sec. 87.is attracted not merely when an act is committed but also when a omission occurs in the course of the performance of the official duty. [42JC-Dl C\n\nJn the present case, applying !he above principles, the case has to be decided against the plaintiffs and the appeal is a11owed. [4230]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISJ?ICTION: Civil Appeal No. 342 of 1972.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 16th September, 1972 of the High Court of Bombay in Civil Revision No. 263 of 1967.\n\nF. S. Nariman, Additional Solicitor General of India, P. C. Bhartari, B. R. Zaiwala and B. S. Bhesania, for the appellant.\n\nAni/ B. Divan, K. S. Cooper, Vasant C. Kotwal, S. C. Agarwal and P. D. Sharma, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. A small cause involving a petty claim of Rs. 1147 .42 has sailed slowly into the Supreme Court by special leave.\n\nBoth sides-The Bombay Port Trust, appellant, and the New Great Issurance Co. (a nationalised institution), the contesting respondentagree before us that while there is only a short point of law in the case, a large section of the business com1nunity, as well as the Port Trust, are affected by the ambiguity of the legal situation and an early pronouncement by this Court on the law of limitation applicable to consignee's actions for short delivery by the Port Trust is necessary.\n\nIs the period so brief as six months in terms of s. 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879 (hereir.ufter called the Act), and if so, does time begin to run within around a week of the landing of the goods (sugge<ted bv s. 61A) of the Act? Or, alternatively, does the longer spell allowed by the Limitation Act avail the plaintiff and the terminus a quo , tart only when the owner has been finally refused delivery ? Although the Court in this case is enquiring whether the little delay alleed legally disentitles the plaintiff to claim the value of the lost goods, it is a bathetic sidelight that the judicial process has limped along for 15 years to decide in this small, single-point commercial cause, whether a little over seven months to. come to court was too late.\n\nPope Paul in opening the judicial year of the Second Roman Rota pontificated that delay in dipen.sing _justice is 'in itelf an act. f injustice'.\n\nSystemic slow motion 111 this area 1nust claim the nations\n\n!\"' I\n\n'!!,,\n\nTRUSTEES BOMBAY PORT v. PREMIER AUToS. (Krishna Iyer, I.) 399'\n\nA immediate attention towards basic reformation of the traditional structure and procedure if the Indian Judicature is to sustain the litigative credibility of the community.\n\nIndeed, even about British Justice Lord Devlm's observations serve as warning for our court system : \"If our business. methods were as antiquated as our legal :methods, we would be a bankrupt country.\"\n\nn The problem that falls for resolution by this Court turns on the .subtle semantics alternatively spun by_ counsel on both sides out of the words \"any thing done, or purporting to have been done, in pursuance of this Act, .... after six months from the accrual of the cause of such suit . ... \" True to Anglo-Indian forensic tradition, a profusion of preeedential erudition has been placed for our consideration in the able submissions of the learned advocates on both sides.\n\nC Intricacy and refinement have marked the arguments and meticulous judicial attention is necessitated to discover from the tangled skein of case law the pertinent principle that accords with the intendment of the statute, the language used, the commonsense and justice of the situation.\n\nA relevant diary of facts and dates will help focus attention on the pnmary legal question. The first plaintiff became entitled to claim a consignment of 53 bnndles of mild steel plates despatched by a Japanese exporter to be delivered at the port of Bombay.\n\nThe goods were discharged in the docks into the custody of the. Bombay Port Trust (the defendant, and now the appellant) on September 12, 1959.\n\nThe goods had been insured and the 5econd plaintiff is the insurer.\n\nWithin a week, that is, on Septem1'er 19, 1959, delivery of the goods was applied for and was given but of only 52 bundles.\n\nA week thereafter, the first plaintiff demanded the missing bundle, but was tcntalisingly put off from time to time by the defendant by letters of September 29, October 10, and December 4, 1959 assuring that a search was in progress to trace the goods.\n\nIt is important at this stage to notice that the plaintiff's letter of September 26, 1959 sought \"information regarding the whereabouts of the above bundle so as to enable us to clear the same at an early date\".\n\nThe broad implication is that at that time the first plaintiff had. no .idea where the missing bundle was-in the vessel or the port.\n\nIt is not unreasonab1e to infer that he did not then know, for sure, whether the undelivered item hall been landed from the ship at all.\n\nNone of the three letters by the defendant stated firmly that it had been discharged into the port, and it is quite on the cards that part of the total consignment had not been discharged into the port, in these any thing-may-happen days of expect the unexpected.\n\nSignificantly, the first plaintiff inquired of th: Indian Maritime Enterprises, the agents of the Japanese vessel, whether the entire consignment of 53 bundles had been duly landed. The reply received by the first plaintiff is meaningful in iliat the J ndian Maritime Enterprises In their Jetter dated November 7, 1959, told the first plaintiff that all the 53 bundles had been duly unloaded. l t inevitably follows that the earliest date when we can attribute to the. plaintiff clear knowledge of the port authorities having come into possession of the missing bundle was November 7, 1959. Of course,\n\nthe Inquiry Section of the Alexandra Dock of the defendant indifferently informed the first plaintiff even on December 4, 1959 that the missing bundle was still under search and a definite reply regarding the 'out-turn' of that item could be given only later when loading sheets were fully checked. However, the first plaintiff by letter dated December 5, 1959 wrote to the port authorities that he had been intormed by the agents of the vessel (The Indian Maritime Enterprises) that the entire 53 bundles had been landed and desired '1o please let us know immediately whether the bundle has been landed; if landed let the information regarding the whereabouts and, if not, kindly confirm the short landings\".\n\nApparently, this was to make assurance doubly sure which could be gained only when the defendant's officials also confirmed it.\n\nCounsel for the plaintiffs, with sweet reasonableness, urges that the interested ipse dixlt of the agents of the vessel may not by itself be sufficient to impute clear knowledge of the discharge from the ship into the port of goods of which the Port Trust disclaimed knowledge of whereabouts. Long later, on January 22, 1960, the Port Trust infonned the first plaintiff \"that the bundle under reference had been out-turned as landed but missing\". Within a week thereafter, the first plaintiff asked for a non-delivery certifkate so that he could claim from the insurers the value of the article lost.\n\nSuch a certificate was issued on March 1, 1960 and on May 12, 1960 a statutory notice under s. 87 of the Act was issued, followed on June\n\nIS, 1960 by the suit for the missing bundle or its value by way of damages.\n\nThe deadly defence put forward by the defendant and reiterated before us with great plausibility, was that the suit being governed by s. 87 of the Act and the cause of actio11 having been born on and limitation commenced to run from around September 19, 1959, the claim was stale, being well beyond six months and the statutory notice of a month super-added.\n\nThe second plaintiff, insurer, having paid the value of the Jost articles to the first plaintiff got itself subrogatcd to the latter's right, and they together laid the suit before the Court of Small Causes: That Court hdd 011 the merits that the dofendant had been negligent in bestowing the basic care which as statutory bailee it was bound to take, and on the prelimina1y pl.la of bar of limitation repelled it, taking the view that non-delivery of a consignment could not attract the shorter period prescribed in s. 87 of the Act. The decrees passed was, however, set aside by the Full Court in appeal which held the daim to fall within the ambit of the lesser limitation laid down by the Act, and so beyond time.\n\nThe teetering course of the case brought success to the plaintiffs in the High Court when a single Judge upset the findin~ on limitation and directed disposal of the appeal on the merits.\n\nThe last lap of the litigation has spurred them to this Court where learned counsel have addressed arguments principally on tw0 facets of the plea of limitation .\n\n. The primary qucstin is whether the present suit is one 'for any thmg done, or purporting to have been do1w in pursuance of this cf.. he action is for non-delivery of on~ out of 53 bundles. l lnmt1f[s counsel argues that an omission to do cannot be 'an act do11e\n\nTRDSTEES BOMBAY PORT v. PREMIER AUTOS. (Krishna Tyer, J.) 401\n\nor purporting to have been done'.\n\nAgain, the failure to do what the Act mandates the Port Trust to do, viz., to deliver .consignments to owners, cannot be 'in pursuance of this Act'. How caµ the statute direct non-delivery and how can the Port officials reasonably conceive that not delivering the goods committed to their charge is in pursuance of statutory duty ? The perverse verdict would then be reached that violation of a law is fulfilment thereof. Embellished by numerous rulings, Shri Cooper strove to convince us of the substance of the further link in the chain of his case that the cause of action for recovery of the value of the lost article could not spring to life before the knowledge of the landing and loss was. brought home to the plaintiff.\n\nHow can a party, other than one with uncanny powers of extra-sensory perception, sue for recovery from a bailee of compensation for loss of goods at a time when he is ignorant of the key fact that they have come into the latter's hands and have been lost ?\n\nIn short, for a cause of action for non-delivery by the bailee to materialise, scicnter that there has been delivery to the bailee and that it has since become non-deliverable while in his custody, is a sine qua non.\n\nOtherwise, suits for loss of goods would be some sort of a blind man's buff game.\n\nThe Additional Solicitor General, armed with many decisions, Indian and English, parried the thrust by urging the rival position that an act includes an omission in circumstances like the present, that an official may contravene the duty laid under an Act and may yet purport to act under it. so much so delivery of 52 out of 53 bundles, impliedly omitting to deliver one item, is in pursuance of the statutory scheme of accepting the cargo discharged from the vessel, warehousing them and making them available for delivery to consignees. In his submission, to dissect the integral course of statutory performance and to pick out a minor component of 'omission' as constituting the infringement of the owner's right which has given rlse to the cause of action, is to misread the purpose and to re-write the effect of s. 87 and similar provisions in many statutes calculated to protect public officer and institutions on a special basis.\n\nHe further contends that even if, theoretically speaking, knowledge of the landing of the goods may be an ingredient of the cause of action, correspondence between the bailee and the owner regarding search for the landed goods is no ground to postpone the accrual of the right to sue, and when in a large consignment the bulk of it is delivered on a certain date the few undelivered items should also be reasonably presumed as having been landed and ready to be handed over, thus bringing into being, on such short delivery, the 'cause' to sue.\n\nLikewise, \\Vhcn the rules specify a week of the landing (vidc s. 61A) within which the owner is expected to take charge of the goods--and the Port Trust is absolved from liability thereafter-that is indication of the reasonable limit of\n\nti111c for delivery.\n\nLimitation begins to run when the goods should\n\nrc~S<;>nab!y lmvc been delivered, ignoring operations for tracin.g the mJSsmg goods.\n\nThe absurd result would otherwise be that the ri2ht t.o sue would flicker fitfully as the search for the last bundle is protractmg and the Port Trust can indefinitely put off a claimant's suit by persisting in vain searches for the pilfered article and sending soothing\n\nletters that efforts to trace are 'in progress'. And more sinister is the possibility of owners of considerable consignments, by oblique methods,\n\ngetting letters of promise of search despatched by Pon officials and th\\IS postpone the time for taking delivery, thereby saving immensely on warehousing charges which are heavy in big cities.\n\nCorruption spreads where such legal construction protects.\n\nThe proponents. of both views have cited rulings in support but the sound approach of studying for oneself the sense of s. 87 prompts us to set it out together wi.th other cognate sections, get the hang of the statutory scheme and read the plain meaning of the notice. and limitation provisions.\n\n\"S. 87. No suit or other proceeding shall be commenced against any person for any thing done, or purporting to have been done, in pursuance of this Act, without giving to such person one month's previous notice in writing of the intended suit or other proceeding, and of the cause thereof, nor after six months from the accrual of the cause of such suit or other proceeding .. .. \"\n\n\"S. 61A(l). The Board shall, immediately upon the landing of any goods, take charge thereof, except as may be otherwise provided in the bye-laws, and store such as are liable in their opinion to suffer from exposure in any shed or warehouse belonging to the Board.\n\n(2) If any owner, without any default.on the 'part of the Board, fails to remove any goods other than those stored in the warehouses appointed by the Board for the storage of duty paid goods or in warehouses appointed under sectietr\n\n15, or licenced under section 16 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, from the premises of the Board within seven clear day& from the date on which such goods shall have been landed, such goo<Js shall remain on the premises of the Board at the sole risk and expense of the owner and the Board shall thereupon e discharged from all liability theretofore incurred bv them in respect of such goods.\"\n\n\"6 IB. The responsibility of the Board for the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods of which it has taken charge shall, subject to the other provisions of this Act and subject also in the case of goods received for carriage by railways to the provisions of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 be that of a bailee under section 151, 152 and 161 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, omitting the words \"in the absence of any special last-mentioned Act.\"\n\nI,, et us interpret and apply.\n\nNon-deliverv of an article is an omission, not an act and, in anv ; case, not one in pursuance of the Act, because the statute does not ; Oirect the Port Trust not to deliver the goods received from the\n\nTRUSTEE$ BOMBAY PORT v. PREMIER AUTOS. (Krishna Iyer, J.) 403\n\nhips that call at the port.\n\nThis view has found favour with !he High l.ourt.\n\nWith due deference to the learned Judge, we think th1S approach to be roo hteral, narrow and impractical. For, inac tioo has a i.-os11.ive side as where! a driver reflljes to n1ove his vehicle from the mtdule of the road or even an operator declines to stop an\n\nenl?Jne or a surgeon om.ts to take out a swab of cotton after the operation. Omission has an activist facet \"like commission, more so when there is a dullv Mt to omit.\n\nAgain, where a course of conduct is enjoined by a law, the whole process pursuant to that obligation is an act done or purporting to be done under that Act although the comp0neuts of that comprehensive act may consist of commissions and omissions.\n\nA police11ian acts or purports to act not only when he uses his lathi but also when he omits to open the lock-uo to set the arrested free or omits to produce him before a Mal!istrate.\n\nThe ostensible basis of the whole conduct colours both doinlts and defaults and the use of the wor'Js \"purp01 ting tn have been done\", in their natural sweep, cover the commissionomission complex.\n\nA comate POint arises as to whether you can attribute the neelect to comPly with a law as something done in pursuance of that law.\n\nHere again the fallacy is obvious. If under colour of office, clothed with the rules of authority, a person indulges in conduct not falling under the Jaw he is not acting in accordance with the sanction of the statute or in bona fide execution of authority but ostensib!v under the cloak of statute. It is the apparel that oft proclaims the man and whether anythin.g is done under, in pursuance of .. or under colour of a law. merely means that the act is done in apparent. though not real. cover of the statute. Broadly understood, can the official when challenged fall back, in justification, on his official trappings?\n\nA revenue officer distraining goods wrongfully or a municioal. officer receiving license fee from a non-licensee is violat~\n\nine the law but purports to act under it.\n\nOn the other hand, a police officer who collects water cess or a municipal officer who takes another into custodv. is not by any stretch of language actiilg in pursuance of or under the relevant Act that gives him power.\n\nAnd certainlv not an act of takine bribe or committing rape.\n\nSuch is the sense of the words we are calleU upon to construe. The true meanine of such and similar words used in like statutes has been set out bv Halsburv correctlv and concisely :\n\n\"An act mav be done in pursuance of or in the execution of the powers l!fanted by a statute, although that act is prohibited by .the statute. A person acting under statutory . powers mav erroneously exceed the powers given, or inadeauatelv discharee the duties imposed, by a statute, vet if he acts bona fid• in order to execute such powers or to discharge such duties. he is considered as acting in pursvance of the statute.\n\nWhere a statute imposes a duty, the omiS<ions to do something that oueht to be done in order completely to perform the duly, or the continuing to leave anv rnch dutv unperformed, amounts to an act done or\n\nintended to be dcme within the meaning of a statute which A provides a sDCCial period of limitation for such an act.\" 13rd edn .• vol. 24. pp.189-190).\n\nA selective reference to the rulinJ!.S cited at the bar may now be made. and. althouid> in this blurred area conflicting pronouncements have made for confusion. a systematised presentation will yield the clear inference we have reached without reference to the citations.\n\nJn one of the earliest cases under the Highway Act, the defendant surveyor of the perish of T., was charged with failure to remove the l!favel from the highway which obstructed mil caused nuisance to the 1>ublic and overturned the plaintiff's. catrlage.\n\nIt was nroved that the defended was Jluilty of want to care in leaving the l!favel there. and the Questions arose whether under s. 1()9 of C the Hjghwav Act he was entitled to notice. Lord Denman, C.J., dis- 1>0sed of ihe matter terselv_:\n\n\"It is clear that the defendant is charged with a tort committed in the course of bis official dutv; he is charged,\n\nas survevor. with the positive act of leavi~ the gravel on t.he road. v.here it had been improperly placed.- for an un- D rrasonable time.\n\nOn that simple ground, I think it clear tbat he was entitled to notice.\"\n\nJ>atterscn J. considered the same point a little more at length taking •he ''ie\\v ·\n\n\" .... that the charge is not one of mere .omissions, but of actuallv continuing the. nuisance.\n\nThat is a charge of doing something wrong, of keeping the gravel in an improper place. an act continued until the concurrence of the mischief.\n\nIs it then an act done in pursuance of the st atu!e ? It is not denied that the heap of t(Tavcl . was put t.here in pursuance of the statute; it could not be spread at the same moment; the Question then would arise, whether the lenl!lh of time during which it was kept in a heap was reasonable er not.\n\nThe continuing, therefore, was a thing c!one in uursuance of the statute.\"\n\nWightman J. struck a similar note. The learned Judge observed :\n\n\"The defendant is liable onlv bv virtue of his office.\n\nHe is charged with permittin2 an obstruction to remain, of which tlermission he is guiltv in his character of an offi- '\n\ncer described in the Act of Parliament. He is, therefore, under sev 109, entitled to a notice, in order to enable\n\nhim to tender amends:·\n\nThi• decision rendered around 130 years ago has a modern freshness and it is remarkable that the languap; e of the statute construe<! bv the Judges there has a likeness to the one we are concerned with here, namely, \"anything done in pursuance of or under the authority\" of statute.\n\nTRUSTEES BOMBAY PORT \\', PREMIER AUTOS. (Krishna Iyer, ].) 405\n\nStill earlier rulillJ!; S may be referreij to; for instance Palmer v. The Gr1J11a Junction Railway Company('} where the same point was\n\nniled, but where Baron Parke said :\n\n\"If the action was broul(ht against the railway company for the ollllSsion of some duty imposed upon them by the Act. this notice would be reQuired.\"\n\nIn another old .decision, Poulsum v. Thirst(') the coustruction of the expression. -:lets \"done or intended to be done under the powers of the Metropolitan Board of Works, and fell for decision. Byles, J. relied on Newton v. Ellia(') where also a similar set of words had to be interpreted and \"omitted to be done\" was absent. Jn the case\n\n<~.ecidecl hv Bvlcs. J.. the defendant stopped up the sewer, and\n\nnc~Jectcd to drain it, thereby causing injury.\n\nThe learned Judge held that the defendant's conduct must be looked at as a wholc, and that he was entitled to notice of action.\n\nThe other two Judges took the same viCw.\n\nNewton v. Ellis(') decided in 1855 under s. 139 of the Public Health Act, 1848, for injury caused by digging a hole on the road without placing a light or signal there, turned on the need for notice before summons. Earlier cases like Davis v. Curling(') \\YCre referred to and the conclusion reached that though the gravamen of the charge against the defendant was the omission to place a light in the spot of danger it attracted the formula \"anything done or intended to be done under the provisions of this Act\"-comparable to the phraseology of the Act which came under the judicial lens in Davis v. Curling 'things dono in pursuance of or under the authority' of the Act. Coleridge, J. observed with fe1icitous precisions :\n\n\"This is not a case of not doing; the defendant does something, omitting to securn protection for the public. He is not sued for not putting up a light, but for the complex act.\"\n\nErle J. likewise said :\n\n\"Here the cause of action is the making the hole, compounded with the not putting up a light. When these are blended, the result is no more than if two positive acts were committed, such as digging the hole and throwing out the dirt; the two would make up one act.\"\n\nArc we not concerned with a blended brew of act and omission, a complex act, a compound act of delivery-cum-non-delivery, pursuant to the statute without which the vinculum juris betv.cen the Board and\n\nthe plaintiff did not exist?\n\nlol/i[fee v. The Wallasey Local Board(') is a leading case, rightly pressed for acceptance of its ratio by the learned Solicitor General.\n\nKesling, J., after finding for the plaintiff on negligence, focussed atten-\n\n(I) 4 M. & W. 74~·\n\n(3) 5 E. & B. 115; 24 L. J. (Q. B.) 337.\n\n15) 8 Q. B. 286.\n\n(2) (1867) 2 L. R. 449.\n\n(4) 119 E. R. 424.\n\n(6) (1873) L. R. 62.\n\n406 SUl'llEMJ! COURT REPORTS [ 1974 1 3 S.C.l\\.\n\nlion on the nature of t!iii act and the need for notice. He observed :\n\n\"As a matter of fact, therefore, I come to the conclusion that the defendants were guilty of the negligence complained of, and that that negligence was the cause of the accident; and, as matter of law, I hold that negligence to give the plaintiffs a cause of action against the local board. . But, assuming th.at to be so, then comes the further queson .. whet.her the defendants are not absolved from liability m this act10n, by reason of the absence of a notice of action.\n\nFor myself, I must express my regret that this case should be decided upon such a point; but my opinion is that the defendants were entitled to notice. This question depends upon the construction of the several Acts of Parliament which have been placed before us.\" . . . . . . \"Now the local board was originally constituted under the Public Health Act, 1848; and it is not denied that, for anything done or intended to be done under that Act, they would be entitled to a notice of action under s. 139.\" . •. . . . . \"That, however, does not dispose of the matter; a further question arises, viz., whether the acts complained of here are acts which could be done by the local board under the provisions of the Act of Parliament, so as to entitle them to a notice of action.\" . . . . . \"It has been suggested that protection is not intended to be given by clauses of this description in cases of nonfeasance.\n\n<o. i< clear, from the cases of Davis v. Curling, Newton v. Ellis, Wilson v. Mayor, & c., of Halifax, and Sa/-\n\nmes v. ludge, all of which seem to me to establish that a case of what appears to be nonfeasance may be within the protection of the Act.\"\n\nBrett, J, expressed himself equally unminicingly :\n\n\"Now. two objections were urged by Mr. Aspinnal. In the first place, he says the thing complained of here is a mere nonfeasance, and therefore not \"an act done.\" If I rightly. understand the judgments in former cases. the rule is this.- where a man is sued in tort for the breach of some positive duty imposed upon him by an Act of Parliament, or for the omission to perform some such duty, either may be an act done or intended to he done under the authority of the Act, and if so oone or intended to bo done, the defendant is entitled to a notice of action.\"\n\n\"In Wilson v. Mayo;,&. c. f Haliiax(1), Kelly, C.B., states the proposition in those terms: \"It has been urged on the part of the plaintiff that the charge against the defendts is not of any act done or intended to be done, but of an omission to erect or cause to be erected a fence between the footpath and the goit, and that the omission to do an act is not\n\n- (Ii' Law Rep. 3 Ex. 114.-\n\nTRUSTEES BOMBAY PORT v. PREM!E!' AUTOS. (Krishna Iyer, I.) 401\n\n'an act done or intended to be done.' Some authorities have been cited on both sides: but we think that, whatever may ba the construction which might be put upon the words of the st•tute if the question arose in this case for the first time, it is now settled by authority that an omission to do something that ought to be done in order to the complete performance of a duty imposed upon a public body under an Act of Parliament, or the continuing to leave any such duty unperformed, amounts to an act done or intended to be done, within the meaning of these clauses requiring notice of action for the protection of public bodies acting in the discharge of public duties under Acts of Parliament.\"\n\n\"It would seem from these authorities that, where the plaintiff is suing in tort, nonfeasance is to be considered as \"an act done,\" within such clauses as these.''\n\nMr. Cooper tried to distinguish Jolliffee's case but having given our close' attention to the matter we decline to jettison this weigh•.y judgment.\n\nJollifjee's case was followed by the Privy Council in Queen v.\n\nWilliams(').\n\nThe Judicial Committee took the view that \"an omission to do something which ought to be done in order to the complete performance of a duty imposed upon a public body under an Act of Parliament, or ihe continuing to leave any such duty unperformed, amounts to \"an act done or intended to be done\" within the meaning of a clause requiring a notice of action.\"\n\nA case which went up to the Privy Council from India under the Calcutta Port Act, 1890, was decided on similar lines by the Judicial Committee in Commissioner for the Porl of Calcutta v. Corporation of Calcutta(').\n\nLord Alness observed : \"Reliance was placed by the respondents on the case of the Bradford Corporation v. M, yers [(1916) I A.C. 242].\n\nNow, inasmuch as that case related to the construction of the Public Authorities Protection Act (1893), which contains language not to be found in the Indian statute, and which omits language to be found in the latter, manifestly the decision falls to be handled with care. In particular; the English Act does not contain the words \"purporting or professing\" to act in pursuance of thestatute. Their Lordships regard these words as of pivotal importance. Their presence in the statute appears to postulate that work which is not done in pursuance of the statute may nevertheless be accorded its protection if the work professes or purports to be done in pursuance of the statute. The English Act was properly treated by the House in the Bradford case as one from which the words \"profession er purporting\" were omitted, and the observations of the House must, of course, be construed secundum subjectam materiem.\"\n\n(l) ([884) 9 L. R. 418. 2 [19311 64fA 363; 371.\n\nIn a different context though, the Privy Council had to deal with a similar provision, namely, s. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1_n the well-known case of Gill v. The King('). Lord Simonds, speak\n\nmg for the Board, explained the position of law thus :\n\n\"A public servant can only be said to .act or to purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty. Thus, a judge neither acts nor purports to act as a judge in receiving a bribe, though the judgment which he delivers may be such an act : nor does a Government medical officer act or purport to act as a public servant in picking the pocket of a patient whom he is examining, though the examination itself may be such an act. The test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that, what he does, he docs in virtue of his office.\" It may be mentioned eveh here. that the Judicial Committee had distinguished Bradford Corporation v. Myers(') on which consider- ·\n\nable reliance was placed by Shri Cooper and also in several decisions which took the opposite point of view. We need make no comments on that decision except to stale that for exceedingly .excellent reasons the Judicial Committee has put that ruling out of the way.\n\nShri Cooper brought to our notice the circumstance that Public Acthorities Protection Act, 1893, brought in 'neglect and default', which became necessary only because \"any act done in pursuance .... of any Act of Parliament .... \" would. not otherwise comprehend omissions and defaults. We are not impressed with this submission and decline to speculate why a change of language was made if the Jaw packed \"omission\" into \"act\". ·\n\nGill v. The King (supra), just referred to, affirms the careful analysis of the authorities by Varadachariar, J., in Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown(') and also the ratio in Huntley's(') case.\n\nIn Hori Ram's case, which related to the construction of s. 197 of the Criminal Prbeedure Code ands. 270(1) of the Government of India Act, Varadachariar, J., brought out the true meaning of the words ''.act done or purporting to be done in the execution of his duty\". The learned Judge\n\nob5crvcd :\n\n\"Apart from the principle that, for the purposes of the criminal\"Iaw, acts and illegal omissions stand very much on the same footing, the conduct of the appellant in maintaining the accounts, which it was his duty to keep, has to be dealt with as a whole and the particular omission cannot of itself be treated as an offence except as a step in the appellant's conduct in relation to the maintenance of the register which it was his duty correctly to maintain.\" Stress was laid rightly by the learned Judge on the relevance of public interest in protecting a public servant and in restrictions being placed on an aggrieved citizen seeking redress in a court of Jaw, to point out\n\nO) [1948],75 I. A .. 41; 59-60.\n\n(2) (191611 A. C. 242'\n\n(3) [1939] F. C.R. 159.\n\n(4) (1944) F. C. R. 252.\n\nTRUSTEES BOMBAY PORT v. PREMIER AUTOS. (Krishna Iyer, 1.) 409\n\nthat acts which have no reference to official duty should not come within the protective umbrella of these statutory provisions. The learned Judge insisted that \"a11 act is not less one done or purporting to be done in execution of a duty because the officer concerned does it negligently.\" The true test, if we may say so with great respect, is whether the conduct of the public servant or public body, viewed as a whole, including\n\nas it may 'omissions' also, be attributed to the exercise of office.\n\nSri Cooper reinforced his contrary argument by reliance on the case of Revati Mohan Das v. latindra Mohan Ghosh(') which dealt withs.\n\n80 of the Civil Procedure Code. That decision, however, is distinguishable and relates to an optional act or omission of a public officer where it could not be designated that the failure to pay the debt by a manager was an 'illegal omission' constituting an 'act' under s. 3 of the General Clauses Act.\n\nA decision of the Calcutta High Court (Commissioner for the Court of Calc!ttta v. Abdul Rahim OOsma11 & Co.(2), turning on the construction of a similar provision (s. 142 of the Calcutta Port Act) covers the various decisions, Indian and English, and after pointed reference to A nzrik Singh's case reaches the conclusion :\n\n\"There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.\"\n\nThe Bench proceeded to set out the following propositions which meet with our approval :\n\n(a) In order to apply the bar under sec. 142 of the Calcutta Port Act, it is first te> be determined whether the act which is complained of in the suit in question can be said to come within the scope of the official duty of the person or persons who are sought to be made liable. This question can be answered in the affirmative where there is a reasonable connec~ tion between the act and the discharge of the official duty.\n\n(b) Once the scope of the official duty is determined, sec. 142 will protect the defendants not only from a claim based on breach of the duty but also from a claim based upon an omission to perform such duty.\n\n(c) The protection of sec. 142 cannot be held to be confined to acts done in the exercise of a statutory power but also extends to acts done within the scope of an official duty.\"\n\nThe case dealt with was also one of short delivery and consequent loss of a part of the goods, and the suit was dismissed for being beyond the short period of limitation prescribed under the special Act.\n\nAgain, in District Board of Manbhum v. Shyamapada Sarkar(') the u Bihar Local Self-Government Act containing a provision analogous to ----\n\n(1) [1934] 61 I. A. 17t.\n\n(2) 68 Cal. Weekly Notes 814.\n\n(3) A. I. R. 1955 Pat. 432.\n\nwhat we are concerned with here was construed by a bench of that Court A reading the words \".anything done under this Act\" to include \"anything mnitted to be done under the Act'', and further that 'anything done under this Act' necessarily and logically embraces anything wrongfully done or wrongfully omitted to be done.\n\nIn Gorakh Fulji Mahala v. State( 1), Chandrachud, J., as he then was, made an elaborate study of a comparable provision in the Bombay Police Act (s. 161) and followed the Federal Court decisions already referred to by us, as well as this Court's decision in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay('). The learned Judge summed up the Jaw thus :\n\n\"The decisions cited above have uniformly taken the view that in an act cannot be said to be done under colour of office or under colour of duty or in the purported execution of official duties unless there is a reasonable connection between the act and the office. A view has also been taken in these decisions that one of the tests for determining whether an act has been done in the purported discharge of official duties is whether the public servant can defend his act by reference to the nature of the duties of his office if he is challenged while doing the act/'\n\nA few more decisions, apart from what has already been referred to by us, specifically dealing with similar causes of action.under similar statutes, viz., the Calcutta Port Act and the Madras Port Trust Act, have discussed the problem before us. In Madras Port v. Home Insurance\n\nCo. ('), a Division Bench of the Madras High Court adopted the widor view and held :\n\n\"The services which the Board has to perform and could perform statutorily under the statutory powers and duties cannot be dissociated from its omissions and failures in relation to the goods. Any action which is called for will properly be covered by the words 'anything done or purporting to be done in pursuance of this Act'. Under the Madras General Clauses Act, 1891 words which refer to the acts done extend also to illegal omissions.\"\n\nNatesan, J., relied on Calcutta Port Con1n1issioner v. Corporation of Cal- .cutta('l, where the Judicial Committee had stressed the ampler sense of 'purporting or professing to act in pursuance of the statute• and observed :\n\n\"Their Lordships regard these words as of pivotal importance. l'he.ir presence in the statute appears to postulate that work which is not done in pursuance of the statute may nevertheless be accorded its protection, if the work professes or purports to be cjone in pursuance of the statute.\"\n\n(I) I. L. R. [1965] Bom. 61.\n\n0) A. !. R. 1970 Mad. 48; 57-58.\n\n(2) [1955] 1 S. C. R. 1177.\n\n(4) A. 1. R. 1937P. C. 306.\n\nntisTEEs BOMBAY PORT v. PREMIER AUTOS. (Krishna Iyer, /.) 411\n\nThe whole issue is clinched in our view by the final pronouncement of this Court in Public Prosecutor Madras v. R. Raju('). The interpreii\\tfon of s.40(2) of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 and the snilthesis argued between 'act' and 'omission' provoked a panoramic survey of the Indian statute book.\n\nReference was made to Pritam Singh's( 2) case where absence from duty at the time of the roll call was held to be something done under the provisions of the Police Act. Mari- /ad Ahmad's('), case was relied on as fortifying this view, for there too a Head Constable who made false .entries in a General Diary of the Police Station was held entitled to invoke the 3 months limitation under s. 42 of the Police Act since the act complained of was the non-discharge of duty in keeping a regular diary. Evei:i filmg false returns by a sales tax assessee was held in Sitaram v. State of Madhya Pradeshl ') as an act done under the Berar Sales Tax Act whereunder a prosecution for such an act had to be brought in three months. Th.e ratio decidendi is set out by Ray, J. (as he then was) thus :\n\n\"25. These decisions in the light of the definition of the word 'act' in the General Clauses Act establish that non-compliance with the provisions of the statute by omitting to do what the act enjoins will be anything done or ordered to be done under the Act. The complaint against the respondents was that they wanted to evade payment of duty. Evasion was by using and affixing cut and torn banderols. Books of actounts were not correctly maintained. There was shortage of banderol in stock. Unbanderolled matches were found. I hese are all infraction of the provisions in respect of things done or ordered to be done under the Att.\n\n26. In Amalgamated Electricity Co. v. Municipal Committee, Ajmer [(1969) I S.C.R. 430] the meaning of omssion' of a statutory duty was explained by this Court. Hcgde, J., speaking for the Court said \"The omission in question must have a positive content in it. In other words, the non-discharge of that duty must amount to an illegality\". The positive aspect of omission in the present case in evasion of payeni of duty. The provisions of the Act require proper affixmg orbanderols.\n\nCut or turn banderols were used.\n\nUnbanderolled match boxes were found. These. provisions about use of banderols are for collection and payment of excise duty.\n\nThe respondents did not .Pay the lawful dues which are acts to be done or ordered to be done under the Act.\"\n\nWe readily concede that it is oversimplification to state that no court has taken the contrary view, both on the question of act not including an omission and action contrary to the behest of the statute not being done pursuant to or under the statute. An exhaustive consideration of these twin propositions is found in Zita ParishtJd v. Shanti Devi(').\n\n(I) A. I. R. 1972 s. c. 2504.\n\n(2) [1971] I sec 653.\n\n(3) [1963] Supp. 2 s. c. R. 38. (4r (1962! Supp~ 3 s. c. R. 21.\n\n(5) (1969] I S. C. R. 430.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1974 J 3 S.C.ll.\n\nSeemingly substantial support for Shri CQOper's contention is A derived from observations in State of GujQiat v. Kansara Mani/al Bhikha/a( 1), where, rejecting ii plea of protection under s. 117 of the Factories Act, 1948, by an occupier of a factory who had violated the duties cast on him, Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) observed ;\n\n\"But the critical words are \"any thing done or intended to be done\" under the Act. The protection conferred can only be claimed by a person who can plead that he was required to do or omit to do something under the Act or that he intended to comply with any of its provisions. It cannot confer immunity in respect of actions which are not done under the Act but are done contrary to it. Even assuming that.an act includes an omission as stated in the General Clauses Act, the omission also must be one which is enjoined by the Act. It is not sufficient to say that the act was honest. That would bring it only within the words \"good faith\". It is necessary further to establish that what is complained of is something which the Act requires should be done or should be omitted to be done.\n\nThere must be a compliance -or an intended compliance with a provision of the Act, before the protection can be claimed.\n\nThe section cannot cover a case of a breach or an intended breach of the Act however honest the conduct. otherwise.\n\nIn this connection it is necessary to point out, as was done in the Nagpur\" case above referred to, that the occupier and manager are exempted from liability in certain cases mentioned in s. 101. Where an occupier or a manager is charged with an offence he is entitled to make a complaint in his own tum against any person who was the actual.offender and on proof of the commission of the offence by such person the occupier or the manager is absolved from liability. This shows that compliance with the peremptory provisions of the Act is essential and unless the occupier or the manager brings the real offender to book he must bear the responsibility. Such a provision largely excludes the operation of s. 117 in respect of persons guilty of a breach of the provisions of the Act. It is not necessary that mens rea must always be established as has been said in some of the cases above referred to. The responsibility exists without a guilty mind. An adequate safeguard, however, exists ins. 101 analysed above and the occupier and manager can save themselves if they prove that they are not the real offenders but who, in fact, is\".\n\nIt is obvious that this ruling can hardly help, once we understand the setting and the scheme of the statute and the purpose of protection of workers ensured by casting an absolute obligation \"on occupiers to observe certain conditions.\n\nThe context is the thing and not verbal sinu1itude.\n\nIn a recent ruling of this Court in Khandu Sonu Dhobi v. State of Maharas/1tra('), Khanna, J., while repelling a pica of immunity from\n\n(I) (19651 I !. L R. All. 78).\n\n(2) (197!] 3 S. C. R. 510.\n\nTRUSTEES BOMBAY PORT v. PREMIER AUTOS. (Krishna Iyer, /.) 413\n\nprosecution put forward by the accused on the score of limitation and the case being \"in respect of anything done or intended to be done under this Act\" (The Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942) said :\n\n'This contention, in our opinion, is devoid of force. Subsection (2) refers to suit or prosecution against a public servant or person duly authorised under the Act in respect of anything done or intended to be done under the Bombay Land Improvement Schemes ct. It cannot be said that the acts of the accused-appellants in preparing false documents and in committing criminal breach of trust in respect of the amount of Rs. 309.-07 as also their act of criminal misconduct were done under the Bombay Land Improvement Schemes Act.\n\nSub-section (2) of section 23 deals with anything done or intended to be done under the above mentioned Act by a public servant or a person duly authorised under the Act. It has no application where something is d<:>il.e not under the Act even though it has been done by a public servant who has been entrusted with duties of carrying out improvement sche' mes under the above mentioned Act.\n\nThe impugned acts of the appellants in the present case were not in discharge of their duties under the above mentioned Act but in obvious breach and flagrant disregard of their duties. Not only they did no rectification work for the Bundh which was a part of the improvement scheme, they also misappropriated the amount which had been entrusted to them for the purpose of rectification.\"\n\nHow slippery and specious law and logic can be unless the Court is vigilant is evident from this kind of defence ! Herc is a case not of performing or omitting to perform an official act in the course of which an offence is committed. On the contrary, an independent excursion into crime using the opportunity of office wi_thout any nexus with discharge of official function is what we have in that case. The Court significantly highlights tlie fact that 'not only they did no rectification work for the Bundh .... they also misappropriated the amount .... entrusted to them for the purpose cif rectification.' We hope no policeman can shelter himself after a rape of an arrested woman or shooting of his own wife on the pretext of acting u.nder the Police Act. Immunity cannot be confused with toxicity-disastrous in law as in medicine. Nor can functions of office be equated with opportunities of office, without being guilty of obtuseness. This chapter of our discussion yields the conlusion that an act includes an omission (regardless of the General Clauses Act, which docs not apply to antecedent statutes)-not under all circumstonces bat in legislations like the Act We are construing. Again, what is\n\ndone uncicr purported exercise of statutory functions, even if in excess of or contrary to its provisions, is done pursuant to or under the Act so long as there is a legitimate link between the offending act and the offic; al rclc. Judged thus the defence by the Board fills the bill.\n\nThe Scheme of the statute is simple. When cargo ships call at the port. the Board constituted under the Act shall take c.harge of the goods landed from the vessel and stce them properly (s. 61(A)(l) ). The\n\n14-L954SupCI/74\n\nBoard cannot keep goods indefinitely, hard-pressed as any modern port is for space and facing as it does.intractable problems of protection of goods. When the goods have landed the owner has to be on the alert and get ready to remove them within 7 days, after which the statutory bailee, the Board, is discharged from liability-subject, of course, to any default on the plrt of the Board in the matter of making the goods deliverable ( s. 61 A (2)). The span of statutory custody of the Board is _short but during that time its obligations are those of a bailee under ss. 151, 152 and 161 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, omitting the words \"in the absence of any special contract\" in s. 152 of the Cor.'iract Act (s. 6IB).\n\n If the person en!itled. to the goods defaults in removing them within one month of the Board coming into custody, special powers of disposal by public auction are given by s. 64A.\n\nThe Act charges, the Port authorities with a wealth of functions and duties and necessarily legal proceedings follow upon the defects, defaults and other consequences of abuse of power.\n\nEven so, a public body undertaking work of the sort which a Port carries out will be exposed to an explosive amount of litigation and the Board as well as its officers will be burdened by suits and prosecutions on top of the pressure of handling goods worth crores daily.\n\nPublic bojies and officers will suffer irremediably in such vuJnerabJe circu1nstances unless actions are brought when evidence is fresh and before delinquency fades; and so it makes sense to provide, as in many other ca'ies of public institutions and servants, a reasonably short period of time within which -the legal proceedings should be started.\n\nThis is nothin.~ unusual in the jurisprudence of India or England and is con<titutioMlty snund. Section 87 is illumined by the protective purpose which will be ill-served if the shield of a short limitation operates in cases of misfeasance and malfeasance but not non-feasance. The object, Stripped Of Je.ealese and viewed through the glasses of simple sense, is that remedial process against official action showing up as wrong doing or non'<loing which inflicts injury on a citizen should not be delayed too long to obliterate the probative material for honest tk fence.\n\nThe dichotomy between act and omission, however, }'.)gicaJ or legal, has no relevance in this context. So the intendment of the 'tatute certainlv takes in its broad embrace all official action, po')itive and negative. which is the operative cause of the grievance. Al though the Act. in the present cac::e. uc:es on!v the expression 'act' and omit~ 'neglect or default or omission, the meaning does not suffer and if other\n\ntatutrc:: hve uo;; erl all thee \\Vords it ic;; more the draftsm1n's anietv tn avoid ta.kin~ ri!<:lc:s in court. not an addition to the semantic S<!Ope of\n\nthe word 'ac~'.\n\nOf course. this is the compulsion of the statutorv context and it may ·\"1e11 be that other en<ictment~. de~Jin!? v.-irh different /:'.11hiect-matter, rnav exclude frnm nn ':tct' an 'omission'.\n\nThis .oo.., d hility ic: TP-rluced agre1t denl bv the rlP-finitlon nf 'act' in rlic various Gencri:il an1ses A<'tc:_ a~ includinq 'illeo-al omissions'.\n\nThe leading case of Jol/ifjee v. The Wal/esey Local , Board('> decided nearly a\n\ncrntury ago has stood the test of time and still cunent coin, and\n\n(t) (1873) 9 I. R. 62.\n\nTRUSTEES BOMBAY PORT v. PREMIER AUTOS. (Krishna Iyer, I.) 415\n\nStroud (Stroud's Judicial Dictionary; 3rd edn. Vol. I; page 877) has extracted its ratio thus :\n\n\"An omission to do something which ought to be done in ordp: to complete performance of a d.uty imposed upon a. public body under. an Act of Parliament, or the continuing to leave any such duty unperformed, amounts to '\"an\n\nact done or intended to be done\" within the meaning of a clause requiring a notice of action (Joliffe v.\n\nWa!lesey,\n\nL.R. 9 C.P. 62) .\" .\n\nWe regret the prolixity of the judgment because we apprecia!e brevity but it is the judicial price or tribute to the learning and length of the arguments presenting a panoramic view ot Anglo-Indian judicial thought for which we are obliged to both counsel.\n\nIndeed, the. plethora of rulings cited has been skipped here and there by a process of calculated ricochet, without omitting the more salient cases.\n\nAnd we are re-assured, at the end of this pilgrimage through precedent>, that the soundness of the view we have taken is attested by pronouncements of vigorous judges twice three score and ten years ago, in words which 'age cannot wither nor custom stak'. Law is a practical instrument. a working tool in a workaday world and\n\nwhere, a~ here, the effected fraction of the community is the common official. the commercial man and ordinary folk, the wiser rule of construction follows commonsense, not casuistry, context, not strictness and not subtle nuance but plain sense.\n\nThe logical conclusion of the legal study is that the short delivery of one bundle or rather the act of under-delivery in purported discharge of the bailee's obligation under s. 6 JB of the Act is covered by s. 87 and the truncated limitation prescribed thereunder will apply.\n\nOf course, the statutory notice under s. 83 is a condition precedent to,\n\nalthough not a constituent of. the cause of action and there is some authority for the position that the period of one month may also be tacked on under s. 15(2) of the Limitation Act. In the view we take on the ultin1ate issue this question is immaterial.\n\nEven so, the decisive date on which the decree turns and time runs has to be settled.\n\nIf the Limitation Act applies, the suit. by any reckoning, is not barred but since it docs not apply the critical issue is as to when time begins to run.\n\nBrushing aside technicalities and guided by the analogyof art. 120 of the Limitation Act, we think it right to bold that the cause of action for short delivery comes into being only when the consignee comes to know that the b'.:lilment has , come into existence. You cannot c1aim deHverv from a statut'.\"'rv b:1ilee till vou know of the bail'Tlent. which under the Act arises only on the vessOI discharging tbe ~00ds into the port-certainly not before. Jn this soecies of actions, the right to\n\n'\"' 9ostulates knowledge nf the right.\n\nTill then it is embryonic, unborn .\n\n. A vital point, then. is as to when the first plaintiff came to know of the uoods in question havin.2 laned. The defendant says that when the bulk of the consignment 1s dehvered on a oarticular date it must be presumed, unless. a cantrarv inference on sOeciaJ circumstance!' is made out, that the undelivered part was deliverable on that date so\n\nmuch so that limitation began to run from then on. Any further representation by the bailee that he was trying to trace the mlssing bundle would not affect the cause of action and therefore the commencement of limitation.\n\nHow can a claim be barred without being born? When, then, did the right to sue arise ? It depends on what right was infringed or duty breached.\n\nWhich leads us to the enquiry as to what is the statutory responsibility c.st on the Board and what is the violation alleged to create the 'cause' of action.\n\nThe blindle of facts constitutive of the right to sue certainly includes the faeach of bailee's duties.\n\nSection 61B of the Act saddles the Board with the obligations of a bailee under ss. 151, 152 and 161 of the Contract Act in regard to loss, destruction or deterioration of goods of which it takes charge.\n\nThe degree of care is fixed by s. 151 the absolvatory circumstances are indicated by s. 152 and the responsibility for loss is fastened by s. 162 if, by the fault of the bailee, the goods are not delivered or tendered at . the proper time to the bailor. The proper time for delivery is as soon as the time for which the goods were bailed has expired or the purpose of the bailment has been accomplished-Sec. 160, although not in terms woven into the Port Trust Act, is impliedly incorporated, because s. 161 inevitably brings it into play. Even so, when does the time for which the goods are bailed expire ? The answer is, according to the Solicitor General, when tho week after landing of the goods expiresif s. 61A(2) betokens anything on this point.\n\nHe urges that when the bulk of a consignment is delivered by the bailee the time for delivery of the short-delivered part must be reaso.nably held to have come.\n\nFinally, he submits that the time consumed by search for the landed goods cannot be added for fixing the terminus a quo of limitation.\n\nAssuming for arguments sake all these in favour of the appellant, one critical issue claims precedence over them. When does the statutory bailment take place and can the time for delivery to the owner of the goods arise before he knows or at least has good grounds to know that the bailment has in law come into being ?\n\nThe owner must ordinarily take delivery in a week's time after landing since thereafter the Board will cease to be liable for loss, etc., save, of course, when the latter defaults in giving delivery as for instance the goods are irremovably located or physical obstruction to removal is offered by striking workers or natural calamities. Here the 7 days ended on September 19, 1959 when actually 52 out of the 53 bundles were delivered. And if the due date for delivery of the missing bundle had arisen then the suit is admittedly time-barred.\n\nHowever, the learned Solicitor General rightly agrees that 7 days of unloading is no rigid, wooden event to ignite limitation and it depends on other factors which condition the reasonable time when delivery ought to be made. If a tidal bore has inhibitea approach to the port it is a futile law which insists on delivery date having arrived and therefore limitation having been set in rnotion. The key question is, according to counsel, when ought the goods have been put in a deliverable state by the Board ? If, having regard to reasonable circum•\n\nTRUSTEES BOMBAY PORT v. PREMIER AUTOS (Krishll(}. Iyer, l.) 417\n\nstances, the Port Trust did not tender delivery, the right of action for non-delivery, subject to statutory notice, arose and the calendar would begin to count the six months in s. 87. We are inclined to assent to this stand for legal and pragmatic reasons.\n\nIn Madras Port Trust case where action for loss of goods was laid, two extreme contentions competed for acceptance. The Board argued that the goods once landed, time ran infJ.exibly and an absolute span of one month having expired before statutory notice was given the suit was barred. This was over-ruled by the Court (M/s. Swastik Agency\n\nv. Madras Port Trust)('). But the opposite plea, equally extravagant, commended itself to the Court, erroneously in our view.\n\nThe plea was that till the plaintiff knew of the loss, desJuction or deterioration time stood still even if many months might have roJled on after the vessel had discharged the goods. It is true thats. 87 speaks of '6 months from the accrual of the cause of such suit'.\n\nWhat is cause of the suit'! Losii, destruction or deterioration ? If so, as Ramamurti, J., has held :\n\n\"It stands to common sense that the owner cannot be expected to file a suit before he is given access to the goods and also an effective opportunity to examine the goods and he becomes aware of the loss or damage which had occurred to the goods.\n\nTo hold that the period of one month specified in s-.40(2) wouldt commence to run even before the owner of the goods became aware of the loss or damage would result in absurd and startling result•.\"\n\nThe legal confusion issues from the clubbing together of the triple categories of damage. Cause of suit being destructi.on or deterioration while the goods are in the custody of the bailee it is correct to read as this Court did in a different situation under the Land Acquisition Act in Harish Chandra v. Deputy Land Acquisition O[ficer(2 ), knowledge of the damage by the affected party as an essential requirement .of fair play and natural justice.\n\nThe error stems from visualising loss as the 'cause' of suit. The bailee is bound to return, deliver or tender. If he defaults in this duty the 'cause' ot action arises.\n\nWhile destruction (Jr deterioration may Iieed lnspectiqn by the owner, it may b:ei proper to import scienter as integral to the 'cause' or grievance. But loss flows from sheer nondelivery, with nothing super-added. Loss is the direct result, viewed through the owner's eyes, of non-return, non-delivery or non-tender by the bailee-the act/omission which completes the 'cause' ( vide s. 161 Contract Act). What is complained-of is the non\"llelivery, the resultant damage being the loss of goods, We must keep the breach of duty which is the cause distinct from the loss which is the consequence. The . judicial interpretation cannot take liberties witli the Ianiruage of the law beyond the strict needs of natural justice_. __ So we hold that awareness of th~ factum of loss of goods is not a sine qua non of the 'cause'.\n\n(1) A, I. R. 1966 .Mad .. 130.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1961 S.C. 1500.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS I 19741 3 s.c.tt.\n\nIn a stroke of' skiHul advocacy it was urged that when the bailee A fails to return the goods it is like a suit for wrongful detention and the cause of action is a continuing one. This is an action in detention and! its impact on limitation must be rec<lgnised, was the contention, strengthened by 'Dhian Singh Sabha Singh v. Union of India(') and cer-· tain passages from Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (11th Edition, pages 441 and 442; paras 720 & 721). The flaw in the argument is that we are. concerned with a statutory bailment, statutory action for loss due to B non-delivery and not a contractual breach and suit in damages or forvalue of the goods bailed.\n\nAnother fascinating, line of thought was suggested to extricate the plaintiff from the coils of brief limitation. When the defendant holds goods as bailee, the plaintiff may found his cause of action on a breach of the defendant's duty as bailee of the goods by refusal to deliver tliem upon request.\n\nGopa/ Chandra Bose v. Surendra Nath Dutt('), Laddo Begam v. Jamal-ud-din(') and Kupruswami Mudatiar v. Pannalal Sowcar(') were cited in support.\n\nOther rulings striking a similar note were also relied on.\n\nBut we need not express any opinion on the soundness of that position for here we are dealing with a. statutory liability where the plenarv liabilities of a bailee cannot be imported.\n\nCounsel for the respondents also urged that the analogy c' art. 120 of the Limitation Act entitles him to reckon time from when he came to know of the facts making up the right to sue.\n\nIn Annamalai Chettiar v. Muthukarappan Chattiar('), the Judicial Committee had obs.ervcd ·\n\n\"In their Lordships' view the case falls under art. 120;. under which the time begins to run when the right to sue accrues.\n\nJn a recent decision of their Lordship's Board, delivered by Sir Binod Mitter, it is stated, in reference toart. 120 : There can be no 'right to sue' until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted\" : Balo v. Kok/an(\"). Counsel for the appellants admitted that he was unable to specify any date at which the claim to an account here in suit was denied by the appellants.\n\nAccordingly this contention fails.\"\n\nThe reference to Sir Binod Milter's observations relates to the ruling in Balo v. Koklan.\n\nThe proposition is impeccable but is inapplicable if it is urged that the knowledge of the loss marks the relevant dote.\n\nOn the other hand, if the right to sue or the accrual of the cause of action is based on the infringement by non-delivery the knowledce must be the knowledge of the factum of bailment which takes pbce on the unloading from the vessel and the taking charge by\n\n(I) [19581 S.C.R. 78t.\n\n(3) [19201 l.L.R. 42 All 45.\n\n(5) SS 1'.A. I; 8.\n\n(2) 12 C.W.N. tOIO.\n\n(4) (1942) Mad. 303.\n\n(6) (1930) L.R. 571.A. 325.\n\nTRUSTEES BOMBAY PORT v. PREMIER AUTOS. (Krishna Iyer, J.) 419\n\nthe Hoard.\n\nThat is to say, it is preposterous to postulate the running of limitation from a date anterior to when the plaintiff has come to know th1t his missing goods have been landed on the port. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnisa(') is authority for the rule that there can be no right to sue (under art. 120) until there is an accrual of the right asserted--, which as we have shown, involves awareness of the bJilment. It meets with reason and justice to state that the cause in s. 87 cannot arise until the consignee gains knowledge that his goods have come into the hands of the Board.\n\nThe Railways Act has spanned cases where courts have laid down legal tests for determining the commencement of limitation.\n\nViews rnn on rival lines till in Bootamal's case(') this Court settled the conr\n\nflict and gave the correct lead which has been heavily relied on by the Solicitor General.\n\nSri Cooper contested the application of the principle in Bootamal on the score that art. 31, Limitation Act, 1908, which fell for construction there, used the words 'when the goods \\lught to be delivered\" and covers both delayed delivery and nondelivery, which were absent in s.87, and' argued that even olherwi5\" it did not run counter to the contention of the respondent.\n\nAnyway, the Court held there as follows :\n\n\"Reading the words in their plain grammatical meaning, they are in our opinion capable of only one interpretation, namely, that they contemplate that the time would begin to run after a reasonable period has elapsed on the expiry of which the delivery ought to have been made.\n\nThe words \"when the goods ought to be delivered\" can only mean the reasonable time taken (in the absence of any term in the contract from which the time can be inferred expressly or impliedly) in the carriage of the goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination.\n\nTake the case, where the cause of action is based on delay in delivering the goods.\n\nIn such a case the goods have been delivered and the claim is based on the delay caused in the delivery.\n\nObviously the question of delay can only be decided on the basis of what would be the reasonable time for the carriage of goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination.\n\nAny time taken over and above that would be a case of delay. Therefore, when we consider the interpretation of these words in the third column with respect to the case of non-delivery, they must mean the same thing, namely, the reasonable time taken for the carriage of goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination.\n\nThe view therefore taken by some of the High Courts that the time begins from the date when the railway finally refuses to deliver cannot be correct, for the words in the third column of art. 31 are incapable of being interpreted as meaning the final refusal of the carrier to deliver.'' ---------\n\n(I) A.LR. !96l S.C. 803.\n\n(2) [1963] l S.C.R, 70, 76, 79.\n\n420 SUPREI, fE COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974 J 3 S.C.R.\n\n\"With respect, it is rather difficult to understand how the subsequent correspondence between the railway and the consignor or the consignee can make any difference to the starting point of Jiniitation, when that correspondence only showed that the railway was trying to trace the goods. The period that might be taken in tracing the goods can have no relevance in determining the reasonable time that is required for the carriage of the goods from the place of despatch to the place of <lestinatfon.\" The ratio is twofold, viz. (1) not when the final refusal to deliver but when the reasonable time for delivery has elapsed does limitation start; (2) correspondence stating that efforts are being made to trace the goods cannot postpone the triggering of limitation. Of course, 'reasonable' time is a relative factor and representation by the Railway inducing the plaintiff not to sue may amount to estoppel or waiver in special circumstances.\n\nWe are inclined to confine Bootamal to the specific words of art. 39.\n\nThe discussion discloses the influence of the words in columns 1 and 3 on the conclusion, rendering it risky to expand its operation. . Section 87 speaks only of the accrual of the cause. . The cause is the grievance which is generated by nondelivery.\n\nBut can it be said that it is unreasonable not to be aggrieved by non-delivery if the Board credibly holds out that delivery will shortly be made and vigorous search for the goods is being made amidst the enormous miscellany of consignments lying pell mell within the Port? Do you put yourself in peril of losing your right by behaving reasonably and believing the Board to be a responsible body ?\n\nWe think not.\n\nWe are not impressed by the argument based on Bootamal and the train of decisions following it, under the Railways Act. The rulings of this Court in Union of India v. Amar Singh,('), Governor General in Council v. Musaddi Lal(') and Jetumull Bhojraj v. The Darjeeling Himalayan Railway Co.(3 ) relate to the Limitation Act and the Railways Act; and, while public carriers and Port authorities may in many respects bear similar responsibility, the limitation law applicable is different.\n\nMay be, some uniformity is desirable in this area of law. But we have to go by the language of s. 87 and not be deflected by analogy drawn from the Railways Act or Limitation Act with noticeable variations.\n\nNever-the-less, one of the legal Jines harshly but neatly drawn in Bootama/ lends some certainty to the 'from when' of limitation, by eliminating an impertinenceletters informing that search for the goods is under way.\n\nThe Snag is in linking this proffer of search to the vital ingredient in the 'accrual of the cause'. If, as Bootamal has correctly highlighted, the tracing process is after the 'cause' is complete, it is irrelevant to procrastinate limitation.\n\nThis is the wider contribution of that decision to this blurred branch of the law. So much so, sheafs of letters from the Port officials that the landed goods are being tracted out or searched for are impotent to alter the date from when the crucial six-months' race with time begins.\n\nOnce limitation starts, nothing-not the most tragic eventscan interrupt it; for -, the moving hand writes, and having writ\n\n(I) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 75.\n\n(2) 119.61] 3 S.C.R. 647.\n\n(3) [19631 2 S.C.E. 832.\n\nD /\n\nTRUSTEIOS BOMBAY PORT v. PREMIER AUTOS. (Krishn(l Iyer, J.) 421\n\nmoves on; not all thy tears nor piety can lure it back to cancel half a line'. This implacable start is after 'the accrual of the cause', which is when non-delivery or non-tender takes place. That event is fixed with reference to reasonable lapse of time after the unloading of the goods.\n\nThus, if the search is to find out whether the goods have landed at all, it is integral and anterio~ to the 'cause'; but if it be to trace what has definitely been discharged into _the port it is de-linked from the 'cause'- a la Bootamal.\n\nSuch an approach reduces the variables and stops the evils of fluctuation of limitation. It is easy to fix when the vessel has discharged the goods into the port by1 looking into the tally sheet or other relevant documents prescribed in the bye-laws. This part of the tracing cannot take long although it is regrettable and negligent for the Bombay Port\n\nofficials to have taken undue time to give the plaintiffs even this information. On the contrary, search for the missing but landed goods in the warehouses and sheds. and open spaces can be a wild goose chase honestly or as long as the consignee or port officials with dishonestly.\n\nReasonable diligence will readily give the consignee information of landing of his goods.\n\nIn the major port cities warehousing facilities are expensive and difficult to procure so that a consignee of considerable goods may manage to get free warehousing space within the port for as Jong as he wants by inducing, for illicit consideration, the port officials to issue letters that the goods are being traced out. This is a vice which adds to the sinister uncertainty of the terminus a quo if we accept the plea that every letter from the port authorities that the missing goods are being traced out has the effect of postponing limitation.\n\nWe wish to make it clear however that the event which is relevant being the discharge of the goods [rom the ship into the port, the bailment begins when the Board takes charge of the goods and a necessary component of the \"cause\" in s. 87 of the Act is the knowledge of the owner that the goods have landed.\n\nOne small but significant argument of the Solicitor General remains to be noticed. In the search for what is the reasonable time for delivery by the bailee a pragmatic or working rules is suggested by him which we think merits consideration. When a large consignment is entnisted with the Board and the bulk' of it is delivered on a particular date it ordinarily follows that the reasonable time for the delivery of the missing part of the consignment also fell on that date.\n\nThere may be exceptiomu circumstances whereby some items in the consiMment\n\nmight not have b.een unloaded from the ship by mistake or might be stored by error in a wrong shed mixed up with other goods so that they are not deliverable readily, or a substantial part of the goods has been taken delivery of and by the time the balance is sought to be removed a bandh or strike or other physical obstruction prevents taking delivery.\n\nApart from these recondite possibilities which require to be specially proved. by him who claims that limitation has not started, it is safe to conclude that the date for delivery of the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1974 J 3 S.C.lt.\n\nnon-delivered part of the consignment is the same as that when a good part of it was actually delivered.\n\nThe ruling in Trustees of the .Port of Madras v. Union of India, cited by Shri Cooper in this context, is good in parts.\n\nThe learned judges were dealing with the short delivery by the Madras Port Trust.\n\nWhile pointing out that attempts made by the Port Trust to locate the goods would be no answer to the claim for delivery made by the consignee, the Court held that the date when limitation starts in such cases is when a certificate that the missing packages are not available (Shedmaster's certificate 'C') is issued.\n\nWhile it is correct to say that alleged attempts by the Port officials to locate the goods which have definitely landed has no bearing on the. \"c1use\", it is equally incorrect to hold that till the certificate that the non-delivered package is not forthcoming limitation does nbt begin.\n\nThe true test, as we have earlier pointed out, is to find out when delivery should have been made in the normal course, subject to the fact of discharge from the ship to the port of the relevant goods and the knowledge about that fact by the consignee.\n\nIn Union of India v. Jutharam(') a single Judge of that High Court took the view that when part of the goods sent in one consignment was not delivered it is right to hold that it should have reasonably been delivered on the same day the delivery of the other part took place.\n\nThe date of delivery of part of the consignment must be deemed to be the starting point of limitation.\n\nThis approach has our broad approval.\n\nJn U11io11 of India v. Vitha/sa Kisansa & Co.(') a single Judge of Bombay High Court, while emphasizing that what is reasonable time for delivery may depend upon the circumstances of each case, the point was made if the correspondence between the bailee and the consignee disclosed anything which may amount to an acknowledgment of the liabiliv of the carrier that would give a fresh starting point of limitation. even as. if the correspondence discloses material which mav throw light on the question of determinin~ the reasonable time fordeliverv, the Court may take into account that correspondence but not subsequent letters relatin• only to the tracing of the goods.\n\nThis statement of law although made in the context of a public carrier's liability applies also to the Port Trust. In short, there is force in the olea that normally the date for delivery of the missing packaoes should be deemed to be the same as the date when another part of the\n\nconignrnent \\Vas actually delivered.\n\nWe thus come to the end of the case and mav formulate our conc1usions, :-5 clearlv as the complex of facts permits.\n\n( 1 ) Soctinn 87 of the Acts insists on notice of\" one month.\n\nThis period mav kgitimatelv be tacked on to the six month period men tioned in the section (vide Sec. 15(2) LimitatiOn Act, 1963).\n\n(2) The starting point of limitation is the accrual of the cause H of action.\n\nT\\vo components of the \"cause'' are important.\n\nThe date\n\n(I) A.1.R. 1968 Pat. 35.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1971Born.172.\n\nTRUSTEES BOMBAY PORT v. PREMIER AUTOS. (Krishna Iyer, J.) 423'\n\nw!1cn the plaintiff came to kno\\v or ought to know with reasonable diligence that the goods had been landed from the vessel into the port.\n\nT.vo clear, though not conclusive indications of when theconsignce ought to know are (i) when the bulk of the goods are delivered, there being short delivery leading to a suit (ii) 7 days after knowledge of the landing of the goods sugested in Sec. 6lA. Which ever is the. later date ordinarily sets off the running of Limitation.\n\n(3) Letters or assurances that the missing packages are being. searched for cannot enlarge limitation, once the goods have landed and the owner has come to know of it.\n\nTo rely on such an unstable date as the termination of the search by the bailee is apt to mak<t the laVI uncertain, the limitation liable to manipulation and abuses of other types to seep into the system.\n\n( 4) Section 87 is attracted not merely when an act is committed but also when an omission occurs in the course of the performanci;- of the official duty.\n\nThe <let-omission complex, if it has a nexus to the official functions of the Board and its officers, attracts limitation under s. 87.\n\nJudged by these working rules, the present case has to be decided against the plaintiffs. For one thing, the short delivery of one bwidle of steel pl:ites is an integral part of the delivery of the consignment by the pert outhorities to the consignee in the discharge of their official functions as statutory bailee.\n\nSection 87 of the Act, therefore, applies.\n\nThe delivery of the bulk of the consignment took place on September 19, 1959 and more than seven months had passed after that before the institL1tion of the suit.\n\nOf course, a later date, nan1cly, Novem~ ber 7, 1959 (Ext. 'A') clearly brings to the ken of the plaintiff the fact that the missing bundle has been duly landed in the port. It is true that the enquiry section of the Bombay Port Trust Docks did not even, as late as December 4, 1959, give a dcrlnite reply about the \"outturn\" for this item.\n\nOn December 5, 1959, the first plaintiff brought to the notice of the Board \"that the above mentioned bundle has been landed and they (agents oi the vessel) hold receipt from you (the Board)\".\n\nThe plaintiffs made an enquiry \"Whether the bundle has been landed, if landed, let the information regarding tlie whereabouts and, if not, confirm the short-landings.\" Further reffiinders by the plaintiffs proved fruitless till at last on J anuarv 22. 1960 .. the port officer concerned wrote : ,\n\n\"] beg to inform you that the bundle under reference has been outturned as \"Landed but missing.\"\n\nIt was contended that the plaintiffs, for certain, came to know of the landing <'f the missing bundle only on J anuarv 22, 1960.\n\nWe are unable to a7cept this plea because the first plaintiff had already got the 111forJ?1at1on,. as early as November 7, 1959. about the due landing of the m1<s111g item. from the Indian Maritime Enterprises.\n\nNothing has been sugested before us as to why this knowledge of the plaintiff should be discarded.\n\nThe subsequent correspondence between the port officers and the plaintiffs was more for getting requisite documents\n\n' to follow up legal proceedings against the insurer by the consignee.\n\nIn this view, the starting point of limitation arose on November 7, 1959 and the suit was instituted on June 18, 1960, a little over 10 days beyond the period of limitation. The plaintiffs thus missed the bus and we regret to decide on this technical point that the suit is liable to be dismissed but we must.\n\nA faint plea that the Board is not a 'person' falling within s. 87 was suggested by Sri Cooper but its fate, if urged, is what overtook a similar contention before a Bench of the Madras High Court in Trustees of the Port of Madras v. Home Insurance Co.(')-dismissal without a second thought.\n\nIt is surprising that a public body like the Port Trust should have shown remissne in handling the goods of consignees and in taking effective action for tracin~ the goods. It is seen that while there is a special police stafon inside the port, called the Yellow Gate Police Station, with six or seven officers and 200 policemen for duty by day and with about 400 policemen for duty by night, the port authorities did not care to report to the police till December 16, 1959.\n\nThree months is far too inordinate and inexcusable a delay for reporting about the .pilferage of a vital and valuable item, namely, a bundle of steel plates imported from Japan by an automobile manufacturing company.\n\nWhile we dismiss this suit, we feel that it is not enough that the State instal police stations inside the ports; it must ensure diligent action by the officials, and if there is delinquency or default in discharging their duties promptly and smartly, disciplinary action should be taken against those concerned.\n\nIn this country our major harbours are acquiring a different reputation for harbouring smugglers and pilferers and an impresi; ion has gained currency that port officials connive at these operations for consideration.\n\nEvery case is an event and an index, projects a conflict of rights between two entities but has a social facet, being the symptom of a social legion.\n\nWe consider that the Government and the public must be alerted about the un satisfactory functioning of the ports so that delinquent officials may be proceeded against for dubious default in the discharge of their duties. It is not enough that diligence is shown in pleading limitation when honest citizens aggrieved by loss of their goods entrusted to public bodies come to court. The responsibility of these institutions to do their utmost to prevent pilferage is implied in the legislative policy of prescribing a short period of limitation.\n\nAnother important circumstance we wish to emphasize is that ambiguity in language leading to possibilities of different constructions should not be left to the painfully long and expensive process of being settled decades later bv the highest court in the land.\n\nThe alternative and quicker process in a democracy of rectification by legislative amendment should be resorted to so that private citizens are not subjected to inordinate expense and delay because the legalese in a legislation reads abstruse or ambiguous.\n\nThe very length Qf this judgment, and_ of thi' litigation, is eloquent testimony to the need (!) A.J.R. 1970 Mad. 48 ..\n\nE .\n\nTRUSTEES BOMBAY PORT v. PREMIER AUTOS. (Krish11111 Iyer, J.) 425\n\nfor prompt corrective legislation on such small matters as have cropped up in the present case.\n\nMoreover, some uniformity in regard to statutory bailee's responsibilities, whether they be public carriers like the Railways, or strategic institutions like Ports, will give the community a sense of certainty and clarity about their rights and the duties of public bodies in charge of their goods.\n\nCounsel had drawn attention to the difficulties of the community where conflicting judicial currents aided by tricky words have made law chancy, and the need for this Court to clear the ground and give the lead.\n\nWe are aware, with justice Jackson of the U.S. Supreme Court, that 'the judicial decree, hoever, broadly worded, actually binds in most instances, only the parties to the case.\n\nAs to others, it is merely a weather vane showing wh.ich way the judicial wind is blowing'.\n\nThe direction of the wind. in this branch of law, is as we have projected.\n\nWe are of the view, in reiteration of earlier expression on the same Jines, that public bodies should resist the te<>1ptation to take technical pleas or defeat honest claims by legally permissible but marginally unjust contentions, including narrow Jimitation.\n\nIn this and similar cases, where a public carrier dissuades private parties from suing by its promises of search for lost articles and finally pleads helplessness, it is doubtful morality to non-suit solely on grounds of limitation, a plaintiff who is taken in by seemingly responsible representation only to find himself fooled by his credibility.\n\nPublic institutions convict themselves of untrustworthiness out of their own mouth by resorting to such defences.\n\nWhat should be the proper direction for costs ? Both the parties are public sector bodies.\n\nBut the principle which must guide us has to be of general application. Here is a small claim which is usually associated with the little man and when, as in this test action, the litigation escalates to the final court wafted by a legal nicety, his financial back is broken in a bona-fide endeavour to secure a declaration of the law that binds all courts in the country for the obvious benefit of the whole community.\n\nThe fact that the case has gained special leave under art. i36 is prima focie proof of the general public importance of the legal issue.\n\nThe course of this litigation proves that the fine but decisive point of law enmeshed in a conllict of precedents found each cpurt reversing the one next below it, almost hopefully appetising the losing party to appeal to the higher forum.\n\nThe real beneficiary is the business community which now knows finally the norm of limitation they must obey.\n\nIs it faidn these circumstances that one party, albeit the vanquished one, should bear the burden of costs throughout for providing the occasion--not provocation-for laying down the correct law in a controversial situation.\n\nFaced with. a similar moral-legal issue, Lord Reid observed :\n\n\"I think we must consider separately costs in this House and costs in the Court of Appeal.\n\nCases can only come before this House with leave, a.nd leave is generally given because some general question of law is involved. In this\n\ncase it enabled the whole vexed matter of non est factum to be re-examined.\n\nThi3 seems to me a typical case \\vhere the costs of the successful respondent shoul<l come o:it of public funds.\"(').\n\n\"The Evershed Committee on Supreme Court Practice and Procedure had sugges; ed in England that t'1c Attorney- General should be empowered to issue a certificate for the use of public funds in appeals to the House o; Lords where issues of outstanding public importance are involved ... (2).\n\nMaybe, a schme for a suitor's fund to indemnify for costs as :recommended by a Sub-Committee of Justice is the answer, but these are matters for the consideration of the Legislature and the E.\\ccutivc.\n\nWe mention them to show that the law in this branch cannot be rigid.\n\nWe have to make a compromise between pragmatism and equity and modify the loser-pays-all doctrine by exercise of a flexible discretion.\n\nThe respondent in this case need not be a martyr for the cause of t)le certainty of law under s. 87 of the Act, particularly when the appellant wins on a point of limitation. (The trial court had even held the appeilant guilty of neligence). Jn these circumstances we direct that the parties do bear their costs throughout.\n\nSubject to this, we nllow the appeal. :s.c.\n\nA ppea/ allo1Ved.\n\n(1) Gallic v. Lee .\n\n. (2) !1971] A.C. 1039, 1048.", "total_entities": 217, "entities": [{"text": "I\n\nTRUSTEES OF PORT OF BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 33, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TRUSTEES OF PORT OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE PREMIER AUTOMOBILES LTD. AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE PREMIER AUTOMOBILES LTD. AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 15, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 94, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AND ANOTHER\n\nFebruary 15, 1974\n\n397."}}, {"text": "D. G. PALEKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.G. PALEKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 159, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Port Trust Act 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 171, "end_char": 190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 191, "end_char": 196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Port Trust Act 1879", "statute": "Port Trust Act 1879"}}, {"text": "Bombay Port Trust", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 632, "end_char": 649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The goods were discharged in the docks on 12th September 1959~ into the custody of the Bombay Port Trust."}}, {"text": "September 19, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 738, "end_char": 756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 19, 1959, delivery of the goods was apphed for and was given .but only 52 bundles."}}, {"text": "Indian Maritime Enterprises", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1019, "end_char": 1046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Indian Maritime Enterprises, the agents of the Japanese vessel, the plaintiff came to know on November 7, 1959 that all the 53 bundles had been duly unloaded."}}, {"text": "November 7, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1113, "end_char": 1129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Indian Maritime Enterprises, the agents of the Japanese vessel, the plaintiff came to know on November 7, 1959 that all the 53 bundles had been duly unloaded."}}, {"text": "December 5, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1231, "end_char": 1247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "December 5, 1959 whether the bundle had been landed; but the port authorities still informed that the missing bundle was still under search."}}, {"text": "January 22, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1387, "end_char": 1403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, on January 22, 1960, the appellant informed the first plaintiff that the bundle under reference tiad been out-turned as landed but missing."}}, {"text": "March 1, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1644, "end_char": 1657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Within a week thereafter, the first plaintiff asked for a non-delivery l:l!rtificate and the certificate was issued on March 1, 1960 and on May 12, 1960 a statutory notice under s .. 87 of the Bomhav Port Trust Act, 1879, was issued and a suit was filed for the m!sing bundle or its value by way of damages."}}, {"text": "May 12, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1665, "end_char": 1677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Within a week thereafter, the first plaintiff asked for a non-delivery l:l!rtificate and the certificate was issued on March 1, 1960 and on May 12, 1960 a statutory notice under s .. 87 of the Bomhav Port Trust Act, 1879, was issued and a suit was filed for the m!sing bundle or its value by way of damages."}}, {"text": "Bomhav Port Trust Act, 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1718, "end_char": 1745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1917, "end_char": 1922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bomhav Port Trust Act, 1879", "statute": "the Bomhav Port Trust Act, 1879"}}, {"text": "September 19. 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1975, "end_char": 1993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tite defence put forward by the appellant was, that since the suit was governed by s. 87 of the Act and the cause uf action having arisen on September 19."}}, {"text": "Section 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2611, "end_char": 2621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bomhav Port Trust Act, 1879", "statute": "the Bomhav Port Trust Act, 1879"}}, {"text": "Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2629, "end_char": 2656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3683, "end_char": 3690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 15(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3833, "end_char": 3843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3844, "end_char": 3863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 61A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4381, "end_char": 4389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Limitation Act 1963", "statute": "Limitation Act 1963"}}, {"text": "Sec. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4623, "end_char": 4630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Limitation Act 1963", "statute": "Limitation Act 1963"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISJ?ICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4916, "end_char": 4945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4230]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISJ?ICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "16th September, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5040, "end_char": 5060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 16th September, 1972 of the High Court of Bombay in Civil Revision No."}}, {"text": "F. S. Nariman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5125, "end_char": 5138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, Additional Solicitor General of India, P. C. Bhartari, B. R. Zaiwala and B. S. Bhesania, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. C. Bhartari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5179, "end_char": 5193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, Additional Solicitor General of India, P. C. Bhartari, B. R. Zaiwala and B. S. Bhesania, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. R. Zaiwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5195, "end_char": 5208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, Additional Solicitor General of India, P. C. Bhartari, B. R. Zaiwala and B. S. Bhesania, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. S. Bhesania", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5213, "end_char": 5227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, Additional Solicitor General of India, P. C. Bhartari, B. R. Zaiwala and B. S. Bhesania, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. Divan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5254, "end_char": 5262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ani/ B. Divan, K. S. Cooper, Vasant C. Kotwal, S. C. Agarwal and P. D. Sharma, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "K. S. Cooper", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5264, "end_char": 5276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ani/ B. Divan, K. S. Cooper, Vasant C. Kotwal, S. C. Agarwal and P. D. Sharma, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Vasant C. Kotwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5278, "end_char": 5294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ani/ B. Divan, K. S. Cooper, Vasant C. Kotwal, S. C. Agarwal and P. D. Sharma, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5296, "end_char": 5309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ani/ B. Divan, K. S. Cooper, Vasant C. Kotwal, S. C. Agarwal and P. D. Sharma, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "P. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5314, "end_char": 5326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ani/ B. Divan, K. S. Cooper, Vasant C. Kotwal, S. C. Agarwal and P. D. Sharma, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5394, "end_char": 5406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. A small cause involving a petty claim of Rs.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5492, "end_char": 5505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1147 .42 has sailed slowly into the Supreme Court by special leave."}}, {"text": "Bombay Port Trust", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5540, "end_char": 5557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both sides-The Bombay Port Trust, appellant, and the New Great Issurance Co. (a nationalised institution), the contesting respondentagree before us that while there is only a short point of law in the case, a large section of the business com1nunity, as well as the Port Trust, are affected by the ambiguity of the legal situation and an early pronouncement by this Court on the law of limitation applicable to consignee's actions for short delivery by the Port Trust is necessary."}}, {"text": "New Great Issurance Co.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5578, "end_char": 5601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both sides-The Bombay Port Trust, appellant, and the New Great Issurance Co. (a nationalised institution), the contesting respondentagree before us that while there is only a short point of law in the case, a large section of the business com1nunity, as well as the Port Trust, are affected by the ambiguity of the legal situation and an early pronouncement by this Court on the law of limitation applicable to consignee's actions for short delivery by the Port Trust is necessary."}}, {"text": "s. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6057, "end_char": 6062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6070, "end_char": 6097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 61A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6226, "end_char": 6232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879", "statute": "the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6302, "end_char": 6316, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7040, "end_char": 7052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TRUSTEES BOMBAY PORT v. PREMIER AUToS. (Krishna Iyer, I.) 399'\n\nA immediate attention towards basic reformation of the traditional structure and procedure if the Indian Judicature is to sustain the litigative credibility of the community.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Devlm", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7280, "end_char": 7285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, even about British Justice Lord Devlm's observations serve as warning for our court system : \"If our business."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8461, "end_char": 8467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first plaintiff became entitled to claim a consignment of 53 bnndles of mild steel plates despatched by a Japanese exporter to be delivered at the port of Bombay."}}, {"text": "September 12, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8594, "end_char": 8612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay Port Trust (the defendant, and now the appellant) on September 12, 1959."}}, {"text": "Septem1'er 19, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8711, "end_char": 8730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Within a week, that is, on Septem1'er 19, 1959, delivery of the goods was applied for and was given but of only 52 bundles."}}, {"text": "December 4, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8986, "end_char": 9002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A week thereafter, the first plaintiff demanded the missing bundle, but was tcntalisingly put off from time to time by the defendant by letters of September 29, October 10, and December 4, 1959 assuring that a search was in progress to trace the goods."}}, {"text": "September 26, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9134, "end_char": 9152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is important at this stage to notice that the plaintiff's letter of September 26, 1959 sought \"information regarding the whereabouts of the above bundle so as to enable us to clear the same at an early date\"."}}, {"text": "J ndian Maritime Enterprises", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10064, "end_char": 10092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reply received by the first plaintiff is meaningful in iliat the J ndian Maritime Enterprises In their Jetter dated November 7, 1959, told the first plaintiff that all the 53 bundles had been duly unloaded."}}, {"text": "s. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11950, "end_char": 11955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June\n\nIS, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11991, "end_char": 12005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a certificate was issued on March 1, 1960 and on May 12, 1960 a statutory notice under s. 87 of the Act was issued, followed on June\n\nIS, 1960 by the suit for the missing bundle or its value by way of damages."}}, {"text": "s. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12208, "end_char": 12213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12951, "end_char": 12956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishna Tyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13811, "end_char": 13823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna Tyer, J.) 401\n\nor purporting to have been done'.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Cooper", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14329, "end_char": 14335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Embellished by numerous rulings, Shri Cooper strove to convince us of the substance of the further link in the chain of his case that the cause of action for recovery of the value of the lost article could not spring to life before the knowledge of the landing and loss was.", "canonical_name": "Cooper"}}, {"text": "s. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15975, "end_char": 15980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 61A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16704, "end_char": 16710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17828, "end_char": 17833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18006, "end_char": 18011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 61A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18389, "end_char": 18398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18910, "end_char": 18920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act, 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18928, "end_char": 18949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19554, "end_char": 19566, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 151, 152 and 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19599, "end_char": 19623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and subject also in the case of goods received for carriage by railways to the provisions of the Indian Railways Act, 1890", "statute": "Act and subject also in the case of goods received for carriage by railways to the provisions of the Indian Railways Act, 1890"}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19631, "end_char": 19656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jn one of the earliest cases under the Highway Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23621, "end_char": 23671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 1()", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24004, "end_char": 24010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jn one of the earliest cases under the Highway Act", "statute": "Jn one of the earliest cases under the Highway Act"}}, {"text": "Denman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24065, "end_char": 24071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Denman, C.J., dis- 1>0sed of ihe matter terselv_:\n\n\"It is clear that the defendant is charged with a tort committed in the course of bis official dutv; he is charged,\n\nas survevor."}}, {"text": "Wightman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25152, "end_char": 25160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Wightman J. struck a similar note."}}, {"text": "TRUSTEES BOMBAY PORT", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25818, "end_char": 25838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TRUSTEES BOMBAY PORT \\', PREMIER AUTOS. ("}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25859, "end_char": 25871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna Iyer, ].)", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Baron Parke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26035, "end_char": 26046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S may be referreij to; for instance Palmer v. The Gr1J11a Junction Railway Company('} where the same point was\n\nniled, but where Baron Parke said :\n\n\"If the action was broul(ht against the railway company for the ollllSsion of some duty imposed upon them by the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 139", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26872, "end_char": 26878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Public Health Act, 1848", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26886, "end_char": 26909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Coleridge", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27505, "end_char": 27514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coleridge, J. observed with fe1icitous precisions :\n\n\"This is not a case of not doing; the defendant does something, omitting to securn protection for the public."}}, {"text": "Erle", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27738, "end_char": 27742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Erle J. likewise said :\n\n\"Here the cause of action is the making the hole, compounded with the not putting up a light."}}, {"text": "Wallasey Local Board", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28280, "end_char": 28300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lol/i[fee v. The Wallasey Local Board(') is a leading case, rightly pressed for acceptance of its ratio by the learned Solicitor General."}}, {"text": "Kesling", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28402, "end_char": 28409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kesling, J., after finding for the plaintiff on negligence, focussed atten-\n\n(I) 4 M. & W. 74~·\n\n(3) 5 E. & B. 115; 24 L. J. (Q. B.) 337."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29442, "end_char": 29452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This question depends upon the construction of the several Acts of Parliament which have been placed before us.\" . . . . . . \""}}, {"text": "Now the local board was originally constituted under the Public Health Act, 1848", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29501, "end_char": 29581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 139", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29718, "end_char": 29724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Now the local board was originally constituted under the Public Health Act, 1848", "statute": "Now the local board was originally constituted under the Public Health Act, 1848"}}, {"text": "Brett", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30384, "end_char": 30389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brett, J, expressed himself equally unminicingly :\n\n\"Now."}}, {"text": "Aspinnal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30475, "end_char": 30483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "two objections were urged by Mr. Aspinnal."}}, {"text": "Kelly", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31038, "end_char": 31043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c. f Haliiax(1), Kelly, C.B., states the proposition in those terms: \"It has been urged on the part of the plaintiff that the charge against the defendts is not of any act done or intended to be done, but of an omission to erect or cause to be erected a fence between the footpath and the goit, and that the omission to do an act is not\n(Ii' Law Rep. 3 Ex."}}, {"text": "Jolliffee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32348, "end_char": 32357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Cooper tried to distinguish Jolliffee's case but having given our close' attention to the matter we decline to jettison this weigh•.y judgment.", "canonical_name": "Jolliffee"}}, {"text": "Jollifjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32465, "end_char": 32474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jollifjee's case was followed by the Privy Council in Queen v.\n\nWilliams(').", "canonical_name": "Jolliffee"}}, {"text": "Privy Council from India under the Calcutta Port Act, 1890", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32932, "end_char": 32990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Alness", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33125, "end_char": 33131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Alness observed : \"Reliance was placed by the respondents on the case of the Bradford Corporation v. M, yers [(1916) I A.C. 242]."}}, {"text": "Bradford", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33993, "end_char": 34001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The English Act was properly treated by the House in the Bradford case as one from which the words \"profession er purporting\" were omitted, and the observations of the House must, of course, be construed secundum subjectam materiem.\""}}, {"text": "s. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34315, "end_char": 34321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Simonds", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34407, "end_char": 34414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Simonds, speak\n\nmg for the Board, explained the position of law thus :\n\n\"A public servant can only be said to .act or to purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty."}}, {"text": "Shri Cooper brought to our notice the circumstance that Public Acthorities Protection Act, 1893", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35514, "end_char": 35609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Varadachariar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36041, "end_char": 36054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gill v. The King (supra), just referred to, affirms the careful analysis of the authorities by Varadachariar, J., in Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown(') and also the ratio in Huntley's(') case."}}, {"text": "Huntley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36116, "end_char": 36123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gill v. The King (supra), just referred to, affirms the careful analysis of the authorities by Varadachariar, J., in Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown(') and also the ratio in Huntley's(') case."}}, {"text": "Hori Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36139, "end_char": 36147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Hori Ram's case, which related to the construction of s. 197 of the Criminal Prbeedure Code ands."}}, {"text": "s. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36193, "end_char": 36199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Shri Cooper brought to our notice the circumstance that Public Acthorities Protection Act, 1893", "statute": "Shri Cooper brought to our notice the circumstance that Public Acthorities Protection Act, 1893"}}, {"text": "[1939] F. C.R. 159", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 37177, "end_char": 37195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1944) F. C. R. 252", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 37202, "end_char": 37221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38197, "end_char": 38201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38209, "end_char": 38228, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 38249, "end_char": 38268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A decision of the Calcutta High Court (Commissioner for the Court of Calc!ttta v. Abdul Rahim OOsma11 & Co.(2), turning on the construction of a similar provision (s. 142 of the Calcutta Port Act) covers the various decisions, Indian and English, and after pointed reference to A nzrik Singh's case reaches the conclusion :\n\n\"There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.\""}}, {"text": "s. 142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38395, "end_char": 38401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A nzrik Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38509, "end_char": 38522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A decision of the Calcutta High Court (Commissioner for the Court of Calc!ttta v. Abdul Rahim OOsma11 & Co.(2), turning on the construction of a similar provision (s. 142 of the Calcutta Port Act) covers the various decisions, Indian and English, and after pointed reference to A nzrik Singh's case reaches the conclusion :\n\n\"There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.\""}}, {"text": "sec. 142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38960, "end_char": 38968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39407, "end_char": 39415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39584, "end_char": 39592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Local Self-Government Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40014, "end_char": 40045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40534, "end_char": 40545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Gorakh Fulji Mahala v. State( 1), Chandrachud, J., as he then was, made an elaborate study of a comparable provision in the Bombay Police Act (s. 161) and followed the Federal Court decisions already referred to by us, as well as this Court's decision in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay(')."}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40631, "end_char": 40641, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40643, "end_char": 40649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Local Self-Government Act", "statute": "Bihar Local Self-Government Act"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 41738, "end_char": 41755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Madras Port v. Home Insurance\n\nCo. ('), a Division Bench of the Madras High Court adopted the widor view and held :\n\n\"The services which the Board has to perform and could perform statutorily under the statutory powers and duties cannot be dissociated from its omissions and failures in relation to the goods."}}, {"text": "Madras General Clauses Act, 1891", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42130, "end_char": 42162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Natesan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42234, "end_char": 42241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Natesan, J., relied on Calcutta Port Con1n1issioner v. Corporation of Cal- .cutta('l, where the Judicial Committee had stressed the ampler sense of 'purporting or professing to act in pursuance of the statute• and observed :\n\n\"Their Lordships regard these words as of pivotal importance."}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S. C. R. 1177", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 42821, "end_char": 42843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42915, "end_char": 42927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna Iyer, /.) 411\n\nThe whole issue is clinched in our view by the final pronouncement of this Court in Public Prosecutor Madras v. R. Raju(').", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "s.40(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43085, "end_char": 43092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Madras General Clauses Act, 1891", "statute": "Under the Madras General Clauses Act, 1891"}}, {"text": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43100, "end_char": 43133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pritam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43268, "end_char": 43280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made to Pritam Singh's( 2) case where absence from duty at the time of the roll call was held to be something done under the provisions of the Police Act."}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43403, "end_char": 43413, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43635, "end_char": 43640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944", "statute": "the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43648, "end_char": 43658, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44003, "end_char": 44006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th.e ratio decidendi is set out by Ray, J. (as he then was) thus :\n\n\"25."}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44113, "end_char": 44132, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hcgde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44831, "end_char": 44836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hcgde, J., speaking for the Court said \"The omission in question must have a positive content in it."}}, {"text": "sec 653", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45825, "end_char": 45832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CQOper", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46009, "end_char": 46015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seemingly substantial support for Shri CQOper's contention is A derived from observations in State of GujQiat v. Kansara Mani/al Bhikha/a( 1), where, rejecting ii plea of protection under s. 117 of the Factories Act, 1948, by an occupier of a factory who had violated the duties cast on him, Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) observed ;\n\n\"But the critical words are \"any thing done or intended to be done\" under the Act.", "canonical_name": "Cooper"}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46158, "end_char": 46164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46172, "end_char": 46191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46262, "end_char": 46274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seemingly substantial support for Shri CQOper's contention is A derived from observations in State of GujQiat v. Kansara Mani/al Bhikha/a( 1), where, rejecting ii plea of protection under s. 117 of the Factories Act, 1948, by an occupier of a factory who had violated the duties cast on him, Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) observed ;\n\n\"But the critical words are \"any thing done or intended to be done\" under the Act."}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46759, "end_char": 46778, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47405, "end_char": 47411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection it is necessary to point out, as was done in the Nagpur\" case above referred to, that the occupier and manager are exempted from liability in certain cases mentioned in s. 101."}}, {"text": "s. 101", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47525, "end_char": 47531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48043, "end_char": 48049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48849, "end_char": 48855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a recent ruling of this Court in Khandu Sonu Dhobi v. State of Maharas/1tra('), Khanna, J., while repelling a pica of immunity from\n\n(I) (19651 I !."}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49183, "end_char": 49223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49782, "end_char": 49792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942", "statute": "The Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942"}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51296, "end_char": 51306, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51593, "end_char": 51612, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 61(A)(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52228, "end_char": 52239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52701, "end_char": 52706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 151, 152 and 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52833, "end_char": 52853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52861, "end_char": 52886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 152", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52951, "end_char": 52957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Contract Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Contract Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "s. 6I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52981, "end_char": 52986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Contract Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Contract Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "s. 64A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53164, "end_char": 53170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Contract Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Contract Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 54042, "end_char": 54049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is nothin.~ unusual in the jurisprudence of India or England and is con<titutioMlty snund."}}, {"text": "Section 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54080, "end_char": 54090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Stroud", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55736, "end_char": 55742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna Iyer, I.) 415\n\nStroud (Stroud's Judicial Dictionary; 3rd edn."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57354, "end_char": 57358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57387, "end_char": 57392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57495, "end_char": 57500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57684, "end_char": 57692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57700, "end_char": 57714, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57883, "end_char": 57897, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "art. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58089, "end_char": 58097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58105, "end_char": 58119, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 61B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59583, "end_char": 59594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 151, 152 and 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59663, "end_char": 59683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 151", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59819, "end_char": 59825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 152", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59873, "end_char": 59879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59927, "end_char": 59933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 160", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60191, "end_char": 60199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60289, "end_char": 60295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 61A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60498, "end_char": 60507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62501, "end_char": 62506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Port Trust", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 62585, "end_char": 62602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Madras Port Trust case where action for loss of goods was laid, two extreme contentions competed for acceptance."}}, {"text": "Ramamurti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63397, "end_char": 63406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If so, as Ramamurti, J., has held :\n\n\"It stands to common sense that the owner cannot be expected to file a suit before he is given access to the goods and also an effective opportunity to examine the goods and he becomes aware of the loss or damage which had occurred to the goods."}}, {"text": "Court did in a different situation under the Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64090, "end_char": 64155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64878, "end_char": 64884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court did in a different situation under the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Court did in a different situation under the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "art. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66830, "end_char": 66838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66846, "end_char": 66860, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "art. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67096, "end_char": 67104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Binod Mitter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67239, "end_char": 67251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn a recent decision of their Lordship's Board, delivered by Sir Binod Mitter, it is stated, in reference toart.", "canonical_name": "Binod Mitter"}}, {"text": "Binod Milter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67756, "end_char": 67768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reference to Sir Binod Milter's observations relates to the ruling in Balo v. Koklan.", "canonical_name": "Binod Mitter"}}, {"text": "SS 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68266, "end_char": 68270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68716, "end_char": 68724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68897, "end_char": 68902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69011, "end_char": 69023, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bootamal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69164, "end_char": 69172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Views rnn on rival lines till in Bootamal's case(') this Court settled the conr\n\nflict and gave the correct lead which has been heavily relied on by the Solicitor General."}}, {"text": "Bootamal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 69361, "end_char": 69369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Cooper contested the application of the principle in Bootamal on the score that art."}}, {"text": "art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69388, "end_char": 69395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69397, "end_char": 69417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69580, "end_char": 69584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71175, "end_char": 71182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72402, "end_char": 72409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72548, "end_char": 72558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 73185, "end_char": 73197, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 73387, "end_char": 73401, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 73410, "end_char": 73422, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73662, "end_char": 73667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 73715, "end_char": 73727, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 73731, "end_char": 73745, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1960] 2 S.C.R. 75", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 74654, "end_char": 74672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Port", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 75670, "end_char": 75681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This part of the tracing cannot take long although it is regrettable and negligent for the Bombay Port\n\nofficials to have taken undue time to give the plaintiffs even this information."}}, {"text": "s. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76841, "end_char": 76846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 79715, "end_char": 79732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn U11io11 of India v. Vitha/sa Kisansa & Co.(') a single Judge of Bombay High Court, while emphasizing that what is reasonable time for delivery may depend upon the circumstances of each case, the point was made if the correspondence between the bailee and the consignee disclosed anything which may amount to an acknowledgment of the liabiliv of the carrier that would give a fresh starting point of limitation."}}, {"text": "Sec. 15(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80918, "end_char": 80928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "LimitatiOn Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 80929, "end_char": 80949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81590, "end_char": 81596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "LimitatiOn Act, 1963", "statute": "LimitatiOn Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Section 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82058, "end_char": 82068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82337, "end_char": 82342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82663, "end_char": 82673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84094, "end_char": 84098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "7, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 84499, "end_char": 84506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this view, the starting point of limitation arose on November 7, 1959 and the suit was instituted on June 18, 1960, a little over 10 days beyond the period of limitation."}}, {"text": "June 18, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 84538, "end_char": 84551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this view, the starting point of limitation arose on November 7, 1959 and the suit was instituted on June 18, 1960, a little over 10 days beyond the period of limitation."}}, {"text": "s. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84806, "end_char": 84811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 16, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 85494, "end_char": 85511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is seen that while there is a special police stafon inside the port, called the Yellow Gate Police Station, with six or seven officers and 200 policemen for duty by day and with about 400 policemen for duty by night, the port authorities did not care to report to the police till December 16, 1959."}}, {"text": "Japan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 85685, "end_char": 85690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Three months is far too inordinate and inexcusable a delay for reporting about the .pilferage of a vital and valuable item, namely, a bundle of steel plates imported from Japan by an automobile manufacturing company."}}, {"text": "Jackson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88312, "end_char": 88319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are aware, with justice Jackson of the U.S. Supreme Court, that 'the judicial decree, hoever, broadly worded, actually binds in most instances, only the parties to the case."}}, {"text": "U.S. Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 88327, "end_char": 88345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are aware, with justice Jackson of the U.S. Supreme Court, that 'the judicial decree, hoever, broadly worded, actually binds in most instances, only the parties to the case."}}, {"text": "Reid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 90633, "end_char": 90637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a similar moral-legal issue, Lord Reid observed :\n\n\"I think we must consider separately costs in this House and costs in the Court of Appeal."}}, {"text": "Evershed Committee on Supreme Court Practice and Procedure", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 91082, "end_char": 91140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"The Evershed Committee on Supreme Court Practice and Procedure had sugges; ed in England that t'1c Attorney- General should be empowered to issue a certificate for the use of public funds in appeals to the House o; Lords where issues of outstanding public importance are involved ... (2)."}}, {"text": "s. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91872, "end_char": 91877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_427_439_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "NAWABKHAN ABBASKHAN\n\nTHE STATE OF GUJARAT\n\nFebruary 19, 1974\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, ]J.j\n\nDo1nbay Police Act, 1951, Sections 56 and 142-Prosecution for contravention of exten11ne11t order-Pending trial High Court quashing the order u11der\n\nArt. 226-EQect of quashing-If void ab iniio-Natural justice.\n\nThe appellant was prosecuted under s. 142 of the Bon1bay Police Act, 1951 on contravention of an cxternment order issued under s. 56 of that Act. During the pendcncy of the criminal trial, the High Court, in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, quashed the order of extemment on the ground that no opportunity to show cause was &iven against allegations relating to areas wh:!;· the acts were alleged to have been committed. In criminal trial, the trial court acquitted the appellant. On appeal by the Stte the High C6urt convicted the appellant. It held that the accused bad re-entered the forbidden area during tht currency of the order. The High Court was of the view that the quashing of thL order by th: court did not render the order of externment void ad initio but it only invalidattd the order with effect from the date of the isstie of the writ quashing the order.\n\nOn the question whether the externment order having been quashed by the High Court during the pendency of the criminal trial the order had become void ob. initio and there being no quit order there was no offence.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : that an order which infringed a fundamental freedom passed in violation of the audi alteram partem rule was a nullity.\n\nA determination i<i no determination if it is contrary to the constitutional mandate of Art. 19.\n\nOn this footing the externment order was of no effect and its violation was no offence.\n\nAny order made without hearing the party affected is void and ineffectual to bind parties from the beginning if the injury is to a constitutionally guaranteed right May be-that in ordinary legislation or at common Jaw a Tribunal having )Urisdictidn and failing to bear the partie.11 may commit an illegality which may render the proceedings voidable when a direct attack was made thereon by way of appeal, revision or review. but nullity is the consequence of unconstitutionality and so the order of an administrative authority charged with the duty of complv tog with natural justice in the exercise of power before restricting the fundamental right of a citizen is void ab initio and of no legal efficacy.\n\nThe duty to hear menacles his jurisdictional exercise and any act is, in its inception, void except when performed in accnrdancc with the conditions laid down in regard to hearinr. [432 G. 436 FJ\n\nAn rder which is vi;>id ma.y b~ di, rec_tty and collateral!\".\" challenged in legal\n\nproceed1n~. An order ts null and void tf the statute cloth1ng the admini<itrati\\\"c tribunal with nower conditions it with the obligation to hear expressly or by implication.\n\nBeyond doubt an order which infringes a fudamental freedom passed in violation of the audi alterom parte1n rule is a nullity.\n\nWhen n competen~ ourt hols such _official act or order invalid, or sets it aside, it operates fro1n nativity, that 1s, the impugned act or order was never valid.\n\n[439 F]\n\nIn the present. case a fuJ!dmentaJ .right of the petitioner had b:en encroached uoon by the Pohce Com1ss1oner without due hearing. The Court quashed that orde~. The legal result !s that the accused .was never guilty of fl'Jutiog .1n order which never legally existed.\n\n[439 D-E]\n\nlTe Cou_rt did not. express its final opinion on the many wideranging prob lems tn public law of 111ega1 orders and violation theeof by citi, zn~.J\n\n[439 E]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 83 A of J 970.\n\nFrom the judgment and order dated MarGh 5, 1970 of the Gujarat High Court at Ahmedabad in Criminal Appeal No. 673 of 1968.\n\nS. K. Dholakia, for the appellant.\n\nG. A. Shah and M. N. Shroff, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA (YER, J. The appeal before us raises a thorny issue of smr.e importance which may be epigramaticatly expressed as when has the citizen the discretion to disobey an order ? When is a determination not a determination? This riddle has to be solved in the foggy legal light of conflicting decisions and academic opinions, Indian and Anglo-American. To appreciate the contention urged in the case a few facts must be narrated. ·\n\nSection 56 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, (the Act, for short), empowers a Police Commissioner to extern any undesirable person on grounds set out therein and the petitioner fell victim to such a direction issued on September 5, 1967. On contravention of that order he was\n\nprosecuted under Sec. 142 of the Act but was acquitted by the trial Court. The State appealed with success, for the High Court held that the accused had re-entered the forbidden area during the currency of the order. What is crucial for this case is whether the externment order having been quashed 1'y the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution 011 July 16, 1968-during the pendency of the criminal trial-it had become void ab initio and there being thus no quit order in Jaw there was no offence. The learned Judge rejected this effect of the w.rit issued under Art. 226 and convicted the accused. His reasonit1g, invigorated by surgical imagery, flowed thus :\n\n\"\"Now the contraveption took place on September 17, 1967 whereas the externment order in question has been quashed about one year thereafter on July 16, 1968.\n\nThe question, therefore, is : can a person against whom an order of externment under section 56 of the Bombay Police Act has been issued disobey the said order and contravene the directions contained therein with impunity if subsequently the order is quashed ? If the argument of the learned counsel were to be accepted, though the externment order held the field and had not been quashed at the material time, no offence would be committed io view of the subsequent quashing of the order. In other words, though the order had not been declared invalid at the material time a contravention thereof would not constitute an offence. A distinction in my opinion has to be drawn be!ween an order which is ab initio void and an order whkh is subsequently quashed on account of some technical defect or irregularity. If the order was ab i11itio void if it was a nu)lity frqm the inception, if it was a\n\nstill born chil<f, the matter would have stood on a different\n\nfooting. In the present case the child was alive and kicki, ng\n\nand apparenlly healthy. It bas subse'!Jlently died during the course of an exploratory operation. The order has been held to be invalid and is quashed on the ground that it cannot be sustained on account of some defect, infirmity or irregularity which has been subsequently discovered. It cannoi be said that the order was void ab initio.\n\nThe order of the High Court passed on July 16, 1968 does not render the order nullity from its very inception. It is not retroactive. It does not render the order of e.xternment •no11 est\". What it does is to invalidate it with effect from the date of the issue of the writ quashing the. said order. If the argument of the learned counsel were to be sustained it would result in an anomalous situation. The externment order Ca)l be violatd\n\nwith impunity if a subsequent writ petition is allowed and the order is quashed. The contravention, however, would .consti tute an offence if the writ petition is rejected. It is not possi ble to take a view which would result in such an anomalous situation. There is no principle in upholding the respondent's claim that he has a right to violate an order passed by an authority having jurisdiction to pass it, if subsequently he can persuade the court that there was an in-built lacuna or latent defect in the said order. In other words he claims to have\n\nthe right to judge for himself whether the order is legal or not and in anticipation of the court upholding his contention, the right to violate it with impunity. Be it realised that these powers are vested into the administration to enable it to take prophylactic action to protect the society from imminent dan gers. These powers cannot be allowed to be robbed of their potency at the sweet will of the person proceeded against in anticipation of a subsequent favourable verdict of the court.\"\n\nThere are sonie untoward ootentialities and legal anomalies visualised by the learned Judge which \"lend assurance to the juridical coneept that an order or act quashed by a court is valid until judicially set aside or declared void. We have to examine the validity of this temporary validity imputed to an otherwise bad order. When does a bad order become bad?\n\nViolation of natural justice is the vice of the order which was defied by the accused. We will first set out the relevant provision in G the Act and the ground of decision in the writ petition, shorn of unnecessary portions. Section 56 reads :-\n\n\"Whenever it shall appear in Greater Bombay \"lid other areas for which a Commissioner has been appointed under section 7 to the Commissioner and in other area or areas to which the State Government may, by notification ill tr.~ Ofil.· cial Gaz.ette, extend, the provisions of this section', to the Dis trict Magistrate. or the Sub-Divisional Magistrate special!y empowered by the State Government in that behalf (a) that the movements or acts of any person are causing or calculated L9;4 Sup. Cl/74\n\nto cause alarm, danger or harm to person or property, or\n\n(b) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that such person is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission ot an ortence 1n\".olving force or violence or an offence punish .. able under Chapter XII, XVI or XVII .of the Indian Penal Code, or in the abetment of any such offence, and when in the opinion of such officer witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against such person by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person or property, or (c) that an outbreak of epidemic disease is likely to result from the continued residence of an immigrant te said officer may, by an order in writing duly served on him or by beat of drum or otherwise as he thinks fil, direct such person or immigrant so to conduct himself as shall seem necessary in order to prevent violence and ala!'ln or the outbreak or spread of such disease or to remove himself outside the area within the local limits of his jurisdiction (or such area ancl any district or districts, or any part thereof, contiguous thereto) by such route and within such time as the said officer may prescribe and not to enter or return to the said area (or the area and such contiguous dis .. tricts, or part thereof, as the case may be), from \\vhich he was directed to remove himself.\"\n\nThe vital freedom guaranteed under Art. 19 of the Constitution becomes a fleeting fragrance if a police or magisterial officer can \\\\'hisk\n\nyou a\\vay by' a n1orc executive-than-judicial fiat. 'This strtJnge power, whose constitutionality is not challenged before us, is hopefully fettered in its exercise by Section 59 which runs thus :-\n\n\"(])Before an order under section 55, 56 or 57 is passed against any person the officer acting under any of the said sections or any officer above the rank of an Inspector authorised by that officer shalt inform the person in writing o[ the general nture of the material allegations against him and give him a reasonable opportunity of tendering an exolanation regarding them. If such person makes an application for the examination of any witness produced by him, the authority or officer concerned shall grant such npplication; and examine such witness, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, the authority or officer is of opinion that such application iS made for the purpose of vexation or delay. Any written statement put in by such person sha!] be filed with the record of the case. Such person shall be entitled to appear before the officer proceeding under this section by an advocateor attorney for the purpose of tenderin~ his explanation. and examining the witness produced by him.\n\n(2) The authority or officer proceeding under sub-section\n\n(1) may, for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person a2ainst whom any order is orooosed to be made under section 55, 56 or 57, require such perso.n to appear before\n\nhim and to pass a security bond with or without sureties for sucn attendance durmg tne inquiry. If tne person taits to pass the secunty bona as reqwred or fils to appear before the officer or authority during the inquiry, it shau be lawful to the. officer or authonty to proceed w1tn the inquiiy and thereupon such order as was proposed to b~ passed against him may be passed.\"\n\nThe externment order was subject to this obligation of judicialisation. Mr Justice Bhagwati (as he then was) in quashing the order reasoned :-:-\n\n\"The show cause notice started with\" a general allegation that the petitioner was desperate and dangerous man and was committing acts involving force and violence .. ; ........ .\n\nThis general allegation was then particularised and four different kinds of acts were specifically set out in clauses I to 4 with an overriding statement that these different kinds of •<:ts were committed by the petitioner during the .period from January 1967 upto the date of the show cause notice in \"the aforementioned localities'', i.e. the localities knoV11n as Narol, Dani Limda Jamapur, Chandola and Benrampura local!ties\n\nsituate within the limit of Kagdapity, Gaikwad Havcli and Maninagar Police Stations. . . . . . . .. None of the allegations in the show cause , notice contained any reference to the area round about these specified localities and the petitioner was there:fore .not called upon to meet any allegation in regard to the area round about the specified localities. Even so, the Deputy Commissioner of Police relied on material which puri;>orled to show that the petitioner was guilty of different kinds of act in the area rour.d-about the specified localities and acting on such material proceeded to hold that he was satisfied that the petitioner was engaged in the commission of acts involving force and violence . ..... The cxternn1ent order is so far as ir was based on the satisfaction of the Deputy\n\nCommissioner of Police that the petitioner was engaged i\" the commission of , acts involving force and violence and acts punishable under Chapter XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal\n\nCode in the roundabout are~ within the limits of Kagdapity, Gaikwad. Haveli and Maninagar Police Stations was, there- fore, cloarly beyond the scope of the show cause notice. No opportunity to show cause against any allegation relating to the roundabout area within the limits of Kagdaoity, Gaikwad Haveli and Maninagar Police Stations was afforded to the petitioner and the' exter.nment order must therefore be held to be invalid.\n\nThere is also a second ground on which we must hold the externment order to be invalid. It. is well settled that it is a mandatory requirement of section 56 that the externing authority must from a subjective ooinion that witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public. against\n\nthe person sought to be ex.terned by reason of apprehension It. on their part as regards the safety of their person or property; This requirement is clearly not satisfied in the present case ... it is clear tltttt the opinon formed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police is only as regards the witnesses who are victims of the said incide.nts and not as regards the other witnesses.\n\nThis opinion would clearly not be the requisite opinion con\n\ntemplated by the mandatory requiremnt of section 56.\n\nWe therefore allow the petition and make the rule absolute by issuing a writ quashing and setting aside the externmeitt order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police against the petitioner.\"\n\nThis judgment is now final an.d binds State and subject alike.\n\nBut does the demolition of the externment order take effect retroactively?\n\nIf it does, the accused is not guilty; if not, he is.\n\nThe constitutional perspective must be clear in unlocking the mystique of 'void'' and 'viodable' vis-a-vis orders under the Act. The Act is a constraint on a fundamental right and so the scheme of Art. 19 must be vividly before our minds if extaordinary controls over human rights statutorily vested in administrative tribunals are to be held in constitutional leash. Freedom of movement, of association, of profession and property, are founding commitments and severe res .. traints thereon must be strictly construed, not in the name of natural justice-an elusive phrase-nor in literal loyalty to Section 59 but in plenary allegiance to the paramount law. The restriction on the fundamental right must be reasonable and the harsher the restriction the heavier the onus to prove reasonableness. The High Court in Special Criminal Application 18. of 1969 held the basic condition clamped on the authoritv to hear and be satisfied according to the 'due process' prescriptions of Section 59 had been violated and the order was liable to be quashed. In short, the finding was that the deprivation of the petitioner's fundamental right having been effected in a mode whic.h is not reasonable, as statutorily expressed in Section 59 of the Act, is\n\ni!leal and unconstitutional. Once the jurisprudential underpinnings of Section 56 and 59 of the Act arc seen, the invalidatory effect is p1ain. An unconstitutional order is void, consequential administrative inconveniences being out of place where an administrator abandons constitutional discipline and limits of power. What about the peril to the citizen if an official, in administrative absolutism, ignores the constitutional restrictions on his authority and conden1ns a person to flee his home ? A determination is no determination if it is contrary to the constitutional mandate of Article 19. On this footing the externment order is of no effect and it!i violation is no d'ffence.\n\n. Unfortunately, counsel overlooked the basic link-up between con. stitutionality and deviation from the audi altJeram partem rule in this jurisdiction and chose to focus on the familiar subject of natural just1ce as an independent requirement and the illegality following upon its noncompliance. In Indian constitutional law, natural justice does not exist as an absohite jural value but js humanistically read by\n\ncourts into those great rights ensh!i\\led in Part III as the quintessence of reasonableness. We are not unmindful that from Senecas Medea, the Magna Carta and Lord Coke, to .the constitutional norms of modern nations and the Universal Declaration \"of Human Rights it is a deeply rooted principle that 'the body of no free man shall be taken, nor imprisoned, nor dissised, nor outlawed, nor banished nor destroyed in any way' without opportunity for defen!'e and one of the first principles of this sense of justice is that you must not permit one side to use means of influencing a decision which means are not known to the other side.\n\nNow, we may as well examine the invalidatory consequence of violation of natural justice on a judicialised administrative act like the externment order under Sec. 56. The wider questions of error versus excess of jurisdiction, <leclaration of invalidity as distinguished from voidable orders being avoided, order void ab inilio and valid till voided retroactively by competent tribunal and the directory-mandatory and ministedal-Judicial dichotomies and allied problems, present, on current precedents, a picture of juristic jungle and need not be ordered into a garden for the limited purp'oses of this case.\n\nA learned author has cynically said : 'The case law, however, affords the usual spectacle of anarchy up9n which order can hardly be superimposed'.(')\n\nHere, a tribunal, having jurisdiction over area, person and subjectmatter, has exercised it disreiarding the obligation to give a real hearing before condemning. Does it spell death to the order and make it still-born so that it can be ignored, defied or attacked collaterally ? Or dqes it mean nullifiability, not nullity, so that before disobeying it a court must declare it invalid? Or, •the third alternative, docs it remain good and binding•hough voidable at the instance of a party aggrieved by a direct fhallenge ? And if a court voids the order docs it work retroactively?\n\nAll these lines of approach have received judicial blessings from the House of Lords in the .landmark case of Ridge v. Baldwin.(\")\n\nThe legal choice depends not so much on neat logic but the facts of life-a pragmatic proposition. Where the law invests an authority with power to affect the behaviour of others what consequence should be visited on abuse or wrong exercise of power is no abstract theory but experience of life and must be solved by practical considerations woven into legal principle. Verbal rubrics like illegal, void, mandatory,\" jurisdictional, are convenient cloaks but leave the ordinary 111an, like the petitioner here, puzzled about his remedy. Rubinstein poses the issue clearly :-\n\n\"How does the validity or nullity of the decision affect. the rights and liabilities of the persons concerned? Can the persons affected by an illegal act ignore and disregard it with impunity? What are the remedies available to the aggrieved parties? When will the courts recognize a right to compcnsa-\n\n~ (I) Jurisdiction And lllegality-RubinStein.\n\n(2) [19631 2 All E.R 66.\n\ntion for damage occasioned by an illegal act? All these questions revert to 1he one basic issue; has the act concerned ever had an existence o: is it merely a nullity ?\n\nVoidable acts are those that can be invalidated in certain proceedings; these proceedings are. especially formulated for the purpose of directly challenging such acts ...... On the other hand, when an act is' not merely voidable but void, it is a nullity and can be disregarded and impeached in any proceedings, before any court or tribunal and whenever it is relied upon.\n\nIn other words, it is subject tq 'collateral attack'.'' Kelson's view, when a court holds an act a nullity, is that it is not a declaration of nullity; it is a (fue annulment, an annulment with retroactive force'.\n\nEven so, the dilemma of the petitioner is, if an authority in excess or error of jurisdiction directs an illegal act, should the citizen suffer it until upturned in a legal proceeding directly or collaterally ? Can he resist the injury even if the seal of authority simulates validity ? The eloquent words of Wedderburn quoted by Rubinstein in the context of nullity is pertinent:-\n\n\"What is a sentence? It is not an instrument with a bit of wax and the seal of a court put to it; it is not an instrument with the signature of a person calling himself a register; it is not such a quantity of ink bestowed upon such a quantity of stamped paper : a sentence is a judicial determination of a cause agitated between real parties, upon which a real interest has been settled.\" Illegal acts of authorities, if can be defied on self-determined voidness, startling consequences \\Viii follo\\v, as the High Court apprehends. A detcnu will beat back, a builder will put his wall on the forbidden line, a court officer will meet with physical resistance, all because the order is, on the view of the affected party, a nullity and is later proved so before a court. Not every action by a Government agency carries with it the force of law and naturally what should he do if he concludes that the action is invalid? Should he disobey, face penal proceedings and get his violation legitimated by Court? Is there no alternative to breaking the laW or order to expose the 1awlessness of the law or order? A recent book ('Discretion to Disobey' by Kadish and Kadish(!) establishes this line of thought from Benjamin Couttis, a former Supreme Court justice, who argued to the Senate on behalf of President Andrew Johnson(sic) during the latter's impeachment trial a century ago :\n\n\"I am aware that' it is asserted to be the civil and rnoral duty of all men to obey those laws which have been passed through all the forms of legisbtion until they shall have been decreed by .iudicial authority not to be binding; but this is too broad a statement of the civil and n1oral duty incun1bent\n\n(t) A Study of Lawful Departures from Legal Rules p. 105 1973-Stanfoni University Press, California, U.S.A.\n\neither upon private citizen or public officers. If this is the measure of duty there never could be a judicial decision that a law is unconstitutional, inasmuch as it is only by disregarding a law that any question can be raised judicially under it.\n\nI submit to senators that not only is there no such rule of civil or moral duty, but that it may be and has been a high and patrotic duty of a citizen to raise a question whether a law is within the Constitution of tJie country.\"\n\nOn this view it is almost as though the Constitution contained the words to be found in the constitution of one contemporary German stat• : \"It is the right and duty of every man to resist unconstitutionally exercised public power.\" More appooite to the present case are these remarks of the same authors:-\n\n\"If policeman, in the exercise of his office, orders a Black person to leave a park in a Southern town, is the citizen obliged to obey the policeman's order and wait until later to invoke some remedy to challenge 'its validity ? Can the citizen be constitutionally convicted of some crime based on his refusal to obey the policeman's order, even if a court should later determine\" that the order was unconstitutional?\n\nNot long ago the Supreme Court considered just this case.\n\nIt had little difficulty reaching a decision. The order was found to be an unconstitutional violation of the defendant's rights first because it was designed to enforce racial discrimination in the park, and second because it was based on the possibility of unlawful troublemaking by others rather than on any wrongdoing by the defendant. So much was sufficient to require a reversal-of the defendant's conviction :\n\n\"Obviously,. . . one cannot be punished for failing to obey the command of an officer if that command is itself violative of the Constitution. The policeman's order was treated like a statute : obedience to an unconstitutional order of an official is not required, even though the order has not yet been ruled invalid by a court. The citizen is at liberty to make his owrr judgment of the order's validity and to act accordingly. If he tufns out to be wrong, of course, he is answerable. But if he turns out to be right, he is not answerable in any way and not for disobeying the order, since the order was in, valid, and not for undertaking himself to decide in advance that the order was invalid, since he was at liberty to make that decision.\n\nWhere the situation escalates into active resistance and perhaps the use of force, typically involved in cases of resistance to unlawful arrest or to the execution of some process, such as serving a search warrant, the interest in the physical welfare of the policeman and the citizen (as well as others) may often produce a contrary answer. Indeed, an increasing numper of jurisdictions afford no right to resist an arrest made under colour of authority, even if the arrest is later determined to be invalid.\n\nThe dtizcn is obliged in this circumstance to yield and submit his case to the courts. As the Model Penal Code concludes, '.'It should be possible to provide adequate remedies against illegal arrest, without permitting the arrested person to resort to force-a course of action highly likely to result in greater injury even to himself than the detention.\"\n\nThe law in this area is full of alarming conundrums hardly resolved by academic writing or judicial\" dicta.\n\nWe may narrow down the scope of the discussion by confining it to breaches of the audi alteram par/em rule. Does this defect go to jurisdiction? Perhaps-not all violations of natural justice knock down the order with nullity. In Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal(') bias or pecuniary interest in the judge was held to render the proceedings voidable, not void. It must be conceded that even this proposition is not out of the penumbra of doubt and dispute (vide A.I.R. 1958 S.C. p. 86). Formalitic moulds will not solve these issues of life and juristic policy enacted with clarity into the statute book is the necessity of this lawless region of the rule of Jaw.\n\nThe common man and thei Courts are confronJed with issues we have touched upon; and, against the background of processual guarantees under the Constitution, the law of jurisdiction and illegality has to be legislatively settled, not as logical extensions of juridical doctrine but empirical formulations based on experience. Grave implications of law and order lurk behind this mlll'.ky branch of public law.\n\nWhere hearing is obligated by a statute which affects the fundamental right of a citizen, the duty to give the hearing sounds in constitutional requirement and failure to comply with such a duty is fatal.\n\nMay be that in ordinary legislation or at common law a Tribunal, having jurisdiction and failing to hear the parties, may commit an illegality which may render the proceedingi; voidable when a direct attack is made thereon by way of appeal, revision or review, but nullilly is the consequence of unconstitutionality and so without going into the larger issue and its plural divisions, we may roundly conclude that the order of an administrative authority charged with the duty of complying with natural justice in the exercise of power before restricting the fundamental right of a citizen is void and ab illilio of no legal efficacy. The duty to hear manacles his jurisdictional exercise and any act is, in its inception, void except when performed in accordance with the conditions laid down in regard to hearing. May be, this is a radical approach, but the alternative is a travesty of constitutional guarantees, which leads to the conclusion of post-legitimated disobedience of initially unconstitutional orders. On the other hand law and order will be in jeopardy if the doctrine of discretion to disobey invalid orders were to prevail. As Learned Hand observed :-\n\n\"The idea that you may resist peaceful arrest. . . . because you are in debate about whether it is lawful or not, instead of going to the authorities which can determine (the question is) not a blow for liberty but, on the contrary, a blow for attempted anarchy.\" ·\n\n(I) [18521 3 H.L.C. 759.\n\nNAWABKHAN v. GUJARAT (Krishna Tyer, J.) 437\n\nThe opposite view is expressed by the California Supreme Court in a case where one Yick came into the country unlawfully but was hell!\n\nby the deputy sheriff without authority. He escaped and his abettor in the escape was convicted but in appeal the Court held :-\n\n\"An escaJ?e is classed as a crime against public justice, .and the law, m declaring it to_ be an offense, proceeds upon the theory that the citizen should yield obedience to the law; that when one has been, by its authority or command, confined in a prison, that it is his duty to submit to such confinement until delivered by due course of law. But when the imprisonment is unlawful, and is itself a crime. the reason which makes fiight from prison an offense does not exist. In such a case the right to liberty is absolute, and he who regains it is not guilty of the technical offense of escape.\"\n\nAmerican case-law is confiicting and doubtful expressions like \"void on its face\" \"transparently invalid\" have been used. We must remember the words of Justice Frankfurter \"If one man can be allowed to determine for himself what is law, every man can. That means first chaos, then tyranny\". We dwell on these PQssible views to underscore the difficulties o~ solution.\n\nEnglish Judges also have not been uniform. Granting the order against a party to be void, does it have to be so declared by a court at bis instance of can the citizen interpret for himself and act on the basis of invalidity. The problem was considered by the Judicial Com mittee in Fernando's(') case where a minister dissolved a municipal council without opportunity to be heard. Lord Upjobn stated the position thus :- ·\n\n\"Apart altogether from authority their Lordships would be of opinion that this was a case where the Minister's order was voidable and not a nullity. Though the council should have been given the opportunity of being beard in its defence, if it deliberately chooses not to complain and takes no step to protest against its dissolution, there seems no reason why any other person shQuld have the right to interfere. To take a simple example to which their Lordships will have to advert in some detail presently, if in Ridge v. Baldwin the appellant Ridge, who bad been wrongly dismissed because he was not gi-:en the opportunity of presenting his defence, bad perferred to abandon the point and accept the view that he bad been properly. dismissed, .their Lordships can see no reason why any other' person, such, for example, as a ratepayer of Brightonj should have any right to contend that Mr. Ridge was still the Chief Constable of Brighton. As a matter of ordinary common sense, with all respect to other opinions that have been expressed, if a person in the position of Mr. Ridge had not felt sufficiently aggrieved to take an)'\n\naction hy reasoo of the failure to afford him his strict right\n\n(I) L.R. [1967] 2 A.C. 337, 35'2 (Darayappah v. Fernando)\n\nto put forward a defence, the order of the watch committee A should stand and no one else should have any right to complain.. . . . . . . . Their Lordships deprecate the use of the word void in distinc.tion to the word voidable in the field of Jaw with which their Lordships are concerned because, as Lord EveI'Shed pointed out in Ridge v. Baldwin quoting from Sir Frederick Pollock, the words void and voidable are imprecise and apt to mislead.\" B\n\nI, n Ridge v. Baldwin (supra) Lord Reid and Lord Hodson opted for 'nullity', Lord Evershed and Lord Devlin supported the 'voidable' theory and Lord Morris of Broth-Y-Gest struck a practical note in between. The learned Lord said :-\n\n\"It was submitted that the decision of the watch com- C mittee was voidable but not void. But this involves the inquiry as to the sense in which the word \"voidable\", a.word deriving from the law of contract, is in. this connexion usd. !f the appellant had bowed to the decision of the watch committee and had ncit asserted that it was void, then no occasion to use either word would have arisen. When the appellant in fact at once repudiated and challenged the D decision, so claiming that it was invalid, and when in fact the watch committee adhered to their decision, so claiming that it was valid, only the court could decide who was right. If in that situation it was said that the decision was voidable. thati was awaited. But if and when the court decides that the appellant was right, the court is deciding that the decision of the watch committee was invalid and of no affect E and null and void. The word \"voidable\" is, therefore, apposite in the sense that it became necessary for the appellant to take his stand : he was obliged to take action for unless he did the view of the watch committee, who were in authority, would prevail. .In that sense the decision of the watch committee could be said to be voidable.\" In Svackman v. Plumstead Board of Works(') (181), Lord Seiber- F ne said:- ''There would be no decision within the meaning of the statute if there was anything of that sort done contrary to the essence of justice.\"\n\nIn 1959 A. C. 83 Lord Somervell of Harrow highlighted the dik!l'ma of 'void' and 'voidable' in these effective words :- G\n\n'ls a man to be sent to prison on the basis that an order is a good order when the court knows it would be set aside if proper proceedings were taken ? .... , .. The_ distinction between void and voidable is by no means a clear one . ..... \"\n\nThe test of ex-facie illegality or bad on its face or in Lord Radcliffe's words 'it bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead', is lso unworkable in the work-a-day world of law. Error of jurisdiction and error -----\n\n([) (1885) 10 A.C. 229.\n\nwithin jurisdiction, have been suggested as a means to cqt the Gordian Knot. Many great writers have dealt with the subject but few have offered a fair answer to the questioni is a determination a determination at all when made without a statutory hearing and when is it void and to what extent?\n\nDecisions are legion where the conditions for the exercise of power !1ave been contravened and the order treated as void.\n\nAncl when there is excess or error of jurisdiction the end product is a semblance, not an actual order, although where the error is within jurisdiction it is good, particularly when a finality clause exists. The order becomes 'infallible in error', a peculiar legal phenomenon like the hybrid beast of voidable voidness for which, according to a learned author, Lord Denning is largely responsible. The legal chaos on thi• branch of jurisprudence should be avoided by evolving simpler concepts which work in practice in Indian conditions.\n\nLegislation, rather than judicial law-making will meet the needs more adequately. The. only safe course, unt.il simple and sure light is shed from a legislative source, is to treat as void and ineffectual to bind parties from the beginning, any order made without hearing the party affected if the injury is to a constitutionally guaranteed right. In other cases, the order in violation of natural justice is void in the limited sense of being liable to be avoided by court with retroactive force.\n\nIn the present case, a fundamental right of the petitioner has been encroached upon by the police commissioner without due hearing. So the Court quashed it-not killed it then but performed the formal obsequies of the order which had died at birth. The legal result is that the accused was never gulity of flouting an order which never legally existed.\n\nWe express no final opinion on the many wide-ranging problems in public law of illegal orders and violations thereof by citizens, grave though some of them may be. But we do hold that an order which is void '.!lay be directly and collaterally challenged in legal proceedings,\n\nAn order is null and void if the statute clothing the administrative tribunal with power conditions it with the obligation to hear, expressly or by implication. Beyond doubt, an order which infringes a fundamental freedom passed in violation of the audi alteram partem rule is a nullity.\n\nWhen a competent court holds such official act or order invalid, or sets it aside, it operates from nativity, i.e. the impugned act or order was never valid. The French jurists call it L'indevistence or outlawed order (p.127), Brown and Garner, French Administrative Law) and could not found the ground for a prosecution. On this limited ratio the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. We allow his appeal.\n\nP. B. R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 80, "entities": [{"text": "NAWABKHAN ABBASKHAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NAWABKHAN ABBASKHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF GUJARAT", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF GUJARAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 19, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NAWABKHAN ABBASKHAN\n\nTHE STATE OF GUJARAT\n\nFebruary 19, 1974\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, ]J.j\n\nDo1nbay Police Act, 1951, Sections 56 and 142-Prosecution for contravention of exten11ne11t order-Pending trial High Court quashing the order u11der\n\nArt."}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Police Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 56 and 142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Police Act, 1951", "statute": "Police Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 258, "end_char": 266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Police Act, 1951", "statute": "Police Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 355, "end_char": 361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Police Act, 1951", "statute": "Police Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Police Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 377, "end_char": 393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 447, "end_char": 452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Police Act, 1951", "statute": "Police Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 545, "end_char": 553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Police Act, 1951", "statute": "Police Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1658, "end_char": 1665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. K. Dholakia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3853, "end_char": 3867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Dholakia, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "G. A. Shah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3889, "end_char": 3899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. A. Shah and M. N. Shroff, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3904, "end_char": 3916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. A. Shah and M. N. Shroff, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA (YER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3983, "end_char": 3995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA (YER, J. The appeal before us raises a thorny issue of smr.e importance which may be epigramaticatly expressed as when has the citizen the discretion to disobey an order ?", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA (YER"}}, {"text": "Section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4417, "end_char": 4427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Police Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4435, "end_char": 4458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "September 5, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4634, "end_char": 4651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 56 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, (the Act, for short), empowers a Police Commissioner to extern any undesirable person on grounds set out therein and the petitioner fell victim to such a direction issued on September 5, 1967."}}, {"text": "Sec. 142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4709, "end_char": 4717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951", "statute": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5016, "end_char": 5024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951", "statute": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5263, "end_char": 5271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951", "statute": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "September 17, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5401, "end_char": 5419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His reasonit1g, invigorated by surgical imagery, flowed thus :\n\n\"\"Now the contraveption took place on September 17, 1967 whereas the externment order in question has been quashed about one year thereafter on July 16, 1968."}}, {"text": "July 16, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5507, "end_char": 5520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His reasonit1g, invigorated by surgical imagery, flowed thus :\n\n\"\"Now the contraveption took place on September 17, 1967 whereas the externment order in question has been quashed about one year thereafter on July 16, 1968."}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5608, "end_char": 5618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5633, "end_char": 5643, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "will first set out the relevant provision in G the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8835, "end_char": 8889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8970, "end_char": 8980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We will first set out the relevant provision in G the Act", "statute": "We will first set out the relevant provision in G the Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9028, "end_char": 9034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 56 reads :-\n\n\"Whenever it shall appear in Greater Bombay \"lid other areas for which a Commissioner has been appointed under section 7 to the Commissioner and in other area or areas to which the State Government may, by notification ill tr.~ Ofil.·"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9102, "end_char": 9111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We will first set out the relevant provision in G the Act", "statute": "We will first set out the relevant provision in G the Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9784, "end_char": 9801, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10898, "end_char": 10905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11171, "end_char": 11181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55, 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11228, "end_char": 11242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55, 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12381, "end_char": 12395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12904, "end_char": 12912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr Justice Bhagwati (as he then was) in quashing the order reasoned :-:-\n\n\"The show cause notice started with\" a general allegation that the petitioner was desperate and dangerous man and was committing acts involving force and violence .. ; ........ ."}}, {"text": "Narol", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13514, "end_char": 13519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This general allegation was then particularised and four different kinds of acts were specifically set out in clauses I to 4 with an overriding statement that these different kinds of •<:ts were committed by the petitioner during the .period from January 1967 upto the date of the show cause notice in \"the aforementioned localities'', i.e. the localities knoV11n as Narol, Dani Limda Jamapur, Chandola and Benrampura local!ties\n\nsituate within the limit of Kagdapity, Gaikwad Havcli and Maninagar Police Stations. . . . . . . .."}}, {"text": "Dani Limda Jamapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13521, "end_char": 13539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This general allegation was then particularised and four different kinds of acts were specifically set out in clauses I to 4 with an overriding statement that these different kinds of •<:ts were committed by the petitioner during the .period from January 1967 upto the date of the show cause notice in \"the aforementioned localities'', i.e. the localities knoV11n as Narol, Dani Limda Jamapur, Chandola and Benrampura local!ties\n\nsituate within the limit of Kagdapity, Gaikwad Havcli and Maninagar Police Stations. . . . . . . .."}}, {"text": "Chandola", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13541, "end_char": 13549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This general allegation was then particularised and four different kinds of acts were specifically set out in clauses I to 4 with an overriding statement that these different kinds of •<:ts were committed by the petitioner during the .period from January 1967 upto the date of the show cause notice in \"the aforementioned localities'', i.e. the localities knoV11n as Narol, Dani Limda Jamapur, Chandola and Benrampura local!ties\n\nsituate within the limit of Kagdapity, Gaikwad Havcli and Maninagar Police Stations. . . . . . . .."}}, {"text": "Benrampura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13554, "end_char": 13564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This general allegation was then particularised and four different kinds of acts were specifically set out in clauses I to 4 with an overriding statement that these different kinds of •<:ts were committed by the petitioner during the .period from January 1967 upto the date of the show cause notice in \"the aforementioned localities'', i.e. the localities knoV11n as Narol, Dani Limda Jamapur, Chandola and Benrampura local!ties\n\nsituate within the limit of Kagdapity, Gaikwad Havcli and Maninagar Police Stations. . . . . . . .."}}, {"text": "Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14558, "end_char": 14562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15137, "end_char": 15147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal\n\nCode", "statute": "Chapter XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal\n\nCode"}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15776, "end_char": 15786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16377, "end_char": 16384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16779, "end_char": 16789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17158, "end_char": 17168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17397, "end_char": 17407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56 and 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17495, "end_char": 17512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18013, "end_char": 18023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Coke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18694, "end_char": 18698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are not unmindful that from Senecas Medea, the Magna Carta and Lord Coke, to .the constitutional norms of modern nations and the Universal Declaration \"of Human Rights it is a deeply rooted principle that 'the body of no free man shall be taken, nor imprisoned, nor dissised, nor outlawed, nor banished nor destroyed in any way' without opportunity for defen!'e and one of the first principles of this sense of justice is that you must not permit one side to use means of influencing a decision which means are not known to the other side."}}, {"text": "Sec. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19325, "end_char": 19332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rubinstein", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21179, "end_char": 21189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rubinstein poses the issue clearly :-\n\n\"How does the validity or nullity of the decision affect."}}, {"text": "Kelson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22195, "end_char": 22201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kelson's view, when a court holds an act a nullity, is that it is not a declaration of nullity; it is a (fue annulment, an annulment with retroactive force'."}}, {"text": "Wedderburn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22663, "end_char": 22673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The eloquent words of Wedderburn quoted by Rubinstein in the context of nullity is pertinent:-\n\n\"What is a sentence?"}}, {"text": "Kadish", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23885, "end_char": 23891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A recent book ('Discretion to Disobey' by Kadish and Kadish(!)"}}, {"text": "Benjamin Couttis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23944, "end_char": 23960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "establishes this line of thought from Benjamin Couttis, a former Supreme Court justice, who argued to the Senate on behalf of President Andrew Johnson(sic) during the latter's impeachment trial a century ago :\n\n\"I am aware that' it is asserted to be the civil and rnoral duty of all men to obey those laws which have been passed through all the forms of legisbtion until they shall have been decreed by .iudicial authority not to be binding; but this is too broad a statement of the civil and n1oral duty incun1bent\n\n(t) A Study of Lawful Departures from Legal Rules p. 105 1973-Stanfoni University Press, California, U.S.A.\n\neither upon private citizen or public officers."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23971, "end_char": 23984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "establishes this line of thought from Benjamin Couttis, a former Supreme Court justice, who argued to the Senate on behalf of President Andrew Johnson(sic) during the latter's impeachment trial a century ago :\n\n\"I am aware that' it is asserted to be the civil and rnoral duty of all men to obey those laws which have been passed through all the forms of legisbtion until they shall have been decreed by .iudicial authority not to be binding; but this is too broad a statement of the civil and n1oral duty incun1bent\n\n(t) A Study of Lawful Departures from Legal Rules p. 105 1973-Stanfoni University Press, California, U.S.A.\n\neither upon private citizen or public officers."}}, {"text": "Andrew Johnson(sic", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24042, "end_char": 24060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "establishes this line of thought from Benjamin Couttis, a former Supreme Court justice, who argued to the Senate on behalf of President Andrew Johnson(sic) during the latter's impeachment trial a century ago :\n\n\"I am aware that' it is asserted to be the civil and rnoral duty of all men to obey those laws which have been passed through all the forms of legisbtion until they shall have been decreed by .iudicial authority not to be binding; but this is too broad a statement of the civil and n1oral duty incun1bent\n\n(t) A Study of Lawful Departures from Legal Rules p. 105 1973-Stanfoni University Press, California, U.S.A.\n\neither upon private citizen or public officers."}}, {"text": "Study of Lawful Departures from Legal Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24429, "end_char": 24472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27575, "end_char": 27585, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Krishna Tyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30704, "end_char": 30716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NAWABKHAN v. GUJARAT (Krishna Tyer, J.) 437\n\nThe opposite view is expressed by the California Supreme Court in a case where one Yick came into the country unlawfully but was hell!", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA (YER"}}, {"text": "California Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30765, "end_char": 30789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NAWABKHAN v. GUJARAT (Krishna Tyer, J.) 437\n\nThe opposite view is expressed by the California Supreme Court in a case where one Yick came into the country unlawfully but was hell!"}}, {"text": "Yick", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30810, "end_char": 30814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NAWABKHAN v. GUJARAT (Krishna Tyer, J.) 437\n\nThe opposite view is expressed by the California Supreme Court in a case where one Yick came into the country unlawfully but was hell!"}}, {"text": "Frankfurter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31752, "end_char": 31763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We must remember the words of Justice Frankfurter \"If one man can be allowed to determine for himself what is law, every man can."}}, {"text": "Fernando", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32243, "end_char": 32251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The problem was considered by the Judicial Com mittee in Fernando's(') case where a minister dissolved a municipal council without opportunity to be heard."}}, {"text": "Upjobn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32347, "end_char": 32353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Upjobn stated the position thus :- ·\n\n\"Apart altogether from authority their Lordships would be of opinion that this was a case where the Minister's order was voidable and not a nullity."}}, {"text": "Brightonj", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33227, "end_char": 33236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dismissed, .their Lordships can see no reason why any other' person, such, for example, as a ratepayer of Brightonj should have any right to contend that Mr. Ridge was still the Chief Constable of Brighton."}}, {"text": "Ridge", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33279, "end_char": 33284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dismissed, .their Lordships can see no reason why any other' person, such, for example, as a ratepayer of Brightonj should have any right to contend that Mr. Ridge was still the Chief Constable of Brighton."}}, {"text": "Brighton", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33318, "end_char": 33326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dismissed, .their Lordships can see no reason why any other' person, such, for example, as a ratepayer of Brightonj should have any right to contend that Mr. Ridge was still the Chief Constable of Brighton."}}, {"text": "EveI'Shed", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33947, "end_char": 33956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their Lordships deprecate the use of the word void in distinc.tion to the word voidable in the field of Jaw with which their Lordships are concerned because, as Lord EveI'Shed pointed out in Ridge v. Baldwin quoting from Sir Frederick Pollock, the words void and voidable are imprecise and apt to mislead.\"", "canonical_name": "EveI'Shed"}}, {"text": "Frederick Pollock", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34006, "end_char": 34023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their Lordships deprecate the use of the word void in distinc.tion to the word voidable in the field of Jaw with which their Lordships are concerned because, as Lord EveI'Shed pointed out in Ridge v. Baldwin quoting from Sir Frederick Pollock, the words void and voidable are imprecise and apt to mislead.\""}}, {"text": "Reid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34126, "end_char": 34130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B\n\nI, n Ridge v. Baldwin (supra) Lord Reid and Lord Hodson opted for 'nullity', Lord Evershed and Lord Devlin supported the 'voidable' theory and Lord Morris of Broth-Y-Gest struck a practical note in between."}}, {"text": "Hodson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34140, "end_char": 34146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B\n\nI, n Ridge v. Baldwin (supra) Lord Reid and Lord Hodson opted for 'nullity', Lord Evershed and Lord Devlin supported the 'voidable' theory and Lord Morris of Broth-Y-Gest struck a practical note in between."}}, {"text": "Evershed", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34173, "end_char": 34181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B\n\nI, n Ridge v. Baldwin (supra) Lord Reid and Lord Hodson opted for 'nullity', Lord Evershed and Lord Devlin supported the 'voidable' theory and Lord Morris of Broth-Y-Gest struck a practical note in between.", "canonical_name": "EveI'Shed"}}, {"text": "Devlin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34191, "end_char": 34197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B\n\nI, n Ridge v. Baldwin (supra) Lord Reid and Lord Hodson opted for 'nullity', Lord Evershed and Lord Devlin supported the 'voidable' theory and Lord Morris of Broth-Y-Gest struck a practical note in between."}}, {"text": "Morris", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34239, "end_char": 34245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B\n\nI, n Ridge v. Baldwin (supra) Lord Reid and Lord Hodson opted for 'nullity', Lord Evershed and Lord Devlin supported the 'voidable' theory and Lord Morris of Broth-Y-Gest struck a practical note in between."}}, {"text": "Somervell of Harrow", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35788, "end_char": 35807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1959 A. C. 83 Lord Somervell of Harrow highlighted the dik!l'ma of 'void' and 'voidable' in these effective words :- G\n\n'ls a man to be sent to prison on the basis that an order is a good order when the court knows it would be set aside if proper proceedings were taken ? .... , .."}}, {"text": "Radcliffe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36194, "end_char": 36203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The test of ex-facie illegality or bad on its face or in Lord Radcliffe's words 'it bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead', is lso unworkable in the work-a-day world of law."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37164, "end_char": 37171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order becomes 'infallible in error', a peculiar legal phenomenon like the hybrid beast of voidable voidness for which, according to a learned author, Lord Denning is largely responsible."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_440_448_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ANDHRA PRADESH CO~ A\n\nOPERATIVE CENTRAL LAND MORTGAGE BANK LTD. ETC.\n\nCHITTOR PRlMARY CO-OPERATIVE LAND MORTGAGE\n\nBANK LTD. ETC.\n\nFebwary 21, 1974.\n\n[P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, S. N. DWIVEDI AND P. K. GosWAMI, JJ.]\n\nAudlrra Pradellr Cuoperarivl!'. Societies Act, 1964, Sections 84, 85, 93, 94, 97, I 00-109, 115, I 16A and 130-A rrdltra Pradesh Cooperatil'e Societies Rules, Rule 70(1)(13) and 04)-Act conferring srrpervisory powers 011 Central Land Mortgage Bank over Cooperative Land Mortgage Banks in the State-Rule em po;>-ering B011rd of Central Bank to constitute a centralised serTice for tire mort' gage banks and to levy contribruion from tlrem for the purpose.-R11/e :10\n\nwlrethtr ultra vires of section 115 of the Act. ·\n\nThe Andhra Pradesh Cooperative :Societies Act, 1974 created a Qentral Land Mortgage Bank to supervise the functioning of the Cooperative ·.t.and I\\lortgage Banks in the State. The scheme of the Act is that the provisions of Chapter XJII thereof relating to advancement of loans and mode of Tecovery of the amounts are made applicable to the Cooperative Land Mortgage Banks in the State. Sec. 85 permits a mortgage bank to advance lol!I)S for the purpose specified therein and to hold lands. the possession of whjch is transferred to it. By virtue of the provisions of section 100·109 any loan granted by a mortgage bank including any interest chargeable thereon and costs, if\n\n:my, incurred in connection therewith shall, when they become due. be recoverable by the mortgage bank. All powers in respect of the recovery of loans are conferred on the mortgage banks. The Collector is empowered to make recoveries during a certain period; he. is also given the power of distraint and sale.\n\nWhen the power of sale is to be exercised, thl! oowers of the mortgage bank where mortgaged property is destroyed or security becomes insufficient, the power of the Board of Trustees to distrain and sell property are also provided for. The title of the purchaser is not to be. questioned em the ground of irregularity nor can a mortgage be questioned on the insolvency of the mortgagor.\n\nAppointment of a Receiver and his powers are provided for Section~ 93 and 94 empower a mortgage bank or the Central Mortgage Bank notwithstanding anything contained in :my law for the time being in force to purchase any mortgaged property sold under Chapter XIII of the Act and the property\n\no purchased shall be disposed of by such banks by sale within such period as may be fixed.\n\nSec. 95 provides that pa:yment of all monies rlu~ to mortgage hanks are payable to it and such payments shall be valid as if the mortgage had not been so trans.ferre<.l. The mortgage bank shall, in the absence of uny\n\npecific direction to the contrary, issued . by the Board of Trustee nnd com municated to the mortgage bank, \"'be entitled to sue on the mortgage or take arty other proceeding for the recovery of the moneys due under the mortgage.\n\nSec. 115 provides that subject to the provisions of the Act the Board shall have such power of supervision over the mortgage banks including the power of appointment, transfer and disciplinary action in respect of the emplorecs of mortgage banks as may be prescribed. By section 130, the Government is empowered to make rules for carrying out all or anv of the. purpost\"s of th:: Act.\n\nSec. 116-A empowers the Regstrar of Cooperative Societies to create\n\n<1 common cadre of employee~ in any class of cooperative society if he consi ders it necessary in the interest of the cooperative movement to do so.\n\nSub-Rule (I) of Rule 70 empowers the Bonrd of Directors of the Central Lnnd Mortgage Bank to constitute a centralised. service for the mortagc banks in the St:tte and with effect from .such constitution the Board shall have power to make appointments to the posts brought under the centralised service and the\n\nA.P. COUP. MORTGAGE BANK V. CHITTOR BANK 441\n\nmortgage banks shall have no power to make appointments to such posts.\n\nSub-l<ule (13) empowersthe Board to levy contributions from the mortgage\n\nbanks towards the _cost of service rendere~ by the Central Mortgage Bank.\n\nSub-ntl~ . ( 14) prov1des that .on~~ . a entra!Jsed cadre is constituted all rishts\n\nad pnileg; es accrued and habthhes mcurred by the employee in relation to hts servtce m the mortgage bank shall stand vested with the Board.\n\nIn three writ petitions filed before the High Court by employees of different Cooperative Land Mortgage Banks and by one of the banks, it was contended, imer tlliu, that r. 70 was ultra t•ires of sec. 130( 1) read with sec. 115 of the Act. The High Court upheld the contention and allowed the\n\nwri~ petitions. On appeals by special leave to this Court, the only question for consideration was whether the High Court was right in declaring Rule 70 of the Rules to be ultra vires of Sec. 115 of the Act.\n\nDismissing the appeals,\n\nHELD : (I) There is nothing in the Act which empowers the Central Mortgage Bank notwit1lstanding the fact that it provides funds to the mortgage banks, to make collection of such advances by the mortgage banks. The rule making power conferred on the Government for carrying out all or any of the pur11oses of the Act must be confined to such of the purposes as are enumerated or indicated in the preamble or in any of the provisions of the Act.\n\nUnaer Sec. 115, the Central Mortgage Bank does not have the power either to directly collect the loans and advances given by tbe member banks,\n\nd.c., mortgage banks, or to create a centralised cadre of service from among the employees of the mortgage banks which are members of the Central Mort gage _bank.\n\nThat section merely confers powlo!r of upervision on the Board of the Central Mortgage Bank over the mortgage banks which power includes\n\nthe power of appointment, transfer and disciplinary action in respect of the employees of the mortgage banks. It may be that some questions may be n<ised in respect of the actions of the mortgage banks in the matter of appointment, transfer and disciplinary actions of its employees. Whenever such questions <Ire raised, the Board of Directors of the Central MC¥tgage Bank in exercise of its power of supervision can go into the question of such appointments, transfers and disciplinary action made or taken by the mortgage banks.\n\nThe power conferred by Sec. 115, therefore; can in no circumstances be construed as empowering the Board of Directors of the Central Mortgage Bank to recruit employees for the mortgage banks or to make appointments to a common cadre created by it from out of the employees of the member mortgage Banks. If the employees one appointed by the Central Mortga-ge Bank .. their salaries and other emoluments shottld be paid by it. But evidently, this\n\ni~ not so as sub-rules ( 13) and (14) or r. 70 authorise the Central Mortgage Bank to call for contribution for the cost of the service rendered by it to be borne by the mortgage banks and provides that once a centralised service is constituted all rights and privileges accrued and liabilities incurred by the employee in relation to his service in the mortgage bank shall stand vested with\n\nthe Botrd. The key words in section 115 are \"employees of the mortgage hanks''. The power of supervision including the power of appointm!nt, transfer and punitive action may be taken by the Central Mortgage Bank against\n\nllersons who are the employees of the 'mortgage bank. But rule 70 seeks to bring into being a centralised service, the employees where of shall b~ the employees of the Central Mortgage Bank and not of the mortgage banks.\n\nSuch a centralised service is not contemplated by Sec; JlS.\n\n[445 E-446 E)\n\n( ll) The supervisory power in respect of the employees of the mort sage banks does not include the power of transfer of employee from one mortgage bank to another creating thereby a contract of service with a different emplover.\n\nThe word ''transfer\" in Sec. US. therefore, must be read as a transfer from one branch of the same mortgage bank to another of its branch. {446 F-Gl\n\n(Ill) While the Central Mortgage Bank may be concerned with curing its loans to the mortgage banks, the provisions of the Act do not coafer upon the Central Mortgage Bank the power to collect any loans advanced by\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974] 3 S, C, R.\n\nthe member banks, i.e. the mortgnge banks. The security 'given to the mortg;; gc banks in respect of the loans advanced by them no doubt is deemed w have been transferred to the Central Mortgage Bank, but that is only l?Y way of securing the monies advanced by the Central Mortgage Dank to the mortgage banks.\n\nNevertheless, the duty to collect loans is upon the mortgage banks and notwithstanding the deemed transfer to the Cntrnl Mort gage Bank of any property. mortgaged to the mortgage banks, the amount due to the mortgage banks ts payable to the mortgage banks only and not to the Central Mortgage B'ank.\n\nUnle's there i~ any specific provision in the Act which directly creates a contractual liability btween the Central Mortgage Bank and rhe borrowers from the mortgage banks, the liability ot the borrowers for payment of loans advanced to them is only to the mortgage banks which actually advanced the loans to them.\n\nThe borrowers have no liability to the Central Mortgage Bank.\n\n[447 B-E)\n\n{IV) The legislature apparently realised the absence of any power in thC Act, nd therefore provided for creation of a common ca.dre of employees when it enacted sec. !16A emoowering .the Registrar to create a common cadre of employees for any chiss of society, if he considers it necessary in the interest of the cooperative movement to do so. The power is of a general Jlatnre and is applicable to the mortgage banks as well as other societies registered under the Act.\n\nSection 116-A also empowers the Registrar to require the affiliated sociehes to make contribution of such sum every year towards expeilditure as may bc incurred for the purpose of creation of any common c&.Jre and make such payment enforceable. The High Court is right in holding that when a centralised service or . any cadre of employees of the mortg::ge banks cannot be created y the Board in exercise of its power umkr s. 115 of the Act, r. 70 cannot vest such power in the Board. In this vic.,·. r. 70 is ultra vires the rule-maki.ng power of the State under sub.sec. (1) of sc. DO read with Sec. 115 of the A:t. [447E-F; 448B-D]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals No. 2229-2231 of 1972.\n\n.....\n\nAppeals hy special leave from the Judgment and ordl'!r datd the E 24th March, 1972 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court at Hyderabad in Wtit Petitions Nos. 6005 of 1970, 1547 of 1971 and 5784 of 1970.\n\nM. Krishna Rao. B. Balamulwnda Reddy anll B. Partha:; aralhi, for the appe11ant (in all the appeals).\n\nM. K. Ramanwrthy a11d J. Ranwmurthi, for n; spondcnt no. 1 (:;1 C. A. No. 2230).\n\nS. Dasaratharama Reddy and T.A. Ramc!tamlran, for respondent No.1 (in C.A. 2231).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANMOHAN REDDY, J.\n\nIn the three writ petitions filed by the G respective respondents challenging the vires of r. 70 of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act. 1964-hereinafter called 'the Act'-the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that rule to be 1tltra vires the Board of Directors of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Central Land Mortgage Bank Ltd.,-hereinafter referred to as 'the Central Land Mortgage Bank.\n\nThese appeals arc by special leave against that judgment.\n\nThe respondent in Civil Appeal No. 2229/72 is an Assistant Accountant in the Chittor Primary Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank\n\nA.P. COOP. MORTGAGE BANK 'v. CHITTOR BANK (Jaganmohan Reddy, ].).\n\nLtd. In Civil Appeal No. 2230/72 the respondents are employees of the different Co-operative Land Mortgage Banks. The respondent in Civil Appeal No. 2231/72 is the Nellore Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank Ltd.\n\nIn the first of the appeals the petitioner/respondent complained that when he was due for promotion for the post of an Accountant, under r. 70 his right to promotion based on seniority had been taken away.\n\nAccording to him, but for r. 70, he would have had a right to promotion under Bye-law 10 on the basis of his seniority among the Assistant Accountants of that Bank.\n\nThe petitioners/respondents in the second of the appeals had urged that a co-operative society was a body corporate and the ultimate authority over that Society was vested in its general body oodcr s. 30 of the Act, and the Managing Committee thereof had the right to manage all its affairs including the power to appoint, transfer and dismiss its employees.\n\nThat power of the Society is sought to be interfered with not only by vesting the Board with power r.\" w-.~··>·•c>., de'lce under s. 115 of the Act -out also by r .. 70 made pursuant to that section. Not only s. 115 and r. 70 but also 's. 116A of the Act according to them, were wholly\n\nultra vires the State Legislature. The respondent in the third of the appeals apprehends that r. 70 takes away its right of appointment, dismissal and control over certain of its employees which render them liable to be transferred by the Central Land Mortgage Bank to other ; nortgage banks elsewhere in the State which is an interference with the right of management of the Primary Land Mortgage Banks. The High Court, while negativing the contention that ss. 115 and 116A of the Act were u.'tra 1ires the State Legislatur~, has, however, held, as already adverted to, that r. 70 was ultra vires of s. 130(1) read with s. 115 of the Act.\n\nBefore us, the arguments were confined to the question whether 1he High Court was right in declaring r. 70 of the Rules to be ultra l'ires of s. 115 of the Act.\n\nThe impugr:ed r. 70 'is purported to be made under sub-s. (1) of s. 130 rca <I w1th s. 115 of the Act.\n\nThese two sections and the impugned rule arc as follows :\n\ns. 115-\"Subjcct to the provisions of this Act, the Doard shc.ll hve sch power of :; uprvision over the mortgage banks mlud!ng power of appomtment, transfer and disciplinary actton m rcpcct of the employees of mortgage banks as may be yrescnbed, and may, wih the previous approval of the R?gtstrar, make such regulatiOn as may be necessary for carrymg O\\lt all or any of the purposes of this Chapter.''\n\ns,. 130-:-\"0) The Government may, by notification pubh?hed m the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, make rules for carrymg out all or any of the purposes of this Act, for the whole or any part of the State and for any class .of societies.\"\n\nr. 70-(1) The Board of Directors of Central Land Mortgage Bank hereinafter referred to as 'Board' shall constitute a .centralised service for the mortgage banks in the State and Wtth effect from such constitution the Board shall have power to make appointments to the posts brought unde.r\n\n.... i\n\n- i··\n\nSUPREME COURT- REPORTS [1974]3 s.c.a,\n\ncentralised service and the mortgage banks shall have no .. power to make appointments to such posts.\n\nX X X X\n\n (13) The Board shall have power to call upon the mortgage banks to contribute to the cos~ <;>f service rendered . by the Central Mortgage Bank by provtdmg the services of members of the centralised service to work in the mortgage banks and the mortagage banks shall pay the cost at th.e rates prescribed from time to time b~ th_e Boad.. If any. mortgage Bank fails to pay such contnutu; m w1thm the ttme fixed, the Registrar may, on the apphcat10n of Central Mortgage Bank and after such enquiry as he may consider necessary make an order requiring the mortgage bank to pay the amount and every such order shall be enforceable againstt~\n\nmortgage bank under section o3 (2) of the Act as if it was an award. ( 14) On constitution of centralised service all rights and privilcg.::s acrued n_nd li<!biliies incurred by the employees in relatiOn to h1s servtce 111 the mortgage bank shall stand vested with the Board.\n\nX X X X\n\nIt may be mentioned that s. 115 of the Act is in Ch. XIU dealing with Land Mortgage Banks. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of s. 84 in Ch. Xlll define ~'lloard''. \"Central Mortgage Bank\" and \"Mortgage Bank\" rcspctivcly.\n\nAccording to these Jcfmitions the \"Board\" me:ms the Board of Directors of Central Mortgage Bank; \"Central .Mortga:g~ E Bank\" means the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Central Land Mort gage Bank; and \"Mortgage Bank\" means a co-operative land mortagc bank registered or deemed to be registered under the Act and adm1tted as a member of the Central Mortgage Bank. That section also ddins\n\n\"trus~~\" but it is not necessary for our purposes to rcf.:r to tlus dcfimuon. It may also be mentioned that the ruks under s. 2(!) of the Act mean the rules made under the Act. f\n\nUnder s. 85 of the Act tht; provisions of Ch. Xlll apply to the mortgage banks ad\\:ancing loans for the purposes thcrei!l enumerat:u\n\nartl under s. 97 subJect to the provisions of the Act and tn accordan': W1Lh the rules. made thereunder, it shall be comp::tcnt for a mortgl~ bank to advance loans for the purposes referred to in s. 85 and t~ ol . lands, the possession of which is transferred to it under the proVJStons G of Ch. XIII. The mode of n:covcry of the amounts advanced by~.:\n\nmortgage banks i.o; set out in ss. 100 to 109 of the Act, und.:r ''h11:t any loan granted by a mortgage bank including any interest chargcab thereon and cots, if any, incurred in' connection therewith, shall whcll !hey become due, be rccoverablt: by the mortgage bank, All powe~ In respect of the recovery of loans arc conferred on the mortga~ banks, sch as. on an application muue by any of r11e mortgage .. tJans II the RegJ!; tr~ Js empowered to grant a certificate for recoverY of a loan due to ll. The other provisions confer power on the Collector t~ make recoveries during a certain pc_riod; and a power of distraint an<\n\nA.P. co-oP. MQllTGAGE BANK V. CHlTTOR. BANK us (JQ[ftlnmt>han Reddy, J.) sale. When power of sale is to be exercised; powers of the mortgage bank where mortgaged property is destroyed or security becomes insufficient; power of Board or Trust~ to distrain and _sell all prope.rty are also provided for.\n\nThese provistons further prlde tha~ the tttle of purchaser is not to be questioned on ground or megulanty; mortgage is not to be q, uestioned on insolvency of mortgagor. They also deal with the appomtment of a receiver and his powers etc.\n\nApart from these sections, it may be noticed that ss. 93 and 94 empower, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, a mortgage bank or the Central Mortgage Bank t!} purchase any mortgaged property sold ulJ,.der Ch. XIII of the Act and the property _so purchased shall be disposed of by such bank by sale wiU!in such\n\nperiod as may be fixed by the Trustee. By sub-s. (2) of s. 93 this power wa'l to override the maximum limit of agricultural holding fixed \\tndv C the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961.\n\nSection 94 provides that the mortgages executed in favour of, and all other assets transferred to, a mortgage bank by the members thereof shall, with effect from the date of such execution or transfer, be deemed to have been transferred by such mortgage bank to the Central Mort gage \"Bank and shall vest in the Trustee. Section 95 provides t11l.\\\n\npayments of all moneys due to the mortgage bank are payable tO:: ~\\ ·:~. :.· and such payments shall be valid as if the mortgage had not been, !tQ _ transferred. It is also provided that the mortgage bank shall, it! t:l\\e absence of any specific direction to the contrary issued by the Boiid\n\nor Trust'!e and communicated to the mortgage bank, be entitled tb rue on the mortgage or take any other proceeding for the recovery of the moneys due under the mortgage.\n\nWe have set out some of the relevant provisions to show that there is npthing in 'the .1\\.ct which . empowers the Central Mortgage Bank, 119twithstanding the fact it provides funds to the mortgage b$nks, to make collection of the loans advanced by the mortgage banks: The ruJe..making power conferred on the Government for carrying out aU or any of the purposes of the Act 'must be confined to such' of the purposes as are enumerated or indicattd in the preamble or in any of the provisions of the Act. The oaly provision to which a refei:ce has been ronde specifically as empowering the Board of Directors of the Central Mortgage Bank tQ constitute a centralised service for the\n\nmortgage banks is s. 115 of the Act. A , careful reading of s. ll~. however, does not justify the contention that the Central Mortga.a~ Bank either bas the power directly to collect the loans and ady~ given by the member banks, namely, tbe mortgage banks, or to crea.t.= a centralised re of service from among the employees of the mortgage banks which are members of the Central Mortgage Bank. Tbat section merely confers power of supervision on the Board of the: Central Mortgage Bank over the mortgage b.nks which power includes\n\nth~ power of appointment, transfer and disciplinary action in res~ of the employees of the 11Wtaage be, nks. It may be that some questiOns may be J'l.ised in respect of the actic)Qs of the mohgage banks in the\n\nmater appointment, ~\"and ip\\itw'y 3Ctions of its em~.\n\nWhenevcsr such quettions are ~~d, the Board of Directot's of 'the Central, tdortgage Bank iJl exercbe of its power of supervision can go\n\n16-L954 S.'PCf/14\n\nSUPREME COUR1' REP<*TS [ 1974] 3 s.C, R,\n\ninto. the question of such appointments, transfrs and disciplinary acqos made or taken by the mortgage bv, nks, 'J'!U5 power, therefore,. can m no circumstances be construed as empowenng the Board of Dll'eCtors\n\nof the Central Mortgage Bank to recruit employees for the mortgage banks or to make appotments to a common cadre created by it from out of the employees of the member mortgage banks. If the employees aie.appointed by the Central Mortgage Bank, their salaries and orher\n\nemolutnents should be paid by it. But evidently this is not so, as subrr. (13) & (14) of r. 70 authorise the Central Mortgage Bank to call for contribution for the cost of the serviCe rendered by the Central Mortgage Bank to be b\"; rne by the mortgage banks and provides that once a centralised cadre is constituted aU rights and privileges accrued and liablities incurred by the employee in relation to his service in the\n\nmortgage bank shall stand vested with the Board. It is this power that the appellants are seeking to draw from s. 115, because only it . such a power can be found in that provision, or in any other provision\n\nthe Act, l!an be impugned r. 70 be made under sub-s. (1) of s. 130 :Of the Act. In this connection it should be observed that the key words ins. 115 .are 'employees of the mortgage banks'. The power Q( survision including the power: of appointment, transfer and punitive action may be taken by the Central Mortgage Bank against _ persons who are. the employees of the mortgage banks. But r. 70 seeks\n\n- to bring into being a centralised service, tbe employees whereof shaH be the employees of the Central Mortgage Bank and not of the mortgage vtmks.\n\nSuch a centralised service js not contemplated by s.l15.\n\n1t is contended by the learned Advocate for the appellants that the word 'transfer' in section 115 would indicate that -it can only be in pe(:t . .Of ·:the transfer of employees from one mortgage bank to anothet.: We canrtot read this power in the manner suggested, and if so this would authoriSe the constitution of a centralised cadre. As we\n\nmive explained afrea:dy the power of the Central Mortgage Bank: is\n\nooly of. suion -, h power tosupervise is to include the powet Of ·~point'lne~_t, transfer aild disciplinary action. lt is only where what Is not inclutJed in particular term as generally understood or whert tra i~ some doubt in respect Of any particuJar matter being included,\n\nthi~ the Legislature specifies it. by including that .matter.\n\nThe super vy power in res~ of he employees M the mortgage banks does\n\nnut include the p()wer to .transfer an employ~ fr9m one mortgage bank to. anotHer -creating--thereby a cORtract of serviCe with a . different\n\nempoyer. . _The wo.::cJ 'transfer', therefore, must be read as. a transfer from one branch of. the same mortga, e bank to -aQother of 1ts branch.\n\nThe learned. Advocate for the appellants stated thai the mortgage banb baw. no anches. w, e wold DOt,· however; :venture. to say so. As\n\nted out bythe learned.· Advocate. fdi the first respondent in Civil Appe<!l No. 2231 df 1972 -'that Bye.Law 20 of the Model\"ByeLaws of\n\nCo.<lpetative Land Mortgage Bank _Ltd. provides fonnaintaiiiing a reeuro of ser-vice -by the Bank in respeet d each emp1oyee lit whleh aU\n\nChanges affecting ra:nk, emoluments, trusfen other aUied atters sbl]l be not~ in the fe!istet under tlte attestation of . tile Secretary.\n\nThis provision shows .that the Bye-Laws envisage a transfer of an\n\n.·.:\n\n' .\n\n,..\n\n. A.P. CD-OP. MORTGAGE BANK V.\"CHlTTOR BANK . 447. (/,?ganmohan Reddy, 1.) A <!mployee from one ~;.:ancil o another of a mortgage bank. This bye- Jaw is consistent with s. 115 of the Act which confers a supervisory power in respect -of transfer of an employee from one branch to another of the mongage bank and-not from one mortgage bank to another.\n\nThe learned Advocate for the appellants contends that it is the Central Mortgage Bank which advances the funds to its members,..; namely, ' the mortgage banks and the responsibility is on the Central Mortgage Bank to see that the amounts advanced by the member banks are collected and the loans advanced by it are properly secured.\n\nWhile no doubt the Central Mortgage Bank may be concerned with securing its loans to the mortgage banks, the provisions of the Act do not coroier upon the Central Mortgage Bank the power to collect any Ioaris advanced by the member banks i.e. the mortgage banks. The security given to the mortgage banks in respect of tbe loans advanced by them no doubt is deemed to have been transferred to tlw Central Mortgage Bank, but that is only by way of securing the monies advanced by the Central Mortgage Bank to the mortgage banks. Nonetheless, as we have seen earlier, the duty to collect the loans is upon the mortgage banks and notwithstanding the deemed transfer to the Central Mortgage Bank of any property mortgaged to the mortgage banks, the D .amount due to the mortgage banks is payable to the mortgage banks only and not to the Central Mortgage Bank. Unless there is any specific provision in the Act which directly creates a contractual liability between the Central Mortgage Bank and the borrowers from the mortgage banks, the liability or the borrowers for payment of loans advimccd to them is only to the mortgage banks which actually advanced the\n\nloans to them. The borrowers have no liability to the Central Mortgage Bank. ·\n\nThe l£:gisiature apparently realised the absence of any power in the Act, and therefore provided for creation of a common cadre of employees when it enacted s. 116A empowering the Registrar to create a common cadre of employees for any class of society, if he considers it necessary in the interest of the co-operative movement to. do so.\n\nThis section reads as under :\n\ns. 116A-\"(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Act where the Registrar, in the interest of the co-operative move- ··· .-: ment; considers that the creation of a common cadre of em- . ployees for any class of societies is necessary, he may, constitute an appointment committee or authorise one or more federal societies to which such class of societis is affiliated, to exercise the power of appointment, transfer and disciplinary action in respect of such categories of employees of that class of societies as may be specified by him and. make ·. such regulations as may be necessary for carrying out the said purpose. wpere such appointment committee is constituted or federal society is authorisd by the Registrar, the affiliated societies shall not have powers to deal with . such categories of employees except to theextent the regulation may permit. ·\n\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\n(2) The Registrar shall have power to require the affiliated societies to make contribution o~ suoh sum every year towards expenditure, as the appoi'ntment committee or federal society is likely to incur or has incurred for the purpose. If any society fails to pay the said ~\\lm tQ such authority as may be specified by tbe Registrar and within the time fixed by him, the Registrar may on. the application of the authority, and after such enquiry as he may , consider necessary, make an order requiring the society 'io pay the amount, and every such order shall be enforceable against the society as if it were a decision under section 62.\"\n\nThe power of the Registrar, it will be noticed is, to create a common cadre of employees for any class of societies.\n\nThe power, thercfo.rc, is of a general nature and is applicable to the mortgage banks as well as to the other societies registered as societies under the Act.\n\nSect-ion 116A also empowers the Registrar to require the affiliated societies to make contribution of such sum every year towards expenditure as may be incurred for the purposes of creation of any COIDII10ll cadre and make .such payment enforceable. In our view the High Clmrt is right in holding that when a centralised service or any cadre of employees of the mortgage banks cannot be created by the Board in exercise of its power under s. 115 of the Act, r. 70 cannot vest such power in the Board.\n\nIn this view, r. 70 is ultra vires the rule-making power of the State under sub-s. (1) of s. 130 read with s. 115 of the Act.\n\nThe appeals arc accordingly dismissed with costs. One set.\n\ns.~.w.\n\nAppeal dismissed", "total_entities": 78, "entities": [{"text": "BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ANDHRA PRADESH CO~ A\n\nOPERATIVE CENTRAL LAND MORTGAGE BANK LTD. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ANDHRA PRADESH CO- OPERATIVE CENTRAL LAND MORTGAGE BANK LTD. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHITTOR PRlMARY CO-OPERATIVE LAND MORTGAGE\n\nBANK LTD. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 149, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHITTOR PRIMARY CO-OPERATIVE LAND MORTGAGE BANK LTD. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 172, "end_char": 191, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. N. DWIVEDI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 193, "end_char": 206, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.N. DWIVEDI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. K. GosWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 211, "end_char": 229, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Societies Act, 1964", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 264, "end_char": 283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 84, 85, 93, 94, 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 285, "end_char": 312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Societies Act, 1964", "statute": "Societies Act, 1964"}}, {"text": "section 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 722, "end_char": 733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Societies Act, 1964", "statute": "Societies Act, 1964"}}, {"text": "Societies Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 781, "end_char": 800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1136, "end_char": 1143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Societies Act, 1974", "statute": "Societies Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1317, "end_char": 1328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Societies Act, 1974", "statute": "Societies Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "Chapter XIII of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2375, "end_char": 2398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2509, "end_char": 2516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XIII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XIII of the Act"}}, {"text": "Sec. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2958, "end_char": 2966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XIII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XIII of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 130", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3229, "end_char": 3240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XIII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XIII of the Act"}}, {"text": "Sec. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3344, "end_char": 3352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XIII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XIII of the Act"}}, {"text": "Regstrar of Cooperative Societies", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3368, "end_char": 3401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "116-A empowers the Regstrar of Cooperative Societies to create\n\n<1 common cadre of employee~ in any class of cooperative society if he consi ders it necessary in the interest of the cooperative movement to do so."}}, {"text": "Central Lnnd Mortgage Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3626, "end_char": 3652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-Rule (I) of Rule 70 empowers the Bonrd of Directors of the Central Lnnd Mortgage Bank to constitute a centralised."}}, {"text": "sec. 130( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4564, "end_char": 4576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4587, "end_char": 4595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4849, "end_char": 4857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Mortgage Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4954, "end_char": 4975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dismissing the appeals,\n\nHELD : (I) There is nothing in the Act which empowers the Central Mortgage Bank notwit1lstanding the fact that it provides funds to the mortgage banks, to make collection of such advances by the mortgage banks."}}, {"text": "Sec. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5348, "end_char": 5356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central MC¥tgage Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6139, "end_char": 6160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whenever such questions <Ire raised, the Board of Directors of the Central MC¥tgage Bank in exercise of its power of supervision can go into the question of such appointments, transfers and disciplinary action made or taken by the mortgage banks."}}, {"text": "Sec. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6343, "end_char": 6351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Mortga-ge Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6661, "end_char": 6683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the employees one appointed by the Central Mortga-ge Bank .. their salaries and other emoluments shottld be paid by it."}}, {"text": "section 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7188, "end_char": 7199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Mortgage B'ank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8905, "end_char": 8927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "mortgaged to the mortgage banks, the amount due to the mortgage banks ts payable to the mortgage banks only and not to the Central Mortgage B'ank."}}, {"text": "Section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9792, "end_char": 9803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10215, "end_char": 10221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10389, "end_char": 10397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10428, "end_char": 10456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "115 of the A:t. [447E-F; 448B-D]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals No."}}, {"text": "M. Krishna Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10702, "end_char": 10716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Krishna Rao."}}, {"text": "B. Balamulwnda Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10718, "end_char": 10738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Balamulwnda Reddy anll B. Partha:; aralhi, for the appe11ant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramanwrthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10805, "end_char": 10821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramanwrthy a11d J. Ranwmurthi, for n; spondcnt no."}}, {"text": "S. Dasaratharama Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10887, "end_char": 10909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Dasaratharama Reddy and T.A. Ramc!tamlran, for respondent No.1 (in C.A. 2231)."}}, {"text": "T.A. Ramc!tamlran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10914, "end_char": 10931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Dasaratharama Reddy and T.A. Ramc!tamlran, for respondent No.1 (in C.A. 2231)."}}, {"text": "JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11014, "end_char": 11030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANMOHAN REDDY, J.\n\nIn the three writ petitions filed by the G respective respondents challenging the vires of r. 70 of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act.", "canonical_name": "JAGANMOHAN REDDY"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11221, "end_char": 11246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964-hereinafter called 'the Act'-the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that rule to be 1tltra vires the Board of Directors of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Central Land Mortgage Bank Ltd.,-hereinafter referred to as 'the Central Land Mortgage Bank."}}, {"text": "Jaganmohan Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11661, "end_char": 11677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MORTGAGE BANK 'v. CHITTOR BANK (Jaganmohan Reddy, ].).", "canonical_name": "JAGANMOHAN REDDY"}}, {"text": "Nellore Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11849, "end_char": 11893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2231/72 is the Nellore Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank Ltd.\n\nIn the first of the appeals the petitioner/respondent complained that when he was due for promotion for the post of an Accountant, under r. 70 his right to promotion based on seniority had been taken away."}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12466, "end_char": 12471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12758, "end_char": 12764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12837, "end_char": 12843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12864, "end_char": 12871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 115 and 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13373, "end_char": 13389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 130(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13516, "end_char": 13525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13536, "end_char": 13542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13698, "end_char": 13704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 130", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13783, "end_char": 13789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13802, "end_char": 13808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13881, "end_char": 13887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Board of Directors of Central Land Mortgage Bank", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14528, "end_char": 14576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r. 70-(1) The Board of Directors of Central Land Mortgage Bank hereinafter referred to as 'Board' shall constitute a .centralised service for the mortgage banks in the State and Wtth effect from such constitution the Board shall have power to make appointments to the posts brought unde.r\n\n.... i\ni··\n\nSUPREME COURT- REPORTS [1974]3 s.c.a,\n\ncentralised service and the mortgage banks shall have no .. power to make appointments to such posts."}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15920, "end_char": 15926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16014, "end_char": 16019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(!)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16615, "end_char": 16622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16678, "end_char": 16683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16817, "end_char": 16822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17002, "end_char": 17007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 100 to 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17191, "end_char": 17205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "han Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17847, "end_char": 17856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BANK us (JQ[ftlnmt>han Reddy, J.) sale."}}, {"text": "ss. 93 and 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18382, "end_char": 18395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 93", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18737, "end_char": 18742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18831, "end_char": 18888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18891, "end_char": 18901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961", "statute": "the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Section 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19212, "end_char": 19222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961", "statute": "the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20403, "end_char": 20409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Mortga.a~ Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20503, "end_char": 20525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A , careful reading of s. ll~. however, does not justify the contention that the Central Mortga.a~ Bank either bas the power directly to collect the loans and ady~ given by the member banks, namely, tbe mortgage banks, or to crea.t.= a centralised re of service from among the employees of the mortgage banks which are members of the Central Mortgage Bank."}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22399, "end_char": 22405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 130", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22557, "end_char": 22563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23193, "end_char": 23204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25023, "end_char": 25029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26933, "end_char": 26940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27147, "end_char": 27154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28651, "end_char": 28661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29382, "end_char": 29388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 130", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29535, "end_char": 29541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29552, "end_char": 29558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_449_452_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "KRISHNA LAL DUTTA\n\nl'.\n\nTHE STATE OF WEST BEN'GAL\n\nFtbruary 21. 1974.\n\n[M. H. BEG AN!) R. s. SARK.ARIA, JJ.J\n\nP1eventive dete11tio, r-Matters tOktn into qccount for ordering dett•nJion- Duty to commu11ictJtt to detenu to enable him to' explain.\n\n. The Drder detaining the petitioner under the Maintenance o!\n\nInternal\n\nurity Act, 1971, mentioned the sole ground that on the nil!ht of October 1 r. 1972~ the .petitioner .and his associates committed theftof some tea chests from aruniiing goods trdin and that they 6cd, when challenged, leaving behind three cheSts of tea at the P.O. In his pet:don for the isSue of a writ of habeas corpus the petitioner contended that it was i_mpossible to commit theft from ._ running train as described. In the counter affidavit, it was stated that what was meant by running train was a train which had come to a stop due to some traffic restriction. It was also stated that the petitioner was a noto~\n\nriqus wagon breaker operating near the Railway Station, but this allegation was never communicated to the petitioner.\n\nE'letr the record relating to the detention nowhere referred to the petitioner as a 'notorious wagon breaker'.\n\nJn the record the incident of 11th October was mentioned, a description of th,!;,. modus operandi of a gang of thieves operating on passenger trains as g1Yen. and it was . also mentioned that the activities of that gang commenced after the incident of 11th October. There was however no indication as to how any information whatsoever came to the District Magistrate, who passed the order of detention, from any source whatsoever that the petitioiier was a member. of that gang. · Allowina the petition, HELD : The Court is not concerned with the_ adequacy or sufficiency of \\l. nd of detention. Jn the present case, there is clear nexus between the sole grc)und for detention given and the maintenance of the eSsenti81 supplies and services. but the ground is vague in so far as it is not apparent what is meant by the words \"the P.O.\" The grounds given could not enable the petitioner to cffectivefy exercise bis constitutional right of 1naking a representation against bis detention.\n\nFurther. matters which were nevtr oommunicated to the petitioner have been taken into account while ordering the detention. Presuming that whatever was in the record operated against the petitioner be should have been given fuller information of the aUegations against him. No explanation has been given as to why that was not done.\n\n[452 D-0]\n\n[Those exercising drastic pawers of preventive detention should at least take care to ascertain whether a detention is being ordered in a manner and on materials which di:11clo.111e that it is really necessary to order a detention with a view .to preventiniz the person to be detained from acting in a manner pre judicial to the objects for which preventive detention may be lawfully ordered.l [452 C-Dl\n\nPrabhu Dayal Deord.h v. District Magistrate, Kamrup &: Ors., A.T.R. 1974 S.C. 183, followed.\n\nORl\\HSAL JUR1so1cTION : Writ Petition No. 845 of I9n.\n\nUnder Art 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ .in the nature of habeas corpus.\n\nS. N, lain, for the paitioner.\n\nP. K. Chakravarty and G. s. Chatterjee, for the respondent.\n\n45(}\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974 1 3 S.C.R.\n\n1'hc Judgment of the <:ourt was. delivered l>y\n\nBEG, J. The petitioner, a citizen: of India; has filed this habear corpus petition c; hallenging the order of . his. detention, dated\n\n2rll-19n, passi'd. under Section 5 cfause <ai of Maintenance of Internal Sccurit} Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').\n\nIt appears that the petitioner was actually arrested on 20-11,1972 and that the. detention order was passed subsequently on 24-11-1972, and; on that very\" d'ate, the .petitioner was served with thedocument\n\ncontainini; the sole ground of detentlQD given as foflows :-\n\n\"I. That on 11-1(};72 at' about 01.55 hrs., you alona with your associates. being armeld with bombs and other weapons, victimised wagon No. NR ) 739:3 Ex Bro to KPD attached to. runnin~ j!Oods train in EC 249 DN near the Booster Sub-station df Dum Dum Jn. RIS when the train slowed down for traffic restriction and. committed theft in respect of tea chests.\n\nTrain guard RPF party challenged you and your associates when you hurled bombs towards the RPF party.\n\nRPF RK Sitaram Rai fired one r.ound in self defence when you arjj your associates fled away leaving behind three chests of tea at the P.O.\n\nYour action caused disruption of train service for a considerable : timei and affected supplies and services.\n\nYou have thus acted in a manner prejudicial to the inaintenance of supplies and serVices essential to the comn1unitv'\". - After givin~ what is marked as ground number 1 only, implying thereby that. tliere was no other ground of detention, the document\n\nproceeds:\n\n\"You are hereby infornied that you may make a representation to the State Gavernment against the detention qrder and that such representation shall be addressed to the. Assistant Secxeta:r'y/ Home (Special) Department, Government of West Bengal and forwarded through the Superintendent of the. Jail in Which you have been detained as early as Jl()Ssible.\n\nUnkler Section 10 of the Maintert.ance elf Internal security Act, 1971 (Act 26 of 1971) your case shall be placed before Advisory Board within thirty days from the date of your detention under the order.\n\nYou are also informed that under Section 11 of the\n\n Mainlcnancc of Internal Security Act, 1971 . (Act. 26 of 1971 ) , the Advisory Board shall if you . desire to .be so heard, hear you in person, and, :if you desire to be so _heard by the Advisorty Board,.you shall intimate such desire in your representation to the State Government\".\n\nH , An annexure to the affidavit filed by a Special Secretary in the Home Department of the Government of West Bengal, who was\n\nK. L. DUTTA v. WEST BENGAL (Beg. /.) 451\n\ntlle District Magisl!'llte concerned when the impgned\n\ndetntion <Jrder was made against the. petitioner;\n\nIS, !U copy of the petitioner's representation addressed to the Gc;)Ve.mmeot,\n\nJn the representation as well as in the petition before us, the peli• tioner asserts that the allegations against him. are absolutely untrue.-\n\nIn his application to this Court he states that it is \"palpably .false and impracticable\" to allege that the petitioner, with some associates,\n\ncommitted theft of \"°me tea chests from a running wagon and that ho !led when challeng~. leaving behind three chests of tea \"at the P.O.\". Be that as it may,_it is difficult to understand what is meant by \"the P.O.\" In his representation to the Government, the petitioner had submitted that there was no evidence that he was identified by anybody as a participator in the incident.\n\nIn the affidavit in Qpposition to the petition, the official concerned, who had passed the \"detention order, stated :\n\n\"The running__goods train as stated therein actually means a: goods train which had come to a stop due to traffic restriction and ilo_t actually a running ono as sought to be suggested by th_c petitioner\".\n\nThe aflldavit also contained the statement :\n\n\"It appears from the records that the petitioner is a notorious wagon breaker operating near, Dum Dun1 Junccion Railway Station''.\n\nLearned Counsel appearing for the State of West Bengal was asked to explain how the J:l\"titioner could possibly make an effective representation against his detent:i'Qn when the District Mag'.istratc had a stationary train in mind which he actually described as \"a rw1ning goods train\" in the gr:ounds icf detention, \\Vhcn it was not indicated what was meant by \"the P.O.\", and when the allegation that the petitioner was a \"fiotorious wagon breaker operating near Dnm Dum Junction Railway Station\" was never communicated to him although it, apparently, formed one of the grounds on which the detention was ordered. In reply, learned Counsel for the State of West Bengal stated that he had the whole record before him on which the detention was ordered and he placed that record before us.\n\nWe were unable to find any menti.Qn in this record that the petitioner was \"a notorios wgon breaker\".\n\nOn the other hand. we found a description there of the modus operandi of a gang of thieves operating on passenger trains which used to deprive the passengers of their trunks and other goods while one of\" the mentbers of the gang sat near the passMgers with a newspaper spread out in front of him which would. be read out loudly to distract their attention and used also to obstruct their view. It is mentioned there that the activities of this gang commenced after the incident of 11-10-1972.\n\nIt is also mentioned there that a number of incriminating articles were recove1ed from members of this gang of thieves including the petitioner and that prosecutions were pending against them.\n\n. 452 _ SUPREME _Cf>Ul\\T REPORT_s __\n\n0 -l 1974 J 3 S.C.R.\n\n_ It is . true that the incident which occurred at: about Z a.m. on 11-10-1972, forming ihe ground df detention,· is also mentioned in the record, but, there is no indication as to _how __ any information . whatsoever came to the Djstnct Magistrate from any_ source_ wl!atSoever _that the petitioner was a member of the gang which was concerned with such an incident, Presumably, this was the whole record as learned Counsel for the State informed us. This makes the petitioner's assertion, that he was not only i)rrested on 20-10-1972 for reasons not disclosed . ll to him, but, when sufficient evidence could not be found against him by the local _officials, a detention order was made on a ground, covered by the Act,· whiclt could be conveniently trotted out at the time, seem plausible. l]eprivation of a citizen's personal liberty is a serious matter.\n\nThose exercising drastic powers of preventive detention, which arc entrusted to them for protecting valuable social and public interests, should at least take care to ascertain whether a detention. is . being ordered in a manner and on materials 'Which disclose that it-is really\n\n\"necessary\" to order a detention with a view to preventing the person to be detained from acting in any manner prejudicial to the objects for which preventive detention may be lawfully ordered. If they misuse\n\nthese powers, by acting unreasonably, capriciously, arbitrarily, or\n\nin a malafide manner, public confidence in them is shaken. We arc 0 unable to say whether the District Magistrate acted unreasonably in making the detention order. --- But, presuming that, whalc•ver was in the record operated, as learned Counsel for the State asserted, against _the petitioner, he should have been given fuller information of allegations against hini: Tt is not explained why this was not done.\n\nWe arc not concerned here with the adequecy or. sufficiency of E a ground of detention.\n\nT)lere is_ clearly -a nexus between the sole ground for detention given a_nd the maintenance of essential supplies and services.\n\nBnt, as indicatod above, we have found that matters which were never commuriicated to the petitioner also appear to have been taken into account while ordering the detention of the petitioner. Further more the sole ground of detention is vague in ,. so far as it is .not apparent what is meant by the words \"the P.O.\". ' Recently, it was held by this Court in Probhu Dayal Deorah Vs . . , District Magistrate, Kamrup_ & Ors.,( 1) that vagueness of a single .· .ground . could vitiate a detention order.\n\nThe grounds given cou:U not, !n ?ur oinion enabl~. the petitioner to effectively exercise his constitutional. nght oJ -making a, representation against his detention.\n\nThe result is that we allow this petition and declare the deten- G tion of petitioner to be illegal.- We oer that the petitioner .be released forthwith. -\n\nV.P.S.\n\nPetition allowed.,\n\n(I) A.l.R. 19(4 S.C. 183.", "total_entities": 20, "entities": [{"text": "KRISHNA LAL DUTTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KRISHNA LAL DUTTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF WEST BEN'GAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "urity Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 319, "end_char": 334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3063, "end_char": 3069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. N", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3148, "end_char": 3152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N, lain, for the paitioner."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chakravarty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3180, "end_char": 3197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chakravarty and G. s. Chatterjee, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "G. s. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3202, "end_char": 3218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chakravarty and G. s. Chatterjee, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3337, "end_char": 3340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "delivered l>y\n\nBEG, J. The petitioner, a citizen: of India; has filed this habear corpus petition c; hallenging the order of ."}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3497, "end_char": 3506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "RK Sitaram Rai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4340, "end_char": 4354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RPF RK Sitaram Rai fired one r.ound in self defence when you arjj your associates fled away leaving behind three chests of tea at the P.O.\n\nYour action caused disruption of train service for a considerable : timei and affected supplies and services."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5084, "end_char": 5095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assistant Secxeta:r'y/ Home (Special) Department, Government of West Bengal and forwarded through the Superintendent of the."}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5214, "end_char": 5224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Internal security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5250, "end_char": 5277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5445, "end_char": 5455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Internal security Act, 1971", "statute": "Internal security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": " Mainlcnancc of Internal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5464, "end_char": 5507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7314, "end_char": 7334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned Counsel appearing for the State of West Bengal was asked to explain how the J:l\"titioner could possibly make an effective representation against his detent:i'Qn when the District Mag'.istratc had a stationary train in mind which he actually described as \"a rw1ning goods train\" in the gr:ounds icf detention, \\Vhcn it was not indicated what was meant by \"the P.O.\", and when the allegation that the petitioner was a \"fiotorious wagon breaker operating near Dnm Dum Junction Railway Station\" was never communicated to him although it, apparently, formed one of the grounds on which the detention was ordered."}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7930, "end_char": 7950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply, learned Counsel for the State of West Bengal stated that he had the whole record before him on which the detention was ordered and he placed that record before us."}}, {"text": "11-10-1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8655, "end_char": 8665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is mentioned there that the activities of this gang commenced after the incident of 11-10-1972."}}, {"text": "20-10-1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9447, "end_char": 9457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This makes the petitioner's assertion, that he was not only i)rrested on 20-10-1972 for reasons not disclosed ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_453_459_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "PARMAR HIMAlllNGH JUGATSD'IGH\n\nPATEL Jb\\RMA)IBHAI NAll.SIBHM\n\nFebruary ii. 1974.\n\n[P, )If, BltAGWA'U''.tND ],';· K: ~AllU, JJ;]\n\nRevm<11t•lion <Jf. lhe P'ople Act, 1951-s .. 33(5) ~1id 36(4)..,..ScoPe v/.\n\nTho appellallt challenged the electl.\\Ofl of the -resPondot)I: t~ tbe Stole J\\.ssem bly.\n\nHe_ alleged ; that at the. tiip.o .. of. ttie. srut_inv of nom1nat100. P8L?~I'$ th_e retitrnin\"a. otfir _improperly rect¢ _the om1ation, pape_r ... of Oll; e of the tand1dates-: for the' election. The name of the r_e1ected can41date _was found, not on the electoral 'ri>Us of the constituency in which he hat! filed hiS non1ill3.tirin l)Opers, but on the rolls oranotPer: constituency .. Since his _name was •not corrtct1y printed-on the el(:ctoral rolls;_. he_ had obtained :a cogend, um to_.the electoral roll, a certified copy Of whic_h was . enclose.d with the nomin, ation P~r.\n\nObjection having been raised b:Y the respondent, his nomina.tion P~.r . Was rejected on the ground that the provisions of s. 33(5) of the Repre'Sentation of People Act were not complied with inasmuch as he had not produced the certified conv of all the relevant entries in the electoral roll at the time of scrutiny of ihe nomination papers.\n\nSection 33(5) of the Representation of the People Act providCS 'that where the candidate is an elector to a different constituency a copy of the electoral roll of that constituency or of the relevant part thereof Or a certified copy of the relevant entries of such roll shall, unless it has been filed .alon.'t with the nomination paper, be produced before the returning officer at the time of !itnitiny;\n\nThe High Court dismissed the election petition of the appellant.\n\nDismissing the appeal to this Court, HELD: Non-compliance withs. 33(5) is a defect of a_sUtantial c_haractcr aua is not covered by s. 36(4) of the Act. The Returning Officer rightly rejected the nomination paper and rejection cannot be held . to be impiope-r.\n\nEvidently the rejected candidate is an elector be a different constituency. Tb.a1 being the position he could have complied witft .. s .. 33-(S) by folloing one .or the other of the three modes provided in that subsectlon namely : ( 1) he could have produced a copy of the electoral roll of constituency in which his name\n\nao_oeared, or (2) he could have produced a copy of the relevant part of the electoral roll of that constituency in which his name appears or ( 3) he could have prodUced a certified copy of the relevant: . entries in the electoral rotl Qf that constituency. He however selected the third mode by. enclosing a certified copy of the corrigendum to the electoral roll. [457 O.:-F; 459 C-D]\n\nIt is clear that the corrigendum did not furnish all the particulars which. would be available if a certified copy of the relevant .entries in the original electoral roll as well as the corrigendum were produced before the Returning Ofticer at the time of scrutiny. Since the original electoral roll may be corrected and amended it was. absolutely necessary for the satisfaction Of the Returning Officer that a certified copv of not only the original .electoral roli containin.: the relevant entry as also a certified copy of the amendment list conccrnin2 the candidate were produced at the time of scrutiny if this had not already been filed along with the nomination paper. [457 F-G]\n\nSr; Baru Rani v. ~!Vin1atl Prasanni & Others, [1959] S.C.R. 1403/14, 1421 and Narbada Prasad v. Cli/UJga1i I.al mid Ors. [1659] I S.C.R. 499/502, followed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 297 of 1973.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and order of the Gujart High Court in Election Petition No. 7 of 1972.\n\nK. RajenJra Cltaudlturi and P. C. Kapur, for the appellant.\n\nV. B. Patel and H. s. Parihar, for the respondent,\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was deliverec! by\n\nGoswAMI, J. This appeal under.section U6-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (briefly the Act) is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat dismissing• the election petition of the appellant who is an elector from Mahudha constituency for the Guja; at State Legislative Assembly. The . appellant challenged the election of the respondent who had been <leclared duly elected to the State Legislative Assembly from this particular constituency in the general elections to the Legislative Assembly held in March\n\n1972. The appellanfs principal ground of challenge was that at the time of the scrutiny of the nomination papers on February 9, 1972, the Returning Officer . improperly rejected the nomination paper of one Christian Suleman Jiyabhai (hereina(ter to be described for brevity as Jivabhai). Jivabhai was not an elector in the Mahudha co)lstituency of the Legislative Assembly.\n\nHe was an elector from Shahpur constituency in Ahmedabad city.\n\nAlong with the nomination form Jivabhai had enclosed a certified copy of the corrigendum to the Electoral Roll issued by the Registration Officer, who was officer incharge of preparation of the Electoral Rolls.\n\nOn objection being raised by the respondent the nomination paper of Jivabh~ was rejected on the ground that the provisions of section 33(5) of the Act were not complied with inasmuch as he had not produced a certified copy of all the relevant entries in the Electoral Roll before the Returning Officer at the time of scrutiny of the nomination papers.\n\nWhat was produced was only the certified copy of the corrigendum issued by the Electoral Registration Officer which .showed the correction in the name of Jivabhai.\n\nOriginally, Jivabhai was shown in the Electoral Roll as Christian Soloman Jivabhai and by the correction shown in the corrigendum, the name of \"Soloman\"\n\n\\Vas substituted b'y the name ~'Suleman\". The correct name, therefore, stands as \"Christian Suleman Jivabhai\" as a result of the corrigendum.\n\nIt appears that the practice of the Electoral Registration Officer is not to issue a corrected Electoral Roll very time some entry in the Electoral Roll is amended or corrected but the officer jssues corrigenda and amendment limits without making any alterations in the original Electoral Roll. The High Court accepted the objection with regard to the non-compliance of section 33(5) of the Act and rejected the nomination paper of Jivabhai.\n\nThe appellant contends that the High Court committed. an error of law in rejecting the nomination paper of Jivabhai in view of the provisions of section 36( 4) of the Act.\n\nSection 33 provides for presentation of nomination papers and requirements for a valid nomination. We are concerned in this appeal with sub-section (5) of that section which may be quoted :\n\n33 ( 5) \"Where the candidate is an elector of a different constituency. a copy of the electoral roll of that constitu-\n\nPARMA~ Hl1'(ATS!NG I' .. PATEL HARMANBHAI (Goswami, J.) 455\n\nency or of the relevant part thereof or a certified copy of the relevant entries in such roll s)lall, unless it has been filed along with the nomination paper,- be. produced heforc the ; returning officer at 'the time of rutlrry\".\n\nSection 36 pr_ovides for scrutiny of nomillations and \\vc mf!Y 'tfflofc sub-section ( 4) of that section which is material.\n\n36(4) 'The returning officer shall not reject any nomi nation paper on tho ground of any defect which is not of a substantial character\".\n\nJn the present case, Jivabhai, whose non1ination paper \\Vas rejected, submitted along with his nomination paper only a certified copy of the corrigendum of the particular entry in the Electoral Roll.\n\nSince he was an elector of another constituency namely, Shahpur, and was contesting in the Mahudha co0:stituency, he was required under section 33 ( 5) to produce before the Returning Officer at the time of scrutiny either a copy of the Ele<:toral Roll of Shahpur con stituency or of the relevant part thereof or a certified copy of the relevant entries in the Electoral Roll of Shahpur constituency. In the instant case, Jivabhai preferred to enclose with his nomination paper a certified copy of the corrigendum of the Electoral Roll correcting his name therein. It appears that neither Jivabhai nor his proposer was present at the time of scrutiny of the nomination papers and, therefore, no other document was produced by him during scrutiny.\n\nEven if he hall not earlier enclosed the relevant entries of the Electoral \"Roll, it would have been in order if the same were produced before the Returning Officei: at the time of scrutiny. Section 36(7) provides as follows :\n\n36( 7) \"For the purposes of this section, a certified copy nf an entrv in the electoral roll for the time, being in force of a constituency shall bi; conclusive evid-oncc of the fact that lhe person referred to in that entry is an elector for that constituency, unless it is proved that. he is subject to a disqualification mentioned in section 16 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (43 of -1950)\".\n\nThe short question that arises for consideration in this appeul is whether the nomination paper of Jivabhai was improperly rejected by the Returning Officer. A certified copy, which was enclosed with the nomination paper, was as follows :-\n\n\"List of voters Qf Shahpur ward. of Gujarat State Legblativc Assembly for the year 1971, District Ahmedabad,\n\nCity Ahmedabad, Ward Shahpur-l, Part No. 38/84 continued.\n\nl\\Je1110r11n4um or List or -I Scrili1 Number in Name of Voter in Present uncorrcct- Entry to read as Voters List Votcn List. ed. entry in the corrected.\n\nVoters List. 595 Christian Soloman Soloman Suloman Jivabhai Ahmedabad Sd/- G. B. Xhah, 28-1-1972.\n\nElectroral Officer\".\n\nBefore proceedin~ further it may be necessary to take note of .certain rules in the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 (briefly tre Rules). Under rule 2(e) \"'roll' means the electoral roll for a constituency\".\n\nUnder rule 4 \"the roll for each constituency shall be ; Prepared in such form and in such language or languages as the Election Commission may direct\".\n\nUnder rule 5 (I), \"the roll shall be divided into convenient parts which shall •be numbered consecutively\". By rule 10 \"as soon as the roll for a constituency is ready, the registration officer shall publish it in draft by making a copy thereof available for inspection and displaying a notice in Form 5\" in the places specified in that rule.\n\nRule 11 provides for further publicity to the roll and notice. Rule f2 provides for lodging claims ; and objections. Rule 22 may be set out in full : 22 \"Final publication of roll-( I ) The regi; tration ofticer shall thereafter- ( a) prepare a list of amendments to carry out his decisions under rules .18, 20, 21 and 21A and correct any clerical or printing error or other inaccurrancies subsequently discovered iri the roll; and\n\n(b) publish the roll, together with the list of amendments, by making a complete copy thereof available for. inspection and displaying a notice in Form 16 at his office.\n\n(2) On such publication, the roll together with the list of amendments shall be the electoral roll of the constituency. ('3) Where the roll (hereafier in this sub-rule . referred\n\nto. anhe basic roll), together with th.e .list of amend: ments, beeomes the eltoral, roll. for a: cpnstltuency undei .sub'.'ru)e (2), t!\\e, Registration '\\llliccr may, for\n\nthe 'CQ'nyeilienc~ of :a1! conc'erned; jntegrte, ubjct to 'any general or 'speciat ilireetions t.su-id by the\n\nEletion' CofumlSsioil iri ille behalf, the list into the\n\nba5ic roll :bY iitduding the .. mimes of electors in the Us, t together with am partiCulars relating io. . such eleetots. in' the relevant parts of the . l)aic,, roll itse)f, 'so. :nowever'that 'no 'chaniie shall be made.in the pro'\n\nces~ ; IJf such integiatioii in 'the. name or itny electors or any rtjcuhits rera\\jnil to any elector .. is given io\n\nthcHist\"of amendments''.· , Rule' 23 priYvidl!~ for appeals agrupst decisi, ons ·:of the 1legi5tratio11 'Oflket under nlle8\"20; 21 , or 2 lA Under sub-tufe f<f) of that rµte ·\"every del:ision Of' the 'iippellate olli.er' shall b~ final, but in so far\n\nPARMAR HIMATSINGH v. PATEL HAJl.MANBHAI (Goswami, /.) 4~7\n\nas it reverses .of modifies a decisioa of the tegiSlralilmndllicef,. shall take effect only from the date of the decision in api)oals\" By sub rule ( 5) \"the registration alliccr shall CllUBe; dil:h amendments to be ma@ in the roll as may be'iiecessary to gi~ effect to the deci•ions of the appellate officer under this rule\".\n\nSection 22 Of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, provides for oorrcction of entries in Electoral Rolls and Section 24 provides for apPeals against orders made under sections 22 and 23 of that Act in the manner prescribed' by_ the Rule&.-\n\nFrom an examination of the above material provisions it is clear that the entries in the Electoral Roll may be corrected at different stages provided under the law and there is also provision for appeal against decisions of the Registration Officer.\n\nAt the time of scrutiny, the Returning Offier [\\as to be satisfied about the identity of the candidates and will have to decide all objections with regard to the nomination paper. The scrutiny will have to be made by him carefully even if there is no objection raised against the nomination paper.\n\nWe are required to consider in this case whether Jivabhai has complied with section 33(5) of the Act.\n\nEvidently he is an elector of a different constituency.\n\nThat being the position he could have complied with section 33(5) by following one or the other of the three modes provided in that sub-section, namely, ( 1) he could have produced a copy of the Elecoral Roll of Shahpur constituency, or (2) he could have produced a copy of the relevant part of tbe Electoral Roll of that constituency in which his name appears, or ( 3) he could have produced a certified copy of the relevant entries in the Electora1 Roll of that constituency.\n\nHe, however, selected the third mode by enclosing a certified copy of the corrigendum to the Electoral Roll.\n\nIt. is clear that the corrigendum does not furoish all the particulars which would be available if a certified copy of the relevnnt entries in the original Electoral Roll as well s the corrigeudum were produced before the Returning Officer at the time of scrutiny. Since the original Electoral Roll may be corrected and amended, even sometimes bY deleting some names, it is absolutely necessary for the satisfaction of the Returning Officer that a certified copy of not only the original Electoral Roll containing the relevant entry as also a certified copy of the amenliment list concerning the candidate are produced at the time of scrutinv. if the.se had not already been filed along with the nomination pper. fa th¥ instant case the candidate remained satisfied by jiling a .; ertified copy of only the corrigendum which did not satisfy the Returnin~ Ol!Wer as reards the.: ide11lity . of the candidate. When, therefore,_ t, he Returajitg Officer rejected the nomination paper, the, order can. '?e supported, on,!be g; ound tht a.cer\\ified copy of the entry m the ongmal EleCtciral R, oll was not furmihed nlong with the certified .copy of the entry in the list of amendiru:nts. H cannot. therefore, be !iai<! .that the rejection of the nomiilaiion paper under section 36(2)(b) iihhis case is improper. In this con.netiori we may\n\nrefer to a decision of this Court in Sri Baru Ram v. Shri111aii P-rcoauni\n\nand others( 1), where an identical question came up for consideration.\n\nThe following extract from the decision will be apposite :\n\n\"Su\\J-section 5 of s. 33 deals with the stat: of the scrutiny of the nomination papers and it provides that where\n\nacndidate is an elector of a different constituency, a copy or tJleelectoral roJI of that constituency or tl'e rclvant part\n\ntheroof or a certified copy of the relevant entry of such roll shall, unless it is filed along .with the nomination paper, be produced before the returning officer at tho time of the scrutiny. It is thus clear that when the stage of scrutiny is reached the returning officer has to be satisfied that the candidate is an elector of a different constituency and for ihat purpose the statute has provided the mode of proof.\n\nSection 36, sub-s. (7) lays down that the certified copies which are required to be produced unde.r s. 33(5) shall be conclusive evidence of the fact that the person referred to in the relevant entry is an elector of that constituency.\n\nIn other words, the scheme of the Act appears to be that where a candidate is an elector of a different constituency he has w prove that fact in the manner prescribed and the production of the prescribed copy has to be taken as conclusive cvidc:tcc of the said fact ..... Section 33 (5i requires the candidate to supply the prescribed copy a.1d s. 3!i(Z) (b) provides that on his failure to comply wit.b tile said requirement his nomination paper is ]iable to be rejected.\n\nJn other words, this is a case where the statute requires the candidate to produce the prescribed evidence and provides a penalty\n\nfor his failure to do so.\n\nIn such a case it is difficult to appreciate the relevance or validity of the argument that the requirement of s. 33(5) is. not mandatory but is directory, because the statute itself bas made it clear that the failure to comply with the said requircinent leads to the rejection of th.e nomination paper.\n\nWhenever the statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manne.r and also :lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence it would be difficult to accept the a.rgument that the failure to c<>mply with the said requirement should .lead to any other consequence .....\n\nThere is no doubt that the essential object of the scrutiny of nomination papers is that the returning officer should be satisfied that the candidate who is not an elector in the constitllency in question is in fact an elector of a different constituency.\n\nThe .satisfaction of the returning officer is thus the matter of substance in these proceedings; and if the statute provides the mode in which the returning officer has\n\n(t) ft959] S.C.R. t403/14t8-142t.\n\nPARMAR HIMATSINGH v. PATEi. HARMANBHAI (Goswami, /.) 459\n\nA to be satisfied by the candidate it is that mode which the candidate must adopt . , ... \"\n\nThe same view was expressed by this Court in Narbada Prasad v.\n\nChhat?an Lal and Ors.( 1 ) :-\n\n\"There was no compliance with the provisions of s. 3315l of the Representation of the People Act and there was no power in the court to dispense with this requirement.\n\nIt is a well-understood rule of law that ii a thing is to be done in a particular manner it must be done in that manner or not at all. Other modes of compliance are excluded';.\n\nWe are, therefore, clearly of the .view that non-compliance with section 33(5) is a defect of a substantial character and is not covered\n\nby section 36( 4) of the Act. The Returning Officer in this case rightly rejected the aomination paper of Jivabhai 'and the rejccil0n\n\ncannot be held to be improper.\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed-\n\n(I) [19691 (1) S.C.R, 4~/SOi.", "total_entities": 51, "entities": [{"text": "s. 33(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1002, "end_char": 1010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sentation of People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1024, "end_char": 1047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 33(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1223, "end_char": 1236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sentation of People Act", "statute": "Sentation of People Act"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1244, "end_char": 1276, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 36(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1826, "end_char": 1834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sentation of People Act", "statute": "Sentation of People Act"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3510, "end_char": 3538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "K. RajenJra Cltaudlturi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3669, "end_char": 3692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. RajenJra Cltaudlturi and P. C. Kapur, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. C. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3697, "end_char": 3708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. RajenJra Cltaudlturi and P. C. Kapur, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "V. B. Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3730, "end_char": 3741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. B. Patel and H. s. Parihar, for the respondent,\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was deliverec!"}}, {"text": "H. s. Parihar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3746, "end_char": 3759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. B. Patel and H. s. Parihar, for the respondent,\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was deliverec!"}}, {"text": "GoswAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3827, "end_char": 3834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by\n\nGoswAMI, J. This appeal under.section U6-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (briefly the Act) is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat dismissing• the election petition of the appellant who is an elector from Mahudha constituency for the Guja; at State Legislative Assembly.", "canonical_name": "GoswAMI"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3877, "end_char": 3915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3974, "end_char": 3995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by\n\nGoswAMI, J. This appeal under.section U6-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (briefly the Act) is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat dismissing• the election petition of the appellant who is an elector from Mahudha constituency for the Guja; at State Legislative Assembly."}}, {"text": "February 9, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4482, "end_char": 4498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellanfs principal ground of challenge was that at the time of the scrutiny of the nomination papers on February 9, 1972, the Returning Officer ."}}, {"text": "Christian Suleman Jiyabhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4572, "end_char": 4598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "improperly rejected the nomination paper of one Christian Suleman Jiyabhai (hereina(ter to be described for brevity as Jivabhai)."}}, {"text": "Jivabhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4643, "end_char": 4651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "improperly rejected the nomination paper of one Christian Suleman Jiyabhai (hereina(ter to be described for brevity as Jivabhai).", "canonical_name": "Jivabhai"}}, {"text": "Shahpur constituency", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4764, "end_char": 4784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was an elector from Shahpur constituency in Ahmedabad city."}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad city", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4788, "end_char": 4802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was an elector from Shahpur constituency in Ahmedabad city."}}, {"text": "Jivabh~", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5085, "end_char": 5092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On objection being raised by the respondent the nomination paper of Jivabh~ was rejected on the ground that the provisions of section 33(5) of the Act were not complied with inasmuch as he had not produced a certified copy of all the relevant entries in the Electoral Roll before the Returning Officer at the time of scrutiny of the nomination papers.", "canonical_name": "Jivabhai"}}, {"text": "section 33(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5143, "end_char": 5156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6202, "end_char": 6215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6420, "end_char": 6434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6448, "end_char": 6458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PATEL HARMANBHAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6784, "end_char": 6800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a copy of the electoral roll of that constitu-\n\nPARMA~ Hl1'(ATS!NG I' .. PATEL HARMANBHAI (Goswami, J.) 455\n\nency or of the relevant part thereof or a certified copy of the relevant entries in such roll s)lall, unless it has been filed along with the nomination paper,- be.", "canonical_name": "PATEL HARMANBHAI NARSIBHAI"}}, {"text": "Goswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6802, "end_char": 6809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a copy of the electoral roll of that constitu-\n\nPARMA~ Hl1'(ATS!NG I' .. PATEL HARMANBHAI (Goswami, J.) 455\n\nency or of the relevant part thereof or a certified copy of the relevant entries in such roll s)lall, unless it has been filed along with the nomination paper,- be.", "canonical_name": "GoswAMI"}}, {"text": "Section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7052, "end_char": 7062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shahpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7573, "end_char": 7580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since he was an elector of another constituency namely, Shahpur, and was contesting in the Mahudha co0:stituency, he was required under section 33 ( 5) to produce before the Returning Officer at the time of scrutiny either a copy of the Ele<:toral Roll of Shahpur con stituency or of the relevant part thereof or a certified copy of the relevant entries in the Electoral Roll of Shahpur constituency."}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7653, "end_char": 7663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 36(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8456, "end_char": 8469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8830, "end_char": 8840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8848, "end_char": 8886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Christian Soloman Soloman Suloman Jivabhai Ahmedabad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9485, "end_char": 9537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "595 Christian Soloman Soloman Suloman Jivabhai Ahmedabad Sd/- G. B. Xhah, 28-1-1972."}}, {"text": "Registration of Electors Rules, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9673, "end_char": 9709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12415, "end_char": 12425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12433, "end_char": 12471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12531, "end_char": 12541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Of the Representation of the People Act, 1950", "statute": "Of the Representation of the People Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "sections 22 and 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12589, "end_char": 12607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Of the Representation of the People Act, 1950", "statute": "Of the Representation of the People Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 33(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13289, "end_char": 13302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Of the Representation of the People Act, 1950", "statute": "Of the Representation of the People Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 33(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13425, "end_char": 13438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Of the Representation of the People Act, 1950", "statute": "Of the Representation of the People Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 36(2)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15227, "end_char": 15243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15510, "end_char": 15519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15523, "end_char": 15528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16166, "end_char": 16176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16266, "end_char": 16274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16675, "end_char": 16685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16748, "end_char": 16752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17146, "end_char": 17154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3315", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18424, "end_char": 18431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18440, "end_char": 18472, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 33(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18788, "end_char": 18801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18864, "end_char": 18878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_460_463_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "STATE OF MYSORE\n\nANANT VINAYAK PATWARDHAN\n\nFebruan 26, 197~\n\n[K. K. MA THEW AND A. ALAG!R!SWAMI, JJ. J\n\nBo111bay Merged Terri1ories Miscellaneous Alienation Abolition Act, 1955, Section 11-Tainat (Casli Allowance) granted to respondents ancestors by tlie Pesliwas-Allowa11ce co/ltinued b_v- Ruler of Ja1nkhandi under terms of 11eaty with East India Co.-S11bseque111ly Ruler of Jamkl1andi converted allow- '11lCe to one for Jife-Whetl1er, cash allowance payable was permanent and hereditar)'-Comtnutation amount whether deductible fro1n cash allowance for paynzerit of comve11sa1ion.\n\nThe respondent's ancestors had been granted a cash allowance called Tainat by the Peshwas. After the defeat of the Peshwas by the British, by the Treety of Gulgallee with Jamkhandi dated 6-6-1819 by the then Governor of Bomba1 on behalf of the East lndia Co. one of the terms which were granted to Gopalrao Jamkhandikar was rec(\\rding the terms which he held from the Govt. of His Highness the Pesbwa, for the payment of his contingent (apparently army) out of his personal allowance. It stated that he was to continue all allowances and no complaints on this befl(l were to be suffered to reach the Government. The allowance to the resi, x>nden.t's ancestors was ooe such allowance. The extract from the Petha Khata wahi of 1942·43 shows that the grant was permanent.\n\nBl).t in 1944, the then Ruler of Jamkhandi converted the allowance to one for life.\n\nAfter the Jamkhandi State was merged in the State of Bomba}', the Bombay Legislature passed the Bombay Merged Terri torits Miscellaneous Alienation Abolition Act, 19$5.\n\nThe respondent filed an application on 21·7·1956 under section 17 of that Act claiming that the cash allowance payable was both pennanent and hereditary but that he learnt that the Ruler of Jamkhandi had passed an order that the said allowance be continued till his (applicant's) life time when the same .was continued to him after the death of his father. He mentioned that he had moved the Rajasaheb by an application which was not disposed of. HeJ therefore, claimed that he wouJd be entitled to seVC}l times the cash allowance, permanent on the basi..'1 that it was permanent oi in the alternative to three tlfncs the ci&)t allowance on the basis that it was -payable for life. However, by this time, the Ruler of 1 amkhandi was no longer a Ruler and was not in a position to be of any assistance to the respondent on the basis of his application. The Aistant Commissioner of Jamkhandi passed en order granting a sum equal to three times the annual sum which the respondent was receiving.\n\nOn appeal by the respondent to the Appellate Tribunal, the Tribunal held that the Ruler of Jamkh•ndi had sovereign J)()Wer and was the fountain head of alt sources of authority, that is. executive, judiciary and legislature and be could change the Tainat cash allowance at his sweet will and pleasure. The Tribunal accordingly dismissed the appeal. ne respandent thereupon filed a writ petition before the High Court. The High Court directed that a sum equll . to seven times the annual ca\"h allowance be paid to the resnondent on the basis that the grant was hereditary.\n\nTh~ State Government thcreupan appealed by a special leave to this Court .\n\n. Allowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : (I) The constitutional position of the Ruler of every one of the Jndian States before their integration with the rest of India and comina. into force of the Constitution of India was that he enjoyed uncontroUcd sovereign\n\npowers and there were no constitutional limitations upon his authority H to act in any Of the three capacities of legislature, executive and judiciary.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that if the Ruler of Jamkhandi bad changed the perma nent cash allowance granted to the respondent~ 11.ncestnrs to one for life, it is legally valid and il cannot be questioned. [463 A-\"Bl\n\nMYSORE v. A. v. PA TWARDHAN (A lagiriswami, J. ) 4 61\n\nAnieer-up-Nissa Btgu1n v. MtJ/1b\"otib Begum, A.I.R. 1955_ S.C. 352, relied on.\n\n(II) The Tainat allowance being service allowance the deduction of the com.mu'!ltion amount is f9r the payn1ent to tbe person -Who was doing. the\n\nsev1ce 10 place of the cash allowance -holder. That is why what was being -paid to the respondent year after year was the cash allowance minus the\n\ncommutation amount.\n\nThe commutatiori ariiount is, therefore, deductible from the cash allowance while calculating the compensation i)ayablc to the respondent.\n\n[463 D-E] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1741 qi \\967.\n\nAooea! bv .soecial leave. from iudgment and order dated the -30th November, 1962 of the Mysore Hiilh Court at Bangalore in Writ Petition No. 777 of 1961. V. K. Krishna Menon, M. V'eerappa and S. P. Singh, for the appellant.\n\nR. B. Datar and M. L. Verma, for tbe respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by- ALAGIRisWAMI, J.-The respondent's ancestors had been granted a cash allowance called Tainat by the Peshwas. After the defeat of D the. Pesh was by the. British, by the Treaty of Gulga!lee with Jamkbandi dated 6-6-1819 by the Hon'ble Mr. Elphinston, Governor of Bombay\n\non behalf of the East India Company one of the terms which .were gran, ted tc, Gopalrao J amkhandikar was regarding the terms which he hell! ft om the Government of His Highness the Peshwa, for the paymeru: ofbis contingent (apparently army) of his personal allowance.\n\nIt stated that he was to continue all allowances and no complaints on this head were to be suffered to reach the Government (East India cOlnpany).\n\nThe allowance to respondent's ancestors was .oµe such allowance. This allowance seems t9 have amonnted to .a sum of Rs. 2010/- minus a sum of Rs. 240/- being the commutation amount as shown in Petha Khata Wahi Extract of 1942-43. That exact also shows that this grant was iiermanent. But. in 1944 the then ruler of Jamkhandi seems to have converted this ... 3Jiowance to one for life.\n\nAfter the JamkhandiState was mered in the State of Bombay, the Bombay. Leiislature .passe.d the. Bombay, Merged territories Misci:l~ laneous. Alienations. Abolition Act, 1.955.\n\nThe rclent filed an application on 21-'7'1956 nnder s. 11 of. that 11ctbefore the Assistant Commissipner .. Jamkhandi clai\\llin~ that the cash allowance payable was both permanent and hereditary but that he learnt th.at.the ruler of G Jamkhandi had passed an order that the. :said . cash .allowance be continued till his (applicant's\\ life time when the same Was continuell to him after the death of his father. .He mtioned that .he had Jllaved the Raiasabeb bv an aoolicatiori which was not finally disposed of.\n\nHe. therefore, claimed that Ile would be entitled to Rs. 21.000/- 'at\n\nH 7 times ofthe cash allowance on (Jiebasis that it was Rs. 3,0QO/- a vear and. oermanent or in .the a1tenative t-0 Rs. . 9,0Q-Or: being three times the cash .. allowance on die basis that it was payable for Jife. It would be nP\\)reciated 'that by this time \\he Ruler of J amkhandi was no longer .a ll\\11er and was certaiit1y not in a i><lsb 17-L954SupCl/74\n\nt&2\n\n'SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 19741 3 S, C.R.\n\nW>~ to be of any .assistance to .the respondent on the basis of his application. The AssJStant Conuwssioner passed an order granting a sum <If ~· 5172-12-0 being three times the annual sum of Rs. 1724-4-0 which the respondent was receiving. The respondent then filed an appeal to the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal as by that time the a{Ca. had become part of the Mysore State. In that appeal he mentioned that through mistake his name has been recorded as holder of the Tainat cash allowance for life only. He also .mentioned that his apPlication to the Rajasaheb of J amkhandi for correction of the mistake was still pending even though the state of Jamkhandi was merged. Tribunal dealt with the argument before it on behalf of tile respondent to the efieet that the ruler of J amkhandi had no power to change the cash allowance to. one for life according to his own earlier order passed in. the year 1909-10 it was permanent and in the view that .the ruler of J amkhllndi had sovereign powers and was the tountain hea.d of all source of authority, that is. executive, judiciary and legislature, he could change the Tainat cash allowance at his sweet will and pleasure, dismissed the appeal.\n\nThe respondent thereupon filed a writ petition No:· 777 before the High Court of My8ore.\n\nThere also he atalcdthat through mistake his name was recorded as the holder of the Cash. allowance for life only, and also urged that the ruler of the Jamldiandi>State had no Power to interfere with the Tainat cash allowance.\n\nThe Hiab Court diU not deal with the question whether the Ruler of lamliliandi had, in' 1944, the powei'to convert a hereditary grant to one for life but directed that a sum of Rs. 14,070 being seven tnnes the annual cash allowance of Rs. 2,010 be paid to the respondent on the basis that the grant was hereditary.\n\nThis appeal is against thai 1wlgment .and order of the High Court.\n\nWe are of opinion that clearly the decision of the Mysore High Court is wrong. In Ameer-un-Nissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum (AIR\n\n}!1~5 SC 352) this Court stated the constitutional position of the Nizam of' Rerabad in these words :\n\n\" .... It cannot be dispute that prior to the integration of Hyderabad State with the Indian Union and the coming into force of the Indian Constitution, the Nizam of Hyderabad enjoyed uncontrolled sovereign powers. He was the supreme legislature the su1>reme judiciary and the supreme head of the executive. and there were no constitutional limitations uoon his authority to act in any 'of these capacities. The 'Firmans were expressions of the sovereign will of the Nizam and they were bindin~ in the same way as any other law;-nay, they would override all other law.s which were in con, fiict with them. So, long as a particular 'Fueman' held the field, that alone would overn or regulate the rights of the parties concerned, though it could be annull.ed or l!lodi lied by a later 'Firman' at any time that the Ntzam wtlled.\n\nThe Nizam was not only the supreme legislature, he was the fountain of justice as well. When he constituted a new Court, he could, according to ordinary notions, be dcced to have exercised his legislative authority.\n\nWhen agam he\n\nMYSORE v. A. V. PATWARDHAN (Alagiriswami, /.) 463\n\naffirmed or reversed a judicial decision, that may appropriately be described as a judicial act. A rigid line of delllarcation, however. between the one and the other would from the verv natlire of things be •not .iustified or even possible.\"\n\nThat sets out the constitutional position of the ruler of every of the Indian States before their integration with the rest of India and com~ ing into force of the Conslitution of India. It follows therefore that if the ruler of Jamkhandi hid changed the panent cash allowance granted tC' the respondens's ancestors to one for life it is legally valid and it cannot be questioned. The extract from the Jamkhandi State Gazelle dated 7-8-1920 publishing rules regarding ca; h allowance itself shows that those rules cancelled the earlier rules and tliose rules also could be appropriately cancelled by the subsequent rules. Any application made by the respondent to the former .ruler of Jamkhandi after the State was merged in Bombay State will not help him.\n\nThe ruler !J; id by that time lost all his powers. The decision of the Mysore Revenue Aj>peUate Tribunal is, therefore, right.\n\nThere is only one small point which has got to be mcntione, J. The compensation allowed was three times the cash allowance. As already mentioned the Petha Khata Wahi extract shows tho allowance at Rs. 2010.80 minus Rs. 240.00 being the commutation amount. These allowances being service allowances, the deduction is for the paJyment to the person who was doing the service in place of the cash allowance holdec. That is why what was being paid to the respondent year after vear was the cash allowance minus commutation amount. The Mvsore High Court was. therefore, wrong in holding that this sum of Rs .. 240 cannot be deducted from the cash allowance while calculatin2 the compensation payable to the respondent.\n\nWe must mention that when this appeal was ta<en up for hearing Mr. Datar apl'l:aring for the respondent con(ended lhat as this Court in M.P. State v. Ranojirao (1968 3 SCR 4119) has held that the Ma<lha Pradesh Abciition of Cash Grants Act violates Art. 19(1)(!) or Art. 31(2) of the Constitution, and so struck it down, the Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienation Abolition Act is also liable to be struck down on the same ground. He, therefcre, wanted that h< shuuld be given the liberty to move the High Court for striking do\\vn the Act under consideration in this case. \\\\'c do not propose to express any opinion as to whether it would be open him to do so in tl1e backt; round of this case. There is nothing to prevent him f!'Ot'1 filing on appbcation if he is so advised.\n\nJn the result this appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court of Mysore set aside. As the special leave was granted oa the condition that the appellant would in any event pay to the resp0ndent his of the appeal, the appellant shall pay the respondent's costs.\n\nS.B.W.\n\nJ8-L954SupCI /74 Appeal allowed.", "total_entities": 47, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MYSORE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MYSORE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ANANT VINAYAK PATWARDHAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANANT VINAYAK PATWARDHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Februan 26, 197~", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF MYSORE\n\nANANT VINAYAK PATWARDHAN\n\nFebruan 26, 197~\n\n[K. K. MA THEW AND A. ALAG!R!SWAMI, JJ."}}, {"text": "Miscellaneous Alienation Abolition Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178, "end_char": 188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Miscellaneous Alienation Abolition Act, 1955", "statute": "Miscellaneous Alienation Abolition Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 353, "end_char": 356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Miscellaneous Alienation Abolition Act, 1955", "statute": "Miscellaneous Alienation Abolition Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Gulgallee", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 740, "end_char": 749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the defeat of the Peshwas by the British, by the Treety of Gulgallee with Jamkhandi dated 6-6-1819 by the then Governor of Bomba1 on behalf of the East lndia Co. one of the terms which were granted to Gopalrao Jamkhandikar was rec(\\rding the terms which he held from the Govt."}}, {"text": "Jamkhandi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 755, "end_char": 764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the defeat of the Peshwas by the British, by the Treety of Gulgallee with Jamkhandi dated 6-6-1819 by the then Governor of Bomba1 on behalf of the East lndia Co. one of the terms which were granted to Gopalrao Jamkhandikar was rec(\\rding the terms which he held from the Govt.", "canonical_name": "JamkhandiState"}}, {"text": "6-6-1819", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 771, "end_char": 779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the defeat of the Peshwas by the British, by the Treety of Gulgallee with Jamkhandi dated 6-6-1819 by the then Governor of Bomba1 on behalf of the East lndia Co. one of the terms which were granted to Gopalrao Jamkhandikar was rec(\\rding the terms which he held from the Govt."}}, {"text": "Bomba1", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 804, "end_char": 810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the defeat of the Peshwas by the British, by the Treety of Gulgallee with Jamkhandi dated 6-6-1819 by the then Governor of Bomba1 on behalf of the East lndia Co. one of the terms which were granted to Gopalrao Jamkhandikar was rec(\\rding the terms which he held from the Govt."}}, {"text": "Gopalrao Jamkhandikar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 882, "end_char": 903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the defeat of the Peshwas by the British, by the Treety of Gulgallee with Jamkhandi dated 6-6-1819 by the then Governor of Bomba1 on behalf of the East lndia Co. one of the terms which were granted to Gopalrao Jamkhandikar was rec(\\rding the terms which he held from the Govt.", "canonical_name": "Gopalrao J amkhandikar"}}, {"text": "Jamkhandi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1387, "end_char": 1396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bl).t in 1944, the then Ruler of Jamkhandi converted the allowance to one for life."}}, {"text": "Jamkhandi State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1449, "end_char": 1464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the Jamkhandi State was merged in the State of Bomba}', the Bombay Legislature passed the Bombay Merged Terri torits Miscellaneous Alienation Abolition Act, 19$5."}}, {"text": "21·7·1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1648, "end_char": 1657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent filed an application on 21·7·1956 under section 17 of that Act claiming that the cash allowance payable was both pennanent and hereditary but that he learnt that the Ruler of Jamkhandi had passed an order that the said allowance be continued till his (applicant's) life time when the same .was continued to him after the death of his father."}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1664, "end_char": 1674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3404, "end_char": 3409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Allowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : (I) The constitutional position of the Ruler of every one of the Jndian States before their integration with the rest of India and comina."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3440, "end_char": 3461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "lagiriswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3902, "end_char": 3913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "463 A-\"Bl\n\nMYSORE v. A. v. PA TWARDHAN (A lagiriswami, J. ) 4 61\n\nAnieer-up-Nissa Btgu1n v. MtJ/1b\"otib Begum, A.I.R. 1955_ S.C. 352, relied on.", "canonical_name": "ALAGIRisWAMI"}}, {"text": "V. K. Krishna Menon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4689, "end_char": 4708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. Krishna Menon, M. V'eerappa and S. P. Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. V'eerappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4710, "end_char": 4722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. Krishna Menon, M. V'eerappa and S. P. Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. P. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4727, "end_char": 4738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. Krishna Menon, M. V'eerappa and S. P. Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. B. Datar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4760, "end_char": 4771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. B. Datar and M. L. Verma, for tbe respondent."}}, {"text": "M. L. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4776, "end_char": 4787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. B. Datar and M. L. Verma, for tbe respondent."}}, {"text": "ALAGIRisWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4854, "end_char": 4866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- ALAGIRisWAMI, J.-The respondent's ancestors had been granted a cash allowance called Tainat by the Peshwas.", "canonical_name": "ALAGIRisWAMI"}}, {"text": "Elphinston", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5091, "end_char": 5101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "British, by the Treaty of Gulga!lee with Jamkbandi dated 6-6-1819 by the Hon'ble Mr. Elphinston, Governor of Bombay\n\non behalf of the East India Company one of the terms which .were gran, ted tc, Gopalrao J amkhandikar was regarding the terms which he hell!"}}, {"text": "East India Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5140, "end_char": 5158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "British, by the Treaty of Gulga!lee with Jamkbandi dated 6-6-1819 by the Hon'ble Mr. Elphinston, Governor of Bombay\n\non behalf of the East India Company one of the terms which .were gran, ted tc, Gopalrao J amkhandikar was regarding the terms which he hell!"}}, {"text": "Gopalrao J amkhandikar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5202, "end_char": 5224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "British, by the Treaty of Gulga!lee with Jamkbandi dated 6-6-1819 by the Hon'ble Mr. Elphinston, Governor of Bombay\n\non behalf of the East India Company one of the terms which .were gran, ted tc, Gopalrao J amkhandikar was regarding the terms which he hell!", "canonical_name": "Gopalrao J amkhandikar"}}, {"text": "JamkhandiState", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5937, "end_char": 5951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the JamkhandiState was mered in the State of Bombay, the Bombay.", "canonical_name": "JamkhandiState"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5978, "end_char": 5984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the JamkhandiState was mered in the State of Bombay, the Bombay."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6157, "end_char": 6162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7381, "end_char": 7414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent then filed an appeal to the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal as by that time the a{Ca."}}, {"text": "J amkhandi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7878, "end_char": 7888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tribunal dealt with the argument before it on behalf of tile respondent to the efieet that the ruler of J amkhandi had no power to change the cash allowance to.", "canonical_name": "JamkhandiState"}}, {"text": "J amkhllndi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8063, "end_char": 8074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the year 1909-10 it was permanent and in the view that .the ruler of J amkhllndi had sovereign powers and was the tountain hea.d of all source of authority, that is.", "canonical_name": "JamkhandiState"}}, {"text": "High Court of My8ore.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8362, "end_char": 8383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent thereupon filed a writ petition No:· 777 before the High Court of My8ore."}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9048, "end_char": 9065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are of opinion that clearly the decision of the Mysore High Court is wrong."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9392, "end_char": 9401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1~5 SC 352) this Court stated the constitutional position of the Nizam of' Rerabad in these words :\n\n\" .... It cannot be dispute that prior to the integration of Hyderabad State with the Indian Union and the coming into force of the Indian Constitution, the Nizam of Hyderabad enjoyed uncontrolled sovereign powers."}}, {"text": "Nizam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9693, "end_char": 9698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 'Firmans were expressions of the sovereign will of the Nizam and they were bindin~ in the same way as any other law;-nay, they would override all other law.s which were in con, fiict with them."}}, {"text": "7-8-1920", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11012, "end_char": 11020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The extract from the Jamkhandi State Gazelle dated 7-8-1920 publishing rules regarding ca; h allowance itself shows that those rules cancelled the earlier rules and tliose rules also could be appropriately cancelled by the subsequent rules."}}, {"text": "Bombay State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11305, "end_char": 11317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Any application made by the respondent to the former .ruler of Jamkhandi after the State was merged in Bombay State will not help him."}}, {"text": "Mysore Revenue Aj>peUate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11409, "end_char": 11442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Mysore Revenue Aj>peUate Tribunal is, therefore, right."}}, {"text": "Mvsore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11997, "end_char": 12014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Mvsore High Court was."}}, {"text": "Datar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12248, "end_char": 12253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We must mention that when this appeal was ta<en up for hearing Mr. Datar apl'l:aring for the respondent con(ended lhat as this Court in M.P. State v. Ranojirao (1968 3 SCR 4119) has held that the Ma<lha Pradesh Abciition of Cash Grants Act violates Art."}}, {"text": "(1968 3 SCR 4119", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12341, "end_char": 12357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pradesh Abciition of Cash Grants Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12384, "end_char": 12420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(!)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12430, "end_char": 12443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pradesh Abciition of Cash Grants Act", "statute": "Pradesh Abciition of Cash Grants Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12447, "end_char": 12457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pradesh Abciition of Cash Grants Act", "statute": "Pradesh Abciition of Cash Grants Act"}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13042, "end_char": 13062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the result this appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court of Mysore set aside."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_464_469_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "IFTIKHAR AHMED AND OTHERS\n\nSYED MEHARBAN ALI AND OTHERS\n\nFebruary 26, 197 4\n\n[K. K. MATHEW AND A. ALAGJRISWAMI, JJ.]\n\n Pwctice~Res-judicata between co-plain!ifJ~~.der oJ f:ourt setti.ng . aside\n\n6 ward and , emitting award for fresh arbrtratzon-lf can be questroned in pr_oceedings arising from rJte cond a ward. . ... . The dispute between the anants and lli.e i-ep6ncfents, as. io _who were the bhumidars of certain prol!erties, was ferred by the Consohdatton Officer under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings1Att, 1953, o to the Civil Judge, who _ referred it to an arbitrato~ appointed under. the A\\!t. The arbitrator held that the respondents had no . title as bhumidars, relyng upon a, .judgment of e High Court, which, accordin, t to the arbitrator oj)erated as r'es-ittdicata between the parties. That judgment was delivered in a suit instituted by the appellant's predecessor and the present respondents for a declaration that a mottg11ge decree in fl\\vour of the :.defendant in that suit did not affect the .shl\\[es of the respondents in the J}roperties in dispute, and the High Court held that the appellant's predecessor alo_ne was e11titled to the properties, accepting the contention of the defendant in that suit that the respondents had no title whatsoever. · The Civil Jud&e held that the award was manifestly wrong because, that judgment according. to him did not operate as resjudicata between the parties.\n\nHe therefore et aside the award and remitted the case to another arbitrator.\n\nThe second arbitrator held that the appellant and respqndents were co bhumidars and determined the shares 'of the ]larties holding that the judgQent of the High Court did not operate as res .judicata. .This award was confirmed by the Civil Judge and the Hi_gh Qourt aareed with the Civil Judge.\n\nAllowin~ the appeal to th~ Court, HELD: ·(a)·~'Jf a judgment is to operate as res judicata between . codefendants it is necessary to-.establish (i) tqat Qlere was ;~ conflict of interest between the co-defendants, (ii) that\" it was necessary to decide the conflict in order to give relief to the plaintiff, .. and (iii) , fbat the Court actually decided the question. There is no reason why_ a previous decision could not operate as res judicata between c; o.plai~\\iffs . also if these three cottditions are satisfied mutatis mutand1's. [467 H; 4~ B-C] . .\n\n. (b) In the judgment of the High Court which was relied upon as having. operated as res judicata there was actual conflict of interest between the present\n\napell.arit _on the oe hand. and the preent responent on the other; they were the pla.rnhffs m that smt, ad 1t. was. necessary to. decide th; tt. conflict in order to give relief to the. defendant m that su1t; and the H1gh Court decided that the properties !Jelonged exclusively to the appellant's .Jl.redecessor. The effect of th, at judgment 1s \"that the present respondents failed to establish their contention that they had title to the properties. [467 F-H]\n\n(c) There was no finding by the arbitrator that by adverse possession the res_pondents had acquired title to the property at any time. {468 F]\n\n(d) The provisions of Arbitration Act. apply to proceedings before an arbitrator under the; U.P .. Cpnsolidation of Holdings Act. Therefore, if the . iudent of the Hih Court operated .in law 'as res judicata it would be an .-ettor of law apparent on e face of the''a'Watd.\"if it says that the judgment l~\\fld'i!\\bt'lie as :ref f\"dicata. I mn:ee, the Award in the present case wa' ' liable td'beftiide iu\\trer s. 30 bf 'the 'Arbitration Act. [468 F-Hl\n\n(e) Under s. 39 of the Arbitration Act no appeal lillll from an order remitting an award .to an arbitrator under s. 16 of the Arbitration Act. Therefore,\n\nIFTOOIAR AHMED V. S. M ALI (Mathew, /.) 465\n\nthe appellant could not have challenged the order when the Civil Judge set • aside the first award and remitted the case to the arbitrator. for passing a fresh award. Hence. there is no reason why the appellant .should be. precl\\lded\n\nfrom challenging the correctness of that order in this apJ)eal and gettina relief on that basis.\n\n[469 BJ ·\n\n(f) Since, in the circumstances ?f the case it would be an empty -~Orinl!li~ to remit the case aRain to. the arbitrator the award of the first arbitrator •s restored.\n\n[469 C) 9-heonarayan Singh v. Ramnandan Prasad Narayan Singh A.I.R. [1916) P.C. 78, applied.\n\nChandu Lal v. K/, ali/ur Rol.aman A.I.R. [1950] P.C. 17, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1646 (N) of 1967.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the judgment and order dated the May 19, 1967 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No. 424 of 1969.\n\nl. P. Goyal and Sobhagmal Jain, for the appellants.\n\nHira Lal Jain, (not present) for respondent No. 1(a).\n\nV. S. Desai and N. M. Kslratriya, for respondent no. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMATHEW, J.-In this appeal, by special ]eave, the question for consideration is whether the High Court of Allahabad was right in setting aside the..decree passed by the Distric;, t Judge, Meerut, in appeal, setting aside an award passed by the arbitrator appointed under the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) .\n\nIn order to appreciate the question in issue, the following pedigree is .. useful : Buniyad Ali-Smt. Kuri (his widow) (died in 1900) i---~----- ~-------r -- ------_ . -·· ·- smt. Tarifun Nisa Sri Aftab AliSmt. Matlubun-Nisa (daughter) (died in 1910) (died in 1925) (died in 1905 or 1906)\n\n----·-· _ _ _ ... __ _I_ __ I\n\nI .\n\nSri lshtiaq Ahmad Smt. Kaniz Fatima I 1\n\nlflikhar Ahmad .. .. ~:~~~-Ah:a~ ....\n\nMukhtia~ Ahmad (Appellant No; 1) (Appellant No. 2) (Appellant No. 3)\n\nII Smt. Majidun Nisa (daughter) (died in 1920)\n\n[ Syed Meharban Ali (Respondent No. 1)\n\nThe appellants are the legal representatives of Ishtiaq Ahmed. In the consolidation proceedings under the Act with respect to the properties in question which originally belonged to Buniyad Ali, dispute arose between Ishtiaq Ahmed on the one hand and Meharban Alf and Kaniz Fatima on the other hand as regards the title to them.\n\nMeharban Ali and Kaniz Fatima claimed that they were co-bhumidhars of the properties along with Ishtiaq Ahmed. Ishtiaq Ahmed contended that all the assets of Buniyad Ali were inherited by his son Aftab Ali and that after the death of Aft a b Ali in 191 0 and his widow in 1925 he became the excJusive owner of the properties as the other heirs had\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974 J 3 S, C, R.\n\nrelinquished their' rights in them. Ishtiaq Ahmed *o claimed title to the properties by adverse possesion. As the dispute between the\n\nparts was coqcerned with the title to the properties, the Consolida.tion Officer referred the matter to the Civil Judge, Meerut who referred the, fame to an arbitrator app9inted under the Act. The arbitrator hefd that Meharban Ali and Kaniz Fatima had no title and so were not o-bhumidhars of the properties with lshtiaq Ahmad. For reaching (his conclusion the arbitrator mainly relied on a judgment of the High Court of Allahabad which, according to the arbitrator, operated as res iudicata between the parties with respect to the title to the properties.\n\nBoth the parties fihid objections to the award before the learned II Civil Judge, Meerut. He held that the judgment of the High Court relieq on by the arbitrator did not operate as res judicata between the parties as regards the title to the properties and that the decision of the arbitrator, based as. it was on that judgment operating as res\n\njudicat~, was manifestly wrong and the award was consequently vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the award. He therefore set aside the awar'd and remitted the case to the arbitrator for a fresh decision.\n\nThe arbitrator Mr:, R. P. Gupta considered the cse. He came to the conclusion, on the basis of the ora] and documentary evidence, that the. parties were co-bhumidhars of the properties except in respect\n\no~ 9 bzghas. 3 biswas 3 hiswasis and determined their shres in the properties. The arbitrat0r was of the view that the judgment of the High Court was not res judicata as regards the title of the parties to the properties.\n\nAgainst this award, lshtiaq Ahn.cd filed objections before the II Civil Judge, Meerut. . The Civil Judge considered the objections and found that there was no manifest error or illegality in the award and he confirmed the award.\n\nIshtiaq Ahmed preferred an appeal from this decision before the District Judge. Ishtiaq Ahmed died during the pendency of the appeal and his Ieal representatives, the present appellants, prosecuted the appeal.\n\nThe District Judge held, that the award suffered frm an error. of law apparent on the face of the rcord in that the ar~1tator ignored the judgment of the High Court wh1ch opeated as res JUdicata as regards the title of the parties to te -properties.\n\nHe, therefoe, allowed the appeal and set aside the \\:Iecree appealed from and remitted 'the case to the arbitrator for a fresh decision. . -The respondents filed a revision befor~ the High Court against th.e decision of the District Judge and the Htgh Court reversed the decision and restored the decree passed by tht! Civil Judge confirming the award.\n\nMr. Goel appearing for the appellants submittd .that the High Court went wrong in reversing the decree of the' DIStrict Judge. He\n\nar2Ued that the award was vitiated by an error of law apparent on the faoe of the record as the award proceeded on he. bas~ that the judgment of the High Court did not operate as res JUdicata tn respect\n\nlFTIKHAR AHMED v. S. M. ALI (Mathew, /.) 467'\n\nof the title of the parties to the properties, and therefore, the decision of the District J 11de setting aside the award was correct.\n\nNow, let us consider the nature of the judgment passed by the High Court and see whether it operated as res judicata in respect of the question of title of the parties to the properties and whether there was any manifest error of Jaw apparent on !he face of the award. That judgment rela~ to the prrties in dispute and was passed in second\n\nappeal from a decree in a suit (Suit J'l:o. (;00 of 1.9.34) instituted by Meharban Ali, Kaniz Fatima and Ishtiag Ahmed for a declaration that the decree obtained in O.S. No. 128 of 19.29 J>y Ishari Prasad, the, defendant in that suit on the foot of a mrtgage deed aated. November 5, 1925 executed in his favour by Matlub-un-nissa did not affect the shares of Meharban Ali and Kaniz 'Fatima in the mohgaged properties and that the mortgage, and the decree obtained thereon were invalid to the extent of their shares in the properties. !, shari Prasad, the de fendant in that suit, contended that Matlub-un-nissa~ the mortgagor alone was entitled to the properties mortgaged and that the decree ob~\n\ntained by him on the mortgage was valid. In substance, the con•ention of lshari'Prasad was that Meharban Ali and Kaniz Fatima had no title\n\nto the properties as the latter and the former's mother had relinquished ·\n\ntheir shares and that the title to the properties vested exclusively in the mother of Ishtiaq Ahmed, namely,. Matlub.un-nisa. The trial Court passed a decree dismissing the suit holding that Kaniz Fatima and Meharban Ali's -mother relinquished their shares in the properties and that Matlub-un-nissa, the mortgagor, alone was entitled to the properties and, therefore, the mongage, and the decree based thereon were valid. The plaintiffs in the suit (Suit No. 600 of 1934) preferred an appeal from the decree. That was dismissed. The decree dismissing the appeal was confirmed by the High Court in the second appeal filed by them.\n\nThere can be: no doubt that by the written statement, !shari Prasad, the mortgagee, denied the title of Kaniz Fatima and Meharban Ali to the properties and set up the contention that Matlub-un-nissa, the morgagor, from whom lshtiaq Ahmed traced his title, alone was entitled to 1he properties.\n\nThere was, therefore, an actual conflict Of interest betweenIshtiac(Ahmed on the one hand and Kaniz Fatima and Meharban Ali on the other, and it was necessary to decide the conflict in order tQ give relief to the defendant (fshari Prasad) and the Coun decided that the propenies belonged exclusively to the mortgagor, the mother of lshtiaq Ahmed.\n\n The effect of the udgment is that Kaniz Fatima and Meharban Ali fail¢ to establish therr contention that they had title to the properties, and, the question is, could they be allowed to agitate the same question'!\n\nNow it is settled by a large number of decisions that for a judgment to operate as res judicata between or among co-defendants, it is necessary to establish that ( 1) there was a conflict of interest between codefendants; (2) that it was necessary to decide the conflict in ord'er to give the rlief which the plaintiff claimed in the suit; and (3) that the court actually decided the question.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1974 l 3 s.c.ll.\n\nIn Chandu Lal v. Khali/ur Rahman(') Lord Simonds said:\n\n\"It may be added that the doctrine may apply even though the party, against whom it is sought to enforce it, did not in the previous suit think fit to enter an appearance and contest the question. But. to this the qualification must be. added that, if such a party is to be bound by a previous\n\njudgment~ it must be proved clearly that he h~ or must be dee.i:ned to have had notice that the relevant question was in issue and wo'\\lld have to be decided\".\n\nWe see no reason why a previous decision should not operate as ies judicata between co-plaintiffs if all these conditions are mutatis\n\nmutandis satisfied. In consi(lering any question of res judicata we have to bear in mind the statement of the Board in Sheoparsan Singh\n\nv. Ramanandim Prasad Narayan Singh(2) that the rule of res judicata \"while found, ed on ancient precedent is dictated by a wisdom which is for all time' and that the application of the rule by the courts \"shoul<i be infiuenced by no technical considerations of form, but by matter of liUbstance within the limits. allowed by law.\n\n: \"The raison d'etre of the rule is to confer finality on ci sions arrived at by competent Courts between interested parties after genuine contest; and to allow persons who had deliberately chosen a position to reprobate it and to blow bot\n\nno~ when t?ey were blowin~ cold before would be completely to Jgnore the whole founduon of the rule.\" {see Ram Bhaj v. Ahmad Saidakhtar Khan(3 ) .\n\nIn the award, the arbitrator has stated that the judgment of the High Court in the second appeal would not operate as res judicata as regards the title to the properties but was. only a piece of evidence. The arbitrator came to the conclusion that the respondents were in joint possession of the properties and, therefore, there was no ouster. If the judgment operated as res judicata, the respondents had no title to the properties. There was no finding by the arbitrator that by adverse possession they had acquired title to the properties at any point of time.\n\nThe question which was referred to the arbitrator was the dispute between the parties as regards the title to the properties. If the judgment of the HiJth.Court operated in law as res judicata, it would be an error of law apparent on the face of the award if it were to' say that the judgmen( would not operate as res judicata. The District Judge was, therefore, right in holding that the award. was vitiated by an error of Jaw apparent on its face in that it was based on the proposition that the judgment of the High Court would not operate as res judicata on\n\ntb~ auestion of title to the properties. If an award sets forth a proposi~ tion of law which is erroneous, then the award is liable to be set aside under s. 30 of the Arbitration Act. This Court has held that the pro~ visions of the Arbitration Act will apply to proceedings by an arbitrator under the Act (see Charan Singh and Others v.\n\nBabulal and Others(4 ).\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1950 P.C. 17.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 78.\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1938 Lah. 571.\n\n(4) [1966] Supp. S.C.R. 63.\n\n....\n\nIFTIKHAR AHMrD 1' S. l\\1. ALI (Mathew, ].) 469\n\nIt might be recalled that the ll Civil J udgc set <side the first award and remitted the case to the arbitrator for passing a fresh award under s. 16 of the Arbitration Act. That was only on the basis that the arbitrator committed an error of law in relying upon the judgment of the\n\nHig~ Court as finally determining the titl~ to the properties. As no appeal under s. 39 of the Arbitration Act lay from an order remitting an award to an arbitrator under s. 1'6 of the Arbitration Act, Ishtiaq Ahmed could not have challenged the order. There is, therefore, no reason why the appellants should be precluded from challenging the correctness of that order in this appeal and getting relief on that basis.\n\nWe et. aside the order of the High Court and allow the appeal. In . the circumstances we think it would be an empty formality to restore the deCision of the District Judge and remit the case again to the arbi- C trator. We restore the award dated March 30, 1959, passed by Mr.\n\nK. C. Govil, the first arbitrator. We make no order as to costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 53, "entities": [{"text": "IFTIKHAR AHMED AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "IFTIKHAR AHMED AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SYED MEHARBAN ALI AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED MEHARBAN ALI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 26, 197", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 73, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IFTIKHAR AHMED AND OTHERS\n\nSYED MEHARBAN ALI AND OTHERS\n\nFebruary 26, 197 4\n\n[K. K. MATHEW AND A. ALAGJRISWAMI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "K. K. MATHEW", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Cpnsolidation of Holdings Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3221, "end_char": 3250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3531, "end_char": 3536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cpnsolidation of Holdings Act", "statute": "Cpnsolidation of Holdings Act"}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3584, "end_char": 3589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cpnsolidation of Holdings Act", "statute": "Cpnsolidation of Holdings Act"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3687, "end_char": 3692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cpnsolidation of Holdings Act", "statute": "Cpnsolidation of Holdings Act"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4451, "end_char": 4479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "P. Goyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4658, "end_char": 4666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l. P. Goyal and Sobhagmal Jain, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Sobhagmal Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4671, "end_char": 4685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l. P. Goyal and Sobhagmal Jain, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Hira Lal Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4708, "end_char": 4721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hira Lal Jain, (not present) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4763, "end_char": 4774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai and N. M. Kslratriya, for respondent no."}}, {"text": "N. M. Kslratriya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4779, "end_char": 4795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai and N. M. Kslratriya, for respondent no."}}, {"text": "MATHEW", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4864, "end_char": 4870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMATHEW, J.-In this appeal, by special ]eave, the question for consideration is whether the High Court of Allahabad was right in setting aside the..decree passed by the Distric;, t Judge, Meerut, in appeal, setting aside an award passed by the arbitrator appointed under the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) ."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4955, "end_char": 4978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMATHEW, J.-In this appeal, by special ]eave, the question for consideration is whether the High Court of Allahabad was right in setting aside the..decree passed by the Distric;, t Judge, Meerut, in appeal, setting aside an award passed by the arbitrator appointed under the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) ."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5138, "end_char": 5187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Buniyad Ali-Smt. Kuri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5312, "end_char": 5333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to appreciate the question in issue, the following pedigree is .. useful : Buniyad Ali-Smt.", "canonical_name": "Buniyad Ali-Smt. Kuri"}}, {"text": "lshtiaq Ahmad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5557, "end_char": 5570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri lshtiaq Ahmad Smt.", "canonical_name": "lshtiaq Ahmad"}}, {"text": "Kaniz Fatima", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5576, "end_char": 5588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kaniz Fatima I 1\n\nlflikhar Ahmad .. .. ~:~~~-Ah:a~ ....\n\nMukhtia~ Ahmad (Appellant No; 1) (Appellant No.", "canonical_name": "Kaniz 'Fatima"}}, {"text": "lflikhar Ahmad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5594, "end_char": 5608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kaniz Fatima I 1\n\nlflikhar Ahmad .. .. ~:~~~-Ah:a~ ....\n\nMukhtia~ Ahmad (Appellant No; 1) (Appellant No."}}, {"text": "Mukhtia~ Ahmad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5633, "end_char": 5647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kaniz Fatima I 1\n\nlflikhar Ahmad .. .. ~:~~~-Ah:a~ ....\n\nMukhtia~ Ahmad (Appellant No; 1) (Appellant No."}}, {"text": "Majidun Nisa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5711, "end_char": 5723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Majidun Nisa (daughter) (died in 1920)\n\n[ Syed Meharban Ali (Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Syed Meharban Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5753, "end_char": 5770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Majidun Nisa (daughter) (died in 1920)\n\n[ Syed Meharban Ali (Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "SYED MEHARBAN ALI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Ishtiaq Ahmed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5839, "end_char": 5852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1)\n\nThe appellants are the legal representatives of Ishtiaq Ahmed.", "canonical_name": "Ishtiaq Ahmed"}}, {"text": "Buniyad Ali", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5973, "end_char": 5984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the consolidation proceedings under the Act with respect to the properties in question which originally belonged to Buniyad Ali, dispute arose between Ishtiaq Ahmed on the one hand and Meharban Alf and Kaniz Fatima on the other hand as regards the title to them.", "canonical_name": "Buniyad Ali-Smt. Kuri"}}, {"text": "Meharban Alf", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6042, "end_char": 6054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the consolidation proceedings under the Act with respect to the properties in question which originally belonged to Buniyad Ali, dispute arose between Ishtiaq Ahmed on the one hand and Meharban Alf and Kaniz Fatima on the other hand as regards the title to them.", "canonical_name": "Meharban Alf"}}, {"text": "Kaniz Fatima", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6059, "end_char": 6071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the consolidation proceedings under the Act with respect to the properties in question which originally belonged to Buniyad Ali, dispute arose between Ishtiaq Ahmed on the one hand and Meharban Alf and Kaniz Fatima on the other hand as regards the title to them.", "canonical_name": "Kaniz 'Fatima"}}, {"text": "Meharban Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6121, "end_char": 6133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meharban Ali and Kaniz Fatima claimed that they were co-bhumidhars of the properties along with Ishtiaq Ahmed.", "canonical_name": "Meharban Alf"}}, {"text": "Aftab Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6317, "end_char": 6326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ishtiaq Ahmed contended that all the assets of Buniyad Ali were inherited by his son Aftab Ali and that after the death of Aft a b Ali in 191 0 and his widow in 1925 he became the excJusive owner of the properties as the other heirs had\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974 J 3 S, C, R.\n\nrelinquished their' rights in them.", "canonical_name": "Aft a b Ali"}}, {"text": "Aft a b Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6355, "end_char": 6366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ishtiaq Ahmed contended that all the assets of Buniyad Ali were inherited by his son Aftab Ali and that after the death of Aft a b Ali in 191 0 and his widow in 1925 he became the excJusive owner of the properties as the other heirs had\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974 J 3 S, C, R.\n\nrelinquished their' rights in them.", "canonical_name": "Aft a b Ali"}}, {"text": "Civil Judge, Meerut", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6757, "end_char": 6776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the dispute between the\n\nparts was coqcerned with the title to the properties, the Consolida.tion Officer referred the matter to the Civil Judge, Meerut who referred the, fame to an arbitrator app9inted under the Act."}}, {"text": "II Civil Judge, Meerut", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7273, "end_char": 7295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the parties fihid objections to the award before the learned II Civil Judge, Meerut."}}, {"text": "R. P. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7795, "end_char": 7806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arbitrator Mr:, R. P. Gupta considered the cse."}}, {"text": "Goel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9252, "end_char": 9256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Goel appearing for the appellants submittd .that the High Court went wrong in reversing the decree of the' DIStrict Judge."}}, {"text": "Ishtiag Ahmed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10212, "end_char": 10225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "00 of 1.9.34) instituted by Meharban Ali, Kaniz Fatima and Ishtiag Ahmed for a declaration that the decree obtained in O.S. No.", "canonical_name": "Ishtiaq Ahmed"}}, {"text": "Ishari Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10298, "end_char": 10311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "128 of 19.29 J>y Ishari Prasad, the, defendant in that suit on the foot of a mrtgage deed aated.", "canonical_name": "Ishari Prasad"}}, {"text": "November 5, 1925", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10378, "end_char": 10394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "November 5, 1925 executed in his favour by Matlub-un-nissa did not affect the shares of Meharban Ali and Kaniz 'Fatima in the mohgaged properties and that the mortgage, and the decree obtained thereon were invalid to the extent of their shares in the properties. !,"}}, {"text": "Matlub-un-nissa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10421, "end_char": 10436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "November 5, 1925 executed in his favour by Matlub-un-nissa did not affect the shares of Meharban Ali and Kaniz 'Fatima in the mohgaged properties and that the mortgage, and the decree obtained thereon were invalid to the extent of their shares in the properties. !,", "canonical_name": "Matlub-un-nissa~"}}, {"text": "Kaniz 'Fatima", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10483, "end_char": 10496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "November 5, 1925 executed in his favour by Matlub-un-nissa did not affect the shares of Meharban Ali and Kaniz 'Fatima in the mohgaged properties and that the mortgage, and the decree obtained thereon were invalid to the extent of their shares in the properties. !,", "canonical_name": "Kaniz 'Fatima"}}, {"text": "shari Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10644, "end_char": 10656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "shari Prasad, the de fendant in that suit, contended that Matlub-un-nissa~ the mortgagor alone was entitled to the properties mortgaged and that the decree ob~\n\ntained by him on the mortgage was valid.", "canonical_name": "Ishari Prasad"}}, {"text": "Matlub-un-nissa~", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10702, "end_char": 10718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "shari Prasad, the de fendant in that suit, contended that Matlub-un-nissa~ the mortgagor alone was entitled to the properties mortgaged and that the decree ob~\n\ntained by him on the mortgage was valid.", "canonical_name": "Matlub-un-nissa~"}}, {"text": "Matlub-un-nissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11836, "end_char": 11851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "shari Prasad, the mortgagee, denied the title of Kaniz Fatima and Meharban Ali to the properties and set up the contention that Matlub-un-nissa, the morgagor, from whom lshtiaq Ahmed traced his title, alone was entitled to 1he properties."}}, {"text": "lshtiaq Ahmed", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11877, "end_char": 11890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "shari Prasad, the mortgagee, denied the title of Kaniz Fatima and Meharban Ali to the properties and set up the contention that Matlub-un-nissa, the morgagor, from whom lshtiaq Ahmed traced his title, alone was entitled to 1he properties.", "canonical_name": "lshtiaq Ahmad"}}, {"text": "fshari Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12172, "end_char": 12185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was, therefore, an actual conflict Of interest betweenIshtiac(Ahmed on the one hand and Kaniz Fatima and Meharban Ali on the other, and it was necessary to decide the conflict in order tQ give relief to the defendant (fshari Prasad) and the Coun decided that the propenies belonged exclusively to the mortgagor, the mother of lshtiaq Ahmed.", "canonical_name": "Ishari Prasad"}}, {"text": "Simonds", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12990, "end_char": 12997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Chandu Lal v. Khali/ur Rahman(') Lord Simonds said:\n\n\"It may be added that the doctrine may apply even though the party, against whom it is sought to enforce it, did not in the previous suit think fit to enter an appearance and contest the question."}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15735, "end_char": 15740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IFTIKHAR AHMrD 1' S. l\\1. ALI (Mathew, ].) 469", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16059, "end_char": 16105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "....\n\nIFTIKHAR AHMrD 1' S. l\\1."}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16251, "end_char": 16256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16473, "end_char": 16478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16562, "end_char": 16566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 30, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17058, "end_char": 17072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We restore the award dated March 30, 1959, passed by Mr.\n\nK. C. Govil, the first arbitrator."}}, {"text": "K. C. Govil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17089, "end_char": 17100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We restore the award dated March 30, 1959, passed by Mr.\n\nK. C. Govil, the first arbitrator."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_470_473_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "RAM LABHAYA\n\nMUNICIPAL CORORATION OF DELHI AND ANR.\n\nFebruari: 26, 1974\n\n[M. H. BEG, Y. V. CHANDRACHUD AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.]\n\nPrtven1ion of Food Adulteratioh Act, 1954-S. 10(7) whether mandatory or directory-Scope of.\n\nThe appellant was charged with an offence 1;1ndCr s .. 16(7) of the reventio!1 of Food Adulteration .Aot~ 1954 for adulterating foreign starches with llaldt.\n\nHe was acquitted by the Magistrate on the ground that the sample was not taken by the Food Inspector in the presence of independent witnesses. leading to non-compliance with the mandatory .Prvisions of s. 10(7) of the A~~· The High Court set aside the order of acquittal and held that the prov1s1ons of s. _10(7) of the Act were directory _and not mandatorY.\n\nSection 10(7) of the Act provides that where the Food Inspector takes any action under ally of the clauses menti9ned therein he shall call one or more persons to be present at the time when uch action is taker, and take his or their signatures. By the amendment of 1964 the words \"as far as possible\" which were in the unamended section were deleted.\n\nJt was contended thats. 10(7) was mandatory and since the F09<1 Inspector did not take a. sample in the presence of independent persons as required by the section its contravention would vitiate the conviction.\n\nOn appeal to this Court, confirming the conviction imposed by the High Court,\n\nHELD : There can be no doubt that \"one or more persons\" nlust mean one or more independent persons.\n\nIn view of the legislative history of i. 10(7) while takin~ action under any of the provisions mentioned in the sub-section, the food Inspector must call one or more indendent persons to be present at the time when such action is taken. It is not, however, correct tO say that regardtc_ss of an circumstances non-presence of one or more independent persons at the relevant time would vitiate the trial or conviction.\n\nThe obligation which s. 10(7} casts on the Food Inspector is to \"call\" one or more persons to be present when he takes action. [472 D-Fl\n\nI~ the instant case the Food Inspector did. call the neighbouring shopkeepers to witness the taking of the sample. None was willing to cooperate. He could not certainly compel their presence.\n\nIn such circumstances the prosecution was relieved of its obligation to cite independent witnesses. The Food Inspector WM unable to secure the presence of independent persons and was\n\nth~.refore, driven to take a sample in the presence of the members of his staff onIY.\n\nI~ is easy enough to understand that shopkeepers might feel bound by fraternal\n\nhs but o cou.rt can countenance ?- conspiracy to keep out independent witnesses _in a bid to defeat the working of laws. f472 F-473 BJ\n\nBabula! Hargovindas v. State of Gujarat [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 53, followed.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :Criminal Appeal No 192 of 1970. .\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 18th August, 1970 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Appeal No. J 9 of H 1966.\n\nM. K. Ramamwthi and Vinee/ K11mar, for the appellant.\n\nA Hardaya! Hardy, B. P. Maheshwari and N. K. Jain, for the respondent. -\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nOrANDRACHUD, J.\n\nOn July 31, 1965 a Food Inspector of the Muriicipal Corporation of Delhi took a sample of Haldi from the appellant's shop on More Sarai Road. On the Public, Analyst certifying that the Haldi contained foreign starches to the extent of 25 per cent the appellant was put up for trial before the learned Magistrate, First Class, Delhi, under section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The learned Magistrate acquitted the appellant on the sole ground that the sample of Haldi was not taken by the Food Inspector in the presence of independent witnesses, leading to non-compliance with the \"mandatory provisions\" of section 10(7) of the Act.\n\nThe order of, acquittal was set aside in appeal by the High Court of Delhi whichfollowing its own earlier judgment took the view that the provisions of section 10( 7) of the Act are directory and not mandatory.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed againstlhe judgment of the High Court convicting the appellant of the offence of selling an adulterated article of food and sentencing. him to suffer imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000.\n\nIt is urged on behalf of the appellant that the report of the Public Analystdoes not say that the presence of 25 per cent of starch affects injuriously the nature, substance or quality of Haldi and therefore the sample taken by the Food Inspector cannot be said to be adulterated within the meaning of section 2(i) (b) of the Act. The short , answer to this contention is that Rule 44 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules,.1955 provides that no person shall sell turmeric \"containing any foreign substance\". The report of the Public Analyst shows that the sample contained not natural but \"foreign starches''. Section 7(v) of the Act provides that no person shall sell any article of food in contravention of any provision of the Act or of any rule made thereunder. The sale of Haldi containing foreign starch is in contravention of rule 44(h) and is therefore an offence under section 7(v) of the Act.\n\nGreat reliance was placed by counsel for the appellant on the circum. stance that as required by section 10(7) of the Act the Food Inspector did not take the sample in the presence of independen~ persons. It is urged that section 10(7) is mandatory and its contravention would vitiate the conviction.\n\nSection !Q(7) provides :\n\n\"Where the food inspector takes any action under clause\n\n(a) of sub-section (I), sub-section (2), sub-section (4) or sub-section (6), he shall, call one or more persons to be present at the time when such . action is taken and take his or their signatures.\"\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974 J 3 S.C.R.\n\nThere can be no doubt that \"one or more persons\" must mean one or more independent persons. The legislative history of sub-section\n\n(7) further shows that at the least, the Food Inspector ought to try and secure the presence of one or more independent persons when he takes action under any of the provisions mentioned in the subsection. Prior to its amendment by Act XLIX of 1964, sub-section (7) ran thus : -..\n\n\"Where the Food Inspector takes any action under clause\n\n(a) of sub-section(!) ...... he shall, as far as possible call not. less than two persons to be present at the time when such action is taken and take their signatures.\"\n\nBy the amendment of 1964, the words \"as far as possible\" were deleted. This deletion naturally lends plausibility to the contention that the provisions of section 10(7) are mandatory and it has been so\n\nhe~ in Food Inspector, Corporation of Calicut v. Vincent and Anr.(1> and Ram Sarup Tara Chand v. The Stale.(')\n\nWe are of the opinion, particularly in view of the legislative history of section 10(7), that while taking action under any of the. provisions mentioned in the sub-section, the Foocl Inspector must call one or more independent persons to be present at the time when such action is taken. We are, however, unable to agree that regardless of all circumstances, the non-presence of one or more independent persons at the relevant time would vitiate the trial qr conviction. The obligation which section 10(7) casts. on the Food Inspector is to 'call' one or more persons to be present when he takes action. The facts in the instant case show tqat the Food Inspector did call the neighbouring shopkeepers to witness the taking of thesample but none was willing to co-operate. He could not certainly compel their presence. In such circumstances, the prosecution was relieved of its obligation to cite independent witnesses. In Babu Lal Hargovindas v. State of Gujarat(') it was held by this Court after noticing that section 10(7) was amended in 1964, that non-compliance with it would not vitiate the trial and since the Food Inspector was not in the position of an accompJice his evidence alone, if believed, can sustain the conviction.\n\nThe Court observed that this ought not to be understood as minimising the need to comply with the salutary provision in section 10(7) which was enacted as a safeguard against possible allegations of excesses or unfair practices by the Food Inspector.\n\n(1) I.LR. [19661 (2) Kerala 551.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1965 Punjab ~\n\n(3) [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 53,\n\nAs stated earlier the Food Inspector was unable to secure the presence of independent persons and was therefore driven to take the sample in the presence of the members of his staff only. It is easy enough to understand that shopkeepers may feel bound by fraternal ties but no court can countenance a conspiracy to keep out independont witnesses in a bid to defeat the working of laws.\n\nHowever, we are not disposed, while confirming the conviction of the appellant, to uphold the sentence imposed by the High Court Rn!e 5 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 provides that standards of quality of the various articles of food specified in Appendix B to the Rules\" must be as defined in that Appendix. .Rule A.05.20.01 which came into force on July 8,' 1968 shows that Haldi Powder may contain not more than 60 per cent of starch by weight.\n\nIt is true that this Rule came into force after the date of the offence in question, but the circumstance is not without relevance on th~ question of sentence. Counsel for the Corporation did not also press for a substantive sentence. In the circumstances, a sntence of fine of Rs. 1000 in place of the minimum sentence prescribed by law .would meet the requirementS of the case. We are informed that the appellant has already paid the fine.\n\nWe therefore uphold the order of conviction but modify the sentence as stated above.\n\nPJ3.R.\n\n2-M 45 Sup. Cl/75", "total_entities": 29, "entities": [{"text": "RAM LABHAYA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM LABHAYA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUNICIPAL CORORATION OF DELHI AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUNICIPAL CORORATION OF DELHI AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y. V. CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Food Adulteratioh Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 10(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171, "end_char": 179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Food Adulteratioh Act, 1954", "statute": "Food Adulteratioh Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "s. 10(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 583, "end_char": 591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Food Adulteratioh Act, 1954", "statute": "Food Adulteratioh Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "Section 10(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 741, "end_char": 754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Food Adulteratioh Act, 1954", "statute": "Food Adulteratioh Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "A Hardaya! Hardy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3062, "end_char": 3078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Hardaya!"}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3080, "end_char": 3096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardy, B. P. Maheshwari and N. K. Jain, for the respondent. -"}}, {"text": "N. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3101, "end_char": 3111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardy, B. P. Maheshwari and N. K. Jain, for the respondent. -"}}, {"text": "OrANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3180, "end_char": 3191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nOrANDRACHUD, J.\n\nOn July 31, 1965 a Food Inspector of the Muriicipal Corporation of Delhi took a sample of Haldi from the appellant's shop on More Sarai Road."}}, {"text": "Magistrate, First Class, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3498, "end_char": 3528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the Public, Analyst certifying that the Haldi contained foreign starches to the extent of 25 per cent the appellant was put up for trial before the learned Magistrate, First Class, Delhi, under section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954."}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3929, "end_char": 3948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of, acquittal was set aside in appeal by the High Court of Delhi whichfollowing its own earlier judgment took the view that the provisions of section 10( 7) of the Act are directory and not mandatory."}}, {"text": "section 10( 7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4026, "end_char": 4040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4639, "end_char": 4651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7(v)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4955, "end_char": 4967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(v)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5223, "end_char": 5235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5346, "end_char": 5359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5471, "end_char": 5484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6675, "end_char": 6688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6909, "end_char": 6922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7327, "end_char": 7340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7847, "end_char": 7860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8190, "end_char": 8203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8940, "end_char": 8983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Appendix B to the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9064, "end_char": 9087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July 8,' 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9168, "end_char": 9181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Rule A.05.20.01 which came into force on July 8,' 1968 shows that Haldi Powder may contain not more than 60 per cent of starch by weight."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_474_486_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "SHRIPAD GAJANAN $UTHANKAR ..\n\nDATTARAM KASH!NATH SUTHANKAR AND ORS.\n\nMarch I, 1974 . [D. o: PALEKAR, P. N. BHAGWATI AND v. R. KRISHNA !YER, JJ.J\n\nHindu Law-Prior to Hindu SuCl't>ssio11 Act, 1956--Dearh of Copal'cener leaving it'idolf-Partition among other r:oparceners /ater~AdoptiolJ by widow- Share of\n\nadoPld son ill -coparcenary properly. - M: ha, d two sons-the first defedant and K.\n\nK died in 1921 leaving a widow nd a daughter.'' In-1944 there was'a partition between Mand the first defendant, and, in that partition, allotment (or residence and :i; naintenance of K's widow was made.\n\nThereafter, M 8ifted away his share, which he got in partition, to Uie first defendant's\n\nson. the second defendant (appeUant). In 1956, before the HinOu Succession Act came into force, the widow of K adopted her daughter's son (respondent) and he filed the suit for a fresh partition claiming a half share of the entire property ignoring the earlier partition and gift. ' On the question of the rights and shares of the parties, HELD : (l) The firiding of the High Court that the adoption of the respondent was te and valid, both .from the ngles of custom and_ factun1, is established by\n\nte evidence. f476FJ ··\n\n(2) (a) Under. the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law a widow's adoption cannot be stultified by an anterior partition of the joint family and the adopted son can claim a share as if he were begotten and alive when 'e adOptive father breathed his last. [48SE]\n\n(b) Nevertheless the fact um of partition .is not wiped out by the later adoption. [48SE-Fj\n\n(c) Any disposition, testamentary or inter rfl'os, lawfully made ; uitecedent to\n\n1he adoption is immune to challenge by the adopted son; l485FJ )!;\n\n(d) Lswful alienation, in this context; rnea::is not necessarily for a family neces sity but .alienation made competently in accordance with law. [485FG]\n\n(e) A widow's power of alienation is limited, and if only if the conditions set by the Hindu Law are fulfilled will the alienation bind a subsequently adopted son.\n\nSo also the alienation by the Karta of an undivided family or transfer by a copar cener governed by the Banaras School of Hindu Law; [485F-G]\n\n(f) Once partitioned validly, the share of a me1nber of a Mitakshara Hilidu F family in which his own issue have no right b}' birth, can be transferred by him at his will and such transfers, be they by will, gift or sale, bind the adopted son who comes later on the scene. [48.~GH]\n\n(3) In computing the net available property for g:iving a share to the respondent, the property gifted by M to the second defendant has to be excluded while the allotment for nlaintenance will have to be brought into the corpus. But, in calculating his share the adopted son's right, arising long after other proprictai'y events. should be worked out, not rigidly but justly. If the respondent is given his 1/3 share as at G the time when the partition took place; since M's share, which had been f_iftcd away, -should be ignored, the respondent will get his 1/3 share of the entire family property\n\nfrom out of the 112 share of the first defendant got by him at the 194+partition.\n\nBut jt would be uiifair to the first defendant 10 deprive him of such a large share n1erely because he had not parted with his properties before the rcspondcnf:i adop tioa. Equally, it would be unjust to _the re<; p~ent if he !8 given only 1/3 of the prop!rties given to the 1st dfendant and rema1n1ng .with bun at the date of ado~ t!on. Th!refore, it would be emine.ntly just t~ divie the properties got by. the .first defendant at the 1944-partition, wJuch were with him at the date of adopbon, toto H two eqal shares and award one share to the plaintiff-respondent. Hence, a dcci:cc should be passed (i) allowing the respondent an half share out of such P:ropcrties allotted to the fi; st defendant !-'oder the 19.W.partitio!l as wei:e with the fust dfen dant at the date of adoption, including, therein, the umcs set apart for the .ma1nte\n\nnance of the adoptive mother; (ii) directing profits to be paid to the plaintiff on that basis; and (iii) dh'ecting the tion of payment of maintenance by the first def en danfs branch to the adoptive mother . .f479AE; 485H-486G]\n\nGovind v. Nagappa, [19i2] 3 SCR 200, P. Ammal v. Rama/ingam, [1970] 3 SCR, 894, Sriniva.r [1955), I S.C.R. 1;17; 24-45; Krishna Murtlii, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 813, Bhimjl Krishna Rai, [1950) 52 B.L.R., 290, in Bijoor v. Padmanabh (9) l.L.R.' [1950)\n\nBorn. 480, Krishtappa v. Gopal, A.l.R. 1957 Born. 214, 215, Ba/a}i, (1944) 47 B.L.R. 121, Sankaralingam. I.L.R. (1943) Mad.,309 and Somesekharappa v. Basappa Chan. naba.rappa, (1960) Mys. L. J. 687, referied to. -; ,\n\nQVJL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Apeal No. 1264 of 1967.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 8th April 1964 of the Mysore High Court at Bangalore in Regular Appeal No. JOO of!958.\n\nS. V. Gupte and R. B. Datar for the appellant\n\nS. S. Jav4/i and H. K. Puri, , for respondent No.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKtusHNA IYER, J. An intricate point of Hindu Law bearing on an adoption by a widow and its impact on an earlier partition in the coparcenary-all prior to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956-arise for decision in this appeal by certificate against the decree of the Mysore (now Karnataka) High Court. The plaintiff succeeded in both the Courts and the aggrieved second defendant, who is the appellant oofore us, has confined his challenge to two major contentions, E although a few minor matters also require our attention in working out the ultimate . relief.\n\nNow the facts. A small family of Gowd Saraswat Brahmi1B of Balgaum had, as its head, one Mahadev and as coparceners his two sons, Gajanand (Defendant No. 1) and Kashi Nath, who died in 1921 leaving behind a widow, Rakhama Bai (Defendant No. 3), and a daughter Lilawatr. The plaintiff is Lilawati's son, i.e., the daughter's rnn of late Kashi Nath. Gajanand, the first defendant had an only son, Shripad, the second defendant. Long years after the demise of her husband, the third defendant adopted the plaintiff on February, 16,\n\n1956. In the considerable interval that elapsed, a partition took place in the family on April 24, 1944 between the then two living copar ceners, namely, Mahadev and the first defendant. The former passed away in 1946 but before his death he gifted his entire share in the joint family derived under the partition of 1944 to the second defendant.\n\nFor completeness sake it must be mentioned that at the partition in 1944, an allotment for the residence and maintenance of the third defendant had been made. The second defendant, the donee from Mahadev, alienated some of those properties but the alienees are not parties to the present appeal although they were defendants to the litigation. The adopted son, i.e., the plaintiff, filed the present suit on April 20, 1956 ignoring the partition of 1944 and praying for fresh partition by metes and bounds of his half share. His case was that the gift was invalid like the partition and that was entitled to\n\nan equal share with the first defendant tog, ther with profits attributable to his share. The contesting defendant was the second defendant who challenged the factum and validity of the adoption and also the right of the adopted son to re-open the partition or impugn the gift effected prior to the adoption. Other contentions had bcen;, raised which need not be noticed now. ·\n\nThe Triaf Court granted a decree more or. less as prayed for up holding the factum and validity of the adoption and the right of the plaintiff to re-open the partition and ignore the gift. The decree declared that the plaintiff'was entitled to I/3rd share, the.first defendant , to a I/6th share, he second defendant to a half share, and so on.\n\nProfits that fell to the share of the plaintiff were also decreed. , The liab; lity of defendants 1 and 2 to pay maintenance to the third defendant under the partition deed of 1944 was to cease from the date of the suit. The High Court in appeal upheld the adoption and the right of the plaintiff to re-open the partition. Certain minor modifications were made which will be referred t(), to the extent necessary, later.\n\nShri Gupte, appearing for the appellant (second defendant) has taken us through the evidence regarding the custom .of adopting the daughter's sdn by the widow, and argued that as a source of law-- undoubtedly, custom is a source of Hindu lawr-there was not sufli,, cient material to hold on the triune. aSPects of antiquity, adequacy and continuity. He urged that the adoption was, therefore, inv_alid even though there was concurrence in the conclusions of the courts below. He did not seriously argue on the factum of the adoption, and evenofhetwise this is a finding of fact rendered.by , the couTts b.; Jow \\\\1hich \\Ve are not disposed to re-examine.\n\nCounsel for the first respondent; Shri Javali, took ui through the.\n\nHigh Court's discussion of the evidence bearing on custom. and we are satisfied that there is ample justification for the finding reached that the adoption of the plaintiff is true and valid, both from the angl!s of custom and factum.\n\nIt is established law that the adoption by a wiow relates back to \\he date of the death of the adoptive father, which; in this case, took place in 1921. Indeed.the complexity of the present case arises from the application of this. legal fiction of \"relation-back\" and the limitations on the amplitudp of that fiction iis a. ris the partition of 1944. in the light of the rulings 'of the various High Courts and of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and of this Court, the last of which is Gorind v. Nagappa.('l According t~ t. he appellant, the rights of the adopted son, armed as he is with the theory of \"relation-back\", have to be effectuated retro-actively, the guidelines wherefor are available from the decided cases. It is no doubt true that \"when a member of a joint family governed by Mitakshara law dies and the widow validly adopts a son to him, a coparcenary interest in the joint property is im1nediately created by the adoption co-extensive Viith that \\Vhich\n\n(!) [t972] .' S.C.R. 200.\n\nthe deceased coparcener had, and it vests at once in the adopted son•. (see Mulla on Hindu Law, 13th edn. page 516). The same author, - however, points out that \"the rights of an adopted &On arise for the first time on his adoption. He may, by virtue of his rights as adopted son, divest other persons in whom the property vested after the death of the adoptive father, but all lawful alienations made by previous holder would be binding on him. His right to impeach previous alienations would dtpend up<ln the capacity of the holder who made the alienation as well as on the nature of the action of alienation.\n\nWhen the holder was a male, who had unfettered right of transfer, e.g., the last surviving member of a joint family, the adopted son could not impeach the transfer. In case of females who had restricted right of transfer even apart from any adoption, the transfers would be valid only when they are supported by legal necessity.\" (ibid; pp; 516-517; para 507). \"An adopte<i son is bOund by alienations made by his adoptive father prior to the adoption to the same extent as a naturalbom son would be.\" (Ibid; p.517; para 508).\n\nIt is settled law that rights of an adopted son spring into existence only from the mqment of the adoption and all alienations made by the widow before the adoption, if they are made for legal necessity or otherwise lawfully, such as with the consent of the next reversioners, are binding on the adopted son. The narrow but important question that arises here is as to whether the adoption made in 1956 can upset the partition of 1944, validly made under the then conditions, and whether the gift by Mahadev of properties exclusively set apart to him, and, therefore, alienable by him, could be retro-actively invalidated by the plaintiff on the application of the legal fiction of \"/elation-back\". It is unlikely that a similar question will arise hereafter since s. 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 has practically swept off texts, rules and the like in Hindu Law, which were part of ' that law in force immediately before the commencement of the Act, if provisions have been made for such matters in the Act. Since on the husband's death the widow takes an absolute estate, questions of the type which engage us in this appeal will be stilled for ever, Of course, we. need not investigate this aspect of the matter as the present case relates to a pre-statutory adoption. Even s. 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, makes it plain that an adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption.\n\nWe may now proceed to consider the contention of Mr. Gupte that the adopted son cannot challenge the partition and the gift,\n\nThe plaintiff, as the adopted son, for secular and spiritual purposes continues _the line, of the adoptive father and when the widow adopts, the doctnne of relation-back' makes sonship retro-active from the moment of death of the late husband. The new entrant is deemed to have been born on the date of death of the adoptive father. Supposrng there was an undivided family in existence when the adc.ptive\n\nfather died, how far can the legal fiction of anterior sonship disrupt the doings between notional birth and actual adoption? Mulla sums up the result of the rulings thus : (p. 496).\n\n\"If, therefore, there was a coparcenary in existence when 1he adoptive father died, then whether it came to an end by the death of the last surviving coparcener or by subsequent partition :-:.:nong the re1naining members, an adoption vaJidly made by the widow of the deceased coparcener would have the effect of divesting the estate in the hands of the heir to the last surviving coparcener in the first case and of putting an end to the partition in the second and enabling the adopted son to claim a share in lhe family properties as if they were still joint.\"\n\nThis means that at the partition of 1944 although as a physical fact only Mahadev and defendant No. 1 were alive .. the , plaintiff :must be deemed to have been alive. The division ha, d denied a share to him while he was eligible, in the eye of law, to a share. There were thus three co-parceners and tbe plaintiff was entitled to a third out of the estate of the joint family as it then existed. Illustration (a) at page 497 of Mulla, based on Surendra Na11da11(') is apt and reads :\n\n\"A and B are un.divided brothers governed by the Mitakshara law.\n\nA dies leaving authority to his widow to adopt a son i<' him. On A's dealh his undivided half share in the coparcenary property passes to B, the surviving coparcener. While B is still s!ive, A's widow adopts a son to A. The effect of the adoption is that a coparcenary interest is created in the joint property coextensive with that which A has in the property (that is, onehalf), and it vests in the adopted son.\"\n\nThe plaintiff's claim for a share is thus well-founded-not half, which is tall but one-third which fits the fiction as in 1944.\n\nTwo crucial questions then arise. One-third share out of what?\n\nShould the gift by Mahadev of what was under the then circumstances his .e~:clusive prop.rty be ignored in working out the one-third share?\n\nTwo principles compete in this jurisdiction and judges have struck a fair balance bet\\veen the two, animated by a sense of realisn1, impelled by desire to do equity and to avoid unsettling vested rights and conciuded transactions, lest a legal fiction should by invading actual facts of life become an instrumentality of instability. Law and order are jarisprudential twins and this pmpective has inarticulately informed judicial pronouncements in this branch of Hindu Jaw.\n\nIn short, the principle of relating the birth of the adopted son to the last day of the adoptive father's life is put in peaceful oo-existence with recogni1ion of rights lawfully vested on the basis of the realities then exis1ing. The law frowns on divesting vested rights and keepiPg in cold storage or suspended anin1ation normal legal events like competent transfers and collateral succession, except when co1npelled by jural mandate. So viewed, the partition of 1944 was valid; so also the gift\n\n(I) (IS9t) 18 Cal. 385.\n\nof his exclusive share by Mahadev, to Shripad, Defendant No. 2. The plaintiff could reopen the partition only to the limited extent rights flowing from these two facts viz. disruption of jointnern and alienation by one share permitted. Nor is law inhuman or inequitable or abstract, its essence being social engineering. Therefore, .the humane endeavour to work out equities in a given case has engaged the conscienee of judges in the reported rulings. Here, the circumstance that the whole share of Mahadev has g>ne out of the corpus of the coparcenary on account of the gift inflicts an injustice on the plaintiff if he is to get only one-third of the properties which were allotted to Gajanan whose branch still remained in tact; equally unjust it would be on Gajanan if out of his allotment the plaintiff were to slice off what is equal to one half of the total assets as at the time of partition in 1944 nerely because of the misfortune that he had still kept it as the asset of his branch at the time of the adoption. Equitable considerations would suggest a modification. When the adoption was made there were only two coparceners and the corpus available only Gajanan's properties. So a half share out of those items may be fair, in the totality of circumstances. Maintenance to the mother and profits due to the plaintiff are minor matters and will be gone into hst.\n\nThe broad approach made and the general conclucions reached above do fit into the conspectus of judge-made law, as we will presently discuss. May be, a flash-back method of reference to the case law will be more effective, and that way the recent decision in Govind v.\n\nNagappa(I) clears the ground a great deal. Hegde, J., speaking for the Court. drew the lines clearly in the situation of confrontation between the fiction of relation-back and the fact of partition, in a way analogous to our case .. In asking for a share the adopted son could overlook the prior division but in pushing the fiction to its plenary c:xtrerne of nullifying the partition so as i o re-unite a divided family, the Court cried halt. The learned Judge observed :\n\n\"It is true that by a fiction of law-well settled by decid<d cases-that an adopted son is deemed to have been adopted on the date of the death of his adoptive father. He is the continuator of his adoptive father's line exactly as an aurasa son and an adoption, so far as the continuity of the line is concerned, has a retrospective effect. • • • Consequently he is dee1nea to have been a copatcener in h; s adoptive father's family when Krishna Rao and Lakshmana Rao partitioned the properties. The partition having been effected without his consent, it is not binding on him. But from this it does not follow that Krishna Rao and Lakshmana Rao did not separate from the family at the time of the partition.\n\nIt was open to Krishna Rao and Lakshmana Rao to separate\n\nthmselves from the family. Once they did separate the appel· ]ant and his adoptive mother alone must be deemd to hav<' continued as the members of the family. • • •\n\n\nWhen the partition took place in 1933, the appellant even A if he was a coparcener on that day could have only got I/3rd share.. We fail to see how his position can be said to have im\n\nproved .J!lerely b!:cause he was adopted subsequent to the date of part11Ion. It 1s true that because he was not a p!rty to the partition, he is entitled to ask for reopening of the partition and have his sl)are work<d out without reference to that partition.\n\n• • • The doctrine ofrelation back is only a legal fiction. There is no justification to logically extend that fiction. Jn fact the plaintiff had nothing to do with his adoptive father's family when Krishna Rao died.\n\n• • • The devolution of Krishna Rao's property must be held to have taken place at the very moment Krishna Rao died. We know of no legal fiction under which it can be said to have been in a suspended animation till the plaintiff was adopted .\n\n• • •\n\nWe see no basis for the contention of the appellant that he can ignore the events that took place in 1933. He can no doubt ignore the actual 'I partition by metes and bounds effect<d by Krishna Rao and. Lakshmana Rao and ask for a repartition of the properties. but his adoption by it£elf does not and cannot re-unite the divided family. It is one thing to say that an adopted son can ignore a partition effected prior to his adoption, which effects his rights and it is a different thing to say that his adoption wipes out the division of status that had taken place in his family.\n\n• •\n\nFurther the interest of the society is not advanced by engrafting one more fiction to the already existing fiction that an adopted son is deemed to have been born on the date of death of his adoptive father. Acceptance of the new fiction canvassed on behalf of the plaintiff is bound to cteate various complications.\n\nHindu widows in tl!e past were proverbially long lived because of the child marriage system. Adoptions might take place and have taken place more than half a century after the death of the adoptive father. Meanwhile the other coparceners might have dealt with the family property on the basis of the then existillg righ11. They might have alienated the property. We see no justification to create chaos by inventing a new fiction unknown to Hindu law texts nor auth<>rised by stare decisis. • • • But where the succession to the property of a person other than the adoptive father is involved, the principle applicable is not the rule of relation back but the rule that inheri tance once vested cannot be divested.\"\n\nI s .. G. SUTHANltAR v. DATTARAM (Krishna lytr, /.) 481\n\nBy parity of reasoning we have to give the plaintiff a one-third share, which alone even an aurasa son of late Kashinath would have got stirpitally. To undo the divided status and continue the CO parcenary till the date of the suit so as to award a half share t~ the plaintiff as representing one of the two surviving branches would be legal fiction run riot. Neither principle nor precedent compels that courie.\n\nWe now sail into still more troubled waters. Where is this share to come from 1 From the coparcenary property, less what ha• legi timately gone out of it. If the widow of a deceased coparcener had alienated for binding necessity, such. property has to be excludedaltbough a strict projection of the fiction would mean that the adopted son was alive at the time succession opened and the widow could not have the right to even a limited estate and a fortiori could not competently alienate for necessity or otherwise. Liberties with the legal fiction have been taken in this and other aspects of the \"relation back\" theory. If a property has validly gone out of the hotch-potch the adopted son cannot recall it. The fact of partition cannot be d, rowned by the subsequent adoption because when it was entered into there was no legal impediment in doing it. Likewise, if a manager or widow alienates for binding necessity the constructive ante-dated nativity of the adopted son cannot nullify what has taken place before he in actuality entered the coparcenary. By the same token, a sole surviving coparcener (except perhaps in the Banaras School where unlike in other schools he has no independent power of transferring his share) may dispose of the estate before adoption by a de.ceased coparcener's widow and that act defeats the claim of a later adoptee. Such is the inexorable operation of time and circumstance on long later adopliom and their proprietary fall-out. You cannot put the clock back beyond a certain stage. We may express the view that some observations, clearly obiter, in P. Amma/ v. Ramalingam,(1) relied on by Shri Javali for the 1st respondent are wider than justified. Legal fictions have legal frontiers. In Srinivas(2), Venkatarama Iyer, J., after refer ring to the relevant books and cases, cautioned against the application of the defeasance right of the adopted son to cases of collateral succession opening before adoption. \"The law was thus well settled that. when succession to the properties of a person other than an adoptiw father was involved, the principle applicable was not the rule of relation back but the rule that inheritance once vested could not be divested.\" The learned Judge, expressing some di, sent from Anant Bhikappa(l), stated the proposition thus :\n\n\"When an adoption is made by a widow of either a copar cener or a separated member, then the right of the adopted son to claim properties as on the date of the death of the adoptive father by reason of the theory of relation back is subject to the limitation that lienations made prior t<> the\n\n{I) [19701 3 S.C.R. 894.\n\n(2) 119SSJ I S.C.R. 1;17;24-25\n\n(J) 7J I.A. 2l2.\n\ndate of adoption are binding on him, if they wrre for purposes binding on the estate. Thus, transferees from limited owners, whether they be widows or coparceners in a joint family, are amply protected. But 110 such safeguard exists in respect of property inherited from a collateral, because if the adopted son is entitled on the theory of relation back to divest that property, the position of the mesne holder would be that of an owner possessing a title defeasible on adoption, and the result of such adoption must bHo extinguish that .title and that of all persons claiming under him. The aliertees from him would have no protection, as there could be no question of supporting the alienations on the ground of necessity or .benefit. And .if the adoption takes place long after the succession to t.he collateral had opened-in this case it was 41 years thereafter-and the prorty might have meanwhile changed hands several times, the title of the purchasers would be liable to be disturbed quite a long time after the alienations. We must hesitate to subscribe to a view of the law which leads to consequences so inconvenient.. The claim of the appellant to divest a vested estate rests on a legal fiction, and legal fictions should not be extended so as to lead to unjust I';!SUltS.\"\n\nThis Court, in KrishnamurtM's (t) case, also considered the amplitude of end embankments on the \"relation back\" stream of adoption by a wido\\v. Bu't there one basic fact deserves attention. The adopted sons's claim was as heir to his grandfather whose property devolved, on death, on his daughters, the adoptive father having died long before , the grandfather and the adoption having taken place Jong after the grandfather's death. The Court took the view that the daughters 1.who took as heirs did so on a defeasible title. For one thing, there was no coparcener alive and no joint family-either as a whole or even a. branch thereof - at the time of the adoption and the adopted son dISplaced those who got title only in the absence of a son. Secondly, inheritance stands on a differtnt footing from alienation-or, at any rate, the erosion of the relation back doctrine has not affected claiming\n\nbak from direct heirs. (The adopted son'.s claim to diV('St collateral he!fs has been negatived in Srinivasa.(2) Krislmamurthi's(t) crucial ratio, giving it full scope, is that property inherited absolutely but subject to defeasance, fails when the divesting even occurs, and the character of the property do\" not change from coparcenary property to solf-acquired property' so long as the possibility of defeasance by_ a widow of the last coparconer, by adding a member by adoption, ex.1sts.\n\nIn the present case, by parity of reasoning, the properties which came to Gajanan's share (Defendant No. 1) must remain vulnerable to the claims of the potential coparcener projected into the family by the widow's adoption. But this case does not deal with\n\nnd cannot govern valid alienations which have effectually changed its character as family property. In Bhimji Krishna Rao(') Chagla, C. J., speaking for himslf, and Gajendragadkar, J., (as he than was) affirmed this position.\n\nWe may usefully extract the headnote here :\n\n\n(2) [19551 1 S.C.R. 1,17, 24-25.\n\n(JJ [1950] 52 B.L.R. 290.\n\n\"A Joint Hindu family consisted of the sole surviving coparcener and the widow of a deceased coparcener. The surviving coparcener made alienations of portions of the family property. Subsequently, the widow adopted a son.\n\nThe son having sued to set acide the alienations:-\n\nHeld, that at the dates of the alienations the coparcener had full right to treat the family property as if it was his own property. and that the adoption which was subsequent to the alienations could not affect the property which was already disposed of by the coparcener as a person who acted as the full owner of the property.\n\nJn considering whether a particular alienation made of joint family property prior to the date of adoption is. or is not a lawful alienation, the alienation must be lawful, n<>t in relation to the rights of the adopted son, but it must be lawfl at the date when the alienation was made. If it is lawful, 1t cannot be questioned or challenged by the adopted son whose ado;>tion is sub5'qucnt to the alienation.\"\n\nThe Court relied on the observations of the Privy Council in Krishnumurthi Ayyar v. Krishnamurthy Ayyar (1) and quoted the following passage which illumines the principle :\n\n\"When a disposition is made intr(i vivas by one who has full power over property under which a portion of that property is carried away, it is clear that no rights of a son who is subse quently adopted can affect that portion which is disposed of.\n\nThe same is true when the disposition is by will and the adoption is subsequently made by a widow who has been given power to adopt. For the will speaks as at the death of the testator, and the pr<>p>rty is carried away before the adoption takes place.\"\n\nThus, alienations by a sole coparcener or testamentary dispositions by him are beyond assail by a subsequently adopted son. This propl5ition was affirmed in a slightly later decision by the same strong bench in Bijoor vs. Padmanabh(2). The headnote sufficiently sums up the law thus :\n\n\"The doctrine of relation back under which a son adopttd by a Hindu widow is decmtd to have been in existence in the adoptive family at the death of the adoptive father cannot be accept<d in its entirety. It is a doctrine with certain definite limitations and exceptions, and one of the important limitations and exceptions is that the adopted son is bound by all the lawful alienations made by his adoptive father if he was the wle surviving coparcener of a joint family. In this behalf there is no difference in principle between an alienation inter vfros and a disposition made by a will.\" -----·----- (!) 54\n\nI.A. 248.\n\n~2) l.L.R. [1950) Born. 480.\n\nA full bench of the Bombay High Court had occasion to touch on a similar issue arising before us although the case was :eventually decided on the equities of the situation. We may extract the observations in this case (Krishtappa v. Gopal) (I) as, in a way, they reinforce our view : ·\n\n \"It is possible to take the view that the position of !he members of the divided family is in law the same as that of a sole surviving coparccner. Just as the sole surviving coplicener has every right and authority to disp)se of the prop, rty as if it was of his absolute ownership, so also after putition the members of the erstwhile coparcenary have equally the right of dispvsing of the share which came to them on p1rtition as if it was their prop, rty.\"\n\nDealing with a fair working out of rights the Court made observations relevant for us at a later stage of this case. Chagla, C. J., observed in that context :\n\n\"Whenever a partition is re-opened, shares must be allocated on a fair and equitable principle, and what was uppermost in the minds of these two learned Judges was that, in giving to the adopted son his proper .share, no injustice should be done to any coparcener and the adopted son should get his own fair share .\n\n• • •\n\nAs Mr. Justice Bavdekar himself observes in the judgment\n\nat page 257 ; \"It is really a question of equity ; and if the judg- E ment proceeds on a question of equity, we entirely agree with the two learned judges that equity could only be done provided the basis adopted is the basis suggested by these two learned Judges in their judgment. We, therefore, do not look upon this judgment as in any way impairing the principle which was laid down by this Court in 52 Born LR 290 : (AIR 1950 Born 271).\n\nThis is not a case of interfering with the right of a divided F coparcener to deal with his share as his own ; nor is this a case of irnpJtiring the principle accepted by this Court over a lorg • period that an adopted son is bound by all lawful alienations made prior to the adoption. But we look upJn this case as a simple case of doing equities on the re-opening of a partition in order that the property should be re-divided on a fair and equitable basis.\" G\n\nShri Javali pressed before us that Ba/aji's(2) ca•e was a closer parallel to our case, forgotting that as Chagla, C. J., explained in Bhimji (Supra) that Lokur, J. decided that case on the footing that a partition was not an alienation and the conclusion would have been different had he treated a partition as a transfer. But now, this Court has laid down that a post-partition adoption cannot re-unite the family even H though it may not deprive him of a share so long as some cop1rcenary\n\n(I) A.l.R. 1957 Born. 214, 215.\n\n(2) (1944) 47 B.L.R. 121.\n\nA prop!rty existed. The Full Bench case in Sankara/ingam(I) also does not militate ag1inst the Bombay view. Leach, C. J., in the course of the judg nent, observed :\n\n\"If the law recog'liz.es in an. adopted son of a deceased coparcener the right to share in the estate as it existed before • tlie p1rtition, property which has not been lawfully alienated in the B meantime is still within his reach.\" (emphasis supplied).\n\nMysore also has fallen in line with this strand of thought. In Som<- sekharappa v. Basappa Channabasappa(?-) a Bench of that Court laid down th! Jaw condensed in the headnote thus\n\n'.'A son adopted by a widow of a deceased coparcener cannot claim the joint family property in the hands of a transferee from the heir of the last surviving coparcencr, even though the transfer took place before the adoption. The doctrine of relation back will not extend to a case where a transfer has already been made either by the sole survivin~ coparcener or by his heir. The principle is that when a disposition is made inter\n\nvivos by one who has full power over property under which a portion of that property is carried away, no rights of a son who is subsequently adopted can affect that.portion which is disposedc\"\n\nTrue, the decision under appeal before us also is from Mysore and takes the opposite view.\n\nWe reach the end of the journey of precedents, ignoring as inessential other citations. The balance sheet is clear. The propositions that emerge arc that : (i) A widow's adoption cannot be stultified by an anterior partition of the joint family and the adopted son can claim a share as if he were begotten and alive when the adoptive fathe.r breathed his last ; (ii) Never-the-Jess, the factum of partition is not wiped out by the later adoption ; (iii) Any disposition testamentary or\n\ninter vivos, lawfully made antecedent to the adoption is immune to challenge by the adopted son; (iv) Lawful alienation, in this context, means not necessarily for a family necessity but alienation made comp!tcntly in accordanile with law ; (v) A widow's power of alienation is limited and.if-and _onlY, ifTl!te conditions set by the Hindu Law are fulfilled wtll the alienation bmd a subsequently adopted son. So also alienation by the Karta of an undivided Hindu flimily or transfer by a coparcener governed !>Y the Banaras school ; (vi) Once partitioned validly, the share of a member of a Mitakshara Hindu family in which his own issue have .. no right by birth can be transfcrred•by him at his will and such transfers, be they by will, gift or sale, bind the adopted SQn.who comes later on the scene. Of course, the position of a void or voidable tra!\\Sfe.r by s.uch a. sharer may stand oil a separate footing )>ut we need not investigate 1t here. ·\n\nApplying the above formulations to the present facts, the concliision is clear. The plaintiff will be eligible to get one-third of the available joint family property. In computing net property the gift by Mahadev\n\n(I) I.LR. (19431 Mad. 309.\n\n(2) (1960) Mys. L.J. 687.\n\nto the 2nd defendant has to be excluded. But the allotment for maintenance of the 3rd defendant will have to be ignored, brought into the corpus and, in the division by metes and bounds allotted to the share of the plaintiff.\n\nOne more problem, rather ticklish, remains-the equitable effectuation of the partition. The Full Bench decision of the Bombay High -Court in Krishtappa (Supra) emphasized that the adopted son's right, arising long after other proprietary events, should be worked out, not rigidly but jstly. Chagla1 C. J., laid do.yn the guidelines .alread.y extracted while deahng with the case earlier. We agree, with this sensitive approach and proceed to adopt it here. The plaintiff has to be given his one-third share as in 1944, when the partition took place.\n\nAssuming that the entire estate was then worth 3 lakbs, the adopted son would have got a lakh of rupees, say. But Mahadev's share has been entirely gifted away and must be ignored. Which means that the plaintiff's one-third share valued at one lakh will have to come out .of Gajanan's properties which, on our arithmetical assumption, would be one-half of three lakhs, i.e. l t lakhs. It would be unfair to deprive Gajanan of a lion's share out of his allotment merely because, before adoption, he had n\\)t parted with his properties. It would be eminently just to make the first defendant bear only one-half the burden .cast by the notional re-entry of the plaintiff into the coparcenary and we direct a division into two equal shares of such of the properties which fell to the first defendant's share in the 1944 partition as were with the first defendant at the date of adoption, and award one share to the plaintiff. The justice and equity of the situation, not any in- .flexible legal principle, prompts this course. We confess that the prer.tatutory Jaw of adoption, in its conflict between fiction and fact, has .had a zigzag course in courts and we have read the diverse 'dicta imbued by the Holmseian thought that the life of the law is not logic hut exprience.\n\nWe are informed that the first defendant is now no more and rival claims to his inheritance. are being 'agitated in some other litigation.\n\nWe do not take note of it in this decree. Nor do we think it necessary to direct inter se partition between the first and the second defendants as was done in the courts below. In substantial allowance of the appeal, we direct that a decree be passed (a) allowing the palintiff a half share out cf such of the properties allotted to the original first defendant under tho J944 partition as . were with the first dofendant at the date of adoption, including among the items to be divided the item set apart for the maintenance of defendant No. 3 ; (b) directing profits to be paid to the plaintiff on the basis of the one-half share of the divisible assets ; and (c) directing the cessation of maintenance to be payable by the first defendant's branch to the 3rd defendant. Parties to boar their costs throughout.\n\nV.P.S.", "total_entities": 57, "entities": [{"text": "SHRIPAD GAJANAN $UTHANKAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHRIPAD GAJANAN SUTHANKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DATTARAM KASH!NATH SUTHANKAR AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DATTARAM KASHINATH SUTHANKAR AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. o: PALEKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.G. PALEKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 S.C.R. 813", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4348, "end_char": 4367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4868, "end_char": 4879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte and R. B. Datar for the appellant\n\nS. S. Jav4/i and H. K. Puri, , for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. B. Datar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4884, "end_char": 4895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte and R. B. Datar for the appellant\n\nS. S. Jav4/i and H. K. Puri, , for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. S. Jav4", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4915, "end_char": 4925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte and R. B. Datar for the appellant\n\nS. S. Jav4/i and H. K. Puri, , for respondent No."}}, {"text": "H. K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4932, "end_char": 4942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte and R. B. Datar for the appellant\n\nS. S. Jav4/i and H. K. Puri, , for respondent No."}}, {"text": "KtusHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5010, "end_char": 5022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKtusHNA IYER, J. An intricate point of Hindu Law bearing on an adoption by a widow and its impact on an earlier partition in the coparcenary-all prior to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956-arise for decision in this appeal by certificate against the decree of the Mysore (now Karnataka) High Court."}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5168, "end_char": 5194, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mysore (now Karnataka) High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5270, "end_char": 5303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKtusHNA IYER, J. An intricate point of Hindu Law bearing on an adoption by a widow and its impact on an earlier partition in the coparcenary-all prior to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956-arise for decision in this appeal by certificate against the decree of the Mysore (now Karnataka) High Court."}}, {"text": "Gowd Saraswat Brahmi1B", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5599, "end_char": 5621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A small family of Gowd Saraswat Brahmi1B of Balgaum had, as its head, one Mahadev and as coparceners his two sons, Gajanand (Defendant No."}}, {"text": "Balgaum", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5625, "end_char": 5632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A small family of Gowd Saraswat Brahmi1B of Balgaum had, as its head, one Mahadev and as coparceners his two sons, Gajanand (Defendant No."}}, {"text": "Mahadev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5655, "end_char": 5662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A small family of Gowd Saraswat Brahmi1B of Balgaum had, as its head, one Mahadev and as coparceners his two sons, Gajanand (Defendant No."}}, {"text": "Gajanand", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5696, "end_char": 5704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A small family of Gowd Saraswat Brahmi1B of Balgaum had, as its head, one Mahadev and as coparceners his two sons, Gajanand (Defendant No."}}, {"text": "Kashi Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5727, "end_char": 5737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) and Kashi Nath, who died in 1921 leaving behind a widow, Rakhama Bai (Defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Kashi Nath. Gajanand"}}, {"text": "Rakhama Bai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5780, "end_char": 5791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) and Kashi Nath, who died in 1921 leaving behind a widow, Rakhama Bai (Defendant No."}}, {"text": "Lilawatr", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5826, "end_char": 5834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3), and a daughter Lilawatr.", "canonical_name": "Lilawatr"}}, {"text": "Lilawati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5853, "end_char": 5861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff is Lilawati's son, i.e., the daughter's rnn of late Kashi Nath.", "canonical_name": "Lilawatr"}}, {"text": "Kashi Nath. Gajanand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5902, "end_char": 5922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff is Lilawati's son, i.e., the daughter's rnn of late Kashi Nath.", "canonical_name": "Kashi Nath. Gajanand"}}, {"text": "Shripad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5961, "end_char": 5968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajanand, the first defendant had an only son, Shripad, the second defendant."}}, {"text": "February, 16,\n\n1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6081, "end_char": 6100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Long years after the demise of her husband, the third defendant adopted the plaintiff on February, 16,\n\n1956."}}, {"text": "April 24, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6185, "end_char": 6199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the considerable interval that elapsed, a partition took place in the family on April 24, 1944 between the then two living copar ceners, namely, Mahadev and the first defendant."}}, {"text": "April 20, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6852, "end_char": 6866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The adopted son, i.e., the plaintiff, filed the present suit on April 20, 1956 ignoring the partition of 1944 and praying for fresh partition by metes and bounds of his half share."}}, {"text": "Gupte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8205, "end_char": 8210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Gupte, appearing for the appellant (second defendant) has taken us through the evidence regarding the custom .of adopting the daughter's sdn by the widow, and argued that as a source of law-- undoubtedly, custom is a source of Hindu lawr-there was not sufli,, cient material to hold on the triune."}}, {"text": "Jow", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8807, "end_char": 8810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He did not seriously argue on the factum of the adoption, and evenofhetwise this is a finding of fact rendered.by , the couTts b.; Jow \\\\1hich \\Ve are not disposed to re-examine."}}, {"text": "Javali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8895, "end_char": 8901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel for the first respondent; Shri Javali, took ui through the."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12079, "end_char": 12083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12091, "end_char": 12117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12597, "end_char": 12602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "statute": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12610, "end_char": 12651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13481, "end_char": 13486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mulla sums up the result of the rulings thus : (p. 496)."}}, {"text": "Surendra Na11da11", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14549, "end_char": 14566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Illustration (a) at page 497 of Mulla, based on Surendra Na11da11(') is apt and reads :\n\n\"A and B are un.divided brothers governed by the Mitakshara law."}}, {"text": "Gajanan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17094, "end_char": 17101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here, the circumstance that the whole share of Mahadev has g>ne out of the corpus of the coparcenary on account of the gift inflicts an injustice on the plaintiff if he is to get only one-third of the properties which were allotted to Gajanan whose branch still remained in tact; equally unjust it would be on Gajanan if out of his allotment the plaintiff were to slice off what is equal to one half of the total assets as at the time of partition in 1944 nerely because of the misfortune that he had still kept it as the asset of his branch at the time of the adoption."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18096, "end_char": 18101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hegde, J., speaking for the Court."}}, {"text": "Krishna Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18964, "end_char": 18975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequently he is dee1nea to have been a copatcener in h; s adoptive father's family when Krishna Rao and Lakshmana Rao partitioned the properties."}}, {"text": "Lakshmana Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18980, "end_char": 18993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequently he is dee1nea to have been a copatcener in h; s adoptive father's family when Krishna Rao and Lakshmana Rao partitioned the properties."}}, {"text": "Kashinath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22168, "end_char": 22177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I s .. G. SUTHANltAR v. DATTARAM (Krishna lytr, /.) 481\n\nBy parity of reasoning we have to give the plaintiff a one-third share, which alone even an aurasa son of late Kashinath would have got stirpitally.", "canonical_name": "Kashi Nath. Gajanand"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24216, "end_char": 24232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Srinivas(2), Venkatarama Iyer, J., after refer ring to the relevant books and cases, cautioned against the application of the defeasance right of the adopted son to cases of collateral succession opening before adoption. \""}}, {"text": "Anant Bhikappa(l", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24724, "end_char": 24740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge, expressing some di, sent from Anant Bhikappa(l), stated the proposition thus :\n\n\"When an adoption is made by a widow of either a copar cener or a separated member, then the right of the adopted son to claim properties as on the date of the death of the adoptive father by reason of the theory of relation back is subject to the limitation that lienations made prior t<> the\n\n{I) [19701 3 S.C.R. 894."}}, {"text": "KrishnamurtM", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26449, "end_char": 26461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We must hesitate to subscribe to a view of the law which leads to consequences so inconvenient.. The claim of the appellant to divest a vested estate rests on a legal fiction, and legal fictions should not be extended so as to lead to unjust I';!SUltS.\"\n\nThis Court, in KrishnamurtM's (t) case, also considered the amplitude of end embankments on the \"relation back\" stream of adoption by a wido\\v."}}, {"text": "Srinivasa.(2", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27432, "end_char": 27444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The adopted son'.s claim to diV('St collateral he!fs has been negatived in Srinivasa.(2) Krislmamurthi's(t) crucial ratio, giving it full scope, is that property inherited absolutely but subject to defeasance, fails when the divesting even occurs, and the character of the property do\" not change from coparcenary property to solf-acquired property' so long as the possibility of defeasance by_ a widow of the last coparconer, by adding a member by adoption, ex.1sts."}}, {"text": "Krislmamurthi's(t", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27446, "end_char": 27463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The adopted son'.s claim to diV('St collateral he!fs has been negatived in Srinivasa.(2) Krislmamurthi's(t) crucial ratio, giving it full scope, is that property inherited absolutely but subject to defeasance, fails when the divesting even occurs, and the character of the property do\" not change from coparcenary property to solf-acquired property' so long as the possibility of defeasance by_ a widow of the last coparconer, by adding a member by adoption, ex.1sts."}}, {"text": "Bhimji Krishna Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28187, "end_char": 28205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Bhimji Krishna Rao(') Chagla, C. J., speaking for himslf, and Gajendragadkar, J., (as he than was) affirmed this position."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28209, "end_char": 28215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Bhimji Krishna Rao(') Chagla, C. J., speaking for himslf, and Gajendragadkar, J., (as he than was) affirmed this position."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28249, "end_char": 28263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Bhimji Krishna Rao(') Chagla, C. J., speaking for himslf, and Gajendragadkar, J., (as he than was) affirmed this position."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31074, "end_char": 31091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A full bench of the Bombay High Court had occasion to touch on a similar issue arising before us although the case was :eventually decided on the equities of the situation."}}, {"text": "Bavdekar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32301, "end_char": 32309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• • •\n\nAs Mr. Justice Bavdekar himself observes in the judgment\n\nat page 257 ; \"It is really a question of equity ; and if the judg- E ment proceeds on a question of equity, we entirely agree with the two learned judges that equity could only be done provided the basis adopted is the basis suggested by these two learned Judges in their judgment."}}, {"text": "Bhimji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33385, "end_char": 33391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G\n\nShri Javali pressed before us that Ba/aji's(2) ca•e was a closer parallel to our case, forgotting that as Chagla, C. J., explained in Bhimji (Supra) that Lokur, J. decided that case on the footing that a partition was not an alienation and the conclusion would have been different had he treated a partition as a transfer."}}, {"text": "Lokur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33405, "end_char": 33410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G\n\nShri Javali pressed before us that Ba/aji's(2) ca•e was a closer parallel to our case, forgotting that as Chagla, C. J., explained in Bhimji (Supra) that Lokur, J. decided that case on the footing that a partition was not an alienation and the conclusion would have been different had he treated a partition as a transfer."}}, {"text": "Sankara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33846, "end_char": 33853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Full Bench case in Sankara/ingam(I) also does not militate ag1inst the Bombay view."}}, {"text": "Leach", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33911, "end_char": 33916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Leach, C. J., in the course of the judg nent, observed :\n\n\"If the law recog'liz.es in an."}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34225, "end_char": 34231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mysore also has fallen in line with this strand of thought."}}, {"text": "Bombay High -Court in", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 37183, "end_char": 37204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Full Bench decision of the Bombay High -Court in Krishtappa (Supra) emphasized that the adopted son's right, arising long after other proprietary events, should be worked out, not rigidly but jstly."}}, {"text": "Krishtappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37205, "end_char": 37215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Full Bench decision of the Bombay High -Court in Krishtappa (Supra) emphasized that the adopted son's right, arising long after other proprietary events, should be worked out, not rigidly but jstly."}}, {"text": "Holmseian", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38816, "end_char": 38825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We confess that the prer.tatutory Jaw of adoption, in its conflict between fiction and fact, has .had a zigzag course in courts and we have read the diverse 'dicta imbued by the Holmseian thought that the life of the law is not logic hut exprience."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_487_493_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "KESARSINGH\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB\n\nMarch 4, 1974\n\n[M. H. BEG ANDY. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.J\n\nCriminal Practice.\n\nConviction for murder-Sentence.\n\nThe appellant was charged with an offence under s. ~02, Indian Penal Code of murdering three persons. The trial court found that there was enough evidence to show that the appellant was one of murderers of one of the three men and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The High Court enhanced the sentence to one for death on the grounds: that, the motive was to avenge murder of the appellant's brotherin-law committed some years prior to the occurrence so that there could be no immediate provocation; that, the three murders were committed in very coldblooded and brutal manner when the deceased were sleeping on their cots; that, two shots from a 12 bore gun had been fired at each of the three murdered men indicating the-determination to give no chance of survival to anyone; that, the time selected for the murder was such that no possible help could be rendered to, iprevent the death of any of the three deceased and no obstruction could be possible to carry out the design of committing these murders.\n\nAllowing the appeal in part,\n\nHELD : A criminal case is not tied down to a particular version as a clvii case is by the pleading of the parties. Moreover, there is so much of explicable inaccuracy often intermingled with imagination and exaggeration by witnesses who are coni vinced of the guilt of a particular accused person that courts dealing with criminal cases cannot throw the whole case over-board simply because parts of it are improbable. To hold that a version is improbable is not to disbelieve entirely or to find it to be false.ltmaybethat factsaresometimesstrangerthanfiction. Prudence, however compels courts to test the version advanced in the light of what is reason ably to be expected from the ordinary or usual norrns of human conduct and tl:e common course of natural events so as to infer what may have actually happened.\n\nIn a criminal case conviction must rest on a proof so strong that the court musl te convinced that what is concluded must necessarily have happened and is not really explicable in any other way. [492A-DJ\n\nIn the instant case although the appellant was .guilty of an offence punishable under s. 302 Tndian Penal Code, all the reasons given by the High Court for awarding the death sentence have not been substantiated. The evidence only disclosed thr.t it was more likely that the appellant wM one of the several murderers and that he caused the death of only one man with his gun, the other having b~-en killed by others who were not recognised, and, therefore, nothing, apart from the occurrence, proved about the character of the appellant. Nothing was disclosed about tile antecedents of the} app~!lant. Therefore, the real basis adopted by the High Court for enhancing the en!ence of the appellant would disappear. [493ACJ -\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JuRrsorcno~ : Criminal Appal No. 167 of 1973.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 24th April, 1973, of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 29 of 1972 and Criminal Revision No. 224 of 1972.\n\nNuruddin Ahmed and JP. Goburdhun, for the appellant.\n\nH.R. Khanna, 0. P. Sharma and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.\n\n• - 488\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS U9741 3-s.c.R.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered.by -\n\nBEG. J.-This is an appeal by special leave filed by Kesar Singh,\n\nagd 23 years, who was convicted under Section 302 Indian Penal\n\nCode on three counts and sentenced to life imprisonment by an Additional Sssions' Judge of Patiala for having committed the murders of three persons, namely, Gurbachan Singh, Karnail Singh and Dewan Singh, one after another, during the night between 20th and 21st June, 1970, in village Dhablan. On appeal against the conviction and a revision application by the State against the lesser penalty for murder, the High Court of Punjab & Haryana dismissed the appeal of Kesar Singh, but it allowed the revision application of the State of Punjab enhancing the s!nten~ of Kesar Singh to one ofdeath. ·\n\nThe grounds given by the High Court for enhancing the sentence were: the motive was tL avenge the murder of the appellant's brotherin-law Gurnam Singh committed about 7 or 8 years prior to the occurren~ so that there could ba no immediate provocation; the three murders were committed \"in a very cold blooded and brutal manner when the deceased wer~ sleeping on their cots\"; two shots from a 12 bore gun had been fired at each of the three murdered men \"indicating the determination to give no chance of survival to anyone\"; \"the time selected for the murder was such that no possible help could re rendered to prevent the death of any of the three deceased and no\n\nobc:.truction could be possible to carry out the design of committing these murders\". Before giving these reasons, quoted mostly in the words of the High Court itself, the High Court had relied on obser vations of this Court in A.pren Joseph & Ors. Vs. The- State oj Kerafa:(l) ·\n\n\"The determination of sentence in a given case depends on a variety of considerations, the more important being, the nature of the crime, the manner of its commission, the motive which impelled it and the character and antecedents of accuso:Jds\".\n\nLearned Counsel for the appellant has taken us through the evidence of the two eye witnesses Gurdev Singh, P. W. 3, and Nachhattar Singh, P. W. 4, whose testimony had been accepted wholly by the Trial Court and the High Court about the murder of three men by the appellant singly, although the Trial Court had disbelieved the\n\nvry reason given for Gurdev Singh to wake up in time to see the murder of Gurbachan Singh, and, therefore, had acquitted the co-accused Kishori.\n\nIt may be mentioned here that Gurdev. Singh, P. W. 3, was shown to be sleeping on the roof of the house of his uncle Dewan Singh, from where he could see his cousin, Gurbachan Singh, and brother Gunnel Singh, P. W. 5, sleeping on the roof of the next house where Gurbachan Singh was murdered on a full moon night. The prosecution version was that, when Kesar Singh and the acquitted accused, Kishori, went up the stairs to the roof, Gurmel Si_ngh, P. W. 5, who was totally blind from birth, woke up and heard Kesar Singh, whom he recognised by voice, telling Kishori to catch hold of the blind man who was awake.\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1.\n\n. -;:-;;~--~- ··--... ~< ., --· ., ·--\n\nICESAR SINGH V, PUN.TAB (Beg, J,) 489 ,. 1-{e alleged that Kishori gave him two blow~ whereupon h d M D'tt \"\n\nI h . e cnc out • ••Mar Dttta ar 1 . a • t 1s t ese cnes which are said to hav~ anlrened Gurdev Stngh. There were two abrasions on th b d f Oorel Singh, one on the forehead and another on his ewrt yi~- dicatlng tha.t he had fallen down and hurt himself. The Trial &urt I ht.d, very ngbtly, held that he must have got up and shouted only • after he .two sho~ ha~ been fired at Guibacban Singh. There was .B no po1nt m assaultmg hm merely because he was awake. If that was do-ne he was sure o rruse hue and cry and wake up others. Therefore, the prosecution ver~1on , that _Guniev Singh, P. w. 3, had got up because of Gurmel Smgh s cnes and had seen the appellant\n\nfirin~ twice: at Gurbahan Singh hd to be discarded as too transparent .; ... an emllishment With an obviOus purpose behind it. The High c Court, however, had not analysed the evidence of any of the witness. It had ob.erved rather mechanically:\n\n\"Both Gurdev Singh and Nachhattar Singh have given colliistent version of the incident and their statements are wholly free from inaccuracies or discrepancies, even though both these witnesses were cros~-examined at considerable length.\n\nNothing at all has ben brought out in their cross-examination D which would show that the story set up by them in the examina- !ion-in-chief wa.'i not true\".\n\nApart from the fact that the High Court l).ad not even noti12d the very good reason.~ given by the Trial Court for discarding the evidence of Gurmel Singh, P. W. ~. including the fact that this wit-\n\nDC!iS, who claimed to have identified Kesar Singh by voice, could not recognise Kesar Singh's voice when the Presiding Judge spoe to K.esar Singh, during the trial, to test the correctness of the cla1m of the 'olitness, the High Court bad overlooked a numb:er of featues .brought out by cross-examination of the two eye wtnesse~ whtch\n\nmade the version given out by them very difficult to beheve totally .•\n\nGurdev Singh had described Kesar Sigh s wearing a blue tur- F ban whereas Nachhattar Singh had descnbed tt a cream colorcd (\"Badami\") turban. While Gur<lev Singh had srud that Kesar Stnb\n\n; ·.·: wore a whtte shirt Nachhattar Singh had said that he was draped tn a clw1ar with stripes on it and wore a shirt of sever a~ col?ur5. Con- ~ \"\n\ni4ering that Nachbattar Singh was said to be sleep1ng tn remote COrllCr of the enclosure around the house on the roof of wtch Sf?u~\n\nG. cha.u Singh was murdered and I?ewn S!ngh .nd Ka:n~l di~lt were asleep nt 11omc distance from h1m sn th1s endosure, 11 1 1 to believe that Nachhattnr could have made out not Xnlti'rrtthef ~r of the turban but also the r.tripes on the chadar a:; s. . 0 e ld s . . escnpttons cou . 1nn even ou a full moon night. These . vrytng n with uns had icato that perhaps two different uthstnulad :tied as 1he murn seen shooting but only Kesar. Stng was I e 1\n\n11 derer with a gun, .\n\nA t ( m the cross-exanrina!lon f nother broad feature, brought ou rKe Singh was shown to 0 the witnesses, may be pointed out here. rar 3-t.f4S Sup Cl/75 ....\n\n- ..\n\nI .\n\n4'90\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nhave first climb:d to the mof of the house where Gurbachan Singh was asleep and then to have come down the stairs to shoot at Karnall Singh on his cot, and, threaf£er, to have shot D~:wan Singh on his cot. 1t does appear rather unlikely that, while even a blind man had got up, and Gurdev Singh, P. W. 3, sleeping onthe roof of the next house, and Nachhattar Singh, P. W. 4, Puran Singh, P. W. 6, declared hostile, who were als'} steeping nar Karnail Singh and Dewan Singh, had got up, neither Karnail Singh nor D.!wan Singh could get up from their cots and try to either grapple with or run away from the assailant who was permitted to quietly reload his double barrelled gun to shoot at each of the three men twice each time. Dewan Singh_\n\nwas, however, said to be awake and sitting up in his bd when shot.\n\nBut, no empty cartridges were recovered. from the scene of occurrence.\n\nThe witnesses, who claimed to have oMerved everything so closly, did .not depose that Kesar Singh took out and put the spent cartridges into a pocket.\n\nAnother difficulty in accepting the proscution version totaEy, a . put forward by the two eye witnesses, is that Gurdev Singh, P. W. :;, was shown to have rushed out of the house on the roof of which he was sleeping and to have taken up his stand at the bottom of the stairs down which the murderer and his companion are shown to have descended altho:1gh Gurdev Singh was. empty handed and admitted that he was .afraid of Kesar Singh who had a gun in his poSS'!S'iion.\n\nWe find it very difficult to believe that Gurdev Singh would have rushed and taken up his stand here to S'!e the murders o ·~ Kamail Singh and D::wan Singh if h:: had actually s'!en Kesar Sing11 shoot twice at Gurbachan Singh on the roof. We think that it is very likely that Gurdev Singh woke up, like the others nearby. at hearing the gun shots and took up his stand near the stairs from where he could have S';!en Kesar Singh murdering Karnail Singh and Dewan Singh. It is only because he had not seen the murder of Gurbachan Singh that he could b:: expected, to act like this and c()me and stand at the bottom of the stairs, without apprehending danger to himself, down which the murderer descended. If he had rushed at once t() this spot in this fashion he was, mme likely, than n()t, to have virtually intercepted the murderer.\n\nThe broad probabilities which we have melltioned above certainly make it difficult to accept. unhesitatingly, as the High Court had done, the version that Kesar Singh alone shot at each of the three\n\nmen and killed them. We have, however, no doubt that Kesar Singh was seen by the witnesses running away with a double barrelled gun and had actually killed at least one of the three men murdered on the night between 20th and 21st June, 1970. and could have been seen doing so. It is likely that more than that is due to the not un. common pr()pensity of witneses f() speculate, imagine, and exaggerate.\n\nEvidence show~ that the appellant had two brothers at least one of whom was. a resident of village Dhablan at the time of tpe. shooting.\n\nJf implication was only due to a desire to take revenge for three murders. the appellant would not have been the only one who would have\n\nKESAR SINGH v. PllNJAB (Beg, /,) 491\n\nbeen alleged to have used a gun o shoot when there was opportunity to implicate others too in the same position as the appellant so far as any enmity goes. It is difficult to hold that either Gurdev Singh or\n\nNachhattar Singh, . who had both b:en prosecuted for the murder of their step brother Gurnam Singh but acquitted about seven years before the occurrence, could have any grudge for this reason. only either against Kesar Singh or his brother Bhajan Singh both of whom were residing with and looking after the land of Tej Kaur the widow of Gurnam Singh. If the witnesses had implicated Kesar Singh merely out of suspicion they would have involved Bhajan Singh also for the same reason. ' The statements of the two eye witnesses find corroboration from the fairly detailed account of the occurrence of about 3 a.m. in the F.IR. lodged at Police Station Sadar Patiala about 10 miles away at 8 25 a.m. on 21-6-1970.\n\nIt appears that Lal Singh Sarpanch and Jag Singh Panch, had also come to the scene of occurrence after it had taken place and had gone to the Police Station so that the F.I.R. was lodged in their presence although they did not sign it because there was no need for that.\n\nIt was contended that they. ()ught to have en proouced by the prosecution becausil the eye witnesses gave their accounts to them fist. They were neither eye witnes.es nor essential for unfold\n\ning of the prosecution version ... If the eye witnesses had said anything before them which could help the accused, they could have been pro duced in defence, or, in any case, ti)e accused could have applied for their examination under Section- 540 Criminal Procedure Code.\n\n'We do not think that the failure to examine these witnesses either by the prosecution or by the Court, suo moto, can cast a doubt on the prosecution case .\n\n. Apart from the motive to murder, we think that the prosecution case against the appellant finds corroboration fom the statement of the Investigating Officer, Kuldev Singh, P. W. 12, who deposed that when he went to the house ofTej Kaur, looking for the appellant, he found it locked. The appellant could be arrested only on 27·6,1970 after a \"Nakabandi\" at the canal bridge of village Dhakraba and was found ifl illegal pos.sesion of the gun No. 60780 loaded with live cartridges and with powder lining inside the barrel so that it must\n\nhave been usd. At the trial, the appellant falsely denied this recovery and circumstances of his arrest. His conduct was a:rtainly ·\n\nvery suspicious.\n\nThe manner in which the witnesses describe the infliction of the injuries is also corroborated, according to the. Rig~ C?urt, by the medical evidence. On the whole we agree wHh tlus V!eW.\n\nAlthough we are not impressed by the rather read~ atld failc acceptance by the High Court of the whole prosecution versiOn, which suffers from the improbabilities mentioned above, we find the evidence to be enough to establish beyod reasonable doubt that Kesar Singh was at least one of the posstbly several murderers.\n\nf ~·\n\nSUPREME. COURT REPORTS\n\n£19741 3 S.C.R.,\n\nLearned Counsel for the appellant bas s1;1bmitted that it would not be prudent, while discarding th~ case of tnple murder against Kesar Singh, to uphold his conviction on the assumption that he COilllllitted at least one murder as this \\Vold be contrary to the.procution version. It is also urged that a Witness who has been disbelieved becall'le he has falsely implicated an accused for one murder could not be relied upon for convicting the accused for. another murder.\n\nWe think that a criminal case is not tied down to a particular version as\n\na civil case is by the pleading of the parties. Moreover, there is so much of explicable inaccuracy often inter-mingled with imagination and exag~; eration by witnesses who are convinced of the guilt of a pa.rticular accused person that Courts dealing with criminal cases C&llDOt throw the whole case OVer-board simply because parts Of it are improbable. To hold that a version is improbable u not to dil!bclieve it entirely or to find it to be false. It may be that facts arc '9metimes stranger than fiction. Prudence, however, compels\n\nCaurt• to test the version advanced in the light of what i! reasonably to l,>e expected from the ordinary or usual norms of human conduct\n\nand 'the common course of natural events so as to infer what may hueactually happened. In a criminal case a conviction must rest on a. proof so strong that the Court must be convince<:! that what it concludes must necessarily have happened and is not reasonably explicable in any other way.\n\nWe think that the version given by the two eye witnesses, even though it suffers from improbabilities mentioned above, so as to make it:; total truthfulness doubtful, must\n\nbe true at least so far as participation of Kesar Singh in the murder\n\no~ three men by shooting at least one of them, if not both Karnail SJD~ and Dewan Singh before their eyes is concerned. This much C.~~· we think, be disbelieved.\n\nAs pointed out abC>ve, the par- IJCipauon cf Kesar Singh in the occurrence is sufficiently corroborated\n\ny other facts and circwnstance.' mentioned above. Thus, the testimony . of the two eye witnesses docs not stand ulone against the appellant. We are unable to conclude that the two eye witnes\n\nhelng to the category of wholly unreliable witnesses so that thc1r teStlDlDny cannot be acted upon even when corroborated by other c~ .\n\nIt may be mentioned bere that Kesar Singh's sister, Tej Kaur, with whom he was saiu to be residing and who was the owner of the licensed double barrelled gun recovered from the appellant's poises:>ion, was al-io challaned as an instigator, but she was Jis G charge\\.1. It nuy be that the appellant h:1J grown up from hildho<>d hearing the woeful story, from his widowed sister, of the murder of\n\n!Ji~ brother-in-law, Gurnam Singh, who was a step-brother of Guruev Singh. The appellant, who i'> a young man, may have bren im pellcd or goaded 011 by the grief of his whJowcd sister to participate I in the murd.:r of three men Dll a pilrt of a vendetta. It had come in Jl\n\nc:\\'ince that two of the murdered men, Karnail Singh and Dewan Siogh, had been proiecuted for the murder of Gurnam Sin~:h the .· brother-iu-Ltw of Kcsar Singh and had been ;\\cquitted.\n\n- y-. - - ·- -t ·: .. \\ - ... r ·- . -\n\nB !\n\nDSAR SINGH v. PUNJAB (Beg, /.) 493\n\nTherefore, although we hold that Kesar Singh was guilty of a11 offence punishable under Section 302 J. P. C., we do not consider all the reasons given by the High Court for awarding the death sentnce to have been substantiated. The High Court had overlooked facts which we have mentioned above. It had also overlooked that there was nothing, apart from the occurrence, proved about the character of the appellant. Nothing was disclsed about the antecedent~ of the appellant. If it was more likely, as we think it was, that the appellant was one of the several murderers and that he had caused the death of only one man with his gun, the others having been killed by others who were probably not recognised, the real basis ad()pted for awarding a death sentence to him would disappear.\n\nThe result is that, although we uphold the conviction of the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 302 I. P. C., we set aside the sentence of death and substitute it by life imprisonmenT, The appeal is thus partly allo\\\\ed to the extent indicated above .\n\nP.B.R. • 4pptal allowed iJJ 14Jrt.", "total_entities": 69, "entities": [{"text": "KESARSINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 10, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.esar Singh", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 4, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 42, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KESARSINGH\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB\n\nMarch 4, 1974\n\n[M. H. BEG ANDY."}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG ANDY. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 192, "end_char": 209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2284, "end_char": 2290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tndian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2291, "end_char": 2308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Nuruddin Ahmed", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3194, "end_char": 3208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nuruddin Ahmed and JP."}}, {"text": "JP. Goburdhun", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3213, "end_char": 3226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nuruddin Ahmed and JP."}}, {"text": "H.R. Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3248, "end_char": 3259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.R. Khanna, 0."}}, {"text": "P. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3264, "end_char": 3273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Sharma and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3278, "end_char": 3292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Sharma and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Kesar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3460, "end_char": 3471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.-This is an appeal by special leave filed by Kesar Singh,\n\nagd 23 years, who was convicted under Section 302 Indian Penal\n\nCode on three counts and sentenced to life imprisonment by an Additional Sssions' Judge of Patiala for having committed the murders of three persons, namely, Gurbachan Singh, Karnail Singh and Dewan Singh, one after another, during the night between 20th and 21st June, 1970, in village Dhablan.", "canonical_name": "K.esar Singh"}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3512, "end_char": 3523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3538, "end_char": 3542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Patiala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3629, "end_char": 3636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.-This is an appeal by special leave filed by Kesar Singh,\n\nagd 23 years, who was convicted under Section 302 Indian Penal\n\nCode on three counts and sentenced to life imprisonment by an Additional Sssions' Judge of Patiala for having committed the murders of three persons, namely, Gurbachan Singh, Karnail Singh and Dewan Singh, one after another, during the night between 20th and 21st June, 1970, in village Dhablan."}}, {"text": "Gurbachan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3696, "end_char": 3711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.-This is an appeal by special leave filed by Kesar Singh,\n\nagd 23 years, who was convicted under Section 302 Indian Penal\n\nCode on three counts and sentenced to life imprisonment by an Additional Sssions' Judge of Patiala for having committed the murders of three persons, namely, Gurbachan Singh, Karnail Singh and Dewan Singh, one after another, during the night between 20th and 21st June, 1970, in village Dhablan.", "canonical_name": "Gurbachan Singh"}}, {"text": "Karnail Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3713, "end_char": 3726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.-This is an appeal by special leave filed by Kesar Singh,\n\nagd 23 years, who was convicted under Section 302 Indian Penal\n\nCode on three counts and sentenced to life imprisonment by an Additional Sssions' Judge of Patiala for having committed the murders of three persons, namely, Gurbachan Singh, Karnail Singh and Dewan Singh, one after another, during the night between 20th and 21st June, 1970, in village Dhablan.", "canonical_name": "Karnail Singh"}}, {"text": "Dewan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3731, "end_char": 3742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.-This is an appeal by special leave filed by Kesar Singh,\n\nagd 23 years, who was convicted under Section 302 Indian Penal\n\nCode on three counts and sentenced to life imprisonment by an Additional Sssions' Judge of Patiala for having committed the murders of three persons, namely, Gurbachan Singh, Karnail Singh and Dewan Singh, one after another, during the night between 20th and 21st June, 1970, in village Dhablan.", "canonical_name": "D.!wan Singh"}}, {"text": "20th and 21st June, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3788, "end_char": 3812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.-This is an appeal by special leave filed by Kesar Singh,\n\nagd 23 years, who was convicted under Section 302 Indian Penal\n\nCode on three counts and sentenced to life imprisonment by an Additional Sssions' Judge of Patiala for having committed the murders of three persons, namely, Gurbachan Singh, Karnail Singh and Dewan Singh, one after another, during the night between 20th and 21st June, 1970, in village Dhablan."}}, {"text": "Dhablan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3825, "end_char": 3832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.-This is an appeal by special leave filed by Kesar Singh,\n\nagd 23 years, who was convicted under Section 302 Indian Penal\n\nCode on three counts and sentenced to life imprisonment by an Additional Sssions' Judge of Patiala for having committed the murders of three persons, namely, Gurbachan Singh, Karnail Singh and Dewan Singh, one after another, during the night between 20th and 21st June, 1970, in village Dhablan."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab & Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3950, "end_char": 3980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal against the conviction and a revision application by the State against the lesser penalty for murder, the High Court of Punjab & Haryana dismissed the appeal of Kesar Singh, but it allowed the revision application of the State of Punjab enhancing the s!nten~ of Kesar Singh to one ofdeath. ·"}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4065, "end_char": 4080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal against the conviction and a revision application by the State against the lesser penalty for murder, the High Court of Punjab & Haryana dismissed the appeal of Kesar Singh, but it allowed the revision application of the State of Punjab enhancing the s!nten~ of Kesar Singh to one ofdeath. ·"}}, {"text": "Gurnam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4275, "end_char": 4287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grounds given by the High Court for enhancing the sentence were: the motive was tL avenge the murder of the appellant's brotherin-law Gurnam Singh committed about 7 or 8 years prior to the occurren~ so that there could ba no immediate provocation; the three murders were committed \"in a very cold blooded and brutal manner when the deceased wer~ sleeping on their cots\"; two shots from a 12 bore gun had been fired at each of the three murdered men \"indicating the determination to give no chance of survival to anyone\"; \"the time selected for the murder was such that no possible help could re rendered to prevent the death of any of the three deceased and no\n\nobc:.truction could be possible to carry out the design of committing these murders\".", "canonical_name": "Gurnam Sin~:h"}}, {"text": "Gurdev Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5425, "end_char": 5437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned Counsel for the appellant has taken us through the evidence of the two eye witnesses Gurdev Singh, P. W. 3, and Nachhattar Singh, P. W. 4, whose testimony had been accepted wholly by the Trial Court and the High Court about the murder of three men by the appellant singly, although the Trial Court had disbelieved the\n\nvry reason given for Gurdev Singh to wake up in time to see the murder of Gurbachan Singh, and, therefore, had acquitted the co-accused Kishori."}}, {"text": "Nachhattar Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5452, "end_char": 5468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned Counsel for the appellant has taken us through the evidence of the two eye witnesses Gurdev Singh, P. W. 3, and Nachhattar Singh, P. W. 4, whose testimony had been accepted wholly by the Trial Court and the High Court about the murder of three men by the appellant singly, although the Trial Court had disbelieved the\n\nvry reason given for Gurdev Singh to wake up in time to see the murder of Gurbachan Singh, and, therefore, had acquitted the co-accused Kishori."}}, {"text": "Gurdev Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5680, "end_char": 5692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned Counsel for the appellant has taken us through the evidence of the two eye witnesses Gurdev Singh, P. W. 3, and Nachhattar Singh, P. W. 4, whose testimony had been accepted wholly by the Trial Court and the High Court about the murder of three men by the appellant singly, although the Trial Court had disbelieved the\n\nvry reason given for Gurdev Singh to wake up in time to see the murder of Gurbachan Singh, and, therefore, had acquitted the co-accused Kishori.", "canonical_name": "Gurdev Singh"}}, {"text": "Kishori", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5795, "end_char": 5802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned Counsel for the appellant has taken us through the evidence of the two eye witnesses Gurdev Singh, P. W. 3, and Nachhattar Singh, P. W. 4, whose testimony had been accepted wholly by the Trial Court and the High Court about the murder of three men by the appellant singly, although the Trial Court had disbelieved the\n\nvry reason given for Gurdev Singh to wake up in time to see the murder of Gurbachan Singh, and, therefore, had acquitted the co-accused Kishori."}}, {"text": "Gurdev. Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5835, "end_char": 5848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned here that Gurdev."}}, {"text": "Gunnel Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6000, "end_char": 6012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh, P. W. 3, was shown to be sleeping on the roof of the house of his uncle Dewan Singh, from where he could see his cousin, Gurbachan Singh, and brother Gunnel Singh, P. W. 5, sleeping on the roof of the next house where Gurbachan Singh was murdered on a full moon night."}}, {"text": "Gurmel Si_ngh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6238, "end_char": 6251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution version was that, when Kesar Singh and the acquitted accused, Kishori, went up the stairs to the roof, Gurmel Si_ngh, P. W. 5, who was totally blind from birth, woke up and heard Kesar Singh, whom he recognised by voice, telling Kishori to catch hold of the blind man who was awake."}}, {"text": "ICESAR SINGH V", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6484, "end_char": 6498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ICESAR SINGH V, PUN.TAB (Beg, J,) 489 ,."}}, {"text": "Oorel Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6734, "end_char": 6745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were two abrasions on th b d f Oorel Singh, one on the forehead and another on his ewrt yi~- dicatlng tha.t he had fallen down and hurt himself."}}, {"text": "Guibacban Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6970, "end_char": 6985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Trial &urt I ht.d, very ngbtly, held that he must have got up and shouted only • after he .two sho~ ha~ been fired at Guibacban Singh.", "canonical_name": "Gurbachan Singh"}}, {"text": "Guniev Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7166, "end_char": 7178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, the prosecution ver~1on , that _Guniev Singh, P. w. 3, had got up because of Gurmel Smgh s cnes and had seen the appellant\n\nfirin~ twice: at Gurbahan Singh hd to be discarded as too transparent .; ..."}}, {"text": "Gurbahan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7275, "end_char": 7289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, the prosecution ver~1on , that _Guniev Singh, P. w. 3, had got up because of Gurmel Smgh s cnes and had seen the appellant\n\nfirin~ twice: at Gurbahan Singh hd to be discarded as too transparent .; ...", "canonical_name": "Gurbachan Singh"}}, {"text": "Gurmel Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8042, "end_char": 8054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the fact that the High Court l).ad not even noti12d the very good reason.~ given by the Trial Court for discarding the evidence of Gurmel Singh, P. W. ~. including the fact that this wit-\n\nDC!iS, who claimed to have identified Kesar Singh by voice, could not recognise Kesar Singh's voice when the Presiding Judge spoe to K.esar Singh, during the trial, to test the correctness of the cla1m of the 'olitness, the High Court bad overlooked a numb:er of featues .brought out by cross-examination of the two eye wtnesse~ whtch\n\nmade the version given out by them very difficult to beheve totally .•\n\nGurdev Singh had described Kesar Sigh s wearing a blue tur- F ban whereas Nachhattar Singh had descnbed tt a cream colorcd (\"Badami\") turban."}}, {"text": "K.esar Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8233, "end_char": 8245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the fact that the High Court l).ad not even noti12d the very good reason.~ given by the Trial Court for discarding the evidence of Gurmel Singh, P. W. ~. including the fact that this wit-\n\nDC!iS, who claimed to have identified Kesar Singh by voice, could not recognise Kesar Singh's voice when the Presiding Judge spoe to K.esar Singh, during the trial, to test the correctness of the cla1m of the 'olitness, the High Court bad overlooked a numb:er of featues .brought out by cross-examination of the two eye wtnesse~ whtch\n\nmade the version given out by them very difficult to beheve totally .•\n\nGurdev Singh had described Kesar Sigh s wearing a blue tur- F ban whereas Nachhattar Singh had descnbed tt a cream colorcd (\"Badami\") turban.", "canonical_name": "K.esar Singh"}}, {"text": "Kesar Sigh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8535, "end_char": 8545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the fact that the High Court l).ad not even noti12d the very good reason.~ given by the Trial Court for discarding the evidence of Gurmel Singh, P. W. ~. including the fact that this wit-\n\nDC!iS, who claimed to have identified Kesar Singh by voice, could not recognise Kesar Singh's voice when the Presiding Judge spoe to K.esar Singh, during the trial, to test the correctness of the cla1m of the 'olitness, the High Court bad overlooked a numb:er of featues .brought out by cross-examination of the two eye wtnesse~ whtch\n\nmade the version given out by them very difficult to beheve totally .•\n\nGurdev Singh had described Kesar Sigh s wearing a blue tur- F ban whereas Nachhattar Singh had descnbed tt a cream colorcd (\"Badami\") turban.", "canonical_name": "K.esar Singh"}}, {"text": "Nachhattar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8582, "end_char": 8598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the fact that the High Court l).ad not even noti12d the very good reason.~ given by the Trial Court for discarding the evidence of Gurmel Singh, P. W. ~. including the fact that this wit-\n\nDC!iS, who claimed to have identified Kesar Singh by voice, could not recognise Kesar Singh's voice when the Presiding Judge spoe to K.esar Singh, during the trial, to test the correctness of the cla1m of the 'olitness, the High Court bad overlooked a numb:er of featues .brought out by cross-examination of the two eye wtnesse~ whtch\n\nmade the version given out by them very difficult to beheve totally .•\n\nGurdev Singh had described Kesar Sigh s wearing a blue tur- F ban whereas Nachhattar Singh had descnbed tt a cream colorcd (\"Badami\") turban.", "canonical_name": "Nachhattar Singh"}}, {"text": "lev Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8660, "end_char": 8669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While Gur<lev Singh had srud that Kesar Stnb\n\n; ·.·:"}}, {"text": "Kesar Stnb", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8684, "end_char": 8694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While Gur<lev Singh had srud that Kesar Stnb\n\n; ·.·:", "canonical_name": "K.esar Singh"}}, {"text": "Nachbattar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8859, "end_char": 8875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Con- ~ \"\n\ni4ering that Nachbattar Singh was said to be sleep1ng tn remote COrllCr of the enclosure around the house on the roof of wtch Sf?u~\n\nG. cha.u Singh was murdered and I?ewn S!ngh .nd Ka:n~l di~lt were asleep nt 11omc distance from h1m sn th1s endosure, 11 1 1 to believe that Nachhattnr could have made out not Xnlti'rrtthef ~r of the turban but also the r.tripes on the chadar a:; s. .", "canonical_name": "Nachhattar Singh"}}, {"text": "Nachhattnr", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9120, "end_char": 9130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Con- ~ \"\n\ni4ering that Nachbattar Singh was said to be sleep1ng tn remote COrllCr of the enclosure around the house on the roof of wtch Sf?u~\n\nG. cha.u Singh was murdered and I?ewn S!ngh .nd Ka:n~l di~lt were asleep nt 11omc distance from h1m sn th1s endosure, 11 1 1 to believe that Nachhattnr could have made out not Xnlti'rrtthef ~r of the turban but also the r.tripes on the chadar a:; s. .", "canonical_name": "Nachhattar Singh"}}, {"text": "Karnall Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9796, "end_char": 9809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4'90\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nhave first climb:d to the mof of the house where Gurbachan Singh was asleep and then to have come down the stairs to shoot at Karnall Singh on his cot, and, threaf£er, to have shot D~:wan Singh on his cot.", "canonical_name": "Karnail Singh"}}, {"text": "Puran Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10045, "end_char": 10056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1t does appear rather unlikely that, while even a blind man had got up, and Gurdev Singh, P. W. 3, sleeping onthe roof of the next house, and Nachhattar Singh, P. W. 4, Puran Singh, P. W. 6, declared hostile, who were als'} steeping nar Karnail Singh and Dewan Singh, had got up, neither Karnail Singh nor D.!wan Singh could get up from their cots and try to either grapple with or run away from the assailant who was permitted to quietly reload his double barrelled gun to shoot at each of the three men twice each time."}}, {"text": "D.!wan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10182, "end_char": 10194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1t does appear rather unlikely that, while even a blind man had got up, and Gurdev Singh, P. W. 3, sleeping onthe roof of the next house, and Nachhattar Singh, P. W. 4, Puran Singh, P. W. 6, declared hostile, who were als'} steeping nar Karnail Singh and Dewan Singh, had got up, neither Karnail Singh nor D.!wan Singh could get up from their cots and try to either grapple with or run away from the assailant who was permitted to quietly reload his double barrelled gun to shoot at each of the three men twice each time.", "canonical_name": "D.!wan Singh"}}, {"text": "Kamail Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11300, "end_char": 11312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We find it very difficult to believe that Gurdev Singh would have rushed and taken up his stand here to S'!e the murders o ·~ Kamail Singh and D::wan Singh if h:: had actually s'!en Kesar Sing11 shoot twice at Gurbachan Singh on the roof.", "canonical_name": "Karnail Singh"}}, {"text": "D::wan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11317, "end_char": 11329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We find it very difficult to believe that Gurdev Singh would have rushed and taken up his stand here to S'!e the murders o ·~ Kamail Singh and D::wan Singh if h:: had actually s'!en Kesar Sing11 shoot twice at Gurbachan Singh on the roof.", "canonical_name": "D.!wan Singh"}}, {"text": "Kesar Sing11", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11356, "end_char": 11368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We find it very difficult to believe that Gurdev Singh would have rushed and taken up his stand here to S'!e the murders o ·~ Kamail Singh and D::wan Singh if h:: had actually s'!en Kesar Sing11 shoot twice at Gurbachan Singh on the roof.", "canonical_name": "K.esar Singh"}}, {"text": "Nachhattar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13136, "end_char": 13152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is difficult to hold that either Gurdev Singh or\n\nNachhattar Singh, .", "canonical_name": "Nachhattar Singh"}}, {"text": "Bhajan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13376, "end_char": 13388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "only either against Kesar Singh or his brother Bhajan Singh both of whom were residing with and looking after the land of Tej Kaur the widow of Gurnam Singh."}}, {"text": "Tej Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13451, "end_char": 13459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "only either against Kesar Singh or his brother Bhajan Singh both of whom were residing with and looking after the land of Tej Kaur the widow of Gurnam Singh.", "canonical_name": "ofTej Kaur"}}, {"text": "21-6-1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13835, "end_char": 13844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lodged at Police Station Sadar Patiala about 10 miles away at 8 25 a.m. on 21-6-1970."}}, {"text": "Lal Singh Sarpanch", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13863, "end_char": 13881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that Lal Singh Sarpanch and Jag Singh Panch, had also come to the scene of occurrence after it had taken place and had gone to the Police Station so that the F.I.R. was lodged in their presence although they did not sign it because there was no need for that."}}, {"text": "Jag Singh Panch", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13886, "end_char": 13901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that Lal Singh Sarpanch and Jag Singh Panch, had also come to the scene of occurrence after it had taken place and had gone to the Police Station so that the F.I.R. was lodged in their presence although they did not sign it because there was no need for that."}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14561, "end_char": 14584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kuldev Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14905, "end_char": 14917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the motive to murder, we think that the prosecution case against the appellant finds corroboration fom the statement of the Investigating Officer, Kuldev Singh, P. W. 12, who deposed that when he went to the house ofTej Kaur, looking for the appellant, he found it locked."}}, {"text": "ofTej Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14972, "end_char": 14982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the motive to murder, we think that the prosecution case against the appellant finds corroboration fom the statement of the Investigating Officer, Kuldev Singh, P. W. 12, who deposed that when he went to the house ofTej Kaur, looking for the appellant, he found it locked.", "canonical_name": "ofTej Kaur"}}, {"text": "27·6,1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15071, "end_char": 15080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant could be arrested only on 27·6,1970 after a \"Nakabandi\" at the canal bridge of village Dhakraba and was found ifl illegal pos.sesion of the gun No."}}, {"text": "Dhakraba", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15132, "end_char": 15140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant could be arrested only on 27·6,1970 after a \"Nakabandi\" at the canal bridge of village Dhakraba and was found ifl illegal pos.sesion of the gun No."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16032, "end_char": 16034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Karnail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17814, "end_char": 17821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We think that the version given by the two eye witnesses, even though it suffers from improbabilities mentioned above, so as to make it:; total truthfulness doubtful, must\n\nbe true at least so far as participation of Kesar Singh in the murder\n\no~ three men by shooting at least one of them, if not both Karnail SJD~ and Dewan Singh before their eyes is concerned.", "canonical_name": "Karnail Singh"}}, {"text": "Guruev Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18809, "end_char": 18821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ji~ brother-in-law, Gurnam Singh, who was a step-brother of Guruev Singh.", "canonical_name": "Gurdev Singh"}}, {"text": "Dewan Siogh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19080, "end_char": 19091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It had come in Jl\n\nc:\\'ince that two of the murdered men, Karnail Singh and Dewan Siogh, had been proiecuted for the murder of Gurnam Sin~:h the .·", "canonical_name": "D.!wan Singh"}}, {"text": "Gurnam Sin~:h", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19131, "end_char": 19144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It had come in Jl\n\nc:\\'ince that two of the murdered men, Karnail Singh and Dewan Siogh, had been proiecuted for the murder of Gurnam Sin~:h the .·", "canonical_name": "Gurnam Sin~:h"}}, {"text": "Kcsar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19170, "end_char": 19181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "brother-iu-Ltw of Kcsar Singh and had been ;\\cquitted.", "canonical_name": "K.esar Singh"}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19377, "end_char": 19388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20178, "end_char": 20189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_494_518_EN", "year": 1974, "text": ".(94\n\nPREMRAJ\n\nRAM CHARAN\n\nMatch 4, 1974\n\n[P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, S. N. DWIVEDI AND P. K. GoSWAMI, JJ.)\n\nLimitation Act 1908---S. 182-Whethcr the fifth applicatioll for execution was a \"step in aid of execution\" and if so, whether ir is barred by limitation.\n\nK. and his wife purchased the house in dispute. K died in 1936 leaving behind him S and R, his son. In 1951, R mortgaged the house to the appellant.\n\nThe. appellant obtained a preliminary decree for foreclosure and also the final decree In the meantime, S. gifted the entire house to Prakash Chandra son of R. He thereafter, frustrated several attempts of the appellant to execute the decree and in 1956, instituted a suit against the appellant and another for a declaration that the preliminary and final decree of foreclosure were not binding on him and prayed for a perpetual injunction against the appellant. The suit was dismissed but he appealed. The appeal court partly allowed his appeal holding that he\n\n~·s te oner. of half share in the house by virtue of the gift and issued an I OJ unction m hts favour. The appellant filed a second appeal in the High Court and Prakash Chandra also filed a cross-objection in respect of his half share.\n\nBoth the appeal and the cross-objection were dismissed by the High Court\n\nThe fourth execution application filed by the appellant was dismissed on June 23, 1956. The fifth execution application was filed by the appellant on July 28, 1964 for possession of half of the house. The respondent objected to this application on the ground of limitation. The objection was disallowed by the execution court and by the appeal court. It was, however, upheld by the High Court and the appli cation was dismissed as time-barred. Hence this appeal. 3 points were raised by the appellant before this Court-(1) Limitation is saved by cis. 1, 2 & 4 of Art. 182\n\n(ii) Limitation is saved by cl. 5 of Art. 182 and (iii) the fifth application for execution was really an application to revive the fourth execution proceeding and therefore, it was not time-barred. Dismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : (i) It is plain that neither the decree of the appeal court nor the decree of the High Court reversed, varied or amended in any manner the final foreclosure decree of the appellant. The foreclosure decree remained intact and fully alive.\n\nIt could be executed against the respondent according to its tenor. He could be ejected from the whole house. But it could never have any effect against Prakash Chandra's (the respondent's son) paramount title to a half har~ in the house.\n\nPrakash Chandra's appeal and the High Court decree I?assed m h1s apenl ould not fall within cls. 2 & 4 of Art.182 and would not fllrmsh a fresh start.mg pomt of limitation for executing 'the foreclosure decree against the respondent-judgment debtor.\n\nBhawanipur Banking Corporation Ltd. v. Guri Sf1ankr1 Sanna (1950] SCR 25 referred to. [498 A-B, q\n\n(ii) In order to get the advantage ofCl. 5 of Art. 182, the appellnt has to satisfy 3 conditions:-\n\n(a) the written statement filed in respondent-son's suit and in his appeal were an \"application\"\n\n(b) the Court where respondent-son's case and appeal, and wherein the appellant's second appeal was filed were the proper court, and\n\n(c) Proceedings specified in (a} are a step in aid of execution of the decree sought to be executed by the appellant. {498 DF]\n\n(iii) To oppose Prakash Chandra's suit, the appellant had filed a written statemen!.\n\nTbe written statement ordinarily does not include any request to the court and 1t is not an 'application' within the meaning of Cl. 5 of Art. 182. [499 CD]\n\nPREM RAJ v. RAM CH.UAN (Dwivedi, ],) (95\n\n(PflllltQ LDI v. Snrt. SarasWQti Dei AIR 1960 All S72 and Karlar Sii. v, SMllaff\n\nSingii'Parap Sitith A.J.R. 1967 Punjab:m, distinguished.) ·\n\n(iV) Further, even if the suit and appeal was instituted in the proPer court, the written statement filed by the appeUant was not an application and thw:fore, he caDDot take advantage of 0. !! of Art. 182. -As the appellant's appeal n the Hiah Court was not an application to the 'Proper Court', it is unnecessary to deCide whether . in 1he suit and in the appeal filed by Prakash Chandra the written statement of the appellant and his resistance to ibe appeal and his second appeal in tho High Court amounted to a step-in-aid in execution of the decree sought to be executed by him.\n\n[500 A-D, SOJH-S04 AJ .\n\n(v) The fifth application for execution was not a continuation of tho previous application because the previous application was dismissed for not payilir tho process fee etc. and it was not a pending application. [504 D-E]\n\nDIJselftinz Ptr Goswami J.-The appellant was faced with resistance from the respondent and his relations. The appellant made abortive attempts to . execute the mortgage decree in order to obtain posseSsion of the suit property. Having failed to obtain possession by usual civil process the appellant applied for poli~ belp which was rejected. Further, the respondents' soil dragged the appellant to a suit which became another obstacle to the execution of the dc!t:rec for possession\n\nof the suit property. Further, the partly accepted appeal of the judgment debtor's son by the appellate Court changed the character of the original foreclosure decree which the appellant could execute. Further, because of injunctioru restraining the appellant from executing the foreclosure decree in full the original foreclosure\n\ndecree, in the form it was, was not capable of execution. [S17 C-B, 518 B]\n\nMaMraja Sir Rmneshwor Silf6h lklhadllr v. Homeshwar Singh (1921) 40 Madrrn L8w JourfiDI l/6, referred to.\n\nTberefore, the decree the Civil suit No. 75A of 1957 had a direct and immediate connection with and effect upon the decree in suit No. 27A of 1952 sought to be executed. The nexus between the two is manifestly clear, It was obvious that the appellants' successive ecphractic actions in defending the foreclosure decree in different ways until its final determination in the High Court were all \"Steps in aid of execution\" of his foreclosure decree !nd therefore, the appellants' fifth exe- . eution application was witllln time, being within 3 years from the date of the final order in the High Court on January 1, 1962: [517 EHJ\n\nNagendra Nath Raj & Ors. v. Suresh Chander Dey & Ors. A.LR. 1932 P.C.l65/ 167, V. E. A. Annama!ai Chethar v. Val/iammai Achi and or1 .12 IA 296/303; Bhaw®ipore Banking Corporation Ltd. v. Gouri Shanker Sharma (1950]; S.C.R. (25) Rufba Narayan & Ors. v. Maharaja- Kapurthala AJ.R. 1936 Oudh 248, A.S.\n\nKr-uhanappa Chetfrar &: Ors. v. Nachiappa Chethar & Ors. [1964] S.CR. 241/252 etc., referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURlSDICf!ON : Civil Appzal No. 1607 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Decree dated the 3rd February, 1967 of the Madhya Pradeh Hi<>h Court at Jabalpur in Civil Misc. Second Appeal No. 124 of 1966. \"'\n\nB. D. Sharma for the appellant.\n\nB. N. Lokur and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the respondent.\n\nThe udgment of P. JAGANMOHAN Rmov AND S. N. DWivEDr, JJ. w~ _deltvered by DwrVEDI, J. P. K. GoswAMI, J. gave a dissenting Opmton.\n\nDWIVI!Dr, J.-Kariya and his wife Sava purcbased the house in dispute by a registered deed on Apr_il 2, 1905. K1riya died in 1936 leaving behind him Sava and Ram Charan, his son. On August 16, 1951 Ram Charan mortgaged the house to Prem Raj (the appellant).\n\nPrem Raj obtained a preliminary decree for foreclos.ur, e on August\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n£19741 3 S.C.R.\n\n16, 1952 and also the .final decree on July 16, 1955. In the meanwhile on March 7,1952 Sava gifted the entire house to Prakash Chandra, son of Ram Charan, the respondent. Fortified by this gift.\n\nPrakash .Chandra frustrated several attempts of the appellant to set ·\n\nposs:::ssion of the house in execution of his decree. He made three unsuccessful -attempts to execute the decree till the end of 1954.\n\nHe made the fourth attempt on April 25, 1956 .. Shortly. thereafter, on December 7, 1956, Prakash Chandra instituted a suit against the appellant and his father Ram .· Cbaran for a declaration that the preliminary and .final decree for forecJosure in favour of the former were not binding on.him and for a perpetual injunction restraining the appellant from taking possession of the bouse in exetution of the aforesaid decree. The suit was dismissed on NoYernber 25, 1958. He filed an appeal and obtained an order staying execution of the decree on December 31, 1958. The appeal court partly allowed his appeal on October 21, 1959. It was held that he was the owner of a half share in the house by virtue of the gift deed from Sava in his favour. So the appeal rourt issued an injunction restraining the appellant from executing his decree with respect to a half share in the howe. The appellant filed a second appeal in the H1p\n\nCourt of Madhya Pradesh against the judgment of the appeal court.\n\nPrakash Chandra also filed a cross-objection in respect of his claim for. the remaining half share in the house. Both the appeal and the cross-objection were dismissed by the High Court on JanWlry I, 1962 .\n\nTurning back to the fourth execution application filed by the appellant, it was dismissed on June 23, 1Q56. The fifth execution E application was filed by the appellant on July 29, 1964 for possession ' over half of the house. The respondent objected to this applica / tion on the ground of limitation. The objection was disallowed by the execution court as well as by the appeal court. It was. however, upheld by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. So the application was dismissed as time-barred. Hence this 'appeal.\n\nThe sole argument of the appellant in the High Court was that s. l.S Limitation Act, 1908 (hereinafter, called the Act) saved limitation.\n\nThe High Court rejected this argument. The order of the appeal court staying execution of the decree remained in force only for a .,.,_ limited priod between January. 31, 1958 and October 21, 1959.\n\nThat time should be excluded in computing limitation under a. 15 • but that alone would not have limitation.· '\n\nBefore us, counsel for the app.!llant ha~ not placed reliance on s. 15 to save limitation. His arguments now are : · • . ' 1.\n\nLimitation is saved by clauses l, 2 and 4 of Ait. 182;\n\nLimitation is saved by cl. 5 of Art. 182;\n\n3. ·· The fifth application for exeution was really an application to rev1ve . the fourth execl!tJOn proceeding and therefore, it was not time-barred •.\n\nl'REM RAJ V, RAM CHARAN (Dwivedi, J.) -497\n\nWe shall consider these arguments in seriatim. But b r. we do so, .it is necessary to read the relevant provisions of Art.e 1pg.\n\n. \"For the execution of a decree of Three\n\nany civil court • • • years\n\nl. The date of the deere~\n\n·············\n\n2. (where there ha.s been an\n\nappc-.11) the date of the final decree •. ...... of the appellate Court\n\n•• 0 ••• 0 ••••• 0 •••\n\n4. (where the decree b; u\n\nbeen amended) the date of amendment, or .\n\n5. (where the application next hereinafter mentiOile<l\n\nhas been made) the date of the final order p~ on an application made iD\n\naccordance with law to the proper court . .. . . . to taKe more rep in aid of eucution of the <kcrce ••.• Eltplanation II : \"Proper Court\" means the <Alan: whose duty it i3 to execah: the decree ...... \"\n\nRexarding argument No. 1 : We are unable to appreciate how the High Court decree in Prakash Chandra's suit will give a fresh startin: point of limitation to the app::Uant undr cl. 1 of Art. 182. Clawoe\n\nI is to be read ag1inst the backdrop of th~ words in the first columLl \"for th~ execution of a decree.\" So the d1te of th'! decree (whether of te first court or of the appellate court) which is put in execution\n\nfurmshes the starting point of limitation.\n\nTite final decree in favour of the appllant was drawn up under Order XXXIV, rule 3 Civil Procedure Cod!. The decree absolutely debarre.d the respondent and all prsons claiming under him fom redzemng the mortg1g~. It also directed the respondent to d;:liver\n\npasses~10n of the di<puted house which was mortgagd. The d-.te Wlls binding on th~ respondent and anyone claiming UJ_ldr him. !t could _not and did not purport to bind a tird person clrumJn, C any\n\nsnterest 1n th! house in his own right . . In hts sutt Prakash Chan, ra Chll!leng d th~ d<!cree, inter c.lia, on the ground that h:: was the sole Offner of th! house..\n\nII~ claimed a declaration that th'! d cree \"as not binding on him and a p::rmanent injunction restr.aining the appellant from taking possession of the house in execution of the deere~.\n\nThe app:al court found tlllt Pn1kash Chandra was the owner of a htlf share in th'! house by virtue of the gift from av.a wbo ~clt~ half share and that accordingly the decree was not bmdmg on hi . the ext~:nt of a half share. The app:al court granted a declaraton to that ffcct and an injunction restraining the appellant from .tatin~\n\npas.esswn of the half share of Prakash Chandra 1n the house\n\n1db.\n\nCUhon of th! dcree. The dcree of the appal court was affirmc } th: Hifh Court.\n\n;7'\" - . . ~· --~-...\n\n498 SUl'REME COURT REPORTS\n\n£19741 3 S.C.R.\n\nIt is plain-that neither the decree of the appeal court nor the dec- ·- rec of'the H!gh Court. reversed; varied or amended in any manner _ the fina1 foreclosJ.lre decree of the appellant. The foreclosure decree remained in tact and fully alive ... It could be executed against . the\n\nrespondnt according to its tenor. He could be ejected from the\n\nwhole ht>use. But it could never have any effect ~Jgainst Prakash Chandra's pfmaount title to a half share in the house.\n\nPrakash Chlndra obtained his decree in a collateral suit. Tht\n\napplbint's second appal against the decree of the appeal court in favour of Prakash Chandra was not directed against the foreclosure decree now in execution, nor would it, as shown earlier, effect the decree in any manner. in relation to the tespondent-judgnent d!btor.\n\nSo his appal and the High Court decree p1ssed in his appeal would not fall within cl. 2 and 4of Art. 182 and would not furnish a fresh startins pint of limitation for executing the foreclosure decree aeainst theresp:>ndent-judgment debtor. (See Bhawanipore Banking Corporation Ltc/. v. Gorl Shanker Sharma(l).\n\nThe appellant has relied on Mohammad Jabir and others v. Narain Prasad Daruka and others (2) and Janab Mohammad Ismail v. Tothna\n\nliM Amra/ and others. (3) n-these two cases the decree sought to be executed itself was amended. So clause 4 of Art. 182 was directly applicable.\n\nRegarding argument No. 2 : In order to get the advantage of cl. 5 of Art. 182, the appllant has to satisfy three conditions :\n\n(a) Th~ written statement filed by him in Prakash Chandra's\n\nsuit, his resistall'C: to the first appal of Prakash Chandra and his second appeal in the High Court are an \"application.\"\n\n(b) The court in which Prakash Chandra's suit and first appaal\n\nwere instituted and the High Court wherein the appellant's second appaal was filed are, the \"proper court\".\n\n(e) Th~ proceeding~ spified in (a) are a step in aid of execution of the decree sought to be e)(ecuted by the appellant.\n\nAn app!ication is \"the making of an appeal, requst, o~ etition to a prson; the request so made.'' (Shorter Oxford Enghsh Dtchonary,\n\n1955 Edn. 86) Thus the making of a request to a person is of the essence of an application. In some cases it has accordingly been held that 'the plnt is an 'application' within the meaning of that word incl. 5 Art. 182. (See Rudra Narain v. Maharaja of Kapurtha/a.(4) The Bom, bay, Calcutta and Madras High Courts have, however, held to the contrary. (See Raghunandan Prasad v. Bhaggoolai.(S) It is unnecessary to resolve this conflict of opinion between the High\n\nCourts in this appeal. To oppose Prakah Chandra's suit, the appel~ lllllt had filed a written statement . So we are directly concerned with the question whther a written statement is an 'application' within\n\n. (1) [19SO] S.C.R. 2S at p. 29.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1960 Patna 126.\n\n(3) I.L.R. [1965] 1 Madras 176.\n\n(4) AJ.R. 1936 Awadh 248. (S) l.LR. 17 Cal. 268.\n\ni /\n\nPREM RAJ V, RAM CHARAN (Dwivedi, ./,) 499>\n\nthe meaning of cl. 5 of Art. 182. According to Order VII r. 1 Civir ' Procedure Code the plaint should specify the relief which the plaintiff claims. So it may be plausiBly argued that the plaint, which\n\nmakes a request to the court,- is an \"application\". But unlike the plaint, the written statement ordinarily does not inc1ude any request to the court. It is simply a defence to the plaintiff's claim. Order- VIII Code of Civil Procedure deals with matters which ought to be included in a written statement. Rule 6 thereof enables the defendant to make a claim for set-off. To the extent the written statement includes the claim for set-off, it may be treated as a plaint. It is perhaps arguable that a written statement filed in an interpleader suit may also be treated as a plaint. But we express no opinion on this ast. Leaving aside rule 6 and the interpleader suit, there is nothing in Orders VI and VIII, Code of Civil Procedure to show that a written statement could legally include any request to the court.\n\nWe are aware of the general practice in the Mufassil of including in the written statement of prayer that the suit should be dismissed with: c.osts. But this prilyer is supererogatory and would not convert a written statement Simpliciter into an 'application' within the meaning of cl. 5 of Art. 182.\n\nIn Panna La/ v. Smt. Saraswati Deri (1), the judgment dbtor made an application under Order XXI, r. 2 Code of Civil Procedure to the execution court alleging payment to the decreeholder outside the court. The decreeholder filed a written objection denying payment. The application was ordered to be dismissed. The appeal from the order met the same fate. The High Court held that the time for filing the execution application ran from the date of the appellate order.\n\nThe High Court said : \"(It was) of the opinion that the words\" •:to take some step in aid of execution of the decree\" .... should be Interpreted' liberally ln favour of the decreeholder. If he has taken any step which would remove as an obstacle to the further cxccut i::.n of the decree, he would be entitled to 'the benefit of the provision. In the present case the decreeholder took steps to set aside the objection which. w:; ts an hindrance against execution and was therefore a step-in-aid of execution.\" Plainly, the High Comt has assumed without any discussion that the written objection of the decreeho!der to the application .of he jugtent-debtor under Order XXI, r. 2 C. P. C. was an apphcatlon w!thtn the meaning of cl. 5 of Art. J 82 and has then proceeed to dectde weher the said objection was a step-in-aid of execulOn.\n\nI~ o, ur optmon, the assumption was wrongly made.\n\nThe wntten ObJeCtton of the decreeholder could not be regarded as an\n\n'apl!cati.on' . The Punjab High Court has followed the Allahabad dectslOn m artar Singh v. Sultan Singh Partap Singh (2). Like the Allahabad H1gh Court, the Punjab High Court also has erroneously\n\nassuned. that the. written objection tiled by the decreeholder to the\n\napp~Ic.atro!l of the JUgment-debtor for reopening the case and for settmg asrde the decree was an application.\n\n(J) A.l.R. 1960 All. 572.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1967 Punjab 375.\n\n.soo\n\nSUP.KEME COURT REPORTS [l974J 3 S.C.R.\n\nCounsel for the appellant has strenuously attempted to pursuade us to give a liberal construction to the word ,'application' i~ ct. of Art. 182. We do not think that the rule of hberal construction gtves a free hand to the Court to stretch and strain the statutory laniuage\n\nto accord with our abstract notions of justic~ and fair play. In\n\nur view. if the statutory language is. susceptible of two constructions, the rule of liberal construction should incline the Court to prefer the one which accomplishes the legislative purpose. ut where the statutory language will b!ar one and only one meanng, there is no room for the application of the rule of liberal construction.\n\nHowsoever liberally one may construe the word 'application', it is not possible to regard the written statement of the appellant in Prakash Chandra's suit as an 'application•, for it made no rquest to the oourt.\n\nJust as the written statement of the appellant cannot be regarded as an 'application', so also the resistance to the appeal filed by Prakash Chandra cannot be held to be an 'application'. Counsel for e .\n\nppellant, however, submits that the appellant'~ econd appeal in the High Court would be an 'application'.\n\nIn V.E.A.. AnnamaJai Chettlar v. Valliammai Achi(1) the Privy Council has held that an appeal filed by the decrceholder is an ·•application'. It may be a~umed that the appellant's second appeal in the High Court is an 'application' within the meaning of cl. 5 -of Art. 182. But this does not conclude the matter in favour of the appellant. He has to show that the High Court is the \"proper court\". '\"Proper Court\" is defined in Explanation IT to Art. 182, as \"the court\n\nwboe duty it is to execute the decree.\" Ordinarily, the High Court will not b~ the ''proper court\" as so defined, because it is normally not the duty of the High Court to execute a decree. According to s.38 Civil Procedure Code a decree may be executed \"either by tile court\n\nwhich passed it or by the court to which it is sent for execution, So \"the proper court\" would be the court which passed the foreclosure decree in favour of the appellant. The appellant can derive no as!i9tance from Annamaloi(supra). 'In that case the decreeholder had made an application for execution of his decree in the proper court. 1be judgment-debtor filed an objection. It was allowed. Then tbe -decreeholder filed an appeal in the High Court. The appeal w.s\n\n<lismied. The Privy Council held that the time for rnakina t)e execution application ran from the order of the High Court. RepeJ. iing the argument of the judgment-debtor that the High Court was not the proper court, the Privy Council said :\"Under s. 187 of the Code of Civil Procedure an appeal court has the same powers as are conferred and imposed by the Code on courts of original jrisdiction. Where .(In application for execution is dismissed by the fewer court, the appeal\n\ncourt is the proper, and indeed, the only, court which can then excute Jhe decree. No doubt in practice a High Court does not itself generally extcute the decree of lower courts; normally it remands the case to the Jower court with directions to execute according to law '.on: the basis\n\n(I) 72 Indian Appeals 296.\n\nPREM RAJ v. RAM CHARAN (Dwivedi, J.) 501\n\nof the High Court's decision ; but in a proper case the ~h Court would no dGubt execute the decree or order itself.\" (emphasis added) It is clear from this passage (especially from the words sho_wn in emphasis) that the Privy Council regarded the High Court as tJte 'proper court' on account of the fact that the decreeholder had ·-applied for execution of his decree in the 'proper court', It was held that the appeal court entertaining an appeal from the order of the execution court is the proper court. Such is not the case before us.\n\nIt may be pointed out here that in the courts below the appellant did not place reliance on Art. 182 for saving limitation. So there is n() finding by the court below on the point as to whether Prakash Chtndra's suit was instituted in the court which could execute the inal foreclosure decree of the appellant. The record before us does\n\nnot unambiguously make out that the suit was institud in the court \"hich could execute the said decree. The foreclosure decree was. pused by the Civil Judge, Class II, Balaghat. It appears from the plaint in Prakash Chandra's suit that the suit was instituted in the Court of the First Additional Civil Judge, Balagbat attached to the Seconel\n\nCi'ril Judge, Balaghat. . But the judgment of the appeal court in Prakash Chandra's first appeal indicates that the suit was instituted in tkt: court of the First Additional Civil Judge, Balaghat attached to the court of the First Civil Judge, Balaghat. So it is not certain whether\n\nPrabsh Chandra's suit was instituted in the court which could execute the final foreclosure decree of the apP.ellant.· But even if it is assumed\n\nthat the suit was instituted' in the court which could execute 1he said decree, we are unable to hold that the_ appellant's second appeal to the High Court arose out of an \"appli((ation\" made to -the ''proper court\" because. his written statement in the suit was not atl \"application\" made to the proper court. So the appellant cannot aet the benefit of cl. 5 of Art. 182.\n\nThe Allahabad and Bombay High Court£ have taken the view that time would run from the date of the appellate order. (Baldeo Singk v, &m Swarup(l) and Joshi Laxmirarn Lallubhai v. Mehta Ba/asltt1nkar\n\nVeniram(2), In Baldeo Singlt (supra) an application for execution was. made by Baldeo Singh, who was the assignee of . the decreeholder on July 15, 1916. About a year earlier, the property against which the decree was to be executed had been sold to Ram Swarup and Jai Dayal inexecution of a simple money decree. Ram Swarup and Jai Dayal' instituted a suit for a declaration that the property purchased by them was not saleable in execution (,)f the decree by the assignee, BaJdeo Singh. They also claimed an alternative relief that they were entitled to a prior charge of nearly Rs. 2.~/- on the property. While this suit was pending, the assignee's application for execution was dismissed. Thereafter the SQit was dec1eed in respect of the alternative relief only. Baldeo Singh filed an appeal from the decree. The appeal court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit on March 19, 1918.\n\nBaldeo Singh then filed an application for execution on September 30,.\n\n(1) A.l.R. 1921 AU. 174.\n\n(2) lL.R. 39 .Bombay 20.\n\n\n. (19741 3 S, C, R.\n\n19l9: t was made thre years aftr be dismissal of the previous applicatton. The execution court diSmissed the application as. timebarred. The first. appeal court upheld the order of the execution court. {)n appel, .the ljh Court held that the application or execution was\n\nade w1thm :t1m7. O:a: of the reason~ giv.en by the High Court .tn suppo!t of 1ts Vle~ was that te appeal file~ by the assignee was a . . step-m-a1d of execution. The High Court said : \"There IS another .aspect of the cae from which also this application would be within time. The suit, as we have stated above, was for two reliefs : (1) that the property was not saleable and (2) the alternative relitfwas that the property was subject to a prior encumbrance. On the 18th of July 1917, the Court gave the then plaintiffs the seconil relief claimed by them, namely, tat they.could put up their prior charge of nearly Rs. 2,000/- as a shield agamst any person who got the proprty in execution. In order to remove this difficulty in the way f the execution .0f his decree unconditionally the decreeholder appealed successfully.\n\nThe decree of the 19th March, 1918 would go to show that this appeal must have been filed within .~ years of the present application for exe- cution and this must b: considered to be a step-in-aid of execution, .as by it the decreeholder wanted to remove certain difficultis which .sto()d in the way of his getting the full benefit of his decree. From this -view also the present application i~ within time.\"\n\nIt may be obs:!rved that the High Court did not consider at all the question whether the appeal was an 'application' made to the ''proper .court\" as defined in Explanation li of Art. 182.\n\nIn Laxmiram Lallubhai (supra) the judgment-debtor applied to have himself declared an insolvent. In the circtm; istances, the decreeholder could not have the judgment debtor arrested in execution of his decree ' :if he was declared an insolvent, and consequently he opposed the application and when that was unsuccessful he appealed against the order .declaring him insolvent. It was contended that if s.lS of the new Limitation Act of 1908 be held inapplicable, his opposition to the in- . 50tvency of the judgment debtor should .be regarded as a step-in-aid of the execution of the decree under Art. 179 of the old Limitation Act, 1877, corresponding to Art. 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Beamon, .J. speaking for the Division Bench, found some difficulty in bringing\n\nsch an apphcation (application opposing the application for insolvency) within the meaning of the words 'application to take some stepin-aid of execution' under Art. 179 (old), now Art. 182 of the Limitation Act. But when the result of the proceedings went against him, the -creditor {appellant appealed to the District Court and succeeded. Adverting to lhis aspect, the learned Judge said:\n\n\"We think that it is not putting too great a strain upon ordinary language to say that an appeal in such circumstances fairly false within the meaning of the words: 'an application to take a step-in-aid of excution'. It. is clear that as long as the insolvency proceedings went tn favour of the debtor, the creditor could not have presented any application in ordinary course for the further execution of his decree with the least hope of success\".\n\nPREM RAJ V. RAM CHARAN (Dwivedi, /.) 5()3\n\nTho appellant had no other course open to him, ifthe debtor was declared insolvent, than in the first instance to get this bar to the further execution of his decree removed.\n\nAnd the only way in which he could hope to obtain that result would be by first opposing the\n\niniolvency petition in the first Court and if he failed there by appealing to the higher court. .While so holding, the learped Judge struck a note ofcaution:\n\n\"Adopting that view, it is unnecessary to enter into any of the other nice and difficult questions which have been raised and adequately argued in the course of this appeal.\n\nWe do not seek to lay down any general principle upon any\n\nof those questions, but we desire to confine our judgment to the rather unusual facts before us, and we think that we do not violence to the meaning of Article 179 (old), now Article 182, by holding thstt the present darkhast is within three years of the last application made by the judgrr.ent-creditor to a Court to take some step-in-aid of the execution of his decree.\"\n\nThis case neither considered whether the application opposing the insolvency was an ' application', nor whether the Insolvency Court was the 'proper court', within the meaning of cl. 5 of Art. 182 of the Limitation Act. On the other hand the Madras High Court in Chat{fall gali Rarichan v.\n\nPuvvanparambath Kunhamu(l) held that an application to the Insolvency Court for leave to execute the decree against the insolvent is not an application made to a proper court, because it is entirely a creature of the Provincial Insolvency Act and is therefore a different Court to the Court which is to execute a decree obtained independently of the insolvency Act. The mere fact that the Presiding Officer of the Insolvency Court and the Court executing the decree is the same person will not make the application to the Insolvency Court as one to the Court entitled to execute the dec ree. lAxmiram Lalubhai's case and the observations cited by us were considered and it was pointed out that explanation II to Art. 182 which defines.what is the proper court was not at all alluded to in the judgment. It is not necessary to refer to other decisions because il1 our view thr period spent in taking a step in aid can be excluded only if the Court in which the step is taken is a 'proper court.', The facts in C.P. Syndicate Ltd. Nagpur v. Firm Hasanali Abdul Ali (2) and Rajendra Prasad v. lndrasan Prasad are similar to the facts in A11na malai(supra). ln the first of the cases, it was an appeal from an order of the executing Court dismissing an objection to the execution. In the second of them, a\\ so, the appeal which was considered to be an application to take a step in aid was one against an order of the executing court. Both these cases relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Annamalai (supra).\n\nAs we have held that the appellant's appeal in the High Court was not. an application, to the 'proper court' it is unnecessary to decide\n\n_!ether in the)uit and in the appeal filed by Prakash Chandra the\n\n(lli.L.R. 57 Madras 808.·\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1959 M.D. 28& (fB).\n\n(3) A.l.R. 1954 Patoa 46.\n\n50 4 SUPREME COURT lt.EPORTS £19741 3 s.e.R.\n\nwritten statement of the appellant and his resistance to the a~ and his second appeal in the High Court amounted to a step..tnaid in execution of the decret sought to be executed by him •\n\n.Rqarding argument No. 3: An application may be saidto be one seeking to continue or to revive the previous execution application if (I) it is in the eye oflaw still pending or has been dismissed for no fault 8 of the decreeholder and (2) if the two applications are in substance similar in acope and character. Where the previous application for execution has been properly and finally disposed of by the execution court, the subsequent application cannot be said to be in COilti •uation of it or to be a revival application. (See r adlamtm~ati Bafa Trllura Slltfdaramma v. Abdul Khader) (1), In the present case the previoua application (the fourth application for execution was disc miSIIed on June 23, 1956. The execution court made this order: \"Docrceholder in person; judgment-debtorabsent. Process fee not pai•.\n\nDismiued as wholly infructuous.\" It appear& from the judgment of the appeal court, dated November 28, 19S6, that tho execution -· court had diamissed the execution application on June 23, 19S6 as the\n\nappeUant bad failed to pay process fcc for the warrant of possession.\n\nIt is plain from these orders that the previous execution application D was not tept pending. On the C9ntrary, it was dismissed on account of .the appellant's failure to pay process fee for the warrant of possel&ion. Accordingly the last application for execution made on , fuly 28, 1964 was not an application for continuing or reviving the_ previous application made on November 28, 1956.~\n\nCoUD.8el for the appellant has relied on Prem Narain v. Gan1a .Ram,(1) E Hita l41 v. P:mjab National Bank(3) ./Cotta .Annaprunromma v.\n\nMtlkku Jlenkomma,(4) Kal/iappa Goundan v. Kmtdaswami Gowrdat(')\n\nand C!rmMmmall•. Chennappa Goundan.(6) -\n\nIn the first case the decrecholder and the judgment debtor compromised and agreed tilat the latter should be given three months' time for paym:ent of the decretal sum and that i.f he failed to pay within F the satd period the execution should proceed. The court then ordered: \"The execution case be struck off for the present\". The judr; ment debtor did not pay the amount within the agreed period.\n\nThen the decreeholder fiJed an application for execution. On te judalllcnt debtor•s objection that jt was time-barred, the Alahabad\n\nHish Court held tllat the application was one to revive the execution proceedings. The facts of the case are plainly distinguishable from G the facts of the case before us. The execution application was not finally dispased of and, in any case, the decreeholder was not at fault.\n\nIll the second case, the decreeholder had applied for execution by attachment and sale of certain property. One Kansbi Ram filed an objection that he had a lien on it. The objection was allowed and\n\n. (1) A.I.R. 1933 Madras 418.\n\n(J) A.T.R. 1935 Lahore 911.\n\n(S) A.f.R. 1938 Mad. 498.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1931 All. 4S8 •\n\n(4) A.J.R. 1938 Mad. 323.\n\n(6) A.T.R. 19S8- Mad .. 21.\n\nPREM RAJ V. P.AM CHAllA~ (Dwivedi, !.) 505\n\nthe proceedings in execution were stayed because the decreeholder had instituted a suit under Order XXI, r.63 Code of Civil Procedure and did not wish to proceed with the execution tilt the decision of the suit. The suit was decreed, but a little before that the application for execution was dismissed in default of the decreeholder and the .attached property was released. The subsequent application was JTlade to revive the previous application and to sen the property which had already been attached after the decision of the suit. In the mean. while Kanshi Ram preferred an appeal to the High Court. So the execution court directed that the application 'be filed for the present.\n\nThey can be restored when appeals in the High Court are decided.' When the appeals were dismissed, the decreeholder applied for the sale of the property which had already been attached. The judgment debtor then objected on the score of limitation. The Lahore High Court held that the subsequent application was one to .revive the previous application (which was dismissed in default). It is true that the previous application was finally disposed of and that too for default of the decreeholder, but it may be recalled that at the request of the decreeholder the execution court had 11tayed the execution proceedings until the decision of the question of Kanshi Ram's lien.\n\nThe court therefore could not dismiss the execution application for default of the decreeholder before the decision of his suit under Order XXI r.63 Code of Civil Procedure. As the order of the court was not correct, the appli cation was deemed to be pending. Thus understood, the decision\n\nwould not be helpful to the appellant.\n\nThe third and fourth cases have nothing to do with the question of revival of an execution application. In the last case the exe cution application was ordered to be dismissed.\n\nMore than three years threafter the decreeholder made another application. The judgment-debtor objected on the ground of limitation. His objection\n\nwas overruled . A learned Single Judge of the Madtas High Court held that on the facts and circumstances of the case, as construed by him, the J:revious application was really pending and that the subsequent application fell under c1.5 of Art. 182 . On the facts as construed by him the case becomes distinguishable from the facts of the present case. We should, however. make it clear that we should not be understood to have given our approval to the decision.\n\nCounsel for the appellant has submitted that it is a hard cue for the decreeholder, for he is losing even half the share in the disputed house. That is so, but the blame lies squarely on him.\n\nHe could have executed his decree with respect to the half share in the house after the decision of the appeal court. But he did not avail of the opportunity and waited for the decision of the Rich Court in the appeal and cross-objection filed by Prakash Chandra.\n\nHe was not vi&ilant . and should suffer the consequences .\n\n• 4..s a result of the foreaoina discussion, we are of opinion that tile High Court riahtly dismissed the fifth application as time barred.\n\nSo we disllliis the appeal. Bat in the circumstances of thii ca.se parties shall bear their own costs. 4-M 45 Sup CI/75\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR1 S\n\n[19741 3 S.C.~.\n\n. GoswAMI, J. The interesting and important question which is\n\nraied _in ts appeal with special leave is whether the present appli- .\n\ntJOn for execution, the fifth of its kind in this case, is barred by\n\nlimitation under article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908. .\n\n In order to appreciate 'the above question of law, a brief reference to the history of the litigation is necessary. One Kariya and his wife n Sava purchased the suit property, which is a house, by a registered sale deed of 20th April, 1905. Kariya died in 1936 leaving behind his widow, Sava and their son Ram Charan, the prese-nt respondent.\n\nRam Charan alone executed a registered mortgage deed of the entir~ suit property on 16th August, 1951, in favour of Prem Raj, the present :i!ppe1lant. Prem Raj instituted a: civil suit No. 27A of 1952 on the basis of the mortpage deed and obtained a preliminary deetee for c foreclosure on 16th August, 1952 2.nd also the final decree on 16th\n\nJul~ 1953.\n\nSava, tbe mother of Ram Charan, on the other hand, had executed a registered deed of gift of the suit property on 7th March, 1952. in favour of Praka:; h Chandra, son of Ram Charan, the respondent. Basing his claim on this deed of gift. Prakash Chandra, then a minor, by his father's sister, as next friend, filed a civil suit on December 7, 1956, beinp: D No. 75A of 1957 impleading the present appellant as the 1st defendant and his father, Ram Charan, as the .2nd defendant. Prakash Chandra claimed to be the sole owner of the suit property and described his father Ram Charan as a .. gambler and drunkard\" in the plaint in that suit. He prayed in the suit for declaration that the preliminary and the final decree for foreclosure ofl6th August. 1952 and 16th July, 1953, respctively in the civil suit No. 27A of 1952 were r:ot binding 1 on him and that Prem Raj, tt.e 1st defendant therein, \"be restrained through a perpetual injunction from taking posession cf the house in. dispute in execution of the aforesaid decree\". This suit was dismissed on 25th November, 1958. Prakash Chandra lodged an appeal against that judgment and decree and obtained stay of the execution of the aforesaid foreclosure decree in suit No. 27A of 1952 on 31st Dec-ember, 1958. His appeal No. 3JA of 1959 was partly allowed F by the First Additional District Judge, Chhindwara, reversing the earlier decree of 25th Novernber, 1958 and declaring that Prakash\n\nChandra was entitled to the half share in the suit property.\n\nThe decree 1'.'as. inter alia, in the following form:-\n\n...... it is ordered and declared that the decrees in Civil .\n\nSuit No. 27-A of 1952 of the Court of Civil Judge, Cls H.\n\nBalaghat, are not binding on the plaintiff to the extent of half share in the house in suit and it is further ordered and decreed that the defendant No. I is hereby restrained from takin,.; possession of plaintiff's half joint share in the house in suit in execution of his aforesaid decrees\".\n\nPrem Raj bein~ dissatisfied with the judgment and decree lodged a second appeal (No. 107 of 1960) in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. Prakash Chandra also filed a cross objection with rerd to\n\nPREM RAJ V. RAM CHARAN (Goswami, ].) 507\n\nhis claim for the other half of the suit property. Both the appeal and the cross objection were dismissed by the High Court on Ist January, 1962.\n\nThus being free from the above mentioned litigation, the appellant, Prem Raj, filed his fifth execution application on July 28, 1964, in the Court of the Civil Judge, Class II, Balaghat, praying for \"joint possession of the half of the house to be delivered from the judgment debtor along with (the half joint possession of) Prakash son of Ram Charan Gadhewal\".\n\nSince this is the fifth application forexecution, let us look in retrospect to the four other execution applications filed c:arly by the appellant as decree-holder. These may be given s:>riatim as under :-\n\n27-7-1953 : The appellant filed the first execution application for obtaining possession of the suit house in execution of the final foreclosure decree in civil suit No. 27A of 1952.\n\n8-10-1953 : The app;!ltant was unable to obtain possession and the execution application was consigned to the records.\n\n31-10-1953 : The second execution application was filled by the\n\nappllant for p::>SSession of the suit house.\n\n6-8-1954\n\n.)0-8-1954\n\n11-l-1955\n\n25-4-1956\n\n4-5·1956\n\n[ 23-6-1956\n\nThe second execution application was also consigned to the records as he was unable to obtain possession.\n\nA third execution application was filed by the ap\n\npllant for possession of the house.\n\nThe third execution applicaton was also consigned to the records as the appllant was u.nable to obtain pJssession of the suit house.\n\nThe appdlant filed his fourth execution application for p;:, ssession of the suit house and also filed an application for police aid as he made several attempts in his previous\n\ncxecution applications to obtain possession of the suit house but he was obstructed by the respondent and his relations and that it was not possible to obtain possession of the suit house in execution -without police aid:\n\nThe application of the appdlant for police aid was\n\nrejctcd by the executing court and it was ordered that an t>ttemot should be made again to obtain possession without the police aid.\n\nThe executing court dismissed the fourth execution application of the appellant as wholly infructuous as the app:llant considered it completely useless to obtain and execute a fresh warrant of possession again without police aid and so did not pay process fee and imt•ad filed an appeal in the District Court against the order .of the executing court.\n\n508 SUPft.EME COURT REPORTS\n\nU974J 3 S.C.R.\n\n28·11·1956 : The appeal of the appellant against the order of the A executing court refusing police aid was dismissed as the said order was not appealable and the execution case was consigned to the records.\n\nReference has already been made to the civil suit No. 75A of 1957 iled by Prakash Chandra on December 7, 1956, which resulted ultimately in his partial success entitling him to half of the suit B property, the whole of which was the subject matter of the foreclosure\n\n•ecree in suit No. 27A of 1952.\n\nTo revert to the present execution case out of which this appeall, las arisen, the respondent objected to the aforesaid fifth and last ext ution application on the ground of the same being barred under article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908 his objection was dismissed by the oxecuting court as well as by the Additional District Judge in.appeaJ.\n\nThe respondent then filed a Miscellaneous Second Appeal No. 134 of 1966 in the Madhya Pradesh High Court against the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Balaghat. The High Court on 2nd March 1967 accepted the respondent's appeal and set aside the orders of the courts below and l'leld that the execution application of the appellant was barred by time and should be dismissed. The appellant's application f'Jr leave to appeal to a Division Bench under the Letters Patent\n\nwas rejec.'ted by the learned Single Judge. Hence this appeal with special leave.\n\nThe question in this appeal is whether the appellant (decree-holder) is entitled to exclude the period covered by the suit filed by Prakash Chandra upto Ist January, 1962 on which date the High Court dis- Dissed the appellant's, second appeal as well as the respondent's crossobjection arising out of that\" suit. To put it differently whether the appellant's filing of the written statement in Prakash Chandra's suit and his resistance to his appeal which resulted in partial mutilation of b.is foreclosure decree and lastly his memorandum of appeal before the High Court against the decreeare a series of steps in aid of execution of his foreclosute which has been passing through vicissitudes of success and failure in the course of litigation.\n\nMr. Lokur, learned counsel for tne respondent, submits that section 15 of the Limitation Act would not come to the aid of the decreeholder since there was no stay of execution of the decree by any court after disposal of the appeal by the First Additional District Judge on 21st October, 1959. There was, therefore, no impediment in the way of the a, ppellant executing the -decree thereafter, says Mr. Lokur.\n\nWith regard to the further contention of Mr . Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Lokur submits that article 182(2) will not apply as the appeal was not directed against the original foreclosure decrc which was sought to be executed.\n\nIn this appeal Mr. Sharma concentrates upon two submissions. Firstly, according to him, the present case is fully covered by article 182(5) as the appellant'~ ristance to the suit of the judgment-debtor's son in civil suit No. 75A of 1957, thereafter to. the civil appeal arising. out of it and 1ater himself proc\n\nPREM RAJ v. RAM C~RAN (Goswami, ].) 509\n\nsecuting a second appeal in the same mauer to defend his foreclosure decree in suit No. 27A of 1952 are all directed to remove an obstacle -· in the way of the execution of the original foreclosure decreo and hence the same are \"steps in aid of execution of the original decree\" under article 182(5) and saves running of limitation. The learned counsel, therefore, submits that the fifth execution application of 28th July, 1964, being filed within three years of 1st January, 1962, on which date the High Court finally dismissed the appellant's second appeal and the respondent's cross objection, is within time. Alternatively the counsel submits that the fifth execution application is not a fresh\n\napplication but a revival of his fourth application of 25th April, 1956 and there is, therefore, no questiOJ' of the same being barred by limi tation in this case.\n\nIt is no~ necessary to take up-the appellant's submiss1on.on the .; core of article 182(5) of the Limitation Act. It will be appropriate, therefore, to quote the same\n\nDescription of Application.\n\nPeriod of Time from which period Limitation. begins to Iun.\n\n182. For the execution of a d.ecrec Three or order of any Civil Court not pro Years.\n\nvided for by art. 133 or bys.48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.\n\nX X X\n\n5. (Where the application\n\nnext hercinartcr men tioned has been made) the date of the final order passed on an ap]llication mad!! in accordanoe with law to the proper Court for execution or to take 6ome step in aid of exe cut!on of the decree or order, or .....• \"\n\nIn the present appeal what is material is the second branch of article 182(5) in the third column, namclv, \"to take some step in aid of\n\nexecution of the decree\". ·\n\nThe learned counsel on both sides submit that there is no direct authority of this Court on the point although a large number of decisions from the High Courts disclosing a cleavage of opinion and a few decisions from the Privy Council were cited at the bar in order to throw light on the subject from the respective points of view of coun set.\n\nAs early as 1932, the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey and another v. Suresh Chandra Dey and others(!), while dealing with the ex pression \"whether there has been an appeal under column 3 of article 182(2)\", and noting the difference of opinion among the authorities in India on the subject observed as follows :-\n\n''The fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary, and may frequently result in hardship.\n\n(1) A.l.R. 1932 Privy Council 16S/167.\n\n510 SUPREME COURT JlEPORTS r1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nBut in construing such provisions equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is, their Lordships think, the only safe guide. It is at least an intelligible rule that so long as there is any question sub judice between any of the parties those affected shall not be compelled to pursue the so often thorny path of execution which, if the final result is against them, may lead to no advantage. Nor in such a case as this is the judgment debtor prejudiced. He may indeed obtain the boon of delay, which is so dear to debtors, and if he is virtuously inclined there is nothing to prevent his paying what he owes into Cour~\".\n\nAgain in V. E. A. Annamalai Cfu:ttiar v. Valliammai A chi and Anothcr(l),\n\nthe Privy Council dealing with article 182(5) of the Limitation Act left the matter open observing as follows :-\n\n\"There has been some difference of opinion in the courts in India as to what amounts to takinz a step in aid of execution and the judgment under appeal discusses various decisio:rs,\n\nincluding a decision of the High Court of Madras in Kuppaswami Chettiar v.\n\nRajagopala Aiyer(2), in which it was held that there could not be a step in aid of executioJl if there was not an application for execution then pending, and another decision of the same court in Krislma Patter v. Seethar• ama Patter (3), in which it was held that a step in aid of execution must be one in furtherance of execution and not merely one seck¥ ing to re~:nove an obstructi011 to possible future execution.\n\nTheir Lordships do not find it necessary to e)( press any opinion on these C]uestions, since in the present case there was at all material times an application for execution pending ...... \"\n\nThe expression \"sicp in aid of execution'' is Jh)t defined in the Limitation Act nor is it capable of a precise or exhaustive dellnition. 1t will have to be construed in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case and the present case is indeed a peculiar one with litigation raised on two fronts, the parties with diametrically opposite avowed objects one (namely, the appellant) to execute and reap the fruit of the foreclosure decree and the other (namely, the respondent judgment-debtor's son) seeking the assistance of the court to completely nullify the very decree in order to maintain his Litle to and possession of the suit property.\n\nIn the above context, can the successive steps taken by the appellant in resisting the respondent son's claim in the Jatte, r's suit and the former's other consequent actions thereafter in the original court. appellate court and lastly in the High Court. be construed as ''steps in aid of execution of the foreclosure decree''. It is strenuously con. tended by the respondent that all these steps are in connection with a.nother suit and not with the original suit out of which the present execution petition was filed. Both sides referred to a decisil>n of this\n\n(I) 72 Indian Appeals 296/303. (2J 1922 LL.R., 4.'i M. 46ti\n\n(3) 1925 I.L.R., <o M. 49.\n\nh-·\n\nc '\" ·~·~\n\n. A\n\nPREM RAJ v. RAM CHARAN (Goswami, J.) 511\n\nCourt in Bhawanipore Banking Corporation Ltd. v. Gouri Shanker Sharma( I), which however, was a case under article 182(2) of the Limi: tation Act and referred to the following passage at page 29 of the decision:-\n\n'It was also suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant that the case might be held to be covered by clause 2 of article 182 on the ground that, even though no appeal was preferred from the final mortgage decree, the words \"where there has been an appeal\" are comprellensive enough to include in this case the appeal from the order dismissing the application under order IX, Rule 9, of the Civil Procedure Code, made in connection with the proceedings under section 36 of the Moneylenders Act. This argument also is a highly far-fetched one, because the expression \"where there has been an appeal\" must be read with the words in column 1 of article 182, viz., \"for the execution of a decree or order of any civil Court ...... \" and, however, broadly we may construe it, it cannot be held to cover an appeal from an order which is passed in a collateral proceeding or which has no direct or immediate connection with the decree under execution\".\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant seeks to derive great support from the words \"which has no direct or immediate connection with the decree under execution in the above excerpt. It is apparent that the facts of the case before this Court in the above decision are clearly distinguishable and there was no direct connection between the\n\napplication etc. Tor revival of a collateral proceeding under, order 9 rule 9 and the original decree sought to be executed. On the contary if it is possible to find in a sui~ or a proc\\':eding a direct ard immediate\n\nconnection with the original decree, the result whete of will be or even likely to b;: affected be the particular suit or proceeding, the matter may be entirely different. What is then the exact legal position on the facts and circumstances of the perscnt executing case ris-a-vis the suit of Prakash Chandrawhich mutilated the foreclosure decree to the extent of depriving the appeHant from executing in respect of half of the suit property earlier decreed in his favour? Would the appellant execute or even reasonably be expected to execute his whole decree while his right to do so has already been under challenge or in a jeopardy in a civil suit? Would the appel\\ant be expected to have a sort of clairvoyance or pre-science about the result of the suit which he is defending and, therefore, execute the decree confidently and seek to recover the property without the least risk of any future litigation?\n\nIn a legal adventure of this type multiplicity of litigation and selfcreated complications in case of an ultimate failure in the sUlt, may be writ lrge ill the nature of things. Would he still tread on the \"thorny path of exl!cution'' '? In the face of ambiguity or doubt, for long, recognised in courts, if a beneficient constructiOn to the wvrds \"step in aid of execution\" in article 182(5) of the Limitation Act could be given, it will be only giving effect to the law and not to equity which is out of bounds in limitation.\n\n!J) [1950] S.CR .:' .•\n\n512 SUPUMB COUIT ll!POJ.TS\n\nU97~1 3 S.C.R.\n\nIt may be clearly noted that there ia no controversy between the . parties in this appeal with regard to \"the proper court\" for execution within the meaning of the nd explanation of article 182(~) of th• Limitation Act. It stands to reason, therefore, that no argument was advanced by the parties' counsel on this acore. The only controversy is with regard to the benefit of the time consumed in the entire litigation commenced in civil suit No. 75A of 1975 and the consequent appeals thereafter. It will be, therefore, difficult to visit the appellanl with an evil consequence without affording him an opportunity to meet such a possible objection which even lacks certainty and definiteness on the records of this appeal.\n\nSome of the High Courts seems to lean towards a fair and liberal interpretation in favour of the decree-holder in the construction of\n\nrticle 182{5) in respect of what is \"step in aid of execution\" ofadcree (See Rudra Narain and others v. Maharaja of Kapurthala (1); Kotta Annapuranamma v.\n\nMakku Venkamma(2); Panna Lol v.\n\nSmt. Saraswati Devi(3) and Uma Shankar Mehrotra v.Kanodia Brothers, Kanpur and another(4). It is not possible to read these decisions as judicial exercise to give effect to equity superimposed upon law.\n\nThe respondent's counsel on the other hand draws our attention to the strict construCtion of section 15 of the Limitation Act, which is, however, not relied upon by the appellant, in A. S. Krishnappa Chettiar {k Ors. \"· Nachiappa Chettiar& Ors.(S) and relies upon the followina passage :\n\n\"The question is whether there is any well-recognised princi pie whereunder the period of limitation can be regarded as being suspended because a party is prevented under certain circumstances from taking action in prusuance of his rights. The limitation Act is a ronsolidating and amending statute relating to . the limitation of suits, appeals and certain types of applications to courts and must, therefore, be regarded as an exhaustive code. It is. a piece of adjective or 'Procedural law and not of substantive law. Rules of procedures, whatever they may be, are to be applied only to matters to which they are made applkable by the legislature e..xpressely or by necessary im¥lication''.\n\nThe learned counsel for the responder...t further relics upon another decision of this Court in Sirojul llaq Khan & Othm v. The Sunni Central\n\nBotud of Wok/ U.P. and Other(t>) tnd lays stress on the following paPsage:\n\n\"Section 13 provides for 'the exclusion of time during which proceedings are suspended' and it lays down that 'in computing the period of Limitation prescribed for any suit or application for the execution of a decree, the institution or execution of which has been staytd by an injuction or order. the time of the oonti\n\nnuance of the injunction or order, the day on wtJch it was issued\n\n(I) AIR 1936 Oudb 248.\n\n(2) AlR. 1938 Madril! 323.\n\n(3) Aill 1960 Allahabad 572.\n\n(4) AIR 1966 Allahabad 409.\n\n(') [1964]2 S.C.R.. 241/253'4\n\n{6) [1959] S.CR. 1287/1301-1302.\n\nPUM RAJ v. RAM CHAAAN (Goswami, ].) 513\n\nor made and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be eJ.cluded. It is plain that, for excuding the time under this section, it must be shown that the institution of the suit in question had been stayed by an injunction or order; in other words, the -.ection requires anorderor an injunction which stays the institution of the suit. And so in cases\"fa1ling11nder s. 15, the party institu- 'ting the suit would by auch imtitution be in contempt of court\".\n\nThis Court, however, also observed in the same decision as follows:-\n\n\"Whether the requirements of s. IS would be satisfied by the production of an order or an injunction which by neces'.lary implication stays the institution or the suit is open to argument We are however; pt:epared to assume in the present case that s.lS would apply even to cases where the institution of a suit is stayed by necessary implication of the order passed or injunction issued in the previous litigion\",\n\nthe respondent, as already mentioned, has referred to Bhawanipore Banking Corporation Ltd. v. Gouri Shankat Sharma (supra) and submits that the subsequent suit has no direct or immediate connection with the decree under execution and we will deal with this aspect at the appropriate place, ·\n\nThe respondent relies upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in Somshikharswami Shidlingswami v. Shivappa Mallappa Hosmaani\n\nahd Others(l), which, according to the learned counsel, runs on all fours with the present cae. This was, however,· a case where the High Court . was considering the pleas of sections 1-4 and 1 S of the Limitation Act raised by the decreeholder to save running of time. The High Court held section 15 out of the way as there was no order of stay or injunction in any of the suits filed by the judgment-debtor preventing the . decreeholder from executing his decree. With regard to the plea of section 14(2) of-the Limitation Act, the High Court held that the decree-ho!der was not prosecuting any case but was only defending the same and it was .. difficult to say ...... that the Court was unable to entertain the proceeding form defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature\".\n\nAdverting to the unholy type of tenacious litigation of the judgmentdebtor in that case the High Court, being unable to apply the provisions of sections 14 and 15 of the Act, pithily and rather ruefully, observed as follows :-:-\n\n.. It is no doubt unfortunate that the plaintiff finds his remedy thus barred in a matter in which he has been asserting his right to this property for the last ten years and more ...... In a case . ()f. this kind it may be desirable that the plaintiff ought to be in a position the Peduct the time taken up in defending a litigation of the nature such as we have in the present case. But as we arc unable to bring the case within the provisions of the Limi~ . tation Act, the plaintiff's appeal must fail\".\n\n(1) AIR 1924 Bombay 39/40-41.\n\n514 SUPllEMB COUllT llBPOUS\n\n£19741 3 S.C.R.\n\nIt may at once be pointed out that there is no reference in the above decision to article 182(5) or' the Limitation Act and necessarily 'therr\n\nwas no discussion of the provision in favour of the decree-holder who sought to execute the decree. This decision is, therefore, of no avail\n\nto the respodent on the legal aspect with which we are concerned in this appeal. At the best it could be advanced as an implied authority, in the circumstances of that case, for the proposition that a written statement or defence in a suit is not to be treated as an application in aid of execution. But we find an observation of this Court in Madan Ia/ v. Sunder lal aud another, (1) while dealing with section 30 of the Arbitration Act, to the fllowing effect:-\n\n\"It may be conceded that there is no special form prescribed for making such an application and in an appropriate case an objection of the type made in this case may be treated as such an application, if it is filed within the. period of limitation\" There is no difficulty in holding that in an appropriate case, a written statement defending a particular suit or memorandum of appeal in prosecuting a particular appeal or resisting it may be treated as an application being a 'step in aid of execution' under certain definite and positive circumstances, although no general rule can be laid down in this hehalf.\n\nThe respondent also relied upon a decision of the Madras High Court (Full Bench) in (Vadl amannati) Bala Tripura Sunderamma v.\n\nAbdul Khadcr, (2) in which section 15 of the Act was pressed into service and the High Court repelled the plea and also refused to treat the subsequent barred application as one of revival of the old application dismissed for non-payment of batta by the decree-holder. _Article 1 S2(5) did not come up for consideration in that case.\n\nThe Madras Full Bi!nch decision (supra) approved of the dec: sion in Satyanarayana Brahmcm v. Serthayya(3) and obscn•ed as follow.>:-\n\n\"In regard to the institution of suits, not the e~\"\\:ecution of de crees, it is held in Satyanarayana Brahmom v. Seetha)')'a(3) that no equitable grounds for the suspension of a cause of action can be added to the provisions ofthe Limitation Act and a decree cancelling a promissory note as fraudulent is no stay of a suit upon the note\" (emphasis supplied).\n\nIn Muthu Korakkoi Chetty v. Madar Ammal, (4) Sadasiva Ayyar, J .. observed as follows :-\n\n\"A person is not bound to bring an unnecessary suit or to make futile and unnecessary applications during the course of other litigation proceedings for the settlement of the same right\" .\n\nSundaram Chctty, J., also observed as follows in the same decision :\n\n(I) [1!:67] (3) S.C.R. 147/151.\n\n(2) AIR 1933 Madras 418/419/421.\n\n(3) AIR 1927 Madras 597.\n\n(4) AIR 1920 Madras 1-43 M1<lras 185 (FJJ.\n\nPREM RAJ v. RAM CHARAN ( Goswami, /.) 515\n\n\"It may be contended with. some show of reason that even in the \\lbsence of an injunction restraining the sale of the properties in execution of the mortgage decree in O.S. No. 29 of 1918, the declaration of the invalidity of that mortgage would be an obstacle to pursue the execution of the mortgage decree by seeking to sell the mortgaged properties. I am not however dealing with that point'' ·\n\nThis, however, does not mean that a rule with statutory force can be laid down by the court superimposing upon the provision of the Limitation Act. The question in the present case, therefore, must rest upon the proper construction of article 1 82(5) without superadding anything to the law and whether the Court will be prepared to &ive a beneficiept construction to the words \"step in aid of execution.''\n\n1he respondent's counsel relied upon Govinda Bhatta v. Krishna Bhatta, (I) which, however, cannot come to his aid as will appear from the following extract therefrom ;\n\n\"It is, therefore, not possible for us to accept the contention ofthe decree-holde~ that his right to execute the decree had been jn any manner affeqted Jl1UCh less extinguished, by reason of the finding contained in Ext. A-3 judgment\".\n\nThe respondent also relied upon Raghunandun Parshad and Another\n\nv. Bhuggo Lall (2), dealing w.ith article 179 ofthe old Limitation Act, 1877, corresponding to article 182(S), but the following observation at page 271 would clearly show that the case is distinguishable on facts :\n\n''It is clear .that the decree-holders could, notwithstanding the order in the claim .case, have prosecuted their application for execution against the one-third share which was not released then quite as well as they can do so now. Their present application is for the .sale ofthat third share of the property; there was no bar then to their enforcing the execution of the decree, and there has been no subsequent removal of that bar\".\n\nThe respondent's •counsel further relied upon Surisetti Ramast{-· hbayya v. Palur Thimmiah and others (l) wherein it was held that the plaint in the declaratory suit under 0 21, r. 63 cannot be treated as an application under article 182(5); nor is it a ''step in aid of execution\".\n\nEven in the above case the High Court observed at page 11 as follows:--\n\n\"ltmay be conceded that the plaint was filed by the decreeholder with the o pject of getting rid of the finding of the execut .. ing court which was to the effect that the property was not liable to be proceeded against in execution of his decree and that .this may be therefore regarded as il step-in-aid of execution\".\n\n(I) AIR 1968 Kerala (FB) 2S0/2S2.\n\n(2) [1890] l.L.R., 17 Culcutta 268/211.\n\n(3) AIR 1942 Madru ·~/ll.\n\n516 SUPllEMB COUitT REPORTS £19741 3 S.C.ll.\n\nThe respondent's counsel also referred to Katragadda Ramayyo and another v. Kolli NegaJwaraTao and others (I) which however, was not required to deal with this particular aspect of the matter before us under article 182(5). Even in Na_rayon J; vangouda Patil and another\n\nv. Puttabai and others (2) at page 8 the Judicial Committee, while deal ing with an argument with regard to section 15 of the Limitation Act that the injunction or order to be effective should contain an express prohibition, observed as follows:\n\n\" .... it is not necessary to consider that point as their Lord\n\nships arc satisfied that there is no prohibition; either express or implied in the injunction or the decree in the present case, which restrains the appellant from instituting a suit for possession\". (emphasis supplied).\n\nAfter a survey of the various decisions on the subject, it may perhaps be possible to have two views on this aspect of the matter but it is difficult to overlook tltat certain reservations were made by the Privy Council both in Nagendra Nath Dey's case (supra) as well as in Narayan Jivangouda Pat it's case (supra) for an appropriate occasion to consider whether the \"intelligible rule\" referred to in the former and the \"rule of implication\" hinted in the latter may not be pressed into service in favour of the decree-holder in construing certain relevant provisions of the Limitation Act-thus making the way clear for a fair and liberal intepretation of Art. 182 adverted to in several High Courts' decisions. A somewhat apposite decision on the point is available in Joshi Laxmiram Lallubhai and another v. Mehta Bala s!Jankar Veniram, (l) with regard to a 'step in aid of execution' under article 179 of the Limitation Act, 1877 and the successor article 182 of 1908 Act. The Bombay High Court observed therein as \"follows .at page 25 :\n\n\"We think that it is not putting too great a strain upon ordinary language to say that an appeal in such circumstances fairly falls within the meaning of the words :\"an application to take a step-in-aid of execution\". It is clear that as long as the insolvenc:y proceedings went in favour of the debtor, the creditor -could not have presented any application in ordinary course for thefurtherexecution of his decree withtheleasthope of success..\n\nTwo at least of the High Courts in India had already put so liberal a construction upon the insolvency provisions of the old Civil Procedure Code that an executing creditor must have foreseen that no application for the eJtecution of the decree either by sale of property or arrest of the person of the judgment-debtor could hav~ the least chance of success so long as the judgmentdebtor had been declared an insolvent under .section 351, even although he had not been actually discharged within the meaning of section 357. So that we think that in view of the Court's finding that this judgment-debtor was an insolvent early in\n\n(1) AIR 1969 Andhra Pradesh (FB) .259.\n\n(2) AIR 194S Privy Couocil 5}8.\n\n(3) [191'] I.L.R. , 39 Bombay 20j2S.\n\nPREM RAJ v. RAM CHARAN ( Goswami, }.) 517\n\n1906, the present appellant had no other course open to him than in the first instance to get this bar to the further execution of his decree removed, and the only way in which he could hope to obtain that result would be by first opposing the insolvency petition in the first Court, and if he failed there, by appealing to higher authority' ...\n\nThe principle adverted to in the above passage of the Bombay High Court appears to be correct. In that case also, as in the present appeal, there was no controversy about the \"proper court\" within the meaning of the 2nd explanation to article 182.\n\nComing now to the facts of the case at hand it is .found that the appellant (decree-holder) was faced with resistance from the respondent judgment debtor and his relations. The appellant, however made abortive attempts to execute the mortgage decree in order to obtain possession of the suit property. Having failed to obtain possession by means of usual civil process, the appellant applied to the court for police aid but the prayer was rejected. Soon after the appellant was dragged to the court by the respondent's son in a suit wherein ooth the appellant and the respondent were parties although the respondent was ex-porte. If the respondent's son had succeeded in the suit the entire foreclosure dcree would have been a scrap of paper for the appellant The appellant therefore found in his front a hurdle which must first be crossed before he could successfully execute his decree in order to obtain possession of the suit house. No doubt his defence was successful in the trial court but the first appellate court partly accepted the appeal of the judgment-debtor's son with reference to half of the share of the suit house and the decree thereafter was no longer the original foreclosure decree which he could execute.\n\nThe form of the decree has already been set out above. The decree in the Civil Suit No. 75A of 1957 had thus a direct and immediate connection with and effect upon the decree in suit No 27 A of 1952 sought to be executed. The nexus between the two is manifestly clear. In such circumstances it is obvious that the appellant's successive ecphractic action in defending the foreclosure decree in different ways in the course of the lengthy litigation until its final determination in the High Court are all steps in aid of execution of his foreclosure decree.\n\nThese steps .to remove the impediment in executing the foreclosure decree were absolutely incumbent upon the appellant to take the nex:t move in furtherance of the execution of the foreclosure decree to facilitate the same. These being therefore, necessarily \"steps in aid of execution\" of the foreclosure decree, the appellant's fifth execution application was within time, being within three years from the date of the final order in the High Court on January 1, 1962.\n\nIt should also be remembered that there was a perpetual injunction restraining the appellant from executing the foreclosure decree in Prakash Chander's appeal No. 37A/59 during the period from 31- 12-1958 to 21-10-1959. Thereafter when the appeal was partly allowed\n\n:518\n\n\n[ 1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nth-; perpetual injunction was directed in the decree against half of the suit-hollse. In other w<>rds in the injunction against the decree in suit NJ. 27Af52 was neve~ raised fully at any time.\n\nIt is clear that the original foreclosure decree in the form it was, was not capable of execution and the appellant's all attempts in the series of litigation were to restore the said decree to its original form for proper and effective enforcement of the same. The appellant c1rried this rae::: upto the High Court and having finally stopped there, turned to execute whatever is now left for enforcement.\n\nAlthough not directly on th::: point, the Privy Council in , Maharaja :Sir Rameslzvar Singh Bahadur v. Homeshvar Singh(l) whiledealing with articles 181 and 182 of the Limitation Act 1908 laid down a kind of pragm1tic principle in the following words :-\n\nThey (the Privy Council) are of opinion that, in order to make the provision of th' Limitation Act apply, the decree sought to b~ enforced must have been in such a form as to render it capable in the circurn5tances of being enforced. A decree so limited in its scop~ as that ofthe 27th July, 1906, under consideration cannot in th::ir opinion be regarded as being thus capable of execution\". ·\n\nIn th' view thus taken in this app!al it is not necessary to decide\n\nwhther article I 82(4) could be invoked in this case on the basis of an implied amndm:nt of the foreclosure decree as a necessary conse- <quen::e of decree in the subsequent suit.\n\nIt is also not necessary in this appal to deal with the alternative submission .\n\nA .\n\n~ t\n\nL..\n\nof the app!llant \\vith regard to the theory of revival of his execu- E , ctio:t case earlier consigned to the records in 1956. >-\n\nIn th! result the a\"pp.!al is allow.!d and the judgment of the High\n\nCo:rt is set aside but in th~ entire circumstances of the case the parties\n\nwill b!ar their own costs in this Court.\n\nS.C. ,-4ppeal allowed\n\n\\.-_-·;\n\n(l} tl9ll) -40 Ma:Iras L'lw 1ournal1/6 .", "total_entities": 245, "entities": [{"text": "94\n\nPREMRAJ", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 13, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PREM RAJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAM CHARAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Ram Charan Gadhewal", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. N. DWIVEDI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. N. DWIVEDI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. K. GoSWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. K. GoSWAMI, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Limitation Act 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Limitation Act 1908", "statute": "Limitation Act 1908"}}, {"text": "Prakash Chandra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 542, "end_char": 557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appellant obtained a preliminary decree for foreclosure and also the final decree In the meantime, S. gifted the entire house to Prakash Chandra son of R. He thereafter, frustrated several attempts of the appellant to execute the decree and in 1956, instituted a suit against the appellant and another for a declaration that the preliminary and final decree of foreclosure were not binding on him and prayed for a perpetual injunction against the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Prakash Chandrawhich"}}, {"text": "June 23, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1355, "end_char": 1368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the appeal and the cross-objection were dismissed by the High Court\n\nThe fourth execution application filed by the appellant was dismissed on June 23, 1956."}}, {"text": "July 28, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1432, "end_char": 1445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fifth execution application was filed by the appellant on July 28, 1964 for possession of half of the house."}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1845, "end_char": 1853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1883, "end_char": 1888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1892, "end_char": 1900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art.182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2670, "end_char": 2677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2960, "end_char": 2968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3588, "end_char": 3593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3597, "end_char": 3605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3709, "end_char": 3712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3998, "end_char": 4006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S04", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4402, "end_char": 4405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "DIJselftinz Ptr Goswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4636, "end_char": 4659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "504 D-E]\n\nDIJselftinz Ptr Goswami J.-The appellant was faced with resistance from the respondent and his relations."}}, {"text": "S17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5512, "end_char": 5515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 1, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6240, "end_char": 6255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "eution application was witllln time, being within 3 years from the date of the final order in the High Court on January 1, 1962: [517 EHJ\n\nNagendra Nath Raj & Ors."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURlSDICf!ON", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6666, "end_char": 6694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURlSDICf!ON : Civil Appzal No."}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6906, "end_char": 6918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. N. Lokur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6939, "end_char": 6950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. N. Lokur and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the respondent."}}, {"text": "A. G. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6955, "end_char": 6972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. N. Lokur and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN Rmov", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7009, "end_char": 7027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The udgment of P. JAGANMOHAN Rmov AND S. N. DWivEDr, JJ.", "canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY"}}, {"text": "S. N. DWivEDr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7032, "end_char": 7045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The udgment of P. JAGANMOHAN Rmov AND S. N. DWivEDr, JJ.", "canonical_name": "S. N. DWIVEDI"}}, {"text": "DwrVEDI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7068, "end_char": 7075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "w~ _deltvered by DwrVEDI, J. P. K. GoswAMI, J. gave a dissenting Opmton."}}, {"text": "P. K. GoswAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7080, "end_char": 7093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "w~ _deltvered by DwrVEDI, J. P. K. GoswAMI, J. gave a dissenting Opmton.", "canonical_name": "P. K. GoSWAMI, JJ."}}, {"text": "J.-Kariya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7135, "end_char": 7144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DWIVI!Dr, J.-Kariya and his wife Sava purcbased the house in dispute by a registered deed on Apr_il 2, 1905."}}, {"text": "K1riya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7234, "end_char": 7240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K1riya died in 1936 leaving behind him Sava and Ram Charan, his son.", "canonical_name": "K1riya"}}, {"text": "Ram Charan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7322, "end_char": 7332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 16, 1951 Ram Charan mortgaged the house to Prem Raj (the appellant).", "canonical_name": "Ram Charan Gadhewal"}}, {"text": "Prem Raj", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7356, "end_char": 7364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 16, 1951 Ram Charan mortgaged the house to Prem Raj (the appellant).", "canonical_name": "Prem Raj"}}, {"text": "Sava", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7579, "end_char": 7583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile on March 7,1952 Sava gifted the entire house to Prakash Chandra, son of Ram Charan, the respondent.", "canonical_name": "Sava"}}, {"text": "Ram Charan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7635, "end_char": 7645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile on March 7,1952 Sava gifted the entire house to Prakash Chandra, son of Ram Charan, the respondent.", "canonical_name": "Ram Charan Gadhewal"}}, {"text": "Prakash .Chandra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7688, "end_char": 7704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prakash .Chandra frustrated several attempts of the appellant to set ·\n\nposs:::ssion of the house in execution of his decree.", "canonical_name": "Prakash Chandrawhich"}}, {"text": "April 25, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7926, "end_char": 7940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He made the fourth attempt on April 25, 1956 .. Shortly."}}, {"text": "Ram .· Cbaran", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8057, "end_char": 8070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "thereafter, on December 7, 1956, Prakash Chandra instituted a suit against the appellant and his father Ram .·", "canonical_name": "Ram Charan Gadhewal"}}, {"text": "NoYernber 25, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8349, "end_char": 8367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was dismissed on NoYernber 25, 1958."}}, {"text": "December 31, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8445, "end_char": 8462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He filed an appeal and obtained an order staying execution of the decree on December 31, 1958."}}, {"text": "October 21, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8510, "end_char": 8526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal court partly allowed his appeal on October 21, 1959."}}, {"text": "H1p\n\nCourt of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8821, "end_char": 8849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant filed a second appeal in the H1p\n\nCourt of Madhya Pradesh against the judgment of the appeal court."}}, {"text": "JanWlry I, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9082, "end_char": 9097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the appeal and the cross-objection were dismissed by the High Court on JanWlry I, 1962 ."}}, {"text": "June 23, 1Q56", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9194, "end_char": 9207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Turning back to the fourth execution application filed by the appellant, it was dismissed on June 23, 1Q56."}}, {"text": "July 29, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9273, "end_char": 9286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fifth execution E application was filed by the appellant on July 29, 1964 for possession ' over half of the house."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9519, "end_char": 9547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "however, upheld by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9688, "end_char": 9708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "January. 31, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9916, "end_char": 9933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "limited priod between January."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10135, "end_char": 10140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10276, "end_char": 10281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10285, "end_char": 10293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "l'REM RAJ V", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10450, "end_char": 10461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the fourth execl!tJOn proceeding and therefore, it was not time-barred •.\n\nl'REM RAJ V, RAM CHARAN (Dwivedi, J.) -497\n\nWe shall consider these arguments in seriatim."}}, {"text": "RAM CHARAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10463, "end_char": 10473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the fourth execl!tJOn proceeding and therefore, it was not time-barred •.\n\nl'REM RAJ V, RAM CHARAN (Dwivedi, J.) -497\n\nWe shall consider these arguments in seriatim.", "canonical_name": "Ram Charan Gadhewal"}}, {"text": "cl. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11445, "end_char": 11450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11454, "end_char": 11462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prakash Chan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12239, "end_char": 12251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In hts sutt Prakash Chan, ra Chll!leng d th~ d<!cree, inter c.lia, on the ground that h:: was the sole Offner of th!", "canonical_name": "Prakash Chandrawhich"}}, {"text": "Prakash Chlndra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13559, "end_char": 13574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prakash Chlndra obtained his decree in a collateral suit.", "canonical_name": "Prakash Chandrawhich"}}, {"text": "cl. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13975, "end_char": 13980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13989, "end_char": 13997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14434, "end_char": 14442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14446, "end_char": 14454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14541, "end_char": 14546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14550, "end_char": 14558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15431, "end_char": 15439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15503, "end_char": 15511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See Rudra Narain v. Maharaja of Kapurtha/a.(4) The Bom, bay, Calcutta and Madras High Courts have, however, held to the contrary. ("}}, {"text": "Madras High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15516, "end_char": 15534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See Rudra Narain v. Maharaja of Kapurtha/a.(4) The Bom, bay, Calcutta and Madras High Courts have, however, held to the contrary. ("}}, {"text": "Prakah Chandra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15719, "end_char": 15733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To oppose Prakah Chandra's suit, the appel~ lllllt had filed a written statement .", "canonical_name": "Prakash Chandrawhich"}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16103, "end_char": 16108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16112, "end_char": 16120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order- VIII Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16492, "end_char": 16508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17001, "end_char": 17024, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17389, "end_char": 17394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order- VIII Code", "statute": "Order- VIII Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17398, "end_char": 17406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order- VIII Code", "statute": "Order- VIII Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17511, "end_char": 17534, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18606, "end_char": 18611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18855, "end_char": 18872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Punjab High Court has followed the Allahabad dectslOn m artar Singh v. Sultan Singh Partap Singh (2)."}}, {"text": "A.I.R. 1967 Punjab 375", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19246, "end_char": 19268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) A.I.R. 1967 Punjab 375."}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19452, "end_char": 19460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20772, "end_char": 20777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20782, "end_char": 20790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20964, "end_char": 20972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21191, "end_char": 21195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21196, "end_char": 21216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 187", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21981, "end_char": 21987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21991, "end_char": 22018, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23203, "end_char": 23211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prakash Chtndra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23305, "end_char": 23320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So there is n() finding by the court below on the point as to whether Prakash Chtndra's suit was instituted in the court which could execute the inal foreclosure decree of the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Prakash Chandrawhich"}}, {"text": "Civil Judge, Class II, Balaghat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23594, "end_char": 23625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "pused by the Civil Judge, Class II, Balaghat."}}, {"text": "First Additional Civil Judge, Balagbat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23729, "end_char": 23767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from the plaint in Prakash Chandra's suit that the suit was instituted in the Court of the First Additional Civil Judge, Balagbat attached to the Seconel\n\nCi'ril Judge, Balaghat. ."}}, {"text": "First Additional Civil Judge, Balaghat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23950, "end_char": 23988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the judgment of the appeal court in Prakash Chandra's first appeal indicates that the suit was instituted in tkt: court of the First Additional Civil Judge, Balaghat attached to the court of the First Civil Judge, Balaghat."}}, {"text": "Prabsh Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24077, "end_char": 24091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So it is not certain whether\n\nPrabsh Chandra's suit was instituted in the court which could execute the final foreclosure decree of the apP.ellant.·"}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24577, "end_char": 24582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24586, "end_char": 24594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad and Bombay High Court£", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24601, "end_char": 24633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Allahabad and Bombay High Court£ have taken the view that time would run from the date of the appellate order. ("}}, {"text": "Baldeo Singlt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24811, "end_char": 24824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baldeo Singk v, &m Swarup(l) and Joshi Laxmirarn Lallubhai v. Mehta Ba/asltt1nkar\n\nVeniram(2), In Baldeo Singlt (supra) an application for execution was.", "canonical_name": "Baldeo Singlt"}}, {"text": "Baldeo Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24875, "end_char": 24887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "made by Baldeo Singh, who was the assignee of .", "canonical_name": "Baldeo Singlt"}}, {"text": "July 15, 1916", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24935, "end_char": 24948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the decreeholder on July 15, 1916."}}, {"text": "Ram Swarup", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25046, "end_char": 25056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About a year earlier, the property against which the decree was to be executed had been sold to Ram Swarup and Jai Dayal inexecution of a simple money decree."}}, {"text": "Jai Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25061, "end_char": 25070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About a year earlier, the property against which the decree was to be executed had been sold to Ram Swarup and Jai Dayal inexecution of a simple money decree."}}, {"text": "BaJdeo Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25270, "end_char": 25282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Swarup and Jai Dayal' instituted a suit for a declaration that the property purchased by them was not saleable in execution (,)f the decree by the assignee, BaJdeo Singh.", "canonical_name": "Baldeo Singlt"}}, {"text": "March 19, 1918", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25671, "end_char": 25685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit on March 19, 1918."}}, {"text": "18th of July 1917", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26573, "end_char": 26590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th of July 1917, the Court gave the then plaintiffs the seconil relief claimed by them, namely, tat they.could put up their prior charge of nearly Rs."}}, {"text": "19th March, 1918", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26950, "end_char": 26966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree of the 19th March, 1918 would go to show that this appeal must have been filed within .~ years of the present application for exe- cution and this must b: considered to be a step-in-aid of execution, .as by it the decreeholder wanted to remove certain difficultis which .sto()d in the way of his getting the full benefit of his decree."}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27520, "end_char": 27528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Laxmiram Lallubhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27534, "end_char": 27552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Laxmiram Lallubhai (supra) the judgment-debtor applied to have himself declared an insolvent.", "canonical_name": "Laxmiram Lallubhai"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27949, "end_char": 27963, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28128, "end_char": 28136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28148, "end_char": 28168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28187, "end_char": 28195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Limitation Act, 1877", "statute": "Limitation Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28203, "end_char": 28223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Beamon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28225, "end_char": 28231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Beamon, .J. speaking for the Division Bench, found some difficulty in bringing\n\nsch an apphcation (application opposing the application for insolvency) within the meaning of the words 'application to take some stepin-aid of execution' under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28466, "end_char": 28474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28486, "end_char": 28494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28502, "end_char": 28516, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "PREM RAJ V. RAM CHARAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29147, "end_char": 29169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PREM RAJ V. RAM CHARAN (Dwivedi, /.) 5()3\n\nTho appellant had no other course open to him, ifthe debtor was declared insolvent, than in the first instance to get this bar to the further execution of his decree removed.", "canonical_name": "PREM RAJ V. P.AM CHAllA~"}}, {"text": "Article 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30005, "end_char": 30016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30028, "end_char": 30039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30406, "end_char": 30411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30415, "end_char": 30423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30431, "end_char": 30445, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30469, "end_char": 30486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand the Madras High Court in Chat{fall gali Rarichan v.\n\nPuvvanparambath Kunhamu(l) held that an application to the Insolvency Court for leave to execute the decree against the insolvent is not an application made to a proper court, because it is entirely a creature of the Provincial Insolvency Act and is therefore a different Court to the Court which is to execute a decree obtained independently of the insolvency Act."}}, {"text": "lAxmiram Lalubhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31110, "end_char": 31127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lAxmiram Lalubhai's case and the observations cited by us were considered and it was pointed out that explanation II to Art.", "canonical_name": "Laxmiram Lallubhai"}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31230, "end_char": 31238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A11na malai(supra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31652, "end_char": 31669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts in C.P. Syndicate Ltd. Nagpur v. Firm Hasanali Abdul Ali (2) and Rajendra Prasad v. lndrasan Prasad are similar to the facts in A11na malai(supra)."}}, {"text": "Annamalai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32013, "end_char": 32022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both these cases relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Annamalai (supra)."}}, {"text": "November 28, 19S6", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33468, "end_char": 33485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appear& from the judgment of the appeal court, dated November 28, 19S6, that tho execution -· court had diamissed the execution application on June 23, 19S6 as the\n\nappeUant bad failed to pay process fcc for the warrant of possession."}}, {"text": "June 23, 19S6", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33558, "end_char": 33571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appear& from the judgment of the appeal court, dated November 28, 19S6, that tho execution -· court had diamissed the execution application on June 23, 19S6 as the\n\nappeUant bad failed to pay process fcc for the warrant of possession."}}, {"text": "fuly 28, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33925, "end_char": 33938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly the last application for execution made on , fuly 28, 1964 was not an application for continuing or reviving the_ previous application made on November 28, 1956.~\n\nCoUD.8el for the appellant has relied on Prem Narain v. Gan1a .Ram,(1) E Hita l41 v. P:mjab National Bank(3) ./Cotta .Annaprunromma v.\n\nMtlkku Jlenkomma,(4) Kal/iappa Goundan v. Kmtdaswami Gowrdat(')\n\nand C!rmMmmall•. Chennappa Goundan.(6) -\n\nIn the first case the decrecholder and the judgment debtor compromised and agreed tilat the latter should be given three months' time for paym:ent of the decretal sum and that i.f he failed to pay within F the satd period the execution should proceed."}}, {"text": "November 28, 1956.~", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34023, "end_char": 34042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly the last application for execution made on , fuly 28, 1964 was not an application for continuing or reviving the_ previous application made on November 28, 1956.~\n\nCoUD.8el for the appellant has relied on Prem Narain v. Gan1a .Ram,(1) E Hita l41 v. P:mjab National Bank(3) ./Cotta .Annaprunromma v.\n\nMtlkku Jlenkomma,(4) Kal/iappa Goundan v. Kmtdaswami Gowrdat(')\n\nand C!rmMmmall•. Chennappa Goundan.(6) -\n\nIn the first case the decrecholder and the judgment debtor compromised and agreed tilat the latter should be given three months' time for paym:ent of the decretal sum and that i.f he failed to pay within F the satd period the execution should proceed."}}, {"text": "Chennappa Goundan.(6", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34262, "end_char": 34282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly the last application for execution made on , fuly 28, 1964 was not an application for continuing or reviving the_ previous application made on November 28, 1956.~\n\nCoUD.8el for the appellant has relied on Prem Narain v. Gan1a .Ram,(1) E Hita l41 v. P:mjab National Bank(3) ./Cotta .Annaprunromma v.\n\nMtlkku Jlenkomma,(4) Kal/iappa Goundan v. Kmtdaswami Gowrdat(')\n\nand C!rmMmmall•. Chennappa Goundan.(6) -\n\nIn the first case the decrecholder and the judgment debtor compromised and agreed tilat the latter should be given three months' time for paym:ent of the decretal sum and that i.f he failed to pay within F the satd period the execution should proceed."}}, {"text": "Kansbi Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35213, "end_char": 35223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Kansbi Ram filed an objection that he had a lien on it.", "canonical_name": "Kansbi Ram"}}, {"text": "PREM RAJ V. P.AM CHAllA~", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35471, "end_char": 35495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PREM RAJ V. P.AM CHAllA~ (Dwivedi, !.)", "canonical_name": "PREM RAJ V. P.AM CHAllA~"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35625, "end_char": 35648, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kanshi Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36070, "end_char": 36080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "while Kanshi Ram preferred an appeal to the High Court.", "canonical_name": "Kansbi Ram"}}, {"text": "Lahore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 36453, "end_char": 36470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Lahore High Court held that the subsequent application was one to .revive the previous application (which was dismissed in default)."}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37025, "end_char": 37048, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madtas High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 37579, "end_char": 37596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A learned Single Judge of the Madtas High Court held that on the facts and circumstances of the case, as construed by him, the J:revious application was really pending and that the subsequent application fell under c1.5 of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37772, "end_char": 37780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "GoswAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38820, "end_char": 38827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GoswAMI, J. The interesting and important question which is\n\nraied _in ts appeal with special leave is whether the present appli- ."}}, {"text": "article 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39040, "end_char": 39051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39059, "end_char": 39079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Kariya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39205, "end_char": 39211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Kariya and his wife n Sava purchased the suit property, which is a house, by a registered sale deed of 20th April, 1905.", "canonical_name": "K1riya"}}, {"text": "n Sava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39225, "end_char": 39231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Kariya and his wife n Sava purchased the suit property, which is a house, by a registered sale deed of 20th April, 1905."}}, {"text": "Prem Raj", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39545, "end_char": 39553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Charan alone executed a registered mortgage deed of the entir~ suit property on 16th August, 1951, in favour of Prem Raj, the present :i!ppe1lant.", "canonical_name": "Prem Raj"}}, {"text": "16th\n\nJul~ 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39767, "end_char": 39782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27A of 1952 on the basis of the mortpage deed and obtained a preliminary deetee for c foreclosure on 16th August, 1952 2.nd also the final decree on 16th\n\nJul~ 1953."}}, {"text": "Sava", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39785, "end_char": 39789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sava, tbe mother of Ram Charan, on the other hand, had executed a registered deed of gift of the suit property on 7th March, 1952.", "canonical_name": "Sava"}}, {"text": "Praka", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39929, "end_char": 39934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in favour of Praka:; h Chandra, son of Ram Charan, the respondent.", "canonical_name": "Prakash Chandrawhich"}}, {"text": "December 7, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40115, "end_char": 40131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prakash Chandra, then a minor, by his father's sister, as next friend, filed a civil suit on December 7, 1956, beinp: D No."}}, {"text": "25th November, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40839, "end_char": 40858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This suit was dismissed on 25th November, 1958."}}, {"text": "31st Dec-ember, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41024, "end_char": 41044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27A of 1952 on 31st Dec-ember, 1958."}}, {"text": "First Additional District Judge, Chhindwara", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 41101, "end_char": 41144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3JA of 1959 was partly allowed F by the First Additional District Judge, Chhindwara, reversing the earlier decree of 25th Novernber, 1958 and declaring that Prakash\n\nChandra was entitled to the half share in the suit property."}}, {"text": "25th Novernber, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41178, "end_char": 41198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3JA of 1959 was partly allowed F by the First Additional District Judge, Chhindwara, reversing the earlier decree of 25th Novernber, 1958 and declaring that Prakash\n\nChandra was entitled to the half share in the suit property."}}, {"text": "Prakash\n\nChandra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41218, "end_char": 41234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3JA of 1959 was partly allowed F by the First Additional District Judge, Chhindwara, reversing the earlier decree of 25th Novernber, 1958 and declaring that Prakash\n\nChandra was entitled to the half share in the suit property.", "canonical_name": "Prakash Chandrawhich"}}, {"text": "Prakash", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42470, "end_char": 42477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus being free from the above mentioned litigation, the appellant, Prem Raj, filed his fifth execution application on July 28, 1964, in the Court of the Civil Judge, Class II, Balaghat, praying for \"joint possession of the half of the house to be delivered from the judgment debtor along with (the half joint possession of) Prakash son of Ram Charan Gadhewal\".", "canonical_name": "Prakash Chandrawhich"}}, {"text": "Ram Charan Gadhewal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42485, "end_char": 42504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus being free from the above mentioned litigation, the appellant, Prem Raj, filed his fifth execution application on July 28, 1964, in the Court of the Civil Judge, Class II, Balaghat, praying for \"joint possession of the half of the house to be delivered from the judgment debtor along with (the half joint possession of) Prakash son of Ram Charan Gadhewal\".", "canonical_name": "Ram Charan Gadhewal"}}, {"text": "28·11·1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44511, "end_char": 44521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "EME COURT REPORTS\n\nU974J 3 S.C.R.\n\n28·11·1956 : The appeal of the appellant against the order of the A executing court refusing police aid was dismissed as the said order was not appealable and the execution case was consigned to the records."}}, {"text": "article 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45223, "end_char": 45234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45242, "end_char": 45262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 45449, "end_char": 45474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "134 of 1966 in the Madhya Pradesh High Court against the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Balaghat."}}, {"text": "Additional District Judge, Balaghat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 45503, "end_char": 45538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "134 of 1966 in the Madhya Pradesh High Court against the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Balaghat."}}, {"text": "2nd March 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45558, "end_char": 45572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court on 2nd March 1967 accepted the respondent's appeal and set aside the orders of the courts below and l'leld that the execution application of the appellant was barred by time and should be dismissed."}}, {"text": "Lokur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46684, "end_char": 46689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Lokur, learned counsel for tne respondent, submits that section 15 of the Limitation Act would not come to the aid of the decreeholder since there was no stay of execution of the decree by any court after disposal of the appeal by the First Additional District Judge on 21st October, 1959."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46740, "end_char": 46750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46758, "end_char": 46772, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47137, "end_char": 47143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Lokur submits that article 182(2) will not apply as the appeal was not directed against the original foreclosure decrc which was sought to be executed."}}, {"text": "article 182(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47203, "end_char": 47217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 182(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47462, "end_char": 47476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 182(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47978, "end_char": 47992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "28th July, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48106, "end_char": 48121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel, therefore, submits that the fifth execution application of 28th July, 1964, being filed within three years of 1st January, 1962, on which date the High Court finally dismissed the appellant's second appeal and the respondent's cross objection, is within time."}}, {"text": "25th April, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48449, "end_char": 48465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Alternatively the counsel submits that the fifth execution application is not a fresh\n\napplication but a revival of his fourth application of 25th April, 1956 and there is, therefore, no questiOJ' of the same being barred by limi tation in this case."}}, {"text": "article 182(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48635, "end_char": 48649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48657, "end_char": 48671, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48916, "end_char": 48924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48942, "end_char": 48971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 182(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49310, "end_char": 49324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "article 182(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49952, "end_char": 49966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 50031, "end_char": 50036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "while dealing with the ex pression \"whether there has been an appeal under column 3 of article 182(2)\", and noting the difference of opinion among the authorities in India on the subject observed as follows :-\n\n''The fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary, and may frequently result in hardship."}}, {"text": "article 182(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51058, "end_char": 51072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51080, "end_char": 51094, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 51352, "end_char": 51372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again in V. E. A. Annamalai Cfu:ttiar v. Valliammai A chi and Anothcr(l),\n\nthe Privy Council dealing with article 182(5) of the Limitation Act left the matter open observing as follows :-\n\n\"There has been some difference of opinion in the courts in India as to what amounts to takinz a step in aid of execution and the judgment under appeal discusses various decisio:rs,\n\nincluding a decision of the High Court of Madras in Kuppaswami Chettiar v.\n\nRajagopala Aiyer(2), in which it was held that there could not be a step in aid of executioJl if there was not an application for execution then pending, and another decision of the same court in Krislma Patter v. Seethar• ama Patter (3), in which it was held that a step in aid of execution must be one in furtherance of execution and not merely one seck¥ ing to re~:nove an obstructi011 to possible future execution."}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52078, "end_char": 52092, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 182(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53489, "end_char": 53503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53705, "end_char": 53713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53717, "end_char": 53728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54062, "end_char": 54072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54245, "end_char": 54256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "order 9 rule 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54953, "end_char": 54967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prakash Chandrawhich", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 55401, "end_char": 55421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What is then the exact legal position on the facts and circumstances of the perscnt executing case ris-a-vis the suit of Prakash Chandrawhich mutilated the foreclosure decree to the extent of depriving the appeHant from executing in respect of half of the suit property earlier decreed in his favour?", "canonical_name": "Prakash Chandrawhich"}}, {"text": "article 182(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56397, "end_char": 56411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56419, "end_char": 56433, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 182(~)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56798, "end_char": 56812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56820, "end_char": 56834, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57962, "end_char": 57972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57980, "end_char": 57994, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "A. S. Krishnappa Chettiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58052, "end_char": 58077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent's counsel on the other hand draws our attention to the strict construCtion of section 15 of the Limitation Act, which is, however, not relied upon by the appellant, in A. S. Krishnappa Chettiar {k Ors. \"·"}}, {"text": "limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58402, "end_char": 58416, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59073, "end_char": 59083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60043, "end_char": 60048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 60960, "end_char": 60977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court, however, also observed in the same decision as follows:-\n\n\"Whether the requirements of s. IS would be satisfied by the production of an order or an injunction which by neces'.lary implication stays the institution or the suit is open to argument We are however; pt:epared to assume in the present case that s.lS would apply even to cases where the institution of a suit is stayed by necessary implication of the order passed or injunction issued in the previous litigion\",\n\nthe respondent, as already mentioned, has referred to Bhawanipore Banking Corporation Ltd. v. Gouri Shankat Sharma (supra) and submits that the subsequent suit has no direct or immediate connection with the decree under execution and we will deal with this aspect at the appropriate place, ·\n\nThe respondent relies upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in Somshikharswami Shidlingswami v. Shivappa Mallappa Hosmaani\n\nahd Others(l), which, according to the learned counsel, runs on all fours with the present cae."}}, {"text": "sections 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61217, "end_char": 61227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61245, "end_char": 61259, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61332, "end_char": 61342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61535, "end_char": 61548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61556, "end_char": 61570, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61975, "end_char": 61993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 182(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62729, "end_char": 62743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62752, "end_char": 62766, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63337, "end_char": 63347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64167, "end_char": 64177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64410, "end_char": 64419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S2(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64420, "end_char": 64425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 64479, "end_char": 64485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras Full Bi!nch decision (supra) approved of the dec: sion in Satyanarayana Brahmcm v. Serthayya(3) and obscn•ed as follow.>:-\n\n\"In regard to the institution of suits, not the e~\"\\:ecution of de crees, it is held in Satyanarayana Brahmom v. Seetha)')'a(3) that no equitable grounds for the suspension of a cause of action can be added to the provisions ofthe Limitation Act and a decree cancelling a promissory note as fraudulent is no stay of a suit upon the note\" (emphasis supplied)."}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64841, "end_char": 64855, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sadasiva Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65015, "end_char": 65029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Muthu Korakkoi Chetty v. Madar Ammal, (4) Sadasiva Ayyar, J .. observed as follows :-\n\n\"A person is not bound to bring an unnecessary suit or to make futile and unnecessary applications during the course of other litigation proceedings for the settlement of the same right\" ."}}, {"text": "Sundaram Chctty", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65250, "end_char": 65265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sundaram Chctty, J., also observed as follows in the same decision :\n\n(I) [1!:67] (3) S.C.R. 147/151."}}, {"text": "AIR 1933 Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65357, "end_char": 65372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) AIR 1933 Madras 418/419/421.", "canonical_name": "AIR 1927 Madras 597"}}, {"text": "AIR 1927 Madras 597", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65391, "end_char": 65410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) AIR 1927 Madras 597.", "canonical_name": "AIR 1927 Madras 597"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66031, "end_char": 66045, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66134, "end_char": 66143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66813, "end_char": 66824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66835, "end_char": 66855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 182(S)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66874, "end_char": 66888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Limitation Act, 1877", "statute": "Limitation Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "article 182(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67660, "end_char": 67674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Limitation Act, 1877", "statute": "Limitation Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "article 182(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68470, "end_char": 68484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Na_rayon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68494, "end_char": 68502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in Na_rayon J; vangouda Patil and another\n\nv. Puttabai and others (2) at page 8 the Judicial Committee, while deal ing with an argument with regard to section 15 of the Limitation Act that the injunction or order to be effective should contain an express prohibition, observed as follows:\n\n\" .... it is not necessary to consider that point as their Lord\n\nships arc satisfied that there is no prohibition; either express or implied in the injunction or the decree in the present case, which restrains the appellant from instituting a suit for possession\". ("}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68642, "end_char": 68652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68660, "end_char": 68674, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Nagendra Nath Dey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69296, "end_char": 69313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a survey of the various decisions on the subject, it may perhaps be possible to have two views on this aspect of the matter but it is difficult to overlook tltat certain reservations were made by the Privy Council both in Nagendra Nath Dey's case (supra) as well as in Narayan Jivangouda Pat it's case (supra) for an appropriate occasion to consider whether the \"intelligible rule\" referred to in the former and the \"rule of implication\" hinted in the latter may not be pressed into service in favour of the decree-holder in construing certain relevant provisions of the Limitation Act-thus making the way clear for a fair and liberal intepretation of Art."}}, {"text": "Narayan Jivangouda Pat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69343, "end_char": 69365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a survey of the various decisions on the subject, it may perhaps be possible to have two views on this aspect of the matter but it is difficult to overlook tltat certain reservations were made by the Privy Council both in Nagendra Nath Dey's case (supra) as well as in Narayan Jivangouda Pat it's case (supra) for an appropriate occasion to consider whether the \"intelligible rule\" referred to in the former and the \"rule of implication\" hinted in the latter may not be pressed into service in favour of the decree-holder in construing certain relevant provisions of the Limitation Act-thus making the way clear for a fair and liberal intepretation of Art."}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69645, "end_char": 69659, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69726, "end_char": 69734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69963, "end_char": 69974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69982, "end_char": 70002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70021, "end_char": 70032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1877", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "section 351", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70985, "end_char": 70996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Two at least of the High Courts in India had already put so liberal a construction upon the insolvency provisions of the old Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Two at least of the High Courts in India had already put so liberal a construction upon the insolvency provisions of the old Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71070, "end_char": 71081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Two at least of the High Courts in India had already put so liberal a construction upon the insolvency provisions of the old Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Two at least of the High Courts in India had already put so liberal a construction upon the insolvency provisions of the old Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "article 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71925, "end_char": 71936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prakash Chander", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 74333, "end_char": 74348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It should also be remembered that there was a perpetual injunction restraining the appellant from executing the foreclosure decree in Prakash Chander's appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Prakash Chandrawhich"}}, {"text": "31- 12-1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 74392, "end_char": 74403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "37A/59 during the period from 31- 12-1958 to 21-10-1959."}}, {"text": "21-10-1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 74407, "end_char": 74417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "37A/59 during the period from 31- 12-1958 to 21-10-1959."}}, {"text": "articles 181 and 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75233, "end_char": 75253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 75261, "end_char": 75280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 75432, "end_char": 75446, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_50_54_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "INDERJIT C. PAREKH & ORS •\n\nV. K. BHATI & ANR.\n\nJanuary, 8, 1974\n\n[M. H. BEG AND Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]\n\nBombay Relief Undutaklnir (Special Provis/om) Ad 1958-S. 4 (I) (•) (iv)- Whether personal liability of directors falls within the scope of stlon.\n\nThe appellants, five of whom were directors and one an officer of a company, were prosecuted under the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952 on the grouod that they had failed to pay the contribution to the Provident Fund and thereby committed an offence punishable under paragraph 76(a) of the Employ..S Provident Fund Scheme, 1952. Later, an investigation was made into the affairs of the company under s. I 5 of the lodustries (Devefopment aod Regulation) Act, 1951 aod an order was issued authorisina the Gujarat State Textile Corporation to take over the management of the company. By a notification the State Government declared the company to be a\"'rclief undertaking\" unde< s. 4 (I) (a) (iv) of the Bombay Relief Undertaking.'! (Special Provisions) Act, 1958 and directed that \"'all rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities a<orued or in<umd before the undertaking .... declared a relief undertaking aad any remedy for the enforcement thereto shall be suspended and all the procutli'ngs relevant tMreto pending before any court, tribunal. officer or authority shall be. stayed\" with effect from a certain date.\n\nAn application filed by the appellants for stay of the prosecution in view of the noti ti.cation issl.led by the Government was rejected by the lower court on the' view that the operation of s. 4 of the 1958 Act was restricted to the statutes mentioned in the Schedule to thkt Act and that clause (iv) of s. 4 (I} (a) did not contemplate stay of criminal proceedings. On appeal the High Court summarily rejected the revision application. The appellants came in appeal to this Cou~ by special leave.\n\nOn the question whether the proaecution pending against the appellants under paragraph 76 (a) of the Employees Provident Funds Scheme 1952 is liable to be stayed. by virtue of the notification issued by the State Government.\n\nDing the, appeal,\n\nHELD : The personal liability of the directors and officers does not fall within the scope of s. 4 (1) (a) (iv) of the Act. The responsibility to pay the contnbution to the Fund was of the appellants and if they had defaulted in paying the amount they were liable to be prosecuted under paragraph 76 (a) of the Scheme. The phrase \"'all proceedings relative thereto\" patently means all proceedings relating to \"an) f right, privilege, obligation or liability accrued or incurred before the undertaking was declared a relief undertaking\". Sub-clause (iv) concerns itself with the pre existing obligations and liabilities of the .undertaking and not of its directors. managers or other officers. Neither the language of the statute nor its object would justify the extension of the immunity so as to cover the individual obligations and liabilities of the directors and other officers of the undertaking. If they had in curred such obligation or liabilities as distinct from the obligations or liabilities of the undertakingthey were liable to be proceeded against for their personal acts of commission and ommission. The remedy in that behalf cannot be suspended G nor can a proceeding already commenced against them in their individual capacity be stayed. [52E; 53EJ\n\nThe occasion for declaring an. industry as a \"relief undertaking\" would arise out of causes connected with the defaults on the part of its directors and other officers.\n\nTo declare a moratorium on legal actions against persons whose activities . have nece3sitated the issuanc; of a notifi:ation in the interest of unemployment relief is to give such persons the benefit of their own wrong. Section 4 (1) (a) (iv) H advisedly limits the pOwer of the State Government to direct suspension of all rem, dies and stay of proceed.jogs involving the obligations and liabilities in relation to a relief undertaking and which were incurred before the undertaking was declared a relief undertaking. [53FJ\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 1973.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 9th February 1973 of the Gujarat High Court at Ahmedabad in Criminal Revision Application No. 86 of 1973.\n\nY. S. Chitaley and S. K. Dholakia, for the appellants.\n\nG. Das, S. N. Anand and M. N. Shroff. for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, J.-Appellants I, 2, 4, 5 and 6 are the directors of Rajnagar Spinning and Weaving Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Ahmedabad, and appellant No. 3 is an office< of the said company. On March 19, 1969 a complaint was lodged against them by respondent l, an Inspector appointed under the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 that they had failed to pay a sum of Rs. 1,39,419 50 being the contribution to the Provident Fund for the months of June, July and August, 1968 and that thereby they had contravened the provisions of Paragraph 38(1) of the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952. an act punishable under Paragraph 76(a) of the Scheme.\n\nAn investigation was made into the affairs of the company under section 15 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 and on being satisfied that lobe company was managed in a manner highly detrimental to public interest, the Government of India issued an order dated January 7, 1972 authorising the Gujarat State Textile Corporation to take over the management of the company. On May 6, 1972 the Gujarat Government issued a notification declaring the company to be a \"relief undertaking\"· under section 4(1XaXiv) of the Bombay Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1958 ('the Act'), and directing that \"all rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities accrued or incurred before the undertaking was declared a relief undertaking and any remedy for the enforcement thereof shall be suspended and all the proceedings relative thereto pending before any Court, tribunal, officer or authority shall be stayed with effect from 6th May 1972\" ..••••\n\nThe appellants filed one application after another asking the court which was seized of the matter to stay the prosecution in view of the notification issued by the Government of Gujarat. Two of such applications were rejected by the learned City Magistrate, III Court, Ahmedabad. Appellants acquiesced in one of the orders, carried the other in revision to the High Court but withdrew that proceeding. On October 27, 1972 they made yet another application for the same relief which also was rejected by the learned.Magistrate. He took the view, as in the two earlier applications, that the operation of section 4 of the Act is restricted to the statutes mentioned in the Schedule to that Act and that clause (iv) of section 4(1) did not contemplate stay of criminal proceedings. The High Court of Gujarat rejected summarily the revision appli- :ation filed by the appellants against the judgment of the learned Magistrate. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[197413 S.C.R.\n\nWe are concerned in this appeal with the narrow question whether the prosecution pending against the appellants under Paragraph 76(a) of the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 is liable to be stayed by virtue of the notification issued by the Government of Gujarat on May 6, 1972. That notification was issued 1n exerdse of the power conferred by section 4(l)(a)(iv) of the Act, which reads thus :\n\n\"4. (I) Notwithstanding any law, usage, custom, contract, instrument, decree, order, award, submission, settlement, standing order or other provision whatsoever, the State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, direct that-\n\n( a) in relation to any relief undertaking and in respect of the period for which the relief undertaking continues as such under sulrsection (2) of section 3-\n\n• • * • •\n\n(iv) any right, privilege, obligation or liability accrued or in curred before the undertaking was declared a relief under taking and any remedy for the enforcement thereof shall be suspended and all proceedings relative thereto pending before any court, tribunal, officer or authority shall be stayed;\"\n\n\"all proceedings relative thereto\" patently meam all proceedings relating to \"any right, privilege, obligation or liability accrued or incurr<d before the undertaking was declared a relief undertaking\".\n\nThe obligation or liability which sub-clause (iv) speaks of is an obligation or liability incurred by the undertaking before it was declaretl a relief undertaking. Jn other words sub-clause (iv) concerns itself with the pre-existing obligations and liabilities 6f the undertaking and not of its directors, managers or other officers.\n\nThe obligation or liability of these persons is not comprehended within the words of sub-clause (iv). Clause (a) of section 4(1) shows that the power of the State Government is itself restricted to giving directions referred tQ in sub-clause (iv). \"in relation to any relief undertaking\". Obligations and liabilities of the directors or other officers of the undertaking are not in a true sense obligations and liabilities in relation to the relief undertaking. In plain and simple language they are the obligations and liabilities of such persons themselV<s. Their obligations and liabilities have to be viewed from a different angle than the obligations and liabilities of the company itself which only acts impersonally.\n\nThe object of section 4(I)(a)(iv) is to declare, so to say, a moratorium on actions against the undertaking during the currency of the notification declaring it to be a relief undertaking. By sub-clause (iv), any remedy for the enforcement of an obligation or liability against the relief undertaking is suspended and proceedings which arc already commenced are to be stayed during the operation of the notification.\n\nUnder section 4(b), on the notification ceasing to have force, such obligations and liabilities revive and become enforceable and the proceedings which are stayed can be continued. These provisions are\n\naimed at resurrecting and rehabilitating industrial undertakings brought by inefficiency or mis-management to the brink of dissolution, posing thereby the grave threat of unemployment of industrial workers. 'Relief undertaking' means under section 2(2) an industrial undertaking in respect of which a declaration under section 3 is in force. By section 3, power is conferred on the State Government to declare an industrial undertaking as a relief undertaking, \"as a measure of preventing unemployment or of unemployment relief'. Relief undertakings, so long a~ they continue as such, are given immunity from legal actions s0 as to render their working smooth and effective. Such undertakings can be run more effectively as a measure of unemployment relief, if the conduct of their affairs is unhampered by legal proceedings or the threat of such proceedings. That is the genesis and justification of section 4(l)(a)(iv) of the Act.\n\nThus neither the language of the statute nor its object would justify the extension of the immunity so as to cover the individual obligations and liabilities of the director and other officers of the undertaking.\n\nIf they have incurred such obligations o.r liabilities, as distinct from the obligations or liabilities of the undertaking, they are liable to be proceeded against for their personal acts of commission and omission.\n\nThe remedy in that behalf cannot be suspended nor can a proceeding already commenced agajnst them in their individual capacity be stayed.\n\nIndeed, it would be strange if any such thing was within the contemplation of law. Normally, the occasion for declaring an industry as a relief undertaking would arise. out of causes connected with defaults on the part of its directors and other officers. To declare a moratorium on legal actions against persons whose activities have necessitated the issuance of a notification in the interest of unemployment relief is to give to such persons the benefit of their own wrong. Section 4(l)(a)(iv) therefore advisedly limits the power of the State Government to direct suspension of remedies and stay of proceedings involving the obligations and liabilities in relation to a relief undertaking and which were incurred before the undertaking was declared a relief undertaking.\n\nParagraph 38(1) of the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 imposes an obligation on 'The employer' to pay the Provident Fund ; contribution to the Fund within 15 days of the close of every month.\n\nThe Scheme does not define 'Employer' but Paragraph 2(m) says that words and expressions which are not defined by the Scheme shall have H the meaning assigned to them in the Employees' Provident Funds Act.\n\nSection Z(e)(ii) of that Act defines an 'Employer', to the extent material, as the person who, or the authority which, has the ultimate contro'.\n\n54 SUPREMj! COURT REPORTS [ 1974 l 3 s.C.L\n\nover the affairs of an establishment and where the said affairs are entrusted to a manager, managing director or rnaru1ging agent, suclt manager, managing director or managing agent. Thus the responsibility to pay the contributions to the Fund was of the appellants and if they have defaulted in paying the amount, they are liable to be prosecuted under Paragraph 76(a) of the Scheme which says that if any person fails tl> pay any contribution which he is liable to pay under the Scheme, he shall be punishable with six months' imprisonment or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. Such a personal liability does not fall within the scope of section 4(1)(a)(iv) of the Act.\n\nWe therefore dismiss the appeal and direct that the prosecution shall proceed expeditiously.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 49, "entities": [{"text": "INDERJIT C. PAREKH & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "INDERJIT C. PAREKH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. K. BHATI & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. K. BHATT & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January, 8, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January, 8, 1974\n\n[M. H. BEG AND Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160, "end_char": 164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 356, "end_char": 391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Gujarat State Textile Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 760, "end_char": 793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, an investigation was made into the affairs of the company under s. I 5 of the lodustries (Devefopment aod Regulation) Act, 1951 aod an order was issued authorisina the Gujarat State Textile Corporation to take over the management of the company."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 933, "end_char": 937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952", "statute": "the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1569, "end_char": 1573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act was restricted to the statutes mentioned in the Schedule to thkt Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1586, "end_char": 1658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1683, "end_char": 1687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act was restricted to the statutes mentioned in the Schedule to thkt Act", "statute": "Act was restricted to the statutes mentioned in the Schedule to thkt Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2217, "end_char": 2221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act was restricted to the statutes mentioned in the Schedule to thkt Act", "statute": "Act was restricted to the statutes mentioned in the Schedule to thkt Act"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3780, "end_char": 3789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitaley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4322, "end_char": 4336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitaley and S. K. Dholakia, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. K. Dholakia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4341, "end_char": 4355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitaley and S. K. Dholakia, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "G. Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4378, "end_char": 4384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. Das, S. N. Anand and M. N. Shroff."}}, {"text": "S. N. Anand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4386, "end_char": 4397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. Das, S. N. Anand and M. N. Shroff."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4402, "end_char": 4414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. Das, S. N. Anand and M. N. Shroff."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4481, "end_char": 4492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, J.-Appellants I, 2, 4, 5 and 6 are the directors of Rajnagar Spinning and Weaving Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Ahmedabad, and appellant No."}}, {"text": "Rajnagar Spinning and Weaving Manufacturing Co. Ltd.,", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4546, "end_char": 4599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, J.-Appellants I, 2, 4, 5 and 6 are the directors of Rajnagar Spinning and Weaving Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Ahmedabad, and appellant No."}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4600, "end_char": 4609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, J.-Appellants I, 2, 4, 5 and 6 are the directors of Rajnagar Spinning and Weaving Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Ahmedabad, and appellant No."}}, {"text": "Provident Funds Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4781, "end_char": 4806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5191, "end_char": 5201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provident Funds Act, 1952", "statute": "Provident Funds Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5209, "end_char": 5258, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5367, "end_char": 5386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An investigation was made into the affairs of the company under section 15 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 and on being satisfied that lobe company was managed in a manner highly detrimental to public interest, the Government of India issued an order dated January 7, 1972 authorising the Gujarat State Textile Corporation to take over the management of the company."}}, {"text": "January 7, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5409, "end_char": 5424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An investigation was made into the affairs of the company under section 15 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 and on being satisfied that lobe company was managed in a manner highly detrimental to public interest, the Government of India issued an order dated January 7, 1972 authorising the Gujarat State Textile Corporation to take over the management of the company."}}, {"text": "6, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5526, "end_char": 5533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 6, 1972 the Gujarat Government issued a notification declaring the company to be a \"relief undertaking\"· under section 4(1XaXiv) of the Bombay Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1958 ('the Act'), and directing that \"all rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities accrued or incurred before the undertaking was declared a relief undertaking and any remedy for the enforcement thereof shall be suspended and all the proceedings relative thereto pending before any Court, tribunal, officer or authority shall be stayed with effect from 6th May 1972\" ..••••\n\nThe appellants filed one application after another asking the court which was seized of the matter to stay the prosecution in view of the notification issued by the Government of Gujarat."}}, {"text": "Gujarat Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5538, "end_char": 5556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 6, 1972 the Gujarat Government issued a notification declaring the company to be a \"relief undertaking\"· under section 4(1XaXiv) of the Bombay Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1958 ('the Act'), and directing that \"all rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities accrued or incurred before the undertaking was declared a relief undertaking and any remedy for the enforcement thereof shall be suspended and all the proceedings relative thereto pending before any Court, tribunal, officer or authority shall be stayed with effect from 6th May 1972\" ..••••\n\nThe appellants filed one application after another asking the court which was seized of the matter to stay the prosecution in view of the notification issued by the Government of Gujarat."}}, {"text": "section 4(1XaXiv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5637, "end_char": 5654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provident Funds Act, 1952", "statute": "Provident Funds Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "6th May 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6075, "end_char": 6087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 6, 1972 the Gujarat Government issued a notification declaring the company to be a \"relief undertaking\"· under section 4(1XaXiv) of the Bombay Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1958 ('the Act'), and directing that \"all rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities accrued or incurred before the undertaking was declared a relief undertaking and any remedy for the enforcement thereof shall be suspended and all the proceedings relative thereto pending before any Court, tribunal, officer or authority shall be stayed with effect from 6th May 1972\" ..••••\n\nThe appellants filed one application after another asking the court which was seized of the matter to stay the prosecution in view of the notification issued by the Government of Gujarat."}}, {"text": "Government of Gujarat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6262, "end_char": 6283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 6, 1972 the Gujarat Government issued a notification declaring the company to be a \"relief undertaking\"· under section 4(1XaXiv) of the Bombay Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1958 ('the Act'), and directing that \"all rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities accrued or incurred before the undertaking was declared a relief undertaking and any remedy for the enforcement thereof shall be suspended and all the proceedings relative thereto pending before any Court, tribunal, officer or authority shall be stayed with effect from 6th May 1972\" ..••••\n\nThe appellants filed one application after another asking the court which was seized of the matter to stay the prosecution in view of the notification issued by the Government of Gujarat."}}, {"text": "October 27, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6503, "end_char": 6519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 27, 1972 they made yet another application for the same relief which also was rejected by the learned."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6701, "end_char": 6710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6814, "end_char": 6826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6881, "end_char": 6902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Gujarat rejected summarily the revision appli- :ation filed by the appellants against the judgment of the learned Magistrate."}}, {"text": "section 4(l)(a)(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7494, "end_char": 7513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7937, "end_char": 7946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8920, "end_char": 8932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(I)(a)(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9543, "end_char": 9562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9953, "end_char": 9965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10390, "end_char": 10402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10469, "end_char": 10478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10495, "end_char": 10504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10773, "end_char": 10775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(l)(a)(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11051, "end_char": 11070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4(l)(a)(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12131, "end_char": 12150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Provident Funds Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12816, "end_char": 12835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 4(1)(a)(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13697, "end_char": 13716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provident Funds Act", "statute": "Provident Funds Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_519_527_EN", "year": 1974, "text": ") H\n\nMOHINDER SINGH & ANR. v\n\nSTATE 0!' HARYANA March 5, 1974 [H. R. KHANNA AND V. R. KRISHNA IYER, JJ.j\n\nIndian Penal Code, Ss.409, read with s.109-Whether conviction could be sustabred 11n oral evidence ir. the Jae~ flf negative written evidence-Illiteracy -Hov for benefit could be given.\n\nThe complainant who was Sarpanch of gram panchayat asked the secor.~ appellant, his pre, decessor, to make over the records of the gram panchayat, transfer its accounts and hand over the money belonging to the gram panchayat to him. The second appellant put him off. \\Vhen he made a complaint to higher authorities the second appelJant transferred some amount to the complainant, but not the whole of it. The complainant tiled a suit in Civil Court for recovery Or the balance and rendition of accounts in respect of the unpaid amount which was also large. The suit of the complainant for rendition of accounts was dismissed by the Civil Court. accepting the evidence of the second appellant and his plea that the accounts bet\\1.'ecn the parties had been settled. The complainant filed a complaint alleging that the first appellant, an advocate and the second appellant had made him sign an official receipt of the gram panchayat with its official seal affixed on the receipt and took it without making the payment of money to him. The second appellant was tried for offences under sections 409, 461 read with 109 and 474 Indian Penal Code and the first appellant under s.409 read with s.109, section 467 read with s.109 Indiah Penal Code and were convicted and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment and fine. The High Court confirmed their conviction and sentences. Before the trial court the complainant led oral evidence to prove that the appellants had taken advantage of his il!iteracy and a trick was played upon him by them.\n\nAI1owing the appeals to this Court,\n\n1-IELD : There are de<ir infirrrdties in the prosecution ca<; e.\n\nIt is not possible to sustain the conviction of the accused. Oral evidence which runs counter to an ac!rnission contained in writing signed by a party in the very nature of things is a , ery \\\\'eak piece of evidence and cannot be accepted without a grain of salt. Jn the face of the finding of the Civil Court it would be incongruous to convict the second appellant on th! bisis that th! amJT1t of th~ Gra.m PJn.; hayat \\\\'as still due from him. The complainant may be illiterate but there must be a limit up to which the benefit of illiteracy can be extended to him. The fact that the complainant was illiterate could not induce the court to ignore the infirmities in his evidence or to fill in lacunae in the prosecution case.[524B--C,525D-D,526A-B]\n\nThis fact would also not justify the benefit cf the doubt Peing given to the prosecution instead of to the accused. [526B]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. 221 of 1970 A-S 47 of 1971.\n\nAppoals by spocial leave from the judgment and order dated the 8th October, 1970 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in Criminal Appoals Nos. 374 and 376of19(0.\n\nNuruddin Ahmad and U.P. Singh, for the appellant,.\n\nN. N. Goswamy and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J.-Surat Singh and Mohinder Singh Advocate were tried in the court of Additional Sessions Judge Karna! for various.\n\noffences. The learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted Surat Singh under section 409 Indian Penal Code, section 467 read with section 109 Indian Penal Code and section 474 Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 25,000 or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of eight months on the irst count, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year on the second count and rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year on the third count. Mohinder Singh accused was convicted under section 409 read with section 109 Indian l\"enal Code and section 467 read with section 109 Indian Penal Code and was s.entenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a inc of Rs. 25,000 or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of eight months on the first count and to undergo rigorou• imprisonment for a period of one year on the second count.\n\nThe oubstantive sentences of imprisonment in the case of each' of the t1110 accused were ordered to run concurrently. It was also directed that out of the fine, if realised, Rs. 46,875 should be paid to the\n\nGram Panchayat Neemwala. On appeal the Punjab and Haryana High Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. By special leave Mohinder Singh has filed criminal appal No. 221 of 1970 while Surat\n\nSingh has filed criminal appeal No. 4, of 1971. This judgment would dispose of both the appeals.\n\nThe prosecution case i<J. that prior tp the year 1961, four villagi;:s, namely, Seonsar, Hailwa, Neemwala an.J Ramgarh Ror had a common Gram Panchyat known as Gram Panchyat Seonsar. Surat Singh accused was the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchyat. Ram Kishan was then a member of the Gram Panchyat and he represented village Ramgarh Ror. Each of the other three villages was also represented by a Panch. Jn 1957-58 the Government acquired large areas of shamlat land of villages Ramgarh Ror, Seonsar and Hailwa for the purpose ot establishing a big forest plantation. The shamlat land of these villages had already vested in the Panchyat under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act. On the acquisition of those lands, the Government paid compensation amounting to Rs. 3,51,844. Out of that amount, Rs. 1,68,844 represented the compensation for the acquisition of •hamlat land in village Ramgarh Ror. Surat Singh in his capacity as Sarpanch of the Gram Panchyat received those amounts and the compensation for each of the villages was kept distinct and separate, so that the benefit of the money should accrue only to the respective\n\nvillaes. The compen,.tion amount of Rs. 1,68,800 relating to Ram- :arh Ror was invested as follows :\n\n(i) Rs. 1,00,000 deposited in the Kaithal Mandi Post Office\n\n(ii) Rs. 50,000 deposited in the Reserve Bank of India New Delhi\n\n(iii) Rs. 18,800 deposited in the Central Co-operative Bank Kai- . thal\n\nThe Gram Panchyat of Seonsar continued to function up to the beginaioC of 1961. Some amounts out of the compensation deposited were withdrawn for beini: spent for those villaecs.\n\nIn the beginning of 1961 the Government split the area of Gram Panchyat Seonsar into two separate areas and constituted two Gram Panchyats. In this new arrangement the Gram Panchyat Seonsar functioned only for two villages, namely, Seonsar and Hailwa. For villages Neemwala and Ramgarh Ror a new Gram Panchyat known as Gram Panch>at Neemwala was constituted. After the frrmat\"rn of the new Paoi,;; h)at Ram Kishan PW was elected Sarpanch of Grcm Panchyat Neemwala, while Surat Singh continued as Sarpar ct of Gram Panchyat Seonsar. After the elections Ram Kishan as Sa1pa1 'b of Gram Panchyat Neemwala made a demand for the custody ot tt.e\n\nPancbyat record relating to the two villages Neemwala and Ramgarb Ror and also asked for the payment of the amount standing in the account of village Ramgarh Ror. Surat Singh eccused, however, put off Ram Kishan PW. Ram Kishan thereupon made an application to the higher authorities. Surat Singh accu!'Cd thereafter transferred the deposit of Rs. 1,00,000 in the name of Ram Kfahan as Sarpanch of the new Panchyat. No steps were, however, taken by Surat Singh accused to transfer the remaining amount. As Surat Singh did not render accounts, Ram Kishan PW consulted Mohinder Singh Advocate accused and on the latter's advice filed a suit for rendition of the accounts against Surat Singh in the Court of Sub Judge at Kaith.al, Mohinder Singh accused was also engaged by Ram Kifhan PW as his counsel in that cllfe. Ram Kishan then learnt that Mohinder Singh accused had good relations with Surat Singh and he, therefore, requested Mohinder Singh for his help for the return of the balance of the amount lying with Surat Singh. On the advice given by Mohinder\n\nSingh, Ram Kishan got passed resolution DB/I by Gram Panchyat Neemwala on May 14, 1963 whereby Ram Kishan was authorised on behalf of the Panchyat to receive the amount due from Gram Panchyat Seonsar. Ram Kishan also handed over memorandum PWJ/A which had been issued by the Reserve Bank of India for the deposit of Rs. 50,000 to Mohinder Singh accused. Ram K.ishan thereafter made enquiries from Mohinder Singh about the amount of Rs. 50,000 but on each occasion Ram Kishan was put off by Mohinder Singh by saying that the amount had not been transferred and that as soon as it was done, he would get in touch with Ram Kishan. As the payment of the amount was being delayed and some funds were needed for the school building, Ram Kishan talked to Mohinder Singh in the first week of December 1963 about the payment of Rs. 6,000 which WM due as interest. Mohinder Singh then told Rain Kishan to come to his office on December 13, 1963 with the receipt book of the Panchyat and its official seal. Mohinder Singh also mentioned that he would send for Surat Singh accus, d on that day and would secure the payment of the interest amount of Rs. 6,000 as well as of the principal amount if the same too was received.\n\nOn December 13, 1963 at about 10 a. m., it is stated, Ram Kishan PW accompanied by Mussadi PW went to the office of Mo hinder Singh accu, ed with the official receipt book and seal of Neemwala Pancbyat.\n\nBoth the accused were present in the office. Mo hinder Singh accused then called a boy aged about 14 or 15 years and got something written 5-M 45.Sup CIJ7~\n\n522 SUPRE;\\fE COURT REPORTS [19741 3 s.c .•.\n\non the official receipt book which had been brought by Ram Kishan.\n\nRam Kishan knows only Landa character and is otherwise .illiterate.\n\nMussadi too is illiterate. Both Ram Kishan and Mussadi kept sitting at some distance smoking Hookah. Ram Kishan was then called by Mohinder Singh accusod and his signatures were obtained on receipt DA a• well as counterfoil Pl of that receipt. The official seal of the Gram Panchyat was also taken from Ram Kishan and wa• affixed both on the receipt and the counterfoil thereof under the signotures of Ram Kishan. Receipt DA was torn off from the receipt book by Mohinder Singh accused and was handed over to Surat Singh accused. When Ram Kishan protested that the receipt had been taken from him without his being handed over any money, he was assured by Mohinder Singh accused that he would be taken to the bank and paid the money there. Ram Kishan, Mussadi and the two accu•ed then went to Cooperative Bank Kaithal. The clerk on duty in the bank told Mohinder\n\nSingh that the sum of Rs. 6,000 on account of interest could not be paid in cash without sanction but he would transfer the amount in the name of Gram Panchyat Neemwala from the account of Gram Panchyat Seonsar by a book entry. The amount of Rs. 6,000 in this way transferred to the account of Gram Panchyat Neemwala. Surat Singh accused then went away, while Ram Kishan, Mussadi and Mohinder Singh went to the office of Mohinder Singh. At the office Ram Kishan demanded back the receipt from Mohinder Singh as the amount had not b>en paid in ca.h. Ram Kishan w.,, howeve•, told by Mohinder Singh that the receipt was with Surat Singh. Mussadi PW was then sent to call Surat Singh but the latrer declined to come.\n\nMohin4er Singh told Ram Kishan that he need not worry. Mohinder Singh also wrote the word \"Cancelled\" on the counterfoil Pl. Mohinder Singh further promised to get the original receipt back from Surat Singh. Ram Kishan and Mussadi then came back to the village. Some days later a fresh election was held and Mehar Chand became the Sarpanch of Neemwala Panchyat.\n\nAccording further to the .pro>ecution case, about a month after the fresh election! Ram Kishan learnt from an overseer of Block Samiti Chika that Surat Singh had withdrawn the amount of Rs. 50,000 from the bank and was giving out that ~~ had paid that money to Ram Kisban and got a receipt from Ram Kishaoi for that11mount. Ram Kishan at first did not attach. much importance to that talk but when the rumour persisted, Ram Kishan learnt on en11uiry that the amount ha<! already been withdrawn by' Surat Singh accused some months earlier. Ram Kish.an then made a complaint to the District Magistrate Karna! on June 12, 1964 praying that a caso might be registered against. the\n\naccusod under sections 1208, 409, 467, 468 and 471 Indian Ponal Code. A case wa~ threaftcr registered against the accused.\n\nDuring the investigation of the case it transpired that an amount of Rs. 46,8/S Which was lying in deposit with the Reserve Bank of India in the accaunt of Gram Panchyat Seonsar was sent on July 12. 1963 by bank draft lo Surat Singh. The aforesaid amount was credited in the nccaunt of Snrnt Singh whh tho Co-oporati\\'e Bank Kaithal\n\non July 18, 1963. The same day, i.e. July 18, 1963 Surat Singh withdrew the amount of Rs. 46,875 from the bank by means of a cheque. 11 further transpired during the investigation that receipt DA which was got signed from Ram Kishan was for an amount of Rs. 46,875 and that the said receipt bore the date July 18, 1963. Writing marked A was also made on copy DB of resolution DB/I. The writing was as under :\n\n\"Rs. 46,875 received.\n\nReceipt accordingly issued.\n\nThumb lmpres.ion, Ram Kishan Sarpanch, Neemwala\n\n18-7-63.\"\n\nThe charge which was framed agaimt Surat Singh was that he had committed criminal breach of tru't in respect of Rs. 46,875 while that framed against Mohinder Singh wa0 that he had abetted the commission of the above offence. There were also charges against the two accused about their having forged the writings purporting to be receipts issued by Ram Kishan in respect of the amounts of Rs. 46,875. Surat Singh was further charged for keeping in his poFSession the forged receipts for fraudulent and dishonest U>e of the same.\n\nAl the trial Surat Singh accused admitted that a sum of Rs. 1,68,844 had been received as compensation for acquisition of the land of village Ramgarh Ror. Surat Singh furthe1 admitted that out of that amount, Rs. 50,000 had been deposited in the Reserve Bank of India.\n\nIt was not disputed by Surat Singh that the Gram Panchyat Seonsar had been split into two Panchyats. According to Surat singh, he withdrew on July 18, 1963 Rs. 46,875 found due on the basis of\n\ndepsitcertificate of the value of Rs. 50,000 and he paid the same amount to Ram Kishan PW as per receipt Ex. A. on DB as well as the official receipt DA. Surat Singh denied having gone to the office of Mohinder Singh on December 13, 1963. The allegation that the receipts were fabricated or that any amount had been misappropriated by Surat Singh were denied by him.\n\nMohinder Singh accused admitted aving filed a suit as counsel of Gram Panchyat Neemwala against Surat Singh. Mohinder Singh denied the other allegations against him. Mohinder Singh expressed ignorance about the withdrawal of money from the bank by Surat Singh on July 18, 1963: Likewise the allegation that Ram Kishan and Mussadi had visited his office on December 13. 1963 was demed by Mohinder Singh.\n\nMohinder Singh also denied that the word \"Cancelled\" on counterfoil Pt of receipt DA was in his hand.\n\nThe trial Court,.as mentioned earlier, accepted the prosecution allegations and convicted and sentenced the two accused as above. On ,1pp.!al the High Court .affirmed the jt1dgmcnt of the tna1 court.\n\nIn appeal before us Mr. Nuruddin, learned council for the appell ants has taken us through the evidence on record and has contended that the amount of Rs. 46,875 after being withdrawn from the bank on July 18, 1963 was paid by Surat Singh to Ram Kishan. It is farther contended that Ram Kishan instead of accounting for that amount bas falsely involved the two accused in this case. As against that, Mr. Goswami on behalf of the state has supJiOrted the judgments of the High Court and the trial court and has urged that no case has been made for interference with the view taken by those courts.\n\nWe have given the matter our consideration and find that there are 11Jaring infirmities in the prosecution case and as such, it is not possible to sustain the conviction of the accused. It is in the evidence of Kitab Singh (PW 4) who was posted as an official in the Kaithal Co-operative Bank that on July 18, 1963 Surat Singh withdrew the amount of Rs. 46,875 from that bank after that amount had been transferred from the Reserve Bank of India New Delhi. The accused have brought on the record receipt DA. It is a printed receipt in Hindi in the prescribed form. The necessary particulars have been filled in this receipt. The receipt is dated July 18, 1963 and according to it, Rs. 46,875 were received by Ram Kishan PW from Surat Singh Sarpanch Seonsar. This receipt admittedly bears the signatures of Ram Kishan in Landa character and also bears the seal of Gram Panchayat Neemwala. In addition to receipt DA, the accused have produced another receipt about the payment of Rs. 46,875 by Surat\n\nSingh to Ram Kishan. This receipt is on copy DB of resolution DBjl which had been passed by Gram Panchayat Neemwala on May 14,1963. Ram Kishan PW was authorised by this resolution to receive the amount of Rs. 50,000 which had been deposited in the Reserve Bank of India and to issue a receipt after receiving that amount. Copy Ex. DB is admittedly in the hand of Mukand Lal (PW 13), who wa• the Secretary of Panchayat Neemwala and is signed by him. The receipt is in the form of writing A wherein it is recited that Rs. 46,875 had been received by Ram Kishan and he had also issued a receipt in token of his having received that amount. The writing is dated July\n\nI~, 1963 .. The accused exami_ned Gian Parkash Sharma (OW 3) Fmger. Prmt Expert, whose evidence shows that the thumb impression on writing marked A tallied with the admitted thumb impression of Ram Kishan PW. Ram Kishan PW also did not deny that the thumb impr; ession undernath wr.iting !'larked A was his own. According to him, the thumb 1mpresSion might be hIS own. There is in addition evidence on the record that the writing marked A was in the hand of Chaudhry Daryao Singh, who was the Manager ofro-operative Bank in July, 1963. Chaudhry Daryao Singh is now dead, but the fact that the writing marked A on Ex. DB is in the hand of Chaudhry Daryao Sin&h is proved by the testimony of Kitab Singh (PW 4) who was ihchar30 of the Co-oprative Bank, as wen as by that of Nihal Singh\n\n(DW I), who 19 a first cousm of Daryao Singh deceased and is familiar with his handwriting. The receipt DA as well as the writing marked A on which were signed and thumb marked by Ram Kishan PW sow tht Surat Singh immediately after withdrawing the amount of . ..\n\ngot the date and amount scored off and got inserted another date and A amount. Ram Kishan may be illiterate but there must be a limit µp to which the benefit of illiteracy can be extended to him. The fact that Ram Kishan is illiterate cannot induce the court to ignore the infirmities in his evidence or to fill in lacunae in the pr.osecution case.\n\nIn any case, this fact would not justify the benefit of the doubt being given to the prosecution, instead of to the accused.\n\nAn attempt was made by the prosecution to show that the receipt book from which receipt DA was issued had been purchased on October 24, 1963 from Harish Chander (PW JO), as per cash memo PWl/D. This cash memo, however, relates to the sale of receipt book No. 9.\n\nThere can be hundrede of such receipt books and it is admitted by Harish Chander that he cannot say whether the cash memo relates to the receipt book from which receipt DA had been issued or to some other receipt book. It, therefore, cannot be said to have been proved that receipt book from which receipt DA we.s issued had been purchased on October, 1963.\n\nThere are alsG \"Some other circumstances which create a doubt about the correctness of the prosecution allegati0ns, It is admitted by Ram Kishan PW that long before he made a complaint to the District Magistrate, he came to know that SuraLSingh was npresenting that he had paid the amount of compensation which was lying in deposit with the Reserve Bank of India to Ram Kishan and that Surat Singh was in possession of receipt for the payment of that amount. Surat Singh also mentioned in a suit brought by him in August 1964 against Ram Kishan that he had paid the amount of Rs. 46,875 to Ram Kishan as per receipt dated July 18, 1963. It would, therefore, follow that Surat Singh has always been taking the stand that he had paid the amount of Rs. 46,875 to Ram Kishan on July 18, 1963 as per receipt issued by the latter and that the plea taken by him at the trial was not the result of an afterthought.\n\nAnother fact which may also be mentioned in the above context i' that a suit was brought in September 1962 by Ram Kishan PW on hehalf of Gram Panchayat Neemwala against Gram Panchayat Seonsar through Surat Singh accused for rendition of account in respect of the assets of Gram Panchayat Neemwala. Jn that suit the plea of Surat\n\nSingh was that the account between the parties had been settled.\n\nEvidence was also led by Surat Singh to that effect. The court accepted this evidence and held as per judgment dated October 19, 1963 that the accounts between the parties had boen settled. The plaintiff's suit was accordingly dismissed. In the face of that finding of the civil court, it would appear to be incongruous to convict Surat Singh on the basis that the amount of Gram Panchayat Neemwala was still due from him.\n\nMOHINDER SlNGH v. HARYANA (Khanna, /.) 527\n\nWe thus find that the prosecutic>n case suffers from glaring infirmities.\n\nIn fact, there are some circumstances which lend credence to the plea of the accused. rt is, in our opinion, not pos'iible to sustain the conviction of the accused on the material brought on reeord.\n\nWe accordingly accept the appoals, set aside the conviction of the accused and acquit them.\n\nBefore parting with this case, we would like to refer to one aspect.\n\nA huge amount belonging to the Gram Panchayat Neemwala is alleged to have been misappropriated by smeone. The case of the prosecutic;>n is that misappropriation of the amount was facilitated by the illiteracy of the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat. It may, therefore be necesliary that some sillutary directions are issued or rules made so that because of the illiteracy of a Sarpanch the funds of the Panchayat are not emh.zzled or used for any purpose other than that of the Panchayat.\n\nP.ll.R.\n\nAppeals allowed", "total_entities": 106, "entities": [{"text": "H\n\nMOHINDER SINGH & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHINDER SINGH & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "v\n\nSTATE 0!' HARYANA March", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ss.409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s.109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "sections 409, 461 read with 109 and 474", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1375, "end_char": 1414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1415, "end_char": 1432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1463, "end_char": 1468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s.109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1479, "end_char": 1484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1486, "end_char": 1497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s.109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1508, "end_char": 1513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indiah Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1514, "end_char": 1531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2881, "end_char": 2885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nuruddin Ahmad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3073, "end_char": 3087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nuruddin Ahmad and U.P. Singh, for the appellant,.", "canonical_name": "Nuruddin Ahmad"}}, {"text": "U.P. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3092, "end_char": 3102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nuruddin Ahmad and U.P. Singh, for the appellant,."}}, {"text": "N. N. Goswamy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3125, "end_char": 3138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. N. Goswamy and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3143, "end_char": 3157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. N. Goswamy and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3224, "end_char": 3230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J.-Surat Singh and Mohinder Singh Advocate were tried in the court of Additional Sessions Judge Karna!"}}, {"text": "Mohinder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3251, "end_char": 3265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J.-Surat Singh and Mohinder Singh Advocate were tried in the court of Additional Sessions Judge Karna!", "canonical_name": "Mohinder\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge Karna!", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3302, "end_char": 3334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J.-Surat Singh and Mohinder Singh Advocate were tried in the court of Additional Sessions Judge Karna!"}}, {"text": "Surat Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3407, "end_char": 3418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted Surat Singh under section 409 Indian Penal Code, section 467 read with section 109 Indian Penal Code and section 474 Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Surat\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3425, "end_char": 3436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3437, "end_char": 3454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3456, "end_char": 3467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3478, "end_char": 3489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3490, "end_char": 3507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 474", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3512, "end_char": 3523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3524, "end_char": 3541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3946, "end_char": 3957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3968, "end_char": 3979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4003, "end_char": 4014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4025, "end_char": 4036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4037, "end_char": 4054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Surat\n\nSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4749, "end_char": 4761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "221 of 1970 while Surat\n\nSingh has filed criminal appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Surat\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "J Ramgarh Ror", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4963, "end_char": 4976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J Ramgarh Ror had a common Gram Panchyat known as Gram Panchyat Seonsar.", "canonical_name": "J Ramgarh Ror"}}, {"text": "Ram Kishan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5095, "end_char": 5105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Kishan was then a member of the Gram Panchyat and he represented village Ramgarh Ror.", "canonical_name": "Ram Kishan Sarpanch"}}, {"text": "Ramgarh Ror", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5172, "end_char": 5183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Kishan was then a member of the Gram Panchyat and he represented village Ramgarh Ror."}}, {"text": "Seonsar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5339, "end_char": 5346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn 1957-58 the Government acquired large areas of shamlat land of villages Ramgarh Ror, Seonsar and Hailwa for the purpose ot establishing a big forest plantation."}}, {"text": "Hailwa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5351, "end_char": 5357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn 1957-58 the Government acquired large areas of shamlat land of villages Ramgarh Ror, Seonsar and Hailwa for the purpose ot establishing a big forest plantation."}}, {"text": "Ramgarh Ror. Surat Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5745, "end_char": 5769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,68,844 represented the compensation for the acquisition of •hamlat land in village Ramgarh Ror."}}, {"text": "Ram- :arh Ror", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6052, "end_char": 6065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,68,800 relating to Ram- :arh Ror was invested as follows :\n\n(i) Rs."}}, {"text": "Kaithal Mandi Post Office", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6127, "end_char": 6152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,00,000 deposited in the Kaithal Mandi Post Office\n\n(ii) Rs."}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India New Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6187, "end_char": 6218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50,000 deposited in the Reserve Bank of India New Delhi\n\n(iii) Rs."}}, {"text": "Central Co-operative Bank Kai- . thal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6254, "end_char": 6291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "18,800 deposited in the Central Co-operative Bank Kai- ."}}, {"text": "Neemwala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6738, "end_char": 6746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For villages Neemwala and Ramgarh Ror a new Gram Panchyat known as Gram Panch>at Neemwala was constituted."}}, {"text": "Ram Kishan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6876, "end_char": 6886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the frrmat\"rn of the new Paoi,;; h)at Ram Kishan PW was elected Sarpanch of Grcm Panchyat Neemwala, while Surat Singh continued as Sarpar ct of Gram Panchyat Seonsar."}}, {"text": "Ramgarb Ror", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7172, "end_char": 7183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the elections Ram Kishan as Sa1pa1 'b of Gram Panchyat Neemwala made a demand for the custody ot tt.e\n\nPancbyat record relating to the two villages Neemwala and Ramgarb Ror and also asked for the payment of the amount standing in the account of village Ramgarh Ror.", "canonical_name": "J Ramgarh Ror"}}, {"text": "Ramgarh Ror", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7264, "end_char": 7275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the elections Ram Kishan as Sa1pa1 'b of Gram Panchyat Neemwala made a demand for the custody ot tt.e\n\nPancbyat record relating to the two villages Neemwala and Ramgarb Ror and also asked for the payment of the amount standing in the account of village Ramgarh Ror.", "canonical_name": "J Ramgarh Ror"}}, {"text": "Ram Kfahan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7485, "end_char": 7495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,00,000 in the name of Ram Kfahan as Sarpanch of the new Panchyat."}}, {"text": "Court of Sub Judge at Kaith.al", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7809, "end_char": 7839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Surat Singh did not render accounts, Ram Kishan PW consulted Mohinder Singh Advocate accused and on the latter's advice filed a suit for rendition of the accounts against Surat Singh in the Court of Sub Judge at Kaith.al, Mohinder Singh accused was also engaged by Ram Kifhan PW as his counsel in that cllfe."}}, {"text": "Ram Kifhan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7884, "end_char": 7894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Surat Singh did not render accounts, Ram Kishan PW consulted Mohinder Singh Advocate accused and on the latter's advice filed a suit for rendition of the accounts against Surat Singh in the Court of Sub Judge at Kaith.al, Mohinder Singh accused was also engaged by Ram Kifhan PW as his counsel in that cllfe."}}, {"text": "Mohinder\n\nSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8163, "end_char": 8178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the advice given by Mohinder\n\nSingh, Ram Kishan got passed resolution DB/I by Gram Panchyat Neemwala on May 14, 1963 whereby Ram Kishan was authorised on behalf of the Panchyat to receive the amount due from Gram Panchyat Seonsar.", "canonical_name": "Mohinder\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Gram Panchyat Neemwala", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8221, "end_char": 8243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the advice given by Mohinder\n\nSingh, Ram Kishan got passed resolution DB/I by Gram Panchyat Neemwala on May 14, 1963 whereby Ram Kishan was authorised on behalf of the Panchyat to receive the amount due from Gram Panchyat Seonsar."}}, {"text": "May 14, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8247, "end_char": 8259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the advice given by Mohinder\n\nSingh, Ram Kishan got passed resolution DB/I by Gram Panchyat Neemwala on May 14, 1963 whereby Ram Kishan was authorised on behalf of the Panchyat to receive the amount due from Gram Panchyat Seonsar."}}, {"text": "Gram Panchyat Seonsar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8351, "end_char": 8372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the advice given by Mohinder\n\nSingh, Ram Kishan got passed resolution DB/I by Gram Panchyat Neemwala on May 14, 1963 whereby Ram Kishan was authorised on behalf of the Panchyat to receive the amount due from Gram Panchyat Seonsar."}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8448, "end_char": 8469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Kishan also handed over memorandum PWJ/A which had been issued by the Reserve Bank of India for the deposit of Rs."}}, {"text": "Ram K.ishan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8527, "end_char": 8538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram K.ishan thereafter made enquiries from Mohinder Singh about the amount of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Ram Kishan Sarpanch"}}, {"text": "Rain Kishan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9053, "end_char": 9064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohinder Singh then told Rain Kishan to come to his office on December 13, 1963 with the receipt book of the Panchyat and its official seal."}}, {"text": "December 13, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9090, "end_char": 9107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohinder Singh then told Rain Kishan to come to his office on December 13, 1963 with the receipt book of the Panchyat and its official seal."}}, {"text": "Mussadi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9469, "end_char": 9476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 13, 1963 at about 10 a. m., it is stated, Ram Kishan PW accompanied by Mussadi PW went to the office of Mo hinder Singh accu, ed with the official receipt book and seal of Neemwala Pancbyat."}}, {"text": "Mo hinder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9502, "end_char": 9517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 13, 1963 at about 10 a. m., it is stated, Ram Kishan PW accompanied by Mussadi PW went to the office of Mo hinder Singh accu, ed with the official receipt book and seal of Neemwala Pancbyat.", "canonical_name": "Mohinder\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Neemwala Pancbyat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9570, "end_char": 9587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 13, 1963 at about 10 a. m., it is stated, Ram Kishan PW accompanied by Mussadi PW went to the office of Mo hinder Singh accu, ed with the official receipt book and seal of Neemwala Pancbyat."}}, {"text": "Landa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9883, "end_char": 9888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Kishan knows only Landa character and is otherwise .illiterate."}}, {"text": "Mussadi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9930, "end_char": 9937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mussadi too is illiterate."}}, {"text": "Cooperative Bank Kaithal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10723, "end_char": 10747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Kishan, Mussadi and the two accu•ed then went to Cooperative Bank Kaithal."}}, {"text": "Gram Panchyat Neemwala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10940, "end_char": 10962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6,000 on account of interest could not be paid in cash without sanction but he would transfer the amount in the name of Gram Panchyat Neemwala from the account of Gram Panchyat Seonsar by a book entry.", "canonical_name": "Gram Panchyat Neemwala"}}, {"text": "Gram Panchyat Seonsar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10983, "end_char": 11004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6,000 on account of interest could not be paid in cash without sanction but he would transfer the amount in the name of Gram Panchyat Neemwala from the account of Gram Panchyat Seonsar by a book entry.", "canonical_name": "Gram Panchyat Neemwala"}}, {"text": "Mohin4er Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11509, "end_char": 11523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohin4er Singh told Ram Kishan that he need not worry.", "canonical_name": "Mohinder\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Mehar Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11817, "end_char": 11828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some days later a fresh election was held and Mehar Chand became the Sarpanch of Neemwala Panchyat."}}, {"text": "Neemwala Panchyat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11852, "end_char": 11869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some days later a fresh election was held and Mehar Chand became the Sarpanch of Neemwala Panchyat."}}, {"text": "Block Samiti Chika", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11994, "end_char": 12012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Kishan learnt from an overseer of Block Samiti Chika that Surat Singh had withdrawn the amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "Ram Kisban", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12133, "end_char": 12143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50,000 from the bank and was giving out that ~~ had paid that money to Ram Kisban and got a receipt from Ram Kishaoi for that11mount.", "canonical_name": "Ram Kishan Sarpanch"}}, {"text": "Ram Kishaoi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12167, "end_char": 12178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50,000 from the bank and was giving out that ~~ had paid that money to Ram Kisban and got a receipt from Ram Kishaoi for that11mount.", "canonical_name": "Ram Kishan Sarpanch"}}, {"text": "Ram Kish.an", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12411, "end_char": 12422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Kish.an then made a complaint to the District Magistrate Karna!", "canonical_name": "Ram Kishan Sarpanch"}}, {"text": "District Magistrate Karna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12452, "end_char": 12477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Kish.an then made a complaint to the District Magistrate Karna!"}}, {"text": "June 12, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12482, "end_char": 12495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on June 12, 1964 praying that a caso might be registered against."}}, {"text": "sections 1208, 409, 467, 468 and 471", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12564, "end_char": 12600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Ponal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12601, "end_char": 12618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July 12. 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12864, "end_char": 12877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "46,8/S Which was lying in deposit with the Reserve Bank of India in the accaunt of Gram Panchyat Seonsar was sent on July 12."}}, {"text": "Snrnt Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12960, "end_char": 12971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The aforesaid amount was credited in the nccaunt of Snrnt Singh whh tho Co-oporati\\'e Bank Kaithal\n\non July 18, 1963."}}, {"text": "July 18, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13011, "end_char": 13024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The aforesaid amount was credited in the nccaunt of Snrnt Singh whh tho Co-oporati\\'e Bank Kaithal\n\non July 18, 1963."}}, {"text": "Ram Kishan Sarpanch", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13488, "end_char": 13507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thumb lmpres.ion, Ram Kishan Sarpanch, Neemwala\n\n18-7-63.\"", "canonical_name": "Ram Kishan Sarpanch"}}, {"text": "18-7-63", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13519, "end_char": 13526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thumb lmpres.ion, Ram Kishan Sarpanch, Neemwala\n\n18-7-63.\""}}, {"text": "Surat singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14443, "end_char": 14454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Surat singh, he withdrew on July 18, 1963 Rs.", "canonical_name": "Surat\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "December 13. 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15247, "end_char": 15264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohinder Singh expressed ignorance about the withdrawal of money from the bank by Surat Singh on July 18, 1963: Likewise the allegation that Ram Kishan and Mussadi had visited his office on December 13."}}, {"text": "Nuruddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15623, "end_char": 15631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal before us Mr. Nuruddin, learned council for the appell ants has taken us through the evidence on record and has contended that the amount of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Nuruddin Ahmad"}}, {"text": "Goswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16003, "end_char": 16010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As against that, Mr. Goswami on behalf of the state has supJiOrted the judgments of the High Court and the trial court and has urged that no case has been made for interference with the view taken by those courts."}}, {"text": "Kitab Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16408, "end_char": 16419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is in the evidence of Kitab Singh (PW 4) who was posted as an official in the Kaithal Co-operative Bank that on July 18, 1963 Surat Singh withdrew the amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kaithal Co-operative Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16464, "end_char": 16489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is in the evidence of Kitab Singh (PW 4) who was posted as an official in the Kaithal Co-operative Bank that on July 18, 1963 Surat Singh withdrew the amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "Surat Singh Sarpanch Seonsar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16925, "end_char": 16953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "46,875 were received by Ram Kishan PW from Surat Singh Sarpanch Seonsar."}}, {"text": "Gram Panchayat Neemwala", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17060, "end_char": 17083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This receipt admittedly bears the signatures of Ram Kishan in Landa character and also bears the seal of Gram Panchayat Neemwala."}}, {"text": "May 14,1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17315, "end_char": 17326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This receipt is on copy DB of resolution DBjl which had been passed by Gram Panchayat Neemwala on May 14,1963."}}, {"text": "Mukand Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17559, "end_char": 17569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DB is admittedly in the hand of Mukand Lal (PW 13), who wa• the Secretary of Panchayat Neemwala and is signed by him."}}, {"text": "Gian Parkash Sharma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17894, "end_char": 17913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writing is dated July\n\nI~, 1963 .. The accused exami_ned Gian Parkash Sharma (OW 3) Fmger."}}, {"text": "Chaudhry Daryao Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18318, "end_char": 18339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is in addition evidence on the record that the writing marked A was in the hand of Chaudhry Daryao Singh, who was the Manager ofro-operative Bank in July, 1963.", "canonical_name": "Chaudhry Daryao Singh"}}, {"text": "Chaudhry Daryao Sin&h", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18498, "end_char": 18519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DB is in the hand of Chaudhry Daryao Sin&h is proved by the testimony of Kitab Singh (PW 4) who was ihchar30 of the Co-oprative Bank, as wen as by that of Nihal Singh\n\n(DW I), who 19 a first cousm of Daryao Singh deceased and is familiar with his handwriting.", "canonical_name": "Chaudhry Daryao Singh"}}, {"text": "Nihal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18632, "end_char": 18643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DB is in the hand of Chaudhry Daryao Sin&h is proved by the testimony of Kitab Singh (PW 4) who was ihchar30 of the Co-oprative Bank, as wen as by that of Nihal Singh\n\n(DW I), who 19 a first cousm of Daryao Singh deceased and is familiar with his handwriting."}}, {"text": "Daryao Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18677, "end_char": 18689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DB is in the hand of Chaudhry Daryao Sin&h is proved by the testimony of Kitab Singh (PW 4) who was ihchar30 of the Co-oprative Bank, as wen as by that of Nihal Singh\n\n(DW I), who 19 a first cousm of Daryao Singh deceased and is familiar with his handwriting."}}, {"text": "October 24, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19509, "end_char": 19525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An attempt was made by the prosecution to show that the receipt book from which receipt DA was issued had been purchased on October 24, 1963 from Harish Chander (PW JO), as per cash memo PWl/D. This cash memo, however, relates to the sale of receipt book No."}}, {"text": "Harish Chander", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19531, "end_char": 19545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An attempt was made by the prosecution to show that the receipt book from which receipt DA was issued had been purchased on October 24, 1963 from Harish Chander (PW JO), as per cash memo PWl/D. This cash memo, however, relates to the sale of receipt book No."}}, {"text": "Harish Chander", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19714, "end_char": 19728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There can be hundrede of such receipt books and it is admitted by Harish Chander that he cannot say whether the cash memo relates to the receipt book from which receipt DA had been issued or to some other receipt book."}}, {"text": "SuraLSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20241, "end_char": 20251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are alsG \"Some other circumstances which create a doubt about the correctness of the prosecution allegati0ns, It is admitted by Ram Kishan PW that long before he made a complaint to the District Magistrate, he came to know that SuraLSingh was npresenting that he had paid the amount of compensation which was lying in deposit with the Reserve Bank of India to Ram Kishan and that Surat Singh was in possession of receipt for the payment of that amount.", "canonical_name": "Surat\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Gram Panchayat Seonsar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21084, "end_char": 21106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another fact which may also be mentioned in the above context i' that a suit was brought in September 1962 by Ram Kishan PW on hehalf of Gram Panchayat Neemwala against Gram Panchayat Seonsar through Surat Singh accused for rendition of account in respect of the assets of Gram Panchayat Neemwala."}}, {"text": "October 19, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21428, "end_char": 21444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The court accepted this evidence and held as per judgment dated October 19, 1963 that the accounts between the parties had boen settled."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_528_535_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "DAYA SINGH (dead) THROUGH L.RS. & ANR. v.\n\nDHAN KAUR March 5, 1974\n\n[K. K. MATHEW AND A. ALAGIR!SWAMI, JJ, J\n\nHbu!u Succession. Act, 1956, sec. 8--Whether effects change in old Hindu Law- B Death of female limited owner who succeeds last male holder-Customary Law of Punjab whether app/icable-Held, succession opens on death of limited owner and\n\nwould be governed by law then in force-Interpretation of statUtes.\n\nThe respondent's father, W,· who owned the suit property died in 1933. His widow, who succeeded to the estate, gifted-the property to her daughter, the res. pondent. The appellants :filed a suit as reversioners ofW questioning the gift. The suit was decreed and the decree was confirmed on appeal After coming into force C of tho Hindu Succession Act on 17-6-.1956, the widow again made a gift of the same lands to the respondent. She died in 1963. The appellants then filed the sui~ out of which this appeal arose, for possession of the lands alleging that the second gift \\Vas void. The trial court decreed their.suit but on appeal the respondent succeeded in the first Appellate Court as well as in the High Court on second appeal.\n\nOn appeal by.special Ieave_to this Court,\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD - (i) Following the decisions of the Privy Council in Moniram Kolita v.\n\nKeri Kofitani, I.LR. S Calcutta 776 at 789 and Duni Chand v. Anar Kali. A.I.R. 1946 P.C.173, (infra) the words .. dying intestate\" in Sec. 8 of the Act must be interpreted as merely meaning .. in the case of intestacy of a Hindu male'\" and to place this inter- pretation on the Act is not to give retrospective effect to its provisions. The refe- . rence is only to the fact of intestacy. The material point of time is the date when the succes.sion opens, namely, the death of the widow. Thus this propositions follow (i) Succession opens on the death of the limited owner, and (ii) the law then in force would govern the succession.\n\n[532D-O]\n\nMoniram Kolita v. Keri Ko/itani, l.L.R. S, Calcutta 776 789 and Duni Chand\n\nv. Anar Kali, A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 173, followed.\n\nEramma v. Verrupanna, (1966) 2 S.C.R. 626, explained and distinguished.\n\nBanso v. Charan Singh, A.I.R. 1961, Punjab 45 and Kuldip Sing v. Karnail Singh, A.I.R. 1961, Pwtjab, 573, approved.\n\nKempiah v. Giriga1nma, 'A.I.R. 1966, Mysore 189, overruled. __ - F Renuka Bal~ v. Aswini Kumar A.I.R. 1961,_Patna -499 ind Sam p, thla.n:liri v.\n\nLakshmi Ammal, A.I.R. 1963 Madras, 50, distinguished.\n\n(it) Succession to wS-Cstate in the present case opened when his widow died and it would have to be decided on the basis tJ:lat W died in 1963 when his widow died. In that case succession to his estate would have to be decided on the basis of s. 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. The accepted position under the Hindu law is that where a limited owner succeeds to an estate the succession to the estate on her death will have to be decided on the basis that the last full owner died on that day. If, therefore. succession opens and is to be decided on the basis of the last full ,\n\nowner dying on the date of the death of the limited owner it is onJy the law in force at the time of the death of the limited owner that should govern the case. To bold that the old Hindu law pplies to such a case is to allow your imaWaation to boggle. [5331<1.-c, GHJ\n\nEastoid Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Fmsbury Borough Council, 1952 A.C. 109, 132,\n\nper Lord Acsquit and Venka taclta/am v. Bornbay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd., (1959) H S.C.R. 703, referred to.\n\n The reversioners• right being a mere Spes succeSsionis there is no quesHon of impairing existing rights by adopting the interpretation we place on s. 8 apart from\n\nDAYA SINGH v. OHAN KAUR (A/agiriswami, l.) / 529\n\nthe fact that it does not amount to giving retrospective operation to s. 8 . Of course, if the property had already vested in a person under the old Hindu Law, it cannot be 1 divested. We can see no reason either in principle or on authority why the principle consistently followed under the earlier Hindu law that on the death of the limited owner succession opens and would be decided on the basis that the last male owner died on that day, should not apply even after coming into force of the A.ct. In the view we have taken it is s. 8 of the Act that applies and not the Customary Law.\n\n[534C-D, E-F.535G]\n\nClv1L AppELLATE JURISD1CTION: Civil Appeal No. 1825 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 18th May, 1967 oft he Punjab and Haryana High Court in L.P.A. No. 158 of 1967.\n\nNaunit Lal and La/it Kohli, for the appellant. 0.P. Verma, for the respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nALAGIR!SWAMI, J.-The property in dispute in this appeal belonged to Wadhawa Singh, the father of the respondent. After his death in the year 1933 his widow, who succeeded to the estate, made a gift of the property in favour of her daughter, the respondent, in April,\n\n1933. The appellants filed a suit as reversioners to the estate of Wadhawa Singh questioning the gift.\n\nThe suit was decreed and the decreo wli confirm'd on app, al. After coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act on 17-6-1956 the widow again made a gift of the same lands to the respondent. She died in 1963. The appellants then filed the suit, out of which this appeal arises, for possession of the lands alleging that the second gift was void. The Trial Court decreed their suit but on appeal the respondent succeeded in the first Appellate Court as well as the High Court on second appeal.\n\nThere is no doubt that Wadhawa Singh'swidow had no right to make a gift of the property which she inherited from her husband in 1933 and the decree obtained by the appellants, who were reversioners to her husband's estate would bind the respondent who wa' also a party to that suit. The question then is whether the coming into force of the Hindu succession Act and the subsequent gift made by the widow in favour of the respondent make any difference. Had not the widow made the gift to the respondent in 1933, she would ave become an absolute owner of the property as a result of s. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act and the gift made by hei subsequently in favour of the respondent could not have been questioned. But having made the gift in 1933 she was not in possession of the property inherited by her from her husband and, therefore, did not become a full owner with the result that the subsequent gift made by hei in favour of the respondent was of no effect. This point that unless the limited owner is in possession of the property section 14 does not apply has now been settled by decisions of this Court beyond dispute.\n\nWhat then is the effect of the provision of s. 8 of the Hindu Succession Act in the circumstances of this case. The Punjab High Court in its decisions in Banso v. Charan Singh (AIR 1961 Punjab 45), and Ku/dip Singh v. Karnail Singh (AIR 1961 Punjab 573). where the facts\n\nwere similar to the present case, has taken the viev..' that when a widow dies after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act the next heir to h'C h'.lsband is to be determined in accordance with the law prevailing on the date of the death of the widow and not in accordance with the law prevailing at the time of the death of her husand and held that the daughter succeeded in preference to the reversioners.\n\nTile Mysore High Court on the other hand in Kempiah v; Girigamma (AIR 1966 Mysore 189) has held that on the death of the widow succession would bi; governed by the Hindu Law which was in force when the last male holder actually died. The Patna High Court in Renuka Bala v. Aswini Kumar (AIR 1961 Patna 498) was disposed to take a similar view though the case before it was concerned with succession to the property of a female under s.15. The Madras High Court in Sampathkumari v. Lakshmi Ammal (AIR 1963 Madras 50) also took the view that in such circumstances s. 8 of the Hindu Succession Act would not apply. But the case before that Court was one where two widows who had succeeded to the estate of their husband were in possession, and therefore, s. 14 was applicable.\n\nLastly, we have the decisibn of this Court in Eramma v. Verrupanna (1966 2 SCR 626). In that case this.Court after setting out the provisions of s. 6 of the Hindu Succession Act observed:\n\n\"It is clear from the express language of the section that it applies only to coparcenary property of the male Hindu holder who dies after the commencement of the Act. It is manifest that the language of s. 8 must be construed in the context of s. 6 of the Act.\n\nWe accordingly hold that the provisions of s. 8 of the Hindu Succession Act are not retrospective in operation and where a male Hindu died before the Act came into force i.e., where succession opened before the Act, s. 8 of the Act will have no application.\"\n\nInterpreted literally this dicision would seem to accord with the decisions of all the other High Courts exceptthe Punjab High Court.\n\nBut it should be noticed that the problem that we are faced within the present appeal and in the cases before the Punjab and Mysore High Courts did not arise before this Court on the earlier occasion.\n\nTh.e decisions of the Madras High Court and the Patna High Court are not directly in point.\n\nIn the case before this Court the two women were in possession of property whose last male holder, who had died before coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, was their step son. They were not, therefore in legal possession of the properties of the last male holder. The question that had to be decided was whether because of the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act they were entitled to succeed under s. 8, and the further question whether s. 14 would be attracted as they were actually in possession. It was held that as they were not legally in possession s. 14 would not apply. It \"'\"\" in that context that it was said that where a male Hindu died before the Act came into force i.e.; where succession opened before the Act, s. 8' of the Act will have no application. The poi11i that succession\n\nDAYA SINGH v. OHAN KAUR. (Alagiriswami, /.) 531.!\n\nmight open not only when the male Hindu died but also subsequently. again when a limited owner who succeeds him dies was not taken. into account. There was no need and no occasion to consider suCh a. contingency i'n that case. There was the further fact that the last male holder was succeeded on his death by persons who were then his nearest heirs and the property vested in them could not be divested by the Hindu Succession Act coming into force subsequently though. this fact was not adverted to in the udgment. This Court had, therefore also no occasion to consider the effect of the earlier decisions on the question as to what happens when a female limited owner, whether. she is a widow. mother or daughter who succeeds the last inale holder. dies.\n\nThat position may now be cunsidered. It was authoritatively laid down by the Privy Council in its decision in Moniram Kolita v. Kerb Kaliteni (\\LR 5 Calcutta 776 at 789) that :\n\n\"According to the Hindu Law, a widow who succeeds to the estate of her husband in default of male issue, whether she succeeds by inheritance or survivorship-as to which see the Shivagunga case (!)-does not take a mere life-estate in the property. The whole estate is for the time vested in her absolutely for some purposes, though in some respects for only a qualified interest.\n\nHer estate is an anomalous one, and has been compared to that of a tenant-in-tail. It would perhaps be more correct 'to say that she holds an estate of inheritance to herself and the heirs of her husband. But whatever her estate is, it is clear that, until the tern1ination of it, it is impossible. to say who are the persons who will be entitled to succeed as heirs of the husband (2). The succession does not open to the heirs of the husband until the termination of the widow's estate.\n\nUpon the termination of that estate the property descends to those who would ha1•e been the heirs of the husband if he had lh•ed up to and died at the moment of her death (l).\"\n\nIn the subsequent decision in Duni Chand v. Anar Kali (AIR 1946 PC 173) the Privy Council observed :\n\n\" .... during the lifetime of the widow, the reversioners in Hindu Law have no vested interest in the 'estate but have a\n\nmre spes successioniS or chance of succession, which is a purely contingent right which may or may not accrue, that the succession would not open out until the widow died, and that the person who would be the next reversioner at that time would succeed to the estate and the alteration in the rule of the Hindu Law brought about by the Act would then be in full force. ---- (!) 9 Moore's I.A., 604:-·-\n\n(2) lei., 604\n\n(3) Id., 601.\n\nIn the argument before their Lordships, reliance was placed upon the words \"dying intestate\" in the Act as connoting the future tense, but their Lordships agree with the view of the Lahore High Court in 17 Lah 356(1) at p. 367, that the words are a description of the status of the deceased and have no reference and are not intended to have any reference (o the time of the death of a Hindu male. The expression merely means \"in the case of intestacy of a Hindu male\". To place this interpretation on the Act is not to give a retrospective effect to its provisions, the materials point of time being the date when the .succession opens, nan1ely, the death o_fthe widow.\n\nOn the position of reversioners in Hindu Law, opinions have been expressed by this Board from time to time with which the views of the learned Chief Justice in 58 All. 1041(2) mentioned above, are in agreement. It was said, for jnstance, that until the termination of the widow's estate, it is impossible to say who are the persons who will be entitled to succeed as heirs to her husband; 9 M.l.A. 539 (') at p. 604. Tlze succession does not open to the heirs of the husband until the termination of the widow's estate. Upon its termination, the property descends to those who would hare been the heirs Of the husband !f lze lzad lived up to and died at the moment of her death 7 /. A. i1 S (4) at p. 154.\"\n\n'It would be noticed that the Privy Council interpreted the words ·\"dying intestate\" as merely meaning \"in the case of intestacy ofa Hindu male\" and said that to place this interpretation on the Act is not to give r.etrospective effect to its provisions. Those are the very words found in s. 8. These may be contrasted with the words of s. 6 \"where 'a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act.\" Here the reference is clearly to the time of the death. In section 8 it is only to the fact of intestacy. The material point of time, as pointed out by the Privy Council, is the date when the succession opens, namely, the death of the widow. It is interesting to note that the Privy Council was interpreting the provisions of the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 where the two contrasting expressions found in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 are not found. The case for the interpretation .of the words \"dying intestate\" under the Hindu Succes sion Act is stronger. The words \"where a male Hindu dies after the •commencement of this Act\" in section 6 and their absence in section s, are extremely significant. Thus two propositions follow: (I) 'Succession opens on the death of the limited owner. and (2) the law\n\n' 11en in force would govern the succession.\n\nNow if this proposition is correct, as we hold it is, that wnere a female heir succeeds to an estate, the person entitled to succeed on the basis as if the last male holder had lived up to and died at the\n\n(I) Mt. Rajpali Kunwer v. Su1ju Rai (58 All. 1041).\n\n(2) Shakunta{a Devi v. Kauhsalya Devi (11 Lah 356).\n\n(3) Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shiva G11nga (9 MIA 539).\n\n(4) Mo11ira111 Kolita v. Kerry Kolita11g (1 TA 115: S Cal 776).\n\nDAYA SINGH v. DHAN KAUR (Alagiriswami, /.) 533:\n\ndeath of the limited owner, succession io Wadhawa Singh's estate in the present case opened when his widow died and it would have to be decided on the basis that Wadhawa Singh had died in 1963 when ms widow died. In that case the succession to his estate would have to be decided on the basis of s.8 of the Hindu Succession Act. 1 he various High Courts which have held otherwise seem to have been oppressed by the feeling that this amounted to giving retrospective effect to s. 8 of the Hindu Succession Act whereas it is only prospective.\n\nAs the Privy Council pointed out it. means no such thing. The accepted position under the Hindu Law is that where a limited owner succeeds to an estate the succession to the estate on her death will have to be decided on the basis that the last full owner died on that day. It would be un-reasonable to hold that in such a circumstance the law as it existed at the time when the last male holder actually died should be given effect to. If the person who is likely t~ succeed at the time of the limited owner's death is not, as happens very often; likely to be the person who would have succeeded if the limited owner had not intervened, there is nothing unrearnnable in holding that the law as to the person who is entitled to succeed on the limited owner's death should be the law then in force and not the la'\\ in force at the time of the last full owner's death.\n\nThe Madras High Court thought that the decision of the Privy Council in Dimi Chand v. Anar Kali (supra) was based upon a legal fiction and that fiction cannot be given effect to except for a limited purpose. The Mysore High Court also thought that the death referred to in section is actual death and not fictional death. Jn East end Dwellings Co., Ltd. v.\n\nFinsbury Borough Council (1952 A.C. 109\n\n132) Lord Asquith of Bishopstone observed :\n\n\"If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, ifthe putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. One of those in this case is emancipation from the 1939 level of rents. The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that.having done so, you must .cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs\". ~\n\nThis observation was cited with approval by this Court in Venkatachalam v. Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co., Ltd. (1959 S.C.R. 703) If, the!'l'fore, succession opens and is to be decided on the basis of the last full owner dying on the date of death of the limited owner th\" inevitable corollary is that it is only the law in force at the time of the death of the limited owner that should govern the case. J\"o hold that the old Hindu Law applies to such a case is to allow your imagination to bcggle, In the case decided by the Privy Council in Duni Chand\n\nv. Anar Kali (supra) if. this principle had been applied the new heirs\n\nintroduced by the Hindu Law of inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 . could not have then come in. We are not impressed with the reasoning of the Patna Highcourt that because the change brought about by that Act is different from the change brought about by the Hindu Succession Act a different conclusion follows. We should consider that if even the limited change in the area of succession effected by the Hindu Law of Inheritance( Amendment) Act, 1929 is to be given effect to as the law applicable on the date of the death of the limited owner, it is all the more reason why the .Hindu Succession Act which makes a much more radical change in the Hindu Law should have similar application. The Mysore High Court thought that the Hindu Succession Act not being a mere declaratory Act, retrospective effect shoul.d not be given to it so as to impair existing rights and obligations. But the reversioners' right being a mere spes successionis there is no question of imp1iring existing rights by adopting the interpretation we place on section 8 apart from the fact that, as earlir pointed out, the interpretation does not amount to givig retrospective effect to section 8.\n\nOf course, if the prop:rty had already vested in a person under the old Hindu Law it cannot be divested.\n\nWe must also point out that the classes of cases where such a question is likely to arise is very limited. Where a widow, mother or daughter was in possession of the estate on the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act she would become full owner under the provisions of the s. 14 of the Act.\n\nEven if a widow was in possession of the share belonging to her in the joint family estate under the provisions of the Hindu Women's Right to property.Act, 1937, she would become a full owner under s. 14. In both those cases s. 8 would have no op.ration. It is only in rare cases, like the present, that .the ues tion is likely to arise at all and we can see no reason either in principle or on authority why the principle consistently followed under the earlier Hindu Law that on the death of the limited owner succession opens and would be decided on the basis that the last male owner died on that day, should not apply even after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act.\n\nMr. Naunit Lal appearing for the appellant argued that the result of the decision of this Court in Eramma v. Verrupanna (supra) is that on the death of Wadhawa Singh's widow it is the old Hindu Law that applied and therefore under the custom in force in Punjab under which a daughter was not entitled' to succeed to the ancestral property .of the father i.n preference to the reversioners should apply and the appellants are entitled to succeed. There is no doubt about the position under the Customary Law of Punjab before coming into force .of the Hindu Succession .f.-ct. In Rattigan's Digest of the Customary Law' y, ubf; eh:~· by the University Book Agency (14th Ed.), paragraph\n\n.r~ at page 132 it is stated :\n\n\"23.(1) A daughter only succeeds to the ancestral landed prop:rty. of h•r fllther, if an agriculturist, in default :-\n\n(IJ Of the heirs mentioned in the preceding paragraph; and\n\nDAYA SINGH \\', DHA~ KAUR (AlagirisW(lf'Jli, J.) 535\n\n(2) Of near male collaterals of her father, provid<d that a married daughter ometimes excludes near male collaterals, especially amongst Muhammadan tribes :\n\n(a) where she has married a near collateral descendant from the same common ancestor as her father; or\n\n(b) w:1ere she has, w; th her husband continuously Jived with her father since her marriage; looking after his domestic wants, and assisting him in the management~ of his estate; or\n\n(c) where being married to a collateral of the father's family, she has been appointed by her father as his heir. ·\n\n(2) But in regard to the acquired property of her father, the daughter is preferred to collaterals.\"\n\nIt is on the basis of this Customary Law that the reversioners succeeded in the suit filed by them questioning the gift made by the respondent's mother to her. There is no doubt that Rattigan's work is an authoritative one on the subject of Customary Law in Punjab.\n\nThis Court in Mahan/ Salig Ram v. Musammat Maya Deii (1955) SCR 1191 at '1196) said : •\n\n\"Customary rights of succession of daughters as against the collaterals of the father with reference to ancestral and nonancestral lands are stated in paragraph 23 uf Rattigan 's Digest of Customary Law. It is categorically stated in sub-paragraph (2} of that paragraph that the daughter succeeds to the self acquired property of the father in preference to the collaterals even though they are within the fourth degree, Rattigan's work has been accepted by the Privy Council as \"a book of unquestioned authority in the Punjab''. Indeed the correctness of this paragraph was not disputed before this Court in Gopa/ Singh v, Ujagar Singh (1).\n\nIt is not now open to the respondent to show whether any of the circumstances mentioned in sub-paragraph (2} of paragraph 23 of Rattigan's Digest of Customary Law is present here as the previous decision is res judicata between the parties anci in any case it has not been attempted to be shown m this case, But in the view we have taken that it is s, 8 of the Hindu Succession Act that applies and not the Customary Law the appellants cannot succeed in this appeal.\n\nIn the result the appeal is dismissed, The appellants will pay the respondant's costs.\n\ns. 8. w.\n\nAppeal dis111iss('d.\n\n(I) 1955\n\nS.C.R, 86.", "total_entities": 78, "entities": [{"text": "DAYA SINGH (dead) THROUGH L.RS. & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAYA SINGH (dead) THROUGH L.RS. & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DHAN KAUR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DHAN KAUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. K. MATHEW", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 745, "end_char": 765, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "17-6-.1956,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 769, "end_char": 780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was decreed and the decree was confirmed on appeal After coming into force C of tho Hindu Succession Act on 17-6-.1956, the widow again made a gift of the same lands to the respondent."}}, {"text": "Sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1430, "end_char": 1436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1966) 2 S.C.R. 626", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2086, "end_char": 2105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2698, "end_char": 2702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2710, "end_char": 2730, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3635, "end_char": 3639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3772, "end_char": 3776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4236, "end_char": 4240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4517, "end_char": 4527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naunit Lal and La/it Kohli, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "La/it Kohli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4532, "end_char": 4543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naunit Lal and La/it Kohli, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "0.P. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4564, "end_char": 4574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "0.P. Verma, for the respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nALAGIR!SWAMI, J.-The property in dispute in this appeal belonged to Wadhawa Singh, the father of the respondent."}}, {"text": "ALAGIR!SWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4639, "end_char": 4651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "0.P. Verma, for the respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nALAGIR!SWAMI, J.-The property in dispute in this appeal belonged to Wadhawa Singh, the father of the respondent."}}, {"text": "Wadhawa Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4707, "end_char": 4720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "0.P. Verma, for the respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nALAGIR!SWAMI, J.-The property in dispute in this appeal belonged to Wadhawa Singh, the father of the respondent.", "canonical_name": "Wadhawa Singh'swidow"}}, {"text": "After coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5073, "end_char": 5124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "17-6-1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5128, "end_char": 5137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act on 17-6-1956 the widow again made a gift of the same lands to the respondent."}}, {"text": "Wadhawa Singh'swidow", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5529, "end_char": 5549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no doubt that Wadhawa Singh'swidow had no right to make a gift of the property which she inherited from her husband in 1933 and the decree obtained by the appellants, who were reversioners to her husband's estate would bind the respondent who wa' also a party to that suit.", "canonical_name": "Wadhawa Singh'swidow"}}, {"text": "Hindu succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5847, "end_char": 5867, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6088, "end_char": 6093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act", "statute": "After coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act"}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6101, "end_char": 6121, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6546, "end_char": 6556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6681, "end_char": 6685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6693, "end_char": 6713, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6753, "end_char": 6770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Punjab High Court in its decisions in Banso v. Charan Singh (AIR 1961 Punjab 45), and Ku/dip Singh v. Karnail Singh (AIR 1961 Punjab 573)."}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7023, "end_char": 7043, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7334, "end_char": 7351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tile Mysore High Court on the other hand in Kempiah v; Girigamma (AIR 1966 Mysore 189) has held that on the death of the widow succession would bi; governed by the Hindu Law which was in force when the last male holder actually died."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7567, "end_char": 7583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Patna High Court in Renuka Bala v. Aswini Kumar (AIR 1961 Patna 498) was disposed to take a similar view though the case before it was concerned with succession to the property of a female under s.15."}}, {"text": "s.15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7762, "end_char": 7766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7772, "end_char": 7789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras High Court in Sampathkumari v. Lakshmi Ammal (AIR 1963 Madras 50) also took the view that in such circumstances s. 8 of the Hindu Succession Act would not apply."}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7891, "end_char": 7895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7903, "end_char": 7923, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8081, "end_char": 8086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1966 2 SCR 626", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8171, "end_char": 8186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8249, "end_char": 8253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8261, "end_char": 8281, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, 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"start_char": 10525, "end_char": 10545, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Lahore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12938, "end_char": 12955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the argument before their Lordships, reliance was placed upon the words \"dying intestate\" in the Act as connoting the future tense, but their Lordships agree with the view of the Lahore High Court in 17 Lah 356(1) at p. 367, that the words are a description of the status of the deceased and have no reference and are not intended to have any reference (o the time of the death of a Hindu male."}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14425, "end_char": 14429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14473, "end_char": 14477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14600, "end_char": 14609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14969, "end_char": 14995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15195, "end_char": 15204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "statute": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s.8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16195, "end_char": 16198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16206, "end_char": 16226, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16375, "end_char": 16379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16387, "end_char": 16407, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Patna Highcourt that", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19102, "end_char": 19122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are not impressed with the reasoning of the Patna Highcourt that because the change brought about by that Act is different from the change brought about by the Hindu Succession Act a different conclusion follows."}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19218, "end_char": 19238, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19540, "end_char": 19560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19689, "end_char": 19709, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19993, "end_char": 20002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hindu Succession Act", "statute": "Hindu Succession Act"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20120, "end_char": 20129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hindu Succession Act", "statute": "Hindu Succession Act"}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20443, "end_char": 20463, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20520, "end_char": 20525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hindu Succession Act", "statute": "Hindu Succession Act"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20737, "end_char": 20742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20764, "end_char": 20768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21198, "end_char": 21218, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21475, "end_char": 21481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Naunit Lal appearing for the appellant argued that the result of the decision of this Court in Eramma v. Verrupanna (supra) is that on the death of Wadhawa Singh's widow it is the old Hindu Law that applied and therefore under the custom in force in Punjab under which a daughter was not entitled' to succeed to the ancestral property .of the father i.n preference to the reversioners should apply and the appellants are entitled to succeed."}}, {"text": "DAYA SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22117, "end_char": 22127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of h•r fllther, if an agriculturist, in default :-\n\n(IJ Of the heirs mentioned in the preceding paragraph; and\n\nDAYA SINGH \\', DHA~ KAUR (AlagirisW(lf'Jli, J.) 535\n\n(2) Of near male collaterals of her father, provid<d that a married daughter ometimes excludes near male collaterals, especially amongst Muhammadan tribes :\n\n(a) where she has married a near collateral descendant from the same common ancestor as her father; or\n\n(b) w:1ere she has, w; th her husband continuously Jived with her father since her marriage; looking after his domestic wants, and assisting him in the management~ of his estate; or\n\n(c) where being married to a collateral of the father's family, she has been appointed by her father as his heir. ·", "canonical_name": "DAYA SINGH"}}, {"text": "Rattigan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23017, "end_char": 23025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no doubt that Rattigan's work is an authoritative one on the subject of Customary Law in Punjab."}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24194, "end_char": 24214, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24389, "end_char": 24393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_536_540_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "KUMARPASHUPATINATHMULLAH (DEAD)BY L. RS.\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\nMarch 5, 1974 (K. K. MATHEW AND A. ALAGIRISWAMl, 1J.J\n\nWest Bengal Estate Acq,, i.ition .Act, 1953, s. SA-Scope of.\n\nB Under s. SA, West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, if it was found after an enquiry that a transfer made after May S, 1953, was not bonafidc, the transfer shall stand cancelled. Under SA (7). a transfer shall be held to be not bonafide if it was made principally or partially with the object of increasing the amount of land which a person may retan, or with the object of increasing the amount of compensation payable. Under s. 6, an intermediary, holding land under a trust may retain such land; and under s. 16, in determining the net income of an inter. mediary, for purposes of determining the compensation payable to him, one of the C items to be deducted from the gross income is the amount payable by the intermedi~ afY, to a re1igious or charitable trust, out Of the income of the estate.\n\nIn 1928, a charge had been created upon an estate for the maiiltenance and seva puja of a family deity and for the performance of certain specified charitable purposes. In October 1953, the appellant, whO had inherited a half share of the estate executed a document whereby a half share in his share of the estate was set apart exclusively for the purpose for which the charge had been created earlier and the rest of the property was to be treated as absolutely free and absolved from the D claims in respect of the religious and charitable purposes. The appellant appointed him self as a trustee in respect of the property set apart for the religious and charitable purposes. He transferred his interest in the remaining portif>n of the estate to bis son and wife. The Settlement Officer held, under the Act, that tlie 1953-document executed by the appellant was not bonafi.de. His appeal, and petition in the High Court, failed\n\nAllowing the appeal to this Court, and remanding the matter to ihe High Court for disposal afresh, E\n\nHELD : (1) Jf the substance of the transaction of 1953 by which properties are endowed in favour of the deity is looked into there is no reason why Jt should not be called a girt. Therefore, the transaction was a transfer within the meaning of the Act [539 B-C)~\n\nChan1pa Bibi v. Panchira1n Nallata AIR 1963 Cal. '51 approved.\n\n(2) 'fhe High Court ; lnd the authorities below erred in holding thnt the transfer F was not bonafide.\n\n(a) The Settlement Officer found that the total expenditure on seva and charitable purposes was Rs. 30,000 and appellant's share therein would be Rs. J 5,000/-. It was also found that the income of the land absolutely transferred for the religiou~ and charitable purposes under the deed of 1953, is Rs. 23,000(-. But ror the execution of the document the appellant would have been .in possession of the whole of his share of the estate with only a charge amounting to Rs. 15,000/-. But the result of the document was that land yielding a larger incoine was transferred absolutely G to the deity the Settlement Officer should therefore, have given his reason as to how he arrived at the conclusion that the transfer would enable the appellant to retain a lar_gcr extent of land or entitle him to a larger amount of compensation. The Special Judge in appeal and the High Court did not go into the question at all.\n\n[539F-H, 5408]\n\n(b) Whether the appellant was entitled to free a portion of the estate from the charge and confine the charge to only a portion Of the estate does not affect the question whether the transfer was bonafidl? in terms of the Act.\n\n[539H] H\n\n(c) Merely because he transferred 'the remaining~ portion to his son and wife could not establish want of bona tides. [539HJ\n\n(3) No question under s. 6(1) (i) of the Act arises on the facts of this case.\n\n(S40B-C] . .\n\nFar/u/ Rabbi Pradhan v. State of Wm Ii<n1a/ (136S] 3 SCR 307, foollwed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JUR.ISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1838 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 23rd May, 1967 of the Calcutta High Court in Civil Rule No. 1119 of 1962.\n\nPurshottam Chatterjee and Ganpat Rai for the appellant,\n\nP. K. Chakrabarty and G. S. Chatterjee for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nALAGIR.ISWAMI, J. Gobinda Prosad Pandit, the founder of the Scarsole Raj Estate died in the year 1861 leaving a will. Aller his death in a suit between his widow and certain other claimants regarding the title to the estate it was held that a charge had been created upon the entire estate for the maintenance and seva puja of the family deity and for the performance of certain pecified charitable purposes. In 1928 thc appellant, his brother and their father who succeeded to the estate executed an arpannamah in favour of the family deity reiterating the charge created by Gobinda Prosad Pandit. On October 12, 1953 the appellant executed a document whereby a half share in a part of the estate was set apart exclusively for the purpose for which the charge biid been created earlier,.and the rest of the property was to be treated as al>Solutely free and absolved from the claims in respect of the reli gious and charitable purposes. The appellant appointed himself as the trustee. The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 came into force on 12·2·1954. Under that Act, the main provisions of which, in so far as they arc relevant for the purposes of thi' appeal, we shall refer to later, the estate vested in the State on 14-4-1955. Subsequently the Act was amended by introducing section 5A therein with retrospective cffeot from 5-5-1953, the date prior to that on which the bill, . which later became the West Bengal fatales Acquisition Act, was published in the Gazette. After an enquiry the Settlement Officer held that the document executed by the appellant on Octobor 12, 1953 was not bona fide. The appeal against thb decision to the Special Judge failed and so also a petition filed befvre the High Court under Art. 227 of the Co'nstitution. This appeal ha' been filed in pursuance of the special leave granted by this Court.\n\nWe shall now set torth the provisions of the Act in brief :\n\nUnder s. 4(1) of the Act a notification may be issued by the State Government that all estates and the rights of every intermediary in each such estate shall vest in the State free from all incumbranccs .\n\nUnder s. 5(1) upon the publication of such a notification the estates H and the rights of intermediaries in the estates shall vest in the State fret frC1m all it1eumbrances. It may bo stated even at thil stage that the appellant is an intermediary. Under s. SA the State Government 6-M45Sup.C.I.{7S\n\nmay enquire into any case of transfer of any land by an intermediary made botween the 5th day of May, 1953 and the date of vesting, if in its opinion there are prima facie reasons for believing that such transfer was not bona fide, and if after such an enquiry the State Government finds that such tramfer was not bona fide, it shall make an. order to that effect and thereupon the transfer shall stand cancdled as from the date on which it was made or purported to have been made: Against an order passed by the State Government an appeal lies to a Special . Judge. Sub-section (7) of this s.ction lays down that a transfer shall be held to be not bona fide if it was made principally or partially With the object of increasing the amourit of land which a person may retain,. or principally or partially with the object of increasing the amount of compensaJion payable. 'Transfer' means a transfer by sale, mortgage, lease, exchange or gift.\n\nUnder section 6 an intermediary is entitled to retain various categories of land. of which it is only mcessary to refer to the category mention.id in $ection 6(1) (i) which reads :\n\n'_'where the intermediary is a corporation or an institution established exclusively for a religious or a charitable purpose or both, or is a person holding under a trust or an endowment or other legal obligation exclusively for apurpose which is charitable or religious or both-land held in khas by such corporation or institution, or person, for such purpose including land held by any person, not being a tenant, by leave or license of such corporation or institution or person;\" •\n\nSection 16 provides for the calculation of the gross income and the E .~ .net income of an interm>_diary. Among. the items which have to be deducted from the gro; s income in order to.arrive at the net income is • the one under section 16(1) (b) (vi) which reads as follows :\n\n\"any sum payable by such intermediary out of the income . of an estate or interest which has vested iii the State under section 5, to a corporation or an institution established exclusively for a religious or a charitable purpose or both, or to a person holding under a .. trust or an endowment or other legal obligation exclusively for a purpne which is charitable or religious or both, where such estate or interest wa~ [held partly for a religious or charitable purpose and partly for a purpose other than religious or charitable.\" .\n\nSection 17 provides for the determination of the amount of compensation payable to intermediaries. ·\n\n. The Settlement Officer held that \"a charitable trust is ex-hypothesi a voluntary transfer by way of gift and it has been held that one of the various modes of giving property for religious purpose is to give it to the . trustees\" and therefore it was a transfer. Before the . Special Judg! it wa> argued tli1t th!re was no tran>fer at all inasmuch as it was not an act of conveying the property from one living person to another, and that it was not at all a gift since there was no transfer •\n\nH •\n\n1 >..-.\n\n• '\n\nThe. learned Special Judge rejected that contention. Similar rguments were repeated before the High Court which also -rejected that con tention. We are of opinion that the High Court as well as the authori~ ties below were right in this conclusion. The definition of the terni 'transfer' does not attract all the definitions given in the Tramfer of Property Act for th~ transactions hich are defined as transfers in the Act. If the substance of the transaction by which properties are endowed in favour of a deity is looked into we do not see why it cannot be called a gift. In Champa Bibi v. Panchiram Nahata (AIR 1963 Calcutta 551) a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that 'a transfer of property by dedication to a Hindu deity is a transfer by gift within the meaning of s. 5A(7)(iii) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act.\n\nAs regards the seoond point whether the transfer was bona fide or not the Settlement Officer did not apply his mind to ihe provisions of the Act which lay down what transfers would\n\n0 be held to be not bona fide. He did not consider whether the transfer was made principally or partially with the object of increasing the amount of land which the transferor may retain or increasing the amount of compensation payable to him. He only took into consideration the fact that certain lands were transferred to the appellant's son and his wife and held that it was clear from them that the deed was made pnncipally or partially with the object of increasing the amount of land which the appellant could retain, and also with the object of increasing the amount of compensation payable under the Act. He did not go into the facts of the case 'but merely repeated the words of the section. It is found from that order itself that the total expenditure on the seva and charitable pur- poses was Rs. 30,000/- and the appellant's share therein would be\n\nRs.15,000/-. It is also found thattheincome of the land_absolutelytrans-. ferred under the deed of October 12, 1953 is Rs. 23,000/-. But for the\n\nc execution of the document the appellant would have been in possession of the whole of the estate with only a charge amounting to Rs. 15,000/-.\n\nAs a reult of the document land yielding a larger income was trans- : ferred absolutely to the deity. The Settlement Officer should, therefore, have given his reasons as to how he arrived at the conclusion that the transfer would enable the appellant to. retain a larger extent of land or entitle him to a larger amount of compensation. The Special Judge merely considered that it was difficult to understand how the appellant who inherited the moiety share of the estate subject to the charge was legally competent to free a portion of the estate from the charge and confine the charge to only a portion of the estate. But that does not affect the question whether the transfer was bona fide in terms of the\n\nAct. He took the view that the Act considered alongwith the fact that A the appellant transferred his interest in the remaining portion of the estate to his son and wife clearly established want of bona fides on the part of the appellant, and that it was done to defeat the purpose of legislation. It would be noticed that he has also not gone into the question whether the impugned transaction enables the appellant to retain a larger extent of land or claim a larger amount of compensation. The High Court did not go into this question at all. 8.\n\nWe do not consider that the facts of this case raise any question under section 6(1) (i) at all. That can arise only with regard to the situation as it existed before the execution of the impugned documen.t and under the unamended Act. The earlier document of 1928 as well as.the prior decree would not bring the lands under this section at all, as was held by this Co11rt in Faz/Ill Rabbi Pradhan v. State of West C Bengal [1965] 3 SCR. 307.\n\nIn the result this appeal is allowed. The High Court will dispose of the matte( a fresh in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.\n\nV. P. S.\n\nAppeaJ allowed •.", "total_entities": 37, "entities": [{"text": "KUMARPASHUPATINATHMULLAH (DEAD)BY L. RS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUMAR PASHUPATI NATH MULLAH (DEAD) BY L.RS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "1974 (K. K. MATHEW", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 196, "end_char": 237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 614, "end_char": 618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 696, "end_char": 701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3768, "end_char": 3775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S40B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3827, "end_char": 3831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JUR.ISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3913, "end_char": 3942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JUR.ISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4061, "end_char": 4080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 23rd May, 1967 of the Calcutta High Court in Civil Rule No."}}, {"text": "Purshottam Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4114, "end_char": 4135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Chatterjee and Ganpat Rai for the appellant,\n\nP. K. Chakrabarty and G. S. Chatterjee for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4140, "end_char": 4150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Chatterjee and Ganpat Rai for the appellant,\n\nP. K. Chakrabarty and G. S. Chatterjee for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chakrabarty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4171, "end_char": 4188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Chatterjee and Ganpat Rai for the appellant,\n\nP. K. Chakrabarty and G. S. Chatterjee for the respondent."}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4193, "end_char": 4209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Chatterjee and Ganpat Rai for the appellant,\n\nP. K. Chakrabarty and G. S. 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Gobinda Prosad Pandit, the founder of the Scarsole Raj Estate died in the year 1861 leaving a will.", "canonical_name": "Gobinda Prosad Pandit"}}, {"text": "Gobinda Prosad Pandit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4851, "end_char": 4872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1928 thc appellant, his brother and their father who succeeded to the estate executed an arpannamah in favour of the family deity reiterating the charge created by Gobinda Prosad Pandit.", "canonical_name": "Gobinda Prosad Pandit"}}, {"text": "October 12, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4877, "end_char": 4893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 12, 1953 the appellant executed a document whereby a half share in a part of the estate was set apart exclusively for the purpose for which the charge biid been created earlier,.and the rest of the property was to be treated as al>Solutely free and absolved from the claims in respect of the reli gious and charitable purposes."}}, {"text": "West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5265, "end_char": 5306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "12·2·1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5326, "end_char": 5335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 came into force on 12·2·1954."}}, {"text": "14-4-1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5506, "end_char": 5515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under that Act, the main provisions of which, in so far as they arc relevant for the purposes of thi' appeal, we shall refer to later, the estate vested in the State on 14-4-1955."}}, {"text": "section 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5565, "end_char": 5575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "5-5-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5615, "end_char": 5623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently the Act was amended by introducing section 5A therein with retrospective cffeot from 5-5-1953, the date prior to that on which the bill, ."}}, {"text": "Octobor 12, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5851, "end_char": 5867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After an enquiry the Settlement Officer held that the document executed by the appellant on Octobor 12, 1953 was not bona fide."}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6004, "end_char": 6012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6187, "end_char": 6194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6393, "end_char": 6400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5th day of May, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6773, "end_char": 6793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.I.{7S\n\nmay enquire into any case of transfer of any land by an intermediary made botween the 5th day of May, 1953 and the date of vesting, if in its opinion there are prima facie reasons for believing that such transfer was not bona fide, and if after such an enquiry the State Government finds that such tramfer was not bona fide, it shall make an."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7637, "end_char": 7646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8299, "end_char": 8309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8527, "end_char": 8540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8696, "end_char": 8705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9114, "end_char": 9124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5A(7)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10519, "end_char": 10532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13246, "end_char": 13258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1965] 3 SCR. 307", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13598, "end_char": 13615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V. P. S.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13767, "end_char": 13775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. P. S.\n\nAppeaJ allowed •."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_541_548_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "l c\n\n• G\n\nLAX MAN\n\nl'.\n\nSTATE INDUSTRIAL COURT & ORS.\n\nI March p, 1974 ( P. JAGANMOllAN REDDY ANDS. N. DWIVEDI JJ.]'\n\nC.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 1947-s.16-JVhether a <lis- 1nissed, discharged or retrenched employee can invoke the jurisdiction of the authority under the S:ate Act for obtaining redress. . _ .\n\nAppellant, a motor driver in the Milk Scheme at Nagpur, v, ras dismissed from servitc by the order of Dairy Development Ccrnmissioner, Bombay. The appellani was on probation for 6 months after bis appointrr, ent and he continued in service more than 2 years y,.hen his services were terminated. The appellant filed an application, under s. 16 of the C.P. and Derar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947, before the Asstt. Labour Commissioner, praying for re-instatement with back \\\\-ages and continuity of employment, The Asstt. Labour Commissioner set aside the order of termination and directed respondents 3 to 5 to reinstate the appellant with back \\Vages.\n\nRespondents 3 to 5 filed a revision f:efore the State Industrial Court u/s. 16(5) of the Berar Act. That Court set aside the order and rCmandetl the case for a fresh decision as to whether the appeIIant was a pern anent employee and whether, he \\vas illegally retrenched. After remand the Deputy Commissioner of Labour concluded that the appellant was not a permanent employee under the provisions of the Standing Orders. He, however held that as . the employee 'vas in continuous service, he had been retrenched illegally and in violation of s. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Ac~. the Central Act.\n\nAgainst this Order, respondents 3 to 5 filed a. revision application u/s, 16(5) of the State Act before the State Industrial Court.\n\nThis Court set aside the retrenchment order and held that the appellant was entitled to retrenchmen't compensation and so remaned the case for determination of what that compensation should be, Against this order respondents 3 to 5 filed a petition before the High Court. The appellant also filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution for modification of the order of the State Industrial Court and for renstatement with back wages . etc.\n\nBoth these petitions were heard together and by a common judgment, allowed the application of Respondents 3 to 5 holding that the appellant was not an ••employee within the meaning of s. 2(10) of the State Act as his dismissal. discharge\n\n- or removal was not on account of an Industrial dispute and accordingly, the appellant's petition was_ dismissed. ·\n\nTue question which fell for consideration wa r,/J whether under the State Act a dismissed, discharged or retrenched employee was an .. employee\" within the _meaning-of s.2(10) of the Act and could invoke the jurisdiction of the authority under the State Act for obtaining redress.\n\nAllowing the appea1,\n\nHELD : (i) A combined reading of the definition of an \"emPloyee\" ins. 2(10) with s.2 (12) & (13) would show that those who had ceased to be in service were also ic.cluded witin the definition of an \"'employee\". [546A-B]\n\n(ii) Under s. 16(2), an employee working in an industry to which a notification under 5ub-s. (1) is applied can within 6 months of his dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension apply to the labour commissioner for re-instatement and payment of compensation for loss of wages. An employee dismissed, discharged or removed on account of any industrial dispute is certainly an employee under s.2(10), and what is meant by an .. inustrial dispute'' can be ascertained by reference to s.2(12), under \\\\'hich any dispute or difference connected with an industrial matter arising between employer and employee or -between employers or employees is an industrial dispute.\n\n[546C-;-EJ\n\nSince the question of re-instaten1ent is an industrial dispute, in the present case, the appellant would be an employee within the n1eaning of s.2 (10) of the Act for the purposes of availing hin1self of the right under sub-s.(2) of sec. 16 of the Act. l546-F]\n\nCentral Provinces Transport Scrrices Ltd., /\\'agp11r v. Ragl11111a1h Gopal Pat1rardha11, [1956j S.C.R. 956; Western India Automobile Association v. fndustria/ Tribunal, B0111bay, [1949] F.C.R. 321 and Bennett Co/en1a11 & Co. (Prirate) Ltd. v. Punya Pri.ia Das Guptu, [1969} L.L.J. 554, referred to .\n\n. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal 1188 & 1189 of 1969.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated the I Ith March 1967 of the Bombay High Court (Nagpcr Bench) at Nagpur in Special Civil A1plication Nos. 345 and 575 of 1966.\n\nS. W. Dhabe and A. G. Ratuaparkhi, for the appellant S. B. Wad and S. P. Nayar, for the respondenls 3 & 4 in (C.\n\nA. l l88) and respondents 4 & 5 (in C. A 1189)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by D\n\nJAGANMOHAN REDDY, J. Tho appllant was appointed as a motor driver in the Milk Scheipe at Nagpur by the Regional Dairy development Ofticer on December 10, 1959andonFebruary28,1962 his services were terminated by the orders of the Dairy Development Commissioner, Bombay-Respondent No. 5 After the appointment the appellant was on probation for a period of six months and since that period was not extended it is his contention that he is a permanent employee inasmuch as the standing orders which came into force on September 30, 1961 made an employee on probation permanent after completion of one year's probationary period. On March 20, 1962, the appellant filed an application before the Assista11t Labour Commissioner, Nagpur, under s. 16 of the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes.\n\nSettlement Act, 1947-hereinafter referred to as 'the Act\" praying for\n\nreinstatement with back wages and continuity of employment. In that application the appellant stated that if the order of termination amount. cc! to dismissal that order was void as it was made \\Vithout any inquiry and if it was an order of retrenchment it was equally bad as no notice of change was given under s. 31 of the Act. The tern1ination '\\Vll.3 also said to be illegal as it was brought about by an authority which had not appointed him. The Assistant Labour Commissioner who heard. the petition set aside the order of tern1ination and directed respondents 3 to 5 to reinstate the appella11t with back wages and continuity of service in as much as it was held that the appellant having completed the probationary period of one year became a pennanent e1nployee. In this vie\\\\', the other contentions raised by the appellant \\vcre not decided.\n\nLAXMAN v. STATE INDUSTRIAL COURT (Jaga11mohan Reddy,!.) 543\n\nRespondents 3 to 5 filed a revision before the State Industrial Court un.dcr s. 16(5) of the Act. That Court set aside the order on August 12, 1953, and remanded the case for a fresh decision as to whe ther the appellant was a permanent employee and whether he was illegally retrenched. After remand the Deputy Commissioner of Labour at Nagpur after considering the evidence came to the conclusion that the appellant was not a permanent employee under the provisions of the Standing Orders. He, however, held that as the appellant was in continuous service, he had been retrenched illegally without following the provisions of s. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act-hereinafter called 'the Central Act.' In the result respondents 3 to 5 were directed to reinstate the appellant with back waees a11d continuity of service.\n\nAgainst this order respondents 3 to 5 filed a revision application under s. 15(5) of the Act before the State Industrial Cou1t at Nagpur. In that revision, an application was made by the respondents for amendment of the revision petition raising a plea for the first time that the appellant being a retrenched employee was not an\"employee\" under the provisions of the Act. The State Industrial Court did not accept this plea and while setting aside the reinstatement order held that the appellant was entitled to retrenchment compensation and consequently remanded the case for determination of what that compensation should be. Against this order respondents 3 to 5 filed a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The appellant also file,\\ a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court for modification of the order of the State Industrial Court and for reinstaterr.em with back wages and continuity of service along with all its privilege•.\n\nBoth these petitions were heard together by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur. By a common judgment, the High Court allowed the application of respondents 3 to 5 holding that the appellant was not an \"employee\" within the meaning of s. 2(10) of the Act as his dismissal, discharge or removal \\.Vas not on account of an industrial dispute. In this view, the appellant's petition wasdismissed. These two appeals are with certificate against that judg111cnt.\n\nThe question which falls for consideration is whether under the Act a dismissed, discharged or retrenched employee can invoke the jurisdiction of the authority under the Act for obtaining redress, namely, whether an application for reinstatement and compensation by a dismissed employee is maintainable under s. 16 of the Act. The determination of this question would depend upon the interpretation of who the employee is for the purposes of the Act and what is meant by \"On account of any industrial dispute\" ins. 2(10) read withs. 2(12) & (13).\n\nThese provisions, as also s. 16, insofar as material, are given below :\n\ns. 2(10)-\"employee\" means any person employed by an employer to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for contract or hire or reward in any industr.v and includes an employee dismissed, discharged or rerr . ..>ved on <..ccount of any industrial dispute ;''\n\ns. 2(12)-\"industrial disput:\" means any :iispute or diffcren :e connected with an industrial mat~r arising between employe• and employe~. or betwen employers or employees;\"\n\n\" 2\\13)-\"industrial matter\" means any matter relating to work, .pay, wage~. reward, hours, privileges, rights or duties of employers or employees, or the mode, terms and conditions of employment or refuse\\ to employ and includes questions pertaining to-;\n\n(a) the relationship between employer and employees, or to the dismissal or non-employment of any person, x x x . x\" s. 16-\"(l) Where the State Government by notification so directs, the labour Commissioner shall have power to decide an iniustrial dispute touching the dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension of an employee working in any industry in general or in any looal area as m•Y be spocified in the notification.\n\n(2) Any employee, working in an industry to which the notification under sub-section (I) applied, may within six months fromthedate ofsuch dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension, apply to the Labour Commissioner for reinstatement and paymeat of compensa.tion for loss of wages. x x x x\"\n\nBoth s. 2(\\0) and 16 were amended by Act 21 of 1966.\n\nThe former E before its amendment was as follows:\n\ns. 2(10)-\"employee\" means any person employed by an employer to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for contract or hire or reward in any industry and includes an employee discharged on account of any dispute relating to a change in resjlect of which a notice is given under section 31 or 32 whether before or after the discharge;\"\n\nIt may be observed that s. 2(10) before its amendment included an employee discharged on account of any dispute relating to a change in resjlect of which a notice was given under s. 31 or 32 of the Act.\n\nIt will be seen that s. 31 dealt with tho procedure to be followed by an employer desiring. change in the standing orders or in resjlect of any industrial matter mentioned in Sch. Jl s. 32 dealt with the procedure to be followed by a representative of employees desiring change in the standing orders or in respect of any other industrial matter. One of the industrial matters referred to in item 3 of Sch. lI is \"Dismissal of any employee except in accordance with law or as provided for in the standing orders settled under section 30 of this Act\". lhi> <ietinition of \"employee\" in s. 2(10) appears to have been enlarged by the amendment by including an employee dismissed, discharged or removed on account of any industrial dispute and not necessarily confined only toany dispute relating to a change in respect of which notice\n\nLAXMAN v. STATE INDUSTRIAL COURT (laganmohan Reddy, 1.) 54S\n\nis given under s. 31 or 32 of the Act. The High Court appears to have read the definition of \"mployee\" in s. 2(10) as contemplating two categories of persons (!) consisting of persons who are actually in the employment of the employer at the date of the application; and\n\n(2) of tho>e who have ceased to be in the employment prior to the date of the application, the reason for ceasing to be an employee being \"dismissal, discharge or removal on account of any industrial di:i• pute\".\n\nJn its vi_w, the words of the definition U.ici not include all ex-employees but only specified categories which have to be corelated to any industrial dispute, and as there was no industrial dispute betwen Laxman and the employer prior to the termination of his service, Laxman cannot be considered to be an ''employee'' within the meaning of s. 2(10) of the Act. A decision of this Court in Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd.\n\nNagpur v. Rahunath Gopa/ Patwardhan(I) was referred to, but the High Court sought to distinguish it on the\n\nround that in that case the employee had been dismissed after an mquiry which i\\lvolved an industrial dis?ute. It then proceeded to state :\n\n\"As we have already pointed out, the definition has since been amended and the reference to ss. 31 and 32 has been dropped. As it now stands, the requirement of the definition is that if the applicant is not in service at the date of application he must have been dismissed, discharged or removed \"on account of.any industrial dispute\". We do not think that the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in that case that every dismissed employee. irrespective of the reason for his dismissal,\n\ncntines to be an \"employee\" within the meaning of the definition ms. 2(10) of the Act so as to entitle him to approach the Labour Commissioner under s. 16(2) of tho Act,\"\n\nI~ .the view of the High Court, therefore, a plain reading of the definit10n qf the term \"employee\" ins. 2(10) shows that the only category of persons who, though not in actual employment at the date of the application included within that term is of persons who are ex-emp- !oyees and were dismissed, discharged or removed on account .of any mdustrial dispute, which dispute must precede the disll'jssal, discharge or removal, and that their dismis>al, discharge or removal must be the result of such dispute.\n\nIt is contended that an \"employee\" having been defined as a person employed, the Legislature intended that the provisions of the Act should be availed of only by persons who were still in the employment at the time when an application was filed under the Act, and even if the employee who invokes the provisions of the Act can be considered to be a person who is dismissed, discharged or retrenched, it is not every sue~ employee who has that right, but only tho:; e employees have the !•&ht to invoke the provisions of the Act.who have been dismissed, discharged or retrenched and in respect of whom an industrial\n\n(1) (1956] S.C.R. 956.\n\ndispute).? pl!nding. In Our view both tnesc contentions arc untenable.\n\nA. combined reading of the definition of an \"employee\" in s. 2(10) with s. 2(12) & (13) would negative the submission that tho>e who had ceased to be in service were not intended to be included within the definition of an \"employee\". When the Legislature in defining a word or term refers to certain matters as being included therein it does so because either.tlr1t \\.Vord or term dues not generically include what is sought to be inclrded or that it is anxious to dispel any doubt ae to v.•hat is included therein is not so included and by abundanti cauta/a it is specifically shown as having been included in order to repel any such contention to the contra. Under s. 16 (2) an •omp!oyee working in an industry to which a notification unJer sub-s. (I) is applied cn\n\nwithin six month~ of his dismissal, discharge, rcn1oval or suspension apply to the Labour Commissioner for reinstatement and payment of compensation for lo\" of wages. A person who applies within six months from the date of his dismissal, di1charge, removal or suspension is certainly not employed on that date and yet if the argument of the re1pondent is accepted he is not an employee within the meaning of s. 2(l0) and hence has no right to apply under sub-s. (2) of s. 16 An employee dismissed, discharged or removed on accoun of any industrial dispute is certainly an employeed under s.2 (IO)~ but what is meant by an \"industrial dispute\" in this definition can be ascer tained by reference to s. 2(12) under which any dispute or difference connected with an industrial matter arising between employr ad employoe or between employers or employee is an Industnal d1Sute. No doubt it was contended in the Central Prol'inces Transport Serl'ices Ltd's case(') that where a person is dismissed, discharged or retrenched, the relationship of an employer and employee is terminated and there is no longer an industrial dispute. This very contention was negatived in that case for the obvious reason that the dispute or difference referred to ins. 2(12) should be connected with an industrial matter arising between an employer and an employee, which industrial matter as defined ins. 2(13) covers any matter relating o refusal to employ and includes questions pertaining to the dismissal or non-employment of any person. If so considered, since a question of reinstatement is an industrial dispute, the appellant would be an employee within the meaning of s. 2(10) of the Act for the purposes of avail_ing himself of the right under sub-s. (2) of s. 16. Even under a restricted definition of the word \"employee\" under s. 2(10) before the amendment, this Court in the Central Provinces Transport Senices Ltd's case (Su\"ra) had held that a workman whose services had been terminated could have resort to sub-s. (2) of s. 16 of the Act The\n\nHigh Court thought that the decision is inapplicable as in that case an enquiry had been held before the employee's services were terminated which amounted to an industrial dispute, but in the instant case no such industrial dispute arose as it was a retrenchment simpliciter. We are unable to appreciate this distinction as in our view it is a distinction without a difference. The ratio in the Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd's case (Supra) is clearly applicable notwithstanding the amendment of s. 2(10) and s. 16 of the Act. After pointing out that s. 2(k)\n\nLAxMAN v. STATE INDUSTRIAL COURT (Jaga11moha11 Reddy,/.) 547\n\nof the Central Act and ss. 2 (12) and 2 (l3) of the Act are substantially in pari materia, the ratio of Western India Automobile Associat; oi v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay(') will be as much applicable to the one enactment as to the other, this Court pointed out in• the Central Prorinces Transport Serrices Ltd's case (Supra) at pp .. 961-962 :\n\n\"We are also unable to accede to the contention of the appellant that the inclusive clause in s. 2(10) of the Act is an indication that the legislature did not intend to include within that definition those who had ceased to be in service. In our opinion, that clause was inserted ex abundanti cautela to repel a possible contention that employees discharged under ss. 31 and 32 of the Act would not fall withins. 2(10), and cannot be read as importing and intention generally to exclude dismissed empolyees from that definition. On the other hand, s. 16 of the Ac expressly provides for relief being granted to dismissed employees by way of reinstatement and compensation, and that provision must become useless and inoperative, if we are to adopt the construction which the appellant seeks to put on the definition of employee ins. 2(10). We must accordingly held agreeing with the decision in Western India Automobile Association v Industrial Tribunal Bombay (supra) that the definition of \"employee\" in the Act would include one who has been dismissed and the respondent cannot be denied relief only by reason of the fact that he was not in employment on the date of the application.\"\n\nThis case was referred to and considered in Bennett Cole1nan & Co .. (Private) Ltd v. Punya Priya Das Gupta.(') The case was under the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, where a newspaper employee was defined in a language similar to that used in defining an \"employee\" under the Act and the Central Act. , This Court took note of the amendment to the Act and even so held that both the decision in the Westem India Automobile Associatwn's case (supra) and the Central Pro1•inces Transport Services Ltd's case (supra) were authorities for the view that an exemployee would, for the purposes of the controversy before them, be a working journalist. The contention that Dhrangadhra Chemical Works Ltd v. State of Saurashtrp and others(3) and Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Dimakuc/ii Iea Estate (4) took a contrary view was examined and distinguished. It was, however, observeii\n\n(I) ]1949) F.C.R. 321.\n\n(1) 11957] I L.L.J. 477.\n\n(2) [19691 2 L.L.J. 554.\n\n(4) [1968] I L.L.J. 500.\n\n'that even assuming that there is such a conflict as contended; it was\n\nnot necessary to resolve it for the purposes of the problem before •the Court, because the Act which was being considered there and the Central Act, the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the Central Provinces Act with which we are concerned disclose a similar scheme under -which an ex-employee is permitted to avail of the benefits of those provisions, the only requirement being that the claim in dispute must be one which has arisen or accrued whilst the claimant was in emp- •loyment of the person against whom it is made.\n\nIn view of what has been stated, we think the High Court was in error in holding that the application of the appellant could not be entertained by the Labour Commissioner. As this was the only question decided, we allow these appeals, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the case to the High Court for disposal according to law. The appellant will have his costs in this court, one set.\n\ns.c.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 86, "entities": [{"text": "STATE INDUSTRIAL COURT & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE INDUSTRIAL COURT & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "1974 ( P. JAGANMOllAN REDDY ANDS. N. DWIVEDI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "1974 ( P. JAGANMOllAN REDDY ANDS. N. DWIVEDI JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 173, "end_char": 177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 1947", "statute": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 670, "end_char": 675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 1947", "statute": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 1947"}}, {"text": "Derar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 692, "end_char": 738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1071, "end_char": 1079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Derar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947", "statute": "Derar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1541, "end_char": 1547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Derar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947", "statute": "Derar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2045, "end_char": 2053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2363, "end_char": 2371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2704, "end_char": 2711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2921, "end_char": 2924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3072, "end_char": 3080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3452, "end_char": 3459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3543, "end_char": 3550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3883, "end_char": 3886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3973, "end_char": 3980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1949] F.C.R. 321", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4181, "end_char": 4198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. W. Dhabe", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4540, "end_char": 4551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. W. Dhabe and A. G. Ratuaparkhi, for the appellant S. B. Wad and S. P. Nayar, for the respondenls 3 & 4 in (C.\n\nA. l l88) and respondents 4 & 5 (in C. A 1189)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by D\n\nJAGANMOHAN REDDY, J. Tho appllant was appointed as a motor driver in the Milk Scheipe at Nagpur by the Regional Dairy development Ofticer on December 10, 1959andonFebruary28,1962 his services were terminated by the orders of the Dairy Development Commissioner, Bombay-Respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. G. Ratuaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4556, "end_char": 4573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. W. Dhabe and A. G. Ratuaparkhi, for the appellant S. B. Wad and S. P. Nayar, for the respondenls 3 & 4 in (C.\n\nA. l l88) and respondents 4 & 5 (in C. A 1189)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by D\n\nJAGANMOHAN REDDY, J. Tho appllant was appointed as a motor driver in the Milk Scheipe at Nagpur by the Regional Dairy development Ofticer on December 10, 1959andonFebruary28,1962 his services were terminated by the orders of the Dairy Development Commissioner, Bombay-Respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. B. Wad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4593, "end_char": 4602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. W. Dhabe and A. G. Ratuaparkhi, for the appellant S. B. Wad and S. P. Nayar, for the respondenls 3 & 4 in (C.\n\nA. l l88) and respondents 4 & 5 (in C. A 1189)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by D\n\nJAGANMOHAN REDDY, J. Tho appllant was appointed as a motor driver in the Milk Scheipe at Nagpur by the Regional Dairy development Ofticer on December 10, 1959andonFebruary28,1962 his services were terminated by the orders of the Dairy Development Commissioner, Bombay-Respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4607, "end_char": 4618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. W. Dhabe and A. G. Ratuaparkhi, for the appellant S. B. Wad and S. P. Nayar, for the respondenls 3 & 4 in (C.\n\nA. l l88) and respondents 4 & 5 (in C. A 1189)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by D\n\nJAGANMOHAN REDDY, J. Tho appllant was appointed as a motor driver in the Milk Scheipe at Nagpur by the Regional Dairy development Ofticer on December 10, 1959andonFebruary28,1962 his services were terminated by the orders of the Dairy Development Commissioner, Bombay-Respondent No."}}, {"text": "D\n\nJAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4745, "end_char": 4764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. W. Dhabe and A. G. Ratuaparkhi, for the appellant S. B. Wad and S. P. Nayar, for the respondenls 3 & 4 in (C.\n\nA. l l88) and respondents 4 & 5 (in C. A 1189)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by D\n\nJAGANMOHAN REDDY, J. Tho appllant was appointed as a motor driver in the Milk Scheipe at Nagpur by the Regional Dairy development Ofticer on December 10, 1959andonFebruary28,1962 his services were terminated by the orders of the Dairy Development Commissioner, Bombay-Respondent No."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5262, "end_char": 5280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 After the appointment the appellant was on probation for a period of six months and since that period was not extended it is his contention that he is a permanent employee inasmuch as the standing orders which came into force on September 30, 1961 made an employee on probation permanent after completion of one year's probationary period."}}, {"text": "March 20, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5376, "end_char": 5390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 20, 1962, the appellant filed an application before the Assista11t Labour Commissioner, Nagpur, under s. 16 of the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes."}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5484, "end_char": 5489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Settlement Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5535, "end_char": 5555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5918, "end_char": 5923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Settlement Act, 1947", "statute": "Settlement Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "LAXMAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6460, "end_char": 6466, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LAXMAN", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "s. 16(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6598, "end_char": 6606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 12, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6653, "end_char": 6668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That Court set aside the order on August 12, 1953, and remanded the case for a fresh decision as to whe ther the appellant was a permanent employee and whether he was illegally retrenched."}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6858, "end_char": 6864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After remand the Deputy Commissioner of Labour at Nagpur after considering the evidence came to the conclusion that the appellant was not a permanent employee under the provisions of the Standing Orders."}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7148, "end_char": 7153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7163, "end_char": 7186, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 15(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7417, "end_char": 7425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8034, "end_char": 8051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8059, "end_char": 8080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8125, "end_char": 8133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court at Nagpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8399, "end_char": 8426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution in the High Court for modification of the order of the State Industrial Court and for reinstaterr.em with back wages and continuity of service along with all its privilege•.\n\nBoth these petitions were heard together by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur."}}, {"text": "s. 2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8582, "end_char": 8590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9115, "end_char": 9120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9380, "end_char": 9385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9427, "end_char": 9435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9699, "end_char": 9707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10246, "end_char": 10251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(\\0) and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10853, "end_char": 10868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10953, "end_char": 10961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11244, "end_char": 11254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11326, "end_char": 11334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11481, "end_char": 11486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11527, "end_char": 11532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11689, "end_char": 11694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12032, "end_char": 12042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12091, "end_char": 12099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12415, "end_char": 12420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12506, "end_char": 12514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Laxman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13092, "end_char": 13098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn its vi_w, the words of the definition U.ici not include all ex-employees but only specified categories which have to be corelated to any industrial dispute, and as there was no industrial dispute betwen Laxman and the employer prior to the termination of his service, Laxman cannot be considered to be an ''employee'' within the meaning of s. 2(10) of the Act.", "canonical_name": "LAXMAN"}}, {"text": "s. 2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13229, "end_char": 13237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 31 and 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13662, "end_char": 13675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13961, "end_char": 13974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not think that the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in that case that every dismissed employee."}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14215, "end_char": 14223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15520, "end_char": 15528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15534, "end_char": 15542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16129, "end_char": 16134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(l0)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16639, "end_char": 16647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16700, "end_char": 16705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16819, "end_char": 16822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16929, "end_char": 16937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Prol'inces Transport Serl'ices Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17138, "end_char": 17180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No doubt it was contended in the Central Prol'inces Transport Serl'ices Ltd's case(') that where a person is dismissed, discharged or retrenched, the relationship of an employer and employee is terminated and there is no longer an industrial dispute."}}, {"text": "s. 2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17884, "end_char": 17892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17975, "end_char": 17980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18046, "end_char": 18054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Provinces Transport Senices Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18095, "end_char": 18134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even under a restricted definition of the word \"employee\" under s. 2(10) before the amendment, this Court in the Central Provinces Transport Senices Ltd's case (Su\"ra) had held that a workman whose services had been terminated could have resort to sub-s. (2) of s. 16 of the Act The\n\nHigh Court thought that the decision is inapplicable as in that case an enquiry had been held before the employee's services were terminated which amounted to an industrial dispute, but in the instant case no such industrial dispute arose as it was a retrenchment simpliciter."}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18244, "end_char": 18249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18662, "end_char": 18702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ratio in the Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd's case (Supra) is clearly applicable notwithstanding the amendment of s. 2(10) and s. 16 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18773, "end_char": 18781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18786, "end_char": 18791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18828, "end_char": 18835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18922, "end_char": 18927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19341, "end_char": 19349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 31 and 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19612, "end_char": 19625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19796, "end_char": 19801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Westem India Automobile Associatwn's", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20889, "end_char": 20925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court took note of the amendment to the Act and even so held that both the decision in the Westem India Automobile Associatwn's case (supra) and the Central Pro1•inces Transport Services Ltd's case (supra) were authorities for the view that an exemployee would, for the purposes of the controversy before them, be a working journalist."}}, {"text": "Central Pro1•inces Transport Services Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20947, "end_char": 20988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court took note of the amendment to the Act and even so held that both the decision in the Westem India Automobile Associatwn's case (supra) and the Central Pro1•inces Transport Services Ltd's case (supra) were authorities for the view that an exemployee would, for the purposes of the controversy before them, be a working journalist."}}, {"text": "1949) F.C.R. 321", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 21373, "end_char": 21389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21695, "end_char": 21718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_549_555_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "SHY AM SUNDER AND OTHES R v.\n\nTHE STATE OF RAJASTHAN\n\nMarch 12,. J974\n\n[K. K. MATHEW AND A. ALAGIRISWAMI, JJ.]\n\n549.\n\nFatal Accidents Act, 18SS, See. 1-A-Accitknt 1esulting from truck catching firt- Occupant dying of injuries sustained in jumping out of truck on caution by drive - Maxim res ipsa /oquitur-App/icability of Constitution of India, Art. 300-Tortious IUWility of state- Held, fami'ne relief work not a sovereign funclf!'n.\n\nThe deceased, who was at the material tinle in the en1ployment of the State of Rajasthan in the Public Department, was required to proceed from his office at Bhdwara to Banswara, in connection with famine relief work undertaken by the department. For that purpose, he boarded a truck owned by the department from Bhilwara on, May 19, 1952 with six others.. Throughout the journey the radiator of the truck was gettiog heated frequently and the driver was pouring water into it after overy .6 or 7 miles of journey. The truck took nine houn to travel the distance or seventy miles.\n\nAfter having travelled four miles from Pratapgarh, the engine of the truck caught fire.\n\nAs soon as the fire was seen, the driver cautioned the occu pants to jump out of the truck. Consequently, they did so. The deceased struck against a stone Iyina by the side of the road and died instantaneously.\n\nThe widow of the deceased brought a suit for damages against the State of Rajasthan under the provisions of the Act. The plaintiff alleged, inter a1ia, that it was on account of the negliaence of the driver of the truck that a truck which was not road-worthy was piit on the road and that it caught fire which led to the death of her husband and that the State was liable for the negligence of its employee in the course of his employment. The plaint also alleaed that the deceased had left behind\n\nhim his widow name]yt the etaintiff, two minor sons, one minor daughter and his parents. The plaiotilfclatmed damaaes to the tune of Rs. 20,<XXJ/. and prayed for a decree for that amount. The state resisted the claim denying negligence of the driver and plea.din& sovereign immunity.\n\nThe trial Court relied on the maxim res ipsa /oquitur, found that in putting the truck on the road the driver was negligent as the truck was not road-worthy and sine the driver was negligent, it held that the State was vicariously Hable for his a.ct.\n\nTh4; court assessed the damages at Rs. 14,7flJ/· and granted a decree for the amount to the plaintiff. Against this decree the state appealed to he High Court. On the evidence on record, the High Court held that the principle of res ipsa /oquitur had no\n\n3pplication to the factsof the case.\n\nAccordingly, the High Court allowed the appea1. On appeal by special leave to thi~ Court.\n\nHELD : (I) Generally speaking an ordinary roadworthy vehicle would not cateh fire. The driver was nea].igent in putting the vehicle on the road. From the evidence it is clear that the radiator was getting heated frequently and that the driver was poui-ing water in the radiator after every 6 or 7 miles of journey. The vehicle-- took 9 hours to cover the distance of 70 miles between Chittorgarh and Pratapgarh.\n\nThe fact that normally a m:otor vehicle would not catch fire if its mechanism is in order would indicatC that there was some defect in it. The Distt. Judge. found on the basis of evidence of witnesses that th~ driver knew about this defec.._ tive cOndition of the truck when he started from Bhtlwara. [5540-FJ\n\nIt is clear that the driver was in management of the vehicle and the accident is sw:h that it does not happen in the ordinary course of th!ngs. There is no evidCnceas to how the truck cauaht fire .. There was no explanatton by the defendant about':!: it It was a matter within the exclusive knowlcdce of the defendant. It was not.. ible rOr _the plainti\" to _give any evide a~ to the cause of the accident. these circumstances, the maxun rts ipsa loqurt11r 1s attracted. [S~4F-G]\n\nThe 1naxiin docs not embody any rulC of substantive law nor a rule of evide- n:c. It is perhaps not a rule of any kind but simply a caption to an agrun1cnt on the evider.ce. The maxim is only a convenient label to apply to a set of circumstances, in which the plaintiff proves a case so as to call for a rebuttal from the defendant without having to allege any specific act or omission on the part of the defendant. Jts principal function i's to prevent injustice which would result if. a plaintiff were invari::tbly co1npellcd to prove the precise cause of the accident and the dcfend:i.ut r~Sponsible for it, even v.hen the facts bearing on the matter arc at the outset unl:novn to him and often within the knowledge of the defendant. The 1naxim is based on commonsense and its purpose is to do justice when the facts bear ing on causation and on care exercised by the <lefenclant are at the outset unknown lo the plaintiff and ure or ought to be within the knowledge of the defendant. !k52F-553 CJ The plointiff r:ierely proves a result, not any particular act or omission prodi..· cing the result. Jf thC result, in clrcumstances which he proves it makes it more prob able than not that it was caused by the negligence of the defendant, the doctrine of re~ ipsa (Jq11itur is said to apply, and the plaintiff will be entitled to succeed un less the defendant by evidence rebuts that probability.\n\nR's dispa loquitur is an im inensely important vehicle for importing strict liability into negligence cases. '[583 C-D, 584 Fj\n\nScorJ. v. London & St. Catherine Docks [18651 3 H. & C. 596, 601, {t9i3) S. C. ·(I-IL) 43, Barkwav v. South ~Vales Transport [1950J 1 AllE.R. 392, Jones v, Gr, at IVester11, [1930] 7 TLR 39, referred to.\n\n(fl) As the law stands today, it is not possible to say that famine relief work is D a sovereign function of the State as it has been traditionally understood. Jt is a work which can be and is being undertaken by private individuals. There is nothing peculiar about it so that it might be predicated that the State alone can legitimately undertake the work. [555 E-FJ Kasturi/a/ v. Sta.le of Uttar P1adesh [1965] 1 S.<;:.R. 375, referred to.\n\nQL1aere : (a) Whether the immunity of the State for injuries on its i.; itizens committed in the exercise of what are called sovereign functions has any m91aJ justi- E fication today; (b) whether there is any rational dividing line between the so-called sovereign and proprietary commercial functions for determining the 1iubility of the state. [555 B-C, E]\n\nSe:n1:llc: The m:iiern sovereign immunitv doctrine which is based on the )!round that there con be no leal right as aainc; t the authority that mak.es the law on which the right depends, for exempting the sovereign from suit is neither logical nor ; practical. [555 D-E].\n\nCJvIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Civil Appw.l No. 1827 of 1967.\n\nApp, al by spocial leave from I.he judgment and order dated the-, '29th April 1966 of the Raja<thc High Court at Jodhpur in D. B.' Civil Regular First Appeal ~\"· 48 of 1957.\n\nU. N. Trivedi and Ga.ipat Rai, for the Appellants.\n\nSobhagmal Jain, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMATHEW, J.\n\nThis is an appoal by special leave, against the iudgment and decree of the High Court of Rajasthan, setting aside decree for recovery of damages under the Patel Accidents Act, 1855 <(hereinafter referred to as the Act).\n\n.. '\"'\n\nSHYA!v1 SUNDER v. RAJASTHAN (l'vt:.d1c, t,. J) 551\n\nNavneetlal was a resident of Udaipur.\n\nHe was in the emplovment of the State of Rajasthan and was, at the material time, worki,; g in the office of the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Bhilwara as a Store Keep or. In connection with the famine relief works undertaken by the department he \\Vas required to piocced to B(l.nswara. For that purpose he boarded trnck No. RJE-131 owned by the deportment from Bhihve.re on May 19, 1952 and reached Chittorgarh in the evening.\n\nReids hiJneif, there \\'i'ere FD.tch Singh FundjJal and Hccra Sing:1, the dnver, cleaner and a stranger jn the truck. On May 20, 1952, they resumed the journey from Chittorgarh at about 11 A.\n\nM. and reached Pratapgarh in the same evening.\n\nThe truck started fro1n Pratapgarh to Bans\\V<ra at about IO A.M. on May 21, ]952. After having travelled for 4 miles fro:n Pratapgarh, the engine of the truck caught lire.\n\nAs soon as the fire was seen the <lriver cautiont<l the occupants to ju1np out of the truck.\n\nConsequently, Navneetlal and the other persons jumped out Of the truck. \\VJ1ile doing so, Navnectla1 strurk against a stone lying by the ide of the r0a:l and died instantaneollsly.\n\nParwati Devi, widow of NnvneetlaI r.rought a suit [].gain.st the State of Rajasthan for damages under the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe p!aintiff alleged that it w&s on account of the negligence of the driver of the truck that a truck \\vhich , va:.; not ror.dwortliy was put on the road and that it caught fire which led to tl:e death of Navneetlal and that the State wos liable for the negligence of its employees in tlie course of his employment. The plaint also alleg'd that the deceased had left behind him his widow, namely, th:! plaintiff, two n1inor sons, one minor daughter and his parents.\n\nThe plaintiff claimed damages to the tune of Rs. 20,000!- and prayed for a decree for that amount.\n\nThe State contended that the truck was qt1ite in order when it started from Bhilwara and even when it started from Pratapgarh to Banswara and that if it dc\\'eloped some mechanical troubles suddenly which resulted in its catc'.1ing fire, the defendant was not liable as th'ro was M neglig, nce oa the part of the driver.\n\nThe trial court found that the act of the driver in putting the truck?\" the road was negligent as the truck was not rnadworthy and since the dnver was neghgent, the State was v1canously liable for his act. The Court assessed the damages at Rs. 14,760/· and granted a decree for the amount to the plaintiff. ·\n\nIt was ag1inst this decree that the State appealed to the High Court.\n\nThe High Court came to the condusion that the plaitiff had not proved by evidence that the driver was negligent, that the mere fact that the truck caught fire was not evidence cf negligence on his part and that the maxim res ipsa /1quitur had. no application.\n\nThe Court said that the truck travelled safely from Bhilwara to Pratapgarh and that the engine caught fire after having\n\nSUPREME COUJ.T REPORTS [ 1974 l 3 s.C.R.\n\ntravelled a distance of 4 miles from Pratapgarh an<i that there was nothing on record to show that the engine of the truck was in any way defectlve or that it was not functioning properly.\n\nThe Court was of the view that the mechanism of \"n automobile engine is such that with all proper and careful handling it can go wrong while it is on the road for reasons which it might be difficult for a driver , to explain. The Court then discussed the evidence and came to the conclusion that no inference of negligence on the part of the , tlriver was pqssibl~ on the basis that ihe engine of the truck got heated of and on and that water was put in the radiator frequently, or that it took considerably long time to cover the distance between Bhilwara and Chittorgarh and that between Chittorgarh and Pratap garh. The High Court therefore, allowed the appeal.\n\nThe main point for consideration in this appeal is, whether the fact that the truck caught fire is evidencde of negligence on the part of the driver in the course of his employment. The maxim res ipso /oquitur is resorted to when an accident is shown to have occurred and the cause of the accident is primarily within the knowledge of the defendant. The mere fact that the cause of the accident is unknown does not prevent the plaintiff from recovering damageo, if the proper inference to in drawn from the circumstances which are known is that it w1s caused by the negligence of the defendant. Tho fact of tte accident may, sometimes, constitute evidence of negligence and then the maxim res ipso loquitur applies.\n\nThe maxim is stated in its classic form by Erk, C. J. :\n\n\" .... Wh< re the thing is to shown to be under the management of the defendant or his scrvents, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the ab, ence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.\"\n\nThe maxim does not embody any rule of substantive law nor a rule of evidence. It is perhaps not a rule of any kind but simply the caption to an argument on the evidence.\n\nLord Shaw remarked that if the phrase had not been in Latin nobody would have called it a principle (2), The maxim is only a convenient label to apply to a set of circumstances in which the plaintiff proves a case so as to call for a rebuttle from the defendant without having to allege and prove any specific act or omission o~ the part of the defendant.\n\nThe principal function of the maxim is to prevent injustice which would result if a plaintiff were invariably compelled to prove the precise cause of the accident and the defendent responsible for it, even when the facts bearing on tlie matter are at the outset unknown to him and often within the knowldge of the defendant. But though the parties' relative access to evidence is an influential, factor, it is not controllinll. Thus the fact that\n\n(I) See Scott v. London St. Katherine Docks (1865) 3 H. & C. S96, 601.\n\n(2) Soe Ballard v. North British Railway Co.1923 S. C. (H.L.)43.\n\nSHYA){ SUNDER V. RAJASTHAN (Mal~W, /,) 553\n\nthe defendant is as much at a loss to explain the aci; ident or ·- himself died in it, docs not preclude an adverse inference against him if the odds otherwise point to his negligence (see John G.\n\nFleming, The Law of Torts, 4th ed., p. 264). The mere happening of the accident may be more consistent with the negligence on the part of tht defendant than with other causes. . The maxim is based on common sense and its purpose is to do justice when the facts bearing on the causation and on the care excercised by defendant are at the outset unknown to the plaintiff and are or ought to be withfn the knowledge of the defendant (see Barkwa>' v. S.\n\nWales Tran.lport(l). ·\n\nthe plaintiff merely proves a result, not any particular act or omission producing the result. . If the result in the circumstances . in which he proves it, makesit more probable than not thai it was\n\ncau$ed by the negligence of thio defendant, the doctrine of res ips11 loquitur is said to apply, and the plaintiff will be entitled to succeed unless the defendant by evidence rebuts that probability.\n\nThe answer needed by the defendant to meet the plaintiff's case may take alternative fornis. Firstly, it may consist in a positive explanation by the defendant of how the accident did in fact occur, of such a kind as to exonerate the defendant from any charge of negligence. ·\n\nIt should be noticed that the defendant doesllot advance bis case inventing fanciful theories, unsupported by evidence, of how the event might have occurred. The whole inquiry is concerned with probabilities, and facts are required, not nlere conjecture unsupported by facts. As Lord Macmillan said in his dissenting judcment in Jones v.\n\nGreat Western (2) : ·\n\n\"Tb•; dividing line between conjecture and inference is often a very difficult one to draw. A conjecture may be plausible, but it is of no legal value, for its essense is that it is a mcreguess. An inference, in. the legal sense, on the other band, is a deductioL from the.evidence, and if it is a reasonable deduction it inay have the validity of legal proof. The attribution of an occurrence to a cause is, I take it, always a matter of inference. The cogency of a legal inference of causation may vary in degree between practical rtainty and reasonable probability. Where the coincidence of cause and effect is not a matter of actual 01>servation there is. necessarily a hiatus in the dirt ct evidence, but Uris may be legitimately bridged by ; m inference from tLe frets actually observed and proved.\"\n\nIn other words, an inference is adeductioo from established facts and an assumption or a guess is SJmething quite different but not necessarily related to established facts.\n\n(I). [1950] l All J; ngland Reports 392, 39~; 7 _;_M 45 Sup on 5\n\n(2) [1930] 47 T. L. R. 39.\n\nAlternatively, in those instances where the defendant is unable to explain the accident, it is incumbent upon him to advance positive proof that he had taken all reasonable steps to avert foreseeable harm.\n\nRes 1ps' /oquitur is an immensely important vehicle for importing strict liability into negligence cases. In practice, there are many cases where res iP'\" /oquitur is properly invoked in which the defendant is unable to show affirmatively either that he took all reasonable precautions to avoid injury or that the particular cause of the injury was not associated with negligence on his part. Industrial and traffic accidents and injuries caused by defective merchandise are so frequently of this type that the theoretical limitations of the maxim are quite overshadowed by its practical significance (I).\n\nOver the years, the general trend in the application of the maxim has undoubtedly become more sympathetic to plaintiffs. Concomitant with the rise in safety standards and' expanding knowledge of the me chanical devices of our age less hesitation is felt in concluding that the miscarriage ofa familiar activity is so unusual that it is most probably the result of some fault on the part of whoever is responsible for its safe performance (see John, G. Fleming, The Law of Torts,4th ed., p. 260).\n\nWe are inclined to think the learned District Judge was correct in inferring negligence on the part of the driver.\n\nGenerally speaking, an ordinary road-worthy vehicle would not catch fire.\n\nWe think that the driver was negligent in putting the vehicle on the road. From the evidence it is clear that the radiator was g<tting heated frequently and that the driver was pouring water in the radiator after every 6 or 7 miles of the journey. The vehicle took 9 hours to cover the distance of 70 miles between Chittorgarh and Pratapgarh. The fact that normally a motor vehicle would not catch fire if its mechanism is in order vould indicate that there \\las some defect in it. The District Judge found on the basis of the evidence of the witnesses that the driver knew about this defective condition of the truck when he started from Bhilwara.\n\nIt is clear that the driver was in the management of the vehicle and the accident is such that it does not happen in the ordinary course of things.\n\nThere is no evidence as to how the truck caught fire.\n\nThere was no explanation by the defendant about it. It was a matter within the exclusive knowledge of the defendant. It was not possible for the plaintiff to give any evidence as to the cause of the accident.\n\nIn these circumstances, we think that the maxim res ipsa foquitur is attracted. ·\n\nIt was, however, argued on behalf of the respondent that the State was engaged in prforming a function app.ertaining to its character\n\ns soverein as he drier wa.s acting in the course of his employment H in connection with famine reltef work and therefore, even if the driver\n\n(1) See Millner : \"Negligence in Modern Law\". 92,\n\nSl!YAM SUNDER v. RAJASTl!AN (Mathew, J.) 555\n\nwas negligent, the State would not be liable for damages. Reliance was placed on the ruling of this Court in Kasturilal Ralia Ram Jain v.\n\nState f Uttar Pradesh (I) where this Court said that the liability of the State for a tort committed by its servant in the course of his employment would depend upon the question whether the employment wa~ of the category which could claim the special characteristic of s?verelgn power. We do not pause to consider the question whether the >mmumty of the State for injuries on its citizens committed in the exercise of what are called sovereign functions has any moral justification today. Its historic and jurisprudential support lies in the oftquoted words of Blackstone(2) :\n\n\"The king can do no wrong ...... The king, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong; he can never mean to do an improper thing : in him is no folly or weakness\".\n\nIn modern times, the chief proponent of the sovereign immunity doctrine has been Mr. Justice Holmes who, in 1907, declared for a unanimous Supreme Court(3) :-\n\n\"A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any for1nal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.\"\n\nToday, hardly anyone agrees that the stated ground for exempting the sovereign from suit is either logical or practical. We do not also think it necessary to consider whether there is any rational dividing line between the so-called sovereign and proprietary or commercial functions for determining the liability of the Slate.\n\nWe are of the view that, as the law stands !Oday, it is not possible to say that famine relief work is a sovereign function of the State as it has been traditionally understood. It is a work which can be and is being und.ertaken by private individuals. There is nothing peculiar about it so that it might be predicated that the State alone can legitimately undertake the work.\n\nIn the view we have taken on the merits of the case, we do not think it necessary to canvass the correctness of the view experessed by the High Court that the appeal by the State before the High Court did not abate even though the legal representa•ives of the plaintiffrepondent there were not impleaded within the period of limitation.\n\nIn the result, we set aside the decree of the High Court, restore the decree and judgment passed by the District Judge and allow the appeal with costs.\n\nS.B.W.\n\n(I) 11965] 1 S. C. R. 375.\n\n(2) Blackstone, Commentaries (10th ed., 1887)\n\n(3) Kawananakav. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 39, "entities": [{"text": "SHY AM SUNDER AND OTHES", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHYAM SUNDER AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 12,. J974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 69, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHY AM SUNDER AND OTHES R v.\n\nTHE STATE OF RAJASTHAN\n\nMarch 12,."}}, {"text": "K. K. MATHEW", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. ALAGIRISWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. ALAGIRISWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Fatal Accidents Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 323, "end_char": 344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 346, "end_char": 354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "of the State of Rajasthan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 500, "end_char": 525, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bhdwara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 595, "end_char": 602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased, who was at the material tinle in the en1ployment of the State of Rajasthan in the Public Department, was required to proceed from his office at Bhdwara to Banswara, in connection with famine relief work undertaken by the department."}}, {"text": "Banswara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 606, "end_char": 614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased, who was at the material tinle in the en1ployment of the State of Rajasthan in the Public Department, was required to proceed from his office at Bhdwara to Banswara, in connection with famine relief work undertaken by the department."}}, {"text": "Bhilwara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 750, "end_char": 758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For that purpose, he boarded a truck owned by the department from Bhilwara on, May 19, 1952 with six others.. Throughout the journey the radiator of the truck was gettiog heated frequently and the driver was pouring water into it after overy .6 or 7 miles of journey."}}, {"text": "May 19, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 763, "end_char": 775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For that purpose, he boarded a truck owned by the department from Bhilwara on, May 19, 1952 with six others.. Throughout the journey the radiator of the truck was gettiog heated frequently and the driver was pouring water into it after overy .6 or 7 miles of journey."}}, {"text": "Pratapgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1058, "end_char": 1068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After having travelled four miles from Pratapgarh, the engine of the truck caught fire."}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1385, "end_char": 1403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The widow of the deceased brought a suit for damages against the State of Rajasthan under the provisions of the Act."}}, {"text": "Chittorgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3124, "end_char": 3135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The vehicle-- took 9 hours to cover the distance of 70 miles between Chittorgarh and Pratapgarh."}}, {"text": "Bhtlwara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3444, "end_char": 3452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "found on the basis of evidence of witnesses that th~ driver knew about this defec.._ tive cOndition of the truck when he started from Bhtlwara. ["}}, {"text": "U. N. Trivedi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6992, "end_char": 7005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. N. Trivedi and Ga.ipat Rai, for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Ga.ipat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7010, "end_char": 7021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. N. Trivedi and Ga.ipat Rai, for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Sobhagmal Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7044, "end_char": 7058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sobhagmal Jain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "MATHEW", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7125, "end_char": 7131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMATHEW, J.\n\nThis is an appoal by special leave, against the iudgment and decree of the High Court of Rajasthan, setting aside decree for recovery of damages under the Patel Accidents Act, 1855 <(hereinafter referred to as the Act)."}}, {"text": "High Court of Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7212, "end_char": 7235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMATHEW, J.\n\nThis is an appoal by special leave, against the iudgment and decree of the High Court of Rajasthan, setting aside decree for recovery of damages under the Patel Accidents Act, 1855 <(hereinafter referred to as the Act)."}}, {"text": "Patel Accidents Act, 1855", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7292, "end_char": 7317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Navneetlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7418, "end_char": 7428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J) 551\n\nNavneetlal was a resident of Udaipur.", "canonical_name": "Navneetlal"}}, {"text": "Udaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7447, "end_char": 7454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J) 551\n\nNavneetlal was a resident of Udaipur."}}, {"text": "Hccra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7956, "end_char": 7961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reids hiJneif, there \\'i'ere FD.tch Singh FundjJal and Hccra Sing:1, the dnver, cleaner and a stranger jn the truck."}}, {"text": "Navnectla1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8498, "end_char": 8508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\VJ1ile doing so, Navnectla1 strurk against a stone lying by the ide of the r0a:l and died instantaneollsly.", "canonical_name": "Navneetlal"}}, {"text": "Parwati Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8590, "end_char": 8602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parwati Devi, widow of NnvneetlaI r.rought a suit [].gain.st the State of Rajasthan for damages under the provisions of the Act."}}, {"text": "Pratap garh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11210, "end_char": 11221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court then discussed the evidence and came to the conclusion that no inference of negligence on the part of the , tlriver was pqssibl~ on the basis that ihe engine of the truck got heated of and on and that water was put in the radiator frequently, or that it took considerably long time to cover the distance between Bhilwara and Chittorgarh and that between Chittorgarh and Pratap garh."}}, {"text": "Erk", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12030, "end_char": 12033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The maxim is stated in its classic form by Erk, C. J. :\n\n\" .... Wh< re the thing is to shown to be under the management of the defendant or his scrvents, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the ab, ence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.\""}}, {"text": "Shaw", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12571, "end_char": 12575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Shaw remarked that if the phrase had not been in Latin nobody would have called it a principle (2), The maxim is only a convenient label to apply to a set of circumstances in which the plaintiff proves a case so as to call for a rebuttle from the defendant without having to allege and prove any specific act or omission o~ the part of the defendant."}}, {"text": "S96, 601", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13432, "end_char": 13440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Macmillan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15191, "end_char": 15200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Lord Macmillan said in his dissenting judcment in Jones v.\n\nGreat Western (2) : ·\n\n\"Tb•; dividing line between conjecture and inference is often a very difficult one to draw."}}, {"text": "John, G. Fleming", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17602, "end_char": 17618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Concomitant with the rise in safety standards and' expanding knowledge of the me chanical devices of our age less hesitation is felt in concluding that the miscarriage ofa familiar activity is so unusual that it is most probably the result of some fault on the part of whoever is responsible for its safe performance (see John, G. Fleming, The Law of Torts,4th ed.,"}}, {"text": "Holmes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20376, "end_char": 20382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In modern times, the chief proponent of the sovereign immunity doctrine has been Mr. Justice Holmes who, in 1907, declared for a unanimous Supreme Court(3) :-\n\n\"A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any for1nal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.\""}}, {"text": "Supreme Court(3)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20422, "end_char": 20438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In modern times, the chief proponent of the sovereign immunity doctrine has been Mr. Justice Holmes who, in 1907, declared for a unanimous Supreme Court(3) :-\n\n\"A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any for1nal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.\""}}, {"text": "1965] 1 S. C. R. 375", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 21892, "end_char": 21912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Blackstone", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21919, "end_char": 21929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Blackstone, Commentaries (10th ed.,"}}, {"text": "Kawananakav. Polyblank", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21966, "end_char": 21988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1887)\n\n(3) Kawananakav."}}, {"text": "S. 349, 353", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21996, "end_char": 22007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_55_63_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "D. N. SANGHA YI & SONS\n\nAMBALAL TRIBHUWAN DAS\n\nJanuary 9, 1974\n\n(S. N. DWIVEDI AND P. K. GoswAMl, JJ.]\n\nMadfr.ya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961, Sec. 12 (l) (f)-fts scope -The expression, 'His business'-Meaning of.\n\nThe respondent is the oWner of the suit pz:emiscs. The appellarits 2 to 4 are carrying on the business in the name of the first appellant, D. N. Sangha vi & Sons.\n\nThey are tenants of the apondent and using a part of the premises as their resi dence. The respondent sued the appellant for eviction on the ground that he needed the accommodation for continuing \"his busines.s\" within the meaning of S.12 (1)\n\n(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961, The questions for decision in the case are as follows :-{i) What is the meaning of the phrase \"his business\" in s.12 (1) (0 and (ii) Whether in the circumstances of the case, the business for which he required the accommodation could be said to be \"his busines.s.\" The first question arose because he wanted the accommodation for continuing the business of a partnership firm of which he was one partner and the other two partners were his brothers.\n\nThe Trial Court held against the respondent and dismissed the suit, but the appeal court reversed the judgrgent and deCreed the suit for ejectment of the appellants. On appea~ the High Court upheld the jud11ment of the appeal Court and Jicnce the appeal before this Court.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : (1) The meaning of the expression \"his business'' in s. 12 (1) (f) or the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961, is to be determined by examining the object othe Act and the setting of the phrase \"'his business.\"\n\n(2) The diroct and immediate object of the Act is to ensure o::cupation of accomodation b~ them who are in need of it. Broadly speaking, a construction which ful fils this purpose should be preferred to the alternate construction which frustrates iL\n\n(3) A review of the provisions of the Act would show that the Act is more strict with respect to the eviction of a tenant from a non--rcsidential accomn.JJation than from a residential accommodation. The landlord cannot sue for eviction of a tenant from a nonresidential accommodation where he needs it for continuing or Startin~ his major married daughter's business or his brother'i business. There-- fore, section 12 (1) (b) is protective of the tenant and should not receive a wide construction as to the class of persons who may ho included in the possessive pronoun 'his' in the phrase 'his business', for it would be against legislative policy.\n\n(4) The words \"for the purpose of continuing or starting his business\" in Sec,, 12 (i) (0 should be amplified to read as \"for the purpose of his own occupation by way of continuing or starting his busi~\". This amplification is necessarily implied.\n\nTlieore, it is necmary for the respondent to prove that the accommoda tion is nctedcd directly and substantially for his occupation for the purpa, e of con tinuing or starting his business. From the evidence, it is not clear whether the res. pondcnt was merely a sleeping partner or an active partner. In absence of any proof that the accommodation is exclusively required directly and substantially for his occupation for the purpose of continuing or starting his business, the suit must fail.\n\nJ14jniklal and Co. v. Ylthal Pandurang Kawade and anoth<r, A. I. R. 1952 Nagpur 312 Tansuklulas Ch/uJgan\"1/ v. Smt. Shamba/, A. I. R. 1954 Na11pur 160, Commlssio_;, of Income-tax, West Bonga/ v. A. W. Fizgies and Co.,\n\n(1954] S.C.R.\n\n. ~-.\n\n171 Dulichand Lakshminarayan v. The Commissioner of Incometa.x, Nagpur, U956] S.C.R. 154, Karasandas Ramji v. Karsanji Ka/yanji, A.LR. 1953 Saurashtra 113 and Gunda!apa//i Rangamannar Chetty v. Desu Rnngiah, A. I. R. 1954 Madras 182, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLHE JUR!SD!Cf!O~ : Civil App:al No. 1643 of 1967\n\nApp, al by sp!chl leave from the judgment and order dated 4th September, 1967 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (lndore Bench)\n\nat Indore in s, cond App!al No. 288 of 1967.\n\nM .. V. Phad/<e md A. G. Ratnap:irklzi, for the appellants.\n\n/J. V. Patel A. T. M. Sampatlz, M. M. L. Srivastava and £. C.\n\nAgarwa!a, for'the respondent.\n\nlh~ J1J; n,:itor th! Court was delivered by\n\nDIVIVEDI, J. -Th: facts of this case fall within a short compass.\n\nThe respondent, Amba Lal Tribhuwan-Oas, is the owner of the suit ac:; ommodation. It is situated in Siyaganj, Indore. The appellants 2 to 4 are cirrying on business in the name of the first appellant, D. N.\n\nSinghavi and Sons. Th!y are the tennants of the accommodation.\n\nCourts b!low have held that it was. being used predominantly as a shJp by them and that a pirt of it was being used by them as their\n\nresidence for the sake of more of efficient conduct of the business they were cirrying on in th: shop. The resp:indent purchased the shop some time in 1963. The ap; i!llant wore then carrying on their business in the shop\". 1h!Y attarne:I to the respondent. On October JO, 1964 the respJndent give the requisite notice to them to vacate. On November 16, 1954 h• instituted a suit for their ejectment from the accommodation. It wds allez:d by him that he . needed the accommodation for cJntinuing\"his business\" within the meaning of s. 12 (I) (f) of the M1dhya Pradesh Acc0mmo:lation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter called th! Act). At the evidence stage he gave evidence that it was needed for putnership business. There arose two crucial questions in the case: (I) What is the m:aning of the phrase \"his business\" in s. 12(1)(f)?\n\n(2) Whether in the circumstances of the ca•e the business for which he required the acommodation could be said to be \"his business\". The first qu., tion arose because he wanted the accommodation for continuing the businoss of a p1rtnership firm of which he was one partner.\n\nTh!fe w!re tw0 other p1rtners. They are his brothers. The trial court held ag1inst the respondent on the second issue and dismissed the suit.\n\nNo view was expressed on this issue. The respondent filed an appeal from the ju:lgn, nt. The ap; nal court reversed the judgment and decreed th' suit for ejectment of the appellants. The appeal court recorded this . fin:iing of fact \" ...... Ambalal (plaintiff) has stated ...... that the\n\np1rtner3hip shop was previously run by his father. It is now run by the brvthers in p1rtnership. This business is thus of the family alone. Their shJ;> is at Siyagmj itself where the premises in suit are situate.',' On\n\nthis fin:iing the app!al court reached the conclusion that the business of th' pirtnership firm, of which he is one partner is \"his business\"\n\nr A •\n\nI E\n\nD. II, IANG~Y.I \" soils v. AMBALAL (Dwivedi, J.) 57\n\nwithin the meaning of s. 12(l)(f). As the firm's business was hirg carried on in a rented premises, his need was found to be grnume. 1 he appellants then filed an appeal in the Madhya Pradesh High Court from the judgment of the appeal court. 1he High Court has upheld, the judgment of the appeal court. It is noteworthy that the appeal court has simply assumed that the partnership business is \"his businus\".\n\nNo reasoning$ are given in support of the conclusion. 1he High Court agreed with the appeal court that the firm's business of which the respondent was one partner is \"his business\". 1he reasoning of the High Court in support of this conclusion Is summed up in the following passage in thejudgment: \"In the present case what we are concerned with is whether the landlord can be said to have the necessity when the need was for the partnership firm. It cannot be doubted that when a p!rson runs a business in partnership with others he does it for him; elf and therefore his necessity is identified wifh the necessity of the firm.\n\nWhether he wants to do business himself or he does it along w i h c.thrs\n\nt still remains that he needs it for his own purpoic.\"\n\nIt is evident from this passage that the High Court, like the appeal court, has overlooked the words of s. 12(l)(f) in arriving at its conclusion. The High Court considered that it is an elementary proposition of law that a partnership business is the business of each and every partner so that it will be \"his business.\" It seems that the High Court was misled by the apparent meaning of this phrase so that the necessity of examining the scheme of the Act and the setting of clause (f) of s. 12(1) to discover its real meaning was not felt at all. But this is the first thing on which the High court should have fixed attention. After all, it is a matrer of statutory construction. And in such a case all attempts at construction should converge on the statute at hand, lest the reasoning should become abstract and artificial, having no contact with reality. The High Court has ought support from a decision of the erstwhile Nagp\\lf High Court. (Rainikla/ and Co. vs. Vitila/ Pandurang Kawade and another)(!). Here again, the High Court did not take care to\n\nIIOJ tpJ1, IM M~J 01(~ UOOMJoq SO)i!l~J!WfSS)PPU~ SO!J)J~)!WfS 01{1 OO!JOU or constderatton ID that case and the law which falls for construction n this appeal.\n\nWith. these preliminary comments, we pass on to the real issue : What does \"his business\" mean ins. 12(I)(f)? 1he meaning is to be determined by ex.amining the object of the Act and the setting of the phrase \"his business\". The Act deals with the difficult problem of\n\nscacity of accommodation and seeks to distribute accommodation in II. fair way amongst those whd need.\n\nThe Act professes to control letting and rent of accommodation and the eviction of tenants therefrom. The Act restricts the power uf the landlord to let and to rack-rent at will. It also restricts his pow<r to eject the tenant at will. Thus the direct and immediate object of the Act is to ensure occupation of accommodation by them who are in need of it. Broadly speaking, a construction which fulfils this purpose should be preferred to the alternative construction which furstrates it. ·\n\nI. Al.R. 19S2 Naapur 312.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS I 19741 3 s.c.ll.\n\nChapter III controls evictionoftenants. Section 12 is the first pro vision in this Chapter. We are now reading the material portions of s. 12:\n\n\"Section 12(1)(e) : that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bonafide by the landford for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof. or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned :\n\n(f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bonafide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or un\" married daughters if he is the owner thereof or of any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned;\n\n(4) where a landlord has acquired any accommodation by transfer, no suit for the eviction of tenant shall be maintainable under sub-s. (I) on the ground specified in clause (e) or clause (f) thereof, unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of the acquisition.\n\n(5) where an order for the eviction of a tenant is made on the ground specified in clause (e) of sub-section (I), the landlord shall not be entitled to obtain possession thereof before the expiration of a period of two months from the date of the order.\n\n(6) where an order for the eviction of a tenant is made on the ground specified in cl. (f) of sub-section (I), the landlord shall not be entitled. to obtain possession thereof-\n\n( a) before the expiration of a period of two months from the date of the order : and\n\n(b) if the accommodation is situated in .... Indore .... unless the landlord pays to the tenant such amount by way of compensation as may be equal to ..... .\n\n(i) double the amount of the annual standard rent of the accommodation in the following case• :\n\n(a) where the accommodation has for a period of ten complete years . immediatly preceding the date on which the landlord files a suit for possession thereof, been used for business purposes or for any other purpose along with such purposes, by the tenant who is being evicted.\n\n' F\n\nD. N. SANG~VI & SONS v. AMBALAL (Dwivedi, 1.) 59\n\n(b) where during the aforesaid period of ten years, the tenant carrying on any business in the accommodation has left it and the tenant immediatly succeeding has acquired the business of his predecessor either through transfer or inheritance.\n\n(ii) the amount of the annual standard rent in other\n\ncases.\"\n\nSection 17 provides that where, after ejecting the tenant, the landlord does not occupy the accommodation within two months of obtaining possession, or transfers or re-lets it witnin two years therwf, the rent Controlling Authority may, on an application made in this behalf by the evicted tenant, direct the landlord to put him in possession of the accommodation or to pay him such compensation as the Rent Controlling Authority may think fit. This compensation shall be over and above the compensation which has already been paid to the tenant under s. 12(6). In a similar way, section 18 provides that where the landlord has ejected the tenant for the purpose of repairing of rebuilding the accommodation and does not commence the work of repairing or rebuilding within one month of the date specified in the order for ejectment or fails to complete the work in a reasonable time or having completed the work fails to place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation, the court may, on an application made in this behalf by the tenant, direct the landlord to give possession to the teriant or to pay to him such compensation as the court may think fit. Section 39(1) requires the landlord to inform the Collector whenever any accommodation has fallen vacant or is likely to fall vacant The Collector may then direct him to Jet or not to let it in accordance with the ]lrovisions of the Act. Section 39(2) gives preference to certain class of persons in the matter of letting.\n\nIt is not neccessary to mention them here. But the first proviso to s. 39(2) is important for this case. It reads : \"Provided that if the landlord has in the information given ...... under s. (I) stated that he needs the accommodation for his own occupation,.the Collector. . . . . shall, if satisfied after due inquiry that the accommodation so needed is proper, direct the landlord to occupy the same under the proviso the accommodation may be allotted to the landlord if he makes out a case that he needs the accommodation for \"his own occupation\".\n\nA review of these provisions would show that the Act is more strict with respect to the eviction of tenant from a non-residential accommodation than from a residential accommodation. Jn the case of a residential accomodation, section 12(1) (e) provid<S for the eviction of a tenant where it is needed for the residence of the landlord or for any member of his family. But he cannot sue for eviction of a tenant from a non-residential accommodation where he needs it for continuing or starting his major married daughter's business. Nor he can evict a tenant from such accommodation for continuing or starting his brother's business.\n\nThus while\n\n60 SUPREME l;; OURT REPORTS\n\n( 1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\ncl. (e) of s. 12(1) is more hospitable to the landlord, cl.(f) thereof A is more prtective of. the tenant. Sut-.section (4), (5) and (6) of s. 12 also pomt to this contrast. While the tenant evicted from a residential accommodatio':' gets a respite .of 14 months, the tenant evtc!ed from a non-res1dent1al accommodat1on g€ts not only the said respite but also the. prescribed compensation. Jn many cases the burden of compe!lsation may act as a deterrent to eviction. Having regard to the ngour of cl.(f) of s. 12(1) we think that the phrase\"his B buss1ness\" should not receive a wide, construction as to the class of persons wh~ may be included in the possessive pronoun 'his' in the phrase, for 1t would be against legislative policy.\n\nSection 39 control' the Jetting of an accommodation, resicential as well as non-residential, which has fallen vacant or is likely to fall vacant. The first proviso to sub-section (2) of s. 39 provides that at the request of the landlord such accommodation may be allotted to him if he needs it \"for his own occupation.\" As section 39 deals with a residential as well as a non-residential accommodation. the expression \"his own occupation\" in the first proviso should be amplified to read as \"his own occupation by way of residence or business\".\n\nClauses (e) and (f) of s. 12(1) are complementary to the fast proviso to s. 39(2). While the first proviso enables the landlord to obtain possession of a vacant accommodation for his own occupation by way of residence or business, section 12(1) (e) enables him to obtain a residential by accommodation for his or his family's residence by ejecting a tenant. Similarly, s. 12(1) (f) enables him to obtai.n a nonresidential accommodation for continuing or starting \"his business\" by ejecting the tenant. Considering the complimentary nature of s. 12(1) (f), we have little doubt in our mind that the words \"for the purpose of continuing or starting his business\" in the section should be amplified to read as \"for the purpose of his own occupation by way of cotinuing or starting his business.\" It cannot be legitimately complained that we are trying to redraft cl. (f). This amplification is necessarily implied, for we think that the legislature intended to use the phrase \"for the purpose of continuing or starting his business.\" as a synonym for the phrase \"for his own occupation\" in the first proviso to s. 39(2) as explained earlier. The words \"in his occupation\" at the end of cl. (f) fortify our construction. Again, the word \"own° in the phrase \"his own occupation\" should not be discarded as redundant. It seems to us that the Legislature has deliberately used it to add emphasis to the possessive force of the pronoon \"his\". (see the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 3rd Edn. P. 1409) It connotes the idea that the accommodation is needed directly and substantially for his occupation.\n\nOn this construction of cl. (f) of s. 12(1), it is necessary for the respondent to prove that the accommodation is needed direc/ly and substantially for his occupation for the purpose of continuing or\n\nstarting his bu, iness.\n\nThe respondent has stated in his evidence that he and his two brothers are carrying on a partnership business in a rented shop in\n\no. N. SANGltAVI & sONS v. AMBALAL (Dwivedi, /.) 61\n\nSiyaganj. He has further said that he needs the suit accommodation for that purpose. The appeal court has believtd this evidence and has: recorded he finding that the respondent bonafide requires the accom.\n\nmodation for his partnership business. But this finding does not: fulfil the conditions of cl. (f) of s. 12(1) as construed by us. Unfortu, nately for him. the respondent did not lead any evidence to show that the accommodation was needed directly and substantially for his occu.\n\nB pation by way of business. He filed the registration e<rtificate •how. ing that the partnership was registered with tlie Registrar of Firms, The certificate will only prove as to who are the partnus of the firm,\n\nnothing more The respondent did not file the deed of partnership.\n\nIt would have disclosed whether the r<spondent is a mere sletping partner or a partner who is entitled to manage the business eithtr solely or with other partners, or that they are the sole managing part- C ners.\n\nJn his examination he has said that he was a partner in the firm. He has also said : \"There is no proper accommodation for carrying on business in Indore by the m<mbus of his family\" Jn Cross-exami\n\nnation he has said : \"In the members of my family there are two of my brothers Nand Kishore and Mani Lal. their wives and children and my mother are included For our residence and running the shop: we netd the disput<d 'shop.\" No doubt he has stated that he needs, the suit accommodation for his residence also. but the lov.Er courts did not examine the need for reridrnce. Before the appeal court counsel for the parties had stated that the suit for eviction of the tenant shoulq be dis;>osed of only on the basis of s. 12(1) (f). The respondent thus abrndoned his case tased on s. 12 (I) (e) which deals with residential accommodation. So we are concerned with his need for business accommodation. The pasage in his statement, earlier reproduced would seem to sugg~t that his notion of 'hi~ business' is inclusive of his brothers' business in which he may have no conccrn at all.\n\nSo 1he possibility of his brothers' S<parate business being sel up in tho suit accommodation is not ruled out. However, we do\n\nnot ground our.judgment on this stetement. In his evidence he has said : \"We, the three brothers and father are the partners in the shop: There is no person from outside. Before the partnership my father.\n\nused to run the shop. (The father died during pendency of the suit)\".\n\nHe also said : \"We deal in bidi, cigarettes, match<S, tobacco and soap., We also want to have the same business in the disputed shop.\" IQ neither of these two passag<S nor anywhere else in the evidence he has stated that on fhe terms of partntrship he is entitled to manage the partnership business or even that he would also occupy the suit accommodation along with his partners on obtaining posS<ssion from the appellants. He has also not said that the other parmcrs have agreed to shift the businrn.\n\nIf the deed of partnership has excluded him expressly or impliedly from th~ management of firm's business and has made him a sleeping partner, it cannot be held that the accommodation is needed directly and substantially for his occupation hy way of business: Nor he has\n\npower to shift !he business. To sum up, for the reasons already given, his suit should fail.\n\nCounsel have referred us to a large number of decisions. Such of them as appear to us to be relevant in this case will alone be noticed by us. We shall make no reference to the others.\n\nIn Rajnik/a/ and Co. (supra) the decision turned on the meaning B of the phrase \"business of his own\" in cl. 13(3)(vi)(c) of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1947. The Nagpur High Court confined itself to that single phrase and did not refer to the object and setting of the order. Jn our case the conditions of s. 12(1)(f), as construed by us, are apparently different from those of cl. 13(3)(vi)(c) of the order. So it is not helpful in this case.\n\nIn Tansukhdas Chhaganla/ vs. Smt. Shambai(I), the Nagpur High C Court has held that where a tenant carrying on business in the demised shop converts the business into a partnership business and allows the latter business to be carried on in the demised premises, it would amount to sub-letting becaust the partnership \"was clearly a personality in law distinct from that of the petitioner himself.\" There also, the High Court was concerned with cl. 13 of the aforesaid Order. This statement ¢' law does not appear to be universally true. However, as D pointed out earlier, in respect of Rajnik/a/ (supra) it is sufficient for us to say that this case also is not helpful in this appeal.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal vs. A. W. Figgies and Co.(2) and Dulichand Lakshminarayan vs. The Commissioner of lncomcotax\n\nNagpur(3) are concerned with the legal character of a firm in the Income-tax Act. It is held that a firm is a distinct entity different from E its partners for purposes of assessment. These decisions are based on particular provisions of that Act which are radically different from the provisions of the Act. So these cases are also not helpful in deciding the present appeal.\n\nKarsandas Ramji vs. Karsanji Ka/yanji(4) and Gundalapalli Rangamannar Clzetty vs. Desu Rangialz(5) discuss the very question which fell F for consideration in Tansukhdas Clzhagan/a/ (supra). It was held on the facts of these cases that the tenant could not be held to have sublet the rented premises to the partnership firm because they retained possession over the premises. These cases thus apply the test of occupation by the tanant in finding out whether he has or has not sub-let.\n\nThese are all the relevant Indians cases cited before us. Sri Patel has also relied on three English cases: (1) Clift. v. Taylor,(6) Tunstall v.\n\nG Steigamann(') and Gian Singh & Co. vs. Devraj Narar and Others. (B) Clift takes the same view as Rajnik/al (supra). The decision turned on the meaning of the expression \"required the premises for his own occupation\" in s. 5(3)(b)(i) of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927.\n\nThere the landlord carried on a business in a part of the building in\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1954 Nagpur 160.\n\n(2) [1954! S.C.R. 171.\n\n(3) [1956] S.C. R. 154.\n\n(4) A.l.R. 1953 Saurashtra 113.\n\n(5) A.LR. 1954 Madras 182,\n\n(6) [1948] 2 A.E.R. 113.\n\n(7) [1962] 2A.E.R. 417.\n\n(8) [19651 I A.E.R. 768.\n\nD. N. SANGNAVI & SONS v. AMBALAL (Dwivedi, J.) 63\n\ndispute; in another part of it the tenant carried on her business. On the eve of the expiry of her lease, she applied for a new lease. Her application was opposed by the landlord on the ground, inter alia, that he required the premises for his own occupation. The facts found were that he had converted his own business into a partnership business.\n\nThere were six partners including himself. The partnership business had extended considerably so that there was scarcity of accommodation.\n\nIt app, ared that the landlord needed the demised premises for the purpose of his partnership business. So the issue was whether he needed the premises \"for his own occupation.\" The finding was: \"The firm and he himself, as its senior partner, had great need for less cramped head office premises, and, in particular, for the free and full use of the ground floor on street level as essential to convenience of office work, for clients, and for display of notice etc., and indeed, it was necessary for the prosperity of the greatly enlarged and still growing business with its remifications into many allied or compatible departments or activities.\" It is evident from this finding that the landlord was a managing plrtner and that he himself along with the firm was to occupy the demised premises after getting possession. This decision, far from helping Sri Patel, helps the appellants in view of the construction placed by us on clause (f) of s. 12(1 ). Tunstall (supra) deals with an entirely different set of facts. There the landlord was carrying on business. She gave notice to the tenant that she wanted the rented shop for her own business. The notice was given under the Landlord and Tenant Act. 1954. In the meantime she transferred her business to an incorporated company. The relevant words of s. 3l(g) of that Act are : \"to occupy the holding for the purpose .... of the business to be carried on by the landlord.\" It was held that the business of an inoorporated company was not the business of the landlord the company being a distinct legal pmon different from the landlord. Gian Singh\n\n(supra) was concerned with the construction of a particular clause in a covenant forbidding the tenant from assigning his tenancy to a third p!rson. It is claimed by the landlord that the tenant ha~ assigned the premises to a partnership firm of which he was a partner. On the facts of the case, it was held that there was no assignment. We fail to appreciate .how these cases help Sri Patel.\n\nIn some of the cases cited by Sri Patel, 'own' has been interpreted virtually as otiose. Nevertheless what it means in the Act would depend on its own context, for a word may take a colour from its context.\n\nIn view of our decision against the respondent on the basis of the construction of s. 12(1)(f) it is not necessary for us to decide several other points raised by Sri Phadke.\n\nThe appeal is allowed with costs (one set only). 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G. Ratnap", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4057, "end_char": 4069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M .. V. Phad/<e md A. G. Ratnap:irklzi, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "V. Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4103, "end_char": 4111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/J. V. Patel A. T. M. Sampatlz, M. M. L. Srivastava and £."}}, {"text": "A. T. M. Sampatlz", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4112, "end_char": 4129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/J. V. Patel A. T. M. Sampatlz, M. M. L. Srivastava and £."}}, {"text": "M. M. L. Srivastava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4131, "end_char": 4150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/J. V. Patel A. T. M. Sampatlz, M. M. L. Srivastava and £."}}, {"text": "DIVIVEDI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4238, "end_char": 4246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court was delivered by\n\nDIVIVEDI, J. -Th: facts of this case fall within a short compass."}}, {"text": "Amba Lal Tribhuwan-Oas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4321, "end_char": 4343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, Amba Lal Tribhuwan-Oas, is the owner of the suit ac:; ommodation.", "canonical_name": "Amba Lal Tribhuwan-Oas"}}, {"text": "D. N.\n\nSinghavi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4506, "end_char": 4521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants 2 to 4 are cirrying on business in the name of the first appellant, D. N.\n\nSinghavi and Sons."}}, {"text": "October JO, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4972, "end_char": 4988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October JO, 1964 the respJndent give the requisite notice to them to vacate."}}, {"text": "November 16, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5052, "end_char": 5069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 16, 1954 h• instituted a suit for their ejectment from the accommodation."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5243, "end_char": 5248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Control Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5294, "end_char": 5311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5528, "end_char": 5539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act, 1961", "statute": "Control Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Ambalal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6202, "end_char": 6209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fin:iing of fact \" ...... Ambalal (plaintiff) has stated ...... that the\n\np1rtner3hip shop was previously run by his father.", "canonical_name": "Ambalal"}}, {"text": "AMBALAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6652, "end_char": 6659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On\n\nthis fin:iing the app!al court reached the conclusion that the business of th' pirtnership firm, of which he is one partner is \"his business\"\n\nr A •\n\nI E\n\nD. II, IANG~Y.I \" soils v. AMBALAL (Dwivedi, J.) 57\n\nwithin the meaning of s. 12(l)(f).", "canonical_name": "Ambalal"}}, {"text": "Dwivedi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6661, "end_char": 6668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On\n\nthis fin:iing the app!al court reached the conclusion that the business of th' pirtnership firm, of which he is one partner is \"his business\"\n\nr A •\n\nI E\n\nD. II, IANG~Y.I \" soils v. AMBALAL (Dwivedi, J.) 57\n\nwithin the meaning of s. 12(l)(f)."}}, {"text": "s. 12(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6700, "end_char": 6711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6855, "end_char": 6880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 he appellants then filed an appeal in the Madhya Pradesh High Court from the judgment of the appeal court."}}, {"text": "s. 12(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7952, "end_char": 7963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8339, "end_char": 8347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9964, "end_char": 9977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 19741 3 s.c.ll."}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10045, "end_char": 10055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10141, "end_char": 10146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12(1)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10150, "end_char": 10166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12731, "end_char": 12741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13283, "end_char": 13291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13311, "end_char": 13321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 39(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13890, "end_char": 13903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 39(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14128, "end_char": 14141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 39(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14282, "end_char": 14290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14993, "end_char": 15006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15471, "end_char": 15479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15600, "end_char": 15605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15968, "end_char": 15976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16198, "end_char": 16208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16384, "end_char": 16389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16521, "end_char": 16531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16767, "end_char": 16775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 39(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16817, "end_char": 16825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16975, "end_char": 16988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17113, "end_char": 17121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17286, "end_char": 17294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 39(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17852, "end_char": 17860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18370, "end_char": 18378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Siyaganj", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18745, "end_char": 18753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent has stated in his evidence that he and his two brothers are carrying on a partnership business in a rented shop in\n\no. N. SANGltAVI & sONS v. AMBALAL (Dwivedi, /.) 61\n\nSiyaganj."}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19055, "end_char": 19063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19877, "end_char": 19883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has also said : \"There is no proper accommodation for carrying on business in Indore by the m<mbus of his family\" Jn Cross-exami\n\nnation he has said : \"In the members of my family there are two of my brothers Nand Kishore and Mani Lal."}}, {"text": "Nand Kishore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20008, "end_char": 20020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has also said : \"There is no proper accommodation for carrying on business in Indore by the m<mbus of his family\" Jn Cross-exami\n\nnation he has said : \"In the members of my family there are two of my brothers Nand Kishore and Mani Lal."}}, {"text": "Mani Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20025, "end_char": 20033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has also said : \"There is no proper accommodation for carrying on business in Indore by the m<mbus of his family\" Jn Cross-exami\n\nnation he has said : \"In the members of my family there are two of my brothers Nand Kishore and Mani Lal."}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20447, "end_char": 20455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20509, "end_char": 20514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajnik/a/ and Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22275, "end_char": 22292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Rajnik/a/ and Co. (supra) the decision turned on the meaning B of the phrase \"business of his own\" in cl."}}, {"text": "cl. 13(3)(vi)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22377, "end_char": 22393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22468, "end_char": 22485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Nagpur High Court confined itself to that single phrase and did not refer to the object and setting of the order."}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22612, "end_char": 22623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 13(3)(vi)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22684, "end_char": 22700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nagpur High C Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22801, "end_char": 22820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shambai(I), the Nagpur High C Court has held that where a tenant carrying on business in the demised shop converts the business into a partnership business and allows the latter business to be carried on in the demised premises, it would amount to sub-letting becaust the partnership \"was clearly a personality in law distinct from that of the petitioner himself.\""}}, {"text": "cl. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23196, "end_char": 23202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajnik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23338, "end_char": 23344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, as D pointed out earlier, in respect of Rajnik/a/ (supra) it is sufficient for us to say that this case also is not helpful in this appeal."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23639, "end_char": 23653, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Tansukhdas Clzhagan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24110, "end_char": 24129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Karsandas Ramji vs. Karsanji Ka/yanji(4) and Gundalapalli Rangamannar Clzetty vs. Desu Rangialz(5) discuss the very question which fell F for consideration in Tansukhdas Clzhagan/a/ (supra)."}}, {"text": "Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24500, "end_char": 24505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Patel has also relied on three English cases: (1) Clift."}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)(b)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24805, "end_char": 24818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These decisions are based on particular provisions of that Act which are radically different from the provisions of the Act", "statute": "These decisions are based on particular provisions of that Act which are radically different from the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24826, "end_char": 24855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A.l.R. 1953 Saurashtra 113", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25011, "end_char": 25037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) A.l."}}, {"text": "s. 12(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26632, "end_char": 26641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26993, "end_char": 26997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27975, "end_char": 27986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Phadke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28059, "end_char": 28065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of our decision against the respondent on the basis of the construction of s. 12(1)(f) it is not necessary for us to decide several other points raised by Sri Phadke."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_570_576_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "BARA TI v.\n\nSTATE OF U. P.\n\nMarch 12, 1974\n\n[H. R. KHANNA AND V. R. KRISHNA IYER, JJ.]\n\nPenal Code-S. J-02\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure-s. 411-Power of appellate Court to review at /ar§e evidence on which order of acqui11al by trial court founded-No limftation on power -Evidence of dose relations-If could. be btlitved-Dying declaration-Meet of.\n\nThe appellant and his companions were charged with an offence under s. 302 I.P.C: for causing the death of the deceased by pouring acid on him when he was sleeping on his cot on the night of the occurrence. After recording the :first infor4\n\nmation report the police sub-inspector recorded the statement of the deceased and at the dispensary the doctor recorded the statement of the deceased, in both of which he stated that the appeJlant poured acid over his body and caused iiijurics to him. The deceased succumbed to his injuries. Disbelievina the prosecution evidence the trial court acquitted him.· The High Court on the other hand accepted the evidence of all the prosecution witnesses and convicted and sentenced the _appe. llant to life imprisonment but acquitted the remaining two accused.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was contended that the High Court should not have reversed the judgDient of the trial court and the evidence JClied upon by the High Court was not satisfactory. ·\n\nDismissing the appeal.\n\nHELD : that the approach of the trial court was clearly onable and the Hi.Rh Court was fully justified in setting aside the acquittal of the appellant. It is well settled that in an appeal under s. 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Court has fUll power to review at large the evidence on which the order of acquittal was founded and to reach the conclusion that upon the evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power unless it be found expressly stated in the Code, but in exercising the power conferred by the Code before reaching its conclusion upon facts the High Cow:t should give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial judge as to the credi bility of the witnj (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any real and reasonable doubt and (4) the-slowness of an appellate court in disturbing the finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. (576 DF]\n\nIn the instant case there was no doubt that the deceased died as a result of acid bums. There was no cogent reason to disbelieve the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. The trial court was wrong in rejectirtg evidence of these witnesses on the ground that they were related to the deceased. Close relatives of the deceased would normally be most reluctant to spare the real assailant and falsely mention the name of another person as the one responsible for causing injuries to the deceased. The deceased would not spare his real assailant and faJsely mention the name of the appellant as one who poured acid over his body. There was no reason to discard the dying declaration made by the api:>ellant to the police sub-inspector. The trial Court was wrong in rejecting the-11ying declaration to the police (F.l.R.) on the ground that the deceased had stated to the doctor that he had become unconscious after the occurrence.· There was nothing in the statement recorded by the doctor to jndicate that the deceased remained unconscious for a long time and as such was not. in position to lodge the F.l.R. The fact that the language used in the dying de clarat; on made to the doctor was rather chaste would not go to show that the said !ltatement could not have been made by the deceased. As to the language used in the dying declaration there is nothing abnormal or unusual in the same person using colloquial language while talking to one person and using refined language while tilking to another person. [574 EF ; 575D.~ 576A]\n\nCRIMINAL APP2LLAT< JL'RISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 226 of 1970.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 14th April, 1970, of the Allahabad High Couit (Lucknow Bench) at Lucknow in Criminal appeal no. 260 of 1968.\n\nB A. N. Mu/la and 0. N. Mohindroo, for the appellant.\n\n0. P. Rana, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court. was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J. Barati (26) was tried in the.court of Sessions Judge Sitapur for an offeni; e under section . 302 Indian . Penal Code for causing the death ofLekhai (45). Prabhu (24) and Ram Lal (24) were also tried along with Barati for offence under section 302 read with section 109 Indian Penal Code for having abette<! the commission of the offence of murder. Learned Sessions Judge acquitted all the three accused. On appeal filed by the State the Allahabad High Court convicted Barati under section 302 Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. The appeal against Prabhu and Ram Lal was dismissed. Barati then came up in appeal to this Court by special leave. ·\n\nThe prosecution case is that the relations between Lekhai deceased and his younger brother Pancham (PW 3) on the one side and Barati accused on the other were strained. All three of them belong to village Nasirapur in district Sitapur. Dispute had been going on between them regarding the construction of a wall. About a couple of months before the present occurrence, Barati effected an opening in the western wall of his house which gave rise to an apprehension that he intended to encroach upon the land belonging to Lekhai and Pancham.\n\nPancham made complaint dated May 27, 1967 to. the Judicial Panchayat in that connection. The said complaint was still pending when the present occurrence took place. About three days prior to the present occurrence Barati and Prabhu accused after arming themselves with lathis went to the door of Lekhai and threatened to assault him.\n\nMainku PW intervened and persuaded Barati and Prabhu to go away.\n\nOn the evening of July 30, 1967, it is stated, Lekhai deceased after taking his meals was lying on a cot in an open space near his baithak.\n\nLekhai's son Nagai (PW I) and brother Pancham (PW 3) slept nearby on another cot. A lighted lantern was hanging nearby. At about\n\nIO 30 p.m. the three accused came there. On hearing some sound, Lekhai opened his eyes. Lekhai saw the three accused standing near the cot. Ram Lal accused is the brother-in-law of Barati accused.\n\nAt the instigation of Ram Lal ang Prabhu, it is stated, Barati accused, who was holding a bottle, poured acRI over Lekhai. Lekhai cried aloud and shouted that he was being killed. On hearing the cries of Lekhai, his son Nagai and brother Pancham got up from their cot and saw the three accused standing there. Barati accused was holding a bottle in his hand. Nagai and Pancham too raised alarm whereupon /\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1974 J 3 S.C.ll.\n\nBhallu (PW 2) and Jeorakhan (PW 4), whose houses are nearby, also arrived there with lia:hted torches and lathis in their hands. On seeing them, the three accused' ran into the house of Barati and closed the door from inside. Nagai and others chased the accused and knocked at the door of the house but the accused did not open the door. Nagai, Pancham, Bhallu and Jeorakhan were told by Lekhai that Barati accused had poured acid over him. Badri Pradhan (PW 6) also came there and on his enquiry he too was told by Lekhai that Barati accused had poured acid over him. Nagai, Pancham, Bhallu, Jeorakhan and Badri Pradhan PWs saw acid present all over the body of Lekhai deceased. His clothes too were stained with acid. At the suggestion of Badri, Lekhai was then taken in a bull(\\ck cart by Nagai and Pancham PWs to police station Sandhana at a distance of two miles from the place of occurrence. Report Ka I was lodged at the police station at 2 30 a.m. by Lekhai. In that report Lekhai stated that Barati accused had poured acid over his body. The names of Nagai, Pancham, Bha!lu and Jeorakhan were also mentioned in the first information report and it was stated that they had seen the accused present near his cot when l.ekhai had raised alarm. The motive for the assault, as given earlier, was also given.\n\nAfter recording the first informa\\ion report, Sub Inspector Asrarul Haq (PW 18) recorded statement Ka 22 of Lekhai. In that statement Lekhai reiterated what he had stated in the first information report. The Sub Inspector thereafter recorded the statements of Nagai and Bhallu PWs. Lekhai was then sent to Misrikh dispensary at a distance of about 12 miles from the place of occurrence. The party arrived at the dispensary at about 3 p.m. on July 31, 1967. Soon there\n\nafter Dr. Bisht (PW 5) recorded statement Ka II at 3 p.m. ofLekhai deceased. Lekhai was at that time in a fit condition to make statement.\n\nIn that statement also Lekhai stated that Barati accused had poured acid over his body and as such had caused him injuries. The injuries of Lekhai were examined by Dr. Bisht at 3·15 p.m.\n\nAs the condition of Lekhai was serious, Dr. Bisht referred the case of Lekhai to District Hospital Sitapur. Lekhai was then taken to the District Hospital Sitapur. The party arrived in the hospital at about 4 45 p.m. the same day but about an hour thereafter at 5 45\n\np.m. Lekhai succumbed to the injuries. Post mortem examination on the body of Lekhai was performed by Dr. N. Verma on the following day, i.e. August I, 1967, at 4 p.m.\n\nBarati accused absconded after the occurrence. Procceaings under sections, 87 and 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were initiated against him. Barati surrendered in court on August 17, 1967.\n\nHe was thereafter put under arrest.\n\nAt the trial the plea of Barati accused, with whom we are concerned was denial simpliciter. No evidence wa; produced in defence.\n\nThe trial court did not place reliance upon the evidence of Nagai, Pancham, Bhallu and Jeorakhan PWs. The reason which weighed\n\n• c\n\n..._ .\n\n• G\n\nwith the trial court was that the witnesses were related to the deceased.\n\nThe evidence with regard t~ the dying declarations of the deceased was not accepted by the tnal court. The deceased, in the opinion of the trial court, became unconscious and as such was not in a position to lodge first information report Ka 1 or to make statement Ka\n\n22. The trial court also rejected dying declaration Ka 11 recordeCJ by Dr. Bisht as it found the language of the same to be chaste and the same, in the opinion of the trial court, was not expected of a rustic living in a village. In the reult the accused were acquitted.\n\nOn appeal the learned Judges of the High Court accepted the evidence of Nagai, Pancham, Bhallu and Jeorakhan PWs as well as the evidence about the dying declarations made by the deceased.\n\nThe High Court also took note of the fact that Barati accused had a motive to assault the deceased and that when witnesses knocked at his door, he instead of professing his innocence, did not open the door. Reference was also made to the fact ihat Barati accused had absconded after the occurrence. In the result the appeal against Barati accused was accepted, and he was convicted and sentenced as above. So far a~ Ram Lal and Prabhu accused were concerned, the High Court gave them the benefit of doubt and as such acquitted them.\n\nIn appeal before us Mr. Mulla on behalf of the appellant has urged that the High Court should not have reversed the judgment of acquittal of the trial court in respect of the appellant. According to the learned counsel, the evidence relied upon by the High Court is not satisfactory and as such the conviction of the appellant cannot be based upon it.\n\nIn reply Mr. Rana has canvassed for the correctness of the view of the High Court.\n\n.. It cannot be disputed that acid was poured on Lekhaideceased on the night of July 30, 1967 as a result of which he died. Dr. Bisht, who examined Lekhai deceased on July 31; 1967 at 3·15 p.m., found the following injuries on his person :\n\n\"Burnt area of black colour on the left side of the face, on both sides of the neck, on thefront part of the whole chest, on . ~··the right arm, right fore-arm, and back part of right palm on the front and back part of both shoulders.\"\n\nDr. Bisht also found black marks caused by running down of fluid on the front and outer part of abdomen and on the vertebral column. Burnt areas of black colourwere found by the doctor on the front and inner part of right thigh, inner and upper part of right leg and inner part of the left thigh i.n the middle. The injuries, i!' te opinion of the doctor, were greVJous and were caused by acid m liquid form. The injuries were about 12 to 24 hours old.\n\nLekhai died at 5 45 p.m. on July 31; 1967. Dr N. Verma who performed the post mortem examination on the body of Lekhai on August I, 1967 at 4 p.m. found the following injuries on the body :\n\nSUPREME COUR1' REPORTS\n\n[ 1974 J 3 S.C.R.\n\n\"I. Cor; osive burns area. There were marks of acid, on the ·left side of the face, in front and.bth sides of the neck, in front of the chest and in front, up and back side of the shoulders ; upper side and in front of' the right arm and in front and in several places of the other arm. In fron.t apd oute.r .side , .. ofright thigh and in front inside of left shoulder, in front and .. down put of the right leg and both sides of the back. : ..\n\nThe marks on account of puring of acid exisied on the leftside of the face, and also existed on both sides of the chest; abdomen and shoulders, the inner part of the skin and flesh of front of . the chest, neck, sid.e and several places became discoloured by the action of acid.\n\nInjuries. were on account of corrosion burns which were upto III, IV, V degree.\" On internal inspection the brain ani thin skin cover were found to be\n\ncongested. The same was the condition of the lcngs, 1arynx,. trachea and bonei . .The heart was full of blooj. while the sto:nach was empty.\n\nDeath, in the opinion of the dootor, was due to shook as a re>ult of the pouring of acid: The injuries were suffi:ient to cause death in the ordinary courseof nature. ,. .\n\nThe case of the prosecution is that it wa• Barati accused who poured acid over Lekhai deceased as a result of which Lekhai.died.\n\nJn support of this allegation, the prosecution has relied, in the first instance; upon the four dying declarations of Lekhai. deceased. The first dying declaration of the deceased was the.one made by him to Nagai, Pancham, Bhallu. and Jeorakhan immediately after the occurrence. It is in the evidence of these witnesses thaf they Were told .immediately after the occurrerice that it was Barati accused who had poured acid over him. There appears to be no cogent reason to disbelieve the above evidence of the witnesses. The trial c()urt, in our opinion, was wholly in error in rejecting the evidence of these witnesses on the ground that they were. related to .the deceased. Close relatives . of the. deceased would normally be m~; t reluctant to spare the real assailant arid falsely mention the naine of another person as the one responsible for causing injuries to .the deceased ... Lekhai deceased also told Badri Pradhan (PW 6) who arrived at the.place of occurrence on hearing alarm that Barati accused had poured acid over him .. No cogent ground.has been shown as to why the above evidence of Badri Pradhan be not. accepted.:. All that was suggested on behalf or the accused was that Badri was inimical to Prabhu accused .. If that was so; no reason has been shown as to why Badri should attribute the major part in the assault on the deceased to Barati accused and not to Prabhu.\n\nIt is alsci plain .that Lekhai deceased musi have' seen as. to ·, who was the person who.poured acid over his body. The moment the acid first came in contact with his body, the immediate. reaction of Lekhai as or any.other person, would be to sie as to who was responsibld for all that. Even if the assailant took only a few seconds to pour acid over the body of Lekhai, the latter would not have failed to fix the identity of the assailant i:ltiring that short time. It is significant that Bara ti was no sfrariger to Lekhai. They were neighbours and were well known to each other.· It is, in our opinion, most difficult\n\n.. .A..\n\n• c\n\nto believe that Lekhai would spare his real ass?.ilant and falsely mention the name of Barati as one who had poured acid over his body.\n\nApart from the oral dying declarations made by the deceased to Nagai, Paticham, Bhallu, Jeorakhan and Badri Pradhan PWs, we have the evidence ()f Sub Inspector Asrarul J{aq that the deceased lodged report Ka I at the police station at 2 30 a.m. when the deceased was brought there in a cart. The deceased stated in that report that Barati accused had poured acid over him and thus caused him injuries. Sub- Inspector, Asrarul Haq thereafter recorded statement Ka 22 of Lekbai, deceased. In that statement also the deceasd reiterated that it was Barati accused who had poured acid over him and thus caused him injuries. We see no particular reason to diibelieve the evidence adduced by the prosecution regarding the dying declaration of Lekhai deceased contained in report Ka I and statement Ka 22.\n\nThe trial court rejected the above evidence because it was of the view that Lekhai deceased, as mentioned by him in dying declaration Ka 11 made .to Dr. Bish!, had become unconscious af!er the occurrence.\n\nThere was, however, nothing in that statement to indicate that Lekhai remained unconscious for a long time and as such was not in a position to lodge the first information report at the police station or make statement /(a 22 to Sub Inspector Asrarul Haq. The view taken by the trial court in rejecting the above evidence, in our opinion, was clearly erroneous.\n\nAnother dying declaration upon which prosecution has placed reliance was Ka 11 recorded by Dr. Bish! in Misrik\\l dispensary.\n\nAccording to' Dr. Bisht, Lekhai was in possession of his senses when he made statement Ka JI.. Dr. Bisht is a wholly disinterested and respectable witness and there appears no reason as to why his statement regarding the dying declaratic>n Ka JI be not accepted. Dying declaration Ka II is a brief document consisting of about 9 or 10 lines. The statement incorporated in dying declaration Ka 11 is very simple and relates to the pouring of acid by Barati accused on Lekhai deceased. The fact that the language usd in it is rather chaste would not go to show that the said statement cou.Id not have been made by Lekhai deceased.\n\nThe statement of Lekhai in Ex. Ka II that Barati accused had poured the liquid from a bottle on him clearly establishes the guilt of Barati accused.\n\nReference was made on behalf of the accused to the fact that statement Ka 11 was sent by Dr. Bisht to Additional District Magistrate not immediately after recording that statement but on the third day.\n\nAccording to Dr. Bisht, the delay took place because of rush of work.\n\nNo adverse inference, in our opinion, can be drawn from the fact that the dying declaration was sent by Dr. Bisht on the third day after recording the same. The dying declaration bears the thumb impression of Lekh>!i deceased. Lekhai was sent from Misrikh dispensary soon after the dying declaration was recorded and his injuries were examined. There could be no possibility of any sucl, dying declaration being prepared subsequently.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1974 I 3 S.C.R.\n\nMr. Mulla has pointed out that the language used in dying declaration Kall is chaste while that used in report Ka! as well as in statement Ka 22 has some words which are spoken by villagers. This fact, in our opinion, is not of much significance because there is nothing abnormal or unusual in the same person using colloquial language while talking to one person and using refined language while talking to another person.\n\nApart from the dying declarations of the deceased, we have the evidence of Nagai, Pancham, Bhallu and Jeorakhan PW s that they saw Barati accused with a bottle in his hand near the cot of the deceased when those witnesses got up on hearing alarm. The High O>urt aci:cptcd the evidence of these witnesses and we see no particular reason to take a different view. As mentioned earlier, the reason given by the trial court in rejecting the evidence of these witnesses was wholly erroneous.\n\nIt is well settled that the High Court in an appeal under secfoin 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has full power to review at large the evidence on which the order of acquittal was founded and to reach the conclusion that upon the evidence the order of acquittal should be re versed. No limitation should be placed upon that power unless it be found expressly stated in the Code, but in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reachingitsconclusion upon fact the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to such matters as {I) the views of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, presumption certainly not weakened by the Jact that be bas been acquitted at bis trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any real a11d reasonable doubt and ( 4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. Keeping the above principles in view as well as the fact that the approach of the trial court was clearly unreasonable, the High Court, in our opinion, was fully justified in setting aside the acquittal of Barati accused. There is, in our opinion, no force in the appeal which fails and is dismissed.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 70, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF U. P", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U. P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 98, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 134, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 415, "end_char": 421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 422, "end_char": 427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1557, "end_char": 1563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1571, "end_char": 1597, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "B A. N. Mu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4284, "end_char": 4294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B A. N. Mu/la and 0."}}, {"text": "N. Mohindroo", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4305, "end_char": 4317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Mohindroo, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4342, "end_char": 4349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4417, "end_char": 4423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J. Barati (26) was tried in the.court of Sessions Judge Sitapur for an offeni; e under section ."}}, {"text": "Barati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4428, "end_char": 4434, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Barati", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4535, "end_char": 4545, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ofLekhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4568, "end_char": 4576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Penal Code for causing the death ofLekhai (45).", "canonical_name": "ofLekhai"}}, {"text": "Prabhu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4583, "end_char": 4589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prabhu (24) and Ram Lal (24) were also tried along with Barati for offence under section 302 read with section 109 Indian Penal Code for having abette<!", "canonical_name": "Prabhu"}}, {"text": "Ram Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4599, "end_char": 4606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prabhu (24) and Ram Lal (24) were also tried along with Barati for offence under section 302 read with section 109 Indian Penal Code for having abette<!"}}, {"text": "Barati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4639, "end_char": 4645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prabhu (24) and Ram Lal (24) were also tried along with Barati for offence under section 302 read with section 109 Indian Penal Code for having abette<!", "canonical_name": "Barati"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4664, "end_char": 4675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4686, "end_char": 4697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4698, "end_char": 4715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4866, "end_char": 4886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal filed by the State the Allahabad High Court convicted Barati under section 302 Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life."}}, {"text": "Barati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4897, "end_char": 4903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal filed by the State the Allahabad High Court convicted Barati under section 302 Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life.", "canonical_name": "Barati"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4910, "end_char": 4921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4922, "end_char": 4939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Lekhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5161, "end_char": 5167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case is that the relations between Lekhai deceased and his younger brother Pancham (PW 3) on the one side and Barati accused on the other were strained.", "canonical_name": "ofLekhai"}}, {"text": "Pancham", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5201, "end_char": 5208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case is that the relations between Lekhai deceased and his younger brother Pancham (PW 3) on the one side and Barati accused on the other were strained."}}, {"text": "Nasirapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5315, "end_char": 5324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All three of them belong to village Nasirapur in district Sitapur."}}, {"text": "Sitapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5337, "end_char": 5344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All three of them belong to village Nasirapur in district Sitapur."}}, {"text": "Pancham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5641, "end_char": 5648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About a couple of months before the present occurrence, Barati effected an opening in the western wall of his house which gave rise to an apprehension that he intended to encroach upon the land belonging to Lekhai and Pancham."}}, {"text": "May 27, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5680, "end_char": 5692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pancham made complaint dated May 27, 1967 to."}}, {"text": "Prabhu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5877, "end_char": 5883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About three days prior to the present occurrence Barati and Prabhu accused after arming themselves with lathis went to the door of Lekhai and threatened to assault him.", "canonical_name": "Prabhu"}}, {"text": "Mainku", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5987, "end_char": 5993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mainku PW intervened and persuaded Barati and Prabhu to go away."}}, {"text": "July 30, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6071, "end_char": 6084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the evening of July 30, 1967, it is stated, Lekhai deceased after taking his meals was lying on a cot in an open space near his baithak."}}, {"text": "Nagai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6207, "end_char": 6212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lekhai's son Nagai (PW I) and brother Pancham (PW 3) slept nearby on another cot."}}, {"text": "Ram Lal ang Prabhu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6544, "end_char": 6562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instigation of Ram Lal ang Prabhu, it is stated, Barati accused, who was holding a bottle, poured acRI over Lekhai."}}, {"text": "Nagai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6742, "end_char": 6747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On hearing the cries of Lekhai, his son Nagai and brother Pancham got up from their cot and saw the three accused standing there."}}, {"text": "Bhallu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6971, "end_char": 6977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhallu (PW 2) and Jeorakhan (PW 4), whose houses are nearby, also arrived there with lia:hted torches and lathis in their hands."}}, {"text": "Jeorakhan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6989, "end_char": 6998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhallu (PW 2) and Jeorakhan (PW 4), whose houses are nearby, also arrived there with lia:hted torches and lathis in their hands."}}, {"text": "Jeorakhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7336, "end_char": 7345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagai, Pancham, Bhallu and Jeorakhan were told by Lekhai that Barati accused had poured acid over him."}}, {"text": "Badri Pradhan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7412, "end_char": 7425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Badri Pradhan (PW 6) also came there and on his enquiry he too was told by Lekhai that Barati accused had poured acid over him."}}, {"text": "Badri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7712, "end_char": 7717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the suggestion of Badri, Lekhai was then taken in a bull(\\ck cart by Nagai and Pancham PWs to police station Sandhana at a distance of two miles from the place of occurrence."}}, {"text": "Sandhana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7803, "end_char": 7811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the suggestion of Badri, Lekhai was then taken in a bull(\\ck cart by Nagai and Pancham PWs to police station Sandhana at a distance of two miles from the place of occurrence."}}, {"text": "Bha!lu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8047, "end_char": 8053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The names of Nagai, Pancham, Bha!lu and Jeorakhan were also mentioned in the first information report and it was stated that they had seen the accused present near his cot when l.ekhai had raised alarm.", "canonical_name": "Bha!lu"}}, {"text": "l.ekhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8195, "end_char": 8202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The names of Nagai, Pancham, Bha!lu and Jeorakhan were also mentioned in the first information report and it was stated that they had seen the accused present near his cot when l.ekhai had raised alarm.", "canonical_name": "ofLekhai"}}, {"text": "Asrarul Haq", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8344, "end_char": 8355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After recording the first informa\\ion report, Sub Inspector Asrarul Haq (PW 18) recorded statement Ka 22 of Lekhai."}}, {"text": "Lekhai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8566, "end_char": 8572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lekhai was then sent to Misrikh dispensary at a distance of about 12 miles from the place of occurrence."}}, {"text": "July 31, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8726, "end_char": 8739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The party arrived at the dispensary at about 3 p.m. on July 31, 1967."}}, {"text": "Bisht", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8763, "end_char": 8768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soon there\n\nafter Dr. Bisht (PW 5) recorded statement Ka II at 3 p.m. ofLekhai deceased."}}, {"text": "Bisht", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9061, "end_char": 9066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The injuries of Lekhai were examined by Dr. Bisht at 3·15 p.m.\n\nAs the condition of Lekhai was serious, Dr. Bisht referred the case of Lekhai to District Hospital Sitapur.", "canonical_name": "Bisht"}}, {"text": "District Hospital Sitapur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9162, "end_char": 9187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The injuries of Lekhai were examined by Dr. Bisht at 3·15 p.m.\n\nAs the condition of Lekhai was serious, Dr. Bisht referred the case of Lekhai to District Hospital Sitapur."}}, {"text": "N. Verma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9455, "end_char": 9463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Post mortem examination on the body of Lekhai was performed by Dr. N. Verma on the following day, i.e. August I, 1967, at 4 p.m.\n\nBarati accused absconded after the occurrence."}}, {"text": "August I, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9491, "end_char": 9505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Post mortem examination on the body of Lekhai was performed by Dr. N. Verma on the following day, i.e. August I, 1967, at 4 p.m.\n\nBarati accused absconded after the occurrence."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9610, "end_char": 9636, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "August 17, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9696, "end_char": 9711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Barati surrendered in court on August 17, 1967."}}, {"text": "Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11390, "end_char": 11395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal before us Mr. Mulla on behalf of the appellant has urged that the High Court should not have reversed the judgment of acquittal of the trial court in respect of the appellant."}}, {"text": "Rana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11732, "end_char": 11736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply Mr. Rana has canvassed for the correctness of the view of the High Court."}}, {"text": "Lekhaideceased", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11852, "end_char": 11866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. It cannot be disputed that acid was poured on Lekhaideceased on the night of July 30, 1967 as a result of which he died."}}, {"text": "July 31; 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12763, "end_char": 12776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lekhai died at 5 45 p.m. on July 31; 1967."}}, {"text": "Bhallu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14516, "end_char": 14522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first dying declaration of the deceased was the.one made by him to Nagai, Pancham, Bhallu.", "canonical_name": "Bha!lu"}}, {"text": "Badri Pradhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15394, "end_char": 15407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "deceased would normally be m~; t reluctant to spare the real assailant arid falsely mention the naine of another person as the one responsible for causing injuries to .the deceased ... Lekhai deceased also told Badri Pradhan (PW 6) who arrived at the.place of occurrence on hearing alarm that Barati accused had poured acid over him .. No cogent ground.has been shown as to why the above evidence of Badri Pradhan be not."}}, {"text": "Bara", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16174, "end_char": 16178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is significant that Bara ti was no sfrariger to Lekhai.", "canonical_name": "Barati"}}, {"text": "Paticham", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16527, "end_char": 16535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the oral dying declarations made by the deceased to Nagai, Paticham, Bhallu, Jeorakhan and Badri Pradhan PWs, we have the evidence ()f Sub Inspector Asrarul J{aq that the deceased lodged report Ka I at the police station at 2 30 a.m. when the deceased was brought there in a cart."}}, {"text": "Asrarul J{aq", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16617, "end_char": 16629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the oral dying declarations made by the deceased to Nagai, Paticham, Bhallu, Jeorakhan and Badri Pradhan PWs, we have the evidence ()f Sub Inspector Asrarul J{aq that the deceased lodged report Ka I at the police station at 2 30 a.m. when the deceased was brought there in a cart."}}, {"text": "Lekbai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16926, "end_char": 16932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub- Inspector, Asrarul Haq thereafter recorded statement Ka 22 of Lekbai, deceased.", "canonical_name": "ofLekhai"}}, {"text": "Bish", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17409, "end_char": 17413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial court rejected the above evidence because it was of the view that Lekhai deceased, as mentioned by him in dying declaration Ka 11 made .to Dr. Bish!,", "canonical_name": "Bisht"}}, {"text": "Asrarul Haq", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17705, "end_char": 17716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was, however, nothing in that statement to indicate that Lekhai remained unconscious for a long time and as such was not in a position to lodge the first information report at the police station or make statement /(a 22 to Sub Inspector Asrarul Haq."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20473, "end_char": 20499, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_577_588_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "RAJA BAHADUR MOTILAL BOMBAY MILLS LTD.\n\nAND ANOTHER\n\nM/S. GOVIND RAM BROTHERS (P) LTD., AND\n\nANOTHER.\n\nMarch 12, 1974.\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.]\n\nBombay Rent Hotel mul Lodging House Ratts Control A.ct (57of1947), s. 11 (I)\n\n(c) -Applicability of principle of apportionment.\n\nOn September l, 19\"40, the basic date under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, the properties in dispute were parts of a larger entity comprised in a single lease. In March 1948, the respondent took a fresh lease of the properties in dispute, Thereafter, the respondent filed applications in the court of Small Causes for fixation of standard rent on the basis of apportionment. The trial court dismissed the applications holding that the premises, on account of structural alterations, had undergone such a change that they could no longer be identified with the property that existed in Septermber 1940;.that the mode of deter~ mining the rent by apportionment was not avai1ab1e to tl:e tenant; and that there was no sufficient material for asc:ertainina the standard rent in any other way. This order was set aside in revision and the case was remanded to the trial court. After remand, the trial court held that except with respect to three items of the premises in dispute, which were new structures, there was no change of identity in the rest of the properties; that the new structures beJonged to the respondent who was consequently liabJe to pay rent only for the land underneath; and on that basis, applying the principle of apportionement, fixed the standard rent. With respect to one item the trial court took into consideration the investment made by the landlord inclusive of the cost of structures, estimated the value of the land underneath as in 1940, and fixed the standard rent on that basis.\n\nIn revision it was held that the ownership of the three new structures also vested in the appellant, that he was entitled to get a fair return on that investment also and that the value of the land should be taken as in 1948 and not in 1940, and the standard rent was fixed on that basis. Further revisions to the High Court were dismissed with some arithmetical corrections.\n\nIn appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : The principle of apportionment is applicable to the fixation of standard rent of the premises in dispute and the principle had been rightly invoked and applied. [584 F-0] .\n\n(a) One of the primary objects of the Act is to curb exaction of extortionate rent. Section 11(1) empowers the Court to fix the standard rent at such amount, as having regard to the provisions of the Act and the circumstances of the case, the Court deems just, If on the basic date the premises were not let out separately but were a part of the subject matter of a larger demise then s. I l(l)(c) comes into operation.\n\nIf the standard rent of a whole was a specific amount it stands to reason that the standard rent of a part or sub-division of the whole should not ordinarily exceed that amount. Therefore, if in the circumstances of a given case the court feels that for securing the ends of justice and giving effect to the provisions and policy or the Act it is reasonably necessary and feasible to work out the standard rent by apportionment, it can legitimately do so. The language of the Act consistently with its scheme and inbuilt policy is elastic enough to permit the fixation of standard rent on apportionment basis. At the same time, caution and circumspection are necessary in applying the principle to the particular circumstances of a case. For example, if after the material date, the landlord has made investments and improvements in the premises it will be just and reasonable to take that factor also into account and give him a fair return on such investment. Similarly, in apportioning the rent, the Court must also consider other relevant circumstances and advantages enjoyed by the tenant -0f thepremises of which the standard rent' is in question as compared with the rest\n\n'\"·\n\nof the property in which tis comprised. Fu.rt her, where after the basic date the pre- A mises completely changed their identity, apportionment as a method of determining just standard rent loses its efficacy and may be abandoned altogether.[583E-585Cj\n\nNcrC!)'anc.l Bansila/ v. Venkatrao Anant Rai 61 Born. L.R. 352, Bainbridge v.\n\nCongdon (1925) 2 K.B. 261 and Fox v. Bishop of Chester (1824) 2 B & C 635 at 655 referred to.\n\nDhanrajgirji Nar,11'ngirji v. W. G. Ward (1925) 27, Born. L.R. 877 and Data Shoe & Co. Ltd. v. Aarayan Das Mullick and Ors. not approved. (b)(i) The findings of the trial court before remand had been set aside in the order of remand, and there is nothing wrong or unfair or untenable in the method adopted by the lower courts after remand which would warrant interference by this Court in exercise of special jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution. [587J?-GJ\n\n(ii) The question whether certain propertY has changed its identity.after the basic date is largely one of fact. The factual conclusions arived at by the revisional court and High Court are not shown to be perverse or manifestly unjust. It was with regard to the unchanged old properties that the High Court and the Revisional Court mainly adopted the method of apportionment. Even so, they allowed the landlord a fair return over the amount invested by him towards the cost of flooring, ceiling and other fixtures. since the rent of the old unchanged premises was fi:ited mainly on apportionment basis, the courts rightly did not think it necessary to take the value of their sites separately into computation in fi.:iting the standard rent. [588\n\nB-D]\n\n(iii) As regards the new structures the courts below, in capitalising their vallle did take into account the value of the land and took the market value of the land as in the year 1948. [588B]\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1186-1188 of 1972.\n\nAppeals by special leave frnm the Judgment and Order dated 12/ 13/15th October, 197! of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil\n\nJl.\n\nApplication Nos. 555, 556 of 1967 and 72 of 1968.\n\nK. S. Cooper, M. K. .Shah, P. H. Parekh and Sunanda Bhandare, for the appellants.\n\nB. N. Lokur, Rameshwar Nath, for respondent No. 1.\n\nSubodh Markendeya, for Respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by F\n\nSARKARIA, ].-Whether the principle of apportionment is applicable to the fixation of standard rent of a premises under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Cohtro[ Act, 1947 (for short, the Act); if so whether on the facts of the case, the principle has been rightly invoked-is the two fold question that falls for decision in these three appeals by special leave directed against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.\n\nThe material facts are as under :\n\nA big compound, measuring II ,150 sq. yards, at'156 Tardeo Road, Bombay, belonged to Raja Bahadur Moti La[ Mills, Ltd., Bombay, appellant No. I. The Mills were shifted from these premises in the year\n\n1930.\n\nIn 1932, th~ whole of this estate including the structures standing on a part of it, was Jet out to Sound Studios Ltd. Between the years 1932 and 1940, some part of it was sub-let by Sound Studios to Sheraj Ali, who was the proprietor of M/s. Famous\n\nkAJA BAHADUR MILLS LTD. v. G. R. BROS. (P.) LTD. (Sarkaria, !.) 57!i\n\nCine Laboratory and another part to Neon Signs (India) Ltd., and the rest of the estate continued to be with Sound Studios. Thereafter, Sound Studios went out of the picture and the whole estate was let out to National Studios Ltd. on October 23, 1940 at a monthly rent of Rs. I 700/- for a period of two years.\n\nIn July 1941, National Studios surrendered their lease and Sheraj Ali became a direct tenant under appellant 1 in respect of the premises in his possession, called for the sake of identification, 983/1 (whole) and 983/2 (Ground floor).\n\nOn December I, 1941 and again in November I 942, Sheraj Ali took on rent additional portions of this estate so that his original rent, which was Rs. 400/-, was first increased to Rs. 600/- and then to Rs. 700/- and thereafter in November 1942 to Rs. 875/-.\n\nBy November 1947, Sheraj Ali was paying Rs. I 200/- per month as rent for the premises demised to him including some new structures which had been built.\n\nSheraj Ali had taken a loan from M/s. Govind Ram Bros. Ltd., Respondent I on the security of his Film Studio Equipments. He failed to repay the loan. Thereupon, Respondent I instituted a suit for recovery of the amount and obtained a decree from the High Court, on February 27,1948.\n\nAs a result oft he High Court's decree, the right, title and interest of Sheraj Ali in the mortgaged property were assigned to Respondent I. Respondent I, in consequence, took a fresh lease on March 19,1948 from appellant No. I of the properties (called for identification) 983/1 to 983/12, which were in the tenancy of Sheraj Ali, at a conttactural rent of Rs. 1228/- p.m. On the same date, Respondent 1 executed another lease in respect of three rooms in the sa1ne premises (marked for identification as) 984, in favour of appellant I, on a monthly rent of Rs. 750/-.\n\nRespondent I failed to pay the co.ntractual rent, regularly, which fell into arrears which were not cleared despite the pressing demands made by the Receiver. On March 13, 1954 the Receiver wrote to Respondent I threatening to take legal proceedings for the recovery of the rent. This Receiver, who is now appellant No. 2. had been appointed by the High Court in Suit No. 454 of 1949 instituted by appellant 1 against the Insurance Company.\n\nOn April 14, 1954, two applications were filed in the Court of Small Causes by Respondent I for fixation of standard rent in respect of the pren1ises coin prised in the said two leases; one application, R. A. N. 983/54, relates to properties 983/J to 983/12, and the other (R.A.N.\n\n984) to premises 984. It was alleged in the applications that since on September, I, 1940, the entire estate, including the properties in question. had been let out on a monthly rent of Rs. 1700/-, standard rent of the premises tn question should be fixed on the basis of apportionm 'nt In particular, it was pleaded that fair rent of Rs. 983/1 to 983/12 should be I/8th of Rs. 1200/- which was later corrected as 1700/-. On the same basis it was alleged in the second application, that fair rent of premises 984 should be Rs. 75/- p. m.\n\nThe appellants resisted these applications and averred in R. A. N. 983/54, that several entirely new structures had been built and substantial alterations made in most of these structures between the years 1940 and 1948, as a result whereof the property had lost its identity, and -consequently, fair rent could not be fixed 'on apportionment basis.\n\nOn June 11, 1958, Respondent 1 made an application for amendment -Of the Standard Rent Application <R.A. N. 983/54) for adding an alternative ground based on the value of the land and cost of construction -so that in the event of the court holding on the preliminary issue in favour of the appellants, the standard rent could be fixed on the basis -Of the valuation of the land and the construction. This application was disallowed.\n\nOn July 30, 1958 Respondent 1 made an application for amendment -Of his R. A. N. 984of1954 on lines similar to that in R. A. N. 983154.\n\nIt was also dismissed by an order, dated July 31, 1958. ·\n\nAt the stage of arguments on December 4, 1958, Respondent I moved another application for amendment and addition of the plea that they were the owners of the structures in premises 983/10, 983/11 And 983/12.\n\nThe second amendment was not sought to be made in the other application R. A. N. 984/1954 relating to property 984. This prayer was also declined,\n\nThe trial court (Samson J.) by its judgment dated April 2, 1959, found that the premises in question on account of structural alterations had undergone such a change that they qmld no longer be identified with the property that existed in September 1940 and that the mode of determining rent by apportionment was not available to the tenants. In the result he dismissed the applications, adding \"there is no sufficient material to ascertain the standard rent in any other way '.\n\nAgainst those orders, Respondent 1 filed a revision petition unuer s. 129 (3)ofthe Act before the Revisional Court of Small Causes, Bombay. which accepted, the same set aside the order of the trial judge, allowed the amendment and remanded both the applications for fixation of fair rent to the trial court.\n\nAgainst this remand order, dated August 8, 1960, of the Revisional Court, the appellants preferred two Civil Revisions to the High Court -0f Bombay.\n\nDuringthependencyofthose Revisions, the trial court allowed the amendment and proceeded to decide the entire matter afresh. These facts were brought to the notice of the High Court, which, however, dismissed the revision petitions by a judgment dated February 3, 1961 holding that the first Revisional Court had, in fact, remanded the entire matter for trial de novo, after rightly allowing both the amendments.\n\nAfter the remand, the trial court by its judgment, dated Aprii 25, 1961 held that except 983/10, 983111 and 983/12, which were new structures, there was no change of identity in the rest of the properties\n\n,, '\n\nRAJA BAHAOUR MILLS LTD. v. G. R. BROS. (P.) LTD. (Sarkaria, J.)sst\n\ni. e. 983/1 to 983/9; that new structures 983/10, 983/II and 983/12 belonged to Respondent 1 who was consequently, liable to pay rent only for the land underneath; that the cost of repairs of the properties 983/8 and 983/9 after they had been destroyed by fire, was mainly borne by Respondent 1, the landlord's contribution being Rs. 8,500/- only.\n\nApplying the principle of apportionment, it fixed the standard rent of the properties 983/1 to 983/12 at Rs. 400/- p.m. subject to permitted increases after 1954.\n\nRegarding the premises 984 (in R. A. N. 984/54), the trial court gave a return on the investment of Rs. 40,000/- made by the landlord inclusive of the cost of structure and the value of land underneath at Rs. 30/- per sq. yard (as that of 1940) and fixed the standard rent at Rs. 386/- p. m. subject to permitted increases after 1946.\n\nAggrieved by these orders of the trial court, appellants and Respondent 2 filed two revision applications under s. 129 (3) to the Revisional Court of Small Causes which by its judgment, dated September 30, 1964, substantially upheld the findings of the trial court, inter alia with the exceptions : (i) that the ownership of the new structures 983/10, 983/11 and 983/12 vested in Appellant I, who was entitled to get a fair return on that investment; (ii) that the value of the land \"married\" to the new structures 983/10, 983/11 and 983/12, and 984/54, should be taken at Rs. 50/-persq. yd., i.e. as ofl948 and not as of 1940as had been done by the trial court on remand. In the result, the standard rent in R.A.N. 983 was raised to Rs. 981/- and in R.A.N. 984 to Rs.411/-p.m.\n\nTo impugn the decision, dated September, 30, 1964, of the Revisional Court, the parties preferred six Special Civil Applications under Art. 226/227 of the Constitution to the High Court. By a common order, a learned single Judge of the High Court dismissed these applications except that he corrected some arithmetical errors and, in consequence, fixed the standard rent of properties 983/1 to 983/12 at Rs. 841.07 and that of premises 984/54 at Rs. 462/11 p. m.\n\n- It is against this decision dated 12/13th October 1971 of the High Court that these apeals have been filed by special leave.\n\nThe first contention of Mr. Cooper, learned Counsel for the appellants is that there is no provision in the Act which requires standard rent to be fixed on apportionment basis; rather. the definition of \"premises., ins. 5(3) (b) which speaks of \"part of a building let separately,\" read with clause (i) ofs. 5(10) and clause (c) of s. 11(1) with due emphasis on the article 'the' immediately preceding the word 'premises' in the said clauses, indicates that the standard rent would be the rent for which the suit premises were first let separately on or after the basic date i.e.\n\nSeptember I, 1940. lfon the basic date-proceeds the argument-the premises in question did not form the subject of a separate, single demise but had been let out together with other portions of larger premises, its standard rent could not be determined on the footing of the rent payable for those different portions.\n\nReliance\n\nbas been placed on Dhanrajgirji Naraingirji v.\n\nW. G. Ward;(!) and Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. v. Narayan . Das Mullick and Ors.(2) Counsel had further tried to distinguish Capital and Provincial Property Trust Ltd. v. Rice(3) and JJhikaji Ramchandra Paranjpe\n\nv. Vishnu Ramchandra Paranjpe(4), referred to in the judgment of the High Court.\n\nOn the other hand, Mr. Lokur, learned Counsel for Respondent I maintains that the principle of apportionment has always been accepted by the Bombay High Court as an appropriate guide in fixing standard rent under the Act of premises which on the basic date had been let out as part of a larger entity. It is pointed out that in Narayan/al Bansi/al v. Venkatrao Anant Rai(S); a Bench of the High Court while considering the question of standard rent in respect of another portion of the very property of the appellant-Mills, had invoked this principle.\n\nBefore we deal with the contentions canvassed, it will be proper to make a brief survey of the relevant provisions f the Act:\n\nThe material part of the definition of \"premises\" in s.5(8) reads: 0 \"Premises\" means:-\n\n(a) any land not being used for agricultural purposes;\n\n(b) any building or part of a building let separately .... \"\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\nSub-section(IO)ofthesameSectiondefines \"standard rent\", in rela- E tion to any premises, to mean-\n\n( a) where the standard rent fixed by the court and the Controller respectively under the Bombay Rent Restrictions Act, 1939 or the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1944, such standard r.;, nt; or\n\n(b) where the standard rent is not so fixedfsubject to the pro- F visions of section 11,\n\n(i) the rent at which the premises were let on the first day of September 1940, or\n\n(ii) where they were not let on the first day of September 1940, the rent at which they were last let before that day, or G\n\n(iii) where they were first let after the first day of September 1940, the rent at which they were first let, or\n\n(iv) in any of the cases specified in section 11, the rent fixed by the Court;\n\n(1) (19251 27, Born. L.R. 877.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 234.\n\n(3) (1952] Appeal Cases 142.\n\n(4) 56 Born. L.R. 402.\n\n(5) 67 Born. L. R. 352.\n\nA Section 11 empowers the Rent Court to fix the standard rent at such amount, as having regard to the provisions of this Act and the circumstances of the case, the court deems just-\n\n(a) where any premises are first let after the first day of\n\nSeptember 1940, and the rent at which they are so Jet is in 8 the opinion of the Court excessive; or\n\n(b) where the Court is satisfied that there is no sufficient evidence to ascertain the rent at which the premises were let in anyone of the cases mentioned in sub-clause(i)to (iii) of clause (4) of sub-section (10) of section 5; or\n\n(c) Where by reason of the premises having been let at one time as a whole orin part and another time in parts or a whole, or for any other reasons, any difficulty arises in giving effect to this part; or\n\n(d) Where any premises have been or are let rent free or at a nominal rent or for some consideration in addition to rent; or\n\n(e) Where there is any dispute between the land-lord and the tenant regarding the amount of standard rent.\"\n\nClause (c) read with the openinig part of s. ll(l) is crucial for our purpose.\n\nOne of the primary objects of the Act is to curb exaction of extortionate rents and to stabilise the same at pre-War level. In achieving that object, however, it avoids a Procrustean or mechanical approach.\n\nWhile pegging the basic line to September 1, 1940, it significantly subordinates \"standard rent\" by its very definition ins. 5 (10) (b) to the benignant jurisdiction of the'Court under s.11. And the key words of the latter provision, into which the conscience of this anti-rack-renting statute is compressed, are ''the circumstances of the case, the Court deems just\". These words inhibit a rigid and ossified determination of \"standard rent\". They leave sufficient \"play at the joints\", investing the court with a wide discretion in the matter.\n\nAccording to the scheme of the Act, while \"rent\" recoverable by the landlord, may owing to permitted increases, fluctuate, the 'standard rent' always remains fixed or stationary.\n\nIf on the basic date, the suit premises were not let out separately but were a part of the subject-matter ofa larger demise-as in the instant case-difficulty arises in giving effect to the statute. Clause (c) of s.\n\n11(1) then comes into operation. To resolve the difficulty this clause and the related provisions are not to be construed in a narrow technical sense which would stultify or defeat their object. It is to be interpreted liberally in a manner which would 'advance the remedy', 'suppress the\n\nmischief' and foil 'subtle inventions and evasions' of the Act.\n\nConstrued in accordance with this socially relevant rule in Heyden's case the meaning of'the premises' having been let at one time as a whole, spoken of in this clause, can legitimately be deemed to cover the larger premises which, on the basic date, had been let as a whole and of which the suit premises was a part let out subsequently. In any event, the amplitude of the phrase \"or any other reason\" in the latter part of the clause, is wide enough to embrace cases of this kind and confers a plenary curative power on the Court.\n\nTrue, that unlike the English Rent Control Act of 1920 or the later English Acts, the (Bombay) Act doos not expressly speak of apportionment. But the language of its relevant provisions construed consistently with the scheme and inbuilt policy of the Act, is elastic enough to permit the fixation of standard rent on apportionment basis.\n\nAs noticed already,s.11 (!)gives a discretion to the Court to fix such amount as standard rent as it udeems just\"· However, in exercising this discretion the Court has to pay due regard to (i) the provisions of the Act and (ii) the circumstances of the case.\n\nApportionment or equal distribution of the burden of rent on every portion-is a rule of justice and good sense. If the standard rent of a whole was a specific amount, it stands to reason that the standard rent of a part or sub-division of that whole should not ordinarily exceed that amount. Therefore, if in the circumstances of a given case the Court feels that for securing the ends of justice and giving effect to the provisions and policy of the Act, it is reasonably necessary and feasible to work out the standard rent by apportionment, it can legitimately do so. This principle, however, is applicable where on the basic date, that portion of which the standard rentis to be determined, had not been let separately as on unit, but tho whole, of which it is a part, had been let on that date. Apportionment postulates that on account of its having been let on the basic date, the whole had acquired a standard rent which has to be allocated to smaller units subsequently carved out ofit.\n\nIt is thus clear that the principle of apportionment is not alien to the spirit of the Act, and has indeed been often invoked by the courts in fixing standard rent under this Act. In Narayan/al Bansilal's case (supra), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court determined standard rent of another part of this very estate of the Mills in accordance with that principle.\n\nHowever, while conceding that apportionment is not foreign to the scheme, purpose and policy of the Act, we will like to emphasise the need for caution and circumspection in invoking it. It is not to be rigidly and indiscriminately applied as a cast-iron rule of law regardless of time and circumstances or the equities of the case. A doctrinnaire approach, not consistent with a just and fair determination, stultifies the whole salutary purpose of justice to both, the landlord and the tenant. If necessary, it can be adjusted, adapted and attuned in the light ofthe particular circumstances of the case, to satisfy the statutory requirement of\n\nfixing the standard rent as at a \"just amount. Thus if after the material date, the landlord has made investments and improvements in the premises, it will be just and reasonable to take that factor also into account and to givehimafair returnonsuchinvestments. Further, in apportioning the rent, the Court must consider other relevant circumstances, such as \"size, accessibility, aspect, and other physical advantages\" enjoyed by the tenant of the premises of which the standard rent is in question, as compared with those of the rent of the property in which it is comprised (see Bainbridge v. Contdon(l)J. Where after the ba:io date, the premises completely change their identity, apportionment as a method of determining just standard rent, loses its efficacy and may be abandoned altogether. We have only illustrated, not exhaustively enumerated the relevant circumstances and their implications.\n\nAt this stage, we may notice the decisions in Danrajgirji v. W.C.\n\nWard(supra)and Bala Shoe and Co. v. Narayan Dass(supra)relied upon by Mr. Cooper.\n\nIn the first, a learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court was considering ss. 2(l)(a) and 13(l)(a) of the Bombay Rent (War Restriction Act II of 1918), which were, to an extent, similar to sections 5(8)(b) and (IO) and ll(l)(c) o(the 1947-Act. There, the Port Trust had in March 24, 1915, leased the building known as Watson's Annexe to one Dr. Billimoria at a rental of Rs. 2,850, besides ground rent a.nd taxes. Dr. Billimoria sublet the premises in different flats to different tenants. The premises in the occupation of the defendant were sublet to.him at a rental of Rs. 75/- in September, 1915, i.e. before September 1, 1916 which was the basic date under the 1918-Act. The tenancy of Dr. Billimoria was terminated by a consent decree on July 31, 1923 and thereafter, the defendant held directly under the plaintiff. The question arose as to whether. standard rental of the flat should be calculated on the basis of the actual rent of Rs. 75/-, on the basis of the subletting or whether it should be determined by apporiionment of the rent which Dr. Billimoria was paying to the Port Trust on the basis of the first letting. Pratt J answered this question thus:\n\n\"The Rent Act itself in the definition of the premises refers to a part of the building separately let as premises of which the\n\nstandad rent has to be determined and such standard rent must bedetennined with reference to those premises in the manner specified bys 2(1 )(a) of the Act. The standrard rent, therefore, must be ascertained on the admitted basic rent of Rs. 75/-...... Again, if the head-lease instead of being as here the lease of one building consisting of flats bad been a lease of a large number of buildings constituting a large estate, it would be almost impossible to make a correct apportionment of the rent. I do not think it was the intention of the Rent Act that landlords and tenants should bo driven to do a difficult and expensive process of valuation and calculation before their rent could be ascertained.\"\n\n{I) (1925] 2 K. B. 261. 9-M4.SSup.CJ/75\n\n,)'.\n\nWe see force in the argument as also textual and pragmatic support.\n\nBut these considerations do not preclude the Court from import; ng the flexible factors of fairness suggested by the circumstances of the case.\n\nIndeed, s. II, as explained earlier, obliges the Court to do it. Moreover, the interpretation of\"premises\" adopted by the learned Judge was a little too literal, narrow and divorced from the purpose and content of the provisions relating to fixation of standard rent. Nor was it in aecord with the scheme and object of the 191E-Act. The court'sjuris diction to consider, as a strong circumstance, proper apporti)oment of rent is not taken away, in our view.\n\nIt may be noted that just like the opening clause of s. 5 of the 1947- Act, which defines •;, remises\" \"standard rent\" etc., the corresponding s. 2(1) of the 1918Act, also, started with the qualifying words : \"Jn this Act, unless. there is anything fepugnant in the subject or context\".\n\nWhile applying these definitions to particular cases and provisions of the Acts, these words should not be lost sight of. The argument in favour of adopting the restricted interpretation, ignores this rider to the definitions, provided by the Legislature in the'e statutes.\n\nWe do not intend to over.burden this judgment with a discussion the decision in Bara Shoe & Co's case (supra). Suffice it to say that that is a decision under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act {I 7 of 1950) which stands on its own facts. It cannot be accepted as laying down a rule of universa1 application. It is vulnerable, more or less on the same grounds, on which the decision in Dhanrajgirji's case can be assailed.\n\nWe reject the narrow interpretation of the relevant provisions ofss. 2 and II, c1nvas'iCd for by the appellants, for two reasons: Firstly, it will leave the door wide open for evasion of this statute by-what Abbot C. J. in Fox v. Bishop of Chester(I)-called \"shift or contrivance\"-All that a greedy landlord, need do to squeeze out more rent would be to divide his premises into several parts and Jet them out separately on exorbitant rents. Such an evasion mav amount to a fraud upon the statute. Secondly, such a construction so manifestly subversive of one of the primary objects of the Ac! would be wholly beyond the intend; nem of the Legislature.\n\nFor reasons aforesaid we would n!gat.ive the first contention of Mr. Cooper, as an inflexible proposition and answer the first part of the question posed in the affimative to the extent indicated. It takes us to the second part of that ques•ion namely whether the principle of apportionment was correctly applied to the factc of the case?\n\nMr. Cooj>Cr contends that the first trial court (Samson J.) had right ly found, that the premises in question on account of extensive alterations and constructions undergone a complete change after the basic date, and therefore standard rent could not be determined by apporoining the rent of the whole among the parts. It is maintained that\n\n(I) (824) 2 B &; C 635 at 655.\n\nA •\n\nthis finding of Sam•on J. was wrongly set aside by t~ High Court and must be deemed to be still holding the field. Objection is also taken to the amendments allowed by the trial c()urt on remand. In the alternative, it is argued that even the courts below found that properties 983/10,\n\n983/11, 983/12 and 984/54 were admittedly new structures and extensive repairs and replacements had been made in the remaining suit premises which had been destroyed or severely damaged by fire in 1948-49. On account of these substantial alterations and reconstruc- , tions the premises in question had lost their identity and consequently, the principle of apportioment was not applicable.\n\nThe first part of the contention basod on the judgment of Samson J. is groundless. The judgment of the fust'trial court was set aside in toto by the Revisional Court, and further by the High Court and the case .was remanded for de novo trial to the trial court which thereafter, decided the case afresh atler allowing the applicant to amend his R.A.\n\nN.S. It is too late in the day any way to argue on the assumption that the findings still survive.\n\nThe question whether a certain property has changed its identity after the basic date is largely one o.f fact. The courts bek•w have found that excepting properties 983/10, 983/11,983/12 and 984/54 which were admittedly new structures contructed near about 1948, the rest of the properties, namely 983/1 to 983/9 had not lost their identity. The courts therefore, worked out the economic rent of these new structures by cepitalising their value and gave the landlord a fair return on his jnvestments and fixed their standard rent mainly on that ba•is. It was with regard to the unchanged old properties 983/1 to 983/9 that the High Court and the Revisional Court mainly adopted the method of apportionment. Even so, it allowed the landlord fair return over Rs. 14,448/· being the cost of flooring, ceiling and other fixtures fi<ed t0 property 983/6. Now it is not disputed that on the basic date (Sep tember I, 1940), these properties in question were parts of a larger entity .comprised in a single lease or tenancy in favour of Sound Studios at a monthly rent of Rs. 1700/·, The courts below have therefore taken into account this basic circumstance along with the other relevant facts of the case. We do not find anything so wrong or unfair or untenable in the method adopted by them which would warrant an interference by this Court in the exercise of its special jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution, Not that apportionment must be applied in all cases a' a rule oflaw but that, if applied along with other considerations dictated by a sense of justice and fairplay, cannot be condemned by this Court as illegal. We therefore, overrule this contention, also.\n\nLastly, it is contended that the courts below have seriously erred in evaluating the land under the suit properties at Rs. 30/- per sq. yd. on the basis of an instance (Ex. R 6) of the year 1942, while they should have taken into account the value of the land as in the year 1948. It is added that some photo-stat copies of sale-deeds pertaining to the relevant year were produced by Mr. Deweja, architect examined by the Landlord, and the Revisional Court wrongly rejected them as unproved. !It is maintained that in 1948, the market value of the site underneath the\n\nstructures was Rs. 120/- per sq. yd. In support of his contention that the value of the land at the date of the letting is the appropriate value to be tak l into account, Counsel has cited Bukmanibai Khunji Cool'erji v. Shfrnarayan Ram Ashre. (1).\n\nWe are unable to accept this contention also. The courts below in capitalising the structures, 983/10 to 983/12 and 984/54 did take into account the value of the land married to those properties at the rate of Rs. 50/- per sq. yd; which, according to. their estimate, after adding Rs . . 30/-per sq. yd for escalation, would be t~ market value of that land in the year 1948. Since the rent of the o unchanged properties 983/1 to 983/9 was fixed mainly on apportio ent basis, the courts did not think it necessary to take the value of tl\\eir sites separately into computation in fixing the standrard rent. Moreover, there was no evidence on the record to show that the value of the land in question, in the year 1948 was Rs. 120/-per sq. yd. We, therefore, donotthinkit necessary to examine Cooverji's case cited l)y the Counsel. We hwever, do not rule out the propriety of paying regard to eecalation• in land value as put forward by Mr. Cooper, but do hold that this Court will be loath to re-investigate factual ; conclusions not shov.'n to be perverse or manifestly unjust. Such is not the case here.\n\n!For:au the foregoing reasons, we would answrr the question posed for decision, in the affirmative and dismiss these appeals with one set or costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeals dismissed\n\n---··---·--- (!) (1966) 67 Born. L.R. 692 ..", "total_entities": 84, "entities": [{"text": "RAJA BAHADUR MOTILAL BOMBAY MILLS LTD.\n\nAND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJA BAHADUR MOTILAL BOMBAY MILLS LTD. AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. GOVIND RAM BROTHERS (P) LTD., AND\n\nANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S. GOVIND RAM BROTHERS (P) LTD., AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 12, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 12, 1974."}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 144, "end_char": 163, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 233, "end_char": 238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 357, "end_char": 404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2508, "end_char": 2521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4886, "end_char": 4894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. S. Cooper", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6132, "end_char": 6144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Cooper, M. K. .Shah, P. H. Parekh and Sunanda Bhandare, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "M. K. .Shah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6146, "end_char": 6157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Cooper, M. K. .Shah, P. H. Parekh and Sunanda Bhandare, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "P. H. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6159, "end_char": 6171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Cooper, M. K. .Shah, P. H. Parekh and Sunanda Bhandare, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Sunanda Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6176, "end_char": 6192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Cooper, M. K. .Shah, P. H. Parekh and Sunanda Bhandare, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "B. N. Lokur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6215, "end_char": 6226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. N. Lokur, Rameshwar Nath, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6228, "end_char": 6242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. N. Lokur, Rameshwar Nath, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Subodh Markendeya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6267, "end_char": 6284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subodh Markendeya, for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "F\n\nSARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6352, "end_char": 6363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F\n\nSARKARIA, ].-Whether the principle of apportionment is applicable to the fixation of standard rent of a premises under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Cohtro[ Act, 1947 (for short, the Act); if so whether on the facts of the case, the principle has been rightly invoked-is the two fold question that falls for decision in these three appeals by special leave directed against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6767, "end_char": 6801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F\n\nSARKARIA, ].-Whether the principle of apportionment is applicable to the fixation of standard rent of a premises under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Cohtro[ Act, 1947 (for short, the Act); if so whether on the facts of the case, the principle has been rightly invoked-is the two fold question that falls for decision in these three appeals by special leave directed against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6904, "end_char": 6910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "yards, at'156 Tardeo Road, Bombay, belonged to Raja Bahadur Moti La[ Mills, Ltd., Bombay, appellant No."}}, {"text": "Raja Bahadur Moti La[ Mills, Ltd., Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6924, "end_char": 6965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "yards, at'156 Tardeo Road, Bombay, belonged to Raja Bahadur Moti La[ Mills, Ltd., Bombay, appellant No."}}, {"text": "Sound Studios Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7147, "end_char": 7165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1932, th~ whole of this estate including the structures standing on a part of it, was Jet out to Sound Studios Ltd. Between the years 1932 and 1940, some part of it was sub-let by Sound Studios to Sheraj Ali, who was the proprietor of M/s. Famous\n\nkAJA BAHADUR MILLS LTD."}}, {"text": "Sound Studios", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7230, "end_char": 7243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1932, th~ whole of this estate including the structures standing on a part of it, was Jet out to Sound Studios Ltd. Between the years 1932 and 1940, some part of it was sub-let by Sound Studios to Sheraj Ali, who was the proprietor of M/s. Famous\n\nkAJA BAHADUR MILLS LTD."}}, {"text": "Sheraj Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7247, "end_char": 7257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1932, th~ whole of this estate including the structures standing on a part of it, was Jet out to Sound Studios Ltd. Between the years 1932 and 1940, some part of it was sub-let by Sound Studios to Sheraj Ali, who was the proprietor of M/s. Famous\n\nkAJA BAHADUR MILLS LTD."}}, {"text": "Neon Signs (India) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7404, "end_char": 7427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "57!i\n\nCine Laboratory and another part to Neon Signs (India) Ltd., and the rest of the estate continued to be with Sound Studios."}}, {"text": "National Studios Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7578, "end_char": 7599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, Sound Studios went out of the picture and the whole estate was let out to National Studios Ltd. on October 23, 1940 at a monthly rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "October 23, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7603, "end_char": 7619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, Sound Studios went out of the picture and the whole estate was let out to National Studios Ltd. on October 23, 1940 at a monthly rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "National Studios", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7695, "end_char": 7711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In July 1941, National Studios surrendered their lease and Sheraj Ali became a direct tenant under appellant 1 in respect of the premises in his possession, called for the sake of identification, 983/1 (whole) and 983/2 (Ground floor)."}}, {"text": "December I, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7921, "end_char": 7937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December I, 1941 and again in November I 942, Sheraj Ali took on rent additional portions of this estate so that his original rent, which was Rs."}}, {"text": "Govind Ram Bros. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8369, "end_char": 8390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sheraj Ali had taken a loan from M/s. Govind Ram Bros. Ltd., Respondent I on the security of his Film Studio Equipments."}}, {"text": "February 27,1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8596, "end_char": 8612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, Respondent I instituted a suit for recovery of the amount and obtained a decree from the High Court, on February 27,1948."}}, {"text": "March 19,1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8808, "end_char": 8821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result oft he High Court's decree, the right, title and interest of Sheraj Ali in the mortgaged property were assigned to Respondent I. Respondent I, in consequence, took a fresh lease on March 19,1948 from appellant No."}}, {"text": "March 13, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9348, "end_char": 9362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 13, 1954 the Receiver wrote to Respondent I threatening to take legal proceedings for the recovery of the rent."}}, {"text": "April 14, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9631, "end_char": 9645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 14, 1954, two applications were filed in the Court of Small Causes by Respondent I for fixation of standard rent in respect of the pren1ises coin prised in the said two leases; one application, R. A. N. 983/54, relates to properties 983/J to 983/12, and the other (R.A.N.\n\n984) to premises 984."}}, {"text": "June 11, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10803, "end_char": 10816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 11, 1958, Respondent 1 made an application for amendment -Of the Standard Rent Application <R.A. N. 983/54) for adding an alternative ground based on the value of the land and cost of construction -so that in the event of the court holding on the preliminary issue in favour of the appellants, the standard rent could be fixed on the basis -Of the valuation of the land and the construction."}}, {"text": "July 30, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11237, "end_char": 11250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 30, 1958 Respondent 1 made an application for amendment -Of his R. A. N. 984of1954 on lines similar to that in R. A. N. 983154."}}, {"text": "July 31, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11412, "end_char": 11425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also dismissed by an order, dated July 31, 1958. ·"}}, {"text": "December 4, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11459, "end_char": 11475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the stage of arguments on December 4, 1958, Respondent I moved another application for amendment and addition of the plea that they were the owners of the structures in premises 983/10, 983/11 And 983/12."}}, {"text": "Samson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11804, "end_char": 11810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This prayer was also declined,\n\nThe trial court (Samson J.) by its judgment dated April 2, 1959, found that the premises in question on account of structural alterations had undergone such a change that they qmld no longer be identified with the property that existed in September 1940 and that the mode of determining rent by apportionment was not available to the tenants.", "canonical_name": "Samson"}}, {"text": "April 2, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11837, "end_char": 11850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This prayer was also declined,\n\nThe trial court (Samson J.) by its judgment dated April 2, 1959, found that the premises in question on account of structural alterations had undergone such a change that they qmld no longer be identified with the property that existed in September 1940 and that the mode of determining rent by apportionment was not available to the tenants."}}, {"text": "s. 129", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12334, "end_char": 12340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Revisional Court of Small Causes, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12365, "end_char": 12405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against those orders, Respondent 1 filed a revision petition unuer s. 129 (3)ofthe Act before the Revisional Court of Small Causes, Bombay."}}, {"text": "3, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12986, "end_char": 12993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These facts were brought to the notice of the High Court, which, however, dismissed the revision petitions by a judgment dated February 3, 1961 holding that the first Revisional Court had, in fact, remanded the entire matter for trial de novo, after rightly allowing both the amendments."}}, {"text": "Aprii 25, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13196, "end_char": 13210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the remand, the trial court by its judgment, dated Aprii 25, 1961 held that except 983/10, 983111 and 983/12, which were new structures, there was no change of identity in the rest of the properties\n\n,, '\n\nRAJA BAHAOUR MILLS LTD."}}, {"text": "s. 129", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14380, "end_char": 14386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 30, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14460, "end_char": 14478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aggrieved by these orders of the trial court, appellants and Respondent 2 filed two revision applications under s. 129 (3) to the Revisional Court of Small Causes which by its judgment, dated September 30, 1964, substantially upheld the findings of the trial court, inter alia with the exceptions : (i) that the ownership of the new structures 983/10, 983/11 and 983/12 vested in Appellant I, who was entitled to get a fair return on that investment; (ii) that the value of the land \"married\" to the new structures 983/10, 983/11 and 983/12, and 984/54, should be taken at Rs."}}, {"text": "September, 30, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15077, "end_char": 15096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To impugn the decision, dated September, 30, 1964, of the Revisional Court, the parties preferred six Special Civil Applications under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15182, "end_char": 15190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12/13th October 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15547, "end_char": 15567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "462/11 p. m.\nIt is against this decision dated 12/13th October 1971 of the High Court that these apeals have been filed by special leave."}}, {"text": "Cooper", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15667, "end_char": 15673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first contention of Mr. Cooper, learned Counsel for the appellants is that there is no provision in the Act which requires standard rent to be fixed on apportionment basis; rather."}}, {"text": "s. 11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15971, "end_char": 15979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lokur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16905, "end_char": 16910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Mr. Lokur, learned Counsel for Respondent I maintains that the principle of apportionment has always been accepted by the Bombay High Court as an appropriate guide in fixing standard rent under the Act of premises which on the basic date had been let out as part of a larger entity."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17023, "end_char": 17040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Mr. Lokur, learned Counsel for Respondent I maintains that the principle of apportionment has always been accepted by the Bombay High Court as an appropriate guide in fixing standard rent under the Act of premises which on the basic date had been let out as part of a larger entity."}}, {"text": "s.5(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17615, "end_char": 17621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Controller respectively under the Bombay Rent Restrictions Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17945, "end_char": 18013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18196, "end_char": 18206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Controller respectively under the Bombay Rent Restrictions Act, 1939", "statute": "the Controller respectively under the Bombay Rent Restrictions Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18570, "end_char": 18580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Controller respectively under the Bombay Rent Restrictions Act, 1939", "statute": "the Controller respectively under the Bombay Rent Restrictions Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18752, "end_char": 18762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Controller respectively under the Bombay Rent Restrictions Act, 1939", "statute": "the Controller respectively under the Bombay Rent Restrictions Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19314, "end_char": 19323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 1, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20090, "end_char": 20107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While pegging the basic line to September 1, 1940, it significantly subordinates \"standard rent\" by its very definition ins."}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20243, "end_char": 20247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.\n\n11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20997, "end_char": 21006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Heyden", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21416, "end_char": 21422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Construed in accordance with this socially relevant rule in Heyden's case the meaning of'the premises' having been let at one time as a whole, spoken of in this clause, can legitimately be deemed to cover the larger premises which, on the basic date, had been let as a whole and of which the suit premises was a part let out subsequently."}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22248, "end_char": 22252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Narayan/al Bansilal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23668, "end_char": 23687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Narayan/al Bansilal's case (supra), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court determined standard rent of another part of this very estate of the Mills in accordance with that principle."}}, {"text": "ss. 2(l)(a) and 13(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25635, "end_char": 25659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "War Restriction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25680, "end_char": 25699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 5(8)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25750, "end_char": 25766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "War Restriction Act", "statute": "War Restriction Act"}}, {"text": "March 24, 1915", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25834, "end_char": 25848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, the Port Trust had in March 24, 1915, leased the building known as Watson's Annexe to one Dr. Billimoria at a rental of Rs."}}, {"text": "Billimoria", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25906, "end_char": 25916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, the Port Trust had in March 24, 1915, leased the building known as Watson's Annexe to one Dr. Billimoria at a rental of Rs."}}, {"text": "September 1, 1916", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26174, "end_char": 26191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "75/- in September, 1915, i.e. before September 1, 1916 which was the basic date under the 1918-Act."}}, {"text": "July 31, 1923", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26305, "end_char": 26318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tenancy of Dr. Billimoria was terminated by a consent decree on July 31, 1923 and thereafter, the defendant held directly under the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "Pratt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26692, "end_char": 26697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pratt J answered this question thus:\n\n\"The Rent Act itself in the definition of the premises refers to a part of the building separately let as premises of which the\n\nstandad rent has to be determined and such standard rent must bedetennined with reference to those premises in the manner specified bys 2(1 )(a) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28340, "end_char": 28344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28430, "end_char": 28437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bara Shoe & Co", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28930, "end_char": 28944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not intend to over.burden this judgment with a discussion the decision in Bara Shoe & Co's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "Suffice it to say that that is a decision under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28961, "end_char": 29050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dhanrajgirji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29243, "end_char": 29255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is vulnerable, more or less on the same grounds, on which the decision in Dhanrajgirji's case can be assailed."}}, {"text": "Abbot", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29489, "end_char": 29494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 and II, c1nvas'iCd for by the appellants, for two reasons: Firstly, it will leave the door wide open for evasion of this statute by-what Abbot C. J. in Fox v. Bishop of Chester(I)-called \"shift or contrivance\"-All that a greedy landlord, need do to squeeze out more rent would be to divide his premises into several parts and Jet them out separately on exorbitant rents."}}, {"text": "Cooj", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30279, "end_char": 30283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Cooj>Cr contends that the first trial court (Samson J.) had right ly found, that the premises in question on account of extensive alterations and constructions undergone a complete change after the basic date, and therefore standard rent could not be determined by apporoining the rent of the whole among the parts."}}, {"text": "Sam•on", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30671, "end_char": 30677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A •\n\nthis finding of Sam•on J. was wrongly set aside by t~ High Court and must be deemed to be still holding the field.", "canonical_name": "Samson"}}, {"text": "Sep tember I, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32682, "end_char": 32700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now it is not disputed that on the basic date (Sep tember I, 1940), these properties in question were parts of a larger entity .comprised in a single lease or tenancy in favour of Sound Studios at a monthly rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33172, "end_char": 33180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Deweja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33849, "end_char": 33855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is added that some photo-stat copies of sale-deeds pertaining to the relevant year were produced by Mr. Deweja, architect examined by the Landlord, and the Revisional Court wrongly rejected them as unproved. !"}}, {"text": "Cooverji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35069, "end_char": 35077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, therefore, donotthinkit necessary to examine Cooverji's case cited l)y the Counsel."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_589_594_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "[A.\n\nS. N. KHARKHANIS & ORS.\n\n'\" UNION Or' INDIA & ORS.\n\nMarch 14, 1974 ·\n\nN. RAY, c. J., P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, s. N. DWIVEDI,\n\nP. K. GOSWAMI AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.J\n\nCo11stitutio11 of India, Art. 309, proviso-Integrating two Class I servicts /Jy Presidential Resolution-Date of integration rnade retrospective by Govern n1e1u's letter-Leg(I[ alidity of subsequent letter.\n\nBy Presidential resolution dated 12th August, 1959, the Government or India, under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution, combined two services of Central Excise Service Clnss I and Indian Customs Service Class I with effet from\n\nJ 5th August, 1959. All the petitioners joined the respective servfoes with effect from 13th July, 1959. Later by decision dated 7th April 1970 the Government decided that a combined list of seniority of officers in the service should be prepared with re. fere:nce to April I, 1959, as being the date of merger. The petitioners complained that by reason of this they were excluded fron1 the list of officers appointed to the initial constitution to the combined cadre even though they had joined the two separate seryices on 13th July, 1959, with the result that persons junior to them had become seniors.\n\nIt was contended that the date of 1st April, 1959 on which the two services were combined for the purpose of inter se seniority was an artificial date chosen arbitrarily and is sought to be given effect to without any legal authority.\n\nHELD : The contention n1ust be uphld. Th.e Government had no authority to override the Presidential resolution by any subsequent decision which lacked legal authority and was violative of Art. 14 of the C:institution. The Presidential Resolu. tion of 12th August, 1959 which drew its authority from the proviso to Art. 309\n\nwas clear and categorical in that it not only showed that the question of integra tion of the Central Excise Service Class I and the Indian Customs Service Class I which was older of the two services was under consideration of the Govcrnmenc of India for quite sometime but that \"the President has now been pleased to decide that the two services should be constituted into a single service with effect from 15th August. 1959\" and that \"the services will initially be formed from amongst ail the existing class l officers of the Customs and Central Ex:dse Services who will hence. forth be borne on a single combined cadre for all purposes\". The subsequent dcci fiion of the Government conveyed in the lettr of 7th April, 1970 had no legal autho. rity as it was not purported to have been made in the name or with the authority of the President of India nor did it in any wiy seek to :imend the Presidential Resolu tion of 12th August, 1959 nor did it purport to change the date on and from v.hich the integration was given effect to. [594 C; 593 BDJ\n\nSince a final decision was taken on 7th April, 1970 the petitioners coulJ not havt'l come to this Court earlier. [592 H]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 286 of 1970.\n\nUnder Art. 32 of Constitution of India for the cnfor, c:tlC!'.'. or Fundamental rights.\n\nS. N. Prasad, for the peti1ioners.\n\nG. Das and R. JV. Sachthey, for the respondents.\n\nARGUMENTS For the Petitioners: By Presidential r.esolution dated J 2th August, A 1959 the Indian Customs Service Class I and the Central Excise Service Class I were integrated with effect from 15th August, 1959. The resolution also stated that \"the service will initially be formed from amongst all the existing class I officers of the Customs apd Central Excise Services, who will henceforth be borne on a single combined cadre for all purposes.\"\n\nThe Government took a decision to change the date of constitution of the cadre in 1960. On objections having been raised by the service associations the matter was referred to the Union Public Service Commission in 1967 and on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission a final decision was taken on 7th April, 1970. For the first time in the letter of 7th April, 1970, (st April, 1959 was taken as the date on which the two services were merged and the petitioners made representations against the said arbitrary date. Since after this date some juniors were promoted, the petitioners approached this Court.\n\nAs stated in paragraph 5 of the letter of 7th April, 1970 by taking the artificial date of Jst April, 1959 the petitioners have been discriminated against as the direct recruits of the year 1958 have been included in the initial constitution of the service and the petitioners who were direct recruits of the year 1959 and who at the time of the integration of the two services were existing officers and formed t(1e cadre of the combined servic~§ had not been so included.\n\nThere cannot be any question of laches as explained above.\n\nFor11ze respondent: The decision to merge the two services was taken in March 1959 and an official committee was appointed to determine the inter se seniority. Pending finalisation of seniority list it waS decided to freeze the position as on a particular point of time.\n\nThe date chosen was Jst April, 1959 though the formal resolution to merge the two services was published on 12th August 1959. The seniority list published on 6th January, 1960was based on the position as it was on !st April, 1959 and the promotions made in the service after that date have been ignored. Direct recruits who joined the Class I service and officers promoted after Jst April, 1959 did not figure in the seniority list circulated on 6th January, 1959. The petitioners who joined Class I service in July 1959 were rightly not included in.the combined seniority list of 6th January, 1960.\n\nThe petitioners have not raised any objection regarding the merger from 1959 to 1970 and it was not open lo them to approach this Court after such long delay.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANMOHAN REDDY, J.-Six petitioners, of whom the 4th petitioner has since died. challenge the decision of the first respondent. the Union of India, fixing the principles of seniority of members of the Customs and Central Excise Service Class I as if the combined Service came into ei:istence on April I, 1959, inst<ad of August J 5,, 1959-the date on which the Presidential Resolution dated August 12, 1959 said that the combined Service would come into effect. Petitioners 2, 3, 4 & 6 were appointed as probationary Superintendents of Central Excise Class T in the Central Excise Service Class I with effect from July 13, 1959 on the result of the combined competitive\n\nD •\n\ns. N. KHARKHANIS v. UNION (Jaganmhan Reddy, !.)\n\n59 I\n\nexamination held by the second respondent, the Union Public Service Commission, in 1958: (vide notification of the Government of India\n\n(Cntral Excise Establishment) dated August 4, 1959). Similarly, petitioners 1 & 5_ were apponted on the same date, namely, from July 13, 1959, as probat10nary Assistant Collectors of Customs in the Indian Customs. Service Class I on the result of the combined competitive examrnal!on held by the second respondent in 1958: (vide notification of the Government of India (Customs Establishment) dated August 4,\n\n1959) .. The petitioners say that contrary to the Presidential Resolution of August 12, 1959, creating the combined Service of Customs and Central Excise, Class I, comprising of all the existing members of both the Services as from August 15, 1959, the impugned decision of the Government which prescribed the principles of seniority of members of the two individual Services as if the combined Service came into existence on April 1, 1959, would affect their seniority. as they would\n\nb~ considered to be appointed only after the constitution of the combmed Sernce, when in fact they were members of one or other of the two Services on the date when the combined Service was created. As the combined list of seniority of OfficersintheServicewas prepared v ith reference to April I, 1959 as being the date of the merger, the petitioners complain that they were excluded from the list of Officers appointed to the initial constitution of the Indian Customs and Central Excise Service Class I, even though they had joined the two separate Services on July 13, 1969, as a consequence of which persons who would be juniors, if the principles of seniority were made applicable to them, have become senior and have been promoted by overlooking their claims. When the impugned letter dated April 7, 1970 gave time till May 15, 1970, calling on any member of the Service to point out any factual mistakes or errors in the application of the principles enunciated in the said letter, it appears all the petitioners made representations in which they asserted that the integration of the two Services having taken place on August 15, 1959, and not on April\\, 1959, they were entitled to be included in the initial constitution of the .combined Service and on the application of the principles enunciated in.the said letter no distinc_tion could be made between the direct recruits appointed to the Indian Customs Service Class I and the Central Excise Service Class I in the years 1955 to 1958 and the direct recruits appointed to the said two Services in the year 1959. In their representations the petitioners had claimed that they be placed above respondent 3 and requested that till this matter was decided promotions from the combined seniority list below Serial No. 73 should not be made, but in spite of this request, even before the date calling for representations expired, some Officers were promoted on May 11, 1970, without considering their claims.\n\nThe first respondent in its counter affidavit stated that the idea of having a separate Class I Service for the Central Excise. Department was mooted for the first time in 1944, but the final constitution of the Central Excise Service Class I took place only with effect from July l, 1955; that after the idea of constituting a Central E:<cise Service was mooted in 1944 the first respondent says that training in central excise work was given to Officers recruited to the Indian Customs Service and\n\neven right from !950 tho notifioation i; sued by the second re; pondent for the com'.>ined I. A. S. Etamination stated that the direct re:ruitment was to the Indian Customs and Excise Service even though there was no su :h service in existence upto July 1, 1955 and tbai even after the formation of the Service with effect from July I, J 955, anj upto its subsequent integration with the Indian Customs Servi; e in 1959 the notification issued by the seconj re<pondent stated that the recruitment was to the Indian Customs and Central Exci; e Service Class I and not. to the Indian Customs Service and the Central Excise Service separately, though the actual allocation of the candidates between the two Services was made by the Department of Revenue. It was also stated that the order constituting the Central Excise Service Class I with effect from July 1, 1955, provided that future vacancies in the grade of Sup:rintendent of Central Excise Class I will be filled up by direct recruitment and promotion in the ratio of 1 :1 and that when the final decision to merge the Indian Customs Service Class I and the Central Excise Service Class I was taken by the Government in March 1959, an Official Committee was set up to make recommendations regarding the determination of inter se seniority in the merged service of the offic.rs in position in the two constituent Services atthe time ofintegration. As the finalisation of the seniority list was expected to take some time it was felt desirable to freeze the position of officers in the two departments as on a particular point of time so that changes introduced thoreafter in one Service did not affect the members of the other Service on a lasting and irretrievable basis. Accordingly the date, April 1, 1959, was chosen though the formal resolution to merge the two Services was published only on August 12, 1959. The counter of the Union of India further stated that as the seniority principles enunciated by the Government in their letter of January 6, 1960 had raised a controversy, the Government referred the matter to the second respondent under Art. 320 (3) (b) of the Con•titution, and ultimately the letter of April 7, 1970 was issued accepting not only the principles evolved by the second respondent, but also the date April 1, 1959, as the date on which the integration of Services were to come into effect as previously indicated in the first respondent's letter of January 6, 1960.\n\nAn objection was sought to be taken on the ground that there was an inordinate delay in the petitioners' presenting the writ petition after over ten years even though the letter of January 6, 1960 stated that the decision taken by the Government was final.\n\nTh~ petitioners countered this objection by pointlng out, firstly, that the Jetter of January 6, 1%0 was addressed to the Heads of Departments who G were asked to communicate the decision to those officers whose names figured in the list and since the petitioners were appointed after April 1, 1959, their names did not appear and the decision was not_ communicated to them, secondly, the letter of April 7, 1970, itself clearly stated that everything done earlier by the <!overnment was prm isiona!. It is, therefore, urged that as right from !he beginning objections had been taken by the H Service Assoc1attons regarding the principles enunciated in the lttter of January 6, 1960, and the Government itself had called\n\n...\n\ns. N, KHARKHANIS v. UNION (Jaganmha11 Reddy, J.) 593\n\nupon the Service Associations by its letter of June 20, 1961, to enunciate theprinciplesthey consideredfair in fixingtheseniority, in compliance to which objections were being urged, the petitioners cannot be held to have committed any !aches. Taking into consideration the respective contentions it appears to us that having regard to the stand taken by the Government and the admissions made by it in the letters subsequently written that the proposals set out in the letter of January 6, 1960, were to be treated as provisional, the petitioners could not have come to this Court earlier till a final decisidn was made on April 7, 1970.\n\nAccordingly the preliminary objection is not sustainable.\n\nThe petitioners' only objection to the decision of the Government conveyed in the letter of April 7, 1970, is that the date, April I, 1959, on which the two Services were said to have been merged for the purposes of inter se seniority was an artificial date chosen arbitrarily and is sought to be given effect to without any legal authority. It appears to us that this contention must be upheld. The Presidential Resolut1on of August 12, 1959, which draws its authority fromthe proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution is clear and categorical in that it not only shows that the question of integration of the C'<ntral Excise Service Class I and the Indian Customs Service Class I which was tl:J.e older of the two Services was under consideration of the Government of India for quite some time, but that \"The President has now been pleased to decide that the two services should be constituted into a single service with effect from the 15th August, 1959.\" It also states that \"The Service will initially be formed from amongst all the existing Class I officers of the Customs and Central Excise Services, who will henceforth be borne on a single combined cadre for al\\ purposes.\" (Emphasis ours). It is not denied that the petitioners were members of the respective services on August 15, 1959, and consequently the ruleuelating to seniority should be applicable to them in the same way as to those recruited in 1958. The subsequent decision of the Government conveyed in the letter of April 7, 1970, has no legal validity, as it was not purported to have been made in the name or with the authority of the President oflndia, nor does it in any way seek to amend the Presidential Resolution of August 12, 1959, nor does it purport to change the date on and from which the integration was given effect to. On the contrary, three days after the Presidential Resolution of August 12, 1959, intimating that the President bad decided that the two Services should be constituted into a single Service with effect from August 15, 1959, and from henceforth, namely on and from August 15, 1959, all persons borne on the respective Services will be borne on a single combined cadre, the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, wrote to the President of all India Central Excise Officers Association and the President, Indian Customs Service Association, informing them that the Presidential Resolution was published in the Gazette. This letter further explained the import of that Resolution thus :\n\n\"Since it is the Government's intention that so far as possible,. the existing normal expectations of promotion of Officers •.n he cadre .posts of the two Deparlmentsshould be secured, 1t 1s proposed to safeguard a suitable number of cadre\n\nposts of the two Departments, based on the strength of such posts on a particular date, to the officers of such Department, for' a limited p>riod. This particular date will be the beginning of the current financial year, viz. !st April, 1959. What is being safeguarded is the number of posts of particular status irrespective of whether they are actually held by the officers of a Department in that Department or elsewhere. This safeguard will be necessary only in the supervisory posts of the Deputy Collectors ana above of each Department. Posts arising in the two Departments after !st April, 1959, deputation posts and other ex-cadre posts, can obviously not be the subject of any safeguard.\n\nWith the merger, the t\\>O services will become one and offiters of the combined service, as a whole, will be co-sharers of the future prospects and vicissitudes of the combined service.\"\n\nEven in this letter, l st April, 1959, has not been shown as the date Oil. which the two Services were to be integrated, but only that it was proposed to safeguard a particular number of posts in the Department on a particular date, namely, !st April, 1959. No mention has been made, in supersession of the Presidential Resolution, that Jst April, 1959 will be the date of the merger of the two Services. In any case, it is clear that the Government has no authority to override the Presidential Resolution by any subsequent decision which lacks legal authority and is violative of Art. 14 of the Const.itution oflndia.\n\nIn this view. the petition is allowed with costs. The Government is directed to give effect to the Presidential Resolution of August 12,\n\n1959, in respect of integration of the two Services from August l 5, 1959, and to apply the principles of seniority to the petitioners as if they were members of the respective Services which were integrated after their appointment in July 1959.\n\nP.B.ll.\n\nPetition allowed.", "total_entities": 61, "entities": [{"text": "S. N. KHARKHANIS & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. N. KHARKHANIS & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION Or' INDIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION Or' INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. N. DWIVEDI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.N. DWIVEDI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. K. GOSWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 163, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 192, "end_char": 200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 472, "end_char": 480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "5th August, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 612, "end_char": 628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "309 of the Constitution, combined two services of Central Excise Service Clnss I and Indian Customs Service Class I with effet from\n\nJ 5th August, 1959."}}, {"text": "13th July, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 698, "end_char": 713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All the petitioners joined the respective servfoes with effect from 13th July, 1959."}}, {"text": "7th April 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 739, "end_char": 753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later by decision dated 7th April 1970 the Government decided that a combined list of seniority of officers in the service should be prepared with re."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1251, "end_char": 1266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended that the date of 1st April, 1959 on which the two services were combined for the purpose of inter se seniority was an artificial date chosen arbitrarily and is sought to be given effect to without any legal authority."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1641, "end_char": 1648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "12th August, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1704, "end_char": 1721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tion of 12th August, 1959 which drew its authority from the proviso to Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1767, "end_char": 1775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "15th August.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2185, "end_char": 2197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "309\n\nwas clear and categorical in that it not only showed that the question of integra tion of the Central Excise Service Class I and the Indian Customs Service Class I which was older of the two services was under consideration of the Govcrnmenc of India for quite sometime but that \"the President has now been pleased to decide that the two services should be constituted into a single service with effect from 15th August."}}, {"text": "7th April, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2488, "end_char": 2503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The subsequent dcci fiion of the Government conveyed in the lettr of 7th April, 1970 had no legal autho."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2625, "end_char": 2630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rity as it was not purported to have been made in the name or with the authority of the President of India nor did it in any wiy seek to :imend the Presidential Resolu tion of 12th August, 1959 nor did it purport to change the date on and from v.hich the integration was given effect to. ["}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3013, "end_char": 3020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3024, "end_char": 3045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. N. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3096, "end_char": 3108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Prasad, for the peti1ioners."}}, {"text": "G. Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3132, "end_char": 3138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. Das and R. JV."}}, {"text": "R. JV. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3143, "end_char": 3158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. Das and R. JV."}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3811, "end_char": 3842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On objections having been raised by the service associations the matter was referred to the Union Public Service Commission in 1967 and on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission a final decision was taken on 7th April, 1970."}}, {"text": "6th January, 1960was", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5214, "end_char": 5234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The seniority list published on 6th January, 1960was based on the position as it was on !"}}, {"text": "6th January, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5502, "end_char": 5519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Direct recruits who joined the Class I service and officers promoted after Jst April, 1959 did not figure in the seniority list circulated on 6th January, 1959."}}, {"text": "6th January, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5637, "end_char": 5654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners who joined Class I service in July 1959 were rightly not included in.the combined seniority list of 6th January, 1960."}}, {"text": "JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5860, "end_char": 5876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANMOHAN REDDY, J.-Six petitioners, of whom the 4th petitioner has since died."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5993, "end_char": 6007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Union of India, fixing the principles of seniority of members of the Customs and Central Excise Service Class I as if the combined Service came into ei:istence on April I, 1959, inst<ad of August J 5,, 1959-the date on which the Presidential Resolution dated August 12, 1959 said that the combined Service would come into effect.", "canonical_name": "UNION Or' INDIA & ORS"}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6639, "end_char": 6670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "59 I\n\nexamination held by the second respondent, the Union Public Service Commission, in 1958: (vide notification of the Government of India\n\n(Cntral Excise Establishment) dated August 4, 1959)."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7564, "end_char": 7577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Service Class I on the result of the combined competitive examrnal!on held by the second respondent in 1958: (vide notification of the Government of India (Customs Establishment) dated August 4,\n\n1959) .. The petitioners say that contrary to the Presidential Resolution of August 12, 1959, creating the combined Service of Customs and Central Excise, Class I, comprising of all the existing members of both the Services as from August 15, 1959, the impugned decision of the Government which prescribed the principles of seniority of members of the two individual Services as if the combined Service came into existence on April 1, 1959, would affect their seniority."}}, {"text": "July 13, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8187, "end_char": 8200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the combined list of seniority of OfficersintheServicewas prepared v ith reference to April I, 1959 as being the date of the merger, the petitioners complain that they were excluded from the list of Officers appointed to the initial constitution of the Indian Customs and Central Excise Service Class I, even though they had joined the two separate Services on July 13, 1969, as a consequence of which persons who would be juniors, if the principles of seniority were made applicable to them, have become senior and have been promoted by overlooking their claims."}}, {"text": "April 7, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8421, "end_char": 8434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the impugned letter dated April 7, 1970 gave time till May 15, 1970, calling on any member of the Service to point out any factual mistakes or errors in the application of the principles enunciated in the said letter, it appears all the petitioners made representations in which they asserted that the integration of the two Services having taken place on August 15, 1959, and not on April\\, 1959, they were entitled to be included in the initial constitution of the .combined Service and on the application of the principles enunciated in.the said letter no distinc_tion could be made between the direct recruits appointed to the Indian Customs Service Class I and the Central Excise Service Class I in the years 1955 to 1958 and the direct recruits appointed to the said two Services in the year 1959."}}, {"text": "May 15, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8450, "end_char": 8462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the impugned letter dated April 7, 1970 gave time till May 15, 1970, calling on any member of the Service to point out any factual mistakes or errors in the application of the principles enunciated in the said letter, it appears all the petitioners made representations in which they asserted that the integration of the two Services having taken place on August 15, 1959, and not on April\\, 1959, they were entitled to be included in the initial constitution of the .combined Service and on the application of the principles enunciated in.the said letter no distinc_tion could be made between the direct recruits appointed to the Indian Customs Service Class I and the Central Excise Service Class I in the years 1955 to 1958 and the direct recruits appointed to the said two Services in the year 1959."}}, {"text": "August 15, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8751, "end_char": 8766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the impugned letter dated April 7, 1970 gave time till May 15, 1970, calling on any member of the Service to point out any factual mistakes or errors in the application of the principles enunciated in the said letter, it appears all the petitioners made representations in which they asserted that the integration of the two Services having taken place on August 15, 1959, and not on April\\, 1959, they were entitled to be included in the initial constitution of the .combined Service and on the application of the principles enunciated in.the said letter no distinc_tion could be made between the direct recruits appointed to the Indian Customs Service Class I and the Central Excise Service Class I in the years 1955 to 1958 and the direct recruits appointed to the said two Services in the year 1959."}}, {"text": "April\\, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8779, "end_char": 8791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the impugned letter dated April 7, 1970 gave time till May 15, 1970, calling on any member of the Service to point out any factual mistakes or errors in the application of the principles enunciated in the said letter, it appears all the petitioners made representations in which they asserted that the integration of the two Services having taken place on August 15, 1959, and not on April\\, 1959, they were entitled to be included in the initial constitution of the .combined Service and on the application of the principles enunciated in.the said letter no distinc_tion could be made between the direct recruits appointed to the Indian Customs Service Class I and the Central Excise Service Class I in the years 1955 to 1958 and the direct recruits appointed to the said two Services in the year 1959."}}, {"text": "May 11, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9542, "end_char": 9554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "73 should not be made, but in spite of this request, even before the date calling for representations expired, some Officers were promoted on May 11, 1970, without considering their claims."}}, {"text": "July l, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9867, "end_char": 9879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Department was mooted for the first time in 1944, but the final constitution of the Central Excise Service Class I took place only with effect from July l, 1955; that after the idea of constituting a Central E:<cise Service was mooted in 1944 the first respondent says that training in central excise work was given to Officers recruited to the Indian Customs Service and\n\neven right from !"}}, {"text": "I. A. S. Etamination", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10183, "end_char": 10203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "950 tho notifioation i; sued by the second re; pondent for the com'.>ined I. A. S. Etamination stated that the direct re:ruitment was to the Indian Customs and Excise Service even though there was no su :h service in existence upto July 1, 1955 and tbai even after the formation of the Service with effect from July I, J 955, anj upto its subsequent integration with the Indian Customs Servi; e in 1959 the notification issued by the seconj re<pondent stated that the recruitment was to the Indian Customs and Central Exci; e Service Class I and not."}}, {"text": "Indian Customs and Central Exci", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10600, "end_char": 10631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "950 tho notifioation i; sued by the second re; pondent for the com'.>ined I. A. S. Etamination stated that the direct re:ruitment was to the Indian Customs and Excise Service even though there was no su :h service in existence upto July 1, 1955 and tbai even after the formation of the Service with effect from July I, J 955, anj upto its subsequent integration with the Indian Customs Servi; e in 1959 the notification issued by the seconj re<pondent stated that the recruitment was to the Indian Customs and Central Exci; e Service Class I and not."}}, {"text": "Indian Customs Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10667, "end_char": 10689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the Indian Customs Service and the Central Excise Service separately, though the actual allocation of the candidates between the two Services was made by the Department of Revenue."}}, {"text": "Central Excise Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10698, "end_char": 10720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the Indian Customs Service and the Central Excise Service separately, though the actual allocation of the candidates between the two Services was made by the Department of Revenue."}}, {"text": "July 1, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10943, "end_char": 10955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also stated that the order constituting the Central Excise Service Class I with effect from July 1, 1955, provided that future vacancies in the grade of Sup:rintendent of Central Excise Class I will be filled up by direct recruitment and promotion in the ratio of 1 :1 and that when the final decision to merge the Indian Customs Service Class I and the Central Excise Service Class I was taken by the Government in March 1959, an Official Committee was set up to make recommendations regarding the determination of inter se seniority in the merged service of the offic.rs in position in the two constituent Services atthe time ofintegration."}}, {"text": "August 12, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11944, "end_char": 11959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly the date, April 1, 1959, was chosen though the formal resolution to merge the two Services was published only on August 12, 1959."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11980, "end_char": 11994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The counter of the Union of India further stated that as the seniority principles enunciated by the Government in their letter of January 6, 1960 had raised a controversy, the Government referred the matter to the second respondent under Art."}}, {"text": "January 6, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12091, "end_char": 12106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The counter of the Union of India further stated that as the seniority principles enunciated by the Government in their letter of January 6, 1960 had raised a controversy, the Government referred the matter to the second respondent under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 320", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12199, "end_char": 12207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "April I, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14407, "end_char": 14420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners' only objection to the decision of the Government conveyed in the letter of April 7, 1970, is that the date, April I, 1959, on which the two Services were said to have been merged for the purposes of inter se seniority was an artificial date chosen arbitrarily and is sought to be given effect to without any legal authority."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14771, "end_char": 14779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15036, "end_char": 15055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "309 of the Constitution is clear and categorical in that it not only shows that the question of integration of the C'<ntral Excise Service Class I and the Indian Customs Service Class I which was tl:J.e older of the two Services was under consideration of the Government of India for quite some time, but that \"The President has now been pleased to decide that the two services should be constituted into a single service with effect from the 15th August, 1959.\""}}, {"text": "15th August, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15219, "end_char": 15236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "309 of the Constitution is clear and categorical in that it not only shows that the question of integration of the C'<ntral Excise Service Class I and the Indian Customs Service Class I which was tl:J.e older of the two Services was under consideration of the Government of India for quite some time, but that \"The President has now been pleased to decide that the two services should be constituted into a single service with effect from the 15th August, 1959.\""}}, {"text": "Customs and Central Excise Services", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15351, "end_char": 15386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also states that \"The Service will initially be formed from amongst all the existing Class I officers of the Customs and Central Excise Services, who will henceforth be borne on a single combined cadre for al\\ purposes.\" ("}}, {"text": "Ministry of Finance", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16505, "end_char": 16524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the contrary, three days after the Presidential Resolution of August 12, 1959, intimating that the President bad decided that the two Services should be constituted into a single Service with effect from August 15, 1959, and from henceforth, namely on and from August 15, 1959, all persons borne on the respective Services will be borne on a single combined cadre, the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, wrote to the President of all India Central Excise Officers Association and the President, Indian Customs Service Association, informing them that the Presidential Resolution was published in the Gazette."}}, {"text": "India Central Excise Officers Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16556, "end_char": 16597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the contrary, three days after the Presidential Resolution of August 12, 1959, intimating that the President bad decided that the two Services should be constituted into a single Service with effect from August 15, 1959, and from henceforth, namely on and from August 15, 1959, all persons borne on the respective Services will be borne on a single combined cadre, the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, wrote to the President of all India Central Excise Officers Association and the President, Indian Customs Service Association, informing them that the Presidential Resolution was published in the Gazette."}}, {"text": "Indian Customs Service Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16617, "end_char": 16651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the contrary, three days after the Presidential Resolution of August 12, 1959, intimating that the President bad decided that the two Services should be constituted into a single Service with effect from August 15, 1959, and from henceforth, namely on and from August 15, 1959, all persons borne on the respective Services will be borne on a single combined cadre, the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, wrote to the President of all India Central Excise Officers Association and the President, Indian Customs Service Association, informing them that the Presidential Resolution was published in the Gazette."}}, {"text": "st April, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18168, "end_char": 18182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st April, 1959."}}, {"text": "Jst April, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18263, "end_char": 18278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No mention has been made, in supersession of the Presidential Resolution, that Jst April, 1959 will be the date of the merger of the two Services."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18508, "end_char": 18515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "August 12,\n\n1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18673, "end_char": 18689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government is directed to give effect to the Presidential Resolution of August 12,\n\n1959, in respect of integration of the two Services from August l 5, 1959, and to apply the principles of seniority to the petitioners as if they were members of the respective Services which were integrated after their appointment in July 1959."}}, {"text": "August l 5, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18742, "end_char": 18758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government is directed to give effect to the Presidential Resolution of August 12,\n\n1959, in respect of integration of the two Services from August l 5, 1959, and to apply the principles of seniority to the petitioners as if they were members of the respective Services which were integrated after their appointment in July 1959."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_595_601_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "GOOULA\n\nGURUMURTHY & ORS.\n\nKURIMETI AYYAPPA\n\nMarch 14, 1974\n\n[(K. K. MATHEW\n\nAND A. ALAGIRISWAMI, JJ.]\n\nHindu Law-Limited estate of a widow-Whether ; ncom• fro111. tire.-· lf11sb0nd'~·,· estate is an accretion to that estaU'.\n\nV, the father of the appellants had a brother R who died child.Tess leaving behind bim his widow, N. After R's death a series of litigatien started between V &: N.\n\nV filed a suit in 1913 against R. for waste committed by hr husband's est<1; te and w.as appointed a receiver in that suit. Jn that suit, be got a decree, V as rcce1 \\\"Cr filed 3 suits on the foot of 3 mortgages in favour of R. In execution of the decrees, 3 valu able properties were purchased. These three properties are the subject matter of the present appeal.\n\nV died in 1947 and Nin 1951 after executing a will bequeathing in favour of her brother S all her properties. S filed the suit out of which this appeal arises, for Possession of the properties bequeathed to him under the will and for mesne profits.\n\nThe Sub-judge held that the said properties became accretions to the main estate of R and therefore, the plaintiff was entitled only to an account of the income from these properties till the death of V. On appeal, the High Court allowed the apP:eal in part. Before this Court four points were raised by the appellants :-(1) The H!gh Court committed an error in not hearing the whole appeal but confining the hearing merely to the points on which the finding was called for from the lower court. (2) a portion of the properties which was lost to the estate due to N's negligence of not paying the land revenue, should be debited against her share in them. (3) the cost incurred by V in the suit and in the execution proceedings should have been taken. into account in allocating the properties between the appellants and the respondents and (4) that the widow N, had treated the properties as accretion to the husband's estate and therefore, the appellants are entitled to the whole of the property.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : (I) When a finding is called for on the basis of certain issues framed by the Appellate Court, the appeal is not disposed of either in whole or in rart. Therefore the parties cannot be barred from arguing the whole appea after the •findings are received from the Court of first instance. f597 E]\n\nGopi Nath Shukul \\'. Sat Narain Shukul, A.LR. 1923 A11ahabad 384, referred F to.\n\n(2) A Hindu widow is entitled to the full beneficial enjoyment of the estate ..\n\nSo long as she is not guilty of wilful waste, she is answerable to no one. In her lifC.\n\ntime~ the reversionary right is a mere possibility or spes successionis. It cannot be predicted who would be the nearest reversioner at the time of her death. It is there~ fore, impossible t_o contend that for any loss to the estate due to the negligncc on the part of the widow, he should be compensated from out of the widow's separate\n\npoperties. He is entitled only to the property left on the date of the death of the G widow.\n\n(599 C; FG] · · · ·\n\n(3) The Income received by V and the amounts spent for tlic suit and the execu~ tion proceeding were taken into account at the time of settlement of accounts and it wa.s open to V to realise the excess amount from the estate of R. It is not now open to the appellants to claim that these amounts should be separated from the amount of the decree and should be added to the amount of principal and interest accrued during the lifetime of R. (600 AC] -\n\n(4) Fro!\" the evidence, it is clear that the wi<!ow did not show any intention to treat the 1ncame from the husband's estate asan accretion to that estate. {601D]\n\nAkkanna v. Venkayya, I.LR. 1902 25 Mad. 351, referred to.\n\nThe appeal was sent back to High Court for hearing afresh.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JUJUSDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1817 of 1967.\n\nFrom the judgment and Decree dated the 21st September 1965 of 1.he Andhra Pradesh High Court in A.S. No. 508 of 1959.\n\nK. R. Choudhury and Veena Khanna, for the. appellants.\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi and J. Ramamurthi; for the respondent,\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nALAGIRISWAMI, J.-Venkanna, the father of the appellants, had a brother Ramamurti who died childless in the year 1908 leaving behind Jiim his widow Narasimham. After Ramamurti's death a series of litigations started between Venkanna and Narasimham and it is not over yet. Venkanna filed O.S. No. 14 of 1913 against the widow in respect of acts of wastecommittea by her of Ramamurti's estate and was appointed a receiver in that suit. Ih that suit he got a decree against Narasimham for a sum of Rs.13,539,1as she failed to furnish security as originally decreed by the court. Venkanna as receiver filed three suits on the foot of three mortgages in favour of Ramamurti. One was O.S. No. 34 of 1916. In execution of that decree item 1 of the 'A' schedule properties was purchased in court auction. O.S. No. 443 of 19 I 8 was filed on the foot of another mortgage in favour of Ramamurti. executed in 1904 and items 2 and 5 of the plaint schedule properties were purchased in execution of decree in that suit. These three items of properties are the subject matter of this appeal. It is unnecessary for the purpose of this app.al to refer to. the third suit.\n\nVenkanna died in 1947 and Narasimham in 1951 after executing a will bequeathing in favour of her brother Venkata Sattayya all her properties. Venkata Sattayya filed the suit, out of which this appeal arises, for possession of the proporties bequeathed to him under the will and for mesne profits. The Subordinate Judge who tried the suit held that items 1, 2 and 5 become accretions to the main estate of Ramamurti and therefore the plaintiff was entitled only to an .acoount of the income from those properties till the death of Venkanna. The appeal against the Subordinate Judge's judgment came up for hearing before Justice Satyanarayana Raju and Justice Venkatesam of the And.bra Pradesh High Court. The learned Judges called for a finding with regard to the interest on the two mortgages in execution of the decrees in which items I, 2 and 5 had been purchased, relating to the period before Ramamurti's death and the period after Ramamurti's death. After that finding was received they allowed the appeal in part and held that the plaintiff would be entitled to a 19/34th share of item l, and 12/23rd share of items 2 and 5. This appeal is filed in pursuance of a certificate granted by the High Court.\n\nMr. Ramasesneya Chaudhri appearing on behalf of the appellants raised four points which we. shall deal with seriatim.\n\nI. The learned Judges of the High Court committed an error in H <:onfining the appeal after receipt of the finding from the Subordinate\n\nJudge's courtonly to the question of the share, which the appellant• and the respondent were entitled to, based on the calculation of the\n\nG, GURUMURTHY v. K, AYYAPPA (Alagiriswami, J.) 597\n\ninterest due on the mortgages before and after the death of Ramamurti.\n\nHis contention was that as the High Court had merely framed issues and referred them for tdal to the court of first instance under Order XLI Rule 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not remanded the whole case under Order XII Rule 23, they should have heard the whole appeal and not confined the hearing merely to the points on which the finding was called for. We think that he is right in thi> contention. Before the High Court the learned advocate for the appellants had contended that Narasimham owed to the estate ot Ramamurti a sum of Rs.14,639/- and that when the decree was sought to be executed by Venkanna, Narasimham claimed that the accouat due to her by way of interest under the three mortgage bonJs should be set off and that the execution could proceed only for the balance that the set off claimed by Narasimham was actually allowed and that therefore she would not be entitled to any share in the properties purchased in execution of the decrees obtained on the foot of the mortgage bonds, in lieu of the interest claimed. The learned Judges disallowed him from raising that question on the ground that it was not raised or argued at the time when the finding was called for on the issues framed by them, and that if it had been raised and accepted there would have been no need to call for a finding or at any rate the finding called for would have been different, and that the argument of the learned counsel impugned the correctness of the conclusions reached by the Court on the basis of which the findings were called for.\n\nWe consider that when a finding is called for on the basis of certain issues framed by the Appellate Court the appeal is not disposed of either in whole or in part. Therefore, the parties cannot be barred from arguing the whole appeal after the findings are received from the court of first instance. We find the same view taken in Gopi Nath Shukul v. Sat Narain Shukul (AIR 1923 Allahabad 384) where it was held that: ·\n\n\"Where an appellate Court at the first hearing does not decide the case but merely remits certain specific issues, it is open to the Court before which the case ultimately comes to disregard the findings on those issues and equally to form its own opinion on the whole case irrespective of anything that is said in the remand order.\" It was also held that:\n\n\"An order remanding issues under Rule 25 is not a final order. No appeal lies againstit. The responsibility for the decree ultimately passed is entirely that of the Court before which the case comes after remand.\n\nH It -is quite oterwise with an order of remand passed under Order 41, Rulo 23, for this is an order which does finally determine, subject to any right of appeal, the issues which it decides.''\n\nA similar view was talcen by the Nagpur High Court in- Sultan\n\nBeg v. Chuni/al (AIR 1918 Nagpur 193). In Abinruh Chandra Bidyanidhi iJhattachariee v. Dasarath Malo (XXXll (1927-28) Calcutta Weekly Notes 1233) it was said:\n\n\"An order of remand made under Or. 41, r. 25 decides nothing. The Court, either the same or as differently constituted has jurisdiction, while finally hearing the appeal, to go back on' the reasons given or views expressed in he order of remand and must do so when those appear erroneous.\"\n\nWe are, therefore, of opinion that the High Court should have gone into this q11estion and decided the matter, for if it turns out that the interest due on the two mortgages subsequent fo the death of Ramamurti had been set off against the amount due to Venkanna in the decree obtained hy him against Narasimham in O.S. 14 of 1913 there can be no ques•ion of Narasimham being entitled to any share in the properties purchased in court auction in execution of the decree in the two mortgages and her brother getting those properties by virtue of the will executed by her in his favour.\n\nIn the Trial Court the plaintiff's contention was that these properties were purchased out of the accumulated interest on the mortgages and the defendants asserted that they were purchased out of the principal. That Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim on the ground that there was no proof of his allegations. It was before the High Court apparently th.t the attempt to split the iterest due on the 1nortgages into two portions, one before Rmamurt1 s death and the other after, was made and accepted by the High Court. It was on that basis that the High Court called for findings.\n\nAfter the findings were received the appellants raised the question about the set-off. They raised the question before .the Trial Court when it \"'.as considering the apportionment of the interest but that Court felt 1t had no power to go into that question in view of the terms of the High Court's order calling for the finding. And the High Court refused to allow the appellants to raise that question, which as we have just held was not correct.\n\nThe decree in Venkanna's suit. appears to hve directed payment of interest to NaraSJmham [Para m (c) of the plamt and judgment of the High Court, page 102 of the paper book].\n\nWe find that Venkanna had submitted accounts to the court in his capacity as receiver till 1940.\n\nWe have also evidence in this case that even \\'Vhen Venkanna died a sum of Rs.4,486/- was due to him on the foot of the decree he obtained against Narasimham. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that any amount due to Narasimham was not given credit to. We find from the finding submitted by the Trial Court (Page 86 of the paper book) that when the decree in 0.S. 14 of 1913 was sought to be executed Narasimham claimed that the amounts due to her should be set off and execution should proceed only for the balance and from Ex. A-7 it would appear that the claim was allowed. It seems therefore un- Hkely, ta!<ing the direction in te decree and the ordr evidenced by .Ex. A-7 mto account, that the rnterest due to Narasimham was not\n\nG. GUllUMURTHY v. K. AYYAPPA (A.lagiriswami, /.) 59f!\n\none of the items set off. We do not want to express any final opinion on the point but are of 0pinion that in the circumstances the High Court should consider this aspect of the matter and dispose of the appeal af1 esh.\n\n2 Out of about 16 acres comprised in item I, 5 acres had been lost in revenue sale because of Narasimbam's failure to pay the land revenue on those lands. It was urged before the High Court and it has geen urged again before us that in allotting to the appellants a share of items I, 2 and 5 these 5 acres which were lost to the estate as a result of Narasimham's negligence should be debited against her share in them. We find ourselves unable to accept this contention just as the High Court, though they imve no reason for their conclusion.\n\nNeither on principle nor on authority could the contention on behalf of the appellants be suppo1ted.\n\nA Hindu widow is entitled to the full beneficial enjoyment of the estate. So long as she is not guilty of wHful waste, she is answerable to no one. Her estate is not a lifeestate, because in certain circumstance• she can give an absolute and complete title. Nor is it in any sense an estate held in trust for reversioners. Within the limits imposed upon her, the female holder has the most absolute power of enjoyment and is accountable to no one.\n\nShe fully represents the estate, and, so long as she is alive, no one has any vested interests in the succession. The limitations upon her estate are the very substance of its nature and not merely imposed upon her for the benefit of reversioners. She is in no sense a trustee for those who may come after her. She is not bound to save the income, nor to invest the principal. If she makes savings, she can give them away as she likes. During her lifetime she represents the whole inheritance and a deci>ion in a suit by or against the widow as representing the estate is binding on the reversionary heirs. It is the death of the female owner that opens the inheritance to the reversioners, and the one most nearly related at the time to the last full owner becomes entitled to 'possession. In her lifetime, however, the reversionary tight is a me>e possibility or spes successionis. It l:annot be predicted who would be the nearest reversioner at the time of her death. It is, therefore, impossible for a reversioner to contend that for any loss which the estate might have sustained Clue to the negligence on the part of the widow he should be compensated from out of the widow's separate properties. He is entitled to get only the property left on the, date of the death of the widow.\n\nThe widow could have, during her lifetime, for necessity, including her maintenance alienated the whole estate. The reversioner's right to institute a suit to prevent waste is a different matter. If it could have been established .that in having allowed some part of the properties to be sold in revenue sale she was guilty of wilful waste it would have been a different matter.\n\nIt would still have been necessary for the reversioner to have instituted a suit on that basis. It is dou\\>tful whether such a suit can be institoted after her death. In any case the necessary averments are not availabl€ in this suit. We are, therefore, unable to accept this contention\n\n3. Another point urged before the High Court as well as before us wu that the cost incurred by Venkanna in the suit and in the execution proccedinas should have been taken into account in allocatina\n\nitems I, 2 and 5 between the appellants and the respondent. The High Court took the view tl)at as the income received by Venkanna and the amounts spent by him including the amounts spent for the suit and the execution proceeding were taken into account at the time of the settlement of the accounts and there was an executable decree in favour of Venkanna for a sum of Rs. 4,486/· as the amount due on settlement of account, and it was peon to Venkanna to realise the amount aeainst the estate of Ramamurti in execution of the decree, it is not now open to the appellants to claim that these should be separated from the amount of the decree and should be added on to the amount of principal and interest accrued during the lifetime of Ramamurti.\n\nWe agree with this view. Incidentally it should be noticed that the conclusion of the High Court on this point would seem to point to the same conclusion in respect of the first point.\n\n4. Lastly, it was argued that Narasimham, the widow, had treated thi• property as accretion to the husband's estate and therefore the appellants are entitled to the whole of the prorty. The facts on the basis of which this contention is urged are :\n\n(a) When Narasimham's life interest in the estate was sold in E.P.\n\nNo. 93 of 1927 filed by Venkanna she did not question the legality of the sale on the ground that her interest in the property was not a life interest but was a full interest.\n\n(b) Jn the order in E.A. 624 of 1935 passed by the Subordinate Judge, Visakhapatnam the widow treated items I, 2 and 5 as part of the estate of her husband and she had also asserted therein that she had a right to enjoy the same as representative of his estate.\n\n(c) Life interest in the A-Schedule properties was sold in E.P. 28 of 1940 in execution of the decree in 0.S. 14 of 1913 and the widow did not object to the sale on the &round that what was J; e.ing sought to be sold was a life interest but that she was entitled to full interest.\n\nWe do not think anyone or all of these grounds are sufficient to establish that the widow had treated this property as accretion to the husband's estate .. As observed by the Madras High Court in Akkanna\n\nv. Vtnkayya (l.L.R. (1902) 25 Mad. 351) \"the acquirer of property presumably inte.nds to retain dominion over it and in the case of a Hindu widow the presumption is none the less so when the fund with which the property is acquired is one which, though derived from her husb•nd's property, was at her absolute disposal. In the case of property inherited from the husband, it is not by reason of her intention but by reason of the limited nature of a widow's estate under the Hindu Law, that she has only a limited power <>f disposition. But her absolute power of disposition over the income derived from such limited estate being now fully recognised, it is only reasonable that, in the absence of an indication of her intention to the contrary, she ml)sl be pres.urned to retain the same control over the investment of such income. The mere fact that properties t.hus acquired by her are managed and en-\n\nG. GURUMUTHY V. K. AYYAPPA (Alagiriswami, /.) 601\n\njoyed by her without any distinction, along with properties inherited from her husband, can in no way effect this presumption. She is the sole and separate owner of the two sets of properties so long as she enjoys the same, and is absolutely entitled to the income derived from both sets of properties.\" The fact that she wanted possession of those properties or that when in execution of his decree Venkanna bought what he alleged was her life interest in the properties she did not object to it and assert that she had full interest does not affect this question.\n\nIt was to her advantage to keep qujet. She was not thereby cstopped from contending that she had an absolute interest in the properties.\n\nIt should, more over, be remembered that the question that the items 1 2 and 5 may have to be divided as between the reversioners and the widow in proportion to the respective shares of the husband's estate and the widow in that property was really a later development. Before the Trial Court both parties proceeded on a different footing altogether as mentioned earlier. The widow was all along• doing everything to prcvent; her husband's reversioners getting anything from the estate.\n\nShe had transferred quite a good part of it to her '1brother, which was what enabled the reversioner to file the suit against her for acts of waste.\n\nShe exhibited a very clear intention that whatever she possessed should So to her brother. There is absolutely no room on the facts of this case to hold that she exhibited the least intention to treat the income from the husband,'s estate as an accretion to that estate.\n\nIn the result the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court set aside. The High Court will dispose of the appeal afresh.\n\nThe costs of this appeal will abide and be provided in the fresh decree to be passed by the High Court.\n\nC.M.P. No. 2016 of 1969 is dismissed.\n\ns.c.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n10-'-M45Sup.Cl/75", "total_entities": 33, "entities": [{"text": "GOOULA\n\nGURUMURTHY & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GOGULA GURUMURTHY & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KURIMETI AYYAPPA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KURIMETI AYYAPPA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 14, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KURIMETI AYYAPPA\n\nMarch 14, 1974\n\n[(K. K. MATHEW\n\nAND A. ALAGIRISWAMI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "K. K. MATHEW", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. ALAGIRISWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. ALAGIRISWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Gopi Nath Shukul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2335, "end_char": 2351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f597 E]\n\nGopi Nath Shukul \\'."}}, {"text": "Sat Narain Shukul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2356, "end_char": 2373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sat Narain Shukul, A.LR."}}, {"text": "K. R. Choudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3957, "end_char": 3972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Choudhury and Veena Khanna, for the."}}, {"text": "Veena Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3977, "end_char": 3989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Choudhury and Veena Khanna, for the."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4013, "end_char": 4029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi and J. Ramamurthi; for the respondent,\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nALAGIRISWAMI, J.-Venkanna, the father of the appellants, had a brother Ramamurti who died childless in the year 1908 leaving behind Jiim his widow Narasimham."}}, {"text": "J. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4034, "end_char": 4047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi and J. Ramamurthi; for the respondent,\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nALAGIRISWAMI, J.-Venkanna, the father of the appellants, had a brother Ramamurti who died childless in the year 1908 leaving behind Jiim his widow Narasimham."}}, {"text": "ALAGIRISWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4114, "end_char": 4126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi and J. Ramamurthi; for the respondent,\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nALAGIRISWAMI, J.-Venkanna, the father of the appellants, had a brother Ramamurti who died childless in the year 1908 leaving behind Jiim his widow Narasimham."}}, {"text": "Ramamurti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4185, "end_char": 4194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi and J. Ramamurthi; for the respondent,\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nALAGIRISWAMI, J.-Venkanna, the father of the appellants, had a brother Ramamurti who died childless in the year 1908 leaving behind Jiim his widow Narasimham."}}, {"text": "Jiim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4246, "end_char": 4250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi and J. Ramamurthi; for the respondent,\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nALAGIRISWAMI, J.-Venkanna, the father of the appellants, had a brother Ramamurti who died childless in the year 1908 leaving behind Jiim his widow Narasimham."}}, {"text": "Narasimham", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4261, "end_char": 4271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi and J. Ramamurthi; for the respondent,\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nALAGIRISWAMI, J.-Venkanna, the father of the appellants, had a brother Ramamurti who died childless in the year 1908 leaving behind Jiim his widow Narasimham.", "canonical_name": "Narasimham"}}, {"text": "Venkanna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4337, "end_char": 4345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After Ramamurti's death a series of litigations started between Venkanna and Narasimham and it is not over yet.", "canonical_name": "Venkanna"}}, {"text": "Venkanna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5270, "end_char": 5278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkanna died in 1947 and Narasimham in 1951 after executing a will bequeathing in favour of her brother Venkata Sattayya all her properties.", "canonical_name": "Venkanna"}}, {"text": "Venkata Sattayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5375, "end_char": 5391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkanna died in 1947 and Narasimham in 1951 after executing a will bequeathing in favour of her brother Venkata Sattayya all her properties."}}, {"text": "Satyanarayana Raju", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5897, "end_char": 5915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal against the Subordinate Judge's judgment came up for hearing before Justice Satyanarayana Raju and Justice Venkatesam of the And.bra Pradesh High Court."}}, {"text": "Venkatesam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5928, "end_char": 5938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal against the Subordinate Judge's judgment came up for hearing before Justice Satyanarayana Raju and Justice Venkatesam of the And.bra Pradesh High Court."}}, {"text": "And.bra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5946, "end_char": 5972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal against the Subordinate Judge's judgment came up for hearing before Justice Satyanarayana Raju and Justice Venkatesam of the And.bra Pradesh High Court."}}, {"text": "Ramasesneya Chaudhri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6484, "end_char": 6504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ramasesneya Chaudhri appearing on behalf of the appellants raised four points which we."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7151, "end_char": 7178, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9770, "end_char": 9787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar view was talcen by the Nagpur High Court in- Sultan\n\nBeg v. Chuni/al (AIR 1918 Nagpur 193)."}}, {"text": "S. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10568, "end_char": 10573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "NaraSJmham", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11948, "end_char": 11958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appears to hve directed payment of interest to NaraSJmham [Para m (c) of the plamt and judgment of the High Court, page 102 of the paper book].", "canonical_name": "Narasimham"}}, {"text": "\\'Vhen Venkanna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12189, "end_char": 12204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have also evidence in this case that even \\'Vhen Venkanna died a sum of Rs.4,486/- was due to him on the foot of the decree he obtained against Narasimham."}}, {"text": "S. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12504, "end_char": 12509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Narasimbam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13248, "end_char": 13258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 Out of about 16 acres comprised in item I, 5 acres had been lost in revenue sale because of Narasimbam's failure to pay the land revenue on those lands.", "canonical_name": "Narasimham"}}, {"text": "Narasimham", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17371, "end_char": 17381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lastly, it was argued that Narasimham, the widow, had treated thi• property as accretion to the husband's estate and therefore the appellants are entitled to the whole of the prorty.", "canonical_name": "Narasimham"}}, {"text": "S. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18206, "end_char": 18211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18556, "end_char": 18573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not think anyone or all of these grounds are sufficient to establish that the widow had treated this property as accretion to the husband's estate .. As observed by the Madras High Court in Akkanna\n\nv. Vtnkayya (l.L.R. (1902) 25 Mad."}}, {"text": "G. GURUMUTHY V. K. AYYAPPA", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19492, "end_char": 19518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mere fact that properties t.hus acquired by her are managed and en-\n\nG. GURUMUTHY V. K. AYYAPPA (Alagiriswami, /.) 601\n\njoyed by her without any distinction, along with properties inherited from her husband, can in no way effect this presumption."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_602_606_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "IRLAPATJ\n\nSUBBAYYA v.\n\nTHE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, ANDHRA PRADESH\n\nMarch\n\nI 4, I 974\n\n[M.H. BEG AND Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.)\n\nSupreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act 1910- Appea/ again.rt acquittal-Duty of the High Court while inerfering with the acquittal.\n\nThe appellant was charged for offences punishable under sections 302, 32S and 323 read with sec. 34 of the J.P.C. along with three others. The Sessions Court acquitt ed the appellant. The High Court set aside the acquittal and convicted the appellant upon the plea of the appellant that the Hih Court had erred in its appreciation of evidence. The Court went through the entrre record for itself as the appellant had .approached the Court under the Criminal Jurisdiction newJy created.\n\nAllowing the appeal, HEW : (I) That1 the conviction by the High Court was not based on complete er comprehensive 21ppreciation of all features of the case, which, taken together cast a reasonable doubt on the prosecution version. There was CJnsiderable uncertainty .about the time and the place at which the incident took place. The evidence of the witnesses that there was considerable bleeding from the injury of the deceased was inconsistent with total absence of blood at the place of occurrence. The prosecution tried to prove that there were 3 blows struck on the head of the deceased, but this was not supported by the medical evidence. [b06C; BJ (JI) Held further that the High Court failed to attach due weight to the assessment of evidence by the trial court which had the additional advantage of seeing the witnes.scs depose in the witness box. {606D]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 229 of 1970.\n\nFrom the judgment and order dated the 29th September, 1970 of the Andbra Pradesh High Court at Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No. 891 of 1969.\n\nK. T. Harindranati and G. S. Rama Rao, for the appellant.\n\nP. Ram Reddy and P. P. Rao, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgement of the Court was delivered by F\n\nBEG J.-The appellant was charged, with his three brothers-in-Jaw, Bayyarapu Butchiah, Bayyarapu Chandriah, and Bayya1apu Kotayya for offences punisbhable under Section 302, 325, and 323 Indian Penal\n\nCode each read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code, for having murdered Irlapati Ramayya aRd causing grievous hurt to Ankayya, P.W. 2, and simple injury to China Veerayya, P.W. I, at about 4.30 p.m., on 15-6-69, G in front of house of Vipparla Peda Veerayya in Village Vipparla. District Guntur in the State of Andhra Pradesh. They were .tried and acquitted by the learned Sessions' Judge of Guntur who attached considerable importance to the supposed delay in lodging the First Information Report of the alleged occurrence af 10.30 p.m. on 15-6-69 at Police Station, Sattonapalli, 13 miles away from the scene of the incident. The prosecution had a sufficiently good explanation for the H supposed delay inasmuch as the wife and other relations of the deceased were busy trying to gt! adequate medical attention for the deceased before thinking of making the F.J.R. The High Court had, on an\n\n:<:t '\"I w ta \"\n\nappeal to it, C)nsidered this and other questions involved in the case and convicted and sentenced the appellant under Section 302 to life imprisonment and awarded other appropriate sentences under Sections 325 and 323 I.P.C. to him. The High Court had convicted the three other co-accused under Sections 323 and 324 I.P.C. only and had sentenced them to a fine of Rs. 150/- only, and, in default of payment Df fine, to three months rigorous imprisonment. Consequently, the appellant, had his right to appeal to this Court against the reversal of the order of his acquittal. The co-accused, Mt being in that advantageous position, could not obtain any special leave to appeal.\n\nAs this is an appeal, in exercise of a newly created right of appeal to this Coµrt, we have examined the evidence on record. The points raised on behalfof the appellant, on this evidence, are mentioned below.\n\nFirstly, it is pointed out that P.W.I, P.W. 2, P.W. 3, and P.W. 4, as well as P.W. 10, and P.W. 11, are relations of the deceased; highly interested in securing the convictions of the appellant on account of partisanship. It was urged that P.W. 5 and P.W. 6,\" were wrongly treated as alleged \"independent witnesses\" by the High Court. It \\Vas suggested to the prosecution witnesses, in the course of their cross.- examination, that the real occurrence took place elsewhere and consisted of long drawn out stone pelting by two sides during the day in the course of which both sides were injured. In support of this version, reliance was placed upon several tell-tale, or, at least, highly suspicious circumstances which were not adequately explained by the proseoution. Secondly, no blood was found anywhere near the Neem tree in front of the house of P.W. 3, Peda Verrayya, where the occurrence is said to have taken place. Thirdly, it was establihsed, from the statement of the investigating officer, that the trunk of the Neem tree under which the alleged occurrence took place was about 5 to 6 ft. high so that no lathis could be lifted and brought down to beat the injured without obstruction by brarrches as was admitted by Lakshmayya. P.W. 4, and China Veerayya, P.W. I. Fourthly, the site plan showed quite a number of stones lying at some d, istance from the scene of occurrence. Fifthly, a number of independent witnesses, apart from the ones examined, (who are all characterised by the appellant's Counsel as \"partisan witnesses\",) were said to be available but not examined. Although this was admitted as a fact in the Committing Magistrate's Court by P.W. I, a new version was, it was submitted, given at the trial. Sixthly, there were injuries upon the appellant's body which had not been explained by the prosecution version although a belated attempt had been made by Lakshmayya, P.W. 4, at the trial to explain these injuries by alleging that the four injuries, all on the head of the appellant, which, according to the Doctor, could be caused by stone throwing also, were caused by P. W. 4.\n\nThis new version was, it was urged, incredible in view of the prosecation case of th< aggressiveness of the accused and youthfulness of P. W. 4, aged 22, who admitted that he had run away as he was afraid of being beaten and was chased. It was pointed out that this attempt to explain the injuries on the head of theappellant was\n\nneithr consistent with the earliest prosecution version nor \\\\iith\n\nstatements of other prosecution witnesses where no such incident is mentioned. It was, therefore, submitted that this belated attempt was not an explanation at all but only an indication of falsehood and fabrication in the case.\n\nSeventhly, we were taken through the statements of prosecution witnesses, P. W. I, P.W. 2, P. W. 3, P. W. 4, P.W. 5, P.W. 6, as to the time of the occurrence which was variously stated by them to have taken place at different times between noon and just before sunset.\n\nThis was certainly a most unusual variation which rould not be explained by mere inability of villagers to give the exact time, The villagers had described the time by reference to \"baras\" before sunset and the colour of the sun which was described as red by one witness so that it was nearing sunset. according to him, at the time of the occurrence. This feature of the evidence was more consistent with some long drawn out occurrence such as stone throwing or with the fact that all the alleged witnesses could not be there. In any case, they could not be there at the same time. Their versions, therefore, appear highly suspicious. Eigbthly, there were variations in the statements of witnesses about the time and place at which China Veerayya, P.W. I and Ankayya, P. W. 2, were said to have been beaten. Sayamma, P. W. IO, for example had stated that Ankayya, P. W. 2 was beaten at a distance of IO to IS yds. from the house of Peda Veerayya, P.W. 3 at the junction of North South streets and East West street. Sub-Inspector Perayya, P.W\". 22 stated that this junction was about 60 to 70 yds. from the house of Peda Veerayya. Venkamma, P.W. 12 bad stated that the place where Ankayya, P.W. 2 fell was at a distance of only I or 2 yds. from the house. of Peda Veerayya, P.W. 3. According to the appellant's Counsel, the cumulative effect of the features mentioned above and of even minor discrepancies which would, in a different context, be quite unimportant, was to indicate that the witnesses had not really seen or described the occurrerce as it took pkce but were putting forward a substantially incorrect version.\n\nIn reply, some attempt has been made to explain the absence of blood from the scene of occurrence by pointing out that China Veerayya, P.W. I had stated that the deceased had a head gear. If that was so, the extent of the injury on the head was really difficult to reconcile with the post mortem report which described the injuries of Ramayya, deceased as follows;\n\n\"I. Lacerated injury scalp 8 cm x I cm. placed over internal parietal area in anterior posterior direction. Cephalo hematoma present extending over left parietal, G occipital, right parietal and temporal areas.\n\n2. Contusion of size 8 cm x 5 cm. over outer and upper part of left fore arm.\n\n3. Three small superficial abrasions anterially below right knee joint\".\n\nH The Doctor had also stated :\n\n\"On dissection of injury No. I showed extensive aphalo hematoma involving left parietal, occipatal and right parietal\n\n; F\n\nand temporal areaa comminuted depressed fracture of vault of scalp involving frontal bone 5 cm. in anterior posterior direction. Part of the left perietal bone detached and broken into three pieces and lying loose over brain fissured fracture extending upto left temporal bone. Right' parietal bone fractured transversely uptQ thr.ee centimetres, occipital bone fractured and. fissure fracture placed obliquely towards right for 3 ems.\n\nBram membrances found contused shOwed no lacerations\".\n\nIt was urged that a \"hematoma\" does not produce much bleeding.\n\nWe do not think that the injuries alleged have been inflicted on the head with sticks are of such a nature that they would not produce considerable bleeding. Jn fact, the Doctor said that the scalp was covered with blood. Therefore, the attempt to explain the mysterious absence of any blood from the alleged place of occurrence is rather feeble.\n\nWe also find that theaccount given by the prosecution witness does not fit in with the medical evidence inasmuch as not only was the appellant said to have beaten the deceased with a stick on his head but another accused was said to have poked him on the chest with his stick firt and then beaten him on his left hand, still another accused was alleged to hB;'e given a blow with a stick on the forehead of the deceased, and the fourth accused was said to have struck the deceased on the left side of the head just above the ear. The three injuries indicated above show that no blow was struck on the forehead of the deceased at all. The superficial abrasions below the knee could be very well due to the falling. Thus, there were really only two injuries on the head. It may be that the first injury was due to more than one blow on the head. The Doctor was, however, not questioned on this aspect. There were, in any case, certainly not four injuries on the body of the deceased.\n\nThe Doctor who performed the post mortem had said that the injury which caused the death could be due to striking the deceased's head with a blunt object like a stick but that \"it is also possible that injury No. I could be caused by \"a stone of 3\" or even more\". The Doctor admitted that injury on the knee could be ca11sed by a fall on a rough surface. He found the scalp was so profusely covered with blood that he could not completely examine the injury.\n\nThus bleeding appears to have been con&iderable. Hence, absence of blood from the alleged place of occurrence appears' to us to carry a significance which the High Court ignored.\n\nWe may also mention that the nature of the incideDt set up by the prosecution itself shows that there was a dispute over the possession and construction of a house for the repairs of which about 400 stones had been collected. On an occasion prior to the actual occurrence, the appellant was said fo have been obstructed from carrying stones. It was alleged that he had, for this reason, ~~1lten Sayamma and her mother who were said to have obstructed him.\n\nA constable was said to have come to the village at about noon on\n\nthe day of occurrence to investigate, ild, thereafter, the incident is alleged to have taken place. The incident alleged by the prosecution certainly did not occur while the constable was still there.\n\nThere is considerable' uncertainty about the time as well as the place at which the incident took place. Furthermore, the injuries on the appellant had not been explained. Apart from the features mentioned already, we find that the village Munsif, who was available for a complaint about the incident was not informed.\n\nThis suggests that the party of the prosecution witnesses had something, like stone throwing by them, to hide. The deceased was also not taken to the nearest dispensary to get his wounds dressed.\n\nWe are, therefore, not satisfied that the High Court Jhad rightly interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the 1rial Court The view of the High Court is not based on a complete or comprehensive appreciation of all the features of the case which taken together, cast a reasonable doubt on the prosecution version. It is well established that, in an appeal against acquittal, the appellate Court ought to attach due weight to the assessment of evidence by the Trial Court which has had the additional advantage of seeing the witnesses depose in the witness box.\n\nWe, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the\"conviction and sentence of the appellant who shall be set free forthwith unless wanted in some other connection .\n\nS: B. W.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n' '", "total_entities": 38, "entities": [{"text": "IRLAPATJ\n\nSUBBAYYA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "IRLAPATI SUBBAYYA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, ANDHRA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, ANDHRA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M.H. BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 185, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 302, 32S and 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 335, "end_char": 360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 371, "end_char": 378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. T. Harindranati", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1840, "end_char": 1858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. T. Harindranati and G. S. Rama Rao, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "G. S. Rama Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1863, "end_char": 1877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. T. Harindranati and G. S. Rama Rao, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Ram Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1899, "end_char": 1911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Ram Reddy and P. P. Rao, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. P. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1916, "end_char": 1925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Ram Reddy and P. P. Rao, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "F\n\nBEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1992, "end_char": 1998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgement of the Court was delivered by F\n\nBEG J.-The appellant was charged, with his three brothers-in-Jaw, Bayyarapu Butchiah, Bayyarapu Chandriah, and Bayya1apu Kotayya for offences punisbhable under Section 302, 325, and 323 Indian Penal\n\nCode each read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code, for having murdered Irlapati Ramayya aRd causing grievous hurt to Ankayya, P.W. 2, and simple injury to China Veerayya, P.W. I, at about 4.30 p.m., on 15-6-69, G in front of house of Vipparla Peda Veerayya in Village Vipparla."}}, {"text": "Bayyarapu Butchiah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2061, "end_char": 2079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgement of the Court was delivered by F\n\nBEG J.-The appellant was charged, with his three brothers-in-Jaw, Bayyarapu Butchiah, Bayyarapu Chandriah, and Bayya1apu Kotayya for offences punisbhable under Section 302, 325, and 323 Indian Penal\n\nCode each read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code, for having murdered Irlapati Ramayya aRd causing grievous hurt to Ankayya, P.W. 2, and simple injury to China Veerayya, P.W. I, at about 4.30 p.m., on 15-6-69, G in front of house of Vipparla Peda Veerayya in Village Vipparla.", "canonical_name": "Bayyarapu Chandriah"}}, {"text": "Bayyarapu Chandriah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2081, "end_char": 2100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgement of the Court was delivered by F\n\nBEG J.-The appellant was charged, with his three brothers-in-Jaw, Bayyarapu Butchiah, Bayyarapu Chandriah, and Bayya1apu Kotayya for offences punisbhable under Section 302, 325, and 323 Indian Penal\n\nCode each read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code, for having murdered Irlapati Ramayya aRd causing grievous hurt to Ankayya, P.W. 2, and simple injury to China Veerayya, P.W. I, at about 4.30 p.m., on 15-6-69, G in front of house of Vipparla Peda Veerayya in Village Vipparla.", "canonical_name": "Bayyarapu Chandriah"}}, {"text": "Bayya1apu Kotayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2106, "end_char": 2123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgement of the Court was delivered by F\n\nBEG J.-The appellant was charged, with his three brothers-in-Jaw, Bayyarapu Butchiah, Bayyarapu Chandriah, and Bayya1apu Kotayya for offences punisbhable under Section 302, 325, and 323 Indian Penal\n\nCode each read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code, for having murdered Irlapati Ramayya aRd causing grievous hurt to Ankayya, P.W. 2, and simple injury to China Veerayya, P.W. I, at about 4.30 p.m., on 15-6-69, G in front of house of Vipparla Peda Veerayya in Village Vipparla."}}, {"text": "Section 302, 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2155, "end_char": 2171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2195, "end_char": 2199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2215, "end_char": 2225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal\n\nCode", "statute": "Indian Penal\n\nCode"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2226, "end_char": 2243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Irlapati Ramayya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2265, "end_char": 2281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgement of the Court was delivered by F\n\nBEG J.-The appellant was charged, with his three brothers-in-Jaw, Bayyarapu Butchiah, Bayyarapu Chandriah, and Bayya1apu Kotayya for offences punisbhable under Section 302, 325, and 323 Indian Penal\n\nCode each read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code, for having murdered Irlapati Ramayya aRd causing grievous hurt to Ankayya, P.W. 2, and simple injury to China Veerayya, P.W. I, at about 4.30 p.m., on 15-6-69, G in front of house of Vipparla Peda Veerayya in Village Vipparla."}}, {"text": "Ankayya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2311, "end_char": 2318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgement of the Court was delivered by F\n\nBEG J.-The appellant was charged, with his three brothers-in-Jaw, Bayyarapu Butchiah, Bayyarapu Chandriah, and Bayya1apu Kotayya for offences punisbhable under Section 302, 325, and 323 Indian Penal\n\nCode each read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code, for having murdered Irlapati Ramayya aRd causing grievous hurt to Ankayya, P.W. 2, and simple injury to China Veerayya, P.W. I, at about 4.30 p.m., on 15-6-69, G in front of house of Vipparla Peda Veerayya in Village Vipparla."}}, {"text": "China Veerayya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2349, "end_char": 2363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgement of the Court was delivered by F\n\nBEG J.-The appellant was charged, with his three brothers-in-Jaw, Bayyarapu Butchiah, Bayyarapu Chandriah, and Bayya1apu Kotayya for offences punisbhable under Section 302, 325, and 323 Indian Penal\n\nCode each read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code, for having murdered Irlapati Ramayya aRd causing grievous hurt to Ankayya, P.W. 2, and simple injury to China Veerayya, P.W. I, at about 4.30 p.m., on 15-6-69, G in front of house of Vipparla Peda Veerayya in Village Vipparla."}}, {"text": "15-6-69", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2396, "end_char": 2403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgement of the Court was delivered by F\n\nBEG J.-The appellant was charged, with his three brothers-in-Jaw, Bayyarapu Butchiah, Bayyarapu Chandriah, and Bayya1apu Kotayya for offences punisbhable under Section 302, 325, and 323 Indian Penal\n\nCode each read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code, for having murdered Irlapati Ramayya aRd causing grievous hurt to Ankayya, P.W. 2, and simple injury to China Veerayya, P.W. I, at about 4.30 p.m., on 15-6-69, G in front of house of Vipparla Peda Veerayya in Village Vipparla."}}, {"text": "Vipparla Peda Veerayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2428, "end_char": 2450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgement of the Court was delivered by F\n\nBEG J.-The appellant was charged, with his three brothers-in-Jaw, Bayyarapu Butchiah, Bayyarapu Chandriah, and Bayya1apu Kotayya for offences punisbhable under Section 302, 325, and 323 Indian Penal\n\nCode each read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code, for having murdered Irlapati Ramayya aRd causing grievous hurt to Ankayya, P.W. 2, and simple injury to China Veerayya, P.W. I, at about 4.30 p.m., on 15-6-69, G in front of house of Vipparla Peda Veerayya in Village Vipparla."}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3223, "end_char": 3234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Sections 325 and 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3302, "end_char": 3322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3323, "end_char": 3328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 323 and 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3400, "end_char": 3420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3421, "end_char": 3426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Peda Verrayya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4851, "end_char": 4864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, no blood was found anywhere near the Neem tree in front of the house of P.W. 3, Peda Verrayya, where the occurrence is said to have taken place."}}, {"text": "Lakshmayya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5221, "end_char": 5231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "high so that no lathis could be lifted and brought down to beat the injured without obstruction by brarrches as was admitted by Lakshmayya."}}, {"text": "Sayamma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7808, "end_char": 7815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sayamma, P. W. IO, for example had stated that Ankayya, P. W. 2 was beaten at a distance of IO to IS yds."}}, {"text": "Peda Veerayya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7932, "end_char": 7945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from the house of Peda Veerayya, P.W. 3 at the junction of North South streets and East West street."}}, {"text": "Perayya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8029, "end_char": 8036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-Inspector Perayya, P.W\"."}}, {"text": "Venkamma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8130, "end_char": 8138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkamma, P.W. 12 bad stated that the place where Ankayya, P.W. 2 fell was at a distance of only I or 2 yds."}}, {"text": "Ramayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8959, "end_char": 8966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If that was so, the extent of the injury on the head was really difficult to reconcile with the post mortem report which described the injuries of Ramayya, deceased as follows;\n\n\"I. Lacerated injury scalp 8 cm x I cm."}}, {"text": "Sayamma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12434, "end_char": 12441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged that he had, for this reason, ~~1lten Sayamma and her mother who were said to have obstructed him."}}, {"text": "Munsif", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13005, "end_char": 13011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the features mentioned already, we find that the village Munsif, who was available for a complaint about the incident was not informed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_607_612_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "DHARAM DAS WADHWANI\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nMarch 14, 1974\n\n[H. R. KHANNA, & V. R. KRISHNA !YER, JJ.] Practice-Criminal Trial-Circun1stantial evidence-Appreciation of\n\nThe accused, a compounder in a hospital was charged with the offence under s. 328 I. P. C., of administering poison to one of the two doctors of the hospital. He was acquitted by the trial court but found guilty by the High Court. Dismissing the appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : The critiCal rule of proof by circumstantial evidence, is that such testimony can be the probative basis for conviction only if one rigorous test is satisfied, namely, that the circumstances must make so strong a mesh that the innocence of the accused is wholly excluded itnd on every reasonable hypothesis the guilt of the accused must be the only inference. Every evidentiary circumstance is a probative link, strong, or weak, and must be made out with certainty.\n\nLink after link forged firmly by credible testimony may form a strong chain of sure guilt binding the accused. Each link, taken separately, may just suggest but when hooked on to the next and on again may manacle the accused inescapably.\n\nOny then can a concatenation of incriminating facts suffice to convict a man.\n\nIf a reasonable doubt arises regarding the guilt of the accused, benefit of that doubt cannot be withheld from him. But proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be distorted into a doctrin~ of acquittal when any delicate or remote doubt flits past a f<ble mind. [611E, GH, 6I2A-B]\n\nIn the present case, the accused bore a grudge against the victim. When he was requested by the victim to bring aspirin he brought it in two packets. There were traces of strychnine crystals in the paper of the packet from which the victim had swallowed what he thought was aspirin, and an analysis of the stomach wash showed that he had consumed strychnine. The accused falsely denied that there was any stock of strychnine. He took a quarter of an hour to get the aspirin, suggesting that he went into the store room to take out a little strychnine. The circumstance that the two packets contained different substances-aspirin in one and strychnine in another-shows that the accused took the powders from 2 differ .. ent bottles, eliminating the possibility of an accident.\n\nWhen another doctor asked him a searching question about the aspirin the accused was seen to be trembling, The accused never showed any anxiety to save the victim. In the commital court he took a false plea of denial and modified his plea in the Sessions Court to present - a plausible defence. These circumstances lead to the only reasonable inference that he is guilty, and the other likelihoods are mere possibilities. [612C~G]\n\nS. S. Bobade v. Slate of Maharash_tra (1973] 2 SCC 801 and Kali Ram v. Slate of Himachal Pradesh A. I. R. 1973 S.C. 2773 followed.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 222 of 1970.\n\nAppoal by leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 15th January, 1970 of the Allahabad High Court at Allahabad in Government Appeal No. 132of1967.\n\nNuruddin Ahmed, B. P. Singh AND A. K. Varm1, for the Appe[- lant,\n\n0. P. Rana for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nKRimNA !YER, J.-A few facts with unique features, attracting a recondite provision of the Penal Code, constitute the subject-matter\n\nof the criminal case which ended in an acquittal in the sessions Court A reversed at the appellate level and is re-agitated before us in this appeal by special leave.\n\nThe offence for which the accused has been punished is one under s. 328, I. P. C., for administering poison to a doctor by a compounder with intent to cause hurt. We did bestow anxious reflection on the materials placed before us in the light of the submissions made by B counsel for the appellant, Shri Nuruddin Ahmed, but, with due regard to their peculiarities and probabilities, we have established ourselves onthe conclusion that the High Court has held right that the accused is guilty of the offence charged.\n\nThe prosecution case, in brief, takes us to a small hospital scene where we have two medical officers, P. Ws. 2 and 3, a compounderc the accused, and a peon, Badri.\n\nThe senior doctor, P. W. 2, arrives in the hospital around 9 30 a.m. with a bad headache and asks the accused, appellant for ten grains of aspirin. Some 12 or 13 minutes are taken for the appellant to bring to his own doctor aspirin which is readily available in the dispensing room. The appellant brings two packets, 'asprin' written on them, and the patient-this time the doctor himself-consumes one packet. Bitten by titterness of D taste unusual in aspirin, P. W. 2 asks the attender, Badri, to fetch a glass of water. By that time, P. W. 3, the other doctor, had come and is sitting in the next chair. P. W. 2 complains to P. W. 3 about the strange bitterness in the tongue, aspirin being tasteless. He gargles his mouth, washes his face with water and asks the attender to buy some atle leaves, apparently to overcom<> the bad taste. Thereafter he proceeds to his normal work and tries . to give injection to a E patient waiting, but begins to feel' shaky. Within a few minutes P. w. 2 has the sensation of cramps in the calf muscles and P.W. 3, the other doctor, is perplexed. So he goes into the dispensing room and asks the accused from which bottle he had given the aspirin.\n\nThe latter shows a bottle of aspirin kept there, and when asked whether he had accidently given strychnine denies that strychnine, a deadly poison, is in stock at all. Of course, the accused himself F begins to tremble. Any way, P. W. 3 seals the bottle of aspirin taken from the disl?\"nsmg room as well as the paper of the p•cket in which the medicines taken by P. W. 2 was kept, and the other unconsumed packet.\n\nApprehensive of poisoning, P. W. 2 is removed to the District Hospital, where he is given a stomach wash. His condition becomes precarious and his statement is recorded by P.W.7, the Police Officer attached to the Kotwali Police Station, and a case G is registered under s. 328, I. P. C., against the accused, Ex. Ka. I.\n\nP. W. 3 gives a written report, Ex. Ka. 2, and also the sealed packets to P. W. 7, the Police Officer.\n\nThereafter, investigation begins and the dispensing and store rooms are inspected and the stock register examined. No bottle of strychnine \" seen in the dispensing room, but one containing 4 2 grams . of this lethal poison is founu in the store room-vide Ex. Ka. 8, the search memo.\n\nThe Chemical Examiner found on ualysis of the stomach wash that P. W. 2 had consumed strychnine. There were traces of stry-\n\nD. D. WADHWAN1v. U.P STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.l 609\n\n' chnine crystals in the paper of the packet from which P. W. 2 had swallowed the headache cure. The other packet, which was not li!ed, contained only aspirin. The sy!IJ.ptoms which P. W. 2 developed were clearly indicative of strychnine poisoning.\n\nIt has been found by the High Court that fr was the accused compounder who brought the two packets of medicine to P. W. 2.\n\nLikewise, it has been fou'hd that it was the accused who dispensed the medici!le and that there was no strychnine in the dispensing room, but there was some quantity of it in the store room. The High Court has also held that the accused's denial to P. W. 3 that there was no strychnine available in stock was false and that the interrogation so upset the accused that he began to tremble. ·\n\nThese are the broad findings which have led to the conviction of the accused, whose stand, however, was one of denial. He agreed, while examined in the sessions court, that P. W. 2 had told Badri, the attendant, to bring aspirin and he in turn told the accused that Doctor Saheb had wanted two 'purias' of aspirin, whereupon the accused told Badri that aspirin packets were kept ready there and he had better take them out and give to the doctor. In short, he disconnected himself from the doctor's request for aspirin or the delivery of the two packets of medicine. The further answer of the accused was that P. W. 3 merely asked him where the bottle of aspirin was and not where the bottle of aspirin from which he gave the packet to P. W. 2 was. That is to say, the incriminating component of that part of the testimrny of P. W. 3 is denied by the accused.\n\nHe denies again that he told P. W. 3 that there was no strychnine in stock while, as a fact, 4 2 grams thereof were found in the store room.\n\nHe suggests an answer to why such a case should have been started against him that it is due to the grudge P. W. 3, Dr. Baijal, bore against him. In this context, it is meaningful to note that before the Committal Court he took a patently false stand, namely, that P.W. 2 had neither asked him foe aspirin nor had he dispensed any to him.\n\nIndeed, he has resorted to an audacious plea that \"purias are dispen.'led by the hospital attendants . . . . three persons work as hospital attendants; I got rest on every Friday and on that day I enjoy holiday.\" The obvious attempt was to fob off the poisonous packet on the hospital attendant. Jn the Session Court, however, he abandoned this impossible position and put forward a more plausible ease, trying to cash in hopefully on Badri, the peon being set up as a dispensing chemist so far as the puria in question was concerned.\n\nThe Sessions Court acquitted the accused on a perverse view of the evidence. Although the learned' Judge has set down the points pressed into service by the prosecution_properly, he has gone off at a tangent into an invfitigation as to why the paper with which the poisonous puria was made was not mentioned in Ex. Ka. 2. He gets entangled in a serious series of trivialities and magnifies minor militating circumstances to persuade himself to the conclusion that there was something very fishy in \\he investigation on this aspect.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1974 I 3 S.C.ll.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge asks why the accused should have given two purias instead of oqe, and why he should have taken the chance of the doctor taking the innocuous puria out of the two, if he had an offending intent. He works himself up into the chance possibility of strychnine getting into the doctor's body through the water he drank after the powder was taken, forgetting that P. W. 2 com plained of the b.itter taste when he took the powder and not after he' drank the water. '\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge observed :\n\n\"The possibility of the strychnine having found its way in the system of Dr. Sen Gupta by some way other than the contents of the Puria cannot at all be excluded, for there is evidence of Dr. Sen Gupta himself that he took the powder of the Puria along with water. whih Badri had brought and the possibility of strychnine being in the water cannot be excluded.\"\n\nAnother casual circumstance which the Sessions Judge chases is that the hospital peons prepare mixtures and powders, sugges ting thereby that the purias in question might have been got pre\n\npared by Hospital peons and not the accused. Yet another fanci ful argument which has appealed to him is, in his own words, that:\n\n\"Dr. Sen Gupta has admitted that strychnine is used in other medicines also. It, therefore, cannot be safely ruled out that the strychnine found its way into one of the aspirin Puri as already prepared and accidently that Puria was taken by Dr. Sen Gupta.\"\n\nNot content with these freak conjectures, the learned Sessions Judge fancies that had the accused an intention against his victim, he would have given him ten grains of strychnine which would have knocked him down at once since one part of strychnine in 7000 parts of water would have made the whole quantity bitter and even half a grain of strychnine could have been a fatai'dose. On the question of motive, the Sessions Judge has again made mistakes, and as for the long interval for supplying the packets, the Judge has a convenient personal theory:\n\n\"Anyone who has any experience of how a dispenser works at a hospital knows that they are neither very prompt nor very efficient. After all Dr. Sen Gupta was only havil)g a headache and there was no immediate urgency.\"\n\nWe could easily illustrate more of this species .but desist from doina so as it is unnecessary. All that we need say is that a court is not concerned with fantastic possibilities but with practical realities.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court have set the record straight, if we may say. so. They have come to the conclusion that H it was the accused who was directed to bring aspirin and it was he who brought the two packets, the contents of one of which were poisonous. The learned Judges have held on a study of the evidence\n\nD. D. WADHWANJ V U.P STATE (Krioh11<1 Iyer, ],) 6 lr\n\nthat the accused's plea that there was no strychnine in stock was false and that he had sought to put off P. W.s 2 and 3 by such a false ans\\\\rer. The intention of the accused to introduce strychnine is in-· ferred by the High Court thus :\n\n\"In view of the circumstances that the two packets handed over to Dr. Sen Gupta .contained t\\\\'O different substance, it. is clear that the same were taken from two different bottles.\n\nIt cannot be, therefore, said that the respondent committed an accidental though bona fide mistake of giving the powder from a wrong bottle. The fact that he took powder from two different bottles whereas he ought to have taken from only one, itself shows that he had a guilty mind.\"\n\nThe effect of the motive made out in the case has not been lost sight of by the High Court, although too much has not been read into it, rightly if we may say so. The ultimate conclusion reached .by the learned Judges is that the accused gave a packet contarnrng strychnine to P. W. 2 for being consumed by him. On these facts, \\vhich have been arrived at by a reasonable appraisal of the evidence, the present appellant has been found guilty by the High \\=ourt.\n\nShri Nuruddin Ahmed, counsel for the appellant, rightly stressed that the prosecution eqifice was built on circumstantial v1de.nce ~~=ooMe~-~-~xnry~M~~= before serving the doctor. The critical rule of proof by circumstan!laf evidence, cqunsel reminded us, is that such testimony can be the probative basiS for conviction only if one rigorous test is satisfied.\n\nThe circun1stances must n1ake so strong a mesh that the innocence of the accused is wholly excluded and on every reasonable hypothesis thlO guilt of the accused must be the only inference.\n\nShri Nuruddin Ahmed suggested some maybes in the case excluding his client's culpability, and contended that the tes.t of incompatibility with the innocence of the accused had not been fulfilled at all here. As a proposition of law and commonsense, we agree that unlike direct evidence the indirect light circumstances may throw may vary from suspicion to certitude and care must be taken to avoiri subjectiv\" pitfalls of exaggerating a conjecture into a conviction.\n\nEvery evidentiary circumstance is a probative link, strong or weak, and must be made out with certainty. Link after link forged firmly by credible testimony may form a strong chain of sure guilt binding the accused. Each link taken separately may just suggest but when hookoo on to the next and on again may manacle the accused inescapably. Only then can a concatenation of incriminating facts suffice to convict a man. Short of that is insufficient.\n\nThe question then is whether the cumulative effect of the guiltpoint.ing circumstances in the present case is such that the court can conclude, not that the accused may be guilty but that he must be guilty. We must here utter a word of caution about this mentaL\n\nsense of 'must' lest it should be confused with exclusion of every contrary possibility. We have in S. S. Robade v. State of Maharashtra(_!) explained that proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be distorted into a doctrine of acquittal when any delicate or remote doubt flits past a feeble mind. The<e observations are warranted by frequent acquittals on flimsy possibilities which are not infrequently set aside by the High Courts weakening the credibility of the judicature. The rule of benefits of reasonable doubt does not imply a .frail willow bending to every whif of hesitancy. Judges are made of sterner stuff and must take a practical view of legitimate inferences flowing from evidence, circumstantial or direct. At the same time it may be affirmed, as pointed out by this Court in Kali Ram v. State of Himacha/ Pradesh (2), that if a Teasonable doubt arises regarding the guilt of the accused, the benefit of that cannot be withheld from him.\n\nComing. to the case in hand, the Sessions Judge has been obsessed by mere maybes. Maybe, the attender made the packets; may be the doctor witnesses are adulterating truth; may be the motive is untrue or inadequate; may be the presence of two purias, one of whicl\\ is aspirin, suggests the accused's innocence, and so on.\n\nDoubt feeds on it\"self. Here are certain incontrovertible facts.\n\nThe accused bore an immediate grudge against P. W. I-the adequacy of motivation is a subjective exploration. The accused was requested to bring aspirin and he brought it in two tiny packets.\n\nHe was perhaps not taking a chance because the doctor might well have swallowed both but for the intolerable bitterness of the first.\n\nHe falsely denied the stock of strychnine and took a long quarter of hour to get a little aspirin to his own boss, suggesting that he went into the store room to take a little strychnine. He trembled when\n\nP. W. 3 turned to ask him a searching question. He never showed any anxiety to save the doctor out of the calamity and in the committal court took a false plea of denial modified in the Sessions Court to present a plausible defence. The following questions arise: Did' the accused prepare the medicine which did indubitably contain poison ? Yes. Did he do it accidently ?\n\nNo.\n\nDid he have motive to harm the victim ? Yes.\n\nDid he deny falsely in the committal court ? Yes, and that is itself a guilty circumstance.\n\nDo other likelihoods neutralise the incrimination available from these circumstances ? No reasonable inferences but theoretical possi~ bilities. If crime is to be punished gossamer web niceties must yield to realistic appraisals. The compounder has dispensed a deleterious substance to his own doctor and has been rightly held guilty. The sentence does not call for interference either. We dismiss the appoal.\n\nV.P.S.\n\n(!) [19731 2 SCC,801.\n\n(2) AIR 1973 SC 2773.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 25, "entities": [{"text": "DHARAM DAS WADHWANI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DHARAM DAS WADHWANI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 14, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DHARAM DAS WADHWANI\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nMarch 14, 1974\n\n[H. R. KHANNA, & V. R. KRISHNA !"}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 328", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 244, "end_char": 250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nuruddin Ahmed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3068, "end_char": 3082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nuruddin Ahmed, B. P. Singh AND A. K. Varm1, for the Appe[- lant,\n\n0.", "canonical_name": "Nuruddin Ahmed"}}, {"text": "B. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3084, "end_char": 3095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nuruddin Ahmed, B. P. Singh AND A. K. Varm1, for the Appe[- lant,\n\n0."}}, {"text": "A. K. Varm1", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3100, "end_char": 3111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nuruddin Ahmed, B. P. Singh AND A. K. Varm1, for the Appe[- lant,\n\n0."}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3138, "end_char": 3145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KRimNA !", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3212, "end_char": 3220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nKRimNA !"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3302, "end_char": 3312, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 328", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3578, "end_char": 3584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Badri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4188, "end_char": 4193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 and 3, a compounderc the accused, and a peon, Badri."}}, {"text": "Badri", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4685, "end_char": 4690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bitten by titterness of D taste unusual in aspirin, P. W. 2 asks the attender, Badri, to fetch a glass of water."}}, {"text": "Kotwali Police Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6011, "end_char": 6033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His condition becomes precarious and his statement is recorded by P.W.7, the Police Officer attached to the Kotwali Police Station, and a case G is registered under s. 328, I. P. C., against the accused, Ex."}}, {"text": "s. 328", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6068, "end_char": 6074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6660, "end_char": 6672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.P STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.l 609\n\n' chnine crystals in the paper of the packet from which P. W. 2 had swallowed the headache cure."}}, {"text": "Saheb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7722, "end_char": 7727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He agreed, while examined in the sessions court, that P. W. 2 had told Badri, the attendant, to bring aspirin and he in turn told the accused that Doctor Saheb had wanted two 'purias' of aspirin, whereupon the accused told Badri that aspirin packets were kept ready there and he had better take them out and give to the doctor."}}, {"text": "Badri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7791, "end_char": 7796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He agreed, while examined in the sessions court, that P. W. 2 had told Badri, the attendant, to bring aspirin and he in turn told the accused that Doctor Saheb had wanted two 'purias' of aspirin, whereupon the accused told Badri that aspirin packets were kept ready there and he had better take them out and give to the doctor."}}, {"text": "Baijal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8572, "end_char": 8578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He suggests an answer to why such a case should have been started against him that it is due to the grudge P. W. 3, Dr. Baijal, bore against him."}}, {"text": "Sen Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10507, "end_char": 10516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Sessions Judge observed :\n\n\"The possibility of the strychnine having found its way in the system of Dr. Sen Gupta by some way other than the contents of the Puria cannot at all be excluded, for there is evidence of Dr. Sen Gupta himself that he took the powder of the Puria along with water."}}, {"text": "Iyer", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12718, "end_char": 12722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges have held on a study of the evidence\n\nD. D. WADHWANJ V U.P STATE (Krioh11<1 Iyer, ],) 6 lr\n\nthat the accused's plea that there was no strychnine in stock was false and that he had sought to put off P. W.s 2 and 3 by such a false ans\\\\rer."}}, {"text": "s 2 and 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12845, "end_char": 12854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nuruddin Ahmed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13914, "end_char": 13928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Nuruddin Ahmed, counsel for the appellant, rightly stressed that the prosecution eqifice was built on circumstantial v1de.nce ~~=ooMe~-~-~xnry~M~~= before serving the doctor.", "canonical_name": "Nuruddin Ahmed"}}, {"text": "AIR 1973 SC 2773", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18482, "end_char": 18498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_613_623_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "GOLAM HUSSAIN ALIAS GAMA\n\nl'.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, CALCUTTA, AND OTHERS\n\nMarch 15, 1974\n\n[H. R. KHANNA AND V. R. KRISHNA IYER, JJ.]\n\nMai11rena11ce of Internal Security Act, 1971-Ss. 3 (1) an:l 3 (2) • If detention af1er discharge in criminal -cases ma/a fide-Link between criminal activity and detention-Detention without duration if invalid-Public disorder-If acts aifned at a single person can disturb public order.\n\nPursuant to an order of detention under s. 3 (l)(a) (ii) read withs. 3 (2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 the petitionet' was arrested for hurling soda water bottles, brickbats and bombs indiscriminately on a group of persons on different dates. The order of detention said that if left free and unfettered the pe~· titioner was likely to continue to disturb maintenance of public disorder by acting in a similar manner. In an earlier criminal case the petitioner was discharged by the court since no witness dared to depose against him in open court. Thereafter the petitioner was detained under the Act.\n\nJn a petition under Art. 32 it was contended : (I) that the detention was mala fide because the petitioner was detained under the Act after his discharge by the court for want of evidence (2) that there had been a long interval of nine months between the criminal incidents and the detention order, (3) that the order of detention which did not specify a period was violative of s. 12 of the Act and (4) that the detention was founded on prevention of public disorder while the acts imputed to th~ petitioner v.\"ere aimed at a particular person, not the genral public.\n\nDismissing the petition,\n\nfIELD : Merely because the detaining authority had chosen to base the order of detention on.the discharge of the petitioner by the court for want of evidence it cannot be held that the order was bad in law. This branch of jurispru dence, as interpreted by this Court, has made it futile for a detcnu to urgethat because the grounds of detention have been the subject matter of criminal cases which have ended in discharge, therefore, the order of detention was ma/a fide.\n\nThe basic imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not apply to the subjective satisfaction component of imprisonment for reasons of internal security. There may be extreme cases where the court had held a criminal case to be false and the detaining authority with that judicial pronouncement before him may not reasonably clain1 to be satisfied about prospective prejudicial activities based on what a court has found to be baseless. In the present case where the order of discharge was made purely for want of evidence on the scope that witnesses were too afraid to depose against a desperate character cannot come under the exceptions carved out by the court to this category. [616C-FJ\n\n(2) It is true that there must be a live link between the grounds of criminal' activity alleged by the detaining authoritY and the purpose of detention. This credible chain is snapped if there is too long and unexplained an interval between the offending acts and the order of detention. If the detaining authority takes the chance of conviction and, when the court verdict goes against it, falls back on its detention pawcr to punish one whom the court would not convict, it is an abuse and virtual nullification of the judicial proc.-ess. But if honestly finding a dangerou~ f?CCSOD getting away th if. by overawing wit_nesses or concealing the comm1ss1on cleverly, an authority thinks on the matenaJ before him that there is likelihood of and need to interdict public disorder at his instance he may validly direct detention. Jn the present case the acts were 'serious being bomb hurling and brickbat 'throwing in public places creating panic. involvement of the petitoner was is~red nly during the investigation of the offences. No ground: C\"x1sts for dtsm1ss1ng this statement as sham or factitious. [616G-H;617Cj\n\nM. S. Khan v. C. C. Bose, A. I. R. 1972 S.C. 1670, Ashim Ku1nar v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2S6l and Sahib Singh Dugal v. Union of btdia, [1966] I S.C.R. 313, followed. .\n\n(3) The argument that detention without defined duration is ipso j:1r~ invalid cannot be sustained: No responsible government .should or would be irresponsive to the claim of citizen's freedom.\n\n(622FJ Suna Ullah v, State (If J & K, A.LR, 1972 S.C. 2431, 2433, Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bo1nbay, [1952] $.C.R. 612, S. Krishnan v.\n\nThe State of Madras, [1951] S.C.R. 621; 629, and Prabhu Dayal v. Distnct Magistrate, Kamn1p, [1974] 1S.C.C.103; 114, referred to.\n\n(4) The nature of the act, the circumstances of its commission, the impact on people around and such like factors constitute the pathology of public disorder.\n\nThese acts cannot be isolated from their public setting nor is it possible to analyse its molecules as in a laboratory but take its total effect on the flow of orderly life: It may be a question of the degree and quality of the activity of the sensitivity of the situation and the psychic response of the involved people. To dissect further is to defeat the purpo~ of social defence which is the paramount purpose of pre ventive detention. [623BC]\n\nMohd. Subrati v. State of West Bengal, ll913J 3 S.C.C. 250; 256, referred to.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 1977 of 1973.\n\nUnder Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus.\n\nD. N. Mukherjee and M. M. Kshatriya, for the petitioner.\n\nD f. K. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-A few issues of son1e moment, in the con~ text of civil liberties have been argued in this application for habeas corpus by Shri Mukherjee as amicus curiae.\n\nThe facts are disquieting at least for the reason that the petitioner an aged ailing man around 74, has been under detention since 1973 and, previous to it, had been facing a criminal prosecution which ended in a discharge on the date the detention order was clamped down on him; and counsel pressed the poignant circumstance that the ultimate order of Government dated September 28, ,1973 merely confirms the detention, being unlimited in duration and unspeaking on the terminus ad quem for the incarceration.\n\nThe relevant facts may be stated before discussing the highlights -of the arguments. The.Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, passed the initial order of detention dated July 19, 1973 on the petitioner, Golam Hussain alias Gama, under s. 3(1) (a) (ii) read with sub-section (2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (Act 26 of 1971) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').\n\nThe grounds which induced the detaining authority to pass the order were communicated tho same day.\n\nThey have been set out by the State as annexure to the affidavit filed in opposition to the petition and read thus :\n\n\"J. On 8-10-72 at about 22·25 hrs., you along with your associates Achche Lal Show of 1, Manickotolla Bazar Lane, Satya Narayan Jaiswal of 123/2, Acharya Prafulla Chandra Road, and others, all being armed with bombs, sodawater bottles created a great disturbance of public order on Gouri Sankar Lane in front of premises No. 8 by hurling oombs\n\nVOLAM HUSSAIN v. COMMR. POLICE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 615\n\nindiscriminately with a view to attack one Jiban Paul of 8,\n\nOouri Shankar Lane and his group in retaliation to an earlier quarrel that took place with the said Jiban Paul at 8 Gouri Sankar Lane with your associates Satya Narayan Jais_;, al and others. The incident terrorised the locality and threw out of gear the notmal life stream of the residents of the said locality amountingtopolice order. ·\n\n2. On 9-11-72 sometimes betweeen 04-45 hrs. you along with your associates Ratish Pradhan alias Laltu of 23/IA, Abinash Kaviraj St., Benode Kr. Jaiswal. of 34B, Gulu Ostagar Lane and other all being armed with brickbats, soda-water bottles, bombs poles, created a great disturbance of public order on\n\nOouri Sankar Lane and Abinash Kaviraj Street by hurling soda-water bottles, brickbats jndiscriminately with a view to overawe the organisers of the Kalipuja that took place in front of 8 Gowi Sankar Lane and thereby to terrorise the locality.\n\nAs a result the lights of the above puja pandals were damaged.\n\nThis was in sequel to an incident that took place earlier at about 04-30 hrs when your associates Benode Kumar and others threw beer bottles at the Kalipuja panda! at 8, Gouri Sankar Lane, where some females were then dancing, which was then protested by the local people and the organisers of the said puja.\n\nAnd ifleft free aad unfettered you are likely to continue to disturb manitenance of public order by acting in a similar manner as aforesaid.\"\n\n' As required by the statute, the fact of detention was communi- ' catcd to the State Government which in turn reported to the Central Government.\n\nThe case was placed before the Advisory Board on August 13, 1973 and when the representation of the detenu was received it was duly considered and negatived by the State Government which thereafter made it over to the Advisory Board. After adverting to the facts, the Board advised continuance of the detention on September 21, 1973.\n\nThe consequential order confirming the detention was made by the State Government on September 28, 1973 and communicated to the detenu by the middle. of October, 1973.\n\nWe see no statutory shortcoming in the time sequence set out above.\n\nBut other grounds of attack have been levelled against the' order which deserve a Closer look.\n\nShri Mukherjee urged that although two criminal cases were started in connection with the two incidents. constituting the grounds for the detention, the petitioner's name was not even mentioned in the first information reports, and he was produced before the Magistrate only on July 5, 1973, and so the order based on those accusations was too irrational to be bona fide. The Commissioner of Police who passed the detention order has stated in his affidavit that there wet'c cases connected with the incidents of October 8th and November 9th, but the detenu could not be arrested until July 4 1973.\n\nIt is not denied that the petitioner's nae was not in the fi; st information\n\nreport, but he was apprehended later on the basis of evidence gathered during the investigation of the criminal case.\n\nThe Commissioner admits that the detenu was discharged by the Court \"as no witness dared to depose against the detenu in open court.\" According to him \"the said order of discharge was made on tho prayer of the police on July 19, 1973,\" and thereafter the petitioner was preventively detained.\n\nCould such an order be castigated as malafide and oblique resort to the inscrutable order of detention when the prospects in the criminal case became bleak 1 This charge . has been .repudiated by the Commissioner .on oath and we are not able to hold with the petitioner that merely because the detaining authority has chosen to pass the order on the discharge of the petitioner by the court for want of evidence, the order is bad in law.\n\nThe branch of jurisprudence bearing on prohibitory detention has been crystallised by now and it is no longer a valid contention that because the accused has been discharged in a criminal case the ground of charge cannot c\n\n be relied upon by the appropriate. authoritY for passing an order of detention. The former relates to the punitivo..branch of the criminal law and relates tothe past commission, the latter to the preventive branch of social defence and protects the community from future injury. Whether we like it or not, this branch of jurisprudence, as interpreted by this Court has made it futile for a detenu to urge that because the grounds of detention have been the Subject matter of criminal cases which have ended in discharge, therefore, the order of detention is malafide. The basic imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not apply to the 'subjective satisfaction• component of imprisonment for reasons of internal security.\n\nTo quarrel with such a, proposition is to challenge the wisdom of Parliament. Of , course, we can visualise extreme cases where a court has held a criminal case to be false and a detaining authority with that judicial pronouncement before him may not reasonably claim to be satisfied about prospective prejudicial activities based on what a court has ... found to be baseless.\n\nBut the present case where the order of discharge is made purely for want of evidence oil the score that witnesses were too afraid to depose against a desperate character cannot come under this exceptional category.\n\nAnother submission, equally an exercise in futility, made before us is that there has been a long interval of nine months between the criminal incidents of October and November, 1972 and the detention order of July, .1973.\n\nCounsel hopefully relied on recent decision\n\nof this Court in Lakshman Khatik v. State f West Bengal (1) and an G earlier decision in Rameshwar Shah v. District Magistrate Burdwan(2).\n\nIt is true that there must be a live link between the grounds of criminal activity alleged by the detaining authority and the purpose of detention, namely, inhibition of prejudicial activity of the species specified in the statute.\n\nThis credible chain is snapped if there is too long and unexplained an interval between the offending acts and the order of detention. Such is the ratio of proximity in Lakshman Khatik(l), H No authority, acting rationally, can be satisfied, subjectively or otherwise, of future mischief merely because lng ago the detenu had\n\n(1) Writ Petition No. 344 of 1972; Judgment on 26·2-74. (2) [1964] 4 S.C.R. 921.\n\nGOLAM HUSSAIN v. COMMR. POLICE (Krishna Tyer, /.) 61 7\n\ndone something evil. To rule otherwise is to sanction a simulacrum of a statutory requirement.\n\nBut no mechanical test by counting the months of the interval is sound.\n\nIt all depends on the nature of the acts relied on, grave and determined or less serious and corrigible, on the length of the gap, short or long on the reason for the delay in taking preventive action, like information of partiClpaticn being available only in the course of an investigation.\n\nW~ have to investigate whether the causal connection has been troken in the circumstances of each case.\n\nIf the detaining authority takes the chance of conviction and, when the court verdict goes against it, falls back on its detention power to punish one whom the court would not convict, it is. an abuse and virtual nullification of the judicial process.\n\nBut if honestly finding a dangerous pmon getting away with it by overawing witnesses or concealing the commission cleverly an authority thinks on the material before him that there is likelihood of and need to interdict public disorder at his instance he may validly difect detention.\n\nThe distinction is fine but real.\n\nIn the present case, the acts are serious, being bomb hurling and brick-bat throwing in public places creating panic.\n\nThe involvement of the petitioner is discovered only during the investigation of the offences.\n\nThe witnesses are scared away from deposing.\n\nThe Commissioner swears that in these special circumstances he did form the satisfaction requisite for ordering preventive detention.\n\nNo ground exists for dismissing this statement as sham.or factitious.\n\nIt is one thing to say that a more subjective satisfaction is sufficient to deprive a person of a fundamental freedom; it is another to reject that satisfaction as specious and non-existent.\n\nParliament makes the law and is responsible for it; the court only applies it, as it must.\n\nWe have, therefore, to reject the plea that because the criminal case has failed the detention must be bad.\n\nM. S. Khan v. C. C. Bose, (t I Ashim Kumar v. State of West Benga/(2), and Sahib Singh Dugal v. Union of lndia\\0) are but three among many cases takhlg this view.\n\nWe follow these precedents.\n\nThe next serious contention of Shri Chatterjee is that an order of detention which does not specify a period is violative of s. 12 of the Act. We may reproduce the relevant provisions which are of ancient vintage, being wholly or substantially in pari materia with earlier corresponding preventive detenfam sections. Nor is the position oflaw canvassed forres integra. Section 12 and 13 of the Mamtenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, as amended, read as follows :\n\n\"12(1) In any case where the Advisory Board has reportc~ that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention c•f a person the appropriate Government may confirm the detention ordr and continue the detention of the person conoernod for such period as it thinks fit.\n\n(2) (ll AJ.R. t972 S.C. 1670.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1972 S.C. 2561.\n\n(3) [195() I S.C.R. 313.\n\nI l-M4 SSup.Cl/75\n\n13. The maximum period for which any person may be detained jn pursuance of any detention order which has been co1ifirmed under section 12 shall be twelve months from the date of detention, or until the expiry of the Defence oflndia Act, 1971 whichever is later ;\n\nProvided that nothing contained in this section shall affect the power of the appropriate Government to revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier time.\" Section 1(3)ofthe Defence oflndiaAct, 197!, laiddown the duration of that Act and said that that Act shall remain in force for the duration of the proclamation of emergency and a period of six months thereafter.\n\nSection 13 of the MISA, as amended, thus provided that the maximum period of detention under the Act shall be twelve months from the date of detention or until the expiry of a period of six months after the cessation of the proclamation of emergency, whichever is later.\n\nThe Court recently dismissed a similar argument in these words in Suna Ullah v. State of J & K (I) :\n\n\"It is urged that the failure of the State Government to specify the period of detention introduces an infirmity in the detention of the petitioner.\n\nThis contention, in our opinion, is without any force.\n\nAccording to sub-8\"ction (l) of Section 12 of the Act, in any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, sufficient caus~ for the detention of a person, the Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit.\n\nSection 13 of the Act seci fies the maximum period of detention. According to that section the maximum period for which a person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order, which has been eonfirmed under Section 12, shall be two years from the date of detention.\n\nIt is further provided that nothing in the section shall effect the power of the Government to revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier time.\n\nIt is, in our opinion, difficult to infer from the language of Section 12 of the Act that the State Government while confirming the detention order should also specify the period of detention.\n\nAll that the section requires is that, if the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for the detention of the person, the Govern1nent may confirm the detention order.\n\nThere is nothing in the sec~ tion which enjoins upon the Government to specify the pzriod of detention order.\n\nThe concluding words of sub-section (1) of Section 12, according to which the Govern1nent may continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit, pertain to and embody the consequences of the confirmation of the detention order. It is, however, manifest that the period\n\nfor which a person can be detained after the confirmation of the detention order is subject to the limit of two years, which is. the maximum period of detention for which a person can be detained vide section 13 of the Act.\n\n(I) A.LR. 1972 S.C. 2431; 2433.\n\nGOLAM llUSSAIN v. COMMR. POLICE (Krishna Iyer, I.) 619\n\nApart from the above, we are of the opinion that it is not always practicable and feasible for the State Government at the time of confirming the detention order to specify the period of detention.\n\nThe continued detention of the detenu, subject to the maximum period-prescribed by the Act, depends upon a variety of factors and the State Government would have to take into account all the circumstances including fresh developments and subsequent events in deciding whether to keep the detenu in detention for the maximum period or to release him earlier.\n\nIt has accordingly been provided in sub-section (2)ofSection 13 of the Act that the State Go.vernment would have the power to revoke or modify the dete.ntion order at any time earlier than the exj>iry of two years from the date of detention.\" ·\n\nThe leading case, if we may say so, is Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay(!) . The majority held that an order of detention under a substantially like provision was not invalid merely because the order did not contain the period of imprisonment. Mahajan, J., as he then was, held a contrary view.\n\nBut even the majority was split on their construction of the section.\n\nDas, J., as he then was, read the section to imply no obligation to write into the order the duration, even though it may be desirable.\n\nThe learned Judge observed :\n\n\"It is said that the section should be construed irrespective of whether it occurs in a temporary statute or a.permanent one, and it is urged that if the statute were.a permanent one the section on the aforesaid interpretation, would have permitted an indefinite detention. . The answer is given by Mahajan J., in the following passage in his judgment in S. Krishnan v. The State of Madras (supra) at page 639 with which concurred(2) :-\n\n\"It may be pointed out that Parliament may well have thought that it was unnecessary to fix any maximum period of detention in the new statute which was of a temporary nature and whose own tenure of life was limited to one year.\n\nSuch temporary statutes cease to have any effect after they expire they automatically come to an end at the expiry of the period for which they have been enacted and nothing further can be done under them.\n\nThe detention of the petitioners therefore is bound to come to anend automatically with the life ofthe statute and in these circumstances Parliament may well have thought that it would be wholly unnecessary to legislate and provide a maximum period of detention for those detained under \"this law.\"\n\nFor all I know, such drastic and extensive power to continue the detention as long as it may think fit may not be given by Parliament to the executive Government in a permanent statute.\n\n(I) (1952) S.C.R. 612.\n\n(2) (1951] S.C.R. 621; 629. J\n\n620 SUPllEMB COUl.T llEPOJlTS\n\n[ 19741 3 S.C.L\n\nBut if it does think fit to do so, it will not be for the Court to. question the knowledge, wisdom or patriotism of the Legislature and to permit its dislike for the policy of the law to prevail over the plain meaning of the language used by the Legislature.\n\nApart from this consideration, there is a period specified in the sub-section itself, for as soon as the appropriate Government will cease to think fit to continue the detention it will revoke the detention order under Section 13 and the period of detention will automatically come to an end.\"\n\n.. \"If the specification of the period of detention is not at all sacrosanct and the appropriate Government may nevertheless\n\ncontinue the detention as long as it thinks fit to do so, why is C the specification of a. period to be regarded as virtually or at all necessary? So far as the detenu is concerned, his detention will not be any more definite and less irksome if it is open to the appropriate Government to continue the detention by an indefinite number of orders made from time to time until the expiry of the Act itself by affiux of time in the case of a temporary statute or by its repeal in the. case of a permanent Act. It D is said that if we insist on a specification of a definite period when the confirmatory order is made and thereafter each time the period of detention is extended then the appropriate Government will have to apply its mind to the case of the detenu before it will make an order for further continuation of the detention, but that if we say that no. time need be specified, the appropriate Government will lose sight of the case and the detenu E will be detained indefinitely. I do not see why we should impute such dereliction of duty to the appropriate Government; but even if we do so and insist on the spocification of the period of detention we shall perhaps be driving the appropriate Government to fix the longest permissible period of detention ending with the expiry of the Act itself and then to lose sight of the case of the detenu. That, I apprehend, will do no good to the F detenu.\"\n\n\"In any event, the considerations of hardship urged upon us may make .it desirable that a period of detention should be fi<ed but this cannot alter the plain !\\leaning of the language of the section : G\n\nPatanjali Sastri, C. J., concurred. However, Mukherjea J. struck a different note ;\n\n\"The question now is whether the omission to state the period of further detention while confirming the detention order under section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act makes the detention illegal? The point1 is n<>t free from doubt, hut having regard to the fact that the new Preventive Detention Act is a temporary statute which was to be in force only up to the\n\nGOLAM HUSSAIN v. COMMR. POLICE (Krishna Iyer,!.) 621\n\n!st of April, 1952, and has only been recently extended to a further period of six months and no detention under the Act can continue after the date of exviry of the Act, I am inclined to hold that non-svecification of the further period in an order under section 11(1) of the Act does not make the order of detention a nullity. If no period is mentioned, the order might be taken to imply that it would continue up to the date of the expiration of the Act itself when all detentions made under it would automatically come to an end. Of course, the appropriate Government is always at liberty to terminate the order of detention earlier, if it considers proper' in exercise ofits general powers under section 13 of the Act.\" .. ··- .\"It is perfectly true that an order for detention for an indefinite period is repugnant to all notions of democracy and individual liberty, bi; t the indefiniteness in the case of an order made under section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act is in a way cured by the fact that there is a limit set to the duration of the Act itself, which automatically prescribes a limit of time beyond which the order cannot operate. In my opinion, section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act does contemplate that a period should be mentioned during which the further detention of the detenu is to continue and the Government should see that no omission occurs in this respect, but I am unable to hold that this omission alone would make the order a nullity which will justify us in releasing the detenu.\" Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. concurred. -\n\nThe undercurrent of judicial unease at loss d citizen's liberty because the Executive subjectively opined that way is evident in the pages of the report, but the brooding feeling that the preventive detention legislation was a short-Jived statute and-all imprisonment without trial would terminate at a near date was writ large in all the opinions.\n\nAfter all civil liberty ordinarily ends where detention without trial begins and commitment to the rule of law receives a rude shock where a permanent statute authorises long term.gaol confinement. That is why courts have been .strict even on procedural steps. Mathew J . . recently observed in Prablzu Dayal v. District Magistrate, Kamrup(I):\n\n\"The facts of the case might induce mournful reflection how an honest attempt by an authority charged with the duty of taking prophylactic measure to secure the maintenance of supplies and services cs•ential to the community has been frustrated by what is popularly called a technical error. We say and that we think it is necessary to repeat, that the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of a citizen, except in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution and the laws; The history of personal liberty is largely the history of insistence on observance of procedure.\n\n{I) W. P. No. 1496 of 1973; judgment dated October 11, 1973.-(1974! 1 sec 103, 114.\n\nObservance of procedure has been the', bastion against wanton assaults on personal liberty over the years. Under our Constitution the only guarantee of personal liberty for a person is that he shall not be deprived of it except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The need today for maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community cannot be over-emphasized. There will be no social security without maintenance of adequate supplies and services essential to the community. But social security is not the only goal of\n\ngood society. There are other values in a society.\n\nOur country is t4king singular pride in the democratic ideals in pem>110l liberty. It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of , ocial security, we would sanction the subversion of thi5 liberty.\n\nWe do not pause to consider whether social security is more precious than personal liberty in the scale of values. For. any judgment as regards that would be but a value judgment on which opinions might differ. But whatever be its impact on the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, when a certain procedure is prescribed by the Constitution or the laws for depriving a citizen of his personal liberty, we think it our duty to see that that procedure is rigorously observed, however strange this might sound to some ears.\"\n\nTl)e basic feature of the Act as distinguished from -its predecessor is that it is no longer a temporary law and even the duration oftbe detention can be distant and considerable. We have misgivings about these anti-personal freedom facets but regard hopefully the presence and use of the power to revoke the detention on a review at any time.\n\nMoreover there is no reason to think that this extraordinary power will be used indiscriminately or inordinately by a democratic government. A tenable interpretation that a detention order of prolonged and unspecified duration has to be abandoned for the time not merely because of the pressure of precedents but because we are assured by the State's counsel that the fulfilment of the imperative obligation of the State to review from time to time the changing social situation and the individuals' criminal potential tipping the scales in favour of enlargement of the detenu is taking place. No responsible government sho~1ld or would be irresponsive to the claim of citizen's freedom and the argument that deten1ion without defined duration is ipso Jure invalid cannot be sustained.\n\nShri Chatterjee took up the further position that the detention in the case on hand was founded on prevention of public disorder while the acts imputed to the petitioner ex (acie were aimed at a particular person and not .the public.generally. Lohia's(I.) cas~ and other rulings were said to reinforce this stance. The law 1s plrun and the decided cases are coilcordant. A criminal act hitting a private target such as indecent assult of a~ .woman or slapping a neighbour or knocking down a pedestrian wliile driving may not shake up public order. But\n\n(1) ll966J 1 S.C.R. 7G9.\n\n• E\n\nGOLAM HUSSAIN v. COMMR. POLICE (Krishna lyer,1.) 623\n\na drunk with a drawn knife chasing a woman in a public street and all women running in panic, a Hindu or Muslim in a crowded place at a time of communal tension throwing a bomb at a personal enemy of the Other religion and the people all scared .fleeing the area, a striking worker armed with a dagger stabbing a blackleg during a bitter strike spreading terror-these are invasions of public order although the motivation may be againsi a particular private individual. The nature of the act the circum, tances of its commission the impact on people around and such like factors constitute the pathology of public disorder. We cannot isolate the act from its public setting or analyse its molecules a~ in a laboratory but take its total effect on the flow of orderly life. It may be a question of the degree and quality of the activity of the sensitivity of the situation and the psychic response of the involved people. To dissect further is to defeat the purpose of social defence which iS the paramount purpose of preventive detention.\n\nAnother argument, ratner flimsy, was made that a corrigendum reading 'public order' in the place of 'police order' was not communicated to the detenu. It is not so and merits no con, ideration. One or two other points, too trivial to be seriously noticed were also mentioned but we ignore them.\n\nBasically we must realise the unpleasant truth that the new jurisdiction of preventive detention by executive fiat rounded on subjective satisfaction and jejune judicial protection is an erosion of a great right.\n\nWe may repeat what this Court in a different context recently observed in Mohd. Subrati v. State of West Benga/(I) :\n\n\"It must be remembered tha, the personal liberty of an individual has been given an honoured place in the fundamental rights which our Constitution has jealously protected against illegal and arbitrary deprivation and that this Court has been entrusted with a duty and invested with a power t1> enforee that fundamental right.\" The seriousness of the step must be appreciated by Government and continuous check-up on the need to prolong the prison life of the citizen made. The final cure for prejudicial activities threatening the survival of the communiy is not exe.cutive shutup of all suspects in prison for how long one is kept guessing. Such a strategy may alienate and embitter men who should be weaned away and won over. Jn the present case a septuagenarion alleedly sickly is confined in jail for an unspecified period: It may well be that his private enemy on whom he threw a bomb IS not there at all. It may also be that the detenu has altogether changed his outlook as many well-known terrorists have turned marvels of saintliness.\n\nHistory will, we hope, serve the Agministration a~ reminder of unwitting misu~; \\Vhile exercising near-absolute power.\n\nWe dismiss the petition.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\n(!) 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KRISHNA IYER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Internal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ss. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 186, "end_char": 191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 467, "end_char": 471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 509, "end_char": 551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1073, "end_char": 1080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1432, "end_char": 1437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5356, "end_char": 5363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5371, "end_char": 5392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5446, "end_char": 5461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Mukherjee and M. M. Kshatriya, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "M. M. Kshatriya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5466, "end_char": 5481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Mukherjee and M. M. Kshatriya, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "D f. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5504, "end_char": 5522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D f. K. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5527, "end_char": 5543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D f. K. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5611, "end_char": 5623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-A few issues of son1e moment, in the con~ text of civil liberties have been argued in this application for habeas corpus by Shri Mukherjee as amicus curiae.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5757, "end_char": 5766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-A few issues of son1e moment, in the con~ text of civil liberties have been argued in this application for habeas corpus by Shri Mukherjee as amicus curiae.", "canonical_name": "Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "September 28, ,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6156, "end_char": 6171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts are disquieting at least for the reason that the petitioner an aged ailing man around 74, has been under detention since 1973 and, previous to it, had been facing a criminal prosecution which ended in a discharge on the date the detention order was clamped down on him; and counsel pressed the poignant circumstance that the ultimate order of Government dated September 28, ,1973 merely confirms the detention, being unlimited in duration and unspeaking on the terminus ad quem for the incarceration."}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Police, Calcutta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6387, "end_char": 6419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, passed the initial order of detention dated July 19, 1973 on the petitioner, Golam Hussain alias Gama, under s. 3(1) (a) (ii) read with sub-section (2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (Act 26 of 1971) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')."}}, {"text": "July 19, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6465, "end_char": 6478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, passed the initial order of detention dated July 19, 1973 on the petitioner, Golam Hussain alias Gama, under s. 3(1) (a) (ii) read with sub-section (2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (Act 26 of 1971) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')."}}, {"text": "Golam Hussain alias Gama", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6498, "end_char": 6522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, passed the initial order of detention dated July 19, 1973 on the petitioner, Golam Hussain alias Gama, under s. 3(1) (a) (ii) read with sub-section (2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (Act 26 of 1971) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').", "canonical_name": "GOLAM HUSSAIN ALIAS GAMA"}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6530, "end_char": 6537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6580, "end_char": 6622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "8-10-72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6907, "end_char": 6914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They have been set out by the State as annexure to the affidavit filed in opposition to the petition and read thus :\n\n\"J. On 8-10-72 at about 22·25 hrs.,"}}, {"text": "Achche Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6967, "end_char": 6977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "you along with your associates Achche Lal Show of 1, Manickotolla Bazar Lane, Satya Narayan Jaiswal of 123/2, Acharya Prafulla Chandra Road, and others, all being armed with bombs, sodawater bottles created a great disturbance of public order on Gouri Sankar Lane in front of premises No."}}, {"text": "Satya Narayan Jaiswal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7014, "end_char": 7035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "you along with your associates Achche Lal Show of 1, Manickotolla Bazar Lane, Satya Narayan Jaiswal of 123/2, Acharya Prafulla Chandra Road, and others, all being armed with bombs, sodawater bottles created a great disturbance of public order on Gouri Sankar Lane in front of premises No.", "canonical_name": "Satya Narayan Jaiswal"}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7277, "end_char": 7289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "POLICE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 615\n\nindiscriminately with a view to attack one Jiban Paul of 8,\n\nOouri Shankar Lane and his group in retaliation to an earlier quarrel that took place with the said Jiban Paul at 8 Gouri Sankar Lane with your associates Satya Narayan Jais_;, al and others.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Jiban Paul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7343, "end_char": 7353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "POLICE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 615\n\nindiscriminately with a view to attack one Jiban Paul of 8,\n\nOouri Shankar Lane and his group in retaliation to an earlier quarrel that took place with the said Jiban Paul at 8 Gouri Sankar Lane with your associates Satya Narayan Jais_;, al and others."}}, {"text": "Satya Narayan Jais", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7516, "end_char": 7534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "POLICE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 615\n\nindiscriminately with a view to attack one Jiban Paul of 8,\n\nOouri Shankar Lane and his group in retaliation to an earlier quarrel that took place with the said Jiban Paul at 8 Gouri Sankar Lane with your associates Satya Narayan Jais_;, al and others.", "canonical_name": "Satya Narayan Jaiswal"}}, {"text": "9-11-72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7707, "end_char": 7714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 9-11-72 sometimes betweeen 04-45 hrs."}}, {"text": "Ratish Pradhan alias Laltu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7776, "end_char": 7802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "you along with your associates Ratish Pradhan alias Laltu of 23/IA, Abinash Kaviraj St., Benode Kr."}}, {"text": "Benode Kr. Jaiswal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7834, "end_char": 7852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "you along with your associates Ratish Pradhan alias Laltu of 23/IA, Abinash Kaviraj St., Benode Kr."}}, {"text": "Benode Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8409, "end_char": 8421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was in sequel to an incident that took place earlier at about 04-30 hrs when your associates Benode Kumar and others threw beer bottles at the Kalipuja panda!"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8891, "end_char": 8909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' As required by the statute, the fact of detention was communi- ' catcd to the State Government which in turn reported to the Central Government."}}, {"text": "August 13, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8961, "end_char": 8976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case was placed before the Advisory Board on August 13, 1973 and when the representation of the detenu was received it was duly considered and negatived by the State Government which thereafter made it over to the Advisory Board."}}, {"text": "September 21, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9226, "end_char": 9244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After adverting to the facts, the Board advised continuance of the detention on September 21, 1973."}}, {"text": "September 28, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9332, "end_char": 9350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The consequential order confirming the detention was made by the State Government on September 28, 1973 and communicated to the detenu by the middle."}}, {"text": "Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9586, "end_char": 9595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Mukherjee urged that although two criminal cases were started in connection with the two incidents.", "canonical_name": "Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "July 5, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9859, "end_char": 9871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "constituting the grounds for the detention, the petitioner's name was not even mentioned in the first information reports, and he was produced before the Magistrate only on July 5, 1973, and so the order based on those accusations was too irrational to be bona fide."}}, {"text": "July 4 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10167, "end_char": 10178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner of Police who passed the detention order has stated in his affidavit that there wet'c cases connected with the incidents of October 8th and November 9th, but the detenu could not be arrested until July 4 1973."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12133, "end_char": 12143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To quarrel with such a, proposition is to challenge the wisdom of Parliament."}}, {"text": "Lakshman Khatik(l", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13473, "end_char": 13490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such is the ratio of proximity in Lakshman Khatik(l), H No authority, acting rationally, can be satisfied, subjectively or otherwise, of future mischief merely because lng ago the detenu had\n\n(1) Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "26·2-74.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13678, "end_char": 13686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "344 of 1972; Judgment on 26·2-74. ("}}, {"text": "[1964] 4 S.C.R. 921", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13691, "end_char": 13710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15999, "end_char": 16009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next serious contention of Shri Chatterjee is that an order of detention which does not specify a period is violative of s. 12 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16088, "end_char": 16093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12 and 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16332, "end_char": 16349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mamtenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16357, "end_char": 16398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16941, "end_char": 16951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mamtenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "the Mamtenance of Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Defence oflndia Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17030, "end_char": 17055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 1(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17241, "end_char": 17253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence oflndia Act, 1971", "statute": "the Defence oflndia Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17454, "end_char": 17464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence oflndia Act, 1971", "statute": "the Defence oflndia Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18066, "end_char": 18076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18351, "end_char": 18361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18564, "end_char": 18574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18841, "end_char": 18851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19331, "end_char": 19341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19789, "end_char": 19799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20513, "end_char": 20523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20967, "end_char": 20974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan, J., as he then was, held a contrary view."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21090, "end_char": 21093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das, J., as he then was, read the section to imply no obligation to write into the order the duration, even though it may be desirable."}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23201, "end_char": 23211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G\n\nPatanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25014, "end_char": 25033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\leaning of the language of the section : G\n\nPatanjali Sastri, C. J., concurred."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25062, "end_char": 25071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, Mukherjea J. struck a different note ;\n\n\"The question now is whether the omission to state the period of further detention while confirming the detention order under section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act makes the detention illegal?", "canonical_name": "Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "section 11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25228, "end_char": 25241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25382, "end_char": 25406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "st of April, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25526, "end_char": 25543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st of April, 1952, and has only been recently extended to a further period of six months and no detention under the Act can continue after the date of exviry of the Act, I am inclined to hold that non-svecification of the further period in an order under section 11(1) of the Act does not make the order of detention a nullity."}}, {"text": "section 11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25781, "end_char": 25794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26226, "end_char": 26236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "section 11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26458, "end_char": 26471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26696, "end_char": 26709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27056, "end_char": 27076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. concurred. -"}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27705, "end_char": 27711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mathew J . ."}}, {"text": "October 11, 1973.-(1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28529, "end_char": 28552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1496 of 1973; judgment dated October 11, 1973.-(1974!"}}, {"text": "sec 103, 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28556, "end_char": 28568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_624_651_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "6 24\n\nNARAINDAS: INDURKHYA v.\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.\n\nMarch 18, 1974.\n\n{A. N. RAY, C. J., H. R. KHANNA, K. K. MATHEW, A. ALAGIRISWAmI .\n\n. P. N. BIIAGWA1I, .JJ.]\n\nMadhya Pradesh Prathmik -;., fiddle School Tatha Madhyamik Shiksha (Pothya Pustakon Samb(}ndhi Vy' v rstha) Adhiniyam, 1973, S. 4(1) and 4{2}--Whether State\n\nGovernme1_ t coli/J prescribe text books in exercise of executive power-Education Board not expressly empowered to prescribe books-if could prescribe text books on languages-Distinction between recommendation and prescription-Whether consul~ talion with Chairn1an of the Board would amount to consultation with the Board.\n\nConstitution of India -Art. 14 and 19(1)(g)-/f the Act l'iolates Art. 162~ Scope, of.\n\nBy S:ction 8 or t'1: l1dhya Prad.!sh Madhyarrik Shiksha Adhiniyam, 1965 the Board of Secondary Education was empowered to prescribe courses of instruction in such branches of Secondary education as it may think fit. _The Board claimed that the power to prescribe courses of instruction carried with it by necessary impli cation the pov•er to prescribe text books, and did prescribe text books on languages.\n\nThis Act was replaced by the Madhya Pradesh Prathmik Middle School Tatha Madhyamik Shiksha (Pathya Pustakon Sambandhi Vyavastha) Adhiniyam, 1973.\n\nSection 4(1) empo\\vered the State Government to prescribe text books according to syllabi laid down under s. 3. The proviso to sub-section (1) enacted that the text books for secondary education shall not be prescribed without prior consulta tion with the Board. Sub-section (2) of this section stated that the text books pre \"Scribed by the State Gcvernment or the Board and 'in fcrce' immediately before the appointed day shall, till they are changed in accordance with the provisions of this Act, be the text-books prescribed for the purpose of sub-section (1). Subsection\n\n(3) prohibited the use of any lf\"ooks other than the text books prescribed under sub section (1) or referred to in sub-section (2) in any approved school or recognised -school from the appointed day, that is, 23rd March, 1973. Jn exercise of the powers conferred by section 4(1) the State Government issued a notification dated 24th\n\nMay, 73 giving its approval to -certain text.books for the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination in Y>'hich it was stated that the approval of these text bo( ks was given by the State Government in consultation \\Vith the Board of Secondary Education. A notification was issued by the Board on 28th March, 1973 giving directions that the scheme of exarr.ination for the higher secondary school certificate -examination 1976 shall continue as per the same examination in 1975 and that ex~ cept for the language subjects the textbooks recommended or prescribed by the Board for higher_ secondary school certificate examination 1975 in respect of other _____ subjects shall be the recommended or prescribed text-books for the same exami nation for the year 1976.\n\nThe petitioner carried en business in printing, publishing and selling text.books for use in schools in the State. The petitioner was one of the publishers \\Vho register G . (:d himself \\Vith the Board and submitted text-books published by him for the app-.\n\nroval of the Board. From among the books received for approval the Board recom mended certain text-books but none of the textbooks prescribed or recommended by the Board \\Vas text book printed and published by the petitioner.\n\nIn a petiton under article 32 of the Constitution it \\Vas contended (1) that before the 1973 Act the State Government had no statutory authority to prescribe any text books and~ therefore, the text-books published by the Text Book Corporation and prescribed bythe State Government could not be said to be validly prescribed and H they could not be regarded as textbooks •in force' immediately before the appoin ted day under s. 4(2) of the Act, (2) that there was no statutory provision empowering the BJard to Prescribe any text-books on languages . and the notification prescribing the textbooks was ineffective because it v•as issued\n\nNAIWNDAS v. M.P. STATE (Bhagwati J.) 625\n\nby the Board and not by the State Government which alone could prescribe the text-books under s. 4(1); (3) that the text-books recommended by the Board could not be regarded as text-books 'in force' immediately before the appointed day under s. 4(2) and the notification dated 28th March, 1973 issued by the Board did ot hve the effect of prescribing any of these text-books (4) that though the nottfica ion dat:d 24th May, 1973 stated that the approval to the text-books was accorded _by the State Government in consultation with the Board, there was, in fact, no prior conc; ultation as required by the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 4 and the notification was, therefore, void, and (5) that sectiof! 4 mposed unreso!lable r trictions on the petitioner's right to carry on his business tn as _much as it did not p:ovide adequate machinery for selection of text books and left 1t to te ui:irtter ed and unguided discretion of the State Government and so was violative of articlo 14 and 19(1)(11) of the Constitution.\n\nHELD: The text-books printed and published by the Text-books Corporation were validly and lawfully prescribed by the State Government in exercise of its executive power and they were 'in force' immediately before the appointed day. These text-books accordingly fall within the cateory of prescribed text-books under s. 4(2) and s. 4(3) of the Act.\n\nThe actton of the State Government in prescribing the text-books, printed and published by the Text Book Corporation, to the exclusion of other text-books on the subject, did not infringe any right of the petitioner and other publishers and it \"':as witin the executive power of the State.\n\nThe State Government could act -.J.D exercise of executive power in relation to any matter with .respect to which the State legislature had power to make laws even if there was no legislation to support executive action; but such executive action must not infringe rights of any person. The fact that.prior to 1973 there was no statutory provision likes. 4(1)of the 1973 Act which empowered the State Government to prescribe any text-books did not mean that the State Government was not entitled to prescribe these books in exercise of its executive power under article 162 of the Constitution.\n\n(638-D; B-C; 636 G}\n\nRai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of f'unjab, \\ 1955] 2 S.C.R. 225 followed.\n\nBennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India [19721 2 S.C.R .. 788, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Thakur Bharat Singh, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 454 referre<l to.\n\n(2) The Board has undoubtedly the power to prCscribc courses of instruction in languages, but it does not include, as necessarily incidental to it, the power to prescribe text-books on languages. It is not corrett to say that the course of instrion in language cannot be laid down except by reference to text books prescribed for the purpose. The prescription of text books on languaees was outside the power of the Board and hence it was ultra v1\"res and had no binding effect which would oblige the schools to use only those text books and I).o others. It is only the State Government and not the Board which is given power under s. 4(1) to prescribe text books and therefore, the notification dated 28th March, 1973 which was issu~ by the Board and not by the State Government was futile and ineffectual and did not have the effect of prescribing these text books under s. 4(1). The Board is a creature of the statute and unless the statute creating it invests it with power to prescribe text-books so as to make it obligat_ory on the schools to adopt such text books and no other for study and teaching, it can not claim to exercise such power. The Board also, cannot in the absence of power exi>ressly or by necessary implication conferred on it by the statute. make it a condition of recognition of schools that they shall follow only the text books prescribed by it and no other ext books shall be used by them for study and teaching. The Act of 1965 under which the Board was created did not in express terms give power to the Board to prescribe text books, nor did it provide anywhere that the Boatd shall be entitled to make it a condition of recognition that the schools shall use the text books prescribed by it and no others. [639 B; 640 B-D; 638 E'Gl\n\n. (3) The notification dated 28th March, 1973 cannot be read as representing exer c1sc of power under s. 4(1) and the status of prescribed text books could not be nccorded to the four text books on the strength of this notification. [641 BJ\n\nThere is a b.asc distinction between reoommendation and prtseriPtion of tex books • Prescnptton of a text book carries with it a binding obligation to follow the text book. There is no such obligation when a book is merely recommended.\n\nNo conferment of statutory power is needed to enable the Board to recommend text books and no question of ultra vires can arise in such a case. The text books were merely recommended and not prescribed by the Board and being only recommended text books, 'they obviously could not be said to be 'in force' immediately before the appointed day. Section 4(2) did not1 therefore, apply in respect of these text books. [640 EH]\n\n(4) The notification dated 24th May, 1973 must be held to be invalid as being in breach of the mandatory requirement of the proviso to section 4(1) of the Act. It is dear beyonil doubt that there was no prior consultation with the Board before the State Government issued the notification. The proviso to section 4(1) clearly lays down a condition for the exercise of power and unless this condition is satisfied the power cannot be exercised by the State Government. Jt is settled law that where the validity of an order depends on the fulfilment of a condition precedent and there is a recital in the order that the condition.precedent is satisfied, the presuinption arises .in favour of the satisfaction of the condition precedent and the .burden is on the person challenging the satisfaction of the condition precedent to prove that in fact the condition precedent was not satisfied. Jn the instant case the question as to what text books should be recommended to the State Government for Prescription was not placed before the general meeting of the Board, nor was any resolution passed by the general meeting of the Board recommending any text books. The recommendations in regard to the text books were made by the Chairman of the Board, which were not made as an emergency measure nor was any power of the Board vested in the Chainnan by the regulations. There is nothing in the Act or the regulations which says that consultation with the Chairman would be tantamount to consultation with the Board. The consultation which Government had before issuing the notification dated 24th May, 1973 was consultation with the Chainnan and not with the Board. (644 E; 641FJ\n\nSwades!ii Cotton Mi/ls v. The State OJ U. P. [1962] 1. S.C.R. 422. referred to.\n\n(5) No fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioner under article 19{1){g) was infringed, if the State Government, in exercise of the statutory power conferred under s. 40), did not prescribe text-books printed and publisheji by them. It is . not pos.sibJe to say that arbitrary and uncontrolled power has been vested in the State Government and on that account Section 4(1) is bad. The power to select and prescribe text books is not an unguided and unfettered power which leaves it .free to. the State Government to select and prescribe such text books as it may w, antonly or capriciously please, but it is a power which is confined and embanked , within limits by the object and purpose for which it is conferred. The State Government has to exercise this power in the light of the policy or principle that the best possible text books should be made available to the students. [648A; 649 D, B]\n\n. It-is true that the Power conferred on the State Government is a large, discretionary power and no machinery is laid down by the legislature which would ensure jtfst and proper executicn of the power by the State Government, but on that account alone confennent of the power connot be held to be invalid. Whenever a discretionary power is conferred On any authority there is always a potential danaer of its exercise or abuse, hcwever much the legislature may try to hedge it with safeguards. But the mere possibility that the power may be misused or abused G cannot per se induce the court to deny the existence of the power. The State legislatura has coRfidcd this power not to any petty official but to the State Government and that itself is a guarantee that the power would be exercisedin confonnity with the policy or principle laid down in the statute. (649GJ\n\nMatajob Dobea v. H. C. Bhari, [1955]2 S.C.R. 925.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 1177 -of J97:i (Under Article 32 of the. Constitution for enforcement of the fundamental rights).\n\nNARAINDAS v. M. P. STATE (Bhagwati, I.) 627\n\nB. Sen with K. P. Munshi, U. K. Khaitan and S. R. Agarwa/a for the petitioner. '\n\nY. S. Dharmadhi Kari with Ram Punjwani and. l.N. Sharif for the respondent 1-3 (In W. P. 1177)\n\nB V. N. Ganpule and Urmila Sirur for the respondent 4-6 (in W. P. 1177)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was de.livered by\n\n. BHAGWATI, J.-The. petitioner carries on business of printing, pub'.ishing and selling text books for use in Primary, Middle schools and Higher Secondary classes in schools in the St.ate of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nOn 1st. November; 1956, as a result of the reorganisation of Stoics under the States Reorganization Act, 1956, a new State of Madhya\n\nPradesh was formed comprising of territories of the existing States of Madhya Pradesh known as Mahakoshal area, the territories of the existing State of Madhya Bharat, excluding Sunel Tappa, Sironj Sub-\n\nDivision of Kotah District in the existing State of Rajasthan and the territories of the existing States of Bhopal and Vindhya Pradesh. We are concerned in this petition mainly with Mahakoshal and Madhya Bharat regions bf the State of Madhya Pradesh and we shall, therefore, so far as any references to the position obtaining prior to the reorganization of the States is concerned, confine our attention only to those two regions: The school education in the State of Madhya Pradesh, and prior to the reorganization of the States, in the Maha koshal and Madhya Bharat regions, has always been divided structurally in three stages, namely Primay, Middle school and Higher Secondary. Primay education consists of classes I to V, Middle School, . of classes VI to VJII and Higher Secondary of classes IX .to XI. Primary and Middle school education may be considered together, for barring a short period upto the enactment of the Madhya Pradesh Secondary Education Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1959), when Middle school education was clubbed together with\n\nHigher Secondary education and was treated differently from Primary education. Middle school education has always been treated on the same basis as Primary education in contrast to Higher Secondary Education.\n\nIt is not necessary for the purpose of the present petition to trace the history of the regulation of Primary and Middle school education from the inception. It would be sufficient to state that Primary education at all times and Middle school education, so far as Mahakoshal region is concerned; after the enactment of the Act of 1959, and in other regions even before that time, were regulated by the State Government. The Sta1e Government prescribed the courses of instruction and syllabi for all classes of Primary and Middle school education and they were followed not only by Government schools but also by pri vate schools, not because of any statutory authority, but because most of the private schools depended on grant-in-aid from the State Government and unles• the courses of instruction and syllabi prescribed by\n\nthe State'Government were followed by them, they would not b' rc;,>g\n\nnized by the Board of Secondary Educations<> as to be able to present their students for tile examination to be held by the Board a .•ine 'Jlla no.1 for admission to a university-unless their Primary and Middle schools sections were recognized by the State Government. So far a• the text books for use in Primary and Middle school etas.es, were concerned, the State Government prescribed 29 text books printed and published by it on different subjects for me in different clasos. There wa. of-course, no statutory provision under which these 29 text bok' cJuU\n\nbe prescribed by the State Government and the prescription of these 29 text books had, therefore, no statutory authority but private scho•)l',\n\nno less than Gover.nment schools accepted these 29 tet books b'cau>e non-acceptnce would have inwlved , toppage of grant-in-aid from the Sta~ (lovernmcnt. rn the meantime a Society called the Madhya Pradesh Pathya Pustak Rachna Avarn Shaiksbinik Anusandhan Nig•m <ltel'!'inafter refem:d to.as the Text Books Corporation) was formod by. te State Government for the purpose of carrying on the work of printing, publishing and distributing text books for use in the Pdmary and . Middle school classes jn the State of Madhya Pradesh. The\n\nMt°!ster incharge pf the portfolio of education was an ex:offic10 Chairman of the text Books Corporation, while some offi::ers of the veroment connected with the Education Department were •.x-0ffic10 members along with certain other non-0fficial members nvmmated by the State Government. The Text Books Corp>rtion wa~ registered under the Madhya Pradesh societies Act. 1959 and according to the prov!si?!1S of that Act, it was to function on a no profit-no los~ basis. 'I; ite 1rut1al resources of the Text Books Corporation. were provided by the State Government by giving a loan of Rs.15 lacs for the purpo; e of\n\ncnablin~ it to commence its operations. The Text 'Books Corporatio~\n\nwas by 11& very constitution controlled by the State' Government and 11 was intended to function as an agency of the state Government.\n\nThe work of printing and publishing of text books wa•, however, not commenced immediately by the Text Books Corporation and until the end of the academic year 1970-71, the aforesaicl 29 text books printed and published by the State Government continued to be prescribed and used in the Primary and Middle school classes.\n\n. There was, however, a change in the course of instruction and sylabi in some of the subjects from the academic year 1971-72. The State -Government by .a notification dated 18th May, 1971 prescribed impro- ved courses of instruction and syallabi in certain subj<cts to be followod G from the academic year 1971-72 and direcled that so far as courses of instruction and syallabi in the other subjects were concened. they\n\nshould continue to be the same as in the previous academic year 1970-\n\n71. The aforesaid 29 text books printed and published by the State Government; not being in accordance with the new courses of imtruction and syallabi so prescribed, were rendered usele5' and in their place, new text books had to be brought out which would be in confor- H rnity with such new courses of instruction and syallabi. The Text Books Corporation accordingly printed and published 28 text books in accordance with the new courses of instruction and syallabi and theso\n\nNARAINDAS v. M. P. STATE (Bhagwari, J.) 629\n\n28 text books were prescribed by the State Government by a notification dated 21st May, 1971 for use in the Primary and Middle school classes for the academic year 1971-72. The number of text book, prin. ted and published by the Text Books Corporation was reduced from 29 to 28 because one text book, namely, Bal Bharati Praveshika, which was printed and published by the State Government as a separate book, was amalgamated by the Text Books Corporation with Bal Bharati Part I. These 28 text books brought out by the Text Books Corporation were referred to by the State Government as 'nationalised text books' as the Text Books Corporation was merely an agency set up by the State Government for carrying out the work of printing, publishing and ditribution of text books. The State Government made\n\nit clear in the notification dated 21st May, 1971 that so far as the other subjects were concerned for which such 'nationalised' text books were not available, the schools were free to use according to their convenience such books of private publishers as they liked, provid<d they were written in accordance with the courses of instruction and syllabi for the academic year 1970-71. The result was that in the Primary and Middle school classes for the academic year 1971-72, the above mentioned 28 text books, printed and published by the Text Books Corporation. were used exclusively as text books for the subjects dealt with by them, while for the other subjects text books printed and published by private publishers were used according to the convenience of the schools.\n\nThe courses of instruction and syallabi for the next academic year 1972-73 were prescribed by the State Government by a notification dated !0th May, 1972 and by this notification the State Government introduced new courses of instruction and syallabi in certain sutiects and with regard to the rest, directed that the same courses of insirc tion and syallabi as also the same text books shall continue to be in use as in the academic year 1971-72. The same 28 text book,, printed and published by the Text Books Corporation, revhed in accordance with the new courses of instruction and syallabi where necessary continued to be prescribed as text books for the academfo year 1972-73.\n\nThe Text Books Corporation thereafter brought out eight further text book.o making in the aggregate 36 text books printed and published by then and as appears from the circular dated 30th August 1973 issued by the Director of Public Instruction, an order dated 23rd March 1973 was issued by the State Government prescribing these 36 text books for use in the Primary and Middle school classes. This order had not been challenged in the present petition or in the voluminous affidavit; filed on behalf of the parties and it need not therefore engage our attention. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner did make an attempt in the course of the agrument to challenge the validity of this order but when we pointed out to him that there was no challenge against it in the petition. and it was, therefore, not open to him to assail its validity on the petition as it stood he rightly withdrew his attack. This, of-course, does not mean that the petitioner cannot challenge the validity of this orde1 in any other appropriate proceeding which he may take for that purpose, provided he has valid grounds for doing so.\n\nSo far as Higher Secondary education is concerned, it was regulate<' by the M.adhya Pradesh Education Act, 1951 in the Mahakoshal regior\n\nand by the Madhya Bharat Secondary Education Act, Samvat 2007 in the Madhya Bharatregion. It is not necessary to refer to the provisions of these two statutes, for both of them were repealed by the Act of 1959 which was enacted by the Legislature of the new State of Madhya Pradesh after the reorganisation of that State. Section 3 of that Act provided for the incorporation of the Board of Secondary Education and s. 4 laid down its composition. The powers of the Board were set out ins. 8, which provided inter alia that the Board shall have the power to prescribe courses of instruction in such branches of Secondary Education as it may think fit.\n\nSections 18 and 19 constituted a salient and distinguishing feature of this Act. They were based on the recommendations made by the Secondary Education Commission, 1952-53 set up by the Government of India. The Secondary Education Commission suggested in its report that it was necessary that \"all political and other extraneous influence must be eschewed in the selection of taxt books\" for use in Higher Secondary classes and this was possible only if a high power committee was entrusted with this task. What should be the constitution of this high power committee and what functions must be assigned to it also formed the subject matter of recommendations made by the Secondary Education Commission.\n\nThese recommendations formed the basis for the enactment of ss. 18 and '19. Section 18 provided for the constitution of a committee called the Text Books Committee which was to consist of distinguished independent persons who would be free from political and other extraneous influences and they included inter alia a sitting or retired Judge of the High Court or a District Judge, a member of the State Public Service Commission, a Vice-Chancellor of a university in the State and two leading educationists.\n\nThe functions of the Text Books Committee were difined by s.19 to be as follows :\n\n\"(!) to select text books for prescribed courses of instructions and syllabi for Secondary Education;\n\n(2) toprepareapanelofexpertreviewers for each of the '.subjects included in the secondarys chool education curriculum;\n\n(3) to appoint expert committees consisting of not more than three members from amongst the panel of experts to examine and submit a detailed report on the.suitability of the books referred to them;\n\n(4) to invite experts to write text books and other books of study, if necessary,---\"\n\nThough oneofthc functions entrusted to the Text Books Committee was to select text books for prescribed courses of instruction and syllabi, no power was given to the Board to prescribe the text books selected by the Text Books Committee. The Board, however, claimed to have the power to prescribe text books in languages on the ground that the power to prescribe courses of instruction and syllabi in languages carried with it by necessary implication the power to prescribe text books and on that view, the Board, on the basis oft he selections made by the Text Books Committee, prescribed text books in English, Hindi, Marathi and Sanskrit. ·\n\nNARAINDAS v. M. P. STATE (Bha, wczti, J.) 631\n\nThe Madhya Pradesh Mad hyamik Shiksha Adhiniyam 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1965) was enacted by the Madhya Pradesh Legislature on 29th September 1965 and bys. 30, it repealed the Act of 1959. Section 3 of that Act provided for the incorporation of the Board of Secondary Education and its constitution was laid down in s. 4. Section 8 defined the powers of the Board which included inter alia the power:\n\n\"(a) to prescribe couses of instruction in such branches of Secondary Education as it may think fit;\n\n(m) to advise the State Government as to the courses of instruction and svJlabi of Middle School Education with a view to secure co-ordination between Middle School and Secondary Education;\n\nThe last quoted cl.(m} of s. 8 clearly postulated that the State Government has the power to prescribe courses of instruction and syllabi for Middle School classes. Section 24 empowered the Board to constitute various committees which included inter alia Committees of Courses and their constitution, powers and duties were to be provided by regulations made by the Board under s. 28. The Board in exercise of the power conferred under s. 28 made the Board of Secondary Education, Mahdya Pradesh Regulations, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations). Regulation 30 provided that the Board shall appoint Committees of Courses in the subject enumerated in that regulation and each Committee of Courses was enjoined by regulation 32 to \"lay down a syllabus in the subject or subjects with which it is concerned, and recommend suitable text books when called upon to do so\". It was not stated in the Regulations as to who could call upon the appropriate Committee of Courses to recommend suitable text books but obviously what was contemplated was that the Board would require the appropriate Committee of Courses to make recommendations in regard to text books. Now, the Board was not given the power to prescribe text books, and therefore, the recommendation of suitable text books imited from the appropriate Committee of Courses could only be for the purpose of enabling the Board in its turn to recommend such text books for use by schools in the Higher Secondary classes. In fact, the Board did not claim to exercise the power to prescribe text books on any subjects other than languages.\n\nThe Board prescribed text books only on languages and so far as the other subjects were concerned, the Board mercily recon1mendcd text books on some of those subjects.\n\nThe procedure followed by the Board for prescribing or recommending text books under the Act of 1965 and the Regulations wasas follows: The Board invited publishers desiring to get their text books selected to register themseleves with the Board and several publishers accordingly got themselves registered and the petitioner was one of them.\n\nThe detailed instructions and specifications in regard to the text books\n\non matters such as quality of paper, number of pages, price etc. were laid down by the Board and the registered publishers were invited to submit text books prepared in accordance with such instructions and specifications for selection by the Board.\n\nThe registered publishers than got the text books written by authors of their choice in conformity with the prescribed courses of instruction and syllabi and printed in accordance with the instructions and specifications given by the Board and submitted such text books to the Board for selection.\n\nThe text books which were received from the registered publishers were then sent to three reviewers appointed by the Board for the relevant subject for evaluation after removing the title page, the names of the author and the publisher and every other matter that might indicate the identity of the author or the publisher. On receipt of the report of the reviewers such of the text books as were rated high by the reviewers were sent to the appropriate Committee of Courses together with the report of the reviewers for the purpose of making its recommendations.\n\nThe appropriate Committee of Courses after scrutinising the text books and considering the evaluation n1ade bv the reviewers made its recommendation to the Board as regards the merits of the text books submitted for its consideration. The Chairman of the Board then, by virtue of the authority conferred upon him by the Resolution of the Board dated 12th October, l 971, selected the text books after considering the report of the reviewers and the recommendation of the appropriate Committee of Courses and the text books so selected were prescribed or recommended, as the case may be. by the Board. This procedure gave opportunity to all the registered publishers to submit their text books for selection by the Board and provided a machinery for selection of the best text books to be recommended or prescribed by the Board.\n\nThe record before us does not show precisely what were the language on which text books were prescribed by the Board, but it does i.p; iear from the affidavits and the notification dated 28th March, 1973 issued by the Board, that text books were prescribed by the Board for most of the languages taught in the primary and middle schools, barring 6:neral English and Tamil for classes IX and X.\n\nSo far as the text books recommended by the Board were concerned, there were four notifications issued by the Board from time to time recommending text books on different subjects for classes IX and X for the period commencing from the academic year 1972-73 for the Higher Secondary School Leaving Certificate Examination, 1975. The first was a notification dated 5th April, 1972 by which the Board recommended six textbooks on Civics, the second was a notification dated 25th April, 1972 by which the Board recommended five text books on Economics, the third was a notification dated 26th April, 1972 by which the Board recommended eight text books on Physics and the fourth wa> a notification dated 17th May. 1972 by which the Bo'td recommended eight text books on Chemistry. There were thus four subjects on which text books were recommended by the Board. It was not seriously disputed on behalf of the petitioner that the procedure set out above\n\nNARAINDAS I'. M.P. STATE (Bhagwati, /.) 633\n\nfor selection of text books was substantially followed by the Board in prescribing text books on languages and recommending text books on these four subjects. None of the text books prescribed or recommended by the Board was a text book printed and published by the petitioner. The petitioner had submitted text books oil Civics, Physics and Chemistry for selection by the Board but they were rejected by the reviewers as they were found to be below standard and were printed on poor quality paper and were also costlier than the text books submitted by other registered publishers.\n\nThis was the position which obtained when the Madhya Pradesh Prathamik, Middle School Tatha Madhyamik Shiksha (Pathya Pustakon Sambandhi Vyavastha) Adhiftiyam, 1973 (hereinafter refeffed to as the Act of 1973) was enacted by the Madhya Pradesh Legislature.\n\nThis Act came into force on 23rd March, 1973 being the date appointed under sub-s. (3) of s. !. The provisions of this Act are material and we may refer .to them. Section 2, cl. (e) defines 'text book' in the wideEt possible terms and according to this definition, it means any book approved by the State Government in accordance with the syllabi prescribed under the Act for use for any examination conducted 11nder the authority of the State Government or by the Board or held in an approved school or a school recognized by the Board and includes other books of study or instructional material such as maps, designs and other material of like nature approved by the State Government for any standard of primary education, middle school education or secondary education in accordance with the syllabi laid down under the Act. Section 3, sub-s. (1) provides that the State Government may from time to time in relation to primary education and middle school education and the Board may from lime to time in relation to Secondary education, lay down syllabi and publish the same in such manner as may be prescribed and sub-s. (2) of s. 3 says that the syllabi laid down under the authority of the State Government in the case of primary education and middle school education and by the Board in the case of secondary education and in force immediately before the appointed\n\nday, i.e., 23rd March, 1973 shall be the syllabi laid down and published for the purpose of sub-s. (!) of\" 3.\n\nThen comes section 4 which deals with the prescription of text books according to syllabi l; lid down under s. 3.\n\nSince that is the section which is impugned in the present petiVion, we may reproduce it :\n\n\"4(1) The State Government i:icy, by order, prescribe the text books according to syllabi laid down under section 3; Provided that text books for secondary education shall not be prescribed without prior consultation with the Board.\n\n(2) The text books prescribed .by the State. Government or the Board according to the syllabi referred to in sub-section\n\n(2) of section 3 and in force iryimediately before the appo.inted H day s'1all, till they are changed in accordance with the provLS1ons_ of this Act, be the text books prescribed for the purpose o! fiub-section (l). 12-M45 Sup. Ct175\n\n(3) As from the appointed day, no books other than the text books prescribed under sub-section (I) or referred to in subsection (2) shall be used in any approved school or recognized school for imparting instructions in accordance with syllabi in primary education, middle school education or secondary education.\"\n\nThe State Goverll\\nent is also given power under s. 5 to undertake the preparation, printing or distribution of text books itself or to cause the text books to be prepared, printed or distributed through such agency as it thinks fit on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed. Section 6 provides that the text books prescribed by the State Government for any standard of secondary education shall be text books prescribed for such standard of secondary education in accordance with the syllabi and the Board shall be bound to accept the same when so prescribed by the State Government. Then follows section 7 which deals with delegation of power and the last is section 8 which confers power on the State Government to make rules for carrying out all or any of the purposes of the Act. It was common gTOund between the parties that no rules have so far been made by the State Government under this section.\n\nSoon after the coming into force of the Act of 1973, the Board issued a notification dated 28th March, 1973° which contained inter a/ia the following directions :\n\nI. The syllabus and sCheme of examination for the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination 1976 shall continue as per the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination, 1975.\n\n2. Leaving aside General English and Tamil for classes IX and X,\n\n so far as the rest of the subjects are concerned, the text books recommended or prescribed by the Board for the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination 1975 shall be the recommended or prescribed text books for the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination, 1976.\n\nThe State Government thereafter in exercise of the power conferred under s. 4, sub-s. {I) of the Act of 1973 issued a notification dated 24th May, 1973 according its approval to certain text books on Botany, Zoology, History, Element of Comner~ and English for the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examinat10n, 1976. It was recited in the notification that the approval to these text bookS was given by the State Government in consultation with the Board.\n\nThe petitioner thereupon filed the present petition claiming various reliefs under Art. 32 of the Con<titution. Several contentions were raised in the petitition which has the great demerit of being a highly prolix and confused document, not easily yielding to analysis, but it is not necessary to delve into the petition to find out all the contentions taken there, since at the hearing the learned counsel for the peti tioner confined his arguments only to the following contentions :\n\nNARAINDAS v. M.P. STATE (Bhagwati, J.) 635\n\nA A. Prior to the enactment of the Act of 1973 the State Government had no statutory authority to prescribe any text books for the primary and middle school classes and the notifications dated 21st May, 1971 and 10th May, 1972 issued by the State Government prescribing 28 text books printed and published by the Text books Corporation for use in some of the primary and middle school classe' were, therefore, without the authority B of law and these 28 text tooks could not be said to be validly prescribed by the State Government nor could they be said to be 'in force' immediately before the appointed day, and if that be so, they could not be regarded as text books prescribed under sub-s. (2) of s. 4.\n\nB. Though text books on languages were prescribed by the Board, there was no statutory provision empowering the Board to do so and the prescription of these text books by the Board was, therefore, without the authority of law and .these text books could not be said to be validly prescribed by the Board or to be 'in force' immediately before the appointed day so as to qualify for being regarded as text books prescribed under s. 4, sub-s. (2). The Notification dated 28th March, 1973 undoubtedly provided that these text books shall be prescribed text books for the period commencing from the academic year 1973-74, but that Notification was ineffective to prescribe any text books under s. 4, sub-s. (1) because it was issued by the Board and not by the State Government which alone could prescribe text books under s. 4, sub-s. (1)- ·\n\nC. The Board by issuing the notifications dated 5th April, 1972, 25th April, 1972, 26th April, 1972 and 17th May, 1972 merely. recommended certain text books on Civics, Economics, Physics and Chemistry. These text books were not prescribed by the Board and they were not 'in force' immediately before the appointed day. They could not, therefore, be regarded as text books prescribed under s. 4, sub-s. (2). Though the notification dated 28th March, 1973 was issued after the appointed day. it did not have the effect of prescribing any of these text books unders.4, sub-s. (1), firstly, because it was issued b he Board and not by the State Government, and secondly, because it did not more than merely direct that these text books shall be recommended text books for the period commencing from the academic year 1973-74.\n\nD. Though the notification dated 24th May, 1973 recited that the approval to the text books mentioned in the notification was accorded by the State Government in consultation with the Board, there was in fact no prior consultation with the Board as required by the proviso to s. 4, su b-s.(1) and the notification prescribing these text books, was therefore, null and void.\n\nE. Section 4 imposed unreasonable restrictions on the right of the petitioner to carry on his business of printing publishing and\n\ndistributing text books for use in Primary, Middle School and Higher Secondary Classes, inasmuch as it did not provide a proper and adequate machinery for selection of the best available text books and left it to the unguided and unfettered discretion of the State Government to prescribe at its own. sweet .will such text books at it liked without providing any standard or guidance which would regulate the exercise of such discretion . and it was, therefore, void as being violative of Art. 19(l)(g) of the Constitution. This section was also violative of the equality clause contained in Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it enabled the State Government to discriminate between one publisher and another by leaving it to the unrestaincd will of the State Government to prescribe such text books as it liked without laying down any machinery which would ensure selection of the best available text books by giving equal opportunity to all publishers.\n\nThese were the only contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner which need to be considered and we shall now proceed to examine them.\n\nRe :A.\n\nThis contention relates to 28 text books printed and published by the Text Books Corporation. The State Government prescribed these 28 text books for use in the primary and middle school classes at the time wlten the Act of1973 had not been enacted and the question is whether the State Government was entitled to do so. There was, of course, then no statutory provision, like s. 4, sub-s. (1) of the Act of 1973, which empowered the State Government to prescribe any text books and the prescription of these 28 text books had, therefore, no legal force. But that does not mean that the State Government was not entitled to prescribe these 28 text books in exercise of its executive power under Art. 162 of the Constitution. The executive power of the State Government under Art. 162 extends to all matters with respect to which the State Legislature )las power to make laws and since education is a subject which falls within entry 11 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the State Government could apparently in exercise of its executive power prescribe these 23 text books, provided that in doing so it did not trench on the rights of any person. It is now well settled by the decision of this Court in Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab(!) that the State Government can act in eercise of executive power in relation to any matter with respect to which the State Legislature has power to make laws, even if there is no legislation to support such executive action but such executive action must not infringe the rights of any person'.\n\nIf the executive action taken by the State Government encroaches on any private rights, it would hve to be upported by legislative authority. for under the rule of law which prevails m out\" country every executive action which operates to the Prejudice of any person must have the authority of law to support it. Vide paragraph 27 of the judgment of this Court in Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of /ndia.(Z) The executiYe action of the State Government in entering upon the business\n\n(1) (1955] 2 S.C.R. 225.\n\n(2) [1972] 2 S.C.C. 788.\n\nc f\n\nG •\n\nIll\n\n'li\n\n,-,\n\n\" w llj\n\n' \"'\n\n.. f '\n\nNARAINDAS v. M.P. STATE (Bhagwati, J.) 637\n\nof printing, publishing and selling text books in Rai Sahib RamJawaya's , case (1), though not supported by legislation, was upheld because it did. not operate to the. prejudice of any person. This Court took care to point out that if it were \"necessary to encroach upon private rights in order to enable the Government to carry on their business, a specific legi.slation sanctioning such eourse would have to be passed\".\n\nThe same view was reiterated by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nv. Thakur Bharat Singh(2) where referring to the decision in Rai Sahib Ramlawaya's case(!) this Court pointed out that in that case it specifically held that \"by the action of the Government no rights of the petitioners were infringed, since. a mere chance or prospect of having particular customers cannot be said to be a right to property or to any interest or undertaking, It is dear that the State of Punjab had done no act which infringed a right of any citizen : the State had merely entered upon a trading venture. By entering \\nto competitiqn with the citizens, it did not infringe their rights\". It would, therefore, seem that the State Government could prescribe these 28 text books in exercise of its executive power provided that such action did not infringe the rights of anyone.\n\nNow, so far as Government schools are concerned, the State Government could always, as the authority owning and conducting those schools; prescribe the text books to be used by the students in those schools. The prescription of such text books by the State Government would not infringe the rights of any publisher, because, as pointed out by this Court in Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya's case,(') there is no right in a publisher that \"any of the books. 11.rinted and published by him should be prescribed as text books by the school authorities or if they are once accepted as text books they cannot be stopped or discontinued in future\". With regard to the private schools also the position is the same. All private schools have to seek recognition by the State Government for two reasons. Firstly, by reason of Regulation 61, cl. (b), it is a condition of recognition of a school by the Board that its primary and middle sections should be recognized by the State Government and secondly, it is only recognized schools which are eligible for grantin-aid from the State Government. Both these are highly compelling reasons. There are hardly any schools which have Iio Higher Secondary sction and that means they must have recognition by the Board, but th ts they cannot have unless they are recognized by the State Government in respect of their primary and middle sections. Besides, having regard to the high costs of maintenance in running a school; it is not possible for any school to function without grant-in-aid from the State Government and in order to qualify for grant-in-aid, the school must be recognized by the State Government. Now, one of the main condi tions on which recognition is granted by the State Government is that .the school authorities must use as text books only those which are prescribed or authorised by the State Government. Thus, even though there is no Jaw which confers power on the S:a:o G0iernment to prescribe text books, the State Government can by virtue of the need of the private schools for recognition. prescribe text books for them\n\n\nand oblie them to use such text book<.\n\nSo far, therefore, as the private schools are concerned. the choice of text books rest< entirely with the State Government. No publisher has any right to insist that any of his books shall be accepted as text books by the State Government. He has merely a chance or prospect of any or some of his books being approved as te<tbooks by the Stale Government. \"Such chances are\". to use the words of Mukherjee, C.J., in Rai Sahib Ram Jawayas case.(!) \"incidental to all trade and busineso\" and there can be no infringement of any right, if by an action of the State Government such chances are taken away. The action of the State Government in prescribing 28 text books pl\"in•ed and published by ihe Text Books Corporation. to the exclusion of other text books on the subject did not therefore infringe any right of the petitioner and other publishers and it was within the execl!tive power of the State Governmnt.\n\nThis view is completely supported hy the deci, inn in Rai Sal1ib Ram Jawaya's case. (l) [t must, therefore follow that 28 text hooks printed and published by the Text'Books Corporation were validly and lawfully prescribed by the State Government in exercise of its executive power and they were 'in force immediately before the appointed day, These text books\n\naccordinly fa!\\ within the category of prescribed text books under\n\nsub-s. (2) of s. 4. and under s. 4. subs. (3\\the approved and recognized schools were under an obligation to use these text books and no others so far as they related to the subjects for which they were prescribed. ·\n\nRJ:B. ft is elementary that the Board is a creature of the statute and unless the statute creating it invests it with power to prescribe text books so as to m1bit obliptory on th' schools to adopt such text books and no others for study and teaching, it cannot claim to exercise such power.\n\nThe Board also cannot, in the absence of power expressly or by necessary implication conferred on it by the Statute, make it a condition ofrecognition of the schools that they shall follow only the text books prescribed by it and no other text books shall be used by them for study and teaching. The Act of 1965 under which the Board is created does not in express terms give PD\"ler to the Board to prescribe text books, nor does it provide anywhere that the Board shall be en titled to make it a condition of recognition that the schools shall use the text books prescribed by it and no others, Even the Regulations made by the Board under s. 28 of the Act of 1965 do r.ot make it a requirement of recognition that only the text books prescribed by the Board shall be used by the schools. Vide Regulation 61. The only question is whether there is anything in the Act of 1965 which by necessary implication confers pow.er oP the Board to prescribe text books. It was not seriously disputed by the learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondents that the Board has no power to prescribe text books generally but his contention was that, so far as languages are concerned, the po\\ver to prescribe courses of instruction, which is admittedly vested in the Board, carries with it by necessary i1nplicatio11 the power to presciib~ text books, because\n\nfl) [1955]\n\n2 S.C.R. 225.\n\nB ,\n\nNARAINDAS v. M.P. STATE (Bhagwatl, /.) 639\n\ncourses of instruction in languages cannot be prescribed otherwise than by reference to particular text books selected for the purpose.\n\nIt was urged by the lea.med Advocate General that it is only through particular selected text' books that courses of instruction in languages can be prescribed, and therefore, the Board has, as necessarily incidental to its power of prescribing courses of instruction, the power to prescribe text books on language, s. This contention is not well founded and cannot be sustained. The Board has undoubtedly the power to prescribe courses of instruction in languages, but it does not include, as necessarily incidental to it, the power to prescribe text books on languages. It is not correct to say that the course of instruction in language cannot be laid down except by reference to text books prescribed for the purpose. The course of instruction in language would cover topics such as grammar, composition. prose and poetry. So far as grammar and composition are concerned, there can be no doubt that course of instruction can be laid down without prescribing any text books and in fact we find from the prospectus issued by the Board from time to time that no text books were prescribed by the Board and yet the course of instruction could be laid down with sufficient clarity and precision by reference to various topics such as nouns, vei-bs, adverbs, adjectives, tenses, complex senten~\n\nces and so on and so forth. The course of instruction in prose and poetry can be easily prescribed by.reference to prose passages, short stories, articles, essays and poems of different authors and for this purpose it is not necessary to prescribe any particular text books containing such prose passages, short stories, articles, essays and poems. In fact, once these prose passages, short stories, articles, essays and poems are prescribed as part of the course of instruction, different publishers would come out with different text books compiling these materials and presenting them in intelligible, instructive and.useful form. These different text books may vary one from the Other, in presentation, sty1e, annotations, comments, elucidations, explanatory notes, quality of printing, price etc. Some may be more intelligible and useful than the others. The chief merit of a text book on prose and poetry would really lie not in mechanical reproductio.n of the prose passage~, short stories, articles, essays and poe~ prescnbed by yhe Board, which can be done by any publisher, but IJl\n\nte annotations, comments, elucidations and explanatory notes given by the/author with a view to inculcating in the students greater\n\nnderstanding and keener appreciation of the literary and other qualities of such prose passages, short stories, articles, essays and poems. Any one of these text books may be prescribed by the Board\n\nnd that would be whlly different from prescribing the course of mstrucl!on. We may illustrate our point by an example. Take a case whre a play of Shakespeare is to be prescribed. There are seve_ral editions of Shakespearian plays. There is the Cambridge ed1t1on; there is the Arden edition; there is the Warwick .edition and there are a host of other editions. The play of Shakespeare can be prescribed by referring .to its title, as for example, Hamlet or King Lear. It is not necessary, m order to prescribe such play as a part of the course of instruction, that a particular edition of such play should\n\nalso be __ prescribed as a text book. The two are entirely distinct A propos1t1ons. The power to prescribe conrses of instruction in languages does not require for its effectual exercise prescription of text\n\nbooks and the power to prescribe text books cannot be read by necessary. implication in the power to prescribe courses of instruction.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear, and this conclusion can hardly be disputed, that the prescription of text books on languages was outside the B .& power of the Board and hence it was ultra vires and had no binding \\ effect which would oblige the schools to use only these text books and no others. These text books could not in the circumstances be • said to be prescribed by the Board, nor could they be said to be in . force, immediately before the appointed day so as to attract the\n\nap; ilicability ofs. 4, sub-s. (2), andthey could not claim the status of prescribed text books under s. 4, sub-s. (2): These text books C could not also be regarded as text books prescribed under s. 4, .sub-s. (I) on the basis of the notification oated 28th March, 1973. It is only the State Government and not the Board, which is given power under s. 4. sub-s. (I) to prescribe text books, and therefore, the notification dated 28th March, 1973, which was issued by the Board and not by the State Government, was futile and ineffectual and did not have the effect of prescribing these text books under s. 4, sub-s.\n\nD (I). These text books could not, . therefore, be regarded as text books prescribed under sub-s. (!) or referred to in sub-s. (2) of s. 4 and in the circumstances there was no obligation on the approved and recognised schools to u; e only these text books and no others under sub-s. (3) of s. 4.\n\nRt: C.\n\nThis contention is self-evident and does not need any elaborate argument. It may be noted that there is a basic distinction between recommendation and prescription of a text book. When a text book is prescribed by an appropriate authority having legal power to do so, it has to be followed by the schools. Prescription of a text book carries with it a binding oblig1tion to follow the text book. There is no such obligation when a text book is_ merely recommended.\n\nRecommendation has mere-ly a persuasive effeCt, it being open to the schools to accept the recommendation or to reject it as they think fit. The schools riiay use the recommended text book or they may not according as the principals choose. That is why no conferment of statutory power is needed to enable the Board to recomµiend .;., xt books and no question of ultra vires can arise in such a case. Now the text books which formed the subject matter of the noti- . fications dated 5th April, 1972, 25th April, 1972, 26th April, 1972 and 17th May, 1972 were merely recommended and not prescribed by the Board and being only recommended text. books as distinguished\n\nfrom prescribed text books, they obviously could not be said to .be 'in force' immediately before the appointed day. Section, 4, sub-s.\n\n(2) did not, therefore, apply in respect of these text. books and they could not be regarded as text books prescribed under s.- 4, sub-s. . (2). The respDndents placed strong reliance on the notification dated 28th March, 1973 but it is difficult to .see how this notification can be of any help to the respondents. This notification was admittedly\n\nNARA!NDAS v: M.P. STATE (Bhagwati, J.) 641\n\nissued by the Board and not. by the State Government and moreover it did not even purport to prescribe these text books but merely direc ted that these text books shall be recommended text books for the period commencing from the academic year 1973-74. It is, therefore, not possible to read this notification as representing exercise of power under s. 4, sub-s. (I) and the status of prescribed text books could not be accorded to these text books on the strength of this notification.\n\nThese text books could not accordingly be regarded as prescribed text books either under sub-s. (I) or under subs. (2) of s. 4, and sec tion 4, sub-s. (3) could not be invoked for contending that these text books alone should be usea .in the approved and recognised schools to the exclusion of text books of other publishers.\n\nRe: D.\n\nThe validity of the notification dated 24th May, 1973 was challenged under this head of contention on the grQund that the State Government by this noyfication prescribed certain text books for the Higher Secondary clases without prior consultation with the Board and the notification was, therefore, invalid as being in con travention of the proviso to s. 4, sub-s. (I). Now, it is clear on a plain reading of s. 4, sub-s. (I) that though power is conferred en the Siate Government to prescribe text books for Higher Secondary classes, this power cannot by reason of the proviso, be exercised by the State Government without prior consultation with the Board.\n\nThe proviso cltarly lays down a condition for the exercise of the power and unless this condition is satisfied the power cannot be exercised by the State Government. Any attempted exercise of the power without complying with this condition would be null and void. The question which, therefore, requires to be considered is whether the Siate Government issued the notification dated 24th May, 1973 after prior con sultation with thO Board. Now there is a recital in the notification that the approval to the text books mentioned ; n the notification was given by the State Government in consultation with the Board.\n\nThis recital throws the burden of proving that there was no prior consultation with the Board on the petitioer. It is settled law that where the validity of an order depends on the fulfilment of a con dition precedent and there is a recital in the order that the conditioP precedent is satisfied, the presumption arises in favour of the satis faction of the condition precedent-the burden is on the person challengi11S the satisfaction of the condition precedent to prove that in fact the condition precedent was not satisfied. See Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. The State of U. P. (I) The petitioner would, therefore, have to show by producing proper and adequate material that though the notification recited that the State Government had consulted the Board prior to the issue of the notification, there was in fact no such prior consultation with the Board. If the petitioner can establish this, the notification would have to be held to be invalid as being in contravention of the proviso to s. 4, sub-s. (I).\n\nNow it is clear from paragraph 134 of the affidavit filed by Chatur vedi, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Madhya Pradesh,\n\n(I) [ 1962] I S.C.R. 422.\n\nEducation Department in replv to the petition that text books on Botany, Zoology, English. Elements of Commerce. History and Geography were invited by the Board from the registered publishers and various registered publishers submitted their text books on one or more of these subjects for selection and approval by the Board.\n\nThe petitioner also availed of this opportunity and submitted text books on History •.nd Geography. The text books received from the various registered publishers were then sent to the reviewers for evaluation, there being a different set of expert reviewers for each subject, and on receipt of the report of the revie\\.vers, these text books. at any rate most of them chosen in the order of merit given by the reviewers. were placed before the appropriate Committee of Courses along with the report of the reviewers. The appropriate Committee of Courses after scrutinising the text books placed before it and considering the evaluation made by the reviewers. submitted its recommendations to the Board and the Chairman of the Board, agreeing with the recommendations made by the appropriate Committee of Courses, forwarded them to the State Government as recommendations of the Board, It appears that no recommendations in regard to text books on Geography were forwarded by the Chairman of the Board to the State Government as all the text books on Geography submitted for selection and approval were found to be below the requisite standard. The State Government then issuea the notification dated 24th May, 1973 ptescribing text books on Botany, Zoology, English, Elen1ents of Commerce and History in accordance with the recom~ mendations forwarded by the Chairman of the Board. It will be seen from these facts that the question as to what text b.ooks should be recon1mended to the State Government for prescription was not placed before the general meeting of the Board, nor was any resolution passed by general meeting of the Board recommending any particular text books. The recommendations in regard to the text books were made by the Chairman of the Board. This was indeed not disputed by the learned Ad vacate General but his contention was that the Chairman was entitled to act on behalf of the Board in making recommendations and the reco111n1endations made by him in regard to text books were in the eye of the Jaw recommendati.onS: of the Board. Now, there can be no doubt that if the recommendations made bv the Chairman could be regarded as recommendations of the Board, the requirement of the proviso to s. 4, sub-s. (!) would be satisfied. But we do not think it is possible to take this view. (What the proviso to s. 4. sub-s. (I) re qui res is that there should be prior consultation \\Vith the Board. and therefore, it is the Board which mU.st give its opinion and advice to the State Government in regard to th' prescription of text books. Now the Board may act by resolution p1ssea at general 1n!eting but as pointed out above, there was no resolution passed at general 1neeting of the Board recon1111ending any text books.\n\nIt was the Chairn1an who recommeµed the text books and the question. therefore. is whether the Chairman could exercise the power of the Board to make recommendations to the State Government so that the recommendations made by the Chairman could in law be said to be recommendations of the Board.\n\nThe powers and duties of the Chairman are to be found ins. 15 of the\n\nNARAINDAS v. M.P. STATE (Bhagwati, ]. ) 643\n\nAct of 1965. Sub-s. (I) of s. 15 does not help, for it merely says that it shall be the duty of the Chairman to see that the Act and the Regulations are faithfully observed and he shall have all powers necessary for that puroose.· Sub-s. (2) of s. 15 has also no relevance in this connection. Then there is sub-s. (3) of s. 15 which provides that in any emergency arising out of the business of the Board, which. in the opinion of the Chairman requires that immediate action should be taken, the Chairman shall take such action as he deems necessary and shall thereafter report his action to the Board at its next meeting.\n\nThis sub-section is clearly inapplicable as it is not the case of the respondents that there was any emergency arising out of the business of the Board which necessitated the taking of immediate action .bY the Chairman. The recommendation of the text books was not made by the Chairman as an emergency measure-at any rate, that was not the plea taken by the respondents. Sub-s. (4) of s. 15 is a <ort of residuary provision which confers power on the Chairman to \"exercise such other powers as may be vested in him by Regulations\". But there is nothing in the Regulations which vests in the Chairman the power of the Board to recommend or give advice in relation to text books to be prescribed by the State Government. In fact, no power of the Board is vested in the Chairman by the Regulations. Thus, we do not find anything in the Act or in the Regulations which provides that the power of the Board to recommend' or give advice in relation to text books to the State Government -which power is necessarily by implication conferred on the Board under s. 4, sub-s. (I) proviso-shall be exercisable by the Chairman so that consultations with the Chairman would be t•ntamount to consultation with the Board. Realising this difficulty, the learned' Advocate General relied on a decision of the Board dated 12th October, 1971, Ex. 9 to the affidavit in reply filed by Chaturvedi on bohalf of the resoondents, and contended that by this decision the Board authorised the Chairman to take all necessary steps for the purpose of proceeding further with the work of the text books improvem, nt schem' which consisted of selection and approval of text\n\noooks for the purpose of prescription or recommendation by the Board, and the Chairman was, therefore. entitled to act on behalf of the Board in recommending or giving advice in relation to text books to the State Government. Now we do not dispute the general proposition that when a power or function is given by the statute to a corporate body and no provision is made in the statute as to how such power or function shall be exercised, the corporate body can by a resolution pissed at a general meeting devise its own mode of exercising such p)Wer or function, such as authorising one or more of the members to exercise it on behalf of the Board.\n\nBut here this broad proposition would have no application. There are several provisions in the Act of 1965 which provide for delegation of the powers and functions of the Board to the Chairman and other Committees by means of Regulations. If, therefore, any power or function of the Board is intended to be made exercisable by the Chairman, that can only be done through the mechanism of the Regulations. The Board cannot, by a resolution pissed at a general meeting, authorise the Chairman to exercise a particular power or function entrusted to the\n\nBoard. The decision of the Board dated 12th October, 1971 cannot, 1herefore, help the respondents even if it were construed as authorising the Chairman to exercise the power of the Board to recommend <Jr give advice in relation to text books to be prescribed by the State Government. But in fact we do not think it can be so construed.\n\nThis decision merely authorises the Chairman to take all necessary steps for the purpose of proceeding further with the implementation of the text bOoks improvement scheme and it does not confer any authority on him to exercise a power of the Board which he otherwise did not possess. In any event the authority conferred by this decision cannot include the exercise of a statutory function v; hich \"'1, me to ho vested in the Board for the first time on 23rd March. 1973 when s. 4, sub-s. (I) was enacted. We aro, therefore, compelled to reach the conclusion that the only consultation which 1he State Government had before isst>ing the notification dated 24th May, 1973 was consultation with the Chairman and not with the Board. The recommendation of text books by the appropriate Committee of Courses also could not be regarded as consultation with the Board, because the power or function to give opinion or advice in relation to text books to be prescribed by the State Go, en1ment came to be conferred on the Board for the first time on the -enactment of s. \"4. sub-s. (I) and there is no Regulation which de le-\n\n.gates this power or function to the appropriate Committee ot\" Courses.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear beyond doubt that there was no prior consultation with the Boara before the State Government issued the noti- fication dated 24th May, 1973 an<! this notification must accordingly •be held to be invalid as being in breach of the mandatory requirement eofthe proviso to s. 4, sub-s. (I).\n\nRe :E.\n\nThe argument of the petitioner under this head of challenge was thats. 4, sub-s. (I) vested power in the State Government to prescribe text books for use in schools at primary, 1niddle and secondary educ:ition levels and by reason of s. 4, sub-s. (3) it became obligatory on the F schools to use only the text books so prescribed and no others for jmparting instruction to the students. The effect of the combined reading of subss. (I) and (3) of s. 4 was that once the text books were prescribed by the State Govern111ent under s. 4, sub-s. { l ). -the schools were precluded from using any other text books for the purpose of i1nparting instruction to the students. This directly interferred with the business of the petitioner for, if the text books printed G and published by the petitiocr \\Vere not selected and approved by the State Govern1nent, the petitioner would not have any 1narket for lhe sale of his text books and that would prejudicially affect his business.\n\nThe petitioner did not seriously contend that it \\Vas not open to the legislature to provide by legislation for standardisation of the courses of instruction and syllabi and prescription of text books but his gri.evance was that the machinery provided by the legislature for th:s\n\n H purpose was unconstitutional. The petitioner pointed out that h~ .could have no grievance if the Legislatufe Provided an independent body of expe-rts like the Text Book Co111111ittee con.stituted under tlc\n\nNARAIND~ v. M. P. STATE (Bhagwati, 1.) 645-\n\nAct of 1959, for prescribing text books. The provision for such in dependent body would ensure fair and equal treatment to all printer~ and Publishers of text books and eliminate arbitrariness in the matter of selection of text books for prescription. But here the State Government was constituted the authority for selection and prescription of text books and unfettered and uncanalised power was vested in the State Government without any guidelines to control and regulate the exercise of such power and without there being anything which would ensure proper execution of the power or operate as a check on the injustice that might result from improper execution of the same. The\n\nState Government could in exercise of its absolute and uncontrolled. discretion select and prescribe any text books it liked without consulting any experts on the subject and this might not only result in wrong. and improper evalutation of the merits of the text books submitted for the consideration of the State Government but also lead to arbitra-. riness and personal as well as political nepotism. The conferment of such unguided and uncontrolled power on the State Government in. the matter of selection and prescripion of text books contravene, d the fundamental right to carry on business guaranteed under Art. 19(1)\n\n(g) and was also violative of equality clause contained in Art. 14 and subss. (1) and (3) of s. 4 were, therefore, liable to be struck down as invalid.\n\nWe do not think this contention of the petitioner is well founded. It must fail for reasons which we immediately proceed to give.\n\nOne thing is clear that in order to achieve a uniform standard of' excellence in education in all the schools within the State, it is necessarv that there should be uniform courses of instruction which are properly thought out and devised by experts on the subject and for giving proper and adequate training in such courses, there should be standardised text books. That would not only ensure uniformity in standard but also achieve efficiency in instruction. Moreover, it would: prevent us of poor quality text books which frequently find way in the schools on account of certain dubious financial arrangements between the management and the printers and publishers of those text books. It is, therefore, in the interest of proper and healthy education of children that scientifically planned courses of instruction should be laid down and text books of high merit and excellence should be prescribed. That can never be regarded as unreasonable. Now when the Legislature decides to adopt this course, the Legislature must necessarily entrust the text of laying down courses of instruction and prescribing text books to some authority fitted and equipped for this purpose.\n\nWe are concerned here only with prescription of text books and we will, therefore, confine our attention to that subject. The Legislature, when it enacted the Act of 1959, left the task of selecting and prescribing text books to be performed by the Text Books Committee but under s. 4, sub-s. (1) of the Act of 1973 the Legislature has provided that this task shall be performed by the State Government. Now it can hardly be disputed that for the purpose of selection and prescription of text books, the machinery of Text Books Committee would be more efficient and objective, and inspiring of greater confidence as to its fairness and iinpartiality of than that of the State Government,.\n\n:but on that account alone the entrustment of the power of selection A .and prescription of text books tq the State Government cannot be regarded as bad. The Legislatur~ may choose one of several methods available to it for achieving its legislative and the Court cannot interfere simply because it thinks that another method is better and should have been adopted by the Legislature. for ultimately it is for the Legislature in exercise of its legislative judgment to determine which of many possible methods it should in the circumstances B adopt. It is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide to which authority it would entrust the power to select and prescribe text books and so long as the authority chosen by the Legislature is not inappropriate or inadept for the task, no complaint of unconstitutionality in the law can be made on the ground that some other authority which appears to be better could have been chosen by the Legislature. The question which has, therefore, to be considered in adjudging the consti- C tutionality of s. 4, sub-ss. (1) and (3) is not whether a better machinery\n\ncould have been chosen by the Legislature for selecting and prescri-. bing text books but whether the machinery which is in fact provided by the Legislature is violative of any of the fundamental rights of the petitioner.\n\nSo far as the claim of the petitioner based on infraction of the D fundamental right under Art. 19(1) (g) is concerned, that stands completely negatived by the decision in Rai Saheb Ram Jawaya's case.(') We have already referred to this decision earlier but in order to appre- ciate how it applies in the context of, the present claim, it is necessary to notice the facts of that case in some detail. The procedure which -was framed by the State of Punjab prior to May 1950 for selection and approval of text books for use in schools was that the State Govern- E ment used to invite publishers and authors to submit their books for -examinatio.n and approval by the Education Department and the\n\nState Government, after scrutiny, selected out of them a certain numiber of text books, any one of them could be used by the schools. This procedure was slightly altered in May 1950 and under the altered pro- cedure, the State Government took upon itself the monopoly of publishing text books in some of the subjects and with regard to the rest, F the State Government selected and approved text books--not several as before but only one on each subject-out of those submitted by the publishers and authors and reserved for itself a certain royalty on the sale proceeds of. such approved text books. In 1952, however, .changes of a far more drastic character were introduced by a notification dated 9th August, 1952 issued by the State Government. By this notification the State Government took over the publishing, prin- G ting and selling of text books exclusively in its own hands and the private publishers were altogether ousted from this business. The petitioners who were a firm carrying on the business of preparing, printing, publishing and selling text books there--upon moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution praying for writs of mandamous directing the State Government to withdraw the notifications of 1950 and 1,952 on the ground that they contravened the fundamenta H rightofthepetitionersunder Art. 19(1) (g). This Court, however, took the view that no fundamental rightof the petitioners to carry on their\n\n{I) [1955] 2 S. C. R. 225\n\nNARAIND;.s v, M, P. STATE (Bhagwati, J.) 647\n\nbusiness of preparing, printing, publishing and selling text books was infringed by the. notifications issued by the State Government in furtherance of their policy of nationalisation of text books for students and the petitioners were, therefore, not entitled to any relief under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Mukherjea, C. J., speaking on behalf of a unanimous Court, pointed out:\n\n\"The procedure hitherto followed was that the Government used to invite publishers and authors to submit their boo\\ls for examination and approval by the Education Department and after selection was made by the Government, the size, contents as well as the prices of the books were fixed and it was left to the publishers or authors to print and publish them and offer them for sale to the pupils. So long as this system was in vogue the only right which publishers, like the petitioners had, was to offer their books for inspection and approval by the Government.\n\nThey had no right to insist on any of their books being accepted as text books. So the utmost that could be said is that there was merely a chance or prospect of any. or some of their books being approved as text books by the Government. Such chances are incidental to all trades and businesses and there is no fundamental right guaranteeing them. A trader might be lucky in securing a particular market for his goods but if he loses that field because the particular coustomers for some reason or other do not choose to buy goods from him, it is not open to him to say that it was his fundamental right to have his old customers for ever. On the one hand, therefore, there was nothing but a chance or prospect which the publishers had of having their books approved by the Government, on the other hand the Government had the undisputed right to adopt any method of selection they liked and if they ultimately decided that after approving the text books they would purchase the copyright in them from the authors and others provided the latter were willing to transfer the same to the .Government on certain terms, we fail to see what right of the publishers to carry on their trade or business is affected by it.\n\nNobody is taking away the publishers' right t.d print and publish any books they like and to offer them for sa)C but if they have no right that their books should be approved' as text hooks by the Government it is immaterial so far as the{ are concerned whether the Government approves of text booefsubmitted by other persons who are willing to sell their copyrights in the books to them, or choose to engage authors for the purpose of preparing the text books which they take up on themselves to 'Print and pubilsh--The action of the Government--does not amount to an infraction of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution.\"\n\nThese observations are equally applicable where the State Government instead of prescribing text books in exercise of its executive power does so in exercise of statutory power such as that conferred\n\nunder s.4, sub-s.(l ). No fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioners . under Art. 19(l)(g) is infringed if the State Government in exercise of the statutory power conferred under s. 4, sub-s. (1) does not prescribe text books printed and published by him. The challenges based on Art. 19(1) (g) must, therefore, fail.\n\nThat takes us to the challenge based on Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThis Article ensures equality before law and strikes at arbitrary and discriminatory State action. Where State Government exercises any power, statutory or otherwise, it must not discriminate unfairly between one person and another. Every State action must be guided by certain norms and standards which are in themselves not objectionable as being discriminatory in character. If power conferred by statute on any authority of the State is vagrant and unconfined and no standards or principles are laid down by the statute to guide and con. trol the exercise of such power, the statute would be violative of tho equality clause, because it would permit arbitrary and capricious exercise of power, which is the anti-thesis of equality before law.\n\nSuch a case would fall within the second proposition laid down by this Court in Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi.\n\n\"The enactment of the rule might not in terms enact a discriminatory rule oflaw but might enable an unequal or discriminatory treatment to be accorded to persons or things similarly situated. This would happen when the legislature vests a discretion in an authority, be it the Government or an administrative official acting either as an executive officer or even in a quasijudicial capacity by a legislation which does not lay down any policy or disclose any tangible or intelligible purpose thus clothing the authority with unguided and arbitrary powers enabling it to discriminate.'\n\nIt can, therefore, hardly be disputed that ifs. 4, sub-s. (!). were\n\nfound to confer a naked and arbitrary power on the State Government to select and prescribe such text books as it pleases in exercise of its absolute and uncontrolled discretion without any guiding principle or policy to control and regulate the exercise of such discretion, it would be in violation of the constitutional mandate of equality before law. The State Government would then be able to choose the text book of any publisher it likes and prescribe it as a text book even though it is inferior in quality than the text book of another publisher.\n\nThat would enable the State Government to exercise its power arbirtarily and capriciously and discriminate at its sweet will between one publisher and another. But we do not thinks. 4, sub-s. (1) suffers from this lethal infirmity. It does not vest an arbitrary uncontrolle<1 discretion in the State Government to select and prescribe such test books as it likes irrespective of their merit and quality. The object or purpose for which the power to select and prescribe text books is conferred on the State Govrnment is to ensure uniformity of standard\n\nNARAINDAS v. M.P. STATE (Bhagwati, I.) 649'\n\nand excellence in instruction which can be achieved only if standardised text books of high quality and merit are used in the schools.\n\nThis object or purpose furnishes guidance to the State Government in exercising its power of selecting and prescribing text books. The power to select and prescribe text books is thus not an ungttided and unfettered power which leaves it free to the State Government to select and prescribe such text books as it may want only or capriciously please, but it is a power which is confined and embanked within limits by the object and purpose for which it is conferred. The State Government cannot, therefore, act arbitrarily or capriciously in selecting or prescribing text books but it has to exercise this power in the light of the policy or principle that the best possible text books, possessing the highest degree of merit and quality, should be made available to the students. This standard or criterion, gatherable from the object and purpose of the Statute, controls and regulates the exercise of the power by the State Government and it is by reference to this yard-stick that the exercise of the power by the State Government is canalised and kept within bounds. If the State Government in selecting and prescrbing text books does not follow this si.ndard or criterion, the prescription of text books made by the State Government, and nots. 4, sub'.s. (l) would be liable to be condemned as invalid. It is not possible to say that arbitrary and uncontrolled power has been vested in the State Government and on that accounts. 4, subs. (I) is bad.\n\nIt was however, contended on behalf o' the petitioner that even if there is any guidance provided by the Legislature, it is futile because the power conferred on the State Government is a very wide disc:etionary power and it can easily lend itself to misuse or abuse in the hands of the executive without any one being able to pinpoint or demonstratably show such misuse or abuse of power. The apprehension which was void was that since there is no machinery provided by the Legislature which would ensure just and proper execution of the power by the State Government according to the guidelines laid down by the Legislature, the State Government may with im; mnity act arbitrarily or capriciously and the selection and prescription of text books by it may not only be vitiated by wrong evaluation of the merit and quality of text books but may also concoivably be actuated by personal or political corruption or nepotism on the part of thoJe.exercising the power on behalf of the State Government. Now, it is true, and there, can be no doubt about it, that the power conferred on the State Government is a large disccetionary power and no machinery is laid down by the Logislature which wuld enrnre just and proper execution of the power by the State Government but on that account alone the conferment of the power cannot be held to be invalid.\n\nWhenever a dilcretionary power is conferred on any authority, there is always a potential dange\" of its misuse or abuse, however much the Legislature may try to hedge it. with safeguards.. But the mere. possibility that the power may be misused or abused cannot pa se mducc the Court to deny the existence of the power. It crnnot be overlooked that the Legislature has confided thi.s po'Yer not to any petty official but to the State Government and that 1tself15 a guarantee that the power\n\ntJ-M45SupCl/75\n\nwould be exe'c\"eu in conformity with the policy or principle laid down in the Statute. As said by this Court in Matajob Dobey v. H. C. Bhari(') \"A discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power and abuse of power is .not easily to be assumed where the discretion is ves!ed in the Government and not in a minor official.\" We have no dcrnbt that if the law is administered by the State Government \"with an evil eye and an unequal hand\" or there is misuse or abuse of power by the\n\nState Government, the arms of this Court would be long enough to reach it and to strike down such misuse or abuse with a heavy hand.\n\nWe may point out that State Government has not yet made rules under s. 8 of the Act of 1973 prescribing the machinery which it would adopt in selecting and prescribing text books. It is quite po5'ible that when such machinery is prescribed by the State Government it will allay any apprehension of possible misuse or abuse of power by the State Government. If, on the other hand, it is found that such machinery operates so as to deny equality of treatment to private publishers similarly circumstanced, it may become vulnerable to attack under Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nWe are not unmindful of the fact-and that is a matter which has caused us great anxiety-that the power to select and prescribe text books for obligatory used by students in schools can be a potent and powerful weapon in the hands of the executive to inculcate its social, economic or political philosophy and ideology in young impressionable minds which have not yet developed the capacity to think independently for themselves and which are easily amenable to the thoughts, ideas and influences to which they are continually exposed. The State Government, controlled by a political party having a particular social, economic and political philosophy or ideology, may use the power of selecting and prescribing text books for indoctrinating the highly receptive and sensitive minds of young boys and girls and stiffing the growth and development of free thought which is SO essential for maintenance of democratic way of life. It is our firm belief, nay, a conviction which constitutes one of the basic values of a free society to which we are wedded under our Constitution, that there must be freedom not only for the thought that we cherish, but also for the thought that we hate. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Holmes iµ Abramson v. United States(') \"the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-the best test of truth is the power -0f the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market\".\n\nThere must be freedom of thought and the mind must be ready to\n\nrccive new ideas, to criticall; analyse and examine them and to accept those which are found to stand the test of scrutiny and to reject the rest.\n\nThat is why our Vedic prayer says : \"Let noble thoughts come tous from all sides\". 'Fhe text books which are selected and. prescribed or\n\nu•e in schools must not, therefore, be such as project only a particular social, economic or political philosophy or ideology. The mind of !he young students must not be. 'cribbed, cabined and confined' by thoughts and ideas which form the social, economic or political philo sophy or ideology of the political party which is for the time being\n\n(I) [J955] 2 S.C.R. 925\n\n(2) 250 U.S. 616\n\nNARAINDAS v. M.P. STATE (Bhagwati, !.) 651\n\ncontrolling the State Government. It is, therefore, necessary that in the selection and prescription of text books all political and other extraneous influences should be eliminated. The only objective must be to give to the students the best possible text books possessing the highest degree of merit and quality from a purely objective and academic point of view so as to lead to a healthy development of the personality of the students and make them truly nationalist, patriotic, service-minded and useful members of the society. That is the reason why the Secondary Education Commission recommended the constitution of a high power c<>mmittee which would be in charge of the func-· tion of selecting and prescribing text books. It is true that under the Act of 1973 there is no provision for constituting such a high power committee and instead, the power to select and prescribe text books is vested in the State Government. But there is nothing to prevent the State Government from setting up an independent high power committee on the lines indicated by the Secondary Education Commission for the purpose of assisting it in the task' of selecting and prescribing text books. This can be done by the State Government by making appropriate rules under s. 8 of the Act of 1973 and there is no reason to suppose that the State Government will not do so. ·\n\nBe that as it may, it is clear from the aforesaid discussion that the wer to select and prescribe text books conferrod on the State Government under s. 4, sub-s. (I) is not an unguided and unfettered power ands. 4, sub-s. (I) is not liable to be struck down as invalid on' the ground of contravention of Art. 14, and if that be so, s. 4 subs. (3) also does not incur the condemnation of that article.\n\nWe, therefore, allow the petition and make the rule absolute to a limited extent. We declare that the text books on languages prescribed by the Board as also the text books which formed the subject matter of the notifications dated 5th April, 1972, 25th April, 1972, 26th April, .1972 and 17th May, 1972 issued by the Board-both' of which categories of text books were purported to be continued by the notification dated 28th March, 1973-are not prescribed text books within the meaning of sub-s. (l) or sub-s. (2) of s. 4. We also issue a writ quashing and setting aside the notification dated 24th May, 1973 issued by the State Government. So far as the other reliefs claimed by the petitioner are concerned, the petition is rejected and the rule will stand discharged. There will be no order '1S to costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nPetition allowed.", "total_entities": 191, "entities": [{"text": "24\n\nNARAINDAS: INDURKHYA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NARAINDAS INDURKHYA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. K. MATHEW", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. ALAGIRISWAmI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 146, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. ALAGIRISWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 4(1) and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 301, "end_char": 314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 657, "end_char": 678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14 and 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 680, "end_char": 700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 722, "end_char": 730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Prathmik Middle School Tatha Madhyamik Shiksha (Pathya Pustakon Sambandhi Vyavastha) Adhiniyam, 1973", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1181, "end_char": 1296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act was replaced by the Madhya Pradesh Prathmik Middle School Tatha Madhyamik Shiksha (Pathya Pustakon Sambandhi Vyavastha) Adhiniyam, 1973."}}, {"text": "Section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1299, "end_char": 1311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1405, "end_char": 1409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "23rd March, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2085, "end_char": 2101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsection\n\n(3) prohibited the use of any lf\"ooks other than the text books prescribed under sub section (1) or referred to in sub-section (2) in any approved school or recognised -school from the appointed day, that is, 23rd March, 1973."}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2142, "end_char": 2154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24th\n\nMay, 73", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2204, "end_char": 2217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn exercise of the powers conferred by section 4(1) the State Government issued a notification dated 24th\n\nMay, 73 giving its approval to -certain text.books for the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination in Y>'hich it was stated that the approval of these text bo( ks was given by the State Government in consultation \\Vith the Board of Secondary Education."}}, {"text": "28th March, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2513, "end_char": 2529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A notification was issued by the Board on 28th March, 1973 giving directions that the scheme of exarr.ination for the higher secondary school certificate -examination 1976 shall continue as per the same examination in 1975 and that ex~ cept for the language subjects the textbooks recommended or prescribed by the Board for higher secondary school certificate examination 1975 in respect of other  subjects shall be the recommended or prescribed text-books for the same exami nation for the year 1976."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3485, "end_char": 3495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Text Book Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3687, "end_char": 3708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a petiton under article 32 of the Constitution it \\Vas contended (1) that before the 1973 Act the State Government had no statutory authority to prescribe any text books and~ therefore, the text-books published by the Text Book Corporation and prescribed bythe State Government could not be said to be validly prescribed and H they could not be regarded as textbooks •in force' immediately before the appoin ted day under s. 4(2) of the Act, (2) that there was no statutory provision empowering the BJard to Prescribe any text-books on languages ."}}, {"text": "s. 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3891, "end_char": 3898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4240, "end_char": 4247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4388, "end_char": 4395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24th May, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4560, "end_char": 4574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and the notification prescribing the textbooks was ineffective because it v•as issued\n\nNAIWNDAS v. M.P. STATE (Bhagwati J.) 625\n\nby the Board and not by the State Government which alone could prescribe the text-books under s. 4(1); (3) that the text-books recommended by the Board could not be regarded as text-books 'in force' immediately before the appointed day under s. 4(2) and the notification dated 28th March, 1973 issued by the Board did ot hve the effect of prescribing any of these text-books (4) that though the nottfica ion dat:d 24th May, 1973 stated that the approval to the text-books was accorded by the State Government in consultation with the Board, there was, in fact, no prior conc; ultation as required by the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 4 and the notification was, therefore, void, and (5) that sectiof!"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4781, "end_char": 4790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5488, "end_char": 5495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5500, "end_char": 5507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6374, "end_char": 6385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "1955] 2 S.C.R. 225", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6479, "end_char": 6497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 S.C.R. 454", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6620, "end_char": 6639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7287, "end_char": 7294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7528, "end_char": 7535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8523, "end_char": 8530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9243, "end_char": 9255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9459, "end_char": 9471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9629, "end_char": 9641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chainnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10950, "end_char": 10958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The consultation which Government had before issuing the notification dated 24th May, 1973 was consultation with the Chainnan and not with the Board. ("}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11139, "end_char": 11149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11247, "end_char": 11252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11443, "end_char": 11455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12966, "end_char": 12976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13088, "end_char": 13094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NARAINDAS v. M. P. STATE (Bhagwati, I.) 627\n\nB. Sen with K. P. Munshi, U. K. Khaitan and S. R. Agarwa/a for the petitioner. '"}}, {"text": "K. P. Munshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13100, "end_char": 13112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NARAINDAS v. M. P. STATE (Bhagwati, I.) 627\n\nB. Sen with K. P. Munshi, U. K. Khaitan and S. R. Agarwa/a for the petitioner. '"}}, {"text": "U. K. Khaitan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13114, "end_char": 13127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NARAINDAS v. M. P. STATE (Bhagwati, I.) 627\n\nB. Sen with K. P. Munshi, U. K. Khaitan and S. R. Agarwa/a for the petitioner. '"}}, {"text": "S. R. Agarwa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13132, "end_char": 13144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NARAINDAS v. M. P. STATE (Bhagwati, I.) 627\n\nB. Sen with K. P. Munshi, U. K. Khaitan and S. R. Agarwa/a for the petitioner. '"}}, {"text": "Y. S. Dharmadhi Kari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13170, "end_char": 13190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Dharmadhi Kari with Ram Punjwani and."}}, {"text": "Ram Punjwani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13196, "end_char": 13208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Dharmadhi Kari with Ram Punjwani and."}}, {"text": "l.N. Sharif", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13214, "end_char": 13225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l.N. Sharif for the respondent 1-3 (In W. P. 1177)\n\nB V. N. Ganpule and Urmila Sirur for the respondent 4-6 (in W. P. 1177)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was de.livered by\n\n."}}, {"text": "B V. N. Ganpule", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13266, "end_char": 13281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l.N. Sharif for the respondent 1-3 (In W. P. 1177)\n\nB V. N. Ganpule and Urmila Sirur for the respondent 4-6 (in W. P. 1177)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was de.livered by\n\n."}}, {"text": "Urmila Sirur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13286, "end_char": 13298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l.N. Sharif for the respondent 1-3 (In W. P. 1177)\n\nB V. N. Ganpule and Urmila Sirur for the respondent 4-6 (in W. P. 1177)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was de.livered by\n\n."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13386, "end_char": 13394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHAGWATI, J.-The."}}, {"text": "1st. November; 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13595, "end_char": 13614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st."}}, {"text": "Stoics under the States Reorganization Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13653, "end_char": 13701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madhya\n\nPradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13718, "end_char": 13733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "November; 1956, as a result of the reorganisation of Stoics under the States Reorganization Act, 1956, a new State of Madhya\n\nPradesh was formed comprising of territories of the existing States of Madhya Pradesh known as Mahakoshal area, the territories of the existing State of Madhya Bharat, excluding Sunel Tappa, Sironj Sub-\n\nDivision of Kotah District in the existing State of Rajasthan and the territories of the existing States of Bhopal and Vindhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Sironj", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13917, "end_char": 13923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "November; 1956, as a result of the reorganisation of Stoics under the States Reorganization Act, 1956, a new State of Madhya\n\nPradesh was formed comprising of territories of the existing States of Madhya Pradesh known as Mahakoshal area, the territories of the existing State of Madhya Bharat, excluding Sunel Tappa, Sironj Sub-\n\nDivision of Kotah District in the existing State of Rajasthan and the territories of the existing States of Bhopal and Vindhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Kotah District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13942, "end_char": 13956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "November; 1956, as a result of the reorganisation of Stoics under the States Reorganization Act, 1956, a new State of Madhya\n\nPradesh was formed comprising of territories of the existing States of Madhya Pradesh known as Mahakoshal area, the territories of the existing State of Madhya Bharat, excluding Sunel Tappa, Sironj Sub-\n\nDivision of Kotah District in the existing State of Rajasthan and the territories of the existing States of Bhopal and Vindhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Bhopal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14038, "end_char": 14044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "November; 1956, as a result of the reorganisation of Stoics under the States Reorganization Act, 1956, a new State of Madhya\n\nPradesh was formed comprising of territories of the existing States of Madhya Pradesh known as Mahakoshal area, the territories of the existing State of Madhya Bharat, excluding Sunel Tappa, Sironj Sub-\n\nDivision of Kotah District in the existing State of Rajasthan and the territories of the existing States of Bhopal and Vindhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14049, "end_char": 14064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "November; 1956, as a result of the reorganisation of Stoics under the States Reorganization Act, 1956, a new State of Madhya\n\nPradesh was formed comprising of territories of the existing States of Madhya Pradesh known as Mahakoshal area, the territories of the existing State of Madhya Bharat, excluding Sunel Tappa, Sironj Sub-\n\nDivision of Kotah District in the existing State of Rajasthan and the territories of the existing States of Bhopal and Vindhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Mahakoshal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14112, "end_char": 14122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are concerned in this petition mainly with Mahakoshal and Madhya Bharat regions bf the State of Madhya Pradesh and we shall, therefore, so far as any references to the position obtaining prior to the reorganization of the States is concerned, confine our attention only to those two regions: The school education in the State of Madhya Pradesh, and prior to the reorganization of the States, in the Maha koshal and Madhya Bharat regions, has always been divided structurally in three stages, namely Primay, Middle school and Higher Secondary."}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14127, "end_char": 14140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are concerned in this petition mainly with Mahakoshal and Madhya Bharat regions bf the State of Madhya Pradesh and we shall, therefore, so far as any references to the position obtaining prior to the reorganization of the States is concerned, confine our attention only to those two regions: The school education in the State of Madhya Pradesh, and prior to the reorganization of the States, in the Maha koshal and Madhya Bharat regions, has always been divided structurally in three stages, namely Primay, Middle school and Higher Secondary."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14165, "end_char": 14179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are concerned in this petition mainly with Mahakoshal and Madhya Bharat regions bf the State of Madhya Pradesh and we shall, therefore, so far as any references to the position obtaining prior to the reorganization of the States is concerned, confine our attention only to those two regions: The school education in the State of Madhya Pradesh, and prior to the reorganization of the States, in the Maha koshal and Madhya Bharat regions, has always been divided structurally in three stages, namely Primay, Middle school and Higher Secondary."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Secondary Education Act, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14856, "end_char": 14900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Pathya Pustak Rachna Avarn Shaiksbinik Anusandhan Nig•m", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17007, "end_char": 17077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rn the meantime a Society called the Madhya Pradesh Pathya Pustak Rachna Avarn Shaiksbinik Anusandhan Nig•m <ltel'!'inafter refem:d to.as the Text Books Corporation) was formod by."}}, {"text": "Text Books Corp", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17642, "end_char": 17657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Text Books Corp>rtion wa~ registered under the Madhya Pradesh societies Act."}}, {"text": "Text Books Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17852, "end_char": 17874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I; ite 1rut1al resources of the Text Books Corporation."}}, {"text": "Text 'Books Corporatio~", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18010, "end_char": 18033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Text 'Books Corporatio~\n\nwas by 11& very constitution controlled by the State' Government and 11 was intended to function as an agency of the state Government."}}, {"text": "21st May, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19588, "end_char": 19602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Text Books Corporation accordingly printed and published 28 text books in accordance with the new courses of instruction and syallabi and theso\n\nNARAINDAS v. M. P. STATE (Bhagwari, J.) 629\n\n28 text books were prescribed by the State Government by a notification dated 21st May, 1971 for use in the Primary and Middle school classes for the academic year 1971-72."}}, {"text": "30th August 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21956, "end_char": 21972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Text Books Corporation thereafter brought out eight further text book.o making in the aggregate 36 text books printed and published by then and as appears from the circular dated 30th August 1973 issued by the Director of Public Instruction, an order dated 23rd March 1973 was issued by the State Government prescribing these 36 text books for use in the Primary and Middle school classes."}}, {"text": "23rd March 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22034, "end_char": 22049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Text Books Corporation thereafter brought out eight further text book.o making in the aggregate 36 text books printed and published by then and as appears from the circular dated 30th August 1973 issued by the Director of Public Instruction, an order dated 23rd March 1973 was issued by the State Government prescribing these 36 text books for use in the Primary and Middle school classes."}}, {"text": "Pradesh Education Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22990, "end_char": 23017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharatregion", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23113, "end_char": 23132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as Higher Secondary education is concerned, it was regulate<' by the M.adhya Pradesh Education Act, 1951 in the Mahakoshal regior\n\nand by the Madhya Bharat Secondary Education Act, Samvat 2007 in the Madhya Bharatregion."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23366, "end_char": 23375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pradesh Education Act, 1951", "statute": "Pradesh Education Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23459, "end_char": 23463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pradesh Education Act, 1951", "statute": "Pradesh Education Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Sections 18 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23696, "end_char": 23714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pradesh Education Act, 1951", "statute": "Pradesh Education Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Secondary Education Commission, 1952-53", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23828, "end_char": 23867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were based on the recommendations made by the Secondary Education Commission, 1952-53 set up by the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23882, "end_char": 23901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were based on the recommendations made by the Secondary Education Commission, 1952-53 set up by the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Secondary Education Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23907, "end_char": 23937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Secondary Education Commission suggested in its report that it was necessary that \"all political and other extraneous influence must be eschewed in the selection of taxt books\" for use in Higher Secondary classes and this was possible only if a high power committee was entrusted with this task."}}, {"text": "ss. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24461, "end_char": 24467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24477, "end_char": 24487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Text Books Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24544, "end_char": 24564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 18 provided for the constitution of a committee called the Text Books Committee which was to consist of distinguished independent persons who would be free from political and other extraneous influences and they included inter alia a sitting or retired Judge of the High Court or a District Judge, a member of the State Public Service Commission, a Vice-Chancellor of a university in the State and two leading educationists."}}, {"text": "State Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24799, "end_char": 24830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 18 provided for the constitution of a committee called the Text Books Committee which was to consist of distinguished independent persons who would be free from political and other extraneous influences and they included inter alia a sitting or retired Judge of the High Court or a District Judge, a member of the State Public Service Commission, a Vice-Chancellor of a university in the State and two leading educationists."}}, {"text": "s.19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24969, "end_char": 24973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Mad hyamik Shiksha Adhiniyam 1965", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26201, "end_char": 26249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NARAINDAS v. M. P. STATE (Bha, wczti, J.) 631\n\nThe Madhya Pradesh Mad hyamik Shiksha Adhiniyam 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1965) was enacted by the Madhya Pradesh Legislature on 29th September 1965 and bys."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26406, "end_char": 26415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26533, "end_char": 26537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26539, "end_char": 26548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26938, "end_char": 26942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27077, "end_char": 27087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27290, "end_char": 27295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27348, "end_char": 27353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahdya Pradesh Regulations, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27393, "end_char": 27425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "12th October, l 971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30565, "end_char": 30584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chairman of the Board then, by virtue of the authority conferred upon him by the Resolution of the Board dated 12th October, l 971, selected the text books after considering the report of the reviewers and the recommendation of the appropriate Committee of Courses and the text books so selected were prescribed or recommended, as the case may be."}}, {"text": "5th April, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31803, "end_char": 31818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first was a notification dated 5th April, 1972 by which the Board recommended six textbooks on Civics, the second was a notification dated 25th April, 1972 by which the Board recommended five text books on Economics, the third was a notification dated 26th April, 1972 by which the Board recommended eight text books on Physics and the fourth wa> a notification dated 17th May. 1972 by which the Bo'td recommended eight text books on Chemistry."}}, {"text": "25th April, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31911, "end_char": 31927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first was a notification dated 5th April, 1972 by which the Board recommended six textbooks on Civics, the second was a notification dated 25th April, 1972 by which the Board recommended five text books on Economics, the third was a notification dated 26th April, 1972 by which the Board recommended eight text books on Physics and the fourth wa> a notification dated 17th May. 1972 by which the Bo'td recommended eight text books on Chemistry."}}, {"text": "26th April, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32024, "end_char": 32040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first was a notification dated 5th April, 1972 by which the Board recommended six textbooks on Civics, the second was a notification dated 25th April, 1972 by which the Board recommended five text books on Economics, the third was a notification dated 26th April, 1972 by which the Board recommended eight text books on Physics and the fourth wa> a notification dated 17th May. 1972 by which the Bo'td recommended eight text books on Chemistry."}}, {"text": "17th May. 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32140, "end_char": 32154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first was a notification dated 5th April, 1972 by which the Board recommended six textbooks on Civics, the second was a notification dated 25th April, 1972 by which the Board recommended five text books on Economics, the third was a notification dated 26th April, 1972 by which the Board recommended eight text books on Physics and the fourth wa> a notification dated 17th May. 1972 by which the Bo'td recommended eight text books on Chemistry."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33440, "end_char": 33449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34105, "end_char": 34114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34409, "end_char": 34413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34772, "end_char": 34781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34869, "end_char": 34873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35074, "end_char": 35083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35331, "end_char": 35340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35924, "end_char": 35928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36159, "end_char": 36168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36481, "end_char": 36490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36544, "end_char": 36553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37558, "end_char": 37562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38028, "end_char": 38035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39178, "end_char": 39182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39613, "end_char": 39617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39875, "end_char": 39879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40004, "end_char": 40008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "17th May, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40129, "end_char": 40143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Notification dated 28th March, 1973 undoubtedly provided that these text books shall be prescribed text books for the period commencing from the academic year 1973-74, but that Notification was ineffective to prescribe any text books under s. 4, sub-s. (1) because it was issued by the Board and not by the State Government which alone could prescribe text books under s. 4, sub-s. (1)- ·\n\nC. The Board by issuing the notifications dated 5th April, 1972, 25th April, 1972, 26th April, 1972 and 17th May, 1972 merely."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40415, "end_char": 40419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41125, "end_char": 41129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41227, "end_char": 41236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41844, "end_char": 41857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41947, "end_char": 41954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42838, "end_char": 42842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43156, "end_char": 43164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43236, "end_char": 43244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43415, "end_char": 43431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1955] 2 S.C.R. 225", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 44518, "end_char": 44537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rai Sahib RamJawaya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44708, "end_char": 44727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c f\n\nG •\n\nIll\n\n'li\n\n,-,\n\n\" w llj\n\n' \"'\n\n.. f '\n\nNARAINDAS v. M.P. STATE (Bhagwati, J.) 637\n\nof printing, publishing and selling text books in Rai Sahib RamJawaya's , case (1), though not supported by legislation, was upheld because it did.", "canonical_name": "Rai Sahib Ram Jawayas"}}, {"text": "Rai Sahib Ramlawaya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45213, "end_char": 45232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same view was reiterated by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nv. Thakur Bharat Singh(2) where referring to the decision in Rai Sahib Ramlawaya's case(!)", "canonical_name": "Rai Sahib Ram Jawayas"}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45548, "end_char": 45563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a mere chance or prospect of having particular customers cannot be said to be a right to property or to any interest or undertaking, It is dear that the State of Punjab had done no act which infringed a right of any citizen : the State had merely entered upon a trading venture."}}, {"text": "Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46303, "end_char": 46323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prescription of such text books by the State Government would not infringe the rights of any publisher, because, as pointed out by this Court in Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya's case,(') there is no right in a publisher that \"any of the books.", "canonical_name": "Rai Sahib Ram Jawayas"}}, {"text": "Mukherjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48455, "end_char": 48464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to use the words of Mukherjee, C.J., in Rai Sahib Ram Jawayas case.(!) \"", "canonical_name": "Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "Rai Sahib Ram Jawayas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48475, "end_char": 48496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to use the words of Mukherjee, C.J., in Rai Sahib Ram Jawayas case.(!) \"", "canonical_name": "Rai Sahib Ram Jawayas"}}, {"text": "Rai Sal1ib Ram Jawaya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49025, "end_char": 49046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view is completely supported hy the deci, inn in Rai Sal1ib Ram Jawaya's case. (", "canonical_name": "Rai Sahib Ram Jawayas"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49414, "end_char": 49418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49430, "end_char": 49434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50551, "end_char": 50556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1955]\n\n2 S.C.R. 225", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 51277, "end_char": 51297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shakespeare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54352, "end_char": 54363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Take a case whre a play of Shakespeare is to be prescribed."}}, {"text": "Hamlet", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54653, "end_char": 54659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The play of Shakespeare can be prescribed by referring .to its title, as for example, Hamlet or King Lear."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55739, "end_char": 55743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55834, "end_char": 55838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55987, "end_char": 55991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56241, "end_char": 56245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56389, "end_char": 56393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56546, "end_char": 56550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58575, "end_char": 58579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58835, "end_char": 58839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59401, "end_char": 59405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59458, "end_char": 59462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61317, "end_char": 61321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chatur vedi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61397, "end_char": 61408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now it is clear from paragraph 134 of the affidavit filed by Chatur vedi, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Madhya Pradesh,\n\n(I) [ 1962] I S.C.R. 422.", "canonical_name": "Chatur vedi"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64042, "end_char": 64046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64154, "end_char": 64158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65007, "end_char": 65012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65225, "end_char": 65230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65301, "end_char": 65306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65989, "end_char": 65994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66657, "end_char": 66661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12th October, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66908, "end_char": 66926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Realising this difficulty, the learned' Advocate General relied on a decision of the Board dated 12th October, 1971, Ex."}}, {"text": "Chaturvedi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66969, "end_char": 66979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 to the affidavit in reply filed by Chaturvedi on bohalf of the resoondents, and contended that by this decision the Board authorised the Chairman to take all necessary steps for the purpose of proceeding further with the work of the text books improvem, nt schem' which consisted of selection and approval of text\n\noooks for the purpose of prescription or recommendation by the Board, and the Chairman was, therefore.", "canonical_name": "Chatur vedi"}}, {"text": "23rd March. 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69244, "end_char": 69260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In any event the authority conferred by this decision cannot include the exercise of a statutory function v; hich \"'1, me to ho vested in the Board for the first time on 23rd March."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69266, "end_char": 69270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Boara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 70065, "end_char": 70070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, therefore, clear beyond doubt that there was no prior consultation with the Boara before the State Government issued the noti- fication dated 24th May, 1973 an<!"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70275, "end_char": 70279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70536, "end_char": 70540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70749, "end_char": 70753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70831, "end_char": 70835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73112, "end_char": 73122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73183, "end_char": 73190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73217, "end_char": 73221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74863, "end_char": 74867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76323, "end_char": 76327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76698, "end_char": 76708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rai Saheb Ram Jawaya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 76779, "end_char": 76799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19(1) (g) is concerned, that stands completely negatived by the decision in Rai Saheb Ram Jawaya's case.(')", "canonical_name": "Rai Sahib Ram Jawayas"}}, {"text": "9th August, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 78002, "end_char": 78018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1952, however, .changes of a far more drastic character were introduced by a notification dated 9th August, 1952 issued by the State Government."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78407, "end_char": 78414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78625, "end_char": 78635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 S. C. R. 225", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 78743, "end_char": 78764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79093, "end_char": 79100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79122, "end_char": 79131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea, C. J., speaking on behalf of a unanimous Court, pointed out:\n\n\"The procedure hitherto followed was that the Government used to invite publishers and authors to submit their boo\\ls for examination and approval by the Education Department and after selection was made by the Government, the size, contents as well as the prices of the books were fixed and it was left to the publishers or authors to print and publish them and offer them for sale to the pupils.", "canonical_name": "Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81596, "end_char": 81609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81844, "end_char": 81847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81920, "end_char": 81933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82022, "end_char": 82026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82123, "end_char": 82133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82202, "end_char": 82209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89081, "end_char": 89085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89558, "end_char": 89565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 616", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91750, "end_char": 91756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93059, "end_char": 93063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93311, "end_char": 93315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93466, "end_char": 93473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93494, "end_char": 93498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94082, "end_char": 94086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_64_73_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "PURXOMOMA\n\nRAMANATA\n\nQUENIN\n\nMAKAN KALYAN TANDEL & ORS.\n\nJanuary 9, 1974\n\n[H. R. KHANNA, V. R. KRISHNA !YER AND R. S. SAR.KARIA, JJ.]\n\nConstiturio11 of India, Art. 14-Contracts with' the Government-Uast of distillery owned by the State to. members of public by tenckr-Government reser; ingright to select any tender or re,,1ect a/I te11ders without assigning any reason-No vlolaJiolt of Art. 14.\n\nWords and phrases-\" Auction\" and \"Jnvliation to tender\"-Distinction betwein- Legislative dip/01na No. 1761, Art. 9 para 2 frame~ by Portuguese Governnt. C\n\nThe Union territory of (Joa; Daman and Diu invited tenders on behalf of the President of India from the public for the lease pf the Daman distillery for a period of three years. Clause 7 of the tenns and conditions of the tender appended to the notice provided that the highest iender shall ordinarily accepted but the Government reserved the right to select any tender or reject all tenders without assigning any reason therefor. The appellant tendered Rs. 3,25,000/· while respondent No. I offered Rs. 3,51,545/· The le1s: of th~ distillery was granted to appellant for Rs. 3,52,545/· Rs. 1000/- more than th~ amount mentioned. in the tender of respondent No. I, .On challenge to the legality of the grant of lease by Respondent No. 1 thourgh a writ petition, the Judicial Commissioner of Goa set aside the lease in favour of appellant No. 1 and directed the Government tc~ deal with the tender of respondent No. I according to law. The main reason which weighed with the learned Judicial Commissioner was the suon made on behalf of the State that it was prepared, without accepting the correctness of the con. tention5 of Respondent No. I, to set aside the lease, if the Court So desired. The Judicial Cornmissioner also held !hat clause? of the notice wa~ ultra v~. that givi:ng E. lease to the appellant by accepttng more money than the highest bid by a private deal was contrary to law and not assigning reasons for the rejection of the tender of 1espondent No. 1 was illegal. (680}\n\nA.llo..ylng the appeal b)' special leave,\n\nHELD: (1) The Judicial Corr'unissioner should not have, without giving some cogent reason set aside the lease of the distillery in favour of the appellant. The main reason v.'.hich weighed with the learned Judkil Commissioner in setting aside the lease in faour of the appellant was the submiion made on behalf of_thc State that it was prepared. without accepting the correctness of the contentions of respondent No. 1, to set aside the lease if the Court so desired. This circun15tance was hardly sufficient to warrant the setting aside of the lease in favour of the appcl. ]ant. The person who was primarily affected by the setting aside of the lease was the appellant to whon1. the lease had been granted. Io the absence of any con currence of the appellant, the fact that the Government was prepared, if the Court so desired. to set aside the lease, could hardly provide valid basis for tlie seltif'lg: aside of the leac. [ 680}\n\n01) Regarding the question of the validity of clause 7 and the grant of lea_se in favour of the appellant even though the tender of respondent- No. 1 was for the highest amount, the matter is not res integta and is more or less concluded by the pronouncements of this court. The view taken by this-Court is that a condition like that contained in clause 7 produced above is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and that in matters relating to contracts with the Government, the latter is not bound to accept the tender of the person who offers the highest amount.\n\nThe circumstance that those cases were decided in the context of certain statutory\n\n~ provisions would not detract from the bindina effect of the general principles eoun-\n\n,. c.lated in those i; ases. [68F; 71HJ\n\n1 A • • r-\n\n...,,\n\n.P. R.\n\n0QUENIN v. M. K. TANDEL (Khanna, J.). 6 s;\n\nC. K. Achuthan v. The-State of Kera/a and others [1959] Suppl. 1 S.C.R; 7_87, .\n\nTrilochan Afishra etc. v. State o/Orissa and Ors. [1971]3 S.C.C. 153.State o/f:?nssa and Ors. v. Harinarayan Jaiswal and others, [1972] 2 S.C.C. 36.\n\nCoover1e B.\n\nBharucha's case [1954] S.C.R. 873 and Union af India and Ors. v. M/s Bh1msert\n\nWalaiti Ram, [1970] 2 S.C.R. 594, relied on.\n\nCehtufy Spinning & Mfg. Co. d anr. v. The Ulhasgar Municipal Council & Anr. [1970] 3 S.C.R;854, Rashbihar Panda etc. v. StateofOrissa. [196913 S.C.R. 374, Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Two Ors., f1954] S.C.R. 803, and Guruswamy v. State of Mysore A.l.R. 1954 S.C. 592, distinguished'.\n\nNo allegations were made in the writ petition by respondent no. 1 that the act of the authorities in the grant of lease of the distillery to the appellant was mafa fide Nor has th' abov~ act been shown to be vitiated by any such arbitrariness as should call for interference by this Co~. [73E]\n\n(III) It does not appear that tenders were invited in connection w!th th~ lease of the distillery in pursuance of the provisions of Art. 9 of the Legislative Diploma No. 1761 framed by the Portuguese Government. According to para 2 of Art. 9 the lease can be put to auction in the stipulated conditions when it is found not convenient to renew the previous one. The aforesaid paragraph, it would thus appear, relates to auction and not to calling of sealed tenders. An auction is a manner of selling or letting property by bids, and usually to thC highest bidder by public competition. -An invitation to tender is a mere attempt to ascertain whether an offer can be obtained within such margin as the building owner or employer is. \"illing to adopt, or, in other words, is an offer to negotiate, an offer to receive offers, an officer to. chaffer. There is a difference between auction and invitationfor tenders. As there was no auction but only invitation for tenders in the present case, it cannot be said that the lease was governed by article 9 of the Legislative Diploma. [72BE] .\n\nHalsbury's Laws of England, third Edition, Vol 2, pp.· 69, 422, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 844 and 845 (N) of 1973.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 31st March, 1973 of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner Goa, .. Daman and piu at Panaji in_1, Special Civil Application Writ Petitions Nos. 8 and 9 of 1973. · .\n\nP. H. Parekh, P. G. Navelkar and Sunanda Bhandare, for the appellant. . . . • , . .\n\nB. R. L. Iyengar and P. C. Bhartari, for Respondent No. I.\n\nL. N. Sinha, Solicitor General of India and-M. N. Shroff, for the Respondent Nos. 2-4. -\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J-This judgment would dispose of civil appeals No. 844 and 845 of 1973 which have been filed by special leave against the judgment of learned Judicial Commissioner Goa, Daman and !>ju whereby he cancelled the leases of the distilleries grant<d in favour of the appellant and directed the Government to deal with the tender of respondent No. I according to Jaw in the light of the observations made by the Judicial Commissioner.· As the question imolv<d in the two appeals is identical, we may set out the facts giving rise to civil appeal No. 844, Learned counsel for the parties are agreed that the decision in that civil appeal would also govern the other appeal.\n\n0-SS2SCI/74 .\n\nThere is a distillery installation owned by the State at Daman.\n\nThe Government has been leasing out the said distillery for specified period to members of the public for manufacture of country liquor.\n\nAt the expiry of each lease, the Government used to invite fresh tenders from the public or :he next lease and granted lease of the distillery\n\nto the person whose tender was accepted.For a number of years before\n\n1973 the appellant's tender in respect of the above distillery was accep- B ted by the Government as the amount offered by him was the highest.\n\nThe last lease in favour of the appellant expired on January 31, 1973.\n\nBefore that by notice dated September 25, 1972 the Finance Secretary for the Union Territoiy of Goa, Daman and Diu invited tenders on behalf of the President of India from the public for the lease of the said distillery for a priod of three years commencing from Februa1y I, 1973 for the manufacture of country liquor. The terms and condi- C tions of tender as framed by the Government were appended to the said notice. Clause 7 of those terms and conditions was as under :\n\n\"The highest tender shall ordinarily be accepted but the Government reserves the right to select any tender or reject all tenders without assigning any reason therefor.\"\n\nPursuant to the notice the appellant and respondent No. 1 submitted closed tenders to the Government in the prescribed form. The tenders were opened on December 20, 1972 in the officeof the Commissioner of Excise in the presense of the tenderers. It was found that the tender of respondent No. l for an amount of Rs. 3,51,345 was the highest, while that of the appellant for Rs. 3,25,000was second. There was a third tenderer also, but his tender was the lowest and we are no longer concerned with him. As respondent No. 1, whose tender was for the highest amount, did not receive any communication regarding the acceptance of his tender, he wrote a Jetter on January 16, 1973 to the Finance Secretary calling upon him to accept the tender of respondent No. 1 within 24 hours and to take necessary steps for the execution of the lease. On January 18, 1973 the Advocate of respondent No. I sent notice to the Finance Secretary to accept the tender of respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 then learnt that the distillery in question had been given on lease to the appellant for Rs. 3,52,345, i.e., Rs. 1,000 more than the amount mentioned in the tender of respondent No. J.\n\nRespondent No. 1 thereupon filed petition under articles 226 and G 227 praying for the issuance of a writ to quash and set aside the grant of lease of the distillery in question in favour of the appellant and for directing the Government to grant the lease of the distillery in favour of respondent No. J. According to respondent No. 1, it was incumbent upon the Government to give reasons for the rejection of his tender. It was further stated that in case the Government relied upon clause 7 of the terms and conditions in support of its action, H the said clause was void for violation of article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it enabled the Government to reject the highest tender without assigning any reason therefor.\n\nJ ,.\n\nP. R. QUENIN v. M. K. TANDEL (K/1(1flna, l.) 67\n\nThe petition was resisted by the appellant as well as by the State Government.\n\nIt was stated in the reply filed on behalf of the State Goverument that the invitation of tenders did not give rise to any rights Gther than those stipulated in the terms and conditions upon which the tenders bad been invited. As those rights were purely of a contractual nature, no relief could be granted by the court under its writ jurisdiction for alleged breach of .contract. According further to the affidavit, the acceptance of the tender was solely within the discretion of the Government, uncontrolled by any statutory obligation or limitation and the rejection of the tender of respondent No. 1 created no statutory rights in him. Clause 7 of the terms and conditions was stated to be valid and not violative of article 14. The tender of respondent No. 1 was stated to have been rejected after the appellant had been informed that his tender could be accepted provided he raised his offer so as to pay an amount higher than that offered by the person with the highest tender. The appellant accordingly raised his ojfer and thereupon his tender was accepted. The grounds for lhe rejection of the tender of respondent No. I were stated to have 'been reeorded in the file. It was, according to the affidavit, for the Government to choose the person to whom it would grant the lease and the party aggrieved could not claim the protection of article 14.\n\nThe learned Judicial Commissioner in the course of his judgment observed that the act of the Government in giving a lease of the distillery to the appellant for Rs. ~,52,345, i.e., Rs. 1,000 more than the highest bid, by a private deal was not countenanced by law. The Judicial Commissioner then referred to the submission which was made during the course of arguments oh behalf of the Government that the Government was prepared to annul the lease granted in favour of the appellant if the court were to so direct. The Judicial Commissioner thereupon directed that the lease in favour of the appellant be set aside. Dealing with the validity of clause 7 reproduced above the learned Judicial Commissioner observed that, to the extent it gave power to the Government to reject the highest tender without assigning any reason, it was ultra vires and should be struck down.\n\nIn the opinion of the Judicial Commissioner, it was open to the Government to assign reasons for the rejection of the tender of respondent No. !. Opportunity was thereafter to be given to respondent No. 1 to show that the reasons assigned by the Government were bad. The lease of the distillery granted in favour of the appellant was accordingly set aside and the Government was directed to deal with the tender of respondent No. l according to law in the light of the observations made by the learned Judicial Commissioner.\n\nIt may be stated that after the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, letter dated April 10, 1973 was addressed on behalf of the Goverment stating that in pursuance of the decision of the Judicial Commissioner the Government had decided that the existing contract with the appellant be set aside and the lease of the distillery be granted in favour of respondent No. 1.\n\nIt has been argued by Mr. Parekh on behalf of the appellant that the Judicial Commissioner was not justified in setting aside the lease in favour of the appellant without giving any reason. Clause 7 reproduced above, according to the learned counsel, is valid and does not contravene .rticle 14 of the Constitution. Respondent No. 1, it is further stated, cannot be allowed to take the benefit of one part of clause 7 without at the same time being bound by the other part of that clause. Learned Solicitor General on behalf of the Union of India has contended that clause 7 is valid and binding upon the parties.\n\nAs against that, Mr. Iyengar on behalf of respondent No. 1 has con- !roverted the contentions advanced on behalf of the appe1lant. The Judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, it is stated, does not suffer from any infirmity. It has also been argued by the learned counsel that the grant of lease of the distillery in question is governed by the provisions of article 9 of Legislative Diploma No. 176l framed by the Portugese Government.\n\nThere is, in our opinion, force in the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that the Judicial Commissioner should not have without giving some cogent reason set aside the lease of the distillery in favour of the appellant. Perusal of the judgment shows that the main reason which weighed with the learned Judicial Commissioner in setting aside the lease in favour of the appellent was the submiss\\on made on behalf of the State that it was prepared without accepting the correctness of the contentions of respondent No. l to set a•ide the lease if the court so desired. This circumstance, in our opinio11 1 was hardly sufficient to warrant the setting aside of the lease in favour of the appellant. The person who was primarily affected by the setting aside of the lease )Vas the appellant to whom the lease had been granted. Jn the absence of any concurrence of the appellant, the fact that the Government was prepared if the court so desired. to set aside the lease could hardly provide valid basis for the setting aside of the lease.\n\nSo far as the question is concerned about the validity of clause 7 and the grant oflease in favour of the appellant even though the tender of respondent No. I was for the highest amount, we find that the matter is not res integra and is more or less concluded by the pronouncements of this Court. In C.K. Achuthan v. The State of Kera la & Ors.(l)the facts were as under. The petitioner and the third respondent, Co-operative Milk Supplies Society Cannanore submitted tenders for the supply of milk to the Government Hospital at Cannanore for the year 1948-\n\n49. The Superintendent who scrutinised the tenders, accepted that of the petitioner and communicated the reasons for the decision to the Director of Public Health. The contract in favour ofthe petitioner was subsequently cancelled in pursuance of the policy of the Government that in the matter of supply to Government medical institutions the Cc-operative Milk Supplies Uion was to be given contract 011 the basis of prices fixed by the revenue Department. The petitioner challenged the decision of {he Government in petition under article 32\n\nU) (1959] Suppl. I S.C.R. 787.\n\nP. R. QUENIN v. M. K. TANDEL (Kh111111a, !.) 69\n\nof the Constitution on the ground, inter alia, that there had been discrimination against him vis-a-ris the third respondent and, as such, there was contravention of article 14, 19(\\)(g) and 31 of the Constitution. Rejecting the contention the Constitution Bench of \\hi> Court speaking through Hidayatullah J. (as he then was) observed:\n\n\"The gist of the present matter is the breach, if any, of the contract said to have been given to the petitioner which has been cancelled either for good or for bad reasons. There is no discrimination, because it is perfectly open to the Government. even as it is to a private party, to cJ:oose a person to their liking, to fulfil contracts which they wish to be performed. When one person is chosen rather than another, the aggrieved party cannot claim the protection of Art. 14, because the choice of the person to fulfil a particular contract must be left to the Government. Similarly, a contract which is held from Government stand on no different footing from a contract held from a private party. The breach of the contract, if any, may entitle the person aggrieved to sue for damages or in appropriate cases, even specific performance but he cannot complain that there has been a deprivation of the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, such as is contemplated by Art. 19(l)(g). Nor has it been shovin how Art. 31 of the Constitution may be invoked to prevent cancellation of a contract in exercise of powers conferred by one of the tenns of the contract itself.\"\n\nIn Tri/ochan Mishra, etc. v. State of Orissa & Ors.(') this court dealt with the validity of section 3(2)(a) and section 8 (1) of the Orissa Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Act, 1961 as amended by the Orissa Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Amendment Act, 1969 as well as the validity of the rules framed under that Act. The petitioner in that case also sought a declaration that the revised policy in the matter of the sale of Kendu leaves was arbitrary, dicriminatory and ma/a fide. One of the grievances of the petitioner in that case was that the bid of person making the highest tenders were not accepted. Repelling the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner, Mitter J. who gave the judgment of the Court on behalf of the Constitution Bench observed :\n\n\"With regard to the girevance that in some cases the bids of persons making the highest tenders were not accepted, the facts are that persons who bad made lower bids were asked to raise their bids to the highest offered before the same were accepted. Thus there was no loss to Government and merely because the Government preferred one tender to another no complaint can be entertained( Government certainly has a right to enter into a contract with a person well known to it and specially one who has faithfully performed his conttacts in the past in preference to an undesirable or unsuitable\n\n\nor untried person. Moreover, Government is not boi:nd to accept the highest tender but may accept a lower on~ in case it thinks that the person offering the lower tender 1s on an overall consideration to be preferred to the higher tenderer.\"\n\nIn State of Orissa & Ors. v. Hari11araya11 Jaiswal & Ors.(I) .the respondents were the highest bidders at an auction held by the Onss.a Government through the Excise Commissioner, for the exclusive pnvilege of selling by retail the country !iquo~ in some shops. The Government of Orissa had reserved the nght either to accept or reiect the highest bid and had actually rejected the bids of the respondents and later on the privilege was sold by negotiation to some others. One of the contentions taken on behalfof the writ petitioners in that case was that the power retained by the Government \"to accept or to reject any bid without assigning any reason therefor\" was an arbitrary po'Yer and therefore, violative of articles 14 and 19(1)(g). Hegde J. speakrng for this Court rejected that contention in the following words :\n\n\"One of the contentions taken on behalf of the writ petitioners was that the power retained by the Government 'to accept or tc:> reject any bid without assigning any reason therefor' in clause (6) of the order made by the Government on January 6, 1971, in exercise of its powers under section 29(2) of the Act was an arbiirary power and therefore it is violative of articles 14 and 19(1)(g). This contention has been upheld by the High Court. It was urged on behalf of the writ petitioners that they have a fundamental right to carry on trade or business in country liquor. That right can be regulated only by imposing reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public. It was further urged that the power retained by the Government to accept or to reject the highest bid without assigning any reason is an unguided power and hence it is violative of article\n\n14. These contentions were accepted by the High Court. To us, none of these contentions appear to be well founded. As seen earlier section 22 of the Act confers power on the Government to grant to any person on such conditions and for such period as it may think fit the exclusive privilege of selling in retail any country liquor. Section 29 empowers the Government to accept payment of a sum in consideration for the grant of any exclusive privilege under section 22 either by calling tenders or by auction or otherwise as it may by general or special order direct. The powers conferred on the State Government by section 22 and section 29 are absolute powers. As seen earlier, the validity of those provisions has not been challenged before us. Under section 29(2) the Gcvernment had power to dispose of any of the exclusive privileges mentioned in section 22 either by auction or otherwise as it may by general or special order direct. Thal being the amplitude of the power of the Government, we fail to see how the Government can be said\n\n(I) [19721 2 s.c.c. 36,\n\nP. R. QUENIN v. M. K. TANDEL (KhiflltUI, /,)\n\nto have conferred on itself arbitrary power under clause (6) of its order made on January 6, 1971, when it provided that :\n\n\"No sale shall be deemed to be final unless confirmed by the State Government who shall be at liberty to accept or reject any bid without assigning any reason therefor.\"\n\nB Even apart from the provisions of sections 22 and 29, this Court took the view that the power retained by the Govornment under clause\n\n(6) reproduced above was not unconstitutional. It was observed in this context :\n\nG .•·\n\n\"Even apart from the power conferred on the Government under sections 22 and 29, we fail to see how the power retained by the Government under clause (6) of its order, dated January 6, 1971, can be considered as unconstitutional. As held by this Court in Cooverjee B. Bharucha's case(!) one of the important purposes of selling the exclusive right to sell liquor in wholesale or retail is to raise revenue. Excise revenue forms an important part of every State's revenue.. The Government is the pardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. Hence quite naturally, the legislature has empowered the Government to see that there is no leakage in its revenue. It is for the Government to decide whether the price offered in an auction sale is adequate.\n\nWhile accepting or rejecting a bid, it is merely performing an executive function. The correctness of its conclusion is not open to judicial review. We fail to see how the plea of contravention of article 19(1)(g) or article 14 can arise in these cases.\n\nThe government's power to sell the exclusive privilege set out in section 22 was not denied. It was also not disputed that those privileges could be sold by public auction. Public auctions are held to get the best possible price. Once these aspects are recognised, there appears to be no basis for contending that the owner of the privileges in question who had offered to sell them cannot decline to accept the highest bid if he thinks that the price offered is inadequate. There is no concluded contract till the bid is accepted. Before there was a concluded contract, it was open to the bidders to withdraw their bids-see Union of India and Ors. v. M/s. Bhimsen Walaiti Ram.(2) By merely giving bids, the bidders had not acquired any vested rights.\n\nThe fact that the Government was the seller does not change the legal position once its exclusive right to deal with those privileges is conceded. If the Government is the exclusive owner of those privileges, reliance on article 19(l)(g) or article 14 becomes irrelevant.\"\n\nIt would appear from the above that the view taken by this Court is that a condition like that contained in clause 7 reproduced above is not violative of article 14 of the Constitution and that in matters relating to contracts with the Government, the latter is not bound\n\n(I) [1954] S.C.R. 873.\n\n(2) [19701 2 S.C.R. 594.\n\nto accept the tender of the person who offers the highest amount. • A Mr. Iyengar has tried to distinguish the above mentioned cases on the ground that they were decided in the context of certain statutory provisions. This circumstance, in our opinion, would not detract from the binding effect of the general principle enunciated in those cases.\n\nWe may now deal with the contention of Mr. Iyengar that the lease of distilleries is governed by para 2 of article 9 of Legislative B Diploma No. 1761. In this connection we find that the judgment of the learned Judicial Commissioner does not show that any such ground was urged before him. Mr. Parekh on behalf of the appellant submits that the said Legislative Diploma was no longer in force at the time the distillery was leased in favour of the appellant. It is, in our opinion, not necessary to go into this aspect because it does not appoar that tenders were invited in connection with the lease of c the distillery in pursuance of the provisions of article 9 of the Legislati.ve Diploma. According to para 2 of article 9 upon which reliance has been placed by Mr. Iyengar, the lease can be put to auction in the &tipulated conditions when it is. fou11d not convenient to renew the previou• one. The aforesaid paragraph, it would thus appear, relates to auction .and not to calling of sealed tenders. An auction, , as stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 2, page 69, is a D manner of selling or letting property by bids, and usually to the highest bidder by public competition. An invitation to tender is a mere attempt to ascertain whether an offer can be obtained within such margin as the building owner or employer is willing to adopt, or, in other words, is an offer to negotiate, an offer to receive offers, an offer to chaffer (see Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, page 422).\n\nThere is, in our opinion, difference between auction and invitation E for tenders. As there was no auction but only invitation for tenders in the present case, it cannot be said that the lease o( the distillery was governed by article 9 of the Legislative Diploma.\n\nIt has been argued by Mr. Iyengar that there must have been s.ome • negotiation between the Government and the appellant as a result of which the appellant raised his offer to that it might exceed that of respondent No. I. This may have been so but it was apparently with F a view to ensure that the pecuniary interest of the Government did not suffer as a result of the rejection of the tender of respondent No. 1.\n\nThe appollant was consequently made to pay Rs. 1,000 more than what had been offered by respondent No. I.\n\nMr. Iyengar has referred to some of the decisions of this Court but none of them, in our opinion, is of any material assistance t~ G respondent No. I. In Century Spinning & Manufacturing Company Ltd. & Anr. v. The U/hasnagar Municipal Council & Anr.(1) this Court\n\nobse!\"\"ed tat pubic. ?ody is not exempt frm the liability to carry\n\no.u~ 1ts obhgallons ammg out of represntallon made by ; t when a\n\nc11Len. who rehes upon that rep_resentatton alters his position to his prejudice. No such question arises m the present case because it is .not. shown tht respondent No. I has altered his position to his pre- H JUdtce by relymg upon any representation made by the authorities.\n\n(I) [1970) 3 S.C.R. 854.\n\nP. R. QUENIN v. M. K. TANDEL (Khanna, /.) 73\n\nIn Rashbihar Panda etc. v. State of Orissa(I) this Court dealt with a Government scheme for sale and disposal of Kendu leaves. It was found that the right to make tenders for the purchase of Kendu leaves was restricted to those persons who had obtained contracts in the previous year. The scheme was held to be violative of articles 14 and 19(1)(g) because it gave rise to monopoly in Kendu leaves to certain traders. The dictum laid down in the above case cannot be of much assistanee because there was no such restriction in the present case with regard to the making of the tenders.\n\nDwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Two Ors.(2) related to the validity of clause 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order, 1953 according to which the licensing authority was given absolute power in the matter of grant, revocation, cancellation or modification of the licences issued under that Order. No such questian arises in the present case.\n\nThe last case referred to on behalf of respondent No. 1 is Guruswamy v. State of Mysore.(l) In that case a liquor contract was knocked cown in an auction by the Deputy Commissioner in favour of A who was the highest bidder. B who was present at th~ auction but did not bid, saw the Excise Commissioner and offered Rs. 5000/- in excess of A's bid. B's offer was accepted and A's bid was cancelled. It was held that the cancellation of A's bid though irregular was proper as A had obtained no right to the licence by the mere fact that the contract had been knocked down in his favour. The action of the Deputy Commissioner in giving contract to B was held to be wro_ng as it was found to be contrary to the rules framed under the Mysore Act. No such contravention of a statutory rule has been shown in the present case because of the lease of the distillery in question to the appellant: It may be stated that no allesations were made in the writ petition by respondent No. I that the act of the authorities in the grant of lease of the distillery in question to the appellant was mala fide. There arises consequently no occasion for us to go into that aspect. Nor has the above act been shown to be vitiated by an such arbitrariness as should call for interferences by the Court. Indeed, as mentioned -earlier, the matter is concluded by the decisions of this Court.\n\nAs a result of the above, we accept the appeals, set aside the judgment of the learned Judicial Commissioner and dismiss the petitions under article 226 filed by respondent No. I. Looking to all the circumstances; we leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.\n\nS.B.W.\n\n(I) [1969) 3 S.C.R. 374.\n\n(2) [19541 S.C.R. 803.\n\n(3) A.T.R. 1954 S.C. 592.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 102, "entities": [{"text": "PURXOMOMA\n\nRAMANATA\n\nQUENIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PURXOMOMA RAMANATA QUENIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAKAN KALYAN TANDEL & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAKAN KALYAN TANDEL & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 9, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 72, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 9, 1974\n\n[H. R. KHANNA, V. R. KRISHNA !"}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159, "end_char": 166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 387, "end_char": 394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 505, "end_char": 511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Daman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 582, "end_char": 587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C\n\nThe Union territory of (Joa; Daman and Diu invited tenders on behalf of the President of India from the public for the lease pf the Daman distillery for a period of three years."}}, {"text": "Diu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 592, "end_char": 595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C\n\nThe Union territory of (Joa; Daman and Diu invited tenders on behalf of the President of India from the public for the lease pf the Daman distillery for a period of three years."}}, {"text": "Clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 731, "end_char": 739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Goa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1344, "end_char": 1347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 thourgh a writ petition, the Judicial Commissioner of Goa set aside the lease in favour of appellant No."}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3066, "end_char": 3074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3367, "end_char": 3375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3411, "end_char": 3421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B.\n\nBharucha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4120, "end_char": 4132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coover1e B.\n\nBharucha's case [1954] S.C.R. 873 and Union af India and Ors."}}, {"text": "[1970] 2 S.C.R. 594", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4216, "end_char": 4235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4991, "end_char": 4997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5094, "end_char": 5100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5898, "end_char": 5907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6024, "end_char": 6052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "P. H. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6328, "end_char": 6340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. H. Parekh, P. G. Navelkar and Sunanda Bhandare, for the appellant. . . . • , . ."}}, {"text": "P. G. Navelkar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6342, "end_char": 6356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. H. Parekh, P. G. Navelkar and Sunanda Bhandare, for the appellant. . . . • , . ."}}, {"text": "Sunanda Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6361, "end_char": 6377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. H. Parekh, P. G. Navelkar and Sunanda Bhandare, for the appellant. . . . • , . ."}}, {"text": "B. R. L. Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6413, "end_char": 6429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L. Iyengar and P. C. Bhartari, for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. C. Bhartari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6434, "end_char": 6448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L. Iyengar and P. C. Bhartari, for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6476, "end_char": 6484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nL. N. Sinha, Solicitor General of India and-M. N. Shroff, for the Respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6517, "end_char": 6529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nL. N. Sinha, Solicitor General of India and-M. N. Shroff, for the Respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6607, "end_char": 6613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J-This judgment would dispose of civil appeals No."}}, {"text": "SS2S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7284, "end_char": 7288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Daman", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7354, "end_char": 7359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a distillery installation owned by the State at Daman."}}, {"text": "January 31, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7912, "end_char": 7928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last lease in favour of the appellant expired on January 31, 1973."}}, {"text": "September 25, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7959, "end_char": 7977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before that by notice dated September 25, 1972 the Finance Secretary for the Union Territoiy of Goa, Daman and Diu invited tenders on behalf of the President of India from the public for the lease of the said distillery for a priod of three years commencing from Februa1y I, 1973 for the manufacture of country liquor."}}, {"text": "Clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8351, "end_char": 8359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 20, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8729, "end_char": 8746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tenders were opened on December 20, 1972 in the officeof the Commissioner of Excise in the presense of the tenderers."}}, {"text": "January 16, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9237, "end_char": 9253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, whose tender was for the highest amount, did not receive any communication regarding the acceptance of his tender, he wrote a Jetter on January 16, 1973 to the Finance Secretary calling upon him to accept the tender of respondent No."}}, {"text": "January 18, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9416, "end_char": 9432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 18, 1973 the Advocate of respondent No."}}, {"text": "articles 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9796, "end_char": 9808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10233, "end_char": 10241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10340, "end_char": 10350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11254, "end_char": 11262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11335, "end_char": 11345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11960, "end_char": 11970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12619, "end_char": 12627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 10, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13456, "end_char": 13470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be stated that after the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, letter dated April 10, 1973 was addressed on behalf of the Goverment stating that in pursuance of the decision of the Judicial Commissioner the Government had decided that the existing contract with the appellant be set aside and the lease of the distillery be granted in favour of respondent No."}}, {"text": "Parekh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13770, "end_char": 13776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been argued by Mr. Parekh on behalf of the appellant that the Judicial Commissioner was not justified in setting aside the lease in favour of the appellant without giving any reason."}}, {"text": "Clause 7", "label": 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"ORG", "start_char": 14773, "end_char": 14793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "176l framed by the Portugese Government."}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15902, "end_char": 15910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Co-operative Milk Supplies Society Cannanore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16257, "end_char": 16301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner and the third respondent, Co-operative Milk Supplies Society Cannanore submitted tenders for the supply of milk to the Government Hospital at Cannanore for the year 1948-\n\n49."}}, {"text": "Cannanore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16373, "end_char": 16382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner and the third respondent, Co-operative Milk Supplies Society Cannanore submitted tenders for the supply of milk to the Government Hospital at Cannanore for the year 1948-\n\n49."}}, {"text": "Cc-operative Milk Supplies Uion", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16747, "end_char": 16778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contract in favour ofthe petitioner was subsequently cancelled in pursuance of the policy of the Government that in the matter of supply to Government medical institutions the Cc-operative Milk Supplies Uion was to be given contract 011 the basis of prices fixed by the revenue Department."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16936, "end_char": 16946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14, 19(\\)(g) and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17195, "end_char": 17222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17273, "end_char": 17291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rejecting the contention the Constitution Bench of \\hi> Court speaking through Hidayatullah J. (as he then was) observed:\n\n\"The gist of the present matter is the breach, if any, of the contract said to have been given to the petitioner which has been cancelled either for good or for bad reasons."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17323, "end_char": 17335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rejecting the contention the Constitution Bench of \\hi> Court speaking through Hidayatullah J. (as he then was) observed:\n\n\"The gist of the present matter is the breach, if any, of the contract said to have been given to the petitioner which has been cancelled either for good or for bad reasons."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17839, "end_char": 17846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18383, "end_char": 18396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18425, "end_char": 18432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18677, "end_char": 18692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18697, "end_char": 18706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1969", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18824, "end_char": 18843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19257, "end_char": 19263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Repelling the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner, Mitter J. who gave the judgment of the Court on behalf of the Constitution Bench observed :\n\n\"With regard to the girevance that in some cases the bids of persons making the highest tenders were not accepted, the facts are that persons who bad made lower bids were asked to raise their bids to the highest offered before the same were accepted."}}, {"text": "Government of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20456, "end_char": 20476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Orissa had reserved the nght either to accept or reiect the highest bid and had actually rejected the bids of the respondents and later on the privilege was sold by negotiation to some others."}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20907, "end_char": 20931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20933, "end_char": 20938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hegde J. speakrng for this Court rejected that contention in the following words :\n\n\"One of the contentions taken on behalf of the writ petitioners was that the power retained by the Government 'to accept or tc:> reject any bid without assigning any reason therefor' in clause (6) of the order made by the Government on January 6, 1971, in exercise of its powers under section 29(2) of the Act was an arbiirary power and therefore it is violative of articles 14 and 19(1)(g)."}}, {"text": "January 6, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21253, "end_char": 21268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hegde J. speakrng for this Court rejected that contention in the following words :\n\n\"One of the contentions taken on behalf of the writ petitioners was that the power retained by the Government 'to accept or tc:> reject any bid without assigning any reason therefor' in clause (6) of the order made by the Government on January 6, 1971, in exercise of its powers under section 29(2) of the Act was an arbiirary power and therefore it is violative of articles 14 and 19(1)(g)."}}, {"text": "section 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21302, "end_char": 21315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21383, "end_char": 21407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article\n\n14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21880, "end_char": 21891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22020, "end_char": 22030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22221, "end_char": 22231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22347, "end_char": 22357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22505, "end_char": 22515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22520, "end_char": 22530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22643, "end_char": 22656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22741, "end_char": 22751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 22 and 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23335, "end_char": 23353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 22 and 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23586, "end_char": 23604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cooverjee B. Bharucha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23780, "end_char": 23801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As held by this Court in Cooverjee B. Bharucha's case(!)"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24528, "end_char": 24544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24548, "end_char": 24558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24652, "end_char": 24662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25560, "end_char": 25576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25580, "end_char": 25590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25721, "end_char": 25729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25767, "end_char": 25777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26391, "end_char": 26400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26940, "end_char": 26949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27002, "end_char": 27011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27337, "end_char": 27344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An auction, , as stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol."}}, {"text": "article 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28032, "end_char": 28041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1970) 3 S.C.R. 854", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 29276, "end_char": 29295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29668, "end_char": 29692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dwarka Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29931, "end_char": 29944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Two Ors.(2) related to the validity of clause 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order, 1953 according to which the licensing authority was given absolute power in the matter of grant, revocation, cancellation or modification of the licences issued under that Order."}}, {"text": "clause 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30029, "end_char": 30040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31816, "end_char": 31827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1969) 3 S.C.R. 374", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 31959, "end_char": 31978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_652_656_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "HALLU AND OTHERS\n\nI'.\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nMarch 19, 1974\n\n(M. H. BEG ANO Y. V. CHANORACHUO, JJ.)\n\nCrimin.:U trial-Cast of rioting and murder-Correct' approach to eridenct- FIR if should be givtn by one having persona/ know/edge of the incitknt.\n\nThe appeUants, along with others, were charged with offences arising out of tbemurdCr of two persons. The trial court assessed the evidence on the followina principles, namely : (a) in rioti.n:g cases discrepancies arc bound to occur in the evidence but the duty of the court is to have regard to the broad probabilities of the\n\ncase; (b) in a factious village independent witnesses arc unwilling to come forward C and therefore the testimony of eye witnesses who may be interested in the doceased cannot be discarded merely for that reason, provided of course the presence of the\n\nwitnesses is proved; and (c) the First Information Report docs not constitute su~ tantive evidence in the case and the mere circumstance that there arc certain omissions in it will not justify the case being disbelieved; and gave weighty fea:SODS fQ[ holding that the guilt of the acc'used was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.\n\nIn appeal, the High Court, while acquitting others, convicted the appellants under s. 302 read with s. 149 l.P.C.\n\nAllowing the appeal to this Court.- D\n\nHELD : The Kigh Court ought not to have interfered with the order of acquittal ven if there were two possible views or the evidence. {6S4D-E}\n\n(a) The High Court wrongly refused to attach any importance to the circumstance that the names of the appellants were not mentioned in the very first report to the police and that a totally different group_ of persons were mentioned as the assailants.\n\nThe High Court held that that report could not be treated as the First Infonnation Report under s. 154 Cr. P.C., bc: .. ause, the person who gave the Report had no personal knowledge of the incident. Buts. 154 docs not require lhat the Report must be given by a person who has personal knowledge of the incident reported. It only speaks of an inrormation relating to the commission of a cognizable offence given to an officer in-charge of a olice station.\n\n(654H-5SSC]\n\n(b) Another rer, ort, given by the Kotwal of the village, was treated by the Hi&h Court .as the First nformation Report. But this report wholly destroys the prosecu~ tion case, because, while the case of the prosecution was that the incident happened on: the afternoon of the previous day, the Kotwal stated in his report that the incident had taken place during the early hours of the day on which he gave the reponp\n\n(6SSE-GJ\n\n(c) In that Report also the names or the assailants were not mentioned. The inference arising from the fact that the name of an accused is not mentioned in the Fin:t Information Report must vary from case to case; but the High Court wholly ignored the fact that even the Kotwal of the village had not come to know he names or the assailants though 20 hours had elapsed after-the incident had taken place nccording to the prosecution. [655G-HJ\n\n(d) The Hih Court reruSed to attach any importance to the discrepancies between the medical evidence and the evidence of the eye witnesses that the deceased were t1ttacked with spears and axes, on the ground that the witnesses had not stated that 'the miscreants dealt axe blows from the sharp-side or used the spears as a piercing weapon'. The High Court explained the absence of incised er punctured wounds by observing, without any basis, that the accused might have used the blunt side. {656C-E]\n\n(e) It is generally not easy to find witnesses on whose testimony implicit reliance can be placed. It is al, vays advisable to test the evidence of witnesses on the anvil\n\n.E\n\n.. --...... \\-\n\n• G\n\nI /\n\nHALLU v. M.P. STATE (Chandrachud, ].) 653\n\n•• : -; c , __ of objective circumstances of the case. But the High Court, in the present case, accepted the evidence of the two a11eged eye-witnesses as implicitly re1iablr v.ith()ut so testing their evidence. They claimed to have seen the incident in the afterx:oon, but if the incident toOk place at night, the whole superstructure of the prosecution must fall. (656A, F-O)\n\nCiUMINAL APPELLATE JURISDI~ION : Criminat Aprea! No: 142 of 1970.\n\nAppel by Special Leave from the Judgnlent and Order dated lhe 27th March, 1970 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal No. 451 of 1967.\n\nD. Mookherjea, S.K. Bagga, S. Bagga and Yash Bagga, for the appellants.\n\nRam Panjwani, H. S. Parihar and_ I. N. Shroff, for the Resp?ndent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, J. Eighteen persons were put up for trial before the First Additional Sessions Judge, Durg (M. P.) for offences arising out of the murder of two persons Jagdeo and Padum. The learned Judge acquitted them of all the charges but that order was partly set aside by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh which confirmed the acquittal of eight persons and convicted the remaining ten under section 302 read with section 149 of the Penal Code. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court under which a sentence of life imprisonment has been imposed on the appellants.\n\nThe case of the prosecution is that on the afternoon of May 9, 1966 a group of about 18 persons including the appellants dragged Jagdeo •and Padum from their houses and attacked them with lathis, spears and axes. In 1965 Jagdeo and Padum were prosecuted along with 2 others for committing the murder of one Daulatram, the Sarpanch of the village. That case ended in acquittal and it is . alleged that Jagdeo and Padum were done to death by the appellants who felt especially aggrieved by)h_e murder of the Sarpanch .\n\nSince the High Court has set aside the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court it is of primary importance to appreciate and understand the approach cf the Sessions Court to the evidence in the case and jts conclusions thereon. These, briefly, are the structural hallmarks of the Se'8ions Court's judgment: (I) In rioting cases discrepancies are bound to occur in the evidence but the duty of the court is to have regard to the broad probabilities of the case; (2) In a factious village independent witnesses are unwilling to come .forward and therefore the testimony of eye-witnesses who are interested in the deceased cannot be discarded merely for the reason that they are so interested, provided of course the presence of the witnesses is proved; (3) The First Information Report does not constitute substantive evidence in the case and the mere circumstance that there are certain omissions in it will not justify the case being disbelieved.\n\n., Applying these broad principles the Sessions Court rejected the evidence of the eye-witnesses and acquitted the accused. fo doing this the court was influenced by these circumstances: (I) There were muteJial discrerancies as re[ards the place wh<re Jagceo was asrnultcd.\n\nThe police had taken scratchings from the walls of Jagdeo's house but did not send them to the Chemical Analyser for ascertaining whether they bore stains of blood; (2) The widows of Jadgeo and Padum had stated that the two men were attacked with spears and axes but according . to the medical evidence there. were neither incised nor punctured wounds on the dead bodies; (3) As many as three different Reports were given to the police station on the morning of the day following the day of the incident but the names of the appellants were not mentioned in any one of them; (4) Jn one of those Reports the incident was stated to have happened at night whereas the c°'e of the prosecution is that the incident happened in broad daylight at about 1 p. m. and (5) There was no reliable evidence showing that the accused had sufficient motive to commit the murder.\n\nThese, in our opinion, are weighty reasons on the strength of which the learned Sessions Judge was reasonably '.entitled to come to the conclusion that the charge against the accused was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. At worst, it may perhaps be possible to say that two views of the evidence were roasonably possible. It is well established that in such circumstances the High Court ought not to interfere with the order of acquittal.\n\nWe will demonstrate in reference to a few important circumstances as to why the High Court was not justified in interfering with the oraer ol acquittal. The incident is alleged to have taken place at about I p. m. on May, 9, 1966 but it was not until the next morning that any one in the village thought it necessry to report the incident to the police.\n\nThe first person who at all contacted the police after the incident was Tibhu, the son of one of the murdered persons, Jagdeo.\n\nTibhu went to the Rancharia Police Station at 8-15 a. m. on the 10th and told the police that on the previous afternoon Jagdeo and Padum were murdered.\n\nJn that report Tibhu mentioned the names of as many as 10 persons who according to him had participated in the assault but none of the 18 accused found a place in that long list except perhaps \"Bentha Satnami\"\n\nthe reference to whom Jnay by a process of some stretching be construed as a reference to one of the accused. Tibhu mad' an interesting disclosure in his evidence that he had gone to the police for lodging information about an altogether different incident and after having lodged that information he was told by a woman called Dharmin that the eighteen accused had committed the murder of Jagdeo and Padum. Yet it is surprising that not only did he not mention the names of the present accused but he mentioned the names of an altogethor different group ofpersom. This is in regard to the earliest information given to the police in point of time.\n\nThe Report given by Tibhu thus suffers from a serious infirmity and the Sessions Court was justified in citing that infirmity as one of the reas-\n\nHALLU v. M.P. , STATE (Cha11drachud, /.) 655\n\nons leading to the acq'\"ttal of the appellants. The High Court however refused to attach any imprtanoe to the circumstance that the names of the appellants were not mentioned in the Report on the ground that though it was earlist in point of time it could not be treated as the First Information Report under section 154, Criminal Procedure Code as Tibhu had no personal knowledge of th: incident and the Report was based on h'arsay evidence. In this view the High Court clearly erred for section 154 does not require that the Report mu't be given by a person who has personal knowledge of the incident reported. The section speaks J.lf an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence given to an officer in charge of a police station. Tibhu had given such information and it was in consequence of that information that the investigation had commenced.\n\nAt abvut 11-45 a. m. one Dharamdas who was examined in the case as an eye-witness went to the police station and lodged information about a totally different incident stating that a boy whose name he did not know had beaten him with a lathi. This of course cannot be regarded as a first information report of the offence in question but the High Court overlooked that if Dharamdas was an eye-witness and if he did go to the police station quite a few horrs after the incident it was strange that he did not refer to the incident at all. Dharamadas wriggled out of an inconvenient situation by saying that as Tibhu had already reported the incident to the police he himself did not think it necessary to do so. The evidence of Dharmdas, we may mention, has been rejected by the trial court as well as the High Court.\n\nThen comes yet another 'Report made to the police and that was made by one Vishal D1s who was the Kotwar of the village in between the two earlier Reports. Vishal Das's Report, Ex. P-47, shows that he gave the information at the police station at about 10 a. m. on the I 0th. This information, according to the High Court, must be treated as the First Information Report in the case. This in our opinion, is clearly erroneous. But apart from the legality of the finding reorded by the High Court Vishal Das's Report almost wholly destroys the prosecution case. The case of the prosecution is that the incident in question ha; ipened on the afternoon of the 9th whereas Vishal Das stated in his Report that the inc'dent had taken place on the night of the 10th, meaning thereby in the early hours of the 10th. Vishal Das also stated expressly in his Report that he did not know as to who had assaulted Jagdeo and Padum. The High Court failed to give\n\ntilese circumstances their due weight and observed on the contrary that the fact that the names of the assailants were not mentioned by Vishal Das was not very material as the assault was committed by a large group of 17 or 18 persons. The inference arising from the fact that the names of the accused are not mentioned in a First Information Report must vary from case to case but the High Court wholly ignored that even the Kotwar of the village had not come to know the names of the assailants though 20 hours had elapsed after the incident had taken place and further that according to him the incident had taken place at night It is obvious that if the incident had taken place at night the\n\nwhole superstructure of the prosecution case must fall.\n\nThe eyewitnesses Musammat Dev Kunwar and Musammat Mahatrin claim to have seen the incident on the supposition that it happened on the after-noon of the 9th.\n\nThe High Court observed in its judgment that the trial court was \"mainly influenced by the so-called discrepancies in the three reports lodged with the police\".\n\nWe may point out that the trial cowt was influenced by a variety of considerations and the discrepancies in the three Reports are not by any standard \"so-called\". The discrepancies have a fundamental importance for they tend to fal5ify the evidence of' the eye-witnesses and show that the incident happened under cover of darkness and was in all probability not witnessed by anyone.\n\nThe postmortem report prepared by Dr. N. L. Jain shows that on the body of Jagcleo were found three bruises and a hematoma. On the body of Pad um were found four lacerated wounds and two bruises.\n\nAccording to the eye-witnesses the two men were attacked with lathis, spoars and axes but that clearly stands falsified by the medical evidence.\n\nNot one of the injuries found on the person of Jagdeo and Pad um could be caused by a spear or an axe. The High Court however refused to attach any importance to this aspect of the matter by saying that the witnesses had not stated that the miscreants dealt axe blows from the sharp-side or used the spear as a piercing weapon\". According to the High Court axes and spoars may have been used from the blunt side and therefore the evidence of the eye-witnesses could safely be accepted.\n\nWe should have thought that normally when the witness says that an axe or a spear is used there fa no warrant for supposing that what the witness means is that the blunt side of the weapon was used. If that be tho implication it is. the duty of the prosecution to obtain a clarification from the witness as to whether a sharp-edged or a piercing instrument was used as blunt weapon. ·\n\nThere is only one more observation which we would like to make about <he judgment of the High Court. The High Court has observed in its judgment at more than one place that Musammat Dev Kunwar and Musammat Mahatrin we1e \"implicity reliable\". It 1s generally not easy to find witnesses on whose testimony implicit reliance can be placod. It is always advisable to test the evidence of witnesses on the anvil of objective circumstances in the case. Not only did the High Court not do that but by persuading itself to the view that the two eye-witnesses were implicitly reliable it denied to itself the benefit of a judicial consideration of the infirmities to which we have briefly referred.\n\nWe therefore allow this app>al, set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the High Court and acquit the anpellants.\n\nThey shall be released forthwith.\n\nV.P. S.\n\nAppeal A1/01red.", "total_entities": 47, "entities": [{"text": "HALLU AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HALLU AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 19, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 62, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nMarch 19, 1974\n\n(M. H. BEG ANO Y. V. CHANORACHUO, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1248, "end_char": 1254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1265, "end_char": 1271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1811, "end_char": 1817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D. Mookherjea", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4410, "end_char": 4423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Mookherjea, S.K. Bagga, S. Bagga and Yash Bagga, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S.K. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4425, "end_char": 4435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Mookherjea, S.K. Bagga, S. Bagga and Yash Bagga, for the appellants.", "canonical_name": "S.K. Bagga"}}, {"text": "S. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4437, "end_char": 4445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Mookherjea, S.K. Bagga, S. Bagga and Yash Bagga, for the appellants.", "canonical_name": "S.K. Bagga"}}, {"text": "Yash Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4450, "end_char": 4460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Mookherjea, S.K. Bagga, S. Bagga and Yash Bagga, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Ram Panjwani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4483, "end_char": 4495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Panjwani, H. S. Parihar and_ I. N. Shroff, for the Resp?ndent."}}, {"text": "H. S. Parihar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4497, "end_char": 4510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Panjwani, H. S. Parihar and_ I. N. Shroff, for the Resp?ndent."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4516, "end_char": 4528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Panjwani, H. S. Parihar and_ I. N. Shroff, for the Resp?ndent."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4595, "end_char": 4606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, J. Eighteen persons were put up for trial before the First Additional Sessions Judge, Durg (M. P.) for offences arising out of the murder of two persons Jagdeo and Padum."}}, {"text": "Jagdeo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4761, "end_char": 4767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, J. Eighteen persons were put up for trial before the First Additional Sessions Judge, Durg (M. P.) for offences arising out of the murder of two persons Jagdeo and Padum.", "canonical_name": "Jagcleo"}}, {"text": "Padum", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4772, "end_char": 4777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, J. Eighteen persons were put up for trial before the First Additional Sessions Judge, Durg (M. P.) for offences arising out of the murder of two persons Jagdeo and Padum.", "canonical_name": "Pad um"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4874, "end_char": 4902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge acquitted them of all the charges but that order was partly set aside by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh which confirmed the acquittal of eight persons and convicted the remaining ten under section 302 read with section 149 of the Penal Code."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4988, "end_char": 4999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5010, "end_char": 5021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5029, "end_char": 5039, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "May 9, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5258, "end_char": 5269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution is that on the afternoon of May 9, 1966 a group of about 18 persons including the appellants dragged Jagdeo •and Padum from their houses and attacked them with lathis, spears and axes."}}, {"text": "Jagdeo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5331, "end_char": 5337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution is that on the afternoon of May 9, 1966 a group of about 18 persons including the appellants dragged Jagdeo •and Padum from their houses and attacked them with lathis, spears and axes.", "canonical_name": "Jagcleo"}}, {"text": "Padum", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5343, "end_char": 5348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution is that on the afternoon of May 9, 1966 a group of about 18 persons including the appellants dragged Jagdeo •and Padum from their houses and attacked them with lathis, spears and axes.", "canonical_name": "Pad um"}}, {"text": "Daulatram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5509, "end_char": 5518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1965 Jagdeo and Padum were prosecuted along with 2 others for committing the murder of one Daulatram, the Sarpanch of the village."}}, {"text": "Jagceo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6928, "end_char": 6934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fo doing this the court was influenced by these circumstances: (I) There were muteJial discrerancies as re[ards the place wh<re Jagceo was asrnultcd.", "canonical_name": "Jagcleo"}}, {"text": "Jadgeo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7134, "end_char": 7140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The police had taken scratchings from the walls of Jagdeo's house but did not send them to the Chemical Analyser for ascertaining whether they bore stains of blood; (2) The widows of Jadgeo and Padum had stated that the two men were attacked with spears and axes but according .", "canonical_name": "Jagcleo"}}, {"text": "May, 9, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8475, "end_char": 8487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The incident is alleged to have taken place at about I p. m. on May, 9, 1966 but it was not until the next morning that any one in the village thought it necessry to report the incident to the police."}}, {"text": "Tibhu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8685, "end_char": 8690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first person who at all contacted the police after the incident was Tibhu, the son of one of the murdered persons, Jagdeo."}}, {"text": "Rancharia Police Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8759, "end_char": 8783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tibhu went to the Rancharia Police Station at 8-15 a. m. on the 10th and told the police that on the previous afternoon Jagdeo and Padum were murdered."}}, {"text": "Bentha Satnami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9088, "end_char": 9102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn that report Tibhu mentioned the names of as many as 10 persons who according to him had participated in the assault but none of the 18 accused found a place in that long list except perhaps \"Bentha Satnami\"\n\nthe reference to whom Jnay by a process of some stretching be construed as a reference to one of the accused."}}, {"text": "Dharmin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9433, "end_char": 9440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tibhu mad' an interesting disclosure in his evidence that he had gone to the police for lodging information about an altogether different incident and after having lodged that information he was told by a woman called Dharmin that the eighteen accused had committed the murder of Jagdeo and Padum."}}, {"text": "section 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10257, "end_char": 10268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10270, "end_char": 10293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10437, "end_char": 10448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Dharamdas", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10845, "end_char": 10854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At abvut 11-45 a. m. one Dharamdas who was examined in the case as an eye-witness went to the police station and lodged information about a totally different incident stating that a boy whose name he did not know had beaten him with a lathi."}}, {"text": "Dharamadas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11357, "end_char": 11367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dharamadas wriggled out of an inconvenient situation by saying that as Tibhu had already reported the incident to the police he himself did not think it necessary to do so.", "canonical_name": "Dharamadas"}}, {"text": "Dharmdas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11546, "end_char": 11554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of Dharmdas, we may mention, has been rejected by the trial court as well as the High Court.", "canonical_name": "Dharamadas"}}, {"text": "Vishal D1s", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11712, "end_char": 11722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then comes yet another 'Report made to the police and that was made by one Vishal D1s who was the Kotwar of the village in between the two earlier Reports.", "canonical_name": "Vishal D1s"}}, {"text": "Vishal Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11793, "end_char": 11803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vishal Das's Report, Ex.", "canonical_name": "Vishal D1s"}}, {"text": "Musammat Dev Kunwar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13358, "end_char": 13377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The eyewitnesses Musammat Dev Kunwar and Musammat Mahatrin claim to have seen the incident on the supposition that it happened on the after-noon of the 9th."}}, {"text": "Musammat Mahatrin", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13382, "end_char": 13399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The eyewitnesses Musammat Dev Kunwar and Musammat Mahatrin claim to have seen the incident on the supposition that it happened on the after-noon of the 9th."}}, {"text": "N. L. Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14083, "end_char": 14093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The postmortem report prepared by Dr. N. L. Jain shows that on the body of Jagcleo were found three bruises and a hematoma."}}, {"text": "Jagcleo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14120, "end_char": 14127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The postmortem report prepared by Dr. N. L. Jain shows that on the body of Jagcleo were found three bruises and a hematoma.", "canonical_name": "Jagcleo"}}, {"text": "Pad um", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14184, "end_char": 14190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the body of Pad um were found four lacerated wounds and two bruises.", "canonical_name": "Pad um"}}, {"text": "Musammat Dev Kunwar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15434, "end_char": 15453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has observed in its judgment at more than one place that Musammat Dev Kunwar and Musammat Mahatrin we1e \"implicity reliable\"."}}, {"text": "Musammat Mahatrin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15458, "end_char": 15475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has observed in its judgment at more than one place that Musammat Dev Kunwar and Musammat Mahatrin we1e \"implicity reliable\"."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_657_664_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "STATE OF HARYANA\n\nGURDIAL SINGH AND PARGAT SINGH\n\nMarch 19, 1974.\n\n[H. R. KHANNA AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.)\n\nIndian Penal Cocle-Sec. 302 read with Ser. 34-Two contradictory versions pre.r, nted by-prosecuti1Jn-Bene/it of doubt must go to 1/ie accused.\n\nP & G were convicted u/s. 302 and were sentenced to death, The High Court set aside the convictions of both the accused and acquitted them. The State has filed the present appeals against the acquittal of the 2, accused by special leave.\n\nThe prosecution case is that on account of a family feud, the deceased was mur~ dered by one P. with a double-barrel gun, in front of one A, the widow of a rich landlord.\n\nThe trial court accepted the prosecution version of occurrence and relied upon the evidence of A which was corroborated by the youngest son and the dau$htr. that P, was hoJdina: a gun etc. and he was convicted along with G, _an associate.\n\nOn appeal 1 the High Cvurt found that the F.I.R. was recorded subsequently after due deliberation and consultation. The High Court also fOund that the witnenes, relied on by the trial court had supported another version .of the occurrence.\n\nIt was found that an attempt had been made to improve upon the story with a vieW to save D, tho eldest Son of the landlord. The High Court, therefore, set\n\naside the conviction of the accused and aquitted them.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\n HELD : In the present ase, the prosecution witnesses hiive come out with two iDCODSis.tent versions of the occurrence. One version of.the occurrence is contained in the evidence of the witnesses in Court, while the other version is contained in their statements made before the police. According to the version given before the Court, it was P, who shot dead the deceased while according to other version, it was G of villqe Ramana, who was responsible for the crime. Again, according to the version given in Court, the occurrence was witne§Cd by A. As against that, the version con-· in the police statement was that A had not witnessed the occurrence. Jn v~ of these contradictory versions, the High Court _rightly set aside the conviction and there is no groul'!d for interference by this Court in the present appeal.\n\n(6648-D] . ·\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. I & 2 of 1971.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 13th May 1970 of the Punjab arid Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 170 and 201 of 1970. ·\n\nJanarda~ Sharma and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant. Nurutldin Ahmed and U. P. Singh, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n'H KHANNA; J. Pargat Singh (31) of village Taraori was convicted by learned Sessions Judge Kamal under sl:ction 302 Indian Penal Code .and was sentenced to death. Gurdial Singh (35) of village Ramana was\n\nalso tried along with Pargat Singh and was convicted under section 302 read with section 34 Indian Penal Code. He too was sentenced to death. On appeal and reference the Punjab and Haryana High Court set aside the conviction of both the accused and acquitted them. The State of Haryana has filed these appeals against the acquittal of the two accused by special leave.\n\nThe prosecution also filed charge sheet against Gurdia:t !; ingh of village Taraori, a brother of Pargat Singh accused, but as he was found to be insane, the committing magistrate directed. that his case be separated and a separate challan be filed against him. The said Gurdial Singh of village Taraori was, in the meanwhile, directed to be sent to the hospital for his treatment.\n\nThe prosecution case is that Avtar Kaur (PW 3) was married about 33 years ago to Gurinder Singh of village Shamgarh. 'Gurinder Singh was one of the biggest landlords of Kamal district and belonged to a family of Chiefs. About four years after the marriage, Lal Singh, who was aged 65 or 70 years at the time of the present occurrence, was brought by Gurinder Singh to reside with him in Shamgarh. Lal Singh was previously in the service of the mother of Avtar Kaur. Lal Singh was respected like a Guru and was known as Dadaji.\n\nGurinder Singh 'used to consult Lal Singh deceased with regard to his affairs and generally acted upon the advice of Lal Singh. When a ceiling on landswas imposed, Gurinder Singh, with a view to save some land and prevent its being declared surplus, transferred 23 acres ofland situated in village Taraori to Pargat Singh accused and an equal area of land in that viii: age to Gurdial Singh, brother of Pargat Singh. Parga! Singh and Gurdial Singh were sons of Sher Singh, maternal uncle of Gurinder Singh, and used to reside with him. After the land had been transferred by Gurinder Singh to Pargat Singh and Gurdial Singh, they shifted to village Taraori which is at a distance of about 4 miles from Shamgarh.\n\nThey, however, used to visit Shamgarh o.ff and on.\n\nGurinder Singh died a few months before the present occurrence.\n\nHe was survived by his widow Avtar Kaur and three sons Daljit Singh, Gurjeet Singh and Sukhjeet Singh and two daughters Sukhiwan Kaur and Harjiwan Kaur. Sukhjeet Singh and Harjiwan Kaur were tlte only two unmarried children. Sukhjeet Singh was a student of Doon School Debra Dun, while Harjiwan Kaur was studying in another 'school in Debra Dun. Both of them were present in their house at Shamgarh during the days of the present occurrence having come there during winter vacation. The h, ouse is also described during the course,\n\nof evidence as a fort. Daljit Singh and Gurjeet Singh also used to live in that house. Sukhjiwan Kaur too was present there on the night of occurrence.\n\nAfter the death of Gurinder Singh, Avtar Kaur used to consult Lal Singh in every matter. Gurinder Singh at the time of his death was constructing a cold storage. One chamber of the cold storage had been completed during the life time of Gurinder Singh, while the other chamber yet remained to be completed. Some money was required by Avtar Kaur in that connection. Lal Singh deceased accordingly called Pargat Singh accused about 15 days before the present occurr- ence and told him that as Gurinder Singh had given to him and his brother land worth rupees two lakhs, they should help Avtar Kaur when she was in need of money. Pargat Singh accused then stated that he had nothing to do with that. He also abused Lal Singh and told him that he was nobody to demand the money. Lal Singh deceased then threatened Pargat Singh ihat he would get a suit filed through Sukhjeet Singh, who had recently become major in respect of the land which had been given to Pargat Singh and his brother Gurdia\\ Singh.\n\nDaljit Singh eldest son of Gttrinder Singh, it is stted, was a spend thrift. Lal Singh deceased and Gurinder Singh used to tell Daljit Singh not to spend too much money. After the death of Gurinder Singh, Da\\jit Singh dem.anded more land in addition to the land which had been given to him by Gurinder Singh in his life time. Demand was also made by Daljit Singh for more money. There used to take place quarrels between Avtar Kaur and Daljit Singh on that account.\n\nThe case of the prosecution further is that on December, 11, 1968 Avtar Kaur, Sukhjiwan Kaur, Harjiwan Kaur, Sukhjeet Singh and Lal Singh took their meals in the dining room on the ground floor of the fort. Gurjeet Singh was on that day away to Ferozepore to attend a marriage. After finishing the meals at 9 15 p.m. Avtar Kaur and her two daughters went to her bed room on the upper storey. Sukhjeet Singh bad a room on the ground floor and he went to that room. AL. about 1 () p.m. Avtar Kaur after finishing othe.r work went to the room of Lal Singh. Lal Singh at that time sat on his cot, while Avtar Kaur sat nearby on a chair. Avdr Kaur during the course of her talk asked Lal Singh to settle the miltter about Daljit Singh and to give to him what was his due. When Avtar Kaur and Lal Singh deceased were talking, they heard the sound of a car in the outer courtyard. Daljit Singh, Pargat Singh, Pargat Singh's brother Gurdial Singh, GurdiaU\n\nSingh of Ramana and Rajinder Singh alighted from the car. Rajinder Singh belongs to village Bairsal. He had borrowed Rs. 3,000 in connection with the election of Chanda Singh to the Haryana Legislative Assembly in 1968. Earlier on that day Rajinder Singh refunded Rs. 1,500 out of the amount of Rs. 3,000 to Ram Lal, who was working as an accountant of Gurinder Singh's estate. As Daljil Singh, Rajinder Singh and Gurdial Singh of Ramana had earlier in the day gone for Shikar, Sukhjeet Singh came out and enquired from Daljit Singh as to what he had shot. Sukhjeet Singh was then told by Daljit Singh that , he had been able to shoot four partridges. Daljit SiTigh then went upstairs to his own room taking his gun with him. Sukhjeet Singh .also went to his own room. About 5 or 10 minutes thereafter Sukhjeet Singh and Avtar Kaur heard some footsteps going up the staircase.\n\nParga! Singh, his brother Gurdial Singh and Gurdial Singh ofRamana then came inside the room wherein Avtar Kaur was talking to Lal Singh deceased. Pargat Singh was holding a double barrel gun P2 in his hand. The said gun belonged to Rajinder Singh. Avtar Kaur en quired from Pargat Singh and others as to why they had come at such .fate hour. Pargat Singh replied that they had come back after Shikar.\n\nLal Singh then asked them as to whether all three of them had become Shikaris. Parga! Singh replied in the affirmative and said that they would make a shikar of Lal Singh. Parga! Singh at the same time fired at Lal Singh. Before the shot was fired at Lal Singh, Pargat Singh and his two companions made some signs to each other. Lal Singh on receipt of the shot fell down on the spot and died soon thereafter. Avtar Kaur was stunned because of the incident. Pargat Singh and his two coml'anions then left. Harjiwan Kaur, Sukhjiwan Kaur and Sukhjeet\n\nSingh on hearing the gun shot came to the room where Avtar Kaur was present and were told about the occurrence by her. Avtar Kaur was then taken to her room. Sukhjeet Singh was directed by her to call caccountant Ram Lal. When Ram Lal came there he was told by Avtar Kaur that Parga! Singh bad killed Lal Singh by firing a shot with a ·doul)le barrel gun. Ram Lal was told to go to the police station and 110 bring the police. Ram Lal then woke up the car driver and went in 'the car towards the police station. When the car reached near the bus. stop of village Shamgarh on the Grand Trunk Road, Ram La\\ saw a police party which included Sub Inspector Ram Rikh. Ram Lal then told the Sub Inspector that Lal Singh had been murdered in the fort and that Ram Lal bad been deputed by Avtar Kaur to call t)le Sub Inspector. Sub Inspector Ram Rikh then went to the fort where Avtar Kaur made statement PD at 3 a.m. to him. The said statement was sent \"to police station Butana at a distance of 61 miles from the place of occurrence and formal first information report PJ was prepared on the basis of statement PD at 3 45 p.m. Inquest report relating to the dead body was thereafter prepared by the Sub Inspector. The dead body . was sent to the mortuary in Karna!. Post mortem.examination on the\n\ndead body was performed by Dr. Jagdeep Singh at 4 30 p.m. on mber 12.\n\nOn the morning following the occurrence, i.e. on December 12, 1968, a number. of persons including Daljit Singh, Rajinder Singh, 1'argat Singh and the latter's brother Gurdial Singh assembled at the\n\nfort. Sub Inspector Ram Rikh did not arrest Parga! Singh or his brother Gurdial Singh, Daljit Singh then produced gun P2 of Rajinder Singh• along with an empty cartridge which had been fired from that gun.\n\nThese articles were taken into possession.\n\nDuring the course of investigation, it is stated, a counter version of the occurrence came to light, Sub Inspector Ram Rikh and the Deputy Superintendent of Police who was supervising the investigation kept Superintendent of Police Brar (OW 1) informed of the investigation. Final report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal\" Procedure in court was filed by Sub Inspector Ram Rikh. In that report only Gurdial Sinh of village Ramana was shown as the culprit.\n\nThe names of Parga! Smgh and his brother Gurdial Singh were mentioned in column No. 2 of the challan. The reason for that, according to Sub Inspector Ram Rikh, was that those two persons had been found on investigation to be innocent.\" The two accused in their statements under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure denied the prosecution allegations which appeared against them in the prosecution evidence. In defence the accused examined Superintendent of Police S. S. Brar who deposed that in view of the fact that there were two versions of the occurrence, he ordered-that before any arrest was made, a thorough probe should be made in the matter to find out the truth.\n\nThe trial court accepted. the prosecution version of the occurrence and, in doing so, relied upon the evidence of Avtar Kaur. It was further held that the evidence of Avtar Kaur was corroborated by that of Sukhjeet Singh and Harjiwan Kaur, who had deposed that when they looked out on hearing the gun shot, they .saw Parga! Singh holding a gun and two Gurdial Singhs going downstairs. Regarding the counter version of the occurrence which appeared from the police statements of Avtar Kaur, Sukhjeet Singh and Harjiwan Kaur, the trial court .held that compared to that version, the version as given in the evidence\n\nof the above witnesses in court was reliable. In the opinion of the trial court, the investigauon of the case was tainted and unfair. The argument that there was delay in recording the report was rejected.\n\nOn appeal the learned Judges of the High Court found that the circumstances of the case showed that the first information report\" was recorded subsequent to the time at which it. purported to have beell' recorded and was the result of deliberation and consultation.\" The High Court also found that the witnesses, upon whose testimony reliance had been placed by the trial court, had supported a\"nother version of th~ occurrence. It was found that an attempt had been made to improve upn the story with a view to save Daljit Singh, eldesr son of Avtar Kaur, Ocular evidence was also found t<' be not in con-\" sonance with.the medical evidence. In the result the High Court accepted the appeal, set .aside the conviction of the accused and acquitted them.\n\nWe have heard Mr . .Janardan Sharma on behalf of the a1-pellant- State and Mr. Nuruddin on behalf of the accused, respondents and\n\nare of the opinion that the judgm, nt of the High Court calls for no 1nterference. ·\n\nIt is not disputed that, Lal Singh deceased died as a result of gun shot wound, Dr. Jagdeep Singh who p.rformed p)st mortem examination on the dead body found \"a single oval wound of entry with\n\n\"irrcular _inverted margins, 11 11 n trnsverse diameter and 11 .. in vertical diameter, placed on the right side of the neck, just above the calvicle about half inch from the mid-line. The margins of the wound showod blackening and scorching. Hair of beard were not singed. The wound was directed backwards and downwards and towards the mid- 1ine producing extensive laceration of.underlying tissues and fracture •of calvicle bone of right side. Right pleura was ruptured on the top -and the pleural cavity contained large amount of blood. Upper lobe of right lung was lac.rated completely, Middle and lower lobes were 10ontused, showing bleeding on the surface. A pirt of the projectile, lying on the right side of the thoracic cavity, was recovered from mediastinum and two from the left lung, which was also showing haemor- , rhages at various parts. In the n\\ediastinum big vassels were ruptured 'at many places and mediastinum was found containing large amount of clotted blood.\" The injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course •Of nature to cause death.\n\nThe case of the prosecution is that it was Parga! Singh accused who fired shot at Lal Singh and thus killed him, The prosecution for this purp)se relied upon tho ocular evidence of Avtar Kaur (PW 3), who \"in thi: course of her dcp:>sition supp:>rted the prosecution case as given above, The High Court did not place reliance upon the testimony of this witness, and we find no sufficient ground to take a different view, Avtar Kaur was confronted with her statement made before the police.\n\nJn that statemont Avtar Kaur stated that after taking her meals, she went to her daughter's room and slept there, It was further stated by Avtar Kaur that on the night of occurrence at about 10 or II p, m.\n\nRupinder Kaur, wife of Daljit Singh, came to Avtar Kaur and woke her up. Rupinder Kaur also told Avtar Kaur that Daljit Singh was -calling her below in the drawing room, Avtar Kaur further state.d before the police that she had been told by Gurdial Singh of Ramano that in a drunken state he had shot dead Lal Singh deceased and he h> pardoned. Acc>rding to that statemont of Avtar Kaur, she imme- .diately directed that police b> called and thoreupon Gurdial Singh of\n\n<village Ramana tried to run away, but he was secured by Pargat Singh .and Daljit Singh. Daljit Singh also snatched the gun from, his hand, [tis thus plain that the version given by Avtar Kaur in her statement l>>fore the p )]ice was materially different. In view of that fact not much reliance can obviously b: placed upon the testimony of Avtar Kaur in court.\n\nAnothor fact of which note may, bo taken is that, according to Avtar Kaur, she was sitting on a chair in the room of Lal Singh and it was while sitting on that chair that she saw the occurrence.\n\nNo such chair was found in that room when /iub Inspector Ram Rikh arrived there on the night of occurrence. It is also nobody's -case that any chair wa• remJved from that room after the occurrence.\n\nHAllYANA V GURDIAL SINGH {Khanna, J.) 663\n\nTh' .ab1cace of the chair in th1t ro'm creates considerable doubt ab, ut lhe correctness of the evidence of Avtar Kaur .\n\n._, The prosecution has sought corroboration of the evidence of Avtar\n\n.IUlur from the testimony of Sukhjeet Singh(PW .4) and Harjiwan Katir, (PW S), accl'rding tq whom they saw Parga! Singh holding a gun and two Uurdial Singhs 'going down the stairs after the occurrence. The . vcmon of these witnesses in their statements before the police was,\n\nhowever, materially different. Sukhject Singh stated before the P'lice tliatllll bing the drawing room he enquired from Daljit Singh as to~ was the matter and that Daljit Singh then replied that Gurdial Sil!Jh :had shot dead Lal Singh. The witness also stated before the police that Gurdial Singh of village Ramana was lying at the foot ofAvtar Kaur and was saying that under intoxication he had fired the shot and he be plrdoned. Harjiwan Kaur in her statement made before the police stated that she had not seen anybody going or coming. She had also not heard the sound of any gun shot. According to that statement, she, her mother and sister were sleeping in her room on the night of occurrence when Rupinder Kaur came and woke them up.\n\n. The High Court also gave cogent reasons for arriving at the conclusion that the first information report appeared to have been reeorded much later and not at the time it purp, rted to have been done. Police station Butana is at a distance of about I 3 miles from Kamal. Tho two places are connected by metalled road on which buses ply frequently.\n\nCopy of the first information report was received by the Ilaka magistrate at Kamal at 2 p.m. If the formal first information report had, in fact, been preplred at 3 45 a.m. it is not explained as to why the copy of the same was not delivered to the magistrate on the morning of December 12, 1968. Likewise, if the inquest report was prepared by Sub Inspector Ram Rikli shortly after recording report PD at 3 a.m., there is no sufficient reason as to why the dead body which was sent in th• trQ!ly of a tractor to Karna! should be brought to the doctor not before 3·55 p.m. The evidence that it took time to get the tractor ready has not b'en accepted by the High Court and we are not inclined to take a different view.\n\nThere is another fact which also indicates that on the morning of December 12, 1968 the P'lice had no material with it about the complicity of Parga! Singh for the murder of Lal Singh deceased. Pargat\n\nSingh was admitiedly amongst those persons who assemblea at the house of Avtar Kaur on the morning of D.:cember 12, 1968. Although Sub Imp:ctor Ram Rikh noticed his presence, he did not arrest Parga!\n\nSingh. It seems rather difficult to believe that if the first information\n\nrepart had. been recorded before the assemblage of different persons including Parga! ingh on the momi'!g of J?ccember 12, 1968 and th.e name of Pargat Singh had been menlloned ID that report as the assailant of Lal Singh, the plice Sub Inspector would not take him into custody.\n\nReliance was placed by the trial court upon the statement of Pargat Singh made before the committing magistrate that on December JI,\n\n1968 he had gone to the room of Lal Singh to pay respects. There is, however, nothing in that statement to show that it related to a visit at day time or at night time. No incriminating inference can in the circumstances be drawn from that statement against Parga! Singh.\n\nThe present is a case wherein the prosecution witnesses have come out with two inconsistent versions of the occurrence. One version of the occurrence is contained in the evidence of the witnesses in court, while the other version is contained in their statements made before the police. According to the version given in court, it was Parga! Singh who shot dead the deceased, while according to the other version it was Gurdial Singh of Ramana who was responsible for the crime.\n\nAgain, according to the version given in court, the occurrence was witnessed by Avtar Kaur. As against that, the version contained in the police statement was that Avtar Kaur had not witnessed the occurrence. In view of these contradictory versions, the High Court, in our opinion, rightly came to the conclusion that the conviction of the accused could not be sustained. We see no ground to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. The appeals fail and are dismised.\n\ns.c.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nB ,", "total_entities": 85, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF HARYANA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GURDIAL SINGH AND PARGAT SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GURDIAL SINGH AND PARGAT SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 19, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF HARYANA\n\nGURDIAL SINGH AND PARGAT SINGH\n\nMarch 19, 1974."}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Sec. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 273, "end_char": 279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Janarda~ Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2453, "end_char": 2468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Janarda~ Sharma and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": ".Janardan Sharma"}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2473, "end_char": 2487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Janarda~ Sharma and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Nurutldin Ahmed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2508, "end_char": 2523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nurutldin Ahmed and U. P. Singh, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2528, "end_char": 2539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nurutldin Ahmed and U. P. Singh, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "'H KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2607, "end_char": 2616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n'H KHANNA; J. Pargat Singh (31) of village Taraori was convicted by learned Sessions Judge Kamal under sl:ction 302 Indian Penal Code .and was sentenced to death."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2723, "end_char": 2740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Gurdial Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2770, "end_char": 2783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurdial Singh (35) of village Ramana was\n\nalso tried along with Pargat Singh and was convicted under section 302 read with section 34 Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "Gurdial Singhs"}}, {"text": "Pargat Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2834, "end_char": 2846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurdial Singh (35) of village Ramana was\n\nalso tried along with Pargat Singh and was convicted under section 302 read with section 34 Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "1'argat Singh"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2871, "end_char": 2882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2893, "end_char": 2903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2904, "end_char": 2921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Punjab and Haryana High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2982, "end_char": 3011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal and reference the Punjab and Haryana High Court set aside the conviction of both the accused and acquitted them."}}, {"text": "State of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3081, "end_char": 3097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Haryana has filed these appeals against the acquittal of the two accused by special leave."}}, {"text": "Gurdia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3230, "end_char": 3236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution also filed charge sheet against Gurdia:t !;", "canonical_name": "Gurdial Singhs"}}, {"text": "Taraori", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3258, "end_char": 3265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ingh of village Taraori, a brother of Pargat Singh accused, but as he was found to be insane, the committing magistrate directed."}}, {"text": "Gurdial Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3453, "end_char": 3466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Gurdial Singh of village Taraori was, in the meanwhile, directed to be sent to the hospital for his treatment.", "canonical_name": "Gurdial Singhs"}}, {"text": "Avtar Kaur", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3594, "end_char": 3604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case is that Avtar Kaur (PW 3) was married about 33 years ago to Gurinder Singh of village Shamgarh. '"}}, {"text": "Gurinder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3646, "end_char": 3660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case is that Avtar Kaur (PW 3) was married about 33 years ago to Gurinder Singh of village Shamgarh. '", "canonical_name": "Gttrinder Singh"}}, {"text": "Shamgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3672, "end_char": 3680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case is that Avtar Kaur (PW 3) was married about 33 years ago to Gurinder Singh of village Shamgarh. '"}}, {"text": "Kamal district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3734, "end_char": 3748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurinder Singh was one of the biggest landlords of Kamal district and belonged to a family of Chiefs."}}, {"text": "Lal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3822, "end_char": 3831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About four years after the marriage, Lal Singh, who was aged 65 or 70 years at the time of the present occurrence, was brought by Gurinder Singh to reside with him in Shamgarh."}}, {"text": "Avtar Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4019, "end_char": 4029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Singh was previously in the service of the mother of Avtar Kaur."}}, {"text": "Dadaji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4084, "end_char": 4090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Singh was respected like a Guru and was known as Dadaji."}}, {"text": "Parga! Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4510, "end_char": 4522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parga!", "canonical_name": "1'argat Singh"}}, {"text": "Sher Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4554, "end_char": 4564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh and Gurdial Singh were sons of Sher Singh, maternal uncle of Gurinder Singh, and used to reside with him."}}, {"text": "Daljit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4978, "end_char": 4990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was survived by his widow Avtar Kaur and three sons Daljit Singh, Gurjeet Singh and Sukhjeet Singh and two daughters Sukhiwan Kaur and Harjiwan Kaur.", "canonical_name": "Daljit SiTigh"}}, {"text": "Gurjeet Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4992, "end_char": 5005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was survived by his widow Avtar Kaur and three sons Daljit Singh, Gurjeet Singh and Sukhjeet Singh and two daughters Sukhiwan Kaur and Harjiwan Kaur."}}, {"text": "Sukhjeet Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5010, "end_char": 5024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was survived by his widow Avtar Kaur and three sons Daljit Singh, Gurjeet Singh and Sukhjeet Singh and two daughters Sukhiwan Kaur and Harjiwan Kaur.", "canonical_name": "Sukhjeet\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Sukhiwan Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5043, "end_char": 5056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was survived by his widow Avtar Kaur and three sons Daljit Singh, Gurjeet Singh and Sukhjeet Singh and two daughters Sukhiwan Kaur and Harjiwan Kaur.", "canonical_name": "Sukhjiwan Kaur"}}, {"text": "Harjiwan Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5061, "end_char": 5074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was survived by his widow Avtar Kaur and three sons Daljit Singh, Gurjeet Singh and Sukhjeet Singh and two daughters Sukhiwan Kaur and Harjiwan Kaur."}}, {"text": "Debra Dun", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5258, "end_char": 5267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sukhjeet Singh was a student of Doon School Debra Dun, while Harjiwan Kaur was studying in another 'school in Debra Dun."}}, {"text": "Sukhjiwan Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5543, "end_char": 5557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sukhjiwan Kaur too was present there on the night of occurrence.", "canonical_name": "Sukhjiwan Kaur"}}, {"text": "Gurdia\\ Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6593, "end_char": 6606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Singh deceased then threatened Pargat Singh ihat he would get a suit filed through Sukhjeet Singh, who had recently become major in respect of the land which had been given to Pargat Singh and his brother Gurdia\\ Singh.", "canonical_name": "Gurdial Singhs"}}, {"text": "Gttrinder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6636, "end_char": 6651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daljit Singh eldest son of Gttrinder Singh, it is stted, was a spend thrift.", "canonical_name": "Gttrinder Singh"}}, {"text": "Da\\jit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6814, "end_char": 6826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the death of Gurinder Singh, Da\\jit Singh dem.anded more land in addition to the land which had been given to him by Gurinder Singh in his life time.", "canonical_name": "Daljit SiTigh"}}, {"text": "December, 11, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7123, "end_char": 7141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution further is that on December, 11, 1968 Avtar Kaur, Sukhjiwan Kaur, Harjiwan Kaur, Sukhjeet Singh and Lal Singh took their meals in the dining room on the ground floor of the fort."}}, {"text": "Ferozepore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7321, "end_char": 7331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurjeet Singh was on that day away to Ferozepore to attend a marriage."}}, {"text": "Avdr Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7709, "end_char": 7718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Avdr Kaur during the course of her talk asked Lal Singh to settle the miltter about Daljit Singh and to give to him what was his due."}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8025, "end_char": 8030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daljit Singh, Pargat Singh, Pargat Singh's brother Gurdial Singh, GurdiaU\n\nSingh of Ramana and Rajinder Singh alighted from the car."}}, {"text": "Ramana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8034, "end_char": 8040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daljit Singh, Pargat Singh, Pargat Singh's brother Gurdial Singh, GurdiaU\n\nSingh of Ramana and Rajinder Singh alighted from the car."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8045, "end_char": 8059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daljit Singh, Pargat Singh, Pargat Singh's brother Gurdial Singh, GurdiaU\n\nSingh of Ramana and Rajinder Singh alighted from the car.", "canonical_name": "Gttrinder Singh"}}, {"text": "Bairsal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8117, "end_char": 8124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajinder Singh belongs to village Bairsal."}}, {"text": "Chanda Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8187, "end_char": 8199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,000 in connection with the election of Chanda Singh to the Haryana Legislative Assembly in 1968."}}, {"text": "Haryana Legislative Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8207, "end_char": 8235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,000 in connection with the election of Chanda Singh to the Haryana Legislative Assembly in 1968."}}, {"text": "Ram Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8333, "end_char": 8340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,000 to Ram Lal, who was working as an accountant of Gurinder Singh's estate.", "canonical_name": "Ram Lal"}}, {"text": "Daljil Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8406, "end_char": 8418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Daljil Singh, Rajinder Singh and Gurdial Singh of Ramana had earlier in the day gone for Shikar, Sukhjeet Singh came out and enquired from Daljit Singh as to what he had shot.", "canonical_name": "Daljit SiTigh"}}, {"text": "Daljit SiTigh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8677, "end_char": 8690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daljit SiTigh then went upstairs to his own room taking his gun with him.", "canonical_name": "Daljit SiTigh"}}, {"text": "Shikar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9297, "end_char": 9303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pargat Singh replied that they had come back after Shikar."}}, {"text": "Sukhjeet\n\nSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9846, "end_char": 9861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harjiwan Kaur, Sukhjiwan Kaur and Sukhjeet\n\nSingh on hearing the gun shot came to the room where Avtar Kaur was present and were told about the occurrence by her.", "canonical_name": "Sukhjeet\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Ram La\\", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10453, "end_char": 10460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "stop of village Shamgarh on the Grand Trunk Road, Ram La\\ saw a police party which included Sub Inspector Ram Rikh.", "canonical_name": "Ram Lal"}}, {"text": "Ram Rikh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10509, "end_char": 10517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "stop of village Shamgarh on the Grand Trunk Road, Ram La\\ saw a police party which included Sub Inspector Ram Rikh.", "canonical_name": "Ram Rikli"}}, {"text": "Karna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11108, "end_char": 11113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was sent to the mortuary in Karna!."}}, {"text": "Jagdeep Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11179, "end_char": 11192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Post mortem.examination on the\n\ndead body was performed by Dr. Jagdeep Singh at 4 30 p.m. on mber 12."}}, {"text": "December 12, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11268, "end_char": 11285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the morning following the occurrence, i.e. on December 12, 1968, a number."}}, {"text": "1'argat Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11348, "end_char": 11361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of persons including Daljit Singh, Rajinder Singh, 1'argat Singh and the latter's brother Gurdial Singh assembled at the\n\nfort.", "canonical_name": "1'argat Singh"}}, {"text": "Rajinder Singh•", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11543, "end_char": 11558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh or his brother Gurdial Singh, Daljit Singh then produced gun P2 of Rajinder Singh• along with an empty cartridge which had been fired from that gun.", "canonical_name": "Gttrinder Singh"}}, {"text": "section 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11964, "end_char": 11975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gurdial Sinh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12077, "end_char": 12089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that report only Gurdial Sinh of village Ramana was shown as the culprit.", "canonical_name": "Gurdial Singhs"}}, {"text": "Parga! Smgh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12148, "end_char": 12159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The names of Parga!", "canonical_name": "1'argat Singh"}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12413, "end_char": 12424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12432, "end_char": 12458, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. S. Brar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12608, "end_char": 12618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In defence the accused examined Superintendent of Police S. S. Brar who deposed that in view of the fact that there were two versions of the occurrence, he ordered-that before any arrest was made, a thorough probe should be made in the matter to find out the truth."}}, {"text": "Gurdial Singhs", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13170, "end_char": 13184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh holding a gun and two Gurdial Singhs going downstairs.", "canonical_name": "Gurdial Singhs"}}, {"text": ".Janardan Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14414, "end_char": 14430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Janardan Sharma on behalf of the a1-pellant- State and Mr. Nuruddin on behalf of the accused, respondents and\n\nare of the opinion that the judgm, nt of the High Court calls for no 1nterference. ·", "canonical_name": ".Janardan Sharma"}}, {"text": "Nuruddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14474, "end_char": 14482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Janardan Sharma on behalf of the a1-pellant- State and Mr. Nuruddin on behalf of the accused, respondents and\n\nare of the opinion that the judgm, nt of the High Court calls for no 1nterference. ·"}}, {"text": "Rupinder Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16569, "end_char": 16582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn that statemont Avtar Kaur stated that after taking her meals, she went to her daughter's room and slept there, It was further stated by Avtar Kaur that on the night of occurrence at about 10 or II p, m.\n\nRupinder Kaur, wife of Daljit Singh, came to Avtar Kaur and woke her up."}}, {"text": "Ramano", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16827, "end_char": 16833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rupinder Kaur also told Avtar Kaur that Daljit Singh was -calling her below in the drawing room, Avtar Kaur further state.d before the police that she had been told by Gurdial Singh of Ramano that in a drunken state he had shot dead Lal Singh deceased and he h> pardoned."}}, {"text": "HAllYANA V GURDIAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17797, "end_char": 17815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HAllYANA V GURDIAL SINGH {Khanna, J.) 663\n\nTh' .ab1cace of the chair in th1t ro'm creates considerable doubt ab, ut lhe correctness of the evidence of Avtar Kaur ."}}, {"text": "Avtar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18026, "end_char": 18031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution has sought corroboration of the evidence of Avtar\n\n.IUlur from the testimony of Sukhjeet Singh(PW .4) and Harjiwan Katir, (PW S), accl'rding tq whom they saw Parga!"}}, {"text": "Sukhjeet Singh(PW", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18062, "end_char": 18079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution has sought corroboration of the evidence of Avtar\n\n.IUlur from the testimony of Sukhjeet Singh(PW .4) and Harjiwan Katir, (PW S), accl'rding tq whom they saw Parga!"}}, {"text": "Harjiwan Katir", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18088, "end_char": 18102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution has sought corroboration of the evidence of Avtar\n\n.IUlur from the testimony of Sukhjeet Singh(PW .4) and Harjiwan Katir, (PW S), accl'rding tq whom they saw Parga!"}}, {"text": "Uurdial Singhs", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18175, "end_char": 18189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh holding a gun and two Uurdial Singhs 'going down the stairs after the occurrence.", "canonical_name": "Gurdial Singhs"}}, {"text": "Sukhject Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18341, "end_char": 18355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sukhject Singh stated before the P'lice tliatllll bing the drawing room he enquired from Daljit Singh as to~ was the matter and that Daljit Singh then replied that Gurdial Sil!Jh :had shot dead Lal Singh.", "canonical_name": "Sukhjeet\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Gurdial Sil!Jh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18505, "end_char": 18519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sukhject Singh stated before the P'lice tliatllll bing the drawing room he enquired from Daljit Singh as to~ was the matter and that Daljit Singh then replied that Gurdial Sil!Jh :had shot dead Lal Singh.", "canonical_name": "Gurdial Singhs"}}, {"text": "Kamal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19316, "end_char": 19321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Police station Butana is at a distance of about I 3 miles from Kamal."}}, {"text": "Ram Rikli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19760, "end_char": 19769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Likewise, if the inquest report was prepared by Sub Inspector Ram Rikli shortly after recording report PD at 3 a.m., there is no sufficient reason as to why the dead body which was sent in th• trQ!ly of a tractor to Karna!", "canonical_name": "Ram Rikli"}}, {"text": "Parga!\n\nSingh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20516, "end_char": 20529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although Sub Imp:ctor Ram Rikh noticed his presence, he did not arrest Parga!", "canonical_name": "1'argat Singh"}}, {"text": "Parga! ingh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20678, "end_char": 20689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "been recorded before the assemblage of different persons including Parga!", "canonical_name": "1'argat Singh"}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_665_677_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "GAMMON INDIA LTD. ETC. ETC.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\nETC.\n\nMarch 20, 1974.\n\n[A. N. RAY C.J., P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, s. N. DWIVEDI, P. K.\n\nGosWAMI AND R. S. SARKARIA JJ.] Contract Labour (Rqu/atfon and Abolition) Act, 1970-Constitutional raJidity of,-Scope and app/ialion of-Validity of the Rules made under the Act.\n\nInterpretation of statutesjusdem generis.\n\nThe Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, requires contrac~ tors to take out licenses. The Act also imposes certain duties and liabilities on the contractor, in respect of the workmen cmployCd by the contractors. The Contractor is defined as a person who undertakes to produce a given result for the establishment through contract labour or who supplied contract labour for any work of the establishment and includes a sub-contractor. It was contended that the application of the Act is in respect of pcndina; work of construction amounts to unreasonable restriction on the right of the contractors violating article 19(1){&) of the Constitution.\n\nItw1~Jurth, rcorttended that th\" f~ prescribed for registration, licences, or renewal of licences amount to a tax and arc, therefore, beyond the rule.making powers or the Central and State Government.\n\nIt was further contended that the _provisions of the Act are unconstitutional and unreasonable because of impracticability of implementation. Provisions in regard to canteens, rest rooms, latrines and urinals as contemplated by sections 16 and 17 of the Act read with Central Rules 40 to 56 and rule 25(2) (vi) arc incapable of implementation and enormously expensive as to amount to unreasonable restrictions within the meaning of Article 19(1)(g).\n\nThe provisions contain in Central Rule 2S(2)(v)(b) were challenged as unreasonable.\n\nRule 25 (2){v)(a) provides that wages and other conditions of service of workmen who do same or similar kind of work as the workmen employed directly in the principal employer's establishment shall be the same. Jn case of disagreement it is prcvided that the same shall be decided by the Chief Labour Cmr.missionCr whose decision shall be final. Rule 25(2)(b) states that in other cases the wage rates holidays and conditions of service of the workmen of the contractor would be such as may be specified by the Chief Labour Coissioner. There is no provision for appeal.\n\nIt was also contended that the provisions in section 14 witk regard to forfeiture of security are unconstitutional The Validity of rule 24 which requires deposit of Rs. 30/- per workmen is chall~ as void under Articles 14 and 19(1Xf) both on the ground that the same is arbitrary and also . because there is no obligation on the Government to pay to the work.men or to utilise fer the workmen any part of the security deposit so forfeited. It was also contended that section 34 of the Act which empowers the Central Government to make any provision not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act for removal of difficulty is unconstitutional on the ground of excessive i; lelegatlon. The intervener challenged section 28 of the Act conferring power on the Government lo appoint Inspectors as conferring arbitrary and unguided power.\n\nIt was also contended that the petitioners were not contractors within the mear.~ ing of the Act since the work of the petitioner is not any part of the work of the principal employer nor was the work normally done in the premises of the establishment of the principal employer.\n\nHELD : (1) The contention that the application of the Act to the pending work of construction amounts to unreasonable restriction Was negatived on the ground that the bill was introduced in 1967 and it was passed in 1970. The subject matter of the legislation is not contract; it is contract labour. There is no unreasonableness in its application to pending contracts. The pendency of contract is not arelevant consideration. There is no retrospective operation. There is no material to show that the petitioner would suffer. The contractors have not shown the contract to show the rates of work. It is also not known whether the petitioners have clauses in the contract to ask for increase of rates in changed circumstqnces.\n\n[671F]\n\n(2) The fees_ prescribed for registration, licences and renewal of licenses do not am >unt , to a levy of taxes. The Government gives service iil regard to the licences anj registration. [671H] 14-M 45 Sup Cl/75\n\n(3) There is no arbitrary power or excessive delegation of Jegislativ~ authority ln reg1rd togrant of licences. The Act and the Rules provide ample guidelines as to the grant and the terms and conditions of licence. Section 15 of the Act confers a right of appeal on any person who is aggrieved by any order refusing a licence or if there is a revocation or suspension of a licence. l672A-B]\n\n(4) The conditions of contract labour has been engaging the attention of various Committees for a long time. The benefits conferred by the Act and the Rules are social legislative measures. The various measures which are challenged as unreasonable, namely, the provisions for canteens, rest rooms, fa\"cilities for supply of drinking water, latrines, urinals, first aid facilities are amenities for the dignity of human labour. - The measure is in the interest of the public. There is a rational relation between the impugned Act and the object to be achieved and the provisions are not in excess of that object. The classification is not arbitrary. There is no violation of Article 14. It is an unproved allegation as to whether it is impracticable to provide a canteen. On the face of it there is no impossibility. Possibility is presumed unless imp.ossibi!ity is proved. It is not an unreasonable provision to requi, re a rest room, if the labourers are required to halt at night at the place of work. [672D-E~\n\n673A]\n\n(5) Rule 25(2)(v)(b) contains an explanation which Jays down that while determining the wages and conditions of service the Chief Labour Commissioner shall have regard to wages and conditions of service in similar employments. This is reason able. It wiJI be question from statute to statute from fact to fact as to whether abse nce of a provision for appeal makes the statute bad. The Commissioner of Labour has special knowledge. It is not difficult to determine and decide th~ questions under rule 25(2)(v)(b).\n\nAbsence of a provision for appeal is not unreasonable in the con text of the provisions in this statute. The provisions for forfeiture of security without provisions for spending the amount on workers is constitutionally valid because forfeiture amounts to departmental penalty. The rate of Rs. 30/- per workman does not offend Article 14. Further, orders for forfeiture are appea1able and forfeiture itself is after giving the party reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed.\n\n[674A~C; 676AJ\n\n(6) Section 34 of the Act does not amount to excessive delegation. [676GJ\n\n(7) The Act was passed to prevent the exploitation of contract Jabour and also to introduce better conditions of work. The underlying policy of the Act is to abolish contract labour wherever possible and practicable and where it cannot be abolished altogether the policy of the Act is that the working conditions of the con tract Jabour should be so regulated as to ensure payment of wages and provision of essential amenities. Section 10 of the Act deals with abolition while the rest of the Act deals mainly with the regulation. [6690-AJ\n\nSince the validity of section 28 was challenged by an Intervener and not by the petitionen, the in tcrvcner was not permitted to challenge since an intervener cannot raise points which arc not canvassed by the Petitioners in' the pleadings. [677A]\n\n(8) The contention of the petitioners that they are not contractors within the meaning of the Act is. unsound. Establishment is understood as including/ the work site. The construction work which the contractor undertakes is the work of the est a~ blishment. [669F]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 202/413/71, 92, 320,\n\n330. 375, 391, 509 & 626-627/72 and 114, 315-316/73, and 1906 of 1973.\n\n(Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).\n\nMr. G. L. Sanghi and Mr. I. N. ShrojffOr the Petitioners (In W.P.\n\nNos. 413/71 509/72) & Intervener No. 2: Mr. Soli Sorabjee, Mr. V. M. Tarkundde (In 202/73, Mr. K. S.\n\nRamamurthi (Jn 375/72). M/s. D. R. Thadani (In 375/72) and G. L.\n\nSanghi (In 320/72 & 330/72), with M/s C. M. Mehta and B. R. Agarwala, (Mr. C. M. Mehta did not appear in 375172) for the petitioners (In WPs. Nos. 320, 330, 375, 391of1972 and WP No. 202/73).\n\nM/s S. K. Mehta, M. Qamaruddin. K. R. Nagraja and Vinot Dhawan for the Petitioners. (In W. Ps. Nos. 626-27/72.\n\nMr. Vineet Kumar with M/s. G. L. Sanghi and S, N, Trivedi (from 21-2-1974) for the Petitioners (In W. P. No. 114/73) Mr. S. N. Singh for the Petitioners (In W. P. Nos. 313-316/73) Mr. J. D. Jain, for the Petitioners (In W. P. No. 1906/73) M/s D. K. Singha an<l K. R. Nambiar, for the Petitioners (In W. P.\n\nNo. 92/71) Dr. L. M. Singhvt with Mr. S. M. Jain for the Respondent No. I (In W. P. No. 413/71) Mr. L. N. Sinha, Mr. M. C. Bhandare (for the State of Maharashtra in 320 & 330/73), Mr. K. L. Hathi (for the State of Gujarat in WP No. 202/71) with M/s. R. N. Sachthey and M. N. Shrojffor Respondent No. 2 (In W. P. No. 413/71) & Respdt. No. I (In W. P. No. 509/\n\n72) and (In W. P. No. 626-627/72 Respdts. Nos. 1-2 (In W. P. 202/\n\n72) WP. No. 1906 -73, AND 92/71): Mr. G.B. Pai with Mrs. Urmila Kapoor, Miss Kamlesh Bansal, and Mrs:. Shobhna Kikshit for Respdt. No. 3 (In W. P. No 320/72): Mr.\n\nR. Ram Reddy with Mr. P. P. Rao for the Respdt. No. 5 (In W. P.\n\nNo. 202/71). Mr. S. M. Jain for Respdt. No. 3 (In W. P. 202/71)\n\nMr. R. C. Prasad for Respdt. No. 8 (In W. P. 202/71) Mr. A. V.\n\nRangam and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respdt. No. 7 (In W. P. 202/71)\n\nM/s Santosh.Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee for the Respdt. No. 6 (In W. P. No. 202/71):\n\nMr. M.N. Shroff for the Respdt. No. 10 (In W. P. No. 202/71): Mr. I. N. Shrojffor the Respdt. 11 (In W. P. No. 202/71): Mr •. veerappa for the Respell. 12 (In W. P. No. 202/71) M/s G. Dass and B. Parthasartht for the Respdt. 13 (In W. p, No.\n\n2D2/71}\n\nMr. P. hm Reddy with P. P. Rao for the Applicant/Intervener (The State of Andhra Pradesh in W. P. 413/71)\n\nM/s. Sharad Manohar, B. P.\n\nMaheshwari and Suresh Sethi for intervener No. I (K. C. Agarwala) Mr. B. R. Awala for Intervener Nos. 3 & 4 (Gammon and Y. V. Narayanan.) Mr. N. N. Keshwanifor intervener No .. 5 (Gujarat Contractor Assn.) The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY, C. J. These petitions under Article 32 of the 0)llstitution challenge the validity of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 referred to as the Act nd of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Central Rules and Rules of the States of Rajasthan and Maharashtra.\n\nThe petitioners carry on the business of contractors for construction of roads, buildings, weigh bridges and dams.\n\nThe Act requires contractors to take out licences. The Act also imposes certain duties and liabilities on the contractors.\n\nThe Act defines in section 2 (c) a \"conlractor\" in relation to an establishment to mean a person who undertakes to produce a given\n\n668 SuPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1974] 3 ~.C.R,\n\nresult for the establishment, other than a mere supply of goods or articles of manufacture to such establishipent, through contract labour or who supplies contract labour for any work of the establishment and includes a sub-contractor. The other definitions relevant to the meaning of a contractor are establishment, principal employer and workmen.\n\n\"Establishment\" as defined in section 2 (e) of the Act means (i) any office or department of the Government or a local authority, or\n\n(ii) any place where any industry, trade, business, manufacture or occupation is carried on._\n\n\"Principal employer\" as defined in section 2 (g) of the Act means\n\n(i) in relation . to any office or department of the Government or a local authority, the head of that office or department or such other officer as the Government or the local authority, as the we may be, may specify in this behalf, (ii) in a factory, the owner or occupier of the factory and where a person has been named as the manager of the factory under the Factories Act, 1948, the person so named, (iii) in a mine, the owner or agent of the mine and where a person has been named as the manager of the mine, the person so named, and (iv) in any other establishment, any person responsible for the supervision and control of the establishment.\n\n\"Workman\" is defined in section 2 (i) of the Act to mean any person employed in or in connection with the work of any establishment to do any skilled, semi-skilled or un-skilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied.\n\nSection 2 (b) of the Act states that a workman shall be deemed to be employed as \"contract labour\" in or ; n connection with the work of an establishment, when he is hired in or in connection with such work by or through a contractor, with or. without the knowledge of the principal employer.\n\nThe petitioners contend that they are not contractors within the definition of the Act. They advance two reasons. First, the work y of the petitioners is not any part of the work of the principal employer nor is it the work \"in connection with the work of the establishment\", namely, principal employer. Second, the work of the petitioners is normally not done in the premi, es of the \"establishment\" of the principal employer.\n\nRelyini on the -definitions. counsel for the petitioners contended that establi•hment means any place where any industry, trade, G business, manufacture or occupation is carried on and1 therefore, the workmen employed by the petitioners are not contract Jabour because they are not employed in connection with the work of the establishment. The work of the establishment is, according to the petitioners, not only at the place where the business, trade, industry of the establishment is carried on bu( also the actual business or trade or industry of the establishment. The entire emphasis is placed by the Ii petiti<>ners on the words \"work of any establishment.\" By way of illustration it is said that ifa banking company which is an establish-\n\n!\\'.' ..\n\nf\\:1 tr- ' ,,\n\nIl!\n\nment which Carries on its business at Delhi employs the petitioners to construct a building at Allahabad the building to be. constructed is not the work of the bank. It is said that the only work of the bank as an establishment is banking work and, therefore, the work of construction.is not the banking work of the establishment. Therefore, the petitioners contend that the workmen. employed by the petitioners are not )\"orkmen in connection with the work of the establishment.\n\nThe contention of the petitioners is unsound. When the banking company employs the petitioners to construct a building the peti tioners<lre in relation to the establishment contractors who undertake to produce a given result for the bank. The petitioners are also persons Wh<i undertake to produce the result through contract labour.\n\nThe petitioners may appoint sub-contractors to do the work. To accede to the petitioners' contention that the c0nstructi6n work which is '!)Yay from the place where the industry, trade, businss of the es rablishment is carried on is not the work of the establishinent is to render the words \"work of any establishment\" devoid ofordinary mean' ill.g. The construction of the building is the work of the establishment. The building is the property of the establishment. Therefore, the c0nstruction work is the wi>rk <>f the establishment. That is why a workman is deemed to be employed as contract labour in connection with the work of an establishment. The place where business or trade or industry or manufacture or occupation is carried on is not s)rnonymouswith \"the work of the establishment\" when a contractor employs contract labour in connection with the work of the establish ment. The error of the petitioners lies in equating the work of the establishment with the actual place where the business; industry or trade is carried on and tlie actual work of the business, industry or trade .\n\n. It is plain that industry, trade, business, manufacture or occu pation is to expand. In connection with the expansion of establishment, buildings are constructed. The site chosen for the building is the work site of the establishment. The work site is the place where on completion of construction, the business Of the establishment will be carrie9 on. Therefore, the work at the site as understood in the definition is the work of an establishment. Establishme'nt is under stood as including the work site. The construction work which the contractor undertakes is the work or the establishment. ·\n\nThe Act was passed to prevent the exploitation of contract labour and also to introduce better conditions of work. The Act provides for regulation and abolition of contract labour: The underlying policy of the Act is to abolish contract labour, wherever possible and practicable. and where it cannot be abolished altogether, the policy qf\\he Act is that the working conditions of the contract labour should .. be so regulated as to ensure payment of wages and provision of esuntial amenities. That is why the Act provides for regulated condi\n\ntionsof work and contemplates progressive abolitioi: 11 tbe extent contempla.ted by section 10 of the Act. Section 10 of the Ac: deals with abolition while the rest of the Act deals mainly with regulation, The domina11t idea of the section 10 of the Act is to find out whether\n\ncontract labour is necessary for the in.dustry, trade, business, manufacture or occupation which is carried on in the establishment.\n\nThe Act in section IO empowers the Government to prohibit employment of contract labour in any establishment. The Government under that section has to apply its mind to various factors before the Government prohibits by notification in the official gazette, employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment. The words \"other work in any establishment\" in section 10 of the Act are important. The work in the establishinent will be apparent from section IO (2) of the Act. as incidental or necessary to the industry, trade, business. manufacture or occupation that is carried on in the establishment. The Government before notifying prohibition of contract Jabour for work which is carried on in the establishment will consider whether the work is of a perennial nature in that establishment or work is done ordinarily through regular workmen in that establishment. The words \"work of an establishment \" which are used in defining workmen as contract labour being employed in connection with the. work of an establishment indicate that the work of the establishment there is not the same as work in the establishment contemplated in section 10 of the.Act.\n\nThe words \"other work in any establishment\" in section IO are\n\no be construed as e}usdom geizeris. The expression \"other work\" m the. collection of words process, operation or other work in any es ta bhshment occurring in section IO has not the same meaning as the expression \"in connection with the work of an establishment\" spoken in relation to workmen or contractor. '\n\nA contractor under the Act in relation to an establishment is a person who undertakes to produce a given result for the establishment through contract labour. A contractor is a person who supplies contract labour for any work of the establishment . The entire context shows that the work of the establishment is the work site.\n\nThe work site is an establishment and belongs to the principal employer who has a right of supervision and control., who is the owner of the premises and the end product and from whom the contract labour receives its payment either directly or through a contractor.\n\nIt is the place where the establishment intends to carry on its business, trade, industry, manufacture', occupation after the construction is complete.\n\nAccording to the petitioners, the. contract labour employed by their sub-contractors will be within the provisions 'of the Act but when the petitioners will be engaged by a trade, or industry, the petitioners will not be a contractor and the workmen directly employed by the petitioners will not be contract labour. This is a strange and anomalous submission. The Act must be construed as a whole.\n\nThe Act must apply to contract labour in connection with the work of an establishment when the contract labour is hired by the contractor or by the sub-contractor of the contractor.\n\nI '\n\nThe expression \"work of an establishment\" meam the work site where the construction work of the establishment is carried on by the petitioners by employing contract labour. Every clause of a statute is to be construed with reference to the context and other provisions of the Act to make a consistent and harmonious meaning of the statute relating to the subject matter. The interpretation of the words will be by looking at the context, the collocation of the words and the object of the words relating to the matters. The words are not to be viewed detached from the context of the statute. The words are to be viewed in relation to the whole context. The definition of contractor, workman, contract labour, establishment, principal employer all indicate that the work of an establishment means the work site of the establishment where a building is constructed for the establishment. The construction is the work of the establishment.\n\nThe expression \"employed in or in connection with the work of the establishment\" does not mean that the operation assigned to the workmen must be a part or incidental to the work perfc rmed by the principal employer. The contractor is employed to produce the given result for. the '?enefit of the principal employer in fulfilment of the undertakmg given to him by the contractor. Therefore, the employment of the contract Jabour, namely, the workmen by the contractor is in connection with the work of the establishment. The petitioners are contractors within the meaning of the Act. The work which the petitioners undertake is the work of the establishment.\n\nThe second contention on behalf of the petitioners is that the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder are unconstitutional.\n\nIt is said that the application of the Act in respect of pending work of construction amounts to unreasonable restriction on the right of the contractors under Article 19 (I} (g). The bill was introduced in\n\n1967. It was passed in 1970, There is no unreasonablen ss in that it applies to pending contracts. The pendency of cont is not a relevant consideration. The subject-matter of the legislation is not contract. It is contract labour. There is no retrospective operation.\n\nThere are no materials to show that the petitioners will suffer. The contractors have not shown the contracts to show the rates of work.\n\nIt is also not known whether the petitioners have clauses in the contract to ask for increase of rates in changed circumstances. That is usual in contracts.\n\nThe petitioners during the years 1967 to 1970 knew that the legislative measure was going to find place in the statute book. The crucial point is that the interests of the workmen are remedied by the objects of the Act. Thoie interests are minimum labour welfare. There is no unreasonableness in the measure.\n\nThe fees prescribed for registration, licence or renewal of licences are said to amount to a tax and are therefore beyo,1d the rule-making powers of the Central and state Governments. The fees prescribed for registration,. licence and renewal of licences do not amount to a levy of tax. The Government has to bear expenses for the scheme\n\nOf regi, tration, licence. The Government gives service in regard to licences and registration. Further there is no arbitrary power or excessive delegation of legislative authority in regard to grant of licence. The Act and the Rules provide ample guideline as to the grant and terms and conditions of licence. Section 15 of the Act confers a right of appeal on any person who is aggrieved by any order refusing a licence or if there. is revocation or suspension of licence.\n\nSiwJlarly, when there is revocation of registration of an establishment or there is refusal to grant registration there is a right of appeal.\n\nCounsel for the petitioners contended that the provisions of the Act are unconstitutional and unreasonable because of impracticability of implementation. Provisions in regard to canteens, rest rooms, latrines and urinals as contemplated in sections 16 and 17 of the Act read with Central Rules 40 to 56 and Rule 25 (2) (vi) are said to be incapable of implementation and also to be enormously expensive as to amount to unreasonable restrictions under Article 19 (1) (g). No provision of the Act is impeached on that ground.\n\nThe attack is only with regard to rules.\n\nThe condition of contract labour has been engaging the attention of various committee' for a long time. The benefits conferred by the Act and the Rules are social welfare legislative meast-res. The various measures which are challenged as unreasonable namely, the provisions for canteens, rest rooms, facilities for supply of drinking water, laterines, urinals, first aid facilities are amenities for the dignity of human labour. The measure is in the interest of the public. It is for the legislature to determine what is needed as the appropriate conditions for employment of contract labour. It is difficult for the Court to im; xise its own standards of reasonableness. The legislature will be guided by the needs of the general public in determining the reasonableness of such requirements. There is a rational relation between the impugned Act and the object to be achieved and the provision is not in excess of that object. There is no violation of Article 14. The classification is not arbitrary. The legi, lature has made uniform laws for all contractors.\n\nSection 16 of the Act confers power on the Government to make rules that in every establishment to which the Act applies wherein contract labour numbering one hundred or more are employed by a contractor, one or more canteens shall be provided .and maintained by the contractor for the use of such contract labour. Rule 42 relates to canteens and Rule 43 relates to dining balls. Rule 42 states that where the contract Jabour is likely to continue for six months or more and wherein the contract labour numbers 100 or more, a canteen shall be provided as mentioned therein. This rule indicates that whore a fairly stable work goes on for six months an!l the number oflablur is 100 or more, a canteen is to be provided.\n\nIt is said that it is difficult to find space in Bombay to provide for canteens. It is also s•.: d that if a road is to be constructed, it will bl:\n\ndifficult to provide canteen. It said on behalf of the respondents that a provision for canteen is capable of performance whether in\n\nGAMMON !NOIA LTD. v. UNION (Ray, C.J.) 673\n\na city or in a desert. On the face of it, there is no imp:>ssibility.\n\nPossibility is presumed unless impossibility is proved. It is an unproved allegation as to whether it is impracticable to provide a canteen.\n\nWhell the ccnstruction work goes on, the contractor will devise ways and means to provide a canteen. The provision. for canteen is not unreasonable. It is not impracticable to have a-canteen. A city like Bombay or the construction of road is not an insurmountable feature by itself to hold either that the provision is unreasonable or impracticable.\n\nSection 17 of the Act states that in every place where contract. labour is required to halt at night in ccnnection with the work of the establishment, there shall be provided . a .rest room as mentioned therein. Rule 41 of the Central Rules states that where contract labour is likely to continue for three months or more and where contract labour is required to halt at night, rest rooms shall be provided. It is not unreasonable to provide rest room. The contractor will make necessary provision. It will be unreasonable to hold that a labourer, will be required to halt at night at the place of work but he will not have any rest room. .\n\nSection 18 of the Act sp, aks of facilities like supply of drinking water, conveniences of Jeterines, urinals and washing facilities. Rule 51 carries out the provision of the Act by stating that laterines shall be provided. The reasonableness as well as practicability of these facilities is indisputable.\n\nIt is said that the provisions contained in Rule 25 (2) (ii) are unreasonable because the licence states the number of workmen employed and if the contractor is required t<5 employ a larger number, the contractor will commit a breach of the condition. The answer is simple. The contractor will take steps to amend the licence, Sections 23 and 24 of the Act which speak of contravention of provisions regarding the employment of contract Jabour will be interpreted in the light of section 14 (I) (b) of the Act as io whether the holder of a licence has, without reasonable cause, failed to comply with the condition of the licence, If there is wrongful refusal of amendment, that is appoalable under the Act.\n\nThe provisions ccntained in Central Rule 25 (2) (v) (b) are challenged as unreasonable. Rule 25 (2) (v) (a) states that wages, conditi<'hs of service of workmen who do same or similar kind of work as the :workmen directly employed in the principal employer's establishment shaU be the same. In case of disagreement with regard to type of work, it is provided that the same shall be decided t>y the Chief Labour Commissioner whose decision shall be final. Rule 25 (2) (v) (b) states that in other cases, the wages rates, holidays and ccnditions . of service of the workmen of the contractor shall be such as may be\n\nspecified by the Chief Labour Commissioner. There is an explanation to this clause that while determining wages and conditions of service under Rule 25 (2) (v) (b) the Chief Labour Commissioner shall have regard to wages and conditions of service in similar employment. This is reasonable.\n\nThe complaint against Rule 25 (2) (v)(b) is that there is no provision for apeal. It is not difficult to determine and decide cases of this type. The Commissioner of Labour has special knowledge.\n\nIt will be a question from statute to statute, from fact to fact as to whether absence of a provision for appoal makes. the statute bad.\n\nThe provisions contained in Rule 25 (2) (v) (b) refer to wages, hours of work and conditions of serv'ce in similar employment. A provision for appeal is not inflexible. The iS>ue is simple hero. A long drawn procedure may exceed the duration of employment of the workmen. A proper standard is laid down in the explanation to Rule 25 (2) (v) (b). The absence of a provision for appeal is not unreasonable in the context of provisions here. The Commissioner shall have due regard to the wages of workmen in similar employment.\n\nThe parties are heard and the Commissioner of Labour who is specially acquainted with the conditions, applies the proper standards. There is no unreasonableness in the Rules.\n\nThe petitioners contended in the third place that the provisions contained in section 14 of the Act with regard to forfeiture of security are unconstitutional. Section 12 of the Act provides that no contrator shall undertake or execute any work except in accordance with a hcence and further that licence shall be issued on payment of fees and on deposit of a security for the due performance of the conditions as may be prescribed.\n\nSection 14 of the Act provides that if a licensing officer is satisfied on.a reference made to him or otherwise that the holder of a licence has, without reasonable cause failed to comply with the conditions subject to which the licence has been granted or has contravened any of the provisions of this Act or the Rules made thereunder then without prejudice to any other penalty to which the holder of the licence may be liable under the Act the licensing officer may, after giving the holder of the licence, an oppor-· < tunity of showing cause, revoke or suspend the licence or forfeit the. sum, if any, or any portion thereof deposited ai security for the due • performance of the conditions subject to which the licence has been granted. Rule 24 of the Central Rules relates to security. Maharashtra and Rajasthan Rules contain similar provisions. Rule 24 of the Central Rules provides that the security amount of Rs. 30/- for each of tlte workmen is to be deposited as security for the due performance of the conditions of licence and compliance with the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder.\n\nOn behalf of the J\"'titioners it is said that Rule 24 which fixes the fee of Rs. 30/- per workman is void under Articles 14 and 19 (I) (f) because it is an arbitrary sum. Secondly, it is said that there is no obligation on the Government to pay to the workmen or to utilise for the workmen any part of the security deposit so fNfeited. Thirdly, it is said that the breach of the conditions of licence or provision of the Act is made punishable under the penal provisions of the Act, viz. section 24 and yet Rule 24 unreasonably provides for the forfeiture of deposit. Fourthly, it is said that ahy breach regarding the welfare of the workmen apart from being penal is safeguarded by the requirement that the principal employer would perform the obligation and\n\n-- A\n\nGAMMON INDiA LTD. v. UNION (Ray, C.J.) 675\n\nrecover the amount from the contractor.\n\nFifthly, section 20 of the Act provides that where the benefit for contract labour is not provided by the contractor, the principal employer may provide the same and deduct the expenses so incurred from amounts payable to the contractor. Sixthly, it is said that the provision regarding forfeiture of deposit has no rational connection between the sum required to be depolll'd and the number e>f workmen nor does the same have rational nexus with the object sought te> be achieved since the Government is not bound to utilise the amount for workmen concerned. Finally, it is said that Article 14 is violated because it will work harshly against medium and weaker class of contractors who have to deposit substantial amounts before getting a contract and who further have to go on leaving in deposit with the Government substantial amounts. The security is characterised by the petitfoners as forced loan without interest.\n\nThe relevant Central Rules with regard to deposit of security are Rules 24 and 31. Rule 24 provides for deposit of security at the rate of Rs. 30/- per workmen for the due performance of the conditions of the licence and compliance with the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder. Rule 31 states that if the licensing officer is satisfied that there is no breach of the conditions of. licence or there is no order under section 14 of the Act for the forfeiture of security or any portion thereof, he shall direct the refund of the security. If there is an order directing the forfeiture of any portion of thesecurity deposit the amount forfeited shall be deducted and the balance, if any, refunded. The forfeiture under section 14 (2) of the Act is for failure to comply with the conditions subject to which the licence is granted or contravention of the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder.\n\nThe forfeiture of deposit under section 14 of the Act may be for the entire sum or any portion thereof. The forfeiture may be for the purpose of due performance of the conditions of the licence or for contravention of any provision of the Act or Rules made thereunder.\n\nIf any portion of the seourity ii forfeited, it is in relation to the extent of infraction or the degree of due performance which may be required.\n\nThe security is utilisabl~ for the due petfor_ma'!ce of the obligations or which the security is taken.Th_e words \"for the due performance of the conditions, subject to which the licence has '.been granted\" are descriptive of the security. The conditions of licence appearing in Form No. VI are that the licensee shall not transfer the licence and rates of wages shall be not less than the rates prescribed under the minimum Wages Act. The other conditions are with regard to hours . of work, wage rates and holidays and conditions of service as may be specified by the Labour Commissioner. These are some of the principal conditions. The provision for forfeiture without provision for spending the amount on workers is constitutionally valid because the forfeiture amounts to departmental penalty. Forfeiture means not merely that which is actually taken from a: man by reason. of some breach of condition but includes also that which becomes liable to be so taken as a penalty.\n\nThe rate of Rs. 30/- per workman does not offend Article 14. The rate is relatable to the classification of big and small contractors according to the number employed by them. No additional burden is imposed by the rules ..\n\nFurther orders for forfeiture are appealable. Forfeiture itself is after giving the party reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed. Secondly the condition of forfeiture is that the failure to comply with the condition i~ without reasonable cause.\n\nThe provisions of the Act with regard to forfeiture do no_t suffer from any constitutional infirmity. The rules are not inconsistent With the provisions of the Act. The forfeiture of security is for due performance or as a penalty on the licensee. The order for forfeiture is. an administrative penalty. The provisions contained in sections\n\n23 to 26 of the Act indicate that contravention of the provisions regarding employment of contract labour is punishable in Criminal Court. The Licensing Officer under section 14 of the Act is not a Court. Therefore, there is no aspect of double jeopardy.\n\nSection' 34 of the Act was challenged as unconstitutional. Section 34 of the Act provides that if any difficulty arises in gi\\'ing effect to the provisions of the Act, the Central Government may, by order,\n\npblished in the official gazette, make such provisions not inconsistent\n\nwith the provisions of the Act as appears to it to be necessary or expedient for removing the difficulty. Reliance was placed by petitioners on the decision of this Court in Jalan Tradin~ Co. v.\n\nMazdoor Union reported in [1967] 1 S.C.R. 15. Section 37 of the Act in that case authorised the Government to provide by order for removal of doubts or difficulties in giving effect to the provisions of the Act. This Court held that it is for the legislature to make provisions for removal of doubts or difficulties. The section in that case contained a provision' that the order must not be inconsistent with the PUfPoses of the Act. Another provision in the section made the order of the Government final. This Court held that in substance there was the vice of delegation of legislation to executive authority, Two reasons were given. First the section authorised the Government to determine for itself what the purposes of the Act were and to make Provisions for removal of doubts or difficulties, Second, the power to remove the doubts or difficulties by altering the provisions of the Act would in substance amount to exercise oflegislatiVe authority and that could not be delegated to an executive authority. In the Present case, neither finality nor alteration is contemplated in any order under section 34 of the Act. Section 34 is for giving effect\n\no the provisions of the Act. This provision is an application of the 1nternal functioning cif the administrative machinery.\n\nDifficulties can only arise in the implementation of rules. Therefore, section 34 of the Act does not amount to excessive delegation.,\n\n. Section 28 of the Act was challenged as conferring arbitrary and unguided power and, therefore violative of Articles 14 and 15.\n\nSection 28 of the Act confers power on the Government to appoint persons\n\nas it thinks fit to be the inspectors for the purposes of the Act and such inspector shall have power to enter at all reasonable h_ours the premises or place where contract Jabour is employed for the purpose of examining any register or record or notice and examine any person and seize or take copies of documents mentioned therein. When they have reasons to believe that an offence has been committed, they can seize or take copies. This point was taken by the Intervener. An intervener cannot raise points which are not canvassed by the petitioners in the pleading$.\n\nFor these reasons. the contentions of the petitioners fail.\n\nThe petitions are dismissed. Parties will pay and bear their own costs.\n\nP.H.P.\n\nPetitions disrriss•d:", "total_entities": 130, "entities": [{"text": "GAMMON INDIA LTD. ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GAMMON INDIA LTD. ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\nETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 20, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 72, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 20, 1974."}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. N. DWIVEDI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.N. DWIVEDI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GosWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 142, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 165, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Validity of the Rules made under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 271, "end_char": 311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 361, "end_char": 413, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 982, "end_char": 995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Validity of the Rules made under the Act", "statute": "Validity of the Rules made under the Act"}}, {"text": "sections 16 and 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1451, "end_char": 1469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1655, "end_char": 1671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2375, "end_char": 2385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 19(1Xf)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2540, "end_char": 2563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2797, "end_char": 2807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2838, "end_char": 2856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also contended that section 34 of the Act which empowers the Central Government to make any provision not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act for removal of difficulty is unconstitutional on the ground of excessive i; lelegatlon."}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3041, "end_char": 3051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4610, "end_char": 4620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5461, "end_char": 5471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6651, "end_char": 6661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6847, "end_char": 6857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7346, "end_char": 7356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7481, "end_char": 7491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8129, "end_char": 8139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8147, "end_char": 8168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8176, "end_char": 8188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. G. L. Sanghi and Mr. I. N. ShrojffOr the Petitioners (In W.P.\n\nNos.", "canonical_name": "G. L.\n\nSanghi"}}, {"text": "I. N. ShrojffOr", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8197, "end_char": 8212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. G. L. Sanghi and Mr. I. N. ShrojffOr the Petitioners (In W.P.\n\nNos.", "canonical_name": "I. N. ShrojffOr"}}, {"text": "Soli Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8283, "end_char": 8296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2: Mr. Soli Sorabjee, Mr. V. M. Tarkundde (In 202/73, Mr. K. S.\n\nRamamurthi (Jn 375/72)."}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkundde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8302, "end_char": 8317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2: Mr. Soli Sorabjee, Mr. V. M. Tarkundde (In 202/73, Mr. K. S.\n\nRamamurthi (Jn 375/72)."}}, {"text": "K. S.\n\nRamamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8334, "end_char": 8351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2: Mr. Soli Sorabjee, Mr. V. M. Tarkundde (In 202/73, Mr. K. S.\n\nRamamurthi (Jn 375/72)."}}, {"text": "D. R. Thadani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8370, "end_char": 8383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. D. R. Thadani (In 375/72) and G. L.\n\nSanghi (In 320/72 & 330/72), with M/s C. M. Mehta and B. R. Agarwala, (Mr. C. M. Mehta did not appear in 375172) for the petitioners (In WPs."}}, {"text": "G. L.\n\nSanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8400, "end_char": 8413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. D. R. Thadani (In 375/72) and G. L.\n\nSanghi (In 320/72 & 330/72), with M/s C. M. Mehta and B. R. Agarwala, (Mr. C. M. Mehta did not appear in 375172) for the petitioners (In WPs.", "canonical_name": "G. L.\n\nSanghi"}}, {"text": "C. M. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8445, "end_char": 8456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. D. R. Thadani (In 375/72) and G. L.\n\nSanghi (In 320/72 & 330/72), with M/s C. M. Mehta and B. R. Agarwala, (Mr. C. M. Mehta did not appear in 375172) for the petitioners (In WPs."}}, {"text": "B. R. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8461, "end_char": 8475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. D. R. Thadani (In 375/72) and G. L.\n\nSanghi (In 320/72 & 330/72), with M/s C. M. Mehta and B. R. Agarwala, (Mr. C. M. Mehta did not appear in 375172) for the petitioners (In WPs.", "canonical_name": "B. R. Agarwala"}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8604, "end_char": 8615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s S. K. Mehta, M. Qamaruddin."}}, {"text": "M. Qamaruddin", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8617, "end_char": 8630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s S. K. Mehta, M. Qamaruddin."}}, {"text": "K. R. Nagraja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8632, "end_char": 8645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Nagraja and Vinot Dhawan for the Petitioners. ("}}, {"text": "Vinot Dhawan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8650, "end_char": 8662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Nagraja and Vinot Dhawan for the Petitioners. ("}}, {"text": "Vineet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8716, "end_char": 8728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Vineet Kumar with M/s. G. L. Sanghi and S, N, Trivedi (from 21-2-1974) for the Petitioners (In W. P. No."}}, {"text": "S, N, Trivedi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8756, "end_char": 8769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Vineet Kumar with M/s. G. L. Sanghi and S, N, Trivedi (from 21-2-1974) for the Petitioners (In W. P. No."}}, {"text": "S. N. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8833, "end_char": 8844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "114/73) Mr. S. N. Singh for the Petitioners (In W. P. Nos."}}, {"text": "J. D. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8896, "end_char": 8906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "313-316/73) Mr. J. D. Jain, for the Petitioners (In W. P. No."}}, {"text": "D. K. Singha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8955, "end_char": 8967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1906/73) M/s D. K. Singha an<l K. R. Nambiar, for the Petitioners (In W. P.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "K. R. Nambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8973, "end_char": 8986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1906/73) M/s D. K. Singha an<l K. R. Nambiar, for the Petitioners (In W. P.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "L. M. Singhvt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9034, "end_char": 9047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "92/71) Dr. L. M. Singhvt with Mr. S. M. Jain for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. M. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9057, "end_char": 9067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "92/71) Dr. L. M. Singhvt with Mr. S. M. Jain for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "L. N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9119, "end_char": 9130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "413/71) Mr. L. N. Sinha, Mr. M. C. Bhandare (for the State of Maharashtra in 320 & 330/73), Mr. K. L. Hathi (for the State of Gujarat in WP No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9136, "end_char": 9150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "413/71) Mr. L. N. Sinha, Mr. M. C. Bhandare (for the State of Maharashtra in 320 & 330/73), Mr. K. L. Hathi (for the State of Gujarat in WP No."}}, {"text": "K. L. Hathi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9203, "end_char": 9214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "413/71) Mr. L. N. Sinha, Mr. M. C. Bhandare (for the State of Maharashtra in 320 & 330/73), Mr. K. L. Hathi (for the State of Gujarat in WP No."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9269, "end_char": 9283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "202/71) with M/s. R. N. Sachthey and M. N. Shrojffor Respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shrojffor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9288, "end_char": 9303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "202/71) with M/s. R. N. Sachthey and M. N. Shrojffor Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "I. N. ShrojffOr"}}, {"text": "G.B. Pai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9484, "end_char": 9492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1906 -73, AND 92/71): Mr. G.B. Pai with Mrs. Urmila Kapoor, Miss Kamlesh Bansal, and Mrs:."}}, {"text": "Urmila Kapoor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9503, "end_char": 9516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1906 -73, AND 92/71): Mr. G.B. Pai with Mrs. Urmila Kapoor, Miss Kamlesh Bansal, and Mrs:."}}, {"text": "Kamlesh Bansal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9523, "end_char": 9537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1906 -73, AND 92/71): Mr. G.B. Pai with Mrs. Urmila Kapoor, Miss Kamlesh Bansal, and Mrs:."}}, {"text": "Shobhna Kikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9549, "end_char": 9564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shobhna Kikshit for Respdt."}}, {"text": "R. Ram Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9610, "end_char": 9622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 (In W. P. No 320/72): Mr.\n\nR. Ram Reddy with Mr. P. P. Rao for the Respdt."}}, {"text": "P. P. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9632, "end_char": 9641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 (In W. P. No 320/72): Mr.\n\nR. Ram Reddy with Mr. P. P. Rao for the Respdt."}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9744, "end_char": 9756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 (In W. P. 202/71)\n\nMr. R. C. Prasad for Respdt."}}, {"text": "A. V.\n\nRangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9797, "end_char": 9810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 (In W. P. 202/71) Mr. A. V.\n\nRangam and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respdt."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9820, "end_char": 9833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 (In W. P. 202/71) Mr. A. V.\n\nRangam and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respdt."}}, {"text": "Santosh.Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9879, "end_char": 9897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 (In W. P. 202/71)\n\nM/s Santosh."}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9902, "end_char": 9918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee for the Respdt."}}, {"text": "M.N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9969, "end_char": 9980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "202/71):\n\nMr. M.N. Shroff for the Respdt."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shrojffor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10031, "end_char": 10046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "202/71): Mr. I. N. Shrojffor the Respdt.", "canonical_name": "I. N. ShrojffOr"}}, {"text": "veerappa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10091, "end_char": 10099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "202/71): Mr •. veerappa for the Respell."}}, {"text": "G. Dass", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10146, "end_char": 10153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "202/71) M/s G. Dass and B. Parthasartht for the Respdt."}}, {"text": "B. Parthasartht", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10158, "end_char": 10173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "202/71) M/s G. Dass and B. Parthasartht for the Respdt."}}, {"text": "P. hm Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10221, "end_char": 10232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2D2/71}\n\nMr. P. hm Reddy with P. P. Rao for the Applicant/Intervener (The State of Andhra Pradesh in W. P. 413/71)\n\nM/s. Sharad Manohar, B. P.\n\nMaheshwari and Suresh Sethi for intervener No."}}, {"text": "Sharad Manohar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10329, "end_char": 10343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2D2/71}\n\nMr. P. hm Reddy with P. P. Rao for the Applicant/Intervener (The State of Andhra Pradesh in W. P. 413/71)\n\nM/s. Sharad Manohar, B. P.\n\nMaheshwari and Suresh Sethi for intervener No."}}, {"text": "B. P.\n\nMaheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10345, "end_char": 10362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2D2/71}\n\nMr. P. hm Reddy with P. P. Rao for the Applicant/Intervener (The State of Andhra Pradesh in W. P. 413/71)\n\nM/s. Sharad Manohar, B. 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VI are that the licensee shall not transfer the licence and rates of wages shall be not less than the rates prescribed under the minimum Wages Act", "statute": "VI are that the licensee shall not transfer the licence and rates of wages shall be not less than the rates prescribed under the minimum Wages Act"}}, {"text": "sections\n\n23 to 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37884, "end_char": 37902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38061, "end_char": 38071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38209, "end_char": 38219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1967] 1 S.C.R. 15", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 38652, "end_char": 38670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38672, "end_char": 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{"document_id": "1974_3_678_686_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "KAYJAY INDUSTRIES (P) LTD.\n\nl'.\n\nASNEW DRUMS (P) LTD. & ORS.\n\nMarch 20, 1974\n\n[D. G, PALEKAR, P. N. BHAGWATI AND V; R. KRISHNA IYER, JJ,]\n\nCode o/Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908), 0.21, r.90 and State Financial Corpo ration Act, 1951, Sec. 31-Material irregularity in comluct of $a/e and sbstfllltlaf .injury to judgment-debtor, what are.\n\nThe State Finance Corporation lent a sum of Rs. 10 lacs to the first respondent on the security of a mortgage of its land etc. The first respondent having failed to repay, the Corporation applied to the District Court under the State Financial <Corporation Act, 1951, for recovering the amount by attachment and sale of the mortgaged properties. The sale proclamation was settled after notice to the parties, and after several adjournments, caused by the first respondent's dilatory tactics, the sale was held. The court felt that it was better to have some valuation report to serve as a basis and to gujde it in deciding whether the offer of Rs. 11,10,000 was grossly unjust. The first respondent did not have the properties val uc-d but the Coq>oration had the properties valued and the mortgaged proprties Wfr~ valued at about Rs. 17 lacs. Thereafter an auction was again held and the appellant was the highest bidder. His offer was, less by about Rs. 40,000/- than the amount on the previous occasion. He however agreed to raise the offer to Rs. 11,50,000/- and the court concluded the sale at that amount. The first respondent applied under 0. 21, r. 90, C.P.C. for setting aside the sale but the application was dismissed. His appeal •was allowed by the High Court.\n\nAllowing the appeal to this Court.\n\nHELD : Under s. 32(8) of the Act, the Civil Procedure Code is attracted to pro• ceedings for the realisation of the dues of the Corporation. Therefore, 0. 21, r. 90 was applicable and if there was any material irregularity in the conduct of the sale and if it caused a substantial injury to the judsment-debtor, the sale could be set \"aside. Where a court mechanically conducts the sale not bothering to see if the offer is too low and a better price could have been obtained and if in fact the price is subs- 1antially inadequate, there is both irregularity and injury. But at the same time the court should not go on adjourning the sale till a good prtce is got as otherwise, decree- holders can never get the property of judgment debtors sold. There is always considerable difference between the court sale price and market price. A court sale is a forced sale, and notwithstandi~ the competitive clement of a public auction, the best price is not always forthcommg. A valuer's repor.l though good as a basis, is not as good as an actual offer and there are bound to be variations within limit~\n\nbetween such an estimate, however careful, and the real bids by seasoned businessman. Mere inadequacy of price cannot demolish a court sale. Further, if court 'Sales are too frequently adjourned with a view to obtaining a still higher price prospective bidders will Jose fa1th in the actual sale taking place and may not attend at 1he auction. Nor is it right to judge the unfairness of the price in the light of the 'Subsequent events which were not within the knowledae of the executing court at the time of the sale. What is expected of the court is to make a realisitic appraisal . or the factors in a pragmatic way and if satisfied that in the given circumstances the bid is acceptable it should conclude the sale. The court may consider the fair value of the property, the general economic trends, the larse sum required to be produced !by the bidder, the formation of a syndicate, the futility of postponements and the possibility of litigation and several other factors depending on the facts of each case.\n\nIf the court has fairly applied its mind to the relevant considerations while accepting the final bid it is not necessary to give a speaking order nor can its order be exa •mined meticulously. [682 A-E; 683C; 684 A-F) J n the present case, the executing court had admittedly declined to affirm the highest bids on the previous occasions in its anxiety to secure a better price.\n\nWell known industrialists in the public and private sectors knew about it and bid at the auction. All interested parties were present at the a.uction and. no on4: raised any objection regarding the conduct of the sale. The Corporation could not be put off indefir1itely in recoverjn~ its dues on baseless expectations and distant prospects.\n\nThe sa!e proceedings had been' p:ndins too long and the first respondent would\n\nnot, even when given the opportunity, produce buyers by private negotiation. He .did not even producea valuer's report. He by his litigious attitude has contributed\n\n. K.~Y1AY INDUSTRIES V. A.SNEW DRUMS (Krishna lyer, J.) 679\n\n10 po!<Siblc buyers being afraid of hurdles thereafter Th f . that the executing court had committed no materi; l ir ere oe, t.t must be h.Id of the sale in accepting the highest offer of the appellant ~~u!arny m te conduct at Rs. 11,50,000/- though the market value may be over Rs •r7co1 nclud[6mg the sale acs.\n\n84G..U85 B] Naya/klta a11d Sons v. Rama11ya Das [1970] 3 S C R 1 r \\ • · , re.err~ to. . m The appeal is not against the approval of the sale b . but against the High Court's order in appeal against an ord/r thf e_, ecutmg court\n\nth~ sale, under 0. 2I. r. 90. Therefore. the question of the a t 11usmg to~~ aside to review the discretion exercised by the trial court does ncit r~~ c[Jk~; rower\n\n. Ward v. Jams. [1966] I Q.B. 273 at 293, referred to.\n\n[It is odd tbat financial organisation in the public sector should ha, e read! lent a huge amount of Rs J 0 lacs and Struggled for several years to recoup the an I r This as_P_ect c-f the matter _should receive the amtious att.c:ntion of the conc::;~d\n\nauthont~_so that J?Ubhc mncy may be hand!~ by public servants 1\\ith p bh rcsponstbthty and tor pubhc bcnefiLJ [6850-E] u c\n\nb vrLAPPELLATE J u RISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.2 I 50 ofl972.\n\nFrom the j J!dgment and decree dated the 7th/8th February, 1972 of the Uombay H1gh Court in Appeal No. 152 of 1970.\n\nSom Natlr Chatterjee, S. N. Sara/, Pramod Soroffand H. K. Puri, for the appellant. .\n\nHardayal Hardy, Suresli Parekh and B. Dutra, for respondents 1 and 2, J\\f. N. Plradke, Rameshll'ar Nath and Rajinder Norian for respondents 4 & 5. ·\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n~R.ISH:-.A In~. J. The appellant in this appeal, by ceificate is te auction purchaser whose sale has been set as1de by te Hgh _court 1n reversal of the decision of the Executing Court whtch dJsnussed the application ofthej udJment debtor( first respondent herein) underrder\n\nXXI_ rule 90, c. P. c. Although many point~ were urge~ a_nd consJder.able lime was taken in the arguments, attenuon _was pnnc1paly focus ed on one issue v.•hich we will mainly deal w1th. Of_cour; e, a bnt:f but sufficient reference wilt also be made to the other potnts. .\n\n!he Mahar:shtra State Finance Corpoftion (for :hort \"te o~od rauon\") plays the role of decree-holder tn the pren~ a~u r:n lent a sum of Rs 10 takhs to the first respondent, \\\\hih t~ - manuf; u:turing p; iV<111: limited company, in May 1961, ondtheasehc.u; rtyy by 11a r _, f building plnnt an m ~: • . Yo mortgage of its lanu, actory -; 113 had guaranteed\n\nltuate at Kalwa, District Th; na. cspondntsa~ the facts that in or atrepaym~:nt of the said loan. lt IS alo stf~ ~(l!'-nstitution but not a ut 1964 the Dena B•1nk, now a nauona t>e 1 \\he first respondent PanYto these proccding~ had also advanced 0 ty of its plant and 5m of R~. 20 laJ.; hs presumably on the sec:~~ as ect is not quite cl achmery and raw material stod<s, although 1, ant or the di&posal\n\nOf;:~_ from the CC~Ocd and is not perhaps vry-[e(~r that the rightS and re ,\n\n1S_apal. We wouiJ only hke to ma e 1 ainst the appdlant or th n.edtes of the said Bank whate\\'eC theY. are •. ag 1 e Other respondents, an: 'not dealt with tn this appca ·\n\n. ····- -~ \"\n\ni .i\n\n680.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19741 3 s.c.a.\n\nThe first respondent which had. taken the loan for an industrial purpose defaulted in making repayment and so a notice was issued to it by the fourth resporment, the Corporation, under s. 30 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) demanding prompt discharge of the liability under . the mortgage and indicating that in default of payment legal proceedings under s. 31 of the Act to realisethe dues would be undertaken. No fruitful response was forthcoming and the Corporation, therefore, made ·. an application, Miscellaneous Application No. 75 of 1965, in the District Court against respondents 1, 2 and 3, under s. 31 of the Act, seeking to levy by attachment and sale of the propertif!S covered by the mortgage, the amounts due to it. . The total amount recoverable was stated to be a little over Rs. 16lakhs, but we are not concerned with the figure as it is not in dispute before us.\n\nIn June 1966 the <.\"orporation moved the Court for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the properties which had been by then attached and to sell them by court auction.\n\nA receiver was duly appointed, who entered o.n his duties and took steps for conducting the sale. A proclamation of sale was settled after notice to the parties, on December 5, 1967, and the sale was fixed to take place on. January 8,\n\n1968. However, the sale did not take place that day and the happenings thereafter culminating in the sale on September 3, 1969, wherein the present appellant was the highest bidder, and oonsequent purchase, are the subject mater of the present appeal.\n\nWe will take a close-up of certain pivotal events on which the fate pf the appeal depends.\n\nWith the consent of both parties, the Court decided to sell in two lots, presumably because that would fetch a better price, one Jot being made up of the land aJ1d what was permanently fixed thereon, and the other the plant and machinery. There is no doubt that the items sold are of considerable value, land in that in~ dustrial area escalating in price as time passed, the machinery being imported and costly and the industry for which they were needed be.ing of growing importance for the country. Even so, let us look at the\n\npnorama of.forensicevento as they unfolded from stage to suige.\n\nOn January 11, 1966 the order for sale was made. Later, the judgment debtor applied for time to 11egotiate a private sale but failed to find a suitable buyer. On January .12, 1967, the Corporation applied for the sale of the entire unit. The sale was fixed to take place on January 8, 1968 when, at the instance of the Dena Bank, it was postponed on the plea that the machin(ry not fixed to the earth had not b!:en shown separately.\n\nIn August, 1968, the judgment debtor. again prayed for postponement to enable him to raise funds to discharge the debt privately and the District Judge acceded to the request conditionally. The prayer was made on August 7; 1968 and the Court directed the judgment debtor to deposit Rs. I! las by October, 15, 1968 and postponed the sale till the last week of October. The judgment debtor could not deposit the preliminary sum -by the time fixed. Even so,. the sale did not take place on October 28, 1968 sincethe'Corporation and the Bank wanted the description of the machinery to be inserted in the proclamation of sale.\n\nB ·\n\nbYJAY INOO~ ll~ AISNBW DRUMS (Krishna lyer, _1.) 681\n\nEarly iJJ. J)eqemblr the judgtnent debtor applied that the sale should be of the whole property in one l9t, which, was turned down by the Court on Decembet, l2; 1968 since the sale in two lots was a course already ooneento4 to by him and the move was purely dilatory. However, the judgment-debtor oved the Jligh Court and obtained stay of\n\n~~&lc, and the appeal was withdrawn by him on February 26, 1969 ; whereupon he 1iled a suit for declaration that the order for sale was without jllriedict.ion. When be found that an interim injunction .apinst holding the sale was refused, he withdrew the suit on April16,\n\n1969. Nt, turaUy, the sale fixed for May 1,1.969 could not take place for ·want ofbi(l~ although a neighbouring industrial concern, Mukund lron, pvc an' offer of Rs; 2·20 lakhs for the land and bul.ldings only, Tke next attempt was tQ hold the sale on May 16, 1969 and the' highes1 bids then oft'erod were R.s. 2lakbs for land and building and Rs. 80,000/· for the machinery. The Court considered the bids too low and preferred to adjourn the sale. This circumstance certainly discloses that the Court was alert to see that a fair price was obtained, and the fact that it was a court auction .Was' not allowed to operate to the detriment , of the judgment debtor. A sale wa:s agai..n attempted on June 5, 1969 when the highest orrcrs for land and bUilding went up to Rs. 2 60 lakhs and for machinery Rs. 2 1 0 lakhs. The judge endeavoured to secure a\n\ntter price since the Corporation pleaded that the offers were inade* q_uate. In the circumstances, the judge postpoed the sale.\n\nWe now come closr to the final. On August\"28., 1969 a sale was held and the highest bids for land and buildings went up to Rs. 5 70 lakhs and for machinery 5 40 lakbs. It must be noted that at this time the Judge, who was then holding the sale, was not the presiding officer but another judge, since the former was on leave. It was felt by the latter that it woul~ be better to have some valuation report to serve as a basis and to guide the court in concluding whether a grossly unjust offer was being fobbed off on it. The Receiver who was in charge requested both the judgment debtor and the Corporation to get valuation reports from competent valuel'l! and the sale it~\\f stood adjourned.\n\nThe judgment debtor did not bother to have the properties valued but the Corporation secured the services of a competent. valuer, Mfs.\n\nCorona Electricals of Bombay, who estimated tb.e lad and buildings to be worth Rs. 10,46,096/· and the machinerY Rs;7,02,000f*. The total value thus arrived at was Rs. 17,48,096/-. In the'\\igbt' of various facts, including the absenCC< oftln alternative evaluation report from the judgment debtor's side, these Corona figures were tightly ti eated by both courts. as tentatively sound. The auction held on September '3, 1969, however, fetched the highest offer for the two lots of only Rs. 5;65,000/- ad Rs. 5,00,000/p respectively, in the latter case Rs. 40,00:l'J~ less than on the previous occasion. After considerable persuasion by the\"Judge, the appellant agreed to raise the ffer for both lots together to a gross &m of Rs. 11,50,000/- and making an intelligent guess on the given\n\nc1rc~tances the Court apprpved the-sale, which is now being_challenged tn these proceedings as an insensible and injurious sanctioning of th~ sale, ignoring the hopeful prospects of'higher prices had the auction been adjourned and better and fuller publicity given. l5-M45SupCI/7S\n\n682 SUPlUlMB COURT REPORTS [1974] 3 s.c.:a..\n\nCertain salient facts may be highlighted in this context. A court sale is a forced sale and, notwithstanding the competitive element of a public auction, the best price is not often forthcoming. The judge must 111ake a certain margin for this factor. A valuer's teport, good as a basis, is not as good as an actual offer and variations withinlimits between such an estimate, however careful, and real bids by seasoned businessmen before the auctioneer are quite on the cards. MQre so, when the subject-matter is a specialised industrial plant, which has been out of commission for a few years, as in this case, and buyers for cash are bound to be limited. The bropding fear of something out of the, imported machinery going out of gear, the vague apprehensions of possible claims by the Dena Bank which had a huge claim and was not a party, and the litigious sequel at the judgment-debtor's instance, have 'scare' value in inhibiting intending buyers from coming forward with the best offers. Businessmen mak~ uncanny calculations before striking a bargain and that circumstance must enter the judicial verdict before deciding whether a better price could be had by a postponement of the sale.\n\nIndeed, in the present case, the executing court had admittedly declined to affirm the highest bids made on May 16, 1969 June 5, 1969 and August 28, 1969, its anxiety to secure a better price being the main reason. If court sales are too frequently adjourned with a view to obtaining a still higher price it may prove a self-defeating exercise for industrialists will lose faith in the actual sale taking place and may not care to travel up to the place of auction being uncertain that the sale would at all go through. The judgment debtor's plea for postponement in the expectation of a higher price in the future may strain the credibility of the court sale itself and may yield diminishing returns as was proved in this very case.\n\nA material circumstan~ which weakens the first respondent's case is that on both the dates-August 28 and September 3 Shri B. Paul director of the judgment debtor company was present at the auction and never voiced any grievance about the conduct of the sale or asked for its postponement on the ground that better price may be obtained on a later date. Equally significant is the fact sworn to by the authorised officer of the Corporation that 'the valuation ofthe total assets' was around Rs. 15 Jakhs 'when the application was made by the petitioner Corporation for sale of the assets under sec. 31 of the State Financial Corporation Act' and 'that the said estimate was given on the basis of the information supplied by the applicants at the time of the disbursal of the loan'. The Dena Bank the second charge holder with considerable stakes in the sale was present on the August and September auctions through a senior representative and did not think it necessary to raise any objection regarding the conduct of the sale or the price tendered. Nor do the proceedings disclose an unfair undervalue on account of the absence of effective bidders or inertness of the Judge. On both occasions there were about 30 or 40 bidders. The judgment debtor the second charge holder the Indian Oil Corpora- tion and other leading industrial cOncerns interested in the drum industry were represented. All the bidders on the 28th August were told of the next auction date and most of them participated passively\n\n-, A\n\nKAYJA, Y INDUSTIUES v. ASNEW DltUMS (Kri.rhna lytr, },) 683\n\nor actively in the September sale.· On both the sale-dates the judges (they were different on the two days) were keen on maximising the price.\n\nA total of Rs. 11,1 O, CX1J/- was the higest bid in late August and in early September the best offer for lot No. 2 sagged from Rs. 5,40,000/- to Rs. 5,00,000/- • This downward trend could have persisted if further postponements of sale had taken place and the judge did his best to boost the total pri~ to Rs. 11 Slakhs and finalised it taking no chances by adjourning the auction. The trend of to-day may be the silhouette of tomorrow and the reduced_ offer for lot No. 2 this time may well infect Jot No. 1 next time. The Court did .a good job taking a conspectus' of the circumstances and avoiding the ominous maybes of future auctions. Such are the broad facts to which the law must be applied. Section 32(8) of the Act attracts the Code of Civil Procedure as far as practicable in the realisation of the dues of the Corporation. and so it may be right to apply the provisions of Order XXI r. 90.\n\nIn short was there any matuial irragularity in the conduct of the sale and did it cause substantial injury to the debtQr ? ·\n\nThe first respondent's counsel Shri Parekh drew our attention to condition No. 3 in the present proclamation of sale which is as foll<>ws:\n\n\"The highest bidders for the two lots shall be declared to be the purchasers of the respective Jots. provided always that he or\n\nthey are Ie.aally qualified to bid and provid'ed that it shall be in the di~~ ortbe undersigned Receiver ho1ding the sale to decline acceptance of the highest bid for any lot when the price offered for any ofthe two lots appears so manifestly inadequate as to\n\nmake its acceptance inadvisable. The highest bid offered by any bidders for any of the two lots shall be subject to the sanction and approval of the District Judge Thana.\"\n\nForm 29 prescribed in Appendix E to the Code contains condition No. 3 which is in like term&.\n\nThe court's activist obligation to exercise a discretion to make a fair sale out of a court auction and avert a distress sale is underscored by this provision. In all public sales the authority must protect the inrests of the parties and the rule is stated bv tbi~ Court in Nayalkha and Sons vs. Raman yo Das (1) thus : .\n\n\"The principles which should govern confirmation of sales .are well established. Where the acceptance of the offer by the Commissioners is subject to confirmation of the Court the offerer does not by mere acceptance get any vested right in the property\n\nS() that he may demand automatic confirmation of his offer. The condition of confirmation by the Court operates as a safeguard against the property being sold at inadequate price whether or not it is a consequence of any irregularity or fraud in the conduct\n\nofthe sale. In every case it is the duty of the Court to satisfy itself that having regard to the market value of the property the price offered is unreasonable. Unless the Court is satisfied about the adequacy of the price the act of confirmation of the sale would not be a proper exerise of judicial discretion.\"\n\n(J ) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 1 •.\n\n684 SUPREME COURT ltEPORTS\n\n\nBe it by a receiver, commissioner, liquidator or court this principle must govern. This proposition has been propounded in many rulings cited before us and summed up by the High Courts. The\n\nexpresions 'material irrugularity in the conduct of the sale' must be benignantly construed to cover the climax act of the court accepting the highest bid. Indeed under the Civil Procedure Code it is the court which conducts the sale and its duty to apply its mind to the material factors bearing on the reasonableness of the price offered is part of the process of obtaining a proper price in the course of the sale.\n\nThere~ fore failure to apply its mind to this aspect of the conduct of the sale\n\nmay amount to material irregularity. Here substantial injury without material irregularity is not enough even as material. irregularity not linked directly to inadequacy of the price is insufficiellt. And where a court mechanically conducts the sale or routinely signs assent to the sale papers not bothering to see if the offer is too low and a better price could have been obtained and in fact the price is substantially inadequate there is the presence of both the elements of irregularity and injury. But it is not as if the court should go on adjourning the sale till a good price is got it being a notorious fact that court sales and market prices are distant neighbours. Otherwise decree hOlders can never get the property of the debtor sold. Nor is it right to judge the unfairness of the price by hindsight wisdom. May be subsequent events not within the ken'bfthe executing court when holding the sale may prove that had the sale been adjourned a better price could have been had. What is expected of the judge is not to be a prophet but a pragmatist an<! merely to make a realistic appraisal of the factors and if satisfied that in the given circumstances the bid is acceptable conclude the sale. The ourt may consider the fair value of the proper~ ty, the general economic trends the large sum required to be produced by the bidder, the formation of a syndicate, the futility of postpone~ ments and the possibility oflitigation, and several other factors depen- . dent on the facts of each case.\n\nOnce that is done, the matter ends there. No speaking order is called for and no meticulous post mortem is proper. Jfthe court has fairly, even if iJently applied its mind to the relevant considerations before him while accepting the final bid no probe in retrospect is permissible.\n\nOtherwise, a new threat to certainty of court sales will be introduced.\n\nSo viewed, we are satisfied that the district court had exercised a\n\nconscientious and lively discretion in concluding the sale at Rs. 11·5 G lakhs. If the market value was over 17 lakhs, it is unfortunate that a Jesser price was fetched. Mere inadequacy of price cannot demolish every court sale. Here, the court tried its best, time after time, to raise the price, well-known industrialists in the public and private sectors knew about it and turned up. Offers reached a stationary l'evel. Nor could the Corporation be put off indefinitely in recovering its dues on baseless expectations and distant prospects. The judgment debtor H himself, by his litigious exercises, would have contributed to the possible buyers being afraid of hurdles ahead. After all, producing around Rs. 11 5 lakhs openly to buy an industry is not easy even for an\n\n,, ;..\n\nKAYJAY INDUSTRIES v. ASNEW DRUMS (Krishna Jyer, /.) 685\n\napparently affluent businessmen. . The sate proceedings had been pend~ ing too long and the first respondent could not, even when given the opportunity, produce buyers by private negotiation. Not even a valuer's report was produced by him, we are satisfied that the Disw trict Judge had committed no material irregularity in the conduct of the sale in accepting the highest offer of the appellant on September 3, 1969. .\n\nShri Parekh has levetled a number of criticisms of the court sale which we regret are more captious than substantial, more fictitious than genuine. Complaining about the rains in Bombay that day, i.e. September 3, dissecting the Corona Electricals' valuation for minor omissions and errors, holding up the exaggerated figure of about Rs. 36 lakhs as the market value of the property and other like cir~ cumstances can hardly convince anyone that the hoped-for happy day would arrive when a handsome price would be forthcoming if the auction were adjourned ad libitum at the instance of the judgment debtor. Prima facie it may look a little odd that a financial orgnisation in the public sector, with a special responsibility to the people not to play with public funds or advance for shady enterprises or persons should have readily lent a huge amount of Rs. 10 Iakhs on a valuation obviously bloated as is established by the sequel, and struggled for long years to recoup the money.. This aspect of the matter, we hope, will receive the anxious attention of the concerned authorities so that public money may be handled by public servants with public responsibility and concern for public benefit. However, we do not wish to express any opinion because we have no material before us as to what were the circumstances in which Dena Bank advanced the loan, what were the other securities given by the Company; arid what was the then worth of the guarantors.\n\nSeveral other unsuccessful grounds were urged before the High Court by the judgment debtor and we need not go over those grounds again as they possess little merit. Nor need we consider the ambit of appellate power to review discretion exercised by the trial court (vide Ward v~ James (l).since here we are concernedwith no appeal against the approval of the sale by the executing court but with an order re~ fusing to set aside the sale under Order XXI r. 90, and an appeal therefrom.\n\nWe see no merit in the application to set aside the sale and are consw trained to allow the appeal. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee, who argued the appeal with thoroughness and firness, in his opening submissions, told the court that, regardless of the outcome, he had persuaded his <:tient to raise the price to a sum equal to the amount at which the properties, lots 1 and 2, were estimated by M/s Corona Electricals, namely, Rs. 17, 48,096/- . He stuck to it to the end a good gesture.\n\nCons- sequently, we shall accept that as the price offered by the auctionpurchaser-appellant and direct that the appellant do deposit the balance of this amount of Rs. 17,48,096/- over what he has already paid into\n\n(1) .J1966J 1 Q.B. 273 at 293.\n\n68 6\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1974} 3 S.C.R.\n\ncourt (Rs. 2,75, fXXJj-) within two months from to-day, in the District Court, Thana, in which event the appellant will be put in possession of the properties 'purchased by him forthwith.\n\nLiberty is given to the Corporation to withdraw to the extent of its dues with up-to-date interest.\n\nWe think that the circumstances of the case warrant the direction that parties will bear their costs throughout.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nApptal allowed.\n\nB 'i\n\n~~ .\n\n1!l\n\n\";, .. ,_", "total_entities": 62, "entities": [{"text": "KAYJAY INDUSTRIES (P) LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KAYJAY INDUSTRIES (P) LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ASNEW DRUMS (P) LTD. & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ASNEW DRUMS (P) LTD. & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 20, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 76, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 20, 1974\n\n[D. 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Puri, for the appellant. ."}}, {"text": "Pramod Soroffand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6149, "end_char": 6165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Som Natlr Chatterjee, S. N. Sara/, Pramod Soroffand H. K. Puri, for the appellant. ."}}, {"text": "H. K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6166, "end_char": 6176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Som Natlr Chatterjee, S. N. Sara/, Pramod Soroffand H. K. Puri, for the appellant. ."}}, {"text": "Hardayal Hardy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6200, "end_char": 6214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardayal Hardy, Suresli Parekh and B. Dutra, for respondents 1 and 2, J\\f."}}, {"text": "Suresli Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6216, "end_char": 6230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardayal Hardy, Suresli Parekh and B. Dutra, for respondents 1 and 2, J\\f."}}, {"text": "B. Dutra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6235, "end_char": 6243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardayal Hardy, Suresli Parekh and B. Dutra, for respondents 1 and 2, J\\f."}}, {"text": ". N. Plradke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6273, "end_char": 6285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardayal Hardy, Suresli Parekh and B. Dutra, for respondents 1 and 2, J\\f."}}, {"text": "Rameshll'ar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6287, "end_char": 6303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Plradke, Rameshll'ar Nath and Rajinder Norian for respondents 4 & 5. ·"}}, {"text": "Rajinder Norian", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6308, "end_char": 6323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Plradke, Rameshll'ar Nath and Rajinder Norian for respondents 4 & 5. ·"}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8205, "end_char": 8210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Financial Corporation Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8218, "end_char": 8255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8424, "end_char": 8429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951", "statute": "the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8676, "end_char": 8681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951", "statute": "the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "December 5, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9299, "end_char": 9315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A proclamation of sale was settled after notice to the parties, on December 5, 1967, and the sale was fixed to take place on."}}, {"text": "January 8,\n\n1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9358, "end_char": 9374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 8,\n\n1968."}}, {"text": "September 3, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9479, "end_char": 9496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, the sale did not take place that day and the happenings thereafter culminating in the sale on September 3, 1969, wherein the present appellant was the highest bidder, and oonsequent purchase, are the subject mater of the present appeal."}}, {"text": "January 11, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10313, "end_char": 10329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 11, 1966 the order for sale was made."}}, {"text": "January .12, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10472, "end_char": 10489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January .12, 1967, the Corporation applied for the sale of the entire unit."}}, {"text": "January 8, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10584, "end_char": 10599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sale was fixed to take place on January 8, 1968 when, at the instance of the Dena Bank, it was postponed on the plea that the machin(ry not fixed to the earth had not b!:en shown separately."}}, {"text": "Dena Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10629, "end_char": 10638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sale was fixed to take place on January 8, 1968 when, at the instance of the Dena Bank, it was postponed on the plea that the machin(ry not fixed to the earth had not b!:en shown separately."}}, {"text": "August 7; 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10957, "end_char": 10971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prayer was made on August 7; 1968 and the Court directed the judgment debtor to deposit Rs."}}, {"text": "October, 15, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11040, "end_char": 11057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "las by October, 15, 1968 and postponed the sale till the last week of October."}}, {"text": "October 28, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11231, "end_char": 11247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the sale did not take place on October 28, 1968 sincethe'Corporation and the Bank wanted the description of the machinery to be inserted in the proclamation of sale."}}, {"text": "bYJAY INOO~", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11372, "end_char": 11383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B ·\n\nbYJAY INOO~ ll~ AISNBW DRUMS (Krishna lyer, _1.)"}}, {"text": "Krishna lyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11402, "end_char": 11414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B ·\n\nbYJAY INOO~ ll~ AISNBW DRUMS (Krishna lyer, _1.)", "canonical_name": "Krishna lyer"}}, {"text": "Decembet, l2; 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11573, "end_char": 11591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J)eqemblr the judgtnent debtor applied that the sale should be of the whole property in one l9t, which, was turned down by the Court on Decembet, l2; 1968 since the sale in two lots was a course already ooneento4 to by him and the move was purely dilatory."}}, {"text": "April16,\n\n1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12029, "end_char": 12043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When be found that an interim injunction .apinst holding the sale was refused, he withdrew the suit on April16,\n\n1969."}}, {"text": "Mukund lron", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12171, "end_char": 12182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nt, turaUy, the sale fixed for May 1,1.969 could not take place for ·want ofbi(l~ although a neighbouring industrial concern, Mukund lron, pvc an' offer of Rs; 2·20 lakhs for the land and bul.ldings only, Tke next attempt was tQ hold the sale on May 16, 1969 and the' highes1 bids then oft'erod were R.s."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12347, "end_char": 12351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 5, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12736, "end_char": 12748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A sale wa:s agai..n attempted on June 5, 1969 when the highest orrcrs for land and bUilding went up to Rs."}}, {"text": "August\"28., 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13055, "end_char": 13071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August\"28.,"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13872, "end_char": 13878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Corona Electricals of Bombay, who estimated tb.e lad and buildings to be worth Rs."}}, {"text": "September '3, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14256, "end_char": 14274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The auction held on September '3, 1969, however, fetched the highest offer for the two lots of only Rs."}}, {"text": "May 16, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16269, "end_char": 16281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, in the present case, the executing court had admittedly declined to affirm the highest bids made on May 16, 1969 June 5, 1969 and August 28, 1969, its anxiety to secure a better price being the main reason."}}, {"text": "August 28, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16299, "end_char": 16314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, in the present case, the executing court had admittedly declined to affirm the highest bids made on May 16, 1969 June 5, 1969 and August 28, 1969, its anxiety to secure a better price being the main reason."}}, {"text": "August 28 and September 3", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16987, "end_char": 17012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A material circumstan~ which weakens the first respondent's case is that on both the dates-August 28 and September 3 Shri B. Paul director of the judgment debtor company was present at the auction and never voiced any grievance about the conduct of the sale or asked for its postponement on the ground that better price may be obtained on a later date."}}, {"text": "B. Paul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17018, "end_char": 17025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A material circumstan~ which weakens the first respondent's case is that on both the dates-August 28 and September 3 Shri B. Paul director of the judgment debtor company was present at the auction and never voiced any grievance about the conduct of the sale or asked for its postponement on the ground that better price may be obtained on a later date."}}, {"text": "sec. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17489, "end_char": 17496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Oil Corpora- tion", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18174, "end_char": 18198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment debtor the second charge holder the Indian Oil Corpora- tion and other leading industrial cOncerns interested in the drum industry were represented."}}, {"text": "Section 32(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19309, "end_char": 19322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19343, "end_char": 19370, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Parekh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19674, "end_char": 19680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first respondent's counsel Shri Parekh drew our attention to condition No."}}, {"text": "Appendix E to the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20363, "end_char": 20385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 S.C.R. 1", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 21593, "end_char": 21610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indeed under the Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21991, "end_char": 22028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Corona Electricals", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25760, "end_char": 25778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Complaining about the rains in Bombay that day, i.e. September 3, dissecting the Corona Electricals' valuation for minor omissions and errors, holding up the exaggerated figure of about Rs."}}, {"text": "Somnath Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27580, "end_char": 27598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Somnath Chatterjee, who argued the appeal with thoroughness and firness, in his opening submissions, told the court that, regardless of the outcome, he had persuaded his <:tient to raise the price to a sum equal to the amount at which the properties, lots 1 and 2, were estimated by M/s Corona Electricals, namely, Rs."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_687_702_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY\n\nM/S POLYCHEM LTD.\n\nMarch 20, 1974\n\n[M.H. BEG AND Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]\n\nBombay Municipal Corporation Act. 3 of 1888-S. 3(r) and S. 154-Scope of.\n\nPrinciples for detennining rateable value of land on which a building is partly completed-Doctrine of sterility-Distinction between English and Indian Law.\n\nThe respondent company was owner of a large area of land in Bombay, on a part of which there was a building under construction. The bulk of the remaining part was lying vacant. The Assessor and Collector of the Municipal Corporation determined the market value of the whole land on a notional basis and fixed the hypothetical annual rental value of the portion of land on which a building was being built as well as the vacant land.\n\nThe respondent's appeal to the Small Cause Court was dismissed. Applying the doctrine of sterility the High Court held that although a vacant plot of land was rateqble under the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act and so was land which had been built UP.on, yet, any part of land which was being actually built upon was not rateable until the building was finished because no tenant could take it in that condition. ·\n\nIn the appeal to this Court it was connded on bellalf of the ppellant Corporation that the High Court erred in applying the doctrine of sterility to land rateable under the provisions of the Act i. that, the High Court overlooked the essential distinction between the Indian and i:.nglish law which waS that the basis for determining the rateable value in India was the value of the property to the owner and not to the occupier, and, that, every kind of 'land' as defined-by s.3(r) of the Act was rateable under s.154 of the Act simply because it had a value to the owner of it and not because it was yielding any income or was usefully or beneficially occupied or enjoyed by tenant or any other kind of occupant paying for the use of it. Allowing the appeal.\n\nHELD : The judgment under appeal is erroneous as it was held there that land which was being rated as vacant ceased to be subject to any ratin~ at all simply because a buildin~ began to be made on it by the owner. The role of interpretation that, where two views are reasonably or equally open, the court should adopt the one which benefits the assessee would enable it to do no more than to treat land which is actually being built upon on the same footing as vacant land so long as no structure capable of occupation and letting is completed on it. [702 DPE]\n\nLand which was being built upon should not be rated like ]and on which a building has been actually constructed unless and. until the construction had reached a stage at which some occupation of the constructed portion was also lelly and actually possible so that it could be taken into account in determining the rateable value. [701 F]\n\nThe doctrine of sterility in the context of the provision$ to be construed could not apply in this case. In England, land which is in the process of being built uPon is equated with vacant land which is not yielding any profit, so that it ceases to bo \"rateable'' ]and. But, under the statute, all 'land' .whether vacant or in the process of being built upon is rateable according to well settled principles. (700 A]\n\nWest Bromwich Si:hool Board v. Overseers of West Bromwich, 13 Q.B.D, 929 @ 942, Mersey Docks & Harbour Boarq v. Oversem of L/ane///an,14 Q.B.O. p. 770, The Metropolitan Board of Works v.\n\nThe. Overseers of Weil Ham :\n\n(1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 193, The Guardians of the Poor of the Sculcoates Union in the Borough of Kingston- Upon-Hu/Iv. Dock Company at Kingston-Upon-Hull, 1895 A.C. 136, the Churchwardens & OversetrS of Lambeth Parish v. The London County Council, & 1897 A.C. 625 @ 630-31, London County Council v. Erith (Churchwardens Overseers of Parish; 1893 A.C. 562 @ 591, held inapplicable.\n\nThe principles upon which lands are rated in this country have been practically settled by the decisions of this Court which held that the mode of assessment in every case must be directed towards finding out the annual letting value of land which is based. on rating of land, and, by definition, \"land\" includes land which is either being built upon or has been built upon. A reference to the provisions of the Act shows that, after a building haS been completed, the letting value of the building which becomes part of the land will be the primary or determining factor in fixing the annual rent for which the land which has been built t1pon \"might reasonably\n\n- be expec; ted to be let from year to year''. All thats. 154 seems to contemplate by\n\nm, enhoning \"land or building\" is that land which is vacant or which has not been built upon may be treated, for the purposes of valuation, on a different footing from land which has actually been built upon. The relevant provisions of the Act do not mention and seem to take no account, for purposes of rating, of any building which is only in the course of being constructed, although s. 3(r) of the Act makes It clear that land which is being built upon is also \"land\". Hence, so long as a building is not completed or constructed to such an.extent that, at least, a partial completion notice can be given so that the corrpleted portion can be occupied or let, the land can, for purposes of rating, be equated with or treated as vacant land. It is only when the building which is being put up is in such a state that it is actually and legally capable of occupation that the letting value of the building can enter into the computaiion for rating. Although the definition of land, which is rateable covers three kinds of \"land\", yet, for the purposes of ratings. 154 recognises only two categories. Therefore, all land must fall in one of these two categories for purposes of rating and not outside. {699 D-0]\n\nCorporation of Calcutta v. Sm. Padma Dtbl Ors., {1962] 3 S.C.R. 49, Bengal Nagpur Railway Co. Ltd. v. c,, rporatlon of Calcutta, 14 Indian Appeals 1, Bengal Nagpur Railway Co. Ltd. v. Corp,, ration of Calcutta, A.I.R 1942 Cal. 455, Polar Assessment Committee v. Roberts, {1922] 2 A.C. 93, Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas\n\nv. Municipal Commi\"ssioner, Ahmedabad, 11964] 2 S.C.R. 608, Municipal Corporation of Gr1ater Bombay v. Royal Western India Turf Club, [1968] 1 S.C.R. 525, Motichand Hirachand Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporati,, n, 11968] 1 $.C.R. 546, Century Spg.\n\n\nIn the instaD.t case the.land which was being assessed as reteable so long as it\n\nw.a~ vcant land had ben treated as entirely outside the scope or sphere of rateab1lity Just because a.building was being erected upon it As theFC is no provision in the .Act.whic~ has th.e effect of criferring such n immunity or exemption upon land which JS being butlt upon, 1t lS not possible to uphold the conclusion which produces such a startling result. [700C]\n\n(The case :was sent back to the Assessor and Collector with a direction that the whole land wtll be valued for the purpase of rating in the relevant year as vacant land.) ·\n\nof 9 APPEi.LATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1828\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated the 4th November 1968 of the Bombay High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 130 of 1964.\n\nN_ren De, Y.S. Chita/e, S.K. Kadam, P.C. Bhartari and J.B. Dada chanp for the appollant.\n\nA.B.Divao and l.N. Shroff for the respondent.\n\nH M.C. Bhandare, B.R. Agarwala Gagrat and Co., Vinay Bhasin and Janedra Lal for Intervener No. I.\n\n'''J,\n\nA Anil B. Divan A.J. Rana and Ashok Grover for Intervener No. 2\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBEG, J. This appeal, by certification under Article 133(1) (c) of the Constitution. is directed against the Judgment of a Division. Bench of the Bombay High Court holding that although a vacant plot of land s rateable under the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 3 of 1888 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). and so is land which has been built upon, yet, any part of land which is being\n\nactually built upon is not rateable until the building is finished because 110 tenant could take it in that condition. In other words the Division Bench upheld what may be called the doctrine of sterility with which the land was said to have been-Struck during the period when a building was being actually put upon it. The appellant Corporation questions the applicability of this doctrine to rating tf land fo this country.\n\nBefore proceeding further we may briefly give the facts.and circumstances in which the question menticned above arises. The respondent Company is the Owrier of 6652 sq. yds. of land out of which 450 sq. yds. wore deducted for havin• fallen within\"the set back line\".\n\nOut of the remaining area of 6202 sq~ yds, 1060sq. yds. was being bilt upon at the relevant time whilst the remaining 5142 sq. yds, was lymg vacant during the period under consideration. As the respondent Company did not lead any evidenee about the hypothetical rent of any part of land the A8'essor & Collector of Bombay Municipal Corporation determined the market value of the whole land as Rs. 62020/- at Rs. 10/-\n\nper sq. yd. He then calculated the hypothetical rent by taking a rate of interest of 3t % per annum as the reasonable return on this value so that the hypothetical annual rental value came to Rs. 2170/- From 1-1-1962 the Assessor divided the plot notionally into two parts one of 1060 sq. yds. which was being built upon and the other of 5142 sq. yds. which was lying vacant. He then assessed the probable market value of the plot which was being built upon as Rs 10,600/- at Re. 10/-\n\nper sq. yd. but as he considered it better developed the fixed. 5 % per annum interest as a reasonable return on it for determining its hypothetical rent which came to Rs. 530/-. For the vacant land also valued at the same rate the market value v.as found to be Rs. 51,420/-, but the annual rate of interest to determine reasonable return was taken as 3! % only, as was done previously for the whole land, so that its hypothetical annual rent came to Rs. 1800/-. Thus, the total hypothetical annual rental value of ihe land for the period under consideration came to Rs. 2330/- for both parts according to what is known as \"'the contractor's test\".\n\nThe respondent company, aggrieved by the assessor's fixation of rateable value, had appealed to the Small Cause Court of Bombay which dismissed the 'appeal. The respondent company then appealed to the Bombay High Court under Section 218(0) of the Act. The appeal was summarily rejected.by a learned Single Judge of that Court.\n\nOn a further appeal, a'Di\"<ision Bench of the High Court, after repe!Iing a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal to it by adopting the view that it was not a second appeal for the purpo'e of the Letters Patent, held that the part of the land which was being built upon was not rateable at all as no tenant could or would take the property in that condition. Thus, the Division Bench bad applied what may be called the \"doctrine of sterility\". It observed :\n\n\" ... if there is no tenant who would be prepared to take the property from year to year in its then condition, evidently there cati be no tax on the same\".\n\nAs this doctrine could not apply to the vacant land, the order cf the Assessing authority and the principle applied by it for rating that portion of the land were upheld by the Division Bench. No argument was C addressed to. us on the question whether an appeal lay to the Division Bench, in the circumstances of the case. We, therefore, refrain from considering this question.\n\nLearned Attorney General submitted, on behalf of the appellant Corporation, that the Divi, ion Bench had erred in applying the English doctrine of sterility to land rateable under the provisions of the Act.\n\nD It was contended that the essential distinction between the Indian and the English law, overlooked by the Division Bench, was that the basis for determining rateable value in this country was the value of the property to the owner and not to the occupier. Hence, it was urged, every kind of 'land, as defined by Sectoin 3(r) of the Act, was rateable under Section 154 of the Act simply because it had a value to the owner of it and not because it was yielding any income E or was. usefully or beneficially occupied or enjoyed by a tenant or any other kind of occupant paying for the use of it. It was contended that, in so far as the rent paid by an actual tenant or that which a hypothetical tenant would presumably pay for the land, in the condition it actually was (i.e. \"rebus sic stantibus\"), is tO be taken into account, this could be done only for the purpose of determining the value of the land to the owner and not, as it had been done in England, to its occu- F pant. This distinction, it was pointed out, logically flows from the essentially different bases of rateability adopted in India, where even vacant land was rateable, and, in England, where vacant land was not rateable at all.\n\nAnother contention advanced was that in any case when there is no evidence about the nature or the extent of the construction on the G land treated as occupied by a building in the course of construction, tt was not possible to apply the principle that it was withdrawn from the sphere of rateable land merely because a building was being constructed over it. The effective reply to this argument was that it was a matter of admission between the parties that 1060 sq. yds. of the area was covered by a building in the course of construction. Our attention was drawn to the statement of facts on behalf of the appellant and also H to the finding of fact that this was the 11rea which could be treated as\n\nland which was actually being built upon. We, therefore, do not think that there is any point in remanding the case for any further finding\n\nupon this question.. We will proceed c n the assumption that the finding that 1060 sq. yds of land is covered by what is an incomplete building in the course of construction for the relevant perlod is correct ..\n\nLearned Counsel for the respondent urged that whatever may be the other differences the basic principles of rating are the same both in Indiaand in England as the annual rent which would be paid by a hypothetical tenant has necessarily to be determined in order to arrive at the rateable value ofland. According to the respondent, it followed logically .from this principle that land which could not have a hypothetical tenant could have no rateable value. The submission was that the \"contractor's test\" was only one of the three modes of determining the annual rateable value. This method was, it was urged not available at all as a substitute for determination of the annnual hypothetical rent. It was, according to the respondent and the Intervener,. only a means adopted for determination of the annual hypothetical rent. The means could not, the argument proceeds, displace the object or the end itself and converted into an independent mode of assesring rateable value.\n\nThe learned Counsel relied upon various provisions of the Act in an attempt to correlate property taxes of which rates were the primary class to beneficial occupation or in other words to income yielding capacity as it existed at the time when the taxes were levied, that is to say, \"rebus sic stantibus\".\n\nSection 3(r) of the Act says :\n\n\"3(r) ''Land\" includes land which is being built upon or is built upon or covered with water banefits to arise out of land, things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth 11nd rights created by legislative enactment over any street\";\n\nand Section 3(s) says :\n\n\"3(s) \"building\" includes a house, out-house stable shed, hut and every other such structure,-whether of masonry, bricks, wood, mud, metal or any other material whatever;\"\n\nBut, section 143 of the Act seems to make a distinction between \"build.~ ings and land\" when it. says that the gel)Cral tax shall be levied \"in res-· peel ofallbuildingi arid land\", and, thereafter, it continues to mention both. Similarly, Section 144 mentions \"buildings\" and \"land\" as. though they were separate. Section 144(A) goes on to provide :\n\n\"144A. (I) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section\n\n140. the gel)Cral tax leviable in respect of any building used for residential purposes- ·\n\n(a) completed, or first let out or occupied on or after the !st day of April, 1956 ; and\n\n(b) consisting exclusively of tenements the annual rent of each of which tenements determil)Cd as provided in sub-·\n\nsection (I) of Section 154, does not exceeding Rs. 12 hundered or such lower sum as may be generally. determined by the Corporation, shall, where an application is made to the Commissioner in that behalf and for the period specified in. sub-section (2) be-\n\n(i) if such building is owned by or belongs to a \"?·\n\noperative society registered or deemed to be registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, seven-tenths of the amount leviable under\n\nSection 140 in respect of any other building excepting those referred to in Section 143 ;\n\n(ii) if such building is owned by or belongs to any other person, eight-tenths of such amount.\n\n(2) (a) if any such building .was completed, o; first let out or occupied on or before the date of commencement of the Bombay Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1957, concession in general tax under this Section shall be available for the period counted from the said date of commencement upto the !st day of April 1956.\n\n(b) Jn all other cases, concession in general tax under this section shall be available for the period often years counted from the date on which any such building shall be completed, first let out or occupied, whichever shall be the earliest.\n\nExplanation-For the purposes of this section, a building shall be deemed to be completed on the date on which the permission for its occupation or use is given or is deemed to be given under Section\n\n353-A\".\n\nSection 353A provides for a notice and completion certificate to be sent by the builder within one month after the completion of the building and the procedure for obtaining the permissio1> by the _Commissioner for occupying such building or for the use of it after he 1s satisfied that the provisions of' the Act and the bye-laws have been complied with. Section 353A (2) lays down:\n\n\"(2) No person shall occupy or permit to be occupied any such building, or use or permit to be used the building or part thereof affected by any such work, until-\n\n(a) the permission referred to in proviso (b) to subsection (1) has been received, or\n\n(b) the Commissioner has failed for twenty-one days after receipt of the notice of completion to intimate as aforesaid his refusal of the said permission\".\n\nMUN!C CORP .• V. POLYCH~M LTD. (Beg, ],) 693\n\nSection 472 gives a list ofcontinuing offences with. specified daily fines.\n\nIt indicates that a violation of Section 353A involves a fine of Rs. 100/· per day. Hence, it was contended ou behalf of the respondent, there can be no hypothetical tenant of a building of which the Jaw prohibits any use or occupation. A building which is in the course of construction would be, it was urged, a buildlng in an incomplete state of which no occupation was possible by an actual or hypothetical tenant of it.\n\nThere is no doubt that rates belong to the category of property taxes mentioned in Section 139(1) of the. Act. Section. 146 makes fresh taxes \"Leviable primarily from the. actual occupier of the premises upon which the said taxes are assessed, if such occupier holds the said premises immediately from the Government or from the corporation or from a fazendar\". Section 146(2) makes it clear that in other cases they are leviable as follows :\n\n\"(a) if the premises are let, from the lessor;\n\n(b) if the premises are sub-let, from the superior lessor; and\n\n(c) if the. premises are unlet, from the person in whom the right to let the same vests\".\n\nSection 146(3) lays down that :\n\n\"if any land has been let for any term exceeding one year to a tenant; and such tenant or any person deriving title howso-· ever. from such tenant has built. upon the land, the property taxes assessed upon the said land and upon the building erected thereon shall be leviable primarily from the said tenant or such penon, whether or not the premises be in the occupation of the l&id tenant or such person\".\n\nSecti9n 147 of the Act provides that, in a. case in which the rateable vall'ie:etcieds the amount of rent actually payable in respect ofland\n\noi:cuped, the lessor is entitled to receive the difference between th<> renl which would otherwise be payable .and what is actually payable • . Similar pr<iVision .is .made in case of sub-tenants.\n\nThe actu&l inethOd of valuation is provided by Section 154(1) which runs:\n\n\"1S4(1) in order to fix the rateable. value of any building or I.and. aisls$&ble to a ptopert_y-tax, there .shall be deducted .from the amount of the annual rent for which such land or building mightrtasonably.be expected to Jet t'rom year to year a sum equal to ten per centumofthe said annual rent and the said deduction shall be in )ieu of all allowances for repairs ot on any other account whatever\".\n\nSection !SS provides :\n\n\"155(1). To enable him to determine the rateable value of any building or land and the person primarily liable for the paYl!ielit of any property tax leviable in respect thereof the Commissioner inay require the owner or occupier of such building\n\nor land, or of any portion thereof, to furnish him, within such A reasonable period as the Commissioner prescribes in this behalf with information or with a written return signed by such owner or occupier-\n\n(•) as to the name and place of abode of the owner or occupier, or of both the owner and occupier of such buildin11 or land; and B\n\n(b) as to the dimensions of such building orland, or of any portion thereof, and the rent, if any, obtained for such buildin11, or land, or any portion thereof.\n\n(2) Every owner or occupier on whom any such requisition is made shall be bound to comply with the same and to give true information or to make a true return to the best of his knowledge C or belief.\n\n(3) The Commissioner may also for the purpose aforesaid make an inspection of any such building or land\". 5ectioR J 56 requires the maintenance of an assessment book. It says :\n\n\"156. The Commissioner shall lccep a book, to be called D \"the assessment book\" in which shall be entered every official year- ( a) a list of all buildings and lands in greattr Bombay distinguishing each, either by name or number, as he shall think fit;\n\n(b the rateable value of each such buildina and land determined in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this Act; ·\n\n(c) the uame of the person primarily liable for the payment of the property-taxes, if any, leviable on each such building or land;\n\n(d) if any such building or land is not liable to be assessed to the general tax, the reason of such non-liability;\n\n(e) when the rates of the property-taxes to be levied for year have been duly fixed by the corporation and the period fixed by public notice, as hereinafter provided, for the receipt of complaints against the amount of rateable value entered in any portion of the assessment-book, has expired, and in the case ofany such entry which is complained against when such complaint has been disposed of in accordanc~ with the provisons hereinafter contained, the amount at which each building or land entered in such portion of the assessment-book is assessed to each of the property-taxes, jf any, leviable thereon;\n\n(f) if, under Section I 69 or I 70, a charge is made for water supplied to any building or land by measurement or the water-tax or charged or water by measurement is\n\ncompounded for, or if, under section 172, the halalkhortax for any building or land is fixed at a special rate, the particulars and amount of such charge, composition or rate;\" It is true that the \"buildings\" and\"lands\" are mentioned separately in Sections 154 to 156 of the Act. Section 154(1) implies that the rateable value of any building or land will be calculated by determining \"the amount of the annual rent for which such land or building might reasonably be expectec\\ to let from year to year\".\n\nSection 156(d) shows that there may be cases in which some building or land may not be liable to pay any amount as a general tax. Hence, it was urged on behalf of the respondent, the doctrine of sterility could be applied in this country just as it was applicable in England.\n\nThe principles upon which lands are rated in this country have been practically settled by the decisions of this Court. But, no case was brought to our notice in which an application of these principles to land upon which a building was being constructed was involved.\n\nJn other words, 1'0 case was cited by any party in which the doctrine of sterility, as indicated above, was invoked. We will, however, glance at the cases cited before deciding the question raised before us.\n\nThe Cor_, oration of Calcutta vs. S.M. Padma Debi & Ors., (1) involved an interpretation of the provisions of Section 127(a) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, in the course of which it was observed that the criterion for determining the annual value of land for purposes of rating is : \"the rent realisable by the landlord and not the value of the holdings in the hands of the tenant\". A reference was made there to the decision of the Privy Council in Bengal Nagpur Railway Co. Ltd. vs. Corporation of Calcutta (2) affirming a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Bengal Nagpur Railway Co. Ltd. vs. Corporation of Calcutta(') on the construction of Section 127 of the Calcutta Act. The Privy Council bad indicated the distinction between law in India and in England as follows :\n\n\"The owner of land in England is not chargeable with rates, as owner, at all. If he leaves land vacant and unoccupied, he pays no rates. Under the Calcutta Act mere ownership carries with it a liability to pay one.half of the rate assessed on the annual value of the land\".\n\nIn the Calcutta case which went to the Privy Council, a golf club was making use of some land with a few holes made in it for occasional practice by persons aspiring to become golfars. The Club used to pay a nominal amount for the use of the land. This Court also referred to the decision of the House of Lords in Polar Assessment Committee vs. Roberts.(4) to indicate : \"The distinction between occupier and owner, in this connection, is of primary importance.\n\nThe occupation value of property may be, and often is, distinct from\n\n\n(2) 74 Indian Appeals I.\n\n(3) AIR 1942 Cal. ~55\n\n(4) (1922) 2A.C. 93.\n\nits value to the owner\". This Court then cited the \"weighty observations of Atkin, L.J., as he then was, which were approved by Lord Carson in his dissenting judgment\" (at page 58) :\n\n\"How then is the annual rent to be ascertained? It is obvious that the definition presupposes that the premises are deemed to be vacant and are deemed to be capable of being let\".\n\nThe respondent, however, relies upon the following passage in the judgment of this Court(!) (at page 56) :\n\n\"A Jaw of. the land with its penal consequences cannot be ignored in ascertaining the reasonable expectations of a landlord in the matter of rent\".\n\nIt was urged 'on behalf of the respondent th:at the test adopted by this Court was to find out the annual rent a hypothetical tenant would pay so as to determine rateable value from the point of view of the landlord. It did not matter, according to the tespondeni, from which angle the rateable value was looked at so long as the method of determining it was really the same as was adopted in England. If that was S'?, it was submitted, the views expressed by this Court in the Calcutta Corporation case (supra) did not militate with an application of the doctrine of sterility where facts warranted it. We think that this submission overlooks an infirmity in the doctrine of sterility itself; the assumption that what is not actually yielding rent has no annual rental value.\n\nThe next case cited was Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas V. Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad(2), where, after references to legislative history of rating in England and in I.ndia, this Court said : (at page 628) :\n\n\"It would, therefore, be right to say that the word 'rate' had acquired a special meaning in English legislative history and practice and also in Indian legislation where that word was usedanditmeanta taxfC)r local purposes imposed by local authorities and the basis of the tax was the annual value of the lands or buildings on or in connection with which it was imposed, arrived at in one of the three ways which we have already indicated\".\n\nThe three modes were indicated in the following passage (at page 622):\n\n\"It will thus be clear from the various statutes to which we have referred and the various books on rating in England that .the rate always had the meaning of a tax on the annual value or rateable value of lands or buildings and this annual value or rateable value is arrived at by one of three modes, namely, (i) actual rent fetched by land or building where it\n\n(I) [1962] 3 S.C.R 49.\n\n(2) [19M] 2 s.c.R. 608.\n\n.t. 1\n\nMUN!C. CORF. V. POLYCHEM LTD, (Beg,].) 691\n\nis actually let, (ii) where it is not let, rent based on hypothetical tenancy, particularly in the case of buildings, and (iii)whereeither of these two modes is not available, by valuation.based on capital value from which annual value has to be found by applying a suitable percentage which may not be the same for lands and buildings, and it was this position which was finally brought out in bold relief by_ the Rating and Valuation Act, 1925. It is clear further that it is not the Rating and Valuation Act of 1925 which for the first time applied the concept of net annual value and rateable value as the basis for levying a rate for purposes of local taxation; that basis was always there for centuries before the Act of I 925 was passed\".\n\nHere, it was held by a majority of five Judges of this Court, that a rule imposing a tax called a \"rate\", \"directly as a percentage of the capitill value\", is ultra vires the Act and \"the assessment based on this manner must be struck down''. The reasoning adopted was : (at pages 633-34):\n\n\"If the law enjoins that the rate should be fixed on the annual value of lands and buildings, the municipality cannot fix it on the capital value, and then justify it on the ground that the same result cJu\\d be arrived at by fixing a higher percentage as the rate in case it was fixed in the right way on the annual value. Further by, fixing the rate as a percentage of the caipta\\ value directly, the real incidence of the levy is camouflaged''.\n\nThis case links the nature of the property tax called a rate levied for local Govt. p'1rposes with the mode adop.ted for its levy. Each mode had nec.ssarily to be directed to finding out the. annual rentel value of land as that was what was taxed and not either the capital or the potential valnc of land. ·\n\nMunicipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs. Royal Western India Turf Club(I) was cited to show that the profit from the actual user, in that particular case of same land used as a race course, was taken into account. This Court said (at page 533) :\n\n\"The measure in arriving at the net rateable value under S. 154(1) is what a hypJthetical tenant would pay as rent and that would depend upon the amount of profits earned from race-meetings held on the race-course. To arrive at the correct amount of such profits all expenseo reasonably and properly incurred which go to the making of the receipts have to be deducted from the gross-receipts\".\n\nIn Motichand Hirachand &Ors. vs. Bombay Municipal Corporatioi.(2) where, as in the Royal Western India Turf Club case (supra), the provisions of the Act with which we are concerned had come up for consideration, this Court said (at page 548) :\n\n(I) 11968] 1 S.C.R. 525.\n\n(2) [1968] I S.C'.R. 546. l6-M4SS 1p.Cl/7S\n\n\"The assessing authority for the purpose of fixing the rateable A value has therefore to determine the annual rent, that is, the annual rent for which such building might reasonably be expect- .ed to let from year to year and to deduct the IO per cent statut?rY. allowance therefrom and arrive at the net rateable value which would be equivalent to the net annual rent. The rateable value is thus taken to be the same as the net annual rent of the pro- B perty. It is a well recognised principle in rating that both gross value and net annual value are estimated by reference to the rent at which the property might reasonably be expected to let from .~ year to year. Various methods of valuation are applied in order to arrive at such hypotheticaf rent. for instance by reference to the t actual rent paid for the property.or for others comparable to it or where there are no rents by reference to the assessments of c comparable properties or to the profits earned from the property or to the cost of construction. The expression -','gross value\" means the rent at which a hereditament might reasonably be expected to let from year to year. The rent which a tenant cmdd afford.to give is calculated rebus sicstantibus, thatis to say, with reference to the property in its existing physical condition and to the mode in which it is actually used. The hypothetical D tenant includes all persons who might possibly take the property . including the person actually in occupation, even though he happens to be the owner of the property .. The rent is that which he will pay in the \"higgling of the market\", taking into account all existing circumstances and any relevant future trends. If the prop,.ty affords the opportunity for the carrying on of a gainful trade, that fact also must be taken into account. The property E . is assumed to be vacant and to let and the material date for the valuation is that of the proposal which gives rise to the proceedings. The actual rent paid for the property is not conc)usiveevidence of value, though such actual rent may serve as an indiration as to what a hypothetical tenant can afford to pay. However, if the actual rent is piid on terms which differ from those of the hypoth, tical tenancy it must be adjusted, if p:issible, F to the terms of the hypothetical tenancy before it affords evidence of value .. (S'° Halsbury's Laws of England, (3rd ed.) Vol. 32, p. 60 and onwards).- !Us.also wll recognised that while valuing the property in q!estion every intrinsic quality and every intrinsic circumstance which tends t.J psh the rental •• . ·:valu! up or do\\vn m11t .b~ taken into cqnsideration\" .\n\nThe Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. District Municipality of Ulhasnagar(I), points out that Section60 oftheB>mbay District Municipal Act 3 of 1901, with which we are not concerned here, has left l open a determination of the basis for each class of valuation to the.\n\nmnicipality after defining annual letting value in s, ction 3(11) a• the rent for which any land or building might reasonably be .exp, cted H 1-- to be let from year to year. In this case, the imp:isition of a flat rate ' (I) [l9681 2 S.C.R; 211.\n\nD ' E\n\nl\\!UNIC. CORP. v. POLYCHEl\\I LTD. (Beg, /.) 699\n\non carpet area was held to be within the provisions of the Act. It was, however, observed that the assessees could challenge, each on the facts of his particular case, the application of this method if it results in a rate not corresponding to \"the _annual letting value\". Apart from emphasising that it is the annual letting value which has to be determined under the rating enactments, this case does not help us in deciding the question now before us. ·\n\nBombay Municipal Corporation v. L.I.C. of India, Bombay,(1) repeats that the criterion for fixing the rate is \"the rent realisable by the landlord and not the valuation of the holclings in the hands of the tenant''.\n\n- ·\n\nGuntur J,, funicipal Cowzcil v •. Guntur Tott'n Rate PaJers'. Association(2), relates to the interpretation of the provisions of the Madras District. Municipalities Act 5 of 1920, where it was held that the assessment must take into account the measure of \"fair rent\" as determined under the Act;\n\nThe abovementioned authorities of t!iis Court, which were cited before us, enable us to hold that the mode of assessment in every case must be directed towards. finding out the annual letting value of land which is the basis of rating ofland, and, by definition, \"land\" includes land which is either being built upon or has been built upon.\n\nNevertheless, reference to the provisions of the Act shows that, after a building has been completed, the letting value of the buil<ling, which becomes part oflancl, will be the primaryordetermining factor in fixing the annual rent for which the land which has been built upon \"might reasonably be expected to be let from year to year\". All that Section 154 seems to contemplate, by mentioning \"land or building\", is that Janel which is vacant or which has not been built upon may be treated, for purposes of valuation, on a different footing from land which has actually been built upon. But, relevant provisions of the Act do not mention ancl seem to take no account, for purposes of rating. of any building which is only in the course of being constructed although Section 3 (r) of the Act makes it clear that land which is being built upon is also \"lam!\". Hence, so long as a building is not completed or constructed to such an extent that atleast a partial completion notice can be given so that the completed portion can be occupied and let, the land can, for purposes of rating, be equated with or treated as vacant land. It is only when the building which is being put up is in such a state that it is actually and legally capable of occupation that the letting value of the building can enter into the computation for rating ·\"rebus sic stantibus\". Although, the definition of land, which is rateable, covers three kinds of \"land\", yet, for the purposes of rating Sec. 154 recognises only two categories. Therefore,. all \"land\" must fall in one of these two categories for purposes of rating and not outside.\n\nThe doctrine of sterility, in the context of the P{ovisions we have to construe, cannot apply here. In England, what happens_ is that\n\n(I) (1971] (I) S.C.R. 335.\n\n(2) ]1971] (2) S.C.Jl.. 423.\n\nwhen land, which is in the process of being built upon, is equated with vacant land, which is not yielding any profit, it ceases to be rateable land. But, under the statute we have before us, all \"land\", whether vacant, or in the process of being built upon, or built upon, is rateable according to the well settled principles. All that can be said is that, so long as a building being constructed on some land is not in a state fit for occupation, its rateable value should not be more or less than that of land which is vacant. That, however, is not the object of the respondent in invoking the doctrine of sterility. What has happened in the case before us is that the land which was being assessed as rateable so long as it was vacant land has been treated as entirely outside the scope or sphere of rateability just because a building is being erected upon it. As we find no statutory provision which has the effect of conferring such an immunity or exemption upon land which is being built upon, we cannot uphold a conclusion which produces such a startling result.\n\nThe English authorities where the doctrine of \"sterility\" was recognised were : West Bromwich School Board v.\n\nOverseers of West Bromwich;('} Mersey Docks & Harbour Board '\" Overseers f L /aneilian;(2) The Metropolitan Board of works '\" The Overseers of West Ham; (l) The Guardians of the Poor of the Sculcoates Union in the Borough f Kingston-Upon-Hu/I v.\n\nDock Company at Kingston-Upon-Hul/;(4) and, the Churchwardens & Overseers of Lambeth Parish '\" The London County Counci/.(S) In the last mentfoned case of The London County Council relating to a park maintained by a County Council for public benefit, Lord Herschell, L.C., after holding that the public was not a rateable \"occupier\", said;\n\n\"Once it has been found, as in this case, that the occupation cannot as a matter of law be a beneficial occupation, there is an end of the question. I say as matter of law, because that it does not give a beneficial occupation as matter of fact is nothing to the PUfPOSe. Here there is no possibility of beneficial occupation to tlie county council; they are incapable by law of using it for any profitable pUfPOSe; they must allow the public the free and unrestricted use of it\".\n\nThese cases are not helpful or really applicable at all because they are based upon the concept of rating exclusively by reference to the beneficial occupation or of the income enjoyed by an occupier.\n\nIt was, however, pointed out by the respondent that in London G County Council v. Erith (Churchwardens & Overseers of Parish), (6) Lord Herschell, L.C., expressed some dissatisfaction with the rather wide application of the doctrine of sterility in some cases in England and explained it as follows (at page 591) :\n\n(I) 13 Q.B.D. 929 @ 942. {2) 14 Q.B.D. p. 770.\n\n(3) (1870) LR. 6 Q.B. 193.\n\n(4) 1895 A.C. 136.\n\n(5) 1897 A.C. 625 @ 630-631.\n\n(6) 1893 A.C. 562 @ 591.\n\nI I I !•\n\n' •\n\nNow, if land is \"struck with sterility in any and everybody's hands\", wl.ether by law or by its inherent condition, so that its occupation is, and would be, of no vahe to any one, I should quite agree that.it cannot be rated to the relief of the poor.\n\nBut I must demur to the view that the question whether profit (by which I understand is meant pecuniary profit) can be derived from the occupation by the occupier is a criterion which determines whether the premises are rateable, and at what amount they should be assessed; and I do not think that a building in the hands . of a school board is incapable of being beneficially occupied by . them and is not so otcujlied because they are prohibited from deriving pecuniary profit from its use. Fry L.J., in the case of Reg. v, School Board.for London (17 Q.B.D. 738) said : \"The term 'Sterilitv' has been introduced into the cases because, as a general rule.\" a profit is produced; but it does not by any mean,· follow that because there is no profit there is no value. There could be no better illustration of this than in the present case\", I think the learned Judge here points to the true test; whether the occupation be such as to be of value. This is the language used by Lord Blackburn, and I have already said that the possibi lity of making a pecuniary profit is. not in my opinion the lest whether the. occupation is of value\".\n\nWe do not think, for ieasons already given, that it is necessary to examine English cases or authorities on the application of doctrine of sterility in EnglaQd to land which is being built upon, because, after examining the relevant provisions of the enactment before us, we have reached ihe conclusion that land on which a building is being constructed does not cease to be rateable simply because a cOI)'truction is going on upon it. The difference between English law and the position which emerges from the statute before us. is vital for deciding the question before us. The most that can be said is that land which is being built upon should not be rated like land on which a building has been actually constructed unless and until the construction has reached . .a stage at which som~ occupation of the constructed portion is also legally and actually possible so that. it could be taken into account in determining the rateable value. On this aspect, we have not found any materi111 to indicate the state of the building on land on which it was being constructed. Evidence would, no doubt have been there if the building had reached a stage at which any part of it was completed so as to be permitted to be occupied. Therefore, we think that the land upon which a building was under construction could and should be rated in the same way as vacant land.\n\nNo appeal has been preferred against the rating of the vacant land.\n\nWe, therefore, assume that the rental value reached, even by employ>ng \"the contractor's test\", correctly determines what a hypothetical tenant would be reasonably expected to pay from year to year for the vacant land. The question whether the owner himself 01 a tenant is actually occupying the land is not relevant for the purpose of determining the rateable value .by a reference to the hypothetical. tenant. Here, the basis of rating is not the actual income from bene ficial occupation, as it may be in England (even:1herc a tendency to shift\n\n70 2\n\nSUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS (19i4J 3 3.C.R.\n\nthe former or traditional base is discernable), but of ownership of land which is capable of beneficial occupation. In other words, the concept of annual value of the land to the ownet\", though obviously linked up with its utility or annual letting value, is more comprehensive than and different from the test of the actual income yielded which has been applied in England in a number of cases.\n\nWhere the landlord is in actual occupation the land does not cease to have rateable value. Jn such a case, rateable value would be dter mined by asking the question : What would or could be reasonably expected to pay from year to year if he was not the owner but wanted to take it on rent? The standard of reasonable expectation from a hypothetical tenant, applied by contemplating a hypcthetical bidding or higgling in a market, howcrer difficult and unsatisfactory as a method of valuation, has to be resorted to in a case beset with such difficulties as the one before us. In no case, however, could the rental yalue of land being built upon be less than that of the same land when 1t was vacant.\n\nWe find the judgment under appeal to be erroneous as it held land which was being rated as vacant to have ceased to be subject to any rating at all simply because a building began to be made on it in 1961 by its owner. The rule of interpretation, that, where two vje\\\\'S are reasonably or equally cpen, we should adopt the one which benefits the assessee, would enabJe us to <lo no 1norc than to treat land which is actually being built upon on the same footing as vacant land as long as no structure capable of occupation and letting' is complet<d on it.\n\nThe result is tl)at we allow this appeal, and we set aside the judgment antl order of the Division Bench.\n\nWe also set aside the assess1ne1t order with regard to 1060 sq. yds., which was being built lipon, and the orders of the Small Cause Court and a learned Judge of the High Court dismissing app>0ls with regard to this area of land. We send back the case to the assessor and Collector of Bombay Municipal Corpration and direct that the whole land will be valued, for purposes of rating\n\nin the relevant year, as vacant land just as it \\vas bejng done in the P\"iod immediately preceding 1962. In the circumstances of the case, which is not free from difficulties, the parties will bear their own costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal alloll'ed.\n\nM45 SCIJ7S-2, SC0-17·7·75--0JPF.", "total_entities": 86, "entities": [{"text": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S POLYCHEM LTD.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S POLYCHEM LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 20, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 74, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 20, 1974\n\n[M.H. BEG AND Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M.H. BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bombay Municipal Corporation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 3(r)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Municipal Corporation Act", "statute": "Bombay Municipal Corporation Act"}}, {"text": "S. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170, "end_char": 176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Municipal Corporation Act", "statute": "Bombay Municipal Corporation Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 405, "end_char": 411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent company was owner of a large area of land in Bombay, on a part of which there was a building under construction."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1569, "end_char": 1574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the appeal to this Court it was connded on bellalf of the ppellant Corporation that the High Court erred in applying the doctrine of sterility to land rateable under the provisions of the Act i. that, the High Court overlooked the essential distinction between the Indian and i:.nglish law which waS that the basis for determining the rateable value in India was the value of the property to the owner and not to the occupier, and, that, every kind of 'land' as defined-by s.3(r) of the Act was rateable under s.154 of the Act simply because it had a value to the owner of it and not because it was yielding any income or was usefully or beneficially occupied or enjoyed by tenant or any other kind of occupant paying for the use of it."}}, {"text": "s.3(r)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1689, "end_char": 1695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1726, "end_char": 1731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2984, "end_char": 2991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In England, land which is in the process of being built uPon is equated with vacant land which is not yielding any profit, so that it ceases to bo \"rateable'' ]and."}}, {"text": "s. 3(r)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5026, "end_char": 5033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1962] 3 S.C.R. 49", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5902, "end_char": 5919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1964] 2 S.C.R. 608", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6212, "end_char": 6230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1968] 1 S.C.R. 525", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6306, "end_char": 6325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N_ren De", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7226, "end_char": 7234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N_ren De, Y.S. Chita/e, S.K. Kadam, P.C. Bhartari and J.B. Dada chanp for the appollant."}}, {"text": "Y.S. Chita", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7236, "end_char": 7246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N_ren De, Y.S. Chita/e, S.K. Kadam, P.C. Bhartari and J.B. Dada chanp for the appollant."}}, {"text": "S.K. Kadam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7250, "end_char": 7260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N_ren De, Y.S. Chita/e, S.K. Kadam, P.C. Bhartari and J.B. Dada chanp for the appollant."}}, {"text": "P.C. Bhartari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7262, "end_char": 7275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N_ren De, Y.S. Chita/e, S.K. Kadam, P.C. Bhartari and J.B. Dada chanp for the appollant."}}, {"text": "J.B. Dada", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7280, "end_char": 7289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N_ren De, Y.S. Chita/e, S.K. Kadam, P.C. Bhartari and J.B. Dada chanp for the appollant."}}, {"text": "A.B.Divao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7316, "end_char": 7325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.B.Divao and l.N. Shroff for the respondent."}}, {"text": "l.N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7330, "end_char": 7341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.B.Divao and l.N. Shroff for the respondent."}}, {"text": "H M.C. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7363, "end_char": 7378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H M.C. Bhandare, B.R. Agarwala Gagrat and Co., Vinay Bhasin and Janedra Lal for Intervener No."}}, {"text": "B.R. Agarwala Gagrat and Co.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7380, "end_char": 7408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H M.C. Bhandare, B.R. Agarwala Gagrat and Co., Vinay Bhasin and Janedra Lal for Intervener No."}}, {"text": "Vinay Bhasin", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7410, "end_char": 7422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H M.C. Bhandare, B.R. Agarwala Gagrat and Co., Vinay Bhasin and Janedra Lal for Intervener No."}}, {"text": "Janedra Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7427, "end_char": 7438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H M.C. Bhandare, B.R. Agarwala Gagrat and Co., Vinay Bhasin and Janedra Lal for Intervener No."}}, {"text": "Anil B. Divan A.J. Rana", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7471, "end_char": 7494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\n'''J,\n\nA Anil B. Divan A.J. Rana and Ashok Grover for Intervener No."}}, {"text": "Ashok Grover", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7499, "end_char": 7511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\n'''J,\n\nA Anil B. Divan A.J. Rana and Ashok Grover for Intervener No."}}, {"text": "BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7578, "end_char": 7581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBEG, J. This appeal, by certification under Article 133(1) (c) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7622, "end_char": 7636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Municipal Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8997, "end_char": 9025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the respondent Company did not lead any evidenee about the hypothetical rent of any part of land the A8'essor & Collector of Bombay Municipal Corporation determined the market value of the whole land as Rs."}}, {"text": "1-1-1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9308, "end_char": 9316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2170/- From 1-1-1962 the Assessor divided the plot notionally into two parts one of 1060 sq."}}, {"text": "Small Cause Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10336, "end_char": 10363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent company, aggrieved by the assessor's fixation of rateable value, had appealed to the Small Cause Court of Bombay which dismissed the 'appeal."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10437, "end_char": 10454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent company then appealed to the Bombay High Court under Section 218(0) of the Act."}}, {"text": "Section 218(0)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10461, "end_char": 10475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12147, "end_char": 12158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bench had erred in applying the English doctrine of sterility to land rateable under the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Bench had erred in applying the English doctrine of sterility to land rateable under the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 3(r)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15336, "end_char": 15348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(s)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15647, "end_char": 15659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15846, "end_char": 15857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16081, "end_char": 16092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 144(A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16156, "end_char": 16170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n140", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16242, "end_char": 16254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16565, "end_char": 16576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16928, "end_char": 16967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 140", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17012, "end_char": 17023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Section 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17088, "end_char": 17099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Section\n\n353", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17961, "end_char": 17973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Section 353A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17979, "end_char": 17991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 353A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18335, "end_char": 18347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 472", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18818, "end_char": 18829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 353A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18928, "end_char": 18940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 139(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19403, "end_char": 19417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 146(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19682, "end_char": 19696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 146(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19967, "end_char": 19981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 154(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20795, "end_char": 20809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23816, "end_char": 23827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 154 to 156", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24035, "end_char": 24054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 154(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24067, "end_char": 24081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 156(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24293, "end_char": 24307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 127(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25159, "end_char": 25173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25181, "end_char": 25209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25596, "end_char": 25615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A reference was made there to the decision of the Privy Council in Bengal Nagpur Railway Co. Ltd. vs. Corporation of Calcutta (2) affirming a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Bengal Nagpur Railway Co. Ltd. vs. Corporation of Calcutta(') on the construction of Section 127 of the Calcutta Act."}}, {"text": "Section 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25704, "end_char": 25715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26117, "end_char": 26125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Calcutta case which went to the Privy Council, a golf club was making use of some land with a few holes made in it for occasional practice by persons aspiring to become golfars."}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26791, "end_char": 26796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court then cited the \"weighty observations of Atkin, L.J., as he then was, which were approved by Lord Carson in his dissenting judgment\" (at page 58) :\n\n\"How then is the annual rent to be ascertained?"}}, {"text": "Carson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26848, "end_char": 26854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court then cited the \"weighty observations of Atkin, L.J., as he then was, which were approved by Lord Carson in his dissenting judgment\" (at page 58) :\n\n\"How then is the annual rent to be ascertained?"}}, {"text": "Calcutta Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27815, "end_char": 27835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it was submitted, the views expressed by this Court in the Calcutta Corporation case (supra) did not militate with an application of the doctrine of sterility where facts warranted it."}}, {"text": "I.ndia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28284, "end_char": 28290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next case cited was Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas V. Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad(2), where, after references to legislative history of rating in England and in I.ndia, this Court said : (at page 628) :\n\n\"It would, therefore, be right to say that the word 'rate' had acquired a special meaning in English legislative history and practice and also in Indian legislation where that word was usedanditmeanta taxfC)r local purposes imposed by local authorities and the basis of the tax was the annual value of the lands or buildings on or in connection with which it was imposed, arrived at in one of the three ways which we have already indicated\"."}}, {"text": "[1962] 3 S.C.R 49", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 29210, "end_char": 29227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rating and Valuation Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29721, "end_char": 29751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 154(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31408, "end_char": 31417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Royal Western India Turf Club", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31829, "end_char": 31858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "vs. Bombay Municipal Corporatioi.(2) where, as in the Royal Western India Turf Club case (supra), the provisions of the Act with which we are concerned had come up for consideration, this Court said (at page 548) :\n\n(I) 11968] 1 S.C.R. 525."}}, {"text": "1968] 1 S.C.R. 525", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 31996, "end_char": 32014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "District Municipal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34820, "end_char": 34842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Guntur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35958, "end_char": 35964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "·\n\nGuntur J,, funicipal Cowzcil v •. Guntur Tott'n Rate PaJers'."}}, {"text": "Section 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36944, "end_char": 36955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37366, "end_char": 37375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38071, "end_char": 38079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Metropolitan Board of works", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39689, "end_char": 39716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The English authorities where the doctrine of \"sterility\" was recognised were : West Bromwich School Board v.\n\nOverseers of West Bromwich;('} Mersey Docks & Harbour Board '\" Overseers f L /aneilian;(2) The Metropolitan Board of works '\" The Overseers of West Ham; (l) The Guardians of the Poor of the Sculcoates Union in the Borough f Kingston-Upon-Hu/I v.\n\nDock Company at Kingston-Upon-Hul/;(4) and, the Churchwardens & Overseers of Lambeth Parish '\" The London County Counci/.(S) In the last mentfoned case of The London County Council relating to a park maintained by a County Council for public benefit, Lord Herschell, L.C., after holding that the public was not a rateable \"occupier\", said;\n\n\"Once it has been found, as in this case, that the occupation cannot as a matter of law be a beneficial occupation, there is an end of the question."}}, {"text": "London County Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40000, "end_char": 40021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The English authorities where the doctrine of \"sterility\" was recognised were : West Bromwich School Board v.\n\nOverseers of West Bromwich;('} Mersey Docks & Harbour Board '\" Overseers f L /aneilian;(2) The Metropolitan Board of works '\" The Overseers of West Ham; (l) The Guardians of the Poor of the Sculcoates Union in the Borough f Kingston-Upon-Hu/I v.\n\nDock Company at Kingston-Upon-Hul/;(4) and, the Churchwardens & Overseers of Lambeth Parish '\" The London County Counci/.(S) In the last mentfoned case of The London County Council relating to a park maintained by a County Council for public benefit, Lord Herschell, L.C., after holding that the public was not a rateable \"occupier\", said;\n\n\"Once it has been found, as in this case, that the occupation cannot as a matter of law be a beneficial occupation, there is an end of the question."}}, {"text": "Herschell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40097, "end_char": 40106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The English authorities where the doctrine of \"sterility\" was recognised were : West Bromwich School Board v.\n\nOverseers of West Bromwich;('} Mersey Docks & Harbour Board '\" Overseers f L /aneilian;(2) The Metropolitan Board of works '\" The Overseers of West Ham; (l) The Guardians of the Poor of the Sculcoates Union in the Borough f Kingston-Upon-Hu/I v.\n\nDock Company at Kingston-Upon-Hul/;(4) and, the Churchwardens & Overseers of Lambeth Parish '\" The London County Counci/.(S) In the last mentfoned case of The London County Council relating to a park maintained by a County Council for public benefit, Lord Herschell, L.C., after holding that the public was not a rateable \"occupier\", said;\n\n\"Once it has been found, as in this case, that the occupation cannot as a matter of law be a beneficial occupation, there is an end of the question.", "canonical_name": "Herschell"}}, {"text": "Herschell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41002, "end_char": 41011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, however, pointed out by the respondent that in London G County Council v. Erith (Churchwardens & Overseers of Parish), (6) Lord Herschell, L.C., expressed some dissatisfaction with the rather wide application of the doctrine of sterility in some cases in England and explained it as follows (at page 591) :\n\n(I) 13 Q.B.D. 929 @ 942. {", "canonical_name": "Herschell"}}, {"text": "Fry", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42095, "end_char": 42098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fry L.J., in the case of Reg."}}, {"text": "Blackburn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42584, "end_char": 42593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is the language used by Lord Blackburn, and I have already said that the possibi lity of making a pecuniary profit is."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_703_721_EN", "year": 1974, "text": ", WORKMEN OF THE STRAW BOARD MANUFACTURING\n\nCOMP ANY LIMITED v.\n\nM/S. STRAW BOARD MA:f{UFACTURING COMPANY LIMITED\n\nMarch 21, 1974.\n\nB [P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY; S. N. Pw1vE!i1 AND P. K. Go; WA)ll, JJ.]\n\n,:;.,, U.P. I11dustriaf. Disputh., A.ct, Si. 2N and 6'N'-l11dl{.S_trial Djsputes Act (J.f of 1947) ~·. 2SFFF-Iw!> units o/ a business-tests for determining if tl1ey are. independent~Principles of res ; udicdta-Applicability to industrial adjudication-Scope of s. 25 FFF of the Central A.ct.\n\nThe respondent-company owned'•two units--S.-milt and R-mill.\n\nThey werein !Cpartte premises, but in close. proximity. . The raw-materials used in the two mills were-different and were obtainCd from different sonrc1.'S. lhey also manufactured different products. Electricity was obtained by the two mills from different Sdurces.\n\nThe sale Of:- products manufactured iµ the respective-- units. was effected from their respective . offices and the members of the staff of the' t.10 unib; were separate, andJ.Was were paid separately. The accounts of the two mills we.re maintained lt:arately although finally they were --a.malgamated into one account. The Fire Insurance of the\\ mills was don~ sej)aratcly; the local manager of the Employees State Irisurance Corporation bad allotted different numbers of provident fund lo the two mills; the assessment of the sales-tax for the sales of the product of the two units was done separately; and as the products. we, r, e di, fferent, different . rates of sales-tax were applied. The res1'ondent closed the:' S-rnill on the groupd of non-availability of ce_rtalO_~ ra:w-niaterial for it\"' product and termir\\ated the services of the workmen of ih8.t Will by stagefl between Mav 7 and July 28, 1967, 'Jhe first batch consisted of 98 workmen and_ they raised a dispute which was_ referred for a'djudiation b_v the tribunal under s. 4-K of th~ U.P. Industrial .Disputes Act.\n\nOn the qu_estions (1) '\\Yhether'-stoppage of work. tly the employers and the- C3nsequent non-employment of the- workmen amounted to a lay-off, retrenchn1ent, Jock-out, oc whether it was a legitimate closure; and (2) to what relief~ if any, t~ workmen concerned were entitled to, the tribunal held that the closure was legitimate; that it was not a case of layoff, retrench1nent or lockout; that, since it was legitimate closure, the question of cvmccnsation could not Oe determined by it; and that the workmen were not entitled to any relief.\n\nIn apoCal to his Court,\n\nHELD :._(l)Ift the circumstances of the case the S mill-which was .an in~ dependent unit and a separate line of business, bad been closed in fact and therefore, it wa., not a case of ly .. off or lock-out or retrenchment.\n\n[713'G-H 1m ·\n\n(a) Several factors are relevant in deciding the question whthr industrial establishments owned by the same management constitute sepuralc units or one cstatJlishment, atld the significance or importance of th':!se relevant-factors, woutd G not be the same in each case but depends On the facts of each cae. The•c i3 bound to be a shift of emphasis in the application cf the various test-; from one case to another.\n\nBut among these tests functional intt!.i!ralitv, n1•:1nin!'.! thereby such functional interdependnce that one .unit c31!no~ exist cnvenient1Y\n\nCIT reasonably without the other, will assume an added s1gnt11cnnc: 1n the casl! of a closure of a branch or a unit. In the present case. RtnHI is a diffcren~ line of business and'the closure of the Smill.has nothing to do with the functioning of the R-mill. This is a most important aspect in thls a1°ticu!ar case though there are certain common features as between the tw.o u111ts. 1 he ! act of the ff unity of ownership. uper\\'ision and control. and the ext-stance of certain ~?mmon features do not jushfv a contrarv conclusion. That most Jf lh~ cond1ttons o( tervke of the two n1ills were substantially identical can be- !asi1y explained by lhc fact that being owned by the same employer i.lnd the two units bing 2-L!4Sup.Cl/75\n\nE; ituate in close poximity it will not be in the interest of the management and pence and .well-be1n~ of. e C?Jllpanr tc;> treaf the employees differently. creating\n\nheart burning and d1scnm1natton. Similarly. no particular significance could be nttached to the fact that the standing orders of the . company were applied to the employees of Rmill. It is true: that there were some-case or transfer from one mill to the other but they were all done with the consent. of the -eJ:Dployoes.\n\nIn fact, the standing orders did not provide !for transfer from one unit to the o.the_r: The triunal has nt committed _any,, manifest .error of law by · any s1gntficant om1ss1on to consider relevant materials in thlS c~ Therefore, it was a clear case of closure of an indel)endcnt unit of the company and not a closure of a part of an establishment. -SUch-' closure l\"Cannot be treated as lay!ofr or lock-out under the Act.\n\nThe S-mill was intended to be closej and was in fact closed and therefore. the question of lay-off. u@r s. 2-N of the Act does not arise; Similarly. it is also not a Case of lock-Ofi, t within. the meaning of s. 2.:.0.\n\nJn both lay Off -and lock-out the unit is nOt clOsed completely and there is also no intention of the etnployer to close -the-l:OncCm. It is also not a case of retrenchment as it i~ ordinarily understood nor even within the meaning of s .. 2(s) of the Act which is substantially >identical with s. 2(00). of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, as interpreted by this Court. (713A-714H;\n\n718C-DJ ·\n\nAssociated Ce1nent ConJ;, nnies. Litnited, CluiibµssO Cement Works Jhitik'\"'nl\n\nv. Their-Workmen, [1960] 1 S.C.R. 709/716, Indian Cable Co., ttd. v. [1$ WoTk men, [1%2] I L, L.J. 409/419, Pakshiraja Studio• v: Its workmtn, [1961] II L.L.T. 330/382, Pratap Press, etc. v. T/ieir Workmtn, !1960] I L.L.J .• 497 q1itted in 1961 (Il) L.LJ . .308/382; Sol(th India Milfoners'. Association and others v. -Coimba.:. tore District '(extile WQrkers' Unionan4, otliers, [1962] 1_ L.L.J. 223/230 and Managemtnt of We11ger & Co. v. Their Workmen, [1963] Suppl, 2 S, C.R. 862/\n\n871. referred to_. , r , ·\n\n(b) The emPtoyer waSjustified in deciding to close Jiown the unit by1stages It is not alwavs. pQssible. to immediately shut down a mill or a concern even •hough .a decision to close it may have ~n irrevocably taken. ·:nere is nothing wrong in the responden~ company arrana; Lng closure of the Smill in such a way as to guard against unnecessary inconvenience to bOth the management and the labour and against possible avdidable wastage or loss to the concern.\n\nIt would be necessary to go on with the unqsed stock.of .raw, matl!rial'i for oome time for which a lesser number of workers 1would. be necess:lry, some of whom would constitute the next batch to go.\n\nHence t11e lennination of th~ services of the 98 workmen as the first batch selected to go on account of closure. in the circumstances of the case, cannot. be held to be unjustified.\n\n[715C-F]\n\n( c) The timing of the termiriation of the 98 workmen which was about three months earlier to the actual closure is not at all relevant in the context of the present case which is one of a closure of an independent unit with different processes of work for its end product. It could , not be oontended that there was no closureon 7th May since the S-Mill had been functioning till 28th July and that therefore the first batch of 98 workmen must be held to have b!en retrenched, on 7th May with a right to compensation as on retrenchment under s, 6N of the U.P. Act. [715F-HJ\n\n(d) (i). The principles of res judicata under s. 11 C.P.C. are applicabl~ , to industrial adjudication, In the application of the principle in industrial adju(l1ca. tion the extremely technical considerations usually jnvoked in civil \"J)rOCC!'dinp may not be allowed to outweigh substantial justice to e parties. This . is so since multiplicity of litigation and agitation and re-agitation of the same dispute\n\nat issue between the same employer -and his employees will not be conducive to industrial peace which is the princioal object of'. all labour legislation bearing on industrial adjudication.\n\nBut, whether a matter in dispute in a subsequent case had already been directly and substantially in issue between the same parties and the same bad been heard and finally decid~ by the tribunl w~I bC of pertinent consideration and will have to be determined before boldtn.i; Jn a particular case that the principles of res judicate are attracted.\n\n[717CFJ\n\n(ii) Rule 18 of the U.P. ln<iu¥; tria1 Tribunal nd Labour Courf; S Rules Procedure. t 967, enables the tribunal to frame any issue that may anse from the\n\nWORKMEN STRAW BOARD co. v. STRAW BOARD co. (Ga.iwami, J.) 7P5\n\nP!eadings but. th~ decision on such issue would not automatically attract the prin~\n\nc1ple of. res 1ud1ate. The heart of the matter always will be what was the\n\nS\\l~'t!lntial _question that c.ame up. for decision in Pie earlier proceedin, gs_.\n\nSome a?d1honal isues. may be .framd 1n order to assist the tribOnal to better appre~ c1ate th~ case of te I?art!es with reference to the princi{'l issue which has been referred to for -ad1ud1cat1on.\n\nThe reasons for the dec1s1on in connection with the adjudication of the principal issue cannot be considered as the decision -itself to attract the plea of res judicate.\n\nThe earlier question at issue must be r'elevant and _germane in determining the question of res judicata in thC subsequeni,, proceedings. The real character of the controversy between the parties , -is the determining factor and in the con1plex and manifold human relations between labour and capital no ·-cast-iron rule can be laid down.\n\n[717F-718A] ·\n\nCi.ii) In. the present case, there were earlier awards but in nolle of them was the question whether R-MiU and S-J\\1ill were one establisbment substantially in issue. (717 A..Cj\n\n2(a) Since the U.P. Act does not make any provision for compensation in the case of closure and the Central Act has supplied the lacuna there is no repugnancy between the U.P. Act and the Central Act and the beneficent provisions of the latter Act can be availed of bY l'lbour even in their absence in the U.P. Act. Any doubt in the matter is cleared,. by s. 25J of the Central Act.\n\nTherefore, on the finding that the S-lill was cloSed as an independent unit it will fall for consideration whether the employees of the said mill are entitled to compensation under s. 25F which is a counter part of s. 6N of U.P. :Act. by virtue of the provisions of s. 25FFF (i) of the Central Act. The Tribunal was, therefore, not correct in holding that s, 25FFF did not apply to the emplorees concerned.\n\n[718D-719D]\n\n(b) It is no longer open to the employer to pfead that there could be no indtistrial dispute with regard to eligibility of workn1en to compe, ns.ation, or to its quantum, on closure of an establishment. Forti.er, the reference has not bee_n challenged as incomoetent either befpre the tribut\\al or in this Court., On the other_ hand the explicit terms of the reference show' that the subject matter referred to is an jndlistrial dispute. Once it is found that there is a closure the question of applicability.-df s .. -25FFF(i) or thecproviso theretq.will automatically arise for consideration in determip.ing the quantum of compensation. The scheme of Chapter V-A -Or even. th'Ctlanguage, of s. 25FFF doesnot indicate that the claim under the section can b& made only llnder s. 33C. pf the Central Act.\n\nIt was therefore incumbent upon. tbe tribun.al 'to adjudic_ate u):)on the second issue of reference for granting appfoptiate relief as a necessary cOrollary to the result of the first issue, and the matter must be remitted to the tribunal. .The tribunal should determine the amount of-COmpensation after givin2 an adeauate opportunity to the parties to establish their respective pleas.\n\n[719H-720H]\n\n(c) The word undertaking as used in s. 25Fff. is not' intended to cover the entire industry or business of the employer and therefore, even closure or stopoage of a part of the business or activities of the employer would be covered. by the sub-section.\n\n[719E-G] ~\n\nJifanagement of Hihduitan Steel Ltd. v. The Work111en and others, A.I.R. 1973 S.C .. 878/882, followed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Ciil AppeaHilo. 52 of 1969.\n\nAppeal bv special leave from the Award dated the 30th April, 1968 of the Industrial Tribunal (Ill Lucknow in Ad.i Case No. 110 of 1967.\n\nS. C. Agrawal, Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar and V. I. Francis, for the appellants.\n\nV. S. Chitalev, 1. N. Shrofl and R. P. Kapur, fotthe respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivereji by.\n\nGoSWAMI, J .-This appeal by special leave at the instance of the workmen of the Straw Board Manufacturing Company Limited, is dir~.:ted against the award of the Industrial Tribunal llll at Lucknow (briefly the Tribunal) dated 30th April, 1968. The facts briefly are a• follows :- The Straw lJoard Manufacturing Company, the respondent hereinafter to be. referred to as the Company) is _a public Limited company and owns two units shown as the Straw Board Mill and the Regmal Mill (hereinafter described as S. Mill and R.\n\nMill respectively).\n\nStraw Board was manufactured in S. Mill and abrassive paper/cloth described as regmai was prepariid in R. Mill.\n\nThes~ two Mills are situ.ated close to each other with only a railway line intervening Each ha; a factory registereH separately under the Factories Act, but one balanc'! sheet and one profit anil loss account are prepared for the Comoanv as a whole consolidating the accounts of both units.\n\nS. Mill was stated some time in 1932 and R. Mill was established some lime iu 194()-41.\n\nS. Mill had more than 200 workmen whereas R. i\\1111 had about 50 workmen.\n\nThe Company dosed the s.\n\nMill on the ground of non\"availability of Bagase which is the raw material for the manufacture of strawboard and terminated the services of the workmen of this Mill bv stages between May 7 and July\n\n28. J %7.\n\nThe first batch consistili of 98 workmen whose dispute wns the subject matter of the reference before the Tribunal.\n\nOn a discu!c being raised by the workmen over their termination of services and. on failure ol conciliation, the State Government under section 4 K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act (briefly the U. P. Act) referred the following two issues for adjudication bv the Tribunnl :-\n\n;, '• (I) Whether the stoppae of work bv the employers and the consequent non-employment by them of the workmen, detailed in the Annevure, in stages as frnm May 7, 1967, amounts to a lay-off/retrenchment/lock-out or whether it should be treated as a legitimate clos11rc'?\n\n(2) To what relief. if any, are the workmen concerned entitled on the basis of., the findings on issue No., I above?\n\nBorl1, the parties submitted. their written statement; and re-joinders.\n\nIn aci:ordancc with the usual procedure followed by the Tribunal, th: following fresh issues were framed on the pleadin.gs :\n\nIi) Whether the present reference is bad in law by reasori G of withdrawal or the previous reference?\n\n! ii) Whether this Tribunal is not competent to oo into the question whether the closure was for unavoidUble rc:-1sons beyond the control of the employers? (iiil Whether this Tribunal is not competent to determine the question of compensation in this reference?\n\n(iv) Whether the emoloyers could vali'lly close only the Straw\n\nBoard Mill without closing the Re, gmal Mill?\n\nWORKMEN STRAW BOARD co. v,\"STRAW BOARD co. (Go.111>ami, J.) 707\n\n(v)\n\n(vi)\n\nWhether the awards in Adj. Cases Nos. 53 of 1965 and 93 of 1965 of Labour Courts, Allahaball and Meerut, respectively and in Adj. Case No. 10 of 1967 of Indus .. trial Tribunal (ll, Allahabad or any of them operate as res judicata between the parties?\n\nWhether this Strawboard Mill and Regmal Mill form part of one and the same establishment, and whether this matter \"llas been finally determined by the award of fndllstrial Tribunal (!) in Case No. 65 of 1963 and does the award operate ,}s res judicata?\n\nIssue No.(il was not pressed before the Tribunal. Numerous documents were exhibited by both the parties bfore the Tribual, most of these on admission.\n\nTh~ workmen examined only one witness while the Company examined three .witnesses, including its director.\n\nAfter hearing arguments in the case on April 24, 1968, the Tribunal recorded the following order :- \"24.4.68\n\n........ Arguments have been heard on all the issues.\n\nTf it aµpears to me that the reference can be answered on\n\nfittdings on the issues fram~U by me, I will prooeed to give mv award and it will not be necessary to call upon the parties to adduce evidence on the question of quantum of com-_\n\noeusation, In case I am of the view that the question of compensation is required to be determined in this case and thi& Tribunal is competent to determine it, parties shall be called upon to adduce evidenc~ on the question of compensatio'1' and the related question of availability or l!_navoidability of reasons of closure of the factory and in .that case the reference will be disposed of only after evidence on this pqint also has been recorded and the parties have\n\nbeen heard . further.\" . .\n\nOn ADril 30. 1968. the Tribunal made the award by recording the following order :-\n\n\"30.4.68\n\nWhile writing the awprd I found it •possible to determine the matters of \\:lispute finally on the findings on the issues at which I. have arrived. It js not, therefore, necessary to call upon the parties _to adtiuce evidence on the question oE co111pensation and any other related question. I do not consider it necessary to go into the question of compensation in 1bis ase. ·\n\nAward made.\n\nLet it be sent to the State Government.\"\n\nH The Tribuna\\ came to the following conclusions :-\n\n11) S. Mill and R. Mill do not form parts of one and the\n\nsam~ esta.blishment.\n\n(2) It is a case of col)lplete closure of an i 1ndependent in- A dustria! unit.\n\n( 3) There is no res judicata on account of the previous awards as claimed by the workmen.\n\n( 4 l The employers coilld validly close the S. Mill without closing R. Mill.\n\nThe Tribunal, therefore, answered .the first issue in the reference in favour of the Company and held that the• closure was legitimate and it was not a case of lay-off, retrenchment or lock-out.\n\nThe Tribunal further held that since it was a legitimate closure, the question of compensation could not be determined by it and the workmen were not entitled to any relief. Hence this appeal by the workmen.\n\nMr. Agirarwal, learned counsel ap.pearing ou behalf of the appellants. submits as follows :-\n\n( 1 l The action of the Company is not a closure, far less,\n\nlecitimate or bona fide closure, It was a lock-out.\n\n(2l Even if it is accepted that suspension of production in D S. Mill was due to shortage of raw materials, the Comnanv should have resorted only to lay-off in accordance with the provi5_ions of section 6-K ot'ihe U.P. Act.\n\ni 3 l In anv event, termination of the services of 98 workmen onstituted retrenchment and was made in violation of sections 6-N and 6-P of the U.P. Act and is, E therefore, invalid iµ law.\n\nr 4) Alternatively, if the action of the Company even amounts . to . closure, tile workmen are entitled to compensation\n\nunder sub-section (1 l of section 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act (briefly the Central Aci) and the proviso of that su)>-section is not attracted.\n\nOn behalf of the respondent the principal submissions of Mr Chitalev are as follows :-\n\n( 1) If a distinct business activity is closed then the provision of section 25FFF is satisfied. The section uses tile word-\n\n'undertak~'_ in i general and popular sense: the accent not being on linanc1al or other unity but on separate line\n\nof business.\n\nTlie test of functi<; mal integralitv is not relevant. -\n\n(2) Since the test for functional integrality would depend\" upon the nature of the dispute raised and the test would be different for section 25FFF, there cannot be any question of res judicata; the matters directly and substantially in issue in the present award and the earlier awards being different. ·\n\nWORKMEN STRAW BOARD co. v. STRAW BOARD co. (Goswami, l.) 709\n\n(3) Oosure need not be instant. It can be, and very often, in the nature of things, has to be in stages. All that sec-. lion 25FFF requires is that there should be a bona fide closure in the sense that it should not be a mere pretence of 'rlosure.\n\nTie Tribunal has held that section 25FFF is not appHcable on accouri, of a similar provision being absent in the U. P. Act.\n\nAlthough Mr. Chitaley als() had anirst submitted in the same vein but finally did not choose to take that position before us. We wiil, therefore, briefly give our own reasons at the appropriate place.\n\nIt may be noted here that the workmen were paid by the Company three month's wages. as, compensation under the proviso to section 25FFF althoqgh there is no like. provision in the U. P. Act and the workmen also accepted the payment without prejudice. to their rights to agitate against the same. )lven so, the Company, however, had successfully raised the non-applicability of section 25FFF before the Tribunal as an answer to tlie. workmen's claim on the score of noncompliance with section 25F under sub-section ( 1) of section 25FFF of the Act. Wit:1 regard to the first submission. the appellants counsel took considerable pains, in the forefront of his argument, to demonstrate that there was n0 closure as uch of the Company at all since only a part of a single establishment was sought to be shut down. It is also pointe<l out that there s; s in fact no closure of even the S. Mill on May 7, 19.67 and that the same continued functioning until it was finally declared closed on July ~8. 1967. Hence, it is submitted that 98 workmen concerned in this \\lppeal should be held to be retrenched on May 7. 1967 and since the pre-conditions laid down under section 6-N and the provisions of section 6-P of the U. P. Act have not been complied with bv the Company, the so described retrenchment should be held as invalild. - In order to assess the correctness of the above submis<ions of the patties. it is necessary first to find if ihe S. Mill and 1he R. Mill were parts of one single establishmnt.\n\nThe U. P. Act follows the Jiattern of the Central Act, namely, the Industrial Disputes Act and the defi!'itions of lay-off, lock:out _and retrenchment and the provisions relatrng thereto are almost 1denttcal.\n\nThe decision of this Court_ dealing with the problems arising out of the. aoolication of the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Central Act relating to Jay-off and retrenchment are, therefore, relied upon by both the parties.\n\n'lbe learned counsel for the appellants drew ,, ur attention to a number of decisions of this Court with regard _to the tests of determining what is 'one establishment'. In the Associated Ceme11t Companies Limited, Chaibassa Cement Works, Jhinkrmi. v. Their Workmen, (') the Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"Several tests were referred to in the course of ar~µ ments bofore us, such as, geographical p1'00<imity, unity\n\n(l) [1960j l S. C.R. 703/716.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1974] 3 s.c.tt.\n\nol ownership, management and control, unity of empioy- 1n011t and conditions of service, functional integrality, gene·\n\nral unity of purpose etc .... fl is, perhaps i111p:>sibti! r, J lav down anv on11 test as an absolute and inrariab/e lest\n\nfor all cases.\n\nThe real purpme of these tem is to lirlJ 0ut Lh~ true relation between the parts, branches. unit!i, etc.\n\nIf in their true relation they constitute one integrated whole, we say, that the establishments is one; if on 1hc conlrarv they do not constitute one integrated v.:ho!c. ca('.h unit is then a separate unit.\n\nHow the ret1tion i::~-· l1>ccn the units will be judged' must depend on the facts prov, d, having regard to the scheme and object of the statute which , cives the right of unemployment compensation -<1nd aisn prescribes disqualification therefor; rhus. in one case the unity of ownership, mdnagc111cnt ~1nJ co1Jtrol 1nav be the in1portant test. in another case func. tional integrality or general unity may be th.e important test; and in still another case, the important test may be\n\nth~ unitv of emplovment.\n\nIn 1jeed~ in a Jargc number of\n\ncae-s- evcral tests mav fall for consideration at the same time\". (emphasis added).\n\nJn Indian Cable Co .. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, ( 1) this Court while\n\napprovi.r.~ of the principles laid down in Associated. Ce1n.'?11t Co111panies case (supra) at page 419 entered a significant observation asfollov.1s :-\n\n\"In Associated Cen1ent Con1pa11ies case (supra) it wos held that all the tests referred to in the judgment were\n\nsatisfied and therefore the question o'f .the comparative i.vcight to bl.! attached to the several tests dfj not arise for consideration\".\n\nIn Pakshiraja Studios v. Its Workme.1',(') this Court referring to its earlier decision in Pratap Press, etc. v. Their Workmen,(Z) reite rated the following principle : ·\n\nthe Court has to consider with care how far there is functionai integrality meaning thereby such !'tmctior:al inter-dependence that one unit cannot xist convni\n\ncntiv and reasonahly without the other and tho further question whether in .matters of finance anld employment the employer has actually kept the two units distinct or integrated\".\n\nJn South India Mil/owners' Association 0•1d others v.\n\nCni111batore District Textile Workers' Union and others,(') this Court on the san:; c topic observed as follows :-\n\n\"rn dealing with the problem. several fitctors ::trC' r~!.:!· vant and it must be remembered that the significance n_f tlze sereral relePant factors would 1int be the sa111e in each case.\n\n(I) [1962) IL. L. J. 409/4t9.\n\n(2) fl96tj Tl L. L J. J8Q/382.\n\n(3) [19601 IL. L. J. 497 quoted in [t9611 Tl L. L. J. J80/J82.\n\n(4) [19621 I L. L. J. 223/230.\n\nWORK;:EN STRAW BOARD co. v. STRAW BOARD co. (Goswami, J.) 711\n\nnor their importance.\n\nUnity of ownership and management and control wou'd be relevant factors.\n\nSo would be general unity of the two concerns; the unity of finance may not be irTelevant and geographical location may ,,\\so be of some relevance; functional integrality can also be a relevant and important factor in some cases. It is also possible that in some cases, the test would be whether one concern forms an inteitral part of another so that the two together constitute one concern, and in dealing with this question the nexus of integration in the form of some essential dependence of the one on the other_ 1nay assun1e\n\nrelevanee. Unity of purpose or design, or even p; irallel or c0-0rdinate activity innded to achieve a common object for the purpose of carryipg .out. the business oLthc one or the other can also assume relevance and importance ....\n\nIn the complex and complicated forms which modern industrial enterprise assumes, it would be unreasonable to suggest that any one of the relevant tests is decisive; the importance and significance of the tests would vary according to the facts in each case and so, the qt!estion must always be determined bearing in mind all the relevant tests and corelating them to the nature of the enterprise with which the Court is concerned\".'\n\n(emphasis added).\n\nIn Management of Wenger & Co. v. Their Workmen,( 1), this Court w!1ile referrinit to almost all the. earlier decisions on the subject emoha.iscd the following aspect in these terms :-\n\n\"Several factors are relevant in deciding this question , (whether industrial establishments owned by the same management constitute separate units or one establishment).\n\nBut it is important to bear in mind that the significance or importance of these relevant factors would not be the same in each case; whether or not the two units constitute one establishment or are really. two separate and .independent units, must be decided on the facts of each case\".\n\nBearing in' mind the not too rigid principles laid down by this Court, as ·.noticed above, we have to consider jf the two units, the S. Mill and the R. Mill can be held, on the materials established in this case. to be functionally one. single establishment.\n\nBroadly the common feafures of the two units emphasised before us by the\n\nappllants are unity of ownership; ultimate control and. supervision; unity of finance; similarity of service conditions in general, similarity of general wage structure; proximity of the units; some work (viz., preparation of Water proof Masala) for the R. Mill being {'erformed in the S, Miii; 'Common boiler located in the S. Mill supplymg steam to.\n\nR. lvlill; location of, the processing. furnace of the R. Mill in the S. Mill; identical bonus scl\\eme for both the units except for one year; intertransferability of employees fron'r' one unit to the other; identical workin.e: ccnditions; maintenance of one balance sheet and profit and loss account and one consolidated account for the COnlpan'( including both tJ::e units; depreciation fund; same occupier, namely, the Directc -\n\nfifll963J Supp. 2 s. c. R. 862/871.\n\n{.E.W. 1), for both the Mills and above all treatment by the Company of both the units as on~ in certain matters, such as opening of Bank accounts xcept in the State Bank where it was in the nan1e of the Company, Regmal section, and the products of both the units bearing the name of the Company. The submission is songht to be reinforced by reference to some earlier awards of Tribunals in certain adjudications where it is pointed out that the Tribunal had held that the standiitg orders of the Company were applicable to the R. Mill and the workmen's terms of conditions of service were the same in both the units.\n\nOn the other hand the circumstances pointed out in favour of the respondent are \"that the two units are separate. Both factories are registered Beparately under the Factories Act and they are in separate premises.\n\nThe raw materials used in the two factories are different and it is obtained from different sources.\n\nElectricity is obtained by the two factories from different sourq:s, the sale of products manufactured in the respective units is effected from their respective office, the staff of the two mills is separate and wages are paid separately.\n\nThe accounts of the two mills are maintained separately, although finally they are amalgamated into one account of the Company.\n\nFire insurance of the two factories is done separately, the local manager of the Employees State Insurance Corporation has allotted different numbers of provident fund to the two factories, the assessment of sales-tax for the sales cf pr.oducts of the two mills is done separately which is obviously due to the fact that the products are different and different rates of sales tax apply to them\".\n\nThere is no provision in the standing orders of the Company regarding transfer of workmen from one unit to ll1e other.\n\nWe haYe got to consider the appellants' submission in the backdrop of the present dispute before the Tribunal. The dispute centres round closure of S. Mill.\n\nBy raising an industrial dispute the closure is sought to be characterised by the workmen as either a lay-off or lock-out N retrenchment.\n\nThe controversy between the parties with regard to the oneness of the establishment has to be. viewed mainly fronr' the point of view of compensation for deemed retrenchment of the employees on closure since it is absolutely clear that the -S. Mill was ultimately closed on July 28, 1967 and remained so till the date of the award. It is, .however, pointed out by the appellants antl not countered by the respondent that the Strawboard section has again been restarted with about 58 workmen from October 1972 during the pendency of this appeal. It is, therefore, clear that the S. Mill was not.functioning at all between July 1967 and October 1972. We will, therefore, have to consider the matter in controversy in the above. context and' circumstances of this particular case.\n\nAdverting to tlle common features emphasised by the appellants, although most of these are present. it is not correct that there was mutual transfer of labour from one unit to the other without the consent of the employees.\n\nAgain too much significance cannot be given in this ease for application of the provisions of the standi.ng orders.\n\nThe fact that in the earlier award, on a dispute being raised by .the workmen of the R. Mill the standing orders were he)d 'to be applicable to them, would not assist tl1e appellants for the purpose of this case to enable an unerring conclusion on that ground alone that the two units are one. Similarly\n\nWORKMEN STRAW BOARD co. v. STRAW BOARD co. (G<!swami, J.) 113\n\nthat some masala for the R. Mill is prepared in the S. Mill or that the steam in the R. Mill is supplied from the boiler located in the S. Mill are not decisive tests in this case when even for the purpose of economy a common employer may arrange his matters in such a way tlJat there is certain operational cooperation between units, not necessarily wholly interdependent one upon the other.\n\nThe most important aspect in this particular case relating to closure, in our opinion, is whether one unit has such componental relatioµ that closing of one must lead to ttie closing of the other or the one cannot reasonably exist without the other.\n\nFunctional integrality will assume an added significance in a case of closure of a b91nch or unit.\n\nThat the R. Jl.lill is capable of fut1.ctioning in isolation is of very materiaUmport in tk case of closure. There is bound to be a shift of emphasis in application of various tests from one case to another. In other words, whether independent functioning of the R. Mill can at all be said to be affected by the closing of the S. Mill.\n\nAt the time we are hearing this appeal we should have thought ti)at the answer i, s easy since the R. Miil admittedly has been functioning in the absence of the S. Mill for a little over five ears. But we have to consider the correctness of the conclusion of the Tribunal on the date it passed the award when the closure was only for a)fout ten months. .That, however, will, in our view, make no difference in principle. The reason for closure of the S. Mill is non-availability of Bagasse, which is the raw material needed for kee.Ping it going.\n\nIt is clear from the finding of the Tribunal that there 1s no other oblique reason at all established in the evidence i:l respect of the closure; The workmen cannot question the motive of the closure once closure has taken place in fact.\n\nThe matter may be different if under the guise of closure the establishment is being carried on iO: some shape or form or at a different place and the closure is only a ruse or .pretence.\n\nOnce the Court comes to the conclusion that there is closure of an undertaking, the motive of the employer ordinarily ceases to be relevant. No employer can be compelled to carry on his business if he chooses to close it in truth and reality for reasons of his own. It is because of this that section 25FFF has been inserted by an amendment_ of the Industrial Disputes Act by Act 18 of 1957 and it is not necessary for us to trace the history of the insertion of Chapter V-A in the.Central.Act by Amendment Act 47 of 1953 and later on of section 25FFF with other provisions.\n\nWe may only note in passing that the legislature had to introduce these beneficial provisions in the interest of labour on account of the interpretation by this Comt of the earlier relevant provisions of the Central Act on the subject.\n\nAfter giving due consideration to all the aspects pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants, we are unable to bold that R. Mill is not an independently functioning upit and that there is any functional\n\ninterality as such between the R. Mill and the S. Mill. The fact of the unity of ownership, supervision and control and some other common. features. which we have noticed above, do not justify a contrary conclusion on this aspect in the present case.\n\nThere is considerable force in the submission of Mr. Chitaley that the R. Mill is a different line of business and the closure of the S. Mill has nothing to do with the functioning oE the R. Mill.\n\nThe matter may be absolutely different when\n\nin an thefwise going c~Ilcerll .or a functioning unit some_ \\vorken's services are terminated as being redundant or surplus to requirements.\n\nThat most of tbe conditions of service of the two Mills were substantially identical can be easily explained by the fact that, being owned by the same employer and the two units being situated in close proximity, it will not be in the ipterest of the management and peace and wellbeing of the Company to treat the employees differently creating heart burning and discrimination. For the same reason, there is no particular significance in this case even in the application of the standing orders of the Company to the employees of the R. Mill which, because of the non-requisite number of employees employed in the latter, is not even required under the law to have separate standing order3. It is, in our opinion, a clear case of closure of an independent unit of a Com- ' pany and not a closure of a part of an establishment.\n\nEven so, tbis kind of closure cannot be treated as lay-off or lock-out under the U.P.\n\nAct.\n\nThe S. Mill was intended to be closed and was in fact closed and, therefore, the question of lay-off under section 2-N of the U.P.\n\nAct does not arise.\n\nSimilarly it is also not a cas-~ of lockout within the meaning of section 2-0 of the U.P. Act. In both lay-off and lockout the unit is not closed completely and there is also no intention of\n\nthe employer to close the concern.\n\nThe learned counsel drew our attention to the fact that the Tribunal did not consider the effect of certain awards and of some material evidence. We have examine\\i au the materials which according to the counsel, were not taken note of by the Tribunal.\n\nWe are, however, not impressed by the argument that the Tribunal committed any manifest error of law by any significant omission to consider relevant materials in this case.\n\nTo cite one or two instances, the appellants drew .our attention to Exhibit E-69 which is a letter to the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports with an application dated 4th June,\n\n1962, addressed by the Manager of the Company. We have gone through this document.\n\nWe find that against item A, while giving particulars of the applicant under column 1, the name of the applicant. \"the Straw Board Manufacturing Company Ltd. (Abrasives Department) Saharanpur\" is mentioned.\n\nAgain, against item B there\" in, regarding particulars of the industrial unit, the name of the industry has been i:iven as \"Coated Abrasives Industry\". Against item D, under column 1 in the said form viz., Date of establishment of business in India. what is mentioned is \"Abrasives Department started production in the vear 1940\". It is trne that the application has been put in for and on behali of the Company but that, by itself, does not at all assist the appellants and this document would not help in coming to a contrary conclusion that the R. Mill is not an independent unit.\n\nSimilarly, the learned counsel was referring to mis-reading of the evidence of the only witness, Raja Ram, on behalf of the workmen, with regard to the inter-transferability of the employees between the two units. Qear. evidence has been given by the Director (B.W. I) that the four cases of transfer within the .last eleven years were \"done with their consent\". Besides, as noted earlier, even the standing cirders relied upon by the appellants do not provide for transfer from one unit to the other.\n\nThere is, therefore, rio merit in the submission of the appellants.\n\ni,. •\n\nWORKMP!'< STRAW BOARD co. v. STRAW BOARD co. (Goswami,!.) 715\n\nWe may now consider whether the employer after he had decided to close down a particular unit is entitled to close the same by stages.\n\nWe have seen in this case that a decision to close the S. Mill was taken by the Company some time in March, 1967 and the Secretary to Government of U.P. Industries De11artment was informed about it on 7th March, 1967. Even the Union had been informed about it earlier on 21st February, 1967. Communication of the decision was also made to various authorities of the Government and other concerned.\n\nFinally on 5th April, 1967, notice of closure of the factory was published stating that the first batch of.98 'workmen will be discharged on 7th May,\n\n1967. Notices of termination of service were also served on these workmen individually. on.the same day. In pursuance of this notice, services of these workmen were terminated, with effect from 7th May, 1967.\n\nIt may not always be possible to. immediately shut down a mill or a concern even though a decision to dose the same may at any rate at the time have irrevocably been taken. There is, therefore, nothing wrong in the employer arranging closure of the S. Mill in such a way as to guard against unnecessary inconvenience to both the management as well as to the labour and against possible avoidable wastage or loss to the concern, say, for not being able to complete some processes which have ultimately to be finished.\n\nHaving decided to close down a unit on account of non-availability of raw materials the supply of which had stopped, it was necessary to go on with the unused stock of raw materials for some time for which a lesser number Of workers would be necessary who would then naturally constitute the next batch or batches to go.\n\nWe do not see anything wrong in law in electing a step or mode in finally closing a unit or a concern. ft may be in the nature of a business to take recourse to such a mode which cannot ordinarily and per se be considered as unfair or illegitimate. In the circumstances of this case we are unable to hold that the termination of the servkes of the 98 workmen, on account of closure, as held by us, is unjustified having been the first batch selected to go while others\n\nwere retained until the final closure of the S. Mill on 28th July, 1967.\n\nThe counsel for the appellants very strenuously submits that there was no closure ori 7th May. 1967, since the Mill had been functioning till\n\n28.th July, 1967 and, therefore, contends that the first batch of workmen must be held to have been retrenched on 7th May, 1967 and paid compensation as on retrenchment under section 6-N of the U.P. Act.\n\nWe are unable to accede to this submission.\n\nThe timing of the ter-\n\nG mination oi the 98 workmen which was about three months earlier is not at all relevant in the context of the present case which is one of closure of an independent unit with different processes of work for its end-product.\n\nWhat compensation they will get under the circumstances is of course a different matter to which we will refer hereafter.\n\n.We will now take up the submission Of the learned counsel for the appellants with regard to res judicata. It is contended by him that in H previous awards between the same parties the Tribunals have held both R. Mill and S. Mill to be one establishment and, therefore, the principles of res judicata will apply and the employer is not entitled to reagitate the same question here in this case. Counsel has referred to\n\nward cEit., E-105t which is_~~' aard of ihe.Regional c~cilition Officer, Meerut, in_ case No._8 Adj. of 1957 dated July 12,.1957. The refefenC0 in _ _th_is-'..cse \\; Vas \\Vith regard to \\Vhether a worker_ named Sri Sanioo \"be made a permanent sweeper?':. In considering this question the Union claimed that although Santoo was employed in-the R. Mill, he was entitled, to b~ made a permanent sweeper under the standing orders_ of the Company •. It is true that the Adjudicator held in favour of the . workman repelling t_he contention. of the management that he was only employed ·:in a temporary capacity in part-time work and he was not a suitable worker to be absorbed as a permanent \\rnrkffian.\n\nThe Adjudicator, of course, observed that the management \"further added that the Regmal'Millis entirely a separate factory than (sic) the Straw Board factory and as such the standing orders of tb Straw Board factory would not apply in this concern\". This decision on the facts 'of the particular case where incidentally the Company's standing orders were also.takennote of-by the Adjudicator, cannot be considered to be. res. -jud/cata in this case for the particular purpose for which that doctrine is invoked here. -' - . · - . ·\n\nThe next award lo which reference has been made by the appellants\n\nis the award in Adjudication Case. No. 65 of 1963 dated . 2nd November, 1964 '(Ex.W-11). The issue in that case was m the D following terms :- ·\n\n- . ' . ., . \"Should the employers be required to introduce the Prm-ident Fund Scheme for the workmen employed in their Regmal Mills .•.. ?\"\n\n'The dispute in. that case WaS between the Company . and the workmen of the R. Mill as such and not. that of the S. Mill.\n\nThe Tribunal, guardedly enough, framed an additional issue (Issue No. 4) in these terms :-\n\n\"Has ihe Regmal Mills to be considered /; r the purposes of the present claim to be an independent and separate unit .. ,.?\" _(emphasis added).\n\n. The Tribunal finally allowd the provident fund facility to the -workenr of the Regmal Milt The decision again cannot be invoked as res iudicata for the purpose of dealing with the case 'Of closure of one of the units of the_ Company. The nature of the subject matter\n\nof the Industrial dispute and the purpose of an ., nquiry in sui:h an adjudication are always material in considering the question of res G judicata in a later proceeding between the same parties._ _ . -\n\nThe net award to which reference has been made by the appellants is in Adjudication Case No. 53 of 1965 dated October 23, 1965 (Ex.\n\nW-2). The subjecfmattter of the dispute in that case was \"whether the employers have retired the workmen, Shri Punnu. Ram, son of Ganga Ram, peon, Regmal Mills, with effect from the March 1, 1964, 11 legally and/or justifiably .... .'I\" Here again on the pleadings one of the issues framed by the Labour Court was \"whether the certified standing orders are 'or are not applicable to the employees of the\n\n_J.r-..\n\nWORKM'.EN STl\\AW BOARD co. v. STRAW BOARD co. (Goswami,/.) 717\n\nRegmal .Mills?\". The Labour Court in. its award gave the .bencJit of the S\\lperannuation age of 61. years provided under the standu1:g orders to this workman.\n\nThis agam cannot be cons_1dered as helping the submission. on the score of res judicata made in this case in respect of the particular dispute which is involved between the parties here.\n\nAnother ward relied upon by the appellants is in Adjudication Case No. 10 of 1967 dated 22nd August, 1967 (Ex. W-4). The issue in this case was \"should the employers be required to grant 12 days' casual leave witll wages in a year to the workmen employed in Regmal section ... ?\" The Tribunal in that case allowed 12 days' casual leave to the employees of the Regmal unit. This case also cannot be considered as res iudica:a for the purpose of the present controversy between the parties in this appeal. Ids the matter directly and substantially in issue in each case which is of material relevance in det, ermining the question of res iudicata in an industrial matter.\n\nIt is now well established that, although the entire Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to industrial adjudication, the principles of res\n\njudicata laid down under section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedur<, however, are applicable, wherever possible, for very good reasons.\n\nThis is so since multiplicity of litigation and agitation and re-agitation of the same dispute at issue between the same employer and his employees will not .be conducive to industrial peace which is the principal object of all labour legislation bearing on industrial adjudication. But whether a matter in dispute in a subsequent case had earlier been directly and substantially in issue between the same parEes and. the same had been heard and finally decided by the Tribunal will be of pertinent consideration and will have to be determined before hol<!ing in a particular case that the principles of res jmlicata are attracted.. ·\n\nThe learned counsel faced with the problem drew our attention to rule 18 of the U.P. Industrial Tribunal and Labour Courts Rules of Procedure, 1967, which provides that after the written statements and rejoinders, if any, of both the parties are filed and after examination of parties, if any, the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court may frame such other issues, if any, as may arise from the pleadings. It is clear that these issues are framed by the Tribwial to assist in adjudication.\n\nWhile it cannot be absolutely ruled out that in a given ase such an additional isme mav sometimes attract th.e principle of res judicata, the heart of the matter will alwys be : What was the substan. tial question that came up for decision in the earlier proceedings ?\n\nSome additional issues may be framed in order to .Ssist the Tribunal to better appreciate the case of the parties with reference to the principal issue which has been referred to for adjudication and on the basis of which, for example, .as to whether it is an industrial dispute or not, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal will have to be determined. Tho reasons for the decision in connection with the adjudication of the principal issue w'1ich has been rPferred to for adiuciicatinn and on thP. hq.,.1s of res judicata.\n\nThe earlier question at issue must be relevant aml germane in determining the question of res judicata in the subsequent proceedings. The real character of the controversy between the parties\n\nis the determining factor and in complex and manifold human relations A between labour and capital giving rise to diverse kinds of ruptures of varying nuances no castiron rule can be laid down.\n\nSome distinction, of whatever shade or magnitude, may have to be borne in mind in application of the principles of res judicata in industrial adjudication in contra-distinction to civil P.roceeding.\n\nEitremely technical considerations, usually invoked in civil proceedings, may not B be allowed to outweigh substantial justice to the parties in an industrial adjudication.\n\nWe have already held on t.he facts established in this case that the S. Mill, which was an independent unit .and a separate line of business, had been closed in fact and, therefore, it was not a case of lay-of! or lock-out. It is also not a case of retrenchment, as it is ordinarily understood, and even within the meaning of section 2(s) of the U.P.\n\nAct which is substantially identical with section 200 of the Central Act as interpreted by this Court.\n\nThe Tribunal is, therefore, right in answering the first issue in the reference in favour of the respondent.\n\nThe next crucial question that will then arise for consideration is whether the concerned employees are entitled to relief under section 25FFF of the Central Act since there is no similar provision in the D U.P. Act.\n\nMr. Chitaly. as stated earlier, at 'first disputed that the employees can invoke the provisions of section 25FFF, although, finally abandoned that position.\n\nSince the U.P. Act does not make any provision for compensation in the case of closure and the Central Act has supplied the lacuna, there is no repugnancy between the U.P. Act and the Central Act and the beneficent provisions of the latter Act can be availed cf by labour even in their absence in tlie U.P. Act.\n\nThe Cen- E tral Act applies to the whole of India, including U.P.\n\nEven if there moy be the slightest doubt in the matter, section 25J of the Central Act advisedly leaves no scope for controversy in the matter.\n\nWe will, therefore, read pection 25FFF of the Central Act which clearly applies in the present ase :\n\n25FFF (I) : \"Where an undertaking is clo5ed down for r.ny reason whatsoever, every workman who has been in continnous service for not less than one year in that undertaking immediately before such closure shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of section 25F, as if the \\vorkn1an had been retrenched :\n\nProvided that where the undertaking is closed down on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer, the compensation to be paid to the workman under clause (b) of section 25F shall not exceed his average pay for three months.\n\nExp/anation.-An undertaking which is closed down by reason merely of-\n\n(i) financial difficulties (including financial losses); or\n\n(ii) accumulation of undisposed of stocks; or\n\nf-\"\n\nWORKMEN STRAW BOARD co. v. STRAW BOARD co. (Goswami, I.) 119\n\n(iii) the ¢xpiry of the period of the lease or licence grantod\n\nto it; or\n\n(iv) in a case where the undertaking is engaged in mining operations, exbauStion of the minerals in the area in which such operations are earned cill; shall not be deemed to be closed down on account of un avoidable circumstances beyond the control of the etriployer within the meaning of the proviso of this sub-section\".\n\nSection 6-N of the U.P. Act is identical with section 25F of the .::entral Act except for some consequential additions in section 2SF(c) in view of the scheme of the latter Act, which are not material for Oll1' purpose. It is, therefore, clear that on the finding that the S. Mill was closed as an independent unit it will fall for consideration whether the employees of the said Mill are entitled to compensation under section 25F which is the counterpart of section 6-N of the U.P. Act. by virtue of the provisions of section 25FFF ( 1) of the Central AcL The Tn\"bunal was, therefore, hot correct in holding that section 25FFF did not apply to the employees concerned. Indeed the management bas paid, as already noted, compensation to their employees under section 25FFF(l) of the Act.\n\nSome controversy was raised at the bar with regard to the meaning of the word 'undertaking' in section 25FFF. Without going inti> the question in detail we may only refer to a decision of this Court in Managemem of Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The Workmen and Others(!), where the following observation appears : \"The word undertaking as used in s. 25FFF seems to us to have been used in its ordinary sense connoting thereby any work, enterprise, project or business undertaking. It is not intended to cover the entire industry or business of the employer as was suggested on behalf of , the respondents.\n\nEven closure or stoppage of a part of the business or activities of the employer would seem in law to be covered by this subsection\".\n\nWe may now deal with another su6mission of Mr. (; bitaley~ According to the learned counsel, the question of compensation cannot be gone into by the Tribunal on account of closure of the Mill as found by the Tribunal. We are not impressed by this argument;\n\nIn the course of gradual development of the industrial law the legislature, by engrafting a provision like section 25FFF in the central Act, has sought to wipe out the deleterious distinction in the consequential effect on labour upon retrenchment and upon cl<isure except that in the latter case a restricted compensation under very specified circumstances is provided for under the proviso to section 25FFF(l) itself. It is no Jon2er onen to the employer to plead that there can be no industrial dispute with regard to the eligibility of workmen to compensation or to its quantum on closure of an establishment although the factum of a\n\n(1) AIR 1973 S.C'. 878/881.\n\nJ-L84Sup.C.T./75\n\n720 SUPIU!MB COllt.T IU!PORTS (1974] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nreal and .puinc or. legitimate closure, .admitted or proved, is . oUISide the p111e ot industrial adjud!cation not partaking of or fulfilling the content of an industrial dispute within .the meaning of section 2(k) of the Central Act. Jf, howi:ver, the closure is a masquerade, the matter will SWMh>il a dilfcrentfootlng. '. That is n<it the case before us here.\n\nBesides. the reference has not been challenged as incompetent either bctore the Tribunal or in tb!s appeal. Indeed on the explicit terms of the reference, it is not possible to contend that the subject matter refCried to is not an industrial dispute. Apart froin that there is no legal bar to refer to the Tribunal to determine the compensation on dosure of an undertaking. The scheme of Chapter V-A or even the language of section 25 FFF, does not necessarily mdicate that claim under the said section can be made only under section 33-C of the Central Act and that lhe Industrial Tribunal, in a reference, has no jurisdiction to grant appropriate relief ln that behalf, as urged by the learned counsel. The submission of the learned counsel is devoid of\n\nsubstance.\n\nThe in!, however, of the respondent-company before us is that the proviso to section 25FFF ( 1) is attracted in this case and the employees are not entitled to any compensation exceeding their average pay for three months as provided therein. The Tribunal, however, did not address itself to this aspect of the matter as according to it \"since it was a legitimate closure the question of compensation could not be determined by it\". The matter, therefore, was not at all considered by the Tribunal ari.d the parties were ail!O not allowed to adduce any evidence with regard to the applicability or otherwise of the said proviso before the Tribunal. Even after decision of the first issue in the reference holding that the closure of the S. Mill was legitimate, it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to adjudicate upon the second issue of the reference for granting appropriate relief as a necessary corollary to the result of the first issue. The Tribunal committed a clear error of jurisdiction in not undertaking that enquiry. Once it is found, as in this case, that there is a closure, the question of applicability of subsection ( l) of section 25FFF or the proviso thereto will automatically arise b: consideration in determining the quantum of compensation.\n\nThe proviso to section 2.~FFF(l) which limits the quantum of compensation under the conditions specified therein, will .have to be carefully considered in order to arrive at a conclusion whether the onus in that behalf ta justify .a lesser amount of compensation has been discharged by the employer or not. A decision against the employer after.considering_ all aspects of the matter in relation to the said proviso read with. the Explanation will lead to granting of a higher compensatiol) under sub-section ( 1) of section 25FFF by reason cf the lctal fiction contained therein for payment in accordance with section 25F of the Central Act. It will now, therefore, be the duty of the Tribunal to afford adequate opportunity to the parties to establish their respectiYe pleas cc the point which appertains to the domain of the second issue in the reference.\n\n In the result the appeal is partly allowed and that ~..rt of the Award of the Tribunal with regard to the non-applicability of section\n\nWOl\\KMEN STRAW BOARD Co. v. STRAW BOARD co. (Goswami, I.) 721\n\n25FFF is set aside. The reference stands restored to the file of the Tribunal for adjudicating only the question of applicability or nonapplicability of the provisO to section 25FFF ( 1) of the Central Act. It will be open to the parties to adduce oral and docww:ntary evidence before the Tribunal with respect to this limited epquiry. In the circumstances of the case tl1e parties will bear their own costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeq( allowed in P.llft •.", "total_entities": 126, "entities": [{"text": "WORKMEN OF THE STRAW BOARD MANUFACTURING\n\nCOMP ANY LIMITED", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WORKMEN OF THE STRAW BOARD MANUFACTURING COMPANY LIMITED", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 154, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 458, "end_char": 463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Employees State Irisurance Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1219, "end_char": 1257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Fire Insurance of the\\ mills was don~ sej)aratcly; the local manager of the Employees State Irisurance Corporation bad allotted different numbers of provident fund lo the two mills; the assessment of the sales-tax for the sales of the product of the two units was done separately; and as the products."}}, {"text": "July 28, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1716, "end_char": 1729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The res1'ondent closed the:' S-rnill on the groupd of non-availability of certalO~ ra:w-niaterial for it\"' product and termir\\ated the services of the workmen of ih8.t Will by stagefl between Mav 7 and July 28, 1967, 'Jhe first batch consisted of 98 workmen and they raised a dispute which was referred for a'djudiation b_v the tribunal under s. 4-K of th~ U.P. Industrial .Disputes Act."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1859, "end_char": 1863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3327, "end_char": 3329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4653, "end_char": 4655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5025, "end_char": 5029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5130, "end_char": 5134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(00)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5436, "end_char": 5444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5453, "end_char": 5481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "[1960] 1 S.C.R. 709", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5635, "end_char": 5654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7608, "end_char": 7613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7614, "end_char": 7619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Act does not make any provision for compensation in the case of closure and the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9910, "end_char": 10001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act and the Central Act and the beneficent provisions of the latter Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10066, "end_char": 10137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 25J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10246, "end_char": 10252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and the Central Act and the beneficent provisions of the latter Act", "statute": "Act and the Central Act and the beneficent provisions of the latter Act"}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10455, "end_char": 10461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and the Central Act and the beneficent provisions of the latter Act", "statute": "Act and the Central Act and the beneficent provisions of the latter Act"}}, {"text": "s. 6N", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10489, "end_char": 10494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and the Central Act and the beneficent provisions of the latter Act", "statute": "Act and the Central Act and the beneficent provisions of the latter Act"}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10540, "end_char": 10546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and the Central Act and the beneficent provisions of the latter Act", "statute": "Act and the Central Act and the beneficent provisions of the latter Act"}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11388, "end_char": 11394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11471, "end_char": 11477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11937, "end_char": 11943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12273, "end_char": 12301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Ciil AppeaHilo."}}, {"text": "S. C. Agrawal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12469, "end_char": 12482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Agrawal, Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar and V. I. Francis, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12484, "end_char": 12507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Agrawal, Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar and V. I. Francis, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "V. I. Francis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12512, "end_char": 12525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Agrawal, Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar and V. I. Francis, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "V. S. Chitalev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12548, "end_char": 12562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Chitalev, 1."}}, {"text": "N. Shrofl", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12567, "end_char": 12576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Shrofl and R. P. Kapur, fotthe respondent."}}, {"text": "R. P. Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12581, "end_char": 12592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Shrofl and R. P. Kapur, fotthe respondent."}}, {"text": "GoSWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12660, "end_char": 12667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GoSWAMI, J .-This appeal by special leave at the instance of the workmen of the Straw Board Manufacturing Company Limited, is dir~.:ted against the award of the Industrial Tribunal llll at Lucknow (briefly the Tribunal) dated 30th April, 1968."}}, {"text": "Straw Board Manufacturing Company Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12740, "end_char": 12781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GoSWAMI, J .-This appeal by special leave at the instance of the workmen of the Straw Board Manufacturing Company Limited, is dir~.:ted against the award of the Industrial Tribunal llll at Lucknow (briefly the Tribunal) dated 30th April, 1968."}}, {"text": "Straw lJoard Manufacturing Company", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12944, "end_char": 12978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts briefly are a• follows :- The Straw lJoard Manufacturing Company, the respondent hereinafter to be."}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13454, "end_char": 13467, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14261, "end_char": 14270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14285, "end_char": 14308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "WORKMEN STRAW BOARD co. v,\"STRAW BOARD co. (Go.111>ami, J.) 707", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15471, "end_char": 15534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "WORKMEN STRAW BOARD co. v,\"STRAW BOARD co. (Go.111>ami, J.) 707\n\n(v)\n\n(vi)\n\nWhether the awards in Adj."}}, {"text": "April 24, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16353, "end_char": 16367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After hearing arguments in the case on April 24, 1968, the Tribunal recorded the following order :- \"24.4.68\n\n........ Arguments have been heard on all the issues."}}, {"text": "ADril 30. 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17220, "end_char": 17234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On ADril 30."}}, {"text": "30.4.68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17302, "end_char": 17309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Tribunal made the award by recording the following order :-\n\n\"30.4.68\n\nWhile writing the awprd I found it •possible to determine the matters of \\:lispute finally on the findings on the issues at which I. have arrived."}}, {"text": "S. Mill and R. Mill", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17801, "end_char": 17820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H The Tribuna\\ came to the following conclusions :-\n\n11) S. Mill and R. Mill do not form parts of one and the\n\nsam~ esta.blishment."}}, {"text": "Agirarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18538, "end_char": 18547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Agirarwal, learned counsel ap.pearing ou behalf of the appellants."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18937, "end_char": 18946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19082, "end_char": 19092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19304, "end_char": 19315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19325, "end_char": 19348, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chitalev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19491, "end_char": 19499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the respondent the principal submissions of Mr Chitalev are as follows :-\n\n( 1) If a distinct business activity is closed then the provision of section 25FFF is satisfied.", "canonical_name": "Chitalev"}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19588, "end_char": 19599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19967, "end_char": 19978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20478, "end_char": 20489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chitaley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20589, "end_char": 20597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although Mr. Chitaley als() had anirst submitted in the same vein but finally did not choose to take that position before us.", "canonical_name": "Chitalev"}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20900, "end_char": 20911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21155, "end_char": 21166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21262, "end_char": 21273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21300, "end_char": 21311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 7, 19.67", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21670, "end_char": 21682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also pointe<l out that there s; s in fact no closure of even the S. Mill on May 7, 19.67 and that the same continued functioning until it was finally declared closed on July ~8."}}, {"text": "July ~8. 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21763, "end_char": 21776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also pointe<l out that there s; s in fact no closure of even the S. Mill on May 7, 19.67 and that the same continued functioning until it was finally declared closed on July ~8."}}, {"text": "May 7. 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21878, "end_char": 21889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence, it is submitted that 98 workmen concerned in this \\lppeal should be held to be retrenched on May 7."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21935, "end_char": 21944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21969, "end_char": 21978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act follows the Jiattern of the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22289, "end_char": 22332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22346, "end_char": 22369, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chapter V-A of the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22596, "end_char": 22626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Both factories are registered Beparately under the Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29823, "end_char": 29887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35050, "end_char": 35061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35106, "end_char": 35129, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Act by Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35247, "end_char": 35267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35295, "end_char": 35306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act by Amendment Act", "statute": "Act by Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37451, "end_char": 37460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37563, "end_char": 37572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4th June,\n\n1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38326, "end_char": 38341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To cite one or two instances, the appellants drew .our attention to Exhibit E-69 which is a letter to the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports with an application dated 4th June,\n\n1962, addressed by the Manager of the Company."}}, {"text": "Straw Board Manufacturing Company Ltd. (Abrasives Department) Saharanpur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38540, "end_char": 38612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Straw Board Manufacturing Company Ltd. (Abrasives Department) Saharanpur\" is mentioned."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38872, "end_char": 38877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Date of establishment of business in India."}}, {"text": "Raja Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 39311, "end_char": 39319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, the learned counsel was referring to mis-reading of the evidence of the only witness, Raja Ram, on behalf of the workmen, with regard to the inter-transferability of the employees between the two units."}}, {"text": "5th April, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40402, "end_char": 40417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally on 5th April, 1967, notice of closure of the factory was published stating that the first batch of.98 'workmen will be discharged on 7th May,\n\n1967."}}, {"text": "7th May,\n\n1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40532, "end_char": 40546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally on 5th April, 1967, notice of closure of the factory was published stating that the first batch of.98 'workmen will be discharged on 7th May,\n\n1967."}}, {"text": "7th May, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40736, "end_char": 40749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of this notice, services of these workmen were terminated, with effect from 7th May, 1967."}}, {"text": "28th July, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42118, "end_char": 42133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the circumstances of this case we are unable to hold that the termination of the servkes of the 98 workmen, on account of closure, as held by us, is unjustified having been the first batch selected to go while others\n\nwere retained until the final closure of the S. Mill on 28th July, 1967."}}, {"text": "7th May. 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42222, "end_char": 42235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The counsel for the appellants very strenuously submits that there was no closure ori 7th May. 1967, since the Mill had been functioning till\n\n28.th July, 1967 and, therefore, contends that the first batch of workmen must be held to have been retrenched on 7th May, 1967 and paid compensation as on retrenchment under section 6-N of the U.P. Act."}}, {"text": "28.th July, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42279, "end_char": 42295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The counsel for the appellants very strenuously submits that there was no closure ori 7th May. 1967, since the Mill had been functioning till\n\n28.th July, 1967 and, therefore, contends that the first batch of workmen must be held to have been retrenched on 7th May, 1967 and paid compensation as on retrenchment under section 6-N of the U.P. Act."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42454, "end_char": 42463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sanioo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43537, "end_char": 43543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The refefenC0 in  this-'..cse \\; Vas \\Vith regard to \\Vhether a worker named Sri Sanioo \"be made a permanent sweeper?':.", "canonical_name": "Sanioo"}}, {"text": "Santoo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43638, "end_char": 43644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In considering this question the Union claimed that although Santoo was employed in-the R. Mill, he was entitled, to b~ made a permanent sweeper under the standing orders of the Company •. It is true that the Adjudicator held in favour of the .", "canonical_name": "Sanioo"}}, {"text": "October 23, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45855, "end_char": 45871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "53 of 1965 dated October 23, 1965 (Ex."}}, {"text": "Punnu. Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45989, "end_char": 45999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The subjecfmattter of the dispute in that case was \"whether the employers have retired the workmen, Shri Punnu."}}, {"text": "Ganga Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46008, "end_char": 46017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram, son of Ganga Ram, peon, Regmal Mills, with effect from the March 1, 1964, 11 legally and/or justifiably .... .'I\" Here again on the pleadings one of the issues framed by the Labour Court was \"whether the certified standing orders are 'or are not applicable to the employees of the\n\n_J.r-..\n\nWORKM'."}}, {"text": "22nd August, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46792, "end_char": 46809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10 of 1967 dated 22nd August, 1967 (Ex."}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47428, "end_char": 47448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47543, "end_char": 47553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Industrial Tribunal and Labour Courts Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48375, "end_char": 48418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. Mill", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 50400, "end_char": 50407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already held on t.he facts established in this case that the S. Mill, which was an independent unit .and a separate line of business, had been closed in fact and, therefore, it was not a case of lay-of!"}}, {"text": "section 2(s)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50657, "end_char": 50669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50725, "end_char": 50736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51026, "end_char": 51037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chitaly", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51119, "end_char": 51126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chitaly.", "canonical_name": "Chitalev"}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51214, "end_char": 51225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act does not make any provision for compensation in the case of closure and the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51288, "end_char": 51379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act and the Central Act and the beneficent provisions of the latter Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51445, "end_char": 51516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 51647, "end_char": 51651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Cen- E tral Act applies to the whole of India, including U.P.\n\nEven if there moy be the slightest doubt in the matter, section 25J of the Central Act advisedly leaves no scope for controversy in the matter."}}, {"text": "section 25J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51709, "end_char": 51720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and the Central Act and the beneficent provisions of the latter Act", "statute": "Act and the Central Act and the beneficent provisions of the latter Act"}}, {"text": "FFF of the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51833, "end_char": 51855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52234, "end_char": 52245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "FFF of the Central Act", "statute": "FFF of the Central Act"}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52480, "end_char": 52491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "FFF of the Central Act", "statute": "FFF of the Central Act"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53189, "end_char": 53198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53235, "end_char": 53246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53311, "end_char": 53321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53609, "end_char": 53620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53649, "end_char": 53658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53709, "end_char": 53720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53804, "end_char": 53815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53948, "end_char": 53959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54073, "end_char": 54084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54319, "end_char": 54325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55079, "end_char": 55090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55367, "end_char": 55378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55908, "end_char": 55920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56494, "end_char": 56504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56596, "end_char": 56606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56916, "end_char": 56927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57977, "end_char": 57988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58116, "end_char": 58125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58618, "end_char": 58629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58712, "end_char": 58723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59329, "end_char": 59340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P.llft", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 59597, "end_char": 59603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.P.S.\n\nAppeq( allowed in P.llft •."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_722_724_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "trrrAM SINGH v.\n\nTHE STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION)\n\nMarch 21, 1974\n\n(P. K. GosWAMI AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.J\n\nPelral Code\"-S: 2S2--Sale of playing cards with lt1rid/y obscene 11ake,1 pic1urea-Sentenc_e If severe-If could be released under tlie Probation of ofien .. ders Act, 1958.\n\nThe appellant was convicted under s. 292 I.P.C. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonme!lt and fine for selling a packet of playing cards portraying on the revC\".rse lundly obsccno naked pictures of men -and women in pamographic sexual_ postures. The conviction and sentence was affirmed by the High Court.\n\nIt as contended that the sentence Wa.$ very severe on the ground that only one single offence had been established and secondly that he might be released under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.\n\nDismissing the appeal.\n\nHELD :-(i) The appeUant cannot be dealt with leniently in this case. The amendment of section 292 I.P.C. by Act XXXVI of 1969, apart from enlarging the scope of the exceptions. enhanced the penalty. By the amendment the dicho_ tomy of penal treatment was introduced for dealing with the first offenders and the subsequent offenders. Even in the case of first conviction the accused shall be punished with imprisonment. The intention of the legislature was, therefore, mado clear by the amendment of 1969 in dealing with this type of offenders v:hich corrupt the minds of people to whom these objectionable things can easily reach.\n\nThe corrupting influence of these pictures is. more likely to be upon the younger generation who has got to be protected from being an easy prey to these libidinous appeals upon which this illicit trade is based. [724A-BJ\n\n(ii) The appellant cannot be released under s. 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act bavin&' regard to the nature of the offence and the potential danger of th.e appeUanrs activity in the nefarious trade affecting the morals of society, pa:t1cularly the young. These offences have got to be treated on the same footing as the cases of food adulterators. (724-GJ\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 1974.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated the 1st October, 1973 of the f Delhi.High Court at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 170 of 1972. / Gopal Singh and M. S. Grpta, for the appellant.\n\nR. N. Sachthcy, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGOSWAMI, J.- This appeal by special leave is limited only to the G question of sentence in a conviction of the accused-appellant under section 292, Indian Penal Code. The accused has a shop at Kishan Ganj, Delhi. It is no more in controversy that on 1st February, 1972, the accused sold a packet of playing cards portraying on the reverse luridly obscene naked pictures of men and women in pomograpb~ sexual postures to P.W. 1. This sale was arranged by the police Sub-Inspector\n\n(P.W. 4) oit receipt of secret infchnation about the acCQ8Cd uttering H these obscene pictures. On. getting a signal from the purchaser a raid was made in the accused's shop when two more pact.ets. Qf Sllcil\n\n;, )\n\nn t\n\n• c\n\nt ..\n\nUTTA'[ Sr.;\"GH \"· DELHI AD~IN; (Goswami,. 1.) 723\n\nobscene cards were also recovered in addition to the packet already sold to. P.W. L The ten-rupee note, which was the price of the said set of playing cards aiid which had been earlier given by the Sub Inspector to P. W. I, was also recovered from the person of the accused. · ·\n\nAt the trial the accused was convicted under. section 292, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment and to a fine of Rs. 500/·, in default further rigorous imprisonment for three months. The High Court affirmed the conviction as well as the sentence.\n\nHence this appeal. . .\n\nThe. learned counsel for the appellant submits that the sentence fr very severe on the ground that only one single sale has been est; iblishcd in this cas.c and also only three packets of cards were recovered fro01\n\nthe accused.\n\nHe further submits that the .accused is entitled to be released on probation under section 4 of the prelJation of Offenders Act, 1958. . - '\n\nSince obscenity of the playing cards recovered from the aciised is not challenged and for the ma_tter of that the conviction under section 292, J.P.C., it is necessary even for the purpose of appreciating the submission on the ground of sentence tC1 read the definition of obscenity under that section to keep in mind what is interdicted under the law. Section 292(1) reads as follows:- ·\n\n292(1) :\"For the purpose of sub-section (2), a book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation or figure or any other object, shall be deemed to be obscene if it is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest ci'. if its effect, or (where it comprises two or more items) the effect of any one of its items, is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it\".\n\n'Sub-section (2) of section 292 is the penal provision which runs as follows:- ·\n\n292 (2} : \"Whoeversells, lets to hire, distributes, publicly exhibits or in any manner puts into circulation, or for purposes of sale, hire, distri bution, public exhibition or circulation, makes, produces or has in his possession any obscene book, pamphlet, paper, drawing, painting, representation or figure or any other obscene object whatsoever .... * *· * * * * shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years. and with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, and, in the event of a secolld or subsequent convic- tion, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extent to five years, and also with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees\".\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1974) 3 S.C.R,\n\nThere are certain exceptions to this section with which we are not concerned. This section was amended by Act XXXVl of 1969 when apilrt .froni enlarging the scope of the exceptions, the penalty was en ha need which was earlier up to three months or with fine or with both.\n\nBy the amendment a dichotomy of penal treatment was introduced for dealing with the first cifenders and the subsequent 'offenders. Jn the case of even a first oonviction the accused shall be punished with im~ prisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees. The intention cl. the legislature is, therefore, made clear by the amendment in 1969 in dealing with this type of offences which corrupt the minds .of people to whom these objectionable things can easily reach and it need not be emphasised that the corrupting inlluence of these pictures is more likely to be upon the younger generaticri who has got to be protected from being easy prey to these libidinous appeals upon which this illicit trade is based. We are, therfore, not prepared to accept the submission of the learned counsel to deal with the accused leniently in lhis case.\n\nWith regard to the plea cif the learned counsel on the £COl'e of section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, we may read the section :\n\nPower to Court to release certain offenders 011 probation of good conduct : 4 (1) \"When any person is found guilty <if having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opimon that, having regard to the circum\n\nstances of the case including the nature of the defence and the character of the offender, it is expedient, to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a\n\nbond,_ with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such P!'riod, not exceeding three years, as the Court ma, y direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour\" .\n\n• • The accused is married and is said to be 36 years of ago. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and the nature of the offence and the potential danger of the accused's activity in this nefarious trade affecting the morals of society particularly of the young, we are not prepared to release him under section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. These offences of corrupting the intornal fabric of the mind have got to be treated on the same footing as the cass of food adulterators and we are not prepared to show any leniency. The appeal is, therefore, rejected. The accused shall surrender to his bail to serve the sentence.\n\nP. B. R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 31, "entities": [{"text": "THE STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION)", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 21, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 65, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "trrrAM SINGH v.\n\nTHE STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION)\n\nMarch 21, 1974\n\n(P. K. GosWAMI AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.J\n\nPelral Code\"-S: 2S2--Sale of playing cards with lt1rid/y obscene 11ake,1 pic1urea-Sentenc_e If severe-If could be released under tlie Probation of ofien .. ders Act, 1958."}}, {"text": "P. K. GosWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 315, "end_char": 321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 322, "end_char": 327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 750, "end_char": 782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 895, "end_char": 906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "statute": "the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 907, "end_char": 912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1708, "end_char": 1712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1720, "end_char": 1746, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Gopal Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2225, "end_char": 2236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Singh and M. S. Grpta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. S. Grpta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2241, "end_char": 2252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Singh and M. S. Grpta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthcy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2274, "end_char": 2288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Sachthcy, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "GOSWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2355, "end_char": 2362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGOSWAMI, J.- This appeal by special leave is limited only to the G question of sentence in a conviction of the accused-appellant under section 292, Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "section 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2490, "end_char": 2501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2503, "end_char": 2520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2561, "end_char": 2566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused has a shop at Kishan Ganj, Delhi."}}, {"text": "1st February, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2605, "end_char": 2623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is no more in controversy that on 1st February, 1972, the accused sold a packet of playing cards portraying on the reverse luridly obscene naked pictures of men and women in pomograpb~ sexual postures to P.W. 1."}}, {"text": "Goswami", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3098, "end_char": 3105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Qf Sllcil\n\n;, )\n\nn t\n\n• c\n\nt ..\n\nUTTA'[ Sr.;\"GH \"· DELHI AD~IN; (Goswami,."}}, {"text": "section 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3443, "end_char": 3454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3456, "end_char": 3473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4014, "end_char": 4023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Jation of Offenders Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4035, "end_char": 4064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4204, "end_char": 4215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jation of Offenders Act, 1958", "statute": "Jation of Offenders Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Section 292(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4426, "end_char": 4440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jation of Offenders Act, 1958", "statute": "Jation of Offenders Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "section 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5007, "end_char": 5018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jation of Offenders Act, 1958", "statute": "Jation of Offenders Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7117, "end_char": 7126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7134, "end_char": 7160, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8381, "end_char": 8390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8398, "end_char": 8424, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_725_733_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "STATE OF PUNJAB\n\nV, HARi SINGH & ANR.\n\nMarch 21, 1974 [M. Ji. BEG AND R. S. SAllKARIA, JI.]\n\nIndian Peno/ Code-S.302, 307 read wltli S. 34~M11rder-Wh<n t/14 evi. de nee, of eye' witnesses who were relatU to each otlwr a11d tlte victims cot11J he lied pon.\n\nThe trial court had convicted the mpondents u/s. 302/34 LP.C. and u/s. 307 /34 1, P.C. for the death of two pmo-a&z, Tho occu~ loot place\n\n~'!\"'Ii niibt bot- 18th It !!Ith June, 1969. Tho victims Used to c:ultivale jointly with others. The reopondents and the two •ai.uitled accused pmom -. brodlm who li\"'!I in the same villas<. It is said that there was enmity -n the cleccaoed pcnoos and the reopondents.\n\nTho prosecution. case was that on the nlsht of 18th June 1969, the respoodents with two othen attacked GltZ and as a result G died but Z survived.\n\nlb• trial court bad comk:ltd the respondenta but the High Court ac:qaitted them. .. On appeal by the Slate, the main question was whother Ibo throe al1-d \"f\"':Witnesses, P, W.3, P, W.4 It P.W.5 who were nlated to each other and the\n\nVlclims could bo relied upon, When corn>borated by other facts and cin:umstanaa. .\n\nAllowina the appeal, . llEu> :-(I) lt is a principle, common to all criminal appeala by special lea.., that this Court will refrain fmm substitu~ ib own views about the appreciation of \"evidence if the judgment of the Hish Court is bued on one of two altematiW> views each of which was reuooably cpcn to the Hish Coun to accept, If however, the High Court's approach is vitiated by eome baalcally erroneous assumptions, or it adopts reuoning which, QD the face of it, is umound, it may become the duty of this Court, to prevent a miscarriage of justice and to interfere with an order whther it be of conviction or of acquittal.\n\n[729F)\n\n(2) In the present case, the trial court had accepted the testimony of 3 oye witnesses, dcspi.te the fact that they are relations of the victims, It has been l'lll'Oltedly held by this Coun that the more fact that witness is related to the\n\nvictim could not be a good enoueh ground for rejecting his testimony althouah it mly be a ground for scrutinizing his evidence more ctitically and carefully where facts and circuµlStances disclase that only relations have been produced and othei-s, presumably independent witneeses, who were available, were not produced.\n\n[729 HJ The ordinary presumption is that a witness speaking under an oath ls trothfut unless and until he is shown to be unreliable or untruthful. In any particular respect, witnesses solemnly deposing on oath in the witness boX during atrial upon a grave charge of murder, must be presumed to act with n full seme of responsibility of the consequences of what they state.\n\nIt may be that what they say is so very unlikely Of' unreasonable that it is safer not to act , upon it or even to disbelieve them. [730 In the present !'\"'e, the evidence of Z who boc~ IJll\"'!'lS<ious ue to fatal bloin . bv the assailants, can bo accepted when his OVIdcnce .ts atrongly cmoboraled br medical and other evidence.\n\nThereforo, the present .... is a lit ca9C wheto this court will intereferc.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE ]UIUSDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 213 of 1970 ..\n\nApPeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 17th Jiine. t 970 of the' Punjab and Haryana High Court. at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 2~8 of 1970.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nHarbans Singh, for the appellant.\n\nNuruddin Ahmed and U. P. Singh, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by :\n\nBEG, J, The State of Punjab has obtained special leave to appeal agamst the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and ffaryiµla, acquitting the two respondents from charges under Sections 302 and\n\n302/34 Indian Penal Code and under Sections 307 /34 Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe Trial Court had convicted the respondents under each of these two sections and sentenced Harl Singh to death under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and Gian Singh to life imprisonment under sections 302/34 l.P.C., and it had sentenced both to six years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,0~/-, and, in default of pa; yment of fine, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for two years under Sections 307 /34 I.P.C.\n\nThe occurrence which gave rise to the prosecution of the two respondents together with two others, Milkiat Singh and Dalip Singh, who were acquitted by the Trial Court, took place during the night between 18th and 19th June, 1969. The victims, Gian Singh, deceased, and his nephew, Zora Singh, P.W. 3, cultivated lands jointly with Bachan Singh, P.W. 5, his son Mukhtiar Singh, his two brothers Gian Singh and .Sarwan Singh, and, Surjit Singh, P.W. 4, and Jagjit Singh, the brothers of Zora Singh and sons of Sarwan Singh.\n\nAll of them also lived together in village Dhandri Kalan.\n\nThe respondents and the acquitted accused persons are brothers who also lived in village Dhandr. Kalan in District Ludhiana. It is said that there had been a fight bet ween Hari Singh, respondent, and Gian Singh deceased in\n\n!YJ. ,,.,, cu had been settled by the Panchayat.\n\nIn 1969, sometime before the occurrence, another incident is said to have taken place.\n\nJagjit Singh and Mukhtiar Singh, by show of force, were said to have carried away some \"toori' in a cart to their house against the wiibes ot Hari Singh, respondent, and another person in his company.\n\nUndoubtedly, the motive disclosed was not be strong enough for a murderous assault of a rather brutal kind on Gian Singh and Zora Singh.\n\nThis, however, is immaterial if the alleged eye-witnesses of the occurrence could be relied upon to establish the prosecution case.\n\nThe whole question before the Courts was whethr the three alleged eye witnesses, Zora Singh, P.W. 3, and Surjit Singh, P.W. 4, anJ Bachan Singh, P.W. 5, who are related to each other and the victims, as stated above could be relied upon, when corroborated by other facts and c_ircumstances which may appear in the case, to sustain the conviction.\n\nThe prosecution case was that Gian Singh and Zora Singh had gone to their field for watering their sugarcane crop in it on the evening of\n\n18th June, 1969. At about 9 p.m. Bachan Singh, P.W. 5, and Surjit Singh, P.W. 4, are said to have carried _the meals for Gian Singh and .Zora Singh, who were at their field situated about \"100 karams\"\n\n(nearly JOO paces) away from their tubewell, which was, as is wiuaf, lit up by electric light.\n\nAfter tliat, tlian Singh and Zora Singh went to sleep a few feet from each other at their tubewell while Bachan Singh and Surjit Singh are said to have stayed oo at the sugarcane\n\nfield nearby.\n\nAt about mi<J.night, Zora Singh is said to have got up . to urinate, and to have just laid himself down on his cot after urinating when he saw the respondents and Milkiat Singh and Dalip Singh arrive with their wea.P\"ns .. , Hari Singh is said to have struck his kirpan on the neck of Gian Singh, deceased, and Milkiat Singh is said to have struck Zora Singh on the right arm with his Gandasa, whereupon Zora Singh raised an alarm. All the four assailants then gave blows to the deceased and Zora Singh who had cried out : \"Marditta-Marditta\"\"\n\nBachan Singh, P.W. 4, and Surjit Singh, P.W. 4, rushed to their aid and alleged having seen the attack and the assailants running away.\n\nThey found Zora Singh unconscious when they came near him. Gian Singh and Zora Singh were removed to a Hospital in Ludhiana, where Gian Singh died at 5.45 a.m. The condition of Gian Singh, which was not such as to enable him to make a dying declaration, was described as follows :\n\n\"B.P. was not recordable. Pulse 60 /mt. fuble, unconscious, Gasping cynotic. Pupils constricted, Reacting Slugishly to light. There was 8\"X4\" wound on the left side. of the neck cutting deep to the muscles. The trachea was cut almost through and through and he was breathing through the hole of the trachea.\n\nHyoid bone was lying exposed in the wound. Could not feel the. left carotid artery. No bleeding was present when patient was brought to the hospital\".\n\nZora Singh who survived had the following injuries :\n\n\" 1. An incised wound 3\" x t\" x 21\" on the inner side of left hand and was cutting the 5th and 4th matacarpals completely. ·\n\n2. Incised wound t' x r x flesh deep on thl inner side of left wrist.\n\n3. Incised wound 5' x l' x 2' deep on the outer side of left hand and was chopping oil the thumb completely from the hand.\n\n4. Incised wound 6\" x :I:' x flesh deep back of left forearm lower part.\n\n5. Incised wound 4\" x t• x 2\" deep on the right side of the face and the middle of the lower part of the nose and was cutting it and the right side of the upper jaw partially.\n\n6. Inside wound 3\"X t\"X 1 t\" deep on the upper part of the back of right side of the neck and was cutting the spine bone partially.\n\n7. Incised wound 4' x l \"x 3' deep on the back of riht\n\nelbow and was cutting the ulna bone completely and the forearm was hanging just with a flesh.\"\n\nH A First Information Report of this occurrence was lodged at 5.15 a.m. at Police Station Sadar, Ludhiana, at a distance of 7 miles frQm village. Dhandri Kalan, disclosing. offences punishable under. Sections 307 and 326 Indian Penal Code only as Gian Singh was still alive at\n\n7.28\n\nSUPREMJ; COURT , REPORTS\n\n[1974) 3 S.C.R.\n\nthat time. It was stated in the F.I.R. that the respondents were recognised and that two other unknown assailants, who were young Sikhs could be identified if produced befcte the witnesses. ' .\n\nSurji~ Singh, P.W. 4, the maker of the F.I.R., upon cross-examinahon derued that he had been tutored to state that he could not identify the two of the assailants as they' had their backs towards him. He had stated in the F.I.R. that they were youngmen although Milkiat Singh, aged 53, and Dalip Singh, aged 46, years were not so young. He had '.'ISO stated there that he could identify the two youngmen thereby implymg that he had seen them properly. He had stated in his evidence that one or two bighas of sugarcane can be irrigated in an hour by their Tubewell. Watering was said to have commenced at' p.m. and Zora Singh, P.W. 3, had stated that only 4 bighas of the field had to be watered. The High Court, therefore, did not think it likely that either Bachan Singh or Surjit Singh would still remain at the Sugarcane field or bo awake at the time when the occurrence took place. Moreover, the High Court thought that both Bachan Singh and Surjit Singh .were too far away, at abount 100 karams, to be able to reach in time to see the . occurrence.\n\nBachan Sitlgh, P.W.5, had supported the statement of Surjit Singh, P. W.4, that he ran up to help the attacked persons after hearing Zora Singh Shouting; \"Marditta-Marditta\". He said 'that he saw the assailants from a distance of 15 karams. He also said that Hari Singh was using his kirpan to attack and that the other assailants had used their gandasas. On cross-examination, this witness also stated that he could not recognise the companions of Hari Sngh and Gian Singh as they had their backs towards him, although it was proved that he had stated be• fore the Police that the unidentified persons were young Sikhs with Gandasas whom he could identify if produced before him.\n\nThe High Court had found some difficulty in getting over the statement of Zora Singh, P.W. 3. It had observed that Zora Singh, aged\n\noruy about 16 years, would have tried to run away as soon as he saw four assailants by electric light attacking Gian Singh only at a distance of 10 feet, if he was really awak~. It had also opened that he would have cried out earlier than the moment of time when he received tho . injury on his right arm if he was .actually awake when the assault on ·\n\nGian Singh, deceased, took place. It was not disposed to rely upon the statement of Zora Singh that he was lying awake because he had. got up to urinate 5 minutes before the occurrence as this appeared to it to be an improvement upon his previous statement. Zora Smgh, on crossexamination, had explained that he had not stated this earlier as he was not questioned about it. The High Court had doubted the veracity of Z.Ora Singh because he disclaimed knowledge that Milkiat Singh and Dalip Singh were employed in the Air-Force although their fields ad, jcined his own fields. The High Court thought that it was likely that Zora Singh would have become unconscious after receiving injuries before he could recognise his assailants. The High Court had also attached importance to the fact that no special report of the occurrence was proved to have been sent to a Magistrate. It has considered the explanation that this was due to the fact that the F.I.R. disclosed only offences punishable under Sections 307 and 326 I.P.C. to be uffi•.\n\nc •\n\nt .-...\n\nPUNJAB 1'. HARI SINGH (Beg, /.) 729\n\ncient to explain this omission. After relying upon the observations of this Court ·; n Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh Vs. State of Punjab(') that . the prci; ecution must traverse the whole gap between \"what may be\n\ntrue\" and \"what must be true\" before a conviction could be recorded in a crimipal the High Court had given the respondents the benefit of doubt and acquitted them.\n\nThe Trial Court, on the other hand, which had the additional advantage of seeing the witnes$es depose in the witness box, was impressed by the evidence of the three' alleged eye witnesses and had convicted the respondents. It bad not relied upon the alleged recoveries by .Hardit Singh, SuMnspector, P.W.8, of a kirpan on 28th June, 1969, from a straw-bin at a tube well at the instance of Hari Singh and a gandasa on the roof of a tubewell at the instance of Gian \"Singh. Both the weapons were proved tCl be stained with human blood. As the recovery was shown to have taken place 4 days after the arrest of the respondents .the Trial Court thought that it must have resulted from the nse of 3rd\n\ndegree methods during the interrogation of the accused. The Trial Court had also considered it unsafe tQ rely upon the sole testimony tf.. the Investigating Officer on this question when other witnesses of the recovery were not produced for some unexplained reason. The Trial C-Ourt, had, however, relied upon the circumstance that the respc,11dents could not be found when searched in their village and could only be arrested several days later.\n\nThe question raised before us is : should we, even if we do not ootirely agree with the reasouing of the High Court, substitute our own views and reverse an order of acquittal by it ? It is enough to refer to the State of Madras Vs. A. V<Udyanatha Tyer(') to ppint out that this Court's power of interference under Article 136 of the Constitution with Judgments of acquittal is not exercised on principles which are different from those adopted by it in dealing with convictions. It is a principle, common to all criminal appeals by special leave, that this Court will refrain from substituting its own views about the appreciation of evideo,:e if the iudgment of the Hig\" Couct is based on on of two alternative views each of which was reasonably open to the High Court to accept. If. however, the High Court's aoproach is vitiated by\n\nsome basically errcneous apparent assumption or it adopts reasonisg which, on the face of it, is UllllOUlld, it may become the duty of this Court, to prevent a miscarriage of justice, to interfere with an order whether it by of conviction or o'f acquittal.\n\nIn the case before us, the Trial Court, which had the additional advantage of seein~ the witn:sses-denose in the witnl\"s~ box .. 1'-\"rJ acceoted the testimony of the three eye witnesses, despite the fact that they are relations of the victims. lt has been repeatedly held by this Cvmt that the mere fact that a witness is related to the victim could not be a good enough ground for rejecting his testimony although it may be a ground for scrutinizing his evidence more critically and carefully wlier• facts and circumstances disclose that only relations have been produced and others, presumably independent witnesses, who were available, were not produced.. In the instant case, thete is no evidence that anyone\n\n(I) AIR 1957 SC 637.\n\n(2) 195! SCR 580\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS i1974] 3 S.C.il.\n\nbesides the witnesses produced had actually witnessed the attack upon\n\nGian Singh and Zora Singh.\n\nThe High Court's reasons for doubting the correctness of some of the statements of Surjit Singh, P.W. 4, and Bachan Singh; P.W. S, as, for instance, that they had actually failed to recognise Milkiat Singh and Dalip Singh because they had their backs towards them when these very witnesses had asserted before the police that the two other participants were youngmen who could be identified by them, if produeed before them, are quite sound and reasonable. If, however, a false implieation was really intended and the F.I.R. was the result of some conspiracy, there was no reason to omit the names cf Milkiat Singh and Dalip Singh, the two brothers of the respondents, fiom the F.I.R. The prosecution had an explanation for this omission. This was. that 2:ora\n\nSingh, who had seen and recognised these two accused persons had .become unconscious before their names could be communicated to Surjit Singh. The High Court had itself accepted the evidence that Zora Singh had ac_tually become unconscious. In fact, it had gone to the extent of holding that he must have become unconscious even before he\n\nrecognised any of the assailants. On the last mentioned point, we certainly do not find it possible to accept the view adopted .by the High Court. ·\n\nIt is in .dealing with the evidence of Zora Singh, P.W. 3, that the High Court seems to us to have adopted a patently erroneous approach and to have given grounds which do not appear to us to be reasonably\n\nsll6tainable. The High Court seems to have assumed that Zora Singh must have invented the stclry that he had got up to urinate so that he may pose as an eye witness of the occurrence.\n\nThe ordinary presumption is that a witness speaking under an oath is truthful unless and until he is shown to be untruthful or unreliable in any particular respect. The High Court, reversing this approach, seems to us to have assumed that witnesses !!re untruthful unless it is proved that they are telling the truth. Witnesses, solemnly deposing on oath in the witness box during a trial upon a grave charge of murder, must be presumecj to act with a full sense of responsibility of the consequences of what they state. It may be that what they say is so very unlikely or unnatural or unreasonable that it is safer not to act upon it or even to disbelieve them. The High Court had no doubt tried to show that this was the position with regard to the whole of the testimony of Zora Singh. But, we do not think that it was successful.\n\nIt is true that the statement of a witness that he had got up to urinate just before a murder was committed, so that he could witness the murder, looks suspicious.\n\nBut, the statement .is not, for that reason n<lCessarily untrue. Again, if, as the High Court believed, both Gian Singh and Zora Singh were attacked almost simultaneously, its view. that Zora Sincl! would have got up and run away or shouted earlier than he was attacked had he been really awake, is unreasonable.\n\nLet us, however, assume, for the sake cif argument, that the High Court's guess is correct that Zora Singh was actually asleep when the\n\n.PUNJAB v. HAltl. SINGH (Beg, /.) 731\n\nau.ct upon Gian Singh and then 1.ora Singh began. Even thea it wO!lld be .quite. imreasonable to .believe and. hold, as the High Court\n\ndid, that Zora Singh must have become unconscious before he c:oald ace and recognise his assailants. There was the light of the electricity at the tubewcll where Zora Singh lay on his bed whether a.<leep or Zora Singh must hav!' nccessarily got up at least when he was. strul:k on the arm. He could not have avoided seeing and then recognising his assailants, whom be knew very well, before he became unconscious. His account, that he was strucldirst on the arm and then he: . gjcd out, is corroborated by the fact that other injuries indicate that his face and jaw were ailllel\\ at .and struck probably in an attempt to silence him. The injuries were of such a nature that he must have .been awakened, shouted, writhed in pain, and seen the assailants before\n\nbe became unconscious.\n\nThe absolutely unacceptable guess work. bldulged in by the High Court, that Zora Singh must have become\n\nunconscious before be could see and recognise his assailants, is utterly un'IUpported by evidence and seems very unreasonable.\n\nEven if other parts of his evidence are, for some reason, not accepted, Zora Siogh's statement that he saw and recognised assailants.\n\nbefore he became unconscious cannot be held to be capable of arousing doubts. There is no evidence that the assailants covered him U!> with a blanket or a cloth, so as to disable him from seeing them, before attacking him.\n\nH we accept this part of th.e evidence of Zora Singh. as we think we must, since it is so strongly corroborated by the medical evidence and there is nothing on record which conflicts with this inference, it becQmes evident that be musi have shouted for help. If thai be so, it is difficult to understand why Surjit Singh and Bachan Singh would. not go to his rescue as they naturally would on hearing shouts even if they were at some distance. We think that, judging from the number of injuries on the two victims, the incident must have lasted long enoguh to enable Surjit Singh, P.W. 4, and Bachan Singh, P.W. 5, to rush :towards the scene of occurrence and to see and _recognise aneast the escaping assailants. It is possible that they may have exaggerated in stating that they actually saw the attack on both the victims. But, that would itot be enough to discard the whole of their\n\ntestimony on the ground that they were not likely to be present at their field nearby at the time of the attack. There is no evidence to suggest that they were elsewl)ere at the time.\n\nIndeed, the fact that t_hey ai:ang\\ld for the transport of the victims to a hospital' 10 Ludhmna and took them there before day-break shows that thy\n\nwere there to be able to do all this. We do not think that the reasons given for suspecting their presence near enough from the tubewell, at their sqgarcane field, are strong enough to make it incredible that they should come to the help of the two atta.:ked persons and to sec at least the escaping assailants out of whom they recognised two.\n\nAs human testimony, resulting from widely different powers of observation and 4'scription, is necessarily faulty and even truthful Witl!eSSes.not infrequently exaggerate or imagine or tell half truths the Courts must try to extract' and separate the hard core of..truth from the whole evidence.\n\nThis is what is meant by the proverbial saying\n\nSUPREME CQURT .REPORTS [l.974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthat Courts must separate .\"the chaff from the grain\" .. lf, after consi d<:ring the who~ ass of evidence, a residue. of acceptable truth . is\n\nesuious11\"l by .the prosecuuon beyond. any reasonable doubt the Courts are hound to give effect to the result flowing from it and not throw it overboard on purely hypothetical and conjectural grounds. In so far as the grounds given for rejecting the evidence of Zora Singh appear\n\nto us lo be patc_ntly unreasonable and highly conjectural, we think .that\n\nth~. case before us calls. for interference by this Court.. That evidence, as we have already pointed .out, is corroborated by medical evideru; c as well as by the statements of Surjit Singh and Bachan Singh. Hence, although, the statements of Bachan Singh and Surjit Singh, taken by themselves, may not have been enough to warrant the conviction of the\n\nrespondents, yet, when the evidence of Zora Singh, strongly corroborated by medical vidcnce is there, we think that the statements of Surjit Singh & Bachan Singh could be used to support the conclusion thus reached without going to the extent of holding that Surjit Singh and Bachan Singh must be wholly believed before their evidence could serve any useful purpose at all as the High Court seems to have erroneously thought. Indeed, it is very difficult to find a witness whose evidence is so flawless that it has to be wholly, completely and, unqualifiedly accepted. We think that the High Court had, without saying so, ignored the principle repeatedly laid down by this Court in appraising evidence, that Courts do not, in this country, act on the maxim : \"fa/sus i11 uoo fa/sus ill omnibus\". In cciisidering the effect of each allegation proved to be incorrect or the likelihood of its being true or untrue, we have to view it in the lit of a whole setting or concatenation of facts in each particular case.\n\nThere may be reasons for doubting the worth af the evidence of recovery from the respondents, but, that docs not mean that t!le evidence given !1y Hardit Singh, S.L, P.W.8, relating to recoveries, is necessarily false so that the investigation itself is tainted. Similarly, the mere fact that, after the lodging of the F.I.R., the necessary precaution of sending the special report to a Magistrate speedily was not shown by the prosecution to have been obscrve4 does not mean that the whole prosecution case is false or unacceptable. On the other hand, the fact that the F.l.R. discloses only offences punishable under Sections 307 and 326 I.P.C. indicates that it must have been lodged before\n\n6. a.m. In any event, before the Inquest report on the morning of 19-6-1969, the police had before it the prosecution version contained in the F.l.R. to which a reference is made in the Inquest report. The statements of Bachan Singh~ and Surjit Singh were also recorded before that.\n\nTherefore, the alleged suspected delay in the lodging of the F. I. R. or in sending a special report to a Magistrate do not, on the facts of this case, .indicate an attempt to conspire and fabricate. Indeed, if this was so, as already observed, one would have expected to find the names of Milkiat Singh and. Dalip Singh also in the F.I.R. instead of a description given of the unidentified youngmen which did not fit these two acquitted accused persons who were. therefore, given the benefit of doubt. This feature of the evidence indicates that the names of these two accused were introduced in the ease ouly after\n\nZora Singh had regained consciousness and revealed them as the prosecution alleged. Hence, it is. likely that the F.I.R. must have been made soon enough to contain the earliest version before Zora Singh 's version could get into it after he regained consciouness.\n\nWe think that the High Court had missed the core of truth in the case and had unjustifiably rejected thi; prosecution case which was strong enough on the statement of Zora Singh alone corroborated by medical evidence. ILl!ad, we think, 111ade the error of throwing away the prosecution case, without attempting to separate the chaff from the grain on the wrong ass1111\\1>tion. that the two were inseparable here.\n\nWe, therefore, set aside the order of acquittal by the High Court and convict the respondents for the offences with which they were charged.\n\nAs, however; the occurrence took place several years ago, we refrain from aw~ a death sentence in this case. We sentence both llari Siqgh respondent u/s 302 I.P.C. and Gian Singh respondent sons of Arjan Singh to life imprisonment under Sections 302/34 I.P.C. We\n\nalso sentence each of them to six years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/\" each, and, in default of payment of linel. to rigotous imprisonment for a further period of two years under ~\n\ntions 307/34 I.P.C. The seiltenees awarded shall run concurrently.\n\ns.c.\n\nAppeal Allowed.", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HARi SINGH & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARi SINGH & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 21, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 53, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 21, 1974 [M. Ji."}}, {"text": "M. Ji. BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S.302, 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 303, "end_char": 309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 325, "end_char": 331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Harbans Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3394, "end_char": 3407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nHarbans Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Nuruddin Ahmed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3429, "end_char": 3443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nuruddin Ahmed and U. P. Singh, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3448, "end_char": 3459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nuruddin Ahmed and U. P. 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"end_char": 3728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3732, "end_char": 3749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3760, "end_char": 3772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3777, "end_char": 3794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Harl Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3890, "end_char": 3900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Trial Court had convicted the respondents under each of these two sections and sentenced Harl Singh to death under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and Gian Singh to life imprisonment under sections 302/34 l.P.C., and it had sentenced both to six years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.", "canonical_name": "HARi SINGH & ANR"}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3916, "end_char": 3927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3928, "end_char": 3945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Gian Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3950, "end_char": 3960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Trial Court had convicted the respondents under each of these two sections and sentenced Harl Singh to death under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and Gian Singh to life imprisonment under sections 302/34 l.P.C., and it had sentenced both to six years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.", "canonical_name": "tlian Singh"}}, {"text": "sections 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3988, "end_char": 4000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Sections 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4205, "end_char": 4217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4222, "end_char": 4227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Milkiat Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4329, "end_char": 4342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,0~/-, and, in default of pa; yment of fine, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for two years under Sections 307 /34 I.P.C.\n\nThe occurrence which gave rise to the prosecution of the two respondents together with two others, Milkiat Singh and Dalip Singh, who were acquitted by the Trial Court, took place during the night between 18th and 19th June, 1969."}}, {"text": "Dalip Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4347, "end_char": 4358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,0~/-, and, in default of pa; yment of fine, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for two years under Sections 307 /34 I.P.C.\n\nThe occurrence which gave rise to the prosecution of the two respondents together with two others, Milkiat Singh and Dalip Singh, who were acquitted by the Trial Court, took place during the night between 18th and 19th June, 1969."}}, {"text": "18th and 19th June, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4435, "end_char": 4459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,0~/-, and, in default of pa; yment of fine, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for two years under Sections 307 /34 I.P.C.\n\nThe occurrence which gave rise to the prosecution of the two respondents together with two others, Milkiat Singh and Dalip Singh, who were acquitted by the Trial Court, took place during the night between 18th and 19th June, 1969."}}, {"text": "Zora Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4512, "end_char": 4522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The victims, Gian Singh, deceased, and his nephew, Zora Singh, P.W. 3, cultivated lands jointly with Bachan Singh, P.W. 5, his son Mukhtiar Singh, his two brothers Gian Singh and .Sarwan Singh, and, Surjit Singh, P.W. 4, and Jagjit Singh, the brothers of Zora Singh and sons of Sarwan Singh."}}, {"text": "Bachan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4562, "end_char": 4574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The victims, Gian Singh, deceased, and his nephew, Zora Singh, P.W. 3, cultivated lands jointly with Bachan Singh, P.W. 5, his son Mukhtiar Singh, his two brothers Gian Singh and .Sarwan Singh, and, Surjit Singh, P.W. 4, and Jagjit Singh, the brothers of Zora Singh and sons of Sarwan Singh."}}, {"text": "Mukhtiar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4592, "end_char": 4606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The victims, Gian Singh, deceased, and his nephew, Zora Singh, P.W. 3, cultivated lands jointly with Bachan Singh, P.W. 5, his son Mukhtiar Singh, his two brothers Gian Singh and .Sarwan Singh, and, Surjit Singh, P.W. 4, and Jagjit Singh, the brothers of Zora Singh and sons of Sarwan Singh."}}, {"text": ".Sarwan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4640, "end_char": 4653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The victims, Gian Singh, deceased, and his nephew, Zora Singh, P.W. 3, cultivated lands jointly with Bachan Singh, P.W. 5, his son Mukhtiar Singh, his two brothers Gian Singh and .Sarwan Singh, and, Surjit Singh, P.W. 4, and Jagjit Singh, the brothers of Zora Singh and sons of Sarwan Singh.", "canonical_name": ".Sarwan Singh"}}, {"text": "Surjit Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4660, "end_char": 4672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The victims, Gian Singh, deceased, and his nephew, Zora Singh, P.W. 3, cultivated lands jointly with Bachan Singh, P.W. 5, his son Mukhtiar Singh, his two brothers Gian Singh and .Sarwan Singh, and, Surjit Singh, P.W. 4, and Jagjit Singh, the brothers of Zora Singh and sons of Sarwan Singh."}}, {"text": "Jagjit Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4686, "end_char": 4698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The victims, Gian Singh, deceased, and his nephew, Zora Singh, P.W. 3, cultivated lands jointly with Bachan Singh, P.W. 5, his son Mukhtiar Singh, his two brothers Gian Singh and .Sarwan Singh, and, Surjit Singh, P.W. 4, and Jagjit Singh, the brothers of Zora Singh and sons of Sarwan Singh."}}, {"text": "Zora Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4716, "end_char": 4726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The victims, Gian Singh, deceased, and his nephew, Zora Singh, P.W. 3, cultivated lands jointly with Bachan Singh, P.W. 5, his son Mukhtiar Singh, his two brothers Gian Singh and .Sarwan Singh, and, Surjit Singh, P.W. 4, and Jagjit Singh, the brothers of Zora Singh and sons of Sarwan Singh.", "canonical_name": ".Zora Singh"}}, {"text": "Sarwan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4739, "end_char": 4751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The victims, Gian Singh, deceased, and his nephew, Zora Singh, P.W. 3, cultivated lands jointly with Bachan Singh, P.W. 5, his son Mukhtiar Singh, his two brothers Gian Singh and .Sarwan Singh, and, Surjit Singh, P.W. 4, and Jagjit Singh, the brothers of Zora Singh and sons of Sarwan Singh.", "canonical_name": ".Sarwan Singh"}}, {"text": "Dhandri Kalan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4797, "end_char": 4810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All of them also lived together in village Dhandri Kalan."}}, {"text": "Ludhiana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4928, "end_char": 4936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kalan in District Ludhiana."}}, {"text": "Hari Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4986, "end_char": 4996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is said that there had been a fight bet ween Hari Singh, respondent, and Gian Singh deceased in\n\n!", "canonical_name": "HARi SINGH & ANR"}}, {"text": "Jagjit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5176, "end_char": 5188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagjit Singh and Mukhtiar Singh, by show of force, were said to have carried away some \"toori' in a cart to their house against the wiibes ot Hari Singh, respondent, and another person in his company."}}, {"text": "18th June, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6136, "end_char": 6151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case was that Gian Singh and Zora Singh had gone to their field for watering their sugarcane crop in it on the evening of\n\n18th June, 1969."}}, {"text": ".Zora Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6272, "end_char": 6283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At about 9 p.m. Bachan Singh, P.W. 5, and Surjit Singh, P.W. 4, are said to have carried _the meals for Gian Singh and .Zora Singh, who were at their field situated about \"100 karams\"\n\n(nearly JOO paces) away from their tubewell, which was, as is wiuaf, lit up by electric light.", "canonical_name": ".Zora Singh"}}, {"text": "tlian Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6447, "end_char": 6458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After tliat, tlian Singh and Zora Singh went to sleep a few feet from each other at their tubewell while Bachan Singh and Surjit Singh are said to have stayed oo at the sugarcane\n\nfield nearby.", "canonical_name": "tlian Singh"}}, {"text": "Bachan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6539, "end_char": 6551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After tliat, tlian Singh and Zora Singh went to sleep a few feet from each other at their tubewell while Bachan Singh and Surjit Singh are said to have stayed oo at the sugarcane\n\nfield nearby.", "canonical_name": "Bachan Singh~"}}, {"text": "Surjit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6556, "end_char": 6568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After tliat, tlian Singh and Zora Singh went to sleep a few feet from each other at their tubewell while Bachan Singh and Surjit Singh are said to have stayed oo at the sugarcane\n\nfield nearby."}}, {"text": "Hari Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6854, "end_char": 6864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P\"ns .. , Hari Singh is said to have struck his kirpan on the neck of Gian Singh, deceased, and Milkiat Singh is said to have struck Zora Singh on the right arm with his Gandasa, whereupon Zora Singh raised an alarm.", "canonical_name": "HARi SINGH & ANR"}}, {"text": "Marditta-Marditta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7153, "end_char": 7170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All the four assailants then gave blows to the deceased and Zora Singh who had cried out : \"Marditta-Marditta\"\"\n\nBachan Singh, P.W. 4, and Surjit Singh, P.W. 4, rushed to their aid and alleged having seen the attack and the assailants running away."}}, {"text": "Sections 307 and 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9165, "end_char": 9185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9186, "end_char": 9203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Surji~ Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9487, "end_char": 9499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Surji~ Singh, P.W. 4, the maker of the F.I.R., upon cross-examinahon derued that he had been tutored to state that he could not identify the two of the assailants as they' had their backs towards him."}}, {"text": "Bachan Sitlgh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10542, "end_char": 10555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bachan Sitlgh, P.W.5, had supported the statement of Surjit Singh, P. W.4, that he ran up to help the attacked persons after hearing Zora Singh Shouting; \"Marditta-Marditta\"."}}, {"text": "Hari Sngh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10991, "end_char": 11000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On cross-examination, this witness also stated that he could not recognise the companions of Hari Sngh and Gian Singh as they had their backs towards him, although it was proved that he had stated be• fore the Police that the unidentified persons were young Sikhs with Gandasas whom he could identify if produced before him.", "canonical_name": "HARi SINGH & ANR"}}, {"text": "Gandasas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11167, "end_char": 11175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On cross-examination, this witness also stated that he could not recognise the companions of Hari Sngh and Gian Singh as they had their backs towards him, although it was proved that he had stated be• fore the Police that the unidentified persons were young Sikhs with Gandasas whom he could identify if produced before him."}}, {"text": "Zora Smgh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11969, "end_char": 11978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Zora Smgh, on crossexamination, had explained that he had not stated this earlier as he was not questioned about it.", "canonical_name": ".Zora Singh"}}, {"text": "Z.Ora Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12129, "end_char": 12140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court had doubted the veracity of Z.Ora Singh because he disclaimed knowledge that Milkiat Singh and Dalip Singh were employed in the Air-Force although their fields ad, jcined his own fields.", "canonical_name": ".Zora Singh"}}, {"text": "Sections 307 and 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12707, "end_char": 12727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12728, "end_char": 12733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "HARI SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12774, "end_char": 12784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HARI SINGH (Beg, /.) 729\n\ncient to explain this omission.", "canonical_name": "HARi SINGH & ANR"}}, {"text": ".Hardit Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13448, "end_char": 13461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It bad not relied upon the alleged recoveries by .Hardit Singh, SuMnspector, P.W.8, of a kirpan on 28th June, 1969, from a straw-bin at a tube well at the instance of Hari Singh and a gandasa on the roof of a tubewell at the instance of Gian \"Singh."}}, {"text": "28th June, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13498, "end_char": 13513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It bad not relied upon the alleged recoveries by .Hardit Singh, SuMnspector, P.W.8, of a kirpan on 28th June, 1969, from a straw-bin at a tube well at the instance of Hari Singh and a gandasa on the roof of a tubewell at the instance of Gian \"Singh."}}, {"text": "Gian \"Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13636, "end_char": 13647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It bad not relied upon the alleged recoveries by .Hardit Singh, SuMnspector, P.W.8, of a kirpan on 28th June, 1969, from a straw-bin at a tube well at the instance of Hari Singh and a gandasa on the roof of a tubewell at the instance of Gian \"Singh.", "canonical_name": "tlian Singh"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14636, "end_char": 14647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "AIR 1957 SC 637", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16134, "end_char": 16149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17070, "end_char": 17075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that 2:ora\n\nSingh, who had seen and recognised these two accused persons had .become unconscious before their names could be communicated to Surjit Singh."}}, {"text": "Zora Sincl", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19139, "end_char": 19149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that Zora Sincl!", "canonical_name": ".Zora Singh"}}, {"text": "1.ora Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19473, "end_char": 19484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SINGH (Beg, /.) 731\n\nau.ct upon Gian Singh and then 1.ora Singh began.", "canonical_name": ".Zora Singh"}}, {"text": "Zora Siogh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20668, "end_char": 20678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if other parts of his evidence are, for some reason, not accepted, Zora Siogh's statement that he saw and recognised assailants.", "canonical_name": ".Zora Singh"}}, {"text": "Hardit Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 24923, "end_char": 24935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1y Hardit Singh, S.L, P.W.8, relating to recoveries, is necessarily false so that the investigation itself is tainted."}}, {"text": "Sections 307 and 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25395, "end_char": 25415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25416, "end_char": 25421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "19-6-1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25537, "end_char": 25546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a.m. In any event, before the Inquest report on the morning of 19-6-1969, the police had before it the prosecution version contained in the F.l."}}, {"text": "Bachan Singh~", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25691, "end_char": 25704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statements of Bachan Singh~ and Surjit Singh were also recorded before that.", "canonical_name": "Bachan Singh~"}}, {"text": "llari Siqgh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27320, "end_char": 27331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We sentence both llari Siqgh respondent u/s 302 I.P.C. and Gian Singh respondent sons of Arjan Singh to life imprisonment under Sections 302/34 I.P.C. We\n\nalso sentence each of them to six years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "s 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27345, "end_char": 27350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27351, "end_char": 27356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Gian Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27362, "end_char": 27372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We sentence both llari Siqgh respondent u/s 302 I.P.C. and Gian Singh respondent sons of Arjan Singh to life imprisonment under Sections 302/34 I.P.C. We\n\nalso sentence each of them to six years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.", "canonical_name": "tlian Singh"}}, {"text": "Arjan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27392, "end_char": 27403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We sentence both llari Siqgh respondent u/s 302 I.P.C. and Gian Singh respondent sons of Arjan Singh to life imprisonment under Sections 302/34 I.P.C. We\n\nalso sentence each of them to six years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.", "canonical_name": ".Sarwan Singh"}}, {"text": "Sections 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27431, "end_char": 27443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27447, "end_char": 27452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27677, "end_char": 27682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_734_737_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "NAWABAU\n\nTHE STATE OF utTAR PRADESH\n\nMarch 22, 1~74 . (H. R. KHANNA AND P. K. GoSWAMI, 1J.J\n\nlnMtm .l'enal Codo, m:. 302 r<atl wit/1 stc. 14? IJ'.C.-No vicarious liability uaku t!M person is • mtm!Nr of the unlawful assembly al tht time of the camml.rllon of oD•nt:•.\n\nni;.a-Uant and six othera were inter a/la, convicted for of!ence u/s 302 read With .... 14? ol the I.P.C. There was long SlalldinJ. enmity belwun -- and Ibo deceased and the parties were involved in civil and crimjoal litlptioo. 11 Wiii allesod tbat the accused attacked tbe deceased with latbis and thereafter carrled him to the houoo of one Mohd. Shafi and locked tbe door from inside.\n\nWhen the police arrived the door was broken open and only six accused were fotmcl there but nol tbe appellant. Tbe body of tbe deceased was also reeowred m tbo house. The Sessions u<f80 convicted all the accused includinJ the llllllOllazil for of!eoco u/s 302 read with Sec. 14? of the J.P.C. and Ibo conVJctioo aDa - were upheld by the High Court. .\n\nAllowing tbo appeal,\n\nHBu> :-(I) Thal from the evidence ii can bo said that tbe appellant was inside tbe house of Mohd. Shafi only for a short time and thereafter left that .Place. 'lberc no evidence on record to show that the deceased was stran~· latm before the appellant left tbe house. There is nothing to rule out the Jl(l8Sibil1ty ol the deceased lµiving been strangulated after the appellant left the house and when ho bad ceased to be ::t member of. the unlawful assembly. No liability can\n\nbe futcned upon the appellant for anything done by the members of the unlawful wembly nfter he had left the house and had ceased to be the memb:r of the unlawful assembly.\n\n[736G-HJ\n\n_. (II) In the prosecution under section 149 l.P.C., it is incumbent upon the prosecution to show that the pcon concerned was a member of the unlawful asaembly at the time of the commission of the offence. No vicarfQUs liability ........ _can be fastened under section 149 I.P.C. if the person concerned goes away and ceases to be a member of the unlawful assembly before the commission of the offence and subsequently the offence is committed by Other members of the unlawful assembly.\n\n[737A-C] ·\n\nCll.IMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 20 of 1971..\n\nAplJCal bv Special Leave fmm the Judgment and Order dated lhe 26th Au211st. 1970 o! the Allabab<{j High Court (Lucknow Bench l in Criminal Appeal No. 8 of 1968. ·\n\nB .. P. Sin11h. for the appellant.\n\nD. P. Yniyal, R. Bai1a and O. P. Rana, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J.-Nawab Ali and six others including bis two sons Naim Khan and Azim Khan were convicted by learned Sessions Judge . Bahraich under section 302 read with section 149 Indian Penal code. section 323 read wiib section 149, Indian Penal Code, section 147, section 342 and section 364 Indian Penal Code. Each of the seven accused was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence\n\nNAWAB ALI v. U.P. STATE (Khanna,/.) 735\n\nA under section 302 read with section 149 Indian Penal Code. Lesser sentences qf imprisonment were awarded for the other offences.\n\nAppeal filed by the seven accused was .dismissed by the Allahabad\n\nHigh Court. Nawab Ali alone then came up in appeal to this Court by special leave. The leave was, however, restricted to the question of conviction of the appelalnt for the offence under section 302 read with section 149 Indian Penal Code. ll\n\n_, E\n\nThe case of the prosecution is that there wa.• long standing enmity between the seven accused, . wbo are related to each other,\n\nand Abdul HamiJ Khan.\n\nDisp_utes had ansen between •.ne parties in connection with some land belonging to Sarju Devi and the parties tml been involved in civil and crimmal litigation.\n\nAbdul Hamid Khan deceased and tbe accused belong to viJlagc Gulalpurwa.\n\nOn the evening of June 17, 1967, it is stated, Abdul Hamid Khan went to the house of his co-villager liahao Khan\n\n(PW 5), because the two wanted to have a talk in connection with a case pendin2 before the Commissioner.\n\nAbdul Hamid Khan accompanied by Puttan Khan (PW 7) left the house of Bahao Khan :ct about 10 p.m. Wben the two reached near the house of Siddiq, the s.:ven accused armed with iathis emerged and attacked Atxlul Hamid Khan and his companion. Puttan Khan ran away and, while doing so. raised alarm. Abdul Hainid Khan was given lathi blows and was apprehended.\n\nTh<:. accuse'tl then lifted Abdul Hamid Khan and carried him to the house dI Mohd. Shafi accused.\n\nAlarm raised by Abdul Hamid Khan and Puttan Khan attracted Maiku 1'han tPW U. Nasir Khan (PW 3), Hafeezulla (PW 4J and some others including Rahim Khan. Rahim Khan tried to intervene but\n\ni1e too was J:iven lathi blows.\n\nAftcr taking Abdul Hamid Khan inside the house of Mohd. Shafi, the accused closed the de.Qr of the\n\nhouse. Attempt was made by those present to get the door of the house opened.\n\nSix of the accused then emerged from the house armed with lathis and threatened those present to go away and that other;>ise they too would be assaulte\\I. The accused thereafter went back to the house and closed the door. . 1'hosc present outsi'<k continued to stay there.\n\nMaiku Khan (PW 1l, who is nephew of Abdul Hamid Khan, in the meantime, rushed to his h{IUSc and from there proceeded on his cycle to police station Nanpara, at a distance of three miles from the\n\npl= of occurrence.\n\nReport l,(a I was lodged at the police station by Maiku Khan at l I.05 p.m.\n\nInspector Y ash want Singh accompanied by some constables immediatelv proceeded to the place of qccurrencc and arrived there about.half an hour after mid-night. The Juspector found a number uf person present outside the house of Mohd. S>1ali.\n\nThe door of the house of Mohd. Shafi .had .been chained from outside a'1!d rhr motbrr of Mohd. Shafi was sitting there. The Inspector got the door opened.\n\nOn going inside. the Inspector fouml th~ dead body ,, r Abdul Hamid Khan lving in the verandah of tbc house.\n\nSix of.\n\n~-LS4SupCl/75\n\nSUPRl!ME COURT Rl!PORTS\n\n[1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe aa; llSW were Present inside the house.\n\nNawab Ali appellant A was. however, not present there.\n\nThe case of the prosecution further is that Nawab Ali had slipped awav Jt the time the accused hat! emerged out of the house. 'fba\n\nix uccased present inside the house were taken into custody.\n\nOn lhe foJlowinJ? morclug the .InsP.Cctor prepared the inquest report and sent the dead bodv to the mortuary.\n\nPost mortem examination on B the dead body was performed by Dr. J. B. Singh at Bahraich on Jun• lR, 1967 at 3 p.m.\n\nNawab Ali appellant surrendered himself in Conrt on June 23,\n\n1967. He was thereafter put under arrest.\n\nAt the trial Nawab Ali appellant, with whom we are concerned, denied the prosecution allegations about his complicity and staled C that he had been falsely involved in this case because of enmity with Puttau Khan.\n\nThe trial court and the High Court accepted the prosecution case and convicted the accused as above.\n\nIt has not been disputed before us that Abdul Harni<I Khan was the victim of a murderous assault. Dr. J. B. Singh, who performed the post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased, found IO iniuries caused with blunt weapon on the body.\n\nThe doctor found that the brain, larynx, .trachea, lungs, intestine, pancrea>. snlcen and kidney were c:onges_ted. Rings of the tmchca and hyoiJ bon,1 were fractured.\n\nBlood was found in the tissues of the neck.\n\nDeath wa; due t-0 aspbvxia as a result of strangulation of the neck.\n\nThe short question which arises for determination in this appeal is whethu the appellant is guilty of the offence under section 30.2 read with section 149 Indian Penal C<ide.\n\nSo far as this question is cc1tcemed, we find that it is in the evidence of Nasir Khan (PW 3) that when he and others rushed to the house of Mohd. Shafi on hearing alarm, all the accused except ROuf came out of the house armed with !othis and threatened those present to go awav.\n\nFive out of the six accused who had come out then went inside the house Nawab\n\nAli, howver, did not go inside the house.\n\nNasir Khan and others present there then surroundctl the house of Mohd.\n\nShafi ~1d umainod there ti!! the arrival of the t>Olicc.\n\nThe Police Inspector. wl•o got the l:loor of the hou<e 01>cned, found only six of the accused\n\npresent there. The appellant was not among those six accused. It can therefore, be said that the appellant was inside the house of Mohd. Shafi only for a very short time and thereafter he left that place.\n\nThere is no ev'dencc on t'c record to show iat Abdul Hamid Khan was strangulated before Nawab Ali \"ppcllant left the house of Mohd. Shafi.\n\nIndeed. there is nothing to rnlo out tho possibility of Abdul Hamid Khan having been strangula:cil uft.cr Nawab Ali had left the house of Mohd. Shafi and had thu~ ceased lo 1\". a member of the unlawful assembly, No liabilitv, in our opinion. {:an he fastened upon Nawah Ali for anything done by the members of the unlawful assembly after he had left the house of\n\n!<AWAD ALI v. U.P. STATE (Kha1111a, /.) 737\n\nMohd. Shafi and had thus ceased to be a member of the unlawful \\ asse.nbly.\n\nAccordin~ to section 149 InUian Penal Code, if an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution o{ the comm.on object of that assembly, or such as the members of tlm assembl.Y knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution ot that object, every pets<.111 who, at the time of the committing o[ that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that olience.\n\nIt is, therefore, inC'!!llbent upon the prosecution to show that tl1e person concerned was_ a member of the unlawful assembly at the time of the ccmmission of the offence. If the person con ccrned oes away and ceases to he a member oI the unlawful assembly before the commission of the offence, no vicarious liability\n\ncan oc fastened up01i him under section 14(} Indian P0nal Code because of any subsequent aq done by the other members of the\n\nunlawfal assembly.\n\nThe c()nviction of NawaJ:> Ali appellant for tl1e >.lifencc under section 302 reacj with section 149 lndbn Penal Code in the circumstances cannot be held to be well found. We, therefore,. accept the appeal of Nawab Ali to the extent of setting aside hi' c0nviction under section 302 read with section 149 Jndiaif Pciwl Code. Ifo is acquitted on that score.\n\nS.B.W.\n\nAppeQ/ allowed.", "total_entities": 83, "entities": [{"text": "THE STATE OF utTAR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "1~74 . (H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. K. GoSWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 336, "end_char": 341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 368, "end_char": 373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mohd. Shafi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 612, "end_char": 623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11 Wiii allesod tbat the accused attacked tbe deceased with latbis and thereafter carrled him to the houoo of one Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Mohd. S>1ali"}}, {"text": "s 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 912, "end_char": 917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Sec. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 928, "end_char": 935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1725, "end_char": 1736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1953, "end_char": 1964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1965, "end_char": 1970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "D. P. Yniyal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2462, "end_char": 2474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Yniyal, R. Bai1a and O. P. Rana, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. Bai1a", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2476, "end_char": 2484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Yniyal, R. Bai1a and O. P. Rana, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "O. P. Rana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2489, "end_char": 2499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Yniyal, R. Bai1a and O. P. Rana, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2566, "end_char": 2572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J.-Nawab Ali and six others including bis two sons Naim Khan and Azim Khan were convicted by learned Sessions Judge ."}}, {"text": "Nawab Ali", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2577, "end_char": 2586, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Nawab\n\nAli", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Naim Khan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2625, "end_char": 2634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J.-Nawab Ali and six others including bis two sons Naim Khan and Azim Khan were convicted by learned Sessions Judge .", "canonical_name": "Nasir Khan"}}, {"text": "Azim Khan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2639, "end_char": 2648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J.-Nawab Ali and six others including bis two sons Naim Khan and Azim Khan were convicted by learned Sessions Judge .", "canonical_name": "Nasir Khan"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2707, "end_char": 2718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2729, "end_char": 2740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2741, "end_char": 2758, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2760, "end_char": 2771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2782, "end_char": 2793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2795, "end_char": 2812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2814, "end_char": 2825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2827, "end_char": 2838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 364", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2843, "end_char": 2854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2855, "end_char": 2872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3013, "end_char": 3024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3035, "end_char": 3046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3047, "end_char": 3064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Allahabad\n\nHigh Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3193, "end_char": 3214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal filed by the seven accused was .dismissed by the Allahabad\n\nHigh Court."}}, {"text": "Nawab Ali", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3216, "end_char": 3225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nawab Ali alone then came up in appeal to this Court by special leave.", "canonical_name": "Nawab\n\nAli"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3391, "end_char": 3402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3413, "end_char": 3424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3425, "end_char": 3442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Abdul HamiJ Khan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3587, "end_char": 3603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "wbo are related to each other,\n\nand Abdul HamiJ Khan.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Harni<I Khan"}}, {"text": "Sarju Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3689, "end_char": 3699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Disp_utes had ansen between •.ne parties in connection with some land belonging to Sarju Devi and the parties tml been involved in civil and crimmal litigation."}}, {"text": "Abdul Hamid Khan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3768, "end_char": 3784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Hamid Khan deceased and tbe accused belong to viJlagc Gulalpurwa.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Harni<I Khan"}}, {"text": "June 17, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3859, "end_char": 3872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the evening of June 17, 1967, it is stated, Abdul Hamid Khan went to the house of his co-villager liahao Khan\n\n(PW 5), because the two wanted to have a talk in connection with a case pendin2 before the Commissioner."}}, {"text": "Abdul Hamid Khan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3888, "end_char": 3904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the evening of June 17, 1967, it is stated, Abdul Hamid Khan went to the house of his co-villager liahao Khan\n\n(PW 5), because the two wanted to have a talk in connection with a case pendin2 before the Commissioner.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Harni<I Khan"}}, {"text": "liahao Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3942, "end_char": 3953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the evening of June 17, 1967, it is stated, Abdul Hamid Khan went to the house of his co-villager liahao Khan\n\n(PW 5), because the two wanted to have a talk in connection with a case pendin2 before the Commissioner."}}, {"text": "Abdul Hamid Khan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4061, "end_char": 4077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Hamid Khan accompanied by Puttan Khan (PW 7) left the house of Bahao Khan :ct about 10 p.m. Wben the two reached near the house of Siddiq, the s.:ven accused armed with iathis emerged and attacked Atxlul Hamid Khan and his companion."}}, {"text": "Puttan Khan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4093, "end_char": 4104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Hamid Khan accompanied by Puttan Khan (PW 7) left the house of Bahao Khan :ct about 10 p.m. Wben the two reached near the house of Siddiq, the s.:ven accused armed with iathis emerged and attacked Atxlul Hamid Khan and his companion."}}, {"text": "Bahao Khan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4130, "end_char": 4140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Hamid Khan accompanied by Puttan Khan (PW 7) left the house of Bahao Khan :ct about 10 p.m. Wben the two reached near the house of Siddiq, the s.:ven accused armed with iathis emerged and attacked Atxlul Hamid Khan and his companion."}}, {"text": "Siddiq", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4198, "end_char": 4204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Hamid Khan accompanied by Puttan Khan (PW 7) left the house of Bahao Khan :ct about 10 p.m. Wben the two reached near the house of Siddiq, the s.:ven accused armed with iathis emerged and attacked Atxlul Hamid Khan and his companion."}}, {"text": "Atxlul Hamid Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4264, "end_char": 4281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Hamid Khan accompanied by Puttan Khan (PW 7) left the house of Bahao Khan :ct about 10 p.m. Wben the two reached near the house of Siddiq, the s.:ven accused armed with iathis emerged and attacked Atxlul Hamid Khan and his companion."}}, {"text": "Puttan Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4301, "end_char": 4312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Puttan Khan ran away and, while doing so.", "canonical_name": "Puttan Khan"}}, {"text": "Abdul Hainid Khan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4357, "end_char": 4374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Hainid Khan was given lathi blows and was apprehended.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Harni<I Khan"}}, {"text": "Maiku", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4577, "end_char": 4582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Alarm raised by Abdul Hamid Khan and Puttan Khan attracted Maiku 1'han tPW U. Nasir Khan (PW 3), Hafeezulla (PW 4J and some others including Rahim Khan."}}, {"text": "U. Nasir Khan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4593, "end_char": 4606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Alarm raised by Abdul Hamid Khan and Puttan Khan attracted Maiku 1'han tPW U. Nasir Khan (PW 3), Hafeezulla (PW 4J and some others including Rahim Khan."}}, {"text": "Hafeezulla", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4615, "end_char": 4625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Alarm raised by Abdul Hamid Khan and Puttan Khan attracted Maiku 1'han tPW U. Nasir Khan (PW 3), Hafeezulla (PW 4J and some others including Rahim Khan."}}, {"text": "Rahim Khan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4659, "end_char": 4669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Alarm raised by Abdul Hamid Khan and Puttan Khan attracted Maiku 1'han tPW U. Nasir Khan (PW 3), Hafeezulla (PW 4J and some others including Rahim Khan."}}, {"text": "Rahim Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4671, "end_char": 4681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rahim Khan tried to intervene but\n\ni1e too was J:iven lathi blows."}}, {"text": "Maiku Khan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5192, "end_char": 5202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maiku Khan (PW 1l, who is nephew of Abdul Hamid Khan, in the meantime, rushed to his h{IUSc and from there proceeded on his cycle to police station Nanpara, at a distance of three miles from the\n\npl= of occurrence."}}, {"text": "Nanpara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5340, "end_char": 5347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maiku Khan (PW 1l, who is nephew of Abdul Hamid Khan, in the meantime, rushed to his h{IUSc and from there proceeded on his cycle to police station Nanpara, at a distance of three miles from the\n\npl= of occurrence."}}, {"text": "Maiku Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5458, "end_char": 5468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Report l,(a I was lodged at the police station by Maiku Khan at l I.05 p.m.\n\nInspector Y ash want Singh accompanied by some constables immediatelv proceeded to the place of qccurrencc and arrived there about.half an hour after mid-night."}}, {"text": "Y ash want Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5495, "end_char": 5511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Report l,(a I was lodged at the police station by Maiku Khan at l I.05 p.m.\n\nInspector Y ash want Singh accompanied by some constables immediatelv proceeded to the place of qccurrencc and arrived there about.half an hour after mid-night."}}, {"text": "Mohd. S>1ali", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5714, "end_char": 5726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Juspector found a number uf person present outside the house of Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Mohd. S>1ali"}}, {"text": "Nawab Ali", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6206, "end_char": 6215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution further is that Nawab Ali had slipped awav Jt the time the accused hat!", "canonical_name": "Nawab\n\nAli"}}, {"text": "J. B. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6531, "end_char": 6542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Post mortem examination on B the dead body was performed by Dr. J. B. Singh at Bahraich on Jun• lR, 1967 at 3 p.m.\n\nNawab Ali appellant surrendered himself in Conrt on June 23,\n\n1967."}}, {"text": "Conrt", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6626, "end_char": 6631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Post mortem examination on B the dead body was performed by Dr. J. B. Singh at Bahraich on Jun• lR, 1967 at 3 p.m.\n\nNawab Ali appellant surrendered himself in Conrt on June 23,\n\n1967."}}, {"text": "June 23,\n\n1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6635, "end_char": 6649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Post mortem examination on B the dead body was performed by Dr. J. B. Singh at Bahraich on Jun• lR, 1967 at 3 p.m.\n\nNawab Ali appellant surrendered himself in Conrt on June 23,\n\n1967."}}, {"text": "Nawab Ali appellant", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6701, "end_char": 6720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the trial Nawab Ali appellant, with whom we are concerned, denied the prosecution allegations about his complicity and staled C that he had been falsely involved in this case because of enmity with Puttau Khan."}}, {"text": "Puttau Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6889, "end_char": 6900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the trial Nawab Ali appellant, with whom we are concerned, denied the prosecution allegations about his complicity and staled C that he had been falsely involved in this case because of enmity with Puttau Khan.", "canonical_name": "Puttan Khan"}}, {"text": "Abdul Harni<I Khan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7045, "end_char": 7063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has not been disputed before us that Abdul Harni<I Khan was the victim of a murderous assault.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Harni<I Khan"}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7656, "end_char": 7666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7679, "end_char": 7690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nasir Khan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7788, "end_char": 7798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as this question is cc1tcemed, we find that it is in the evidence of Nasir Khan (PW 3) that when he and others rushed to the house of Mohd."}}, {"text": "Nawab\n\nAli", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8065, "end_char": 8075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Five out of the six accused who had come out then went inside the house Nawab\n\nAli, howver, did not go inside the house.", "canonical_name": "Nawab\n\nAli"}}, {"text": "Nasir Khan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8115, "end_char": 8125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nasir Khan and others present there then surroundctl the house of Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Nasir Khan"}}, {"text": "Mohd.\n\nShafi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8181, "end_char": 8193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nasir Khan and others present there then surroundctl the house of Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Mohd. S>1ali"}}, {"text": "Nawah Ali", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8951, "end_char": 8960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "an he fastened upon Nawah Ali for anything done by the members of the unlawful assembly after he had left the house of\n\n!", "canonical_name": "Nawab\n\nAli"}}, {"text": "Mohd. Shafi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9096, "end_char": 9107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<AWAD ALI v. U.P. STATE (Kha1111a, /.) 737\n\nMohd.", "canonical_name": "Mohd. S>1ali"}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9186, "end_char": 9197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "InUian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9198, "end_char": 9215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "NawaJ", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10056, "end_char": 10061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The c()nviction of NawaJ:> Ali appellant for tl1e >.lifencc under section 302 reacj with section 149 lndbn Penal Code in the circumstances cannot be held to be well found."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10103, "end_char": 10114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "InUian Penal Code", "statute": "InUian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10126, "end_char": 10137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "InUian Penal Code", "statute": "InUian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10144, "end_char": 10154, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10308, "end_char": 10319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10330, "end_char": 10341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jndiaif Pciwl Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10342, "end_char": 10360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_738_753_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "j 738\n\nMOHD. YUNUS SALEEM v.\n\nSHIV KUMAR SHAS1RI AND OTHERS.\n\nMarch 25, 1974\n\n(P. N. BHAGWATI AND P. K. ClosWAMI, 11.]\n\nRcvr1:sentah_\"o11the, Pople1-ct (43 of 1951), Ss. 30, 116--A and 123(1) (A)(a)-Elect1on ·,_, omm1ss1oner if he can alter .date of Poll-Appreciation of evidence by Supre111e Court-Bribe for witlrdrawal after the date fixed for witltdrawal-lf corrupt practice.\n\nA parliamentary nstituency from which election to Lok Sabha took place 1n March 1971 consisted of five assembly constituencies.\n\nThe polling at two of them was scheduled to take place on March 1, and at the other three on March 3. 1971. ISth March. 1971 was fixed as the last day for the completion of tho election. The Polling at the first two constituencies took place on Marth\n\nI. 19_71. but. or: ¥arch 2. there was a communal riot as a result of which, the Election Comm.ISS1oner pastponed the poll at the other three constituencies from March 3 to March 9.\n\nAfter the polling took place the first respondent was ded~ elected.\n\nThe appellant filed an election petition challenging the clecti0-!1 of the first respondent alleging several corrupt practices against him, one of which was that on 6th March. tho second respondent, who was one of the candidates. was induced to withdraw from the contest by the first respondent offering to reconunend him to a seat in the legislative council and by a financier offering him a large sum of money; and that tho second respondent, though he declined the offers, did. in fact, withdraw. He also contondcd that the Election ('ommissioner had no power to alter tho date of Poll at the remaining constituencies. Tho election petition was dismissed by tho High Court.\n\nJn appeal to this Court, tho firnt respondent raised the contention that even if tho facts relating to tho offers were established,, the first respandent would not be guilty of the corrupt practice under s. 123(1)(A)(a), because, the with drawal of the 2nd respondent was after the date fixed for withdrawal from being a candidate.\n\nDismissing the appeal to this Court.\n\nHELD .(1) The Election Coi; nmissioner had power to alter the date of the poll from 3rd Maren to 9th March in the remaining constituencies. Secs. 57 & 58 could not be invoked by Election Commissioner for this purpose, because they are applicable only in the circumstances specifiod and in the manner provided, in those sections and s. 153. on which the High Court relied, is also F not applicable, because it in terms provides only for extending the timt ftN co1nplcfion of election and not for altering the date of the poH. But s. 30 of the _Repre6entation of the People Act. read with s. 21 of the General Clauses Act gives the necessary power to the Election Commissioner to a1ter the dalt\" of the poll.\n\n1.742H; 743F-H; 744C.E) .(2) The amendment of the date of the poll gets en.grafted in the original form no. 1 in pursuanc.o of the subsequent notification made in valid exercise of the power under s. 30 of the Representation of the People Act read \\vilh G s. 21 of the General Clauses Act. and therefore, a fresh notification of the date under r.3 of the Conduct of Election Rules. in the requisite form, is not necessary.\n\n[744EG)\n\n(3) If the facts regarding the offers to the second respondent had been established it v:oold amount to corrupt practice within the meaning of s. 123(1) (A)(a) of the Representatin of the eople Act. (a1 Bribery to induce a person to withdraw from being a candidate at an election amoun!S to cor!Ul't practice within the meaning of. the sub-section. It cannot said that !lt!lCC H 1he time for withdrawal of candidature fixed for that purpose in the. appropnatc notification had .aJready expired in this case there coul~ be no. withdrawal of c:111didature after the date.\n\nWhen s. 123(1)(A){a) speaks of wtthdf!'Wal fro'!' \\\\being a candidate it is not limited to a candidate who has been validly nom1c\n\nnted and who hs withdraw!\\ ea.lier according to law.\n\nThe expression \"to withdraw from being a Candidate cnnnot be given a restricted meaning and confi!led .to the stage where law permits a cindidate to withdraw from thi.:\n\nlection. For the prpose of the section the words are of wide amplitude to mclude subsequent \\vtthdrawal even at the last stage prior to tho poll\n\n(746B\n\n747C] . •\n\n. <? The omiss!on of he. words \"retire from contest\" from the section as\n\nt _ong1na1ly_ stood is, not s1.gn1ficant, because the dictionary n1eaning of the \"''Ord\n\nwithdraw' includes to retire from the field or battle or any contest' and it is because the words 'retire from contest' .have become unnecessary '•bat they were advisedly deleted by the legislature.\n\n(746G~H] •\n\n(c) Si11ce purity of elections is the most important object of the Act. a 11arrow meaning to the v.ord \"withdraw'' to refer only to lesal withdrawal under\n\nsection 37 \\\\'otdd defeat the very aim.\n\nWe have therefore, to give n\\Cllning lo the word \"withdraw\" keeping in mind the object and scheme of the Act with a vie\\'.' to effe.ctuate the intention of the legislature to ensure purity in elections; else there will be an absurd poition where actual withdrawal after the time limit by taking bribe: will be free from the vice of corrupt pfacticC\" whereas that prior 1.o it \\I/ill not be so. Such an intention cannot be attributed to the legislature from deletion of the words ••retire from contest\". The worJ .. withdraw'' is. :omprehensive enough to also connote \"retir~ from contc:>l\".\n\n[747C-FJ\n\n(4j On the c\\'idence, however, it could not be held that any com1; it practice had been proved to have been conunitted by the first respondent under s. 123(1) to (4} of the Act. In the matter of appreciation of oral testimo11y in an election di., putc this Court, in an appeal under s. l 16A, must ha\\•e COn .vincing and clinching reasons to take a contrary view from that of the High rCol, lrt. It is not enough that. another view is merely possible on the oral l:!vidence.\n\nStrict proof of the allegations is called for and the High Court ha<> :in ihe present case rightly declined to accept the oral evidence of the appCllant's -side and rightly preferred that on the respondeI).t's side. [753A-EJ\n\nC1v11, APPELLATE JuRrsn1cT10N : Civil Appeal No. 282 of 1\\17'.!.\n\nFrom the judgment and order dated the 21st December, 1971, of 1he Allahabad High Court in Election Petition No. 6 of 1.971,\n\nA. Subba Rao and J.B. Dadacha11ji, for the appcllan(\n\nllardyal Hardy, S. S. Khanduja and S. K. Dhingra, for respondent No. 1.\n\nL. N. Si11Jza,, Solicitor General of India and M. N. Shroff, for the respondent no. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGosw, AMI, J. This election appeal under section 116A of the Re presentation cf the People Act, 1951 (briefly the Act) by the appellant, Mohd. Yunus Saleem, the defeated Congress (R) candidate, is against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court wherein he challenges the election of the B. K.. D. candidate, Shiv Kumar Shastri .(Respondent No. 1) to the Lok Sabha from the 76 Aligarh Parliamentary constituency in the general elections he)d in fviarch 1971- .This constituency consists of five Assembly .C<Jnstituenc1es, namely, 376- Aligarh, 377-Koil, 378-Jglas, 379-Khrur and 380-Chandaus. There\n\nwere seven candidates on the run for the election from this coristi- A tuency. The poll was scheduled to take place in Aligarh and Koil on.\n\nMarch 1,· 1971 and in Iglas, Khair and Chandaus o.n March 3, 1971.\n\nThe polling in Aligarh and Koil was completed peacefully on March\n\nI, 1971 and the appellant obtained the highest number of votes as will appear from the chart giycn below ·\n\nSarra Shri\n\nAmar Singh\n\nJagdish Gandhi\n\nPooran Singh\n\nl\\Ialan\n\n~Iohd. Yunus\n\nSaleem\n\nVirpal Singh\n\nShiv Kuniar\n\nShastri\n\nSaheb Singh\n\n367 City\n\n18,385\n\n44,422\n\n4,719\n\nS58\n\n377 Koil\n\n.559\n\nl,~91\n\n4,165\n\n25,228\n\n1,240\n\n16,260\n\n3,170\n\n378 Jglas\n\n17,134\n\n1,026\n\n42,281\n\n1,653\n\n379 380 Khair Chandau'i Total\n\n1,103\n\n19,372\n\n1,254\n\n53,240\n\n1,671\n\n868'\n\n3,995\n\n4,937\n\n23,583\n\n18,030 124, l 86\n\n1,320 5,462\n\n43,012 180,313\n\n3,076 6,958\n\nOn March 2, 1971 a communal riot betwen Hindus .and Muslims took place in Aligarh city and as a result of this the Election Commission ou receipt of reports of th~ local authorities at Aligarh postponed the poll in the reniainining segments from Marc!i 3, 1971 to E\n\nMarc1\" 9, 1971. As wilWippear from the abc!Ve chart, during the poll this time on March 9, 1971, the first respon'dent obtained a very high percentage of votes with the result that he was decli'red elected. The 2nd respondent, although a Samyukt Socialist Party candidate (SSP), was sponsored by the four parties alliance consisting of Jan Sangh, Swatantra, Congress led by Shri Nijalingappa, and Samyukt Socialist Party. , F\n\nThe appellant alleges several corrupt practices in his election petition before the.'Hizh Court and also raises <:ertain question of law ..\n\nThe Chief Election Commissioner has been impkaded as a respondent in this appeal. The High Court has repelled the contentions of the appellant. We are now concerned in this appeal with the following issues:-.\n\nIssue No. 2 : \"Whether the order of the Election\"Commission adjourning the poll from 3rd March to 9th March wa~\n\nwithout jurisdictio.n and iIIegal\"' ?\n\nIssue No. 5 : \"Whether Pooran Singh Malan (respondent No. 2) withdrew from the election on 6th March and asked his supporters to vote instead for respondent No. 1. If so, was this done as a result cf inducements offered at the instance of respondent No. 1\" ? ·\n\nMOHD. YUNUS v. s. K. SHASTRI (Gosl\\'ami, /.)\n\nIssue No. 7 : \"Whether voters were induced by threats oll'ered by Hukum Singh, the polling agnt of respondent No. 1, to promisa not to vote for the petitioner but to vote for respondent No. l (as detailed in paragraph 28 of the petition)\"'!\n\nIssue No. 8 : \"Whether respondent No. 1 and Kalya11 Singh, M.. L.A. appealed to Hindu voters in Gordha village on 7-3-1971 not to vote for the petitioner because he was a Muslim (as detailed in para 29 of the petition): and whether similar appeals were made to voters by respondent No. 1 and Prakash Vir Shastri, Virendra Varma, Raghunath Singh and Ram Prasad Deshmukh in Khair, Chandaus and lglas bet ween 7·3-1971 and 9-3-1971 (as detailed in para 30 of the petition)\"?\n\nIssue No. 8A: \"Whether respondent No. 1 and the other persons named in paragraph 30 of the petition and the sta'c ment of further particulars made speeches in Khair, Chandaus and Iglas Tehsils alleging that the petitioner was responsible for communal riots in Aligarh and other place.;, which statements were known by them to be false\" ?\n\nIssue No. 9 : \"Whether Virendra Varma and Raghunath Singh appealed to Jat voters to vote for respondent No. 1 on the ground that he was the candidate of a party led by Shri Charan Singh (as detailed in para 30 of the petition)\" ?\n\nIssue No. 10 : \"Whether respondent No. l's election agent Yogendra Pal Singh and Virendra Varma and Charan Singh appealed to Jat and Thakur voters at Iglas on 7-3-1971 not to vote for the petitioner as he was a Muslim and not to allow Muslim, Jatav and Brahmin voters to vote (as detailed in para 34 of the petition)\" ?\n\nIssue No. 11 : \"Whether at the same mectlhg men•ioned in para 34) Yogendra Pal Singh falsely stated that the peti, tic.ner was a Razakar of Hyderabad and had instigated the Aligarh riots\" ?\n\nIssue No. 12 : \"Whether respondent No. l has commi•ted corrupt practices as defined in clauses (1), (2), (3), (3A) and ( 4) of section 123 of the Representation of the People Act\"?\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant has firstly addressed us on the 2nd issue and we will, therefore, take the same first.\n\nTo appre ciate the point i.n controversy, some 'facts may be stated :\n\nThe Election Commission published a notification in the Ga7.etle of India Extraordinary dated 27th January, 1971, fixing the following dates for the purpose of the election under section 30 of the Act :\n\nFebruary 3, 1971-The last date for making nominations.\n\nFebruary 4, 1971-The date for the scrutiny of nominations.\n\nFebruary 6, 1971-The last date for the withdrawal of candidatures.\n\nVarious dates between March 1, 1971 and March 5, 1971-For holding the poll in different constituencies in Uttar Pradesh.\n\nMarch 15, 1971-The date before which the election shall be completed.\n\nThe notification fixed March I, 1971, for the poll in the A!igarh and Koil segments and March 3, 1971 in the Iglas, Khair and Chandaus segments.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Election Commission had no jurisdiction or authority to alter the dates fixed under clause (d) of section 30 in the aforesaid notification except under circumstances mentioned in sections 57 and 58 of the Act.\n\nWe may, therefore, first look at sections 57 and 58 of the Act. Section 57 in terms provides for a situation when the proceedings at any poHing station in an election are interrupted or obstructed by any riot or open violence, or if it is not possible to take the poll at any polllllg\n\nstation on account of any natural calamity, or any other sufficient cause. Section 57 empowers the presiding officer or the returning officer to adjourn the poll to ano:hcr date in any of those circumstances.\n\nThe returning officer under sub-section (2) has to report the circumstances to the appropriate authority and the returning officer next fixes appropriate dates for poll with the previous approval of the Election Commission. Under soction 57(2) when the poll has to k post-· paned after the same has commenced and voters have exercised their right to vote for some time, there is provision for fixing the hours during which the next poll shall be taken and there is a direction in this sub-section not to count the votes cast at such election until such ad- }ourncd poll has been completed. Section 57, therefore, does not deal with •he direct exercise of power by the Election Commission in altering dates of poll under the conditions specified in that section. Section\n\n58 provides for a contingency where a ballot box used at a polling station or at a place fixed for the poll is unlawfully taken 011t of the custody of the presiding officer or the returning officer, or is accidentally or intentionally destroyed or lost or is damaged or tampered with to such an extent that the result of the poll at that polling station or place cannot be ascertained or any such error or irregularity in procedure is likely to vitiate the poll is committed. therein. In such an event the returning officer has to report the matter to the Election Commission who after. taking all material circumstances into account has to t1ke a decision to declare the poll void and appoint a day and fix the Jiours for taking a fresh poll after an appropriate notification in that behalf. The Election Commission under this section may even decide against a fresh po!I after considering •he various circumstances and direct the returning officer for the further conduct and completion of the election. It is, therefore, clear that these two sections can be invoked only in very specified circumstances and in the manner provided therein. On the other hand, our attention is drawn to two oth<r\n\nsections, namely, section 30 and section 153 of the Act, which were\n\nMOHD. YUNOS V, s. K. SHASTRI (Goswami,/.) 743\n\nA relied upon by the respondents in. the High Court and the submissions were accepted there .. We may read these two sections :\n\n·-r ' .. , •\n\nSection 30 : \"Appointment of dates for nomi, nations, etc.-\n\nAs soon as the notification calliJ.lg upon a constituency to elect a member or members is issued, the Election Commission shall; by notification in the Official pazette, appoint- ( al the last date fr maki, ng nominations, which shall be\n\nthe seventh day after the date of publication of the first-mentioned notification or, if that day is a public holiday, the 'next succeeding day which is not a public holiday; ( b) the date for the scrutiny of nominations, which shall be the day immediately following the last date for asking nominatio.ns or, if that day is a public holiday, the next succeeding day which is not a public holiday;\n\n( c) the last date for the withdra\\Val of candidatures, which shall be the second day after the date for the scrutiny of noininations or, if that day is a public holiday, the next succeeding day which is not a public holiday;\n\n{ d) the date or dates on which a poll shall, if necessary, be take.n, which or the first of which shall be a date not earlier than the twentieth day after .the Jast date for the withdrawal of candidatures; and\n\n( e) the date before which the election shall be completed\".\n\nSection 15 3 : \"Extension of time for completion of election- It shall be competent for the Eiection Commission !or reasons which it considers sufficient, to extend the time for the completion of any election by making necessary amendments in the notification issued by it under secticln 30 or sub-section\n\n(1) of section 39\".\n\nThe High Court has held that \"sectio.n 153 can be construed as declaring the competency of the Election Commission to extend time under clause (d) as well as clause (e) of section 30\". We are w1ablc to ae with the High Court .that section 153 can be properly invoked in this case to the aid of the Election Commission in changing the dates of poll for the three remaining constituencies, speeified in the notification under .section 30'(d) of the Act. Secti6n 153 in terms pro vides for extending \"the time for completion of any election by making necessary amendments in the notification issued by it under section 30 .....• \". Section 30 (e) deals with \"the date before which the election shall be completed\". It is clear in this case, as set out earlier, that the last date for completion of the election was fixed by the appropriate notification to be 15th March, 1971 and the altered date of poll .in this case from 3rd to 9th March is within. the last date for completion of the poll under section 30(e). Section 153, therefore. cannot\n\ncome to the aid of the Election Commission to alter the date of poll, A ns has been clone in this case, as the said section is inapplicable to the\n\nfacts and circumstances of this case. We may, therefore, examine whether the Election Commission bas got power to alt!'r the date of poll under section 30 of the Act read with section 21 of the General\n\nClauses Act which is undoubtedly applicable in interpretation of the proviS1ons of the Act. We may read section 21 of the General Clauses B Act.\n\nSection 21 : \"Where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules, or bye-Jaws is cunforred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanctio.n and conditions if any, to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, crdcrs, rules or bye-laws so issued\". .\n\n The Election Commission in this case exercised power under section 30 of the Act and issued the .notification appointing the various dates mentioned therein for the purposes specified. Once this power is conferred under section 30 upon the Election Commission, the power to amend the - amo,. which will include alteration of the dates of poll, can be exercised under secticn 21 of the General Clauses Act. There is, teerefore, no merit in the contention that the Election Commission had no power or jurisdiction to alter the date of poll from 3rd March to 9th March\" 1971, in the remaining constituencies in this case. Issue No. 2 is, therefore, rightly decided by the High Court although we do not agree with the High Court with regard to the construction of sec tion 153 of the Act In the view we have taken, it is not necessary for us to consider whether Article 324 can be invoked in this case in aid of the power to alter the date of poll by the Election Commission.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant also submits that there should have been a fresh notification of the date in form No. 1 under rulc 3, read with. section 31 of the Act, of the Conduct of Elections Rules 1961. We -are, however, not impressed by this submission as the amendment of the date of poll gets engrafted in the original form in pursuance of the subsequent notification dated 2nd March, 1971. made in valid. exercise of the power under section 30 of the Act, read with section '.21 of the General Clauses Act.\n\nWe now turn to issue No. 5 relating to the corrupt practice of bribery defimod under section 123(0.(A) {'a) of the Act, The case of the appellant with regard to this. issue is as follows :-\n\n\"At about 7.00 P.M. on 6-3-1971 there was a meeting at the J\\ligarh residence of K. N. Agarwal(said to be one of the financiers of the B . K. D .\n\nParty in . the elec•ion), . which, was attended by Shiv Kumar Shastri (respondent No.)), Pooran Singh Malan (respondent No. 2), Vircndra Verma (Hom~ Minister of the then U. P. Government),\n\nurendra Kumar (another alleged financier of the B. K. D.\n\nParty), and a number of other persons. Oiie A•nia Deo %arma stood up and made an appeal. to Shastri and Malan\n\n, <~ •\n\nthat only one of them should stand for election and thereupon Shastri, Malan and Surendra Kumar went into an adjommg room, where Surendra Kumar offered to pay Rs. 30,000/· to Rs. 35,000/- to Malan if he would withdraw from the co.ntest, white Shastri told Malan that he would recommend him for a seat in the Legislative Council. On this Malan said that he had no need of money and as regards the seat in the Council, that was for the future to decide, but as they were all asking him to withdraw, he would comply.\n\nThe three of them then joined the others and Malan ,, nnounced his withdrawal and requested his supporters to . transfer their allegiance to Shastri\".\n\nBefore we discuss the evidence, we may deal with a question of law. addressed by Mr. Hardy, learned counsel for the contesting respondent.\n\nAccording to the learned counsel, even assuming that any gratification was offered to Malan on 6th March, 1971, to induce him to refrain fron1 contesting the election, that would not amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of section i23(l}(A)(a) of the Act.\n\nWe may, therefore, read that part of the section :\n\nSection 123: \"Corrupt practiceS-The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act :-\n\n(1) 'Bribery', that is to say,-\n\n( A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsoever, with the object, di rec Uy or illr directly of inducing-\n\n( a) a person to stand or not to stand as, or to. withdraw\n\nor not •o v.ithdraw from being a candidate at a.n election, or;''\n\nTh<! allegation in the present case is that an offer of gratification wa~, mode to Malan to induce him \"to withdraw from being a candidate\".\n\nIt is submitted that since. the time for withdrawal Qf candidature ha<t already expired, there can be no withdrawal of candidature after the\" date fixed for that purpose in the appropriate notification to come within the mischief of section 123(l)(A)(a). It is further submitted that even though he may not have taken any part in the election after the expiry (If. the date of withdrawal, he will remain a contesting can didate •houghout the clectio.n. n is also pointed out that in fact Malan obtained vote.s in the election which was held on 9th March, 1971 itr various constituencies as will also appear from the chart given above.\n\nThe learned counsel also drew our attention to the earlier law on the\" subject where a provision under section 123(0(a) stood as follows:-\n\n\"a person to stand or not to stand as or to. with-draw from being a candidate or to retire from contest, at an election;''\n\n5';·\n\nMr. Hardv .submits that the words \"to retire from contest\" are omitted from the 'present section, which, according to him, is very -significant.\n\nHe, theretore, submits that since Malan could not in !aw withdraw from the candidature on 6th March, 1971 and there is no question of retiring from the contest under the present Jaw, _no corrupt practice has bcrn committed within the meaninz of section 123(l)(A)(a}.\n\nJI is well settli:d that election under the Act is from the date of publication of the notification calling the election to the date of declaration of the result of the election, both days inclusive. We have, therefore, a torminus a quo and terminus ad quern under the law. The word \"candidate\" is defined for Part VI (Disputes regarding Elections) and !'art VII (Corrupt Practices and E1ectoral Offences) under Section 79 (b} and it mea.ns \"a. person who has been or claims to have been duty nominated as a candidate at any election and any such person shall be deemed to have been a candidate as from the time when with the election in prospect; he began to hold himself out as a prospective candidate\".\n\nSection 32 provides for nomination of candidates for election. Under section 36(8), \"f=ediately after all the nomination papers have been scrutinised and decisions accepting or rejecting the same have been recorded, the returning officer shall prepare a list of validly nominated candidates, that is to say, candidates whose nominations have been found valid, and affix it to his hotice board\"'. Section 37 provides for withdrawal of candidature within the time. specified therein. Section 38 provides for publication of list of contesting candidates, that is to say, candidates who were included in the list of validly nominated candidates and who have not withdrawn their candidature within the said period.\n\nThe word \"contesting candidate\" as such is not defined in the Act, but the word \"candidate\" under rule 50(a} and rule 28(a} of the Conduct of\n\nElections Rules 1961 means a contesting candidate. The question is whether after the time for withdrawal has expired and a JiSt of contesting candidates has been published, withdrawal thereafter from the contest on receipt of bribe will be within the mischief of section 123(1)(Al(a). -\n\nWe have already set out the material portions of section 123(1} (A} as well as the earlier section to which our attention has been drawn. It is strimuously submitted by Mr. Hardy that the omission\n\n__ -_of the words \"retire from contest\" is very significant and the legislature now confines withdrawal under section: 123(l}(A}(a) to the stage as envisaged under section 37 and not thereafter. The Shorter Oxford English dictionary gives the meaning of the word \"withdraw\" (verb intransitive} to go away or retire fro!!! the field of battle or any contest.\n\nWithdraw or not to withdraw, therefore, includes \"retire from contest\" or not to retire from contest. There is,, therefore, nothing significant etymologically in the deletion of the words \"retire from contest\". When, therefore, section 123(l}(A) soeaks of withdrawal from being a candidate, it is not limited to a candida•e who has been vali'dly nominated and who has withdrawn earlier according to law.\n\nIt is because of this reason that the words \"retire from contest\" become unnecessary and were advisedly deleted by the legislature.\n\nAgain looking frcm another angle, section 123(l)(A)(a) has got two stages; the first stage relates to the period when even before filing of nomination paper a person is contemplating to stand or not to stand as a candidate in the election [see definition of candidate under section 79(b)]. The second stage is reached after filing of the nomination paper when law gives a candidate requisite lime to withdraw from the cindidature. It is true that the words \"to retire from contest\" in the old provision arc now deleted and the provision is recast by adding the words \"not to withdraw\" in addition to the words \"to withdraw\" in the earlier provision.\n\nWe arc, however, unable to hold that the expressicn \"to withdraw or not to withdraw\" from being a candidate has only a r\"strictcd meaning to be confined to the stage where law permits a candidate to withdraw from the election.\n\nFor the purpose of section 123 the words \"to wihdraw or not to withdraw\" from being a candidate are of wide amplitude to include a subsequent withdrawal or nonwithdrawal even al the last stage prior to the poll.\n\nWe may also consider whether deletion of the aforesaid words makes any difference under the scheme of the Act. \"Since purity of elections is the mcM important object of the Act, a narrow meaning to the word\n\n\"withdraw\" to refer only to legal withdrawal under section 37 would Jcfeat the very aim.\n\nWe have, therefore, to give a meaning to the word \"withdraw\" keeping in mind the object and scheme of the Act with a view to effectuate the intention of the legislature to ensure purity in elections; else there will be an absurd position where actual withdrawal after the time limit by taking bribe will be free from the vice of corrupt practice whereas that prior to it will not be so.\n\nSuch an intention cannot be attributed to the legislature from deletion of the words \"'retire from contest\".\n\nThe word \"withdraw\" is comprehensive enough to also connote Hretire from contest\".\" We are, therefore,. unable tci accept the submission that even if the facts alleged be established, there can be no corrupt practice within the meaning of seclion- 123( 1) (A) (a) of the Act.\n\nWe will, therefore, deal with the allegations to see how far they are established on the evidence.\n\nWe have already set out the allegations with regard to this issue and the first respondent has denied all the allegations. His case is that no bribe was offered nor any promise made to. Malan and in actual fact Malan did not withdraw from the contest and continued to fight the election to the end. The solitary witness who claims to have been present when the offer of gratification was made is Dcvendra Pal Singh (P.W. 20). This witness claims to have been one of the workers of the first respondent and indeed propooed Shastri's nomination.\n\nHe changed his allegiance from one party to another, namely, from the B.K.D. to the Congress (R) in September 1971. We are unable to hold that the High Court.js wrong in not placing reliance upon his evidence. The High Court has also found the corroborating evidence equally unreliable. .Since we agree with the appreciation of the evidence of the witness by the High Court with regard to this.charge, we may only briefly allude to the other evidence to demonstrate its unreliability. Radha Raman Dhwaj Prasad Singh (P.W. 21) was examined to support these allegations.\n\nHe hu.s been a B. K. D. worker since 1969 and he claimed also to be in that\n\n748 SUPREMll. COUR'{. REPORTS tl974J 3 s.c.a.\n\n' party on the date (12-12,1971) he gave evidence for the appellant.\n\nHe admits to have worked for the first respondent in 1971 election.\n\nAlthough he did not depose to the entire episode and did not go into .the room where the discussion took place with regard to the bribe and .the promise of a seat in the Council, he stated that Malan announced .that he was withdrawing in favour of Shiv Kumar Shastri and told his workers to see that Shastri was successful.\n\nHe admits to have taken ll!llll from the Aligarh Cooperative Bank at a time when Devendra Pal\n\nSingh (PW 20) was the Chairman of the Bank. He has not received .any recovery notice.\n\nThis witness has also changed his loyally for .reasons best known to him and cannot be considered as a reliable witness in an election matter where one may not fail to come across truth being sacrificed at the altar of political expediency.\n\nThe next witness is Shashi Bhushan (P.W. 32). He has been a Member ot Parliament since 1967. He went to Aligarh on 7th March, 1971, to 'help the appellant in his election.\n\nHe met Pooran Singh Malan on 7thMarch, 1971, in Aligarh.\n\nHe asked him why he was withdrawing from the election since he had read about this in an Agra news paper .called \"Amarujwala\", which, however, has not been produced . .According to his evidence, Malan told him that the atmosphere had •Changed since the communal riots and the grand alliance which had been supporting him was no longer supporting him. He further stated ''° this witness that he had be.en promised a seat by Shiv Kumar Shastri in the .Legislative Council.\n\nHe further stated that he was going to a meeting of Shastri to announce his withdrawal.\n\nThis videncc is , absolutely improbable in view of P.W. 2l's statement that Malan had .announced his withdrawal on the previous day, viz., 6th March, 197L Tt is not easy to comprehend why Malan should have at all cxpo5cd him.- self to unsavoury comments and other consequences by stating to this witness in the manner he is alleged to have done.\n\nWe cannot say lhat the High Court has wrongly rejected the testimony of P.W. 32. Another witness is Anand Pal (P, W. 10) who attended, according to. him, certain meeting at Gordha Bazar on 7th March, 1971. He deposed to rhe effect that KaJyan Singh was addressing the meeting and Kalyan Singh while addressing the meeting said, \"he had got Pooran Singh Malan to withdraw'', so that all Hindus could unite to vote for a Hindu.\n\nShiv Kumar Shastri also repeated the same things.\n\nHe said he was a staunch Hindu and they should vote for him and he bad got Malan to stand down\". It is difficult to believe that the first respondent woukl expose himself in such an open manner by stating in public that \"he had got Malan to stand down\".\n\nThis Was not at all necessary to state.\n\nSuch a serious charge cannot be established on mere statcmem of this kind.\n\nGajendra Singh (P.W. 18) is another witness to depose about the withdrawal of Malan amongst other things.\n\nHe is a member .:if s.K.D. Party and was a polling agent of Mrs. Gyatri Devi (wife of Sri Charan Singh) in 1967. In 1971 Parliamentary election k worked for'the first respondent and yet he went against him to depose against his interest. It is difficult to place any reliance upon such a witness and the High Court has rightly rejected ))is testimony.\n\nKishan Singh (P.W. 23) also deposed that he was present in a meeting at Iglas on /th March, 1971 and he heard Jogendra Pal Singh, election agent <>f\n\nthe first respondent, speaking in the meeting to the cf!ect, among•t -0lher things, \"that Malan had bce.n made to withdraw and votes should\n\nnow go to Shastri who was of Charan Singh's party\". This is llOt at all direct evidence about the allegauons which are made. by the appellant\n\nto support the charge.\n\nRam Das Singh (P.W. 19) was also examined with reference to this charge.\n\nHis evidence too is not direct On the point and cannot be held to be at all helpful in establishing th\" charge.\n\nOn the side of the respondents, the allegaticJts have been denied by Virendra Varma (R.W. 7) and also by Mahendra Singh (R.W. 3). In view of the nature of the evidence on the side of the appellant it is not even necessary to refer in detail to the respondent's evidence.\n\nA grievance was made by the learned counsel for th~ appellant that a petition was made by the appellant for examination of additional witnesses and the High Court wrongly rejected the same.\n\nWe frnd from the order of the High Court that the party had been warned that \"any\n\nproposed addition to the list of witnesses would have to be justified\". 'fhe High Court found that beyond saying that their names were left out \"by inadvertence or oversight\" no other sufficient ground was giYCn by the appellant to justify his prayer. We, therefori, do not find any Justification for the grievance on this score. Another petition was also filed by the appellant on 18th November, 1971, for examination of Pooran Singh Malan (respondent No. 2) as a witness. The High Court rejected the prayer on the ground that his name did not figure in the list of witnesses supplied on 9th November, 1971. Since Malan is a respondent, who on the proof of the averments could have been named under section 99, the appellant cannot mnke. a grievance for rejection of his prayer. It is not possible for this Court to interfQrc with the discretion exercised by the learned trial 1udge in a matter like this.\n\nWe now come to issue No. 7. This issue is with regard to the cot' rupt practice of undue. influence under section 123(2) of the Act. TI1e allegations are that on 7th March, 1971, two days before the poll, the first respondent visited the village of Sapera and after collecting a number of Hindus at the chaupal of the Sarpanch, Hukum Singh, went, along with them to the Muslim quarter of the village and by means of F 'threats forced the Muslim voters of that place to swear by the Quran that they would vote for him and not for the appellant or any other candidate. After the Muslims had. taken the oath, Shastri is alleged to have warned them that if they d1d not act in accordance with the oath, they would be in danger of divine displeasure. The witnesres examined by the appellant for establishing this charge arc Raghubir\n\nSingh (PW 11), Rafiq (PW 14) and Shcodan Singh (PW 15). These witnesses are residents of Sapera. Both PWs 11 and 15 admit that they are supporters of the Congress and were supporting the Congress in the election but claim that on account of Shastri's visit to the villag~ on 7th March, J 97 J, they turned over to him. Even then they ha\\'c come forward to give evidence against Shastri in this case. The High Court has given cogent reasons for discarding their testimony and we ore unable to take a contrary view.\n\nP.W. 14, Rafiq, is nlso undepend-\n\nII able.\n\nAlthough he spoke about the swearing by the Quran at the mosque, he did not know the name of the Mulla.. He has no opinion nf his own and admitted that when asked by Shastri and others lie toltl that he would vote \"as they directed\". Finally he did not go lo \\'Ole\n\non the day of poll. Besides, their statements are satisfactorily rebutted . A by the evidence of the first respondent, R.W. 1, Giraj Singh and R.W. 8 Harl Singh, the polling agent of the first respondent. We are satisfied that the High Court has correctly appreciated. the testimony of these witnesses with regard to this charge.\n\nWe will now deal with issues Nos. 8, SA, 9, 10 and 11.\n\nThese issues are interconnected and relate to the allegations made in paragraphs 29, 30 and 34 of the election petition. Tuey refer to a number of meetings held at various places, namely, Gordha, lglas, Jatari, Gaghana and Beswa, on 7-3-1971 and 8-3-1971, at whiclJ speeches were made either by the first respondent or by his agents and supporters.\n\nSince we agree with the conclusions reached by the High Coun with regard to the proof of the various allegations, we do not propose to deal exhaustively with the evidence and only make a brief reference to some broad features.\n\nMeeting at Gordha :\n\nThe allegations are that on 7th March. 1971, in village Gordha in the afternoon at weekly bazar, Kalyan.Singh, M.L.A., addressed a huge gatheriog in the following terms :-\n\n\"In Aligarh Muslims at the instance of the petitioner have chopped off the breasts of the Hindu women and have inllicted bodily injuries.\n\nNow I ask every Hindu who is present in this gathering : Arc you so shameless to vote for a Muslim candidate?\" He posed a question that you are the descendants of Shivaji and Rana Pratap and you should see that the butcher miyan (i.e. the petitioner) is defeated.\n\nHe also said that for this purpose only we got Shri Pooran Singh Malan, respondent No. 2, to withdraw his candidatwe so that Hindu votes may not be divided and a Muslim candidate may not win the election\".\n\nIt is fwther stated in paragraph 20 of the. petition that \"the first respondent was also present from the very beginning at the meeting and he also addressed the gathering supporting Kalyan Singh and requested them to vote for hi!ll as he was a Hindu and that they should not vote for the petitfoner who was a Muslim butcher, whose members of the community butchered the_ innocent Hindus and looted their properties in Aligarh city\".\n\nTo establish the charge the appellant examined Kcsho Deo Haryana (PW 6), Khacheru Lal (PW 8), Subcdar Singh\n\n(PW 9) and Anand Pal (PW 10); The first respondent examined himself (RW 14), Nern Singh Chauhan-(RW 5) and Jaipal Sineh\n\n(RW 6).\n\nP. IV. 6 (Kesho Deo.Haryana) : He is a counting agent of th~ appellant and was working for him. He is a Congress (R) worker.\n\nHe does belong to Gordha village.\n\nHe went . there for propaganda work for the appellant. Though he claims that he was present at the meeting held at Gordha on 7th March, 1971, and that offensive speeches . were made by Kalyan Singh and the first respondent at the meeting, he deposed to the following c(fect :-\n\n.__ c.. ,\n\n....\n\n• <\n\n\"I. sent no written report about the speeches to the authorilies.\n\nI made no written report to any one.\n\nI merely reported orally to our President. .• He made a note in a file\".\n\nSuch a file was not produced to corroborate his testimony.\n\nP.IV. 8 (Khacheru Lal) : He does not belong to Gordha; his village is two miles from Gordha. He states that there is a Sunday market in Gordha and that he attended the meeting held there on 7-3-1971.\n\nHe did not attend any other meeting. He has further stated that he does not know how many candidates were contesting the election. He even does not know which party Pooran Singh Malan, respondent No. 2, was representing, though he alleges that Kalyan Singh in his speech at the said meeting inter alia, said \"he had got Malan to withdraw\". He could not also name the parties whose representatives had gone to his village in connection with Votes; nor could he give the name of any one who went there to carry on propaganda.\n\nP. IV. 9 (Subedar Singh) : He states that he attended meetings at Kashipur Power House and at Nawala, but could not remember the dates of these meetings.\n\nAlthough he stated that only Bir Pal Singh made a speech at the Kashipur meeting, he could not reproduce what Bir Pal Singh had said in the course of his speech. He gave the same pattern of evidence with regard to the Nawala meeting and could not give any idea about the speech that Kesho Deo Haryana made there.\n\nHe did not make any notes of the speeches at Gordha meeting and did not report to any one about it.\n\nP. IV. 10 (Anand Pal) : He states that he made no written report . . about the Gordha meeting, nor did he make any notes about the E meeting.\n\nHe was asked by Babu Lal, former Chairman of the Municipal Board of Aligarh and an active Congress (R) worker, to give evidence. He gave him his ticket at the railway station ::nd told him that he could stay in the Congress office.\n\nThese allegations have been denied by R. W. 14 (the first respondent), R.W. 5 (Neem Singh Chauhan) and R.W. 6 (Jaipal Singh) F as will appear from their evidence which we have closely examined.\n\nMeeting at lglas\n\n Thecappellant's case is that a meeting was held at Jglas at the Jawahar Inter College at 8.00 A.M. on March 7, 1971. Ho examined Gajendra Singh (P.W. 18) and Ram Das Singh (P.W. 19 J, Kishan Singh (P.W. 28) and Brij Lal Sharma (P.W. 31). P.Ws. 18 and 19 G were the active workers of the B.K.D. party yet they deposed that on hearing the allegations against Yunus Saleem and the Muslims of Aligarh . they changed their minds and worked day and night for the success of the first respondent. Even at the time of giving evidence they claimed to be in favour of the B.K.D. party, yet came forwad to give evidence against the successful B.K.D. candidate. Kishan Singh (PW 23) is a member of the Aligarh District Congress Co=ittee and claims to H have gone to the meeting organised by the rival party iµ order to find out what was being said. He, however, made no report about the unfa;; ful propaganda being carried on at this meeting to the election\n\n5-L~4SupCl/75\n\n752 SUPREMI: C'..ltraT REPORTS\n\n[197 4] 3 S.C.R.\n\nauthorities. He was conscious that this meeting held within 48. hours k of the time fixed for the closing of the poll was an illegal one, yet he made no report to the authori!ies about this. Brij Lal Sharma (P.W.\n\n31) is also a supporter of the Congress (R). Even he aid not make any report to any one about what he had heard in the inoting. The High Court has observed tl>at \"the unreliability of the petitioner's allegations regarding this alleged Jglas meeting stands further more revealed by the discrepancy between the testimony of these witnesses • and the details given in the statement of further particulars filed by the petitioner on 26·8-71\". It is also, disclosed in the further particulars \"that among those who addressed the meeting held in Jglas at 8.00 P.M. on 7-3-1971 was Chaudhary Charan Singh, but none of four witnesst'S deposes to Chaudhary Charan Singh's participation in the meeting and from the statement of Brij Lal Sharma it is clear that Chaudhary Charan Singh did not alt.end it\". As against this, we have C the evidence of Ramesh Chandra (R.W. 10) and Virendra Varma (R.W. 7) who deposed denying the allegaticins.\n\nVirendra Varma (R.W. 7) who was then the Home Minister of U.P. frankly admitted that he had been to Iglas on 7-3·1971 in order to meet the B.K.D. workers of those places and not hold any public meeting or to make any electioneering speeches. The High Court has accepted his testi-\n\n..J. mony and we have no reason to disagree with the conclusions reached D by the High .Court with regard to these allegations being not established against the first respondent.\n\nMeetings at Jatari, Gabhana and Beswa : It is also alleged in the further -particulars filed by the appellant in the High Court on 26-8-1971 that a meeting was held at Jatari at 10.00 E A, M. on 7-3-1971. The appeilant examined Bed Vir Singh (P.W. 16) ' and Govardhan Singh (P.W. 17) to establish the allegations with regard to the. speeches made by Mahendra Singh (R.W. 3), YC@Cndra\n\nPal Singh and Virendra Varma (R.W. 7). There was also another meeting at Gabha:ia Village at 11.00 A.M. on 8-3-1971 at , which speeches were said to have been ma.de by the first respondent and Prakuh Vir Shastri, Genenl Secretary of the B.K.D. The appellant's F witnesses with regard to this meeting are Raj Kumar Sini; h (P.W. 24), Ombir Singh (P.W. 25), 01etanyn Raj Singh (P.W. 26) am! Dev Dutta Bhardwaj (P.W. 29). To refute allegations made by these witnesses, the first respondent examined himself (R.W. 14), fodh Pal Sil!lh (R.W .. Jl) and Raghunath Prasad Sharma (R.W.\n\n12). A meeting was also held, according to the appellant, in tbe village of Beswa <'n 8-3-1971 at 12.30 P.M. at whicb Pooran Singh Malan, Gi Y otmdra Pal Singh and Virendra Varma are said to have made\n\nobje<.'tiooable spc.ecbcs.\n\nEvidence was led by the appellant\" with regard to this meeting by examining Radha Raman Dhwaj Prasad Sin)!h (P.W. 21) and Harcbaran Lal (i'.W. 22). Virendra Varma (R.W. 7) and Virendra Singh (R.W. 9) denied the allegations.\n\nThe first respondent also produced rebutting evidence with regard to each of these alleged meetings.\n\nWe have examined the evidence in regard to each or tlic a£0t'e8aid !l'eetings.\n\nThe High Coitrt after a correct appreciation of the evidence\n\nA led by the appellant came to the conclusion that tl1e evidence produced by the respondent has to be preferred and beld that allegations and imputations alleged to have been made in these meetings were not established.\n\nWe have en taken through the evidence by the learned counsel for the appellant and we are unable to hold that another view with regard to the oral testimony of tlie appellant's side is even possible in this case. Although we have referred to the evidence with regard B to two meetings earlier in the judgment, we do not propose lo restate the evidence and the improbabilities again since we are in complete agreement with the conclusions with reg_ard to all these charges reached by the High Court.\n\nIn view of the natue of the evidence Jed by the appellant with regard to these meetings and its refutation by the witnesses 0! the first c respondent, we have no reason to differ from the High Court's conclusion that the allegations have not been established.\n\nIn the matter of appreciation of oral testimony lit an election dispute, this Court in an appeal under section 116A must have convincing and clinching reasons tci take a contrary view from that of the High Court.\n\nIt is not enough that another Yicw is merely possible to take on the oral evidence. Strict proof of the allegations is called for D and the High Court has, in our opinion, rightly declined to accepnhe oral evidence of the appellant's side and rightly preferred that of the respondent's side.\n\nWe do not feel at all justified in this case to take a contrary view. We, therefore, hold that Issues Nos. 8, 8A, 9, 10 and 11 are correctly decided by the High Court. We have no hesitation to hold that the election petition was rightly dismissed. As for Issue No. 12, it is a consequential issue and in the view we have takn in the E foregoing discussion it was rightly decided against the appellant. We hold that no corrupt practice has been proved to have been committed by the first respondent under section 123(1), (2), (3), (3A) and\n\n(4) of the Act.\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nV.P.S.", "total_entities": 217, "entities": [{"text": "738\n\nMOHD. 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This election appeal under section 116A of the Re presentation cf the People Act, 1951 (briefly the Act) by the appellant, Mohd."}}, {"text": "section 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6659, "end_char": 6671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Re presentation cf the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6679, "end_char": 6718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mohd. Yunus Saleem", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6755, "end_char": 6773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGosw, AMI, J. This election appeal under section 116A of the Re presentation cf the People Act, 1951 (briefly the Act) by the appellant, Mohd.", "canonical_name": "738\n\nMOHD. YUNUS SALEEM"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6843, "end_char": 6863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yunus Saleem, the defeated Congress (R) candidate, is against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court wherein he challenges the election of the B. K.. D. candidate, Shiv Kumar Shastri .(Respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. K.. D. candidate,", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6906, "end_char": 6926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yunus Saleem, the defeated Congress (R) candidate, is against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court wherein he challenges the election of the B. K.. D. candidate, Shiv Kumar Shastri .(Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Shiv Kumar Shastri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6927, "end_char": 6945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yunus Saleem, the defeated Congress (R) candidate, is against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court wherein he challenges the election of the B. K.. D. candidate, Shiv Kumar Shastri .(Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "SHIV KUMAR SHAS1RI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Aligarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7337, "end_char": 7344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The poll was scheduled to take place in Aligarh and Koil on."}}, {"text": "Amar Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7614, "end_char": 7624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The polling in Aligarh and Koil was completed peacefully on March\n\nI, 1971 and the appellant obtained the highest number of votes as will appear from the chart giycn below ·\n\nSarra Shri\n\nAmar Singh\n\nJagdish Gandhi\n\nPooran Singh\n\nl\\Ialan\n\n~Iohd."}}, {"text": "Shiv Kuniar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7701, "end_char": 7712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yunus\n\nSaleem\n\nVirpal Singh\n\nShiv Kuniar\n\nShastri\n\nSaheb Singh\n\n367 City\n\n18,385\n\n44,422\n\n4,719\n\nS58\n\n377 Koil\n\n.559\n\nl,~91\n\n4,165\n\n25,228\n\n1,240\n\n16,260\n\n3,170\n\n378 Jglas\n\n17,134\n\n1,026\n\n42,281\n\n1,653\n\n379 380 Khair Chandau'i Total\n\n1,103\n\n19,372\n\n1,254\n\n53,240\n\n1,671\n\n868'\n\n3,995\n\n4,937\n\n23,583\n\n18,030 124, l 86\n\n1,320 5,462\n\n43,012 180,313\n\n3,076 6,958\n\nOn March 2, 1971 a communal riot betwen Hindus .and Muslims took place in Aligarh city and as a result of this the Election Commission ou receipt of reports of th~ local authorities at Aligarh postponed the poll in the reniainining segments from Marc!i 3, 1971 to E\n\nMarc1\" 9, 1971."}}, {"text": "S58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7769, "end_char": 7772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 9, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8380, "end_char": 8393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As wilWippear from the abc!Ve chart, during the poll this time on March 9, 1971, the first respon'dent obtained a very high percentage of votes with the result that he was decli'red elected."}}, {"text": "Samyukt Socialist Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8536, "end_char": 8559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 2nd respondent, although a Samyukt Socialist Party candidate (SSP), was sponsored by the four parties alliance consisting of Jan Sangh, Swatantra, Congress led by Shri Nijalingappa, and Samyukt Socialist Party. ,"}}, {"text": "Jan Sangh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8634, "end_char": 8643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 2nd respondent, although a Samyukt Socialist Party candidate (SSP), was sponsored by the four parties alliance consisting of Jan Sangh, Swatantra, Congress led by Shri Nijalingappa, and Samyukt Socialist Party. ,"}}, {"text": "Swatantra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8645, "end_char": 8654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 2nd respondent, although a Samyukt Socialist Party candidate (SSP), was sponsored by the four parties alliance consisting of Jan Sangh, Swatantra, Congress led by Shri Nijalingappa, and Samyukt Socialist Party. ,"}}, {"text": "Nijalingappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8677, "end_char": 8689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 2nd respondent, although a Samyukt Socialist Party candidate (SSP), was sponsored by the four parties alliance consisting of Jan Sangh, Swatantra, Congress led by Shri Nijalingappa, and Samyukt Socialist Party. ,"}}, {"text": "Pooran Singh Malan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9251, "end_char": 9269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 : \"Whether Pooran Singh Malan (respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Pooran Singh Malan"}}, {"text": "Hukum Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9602, "end_char": 9613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 : \"Whether voters were induced by threats oll'ered by Hukum Singh, the polling agnt of respondent No."}}, {"text": "Kalya11 Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9822, "end_char": 9835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and Kalya11 Singh, M.. L.A. appealed to Hindu voters in Gordha village on 7-3-1971 not to vote for the petitioner because he was a Muslim (as detailed in para 29 of the petition): and whether similar appeals were made to voters by respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Kalya11 Singh"}}, {"text": "Prakash Vir Shastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10070, "end_char": 10089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and Prakash Vir Shastri, Virendra Varma, Raghunath Singh and Ram Prasad Deshmukh in Khair, Chandaus and lglas bet ween 7·3-1971 and 9-3-1971 (as detailed in para 30 of the petition)\"?", "canonical_name": "Prakash Vir Shastri"}}, {"text": "Virendra Varma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10091, "end_char": 10105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and Prakash Vir Shastri, Virendra Varma, Raghunath Singh and Ram Prasad Deshmukh in Khair, Chandaus and lglas bet ween 7·3-1971 and 9-3-1971 (as detailed in para 30 of the petition)\"?", "canonical_name": "Virendra Varma"}}, {"text": "Raghunath Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10107, "end_char": 10122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and Prakash Vir Shastri, Virendra Varma, Raghunath Singh and Ram Prasad Deshmukh in Khair, Chandaus and lglas bet ween 7·3-1971 and 9-3-1971 (as detailed in para 30 of the petition)\"?"}}, {"text": "Ram Prasad Deshmukh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10127, "end_char": 10146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and Prakash Vir Shastri, Virendra Varma, Raghunath Singh and Ram Prasad Deshmukh in Khair, Chandaus and lglas bet ween 7·3-1971 and 9-3-1971 (as detailed in para 30 of the petition)\"?"}}, {"text": "Charan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10763, "end_char": 10775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 on the ground that he was the candidate of a party led by Shri Charan Singh (as detailed in para 30 of the petition)\" ?"}}, {"text": "Yogendra Pal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10879, "end_char": 10897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l's election agent Yogendra Pal Singh and Virendra Varma and Charan Singh appealed to Jat and Thakur voters at Iglas on 7-3-1971 not to vote for the petitioner as he was a Muslim and not to allow Muslim, Jatav and Brahmin voters to vote (as detailed in para 34 of the petition)\" ?", "canonical_name": "Yogendra Pal Singh"}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11282, "end_char": 11291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11 : \"Whether at the same mectlhg men•ioned in para 34) Yogendra Pal Singh falsely stated that the peti, tic.ner was a Razakar of Hyderabad and had instigated the Aligarh riots\" ?"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11460, "end_char": 11471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11479, "end_char": 11511, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11716, "end_char": 11735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To appre ciate the point i.n controversy, some 'facts may be stated :\n\nThe Election Commission published a notification in the Ga7.etle of India Extraordinary dated 27th January, 1971, fixing the following dates for the purpose of the election under section 30 of the Act :\n\nFebruary 3, 1971-The last date for making nominations."}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11891, "end_char": 11901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12206, "end_char": 12219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Various dates between March 1, 1971 and March 5, 1971-For holding the poll in different constituencies in Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "March 3, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12381, "end_char": 12394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notification fixed March I, 1971, for the poll in the A!igarh and Koil segments and March 3, 1971 in the Iglas, Khair and Chandaus segments."}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12592, "end_char": 12602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 57 and 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12673, "end_char": 12691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 57 and 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12738, "end_char": 12756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12769, "end_char": 12779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13066, "end_char": 13076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13791, "end_char": 13801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13963, "end_char": 13974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15188, "end_char": 15198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15203, "end_char": 15214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15429, "end_char": 15439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16628, "end_char": 16638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16942, "end_char": 16952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17128, "end_char": 17138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17187, "end_char": 17198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17381, "end_char": 17391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17564, "end_char": 17574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17585, "end_char": 17595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17952, "end_char": 17965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17967, "end_char": 17978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18291, "end_char": 18301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18323, "end_char": 18333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18454, "end_char": 18464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18496, "end_char": 18506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18900, "end_char": 18910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19061, "end_char": 19071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19226, "end_char": 19245, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "3rd March to 9th March\" 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19384, "end_char": 19412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is, teerefore, no merit in the contention that the Election Commission had no power or jurisdiction to alter the date of poll from 3rd March to 9th March\" 1971, in the remaining constituencies in this case."}}, {"text": "Article 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19699, "end_char": 19710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19965, "end_char": 19975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Conduct of Elections Rules 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19995, "end_char": 20026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "2nd March, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20202, "end_char": 20217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We -are, however, not impressed by this submission as the amendment of the date of poll gets engrafted in the original form in pursuance of the subsequent notification dated 2nd March, 1971."}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20262, "end_char": 20272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Conduct of Elections Rules 1961", "statute": "the Conduct of Elections Rules 1961"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20315, "end_char": 20334, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 123(0.(A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20422, "end_char": 20439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Conduct of Elections Rules 1961", "statute": "the Conduct of Elections Rules 1961"}}, {"text": "6-3-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20551, "end_char": 20559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "issue is as follows :-\n\n\"At about 7.00 P.M. on 6-3-1971 there was a meeting at the J\\ligarh residence of K. N. Agarwal(said to be one of the financiers of the B ."}}, {"text": "K. N. Agarwal(said", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20609, "end_char": 20627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "issue is as follows :-\n\n\"At about 7.00 P.M. on 6-3-1971 there was a meeting at the J\\ligarh residence of K. N. Agarwal(said to be one of the financiers of the B ."}}, {"text": "Vircndra Verma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20803, "end_char": 20817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2), Vircndra Verma (Hom~ Minister of the then U. P. Government),\n\nurendra Kumar (another alleged financier of the B. K. D.\n\nParty), and a number of other persons.", "canonical_name": "Virendra Varma"}}, {"text": "U. P. Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20845, "end_char": 20861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2), Vircndra Verma (Hom~ Minister of the then U. P. Government),\n\nurendra Kumar (another alleged financier of the B. K. D.\n\nParty), and a number of other persons."}}, {"text": "urendra Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20865, "end_char": 20878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2), Vircndra Verma (Hom~ Minister of the then U. P. Government),\n\nurendra Kumar (another alleged financier of the B. K. D.\n\nParty), and a number of other persons.", "canonical_name": "Surendra Kumar"}}, {"text": "B. K. D.\n\nParty", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20913, "end_char": 20928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2), Vircndra Verma (Hom~ Minister of the then U. P. Government),\n\nurendra Kumar (another alleged financier of the B. K. D.\n\nParty), and a number of other persons."}}, {"text": "Shastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21015, "end_char": 21022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to Shastri and Malan\n\n, <~ •\n\nthat only one of them should stand for election and thereupon Shastri, Malan and Surendra Kumar went into an adjommg room, where Surendra Kumar offered to pay Rs."}}, {"text": "Malan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21027, "end_char": 21032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to Shastri and Malan\n\n, <~ •\n\nthat only one of them should stand for election and thereupon Shastri, Malan and Surendra Kumar went into an adjommg room, where Surendra Kumar offered to pay Rs.", "canonical_name": "Malan"}}, {"text": "Surendra Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21123, "end_char": 21137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to Shastri and Malan\n\n, <~ •\n\nthat only one of them should stand for election and thereupon Shastri, Malan and Surendra Kumar went into an adjommg room, where Surendra Kumar offered to pay Rs.", "canonical_name": "Surendra Kumar"}}, {"text": "Hardy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21794, "end_char": 21799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "addressed by Mr. Hardy, learned counsel for the contesting respondent.", "canonical_name": "Hardy"}}, {"text": "Section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22169, "end_char": 22180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123(l)(A)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23066, "end_char": 23086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "9th March, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23377, "end_char": 23392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "n is also pointed out that in fact Malan obtained vote.s in the election which was held on 9th March, 1971 itr various constituencies as will also appear from the chart given above."}}, {"text": "section 123(0(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23572, "end_char": 23588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hardv", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23743, "end_char": 23748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "with-draw from being a candidate or to retire from contest, at an election;''\n\n5';·\n\nMr. Hardv .submits that the words \"to retire from contest\" are omitted from the 'present section, which, according to him, is very -significant.", "canonical_name": "Hardy"}}, {"text": "6th March, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23975, "end_char": 23990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "aw withdraw from the candidature on 6th March, 1971 and there is no question of retiring from the contest under the present Jaw, _no corrupt practice has bcrn committed within the meaninz of section 123(l)(A)(a}."}}, {"text": "Section 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24565, "end_char": 24575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24860, "end_char": 24870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24929, "end_char": 24942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25256, "end_char": 25266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25342, "end_char": 25352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Elections Rules 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25714, "end_char": 25734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 123(1)(Al(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25977, "end_char": 25997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Conduct of\n\nElections Rules 1961", "statute": "the Conduct of\n\nElections Rules 1961"}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26364, "end_char": 26374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Conduct of\n\nElections Rules 1961", "statute": "the Conduct of\n\nElections Rules 1961"}}, {"text": "section 123(l}(A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26787, "end_char": 26804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123(l)(A)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27131, "end_char": 27151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 79(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27371, "end_char": 27384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27995, "end_char": 28006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28448, "end_char": 28458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dcvendra Pal Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 29758, "end_char": 29776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The solitary witness who claims to have been present when the offer of gratification was made is Dcvendra Pal Singh (P.W. 20)."}}, {"text": "B.K.D.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29977, "end_char": 29983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He changed his allegiance from one party to another, namely, from the B.K.D. to the Congress (R) in September 1971."}}, {"text": "Radha Raman Dhwaj Prasad Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 30392, "end_char": 30422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Radha Raman Dhwaj Prasad Singh (P.W. 21) was examined to support these allegations."}}, {"text": "Shiv Kumar Shastri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30988, "end_char": 31006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although he did not depose to the entire episode and did not go into .the room where the discussion took place with regard to the bribe and .the promise of a seat in the Council, he stated that Malan announced .that he was withdrawing in favour of Shiv Kumar Shastri and told his workers to see that Shastri was successful.", "canonical_name": "SHIV KUMAR SHAS1RI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Aligarh Cooperative Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31106, "end_char": 31130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He admits to have taken ll!llll from the Aligarh Cooperative Bank at a time when Devendra Pal\n\nSingh (PW 20) was the Chairman of the Bank."}}, {"text": "Devendra Pal\n\nSingh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 31146, "end_char": 31165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He admits to have taken ll!llll from the Aligarh Cooperative Bank at a time when Devendra Pal\n\nSingh (PW 20) was the Chairman of the Bank."}}, {"text": "Shashi Bhushan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 31509, "end_char": 31523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next witness is Shashi Bhushan (P.W. 32)."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31559, "end_char": 31569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has been a Member ot Parliament since 1967."}}, {"text": "7th March, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31604, "end_char": 31619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He went to Aligarh on 7th March, 1971, to 'help the appellant in his election."}}, {"text": "Pooran Singh Malan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31669, "end_char": 31687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He met Pooran Singh Malan on 7thMarch, 1971, in Aligarh.", "canonical_name": "Pooran Singh Malan"}}, {"text": "7thMarch, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31691, "end_char": 31705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He met Pooran Singh Malan on 7thMarch, 1971, in Aligarh."}}, {"text": "Agra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31809, "end_char": 31813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He asked him why he was withdrawing from the election since he had read about this in an Agra news paper .called \"Amarujwala\", which, however, has not been produced ."}}, {"text": "Anand Pal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 32728, "end_char": 32737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another witness is Anand Pal (P, W. 10) who attended, according to."}}, {"text": "KaJyan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32864, "end_char": 32876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He deposed to rhe effect that KaJyan Singh was addressing the meeting and Kalyan Singh while addressing the meeting said, \"he had got Pooran Singh Malan to withdraw'', so that all Hindus could unite to vote for a Hindu.", "canonical_name": "Kalya11 Singh"}}, {"text": "Kalyan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32908, "end_char": 32920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He deposed to rhe effect that KaJyan Singh was addressing the meeting and Kalyan Singh while addressing the meeting said, \"he had got Pooran Singh Malan to withdraw'', so that all Hindus could unite to vote for a Hindu.", "canonical_name": "Kalya11 Singh"}}, {"text": "Gajendra Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 33478, "end_char": 33492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendra Singh (P.W. 18) is another witness to depose about the withdrawal of Malan amongst other things."}}, {"text": "s.K.D. Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33605, "end_char": 33617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He is a member .:if s.K.D. Party and was a polling agent of Mrs. Gyatri Devi (wife of Sri Charan Singh) in 1967."}}, {"text": "Gyatri Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33650, "end_char": 33661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He is a member .:if s.K.D. Party and was a polling agent of Mrs. Gyatri Devi (wife of Sri Charan Singh) in 1967."}}, {"text": "Kishan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 33938, "end_char": 33950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kishan Singh (P.W. 23) also deposed that he was present in a meeting at Iglas on /th March, 1971 and he heard Jogendra Pal Singh, election agent <>f\n\nthe first respondent, speaking in the meeting to the cf!ect, among•t -0lher things, \"that Malan had bce.n made to withdraw and votes should\n\nnow go to Shastri who was of Charan Singh's party\"."}}, {"text": "Iglas", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34010, "end_char": 34015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kishan Singh (P.W. 23) also deposed that he was present in a meeting at Iglas on /th March, 1971 and he heard Jogendra Pal Singh, election agent <>f\n\nthe first respondent, speaking in the meeting to the cf!ect, among•t -0lher things, \"that Malan had bce.n made to withdraw and votes should\n\nnow go to Shastri who was of Charan Singh's party\"."}}, {"text": "Jogendra Pal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34048, "end_char": 34066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kishan Singh (P.W. 23) also deposed that he was present in a meeting at Iglas on /th March, 1971 and he heard Jogendra Pal Singh, election agent <>f\n\nthe first respondent, speaking in the meeting to the cf!ect, among•t -0lher things, \"that Malan had bce.n made to withdraw and votes should\n\nnow go to Shastri who was of Charan Singh's party\".", "canonical_name": "Yogendra Pal Singh"}}, {"text": "Ram Das Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 34396, "end_char": 34409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Das Singh (P.W. 19) was also examined with reference to this charge."}}, {"text": "Virendra Varma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 34652, "end_char": 34666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the side of the respondents, the allegaticJts have been denied by Virendra Varma (R.W. 7) and also by Mahendra Singh (R.W. 3)."}}, {"text": "Mahendra Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 34688, "end_char": 34702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the side of the respondents, the allegaticJts have been denied by Virendra Varma (R.W. 7) and also by Mahendra Singh (R.W. 3)."}}, {"text": "18th November, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35511, "end_char": 35530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another petition was also filed by the appellant on 18th November, 1971, for examination of Pooran Singh Malan (respondent No."}}, {"text": "9th November, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35718, "end_char": 35736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court rejected the prayer on the ground that his name did not figure in the list of witnesses supplied on 9th November, 1971."}}, {"text": "Malan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35744, "end_char": 35749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since Malan is a respondent, who on the proof of the averments could have been named under section 99, the appellant cannot mnke.", "canonical_name": "Malan"}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35829, "end_char": 35839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36143, "end_char": 36157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sapera", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36286, "end_char": 36292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TI1e allegations are that on 7th March, 1971, two days before the poll, the first respondent visited the village of Sapera and after collecting a number of Hindus at the chaupal of the Sarpanch, Hukum Singh, went, along with them to the Muslim quarter of the village and by means of F 'threats forced the Muslim voters of that place to swear by the Quran that they would vote for him and not for the appellant or any other candidate."}}, {"text": "Raghubir\n\nSingh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 36856, "end_char": 36871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesres examined by the appellant for establishing this charge arc Raghubir\n\nSingh (PW 11), Rafiq (PW 14) and Shcodan Singh (PW 15)."}}, {"text": "Rafiq", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 36881, "end_char": 36886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesres examined by the appellant for establishing this charge arc Raghubir\n\nSingh (PW 11), Rafiq (PW 14) and Shcodan Singh (PW 15)."}}, {"text": "Shcodan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 36899, "end_char": 36912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesres examined by the appellant for establishing this charge arc Raghubir\n\nSingh (PW 11), Rafiq (PW 14) and Shcodan Singh (PW 15)."}}, {"text": "Giraj Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 37819, "end_char": 37830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A by the evidence of the first respondent, R.W. 1, Giraj Singh and R.W. 8 Harl Singh, the polling agent of the first respondent."}}, {"text": "Harl Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 37842, "end_char": 37852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A by the evidence of the first respondent, R.W. 1, Giraj Singh and R.W. 8 Harl Singh, the polling agent of the first respondent."}}, {"text": "Tuey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38200, "end_char": 38204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tuey refer to a number of meetings held at various places, namely, Gordha, lglas, Jatari, Gaghana and Beswa, on 7-3-1971 and 8-3-1971, at whiclJ speeches were made either by the first respondent or by his agents and supporters."}}, {"text": "Gordha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38267, "end_char": 38273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tuey refer to a number of meetings held at various places, namely, Gordha, lglas, Jatari, Gaghana and Beswa, on 7-3-1971 and 8-3-1971, at whiclJ speeches were made either by the first respondent or by his agents and supporters."}}, {"text": "lglas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38275, "end_char": 38280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tuey refer to a number of meetings held at various places, namely, Gordha, lglas, Jatari, Gaghana and Beswa, on 7-3-1971 and 8-3-1971, at whiclJ speeches were made either by the first respondent or by his agents and supporters."}}, {"text": "Jatari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38282, "end_char": 38288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tuey refer to a number of meetings held at various places, namely, Gordha, lglas, Jatari, Gaghana and Beswa, on 7-3-1971 and 8-3-1971, at whiclJ speeches were made either by the first respondent or by his agents and supporters."}}, {"text": "Gaghana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38290, "end_char": 38297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tuey refer to a number of meetings held at various places, namely, Gordha, lglas, Jatari, Gaghana and Beswa, on 7-3-1971 and 8-3-1971, at whiclJ speeches were made either by the first respondent or by his agents and supporters."}}, {"text": "Beswa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38302, "end_char": 38307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tuey refer to a number of meetings held at various places, namely, Gordha, lglas, Jatari, Gaghana and Beswa, on 7-3-1971 and 8-3-1971, at whiclJ speeches were made either by the first respondent or by his agents and supporters."}}, {"text": "7-3-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38312, "end_char": 38320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tuey refer to a number of meetings held at various places, namely, Gordha, lglas, Jatari, Gaghana and Beswa, on 7-3-1971 and 8-3-1971, at whiclJ speeches were made either by the first respondent or by his agents and supporters."}}, {"text": "8-3-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38325, "end_char": 38333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tuey refer to a number of meetings held at various places, namely, Gordha, lglas, Jatari, Gaghana and Beswa, on 7-3-1971 and 8-3-1971, at whiclJ speeches were made either by the first respondent or by his agents and supporters."}}, {"text": "Gordha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38668, "end_char": 38674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meeting at Gordha :\n\nThe allegations are that on 7th March."}}, {"text": "Kalyan.Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38775, "end_char": 38787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1971, in village Gordha in the afternoon at weekly bazar, Kalyan.", "canonical_name": "Kalya11 Singh"}}, {"text": "Shivaji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39153, "end_char": 39160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He posed a question that you are the descendants of Shivaji and Rana Pratap and you should see that the butcher miyan (i.e. the petitioner) is defeated."}}, {"text": "Rana Pratap", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39165, "end_char": 39176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He posed a question that you are the descendants of Shivaji and Rana Pratap and you should see that the butcher miyan (i.e. the petitioner) is defeated."}}, {"text": "Aligarh city", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39881, "end_char": 39893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "petition that \"the first respondent was also present from the very beginning at the meeting and he also addressed the gathering supporting Kalyan Singh and requested them to vote for hi!ll as he was a Hindu and that they should not vote for the petitfoner who was a Muslim butcher, whose members of the community butchered the_ innocent Hindus and looted their properties in Aligarh city\"."}}, {"text": "Kcsho Deo Haryana", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 39944, "end_char": 39961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To establish the charge the appellant examined Kcsho Deo Haryana (PW 6), Khacheru Lal (PW 8), Subcdar Singh\n\n(PW 9) and Anand Pal (PW 10); The first respondent examined himself (RW 14), Nern Singh Chauhan-(RW 5) and Jaipal Sineh\n\n(RW 6)."}}, {"text": "Khacheru Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 39970, "end_char": 39982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To establish the charge the appellant examined Kcsho Deo Haryana (PW 6), Khacheru Lal (PW 8), Subcdar Singh\n\n(PW 9) and Anand Pal (PW 10); The first respondent examined himself (RW 14), Nern Singh Chauhan-(RW 5) and Jaipal Sineh\n\n(RW 6)."}}, {"text": "Subcdar Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 39991, "end_char": 40004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To establish the charge the appellant examined Kcsho Deo Haryana (PW 6), Khacheru Lal (PW 8), Subcdar Singh\n\n(PW 9) and Anand Pal (PW 10); The first respondent examined himself (RW 14), Nern Singh Chauhan-(RW 5) and Jaipal Sineh\n\n(RW 6)."}}, {"text": "Nern Singh Chauhan-(RW", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 40083, "end_char": 40105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To establish the charge the appellant examined Kcsho Deo Haryana (PW 6), Khacheru Lal (PW 8), Subcdar Singh\n\n(PW 9) and Anand Pal (PW 10); The first respondent examined himself (RW 14), Nern Singh Chauhan-(RW 5) and Jaipal Sineh\n\n(RW 6)."}}, {"text": "Jaipal Sineh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 40113, "end_char": 40125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To establish the charge the appellant examined Kcsho Deo Haryana (PW 6), Khacheru Lal (PW 8), Subcdar Singh\n\n(PW 9) and Anand Pal (PW 10); The first respondent examined himself (RW 14), Nern Singh Chauhan-(RW 5) and Jaipal Sineh\n\n(RW 6)."}}, {"text": "Kesho Deo.Haryana", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 40146, "end_char": 40163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 (Kesho Deo."}}, {"text": "Kalyan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40482, "end_char": 40494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "were made by Kalyan Singh and the first respondent at the meeting, he deposed to the following c(fect :-\n\n.", "canonical_name": "Kalya11 Singh"}}, {"text": "Subedar Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41572, "end_char": 41585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 (Subedar Singh) : He states that he attended meetings at Kashipur Power House and at Nawala, but could not remember the dates of these meetings."}}, {"text": "Nawala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 41656, "end_char": 41662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 (Subedar Singh) : He states that he attended meetings at Kashipur Power House and at Nawala, but could not remember the dates of these meetings."}}, {"text": "Bir Pal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41746, "end_char": 41759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although he stated that only Bir Pal Singh made a speech at the Kashipur meeting, he could not reproduce what Bir Pal Singh had said in the course of his speech."}}, {"text": "Kesho Deo Haryana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42000, "end_char": 42017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He gave the same pattern of evidence with regard to the Nawala meeting and could not give any idea about the speech that Kesho Deo Haryana made there."}}, {"text": "Babu Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42291, "end_char": 42299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was asked by Babu Lal, former Chairman of the Municipal Board of Aligarh and an active Congress (R) worker, to give evidence."}}, {"text": "Municipal Board of Aligarh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42324, "end_char": 42350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was asked by Babu Lal, former Chairman of the Municipal Board of Aligarh and an active Congress (R) worker, to give evidence."}}, {"text": "Neem Singh Chauhan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 42587, "end_char": 42605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These allegations have been denied by R. W. 14 (the first respondent), R.W. 5 (Neem Singh Chauhan) and R.W. 6 (Jaipal Singh) F as will appear from their evidence which we have closely examined."}}, {"text": "Jaipal Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 42619, "end_char": 42631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These allegations have been denied by R. W. 14 (the first respondent), R.W. 5 (Neem Singh Chauhan) and R.W. 6 (Jaipal Singh) F as will appear from their evidence which we have closely examined."}}, {"text": "March 7, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42824, "end_char": 42837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meeting at lglas\n\n Thecappellant's case is that a meeting was held at Jglas at the Jawahar Inter College at 8.00 A.M. on March 7, 1971."}}, {"text": "Brij Lal Sharma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 42933, "end_char": 42948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ho examined Gajendra Singh (P.W. 18) and Ram Das Singh (P.W. 19 J, Kishan Singh (P.W. 28) and Brij Lal Sharma (P.W. 31)."}}, {"text": "B.K.D. party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43009, "end_char": 43021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "18 and 19 G were the active workers of the B.K.D. party yet they deposed that on hearing the allegations against Yunus Saleem and the Muslims of Aligarh ."}}, {"text": "Yunus Saleem", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43079, "end_char": 43091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "18 and 19 G were the active workers of the B.K.D. party yet they deposed that on hearing the allegations against Yunus Saleem and the Muslims of Aligarh ."}}, {"text": "Aligarh District Congress Co", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43412, "end_char": 43440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kishan Singh (PW 23) is a member of the Aligarh District Congress Co=ittee and claims to H have gone to the meeting organised by the rival party iµ order to find out what was being said."}}, {"text": "26·8-71", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44378, "end_char": 44385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has observed tl>at \"the unreliability of the petitioner's allegations regarding this alleged Jglas meeting stands further more revealed by the discrepancy between the testimony of these witnesses • and the details given in the statement of further particulars filed by the petitioner on 26·8-71\"."}}, {"text": "Jglas", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 44489, "end_char": 44494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also, disclosed in the further particulars \"that among those who addressed the meeting held in Jglas at 8.00 P.M. on 7-3-1971 was Chaudhary Charan Singh, but none of four witnesst'S deposes to Chaudhary Charan Singh's participation in the meeting and from the statement of Brij Lal Sharma it is clear that Chaudhary Charan Singh did not alt.end it\"."}}, {"text": "Chaudhary Charan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44524, "end_char": 44546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also, disclosed in the further particulars \"that among those who addressed the meeting held in Jglas at 8.00 P.M. on 7-3-1971 was Chaudhary Charan Singh, but none of four witnesst'S deposes to Chaudhary Charan Singh's participation in the meeting and from the statement of Brij Lal Sharma it is clear that Chaudhary Charan Singh did not alt.end it\"."}}, {"text": "Ramesh Chandra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 44787, "end_char": 44801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As against this, we have C the evidence of Ramesh Chandra (R.W. 10) and Virendra Varma (R.W. 7) who deposed denying the allegaticins."}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44937, "end_char": 44941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Virendra Varma (R.W. 7) who was then the Home Minister of U.P. frankly admitted that he had been to Iglas on 7-3·1971 in order to meet the B.K.D. workers of those places and not hold any public meeting or to make any electioneering speeches."}}, {"text": "7-3·1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44988, "end_char": 44996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Virendra Varma (R.W. 7) who was then the Home Minister of U.P. frankly admitted that he had been to Iglas on 7-3·1971 in order to meet the B.K.D. workers of those places and not hold any public meeting or to make any electioneering speeches."}}, {"text": "Jatari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45353, "end_char": 45359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meetings at Jatari, Gabhana and Beswa : It is also alleged in the further -particulars filed by the appellant in the High Court on 26-8-1971 that a meeting was held at Jatari at 10.00 E A, M. on 7-3-1971."}}, {"text": "Gabhana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45361, "end_char": 45368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meetings at Jatari, Gabhana and Beswa : It is also alleged in the further -particulars filed by the appellant in the High Court on 26-8-1971 that a meeting was held at Jatari at 10.00 E A, M. on 7-3-1971."}}, {"text": "Beswa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45373, "end_char": 45378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meetings at Jatari, Gabhana and Beswa : It is also alleged in the further -particulars filed by the appellant in the High Court on 26-8-1971 that a meeting was held at Jatari at 10.00 E A, M. on 7-3-1971."}}, {"text": "26-8-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45472, "end_char": 45481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meetings at Jatari, Gabhana and Beswa : It is also alleged in the further -particulars filed by the appellant in the High Court on 26-8-1971 that a meeting was held at Jatari at 10.00 E A, M. on 7-3-1971."}}, {"text": "Bed Vir Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 45569, "end_char": 45582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeilant examined Bed Vir Singh (P.W. 16) ' and Govardhan Singh (P.W. 17) to establish the allegations with regard to the."}}, {"text": "Govardhan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 45599, "end_char": 45614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeilant examined Bed Vir Singh (P.W. 16) ' and Govardhan Singh (P.W. 17) to establish the allegations with regard to the."}}, {"text": "Pal Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 45726, "end_char": 45735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "speeches made by Mahendra Singh (R.W. 3), YC@Cndra\n\nPal Singh and Virendra Varma (R.W. 7)."}}, {"text": "Gabha:ia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45799, "end_char": 45807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was also another meeting at Gabha:ia Village at 11.00 A.M. on 8-3-1971 at , which speeches were said to have been ma.de by the first respondent and Prakuh Vir Shastri, Genenl Secretary of the B.K.D. The appellant's F witnesses with regard to this meeting are Raj Kumar Sini; h (P.W. 24), Ombir Singh (P.W. 25), 01etanyn Raj Singh (P.W. 26) am!"}}, {"text": "Prakuh Vir Shastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45919, "end_char": 45937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was also another meeting at Gabha:ia Village at 11.00 A.M. on 8-3-1971 at , which speeches were said to have been ma.de by the first respondent and Prakuh Vir Shastri, Genenl Secretary of the B.K.D. The appellant's F witnesses with regard to this meeting are Raj Kumar Sini; h (P.W. 24), Ombir Singh (P.W. 25), 01etanyn Raj Singh (P.W. 26) am!", "canonical_name": "Prakash Vir Shastri"}}, {"text": "Raj Kumar Sini", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 46030, "end_char": 46044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was also another meeting at Gabha:ia Village at 11.00 A.M. on 8-3-1971 at , which speeches were said to have been ma.de by the first respondent and Prakuh Vir Shastri, Genenl Secretary of the B.K.D. The appellant's F witnesses with regard to this meeting are Raj Kumar Sini; h (P.W. 24), Ombir Singh (P.W. 25), 01etanyn Raj Singh (P.W. 26) am!"}}, {"text": "Ombir Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 46059, "end_char": 46070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was also another meeting at Gabha:ia Village at 11.00 A.M. on 8-3-1971 at , which speeches were said to have been ma.de by the first respondent and Prakuh Vir Shastri, Genenl Secretary of the B.K.D. The appellant's F witnesses with regard to this meeting are Raj Kumar Sini; h (P.W. 24), Ombir Singh (P.W. 25), 01etanyn Raj Singh (P.W. 26) am!"}}, {"text": "01etanyn Raj Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 46082, "end_char": 46100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was also another meeting at Gabha:ia Village at 11.00 A.M. on 8-3-1971 at , which speeches were said to have been ma.de by the first respondent and Prakuh Vir Shastri, Genenl Secretary of the B.K.D. The appellant's F witnesses with regard to this meeting are Raj Kumar Sini; h (P.W. 24), Ombir Singh (P.W. 25), 01etanyn Raj Singh (P.W. 26) am!"}}, {"text": "Dev Dutta Bhardwaj", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 46115, "end_char": 46133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dev Dutta Bhardwaj (P.W. 29)."}}, {"text": "fodh Pal Sil!lh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 46241, "end_char": 46256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To refute allegations made by these witnesses, the first respondent examined himself (R.W. 14), fodh Pal Sil!lh (R.W .. Jl) and Raghunath Prasad Sharma (R.W.\n\n12)."}}, {"text": "Raghunath Prasad Sharma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 46273, "end_char": 46296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To refute allegations made by these witnesses, the first respondent examined himself (R.W. 14), fodh Pal Sil!lh (R.W .. Jl) and Raghunath Prasad Sharma (R.W.\n\n12)."}}, {"text": "Gi Y otmdra Pal Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 46442, "end_char": 46463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A meeting was also held, according to the appellant, in tbe village of Beswa <'n 8-3-1971 at 12.30 P.M. at whicb Pooran Singh Malan, Gi Y otmdra Pal Singh and Virendra Varma are said to have made\n\nobje<.'tiooable spc.ecbcs."}}, {"text": "Radha Raman Dhwaj Prasad Sin)!h", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 46610, "end_char": 46641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Evidence was led by the appellant\" with regard to this meeting by examining Radha Raman Dhwaj Prasad Sin)!h (P.W. 21) and Harcbaran Lal (i'."}}, {"text": "Harcbaran Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 46656, "end_char": 46669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Evidence was led by the appellant\" with regard to this meeting by examining Radha Raman Dhwaj Prasad Sin)!h (P.W. 21) and Harcbaran Lal (i'."}}, {"text": "Virendra Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 46710, "end_char": 46724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Virendra Varma (R.W. 7) and Virendra Singh (R.W. 9) denied the allegations."}}, {"text": "section 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48088, "end_char": 48100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48996, "end_char": 49010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_74_83_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "SAWAL DAS\n\nSTAT);: OF BIHAR\n\nJanuary 9, 1974\n\n[M. H. BEG AND P. N. BHAGWATI, JJ.J\n\nIndian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), s. 34 and 302-Circun1sta11tial evicknce- Accusedchargedunders. 302/34-When accused1nay be convicted unders. 302, when the others are acquitted under s. 302/34-0./Jence under s. 201-Sentence.\n\nEvidence Act (1 of 1872) Ss. 103and106-Scape of\n\nThe appellant is the husband of the deceased. The evidence in the case established that, the relations between .the deceased and her mother-in-law; were very strained; that, on the morning of the murder following a quarrel between them the appellant went with his wife, the deceased, into a room, into which his father and mother then followed; that, immediately thereafter, cries of the murdered woman were heard to save her from being killed; and, that, a little while later, the appellant and his father conveyed the dead body of the deceased and disposed it of: by burning it at the burning ghat without informing the relations of the deceased who were Jiving in the town and without performing any funeral rites.\n\nOn this evidence, rejecting the appellant's contention that the deceased died accidentally of injuries caused by fire, the trial court convicted the appeJlant, his father; and mother for offences under s. 302/34 I. P. C. The trial court also con. victed the appellant and his father under s. 201, J, P. C.\n\nOn appeal, the High Court acquitted them of the offence under s. 302/34 I. P. C. but found the appellant alone guilty of the oftCnce under s. 302 J. P. C.\n\nThe High Court also found the appellant and his father guilty under s. 201 I. P._C. and passed a sentence of three years against the father. No separate sentence on the appellant was passed in view of the sentence of life imprisonment for the offence under s. 302. '\n\nIn appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : (Q The evidence regarding death by burning consisted 1nostly of rumours and beliefs. It was clearly hearsay and was rightly excluded by the lower courts.\n\n(2) Under Ss. 103 and 106, Evidence Act, the burden of proving such a plea specifically set up by an accused, which n1ay absolve hin1 from criminal liability, lies upon him; though, the quantum of evidence by which he may succeed in discharging the burden, may be lower than the burdcil'resting upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The best evidence would have been that of a doctor who could have been called by the appellant on his phone, but no doctor was called. [79BJ\n\n(3) But, neither the application of s. 103 nor of s. 106, Evidence Act, could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It is only \\Vhen the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or, which makes out a prima facie case that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. [79D]\n\n(4) In the present case, after the acquittal of the appellant's father and 1nother for murder under Ss. 302/34, I. P. C., the individual liability of the appellant has to be established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under s. 302 J.P. C. simp/iciter.- There is nothing in the present case which could fasten or conclusively fix the li:ability for any particular or separate act of the appellant which may be said to have caused his wife's death.\n\n[79H]\n\nK. G. Patilv. State of Maharashtra, [1964] I S.C.R. 678, Solian Lal v. State of U. P., [1971] l S.C, C. 498 and Yashwant anil Ors. v. Stare of Maharashtra, [1973J I S.C; R. 291, followed.\n\n(5) Further, the prosecution has not examined an important witness namely,. the maid servant, who was on the varandah at the time of the occurrence. Her evidence was necessar1 for unfolding the prosecution case and hence, the prosecution should not have withheld her evidence whatever may be its effect upon the ca5e. The appellant could, there ask the Court to give him the benefit of the presumption under s. 114 illus_tration (g), Evidence act and to infer that, if she had been produced, her evidence would have damaged the prosecution case agait the appellant. Her statement under s. 164, Cr. P. C., could only be used as evidence to corroborate or contradict her if she had appeared as a witness at the trial, and could not be relied upoii by the prosecution. [80 G, H]\n\nStephan Sneviratne v. The King. A.I.R. 1936 P. C. 289, 300, referred to.\n\n(6) Therefore, although it must be held that the deceased was murdered it was not possible to find conclusively that the person who could have throttled or done some other act which actually killed the deceased was the appellant and not his father or mother.\n\n(7) So far as the case of disposal of the body by the appelfant was concerned the circun1stantial evidence \\Vas rightly believed and held to be conclusive by both the Courts below. [82G]\n\n(8) As regards sentence, the appeUant deserves the n1aximum sentence that can be imposed under s. 201, I. P. C. A distinction between the case of the appel'- Jant and his father, as regards sentence is justified because; (a) It was the duty of the appellant as a husband to have done something to protect his wife even if fl is assumed for the sake of argument, that the actual death may have been brought about by the acts of others, and, (b) the appellant had taken a leading part in dis~ posing of the body of the murdered woman. [83BJ\n\nCRnUML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 70' 1972.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 16th September, 1971 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No .. 90 of 1968.\n\nA. N. Mui/a, S. N. Misra, S. S. Jauhar and Sud/la Misra, for the appellant.\n\nR. C. Prasad, for the respondent.\n\nF The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n~-.\n\nBEG, J.-The appellant before us by special leave, Sawal Das, hiS' father Jamuna Prasad, and his stepmother Ka!awati Devi, were charged with Offences punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code simpliciter on the allegation that they had intentionally caused the\n\ndeath of Smt. Chanda Devi, the wife of the appellant, on 28-5-1965,. in their house in Mohalla Andi Gola, in Muzaffarpur, in Bihar. The appellant Sawal Das, his father Jamuna Prasad, their motor driver Sita Ram, and eight other persons were charged under Section 20!\n\nIndian Penal Code for having caused the disappearance of the body of Smt.- Chanda Devi with a view to concealing the murder. Furthermore, Smt. Kalawati Devi was charged under Section 302/109 Indian Penal Code for having instigated the murder of Chanda Devi. The Trial Court had amended and converted the charges against the appellant and Jamuna Prasad and Kalawati Devi into those under Sections 302/34 Indian Penal Code and convicted each of them with the aid of Section 34 Indian Penal Code for the offence of murder and sentenced\n\nthem to life imprisonment. Jt had also convicted the appellant and his father under Section 201 Indian Penal Code, but it did not pass separate sentences against them for this offence. The driver Site Ram was also convicted under Section 201 Indian Penal Code and sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment. It acquitted all the other accused persons. On appeal, the High Court of Patna had acquitted the appellant, his father, and his step-mother of offences punishable under Section 302/34 Indian Penal Code, but it found the appellant alone guilty of an offence punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code simpliciter and sentenced him to life imprisonment. It had also found the appellant and his father guilty under Section 201 Indian Penal Code, but, while passing a sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment on Jamuna Prasad, it had not passed a separate sentence on the appellant in view of his conviction under Section 302 Indian Penal Code. It had allowed appeals of Kalawati Devi and Sita Ram and acquitted them.\n\nThe whole case against the appellant depends upon circumstantial evidence. There is no eye witness of the murder which was alleged to have 'been committed by the appellant, his father, and step-mother conjointly on the morning of 28-5-1965 at about 8.00 a.m. The Sessions Judge had relied upon the following proved facts and circums- D lances to convict the three accused persons of murder under Sections 302/34 Indian Penal Code :\n\nI. The relations between Sm!. Chanda Devi and her step-motherin-law, Smt. Kalawati Devi, who were living in the same house with their respective husbands and children, were strained so that there were\n\nfrequent quarrels between them.\n\n2. The appellant as well as his father Jamuna Prasad used to take the side of Smt. Kalawati in the quarrels between the murdered wife and her mother-in-law.\n\n3. On the morning of the murder, there was a particularly sharp quarrel between the deceased and Sm!. Kalawati so that Smt. Kalawati, who was living in a room adjoining that of Smt. Chanda DeYi on the first floor of the house, called out to the appellant that his \"rascal wife\" was quarrelling with her and informed him as well as Jamuna that either she or Chanda Devi will live in the house henceforth.\n\n4. The appellant and his father Jamuna Prasad went upstairs to the Verandah where the quarrel was taking place and the appellant took or pushed Chanda Devi inside her room followed by the appellant'• father and his step-mother.\n\n5 .. I1nn1ediatc1y after that, cries of atleast \"Bachao\" ~~Bachao \", were heard from inside the room. No body heard the voice of Smt.\n\nChanda Devi after that.\n\n5. Immediately after these cries, the children of Chanda Del'i wer eard crying and uttering words. indicating that their mother was either being killed or had been killed.\n\nSAWAL DAS v. BlllAR (Beg, I.) 77\n\n7. A short while after that, the appellant and his father Jamuna Prasad were seen bringing a gunny bag with the help of their driver,\n\nSita Ram, and another person, and keeping it in the luggage boot of the car which had been brought there by the driver.\n\n8. The car, containing the body of the deceased Chanda Devi, was driven fast and taken to what is known as Pahleza-Ghat, 50 miles away, to be burnt there at night. The car was shown to have crossed\n\nSonepur Bridge at 9.00 p.m.\n\n9. The relations of the deceased Smt. Chanda Devi, who were Jiving in the town, were not at all informed by the appellant or other members of his family, that she had died either naturally or accidentally.\n\n10. No persons who usually performed the funeral rites in the family were shown to have been informed and there was no funeral procession of the usual kind. But, some of those related to the appellant, who were co-accused for the offence of illegal disposal of the body, were said to have followed in a truck.\n\n11. Some blood, which was said to have distintegrated so much that its origin could not be determined, was shown to have been scraped from the boot of the car as well as from inside the car.\n\nThe Trial Court had come to the conclusion that, upon the estab- Jished circumstances listed above, no other inference was left open to the Court except that the appellant and his father and step-mother had conjointly committed the murder of the deceased Smt. Chanda Devi on the morning of 28-5-1965 and that the appellant and his father had then hastily and stealthily disposed of the body in order to oonceal the commission of the offence. It had also taken into account, in coming to this conclusion, the fact that the appellant had unsuccessfully set up a plea, in his written statement, that Smt. Chanda Devi, who was alleged by him to be wearing a Nylon Saree, said to have caught fire accidentally while she was using a Kerosene stove in her room, died of extensive burns on her body and collapsed. The appellant had alleged that Smt. Chanda Devi was debilitated and kept a bad health due to frequent pregnancies and was also sufferini: from Asthma, a weak heart, and abdominal complaints. She had given birth to six children.\n\nThe Trial Court observed that no Doctor was called in to substantiate the appellant's plea. Furthermore, it pointed out that, as a highly qualified Doctor, Dr. G. B. Sahai, had deposed, normally death would not take place immediately as a result of accidental burning of the kind alleged by the appellant and that there would have been evidence of rolling on the ground or other acts of the deceased in attempts\n\nto save herself in such an event. The Trial Court had also believed the evidence of the relations of .Chanda Devi that she was enjoying good health so that the bare assertions of the appellant that 'he had a weak heart could not be accept<d. It also observed that no burnt pieces of cloth or marks of smoke or soot on the walls or roof of the room in which Smt. Chanda Devi had admittedly died were shown to exist.\n\nLearned Counsel for the appellant drew our attention to a numb\" A of pieces of evidence, such as a boil on the finger of Jamuna multiple\n\nirregular areas of suspected burns, varying from l\" to 1/3\", in length and half inch to 3/4\" in width, on the lower third of right fore-arm. ulnar side, of the appellant, when he was examined by Dr. 1. Nath -On 2-6-1965, the statement by a witness that he saw some smoke comine .out of the house at the time of the alleged murder, the rumour of her <leath by burning mentioned by several witnesses, which found a B .Place in the information sent to the Police on 30-5-1965 by Lallu\n\nPrasad, P.W. 28, a relation of the murdered wife, and into another written information given by Hawaldar Gorakhnath Singh, P.W.3, at the Police Station, on 28-5-1965, and other similar bits of information and belief deposed to by witnesses.\n\nSo far as the information dated f30-5-1965 (Ex. 17) treated as c F.I.R. by the Police, or the information given by Gorakhnath Singh .on 28-5-1965, which, according to the appellant, ought to be treated .1s a First Information Report, and other pieces of information and belief given by the witnesses are concerned, it is clear that these are based on hear-say which was rightly excluded. The Trial Court pointed out that the appellant and other members of his family were the sources of these false rumou1s circulated by them so as to protect D themselves against an accusation for murder. We, therefore, attach no importance whatsoever either to the document which the prosecution or the one which the appellant placed before us as the First Infor- 1nation Report. These contain nothing more than rumour and hearsay because those who could have reported the commission of an offence were actually the offenders interested in concealing its com- 1nission and misdirecting investigation.\n\nAs regards the burns on the body of the appellant, the Trial Court Tightly pointed out that the Doctor had stated on 2-6-1965 that they were 3 or 4 days old. They were not shown to be connected with <iny attempt to extinguish a fire which could have burnt Smt. Chanda Devi. The best evidence in such a case could have been that of a Doctor who, as the High Court pointed out, shCJLi!d have been call<tl }' but was not called despite the fact that there was a telephone in the 'house. ·\n\nWe think that the burden of proving the plea that Smt. CI1anJa Devi died in the manner alleged by the appellant lay upon the appellant. This is clear from the provisions of Sections 103 and 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. Both the Trial Court and the High Court had rightly pointed out that the appellant had miserably failed to gi•e G , credible or substantial evidence of any facts or circumstances which .could support the plea that Smt. Chanda Devi met her death because her Nylon Saree had accidentally caught fire from a kerosene stove.\n\nThe Trial Court had rightly observed that the mere fact that some witnesses had seen some smoke emerging from the room, with a kitchen nearby at a time when food was likely to be cooked, could not indicate 11 ihat Smt. Chanda Devi's saree had caught fire. Neither the murdered woman nor the appeHant nor any member of his family was shown t0 have run about or called for help against a fire.\n\nA Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that Section 106 o( the Evidenee Act could not be called in aid by the prosecution\n\nbecause that section applies only where a fact relating to the actual commission of the offence is within the special knowledge of the accused, such as the circumstances in which or the intention with which an accused did a particular act alleged to constitute an offence. The\n\nlanguage of Section 106 Evidence Act does not, in our opinion, warrant putting such a narrow construction upon it. This Court held in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab(!), that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him. It is a different matter that the quantum of evidence by which he may succeed in discharging his burden of creating a reasonable belief, that circumstance absolving c him from criminal liability may have existed, is lower than the burden resting upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. ·\n\nNeither an application of Section 103 nor of 106 of the Evidence Act could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. Tt is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or, which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. The , crucial question in the case before us is : as the prosecution discharged its initial or general alld primary burden of proving the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt? ·\n\nE Perhaps the Trial Court had adopted a more logical course upon facts and circumstances indicating that the appellant was one of the three persons whose conjoint actions had, on the morning of 28-5-1965, ..... resulted in the death of Smt. Chanda Devi. It may be that the appe- Hant was the primary or the main actor in the actual commission of the murder after his step-mother had sought his aid in what appeared\n\nF to be an appeal to him by her to teach his wife a lesson so that she may not be trou1>lcd by her any more. But, the effect of the finding that the appellant went into the room from which the cries of the murdered woman, to save her from being killed, came immediately afterwards, is diluted by the evidence that Jamuna Prasad and Smt.\n\nKalawati had followed him.· The High Court's view could perhaps find some support from the fact that Jamuna Prasad was seen paci\n\nG fying and rebuking the children outside while the appellant may have been dealing with his wife in a manner which brought about her death, But, all this is a matter of conjecture. Lurking but not un-reasonable\n\n.t doubts and suspicions seem to us to envelope and assail the prose . cution case atleast after Jamuna Prasad and Smt. Kalawati have been acquitted. As the learned counsel for. the appellant has rightly pointed out, after the acquittal of Kalawati and Jamuna Prasad for\n\nH murder, by the use of Section 34 Indian Penal Code, the individual and not the conjoint liability of the appellant has to be established by the prosecution before the appellant could be convicted under\n\n(l) A.LR. 19S6 S.C. 460. .. ~\n\nSection 302 Indian Penal Code simpliciter. Beyond the fact that the appellant is the husband of the murdered wife, who might be ordin.arily expected to take te ini'.iative in .teahing her a lesson, especially when Smt. Kalawati had mvoked his aid, and a possibly natural reluctance of a normal father-in-Jaw to take the initiative or a leading role in such a matter, both of which could be matters of conjecture or presumptjon only, there is nothing which could fasten or conclusively fix the liability for any particular or separate act of the appellant which may be mid to have caused his wife's death.\n\nWe find that the High Court had not dealt with the question whether a distinction could be made between the case of the appellant on the one hand and his father Jamuna Prasad and his step-mother Kala wati on the other quite satisfactorily, so far as the offence of murder\n\nis concerned. Nevertheless, we may have agreed with its conclusion, C on the evidence on record, that the appellant alone was liable for the murder of his wife Smt. Chanda Devi and we may not have disturbed its finding of fact but for another feature of the case which stares one in the face. We proceed now to deal with this feature.\n\nEven if, as the Trial Court and the High Court had correctly held, there is admissible and credible evidence of five witnesses, Ganesh D Prasod, P.W. 1, Nand Kishore, P.W. 2, Radhey Shyam Sharma, P.W.9, Laxmi Narain, PW. 16, and Basdeo Prasad, P.W. 27, who are said to have heard or watched from outside, from varying distances, Of what was going on in the Verandah, no eye witness was produced who could prove what actually took place inside the room where the murder was committed. The only evidence given of what could have taken place inside the room was the cry of \"Bachao Bachao\" although there is E some understandable variation between accounts of witnesses as to whether the murdered woman also uttered some more words showing that she was being actually killed. We also agree with the view that the evidence of witnesses about what the children said or did at that time is admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act. In view of some evidence in the case that the appellant's children had refrained from revealing any facts against the appellant or his father or his step- F mother, when they were questioned by relations or by the Police, it could be urged that there was no point in producing the children.\n\nThe Court could also have rightly decided, in such circumstances. not to exan1ine them under Section 540 Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nBut, there is no explanation even attempted to sho\\v why the Maid servant, Geeta Kurmini, who, according to the pros:::cution case, was also in the Verandah at the time of the occurrence, was not produced G at the Trial although her statement was recorded under Section 164 Criminal Procedure Code and was brought on the record (Ex. 12).\n\nThis tatement could only be used as evidence to corroborate or contradict Geeta Kurmini if she had appeared as a witness at the trial.\n\nThe appellant could, therefore, quite reasonably ask the Court to give him the benefit of the optional presumption under Section 114 illustration (g) of the Evidence Act and lo infer that, if she had been pro- H duced, it would have damaged the nrosccution case against the appellant. Her statement, if it had been there as evidence in the case, may very well have shown that it was Jamuna who was taking the leading\n\n'I.'\n\nSAWAL DAS V. BillAR (Beg, /.) 81\n\npart in bringing about the death of Smt. Chanda Devi. There ·is some evidence in the case as to the kind of man Jamuna was. It shows that he was not a naturally kind or gentle or amiable individual liked by people. The normal inhibitions of a father-in-law with regard to his daughter-in-law, which learned Counsel for the State emphasized so much, may not really be there at all in this case. Indeed, we think that, in the circumstances of the case, Geeta Kurmini, the maid servant,. was a witnessessential to the unfolding of the prosecution case. Her evidence could not be withheld by the prosecution whatever may be its effect upon the case.\n\nWe think that the principle laid down by Privy --Couneilin Stephen Sneviratne v. the king (1 ), with regard to such a witnes, is applicable here. It was observed there (at page 300):\n\n\"Their Lordships do not desire to lay down any rules to fetter discretion on a matter such as this was is so dependent on the particular circumstances of each case. Still less do they desire to discourage the utmost candour and fairness on the part of those conducting prosecutions; but, at the same time they cannot, speaking generally, approve of an idea that a prosecution must call witnesses irrespective of considerations of number and of reliability, or that a prosecution ought to discharge the functions both of prosecution and defence. If it does so, confusion is very apt to result and never is it more likely to result than if the prosecution calls witnesses and then proceeds almost automatically to discredit them by cross-examination. Witnesses essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution is based, must, of course, .be called by the prosecution, whether in the result the effect of their testimony is for or against the case for the prosecution\". '\n\nMr. Mulla, appearing for the appellant, has also drawn our attention to K.G. Patil V. State of Maharashtra (2). This Court held there that, when two out of three accused persons, each having been charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 Indian Panel Code, were acquitted, it must be assumed that the two acquitted persons did not participate in the commission of the offence at all. It is contented that the natural result of this view is that the 'P\"rticular act of the individual accused which brought about the death of the murdered person must be established beyond doubt before he is singly and separately convicted under Section 302 Indian Penal Code simpliciter.\n\nOur attention was also invited to Soha11 Lal v. State of U.P.,(3} where it was held by this Court that in the absence of evidence to show which act of the accused caused the death of the murdered man, it would neither be proper to convict the accused person. under Seciion 302 Indian Penal Code simpliciter nor under Section 302 read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code, when the High Court bad acquitted the co-accused of charges under Section 302 read with Section .34 Indian Penal Code, and the State had not appealed against the acquittal.\n\n(I) A1R 1936 P. C. 289 @ 300. (2)\n\n[1964] (I) SCR 678.\n\n(3)\n\n[1971] (I) S. C. C. 491.\n\nIn the case before us, the High Court had actually altered the con-\n\nA .. , viction of the appellant from one under Sections 302/34 I.P.C. to one under Section 302 I.P.C. thereby implying that he was not guilty of any offence under Section 302/34 I.P.C.\n\nIt is true that this Court explained, in Yashwant & Ors. V. State of Maharashtra, (1) that the appli •. cability of Section 34 I.P.C. to a case depends upon the particular facts and circumstances <lf the case. Therefore, we have to scrutinize and pronounce upon the particular facts of the case before us.\n\nWe think that, upon the facts of this case, there could be a reason able doubt as to whether Section 34 l.P.C. could be applied to conrict any of the three accused persons of murder. After excluding the application of Section 34 I.P.C. to the case, the evidence does not also appear to us to prove conclusively that the appellant must have either throttled the deceased or done some other act, quite apart c from the acts of his father and step-mother, which brought about the death. This result follows from the totality of evidence and the pre-\n\numption from the non-production of Geeta Kurmini whiclt destroys the value of the evidence which weighed so much with the High Court, that the appellant was doing something like pushing or taking the murdered woman inside her room at the time when she was last seen alive.\n\nThe Trial Court and the High Court relying on the evidence of some bleeding of the body of the deceased, admitted by the appellant to have been carried in the car to the burning ghat, and the absence of evidence of death caused by burning, came to the condusion that the appellant must have throttled the deceased. This was pure conjecture after eliminating the defence case of burning by E accident. If it had been a case of throttling only, it would be difficult to explain the cries of murdered woman for help which were heard by wit\n\nnesses on the road unless we assume that the murdered woman cried out, as she may have done, before the hands which choked her were -..._j placed on her throat. Therefore, although we may hold, as we do, that this must be a case of murder, it is not possible for us to find condusively that it was a case of throttling and of nothing else or that the F person who could have throttled or done some other act which actually .killed the deceased was the appellant and not his father or step-mother.\n\nSo far as the case of quick disposal of the body by the appellant is concerned, the circumstancial evidence was rightly believed and held to be conclusive by both the Courts below. This evidence was too damaging to admit of any doubt that the appellant took the leading G part in doing away with the remains of the body of his wife after site had been murdered. The Trial Court and the High Court, while maintaining the appellant's conviction under Section 201 Indian Penal Code, \\ had not fixed l>is sentence. It was urged by Mr. Mulla before us that the appellant should not be given more than three years rigorous imprisonment just as his father Jamuna had been sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment only under Section 201 Indian Penal Code. l!\n\nIt may be mentioned here that, while special leave to appeal was granted to the appellant against the judgment of the High Court, this Court\n\n(I) [197311 SCR 291.\n\nhad refused to grant any leave to his father Jamuna to appeal against his conviction under Section 201 Indian Penal Code. We, however, think that a distinction between the ease of the appellant and his father is justified on two grounds mainly; firstly, it was the duty of the appellant, as the husband, to have done something to protect his wife/even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that the actual death may have been brought about by the acts of others ; and secondly, the appli- Iant had tal::en a leading part in disposing of the murdered woman. We thinl:: that the maximum sentence which can be passed under Section 201 Indian Penal Code is deserved by the appellant upon facts and circumstances of this case. Accordingly; we allow this appeal!<> the extent that we set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section\n\n302 I. P. C., but we maintain his conviction under Section 201 I. P. C. and sentence him to undergo seven years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and, in default of payment offine, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a term of six months.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 137, "entities": [{"text": "DAS\n\nSTAT);: OF BIHAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 9, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 44, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SAWAL DAS\n\nSTAT);: OF BIHAR\n\nJanuary 9, 1974\n\n[M. H. BEG AND P. N. BHAGWATI, JJ.J\n\nIndian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), s. 34 and 302-Circun1sta11tial evicknce- Accusedchargedunders."}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 34 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 268, "end_char": 274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 293, "end_char": 299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Ss. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 336, "end_char": 343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1281, "end_char": 1287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1368, "end_char": 1374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1448, "end_char": 1454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1525, "end_char": 1531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1610, "end_char": 1616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1799, "end_char": 1805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ss. 103 and 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2008, "end_char": 2023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2555, "end_char": 2561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2569, "end_char": 2575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ss. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3091, "end_char": 3098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3231, "end_char": 3237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4059, "end_char": 4065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4237, "end_char": 4243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5045, "end_char": 5051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CRnUML APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5490, "end_char": 5519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "83BJ\n\nCRnUML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5643, "end_char": 5659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 16th September, 1971 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No .. 90 of 1968."}}, {"text": "A. N. Mui", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5698, "end_char": 5707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Mui/a, S. N. Misra, S. S. Jauhar and Sud/la Misra, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5711, "end_char": 5722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Mui/a, S. N. Misra, S. S. Jauhar and Sud/la Misra, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. S. Jauhar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5724, "end_char": 5736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Mui/a, S. N. Misra, S. S. Jauhar and Sud/la Misra, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Sud/la Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5741, "end_char": 5753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Mui/a, S. N. Misra, S. S. Jauhar and Sud/la Misra, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5775, "end_char": 5787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. C. Prasad, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5861, "end_char": 5864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BEG, J.-The appellant before us by special leave, Sawal Das, hiS' father Jamuna Prasad, and his stepmother Ka!awati Devi, were charged with Offences punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code simpliciter on the allegation that they had intentionally caused the\n\ndeath of Smt."}}, {"text": "Sawal Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5911, "end_char": 5920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BEG, J.-The appellant before us by special leave, Sawal Das, hiS' father Jamuna Prasad, and his stepmother Ka!awati Devi, were charged with Offences punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code simpliciter on the allegation that they had intentionally caused the\n\ndeath of Smt.", "canonical_name": "SAWAL DAS"}}, {"text": "Jamuna Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5934, "end_char": 5947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BEG, J.-The appellant before us by special leave, Sawal Das, hiS' father Jamuna Prasad, and his stepmother Ka!awati Devi, were charged with Offences punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code simpliciter on the allegation that they had intentionally caused the\n\ndeath of Smt."}}, {"text": "Ka!awati Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5968, "end_char": 5981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BEG, J.-The appellant before us by special leave, Sawal Das, hiS' father Jamuna Prasad, and his stepmother Ka!awati Devi, were charged with Offences punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code simpliciter on the allegation that they had intentionally caused the\n\ndeath of Smt.", "canonical_name": "Ka!awati Devi"}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6027, "end_char": 6038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6039, "end_char": 6056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Chanda Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6141, "end_char": 6152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chanda Devi, the wife of the appellant, on 28-5-1965,.", "canonical_name": "Chanda Del'i"}}, {"text": "Sawal Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6273, "end_char": 6282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Sawal Das, his father Jamuna Prasad, their motor driver Sita Ram, and eight other persons were charged under Section 20!", "canonical_name": "SAWAL DAS"}}, {"text": "Sita Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6329, "end_char": 6337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Sawal Das, his father Jamuna Prasad, their motor driver Sita Ram, and eight other persons were charged under Section 20!"}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6382, "end_char": 6392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6395, "end_char": 6412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Kalawati Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6538, "end_char": 6551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kalawati Devi was charged under Section 302/109 Indian Penal Code for having instigated the murder of Chanda Devi.", "canonical_name": "Ka!awati Devi"}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6570, "end_char": 6581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6586, "end_char": 6603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6782, "end_char": 6794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6798, "end_char": 6815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6859, "end_char": 6869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6870, "end_char": 6887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7013, "end_char": 7024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7025, "end_char": 7042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Site Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7125, "end_char": 7133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The driver Site Ram was also convicted under Section 201 Indian Penal Code and sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment."}}, {"text": "Section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7159, "end_char": 7170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7171, "end_char": 7188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7300, "end_char": 7319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal, the High Court of Patna had acquitted the appellant, his father, and his step-mother of offences punishable under Section 302/34 Indian Penal Code, but it found the appellant alone guilty of an offence punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code simpliciter and sentenced him to life imprisonment."}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7410, "end_char": 7421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7425, "end_char": 7442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7515, "end_char": 7526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7527, "end_char": 7544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7657, "end_char": 7668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7669, "end_char": 7686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7860, "end_char": 7871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7872, "end_char": 7889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "28-5-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8195, "end_char": 8204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no eye witness of the murder which was alleged to have 'been committed by the appellant, his father, and step-mother conjointly on the morning of 28-5-1965 at about 8.00 a.m. The Sessions Judge had relied upon the following proved facts and circums- D lances to convict the three accused persons of murder under Sections 302/34 Indian Penal Code :\n\nI. The relations between Sm!."}}, {"text": "Sections 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8361, "end_char": 8373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8377, "end_char": 8394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Kalawati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8716, "end_char": 8724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kalawati in the quarrels between the murdered wife and her mother-in-law.", "canonical_name": "Ka!awati Devi"}}, {"text": "Chanda DeYi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8973, "end_char": 8984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chanda DeYi on the first floor of the house, called out to the appellant that his \"rascal wife\" was quarrelling with her and informed him as well as Jamuna that either she or Chanda Devi will live in the house henceforth.", "canonical_name": "Chanda Del'i"}}, {"text": "Jamuna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9122, "end_char": 9128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chanda DeYi on the first floor of the house, called out to the appellant that his \"rascal wife\" was quarrelling with her and informed him as well as Jamuna that either she or Chanda Devi will live in the house henceforth."}}, {"text": "Chanda Del'i", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9635, "end_char": 9647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Immediately after these cries, the children of Chanda Del'i wer eard crying and uttering words.", "canonical_name": "Chanda Del'i"}}, {"text": "G. B. Sahai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12181, "end_char": 12192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Furthermore, it pointed out that, as a highly qualified Doctor, Dr. G. B. Sahai, had deposed, normally death would not take place immediately as a result of accidental burning of the kind alleged by the appellant and that there would have been evidence of rolling on the ground or other acts of the deceased in attempts\n\nto save herself in such an event."}}, {"text": ".Chanda Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12535, "end_char": 12547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Trial Court had also believed the evidence of the relations of .Chanda Devi that she was enjoying good health so that the bare assertions of the appellant that 'he had a weak heart could not be accept<d. It also observed that no burnt pieces of cloth or marks of smoke or soot on the walls or roof of the room in which Smt.", "canonical_name": "Chanda Del'i"}}, {"text": "Nath", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13190, "end_char": 13194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nath -On 2-6-1965, the statement by a witness that he saw some smoke comine .out of the house at the time of the alleged murder, the rumour of her <leath by burning mentioned by several witnesses, which found a B .Place in the information sent to the Police on 30-5-1965 by Lallu\n\nPrasad, P.W. 28, a relation of the murdered wife, and into another written information given by Hawaldar Gorakhnath Singh, P.W.3, at the Police Station, on 28-5-1965, and other similar bits of information and belief deposed to by witnesses."}}, {"text": "30-5-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13451, "end_char": 13460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nath -On 2-6-1965, the statement by a witness that he saw some smoke comine .out of the house at the time of the alleged murder, the rumour of her <leath by burning mentioned by several witnesses, which found a B .Place in the information sent to the Police on 30-5-1965 by Lallu\n\nPrasad, P.W. 28, a relation of the murdered wife, and into another written information given by Hawaldar Gorakhnath Singh, P.W.3, at the Police Station, on 28-5-1965, and other similar bits of information and belief deposed to by witnesses."}}, {"text": "Lallu\n\nPrasad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13464, "end_char": 13477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nath -On 2-6-1965, the statement by a witness that he saw some smoke comine .out of the house at the time of the alleged murder, the rumour of her <leath by burning mentioned by several witnesses, which found a B .Place in the information sent to the Police on 30-5-1965 by Lallu\n\nPrasad, P.W. 28, a relation of the murdered wife, and into another written information given by Hawaldar Gorakhnath Singh, P.W.3, at the Police Station, on 28-5-1965, and other similar bits of information and belief deposed to by witnesses."}}, {"text": "Hawaldar Gorakhnath Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13567, "end_char": 13592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nath -On 2-6-1965, the statement by a witness that he saw some smoke comine .out of the house at the time of the alleged murder, the rumour of her <leath by burning mentioned by several witnesses, which found a B .Place in the information sent to the Police on 30-5-1965 by Lallu\n\nPrasad, P.W. 28, a relation of the murdered wife, and into another written information given by Hawaldar Gorakhnath Singh, P.W.3, at the Police Station, on 28-5-1965, and other similar bits of information and belief deposed to by witnesses."}}, {"text": "Gorakhnath Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13828, "end_char": 13844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17) treated as c F.I.R. by the Police, or the information given by Gorakhnath Singh .on 28-5-1965, which, according to the appellant, ought to be treated .1s a First Information Report, and other pieces of information and belief given by the witnesses are concerned, it is clear that these are based on hear-say which was rightly excluded."}}, {"text": "2-6-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14818, "end_char": 14826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the burns on the body of the appellant, the Trial Court Tightly pointed out that the Doctor had stated on 2-6-1965 that they were 3 or 4 days old."}}, {"text": "CI1anJa Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15243, "end_char": 15255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CI1anJa Devi died in the manner alleged by the appellant lay upon the appellant."}}, {"text": "Sections 103 and 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15361, "end_char": 15381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15389, "end_char": 15408, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16176, "end_char": 16187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16545, "end_char": 16556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17205, "end_char": 17216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19223, "end_char": 19233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19234, "end_char": 19251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19435, "end_char": 19446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19447, "end_char": 19464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Kala wati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20236, "end_char": 20245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We find that the High Court had not dealt with the question whether a distinction could be made between the case of the appellant on the one hand and his father Jamuna Prasad and his step-mother Kala wati on the other quite satisfactorily, so far as the offence of murder\n\nis concerned.", "canonical_name": "Ka!awati Devi"}}, {"text": "Ganesh D Prasod", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20778, "end_char": 20793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if, as the Trial Court and the High Court had correctly held, there is admissible and credible evidence of five witnesses, Ganesh D Prasod, P.W. 1, Nand Kishore, P.W. 2, Radhey Shyam Sharma, P.W.9, Laxmi Narain, PW."}}, {"text": "Nand Kishore", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20803, "end_char": 20815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if, as the Trial Court and the High Court had correctly held, there is admissible and credible evidence of five witnesses, Ganesh D Prasod, P.W. 1, Nand Kishore, P.W. 2, Radhey Shyam Sharma, P.W.9, Laxmi Narain, PW."}}, {"text": "Radhey Shyam Sharma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20825, "end_char": 20844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if, as the Trial Court and the High Court had correctly held, there is admissible and credible evidence of five witnesses, Ganesh D Prasod, P.W. 1, Nand Kishore, P.W. 2, Radhey Shyam Sharma, P.W.9, Laxmi Narain, PW."}}, {"text": "Laxmi Narain", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20853, "end_char": 20865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if, as the Trial Court and the High Court had correctly held, there is admissible and credible evidence of five witnesses, Ganesh D Prasod, P.W. 1, Nand Kishore, P.W. 2, Radhey Shyam Sharma, P.W.9, Laxmi Narain, PW."}}, {"text": "Basdeo Prasad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20879, "end_char": 20892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16, and Basdeo Prasad, P.W. 27, who are said to have heard or watched from outside, from varying distances, Of what was going on in the Verandah, no eye witness was produced who could prove what actually took place inside the room where the murder was committed."}}, {"text": "Verandah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21007, "end_char": 21015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16, and Basdeo Prasad, P.W. 27, who are said to have heard or watched from outside, from varying distances, Of what was going on in the Verandah, no eye witness was produced who could prove what actually took place inside the room where the murder was committed."}}, {"text": "Bachao Bachao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21221, "end_char": 21234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only evidence given of what could have taken place inside the room was the cry of \"Bachao Bachao\" although there is E some understandable variation between accounts of witnesses as to whether the murdered woman also uttered some more words showing that she was being actually killed."}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21550, "end_char": 21559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 540", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21966, "end_char": 21977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21978, "end_char": 22001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Geeta Kurmini", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22079, "end_char": 22092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, there is no explanation even attempted to sho\\v why the Maid servant, Geeta Kurmini, who, according to the pros:::cution case, was also in the Verandah at the time of the occurrence, was not produced G at the Trial although her statement was recorded under Section 164 Criminal Procedure Code and was brought on the record (Ex."}}, {"text": "Section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22266, "end_char": 22277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22278, "end_char": 22301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22600, "end_char": 22611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "SAWAL DAS V. BillAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22903, "end_char": 22922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Her statement, if it had been there as evidence in the case, may very well have shown that it was Jamuna who was taking the leading\n\n'I.'\n\nSAWAL DAS V. BillAR (Beg, /.) 81\n\npart in bringing about the death of Smt."}}, {"text": "Geeta Kurmini", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23388, "end_char": 23401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, we think that, in the circumstances of the case, Geeta Kurmini, the maid servant,."}}, {"text": "Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24762, "end_char": 24767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Mulla, appearing for the appellant, has also drawn our attention to K.G. Patil V. State of Maharashtra (2)."}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24968, "end_char": 24979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24990, "end_char": 25000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Panel Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25001, "end_char": 25018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25391, "end_char": 25402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Panel Code", "statute": "Indian Panel Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25403, "end_char": 25420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25712, "end_char": 25729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25752, "end_char": 25763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25774, "end_char": 25784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25785, "end_char": 25802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25870, "end_char": 25881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25904, "end_char": 25921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26181, "end_char": 26193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26197, "end_char": 26202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26217, "end_char": 26228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26229, "end_char": 26234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26297, "end_char": 26308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26312, "end_char": 26317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26436, "end_char": 26446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26447, "end_char": 26452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26720, "end_char": 26730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26845, "end_char": 26855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26856, "end_char": 26861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28934, "end_char": 28945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28946, "end_char": 28963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29208, "end_char": 29219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29220, "end_char": 29237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29498, "end_char": 29509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29510, "end_char": 29527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30029, "end_char": 30040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30041, "end_char": 30058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section\n\n302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30235, "end_char": 30247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30295, "end_char": 30306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_754_759_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "R. S. SIAL\n\nTHE STATE OF U.P. & ORS.·.\n\nMarch 25, 1974\n\n[H. R. KHANNA AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.)\n\nConstitution of India, Art. 311(2)-Reversion from _an officiating higher post to substantive post-If attracts Art. 311(2)\n\n. B:\n\n_The appellant wh~ was Assist. General Manager in the State Transport Department was appointed as offic1at:J.ng General ianager in the same departmei; tt: During the period of his .officiating appointment he was reverted.\n\nAt the llme of the appellant's reversion there were two letters from the Vigilance Department making certain allegations against the appellant. These letters show that the authorities concerned came to the conclusion that pending the enquiry.\n\nC the appllant should not be allowed to officiate in a higher post. His writ petition challenging the order of reversion was dismissed by the High Court.\n\n !t was contellded in this court that the order of reveion -was by way of punishment and since it had been made without complying with the requirements of Art. 311 of the Constitution the same was liable to b~ quashed.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD :-The test for attracting Art. 311(2) of the Constitution is whetli.er D the misconduct or negligence is a mere motive for the order of reversion or termination of service of the temporary employee. The form of the order ho\\'; ever, is not conclusive of its true nature.\n\nThe entirety of circumstances preceding or attendant on the impugned order must be examined by the court and the overriding test will always be whether the misconduct is a mere motive or is the very foundation of the order.\n\n[757E]\n\nA perusal of the order showed that it contained no adverse remarks against r~. the appellant nor could it be said that any stigma attached to the appellant i:... because of that order. The post of General itanager which was held by the appeIIant was only in an officiating capacity. The appellant had no vested right to retain that post.\n\nIn case the author_ities concerned came to the conclusion that the appellant should not b~ allowed to retain the post. of which he was officiating they could pass an order for his reversion without complyin~ with the requirements of Art. 311 provided the order was not by way of punishment.\n\n[756H) Parshotam Lai Dhi11gra v. Union of India, [1958] S.C.R. 828, Union of India & Anr. v. Gajendra Singh etc. etc .• [1972] 3 S.C.R. 660 and State of Bihar & Ors. y. Shi~'a Bhik.shuk-Mishra, [1971) 2 S.C.R. 191, followed.\n\n\nThe same rule would bold good if the order passed is not for termination of service but for reversion '?f a Government servant from. a higher post to a lower post \\\\\"-hich he holds tn a substantive capcity.\n\n\nCIVIL APPELLANT JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1062 of 1971.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 12th January, 1971 of the Allahahad High Court (Lucknow Bench)\n\nt Luck; now in Writ Petition No. 1073 of 1968.\n\nG :.\n\nS. V. Gupte, I. P. Goyal and G. S. Chatterjee, for the appellant.\n\nC. N. Dikshit, and R. Ba11a for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court . whereby petition under article 226 of the Constitution onndia filed by the appellant was dismissed.\n\nThe appellant was appointed Traffic Manager in the transpnrt organization of the State of Uttar. Pradesh on July 21, 1948. The office of Traffic Manager was subsequently designated a~ Assistant General Manager and the appellant continued to work as such.\n\nOn December 1, 1955 tl)e appellant was confirmed as Assistant General Manager with effect from April 1, 1955. On July 5, 1963 the appellant was appointed Officiating General Manager in the Gorakhpur region of the Transport Department The appellant continued to officiate as General Manager of Government Roadways till September 7, 1967 when he.was reverted to the post of Assistant General Manager. The appellant filed writ petition No. 3167 of 1967 in the Allahabad High Cqurt challenging the order of his reversion but the same was summarily dismissed by a Division Bench of that court as per order dated Se?tember 12, 1967. Representation was made by the appellant against the order of his reversion but the representation too was rejected by the State Government as per letter dated October 7, 1968.\n\nThe writ petition which has given rise to this appeal was thereafter filed by the petitioner praying for quashing the ordei by which he had been reverted from the post of Officiating General .Manager to that of Assistant General Manager as well as the orders whereby his representation had been rejected.\n\nA number of grounds were set out in the petition for assailing the impugned orders, but at the hearing of the appeal only one ground has been pressed and it is only that ground with which we are concerned. According to 1the appellant, the order of his reversion was by way of p\\mishment and as it had been made wiihout complying with requirements of article 311 of the Constitution, the same was liable to be quashed.\n\nThe petition. was resisted by the State of Uttar Pradesh and the affidavit of Shri Bhagwan Sarup Sl\\Xena, Deputy Secretary to the Government in the Transport Department was filed in opposition to the petition. Objection was; taken that the present petition was barred because of the dismissal of the earlier petition.\n\nOn merits it was stated that the appellant was merely , officiating as a General Manager and bad no right to that post. According to the respondent-State, the appellant could be reverted to his substantive post of Assistant Gneral Manager withO\\lt the State takipg any disciplinary action or assigning anv reason.\n\nWhen the petition can1e up for hearing fore a single Judge the learned Judge referred the matter to a farger Bench. Ultimately, the matter was heard by a Full Bench of the High Court. The learned Judges held that the present l;>etition was barred because of the dis- JDissal of lhe appellant's earlier petition. On merits also, the learned\n\nJudges did not accept the contention advanced on behalf of the appel- A ·)ant and held that as he was only officiating as General Manager, he did not have any lien on that post. The reversion was held to.be not by way of punishment. The Government, in the opinion of the High: Court, was entitled in exerci~ of its power to revert a person who was: officiating in a higher post. Contention was also raised that the order of reversion was violative of the principles of natural justice but this contention was repelled.\n\nIn the result the petition of the appellant B was dismissed.\n\nIn appeal before us Mr. Gupte on behalf of the appellant has argued that as the previous petition No. 3167 of 1967 filed by the appellant had been dismissed summarily by means of a non-speaking order, it cannot\n\nb~ said that the dismissal of that petition was on merits. As such, according to the learned counsel, the present petition was not barred C because of the dismissal of the pre; ious petition. The second conten tion of Mr. Gupte is that the reversion. of the appellant from the post of Officiating General Manager to that of Assistant General Manager was by way of punishment and as the same had been ordered without complying with article 311 of the Constitution, the order of reversion was liable to be quashed.\n\nThe above contentions have been controverted by Mr. Dikshit on behalf of the respondent-State. It is, in our opinion, D not necessary to go into the first contention of Mr. Guptc because we find that the order of reversion of the appellant cannot be said to have been made by way of punishment.\n\nThe material part of the order of reversion reads as under :\n\n\"OFFICE OF THE TRANSPORT COMMISSIONER E\n\nUTT AR PRADESH\n\nNo. 714/PAVS/67 Dated Lucknow, September 7, 1967\n\nORDER\n\nIn pursuance of Government's instructions contained is Deputy Secretary, Trausport's D.0. letter No. 13060 S/XXXA-10/18/i'vl/59, dated September 5, 1967 the F folJowing reversion~, transfers and postings arc hereby crdcred :-\n\n(1) Sri R. S. Sial, officiating General Manager, U.P.\n\nGovernment Roadways, Aligarh, is reverted to his substantive post of Assistant General Manager, and posted at Lucknow as Assistant General Manager (Rural) vice Sri V. P.\n\nG Gupta transferred.\"\n\nPerusal of the above order shows that it contains no adverse remarks against the appellant, nor can it be said that any stigma attaches to the appellant because of that order. At the time the above order was made the substantive rank of the appellant was that of Assistant General Manager.\n\nThe post of General Manager which was held by H the appdlant was only in an officiating capacity. The appellant had no vcst., d right to retain that post. In case the authorities concerned came to the conclusion that the appellant should not be allowed to\n\nretain the post in which he was officiating, they could pass an order for his reversion without complying with the requirements of article 311 provided the ordr was not by way of punishment.\n\nAppointment to a post on an officiating basis is, from the nature of employment, itseH of a transitory character and in the absenee of any contract or specific rule regulating the conditions of service to the contrary, the implied term of such an appointment is that it is terminable at any time.\n\nThe Government servant so appointed acquires no right to the post. But if the order entails or provides for forfeiture of bis pay or allowance or the loss of his seniority in the substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of bis future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that though, in form, the Government had purported to exercise its undoubted right to terminate the employment, in truth and reality, the termination was by way of penalty [see Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India (I) and Union of India & Anr. v. Gajendra Singh, etc. etc.( 2 )].\n\nOfficiating and temporary Government sevants are also entitled to the protection of article 311 as permanent Government servants if the Government takes action against them by meting out one of the punishments, i.e. dismissal, removal or reduction in rank [see Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, (supra), Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v.\n\nUnion of India(') and Appar Apar Singh v. The State of Punjab & Ors.(<)].\n\nThe test for attracting article 311 (2) of the Co1istitution is whether the miscpnduct or negligence is a mere motive for the order of reversion or termination of service or whether it is the very foundation of the order of termination of service cif the temi;><>rary employee.\n\nThe form of the order, however, is not conclusive of its true nature.\n\nThe entirety of circumstances preeding or attendant on the impugned order must be examined by the court and the overriding test will always be whether the misconduct is a mere motive or is the very foundation of the order [sec State of Bihar & Ors. v. Shira Bhikshuk Mishra(')].\n\nIn the case of State of Punjab v. Shri Sukh Raj Bahadur(6) this Court enunciated the following propositions which have to be borne in mind:\n\n\"(!) The services of a temporary servant or a probationer can be terminated under the rules of his employment and such termination without anything more would not attract the operation of Art. 311 of the Constitution.\n\n(2) The circumstances preceding or attendant on the. order of termination of service have to be examined in each case, the motive behind it being immaterial.\n\n(3) lf the order visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts an aspersion against his\n\n(I) [1958] SCR 828.\n\n(2) [1972] 3 SCR 660.\n\n(3) [196415SCR190.\n\n(4) [1971] 2 SCR 890.\n\n(5) [1971] 2 SCR 191. (6)\n\n[19681 3 SCR 2J4.\n\ncharacter or integrity, it must re considered to be one A\n\n(4)\n\n(5)\n\nby way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant.\n\nAn oruer of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service, does not attract the operation of Art. 311 of the Constitution.\n\nIf there be a full-scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Art. 311 i.e. an Enquiry Officer is appointed, a charge sheet subm; tted, .explanation called (or and considered, any order of termination of service made thereafter will attract the operation of the said article.\" -\n\nKeeping in view the principles enunciated above, we ha\\-C looked at the facts of the case and are not satisfied that the order of reversion of the appellant was by way of punishment. It has already been mentioned above that no aspersion was cast on the appellant in the order of reversion and as a result of toot order no stigma attaches to his name: The appellant was merely officiating in a higher post and the impugned order had the effect of reverting him to his substantive post.\n\nThe attendant circumstances to which our attention has been invited with a view to show that the order of reversion was by way of punishment are two letters dated July 12, 1967.\n\nOne of these letters was addressed by the Deputy Secretary, Vigilance Department to the Director of Vigilance wherein reference was made to the report of the officers of the Intelligence and Evaluation Cell.\n\nIt was requested that an open enquiry might be made into the allegations of involvement of the appellant in a matter relating to the supply of non-genuine and substandard motor parts by a Delhi dealer. In the other letter addressed to the Secretary to Uttar Pradesh Government, Transport Department a request was made by the Deputy Secretary, Vigilance Department that in case .the appellant was n6t confirmed on the post of General Manager, he might be reverted since an enquiry made by the CID into the allegations of corruption against the appellant had rewalcd that there was substance in those allegations.\n\nThe above kiters would show that the authorities concerned came to the conclusion that, pending the holding of an open enquiry into the charges of corruption against the appellant, he should not be allowed to officiate in a higher post. It cannot, in our opinion, be inferred therefrom that the reversion of the appellant was by way of punishment. All that c:i.n be said is that the contemplated enquiry into the charges of corruption against the appellant provided the motive for the reversion of the appellant.\n\nThe existence of such a motive cannot, in our opinion, vltiale the order for the reversion of the appellant.\n\nIt may be taken to l>o well settled that even though misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualifications may be the motive or the inducing factor which influence the Government to take action under the express or implied terms of the contract of employment or under the statutory rule, nevertheless if a right exists, under the contract or the rules to terminate the services the\n\nmotive operating on the mind of the Government is whoUy immaterial [see Union of India v. R. S. Dhaba( 1) .]. The same rule would hold good if-the order passed is not for termination of service but for reversion of a Government servant from a higher post to a lower post which he holds in a substantive capacity.\n\nApplication was filed .during the pendency of the appoal on behalf of the appellant that this Court might take into account additional documents.\n\nThese documents were in existence at the time the appellant filed the petition in the High Court.\n\nThe petition in the High Court remained pending for more than a year.\n\nWe are not impressed by the plea taken on behalf of the appellant that he coulct not trace these documents with due diligence and has been able to trace them now. 1be documents in question are not of such a nature as arc\n\nneedod to enable us to pronounce this judgment. In the circumtances, the application filed by the appellant for taking on record additional documents in appeal is rejected.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs .\n\nP.B.R. ,4ppeal dismissed.\n\n(I) [1969] 3 SCR 603.", "total_entities": 51, "entities": [{"text": "R. S. SIAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 10, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. S. SIAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF U.P. & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF U.P. & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 25, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 54, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 25, 1974\n\n[H. R. KHANNA AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 205, "end_char": 216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1001, "end_char": 1009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1121, "end_char": 1132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2172, "end_char": 2180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1972] 3 S.C.R. 660", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2351, "end_char": 2370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2375, "end_char": 2389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "etc .• [1972] 3 S.C.R. 660 and State of Bihar & Ors."}}, {"text": "[1971) 2 S.C.R. 191", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2425, "end_char": 2444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2909, "end_char": 2920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, I. P. Goyal and G. S. Chatterjee, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "I. P. Goyal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2922, "end_char": 2933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, I. P. Goyal and G. S. Chatterjee, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2938, "end_char": 2954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, I. P. Goyal and G. S. Chatterjee, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. N. Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2976, "end_char": 2989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. N. Dikshit, and R. Ba11a for the respondents."}}, {"text": "R. Ba11a", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2995, "end_char": 3003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. N. Dikshit, and R. Ba11a for the respondents."}}, {"text": "KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3070, "end_char": 3076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court ."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3159, "end_char": 3179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court ."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3205, "end_char": 3216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "December 1, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3542, "end_char": 3558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 1, 1955 tl)e appellant was confirmed as Assistant General Manager with effect from April 1, 1955."}}, {"text": "July 5, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3652, "end_char": 3664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 5, 1963 the appellant was appointed Officiating General Manager in the Gorakhpur region of the Transport Department The appellant continued to officiate as General Manager of Government Roadways till September 7, 1967 when he.was reverted to the post of Assistant General Manager."}}, {"text": "Gorakhpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3728, "end_char": 3737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 5, 1963 the appellant was appointed Officiating General Manager in the Gorakhpur region of the Transport Department The appellant continued to officiate as General Manager of Government Roadways till September 7, 1967 when he.was reverted to the post of Assistant General Manager."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Cqurt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3996, "end_char": 4016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3167 of 1967 in the Allahabad High Cqurt challenging the order of his reversion but the same was summarily dismissed by a Division Bench of that court as per order dated Se?tember 12, 1967."}}, {"text": "Se?tember 12, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4146, "end_char": 4164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3167 of 1967 in the Allahabad High Cqurt challenging the order of his reversion but the same was summarily dismissed by a Division Bench of that court as per order dated Se?tember 12, 1967."}}, {"text": "October 7, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4326, "end_char": 4341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Representation was made by the appellant against the order of his reversion but the representation too was rejected by the State Government as per letter dated October 7, 1968."}}, {"text": "article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5000, "end_char": 5011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5103, "end_char": 5125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was resisted by the State of Uttar Pradesh and the affidavit of Shri Bhagwan Sarup Sl\\Xena, Deputy Secretary to the Government in the Transport Department was filed in opposition to the petition."}}, {"text": "Bhagwan Sarup Sl\\Xena", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5152, "end_char": 5173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was resisted by the State of Uttar Pradesh and the affidavit of Shri Bhagwan Sarup Sl\\Xena, Deputy Secretary to the Government in the Transport Department was filed in opposition to the petition."}}, {"text": "Gupte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6650, "end_char": 6655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal before us Mr. Gupte on behalf of the appellant has argued that as the previous petition No.", "canonical_name": "Gupte"}}, {"text": "article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7269, "end_char": 7280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dikshit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7404, "end_char": 7411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The above contentions have been controverted by Mr. Dikshit on behalf of the respondent-State."}}, {"text": "Guptc", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7525, "end_char": 7530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, in our opinion, D not necessary to go into the first contention of Mr. Guptc because we find that the order of reversion of the appellant cannot be said to have been made by way of punishment.", "canonical_name": "Gupte"}}, {"text": "OFFICE OF THE TRANSPORT COMMISSIONER E\n\nUTT AR PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7711, "end_char": 7765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material part of the order of reversion reads as under :\n\n\"OFFICE OF THE TRANSPORT COMMISSIONER E\n\nUTT AR PRADESH\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "R. S. Sial", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8059, "end_char": 8069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13060 S/XXXA-10/18/i'vl/59, dated September 5, 1967 the F folJowing reversion~, transfers and postings arc hereby crdcred :-\n\n(1) Sri R. S. Sial, officiating General Manager, U.P.\n\nGovernment Roadways, Aligarh, is reverted to his substantive post of Assistant General Manager, and posted at Lucknow as Assistant General Manager (Rural) vice Sri V. P.\n\nG Gupta transferred.\"", "canonical_name": "R. S. SIAL"}}, {"text": "V. P.\n\nG Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8270, "end_char": 8284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13060 S/XXXA-10/18/i'vl/59, dated September 5, 1967 the F folJowing reversion~, transfers and postings arc hereby crdcred :-\n\n(1) Sri R. S. Sial, officiating General Manager, U.P.\n\nGovernment Roadways, Aligarh, is reverted to his substantive post of Assistant General Manager, and posted at Lucknow as Assistant General Manager (Rural) vice Sri V. P.\n\nG Gupta transferred.\""}}, {"text": "article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8979, "end_char": 8990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10006, "end_char": 10017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10362, "end_char": 10373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11297, "end_char": 11305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1972] 3 SCR 660", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11617, "end_char": 11633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1971] 2 SCR 890", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11660, "end_char": 11676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1971] 2 SCR 191", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11683, "end_char": 11699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12114, "end_char": 12122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12204, "end_char": 12212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "July 12, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13071, "end_char": 13084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The attendant circumstances to which our attention has been invited with a view to show that the order of reversion was by way of punishment are two letters dated July 12, 1967."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13484, "end_char": 13489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was requested that an open enquiry might be made into the allegations of involvement of the appellant in a matter relating to the supply of non-genuine and substandard motor parts by a Delhi dealer."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13548, "end_char": 13572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the other letter addressed to the Secretary to Uttar Pradesh Government, Transport Department a request was made by the Deputy Secretary, Vigilance Department that in case .the appellant was n6t confirmed on the post of General Manager, he might be reverted since an enquiry made by the CID into the allegations of corruption against the appellant had rewalcd that there was substance in those allegations."}}, {"text": "[1969] 3 SCR 603", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16032, "end_char": 16048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_760_788_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "THE STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER A\n\nSHRI AMBICA MILLS LTD., AHMEDABAD, ETC.\n\nMarch 26, 1974\n\n[A. N. RAY, C.J., H. R. KHANNA.t K. K. MAmEW, Y. V.\n\nCHANDRACHUD AND A. ALAGIRISWAMI, JJ.]\n\nConsritution of India, 1950, Art. 13-Legislation void in relalion to citi\n\nc11s as violating Art. 19-Jf corporation, a non-citizen, can contend that Jaw u 11011-e:St.\n\nBombay Labour Welfare Fund .Act, 1953, liS amended by Guiarat Amend- C mmt Act, 1961 s. 2(4)-'Establishmellt' d!!jirlition of-if violates Art, 14.\n\nAfter the State of Bombay was bifurcated the legislature of the State of Gujarat enactd the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund (Gujarat Extension and Amndment) Act, 1961, mak:ing various amendments in the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1953.\n\nThe 1953-Act was passed with a view t\\) provide for the constitution of a fund for financing activities for promoting the wel fare of labour in the State of Bombay. Section 3 as amended, provides that the State Government shall constitute a fund called the Labour Welfare Fund D and that the. f; md shall consist of. among other things, all unpaid accumulations. Sec. 2 (1 0} defines unpaid accumulations as meaning all payments due to the employees but not made to them within a period of three years from the date on which they became due whether before or after the commencemnt of the Act including wages and gratuity legally payable. Sec. 6A(l) provides that \\1Dpaid accumulations shall be deemed to be abandoned property anti that the Board, constituted under the Act, shall take them over. As soon :1s the Board takes over the unpaid accumulations, notice as provided in the E section, will haw to be published and claims invited. Sub-section 3 to 6 provide for notice and sub-ss. 7 to 11 lay down the machinery for adjudication of t:l:lims which might be received in response to the notice. It is only if no clnim is made for a veriod of four years from the date of the publication of the first no tic~. or if a claim is made but rejected wholly or in part, that the St:He approp1 i:aes the unpaid accumulation, as borra mea/Ilia.\n\nSection :!(4) of the Act defines 'establishment' and the definition includes F f:1ctories, tramway or motor omnibus services and any establishment carrying on business or 'trade and employing more than SO persons; but excludes nil government establishments carrying on business or trade.\n\nDe1r.and for the parment of the unpaid accumulations having been made the respondents filet!\n\nptitions in th~ High Court challenging various provisions of the Act and the\n\nHigh Court held that s. 3(1). in so tar as it relates to unpaid accumulations specified in s. 3 (:!) (b), 3 ( 4) and 6A of the Act, and rules 3 and 4 of the\n\nrals made therunder nre unconstitutional and void on the grounds : (i) that the impugned provisions violated the fundamental rights of citizen-employers G nnd employees under Art. 19(1)(0 and therefore were voi~ under Art. 13(~} :-tnd hence ti1er~ \\\\':IS no law and the demands were thus wtthout the :mthonty of bw; and l~) that discrimination was writ large in the definition of 'establ i,; hment'.\n\nAllowing the nppeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : ( 1 )(a) Unpaid accumulations represent the obligations or the employers to the employees and they are the property of the employes. In H o:hc-r words, what is being treated as abandoned property. uder fiA ts the C't, ligation to the employees owed by the employers and Y!htch IS property from the standpoint of the emplo)ees.\n\n[771A-BJ\n\nGUJARAT v. AMBICA MlLLS LTD. (Mathew, /.) 761\n\n(b) At common law, abandoned personal property could not be tho subject of escheat. It could only be appropriated as bona vacantia.\n\nUnder the Act, though unpnid accumulations are deemed to be abandoned. property under s. 6A(l) they are appropriated as bona vacantia only after claims are invited and disposed of, l770G.711A]\n\n(c) lf unpaid accumulations are not claimed within a total period of 7 years the inactivity on the part of the employees would furnish adequate basis.\n\nfor the administration by the State of the unasserted claims or demands. It cannot be said that the period of 7 years allowed to the employees for the purpose cf claiming unpaid accumulations is an unreasonably short one which will result in the infringement of any constitutional rights of the employees.\n\n[771EJ\n\n(d) There is no reason to think that the State will be, in fact less able or less willing to pay the amounts when it has taken them over. [771E.F]\n\n(e) lt. cannot also be assumed that the mere substitution of the State as: the debtor will deprive the employees of their property or impose on them any unconstitutional burden.\n\n[771F]\n\n(f) Since the employers are the debtors of the employees, they can inter-· pose no objection if the State is lawfully entitled to demand the payment, for\n\nin that case payment of the debt to the State under the statute reteases the employers of their liability to the .employees. When the moneys representing Lhe unpaid accumulations are paid to the Board the liability of the employers to mlke payment to the employees in respect of their claims against the em- . ployers w1>uld be discharged to the extent of the amount paid to the_ Board, and on such liability being transferred to the Board, the debts or claims to that extent cannot thereafter be enfoi;_ced against the employers.\n\n[7710, G]\n\n(g) As regards notice, all persons having property located within a state and subject to its dominion must take. note. of its statutes affecting control and disposition of such property and the procedure prescribed for those purposes.\n\nThe various modes of notice prescribed in s. 6A are sufficient to give reaso~ nblc information to the employees to come forward and claim the amount 1f they .really want to do so. [7710-Hl\n\nIn the absence of a showing of injury, actual or threatened, there could be no constitlllional argument, therefore, against the taking over of the unpaid accumulations by the State.\n\n[771F.G]\n\n(2) But assumin~ that the impugned provisions abridge the fundamental rights of citizen-employers or citizen-employees under Art. 19(1) (f) the res pendent, a corporation and hence a non-e<itizen employer, could not claim\n\n(i) that the taw was void as aainst non.citizen employers also under Art. 13 (2), and (ii) that since a void law is a nullity, the privation of its property was without the authority pf law. [7720)\n\n(a} It is settled that a Corporation is not a citizen for the purposes of Art. 19 and has, therefore no fundamental right under that Article.\n\n[772E] Tata Ertf!illefl'illf? and !oconiolive Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and orhers. [19641 6 S.C. R. 885, R. C. Cooper v. Unio11 of India, [1970] 2 S.C.R. 530 and Bermcrt Cofeman & Co., etc. v. Unio11 of India and Otlrers [1972] 2 S.C.C. 788, followed.\n\n(b) Courts shculd not adjudse on the constitutionality of a statute except when they are called upon to do so when legal rights of the Jltigants are in actual controversy; and as part of this rule, is the principle that one to whom the application of R statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that, it must al110 be taken as applying to other persons to whom or sitt, Jations in which, its application may be unconstitutional.\n\n[77JH-772B]\n\nUnited States v. Rainas, 362 U.S. 17, referred to.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1974) 3 S.C.R,\n\n(c) The same chme permeates both the sub-articles of .Art. 13, namely, to make the law VOid m Art. 13 (I ) to the extent of the inconsistency with the fundamental rights, and in Art 13 (2) to the extent of the contra\\ention of those rights. In other words, the voidness is not in rem but to the extent only of inconsistency or contravention as the case may be, of the rights conferred under Part llL Therefore when Art. 13(2) uses the expression 'void' it can only mean void as against persons whose fundamental rights are taken away or abridged by a law.\n\n[777G-H] ·\n\n(d) If a pre-constitutional Jaw which takes away or abridges the rights under Art. 19 could remain operative even after the Constitution came into force as regards non-citizens, there is no reason why a post-constitutional Jaw which takes away or abridges them should not be operative as respects noncitizens, if the meaning of the word 'void' in Art. 13(1) is the same as its meaning in Art. 13(2). The reason why a pre-constitutional law remains operative as against non-citizens is that it is void only to the extent of its in- consistency with the rights conferred under Art. 19 and that its voidness is, therefore, confined to citizens, as, ex hypot/Jrsi the Jaw became in:onsistent with their fundamental rights alone. Art. 13(2) is an injunction to th: State not to pass any law which takes away or <lbridges the fundamental rihts confened by Part III and the consequence of the contravention of the injunction is that\" the Jaw would be void to the extent of the contravention. The expression 'to the extent of the contravention' in the sub-article can only mean to the extent of th~ contravention of the rights conferred under that Pat. Rights always inhere in some person whether natural or juridical.\n\nJust a3 a pre- -constitutional Jaw taking away or abridging the fundamental rights under Art. 19 remains operative after the Constitution came into force as respects of noncitizens as it is not inconsistent that their fundamental rights so also a postconstitutional Jaw, offending Art. 19. remains operative as against non-citizens as it is not in contravention of any of their fundamental rights. The hw might be still-born so far as the persons, entities or denominations whose fundamental rights are taken away or abridged; but there is no reason why the law should be void or stiH-born s against those who have no fundamental rights.\n\n[777B-D, E-G, H-778A]\n\n(e) It could not be said that the expression 'to the extent of tl:e contravention' mean only that part of the law which contravenes the fundamental right would alone be void and not the other parts which do not so cc-ntravene.\n\nThe expression 'any law' occurring in the .latter part of the sub-article , must\n\nnecessarily refer to the same expression in the former part and, therefore, the Constitution-makers have already made it clear that the Jaw that would be void is only the law which contravenes the fundamental rights conferrd by Part JTI; and, so, the phrase 'lo the extent of the contravention' can mean only to the extent of the contravention of the rights coofrred. When it is sen that the I alter part of the sub-article is concerned with the effect of the violation of the iniunction contained in the former part. the words 'to the extent of the contravention' can only refer to the rights conferred under Part III r.nd denote only the com!Jass of voidness with respect to persons or entities resu', dng from the contravention of the rights conferred upon them. There is no reac.n wh~·\n\nthe Constilntion-maker~ wanted to state that th\"e other sections which did not violate the fundamental right~ wonld not be void_ Beides. any such categorical statement would be wrong as the other sections niil!ht be void if !hey are inseparably knitted to the void one.\n\n[778A-G]\n\n(f) Assuming that this Court has rejected the distinction bet;'ee~ legisla- tive incapacitv arising from lack of power under the relevant le~!ISJa:, ve etry and that ari•ing from a check upon lesrislative power on account of constttutional nrovisions like fundmental rights, it does not follow that if the ht\\1cn<Jcted bv the legislature having no capacity in the former sense \\\\-ould be void in rem a law passed by a legislature having no Jeis\\ative cap~it\" in th~ lalter sense should also be void in rem, because : f778G-H]\n\n(i) Tf on a textual reading of Art. 13 the conclusion. reached nam~IY. that :a law passed by a legislature having no legislative capac1ty in th~ lr:::er sense\n\ni H\n\nGUJARAT v. AMBICA MILLS LTD. (Mathew, /,) 763\n\n~~ nly ''id qua those persons whose fundamental rights are taken away or abndged, IS the only reasonable one, there is no need to consider whether that\n\nconcll!ion could not be arrived at except on the basis of such a distinction; and {n) Further, there is nothing strange in the notion of a legislature having no inherent legislative capacity or power to take away or abridge by law the fundamental rights conferred on citizens and yet having legislative power to pass the same law in respect of non-eitizens who have no such fundamental rights to be taken away or abridged. In other words, 1he le_gislative incapacity subjectw:se with reference to Arts. 245 and 246 in. this context would be the\n\ntaking away or abridging by law the fundamental rights under Art. 19 of citizens.\n\n[779A-E]\n\nM. P. V. Smu/araramaier v. State of A.P. (1958) S.C.R. 1422, referred to.\n\n(g) Th~ expression \"that State shall not make any law\" in Art. 13 (2) is no doubt a clear mandate of the fundamental law of the land and, therefore, it is case of total incapacity and total want of power.\n\nBut the mandate is tbat !-he State shall not make any law which takes awy or abridges the rights conferred by Part Ill. If no rights are conferrd under Part TII upon a person, or, if rights are conferred, but they are not taken away or abridged by Jaw\n\nther~ could not be incapacity of the legislature to make a law. If a law is otherwise good and 'does not contravene any of their fundamental rights, noncitizens cannot ake advantage of the voidness of the law for the reason. that it contravenes the fundamental rights of citizens and claim that there is no law at rill.\n\nSuch a proposition would not violate any principle of equality before the Jaw, because, citizeqs and non-citizens are not similarly situated as citizem have certain fundamental rights which non-citizens have not. ·[779 B-D:\n\n780 D-EJ\n\nKesh:.;1a Madha~'P Menon v. Stale of Bombay, [1951] S.C.R. 228, Bahran Khurslud Pt>sikake v. State of Bo1nbav, £19551 1 S.C.R. 613. Bhikft(l/i Narain\n\nUhakras v. Stale 0/ M.P. [1955] 2 S.'C.R . 589, M. P. V. SwrdararaiTI(Jier v. 'Stale of A..P., [19j8] S .C .R . 1422. Deep Char.-1 v. State -of U.P. and Others, [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R . 8, Mahendra l.tll Jaini's case [1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 912 and lu~:awrath v. Autlroried Officer, Ltmd Reforms, [19711\n\n2 S.C.C. 893, referred lo.\n\n(h) .Therefore, even assuming that under Art. 226 of the Constitution te respondent was entitled to move the High Court and seek a remedy for Infringement of its ordinary right to property, the impugned provisions could not be treated as uon-esr. and the respondent cannot take the plea that his rights to property are being taken away or abridged without the authority of !aw. [7n H-773 A]\n\n(3) The definition of 'establishment' in S. 2(4) does not violate Art. 14 and does not make the impugned provisions void.\n\n(a) The equal protection of the l aws is a piedge of the protection of equal taws. But courts have resolved the contradictory demands of legislative specialisation and constitutional generality by the doctrine of reasonable classification. (782 BGl\n\n(bl A reas.onable classification is one which includes all who are similarly situated, and none who are not, with respect to the purpose of the law [782\n\nC-D]\n\n(c) A cl as.ification is underinclusive when all wno are included in the class are tainted with the mischief, but there are others also tainted wbooi the\n\nclasification does not include>.\n\nA classification is over-inclusive when it includes not only those who arc similarly situated with respect to the purpose but also others who are not so situated. [782 D-FJ\n\n(d) The Court has recognised the very real difficulties under which legislatures operate difficulties ariinJr out of both the nature of the leislative\n\npr('(:C~~ aild of the societv which legislation attempt..~ nerenniallv to rPShape and it has reCused to strike down indiscriminately all legislation embodying-\n\n\n{1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nclassificatory inequality like the one here under consideration. The legislature cannot be required to impose upon administrative agendes tasks which cannot be carried out or which must be carried out on a large scale at a single stroke.\n\nThe piecemeal approach to a general problem permitted by under-inclusive classifications is JUstified especially when it is conscdered that legisl::ttion dealing with such problem5 is usually an experimental matter. It is impossible to tell how successful a particular approach may be, what dislocation may occur, what evasions may develop or what new evils. might be generated in the attempt. A legislation may take one step at a time addressing itself to the phase of the\n\nproblm which seems most acute to the legislative mind. Therefore, a legislature might select only one phase of one field for application of a reml!dy.\n\nOnce: an objective is decided to be within the legislative competence the working out of classification should not be impeded by judicial negatives. The courts attitude\n\ncannot be that the state either has to regulate nll busineses or even all rel::tted businesses and in the same way, or not at all. The court must b:! fiWare of its own remoteness and lack of familiarity with the local problems. Cla5Sification is dependent on the particular needs and specific difficulties of the community which are beyond the easy ken of the court, and which the legislature alone wa~ competent to make. Consequently, lacking the capacity to inform itself fuliy about the peculiarities of a J>articular local situation, a C()Urt should hesitate to dub the legislative classification as irrational.\n\n[782 H-783 G;\n\n784 A-D;\n\n786 G-H; 787 A)\n\nMissouri, K&T, Rly. v. M.-ry, [1904] 194 U.S. 267, 269, West ChM Hotrl Company v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400, Two Guys from HarriSOI1Allentowll\n\nv. Me Ginley 366, U.S. 582, 592, Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 56 LEd. 175, 180, Tianer v. Texas 310 U.S. 141 and Carmiclrel v. Soutltem Coal & Coke .co., 201. U.S. 495, referred to,\n\n(e) The question whether, under Art. 14, a classification is reasonable or unreasonable mu.st, in the ultimate analysis depend upon the judicial approach to the problem. The more complicated society becomes, the greater the diversity of its problems and the more does legislation direct itself to the diversities.\n\nIn the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good I\"casons for judicial self-restraint if not official deference to legislative judgment. The Courts have only the power to destroy but not to ree()nstruct. When to this are added the complexity of economic regula!ion, the uncert::tinty, the liability to error, the bewildering conflict of th.e cx!)erts, and the number of times the judges bave\n\nbeen overruled by events self limitation can be seen to be the path t~ judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability. [784 F-785 D)\n\n(f) Laws regulating economic activity should be viewed differently from Jaws which touch and concern freedom of speech and religion, voting procreation, rights with respect to criminal procedure etc. Judicial dl!fetence to legislature in instances of economic regulation is explained by th~ argument that rationality of a classification depends upon local conditions ai>out which local legislative or administrative bodies would be better informed th=:n a wort.\n\n[784 D-E; 786 A]\n\n(g) Tn the present case, the purpose of the Act is to gt unpaiJ accumulations for utilising them for the welfare of labour in general.\n\nH is from the factories that the greatest amount of unpaid accumulations could be collected and since the factories are bound to maintain records from which the amount of unpaid accumulations could be easily ascertained the legislature t-rought all the factories within the definition of 'establishment'. It then addressed itself to other establishments but thought that establishments employing less than 50 persons need not be brought within the purview of the definition as unpaid accumulations in those establishments would be tess and might not be sufficient to med the administrative expenses of collection and as many of them might not be maintaining records from which the amount of unpaid accumulations could be ascertained. Adminirative convenience in the collection of unpaid accumulations is a. factor to be taken into account in adjudging whether the classification\n\nis reasonable. The reason why government establishments other than factories were not included in the definition is that there are hardly any establishments run by the Central or State Government.\n\n[783 FG: 785 E-H; 786 A-B)\n\n(h) The justification for including tramways and motor omnibuses within the purview of the definition is that the legislature of the State of Bombay, when it\n\nGUJARAT V. AMBICA MILLS LTD. (MatfleW, },) 765\n\nenacted the Act in 1953, must have had reason to think that unp:lid accumulations in these concerns would be large, b:cause, they usually employed a large amount of labour force, and they were bound to keep records of the wages earned and paid. [786 C-D] ·\n\n(i) Whether a court can remove the unreasonablenss of a cl:lssilication when it is under-inclusive by extending the ambit of the legislation to cover the class omitted to be included, or by applyins the doctrine of severability delete a clause which makes a classification over-inclusive, are matters on which it is not necessary to express any final opinion because the inclusion of tramway or motor omnibus service in the definition of 'establishment' does not make the classification unrearonab)e having regard to the purpose of the legislation. [788 A-C)\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDZCTIOX: Civil Appeals Nos. 1931 to 1933/68.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated the 19thj20thj2lst day of July 1965 of the Gujarat High Court at Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application Nos. 579 to 581 of 1963.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 2271 of 1968.\n\nFrom the judgment and order dated the 19th/20th/21st day of July 1965, of the Gujarat High Court at Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application No. 836 of 1962.\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 492 to 512 of 1969.\n\nFrom the Judgment and order dated the 21st July; 1965 of the Gujarat High Court at Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application Nos. 1069/62, 20, 21, 40, 49, 476, 699, 574 of 1963, 1070 to 1075 of 1962, 1086 to 1089 of 1962, 516, 727 and 728 of 1963.\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 1114 to 1129 of 1969. \\From the judgment and order dated the 21st July, 1965 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Applications Nos. 458 to 473 of 1963.\n\nS. T. Desai, S. K. Dholakia and S. P. Nayar, for the appellants. (In all the appeals).\n\nV. B. Patel, D. N. Misra, J. B. Dadacllanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for respondent no. 1 (in C. As. 1115, 1118, 1125/ 69). - Ram Punjwani, P. C. Bhartari, J. B. Dada&hanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for respondent no. 1 (in C.-A. 1931/68).\n\nP. C. Bhartari, J. B. Dadacllanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, respondent no. 1 (in C. As. 1931-33/68, 49~494, 497, 499,\n\n500-502, 504-507, 511-512j69, 1117; 1122, 1124 and 1126-27/69).\n\nM. C. Setalvad, V. B. Patel and I. N. Shroff, for respondent no. 1 (in C.A. 2271/68).\n\nV. B. Patel and I. N. Shroff, for respondent no. 1 (In C.As. 1114, 1116, 1119 and 1128j69).\n\nM. C. Bhandare and M. N. Shroff, for intervener.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by MATHEW, I.-The facts are similar in all.these cases. We prop9se to deal with Civil Appeal No. 2271 of 1968.\n\nThe decisii.m. le ~:..:!l. dispose of the other appeals.\n\nThe first respondent, a company registered under the Companies Act, filed a Writ petition in the High Court of Gujarat. In that\n\n\n(1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\npetition it impugned the provisions of sections 3, 6A and 7 of the A Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and s: 13 of the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund (Gujarat Ext:msion and Amendment) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the First Amendment Act) and rules 3 and 4 of the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Rules, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) as unconstitutional and prayed for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus\n\nor other arpropriate writ or direction against the respondents in the B writ petition to desist from enforcing the direction in the notice dated August 2, 1962 of respondent No. 3 to the writ petition requiring the petitioner-1 si respondent to pay the unpaid accumulations specified therein.\n\nThe High Court held that s. 3 (1) of the Act in so far as it relates to unpaid accumulations specified in s. 3 (2) (b), s. 3 ( 4) and s. 6A of the Act and rules 3 and 4 of the Rules was unconstitutional and void.\n\nIn order to appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to state the backgrom, dof the amendment made by the Legislature of Gujarat in the Act.\n\nThe Act was passed by the legislature of the then State of Bombay b 1953 with a view to provide for the constitution of a fund for financing the activities for promoting the. welfare of labour in the State of Bombay.\n\nSection 2(10) of the Act defined \"unpaid accumlarion\" as meaning all payments due to the employees but not made to them within a period of three years from the date on which they becac due, whether before or after the commencement of the Act, including the wages and gratuity legally payable, but not including the amount of contribution, if any, paid by any employer to a Provident Fund established under the Employees' Provident Fund Act, 1952. Section 3 ( l) provided that the State Government shall constitute a fund caiJed the Labour Welfare Fund and that notwithstanding anything contained in any other Jaw for the time being in force, the sums specified in subsection (2) shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section ( 4) and sec- : ion 6A be paid in to the fund.\n\nClause (b) of sub-section (2) of s. 3 provided that the Fund shall consist of \"all unpaid accumulations\".\n\nSection 7 (1) provided that the fund shall vest in and be applied by the Board of Trustees subject to the provisions and for the purposes of the Act. Section 19 gave power to the State Government to make rules and in the exercise of that power, the State Government made the Rules.\n\nRules 3 and 4 concernecf the machinery for enforcing the provisions of the Act in regard to fines and unpaid accumulations.\n\nIn Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co, Ltd.\n\nv. The State of Bombay and Others(l) this Court held that the provisions of sections 3 ( 1) and 3 (2) (b) were invalid on the ground that they violated the fundamental right of the employer under article 19(1)(0. The reasoning of the Court was that the effect of the relevant provisions of the Act was to transfer to the Board the debts due by the employer to the employees free from the bar of limitation without discharging the employer from his liability to the employees and that s.3(1) here\n\nfore operated to take away the moneys of the employer wtthoul releasing him from his liability to the employees.\n\nThe Court also\n\n(1) {1958] S.C.R. 112~\n\nGUJAII.AT v: AMBICA MILLS LTD. (Mathew, ],) 767\n\nfound that there was no machinery provided for adjudication of the claim of the employees when. the amounts were required to be paid to the fund.\n\nThe State sought. to justify the provisions of the' Act as ne relating to abandoned property and, therefore, by their very nature, they could not be held to violate the rig!tts of any person either under article 19(l)(f) or article 31 (2). The Court did not. accept the contention of the Sate but held that the purpose of a legislation with respect to abandoned property being in the first instance to safeguard the property for the benefit of the true owners and the State taking it over only in the absence of such claims, the law which vests the property absolutely in the Stat.e without regard to the claims of the true owners cannot be considered as one relating to abandoned property.\n\nOn May 1, 19601 the State of Bo!Jlbay was bifurcated into the States of Maharas.htra and Gujarat. The legislature of Gujarat thereafter enacted to First Amendment Act making various amendments in the Act, some of them with retrospective effect. The First Amendment Act was intended to remedy the defects pointed out in the decision of this Court in the Bombay Dyeing Case(l).. The preamble to the First Amendment Act recites that \"it is epedient to constitute a Fund for the financing of .activities to promote welfare of labour in the State of Gujarat, for conducting such activities and for certain other purposes\".\n\nSection 2(2) defines 'employee'. Section 2(3) defines 'employer' as any person who employs either directly or through another person either on behalf of himself or any other person, one or more employees in an establishment and includes certain other persons: Section 2 ( 4) defines 'establishment' and that sub-section as amended reads :-\n\n\"2 ( 4) 'Establishment' means :\n\n(i) A factory;\n\n(ii) A Tramway or motor omnibus service; and\n\n(iii) Any establishment including a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960, and a . charitable or other trust, whether registered under the Bombay Public. Trusts Act, 1950, or not, which carries on any business or trade or arey work in connection with or ancillary thereto and which employs or on any working day during the preceding twelve months employed more than fifty persons; but does not include an establishment (not being a factory) of the Central or any State Government.\" Sub-section (10) of s. 2 defines 'unpaid accumulations' :\n\n'\"unpaid accumulations' means all payments due to the employees but not made to them within a period of three years from the date on which -they became due whether before or after the commencement of this Act including the H wages and gratuity legally payable but not including the amount of contribution if any, paid by an employer to a\n\n(I) [1958} S.C.R. 1122. 6-L 84 Sup C 1/75\n\nS1,]PR£M~ COURT .REPORTS i1974] .3 S.C.R,\n\n- providnt fund established under the Employees' Provident\n\nFunds Act, 1952'.', .\n\nSection 3 is . retrospectively amended and the amended section in its material part provides that the State Government shall constitute a fu...W ailled the Labour Welfare Fund and that the Fund shall consist of, among other things, all unpaid accumulations. It provides that the sums specified shall be collected by such agencies and in such manner and the accounts of the fund shall be maintained and audited in such maner as may be prescribed. The ection further. provides that notwithstanding anything ontained in any law for the time being in force or any contract or instrument, all unpaid accumulations\n\nshall be collecteq by such agencies and in s.uch manner as may be prescribed and be paid in the first instance to the Board which shall keep a separate account therefor untU claims thereto have been decided in the manner provided in s.6A. Section 6A is a new section introduced retrospectively in the Act .and sub-section (1) and (2) of thai section state that all unpaid accumulations shall be deemed to be\n\n:-:';:-.::::oned property and that any unpaid accumulations paid to the Board in accordance with the provisiotts of s.3 shall, on such payment, discharge an eloyer of the liability to make payment to an employee in respect thereof, but to the extent only of the amount paid to the Board and that the liability to make payment to the emplovee to the extent ttforesaid shall, subject to the other ptovisions of the section, be deemed to be tramferred to the. Board. Sub-section (3) provides that as soon as possible after any unpaid accumulation is paid to the Board, the Board shall, by a public notice, call . upon interested employees to submit to the Board their claims for any payment due to them. Sub-section ( 4) provides that such public notice shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed and that it shall be affixed on the notice board or in its absence on a conspicuous part of the premises, of each establishment in which the unpaid accumulations were earned and shall be published in the Official Gazette and also in any two newspapers in the language commonly understood in the area in which such establishment is situated, or in such other manner as may be prescribed, regard being had. to the amount of the claim. Sub-section (5)states that after the notice is first affixed and published under sub-section ( 4) it shall be again affixed and published\n\nfrom time to time for a period of three years from the date on which it was first affixed and published, in the manner provided in that subsection in the months of June and December each year. Sub-section\n\n(6) states that a certificate of the Board to the effect that the provisi\\lns of sub-section (4) at)d (5) were complied with shall be conclusive evidence thereof. Sub-section (7) provides that any claim received whether in answer to the notice or otherwise within a period of. four years from the date of the first publicatioR of the notice in respect o( such claim, shall be transferred by the Board to the authority appointed under s. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, having jurisdiction in the area in which the factory or establishment is situated, and the Authority shall proceed to adjudicate upon and decide sud1 da:.,. nJ that in bearing such claim the Authority shall have the powers conferred by and shall fo1Iow the procedure (in so far as it is applicable) . followed in giving effect to the provisions of that Act. Sub-section (8)\n\nGUJARAT v. AMBICA MILLS LTD' •. (Mathew, /,) 769\n\nstates that if in deciding any claim under sub-section (7), the Authority allows the whole or part of such claim, it shall declare that the. unpaid accumulation in relation to which the claim is made shall, .to the extent\n\nto which the claim is allowed ceases to be abandoned property and snall order the Board to pay to the claimant the amount of the claim as allowed by it and the Board shall make payment accordingly : provided that the Board shall not be liable topay any sum in excess of that paid under sub-section ( 4) of s.3 to the Board as unpaid accumulations, in respect of the claim.\n\nSub-section (9) provides for an appeal against the decision rejecting any claim. Sub-section (10) provides. that the Board shall comply with any oi:der made in appeal.\n\nSub-section ( 11) makes the decision in appeal final and conclusive as to the right to receive payment, the liablity of the Board to pay ana also. as to the amount, if any: and sub-section (12) states that if no claim is made within the, time specified in sub-section (7) or aclaim or part thereof has been 'rejected, then the unpaid accumulations in respect of such claim shall accrue to and vest in the State as bQna\n\nvacantia and shall thereafti!r without further assurance be deemed to be transferred to ana form part of the Fund.\n\nSection 7(1) provides that the Fund shall vest in and be held and applied by the Board as Trustees subject to the prqvisions and for the purposes of the Act and the moneys in the Fund shall be _utilized\n\nby the Board to defray the cost of carrying out tneasures which may be specified by the State Government. fro~ time to time to promote the . welfare of labour and of their dependents.\n\nSubsection (2) of s.7 specifies various measures for the benefit of employees in general ' on which the moneys in the Fund may be expended by the Board.\n\nSection 11 provides for the appointment of an officer called the Welfare Commissioner and defines his powers and duties.\n\nSection 19 confers rule-making power on the State Government.\n\nSection 22 empowers the State Government by notification in the official gazette to exempt any cJass ofestablishment from aU or any of the provisions of the Act subject to such conditions as may be specified in. the notification.\n\nDuring the pendency of the writ petition before the High Court, 1he Gujarat Legislature passed the Bombay Labour Welfare Func:l (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1962 on February 5, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Second Amendment Act) introducing sub-section\n\n(13) in s.6A with retrospective effect from the date of commencement of the Act That sub-section provids as follows :\n\n'' ( 13) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall apply to unpaid accumulations not already paid to the Board;\n\n(a) in respect of which no separate accounts have been maintained so that the unpaid claims of employ('es are not traceable. or ·\n\n(b) which are proved to have been spent before the sixth\n\ndy of December, _1961,\n\n\n(1974) 3 '>.C:.R.\n\nand accordingly such unpai~ accumulations . shall not be A liable to be collected and pa1d under sub-sectton ( 4) of section 3\". .\n\nThe State Govcrnn1ent, in the cxercis~ of its rulc-makig power under s. 19 amended the Rules by amendmg ulc and addug a new rule 3A setting out the particulars to be contamed rn the pubhc notice issued under s. 6A (3) B The first respondent raised several contcnions before the High Court but the Court rejected aU except two ot them and they were :\n\n(1) that the impugned provisions violate~ the fundamental right of citizen-employers and employees uder arttclc 19 (1) (f) an~, t!Jerefore, the provisions were void under arttclc 13 (2) of the Conshtutton and hence there was no law, and so, the notice issued by the Welfare Commissioner was without the authority of law; and (2) that discrimination C was writ Iarac in the definition of 'establishment' in s. 2 ( 4) and since the definitiOJ~ permeates through every part of the impungcd provisions and is an integral part of the impugned provis!ons, the impugned provisions were violative of article 14 and were VOid.\n\nSo, the two questions in this appeal arc, whether the first respondent was competent to challenge the validity of the impugned provifons on the basis that they violated the fundamental right undr article 19 (I) (f) of citizen-employers or employees and tbu.s show that the law was void and non-existent and, therefore, the action taken against it was bad; and whether the definition of 'establishment' iu s. 2(4) violated the fundamental right of the respondent under article\n\n14 and the impugned provisions were void for that reason.\n\nDefore adverting to these questions, ir is necessary to see what the Act, after it was amended, has purported to do.\n\nBy s. 6A(l) it was dedarcd that unpaid accumulations shall b.: deemed to. be abandoned property and that the Board shaJJ taken them over. As soon as the Board takes over the unpaid accumulations treating them a.s abandoned property, notice as provided in s. 6A will have to~ published an.d claims invited.\n\nSulrsections (3) to (6) of s. 6A pronde for a pu?ltc otice calling upon interested employees to sumit to the Board thetr cJaHns for any payment due to them and sulrsecttoo.~\n\n(7~ to (~ 1) ol ' 6A Jay down the machinery for adjudication of claims htch m!gh~ be rccei\\ed in pursuance to the public notice. lt is oni, Y Jf ~0 clatm IS made fr a period Of 4 years from the date of the publJatton of the first nottcc, or, if a claim is malic but rejected wholly or tn part,. that te State appropriates the unpaid accumulations as bota vacamla. .It s not as if unpaid accumulations become bona vaccmtw on the c1:p1ratton of three years They are no doubt deemed to bl! ~~; 1ndncd propcry under s .. 6A(l) •. but thy arc not'appropriah:d ~: .a l acama Untd after claimS are IOVitcd in pursuance to rubfl~; OIJtla< and dLposcd of. ·\n\ncct -~~ o~on law, abandoned personal property could not be the sub\n\nJ . /.itltheat. It could only be appropriated by the sovereign as bona ; c\"! 1f_J)e Ho!dsworth:s History of English Law. 2nd ed., vol . . 1 ' -. ; ' The So\\eretgn has a prcrogatiVI! right tO aprropn:Lle\"\n\nJ l , I\n\nI I\n\nI I I I I l 1\n\n. • ..\n\n. - .. ·· ' -~· ;'\n\nGUJARAT v. AMBICA MILLS LTD. (Mathew, J.) 711\n\nbona vacantia. And abandoned property can be appropriated by the Sovereign as bona vacantia.\n\nUnpaid accumulations represent the obligation of the 'employers' to the 'employees' and they are the property of the emplqyecs.\n\nIn other words, what is being treated as a!landoned property is the obligiJ,· tion to the employees owed by the employers and which is property from the standpoint of the employees. No doubt, when we look at the scheme of the legislation from a p~; actical point of view, what is being . treated as abandoned property is the money which the employees are entitled to get from the employers and whatthe'Board takeS over is the obligation of the employers to pay the amount due to the employees in consideration of the moneys paid by the employers to the Board. The State, after taking the n;10ney, becomes liable to mak~ the payment to the employees to the extent of the amount received. Whether the liability assumed by the State to the employees is an altogether new lia\n\nbility or the old liability of the employers is more a matter of academic interest than of practical consequence.\n\nWhen the moneys . representing the unpaid accumulations are paid to the Board, the liability of the employers to make payment to the employees in respect of their claims agamst the employers would be dis charged to the extent of the amount paid to the Board and on such lia bility beitlg transferred to the Board,. the debts or claims to that extent cannot thereafter he enforced against the employer.\n\nWe think that if unpaid accumulations are not claimed within a total period of 7 years, the mactivity on the part of the employees would furnish adequate basis for the administration by State of the unasserted claims Clr demands.\n\nWe cannot say that the period of 7 years allowed to the employees .for the purpose of claiming unpaid accumulations is an unreasonably short one which will result in the infringement c~ any constitutional rights of the employees. And, in the absence of some\n\nJ>~.:rsuasive reason, which is lacking here, we see no reason to think that the State will be, in fact, less able or less willing to pay the amounts when it has taken them over. We cannot also assume that the mere\n\nubstitution of the State as the dbtor will deprive the employees of their property or impose on them any unconstitutional burden. And, in the absence of a showing of injury, actual or threatened, there can be no constitutional argument against the taking over of the unpaid accumulations by the State. Since the employers are the debtors of the employees, they can interpose no objection if the State is lawfUlly entitled t() demand the payment, for, in that case, payment of the debt to the State under the statute releases. the employers of their liability o the employees.\n\nAs regards notice, we are of the view that all persons having property located within a state and subject to its dominion must\n\ntake npte of its statutes affecting control and disposition of such .pro. perty and the procedure prescribed for these PuiPoses. The vanous modes ot notice prescribed in s. 6A are sufficient o give reasonable infonnatioit to the employees to come forward and claim the amount if they. really, want to do so.\n\nBe that as it may, we do not, however, think it necessary to consi der whether the High Court was right in its view that the impugned p~\n\n\nvisions violated the fundamental rights of the citizen-employers or emplo- A yees, for, it is a wise tradition with courts that they will not adjudge on the constitutionality of a statute except when they are called upon to do so when legal rights of the litigants are in actual controversy and as part of this rule is the principle that one to whom the application of a statute in constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that it must also be taken as applying_ to other persons or other sttuations m which its application might be unconstitutional [see Uniled States v.\n\nB Raina.Y(l)J.\n\n\"A person ordinarily is precluded from challenging the constitutionality of governmental action by invoking the rights of others and it is not sufficient that the statute or administrative regulation is unconstitutional as to other persons or classes\n\nof persons; it must affirmatively appear that the person attackc ing the statute comes within the class of persons affected by it.\"\n\n(see Corpus Juris Secundum,_ vol. 16, pp. 236-7).\n\nWe, however, proceed on the assumption that the impugned provisions abridge the fundamental right of citizen-employers and citi'l; enemployees undcr article 19 ( 1) (f) in order to decide the further question and that is, whether, on that assumption, the first respondent could\n\ncJaim that the law was void as against the non-citizen. employers or employees under article 13(2) and further contend that the non-citizen employers have been deprived of their property without the autb_ority of Jaw, as, ex hypothesi a void law is a nullity.\n\nIt is settled by the decisions of this Court that a Corporation is not a citizen for the purposes of article 19 and has, therefore, no fundamental right under that article (see Tata EnQineering and Locomotiv~ Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others(2), R. C. Cooper v. Union of India(&).\n\nThe same view was taken in Bennett Coleman & Co. etc., etc. v. Union of India and Others(()].\n\nAs already stated, the High Court found that the impugned provisions, in s() far as they abridged the fundamental rights of the citizen~ employers and employees under article 19 ( 1) (f) were void under article 13(2) and eve.n if the respondcnt:company had no fundamental right under article 19(1) (f), it had the ordinary right to hold and dispose of its property, and that the right cannot be taken away or even affected except under the authority of a 1aw.\n\nExpressed in another way, the reasoning of the Court was that since the impugned provision~ became void as they abridged the fundamental right under' article 19(1) (f) of the citizen-employers and employees the law was void and non-est, and therefore, the first respondent was entitled to challenge the. notice issued by the Welfare Commissioner demanding the unpaid accumulation as unauthorized by any law.\n\nThe first respondent, no doubt, }Jas the ordinary right of every per son in the country to hold and dispose of property and that right, if\n\n(I) 362 U.S. 17.\n\n\n(4) [1972] 2 s.c.c. 788.\n\nGUJARAT y, AMBICA MILLS LTD. (Mathew, ],) 773\n\nA taken away or even affected by the act of an Authority without the authority of law, would be illegaL That would give rise to a justiciable issue which can be agitated in a proceeding under article 226.\n\nThe real question, therefore, is, even if a law takes away or abridges the fundamental right of citizens under article 19 ( 1 ){f), whether it would b~ void and therefore non-est as respects non-citizens ?\n\nIn Keshava Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay(l) the question was whether a prosecution commenced before the coming into force of the Constitution could be continued after the Constitution came into force as the Act in question there became void as violating article 19 (1) (a) and. 19 ( 2) . Das, J. who delivered the majority judgment was of the view that the prosecution .could be continued on the ground that the provisions of the Constitution including article 13 (1) were not retrospective.\n\nThe learned judge said that after the commencement of the Constitution, no existing law could be allowed to stand in the way of the exercise of fundamental rights, that such inconsistent laws were not wiped off or obliterated from the statute book and that the statute would operate in respect of all matters or events which took place before the Constitution came into force and that it is also operated after the Constitution came into force and would remain in the statute book as operative so far as non-citizens are concerned.\n\nThis decision is clear that even though a law which is inconsistent with fundamental rights under article 19 would become void after the commencement of the Constitution, the law would still continue in force in so far as non-citizens are concerned.\n\nThis decision takes the view that the word 'void' in article 13(1) would not have the effect of wiping ot1t pre-Constitution laws from the statute book, that they will continue to be operative so far as non-citizens are concerned, notwithstanding the fact that they are inconsistent with the fundamental rights of citizens and therefore become void under article 13 (1 ) .\n\nIn Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. State of Bombay(\") the question was about the scope of article 13 ( 1) . This Court had held that certain .P.rovisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 (a pre-Constitution\n\nAct), in so far as they prohibited the possession, use and consumption of medicinal preparations were void as violating article 19(1) (f). The appellant was prosecuted under the said Act and he pleaded that he had taken medicine containing alcohol.\n\nThe controversy was whether the burden of proving that fact was on him. It became necessary to consider the legal effect of the declaration made by this Court that s. 13 (b) of the said Act in so far as it affected liquid medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol was in valid as it infringed article 19 ( 1) (f) .\n\nAt the first hearing all the judges were agreed that a declaration by a Court that part of a section was invalid did not repeal or amend that section.\n\nVenkatarama Aiyar, J. with whom Jagannadhadas, J. as inclined to agree, held that a distinction must be made between unconstitutionality arising from lack of legislative competence and that arising from a violation of constitutional limitations on legislative\n\n(1) [1951] S.C.R. 228.\n\n(2) [i955]1 S.C.R. 613.\n\n\n[1974J 3 S.C.R.\n\npower. According to him, if the law is made without legislative com- A petence, it was a nullity; a law violating a constitutional prohibition enacted for the benefit of the public generally was also a nullity; but a law violating a constitutional prohibition enacted for individuals was not a nullity but was merely unenforceable. At the second hearing of the case, Mahajan, J. after referrring to Madhava Menon's _Case(1), said that for determining the rights and obligations of citizens, the part declared vbid should be notionally taken to be obliterated from the B section for all intents and purposes though it may remain written on\n\nth~ statute book and be a good law when a question arises for determination of rights and obligations incurred prior to January 26, 1950, and also for the determination of rights of persons who have not been given fundamental rights by the Constitution. Das, J. in his dissenting judgment held that to hold that the invalid part was obliterated would be tantamount to saying covertly that the judicial declaration had to C that extent amended the section. At p. 659, the learned Judge observed :\n\n''It is beyond all dispute that it is for the Court to judge whether the restrictions imposed by any existing law or any part thereof on the fundamental rights of citizens are reason- D able or unreasonable in the interest of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.\n\nIf the Court holds that the restrictions are unreasonable then\n\nthe Act or the part thereof which imposes such unreasonable restrictions comes into onflict and becomes inconsistent with the fundamental right confrred on the citizens by article 19(1) (f) and is by article 13(1) rendered void, not in toto E or for all purposes or for all persons but 'to the extent of such inconsistency' i.e., to the extent it is inconsistent with the exercise of that fundamental right by the citizens. This is plainly the position, as I see it.\"\n\nMahajan, CJ. rejected the distinction between a law void for lack of legislative power and a law void for violating a constitutional fetter cir F limitation on legislative power. Both these declarations, according to the learned Chief Justice, of unconstitutionality go to the root of the power itse!f and there is no real distinction between them and they represent but two aspects of want of legislative power.\n\nIn Bhikhaii Narain Dhakras v. State of M.P.(2 ) the question was G whether the C.P. and Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947, amended s. 4.3 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, by introducing provisions which authorized the Provincial Government to take up the entire motor transport business in the Province and run it in competition with and even to the exclusion of motor transport operators. These provisions, though valid when enacted,· became void on the coming into force of the Constitution, as they vio1ated article 19 (l )(g). On H June 18, t9S 1, the Constitution was amended so as to authorize the\n\n(1) [19Sl] S.C.R. 228.\n\n(2) l19SS] 2 S.C.R. S89.\n\nGUJ'ARAT v. AMBICA MILLS LTD •. (Mathew,·/.) 775\n\nState to carry on business \"whether to the exclusion, complete or par tial. or citizens or otherwise''. A notification was issued after the amendment and the Court was conc; erned with the validity of the notification. The real question before the Court was that although s. 43 was void between January 26, 1950, and June 18, 1951, the amend-· ment of the article 19(6) had the affect of removing the constitutional invalidity of s. 43 which, from the date of amendment, became valid and operative. After referring to the meaning given to tlle word 'void' jn Keshava Madhva Menon's Case (I) 1 Das, Acting C.J. said for the Court:\n\n\"All laws, existing or future, which are inconsistent with the J?rovisions of Part III of our Constitution are, by the express provision of article 13, rendered void 'to the extent of such , mconsistency'. Such laws were not dead for all purposes. They existed for the purposes of pre-Constitution rights and liabilities and they remained operative, even after the Constitution, as against non-citizens. 1It is only as aainst the citizens that they remained in a dormant or monbund condition\" (at pp. 599·600).\n\nIn M. P. V. Sundararamaier v. State of A.P.(~), Venkatarama Aiyar, J. said that a law made without legislative competence and a law violative of constitutional limitations on legislative power were both unconstitutional and both had the same reckoning in a court of law; and they were both unenforceable but it did not follow from this that both laws were of the same quality and character and stood on the same footing for all purposes.\n\nThe propositipn laid down by the learned Judge was that if a law is enacted by a legislature on a topic not within its competence, the law was a nullity but if the law was on a topic within its competence but if it violated some constitutional prohibition, the law was onJt unenforceable and not a nullity. In other words, a law if it lacks legislative competence was absolutely null and void and a subsequent cession of the legislative topic would not revive the law which was still-born an.d the law would have to be reenacted; but a law within the legislative competance but violative of constitutional limitation was un-enforceable but once the limitation was removed, the law became effective. The learned judge said that the observa~ ·\n\ntions of Mahnjan, J, in Pesikaka's c<1se(3) that qua citizens that part of s.13(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, which bad been declared invalid by this Court ''had to be regarded as null and void\"' could not in the context be construed as implying that the impugned Jaw must be regarded as nonest so as to be incapable of taking effect when the bar was removed. He summed up the result of the autho~ rities as follows :\n\n\"Where an enactment is unconstitutional in part but valid as to the rest, assuming of course that the two portions are severable, it cannot be held to have been wiped out of the statute book as it admittedly must remain there for the purpose of enforcement of the valid portion thereof, and\n\n(1) [1951] S.C.R 223.\n\n(2) [1958] S.C.R. 1422.\n\n(3) [19SS]I S.C.R. 613.\n\n\nbeing on the statute book, even that portion which is unenforceable on the ground that it is unconstitutional will operate proprio vigore when the Constitutional bar is removed, and there is no need for a fresh legislation.\"\n\nIn Deep Chand v. Siate of U. P. and Others(!) it was held that\n\na post-Constitution law is void from its inception but that a pre- Constitution law having been validly enacted would continue in forco B so far as non-citizens are concerned after the Constitution came intd force.\n\nThe Court further said that there is no distinction in the meaning. of the word 'void' in article 13(1) and in 13(2) and that it connoted the same concept but, since from Jts inception the post- Constitution lay is void, the law cannot be resuscitated without reenactment. Subba Rao, J. who wrote the majority judgment said after citing the observations of Das, Actg.\n\nC.J. in Keshava Madhavai C Menon's Case(supra):\n\n\"The second part of the observation directly applies only to a case covered by article 13 ( 1) , for the learned' Judges say that the laws exist for the purposes of preconstitution rights and liabilities and they remain operative even after the Constitution as against noncitizens. The D said observation could not obviously apply to pct Constitu tution laws. . Even so, it is said that by a parity of rasoning the post-Constitution laws are also void to the extent of\n\nthir repugnancy and thereforethe law in respect of non~ citizens will be on the statute-book and by the application of the doctrine of eclipse, the same result should flow in its case also.\n\nThere is some plausibility in this argument, E but it ignore'> one vital principle, viz:, the existence or the\n\nnonexistence of legislative power or competency at the time the law is made governs the situation\" (p. 38).\n\nDas, C.J. dissented.\n\nHe was of the view that a post~Constitution law may infringe either a fundamental right conferred on citizens only or a fundamental right conferred on any person, citizen or non- F citizen and that in the. first case the law will not stand in the way of the exercise by the citizens of that fundamental right and, therefore, will not have .any operation .on. the rights of the citizens, but it will be quite effective as regards non-citizens.\n\nIn Mahendra Lal laifli v. The State of U.P. and Others(2), the court was of the view that the meaning of the word 'void' is the same G both in article 13 ( 1) and article 13 ( 2) and that .the application of the doctrine of eclipse in the case of .pre-Constitution laws and not in the case of post-Constitution laws does not depend upon t}le two parts of article 13; \"that it arises from the inherent difference between article 13(1) andarticle 13(2) arising from the fact that one is dealing with pre~Constitution laws, and the other is dealing with\n\npost~Constitution laws, with the result that in one case the laws being\n\nnot still-born the doctrine of eclipse will apply while in the other H\n\n(I) [1959] Supp, 2 S.C.R. 8.\n\n(2) [1963] Supp. 1 S. C: R. 912.\n\nGUJARAT v. AMBICA MILLS LTb, (Mathew, 1.) 777\n\ncase the law being stillpborn there will be no scope for the application of the doctrine of eclipse.\" ·\n\nIf the meaning of the word 'void' in article 13 ( 1) is the same as. its meaning in article 13 ( 2), it is difficult to understand why a pre- Constitution law which takes awayor abridges the rights under a_rticle 19 should remain. operative even after the Constitution came into force as regards nonpcitizens and a post-Constitution law which takes away or abridges them should not be operative as respects noncitizens.\n\nThe fact that pre-Constitution law was valid when enacted can afford no reason why it should remain operative as respects noncitizens after the Constitution came into force as it became void ort account of its inconsisteny wlth the provisions of Part III.\n\nTherefore, the real reason why it remains operative as against non-citizens is that it is void only to the extent. of its inconsistency with the rights conferred under Article 1.9 and that its voidness is, therefore, confined to citizens, as, ex. hypotsi, the law became inconsistent with theirfun9amental rights alone. If that be so, we see no reason why a post-Constitution law which takes away' or abridges the rights conferred by article 19 should not be 'operative in regard to noncitizens\n\nas it is void cjnly to the extent of the contravention of the rights conterred on citizens, namely, those under article 19.\n\nArticle 13(2) is an injunction to the 'state' not to pass any law which tkes away or abridges the fundamental rights conferred by Part III and the consequence of the contravention of the injunction is that the law would be void to the extent of the contravention. The expression 'to the extent of the contravention' in the sub-article can cnly mean, to the extent of the contravention of the rights conferred under that part. Rights do . not exist in vacuum.\n\nThey must always inhere in some person whether natural or juridical and, under ParU. llf, they inhere even in fluctuating bodies like a linguistic or religious minorities or denominations.\n\nAnd, when the sub-article says that the law would be void \"to the extent of the contravention\", it can only mean to the extent of the contravention of the rights conferred on persons, minorities or denominations, as the case rna~ be.\n\nJl, l.st as a pre-Constitution law taking away. or abridging the fundamental rights under article 19 remains operative after the Constitution came into force . .as respects non-citizens as it is not inconsistent with their fundamental rights, so also a post-Constitution law offending article 19,\n\nremaiiit. operative s against non-citizens as it is not in contravention of any of their fundamental rights. The same scheme permeates both the sub-articles, namely, to make the law void in article 13(1) to the extent of the inconsistency with the fundamental rights, and in article 13 (2) to the extent of the contravention of those rights. In ether words, the voidness is not in rem but to the extent CJJlY of inconsistency or contravention, as the case may be of the rights con-· ferred under Part III. Therefore, when article 13(2) uses the expression 'void', it can only mean, void as against persons whose fundamental rights are taken away or abridged by a law.. The law might be 'still-born' so far as the persons, entities or denominations whose fundamental rights are taken away or abridged, but there is no reason\n\n178 SUPREME COURT REPORtS [1974} 3 ~.c.R.\n\nwhy the law should be void or 'still-born' as against those who have no fundamental rights.\n\nIt is said that .the expression \"to the extent of the contravention\" in the article means that the part of the law which contravenes the( fundamental right would alone be void and not the ether parts which do not so contravene.\n\nIn other words, the argument was that the expression is intended to denote only the part of the law that would become void and not to show that the law will be void only as regards the persons or entities whose fundamental rights hate beeh taken away or abridged.\n\nThe first part of the sub-article speaks of 'any law' and the second part refers to the same Jaw by using the same expression, namely, any law'.\n\nWe think that the expression 'any law' occurring in the latter part of the sub-article must necessarily refer to the same expression in the former part and therefore, the Constitution-makers have already made it clear that the law that would be void is only the law that contravenes the fundamental rights conferred by Part Ill, and so, the phrase 'to the extent of the contravention' can mean only to the extent of the contravention of the rights conferred. For instance, if a section in a statute takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Part III, it will be vc; d because it is the law embodied in the section which takes away or abridges the fundamental right.\n\nAnd this. is precisely what the sub-article has said in express terms by employing the expression 'any law' both in the former and the latter part of it. It is difficult to see the reason why the Constitutionmakers wanted to state that the other sections, which did not violate the fundamental right, would not be void, and any such categorienl\n\nstatement would have been wrong, as the other sections might be void if they are inseparably knitted to the void one.\n\nWhen we see that the latter part of the sub-article is concerned with the effect of the voilation of the injunction contained in the former part, the words\n\n''to the extent of the contravention\" can only refer to the rights con~ ferred under Part III and denote only the compass of voidness with respect to persons or entities resulting from the contravention of the rights conferred upon them.\n\nWhy is it that a law is void under article 13(2) ?\n\nIis only because the law takes away or abridges a fundamental right.\n\nThere are many fundamental rights and they inhere in diverse 'types of persons, minorities or denominations.\n\nThere is no conCeivable reason why a law which takes away the fundamental right of one class of persons, or minorities or denominations should be void as against others who have no such fundamental rights as, ex hypo~\n\nthesi the law cannot contravene their rights. ltwas submitted that this Court has rejected the distinction drawn by Venk:atarama Aiya~, J. in Sundararamaiers case(l) between legisiative incapacity arising from lack of power under the relevant legislative entry and that arising from a check upon legislative power on account of constitutional provisions like fundamental rights and that if the Jaw enacted by a legislature having no capacity in tbe former sense would be void in rem, there is no reason why a law passed by a legislature having no legislative capacity in the latter\n\n{I) [ 1958] S.C.R. 1422:-\n\nGUJUAT v. AMBICA MILLS LTD, (Mathew, /,) 119\n\nA sense is void only cua persons whose fundamental rights are taken away or abridged.\n\n1t was also urged that the expression \"the State shall not make any law\" in article 13(2) is a clear mandate of the fundamental law of th~ land and, therefore, it is a case of total incapacity and total want of power. But the question is: what is the mandate? The mandate is that the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III.\n\nIf no rights ae conferred under Part III upon a person, or, if rights are conferred, but fhey are not taken away or abridged by the law, where is the incapacity of the legislature? It may be noted that both in Dttp Chand's\n\nCase (supra) and Mahendra Lal lain's case (supra), the decision in Sundararamaier's case (supra) was not adverted to. If on a textual reading of article 13, the conclusion which .we have reached is the only, reason.able one, we need not pause to consider whether that conclusion could be arrived at except on the basis of the distinction drawn by Venkatarama Aiyar, J, in . Sundararamaie's case(supra). However, we venture to think that there is nothing strange in the notion ci a legislature having no inherent 'legislative capacity or power to tak~ away or abridge by a law the fundamental rights conferred on citizens and yet having legislative power to pass the same law in respect of noncitizens who have no such fundamental rights to be taken away or abridged.\n\nIn other words, the legislative incapacity subjectwise with reference to Articles 245 and 246 in this context would be the takinJ away or abridging by law the fundamental rights under Artcle 19 of citizens.\n\nMr. H. W. R. Wade has urged with considerable force that the terms 'void' and 'voidable' are inappropriate in the sphere of administrative law(t). According to him, there is no such thing as voidnes~ in an absolute sense, for, the .whole question is void as against whom ? And he cites the decision of the Privy Council in Durayappah v. Femaitdo( 2) in his support:\n\nIn Jagannath v. Authoristd Officer, Land Rejorms(8) this Court has said that a post-constitution Act which. has been struck down for violating the fundamental rights conferred under Part III and was therefore still-born, has still an existence. without re-enactment, for being put in the Ninth Schedule. That only illustrates that any statement that -a law which takes away or abridges fundamental rights conferred under Part III is still-born or null and void requires qualitications in certain situations.\n\nAlthough the gener~ rule . is . that a statute declared unconstitutional is void at all times and that its invalidity must be recognized and acknowledged for 1 purposes and is no law and a nullity, this is neither universally no absolutely true, and there are many exceptions to it.\n\nA realistic approach has been eroding the doctrine of absolute nullttv in .all cases and for all pur- pci:; es ( 4 ) and it has been held that such broad statements must be\n\n(I) See \"Unlawful Administrative Action:', 83 Law Quarterly Rev. 499, at\n\nS18.\n\n(2) (1967) 3 W.L.R. 289. t3) [1971) 2 S.C. C. 893,\n\n(4) See Warrirrg. v. Co/pcys, 122 F. 2d 642.\n\nSUPREME COURI' REPORTS\n\n[19/4] 3 S.C.R.\n\n1aken with some qualifications( 1 ), that even an unconstitutional statute is an operative fjlct(2) at least prior to a determination of constitutionality(!), and may have consequences which cannot be ignored{t). See Corpus Justice Secundum, Vol. 16, p. 4.69).\n\nThis is ilJQStrated by the analysis given by kelse)l(3) :\n\n\"The decision made by the competent authority that something that presents itseJf as a norn1 is null ab initio because it fulfils the conditions of nullity determined by the legal order is a constitutive act; it has a definite legal effect; without and prior to this act the phenomenon in question cannot be considered as null; Hence the decision is not 'declaratory', that is to say, it is not, !lS it presents itself, a declaration of nullity; it is a true annuJment,. an annuJment with retroactive force.\n\nThere must be something legally existing to which this decision reters. Hence, the phen~ menon in question cannot be something null ab initio, that is to say, legally nothing. It. has to be considered as a norm annulled with retroactive for~ by the decision declar~ ing it null ab iniiio. . Just as everything King Midas touched turned into gold, everyl:hing to which the law refers becomes !.aw, i.e., something legally existing\". we do not thj.nk it necessary to pursue this aspect further in this case.\n\nFor our putpose it is enough to say that if a law is otherwise good and does not contravene any of their fundamental rights, noncitizens cannot take advantage of the voidness of the law for the reason that it contravenes the fundamental right of citizens and claim that there is no law at all. Nor would this proposition violate any principle of equality before the law because .citizens and non<itizens\n\nare not similarily situated :as the citizens have certain fundamental rights which non-citizens have not.\n\nTherefore, even assuming that under article 226 of the Constitution, the first responden.t was entitled to move the High Court and seek a remedy for irifringement of its ordinary right to property, the impugned provisions were not non-est\n\nbut were valid laws enacted by a competent legislature as respects\n\nnoncitizens and the first respondent cannot take the plea that its rights to property are being taken away or abridged without the authority of law.\n\nNow, let us see wbther the definition of 'establishment' in s. 2(4) violates the right under article 14 and make the impugned provisions void.\n\nThe High Court held that there was no inteUigible differentia to distinguish establishments grouped together under the definition of 'establishment' in s. 2(4) and establishments left out of the group and that in any event, the differentia had nci rational relation or nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act and that the im-\n\n(l) See ChicrJt Country Drai11age District v. Baxtl!r Stat( Bank, Al'k .• 308 U.S. 371.\n\nl2) See warringv. colpoys, I:!Z F. 2d 642. t3) Sc:e \"General Theory of Law and State\", p. 161.\n\nGUJARAT v. AMBICA MILLS LTD, (Mathew, J.) 781\n\npugned provisions as they affected the rights and liabilities of em ployers and employees in respect cif the establishments defined in s. 2(4) were, therefore, violative of article 14. The reasoning of the High Court was that all factories falling within the meaning of s. 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948, were brought within the purview of the definition of 'establishment' while establishments carrying business or trade and employing less than fifty persons were left out and that out of this latter class of establishments an exception was made and all establishments carrying on th~ business of tramways or motor omnibus services were included without any fair reason and that, though Government establishments which were factories were included within the definition of • 'establishment', other . Government establishments were excluded an_d, therefore, the classification was unreasonable. ·. .\n\nThe definition of 'establishment includes factories, tramway or motor omnibus services and any establishment carrying on business or trade and employing more than 50 persons, but excludes all Government establishments carrying on business or trade.\n\nln the High Court, an affidavit was filed by Mr. Brahmbhatt, Deputy Secretary to Education and Labour Department, wherein, it was stated that the differentiation between factories and commercial establishments employing -less than 50 persons was made for the rea~ son that the turnover of labour is more in factories than in commercial establishments other than factories on account of the fact that industrial labour frequently changes .employment for a variety of reasons.\n\nThe High Court was not -prepared to accept this explanation. The High Court said : '' \"It may' that in case of commercial establishment employing not more than 50 persons the. turnov~; r of labour • in commercial establishment~ being less, the unpaid accumulations may be small.\n\nBut whether unpaid accumulation Ure small or large is an immaterial cc.nsideration for the putpose of the enactn)ent o.'f the impugned provision~. The object of the impugned provisiPns being to get at the unpaid accurtlulations and to utilize them for the benefit of labour, the extent of the unpaid accumulations with' any particular es tablishment can never be a relevant consideration.\"\n\nAccording to the High Court, as _lfl establishthent carrying on tramway or motor omnibus service wdilld be within the defil)ition of establishment even if it employs less thaq, 50 persons, or for thtit matter, even less than 10 persons, the reason given in the affidavit of Mr. Brahmbhatta fot excludng all commerdatstablishi'l'lents employing\n\nlcs than SO persons from. the definition was iio.t tenable.\n\nThe. Courts . was also of the view that when Gove.(nment factories were included in the definition of 'estab1ishment' there was 110 'reason or excluding government establishments other than factories from the definition~ The affidavit of Mr. Brahmbhatt made it clear that there were hardly any establishments of the Central or Stnte Governments which carried\n\n\non business or trade or any work in connection with or ancillary there4 A to and, therefore, the legislature did not think it fit to extend the provi4 sions of the Act to such establishments. No affidavit in rejoinder was filed on behalf of respondents to contradict this statement.\n\nIt would be an idle parade of familiar learning to review the multitudinous cases in which the constitutional assurance of equality before the law has been applied.\n\nThe equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. But laws may classify. 'And the very idea ct classification is that of inequality.\n\nJn tackling this paradox the Court has neither abandoned the demand for equality nor denied the legislative right to classify. It has taken a middle course. It has resolved the contradictory demands of legislative specialization and constitutional generality by a doctrine of reasonable classification. ( 1)\n\nA reasonable classification is one which includes all who are similarly situated and none who are not.\n\nThe question then is what does the phrase 'simiarly situated' mean ? The answer to the question is that we must look beyond the classification to the purpose of the Jaw.\n\nA reasonable classification is one which includes all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law. The purpose of a law may be either the elimination of a public mischief or the achievement of some positive public good.\n\nA classification is under-inclusive when a}) who are included in the class are tainted with the mischief but there are others also tainted whom the classification does not include. In other words, a classification is bad as under-inclusive when a State benefits or burdens persons in a manner that furthers a legitimate purpose but does not confer the same benefit or place the same burden on others who are similarly situated.\n\nA classification is over-inclusive when it includes not only those who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose but others who are not so situated/ as well.\n\nIn other words, this type of dassification imposes a bden upon a wider range of individuals than are included in the class of those attended with mischief at which the law aims.\n\nHerod ordering the death of an male children born on a particular day because one of them would som~ day bring about his downfall employed such a classification.\n\nThe first question, therefore, is whether the exclusion of establish- . rnents carrying on\\ business or trade and employing less than 50 persons makes the classification under-inclusive, w}len it is seen that ali factories employing 10 or 20 persons, as the case may be, have been included and that the purpose of the law is to get in unpaid accumulations for the welfare of the labotp\".\n\nSince the cJassification does not include all who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law, the classification might appear, at first blush, to be unreasonable. But the Court has recognised the very real difficulties under which legislatures operate-difficulties arising out of both the nature\n\n(l} . See Joseph Tussman and Jacobus ten Brcek, \"The Equal Protaction of the Laws\", 37 California Rev. 341.\n\nGUJARAT v. AMBlCA MILLS LTD. (Mathew, J,) 783\n\nof the legislative process and of the society which .legislation attempts perennially to .re-shape-and it has refused to strike down indiscrlmiately aU legislation embodying classificatory inequality here under consideration. Mr. Justice Holmes, in urging tolerance of under-inClusive classifications, stated that such legislation should not be disturbed by the Coutt unless it can clearly se~ that there is no fair reason for the law which would not require with equal force its extension to those whom it leaves untouched (1), What, the.n. are the fair reasons for non-extension? What should a court do when it is faced with a law making an undet-inclusive classification in areas relating to economic and tax matters? Should. it, by its judgment, force the legislature to .. choose between inaction or perfection ?\n\nThe legislature canJ; ot be required to impose upon administrative\n\naget.es tasks which cannot be carried out or whicll must be carried out on a large scale at a single stroke.\n\n\"If the Jaw presumably hits the evil where it is most -felt. it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied. There is no doctrinaire requirement that the legislation should be couched in all embracing terms.\" . (see West Coast Hotel Compqny v. Parrish2).\n\nThe piecemeal approach to a genetal problem permitted by underinclusive classifications, appean justified when it is considered that\n\nlegisltive dealing with such problems is usually an e.xperimental matter. It is. impossible to tellllow successful a partiCUlar approach may be, what dislocations might occur, what evasions might develop. what\n\nnew evils might . be generated in the attempt. Administrative expedients must be. forged and tested. Legislators, reco_gnizing these factors, may wish to proceed cautiously,. and courts must allow them to do so (supra).\n\nAdministrative convenience in the c()]lection of unpaid accumulations is a factor to be taken into accoun~ in. adjudging whether the classification is reasonable. A legislation may take o~ step at a time addressink itself to the phase of the prOblem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. Therefore, a legislature might select only one phase of one filed for applicati?n or a remedy(•).\n\nIt may be remembered that article 14 does not require that every regulatory statute apJ)!y to all .in the same business : where size is an indeJ: to the evil at which the law is directed. discriminations betn the larse and small are permissible, and it is also Permissible for.Rform\n\nto take one step at a time, ad~ itself to the phase of the problem which, seems moat acute to the legislative mind. ·\n\n(1) See.Mi8101lri, R ol T Rfy., v. Moy (1904) 194 US 267, 269.\n\n(2) 300 u.s. 319, 400. (3} See 1'II'D G11ys from Horrlsoll-.41/tntowtt v, McGittlrJ, 366 U.S. S82, S92, 7-Ls.tSup.c.t.ns\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1974] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA legislative authority acting within its field is not bound to extend A its 1egulatic~ to all cases which it might possibly reach. The legislature 'is free to recognize degrees of harm and it may confine the restrictions to those classes of ca..:; es where the need seemed to be clearest [see Mutual Loan, Co. v. Martelf(1)].\n\nIn short, the problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same filed may be B of different. dimensions and proportions requiring different remedies.\n\nOr so the legislature rtlay think [see Tigner v. Texas(2)].\n\nOnce an objective_ is decided to be within legislative competence, however, the working out of classifications has been only infrequently impeded by judicial negativs. The Courts attitude cannot be that the state either has to regulate all b!lsinesses, or even all related business- C es, and in the same way, or, not at all. An effort to strike at a particular economic evil could not be hindered by the necessity of carrying in its wake a train of vexatious, troublesome and expensive regulat[ons covering the whole range of connected or similar enterprises.\n\nLaws regulating economic activity would be viewed differently from laws which touch and concern freedom of speech and religion, voting, D procreation, rights with respect to criminal procedure, etc. The prominence given to the equal protection clause in many modern opinions and decisions in America all show that the Court feels less constrained to give judicial deference to legislative judgment in the field of human and civil rights than in that of economic regulation and that it is making a vigorous use of the equal protectin clause to strike down legislative action in the area of fundamental human rights( 3). \"Equal Protec- E tion clause rests upon two largely subjective judgments : one as to the relative invidiousness of particular differentiation and the other as to the relative importance of the subject with respect to which equality is sought\"(').\n\nThe question whether, under article 14, a classification is reasonable or unreasonable must, in the ultimate analysis depend upon the judicial approach to the problem. The great divic}e in this area lies in the..<lifference between emphasizing the actualities'or the abstractions of legislation.\n\nThe more complicated society becomes, the greater the diversity of its problems and the more does legislation direct itself to the diversi ties. . \"Statutes are directed to less than universal situations. Law reflects distinction that exist in fact or at least appear to exist in the judgment of legislators-those .who have the responsibility for making iaw fit fact.\n\nLegislation is. essentially empiric. It addresses itself to the more or less crude outside world and not to the :neat, logical models of the mind.\n\nClassification is inherent in . Iegislttion. To ttcogrtize\n\n(1) 56 L. Ed., 175, 180.\n\n(2) 310 U.S. !41. (3) S~; e \"Developments-Equal Protection\" 82 Harv. L~.w Rev., 106S, at 1127\n\n(4) See Cox, \"The Supreme Court Foteward\", 1966 Term, 80 Harv. Law Rev. 91-95.\n\nGUJARAT V. AMBICA MILLS LTD. (Mathew,}.) 785\n\nmarked differences that exist in fact is living law; to disregard practical differences and concentrate on some abstract identities is lifeless logic\" (1).\n\nThat the legislation is directed to practical problems, that the economic mechanism is highly sensitive and complex, that many problems are singular and contingent, that laws are not abstract propositions and do not relate to abstract units and are not to be measured by abstract symmetry, that exact wisdom and nice adaption of remedies cannot be required, that judgment is.Iargely a prophecy based on meagre and uninterpreted experience, should stand as reminder that in this area the Court does not take the equal protection requirement in a pedagogic manner (supra) . c In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial selfrestraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment The legislature after all ha~ the affirmative responsibility.\n\nThe Courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error, the bewildering conflict of the experts, and the number of times the judges have been overruled by events--self D . limitation can be seen to be the path to judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability(supra).\n\nWe must be fastidiously careful to observe the admonition of .Mr.\n\nJustice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Cardozo that we do not \"sit as a superlegislature\" (see their dissenting opinion in Colgate v. HarveJ(2). .\n\nLet us look at the problem here in the light of the above discussion.\n\nThe purpose of the Act is to get unpaid accumulations for utilizing them for the welfare of labour in general.\n\nThe aim of any legislature would then be to get the unpaid accumulation from aU concerns. So\n\nan ideal classification should include all concerns which have 'unpaid accumulations'.\n\nBut then there are practical problems.\n\nAdministrative convenience as well as the apprehension whether the experiment. it'\n\nundertaken as an all-embracing one will be successful, are legitimate considerations in confining the realization of the objective in the first instance to large concerns s.uch as factories employing large amount/of labour an~ with statutory duty to keep register of wages, paid and unpaid, and the legislature has, in fact, brought all factories, whether owned by Government of otherwise, within the purview of the definition of 'establishment'. In other words, it is from the factories that tl; le greatest amount of unpaid accumulations could be collected and since the factories are bound to maintain records from which the amount of unpaid accumulations could be easily ascertained, the legisla\n\nture brought all the factories within the definition of 'establishment'. Jt then: addressed itself to other establishments but thought that establishments employing, less than 50 persons need not be brought within the\n\n(1) See the observations of Justice Frankfurter in Morty v. Doud, 3~4 u.s. 457, 472.\n\n(2) 2'96 U.S. 404, 44L\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [I 97 4] 3 s.c.k.\n\npur_view of the definition as unpaid , accumulations in those establishments would be less and might not be sufficient to meet the administrative expenses of collection and_ as many of them might not be main taining records from which the amount of unpaid accumulations could be ascertained. The affidavit of Mr. Brahmbhatt made it clear that unf>aid accumulations in these. establishments would be comparatively small.\n\nThe reasor•. why government establishments other than factories were not included 'in the definition is also stated in the affidavit of Mr. Brahmbhattt namely, that there were hardly any establishments run by the Central or State Government.\n\nThis statement was not contradicted by any affidavit in rejoinder.\n\nThere remains then the further question wheiher there was any justification for including tramways and motor omnibuses within the purview of the definition.\n\nSo far as tramways and motor omnibuses arc concerned, the legislature of Bombay, when.it enacted the Act in 1953, must have had reason to think that unpaid accumulations in these concerns would be large as they usually employed large amount of labour force and that they were bound to keep records of the Y{ages earned and paid.\n\nSection 2(ii) (a) of the Payment ot Wages Act, 1936, before that section was amended in 1965 so far as tt is material provided:\n\n\"2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-\n\n(ii) \"industrial establishment'' means any--\n\n(a) tramway or motor omnibus service''.\n\nRule. 5 of the Bombay Payment of Wages Rules, 193i provided =\n\n\"5. Register of Wages : A Register of Wages shall be maintained in every factory and industrial establishment and may be kept .in such form as the paymaster find3 convenient but shall include the following particulars :\n\n(a) the gross wages earned by each person employed for each wage period;\n\n(b) all deductions made from those wages, with an indication in each case of the clause of sub-section (2) of section 7 under which the deduction is 111adc-: ' -\n\n(c) the wages actually paid to each person employed for each wage period.\"\n\nThe Court must be aware of its own remoteness and 1.lck of familiarity with local problems.\n\nClassification is dependent on the peculiar needs and specific difficulties of the community.\n\nThe needs and difficulties of the community are constituted out of facts and opinions beyond the easy ken of the court (supra). It depends to a great extent upon an assessment of the local condition of these concerns which the legislature alone was competent to make.\n\nJudicial deference to legislature in instances uf economic regula tion is sometimes explained by the argument that ra1ionality of a ' classification may depend upon 'local conditions about \\\\hich local\n\nGUJARAT v. AMBICA MILLS LTD. (Mathew,/.) 787\n\nlegislative or administrative body would be better informed than a court. Consequently, lacking the capacity to inform ttelf fully about the peculiarities of a particular local situation, a court should hesitate to dub the legislative classificaton irrational (see Carmichnel v. Southern Coal and Coke Co.(l). Tax laws, for example, may respond closely to local needs and court's familiarity with these needs i~ likely to be limited.\n\nMr. S. T. Desai for the appellants argued that, if it is held that the inclusion of tramways and motor omnibuses in the category of 'csta blishment' is bad, the legislative intention to include factories and establishments employing more than 50 persons should not be thwarted by striking down the whole definition.\n\nHe said that th.: doctrine of severability can be applied and that establishments runmng tramways and motor omnibuses can be excluded from the definition without in the least sacrificing the legislative intention.\n\nIn Skinner v. Iklahoma ex rel Williamsone), a statute providing for sterilization of habitual criminals excluded emben:lers and certain other criminals from its coverage.\n\nThe Supreme Court found that the statutory classification denied equal protection and remanded the case to the State Court to determine whether the sterilization prcrvisions should be either invalidated or made to cover all habitu::l criminals.\n\nWithout elaboration, the State Court held the entire statute unconstitutional, declining to use the severability clause to remove the exception that created the discrimination. 1n Skinner's case the exception maY have suggested a particular legislative intent that one class should not l.lc covered even if the result was that none would be.\n\nBut there is no necessary reason for choosing the intent to ell.clude one group over the intent to include another.. Courts may reason that without legislation none would be covered, and that invalidating the exemption therefore amounts to illegitimate judicial legislation over the remaining class not previously covered.\n\nThe conclusion, then, is to invalidate the whole statute, no matter how narrow the exemption had been. The. reluctance to extend Iegisl11.tion may be particularly great if a statute defining a crime is before a court, slnce extension would make hchaviour criminal that had not been so before. But the consequences o[ invalidation will be unacceptable .if the legislation is necessary to an important pub- Tic purpose. For example, a statute requiring licensing of all doctor'S\n\nexcept those from a certain school could be found to deny equal protection, but a court should be hesitant to choose invalidation of licensing as an appropriate remedy.\n\nThough the test is imprecise, a court must weigh the general interest in retaining the statut~ against the court's own reluctance to extend legislation to those uot previously covered.\n\nSuch an inquiry may lead a court into examination of legislative purpose, the overall statutory scheme, statutory arrangl.\"ments in connected fields and the n'!cds of the public C).\n\n(l) 301 u.s. 495.\n\n(2) 316 u.s. 535.\n\n(3) See \"Developments-Eq\\~:tl Protection\", 82 Harv. law Rev., 1065, at rr. 1136-7.\n\n\nThis Court has, without articulating any reason, applied the doctrine A of severability by deleting the offending clause which made classification unreasonable fsee Jalan Trading Co. v. Mazdoor Union( 1) and Anamlji & Co. v. S.T.0.(2)].\n\nWhether a court can remove the unreasonableness of a classification when it is under-inclusive by extending the ambit of the legislation to cover the class omitted to be included, or, by applying the doctrine of B severability delete a dausc which makes a classificatioll over-inclusive, arc matters on which it is not necessary to express any final opinion as we have held that the inclusion of tramway and motor omnibus service in the definition of 'establishment' did not mak() the classlficaiion unreasonable having regard to the purpose of the legislation.\n\nIn the result, we hold that the impugned sections are valid and c aUow the appeals with costs.\n\nHearing fee one set.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\n(I) (1967] 1 S.C.R. 15. (2)\n\n[ 1968] J S.C. 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{"in_sentence": "Venkatarama Aiyar, J. with whom Jagannadhadas, J. as inclined to agree, held that a distinction must be made between unconstitutionality arising from lack of legislative competence and that arising from a violation of constitutional limitations on legislative\n\n(1) [1951] S.C.R. 228.", "canonical_name": "Venk:atarama Aiya~"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49149, "end_char": 49162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatarama Aiyar, J. with whom Jagannadhadas, J. as inclined to agree, held that a distinction must be made between unconstitutionality arising from lack of legislative competence and that arising from a violation of constitutional limitations on legislative\n\n(1) [1951] S.C.R. 228."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49812, "end_char": 49819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the second hearing of the case, Mahajan, J. after referrring to Madhava Menon's _Case(1), said that for determining the rights and obligations of citizens, the part declared vbid should be notionally taken to be obliterated from the B section for all intents and purposes though it may remain written on\n\nth~ statute book and be a good law when a question arises for determination of rights and obligations incurred prior to January 26, 1950, and also for the determination of rights of persons who have not been given fundamental rights by the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Madhava Menon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49844, "end_char": 49857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the second hearing of the case, Mahajan, J. after referrring to Madhava Menon's _Case(1), said that for determining the rights and obligations of citizens, the part declared vbid should be notionally taken to be obliterated from the B section for all intents and purposes though it may remain written on\n\nth~ statute book and be a good law when a question arises for determination of rights and obligations incurred prior to January 26, 1950, and also for the determination of rights of persons who have not been given fundamental rights by the Constitution."}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50205, "end_char": 50221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the second hearing of the case, Mahajan, J. after referrring to Madhava Menon's _Case(1), said that for determining the rights and obligations of citizens, the part declared vbid should be notionally taken to be obliterated from the B section for all intents and purposes though it may remain written on\n\nth~ statute book and be a good law when a question arises for determination of rights and obligations incurred prior to January 26, 1950, and also for the determination of rights of persons who have not been given fundamental rights by the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51127, "end_char": 51140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51155, "end_char": 51168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51978, "end_char": 51982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51992, "end_char": 52016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52358, "end_char": 52368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "June 18, t9S 1", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52383, "end_char": 52397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On H June 18, t9S 1, the Constitution was amended so as to authorize the\n\n(1) [19Sl] S.C.R. 228."}}, {"text": "S89", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52496, "end_char": 52499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52824, "end_char": 52829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "June 18, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52869, "end_char": 52882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The real question before the Court was that although s. 43 was void between January 26, 1950, and June 18, 1951, the amend-· ment of the article 19(6) had the affect of removing the constitutional invalidity of s. 43 which, from the date of amendment, became valid and operative."}}, {"text": "article 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52908, "end_char": 52921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52982, "end_char": 52987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Keshava Madhva Menon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53111, "end_char": 53131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After referring to the meaning given to tlle word 'void' jn Keshava Madhva Menon's Case (I) 1 Das, Acting C.J. said for the Court:\n\n\"All laws, existing or future, which are inconsistent with the J?rovisions of Part III of our Constitution are, by the express provision of article 13, rendered void 'to the extent of such , mconsistency'.", "canonical_name": "Keshava Madhavai C Menon"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53323, "end_char": 53333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahnjan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54886, "end_char": 54893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned judge said that the observa~ ·\n\ntions of Mahnjan, J, in Pesikaka's c<1se(3) that qua citizens that part of s.13(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, which bad been declared invalid by this Court ''had to be regarded as null and void\"' could not in the context be construed as implying that the impugned Jaw must be regarded as nonest so as to be incapable of taking effect when the bar was removed."}}, {"text": "Pesikaka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54901, "end_char": 54909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned judge said that the observa~ ·\n\ntions of Mahnjan, J, in Pesikaka's c<1se(3) that qua citizens that part of s.13(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, which bad been declared invalid by this Court ''had to be regarded as null and void\"' could not in the context be construed as implying that the impugned Jaw must be regarded as nonest so as to be incapable of taking effect when the bar was removed."}}, {"text": "s.13(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54952, "end_char": 54959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54967, "end_char": 54995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56268, "end_char": 56281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56451, "end_char": 56460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subba Rao, J. who wrote the majority judgment said after citing the observations of Das, Actg."}}, {"text": "Keshava Madhavai C Menon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56555, "end_char": 56579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J. in Keshava Madhavai C Menon's Case(supra):\n\n\"The second part of the observation directly applies only to a case covered by article 13 ( 1) , for the learned' Judges say that the laws exist for the purposes of preconstitution rights and liabilities and they remain operative even after the Constitution as against noncitizens.", "canonical_name": "Keshava Madhavai C Menon"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56675, "end_char": 56685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58087, "end_char": 58097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58107, "end_char": 58117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58299, "end_char": 58309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58364, "end_char": 58377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58381, "end_char": 58394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58894, "end_char": 58904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58941, "end_char": 58951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59703, "end_char": 59712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59969, "end_char": 59979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60143, "end_char": 60153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60156, "end_char": 60169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61131, "end_char": 61141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61326, "end_char": 61336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61529, "end_char": 61542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61614, "end_char": 61624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61861, "end_char": 61874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64515, "end_char": 64528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venk:atarama Aiya~", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65047, "end_char": 65065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ltwas submitted that this Court has rejected the distinction drawn by Venk:atarama Aiya~, J. in Sundararamaiers case(l) between legisiative incapacity arising from lack of power under the relevant legislative entry and that arising from a check upon legislative power on account of constitutional provisions like fundamental rights and that if the Jaw enacted by a legislature having no capacity in tbe former sense would be void in rem, there is no reason why a law passed by a legislature having no legislative capacity in the latter\n\n{I) [ 1958] S.C.R. 1422:-\n\nGUJUAT v. AMBICA MILLS LTD, (Mathew, /,) 119\n\nA sense is void only cua persons whose fundamental rights are taken away or abridged.", "canonical_name": "Venk:atarama Aiya~"}}, {"text": "Sundararamaiers", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65073, "end_char": 65088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ltwas submitted that this Court has rejected the distinction drawn by Venk:atarama Aiya~, J. in Sundararamaiers case(l) between legisiative incapacity arising from lack of power under the relevant legislative entry and that arising from a check upon legislative power on account of constitutional provisions like fundamental rights and that if the Jaw enacted by a legislature having no capacity in tbe former sense would be void in rem, there is no reason why a law passed by a legislature having no legislative capacity in the latter\n\n{I) [ 1958] S.C.R. 1422:-\n\nGUJUAT v. AMBICA MILLS LTD, (Mathew, /,) 119\n\nA sense is void only cua persons whose fundamental rights are taken away or abridged.", "canonical_name": "Sundararamaiers"}}, {"text": "article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65750, "end_char": 65763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dttp Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66261, "end_char": 66271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noted that both in Dttp Chand's\n\nCase (supra) and Mahendra Lal lain's case (supra), the decision in Sundararamaier's case (supra) was not adverted to."}}, {"text": "Mahendra Lal lain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66292, "end_char": 66309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noted that both in Dttp Chand's\n\nCase (supra) and Mahendra Lal lain's case (supra), the decision in Sundararamaier's case (supra) was not adverted to."}}, {"text": "Sundararamaier", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66342, "end_char": 66356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noted that both in Dttp Chand's\n\nCase (supra) and Mahendra Lal lain's case (supra), the decision in Sundararamaier's case (supra) was not adverted to.", "canonical_name": "Sundararamaiers"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66420, "end_char": 66430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sundararamaie", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66649, "end_char": 66662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sundararamaie's case(supra).", "canonical_name": "Sundararamaiers"}}, {"text": "Articles 245 and 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67116, "end_char": 67136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H. W. R. Wade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67255, "end_char": 67268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. H. W. R. Wade has urged with considerable force that the terms 'void' and 'voidable' are inappropriate in the sphere of administrative law(t)."}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67906, "end_char": 67920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Unlawful Administrative Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68594, "end_char": 68621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68659, "end_char": 68662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Unlawful Administrative Act", "statute": "Unlawful Administrative Act"}}, {"text": "Midas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69949, "end_char": 69954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Just as everything King Midas touched turned into gold, everyl:hing to which the law refers becomes !"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70689, "end_char": 70700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71171, "end_char": 71178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71204, "end_char": 71214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71407, "end_char": 71414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 371", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71677, "end_char": 71683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71964, "end_char": 71971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72002, "end_char": 72012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72099, "end_char": 72106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72114, "end_char": 72133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Brahmbhatt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 73031, "end_char": 73041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ln the High Court, an affidavit was filed by Mr. Brahmbhatt, Deputy Secretary to Education and Labour Department, wherein, it was stated that the differentiation between factories and commercial establishments employing -less than 50 persons was made for the rea~ son that the turnover of labour is more in factories than in commercial establishments other than factories on account of the fact that industrial labour frequently changes .employment for a variety of reasons.", "canonical_name": "Brahmbhatta"}}, {"text": "Brahmbhatta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 74407, "end_char": 74418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the High Court, as _lfl establishthent carrying on tramway or motor omnibus service wdilld be within the defil)ition of establishment even if it employs less thaq, 50 persons, or for thtit matter, even less than 10 persons, the reason given in the affidavit of Mr. Brahmbhatta fot excludng all commerdatstablishi'l'lents employing\n\nlcs than SO persons from.", "canonical_name": "Brahmbhatta"}}, {"text": "Holmes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78381, "end_char": 78387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Holmes, in urging tolerance of under-inClusive classifications, stated that such legislation should not be disturbed by the Coutt unless it can clearly se~ that there is no fair reason for the law which would not require with equal force its extension to those whom it leaves untouched (1), What, the.n."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80435, "end_char": 80445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 319, 400", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80886, "end_char": 80897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80970, "end_char": 80973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S92, 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80975, "end_char": 80981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 82497, "end_char": 82504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prominence given to the equal protection clause in many modern opinions and decisions in America all show that the Court feels less constrained to give judicial deference to legislative judgment in the field of human and civil rights than in that of economic regulation and that it is making a vigorous use of the equal protectin clause to strike down legislative action in the area of fundamental human rights( 3). \""}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83100, "end_char": 83110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "GUJARAT V. AMBICA MILLS LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 84147, "end_char": 84174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GUJARAT V. AMBICA MILLS LTD. ("}}, {"text": "Brandeis", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85605, "end_char": 85613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Cardozo that we do not \"sit as a superlegislature\" (see their dissenting opinion in Colgate v. HarveJ(2). ."}}, {"text": "Stone", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85627, "end_char": 85632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Cardozo that we do not \"sit as a superlegislature\" (see their dissenting opinion in Colgate v. HarveJ(2). ."}}, {"text": "Cardozo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85649, "end_char": 85656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Cardozo that we do not \"sit as a superlegislature\" (see their dissenting opinion in Colgate v. HarveJ(2). ."}}, {"text": "Frankfurter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87203, "end_char": 87214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jt then: addressed itself to other establishments but thought that establishments employing, less than 50 persons need not be brought within the\n\n(1) See the observations of Justice Frankfurter in Morty v. Doud, 3~4 u.s."}}, {"text": "s. 457, 472", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87239, "end_char": 87250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 404, 44L", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87264, "end_char": 87275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Brahmbhattt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 87879, "end_char": 87890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reasor•. why government establishments other than factories were not included 'in the definition is also stated in the affidavit of Mr. Brahmbhattt namely, that there were hardly any establishments run by the Central or State Government.", "canonical_name": "Brahmbhatta"}}, {"text": "Section 2(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88538, "end_char": 88551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Payment ot Wages Act, 1936", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88563, "end_char": 88589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89303, "end_char": 89312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Payment ot Wages Act, 1936", "statute": "the Payment ot Wages Act, 1936"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 91281, "end_char": 91294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Supreme Court found that the statutory classification denied equal protection and remanded the case to the State Court to determine whether the sterilization prcrvisions should be either invalidated or made to cover all habitu::l criminals."}}, {"text": "Skinner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 91703, "end_char": 91710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1n Skinner's case the exception maY have suggested a particular legislative intent that one class should not l.lc covered even if the result was that none would be."}}, {"text": "s. 495", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93217, "end_char": 93223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 535", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93236, "end_char": 93242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1967] 1 S.C.R. 15", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 94279, "end_char": 94297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_789_793_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "MILAN BANIK\n\nTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.\n\nMarch 26, 1974\n\n[H. R. KHANNA AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.]\n\nMaintet1af1c~ of Internal Securily A.ct-S. 3-Public Order-Meanlng of- W/ierher detention order can be passed for the sa1ne set of activities in respect of wlu\"ch cases l1ad already been registered under Indian Penal Code. . The petitioner was detained under S. 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Sccu r!tY Act. 197 .1 on the grounds tt on two occasions he along with other associates. committed robbery on p01nt of dagger in a town in West Bengal and\n\nsnatced away money and <?ther valuables. Such activities of the petitioner terronsed the local people and created a panli; in the area and the petitioner 'vas detained al-1; SC in the opi!lion of the Distrit Magistrate, ht was acting in a manner pre1uc1al to the maintenance of publtc ordl!r. ·\n\nIn a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution, the detention was challenged on the following grounds :- (i) That the alleged activities for which tho peth tioner had been detained were not germane to public order; (ii) that tho names\n\nf all the associates of the Petitioner were not mentioned in the grounds of dellon and as such the grounds should be held to be vague; (iii) that two cases were registered against the petitioner in respect of the ac1ivities mentioned in the grounds of detention and therefore for the same activities. the petitioner could not be detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, and (iv) that\n\nthe period of the petitioner's detention has not been specified by the State Govment and therefore ii is an infirmity in the detention order.\n\nPismissing the petition,\n\nHEID : (i} The test for determining whether a particular activity affects law and order or whether it impinges upon public order is : Does it interfere with the current of life of the community so as to amount to disturbance of public order or does it affect merely .an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed in whiCh_ Case it would be an activity alfe<:ting law and order. f791 E-Fl\n\nKa11u Biswas v. State of West Bengal [19731 1 S.C.R. 546 referred to.\n\nKeeping this test in view it was held that the activities of the petitioner bad the effect of disturbi'ng public order.\n\n111 Re : Sus11anta Goswami & Ors. [1969] 3 S.C.R. 138 referred to and dis\n\ntinguhed.\n\n(ii) As regards vagueness of thegrounds, a pen1sal of the grounds of detention shows that the date, time and place of the incidents were specified. Particulan were also given regarding the nature of the activities of the petitioner.\n\nThe facts stated in the grounds of detention were sufficient to apprise the petitioner of the precise activities of the petitioner on account of which the order for detention had been made ilnd it cannot be said that the petitioner was in any way handicapped in making an effective representation against the detentiori order.\n\nWhat hasto be._s_een by the court is that the grounds of detention supplied to the petitionet should not be sO vague as to prevent him from making an effective representation. The• grounds of detention in the present case do not suffer from the infirmity Of vagueness. [792 A-Cl\n\nSk. Hasan Ali v. State of West Be11gal A.LR. 1972 S.C. 2590 referred to.\n\n(iii) There is no legal bar for a District Magistrate to make an order for detention in respect of the same activities of the detenu for which cases had earlier been registered in a Criminal C.ourt, but in which cases be was discharged_\n\nThe detaining authority might well feel that though there - not sufficient evidence for securing conviction, the activities of the t>erson ordered\n\nto be dctaned were of such a nature a~ to justify the order of detention.\n\nA [792F-Gl\n\nMohd. Salim Khan v. Shri C. C. Bose and anather W.P. No. 435/71 decided on April 2S, 1972 referred to.\n\n(iv) Further, non-specification of an definite period in a detention order n1ade under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, .i.! not a material omission as would render the order to be invalid. [793 GJ\n\nSunn Ullah v. State of I. & K. AIR 1972 SC 2431 and Ujagar Singh v. The B State Qf Punjab [19521 S.C.R. 756 referred to.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 2023 of 1973.\n\nUnder Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for issue of a Writ in the nature of habeas corpus.\n\nG. Narayana Rao, for the petitioner.\n\nDiiip Sinha and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J.\n\nMilan Banik petitioner was ordered by District Magistrate Burdwan to be detained under section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (Act 26 of 1971) with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.\n\nJn pursuance of the detention order, the petitioner was arrested on July 23, 1973. The petitioner has now filed this petition through jail under article 32 of the Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus.\n\nAller makir.g the detention order on June l, 1973 the D.M. sent report to the State Government about his having made the detention order along with the grounds of detention and other necessary particulars.\n\nThe State Government approved the detention order on June 12, 1973. The petitioner at the time of his arrest on July 23, 1973 was served with the order of detention as well as the grounds of detention together with vernacular translation thereof.\n\nThe case of the petitioner was placed before the Advisory Board on August 7, 1973.\n\nThe same day the State Government received a representation from the petitioner.\n\nThe said representation after being considered was rejected by the State Government on August 8, 1973.\n\nThe representation was then forwarded to the Advisory Board.\n\nThe Advisory Board 'expressed the opinion on September 25, 1973 that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner.\n\nOn October 1, 1973 the State Government confirmed the detention order.\n\nIt has been argued by Mr. Narayana Rao, who has appeared amicus curiae on behalf of the petitioner, that the alleged activities for which the petitioner had been detained were not germane to public order. In this connection we find that according to the grounds of detention, the petitioner was being detained because in the opinion of the District Magistrate he was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as evidenced by the particulars given below :\n\n\"I. On 8-5-73 at about 04.00 hrs. you along with your associates stopped the rickshaw of Sri Gopal Sharma on\n\npoint of dagger while he was coming from Burdwan Railway Station towards Curzon Gate and snatched each Rs. 20/- and other valuables and escaped.\n\nYour commission of this highway robbery created panic amongst local people and thereby disturbed the normal avocation of life in the area.\n\n2. On 15-5-73 at about 04.30 hours your along with yom associates Swapan Singh and others attacked Shri Aditya Monda!, a Bus conductor on B. C. Road, Burdwan and on the point of an open Bhojali rc;>bbed him of each Rs. 30/- one wrist watch and other valuables and forced him to keep silent.\n\nYour such act terrorised the local people and created a sense of panic in their minds and as a result flow of life in the area was highly disturbed.\n\nYour such acts created a panic in the area and the local people were afraid to come out of door as usual and their normal avocation of life was disturbed.\" It would appear from the above that the petitioner and his associates committed robbery on point of dagger on a public road in Burdwan on two occasions in the month of May, 1973. The activities of the petitioner and his associates were of such a nature as terrorised the local people and created a sense of panic.\n\nOn account of the above activities the local people were afraid to come out of their houses and follow the normal avocations of tire.\n\nThe activities attributed to the petitioner, in our opinion, have a direct nexus with the maintenance of public order because they had the effect of disturbing the even tempo of life of the people .in the locality.\n\nThe test for determining whether a particular activity affects law and order or whether it impinges upon public order is : Does it interfere with the current of life of the community so as to amount to disturbance of public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed in which case it would be an activity affecting law and order [see Kanu Biswas v. State of West Benga/( 1)]. Keeping this test in view we have no doubt that the activities of the petitioner had the effect of disturbing public order.\n\nReference has been made by Mr. Narayana Rao to the case of 111\n\ne : Sushanta Goswami & Ors.(') wherein this Court directed the release of a detenu nal)led Ram Kamal Dhar inspite of the fact that he along with his associates was alleged to have snatched a wrist watch from a person at the point of dagger.\n\nThere is, however, nothing to show that in that case the activity of the detenu created panic amongst the local people and thereby disturbed the normal avocation of life in the area.\n\nAs such, the petitioner, in our opinion, cannot derive much help from that authority. ·\n\nAnother contention advanced by Mr. Narayana Rao is that the names of all the associates of the petitioner were not mentioned in the .11rounds of detention and as such the grounds should be held to be vague.\n\nThere is no force in this contention.\n\nPerusal of the grounds\n\n(I) [19731 I SCR 546.\n\n(!) [1960) 3 SCR 138.\n\nof detention shows that the date, time and place of the incidents were specified.\n\nParticulars were also given regarding the nature of the activities of the petitioner.\n\nThe facts stated in the grounds of detention were sufficient to apprise the petitioner of the precise activities on account of which the order for detention had been made and, in our opinion, it cannot be said that the petitioner was in any way handicapped in making an effective representation against the detention order. What has to be seen by the court is that the grounds of detention supplied to the petitioner should not be so vague as to prevent him from making an effective representation.\n\nThe grounds of detention in the present case do not suffer from the infirmity of vagueness.\n\nThe fact that the names of all the associates of the petitioner were not given in the grounds of detention would not make the grounds to be vague [see also Sk. Hasan Ali v. State of West Bengal( 1) wherein a similar content on was repelled). ' ·\n\nIt has further been argued by Mr. Narayana Rao that two cases were registered against the petitioner in respect of the activities mentioned in the grounds of detention.\n\nFor the same activities the petitioner, according to the learned counsel, could not be detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act.\n\nThis contention is equally devoid of force.\n\nIt would appear from the affidavit of Shri Shyama Charan Chatterjee District Magistrate that in both the cases final reports were submitted and the petitioner was got discharged as the witnesses were unwilling to give evidence against him in open court for [car of their lives.\n\nIn the circumstances there was no legal bar in the way of the District Magistrate in making an order for the detention of the petitioner. A similar argument was advanced on behalf of the dctenu in the case o( Sasti @ Satish Chowdhary v. Chowdhary v. State of West Bengal(') and it was repelled in the following words :\n\n\"It is always open to the detaining authority to pass an order for the detention of a person if the grounds of detention are germane to the object for which a detention order can legally be made.\n\nThe fact that the particular act of the detenu which provides the reason for the making of the detention order constitutes an offence under the Indian Penal Code would not prevent the detaining authority from passing the order for detention instead of proceeding against him in a court of law.\n\nThe detaining authority might well feel that though there was not sufficient evidence admissible under the Indian Evidence Act for securing a conviction, the activities of the person ordered to be detained were of such a nature as to justify the order of detention.\n\nThere would be no legal bar to the making of detention order in such a case. It would, however, be imperative that the incident which gives rise to the apprehension in the mind of the detaining authority and induces that authority to pass the order for detention should be germane to the object for which a detention order can be made under the Act.\n\nEven in cases where a person has been actually prosecuted in a court of law in res-\n\n(I) AIR [1972] SC 2590. (2)\n\n[1973] I SCR 467.\n\npect of an incident and has been discharged by the trying magistrate, a valid order of his detention can be passed against him in connection with that very incident. It was recenQy observed by this Court in the case of Mohd. Salim Khan v. Shri C. C. Bose & Anr. (Writ petition No. 435 of 1971 decided on April 25, 1972) that from the mere fact that a detenu was discharged in a criminal case relating to an incident by a magistrate, it could not be said that the detention order on the basis of that incident was incompetent, nor could it be inferred that it was without basis or mala fide.\n\nReliance in this connection was placed upon the case of Sahib Singh Duggal v. Union of lndia( 1).\"\n\nReference has also been made to the fact that the period of the petitioner's detention has not been specified by the State Government.\n\nThis fact, in our opinion, does not introduce an infirmity in the detention order.\n\nA similar question arose before this Court in Suna Ullah\n\nv. State of !. & K. (') while dealing with a detention order under the.\n\nJammu & Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964. It was held by this Court that it is difficult to infer from the language of section 12 of the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act that the State Government while confirming the detention order should also specify the period of detention.\n\nAll that the section requires is that, if the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for the detention of the person, the Government may confirm the detention order.\n\nThere is nothing in the section which enjoins upon the Government to specify the period of detention also while confirming the detention order.\n\nThe .concluding words of sub-section (1) of •ection 12, according to which the Government may continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit, pertain to and embody the consquence of .the confirmation of the detention order. It is, however, manifest that the period for which a person can be detained after the confirmation of the detention-order is subject to the limit of two years. which is the maximum period of detention for which a person can be detained vide section 13 of the Act.\n\nAlthough the above dictum was laid down while dealing with Jammu & Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, it holds equally good in the case of detention made under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act of which the relevant provisiqns except for the maximum period of detention are in pari materia. It may also be mentioned in the above context that in the case of Ujagar Sing~ v,\n\nThe State of Punjab (3) this Court, while dealing with a case under the Preventive Detention Act, held that non-specification of any definite period in a detention order made under section 3 of that Act was not a material omission as would render the order to be. invalid.\n\nThe order for the detention of the petitioner has not been shown to be not in accordance with law. We accordingly d.is, mlss the petition.\n\nPetition dismissed-\n\n(1) {1966] 1 SCR 3B ..\n\n(2) AIR [1972) SC 2431.\n\n(J) [1952) SCR 756.", "total_entities": 47, "entities": [{"text": "MILAN BANIK", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MILAN BANIK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 26, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 26, 1974\n\n[H. R. KHANNA AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 304, "end_char": 321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 359, "end_char": 363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 534, "end_char": 545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "committed robbery on p01nt of dagger in a town in West Bengal and\n\nsnatced away money and <?"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 867, "end_char": 874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "[1969] 3 S.C.R. 138", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2289, "end_char": 2308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1972 SC 2431", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4073, "end_char": 4089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4226, "end_char": 4233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4241, "end_char": 4262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Diiip Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4354, "end_char": 4365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Diiip Sinha and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4370, "end_char": 4386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Diiip Sinha and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4453, "end_char": 4459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J.\n\nMilan Banik petitioner was ordered by District Magistrate Burdwan to be detained under section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (Act 26 of 1971) with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order."}}, {"text": "Milan Banik", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4465, "end_char": 4476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J.\n\nMilan Banik petitioner was ordered by District Magistrate Burdwan to be detained under section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (Act 26 of 1971) with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.", "canonical_name": "MILAN BANIK"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4552, "end_char": 4561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4569, "end_char": 4611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4876, "end_char": 4886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "June l, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4974, "end_char": 4986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aller makir.g the detention order on June l, 1973 the D.M. sent report to the State Government about his having made the detention order along with the grounds of detention and other necessary particulars."}}, {"text": "June 12, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5197, "end_char": 5210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government approved the detention order on June 12, 1973."}}, {"text": "July 23, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5256, "end_char": 5269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner at the time of his arrest on July 23, 1973 was served with the order of detention as well as the grounds of detention together with vernacular translation thereof."}}, {"text": "August 7, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5459, "end_char": 5473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the petitioner was placed before the Advisory Board on August 7, 1973."}}, {"text": "August 8, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5645, "end_char": 5659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said representation after being considered was rejected by the State Government on August 8, 1973."}}, {"text": "September 25, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5769, "end_char": 5787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Advisory Board 'expressed the opinion on September 25, 1973 that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner."}}, {"text": "October 1, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5861, "end_char": 5876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 1, 1973 the State Government confirmed the detention order."}}, {"text": "Narayana Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5956, "end_char": 5968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been argued by Mr. Narayana Rao, who has appeared amicus curiae on behalf of the petitioner, that the alleged activities for which the petitioner had been detained were not germane to public order."}}, {"text": "Gopal Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6503, "end_char": 6515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "you along with your associates stopped the rickshaw of Sri Gopal Sharma on\n\npoint of dagger while he was coming from Burdwan Railway Station towards Curzon Gate and snatched each Rs."}}, {"text": "15-5-73", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6812, "end_char": 6819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 15-5-73 at about 04.30 hours your along with yom associates Swapan Singh and others attacked Shri Aditya Monda!,"}}, {"text": "Swapan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6872, "end_char": 6884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 15-5-73 at about 04.30 hours your along with yom associates Swapan Singh and others attacked Shri Aditya Monda!,"}}, {"text": "Aditya Monda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6910, "end_char": 6922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 15-5-73 at about 04.30 hours your along with yom associates Swapan Singh and others attacked Shri Aditya Monda!,"}}, {"text": "Burdwan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6956, "end_char": 6963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a Bus conductor on B. C. Road, Burdwan and on the point of an open Bhojali rc;>bbed him of each Rs."}}, {"text": "Sushanta Goswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8693, "end_char": 8709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference has been made by Mr. Narayana Rao to the case of 111\n\ne : Sushanta Goswami & Ors.(')"}}, {"text": "Ram Kamal Dhar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8780, "end_char": 8794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "wherein this Court directed the release of a detenu nal)led Ram Kamal Dhar inspite of the fact that he along with his associates was alleged to have snatched a wrist watch from a person at the point of dagger."}}, {"text": "[1960) 3 SCR 138", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9502, "end_char": 9518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shyama Charan Chatterjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10934, "end_char": 10958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would appear from the affidavit of Shri Shyama Charan Chatterjee District Magistrate that in both the cases final reports were submitted and the petitioner was got discharged as the witnesses were unwilling to give evidence against him in open court for [car of their lives."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11831, "end_char": 11848, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12089, "end_char": 12108, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "April 25, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13037, "end_char": 13051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "435 of 1971 decided on April 25, 1972) that from the mere fact that a detenu was discharged in a criminal case relating to an incident by a magistrate, it could not be said that the detention order on the basis of that incident was incompetent, nor could it be inferred that it was without basis or mala fide."}}, {"text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13784, "end_char": 13822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13901, "end_char": 13911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964", "statute": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14918, "end_char": 14928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15009, "end_char": 15041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15503, "end_char": 15512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "1966] 1 SCR 3", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15762, "end_char": 15775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_794_798_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "7 94\n\nJEHAN SINGH\n\nDELHI ADMINISTRATION March 27, 1974\n\n[M. H. BEG AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ .]\n\nCode of Crinzi11al Procedure, 1898, Sec. 561-A-lnherent powers of the H; gli Court-Interference with i111estigation by tile Po/ice-F.J.R. pri111a facie dis closes cognizable offence.\n\nA bus belonging to one Indraj and Sukhlal was in the/ossession of Munshi Ram, the driver, and other servants. The bus was remove from the custody of the said servants by the appellant and one Mr. Pathak. Munshi Ram filed F.I.R. disclosing these facts.\n\nJn pursuance of the information the Police started investigaiton, arrested Jehan Singh, the appellant, and Pathak who were later on released on bail.\n\nThe bus was seized by the Police.\n\nThe proceeding in regard to Pathak was quashed by the High Court but not in respect of the appellant.\n\nThe appellant contended before this Court that the F.I.R. did not disclose any offence and therefore, the investigation by PoliCe should be quashed.\n\nDisn1issing the appeal,\n\nHELD :-(I) That the decision of the Privy Council in Kliwaza Nudr Aluned':r case and the decision of the Supreme Court jn S. N. Basok's ca5e have settled lhe Jaw in regari to the High Court's power of interference at th~ interlocutory stage. The statutory power of the pol.ice 'o investigate the cogniz able offences cannot be interferred with in exercise of the inherent power of the Court u/s 561-A of the Cri1ninal Procedure Code.\n\nJn lhe present case. no charge-sheet or complaint had been filed in the Court and the matter \\Vas o; lill at the stageof investigation by the Police. {796]\n\n(II) Held further, that the first information report pri111a facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence by the appeJlant and his companions.\n\nApplying the decision of the Court in R. P. Kaiur's case held, the High Court was right in not interfering with the police investigation. The interference is justified only if the F .LR. does not disclose any offence. In exercise of it~ jurisdiction u/s. 561-A, the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether evidence in a given case is reliable or not.\n\n(79R A-797 D]\n\nKing E111peror v. K/iu•aja Nazir Alin1ed, 71 l.A. at 213, followed.\n\nState of We</ Bengal v. S. N. Hasak [1963] 2 S.C.R. 54, applied.\n\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 201 of 1970.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 3rd February, 1970 of the Delhi High Court in Crl. Mis. (M) No. 93 G of 1969.\n\nS. M. A 11a11d, for the Appellant.\n\nS. N.-Prasad and R. N. Sachthey for Respondent No. I.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.-This appeal by special !ave. is directed aaint .an order of a learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court, . d!sm1ssmg appellant's petition made under s. 561-A of the Code of Cnmmal Procedure.\n\nThe material facts are these :\n\nOn June 15, 1969, a report was lodged in Police Station, Tilak Mark, New Delhi, by one Munshi Ram alleging that he was employed as a Driver of bus, DLP 3867, belonging to Jndraj Singh and Su1<h Lal of Chirag Delhi.\n\nOn June 13, 1969 at 6 p.m., he stopped the bus at Mathura Road to talk to one Devi Singh son of Ganesh Lal.\n\nDevi Singh invited the informant and his companions, Mahinder Singh Conductor and Sher Singh helper, to soft-drinks at a nearby shop.\n\nLeavmg the bus unattended, they proceeded to that shop.\n\nIn the meantime, Jehan Singh appellant, Sharma, R. K. Pathak and another man of 'stout-build' got into the vehicle.\n\nThe stout man took the steering wheel, and all the four drove away in the bus despite the protests of the informant and his companions.\n\nMunshi Ram then went to Chirag Delhi to inform his employer Indraj Singh, but found the latter absent.\n\nIt was also mentioned in the report that Pathak and Sharma were employed in Scindia House.\n\nThe police started investigation and arrested Jehan Singh appellant, and R. K. Pathak, Assistant Manager of the Industrial Credit Co. Ltd.,\n\nScindia House (hereinafter called the Company).\n\nThey were later released on bail.\n\nThe bus was also seized by the police from the possession of the Company.\n\nPathak and the appellant filed two separate petitions under s. 561- A, Cr. Procedure Code challenging the police proceedings in pursuance of the First Information Report made by Munshi Ram.\n\nThe learned Judge by a common judgment allowed Pathak's petition and quashed the proceedings against him, but dismissed the appellant's petition with this observation :\n\n\"If Jehan Singh had transferred all his rights in the bus, though against the stipulations in the hire-purchase agreement, it would be a matter for consideration of the trial court whether he could be regarded guilty of the offence of theft if the version contained in the first information report is proved.\"\n\nAt the outset, we inquired from Shri Anand, learned Counsel for the appellant, whether the proceedings sought to be quashed were pending in any court or before the police.\n\nWe are told that at the date of the filing of the petitions under s. 561-A, Cr. Procedure Code, no d.ar_ge-sheet or complaint had been laid in court. The matter was still at the stage of investigation by the police.\n\n. Shri Prasad, learned Counsel for the State contends that lhe petioons under s. 561-A to quash the proceedings which were being conducted in the course of policy investigation, were not competent. He Jias referred to King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad(!) and State of\n\nWest Bengal v. S. N. Basak('). It is maintained that in these circumstances, the petitions of both Pathak and the appellant Jehan Singh ought to have been dismissed as premature.\n\nH On the other hand Shri Anand maintains that his case falls within one of the exceptions to the general rule enunciated in the cases cited\n\nI I) 71 I.A. 203 at 213.\n\n(2) (t963] 2 S.C.R. 54.\n\nby Shri Prasad.\n\nReliance has been placed on R. P. Kapur v. State of A Punjab(').\n\nIt appears to us that the preliminary objection raised by Shri Prasad must prevail.\n\nIn King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad (supra), their Lordship -of the Privy Council pointed out that \"the functions of the judiciary .and the police arc complementary, not overlapping\" and that the \"court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then\". It was added that \"it has sometimes been thought that s. 561-A has given increased powers to the Court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so, the section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the court already inherently possesses shall be preserved\".\n\nThe principle enunciated in Khwaja Nazir Ahmed's case (supra) was applied by this Court in S. N. Basak's case (supra).\n\nTherein a First Information Report was registered at the Police Station to the .effect, that S. N. Basak along with three others had committed offences under ss. 420, 120-B read withs. 420, Penal Code.\n\nThe police started investigations on the basis of that report.\n\nBasak accused surrendered before the Judicial Magistrate and was enlarged on bail.\n\nSubsequent- 1y, he moved the High Court by a petition under ss. 439 and 561-A of the Code of Criminal Prncedure praying that the proceedings pending .against him be quashed.\n\nAt the time he filed the petition them was no case pending before any court. . The High Court quashed the police investigation holding that \"the statutory power of investigation given to the police under Chapter XIV is not available in respect ol an offence triable under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949 and that being so, the investigation concerned is without jurisdiction\".\n\nAgainst that order, the State came in appeal before this Court on a certificate granted by the High Court under Art. 134(1) (c).\n\nAllowing the appeal, this Court speaking through J. L.\n\nKapur J., observed :\n\n\"The powers of investigation into cognizable•offences arc contained in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 154 which is in that Chapter deals with information in cognizable offences and s. 156_ with investigation into such offences and under these sections the police has the statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory power of the police to investigate cannot be interfered with by the. exercise of power under s. 439 or under the inherent power of the court under s. 561-A of Criminal Prncedure Code\".\n\nThe basic facts in the instant case are similar.\n\nHere also, no -police challan or charge-sheet against the accused had been laid in court, when the petitions under s. 561-A were filed.\n\nThe impugned proceedings were those which were being conducted in the course of\n\n\n!!!!:t.\n\nA police investigation.\n\nPrima facit, therefore, the rule in Basak's case would be attracted.\n\nJn R. P. Kapur v. The State of Punjab (supra), it was clarified that the rule as to non-interference by the High Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers, with the proceedings at an interlocutory stage, was not an inflexible one, and there are some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings.\n\nGajendragadkar J., as he then was, speaking for the Court indicated one of such categories thus :\n\n\"Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Informatin Report to decide whether the offe11ce alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person.\"\n\nIt was held that since the allegations made in the First Information Report against the appellant therein did constitute offences alleged, there was no legal bar to the institution or continuance of the proceedings against him. It was further laid down that in exercise of its jurisdiction under s. 561-A, the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in the case is reliable or not.\n\nThe question, therefore, to be considered is, whether in the instant case, the allegations made in the First Information Report, did not, if assumed to be correct, constitute the offence of theft or its abetment against the appellant.\n\nA plain reading of the First Information Report would show that the answer to this question must be in the negative.\n\nIt is alleged therein that the bus (DLP-3867) belonged to Indraj and Sukhlal of Chirag .Delhi and was at the material time in their possession through their servants, Munshi Ram Driver, Mohinder Singh Conductor and Sher Singh\n\nHelper, and that it was removed in the teeth of opposition from them, without their consent, from their custody or possession by four persons including Jehan Sin.h and R. K. Pathak, who all entered into the vehicle which was then driven by one of them, who was of stron~ build, medium height, dark complexion .etc. to Scindia House. In substance the allegation was that the wrongful removal of the bus was the concerted action of the appellant Jehan Singh and R. K. Pathak and their un-named companions. Prima facie, the allegations in the First Information Report, if taken as correct, did disclose the commission of a cognizable offenee by the appellant and his companions. May be, that further evidence to be collected by the police in the course Vi i1i;-,;; tigation including thy hire-purchase agreement, partnership deed and the receipt etc. would confinn or falsify the allegations made in the First Information Report.\n\nBut, the High Court, at this stage, as was pointed out by this Court in R. P. Kapur's case (supra), could not, in\n\n. -;.{~ '..\n\n'\"· 798 .?fo\n\nthe exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, appraise that evidence or A enquire as to whether it was reliable or not.\n\nMight be, after collecting all the evidence, the police would itself submit a cancellation report.\n\nIf, however, a charge-sheet is laid before the Magistrate under s. 173, Criminal Procedure Code, then all these matters will have to be considered by the Magistrate after taking cognizance of the case.\n\nWe cannot, at this stage, possibly indicate what B should be done in purely hypothetical situations which may or may not arise in this case.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we would hold that the petitions under s. 561-A were liable to be dismissed as pre-mature and incompetent.\n\nOn this short ground, we would dismiss this appeal.\n\nNo observation unwittingly made with regard to the merits of the C case, in the above judgment shall be taken into account to the prejudice of any of the parties.\n\nS.B.W.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 71, "entities": [{"text": "94\n\nJEHAN SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "94\n\nJEHAN SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DELHI ADMINISTRATION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DELHI ADMINISTRATION", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 27, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 54, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 94\n\nJEHAN SINGH\n\nDELHI ADMINISTRATION March 27, 1974\n\n[M. H. BEG AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ .]"}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Sec. 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 301, "end_char": 307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A bus belonging to one Indraj and Sukhlal was in the/ossession of Munshi Ram, the driver, and other servants.", "canonical_name": "Indraj Singh"}}, {"text": "Sukhlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 312, "end_char": 319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A bus belonging to one Indraj and Sukhlal was in the/ossession of Munshi Ram, the driver, and other servants."}}, {"text": "Munshi Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 344, "end_char": 354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A bus belonging to one Indraj and Sukhlal was in the/ossession of Munshi Ram, the driver, and other servants."}}, {"text": "Pathak. Munshi Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 474, "end_char": 492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The bus was remove from the custody of the said servants by the appellant and one Mr. Pathak."}}, {"text": "Jehan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 606, "end_char": 617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn pursuance of the information the Police started investigaiton, arrested Jehan Singh, the appellant, and Pathak who were later on released on bail.", "canonical_name": "94\n\nJEHAN SINGH"}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 638, "end_char": 644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn pursuance of the information the Police started investigaiton, arrested Jehan Singh, the appellant, and Pathak who were later on released on bail.", "canonical_name": "Pathak"}}, {"text": "Kliwaza Nudr Aluned':r", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1048, "end_char": 1070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Disn1issing the appeal,\n\nHELD :-(I) That the decision of the Privy Council in Kliwaza Nudr Aluned':r case and the decision of the Supreme Court jn S. N. Basok's ca5e have settled lhe Jaw in regari to the High Court's power of interference at th~ interlocutory stage."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1100, "end_char": 1113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Disn1issing the appeal,\n\nHELD :-(I) That the decision of the Privy Council in Kliwaza Nudr Aluned':r case and the decision of the Supreme Court jn S. N. Basok's ca5e have settled lhe Jaw in regari to the High Court's power of interference at th~ interlocutory stage."}}, {"text": "S. N. Basok", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1117, "end_char": 1128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Disn1issing the appeal,\n\nHELD :-(I) That the decision of the Privy Council in Kliwaza Nudr Aluned':r case and the decision of the Supreme Court jn S. N. Basok's ca5e have settled lhe Jaw in regari to the High Court's power of interference at th~ interlocutory stage.", "canonical_name": "S. N. Basok"}}, {"text": "s 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1388, "end_char": 1393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. P. Kaiur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1779, "end_char": 1790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Applying the decision of the Court in R. P. Kaiur's case held, the High Court was right in not interfering with the police investigation.", "canonical_name": "R. P. Kaiur"}}, {"text": "s. 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1993, "end_char": 1999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1963] 2 S.C.R. 54", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2228, "end_char": 2246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. N.-Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2503, "end_char": 2515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N.-Prasad and R. N. Sachthey for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2520, "end_char": 2534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N.-Prasad and R. N. Sachthey for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2602, "end_char": 2610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.-This appeal by special !"}}, {"text": "s. 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2767, "end_char": 2773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 15, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2845, "end_char": 2858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material facts are these :\n\nOn June 15, 1969, a report was lodged in Police Station, Tilak Mark, New Delhi, by one Munshi Ram alleging that he was employed as a Driver of bus, DLP 3867, belonging to Jndraj Singh and Su1<h Lal of Chirag Delhi."}}, {"text": "Jndraj Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3013, "end_char": 3025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material facts are these :\n\nOn June 15, 1969, a report was lodged in Police Station, Tilak Mark, New Delhi, by one Munshi Ram alleging that he was employed as a Driver of bus, DLP 3867, belonging to Jndraj Singh and Su1<h Lal of Chirag Delhi."}}, {"text": "h Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3034, "end_char": 3039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material facts are these :\n\nOn June 15, 1969, a report was lodged in Police Station, Tilak Mark, New Delhi, by one Munshi Ram alleging that he was employed as a Driver of bus, DLP 3867, belonging to Jndraj Singh and Su1<h Lal of Chirag Delhi."}}, {"text": "Chirag Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3043, "end_char": 3055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material facts are these :\n\nOn June 15, 1969, a report was lodged in Police Station, Tilak Mark, New Delhi, by one Munshi Ram alleging that he was employed as a Driver of bus, DLP 3867, belonging to Jndraj Singh and Su1<h Lal of Chirag Delhi."}}, {"text": "June 13, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3061, "end_char": 3074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 13, 1969 at 6 p.m., he stopped the bus at Mathura Road to talk to one Devi Singh son of Ganesh Lal."}}, {"text": "Devi Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3136, "end_char": 3146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 13, 1969 at 6 p.m., he stopped the bus at Mathura Road to talk to one Devi Singh son of Ganesh Lal."}}, {"text": "Ganesh Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3154, "end_char": 3164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 13, 1969 at 6 p.m., he stopped the bus at Mathura Road to talk to one Devi Singh son of Ganesh Lal."}}, {"text": "Mahinder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3220, "end_char": 3234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Devi Singh invited the informant and his companions, Mahinder Singh Conductor and Sher Singh helper, to soft-drinks at a nearby shop.", "canonical_name": "Mahinder Singh"}}, {"text": "Sher Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3249, "end_char": 3259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Devi Singh invited the informant and his companions, Mahinder Singh Conductor and Sher Singh helper, to soft-drinks at a nearby shop."}}, {"text": "Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3399, "end_char": 3405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, Jehan Singh appellant, Sharma, R. K. Pathak and another man of 'stout-build' got into the vehicle.", "canonical_name": "Sharma"}}, {"text": "R. K. Pathak", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3407, "end_char": 3419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, Jehan Singh appellant, Sharma, R. K. Pathak and another man of 'stout-build' got into the vehicle.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Pathak"}}, {"text": "Indraj Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3673, "end_char": 3685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Munshi Ram then went to Chirag Delhi to inform his employer Indraj Singh, but found the latter absent.", "canonical_name": "Indraj Singh"}}, {"text": "Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3769, "end_char": 3775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also mentioned in the report that Pathak and Sharma were employed in Scindia House.", "canonical_name": "Sharma"}}, {"text": "Jehan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3855, "end_char": 3866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The police started investigation and arrested Jehan Singh appellant, and R. K. Pathak, Assistant Manager of the Industrial Credit Co. Ltd.,\n\nScindia House (hereinafter called the Company).", "canonical_name": "94\n\nJEHAN SINGH"}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4109, "end_char": 4115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pathak and the appellant filed two separate petitions under s. 561- A, Cr.", "canonical_name": "Pathak"}}, {"text": "s. 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4169, "end_char": 4175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4818, "end_char": 4823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the outset, we inquired from Shri Anand, learned Counsel for the appellant, whether the proceedings sought to be quashed were pending in any court or before the police."}}, {"text": "s. 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5020, "end_char": 5026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5178, "end_char": 5184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Prasad, learned Counsel for the State contends that lhe petioons under s. 561-A to quash the proceedings which were being conducted in the course of policy investigation, were not competent.", "canonical_name": "Prasad"}}, {"text": "s. 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5249, "end_char": 5255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5821, "end_char": 5827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Shri Prasad.", "canonical_name": "Prasad"}}, {"text": "s. 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6317, "end_char": 6323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Khwaja Nazir Ahmed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6600, "end_char": 6618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principle enunciated in Khwaja Nazir Ahmed's case (supra) was applied by this Court in S. N. Basak's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "S. N. Basak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6663, "end_char": 6674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principle enunciated in Khwaja Nazir Ahmed's case (supra) was applied by this Court in S. N. Basak's case (supra).", "canonical_name": "S. N. Basok"}}, {"text": "ss. 420, 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6850, "end_char": 6862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6882, "end_char": 6892, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Basak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6959, "end_char": 6964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basak accused surrendered before the Judicial Magistrate and was enlarged on bail."}}, {"text": "ss. 439 and 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7103, "end_char": 7118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7742, "end_char": 7753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J. L.\n\nKapur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7809, "end_char": 7821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Allowing the appeal, this Court speaking through J. L.\n\nKapur J., observed :\n\n\"The powers of investigation into cognizable•offences arc contained in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure."}}, {"text": "Chapter XIV of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7909, "end_char": 7932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7956, "end_char": 7967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XIV of the Code", "statute": "Chapter XIV of the Code"}}, {"text": "s. 156", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8043, "end_char": 8049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XIV of the Code", "statute": "Chapter XIV of the Code"}}, {"text": "s. 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8369, "end_char": 8375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XIV of the Code", "statute": "Chapter XIV of the Code"}}, {"text": "s. 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8423, "end_char": 8429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XIV of the Code", "statute": "Chapter XIV of the Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Prncedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8435, "end_char": 8458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8627, "end_char": 8633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Prncedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Prncedure Code"}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9200, "end_char": 9214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendragadkar J., as he then was, speaking for the Court indicated one of such categories thus :\n\n\"Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Informatin Report to decide whether the offe11ce alleged is disclosed or not."}}, {"text": "s. 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10188, "end_char": 10194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chirag", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10737, "end_char": 10743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged therein that the bus (DLP-3867) belonged to Indraj and Sukhlal of Chirag .Delhi and was at the material time in their possession through their servants, Munshi Ram Driver, Mohinder Singh Conductor and Sher Singh\n\nHelper, and that it was removed in the teeth of opposition from them, without their consent, from their custody or possession by four persons including Jehan Sin.h and R. K. Pathak, who all entered into the vehicle which was then driven by one of them, who was of stron~ build, medium height, dark complexion .etc."}}, {"text": ".Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10744, "end_char": 10750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged therein that the bus (DLP-3867) belonged to Indraj and Sukhlal of Chirag .Delhi and was at the material time in their possession through their servants, Munshi Ram Driver, Mohinder Singh Conductor and Sher Singh\n\nHelper, and that it was removed in the teeth of opposition from them, without their consent, from their custody or possession by four persons including Jehan Sin.h and R. K. Pathak, who all entered into the vehicle which was then driven by one of them, who was of stron~ build, medium height, dark complexion .etc."}}, {"text": "Mohinder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10843, "end_char": 10857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged therein that the bus (DLP-3867) belonged to Indraj and Sukhlal of Chirag .Delhi and was at the material time in their possession through their servants, Munshi Ram Driver, Mohinder Singh Conductor and Sher Singh\n\nHelper, and that it was removed in the teeth of opposition from them, without their consent, from their custody or possession by four persons including Jehan Sin.h and R. K. Pathak, who all entered into the vehicle which was then driven by one of them, who was of stron~ build, medium height, dark complexion .etc.", "canonical_name": "Mahinder Singh"}}, {"text": "Jehan Sin.h", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11036, "end_char": 11047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged therein that the bus (DLP-3867) belonged to Indraj and Sukhlal of Chirag .Delhi and was at the material time in their possession through their servants, Munshi Ram Driver, Mohinder Singh Conductor and Sher Singh\n\nHelper, and that it was removed in the teeth of opposition from them, without their consent, from their custody or possession by four persons including Jehan Sin.h and R. K. Pathak, who all entered into the vehicle which was then driven by one of them, who was of stron~ build, medium height, dark complexion .etc.", "canonical_name": "94\n\nJEHAN SINGH"}}, {"text": "R. K. Pathak", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11344, "end_char": 11356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In substance the allegation was that the wrongful removal of the bus was the concerted action of the appellant Jehan Singh and R. K. Pathak and their un-named companions.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Pathak"}}, {"text": "R. P. Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11884, "end_char": 11895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, the High Court, at this stage, as was pointed out by this Court in R. P. Kapur's case (supra), could not, in\n\n.", "canonical_name": "R. P. Kaiur"}}, {"text": "s. 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12236, "end_char": 12242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12244, "end_char": 12267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12583, "end_char": 12589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_799_807_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "• D\n\n. <\n\n• •\n\nRAGHUBIR SINGH\n\nSTATE OF HARYANA March 28, 1974\n\n[H. R. KHANNA, V'. R. KRISHNA !HR AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.J Pret:e,11ion of Corrupti~ Act. (2 of i947) S. SA-Sanction to prosecute--:- Aurhority of. sanctio11i11g authority questioned for the first ti1ne in appeal under Art. 136-Contention when may be allowed-Executive. magistrale laying traP- Propriet_v-Trap witnesses, if accomplices-Non-examinfltion of a wUness and allowing a pros•cutio11 witness to be 1'tated as stile-Effect of.\n\nThe appellant, an Assistant Station MaSter, was c(>D.victcd of the offence of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duties punishable under s. S(2) of the Prevention. of Corruption Act. 1947, and the conviction was confirmed by the High Court. In appeal to this Court under Art. 136, it was contended that; ( 1) the~ prosecution was invalid for want of competent sanction;. (2) the investigation was not merely illegal but caused serious prejudice to the accused; (3) the Court should have drawn an adverse. inference aa; ainst the prosecution from .lhe non-!'xani.ination of a key witness like the Deputy Superintendent of Police;\n\n{ 4) ·.the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices .or quasi-accomplices should not have been made the foundation fQr the conviction; a.lid ( 5) the Court should not have drawn a presumption under s. 4 of the Act as the charge was under s. 5(l)(d) rend withs . .S(2).\n\nDislliissing the appeal.\n\nHELD :-(l)(a) The Divisional Officer (Senior scale) eranted the sanctioa for prosecution in this case, and under r. 134 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, he has the delegated power to appoint and dismiss officers like the accused, and therfore, was competent to grant the sanction. [802 C-D]\n\n(b) The construction souaht to be put On the rule reading it with r. 3(a). chat ofily 'Divisional Personnel Officers are in executive charge_ of the staff of Divisional Offices and are entitled to control them and therefore, by implication other divisional officers are excluded from the delep.tion of powers in re&ilrd to appointments has no substance.\n\nRule 3(a) refers to 'E.stablishmenl matters' which ordinarily cover routine items and not appointments and dismissals\n\n(802 H-803 A]\n\n( c) MOreovor the appellant should have produced his appointment order if his case was that it was only a Divisional Personnel Officer and not a Divisional OffiC!'r that appainted him. [803 BJ\n\n(d) .This. cqnte.nti9n was nQt a!sed in th~ low.er cour~ nor in the High .Court.\n\nIn special circumstances the vahdny of a sanction which goes to the root of tho case may be permitted to be raised for the first time inthis Court but this. is not one such. [802 G) Vinayak v:. Josl1ib\"v. State, A.l.R. 1968 Pun, 120 and Sudarshan/111 Baja;\n\nv. S. P. Agarwaki, A.l.R. 1966 Raj. 37, referred to.\n\n(2) The mandate of s. SA regarding investigation is merely that no police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent .of Police shall investigate any of the offences specified therein. There was no inaction by the police or misuse. of tbe executive m8.gilstracy in this case. In the present case, a trap was laid by the Executive Magistrate, because the D.S.P. had no jurisdiction over railway prt'miscs, and after the trap episode was completed and'. the bft'ence committed information was laid before the police officer. who started. the iQVtigation; and he certainty was an officer of competent.rank .. While,.layi!18'. a trap by a police\n\nOfficer, may be a sieP ill irivestigation if a case had already: been; registered itl the -palicC station pursuant to which the trap was set, ii Cannof be sald tO: bi a part or investigation where a trap is Jaid only to find out -whether \"an offence is going to be committed. There is nothing in s. SA prevenling an Executive, Magistrate or other public officer laying a trap to catch the allegedly conupt official. [804 A-DJ\n\nState of Bihal v. Baawan Singh. J1959] S, C, R .. 195 and Rishbud and lnder Singh V. Stale of Delht, [1955] I s.c.R: 1150 followed.\n\nHira Lal [1970] 3 S.C.R.. 933, rofe)'rid tg. 8-L84Sup. Cl/75\n\n800 SllPREME COURT- REPORTS\n\n(1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\n(3) The non-examination of th: Deputy Superintenjent of Police is of no A consequence at aII in the case. [807 B] (4)(a) The speci2.I jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution cannot , be diluted into a second appeal on facts. [804. E-F] . (b) To condemri roundly every public official or man of the people as an accomplice or. quasi-accomplice for participating in a raid is to harm the public cause. 11.Iay be a_ judicial officer, should hesitate to get involved in police traps \\Vhen the police provide inducements and instruments to commit crimes, because,\n\nthat. \\\\rould s_uHy the image of the independence of the judiciary.\n\nBut there B cannot be a total ban on public officers even though executive . magistrates, { playing a socially useful role. in checking public men's corruption when the r\"\\,--\n\nituation needs it. A flexible, realistic approach is the sound ourse. (805 C-E] i In the present cases the magistrate was not a full-blooded judicial officer no de 1iqJ..'O_ temptation or bribe money was offered by the Police and no ground to 4isre_dit the veracity of the magistrate had geen elicited. (805 E]\n\nr:.:.a Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vind/Jya Pradesh, [1954] S.C.R. 1096, C referred to.-·\n\n (c) The permissioQ. given .by the Court to treat a prosecution witness as hostile \\Vas properly granted. It is discretionary power of the trial coilrt and, if_ the. witness strikes. the. court as imbued \\vith partisan zea1. cross-examination 1nay bi!· allowed by the party who calls him;;-\n\n[806 E-F]\n\n(5) Even if the statutory presumption is unavailable courts may presume \\Vhat may in the ordinary course be the most probable inference.\n\nThat an' Assistant Station Master has in his hand a marked currency note made over to him by a passenger whose bedding had been detained by him, for which no. credible. explanation was forthcoming, speaks for itself. Assuming that the passenger was using a. pass intended for himself to take with him his rife and child illegally aiid thus tried to dupe the railway~ it is no alibi for the Assistant Station_ MaStCr to heJp himself to illici_t gratification.\n\n[806 G-807 B] CR.iMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 1971. . .\n\nAppe3J by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 15th May, 1970 of the Punjab and Haryana High Conrt in Criminal Appeal No. 737 of 1968. • ·· Frank Anihony and K. B. Rohatgi, for. the appellant.\n\nH. s, Mmwah, and.R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.·\n\nThe' Judgment of the Court was delivered by, \" KRISHNA IYER, J.-Mr. Frank Anthony arguing the case for the accused, in this appeal by special leave, has put forward four main contentions against the appellant's is conviction, namely, (a) that the 'prosecution is invalid for want of competent sanction; (b) that the investigation. is not merely illegal but has in consequence inflicted serious prejudice on the accused; ( c) th<1t the non-examination of key witnesses, like the Deputy Superintendent of Police, should have driven the court to. draw an adverse inference fatal to the case, and the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices or quasi-accomplices should not have been the foundation for a conviction, and ( d) that the Court had drawn a presumption under s. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, although there was no warrant for it in the present case, the charge having been one under s. 5(1)(d), read with s. 5(2) of the said Act.\n\nA brief statement of the facts will lead to a better appreciation of the arguments urged. The accused (appellant) was an . Assistant\n\n' >-\n\n),... __ , (\n\n~ I\n\nStation Master at Ateli in May 1967. P.W. 3, a member of the Armed Forces, was going back home by train from Udaipur with his wife and child on railway concession pass, carrying with him a trunk and bedlling. When the train reached Ateli Railway station in , the afternoon of May 9, 1967, P.W. 3 got down with his baggage arid, when he handed over his ticket to the accused, was told that he had to pay extra for his wife and child and excess luggage-a sum around Rs. 45 or more. P.W. 3 pleaded that he had no money on him then and was suggestedl a way out by the payment of Rs. 10 at once a bribe and a bargain. Promising to bring the money the next day, P.W.\n\n3 left the station leaving his bedding as something of a non-human 'hostage' which was to be released or. the payment of the illicit sum.\n\nOn reaching his village late in the night, P.W. 3, the Jawan, thought of informing the authorities about this harassment. Accordingly, be contacted the Deputy Commissioner, Narnaul, on May 11 and related to him what had happened. The Deputy Commissioner instructed the Superintendent of Police to look. into the matter who directed the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Narnaul, to take suitable action. He also sent a telephonic message to Shri Dharamvir, Sub Divisional Magistrate, Narnaul, and told him that Sis Ram had been directed to contact the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Narnaul, in connection with his complaint. thereupon, the Sub Divisional Magistrate, P.W. 5, together with the Deputy Superintendent of Police, decided to. organise a trap, on being apprised of the story by P.W. 3. The team consisted of the Deputy Superintendent, the Sub Divisional Magistrate, a head constable of the railway police, and P.W. 3 himself. The party moved to the railway station and P.W. 4, Lakshmi Narain, also joined them on the way. A .ten-rupee note (Ex. Pl) was handed over by P.W.3 to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, who signed on it, .in token whereof a memo was prepared, Ex. PF. P.W. 3 took back the note, his body' was searched as part of the usual precaution and he was directed to go to the accused and give signal after the money was paid. As arranged, P.W. 3 met the accused, made over the money, gave a signal whereupon the party of the Sub Divisional Magistrate closed in on the accused.\n\nThe marked note was. recovered from his right hand ( vido memo. Ex.\n\nPG). Thereafter, the Sub Divisional Magistrate lodged a First Information Report with the police, a case was registered and on completion of investigation by the Deputy Superintendent of Police having jurisdiction over the Railways, P.W. 7, and after obtaining the statutory sanction, Ex. PD/l, the accused was charged with an offence of having accepted illegal gratification of Rs. 10 on May 11, 1967 from P.W. 3 thereby committing criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duties, punishable under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Special Judge convicted the accused, overruling the defence version set up under s. 342, Cr. P.C., and disbelieving the defence witnesses. The High Court confirmed the. conviction.\n\nThe sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200 \\\\'US\n\nalso confirmed.\n\nShri Frank Anthony sought to make good his contention regarding the invalidity of the sanction, Ex. PD/l, by urging that P.W. 2, a Divisional Officer (Senior Scale), who granted the sanction did not\n\nand, under the rules, could not appoint or dismiss the accused. It has A to be mentioned right at the beginning that P.W. 2, who was working as Divisional Operating Superintendent, Western Railway, Udaipur, has sworn that by virtue of delegated powers he was competent to remove an Assistant Stati.on Master like the accused. Although his evidence was a little ambiguous in that he first swore that he was competent to remove but not to dismiss the accused, on a later date he was recalled, and gave evidence bringing with' him the relevant rules B and regulations. He testified that under the rules he was competent to f. dismiss a Class III servant drawing a pay rising up to Rs. 250. The _., l accused came within this category. The High Court, not content with mere oral evidence on this issue, went elaborately into the legality of the sanction and found that the Indian Railway Establishment Code (rule !34) authorised delegation of powers, and in the schedule there is a clear delegation of the powers in favour of Divisional Officers c. (Senior Scale) to make initial appointments to posts in scales of pay rising up lo Rs. 380 per month. P.W. 2 is a Divisional Officer, Senior Scale, and the accused holds a post in a scale of pay not exceeding Rs. 380/- per month. The Court, therefore, concluded that the power to appoint, which also carried with it the power to dismiss, vested in\n\nP.W. 2.\n\nCounsel for the. appellant contended that even though i:. !34 of the, Indian Railway Establishment Code appeared to. vest powers in Divisional Officers, Senior Scale, if read in the light of the Schedule of Powers delegated by the General Manager, control in regard to appointments was vested only in'. the Divisional Personnel Officer as such .. To substantiate this argument counsel invited our attention to certain earlier portions of the Code .. He placed reliance on r. 3(a), which reads: . , ,· ,. ,\n\n\"As the DPOs ~; e in executive' charge of the staff of the Divisional Offices, exclusive of those working under the Divisional Accounts Officers, the powers delegated to Divisional Officers (Si. Scale) in Esta]Jlishment matters will, in respect of staff of the Divisional Offices, be exercised by the DPOs.\" . . . . . ' . .. . ·, . , .\n\nThere are.two difficulties in the way of our'accepting this conten- ?- lion. For one tiring, this point admittedly has not been taken before the High Court or the special judge. It is not, therefore, permissible ~- for us to allow it to be argued for the first time in the Supreme Court since the State has no opportunity to explain whether there are other G orders and what the expression 'Establishment matters\": means. In special circumstances, the validity of a sanctionwhich goes to the root of the case may be permitted to be raised for the first time in this Court. This case is not one such. For another, the rule is clear that persons like P.W. 2, namely, Divisional Officers, Senior Scale, have the power to .appoint class III officers like the accused. The contruction sought to be put on it by counsel that only DPOs are in H executive charge of the staff of Divisional Offices :j]Id are entitled to control them, and by. implication, therefore, other Divisional Officers are excluded from the delegation of po.vers in regard to appointments\n\nhas no substance. 'Establishment maUefS' ordinarily. cover routine items, not appointments and dismissals. May be,, for tier. co-ordina tion and avoidance of conflict among divjsional officer~.d.irections may have been issued regarding exercbe of powers by one which do not contradict existence of powers in others. Moreover, it,, was easy for the appellant to produce his appointment orderif his .a<!ditional c.ase that only a Divisional Personnel Officer and not a .. Divisional Officer appointed him.\n\nAgain, all that Ex. P.E. and like.d<)(:umcnts prove is that allotments of selected persons are made .by the higher officer (the\n\nR.T.S.) but the actual appointment is made by the D.T.S. There is thus no force in the 'last straw' plea that the R.T.S. alone could or did appoint him.\n\nTwo decisions were pressed before us by Shri Frank Anthony. The first, Vinayak V. Joshi v. State(!), is easily distinguishable. There, a Divisional Medical Officer who was of equal status with a Divisional Personnel Officer granted sanction but be had no delegation of powers of appointment which only the latter enjoyed .. Mere equality of official status with a ddegate cannot clothe the other officer with delegated powers and so in that decision it was helcl. that the Medical Officer's sanction was incompetent, there being no delegation in his favour.\n\nThe other ruling of the Rajasthan High Court, Sudarshan/a/ Bajaj v.\n\nS. P. Agarwala('), has no application whatsoever. In these circumstances, we 'have no hesitation in rejecting the plea of the illegality of . the sanction. Couns'l is certainly right that if there is infirmity in the sanction the prosecution must fail. While it is true that provision for sanction before prosecution of 1 a pYblic servant should not be an umbrella for protection of corrupt officers but a shield against reckless or malevolent harassment of officials whose upright discharge of duties may provoke unpleasantness and hostility, that is an area of law reform covered, we find, by the 4 7th Report of the Law Commission of India.\n\nNow we proceed to consider a kinded contention that the investi gation is grossly illegal nnd, without more, spells an acquittal.\n\nShri Anthony asked why the Deputy Commissioner did not record the statement of P.W. 3, the aggrieved Jawan. Why did the Superintendent of Police or even the Deputy Superintendent of Police desert his duty to register .a case on being apprised of the offence? Was it not a sub. version of the provision of s. SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 194 7, to bypass the police establishment by employing a magistrate to lay a trap? These interrogations do not legally wreck the conviction because they do not brand the investigation as invalid. As explained by counsel for the State, P.W. 3 may well have complained of harassment by the accused detaining his bedding and the Deputy O:m1missioner would have in the usual course directed him to the District head of the police. The latter, not improperly, may well have asked his subordinate to take action. Since this D.S.P. had no jurisdiction over the railway premises, he did not act directly but requested the executive magistrate of the place, P.W. 5, who had already been informed by the Deputy Commissioner to initiate steps for catching\n\n(I) AJ.R. 1968 Pun. 120. <2) A.LR. 1966 Raj. 37.\n\nthe alleged bribe taker. We do not share Shri Anthony's grave suspicion about the alleged inaction of the police and the misuse of the executive magistracy. The simple legal issue is whether s. SA has been violated or . fraudnlently frustrated and consequent failure of justice inflicted? The mandate of s. SA is merely that no police officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police shall investigate any of the offences specified there. Here, no investigation was done by a lesser police officer, for P.W. 7, who did the_investigation, was of competent rank and what the Magistrate, P.W. S, did was not investigation and was de hors s. SA. By \\lefinition, only a police officer can investigate (sec . .4(1) Cr. P.C.) A magistrate cannot. In the present case, after the trap episode was completed and the offence committed, - P.W. S laid information before the police whereupon P.W. 7 started investigation. Until then, no investigation in law did or could com- . mence. Moreover,.while laying a trap by a police officer may be a step in investigation if a case has already been registered in a police station pursuant to which the trap is set, it cannot be part of investigation where the exercise is only to find out whether an offence is going to be committed. Hira Lal(') hardly rescues the accused .. There is nothing in s. SA preventing an executive magistrate or other public officer laying a. trap to catch an allegedly corrupt official. The ruling in State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh(2 ) by implication upholds this position. In fact, in the current crisis of rampant corruption polluting the public services-so the public mind demoralisingly believes-the-need for superior officers vigilantly organising Operation Anti-Corruption cannot be discouraged by legalisms. For the present case it is enough to say' that. no violation of law nor serious prejudice has been made out (vide Rishbud and lnder Singh v. State of Delhi) (3). ·\n\nThe meat of the matter, if one may say so, is whether the accused has been proved to have helped himself to an illegal gratification of Rs. 101-, as alleged. At the thres!; old we must remind ourselves that the special jurisdiction under art. 136 of the Constitution cannot be diluted intO\" a second appeal on facts. The e_nd of the appellate journey is normally 'the High _Court and exceptional circumstances alo[le can justify the exercise of the extraordinary power of the Supreme Court to review the evidence. The strange and expensive spectacle of multitiered appeals built into the system does more injury than justice and strictness inthiS( regard brings finality to litigation early instead of holding out illusory hopes to one who would not have ventured on this costly project had he. known the limitations on the jurisdiction under art. 136, m._ore so when the findings are concurrent.\n\nWe shall brieflj examine the strong attack made by Shri Frank Anthony on the evidence adduced and the credence given to it by the courts below. The sharp castigation of traps as. immorar. of trap witnesses as accomplices, of involving magistrates in such dubious exercises as reprehensible, may have had some precedential support but\n\n(1) (1970] 3 S.C.C. 933. (2)\n\n(19591 S.C.R. 195.\n\n\n.. c\n\n. !\n\nRAGHUBIR SINGI! v. l!ARYANA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 805\n\ntime and circumstance, the compulsions of public demand for arresting an insidious but expandin_g evil and a sense of judicial realism and appreciation of the specific facts of each case guide the pragmatic yet principled approach the court has to make. It is not necessary ihat executive magistrates should always keep away from operations in tended to catch the criminal red-handed. He is not so strongly moti. vated to get a suspect somehow or other punished. He is professionally detached and has a public responsibility to help detect a bribe-taker if credible requests are made. Such a magistrate is not a cloistered virtue unconcerned with social claims _on his services. It is apathy of good citizens that induces police officers to go after the lesser breed\n\nof. search witnesses in the enforcement of social welfare statutes. To condemn roundly every public offiCial or man of the people as a quasi-accomplice for participating in a raid is to harm the public cause. May be, a judicial officer, unlike an executive magistrate, should hesitate to get involved in police trap experiments and expose him self to charges of unveracity. However, there is force in the censure made in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradeshc') when the police provide inducements and instruments to commit crimes and judicial personages willingly lend themselves to be enmeshed in such shady attempts, sullying the image of indepenclence of_the judi ciary. But we cannot exaggerate these dicta into a total ban on public officers, even though executive magistrates, playing a socially useful role in checking public men's corruption when the situation needs it.\n\nThis is best illustrated by the observations of Das, J., in State of Bihar\n\nv. Basawan Singh(') where the learned Judge emphasized that a flexible, realistic approach is the sound course. In the present case, the magistrate was not a full-blooded judicial officer but only exercised limited preventivei powers after separation of the judiciary from the executive. No. de nove temptation nor bribe money was offered by the police in the present case. The magistrate merely sought to do his public duty of. intercepting a crime which was otherwise in the process of fulfilment. It was service, not sin, to have done it. No ground to discredit the veracity or taint the testimony of P.W. 5 has been elicited. And, what dissolves scepticism and builds up credence is the seizure of the marked currency note from the accused's right hand and the presence of the bedding of the jawan on the railway station. The briginal story of P.W. 3 fits in with the facts while the accused's strained version stands unproven. The murky evidence of the miUtary man, P.W. 3, who perhaps stood to gain by paying Rs. 10 and avoiding excess. baggage and extra passepger charges may be insufficient to prove guilt if uncorroborated by better testimony. A bribe deal is usually a benefit-both syndrome and the payer's lips carry little con. viction in the absence of re-assuring support. Before us, the executive magistrate, P.W. 5, and the casual member of the trap team, P.W. 4, have given testimonial boost. But real reinforcement comes from the right hand of the accused which held the guilty note and gave it over to P.W. 5 on being challenged. The counter-story of the Assistant Station Master (accused) was that the Jawan was stopped by the attender (or water carrier) of the station at the gate for insufficient ---··- - Ol [19541 s.c.R. 1096.\n\n(2) [19591 S.C.R. 195.\n\ntickets and excess baggage but, after some sound and fury over an interpolation in the military pass, was allowed. to go by the accused who promptly reported to the Jaipur Station Master to know how many passengers were covered by the pass. The inconvenient 'bedding' of the J a wan was explained by the accused as. having been left behind by P.W. 3 in .the heat of the moment and had bee!! kept in the lost property room and entered in the relevant register. The courts below have rejected this exculpatory case of th~ appellant and we see noth ing too odd in the appreciation or too unnatural in the inference to warrant our 5nterference. True, P.W. 1, the fellow station master, has endeavoured to substantiate the appellant's plea hut has been disbelieved. After all, the successful and sustained prevalence of rackets like corruption is built on the artful network of sharing agencies and the rescue operations of P.W. 1 cannot be regarded as independent evidence of an unconnected officer. We hope that the authorities in charge of cleansing our public sector of corruption wjll view each detected act as symbolic of a chain scheme and symptomatic of a deeper systr 11ic malady and not as an isolated aberration of a delinquent official. A massive purge, not stray traps, can alone be the strategy. That P.W. 1 supports the accused is no surprise if we realise how dubious 'distributjve_ justice' works in some of these public offices where money is illicitly collected. An honest Assistant Station Master in the place of the accused cJuld not have allowed P.W. 3 to leave without reporting to the raiI.vay polic.::. Nor is th<;_ frivolous explana. tion that the ten-rupee note was brought by P.W. 3 when the accused wanted only one rupee as official charge for keeping the bedding in the lost property room worth a serious look. We regret our inability to accede to the forceful submissions of Shri Frank Anthony on this aspect of the case. ·\n\nIn passii!g we may mention that the criticism made by learned counsel that P.W. 1 has been illegally permit!ed to be treated as 'hostile' is pa, i.ntless. It is a c;!iscretionary power of the trial judge and , when a witness strikes him as imbued with partisan zeal cross-exami nation may be allowed by the party who calls him. After . all, these rules are only to further the end of truth, not clogs in the quest for it.\n\nWe see nci merit in the argument. To sum.up, the case against the accused has been made out beyond reasonable doubt. Infallibility 'is -the attribute of the omniscient and judges can only act on pragmatic sense and reasonable doubts. ·\n\nThe last submission turns on the presumption under Section 4 of the Act: The contention of counsel for the appellant that the presumption\n\naviailable under s. 4 of the Act cannot be raised in the present case since the charge is under s. 5(l)(d), read withs. 5(2), is apparently attractive. But we may notice that even if the statutory {'resumption is unavailable, courts may presume what may in the ordinary course be the most probable inference. That an Assistant Station Master like the accused has in his hand a marked! cm:rency note made over to him\n\nby a passenger whose bedding has been detained by him for which no H credible explanation is forthcoming, and he is caught red-handed wjth the note, is a case of res ipsa /oquitur. The very thing. speaks for itself in the circumstances. We need not, therefore, scrutinise the\n\n'/\"----.\n\n,. -\n\nsubstance of the argument based on the inapplicability of s. 4. We also feel that there may be some force in the _argument of counsel that the jawan, P.W. 3, might have duped the railway by using a pass for one passenger and carrying ii family of wife and! child together. Of course, we cannot finally pronounce on this matter for want of sufficient documents. All that we nee.ct say is that even assuming that the passenger so tried to dupe the railway, that is no alibi for the Assistant Station Master to help himself to illicit grarification. Nor is the non-examination of the Peputy Superintendent of Police of any consequence in the case.\n\nIn these circumstances we find no reason for interfering with the concurrent conviction and sentence. The appeal is dismissed.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 48, "entities": [{"text": "RAGHUBIR SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBIR SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF HARYANA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 282, "end_char": 290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 779, "end_char": 787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1335, "end_char": 1339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(l)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1375, "end_char": 1385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D.S.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3170, "end_char": 3176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, a trap was laid by the Executive Magistrate, because the D.S.P. had no jurisdiction over railway prt'miscs, and after the trap episode was completed and'."}}, {"text": "Rishbud", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3944, "end_char": 3951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J1959] S, C, R .. 195 and Rishbud and lnder Singh V. Stale of Delht, [1955] I s.c."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4280, "end_char": 4288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Frank Anihony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6489, "end_char": 6502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anihony and K. B. Rohatgi, for.", "canonical_name": "Frank Anihony"}}, {"text": "K. B. Rohatgi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6507, "end_char": 6520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anihony and K. B. Rohatgi, for."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6560, "end_char": 6574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.·"}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6645, "end_char": 6657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The' Judgment of the Court was delivered by, \" KRISHNA IYER, J.-Mr."}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6666, "end_char": 6679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony arguing the case for the accused, in this appeal by special leave, has put forward four main contentions against the appellant's is conviction, namely, (a) that the 'prosecution is invalid for want of competent sanction; (b) that the investigation.", "canonical_name": "Frank Anihony"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7364, "end_char": 7368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7376, "end_char": 7404, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7497, "end_char": 7507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7519, "end_char": 7526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ateli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7722, "end_char": 7727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assistant\n\n' >-\n\n),...  , (\n\n~ I\n\nStation Master at Ateli in May 1967."}}, {"text": "Udaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7813, "end_char": 7820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 3, a member of the Armed Forces, was going back home by train from Udaipur with his wife and child on railway concession pass, carrying with him a trunk and bedlling."}}, {"text": "May 9, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7980, "end_char": 7991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the train reached Ateli Railway station in , the afternoon of May 9, 1967, P.W. 3 got down with his baggage arid, when he handed over his ticket to the accused, was told that he had to pay extra for his wife and child and excess luggage-a sum around Rs."}}, {"text": "Narnaul", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8678, "end_char": 8685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, be contacted the Deputy Commissioner, Narnaul, on May 11 and related to him what had happened."}}, {"text": "Dharamvir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8950, "end_char": 8959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also sent a telephonic message to Shri Dharamvir, Sub Divisional Magistrate, Narnaul, and told him that Sis Ram had been directed to contact the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Narnaul, in connection with his complaint."}}, {"text": "Sis Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9015, "end_char": 9022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also sent a telephonic message to Shri Dharamvir, Sub Divisional Magistrate, Narnaul, and told him that Sis Ram had been directed to contact the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Narnaul, in connection with his complaint."}}, {"text": "Sub Divisional Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9147, "end_char": 9172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "thereupon, the Sub Divisional Magistrate, P.W. 5, together with the Deputy Superintendent of Police, decided to."}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Narain", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9495, "end_char": 9509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The party moved to the railway station and P.W. 4, Lakshmi Narain, also joined them on the way."}}, {"text": "May 11, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10466, "end_char": 10478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10 on May 11, 1967 from P.W. 3 thereby committing criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duties, punishable under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947."}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10579, "end_char": 10586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10594, "end_char": 10628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10715, "end_char": 10721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10914, "end_char": 10927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Frank Anthony sought to make good his contention regarding the invalidity of the sanction, Ex."}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Establishment Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12582, "end_char": 12615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13629, "end_char": 13642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not, therefore, permissible ~- for us to allow it to be argued for the first time in the Supreme Court since the State has no opportunity to explain whether there are other G orders and what the expression 'Establishment matters\": means."}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15244, "end_char": 15257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two decisions were pressed before us by Shri Frank Anthony.", "canonical_name": "Frank Anihony"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court, Sudarshan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15782, "end_char": 15813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other ruling of the Rajasthan High Court, Sudarshan/a/ Bajaj v.\n\nS. P. Agarwala('), has no application whatsoever."}}, {"text": "Anthony", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16608, "end_char": 16615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Anthony asked why the Deputy Commissioner did not record the statement of P.W. 3, the aggrieved Jawan."}}, {"text": "Jawan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16704, "end_char": 16709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Anthony asked why the Deputy Commissioner did not record the statement of P.W. 3, the aggrieved Jawan."}}, {"text": "SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16911, "end_char": 16949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hira Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19023, "end_char": 19031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hira Lal(') hardly rescues the accused .. There is nothing in s. SA preventing an executive magistrate or other public officer laying a. trap to catch an allegedly corrupt official."}}, {"text": "art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19937, "end_char": 19945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20542, "end_char": 20550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22756, "end_char": 22759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is best illustrated by the observations of Das, J., in State of Bihar\n\nv. Basawan Singh(') where the learned Judge emphasized that a flexible, realistic approach is the sound course."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27222, "end_char": 27231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27327, "end_char": 27331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(l)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27406, "end_char": 27416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28078, "end_char": 28082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_808_812_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "SURAJMAL SUROLIA\n\nTHE BAR. COUNCIL OF INDIA & OTHERS\n\nMarch 28, 1974\n\n[A. N. RAY, C.J., P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, P. K. GOSWAMI AND\n\nR. S. SARKARIA, JJ.)\n\nAdvocaus Act 1961, (25 of 1961)-Sanai granted by a princely State which was not a covenanting state-Sanad did rwt show under what law II was issued- // entitled to enrol as an advocate under the A.ct.\n\nThe petitioner was granted .a Sanad by Jiias Tbikana Khetri which was the highest court in a native state. On the basis of the Sanad the petitioner practised in another native State for some years and later joined service. In 19SS his applicatioD. for recomlnencing practice was rejected by the High Court of Rajasthan on a.ccount of his not making an application before the appointed day in December, 1951.\n\nLater the petitioner applied to the Delhi State Bar Council for enrolment under s. 24(3)· of the Advocates Act Which was reiected.\n\nSub-section 3 to section 24 says that a person who has for at least three years\n\nbeen a vakil or a pleader or a mukhtar or was entitled at any time to be enrolled ut1der any Jaw as an Advocate of a High Court (including a High Court of a former part B State) may be admitted as an advocate on a State roll Dismissing the appeal.\n\nHELD : On the material placed before the Delhi Bar Council for the purpose D of the petitioner's enrolment it could not be held that the decision of the Bar Council was incorrect. If the petitioner were actually qualified under the Act for enrolment as an advocate and had been wrongfully refused enrolment by the authorities the question of infringement of his fundamental rights under Article l9(l)(g) would have arisen. [~12 D-E] Admittedly the petitioner did not come under the first part of sub+section 3(a) of section 24 of the Advocate Act since he was neither a vakil nor a pleader nor a mukhtar. The Sanad on which he relied upon did not show under what law it E was issued. Further,· Thikana Khetri was not one of the covenanting States of the United State of Rajasthan. [81! E] The petitioner had not taken any steps in accordance with the law to get him self _enrolled under the Bar Council Act or any other Act entitling him for enrol\n\nment; nor did be pursue the matter furthei: in that behalf when his application had been rejected by the High Court under s. 49 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance (JS of 1949) [812 DJ\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 424 of 1971.\n\nF Under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nCh. Rant Sarup and R. A. Gupta, for the petitioner.\n\nN. H. Hingorani, for respondent no. 1.\n\nHardev Singh, for respondent no. 2.\n\nG R. N. Sachthey, for respondent no. 3.\n\nARGUMENTS For the petitioner : The petitioner's-ease was fully covered by s. 24(3) of the Advocates' Act as he had practised as Vakil for three years before the coming into force of this Act. He 'Yas allwed to pra~- tise at Loharu by endorsement upon the sanad by Iilas Thikana Khetr1.\n\nH By reasQn of this he was entitled to practise in Punjab including the High Court of Punjab. Secondly, the petitioner was entitled to be enrolled as an advocate under r. 421 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules\n\n1952 but the date mentioned for application for enrolment had expired before the publication of the rules and hence he could not apply with\\n the time limit prescribed.\n\nFor the respondent No. 1 : The petitioner's application to the Delhi Bar Council for enrolment as an Advocate under section 24 of the Advocates Act, 196! was rejected on the ground that the petitioner was not a law graduate and that the court of Ijlas Thikana Khetri where he was enrolled as an advocate was not a High Court. It is conceded by him that he is not qualified to be enrolled as an Advocate under section 24( I} of the said Act but contended that Jiis case is covered by section 24 ( 3} as he had practised as a vakil for three years i11 the court of Ijlas Thikana Khetri and was entitled at any time to be e'.lrolled under any law as an Advocate of a High Court of a former\n\nPart B State.\n\nTh.e question arises whether Khetri State was one of the covenanting states of United State of Rajasthan. The United State of Rajasthan (consisting of 14 covenanting states) came into existence with effect from May 15, 1949 and Thikana Khetri was not one of them.\n\nThe Rajasthan High Court Ordinance No. XV of 1949 provided for the establishment of the Rajasthan High Court and abolition of all High Courts in the covenanting States. The Part B States (Law) Act No. III of 1951, provided for extension of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 to Part B States. Under section 8(2) of the Bar Councils Act it was obligatory for the R, ajasthan High Court \"to prepare and maintain a roll of Advocates of the High Court in which shall be entered the names of all persons who were as Advocates, Vakils or pleaders entitled as of. right to practise in the High Court before the date on which the section comes foto force in respect thereof\" and as the petitioner was not practising or was not entitled lo practise in the High Court of any of the covenanting states his name could not be\n\netered on the roll of Advocates under the said section. The Rajasthan High Court Rules 1952 had no application to his case.\n\nThe petitioner's alternative argument that by virtue of endorsement on his sanad he was entitled to practise in the State of Loharu, which was one of the States merged in East Punjab and in view of its merger he was entitled to practise in Punjab including the High Court cf that state is. without any substance. The petitioner has.not produced anything to show that he was entitled to be enrolled as an Advcx; ate in the State of Loharu and later in the state of East Punjab.\n\nG The case of the petitioner is not covered by section 24(3) of the Advocates Act. ·\n\nFor the Bar Council of India : Assuming that the impugned decision was erroneous it c.annot amount to infringement of the petitioner's fundlamental right under Art. 19(1 )(g} of the Constitution [(1955) 2 S.C.R. 1113; A.LR. 1962 S.C. 1183 and 1971 Supp.\n\nS.C.R. 688]. Since Ijlas Thikana Khetri was not a High Court and\n\nKhetri was not even a 'State' the sanad relied upon by the petitioner did not give him the status of a vak'il so as to confer a right under s 24(3) of the Advocates Act to entitle him to enrol as an Advocate.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGOSWAMI, J. This writ petition under Article 32 of the Consti tution is directed against an or_der passec! by the Bar Council of Delhi\n\nrefuing to enrol the petitioner as an advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961 (Act 25 of 1961), hereinafter referred to as the Act. Since the order was passed by the Delhi Bar Council after reference to the Bar Council of India under section 26(2) of the Act, both the Bar Councils are impleaded as the first and the second respondents respectively. The third• respondent is the Union of India in the l\\llinistry of Law since the petitioner takes an additional ground that section 26(2) of the Act is in conffict with section 48A of the same Act.\n\nThe facts, as disclosed in the Writ Petition, are as follows :-\n\nThe petitioner is a citizen of India. Under the laws then prevailing he was granted sanad by the highest court ljlas Thikana Khetri on 22nd November, 1936. The petitioner states that Thikana Khetri was a small native state having jw-isdiction to make Jaws and enforce the same. On the bas'is of that sanad the petition.er started practice at Loharu, another I\\ative state, in I 944 and continued to practise till May 1947 when he joined• service as a Civil Supply Officer, Khetri.\n\nThe petitioner informed about his joining service to the enrolment authority and received a telegram from Diwan of Khetri (Annexure-A) which takes note of his joining. service and discontnuance of practice.\n\nAlthough the petitioner has stated that this telegram was received from Diwan of Khetri, a perusal of the same shows that the telegram was really from Diwan of Loharu, which was the office of origin of the telegram. The petitioner's sanad (Annexure-C) which bears the seal of ljlas Thikana Khetri dated 22nd November, I 936, is signed by one Hari Prasad, Secretary, ljlas Thikana Khetri and shows that \"he has been enrolled us a vakil and authorised to practise in all the Ci, il, Criminal, Custom and Excise and Revenue Courts of Thikana Khetri\".\n\nThere 1is an endorsement below the Secretary's signature to the effect \"practice allowed\", \"Sd/-Loharu State\". It is, .therefore, understaDdable that the petitioner would have received the telegram (Annexure-A) from Diwan, Lo.haru. The petitioner resigned from service in I 948 ar.d in 1955 he applied to the District Judge, Jaipur, intimating Iris intention to recommence practice. But his application was rejected by the Rajasthan High Court on September IO, 1955. The petitioner further states in his petition that his applicaticnr was rejected by the High Court under rule 421 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952, on account <>f his not making the application before the appointed day in Decemb?r\n\n1951. It is, however, not necessary to deal with the order of the High Court in this case and we may only note in passing that under rule 421 the following persons shall be qualified for admission as advocates of the High Court :\n\n\"Any person whose name is borne on the roll of Advocates or Vakils of the I (sic) grade of any High Court or any H authority exercising the powers of a High Court in any of the Covenanting States of Rajasthan and who was entitled to\n\nappar, act or plead in such Court or authority :\n\nProvided, that if such person not holding the LL.B. or any higher or equivalent degree of any 'university established by law in the Union of India fails to apply by the end of December, 1951, he shall not be enrolled as an Advocate thereafter\".\n\nThere is an Explanation to this rule as follows :-\n\n\"Practice as a Vakil of the 2nd grade under the rules of a High Court or an authority exercising the powers of a High Court in any of the Covenanting States shall be deemed to be a practice as a pleader\".\n\nIt appears later on the pelitioner applied to the Delhi State Bar Council for enrolment basing his claim under section 24(3) of the Act. He does not admittedly have a degree in Law from any university.\n\nHe, therefore, rests his claim under section 24(3)(a) which may be quoted:-\n\n24(3): \"Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (I) a person who-\n\n(a) has, for atleast three years, been a vakil or a pleader or a mukhtar, or was entitled at any time to be enrolled under any law as an advocate of a High Court (including a High Court of a former Part B State) ...... .\n\n• • * •\n\nmay be admitted a• an advocate on a State roll ..... , . \"\n\nAdmittedly he does not come under the first part of sub-section (3) (a)> since he is neither a vakil nor a pleader nor a mukhtar. His entire claim is that he was-. enrolled as. an ad.vocate of a High Court in \"' former Part B State, riamely, Rajasthan. In ordr to , come under the second part, he has not drawn our attention to any law under which he was entitled to be enrolled as an acivocate of the former Part B State of Rajasthan. He entirely relies upon the sanad (Annexure-C).\n\nIt does not show under what law the sanad was issued. Besides, the most formidable stumbling-block to his claim is that Thikana Khetri 's not one of the covenanting States of the United State of Rajasthan The White Paper on Indian States does not show Thikana Khetri as one of the covenanting States (see Pages 53-55 of' the White Paper on Indian States; paras 134-138; Appendix XL and Appendix XU at pages 274 and 283; also pages 326-335). Under the Part B States\n\n(Laws) Act No. III of 1951, which came into force on !st April\n\n1951. the Legal Practitioners Act No. XVIII of 1879 and the India~ Bar Councils Act No. XXXVIII of 1926 were extended to Part B States. Under section 8(2) of the Bar Council Act. \"the High Court shall prepare and maintain a roll of advocates of the High Court in which shall be entered the names of-\n\n(a) all persons who were, as advocates vakils or pleaders, entitled as of right to practise ' in the High Court immediately before the date on which this section comes into force in respect thereof; and\n\n( b) all other persons who have been ad.\"Ditted to be A advocates of the High Court under this Act : • • • • Earlier. after the formation of the United State of Rajasthan, ;; o Rajpramukh promnlgated the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance No. XV of 1949; which came into force on 79th August, 1949. The Ordinanco provided for the esta_blishment of the Rajasthan High Court and abo- B lition of all High Courts in the covenanting States. Under section 49 of the Orclinance, on and from the appointed day, namely, 29th August, 1949, \"every Tribunal functioning as the High Court of a covenanting State or any authority exercising the powers of a High Court in such State shall cease to exist, and all cases pending before the said High Court or authority at that date shall be transferred to and heard by the High Court constituted by this Ordl.nance, and all the records and C documents of the several Courts which so cease to exist, shall become, and be, the records and documents of the High Court\".\n\nTh~ pe_titioner had not taken any steps in accordance with la\\v tu get himself enrolled under the Bar Council Act or any other Act entitling him for enrolment. He also did not pursue the l)latter further in that behalf when his applicatfon had been rejected by the High D Court under the Ordinance. We are unable to hold that the decision of the Delhi Bar Council is not correct on the materials produced before it for the purpose of the petitioner's enrolment. If the petitioner were actually qualified undr the law for enrolment as an advocate am! he has been wrongfully refused enrolment by the authorities, the question of infringement of his fundamental rights under Article 19 (1) (g l would have arisen. This, however, has not happened in this case since E the very foundation of his claim is non-existent. The Writ Petition is. therefore, without any merit and is rejected. We will, however, make no order as to costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nPetition disn1issed.", "total_entities": 81, "entities": [{"text": "SURAJMAL SUROLIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SURAJMAL SUROLIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE BAR. COUNCIL OF INDIA & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 28, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 68, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COUNCIL OF INDIA & OTHERS\n\nMarch 28, 1974\n\n[A. N. RAY, C.J., P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, P. K. GOSWAMI AND\n\nR. S. SARKARIA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. K. GOSWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Advocaus Act 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jiias Tbikana Khetri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 391, "end_char": 411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was granted .a Sanad by Jiias Tbikana Khetri which was the highest court in a native state."}}, {"text": "High Court of Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 647, "end_char": 670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 19SS his applicatioD. for recomlnencing practice was rejected by the High Court of Rajasthan on a.ccount of his not making an application before the appointed day in December, 1951."}}, {"text": "Delhi State Bar Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 797, "end_char": 820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later the petitioner applied to the Delhi State Bar Council for enrolment under s. 24(3)· of the Advocates Act Which was reiected."}}, {"text": "s. 24(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 841, "end_char": 849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Advocaus Act 1961", "statute": "Advocaus Act 1961"}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 858, "end_char": 871, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 897, "end_char": 906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Advocaus Act 1961", "statute": "Advocaus Act 1961"}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 910, "end_char": 920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Advocaus Act 1961", "statute": "Advocaus Act 1961"}}, {"text": "Delhi Bar Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1264, "end_char": 1281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HELD : On the material placed before the Delhi Bar Council for the purpose D of the petitioner's enrolment it could not be held that the decision of the Bar Council was incorrect."}}, {"text": "section 3(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1723, "end_char": 1735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1739, "end_char": 1749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Thikana Khetri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1917, "end_char": 1931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further,· Thikana Khetri was not one of the covenanting States of the United State of Rajasthan. ["}}, {"text": "United State of Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1977, "end_char": 2002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further,· Thikana Khetri was not one of the covenanting States of the United State of Rajasthan. ["}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2294, "end_char": 2299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2424, "end_char": 2431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2439, "end_char": 2460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rant Sarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2509, "end_char": 2519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rant Sarup and R. A. Gupta, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "R. A. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2524, "end_char": 2535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rant Sarup and R. A. Gupta, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "N. H. Hingorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2558, "end_char": 2573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. H. Hingorani, for respondent no."}}, {"text": "Hardev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2598, "end_char": 2610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardev Singh, for respondent no."}}, {"text": "G R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2635, "end_char": 2651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G R. N. Sachthey, for respondent no."}}, {"text": "s. 24(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2750, "end_char": 2758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Act as he had practised as Vakil for three years before the coming into force of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2777, "end_char": 2866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Loharu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2900, "end_char": 2906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He 'Yas allwed to pra~- tise at Loharu by endorsement upon the sanad by Iilas Thikana Khetr1."}}, {"text": "Iilas Thikana Khetr1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2940, "end_char": 2960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He 'Yas allwed to pra~- tise at Loharu by endorsement upon the sanad by Iilas Thikana Khetr1."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3014, "end_char": 3020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H By reasQn of this he was entitled to practise in Punjab including the High Court of Punjab."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3035, "end_char": 3055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H By reasQn of this he was entitled to practise in Punjab including the High Court of Punjab."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3145, "end_char": 3171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3459, "end_char": 3469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Rajasthan High Court Rules\n\n1952", "statute": "the Rajasthan High Court Rules\n\n1952"}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3477, "end_char": 3490, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ijlas Thikana Khetri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3589, "end_char": 3609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was rejected on the ground that the petitioner was not a law graduate and that the court of Ijlas Thikana Khetri where he was enrolled as an advocate was not a High Court.", "canonical_name": "Ijlas Thikana Khetri"}}, {"text": "Khetri State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4075, "end_char": 4087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th.e question arises whether Khetri State was one of the covenanting states of United State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "United State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4156, "end_char": 4181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The United State of Rajasthan (consisting of 14 covenanting states) came into existence with effect from May 15, 1949 and Thikana Khetri was not one of them."}}, {"text": "May 15, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4257, "end_char": 4269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The United State of Rajasthan (consisting of 14 covenanting states) came into existence with effect from May 15, 1949 and Thikana Khetri was not one of them."}}, {"text": "Thikana Khetri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4274, "end_char": 4288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The United State of Rajasthan (consisting of 14 covenanting states) came into existence with effect from May 15, 1949 and Thikana Khetri was not one of them.", "canonical_name": "Thikana Khetri"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4315, "end_char": 4335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Rajasthan High Court Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4555, "end_char": 4584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4609, "end_char": 4621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926", "statute": "the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court Rules 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5184, "end_char": 5215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "East Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5713, "end_char": 5724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner has.not produced anything to show that he was entitled to be enrolled as an Advcx; ate in the State of Loharu and later in the state of East Punjab."}}, {"text": "section 24(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5774, "end_char": 5787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Rajasthan High Court Rules 1952", "statute": "The Rajasthan High Court Rules 1952"}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5795, "end_char": 5808, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bar Council of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5821, "end_char": 5841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the Bar Council of India : Assuming that the impugned decision was erroneous it c.annot amount to infringement of the petitioner's fundlamental right under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1 )(g} of the Constitution [(1955)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5973, "end_char": 6015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Rajasthan High Court Rules 1952", "statute": "The Rajasthan High Court Rules 1952"}}, {"text": "Ijlas Thikana Khetri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6087, "end_char": 6107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since Ijlas Thikana Khetri was not a High Court and\n\nKhetri was not even a 'State' the sanad relied upon by the petitioner did not give him the status of a vak'il so as to confer a right under s 24(3) of the Advocates Act to entitle him to enrol as an Advocate.", "canonical_name": "Ijlas Thikana Khetri"}}, {"text": "s 24(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6274, "end_char": 6281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6289, "end_char": 6302, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "GOSWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6388, "end_char": 6395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGOSWAMI, J. This writ petition under Article 32 of the Consti tution is directed against an or_der passec!"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6425, "end_char": 6435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "refuing to enrol the petitioner as an advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6524, "end_char": 6600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 26(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6757, "end_char": 6770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bar Council of Delhi\n\nrefuing to enrol the petitioner as an advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "the Bar Council of Delhi\n\nrefuing to enrol the petitioner as an advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6902, "end_char": 6916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third• respondent is the Union of India in the l\\llinistry of Law since the petitioner takes an additional ground that section 26(2) of the Act is in conffict with section 48A of the same Act."}}, {"text": "section 26(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6996, "end_char": 7009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bar Council of Delhi\n\nrefuing to enrol the petitioner as an advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "the Bar Council of Delhi\n\nrefuing to enrol the petitioner as an advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 48A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7041, "end_char": 7052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bar Council of Delhi\n\nrefuing to enrol the petitioner as an advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "the Bar Council of Delhi\n\nrefuing to enrol the petitioner as an advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7167, "end_char": 7172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts, as disclosed in the Writ Petition, are as follows :-\n\nThe petitioner is a citizen of India."}}, {"text": "Thikana Khetri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7319, "end_char": 7333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner states that Thikana Khetri was a small native state having jw-isdiction to make Jaws and enforce the same.", "canonical_name": "Thikana Khetri"}}, {"text": "Hari Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8168, "end_char": 8179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner's sanad (Annexure-C) which bears the seal of ljlas Thikana Khetri dated 22nd November, I 936, is signed by one Hari Prasad, Secretary, ljlas Thikana Khetri and shows that \"he has been enrolled us a vakil and authorised to practise in all the Ci, il, Criminal, Custom and Excise and Revenue Courts of Thikana Khetri\"."}}, {"text": "Diwan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8591, "end_char": 8596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, .therefore, understaDdable that the petitioner would have received the telegram (Annexure-A) from Diwan, Lo.haru."}}, {"text": "Lo.haru", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8598, "end_char": 8605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, .therefore, understaDdable that the petitioner would have received the telegram (Annexure-A) from Diwan, Lo.haru."}}, {"text": "District Judge, Jaipur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8684, "end_char": 8706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner resigned from service in I 948 ar.d in 1955 he applied to the District Judge, Jaipur, intimating Iris intention to recommence practice."}}, {"text": "September IO, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8822, "end_char": 8840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But his application was rejected by the Rajasthan High Court on September IO, 1955."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8963, "end_char": 8995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 24(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10211, "end_char": 10224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24(3)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10340, "end_char": 10356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "st April\n\n1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11752, "end_char": 11766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st April\n\n1951."}}, {"text": "Legal Practitioners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11772, "end_char": 11795, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bar Councils Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11829, "end_char": 11845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11904, "end_char": 11916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bar Councils Act", "statute": "Bar Councils Act"}}, {"text": "Ditted to be A advocates of the High Court under this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12308, "end_char": 12365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rajpramukh promnlgated the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12444, "end_char": 12501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "79th August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12543, "end_char": 12560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XV of 1949; which came into force on 79th August, 1949."}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12706, "end_char": 12716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rajpramukh promnlgated the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance", "statute": "Rajpramukh promnlgated the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance"}}, {"text": "29th August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12775, "end_char": 12792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under section 49 of the Orclinance, on and from the appointed day, namely, 29th August, 1949, \"every Tribunal functioning as the High Court of a covenanting State or any authority exercising the powers of a High Court in such State shall cease to exist, and all cases pending before the said High Court or authority at that date shall be transferred to and heard by the High Court constituted by this Ordl.nance, and all the records and C documents of the several Courts which so cease to exist, shall become, and be, the records and documents of the High Court\"."}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13937, "end_char": 13947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_813_819_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "l ~\n\ni c\n\n-...\n\nBIRAM CHAND v.\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH _&ORS.\n\n1\\--larch 28. 1974 ·\n\n[H. R. KHANNA AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.] . . .. : '\n\nJt.laintellance of lntemal Security Act, 1971, S. 3 (I)(a) (iii)-Detention when prosemtion is. pending on the same facts-Validity. . ·\n\nThe petitioner was detained by an order of the District Magistrate, Varanasi, U.P. under Sec. 3(1) (a)(iii) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, with a view to preventing hjm from acting in any manner , prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.\n\nUn the questions, whether, when some ot the gmunds furntshed by the detain ing authority form the subject-matter of trial rn criminal cases which are still mb-judice, the detention would be valid, and whether tbe detenu can be said to be reasonably able to make an effective representation against those grounds :\n\nHELD : (a) In the case of preventive detention the grounds must be clear and de.Jinlt~ to enable.the detenu to make a real and effective representation to the Government to establish his. innocence. [818 q\n\n(b) Being faced with a criminal prosecution in a . trial which is pending against him,_ although, the detenu has not got a proper and reasonable opportunity in accordance with law to make an effective . representation against the\n\nin1pugned order of detention covered by the said prding, because, by dis clt>sing his defence and cet1ain facts Jte would behandicapped in defending himself in the criminal court. [818 B-DJ ·\n\n(c) On_ the question. whether i~ is open to the detaining authority to choose tw_o parallel. proceedings against the detenu held that the fact that the ground of detention could be a subject matter of criminal pecution is not enough to\n\n\\itiate a detentionorder if the detaining authority does not choose to prosecute him but only passes an order of detention. in accordance wtth law. The choke of theauthority. concerned for the, mode of tackling the illegal activity cannot per se be illegal and the order of detention is to be judged on its merits. The position however will 1.1~ entirely different if the authority concerned makes an order of. detntion, uni!er, the Act and also prosecutes. him in a criminal case on\n\nthe self-same facts.· Tbe detaining authority cannot take recourse to two parallel and simultaneou~ proceedings nor can take recourse to a wound which is the subject matter of a criminal trial: [818 D-G] ·. · .\n\n(dJ Under the Act. the. decision of the authorities is subjcive one and if one of the !,'fOUnds. is non-existent or irrelevant' or is not available under the Jaw the entire detention order will f:l.ll since it is not possible to predicate as to\n\nwhether the de[aining aut!J.ority would have m; ufe an order of detention even in tJ:e absence of the non-ex.istent or, irrelevant ground [819 CE]\n\n(e) Although the aim and object of the order of detention would be laudable and the antecedents of a detenu be extremely reproachable, yel, it is essential that\n\nif it is desired to detain a person without trial, .the auth01it1es concerned should conform to the requirements of' the Jaw. The shady antecedents of the detenu cannot provide. a JUStification for:· non-t.:ompliance with the mandatory provisions.\n\nThe scope of the inquiry in the case of preventive detention bast:d upon subjective satisfaction being necessarily narrow und limited; the scrutiny of the comt has to he even stricter than in a normal case of puni!ive trial. [819 EFJ\n\nIn the present case, if the District Magistrate had not at all taken recourse to the facts of the criminal cases pending against the detenu in Bihar in coming to a conclusion about. his reasonable satisfaction for making the order of detention\n\nthe matter would have been different.\n\nBut it is clear that the District Magistrate has been influenced by the existence of the criminal nrosecutions in Bihar and he has chosen those J:rOtl!lds to furnish as aids to his satisfaction in order to make\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nan _orde! of _detention. The gro':'nds wit~ reference to the pending crin1inal prose\n\nCUh~?ns 10 Bihar could not provide a valid basis for making the order of detention particularly because those cases are pending trial in Bihar and in view of the decision of the Patna High Court in connection with one of them. Hence the detention order is invalid. [8 t,9 A-C]\n\nMohd. Salim Khan v. Shri C. C. Bose, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Wt>st Bt>ntal and anotllu, A.l.R. 1972 S.C. 1670/1672 di8tinauished.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 23 of 1974.\n\nPetition Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.\n\nFrank Anthony and K. B. Rohtagi for the Petitioner.\n\nD. P. {!niyal, R. Bana and 0. P. Rana for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by GoswAMI, J.-This habeas corpus petition un9.er Article 32 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order of the District Magistrate, Varanasi, of 3rd September, 1973, whereby .the petitioner was detained under sub-section (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (l) of section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (briefly the Act) , The order has been _Passed \"with a view to preventing him from. acting in any manner' prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community\".\n\nThe grounds of detention were served on the petitioner on 7th September, 1973. Leaving out the prefatory and descriptive portions, the ~:rounds of detention may be S<:t out as under :-\n\nGround No. 3 : \"That you and your other associates have been char~:e sheeted by Mohania Police on 28-11-66 for the offence punishable under section 7 F.C. Act and 125 DIR 1962 and the case is 'till pending in the Court, Magistrate of Bhabhua (Bihar) s the proceedings have been stayed by the orders of the High. Court, Patna\".\n\nGround No. 4 : \"That with a view to continue your anti-social activities and to save yourself from the clutches of law you have started a firm under the name and style of M/s Shyam Sunder Ashok Kumar, in Mohalla Machchodari P. S. Kotwali, Varanasi City some time in the year 1966 or 1967 and you have purposely associated your minor son Ashok Kumar, your brother Shyam Sunder and a lady of your family as partners in the said firm only in name while, in fact, you are actively transacting the entire business of the said firm to carry on the illegal activities\".\n\nGround No, 5 : \"That taking undue advantage of the acute shortage of the foodgrains in the state due to the failure of the rains disrupt the fair and equitable distribution amongst the public you have succeeqed in getting large quantity of maize, bajra and jawa_r an? smuggled to and stored in your goodown at Mohama (B1har), a non-producing area of these foodgrains in the State of Bihar, just on the border of U.P. through yo.ur said firm which will be evidenced the facts given below:-\n\nBIRAM CHAND V.-.U.P. STATE (Goswami, J.) 815.\n\nlhen follows a det_ailed list of sales of bajra, jawar and maize to numerous persons as .per, cash memos mentioned-therein showing.sales. on 21~6-197jt 26-6-1973, 7-7-1973, 16-6-1973 and 16-7-1973: '\n\n- Ground -No. 6 : \"That the persons named above are neither foodgrains 'Arhatias' nor retail shopkeepers either at Chandsuli Bazar or in Chandsuli village\".\n\nGround No. 7: \"That the aforesaid sales are fictitious - and have been show, n with a view to smuggle bajra, jawar and maiie to Bihar from where enough quantities of bjra and. jwar ave been booked by rail to Delhi and Pooha as shown below:-\n\nThen is given a list of various bookings o£225 bags of jwar to Delhi, 116 bags of bajra to Poona, 1 50 bags of bajra to Poona, 220 C bags of bajra to P9.ona and 22_? bags of jawar to Poona and even railway wagon numbers are mentioned. ·\n\nThi 7th groUJ)d ends as under:-\n\n\"All these consignments were booked to self.\n\nThe consigners of all these consignments were searched at Mohania on the address given in the railway records but no such persons or Bbandar were available on that address.\n\nEnquires show that you were the person behind these transactions\";\n\nGround No. 8 : \"That five trucks bearing registration No. UPF 2039, USF 3253, UPF 2927, USS 7745.p.nd UPF 2015 loaded with jawar and bajra were apprehended by Mohania Police on 2-3-1973 (2/3 July 1973?) on the ground that all the trucks belonged to Uttar Pradesh and the jawar and bajra loaded on them were being smuggled from U.P. to Bihar at your instance\".\n\nGround No. 9 : \"That 3 bags of ri~ No. 2, 499 bags gram, 70 bags of 'Matar' and 90 ba~ of 'Dal matar' were found short on the actual verification of the stock of finn\n\nShyam Suitdei Ashok Kumar on 17-7~1973 by Deputy Regional Marketing Officer, V aranasi (Enforcement)\".\n\nGround No. 10 : \"That the firm Shyam Sunder Askok Kumar have not maintained any stock register and satta\n\nhai since 1~70 of oil-seeds and oil-seeds product but at _the ttme of checkt, ng on 17-7.,.73, 30S bags of 'Tisi' and 10 bags of 'Sarson' were found\": , Ground No. ll : \"In view of the aforesaid mentioned\n\ngrunds I am 5!ltisfied that the activities carried on by you are such as to mterfere with the scheme underlying the Essential Commodities Act and the Movement Orders promulgated by Government under the above Act in a man.ner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and Services essential to the community and it is necessary to detain you,.\n\n9-L84Sup.C.I. /15\n\n:.·,.\n\n\\ .. \\\n\n: ·,~ ·· ' . ' .. ::~·\n\nSlG\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1974j 3 S.C.R.\n\nThe petltioner applie? t? the High. Cour~ of Allahabad under Article 226 of the Consututton read wtth sectton 49.1 of the Cod!! 0; Criminal Procedure for quashing the order of detentton and the same was dismissed by the Divtsion Bench on 26th :t; fovembe~, 1973. The petitioner obtained special leave to appeal agams~ the judgm~:n.t . on\n\n19th December 1973 and the same has been regtsterC'.ri as Ctrtmtnal Apeal No. 231' of 1973. The petitionr also filed writ pcitin No. 23 of 1974 before this Court under Arttcle 32 of the ConstttUlton on\n\n20th December, 1973, against the order of te State Government of 21st November, 1973, confirming the afor~td or?er of detention under section 12 ( 1 ) of the Act and rule mst was tssued on 31st January,_1974. Both the matters arc heard together and are dispoed\n\nof by this common judgment.\n\nOn behalf of the petitioner, the following submissions arc made by Mr. Frank Anthony :\n\n(1) There was considerable dday in the Government\n\ndisposing of the representation of the dctenu and hence it vitiates the detention order.\n\n(2) Ground No. 8 is non-existent and irrelevant and\n\nhence it vitiates the detention order.\n\n(3) Some grounds furnished by the detaining authority\n\narc the subject matters of criminal case:; which arc still sub judice. ( 4) Two remote plst incidents of th;: detcnu arc made the basi~ ofsomc grounds of detention.\n\nAlt[Jough Mr. Anthony made a strong p!c:a on the lirt gr0unJ £ r.!garding delay in forwarding the reprcscntJtion of the detenu to the Government and in its ultimate dispor.al, we will first take up his thirJ\n\nubmi-; sion. .\n\n• Jr is admitted by Mr. Uniyal, lc:rncJ counsc.:l for the Star~. that the Mohania Police Station case rcfcrr.:d to in groun 1 No. 3 i; s ill pending in the criminal cour~ in ilihar.\n\nHe, howcvt'r, ub: tlir.~ tha:\n\n);.rond No. 3 is _merely descriptive and is not a ground in itself upon\n\nh.tch the detcntton order ha> been based..\n\nWe may, th~:rdon:, scruttoJe the aforesaid submission of Mr. Uniyal.\n\nWhat is rcfcm:d IO m ground No. 3 jo; the criminal ca~~.: und~.:r s~.:ctlon 7 \"1f the Essential Commoditk,~ Act and ruh: 125 of the Ddcncc of India Rule>,\n\n1962. This has_ reference to the firt information nport JoJgcJ by th~\n\n~~p\\!ctor of Pohcl.', Karm Na.., ha Chcd. Pot. Camp h>hania r\\rra~.\n\nBta.r, on the 11th Octoh::r, 196-l (A11ncxurc-P ut pa)!c 137 of the wnt p.:tJll(ln!.\n\nThe relative: chargc-h!!ct da'cll 2'Jth Novcmb.::r. !96.6\n\n12k.t~ Noc:mber, 1 ~66 ?) is at 1\\nncxurcO ; tt Page 140 of th.: wnt\n\nP~: lJtton . . fhe charg.-:-hcc:t h<idf mention'! ahout the saiJ urJcr uf the\n\natoa l_f1!!-h Court. It i-;, thcrdorc. ckar that the 3rd gn.>unJ fortn' t!,!: !.ubJtXt ~<ttr of a Cr.imin; tl trial which is ~>till sub juJice. The\n\n\\.h..trl'~~.llct mdcatc' manrfold , inter-stat..: ilkgal activities of the ·~~~~\n\nvr ~-~ .' Sh) cm Sundr Ahok Kumar of Mohania uttractint the r-1 •11\n\nllr(J\\,'wm'. ,, t _tho.: E~:.nti.al Cu:nmoditk~ Act and th.: Dd..:n~.: of InJlil RvL h~\\Jd~:' other sect tons of the lndiatt Pcual Cllllc. 1t is bccau' c\n\nF l\n\nBIRAM CHAND V. U.P. STA'fE (Goswami, J.) 817\n\nof this 3rd ground tl'!at the 4th ground has been worded in the way it has been done, namely, \"that with a view to continue your anti-social activities and to save yourself from the clutches of law you have started a finn under the name and style of M/S Shy~ Sudcr Asbok Kumar .... \".\n\nWe are, therefore, unable to accept the submission of Mr. Uniyal that ground No. 3 is merely descriptive i!ild is not germane with regard to the order of detention. On the other hand, there i~ great force in the submission of Mr. Anthony that ground No. 3 is\n\nthe corncrstone of ground No. 4. It is clear that ground No. 3 is covered by a prosecution in the criminal court which is pending trial in Bihar.\n\nIt shoulq be mentioned here that the High Court of Palna in Criminal Writ Jurisdiction cases Nos. 39 and 40 of 1965 by order dated 21st August, 1965, quashed an order of detention of the petitioner made on 1 9th July, 1 965, based on the allegation~ in the same first information report of 1 lth October, 1964, of Mohania Police Station under section 7 of ihe Essential Commodities A::t, 1955 and various other sections of the Indian Penal Code. The. iJcntical facts arc\n\nnow relied upon .in ground No: 3.\n\nAgain ground No. 8 is also the ubject matter of criminal case with reference to the first information report of 3rd July 1973 (Annexure 12 at page 288 of the writ petition).\n\nThere is no c9ntroversy that the said criminal case is still pending.\n\nSimilarly grounds Nos. 9 and 10 arc covered by a criminal case with reference to first information report dated 5th August, 1973 and the relative charge-sheet dated 19th September, 1973 under section\n\n317 of the Essential Commodities Act, pending in the criminal court at Varanasi (U.P.).\n\nWe arc informed that there is no direct authority o[ this Court on the point. Mr. Uniyal has, however, drawn .our attention to a decision of this Court in Mohd. Salim Klum v. Shri C. C. Bf)se, [)eput}' Sec:relllr.'' to the Government of West BenRal a11d another,( 1 ) to which one of us (Brother Khanna) was a party. The decision is clearly distinguish~ able as will be clear from the following excerpt from the same :-\n\n\"The mere fact, however. that criminal proceedings in connection with the same incidents had been adopted against the petitioner and he had been discharged by the trying\n\nMagistrate docs not mean that no valid order of Jctclltion\n\nold be passed again!>t him in connection with those very\n\nmc1dcnts, or that such an order can for that reason be\n\nchractcrisc~ as mala fide. ll might well be that a magistrate trymg a parttcular person under the Code of Criminal Procc~\n\nrlure. ha~ insufllcicnt cviJcnce before him, and, thcr.::forc, has to. d1scharc such a person. Btt the detaining authorities m•ght well feel that though there was not sullicicnt evidence\n\nadmissible under the Evidence Act for a conviction the activities of that person, which they had hcen watching,' were\n\nIll AIR 1972SC 1670,'167.:.\n\n\n{1974] 3 S.C.R\n\nof such .a nature as to justify an order of de_tention. From the\n\nmere fact,· therefore,· that the Magisate discharged the petitioner from the criminal ase lodged against him It cannot\n\nbe said that the impugned: rder was incompetent, nor can iLbe inferred that it was' without a basis or mala fide.\n\nSee Sahib Singh Dugal v. Union of India\"(!).\n\nIn the above premises, more tltan one question may arise for consideration with regard to the third submission of Mr. Anthony.\n\n\\ Firstly by whether the detenu can be said to be reasonably able to make an effective representation against this ground when he has been fadng a trial in the criminal courts. By disclosing his defence and\n\ncert~Un, facts, can he not complain that he will be handicapped in defend_ -ing; himself in the criminal courts? It iS well settled that in a case of preventive detention the grounds must be clear and definite to enable the detenu to make an effective representation to the Government to induce the authorities. to take a view in his favour. He must, therefore, have a real and affective opportunity to make his representation to establish his innocence.\n\nBeing faced with a: criminal prosecution which is pending against him all through, we are clearly of the view that the . detenu has not got a proper and reasonable opportunity in accordance with Jaw to make an effective representation against the impugned order of detention covered by the said proceeding.\n\nSecondly, the question is whether it is open to the detaining authority to choose two parallel proceedings against the detenu as in this case.\n\nThe fact that the ground of detention could be a subject matter of criminal prosecution is not enough to vitiate a detention order if the detaining authority does not choose to prosecute him and only passes an open trial.\n\nThe choice of the authority concerned for the mode of nr> answer that the detenu must be prosecuted in the criminal court in an open trial. The choice of the authority concerned for the mode of tackling the illegal activity cannot per se be illegal and the order of detention will be judged on its merits in accordance with the Jaw laid down by this Court. The position will be, however, entirely different if the authority concerned makes an order of detention under the Act' and also prosecutes him in a criminal case on the self-same facts. This, in our view, is totally barred. The detaining authority cannot take recourse to two parallel and simultaneous proceedings nor can take recourse to a ground which is the subject mater of a criminal trial as in the case of the first information report dated 5th August, 1973 furnishing the grounds 9 and 10 of the detention order.\n\nThat fact itself introduces a serious infirmity in the order of detention for which the same must be held to be invalid.\n\n: Similarly it is obvious that two of the cases are pending in the criminal courts in Bihar. But it is also clear, as noted above, that the Patna High Court had quashed the order of detention of the Government of Bihar based on facts relating to the first information report of 11th October, 1964, although on grounds different from those which we H are now considering. If the District Magistrate in the instant case had\n\n(I) [1966] (I) SCR 313 quoted in ATR 1972 SC 1670.\n\nBIRAM CHAND V. U.P. STATE (Goswami, J.) 819\n\nnot at all taken recourse to the facts of the criminal cases pending against the detenu in Bihar in coming to the conclusion about his reasonable satisfaction for making an order of detention, the matter would have\n\nbten different. It is clear that the District Magistrate has been influenced by the existence of the criminal prosecutions in Bihar and he has chosen those grounds to furnish as aids to his satisfaction in order to make the order of detention. We are clearly of the view that the grounds with reference to the pending criminal prosecutions in Bihar could not provide •\n\na valid basis for maki1'lg the impugned order of delentiori, panicularly because those cases are pending trial in the criminal courts in Bihar and in view of the decision of the Patna High Court in connection with one of these cases. Since the detention order is based on these grounds, the same must be held to be invalid. The third submission of the learned counsel, is, therefore, accepted.\n\nIt is well settled that in an order under the present Act the decision of the authority is a subjective one and if one of the' grQunds is nonexistent or irrelevant or is not available under the law, the entire . detention order will fall since it is not possible to predicate as to whether\n\nthe detaining authority/ would have made an order for detention even in the absence of non1xistent or irrelevant ground. The conclusion is, therefore, irresistible, in this case that the impugned order is invalid and tlte detention in this case must be held to be illegal.\n\nAs too many cooks spoil the broth so also too many grounds may vitiate an order of detention if any one of them is irrelevant or non .existent.\n\nThe authority, therefore, has to be careful enough to see that. only relevant and valid grounds arc selected having a nexus with the object of the order of detention.\n\nAlthough the aim and object of tile order of detention be laudable and the antecedents of a detenu be extremely reproachable yet it is essential that if it is desired to detain a person without trial, the authorities concerned should confor:m to the requlrements of the law. The shady antecedents of the dctenu cannot provide a justification for non-compliance with the mandatory\n\nprovisions. The scope of the inquiry in the case of preventive detention based upon subjctive satisfaction being necessarily narrow and tlimited, the scrutiny of the court has to be even stricter than in a normal case of punitive trial.\n\nSince we have held the order of detention as invalid for the reasons given above, it is not necessary to deal with the other grounds submitted by Mr: Anthony. The writ petition and the appeal are al1owed.\n\nThe judgment of the Allahabad High Court is set aside and in the view we have taken we do not feel called upon to pronounce upon the variou_s .n; asons given by the High C?rt in rejecting the petition. The rule msz ts made absolute. The petitioner shall be released forth with from the jail unless he is required in any other case. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 318 of 1974-is allowed.\n\nThe application. for taking additional papers on record is rejected.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nPetition allowtd~ .. ·.:", "total_entities": 64, "entities": [{"text": "BIRAM CHAND", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIRAM CHAND", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH _&ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH.&.ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 162, "end_char": 180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 182, "end_char": 186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Security Act, 1971", "statute": "Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Sec. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 360, "end_char": 369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Security Act, 1971", "statute": "Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 386, "end_char": 428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3636, "end_char": 3641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "819 EFJ\n\nIn the present case, if the District Magistrate had not at all taken recourse to the facts of the criminal cases pending against the detenu in Bihar in coming to a conclusion about."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4293, "end_char": 4309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The gro':'nds wit~ reference to the pending crin1inal prose\n\nCUh~?ns 10 Bihar could not provide a valid basis for making the order of detention particularly because those cases are pending trial in Bihar and in view of the decision of the Patna High Court in connection with one of them."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4607, "end_char": 4617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4625, "end_char": 4646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4649, "end_char": 4662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony and K. B. Rohtagi for the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "Frank Anthony"}}, {"text": "K. B. Rohtagi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4667, "end_char": 4680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony and K. B. Rohtagi for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "D. P. {!", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4702, "end_char": 4710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. {!"}}, {"text": "R. Bana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4717, "end_char": 4724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "niyal, R. Bana and 0."}}, {"text": "0. P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4729, "end_char": 4739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "niyal, R. Bana and 0."}}, {"text": "GoswAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4804, "end_char": 4811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GoswAMI, J.-This habeas corpus petition un9.er Article 32 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order of the District Magistrate, Varanasi, of 3rd September, 1973, whereby .the petitioner was detained under sub-section (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (l) of section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (briefly the Act) , The order has been _Passed \"with a view to preventing him from.", "canonical_name": "GoswAMI"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4851, "end_char": 4861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4869, "end_char": 4890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5080, "end_char": 5089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5097, "end_char": 5139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mohania Police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5598, "end_char": 5612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 : \"That you and your other associates have been char~:e sheeted by Mohania Police on 28-11-66 for the offence punishable under section 7 F.C. Act and 125 DIR 1962 and the case is 'till pending in the Court, Magistrate of Bhabhua (Bihar) s the proceedings have been stayed by the orders of the High."}}, {"text": "28-11-66", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5616, "end_char": 5624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 : \"That you and your other associates have been char~:e sheeted by Mohania Police on 28-11-66 for the offence punishable under section 7 F.C. Act and 125 DIR 1962 and the case is 'till pending in the Court, Magistrate of Bhabhua (Bihar) s the proceedings have been stayed by the orders of the High."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5658, "end_char": 5667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "High. Court, Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5824, "end_char": 5842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 : \"That you and your other associates have been char~:e sheeted by Mohania Police on 28-11-66 for the offence punishable under section 7 F.C. Act and 125 DIR 1962 and the case is 'till pending in the Court, Magistrate of Bhabhua (Bihar) s the proceedings have been stayed by the orders of the High."}}, {"text": "Shyam Sunder Ashok Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6021, "end_char": 6045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 : \"That with a view to continue your anti-social activities and to save yourself from the clutches of law you have started a firm under the name and style of M/s Shyam Sunder Ashok Kumar, in Mohalla Machchodari P. S. Kotwali, Varanasi City some time in the year 1966 or 1967 and you have purposely associated your minor son Ashok Kumar, your brother Shyam Sunder and a lady of your family as partners in the said firm only in name while, in fact, you are actively transacting the entire business of the said firm to carry on the illegal activities\".", "canonical_name": "Shyam Sunder Ashok Kumar"}}, {"text": "Varanasi City", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6085, "end_char": 6098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 : \"That with a view to continue your anti-social activities and to save yourself from the clutches of law you have started a firm under the name and style of M/s Shyam Sunder Ashok Kumar, in Mohalla Machchodari P. S. Kotwali, Varanasi City some time in the year 1966 or 1967 and you have purposely associated your minor son Ashok Kumar, your brother Shyam Sunder and a lady of your family as partners in the said firm only in name while, in fact, you are actively transacting the entire business of the said firm to carry on the illegal activities\"."}}, {"text": "Mohama", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6720, "end_char": 6726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "smuggled to and stored in your goodown at Mohama (B1har), a non-producing area of these foodgrains in the State of Bihar, just on the border of U.P. through yo.ur said firm which will be evidenced the facts given below:-\n\nBIRAM CHAND V.-.U.P. STATE (Goswami, J.) 815."}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6822, "end_char": 6826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "smuggled to and stored in your goodown at Mohama (B1har), a non-producing area of these foodgrains in the State of Bihar, just on the border of U.P. through yo.ur said firm which will be evidenced the facts given below:-\n\nBIRAM CHAND V.-.U.P. STATE (Goswami, J.) 815."}}, {"text": "BIRAM CHAND", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6900, "end_char": 6911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "smuggled to and stored in your goodown at Mohama (B1har), a non-producing area of these foodgrains in the State of Bihar, just on the border of U.P. through yo.ur said firm which will be evidenced the facts given below:-\n\nBIRAM CHAND V.-.U.P. STATE (Goswami, J.) 815.", "canonical_name": "BIRAM CHAND"}}, {"text": "V.-.U.P. STATE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6912, "end_char": 6926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "smuggled to and stored in your goodown at Mohama (B1har), a non-producing area of these foodgrains in the State of Bihar, just on the border of U.P. through yo.ur said firm which will be evidenced the facts given below:-\n\nBIRAM CHAND V.-.U.P. STATE (Goswami, J.) 815."}}, {"text": "Chandsuli village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7285, "end_char": 7302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 : \"That the persons named above are neither foodgrains 'Arhatias' nor retail shopkeepers either at Chandsuli Bazar or in Chandsuli village\"."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7514, "end_char": 7519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "jwar ave been booked by rail to Delhi and Pooha as shown below:-\n\nThen is given a list of various bookings o£225 bags of jwar to Delhi, 116 bags of bajra to Poona, 1 50 bags of bajra to Poona, 220 C bags of bajra to P9.ona and 22_?"}}, {"text": "Pooha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7524, "end_char": 7529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "jwar ave been booked by rail to Delhi and Pooha as shown below:-\n\nThen is given a list of various bookings o£225 bags of jwar to Delhi, 116 bags of bajra to Poona, 1 50 bags of bajra to Poona, 220 C bags of bajra to P9.ona and 22_?"}}, {"text": "Poona", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7639, "end_char": 7644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "jwar ave been booked by rail to Delhi and Pooha as shown below:-\n\nThen is given a list of various bookings o£225 bags of jwar to Delhi, 116 bags of bajra to Poona, 1 50 bags of bajra to Poona, 220 C bags of bajra to P9.ona and 22_?"}}, {"text": "Mohania", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7923, "end_char": 7930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The consigners of all these consignments were searched at Mohania on the address given in the railway records but no such persons or Bbandar were available on that address."}}, {"text": "2-3-1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8284, "end_char": 8292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UPF 2039, USF 3253, UPF 2927, USS 7745.p.nd UPF 2015 loaded with jawar and bajra were apprehended by Mohania Police on 2-3-1973 (2/3 July 1973?)"}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8356, "end_char": 8369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the ground that all the trucks belonged to Uttar Pradesh and the jawar and bajra loaded on them were being smuggled from U.P. to Bihar at your instance\"."}}, {"text": "Suitdei Ashok Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8642, "end_char": 8661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, 499 bags gram, 70 bags of 'Matar' and 90 ba~ of 'Dal matar' were found short on the actual verification of the stock of finn\n\nShyam Suitdei Ashok Kumar on 17-7~1973 by Deputy Regional Marketing Officer, V aranasi (Enforcement)\"."}}, {"text": "17-7~1973 by", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8665, "end_char": 8677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, 499 bags gram, 70 bags of 'Matar' and 90 ba~ of 'Dal matar' were found short on the actual verification of the stock of finn\n\nShyam Suitdei Ashok Kumar on 17-7~1973 by Deputy Regional Marketing Officer, V aranasi (Enforcement)\"."}}, {"text": "Shyam Sunder Askok Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8771, "end_char": 8795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10 : \"That the firm Shyam Sunder Askok Kumar have not maintained any stock register and satta\n\nhai since 1~70 of oil-seeds and oil-seeds product but at _the ttme of checkt, ng on 17-7.,.73, 30S bags of 'Tisi' and 10 bags of 'Sarson' were found\": , Ground No.", "canonical_name": "Shyam Sunder Ashok Kumar"}}, {"text": "17-7.,.73", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8930, "end_char": 8939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10 : \"That the firm Shyam Sunder Askok Kumar have not maintained any stock register and satta\n\nhai since 1~70 of oil-seeds and oil-seeds product but at _the ttme of checkt, ng on 17-7.,.73, 30S bags of 'Tisi' and 10 bags of 'Sarson' were found\": , Ground No."}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9168, "end_char": 9193, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9560, "end_char": 9571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10175, "end_char": 10185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10403, "end_char": 10416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the petitioner, the following submissions arc made by Mr. Frank Anthony :\n\n(1) There was considerable dday in the Government\n\ndisposing of the representation of the dctenu and hence it vitiates the detention order.", "canonical_name": "Frank Anthony"}}, {"text": "Anthony", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10889, "end_char": 10896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Alt[Jough Mr. Anthony made a strong p!c:a on the lirt gr0unJ £ r.!garding delay in forwarding the reprcscntJtion of the detenu to the Government and in its ultimate dispor.al, we will first take up his thirJ\n\nubmi-; sion. ."}}, {"text": "Uniyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11124, "end_char": 11130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• Jr is admitted by Mr. Uniyal, lc:rncJ counsc.:l for the Star~. that the Mohania Police Station case rcfcrr.:d to in groun 1 No.", "canonical_name": "Uniyal"}}, {"text": "Uniyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11492, "end_char": 11498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 is _merely descriptive and is not a ground in itself upon\n\nh.tch the detcntton order ha> been based..\n\nWe may, th~:rdon:, scruttoJe the aforesaid submission of Mr. Uniyal.", "canonical_name": "Uniyal"}}, {"text": "Goswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12579, "end_char": 12586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1t is bccau' c\n\nF l\n\nBIRAM CHAND V. U.P. STA'fE (Goswami, J.) 817\n\nof this 3rd ground tl'!at the 4th ground has been worded in the way it has been done, namely, \"that with a view to continue your anti-social activities and to save yourself from the clutches of law you have started a finn under the name and style of M/S Shy~ Sudcr Asbok Kumar .... \".", "canonical_name": "GoswAMI"}}, {"text": "High Court of Palna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13327, "end_char": 13346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It shoulq be mentioned here that the High Court of Palna in Criminal Writ Jurisdiction cases Nos."}}, {"text": "21st August, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13421, "end_char": 13438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "39 and 40 of 1965 by order dated 21st August, 1965, quashed an order of detention of the petitioner made on 1 9th July, 1 965, based on the allegation~ in the same first information report of 1 lth October, 1964, of Mohania Police Station under section 7 of ihe Essential Commodities A::t, 1955 and various other sections of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "1 9th July, 1 965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13496, "end_char": 13513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "39 and 40 of 1965 by order dated 21st August, 1965, quashed an order of detention of the petitioner made on 1 9th July, 1 965, based on the allegation~ in the same first information report of 1 lth October, 1964, of Mohania Police Station under section 7 of ihe Essential Commodities A::t, 1955 and various other sections of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13633, "end_char": 13642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13717, "end_char": 13734, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section\n\n317", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14235, "end_char": 14247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14255, "end_char": 14280, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government of West BenRal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14556, "end_char": 14581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the Government of West BenRal a11d another,( 1 ) to which one of us (Brother Khanna) was a party."}}, {"text": "Khanna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14629, "end_char": 14635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the Government of West BenRal a11d another,( 1 ) to which one of us (Brother Khanna) was a party."}}, {"text": "5th August, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18195, "end_char": 18211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detaining authority cannot take recourse to two parallel and simultaneous proceedings nor can take recourse to a ground which is the subject mater of a criminal trial as in the case of the first information report dated 5th August, 1973 furnishing the grounds 9 and 10 of the detention order."}}, {"text": "Government of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18590, "end_char": 18609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it is also clear, as noted above, that the Patna High Court had quashed the order of detention of the Government of Bihar based on facts relating to the first information report of 11th October, 1964, although on grounds different from those which we H are now considering."}}, {"text": "11th October, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18669, "end_char": 18687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it is also clear, as noted above, that the Patna High Court had quashed the order of detention of the Government of Bihar based on facts relating to the first information report of 11th October, 1964, although on grounds different from those which we H are now considering."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21615, "end_char": 21635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Allahabad High Court is set aside and in the view we have taken we do not feel called upon to pronounce upon the variou_s .n; asons given by the High C?rt in rejecting the petition."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_820_826_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "THE AMALGAMA'MlD TEA ESTATE CO. LTD. ETC.\n\nA v.\n\nSTATE OF KERALA\n\nApril 2, 1974 [A. N. RAIY, C.J., P. JAGANMOllAN REDDY, s. N. DWJVEDI,\n\nP. K. GOSWAMI AND R. S. SARICARIA, 1J, J\n\nConstit11tion of India. A.rt. 14-Classificati\"n test if inflexible and doctrlnairi.\n\nKera/a Agric11/t11ral Income Tax Act, 1950-lf imposition of graduated .ta.T betwttll don1t.stic and foreign companies violates Art. 14.\n\nThe petitioners, two foreign companies, had been assessed to agricultural income tax under the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950 , M amended by the Amendment Act of 1970. n1e Act has fixed a graJ\\1ated scaJe on 3Ji:ri:ulhtral income tax to a minimum of 65% on domestic companies anJ a flat rate: of 75% of. the total incorne on foreign companies. The petitioner.1 contended that this discrimination between a domestic company and a foreign company was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution because the classification was not bsed on any intelligible differentia and the differentia. if any, had no rational relation to the purpose sought to be achieved by the taxing statute .and that it treats as unequal, companies which are equally circumstanced.\n\nDismissing the petitions,\n\nHELD : (I) The impugned provisions of the Amending Act, 1970 were not violative of Art. 14.\n\nThe impuJ!; ned legislation, in order to get tht: green light from Art 141 should satisfy the classification test evolved by this Court namely\n\n(I) the classification should be passed on an intelligible differenlia and (2) the differentia should bear a rational relation to the purpOse of the legislation.\n\n[822 F]\n\n(2) The classification test is, however. not inflexible and doctFinuire.\n\nJt gives do.1e regard to the complex necessities and intricate -problems of government.\n\nAs revenue is the first necessity of the State and as taxes arc l'aised for various purposes and bv an adiustment of diverse elements, the Court grants the State greater choice of classification in the field of taxation than in other spheres.\n\n[822 G]\n\nKl1andi1:e Sham Bhat \\'. Auricu/tura/ /11conie-tax Officer, 1\\.l.R. 1963 S.C. 591 and Kasargod Ravi Ver1na Rajall v. Union of /11dia [19691 3 S.C.R. 827, referred to.\n\n(3) On a challenge to a statute on the ground of Art. 14 the court would raise a presumtion in_ favour of its constitutionality. Consequently one who challenged the salute h!ars th: burden of eitab'.ishing that the statu~. is clearly' violative of Art. 14. [823 BJ\n\nCl1ara11jl1 Lal v. Union of India, [1950] S.C.R. 869 at p. 879 per Fazal Ali J. and State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] S.C.R. 284 at p. 303. referred to. ( 4) It is not possible to hold on the meagre facts pre!iented before the court that domestic companies and foreign companies carrying on agriclllture in the S'tate of Kerala are equaly circumstanced. [823 0]\n\nD. P. Jo.lii v. State of 1'1Cldlir11 l}lwrat, [1955], 1 S.C.R .. 1215, at p. 1228, Hu11x. Muller of Nurenburg v. Super1111e11dent Pre.ndencJ. Jail, Calcutla, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1284, K. T. Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala t1961] 3 S.C, R. 77 and\n\nlate of Kerala, v. Haji K. K11tty Nalw, A.l.R. 1959 S.C. 378, referred to.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions Nos. 2 and 9 of 1971.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nAMAL. TEA ESTATE\\', KER.ALA (Dwivtdi, /.) 821\n\nA G. B. Pai, 0. C. Mathur, D. N. Misra, J. B. DaJaclw11ji and Rmirider Narain, for the petitioners\n\nL. N. Misra, Solicitor General of India and A. G. P11dissary, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nB Dw1vE01, J.-Thc two petitioners have been assessed to Agricultural Income-tax by the State of Kerala under the Agricultural Incometa• Act, 1950 (hereinafter called the Act) as amended by the Agricultural Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1970. The assessment is made at the rate of 75 per cent of their total income. They challenge the assessment on the ground that s. 2(hh) and (kk) and clauses (2) . and \\3) of Pan I to the Schedule of the Kcrala Agricultural Jncome- C tax (Amendment) Act, 1970 are violative of Art. 14 o{ the Constitution.\n\nit will facilitate appreciation of the facts and the constitutional qu .... stlon in this case if the taxing provisions are noticed at this stage.\n\nThe Agricultural Income-tax Act was passed in 1950. In the beginning, the Act was known as the Travancorc-Cochin Agricultural Income-tax Act.\n\nLater as a result of the State'-; reorganisation, the Act was renamed simply as Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950.\n\nAccording to the preamble, the Act was made to provide for levy of tax on agricultural income in the State o[ Kerala. Tilt the Amending Act of l 970, all companies were liable to pay tax according to their total income.\n\nThe tax is chargeable under s. 3.\n\nSub-section. (l) thereof provided that the agricultural incon1c at the rate or rates specified in the schedule to the Act shall be charged oa the total agricultural income ofthe previous year of every person. It was a grnduated rate.\n\nSection 2(h) of the Amending Act of 1970 has redefined a 'Company' as \"a domestic company or a foreign company.\" Section 2(hh) defines a 'domestic company' as \"'a company fonncd and registered under the Companies Act, 1956 ... and includes a company 'formed and registered under any law relating to companies formerly in force in any part of India.\" lt is necessary that the registered office of the Company should be in India.\n\nSection 2(kk) defines a 'foreign company' as 'a foreign company within the meaning of s.591 of the CC\\mpanics Act, 1956 .... and includes any foreign association whether incorporated o_r not which the Government, may. by general or special order, declare to be a foreign company for the purposes of this Act.\"\n\nClause (2) of Part I of the Schedule to the Amending Act, 1970, provides for the rate of taxation chargeable fron1 a 'do1nestic co1npany.' It is this :\n\nA. Where the total agricultural_ incon1c docs not exceed\n\nRs. 25,000-45 per cent of the total agricultural income\n\nB. Where the total agricultural income exceeds. Rs. 25,000\n\nbut docs nol exceed Rs. 1 lakh-50 per cent of the total\n\ng:ricultural inco1nc\n\nC. Where the total agricultural income exceeds Rs. l lakh but does not exceed Rs. 3 lakhs-55 per cent of the total agricultural income\n\nD. Where the total agricultural income exceeds Rs. 3 lakhs but does not exceed Rs. 10 lakhs.-60 per cent of the total agricultural income E. Where the total agricultural income exceeds Rs. 10\n\nlakhs.-65 per cent of the total agricultural income.\n\nThe provisos to vai-ious alphabetical clauses have been omitted here from as they are not material. Clause ( 3) of Part I of the Schedule provides for the rate of tax chargeable from a foreign company. The rate fixed is 75 per cent of the total agricultriral income.\n\nIt is obvious from the review of the aforesaid provisions that while C in the case of domestic companies a graduated scale is fixed, in the ca..e of foreign companies a flat rate is fixed. Secondly, while the maximum rate of tax in the case of a domestic company is 65 per cent of the total income, it is 75 per cent in case of all foreign companies.\n\nThe petitioners' contention is that this discrimination between a domestic company and a foreign company is violative of Art. 14 of D the Constitution.\n\nThe classification for the purposes of taxation is not based on any intelligible differentia; and the differentia, if any, has no rational relation to the pwpose ought to be achieved by the taXing statute. Reliance is placed on Wheeling Steel Corporation v. C. Emory G/ander, P) where the U.S.A. Supreme Court has said: \"After a State has chosen to domesticate foreign corporations, they arc entitled to equal protection with the State's own corporate progeny, at least to E the extent that their property is entitled to an equally favourable ad valorem tax basis.\"\n\nIt may be pointed out that the Indian Income-tax Act also makes a distinction between a domestic company and a foreign company.\n\nBut that circumstance per se would not help the State of Kera!a. The impugned legislation, in order to get the green light from Art. 14, F should satisfy the classification test evolved by this Court in a catena of cases. According to that test ( 1) the class.ification should be based on an inte!iligible differentia and (2) the differentia should bear a rational relation to the purpose of the legislation.\n\nThe classification test is, however, not inflexible and doctrinaire.\n\nIt gives due regard to the complex necessities and intericatc problem• G of government. Thus, as revenue is the first necessity of the State and as taxes are raised for various purposes and by an adjustment of diverse elements, the Court grants the State greater choice of classification in the field of taxation, than in other spheres. Accorging to Subba Rao J.,, \"(T) he courts in view of the inherent complexity of fiscal adjustment of diverse elements, permit a larger discretion to the Legislature in the matter of classification, so long as it adheres to the fundamental H principles underlying the said doctrine.\n\nThe power of the Legislature\n\n(I) 93 Law. Edn. 1544.\n\nAMAL. TEA ESTATE v. KERALA Wwivedi, !.) 823\n\nto classify is of wide range and flexibility so that it can adjust its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways.\" [Khandige Sham Bhat v.Agricu/t11ral /iicome-tax Officer, Kasargod('); Ravi Verma Rajah v.\n\nUnion of India(').]\n\nAgain, on a challenge to a statute on the ground of Art. 14, the Court would generally raise a presumption in favour of its constitutionality.\n\nConsequently, one who challenges the statute.bears the burden of establishing that the statute is clearly. violative of Art. 14. \"(T)l1e presumption is always i11 favour of the constitutionality of an enact,-\n\nment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there is a clear transgression of the constitutional principle.\" [See Charanjit Lal v.Union of India(').] .\n\nThe reason why a statute is presumed to be constitutional is that the Legislature is the best judge of the local condition and circumstances and special needs of various classes of persons. \"(T) he Legislature is the best judge of the needs of particular classe.s and to estimate the degree of evil so as to adjust its legislation according to the exigency found to exist.\" (Charanjit Lal (supra) at page 933 per Das J.)\n\nSpeaking in the same vein, Patanjali Sastri, C.J. observed: \"(The Legislatures) alone know the local conditions and circumstances which demanded the enactment of such a law, and it must be remembered that \"legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.\" [See State of West Btngql v. Anwar Ali Sarkar(').]\n\nThe contention of the petitioners would have to be examined in the light of the foregoing considerations.\n\nThe only relevant statement of fact in the petitions is that the petitioners are Joint Stock Companies with limited liability and have been incorporated in the United Kingdom.\n\nOne of them has its registered office in Scotland, and the other in England.\n\nBoth of them carry onbusiness also in this coun(fy, and particularly in the State ¢ Kerala.\n\nIn Kerala their main business is oneof cultivation and marketing of plantation crops such as tea. It is also alleged that the impugned statute seeks to treat as unequal companies which are equally circumstanced.\n\nNo other facts are disclosed in the petitions. No comparison is made between the domestic companies and foreign companies carrying on agriculture in Kerala in regard to their financial standing. Magni tude of their business inside a.nd outside the country, the fertility of the land owned by them and the quality of the plantation crops raised by them. It is not possible to hold on the meagre facts presented before us that domestic companies and foreign companies carrying on agriculture in the State of Kerala are equally circumstanced.\n\n(1) A.T.R. 1963 S.C. 591.\n\n(2) (1969! S. C. R 827 ()) (1950] S. C'. R. 869 at p, 879 per Fazal AH .T.\n\n(4) [19521 S. C.R. 284 at p, 303\n\nThere is no denying the fact that for various reasons a domestic A company may be 1rr.ated differently from a foreign company in the field of taxation.\n\nAccording to Art. 48 of the Constitution, it is a fundamental obligation of the State to make \"'endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modem and scientific lines and to take .steps for preservation and improving the breeds ... of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle.\" So it may b~ safely presumed that the State of Kerala shOuld be striving to improve agriculture and B\n\nanim~I husbandry within 11s boundaries. It may also be presumed that in so doing it mu!)t be 1nvesttng considerable money and skill. The State is, therefore, entitled to raise revenue by taxation for investment in agriculture and animal husbandry.\n\nSo it could reasonably demand 75 per cent of total income as tax from a foreign company.\n\nIt could demand the same amount of tax from a domestic company also.\n\nBut the rate of tax on them is lesser.\n\nBut the tax relief given to them is c 11ot proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable.\n\nIt may be that the domestic companies own land which is less fertile or produce inferior quality of plantation crops while the foreign companies own 1no.re fertile land and produce superior quality of plantation crops.\n\nIn that case. the domest'c companies would not be able to withstand the compctitic!l1 or\n\nthe foreign con1punics rind would not survive. 1hc State might have chosen to give the domstic con1panies protection against the foreign D companies.\n\nAnd there seems to be yet another good reason for this.\n\nThe entire income earned by a domestic company fron1 business insid~\n\nas well as outsido India will remain in India.\n\nBut a good part of the income earned by the petitioners inside India would be drained out of India to the United Kingdom in the shape of dividends, etc.\n\nUnder the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, l 94 7. it is open to a forcig;1 company to transmit money out of India with the permission of the E.\n\nReserve Bank of India.\n\nIt is thus evident that a greater part of the income and skill of the domestic companies is likely to be utilised in improving agriculture within the State.\n\nIt will not be so in the case of forcig11 co1npanics.\n\nOn these considerations it cannot be said that the cla>Sification ot c.ompanics into domestic and foreign con1panies has no rational rcJation to the purpose of the impugned provisions.\n\nOur view receives strong support from the Court's opinion in D. P.\n\nJoshi v. State of Madhya Bilarat(I). That case related to the question of admission of students in a Medical College in the Sta!e of Madhya Bharat.\n\nAccording to a direction of the State of Madhya Bharat, all students admitted to the College were required to pay a prescribed fee.\n\nBut students who were not btJna fide residence of Madhya Bharat were also requ; rcd to pay capitation fe.o of Rs. 1500/-.\n\nA student who was not a hona fide resident of Madhya Bharat challenged the capitation fee as being violative of Art. J4_ The majority of the Court overruled the contention.\n\nSpeaking for the Court, Vcnkatarama Ayyar J. said :\n\n'The object of the classification underlying the impugned rule was cleerly to help to some extent students who residents of Madhya Bharat in the prosecution of their studies,\n\n(t) lt955] t S. C.R. 1215 ot P. t228.\n\n' '\n\nAMAL. TEA ESTATE v. KERALA <Dwivedi, J,) 825\n\nand it cannot be disputed that it is quite a legitimate and laudable objective for a State to encourage education within Us borders.\n\nEducation is a State subject, and one of the directive principles declared in Pan IV of the Constitution 1s that the State should make effective provision for education within the limits of its economy ..•• The State has to contribute for the unkeep and the running of its educational institutions.\n\nWe are in this petition concerned with a Medioal College, and it is well-known that it requires considerable finance to maintain such as institution. If the State has to spend money on it, is it unreasonable that it should SO> order the educational system that the advantage of it would to some extent at least enure for the benefit of the State? A concession given to the \"residents of the State in the matter of fee is obviously calculated to serve that end, as presuma- 2bly some of them might, after passing out of the College, settle down as doctors and serve, the needs of the locality.\n\nThe classification is thus based on a ground which has a rea sonable relation to the subject matter of the legislation, and is in consequence not open to attack. It has been held in the State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh and others(') that a classification might validly be made on a geographical basis. Such a classification would be eminently just and reasonable, where it relates to education which is the concern primarily of the State.\n\nThe contention, therefore, that the rule imposing capitation tee 1s in contravention of article 14 must be rejected.\"\n\nWheeling Steel Corporation (supra) cannot, in our view, assist the petitioners.\n\nFirstly, the foreign corporation there was a corporation incorporated and registered in a State within the U.S.A.\n\nHere the petitioner companies are incorporated not in any part of India but in the United Kingdom.\n\nSecondly, while there the taxing State has chosen ''to adopt\" the petitioning foreign corporation. here there is. no evidence to show that the petitioners were permitted to carry on business in the State of Kerala by the choice of that State.\n\nIn all probability they had set up their business in that State before India became a Sovereign Republic.\n\nThirdly, there the taxing State was trying to tax the property of a foreign corporation admitted in the State.\n\nHere the State of Kcrala is not taxing the property, but the income, of the petitioners from their agricultural property.\n\nIn Haus Mu!/er of Nurenbug v. Su, perintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta('). this Court upheld the classification of foreigners into those who are British subjects and those who arc not British subjects for the purpose of preventive detention.\n\nThe Court said there : \"(I )t is casih understandable that the reasons of State may make it desirable tO. classify foreigners into different groups.\"\n\nK. T. llfoopi/ Nair v. State of Kera/a(') and State .of Kera/a v. l/aji K. Kully Naha(') deal with taxing statutes. In the first cos~.\n\n{l J [1953] S.C.R. 254.\n\n(JI [1961] J S.C.R. 77. (2)\n\n[1955! I S.C.R. 11~4.\n\n(4) A.l.R. 1969 S.C. JW.\n\nthe State oj Kerala had imposed a uniform tax levy on land.\n\nThe A taxing pr, ovisions were struck down as violative of Art. 14 because according to the Court there was no classification of persons .for the purpose of taxation. In the other case, a uniform building tax was imposed on buildings according to their floor area. The taxing provisions were struck down as being discriminatory for total lack of any classification of persons or buildings. The impugned Act of 1970 does not suffer from this vice.\n\nSo these cases also do not help the B pctitiOncrs.\n\nWe are of opinion that the impugned provisions of the Amending Act of 1970 are not violative of Art. 14.\n\nThe petitions arc accordingly disn1isscd with costs. One set.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nPetitions disn1issed.", "total_entities": 66, "entities": [{"text": "THE AMALGAMA'MlD TEA ESTATE CO. LTD. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE AMALGAMATED TEA ESTATE CO. LTD. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF KERALA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF KERALA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 2, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 79, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A v.\n\nSTATE OF KERALA\n\nApril 2, 1974 [A. N. RAIY, C.J., P. JAGANMOllAN REDDY, s. N. DWJVEDI,\n\nP. K. GOSWAMI AND R. S. SARICARIA, 1J, J\n\nConstit11tion of India."}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOllAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. K. GOSWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 150, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 286, "end_char": 306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 391, "end_char": 398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1950", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 496, "end_char": 536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 873, "end_char": 880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950", "statute": "the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "impugned provisions of the Amending Act, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1204, "end_char": 1249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1272, "end_char": 1279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The impugned provisions of the Amending Act, 1970", "statute": "The impugned provisions of the Amending Act, 1970"}}, {"text": "Art 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1349, "end_char": 1356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The impugned provisions of the Amending Act, 1970", "statute": "The impugned provisions of the Amending Act, 1970"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2231, "end_char": 2238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The impugned provisions of the Amending Act, 1970", "statute": "The impugned provisions of the Amending Act, 1970"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2430, "end_char": 2437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2448, "end_char": 2451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2784, "end_char": 2790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4) It is not possible to hold on the meagre facts pre!iented before the court that domestic companies and foreign companies carrying on agriclllture in the S'tate of Kerala are equaly circumstanced. ["}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S.C.R. 1284", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2984, "end_char": 3004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3211, "end_char": 3221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. B. Pai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3335, "end_char": 3344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TEA ESTATE\\', KER.ALA (Dwivtdi, /.) 821\n\nA G. B. Pai, 0."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3349, "end_char": 3358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur, D. N. Misra, J. B. DaJaclw11ji and Rmirider Narain, for the petitioners\n\nL. N. Misra, Solicitor General of India and A. G. P11dissary, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "D. N. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3360, "end_char": 3371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur, D. N. Misra, J. B. DaJaclw11ji and Rmirider Narain, for the petitioners\n\nL. N. Misra, Solicitor General of India and A. G. P11dissary, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "D. N. Misra"}}, {"text": "J. B. DaJaclw11ji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3373, "end_char": 3390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur, D. N. Misra, J. B. DaJaclw11ji and Rmirider Narain, for the petitioners\n\nL. N. Misra, Solicitor General of India and A. G. P11dissary, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Rmirider Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3395, "end_char": 3410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur, D. N. Misra, J. B. DaJaclw11ji and Rmirider Narain, for the petitioners\n\nL. N. Misra, Solicitor General of India and A. G. P11dissary, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "L. N. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3433, "end_char": 3444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur, D. N. Misra, J. B. DaJaclw11ji and Rmirider Narain, for the petitioners\n\nL. N. Misra, Solicitor General of India and A. G. P11dissary, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "D. N. Misra"}}, {"text": "A. G. P11dissary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3477, "end_char": 3493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur, D. N. Misra, J. B. DaJaclw11ji and Rmirider Narain, for the petitioners\n\nL. N. Misra, Solicitor General of India and A. G. P11dissary, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B Dw1vE01", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3560, "end_char": 3569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nB Dw1vE01, J.-Thc two petitioners have been assessed to Agricultural Income-tax by the State of Kerala under the Agricultural Incometa• Act, 1950 (hereinafter called the Act) as amended by the Agricultural Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1970."}}, {"text": "s. 2(hh)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3922, "end_char": 3930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4071, "end_char": 4078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4266, "end_char": 4280, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4375, "end_char": 4389, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Act was renamed simply as Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4446, "end_char": 4505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Tilt the Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4626, "end_char": 4647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4757, "end_char": 4761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tilt the Amending Act", "statute": "Tilt the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4999, "end_char": 5011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tilt the Amending Act", "statute": "Tilt the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2(hh)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5112, "end_char": 5125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tilt the Amending Act", "statute": "Tilt the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5202, "end_char": 5221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5341, "end_char": 5346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 2(hh) defines a 'domestic company' as \"'a company fonncd and registered under the Companies Act, 1956 ... and includes a company 'formed and registered under any law relating to companies formerly in force in any part of India.\""}}, {"text": "Section 2(kk)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5428, "end_char": 5441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s.591", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5514, "end_char": 5519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Part I of the Schedule to the Amending Act, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5753, "end_char": 5801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7270, "end_char": 7277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U.S.A. Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7591, "end_char": 7611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance is placed on Wheeling Steel Corporation v. C. Emory G/ander, P) where the U.S.A. Supreme Court has said: \"After a State has chosen to domesticate foreign corporations, they arc entitled to equal protection with the State's own corporate progeny, at least to E the extent that their property is entitled to an equally favourable ad valorem tax basis.\""}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7907, "end_char": 7921, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of Kera!a", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8046, "end_char": 8061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But that circumstance per se would not help the State of Kera!a."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8126, "end_char": 8133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8828, "end_char": 8837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accorging to Subba Rao J.,, \"(T) he courts in view of the inherent complexity of fiscal adjustment of diverse elements, permit a larger discretion to the Legislature in the matter of classification, so long as it adheres to the fundamental H principles underlying the said doctrine."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9488, "end_char": 9495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9700, "end_char": 9707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Charanjit Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10334, "end_char": 10347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Charanjit Lal (supra) at page 933 per Das J.)\n\nSpeaking in the same vein, Patanjali Sastri, C.J. observed: \"(The Legislatures) alone know the local conditions and circumstances which demanded the enactment of such a law, and it must be remembered that \"legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.\" ["}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10372, "end_char": 10375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Charanjit Lal (supra) at page 933 per Das J.)\n\nSpeaking in the same vein, Patanjali Sastri, C.J. observed: \"(The Legislatures) alone know the local conditions and circumstances which demanded the enactment of such a law, and it must be remembered that \"legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.\" ["}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10408, "end_char": 10424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Charanjit Lal (supra) at page 933 per Das J.)\n\nSpeaking in the same vein, Patanjali Sastri, C.J. observed: \"(The Legislatures) alone know the local conditions and circumstances which demanded the enactment of such a law, and it must be remembered that \"legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.\" ["}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11028, "end_char": 11042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only relevant statement of fact in the petitions is that the petitioners are Joint Stock Companies with limited liability and have been incorporated in the United Kingdom."}}, {"text": "Scotland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11086, "end_char": 11094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of them has its registered office in Scotland, and the other in England."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11113, "end_char": 11120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of them has its registered office in Scotland, and the other in England."}}, {"text": "Art. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12273, "end_char": 12280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Kerala", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12600, "end_char": 12615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So it may b~ safely presumed that the State of Kerala shOuld be striving to improve agriculture and B\n\nanim~I husbandry within 11s boundaries."}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14134, "end_char": 14155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it is open to a forcig;1 company to transmit money out of India with the permission of the E.\n\nReserve Bank of India."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Bharat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14806, "end_char": 14828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to a direction of the State of Madhya Bharat, all students admitted to the College were required to pay a prescribed fee."}}, {"text": "Vcnkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15228, "end_char": 15245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Speaking for the Court, Vcnkatarama Ayyar J. said :\n\n'The object of the classification underlying the impugned rule was cleerly to help to some extent students who residents of Madhya Bharat in the prosecution of their studies,\n\n(t) lt955] t S. C.R. 1215 ot P. t228."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17077, "end_char": 17087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wheeling Steel Corporation", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17108, "end_char": 17134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Wheeling Steel Corporation (supra) cannot, in our view, assist the petitioners."}}, {"text": "U.S.A.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17296, "end_char": 17302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Firstly, the foreign corporation there was a corporation incorporated and registered in a State within the U.S.A.\n\nHere the petitioner companies are incorporated not in any part of India but in the United Kingdom."}}, {"text": "State of Kcrala", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17876, "end_char": 17891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here the State of Kcrala is not taxing the property, but the income, of the petitioners from their agricultural property."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18746, "end_char": 18753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "are of opinion that the impugned provisions of the Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19190, "end_char": 19253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19283, "end_char": 19290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We are of opinion that the impugned provisions of the Amending Act", "statute": "We are of opinion that the impugned provisions of the Amending Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_827_832_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "KESHO RAM\n\nDE'LHI ADMlNISTRATION April 3, 1974.\n\n[M. H. BEG AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.J\n\nDl'lhi }.fu11icipa: Corporation Act 1957-Ss. 154, 155 & 161 read wit/: Secs. 353/332 3330/ l.P.C.-Whet/ler seizure and detention of animal u/s 161 posJible 1ritlzout 11otice 11/s. 154 for recoW.'ryaf mHk tax-If notice Optional.\n\nThe appellant was convicted u/s 353/332/333 of the Indian Penal Code a.nd was sentenced accordingly.\n\nThe prosecution case was th:it tlte appellant obstructed 3 inspectors and a peon of the Delhi Municipal Corporation, when they went to seize the appell'ants' buffalo in the discharge of their duty to realise the milk tax from him and struck one of the officers on the nose with the result that it bled and was found fractured.\n\nThe main contention of the appeUant was that the attempt to realise the arrears of milk. tax and recovery charges was illegal because no demand notice under Sec. 154 of the Act was served on the appellant, and therefore, he hitd the right of private defence.\n\nThe\n\n0 prsecution relied on Sec. 99 Indian Penal Code which provideii that there is no right of priVate defence against an act of a public servant. done in .!?ood faith under colour of his office, though that act may not be strictly justifiable bv law. Further according to the prosecution, Sec. 161 of the Act empowered the Inspector of the Corpo'ration. to, seize and n10 ... e the appetla.nt's buffalo for non-payment of tax and the sect.Ion gave them an over-riding power to resort to seize and detention of the artimaJ. Therefore, according to the prosecution, the appellant .was guilty of the offences charged.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD: (1) AithouJ?h the interpretation placed by the High Court that seizure and detention of a vehicle or an animal is possible under sec. 161 at an\\.1ime after the tax. ha~ become due' when read in the light of other provisions of the Act. it has to be remembered that section 161 would become the repository :'.>f a rather drastic power of .actinp; without previous notice to seizeany animal or vehicle at anv time after 'the tax bcame due. and thereby, of seriously iniurin~ c\\'en innocent individuals who mav have every intention and the capacity to par the demanded tax, but may 'have 'defaulted only by some oversight and may be unable to produce the required money on the spot.\n\nIt is well settled that out of two possible internationals, the one which confines the content of such oower of seizure to reasonable limits and fair modes of operation should be preferred. [831 DJ\n\nTherefore. although Sec. 161 of the Act can be used 'at any time', agaipst a defaulter, yet a defaulter in view of secs. 154 and 155 of the Act would be a person who refuses to pay within a period specified in Sec, 155 of the Act after a notice of demand u/s. 154 of the Act. Although the demand of notice is optional, yet, but the option has to be exercised if it is intended to invoke the powers contained in sec. 161. [8,31 F]\n\n(ii) The Inspectors were acting honsetly in exercise of the powen~ delegated to them, but they had erred in the exercise of their PoWers. They, however, cannot be presumed to know that a notiee under sec. 154 must precede any attemot of seizure.\n\nTherefore. there waS no legal defect which. vitiated their action<;. Sec. 99, therefore. did confer a protection upon the employees of the Corporation who acted in good faith under_ the colour of their office. But 11ince\n\nthey acted in an improper manner in demanding immediate payment, the sentences imoosed upon the appellant were oxcessive. The sentences, therefore, were reduced to the period already undergone by the appellant but the convictions were upheld. The fine imposed upon the appellant \\'{as also set aside ..\n\n[832 A-CJ\n\nI '\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JuR1so1cno:-i: Criminal Appeal No. 199 of [ l) 10.\n\nAppeal by Special leave from the judgment and order dated the l 2ch November, 1969 of the Delhi High Court at New Delhi in Criminal Apeal No. 103 of 1968.\n\nHarba11s Singh. for the appellant.\n\n(Jovi11d Das, for the respondent.\n\nIhe Judgment of the Court. was delivered by\n\nBEG, J.-The High Court or Delhi had confirmcdtho conviction .. of the appellant under Section 353/332/333 of the Indian Penal\n\nCod~, nnd a sent.nce of one year's regorous imprisonment on each , count, and also to be fine of Rs. 400/-, and, in default of payment . of fine, to four months further rigorous imprisonment under section . 333 Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe appellant has come to this Court by grant of special leave.\n\nIt was alleged that the appellant had, on 17-3-1967, at 4,30 p.m., in Rameshwar Nagar, obstructed Sarvshri Rattan Singh, Maharaj Singh , and Raghbir Singh, Section Inspectors, and Dunger, a Peon of the Delhi Municipal. Corporation, when they went to seize a buffalo belong • . ing tO the appellant in the discharge or their duty to realise the milk\n\ntax from him, and struck Rattan Singh on the nose with the result that it bled and was also fractured.\n\nTho Main contention on behalf of tc appellant is that the attempt to realize Rs. 153.75 as arrears of milk tax together with Rs. 10/- as recovery charges was illegal, because compliance with the provisions . of the Dolhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as \"the Act'), for the payment an:I recovery of taxes, and, in parti- . cular \\vith the requirements for.a notice o[ <lcn1and contained in Section\n\n154 of the Act, was wanting so that he ha:I a right to private defrncc.\n\nAn at1cmpt was also made to argue that the Inspectors who went to realise the milk tax by seizing the buffalo were not duly empowered by the Commissioner to do so.\n\nAn order of the Commissioner dated 22-7-1959 under Section 491 of the Act. delegating the Commissioner\"s . pow ors to Inspectors of the .corporation, set that question at rest. We do not think it could be areue.d .that Soction 491 requires the conferment of the Coinmissioners pO'Ncrs upon every Inspector by name.\n\nIt is enough if there is a general order, as there is in this case, indicating tbo class of ofticcrs to whom the Commissioner had delegated his , powers under any section.\n\nWe arc supported in thio; view by the case . of Ka11war Sing/1 l's. Delhi Adniinistrlltiou. ( 1 )\n\nWe find that it has not been contended anywhere that the Inspectors Jid not act under the colour of their oftice.\n\nThe appellant did not plead, in defence. that the officers concerned were not known to him a• ln, pectors of the Corporation authorised to collect tax or that they could not sho\\V any authority for perfonning their duties.\n\nHence.\n\n0) [t965] (I) SCR r. 7 \"' t I.\n\nKESUO RAM v. DELHI ADMN. (Beg, J.) 829\n\n!he prosecution has relied upon Section 99 of the I.P.C. which lays down:\n\n\"There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or altempted to be done, by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office. though that act may not be strictly justifiable by law\".\n\nOn facts found, it has to be assumed that the appdlant haJ objected to the taking of his buffalo, and, as this was of no avail, he had given a blow to Rattan Singh on the nose which bled and wa5 alio traclUred a• a result. It is true that, if the act against which a right of private defence is pleaded is not done in good faith the protection o'f Section 9P \"I.P.C. will not extend to it. It bas, therefore, to be determined whether there was any such non-compliance with the provisions relating to the realisation ot the tax, in attempting to take away ti)e buffalo of the appellant, as to amount to want of good , faith.\n\nThe High Court had acceptd the submission on behalf of the prosecution that Section 161 of the Act empowered the Inspectors of\"''\n\nthe Corporation to seize and remove the appellant's buffalo for nonpayment of the tax as it gave an over-riding power to resort to this\n\nmethod of enforcing payment \"at any time after the tax has become due.\" Section 161 of the Act lay> down :\n\n\"161(1) If the tax on any vehicle or animal is not paid, then, instead of proceeding against the defa.uiter by distress am! sale of his other movable property as hereinbefore provided, the Commissioner may, at any time after the tax has become due, seize and detain the vehicle or animal or both and, if the owner or other p,.son enti:lcd thereto does not within seven days .in respect of a vehicle and two days in respect of an animal from the date of such seizure and detention, claim the same and pay the tax due together with the charges incurred in connection with th~\n\nseizure and detention, the Commissioner may cause the same to be sold and apply the proceeds of the sale or such part thereof as is required in discharge of the sum due and. tho charges incurred as al'oresaid.\n\n(2) The surplus, if any, remaining after t_he application of the sale-proceeds under sub-section( 1) shall be disposed of in the manner laid down in sub-sections (6) and (?) of Section 158 ..\n\nSection 152 provides Iha.\\ a tax levied under the Act becomes payable \"on such dates, in such number of instalments and in such manner as may he determined by bye-hws ma1e in this bchalr'.\n\nA tax on an animal must be deemed to have become due wi!h()Ut t!1<· need to present a bill because Section 153 reads as follows :\n\n\"153(1) When anv tax has become due, the Commissioner shall cause to be presented to the person liable for the payment thereof, a bill for the amount due :\n\n. Provided that no such bill shall be necessary in the case cl:- .\n\n(a) . a tax on vehicles and animals;\n\n(b) a theatre-tax; and\n\n(c) a tax on advertisements.\n\n(2) Every such bill shall specify the particulars of the tax and the period for which the charge is made\".\n\nNevertheless, Section 154 reads as follows :\n\n\"154(1) If the amount of the tax for which. a bill has\" been presented under Section 153, is not paid within fiftem days from the presentation thereof, or if the tax on vehicles and animals or the theatre-tax or the tax on advertisements is not paid after it has become due, the Commissioner may cause to be served upon the person liable for the payment of the same a notice of .demand in the form set forth in the seventh Schedule.\n\n(2) For every notice of demand which the Commissioner causes to be served on any person under this Section, a fee of such amount not exceeding five rupees as may be deter- D mined by bye-laws made in this behalf, shall be payable by the said person and shall be included in the cost of recovery\"_.\n\nThen comes Section 155, which runs as follows :\n\n\"155(1) If the person liable for the payment of any tax docs not, within thirty days of the service of the notice of demand under Section 154, pay the sum due and if no appeal E is preferred against such tax, he shall be deemed _to b in default. ·\n\n(2) When the person.liable for the payment of any tax is deemed to be in default under-sub-section ( 1), such sum not exceeding twenty per cent. of the amount of the tax as may be determined by the Commissioner may be recovered from him by way of penalty, in addition to the amount of the tax and the notice-fee payable under sub-section (2) of section 154.\n\n(3) The amount due as penalty under subsection (2) shall be rccoverabl! as an arrear of tax under this Act.\"\n\nThe argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant, based upon the provisions of Section 154 and Section 155 of the Act, is that, unless Section 154 is complied with, so that a notice of -demand is served upon a person from whom tax has become due, be cannot file an appeal. It was emphasised that he will \"be deemed to be in default\" only if the demand is not satisfied within 30 days and _ no appeal is filed against it. It was urged that Section 155 thus, indirectly, provides the meaning of the word \"defaulter\" as used in Section 161 of the Act. Furthermore, it is contended that, unless a person is a defaulter within the meaning of Section 155 of the Act, no proceeding can be taken against him under Section 161 of the Act.\n\nThe High\n\n;·--~\n\n.• , ·;\n\n' ,.. .\n\nUSHO RAM .v. DELHI ADMN. (Beg, /.) 831\n\nCourt had met this argument by holding that this interpretation would make it unnecessary to have inserted the words in Section 161 \"at . any time after the tax has become due\".\n\nIt held that these words are to be given their literal meaning .and due effect.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant, support was sought from the provisions of Section 156, Section 157, and Section 159 of the Act to contend that rcoveries by sale and distress have to be preceded by notices of demand. It was pointed out that, even in the caa of recovery of tax from a person likely to leave Delhi soon, Section 159 required a notice of demand, for immediate payment.\n\nHence, it was urged that the procedure laid down for seizure of vehicles and animals in Section 161 of the Act is an alternative only to the procedures of. recovery by distress and sale but does not dispense with the notice required under Section 154 of the Act or else it would become much too. drastic an elternative which could be used arbitrarily.\n\nWe, think that, although the interpretation placed by the High Court upon the proVisions of Section 161, read in the light of otfter provisions of the Act, is 'possible interpretation, it bas to be remembered that Section 161 would become the repository of rather drastic power, of acting without previous notice, to seize any animal or vehicle at any time after the tax has become due, and, thereby, of seriously injuring even innocent individuals who may have every intention and the capacity to pa'y the demanded tax, but may have defaulted only by some oversight and may be unable to produce the required money on the spot. It is well settled that, out of two possible interpretations, the one which confines the content of such power of seiiure to reasonable limits and fair modes of operation should be preferred lest the validity of the provision itself becomes questionable, The provisions of the Act, set out above, are capable, we think, of being reasonably so interpreted as to confine the ambit of power contained in Section 161 of the Act to situations in which the person from whom the tax is to be realized can be deemed to be a defaulter. In other words, although Section 161 can be used \"at any time\" when the person against whom it is to be used is shown to be a \"defaulter\". yet a defaulter, in view of. the provisions of Sections 154 and 155 of the Act, would be a person who refuses !O pay within the period specified JD Section 155 of the Act after a noti~ of demand under Section 154\n\nof the Act. No doubt the demand by notice for a tax on an animar is optional. But, the option has to be exercised if it is intended to invoke the powers contained in Section 161.\n\nG '!'e, however,. d~ not think that, in .view o: the provisions of Sec!Ion 99. I.P.C, .rt IS enough to hold that there had been no notice of demand in the instant case.\n\nThe action of the Inspectors did not become vitiated by bad faith simply for that reason. They were acting honestl.Y _in the xerise of the powers delegated to them by the Comm1ss1oner.\n\nTheir attempt to recover the tax due by seizure of the animal, was not entirely outside the law, All trat could be said H was that they had erred, even if sadly, in the exercise of their powers,\n\n'The Inspectors could not he fairly presumed to know that a notice under Section 154 of the Act must precede any attempt to seize the IO-L84Sup.C.L/75\n\nbuffalo as the law has been anything but clear on a subject on which A there has been no previpus decision of this Court.\n\nThe view of the Delhi High Court supported the view that no legal defect at all vitiated the actions of the Inspectors.\n\nAs already stated, there was no plea that the Inspectors did not act in a bona fide manner or that they were aware of the defect in the procedure adopted.\n\nAll that the appellant told them was that he did not have ready money to pay up instantly.\n\nHe did not refuse to pay. In these circumstances, we think that Section B 99 did confer a protection upon the employees of the Corporation who acted in good faith under the colour of their office.\n\nBut, in as much as they had actrd in an improper manner in demanding immediate payment and tried to seize the animal prematurely under a misconception about the mode of exercise of their powers under Section 161 of the Act, the sentences imposed upon the appellant are excessive.\n\nWe think that the ends of justice wm be served by maintaining the convictions but reducing the sentences to the period already undergone by the appellant.\n\nConsequently, we set aside the fine imposed upon the appellant and reduce the sentences passed upon him to the period already undergone.\n\nWith this modification, this appeal is hcrel>y dismissed.\n\ns.c.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "RAM\n\nDE'LHI ADMlNISTRATION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 32, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DELHI ADMINISTRATION", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 3, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 46, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KESHO RAM\n\nDE'LHI ADMlNISTRATION April 3, 1974."}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Corporation Act 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ss. 154, 155 & 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Corporation Act 1957", "statute": "Corporation Act 1957"}}, {"text": "s 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 227, "end_char": 232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Corporation Act 1957", "statute": "Corporation Act 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 263, "end_char": 269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Corporation Act 1957", "statute": "Corporation Act 1957"}}, {"text": "s 353", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 345, "end_char": 350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Corporation Act 1957", "statute": "Corporation Act 1957"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 366, "end_char": 383, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 505, "end_char": 532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case was th:it tlte appellant obstructed 3 inspectors and a peon of the Delhi Municipal Corporation, when they went to seize the appell'ants' buffalo in the discharge of their duty to realise the milk tax from him and struck one of the officers on the nose with the result that it bled and was found fractured."}}, {"text": "Sec. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 902, "end_char": 910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Corporation Act 1957", "statute": "Corporation Act 1957"}}, {"text": "Sec. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1033, "end_char": 1040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Corporation Act 1957", "statute": "Corporation Act 1957"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1041, "end_char": 1058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1296, "end_char": 1304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "sec. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1782, "end_char": 1790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1918, "end_char": 1929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Sec. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2553, "end_char": 2561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2790, "end_char": 2796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2944, "end_char": 2952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3164, "end_char": 3172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3280, "end_char": 3287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Harba11s Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3980, "end_char": 3994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harba11s Singh."}}, {"text": "Jovi11d Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4017, "end_char": 4028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Jovi11d Das, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4096, "end_char": 4099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by\n\nBEG, J.-The High Court or Delhi had confirmcdtho conviction .. of the appellant under Section 353/332/333 of the Indian Penal\n\nCod~, nnd a sent.nce of one year's regorous imprisonment on each , count, and also to be fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "Section 353", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4182, "end_char": 4193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4434, "end_char": 4451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "17-3-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4561, "end_char": 4570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged that the appellant had, on 17-3-1967, at 4,30 p.m., in Rameshwar Nagar, obstructed Sarvshri Rattan Singh, Maharaj Singh , and Raghbir Singh, Section Inspectors, and Dunger, a Peon of the Delhi Municipal."}}, {"text": "Rattan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4626, "end_char": 4638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged that the appellant had, on 17-3-1967, at 4,30 p.m., in Rameshwar Nagar, obstructed Sarvshri Rattan Singh, Maharaj Singh , and Raghbir Singh, Section Inspectors, and Dunger, a Peon of the Delhi Municipal."}}, {"text": "Maharaj Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4640, "end_char": 4653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged that the appellant had, on 17-3-1967, at 4,30 p.m., in Rameshwar Nagar, obstructed Sarvshri Rattan Singh, Maharaj Singh , and Raghbir Singh, Section Inspectors, and Dunger, a Peon of the Delhi Municipal."}}, {"text": "Raghbir Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4660, "end_char": 4673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged that the appellant had, on 17-3-1967, at 4,30 p.m., in Rameshwar Nagar, obstructed Sarvshri Rattan Singh, Maharaj Singh , and Raghbir Singh, Section Inspectors, and Dunger, a Peon of the Delhi Municipal."}}, {"text": "Dunger", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4699, "end_char": 4705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged that the appellant had, on 17-3-1967, at 4,30 p.m., in Rameshwar Nagar, obstructed Sarvshri Rattan Singh, Maharaj Singh , and Raghbir Singh, Section Inspectors, and Dunger, a Peon of the Delhi Municipal."}}, {"text": "Dolhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5188, "end_char": 5225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section\n\n154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5390, "end_char": 5402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Dolhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "statute": "the Dolhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "22-7-1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5672, "end_char": 5681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An order of the Commissioner dated 22-7-1959 under Section 491 of the Act."}}, {"text": "Section 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5688, "end_char": 5699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Dolhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "statute": "the Dolhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6676, "end_char": 6686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6694, "end_char": 6699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 9P", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7360, "end_char": 7370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7372, "end_char": 7377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7713, "end_char": 7724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7977, "end_char": 7988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 158", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8976, "end_char": 8987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 152", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8992, "end_char": 9003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9281, "end_char": 9292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9752, "end_char": 9763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9861, "end_char": 9872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10528, "end_char": 10539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10696, "end_char": 10707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11160, "end_char": 11171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11368, "end_char": 11379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11384, "end_char": 11395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11424, "end_char": 11435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11728, "end_char": 11739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11814, "end_char": 11825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11926, "end_char": 11937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11995, "end_char": 12006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12215, "end_char": 12226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 156", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12425, "end_char": 12436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12438, "end_char": 12449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12455, "end_char": 12466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12657, "end_char": 12662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out that, even in the caa of recovery of tax from a person likely to leave Delhi soon, Section 159 required a notice of demand, for immediate payment."}}, {"text": "Section 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12669, "end_char": 12680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12822, "end_char": 12833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12973, "end_char": 12984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13179, "end_char": 13190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13301, "end_char": 13312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14116, "end_char": 14127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14267, "end_char": 14278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 154 and 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14428, "end_char": 14448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14529, "end_char": 14540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14582, "end_char": 14593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14761, "end_char": 14772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14854, "end_char": 14859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15400, "end_char": 15411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15618, "end_char": 15634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view of the Delhi High Court supported the view that no legal defect at all vitiated the actions of the Inspectors."}}, {"text": "Section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16369, "end_char": 16380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_833_846_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MADRAS AND ORS\n\nD .. BHOORMUL\n\nApril 3, 1974\n\n[M. H. BEG AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ; J\n\nSea C11sto1ns Act, 1878, Sec. 167(8_)--Irnports 11nd &pons Control Act, 1947-Sec. 3(2)-Confiscation of gi:>ods--Goods acquired jrom illegally i1nported stocks-Burden of ptoo/, how discharged by tlie DepartmtlJl-lndian Evidence Act, Sec. 106---Conflicting and incredible-account by alleged owner\n\nof facts (regarding iniportation and owner.ship) within Iii& per.tonal knowledge- How far co11duc1 of 1lie alleged owner determinatiie of legal inferenct regard ing smuggled nature of goods.\n\nThe preventive officers of the Customs Deptt. recovered from the shop of one Baboothmull ten packa8es containing imported goods, such as fountain peos.\n\nhair clippers, razor sets, etc. worth about Rs. 12,00Q/.. They were lying packed as if they had been. frshly delivered or were ready for despatch to a further destination. The respondent disclaimed not only the ownership but all knowledse about the contents of the packages. He could not give a satisfactory aocount as to how those packages came into h\\.s shop. His first explanation was that some next door unknown broker had left the packages outside his shop.\n\nHe then :; lated I.hat they were owned bv one Bhoormul. The said Bhoormul despite repeated requests by the Deptt, did not furnish any inforn1atton regarding the source of the alleged uisition of the goods.\n\nHe never appeared penonally nor gave address or sufficient particulars of the brokers who bad aold the goods to him. Despite two show-cause notices, Bhoormul refused to disclose any further information. He did not furnish any evidence of his ownership or even juridical posses5ion of the goods. The Collector of Customs on consideration of the fact that the goods were. admittedly foreign goods incredible explanations by the resPondent concluded that the goods were acquired from the illegally acquired stocks and ordered the confiscation of the goc)ds u/s 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. On a writ petition filed by the respondent. the single Judge of the Madras High Court rejected the writ petition but the Letters Patent Appeal was allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division.\n\nBench held that the Customs Dcptt. had not discharged its burden or proof that the goods were smuggled goods.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : (I) The propriety and legality of the Collector's order is to be Judged in the light of the principles regarding the burden of proof, Legal proof is not necessarily pcrlect proof; often it is nothing more than a prudent man'1 estimL.te as to the nrobabilities of the case. Since it is cxteedingly difficult for the prosecution to prove the facts Which are especially within the knowledge of the accused, it is not obliged to prove them as a part of its priaiary burdo.\n\nOn the principle underlyings. 106 of the Evidence Act, the burden to establ1sh. the facts within special knowledge of a person lies on him and if be fails to establish the facts within special knowledge of a penon lies on him anJ if .he fails to establish or explain those facts, an adveFe inference of facts may anse against him. which coupl~ with the presumotie. vidence aduced . by the prosecution or the Department. would rebut the inittal prcsm, ption of innocence in favour of that person. and in the result wouJd prove him guilty. The first oart-of the e11trv in the third column of clause 8 of s. 167 of the Sea Custoo Act regardin\" the penalty of confiscation of the goods casts less ri'°rou-; burden on the prosecution a-; the order operates in rem and is enforced against the goods only [842 D; 841 D; EF]\n\n(II) Although no direct evidence of the illicit importation of g<?<JdS ~s adduced by the Department the fact that the goods were of foreign ong1n couoled with the inference arlsin~ from the dubiou; conduct of Babhoothmull and Bhoormal could reasonably lead to the conclusion drawn by the Collector that the goods were smuggled a:oods.\n\nJssardas Daulat Ram and ors. v. The Union of India and ors., [1962] Supp.\n\n1. S.C.R. 355 and M/S. Kanungo and Co. v. Collector of Custo1111 (Ca/cuua) A.LR. 1972 S.C. 2136, relied upon.\n\nAmba Lal v. Union of India, [1961] 1, S.C.R. 933, and S/uzmbhu Nath Mehra\n\nv. State of Ajmer, [l!IS6] S.C.R. 1'9, distinguished .\n\nBletch v. Archer 11774] Cowp. 63 at p.65 and R. Madhub Chander, 11874] 21, W.R. Cr. 13 at 19. .\n\nCIVIL APPEi.LATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1142 of 1973.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 12th March, 1973 of the Madras High Court at Madras in Writ Appeal No. 357 of 1969.\n\nG. L. Sanghi and .s. P. Nayar, for the appellants.\n\nK. S. Ramamurthy and B. R. Agarwala, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by :\n\nSARKARIA, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave arises out of the following facts :\n\nOn receiving information that some packages containing smuggled goods had been left by a person .in the premises of M/s. Sha Rupaji D Rikhabdas at 98, Narayana Mudali Lane, Madras-I and that these packages were about to be despatched to Bangalore for disposal, a posse of Preventive Officers of the Customs House went to the said shop on June 4, 1962. They found ten packai:es in that shop.\n\nBaboothmull of M/s. Sha Rupaji Rikhabdas was present there.\n\nThe officers questioned Baboothmull about those packages. Baboothmull replied that he was not the owner of those packages and that somebody E next to his shop had left them outside the premises and since that person had not returned for a considerable time, he got them removed into the shop.\n\nBaboothmull was unable to throw any light with regard to the owner or the contents of the packages.\n\nAfter getting a consent letter from Baboothmull, the officers opened the packages which contained these articles of the total value of F Rs. 12,255/-.\n\nJ. ParkerF9untain Pens (19 made in Canada)\n\n~. Master hair clippers made in Germany\n\n3. OMer Hair Clippers made in Germany\n\n4. Venus pencils made in England\n\nS. K. SS Out thread razors made in Germany\n\n6. Nylon buttons made in Japan\n\n7. Gillette Razor Blades n1ade in England\n\n8. 7 O'clock Razor sets made in Englarid\n\n28 Doz.\n\n5 Doz.\n\n3!· Doz.\n\n760 Doz.\n\n68 Doz.\n\n47 Gross.\n\n1,000 Pcs.\n\n12 Doz.\n\nRs. 3,360 00\n\nRs. 600 00\n\nRs. 400·00\n\nRs. 2,250 00 G\n\nRs. 4,080 00\n\nRs. 705 00\n\nRs. 120 00\n\nRs. 730 00\n\nH Rs. l 2,255 00\n\n\\,_ -\n\nThe Officers seized these goods under a mahazarnama.\n\nOn June 9, 1962, a letter was addressed by the said Baboothmull to the Collector, Customs, informing that on that date, the owner of the packages, one Mr. D. Bhoormull turned up to claim the goods; that his other partner was absent at the time iif the seizure of the aoods who knew about this affair and that he had spbsequently learnt from this partner that those goods belonged to D .. Bhoormull who left instructions for their storage in the shop.\n\nSubsequently the name of this partner was given as Indermul.\n\nThe Custom Officers attempted to find out and contact this Indermu1 but without success.\n\nEight days after the seizure, a letter dated June 12, 1962, was received by the Collector of Customs from one D. Bhoormull (Poona wala, temporarily at 98, Narayana Mudali Lane, Madras-1), claiming ownersl1ip of the goods.\n\nIn this letter it was stated that he had pur chased these goods on June 3, 1962 in the local market at Madras through brokers; that he was packing the same till late in the evening, and since he was forced to leave for Bangalore on the call of a friend immediately, he instructed one of the staff of Sha Rupaji Rikhabdas to keep the goods in their shop until his return. This letter of Bhoormull did not contain the names or the particulars of the brokers from whom the goods were allegedly purchased; nor did it refer to any bill, voucher or other document to support the allegati0n of their having been purchased locally in the normal course .of business.\n\nOn receipt of this letter, the Collector made an attempt to contact Bhoormull for furtber investigation.\n\nBhoormull, however, could not be contacted as he had gone away to Poona which was said to be his normal place of activity.\n\nAnother le; ter, dated June 25, 1962, was received by the Collector from Bhoormull urging for release of his goods at an early date ..\n\nOn July 3, 1962, a letter was received by the Collector from M/s.\n\nGagrat & Co., Solicitors, Bombay on behalf of Bhoormull, requesting for disclosure of the grounds for the seizure of the goods, and for supply of the copies of the M ahazarnama and other relevant documents relating to the seizure. It was reiterated that the goods had been bona fide purchased by Bhoormull in the course of business, and as such, were\n\nnot liable to seizure or confiscation.\n\nThis was followed., by, another letter dated September 14, 1962 from M/s. Gagrat & Co./addressed to the Assistant Collector of Customs wherein the request for supply of the necessary information, was reiterated.\n\nThe importation of goods shown as items 1, 4 and 7 had been J?rDhibited since December 1957 and of those at items 2, 3, 5, 6.and 8 smc~ March .1.960, save under a licence issued by the Import Trade Control Authonl!es under s. 19 of the Sea Customs Act read withs. 3(1)of the Imports and F!xports Control Act, 194 7.\n\nThe A<sistant Collector of Customs on October 26, 1962 issued a notic.e_ to Boormull through. his solicitors, M/s. Gagrat & Co., Bombay\n\nequmn~ him .to prod1;1ce eVIdence of bona fide acquisition of the p:oods m que<llon fa1lm2 , which to show cause within a week as to why those goods valued at Rs. 12;255/- be not confiscated under s. 167(8) of tbe Sea Customs Act read with s. 3 ( 2) Imports and Exports Control Act,\n\n1947. It was added tl)at in case no reply was received within the specified period the case. would be decided ex-parte on the basis of the facts already on record without further reference to him.\n\nIn reply, a letter, dated December 13, 1962, was written by the Solicitors in which, it was inter alia stated that on Jun~ 4, 1962, at Madras, the goods, being items 2 and 4 to 8, were purchased by their client from Broker Ram Lal for a total price of Rs. 10,675 /-, and those shown as items 1 and 3, from Broker Shanthi Lal for a sum of Rs. 4872/-, and that these brokers had not issued any bills or receipts regarding those goods.\n\nAny further particulars or addresses of the brokers were not disclosed.\n\nOn March 27, 1963, a revised show-cause notice was sent under registered cover by the Collector of Customs to Bhoormull through bis solicitors requiring him to produce within a week the purchase receipts, bills, vouchers, Customs auction-receipts, Central excise auction receipts, licences or any other documents in his po<session and to furnish the names of the brokers in the market, their addresses etc. from whom the goods were purchased by him, failing which to show cause against confiscation of the goods.\n\nThe information called for was not supplied, nor did Bhoormull appear personally before the Collector at any stage. However, on his behalf the Solicitors wrote to the Collector, a letter, dated April 30,\n\n1963, contending that the burden of proving that the seized goods had been illegally. imported into India lay on the Customs Department and the non-production of the documents or non-furnishing of the information asked for by the Collectorcould not justify an inference of illicit importation of the goods.\n\nIt was added that such goods bad been imported as late as 1959/1960 as personal baggages and had in fact been sold by the Customs Department at Madras and elsewhere and as such were being freely bought and sold in the market.\n\nA date. was fixed by the Collector for personal hearing of Bhoormull.\n\nBut he did not personally appear.\n\nHowever, on August l, 1963, Shri J. R. Gagrat, of Mis Gagrat & Co. appeared before the Collector with a representative of Bhoormtill, and contended-that unless the Department had any other indication, it would not be necessary for Bhoormull to establish ownership of the goods; that there were no purchase vouchers; nor was he in a position to produce the broker who was supposed to have left the goods near the shop of Baboothmull.\n\nWhile conceding that the burden of proving the goods to be smuggled goods, was on the Department, the Collector held that such G burden prima facie stood discharged as the circumstances of this case irresistibly led to the conclusion that the goods had been illicitly imported.\n\nThe main circumstances, taken into account by the Collcetor, in raising such an inference, may be arranged as under-:\n\n(i) The import of such goods has been totally prohibited since 1957 except in the case of hair clippers and Venus H Pencils, which were allowed on a highly restricted quotabasis till October 1959 /March 1960, Policy period, when their import too was banned;\"\n\n• B\n\nCUSTOMS COLLECTOR v. I>. BHOORMl'I. (Sarkaria, /.) 837\n\n(Ii) The highly suspicious circumstances of the seizure and the dubious conduct Cif the parties in relation thereto : {a) This large number of goods, all of foreign origin, worth over Rs .12,000/-, were found fully packed and ready for despatch. (b) Baboothmull from whose possession they were seized gave confticting and evasive explanations in regard thereto.\n\nAt the time of seizure on June 4, 1962, he disda!Dled all la)OIVledge about the ownership and content~ of those packages_, and said they were left outside the shop by a broker whom he could not identify.\n\nSome days later, he 'appeared in the arena (garb?) of an anonymous (ficticous ?) person, one Bhoormull\".\n\n(c) It was eight days after the seizure that one Bhoormull by a letter claimed ownership of the goods, and Baboothmull, also confirmed this: \"This llhoormull the alleged owner of the goods has never been seen.\n\nEven at the personal hearing a representative from !tim came ... All the correspondence was exchanged with the firm of Solicitors, namely M/s. Gagrat & Co. of Bombay\".\n\n( d) Despite repeated requisitions made and two showcause notices given by the Collector, no bill, voucher or other documentary evidence, whatever, regarding purchase of the goods in the recognised markets of the country was produced. At first, even the names of the seller were not disclosed. Later on M/s. Gagrat & Co. cited two brokers whose addresses were not furnished.\n\nIn view of the above circumstances the Collector held that there \"was no room for doubt that the goods were acquired from illegally imported stocks\". He, therefore, ordered their confiscation under s. 167 ( 8) of the Sea Customs Act.\n\nAgainst this order dated October 24, 1963, Bhoormull carried an appeal under s. 131 of the Customs Act 1962 to the Central Board of Revenue which dismissed the same on September 7, 1964. Aggrievoo,\n\nBhoormull preferred a Revision Petition to the Central Government.\n\nIt was dismissed by the Secretary to the Government by an order, dated September 7, 1965.\n\nBhoormull then moved the High Court at Madras by a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution impugning the aforesaid orders of the Collector, the Board and the Central Government, contending that the confiscation was illegal because the Customs Department on which the onus of proving the unlawful importation of the goods lay, had failed to adduce any evidence whatever, to discharge that onus. The learned single. Judge who tried the petition repelled this contention, holding that the circumstances on .record established \"every probability of the goods having been illicitly imported into India,\" and dismissed the petition.\n\nAgainst the ordr of the learned Single Judge Bhoormull filed an appeal under Clause (15) of the Letters Patent to the Division Bench of the High Court which held that the onus on the Department to prove that the goods had been smuggled, could not-in this case did notsbift to Bhoormull and that the later's failure to appear personally or\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1974] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nprove before the Collector how he had come by those goods, did not A justify an inference of their illicit importation, because a mere suspicion cannot be a substitute for proof. On the above reasoning, the Bench allowed the appeal and quashed the .Collector's order for confiscation of the goods. Hence this appeal with special leave, by the Department.\n\nBefore dealing with the contentions canvassed, we would refer briefly to the relevant statutory provisions.\n\nSection 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act provides for offences punishable to the extent mentioned in the 3rd column of the Schedule appended to that section.\n\nClause (8) of that Schedule provides that if any goods the importation or exportation of whiCh is for the time being prohibited or restricted by order under Ch. IV of this Act be imported into or exported from India conllacy to such prohibition or C restriction, then (i) such goods '.'shall be liable to confiscation, and\n\n(ii) any person concerned in any such offence shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding three times of the value of the goods, or not exceeding 1000 /- rupees.\"\n\nSection 171-A specifically empowers the Customs Officers employ' ed in the prevention of smuggling to summon any person whose attendance be considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce a D document or thing in an enquiry in connection with the smuggling of any goods and such person shall be bound to state the truth and produce that document or thing and would be liable to prosecution if he made a false statement.\n\nA reading of s. 167 ( 8) and the related provisions indicates that proceedings for confiscation of contraband goods are proceedings in rem E and the penalty of confiscation under the first part of the entiy in column ( 3) of clause ( 8) of the Schedule, is enforced against the goods irrespective of whether the offender is known or 'unknown. But, imposition ohhe other kind of penalty, under the second part of the entry in column 3, is one in personam; such a penalty can beievied only on the \"person concerned\" in any offence described in column I oftheC~.\n\nGoods found to be smuggled can, therefore, be confiscated without proceeding against any person and without assertaining who is their real owner or who was actually concerned in their illicit import.\n\nSection 168 empowers an officer of the Customs or anti-smuggling staff to seize any thing liable to confiscation.\n\nSection 178 (A) provides for burden of proof. It says :\n\n\" ( 1) Where any goods to which the section applies are seized under this Act in the reasonable belief that they arc smuggled goods, the burden of proving that they are not smuggl!'<I goods shall be on the person from whose possession the goods were seized; ( 2) This section shall apply to gold, gold manufactures, diamonds and other precious stones, cigarettes and cosmetics and any other goods which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf;\n\n(3) Every notification issued under sub-section (2) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament as soon as may be after it is issued.\"\n\nLarge scale smuggling of gold or other goods into India may pose a threat to the economic and fiscal interests and policies of the State.\n\nSuch illicit trade is often carried on by organized international smugglers in the secrecy of the under-world. The more it is organized, the less are the chances of its detection, and greater the difficulty of proving the offences relating thereto. Laws have therefore been enacted in most countries, which mark a partial or wholesale departure in matters relating to smuggling, from the general principle of penal law, viz., that it is for the State or its Department to prove the offence against the accused or the defendant. Thus in England, s. 290(2) of the Customs and Excise Act, 1952 provides that where in any proceeding relating to ustoms or Excise any question arises as to the place from which any goods have been brought or as to whether or not any duty has been paid er any goods have been lawfully imported etc., then the burden of proof shall lie upon the other party to the proceeding.\n\nIn India, Parliament inserted s. 178-A by the Amending Act 10 of 1957, but it did not, in its wisdom, go as far ass. 290(2) of the English Act. Section 178-A in terms applies to \"gold, gold manufacture, diamands and other precious stones, cigarettes and cosmetics\". With regard to thes.- specified goods if seized under this Act in the reasonable belief tha< they are smuggled goods, the burden of proof that they are not such goods shall be on the person from whose possession, they are seized. But with regard to any other goods, the rule in sub-section (I) of Section 178-A would not 11pply unless the Central Government had specifically applied the same by notification in the Official Gazette.\n\nIt is common ground that at the material time, no such notification applying the section to the categories of the goods in question had been issued. In respect of such goods the provisions of the Evidence Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure, do not, in terms, govern the onus of proof in proceeding under s. 167(8) of the Act. In conducting these penal proceedings, therefore, the Collector of Customs is to be\n\nuied by the basic canons of criminal jurisprudence and natural 1usttce.\n\n:-Yith the above prefactory remarks, we now advert to the conten!Ions. canvassed before us.\n\nMr. Sanghi, learned Counsel for the appellants, has advanced these arguments:\n\n_(a) B.ho?rmu!l had no locus standi to invoke the extraordmary 1unsd1ct1on of the High Court under Article 226 of. the Constitution because there was not even prima facie\n\nev!denc~ to. show that at the time of seizure, he was in ownership or 1und1cal possession of the goods;\n\n(bl, !he on_s of proving the goods to be smuggled cods that mitially l~~ o~ the epartment, stood sufficient]: discharged .by the mev1tble inference arising out of the totality of the Clfcumstances m this case, which were appraised by\n\nthe Collector m the Ifght of the conduct of Baboothmull and Bhoormull, who gave conflicting and incredible explanations as to how they had come by these goods; (c) The source from which and the circumstances in which Bhoormull or Baboothmull acquired these goods, were facts especially within their knowledge and on the principle underlying s. 106, Evidence Act, these facts had to be proved by them.\n\nThey deliberately failed to disclose those facts or to give the necessary particulars of the persons from whom the goods were allegedly purchased, although such. information was repeatedly requisitioned from Bhoormull by the Collector, and they were duty bound under s. 171-A disclose it. This contumacious conduct of Baboothmull and Bhoormull strongly pointed towards the conclusion that the goods were smuggled stocks, and in that sense, the inference arising from the circumstances had shifted the onus on the Bhooormull to prove to the contrary. (In this connection, reliance has been placed upon lssardas Dau/at Ram and ors. v. The Union of India and ors.(I) and M/s. Kanungo and Co. v. Collector of Customs (Calcutta)('); (d) The Order of the Collector did not sufF•r from any apparent error or defect of jurisdiction. ft,. order was. based on an appraisement of the circumstantial evid.ence before him and was consistent with the rules of natural justice. He had given the fullest opportunity to the Respondent to put forth bis case and had issued two show-cause notices .to him through his Solicitors.\n\nThe Division Bench of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226 was not competent to go .into the question of the adequacy of that evidence, and act as if it was a court of appeal.\n\n' B\n\nMr. Ramamurthi, learned Counsel for the Respondent, contends in reply, that all proceedings were conducted by -the Collector on the ~, assumption that Bhoormull was the claiment or the supposed owner of the goods; that at no st , ge, before the High Court an objection was taken that he had no locus standi to maintain the writ petition, because F he had no interest in the confiscated goods and consequently, this objection should not be entertained for the first time in this Court. Learned Corinsel further submits that proceedings of confiscation being penal in nature, the burden was on the Department to show by cogent and convincing evidence that the goods had been illicitly imported into India and that no part of this burden could be sliifted to the person claiming the goods. It is emphasised that in the present case, no evi- G dence whatever was produced by the Department to show that the goods in question were smuggled goods. The Collector's order-proceeds the argument-calling upon Bhoormull to prove that he bad purchased / these goods in the normal course of business was contrary .to the law laid down by this Court in Amba Lal v. Union of lndia( 8 ). Reference has also been made to several decisions of the High Courts, but most of H\n\n(I) [1962] Supp, 1, SCR 355.\n\n(2) AIR 1972 SC 2136.\n\n(3) [1961) J, S.C.R. 933.\n\nthem turn on their own facts and do )lot elucidate the principle beyond what was laid down in Amba Lal's case (supra)\n\nIt cannot be disputed that in proceeding for imposing penalties under Clause (8) of S.167 to which s. 178-A does not apply, the burden of proving that the goods are smuggled goods, is on the Depart ment. This is a fundamental rule relating to proof in all criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings, where there is no statutory provision to the contrary. But in appreciating its scope and the nature of the onus. cast by it, we must pay due regard to other kindred principles, no less fundamental, of universal application. Orie of them is that the prosecution or the Department is nQ! required to prove its case with mathematical precision to a demonStrable degree; for, in all human affairs. absolute certainty is a myth, and-as Prof. Brett felicitously puts it-\"all exactness is a fake\". El Dorado of absolute proof being un attainable, the law accepts for it, probability as a working substi tute in this worka-day world. The law does not require the prosecution to prpve the impossible. All that it requires is the establishment of such a degree of probability that a prudent man may, on its basis,. believe in the existence of the fact in issue. Thus, legal proof is not necessarily perfect proof; often it is nothing more than a prudent man's. estimate as to the probabilities of the case.\n\nThe other cardinal principle having an important bearing on the incidence of burden of proof is that sufficiency and weight of the evidence is to be considered-to use the words of Lord Mansfield in Bmch v. Archer(') \"according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to prove, and in the power of the other to have contra dieted\". Since it is exceedingly difficult, if not absolutely impossible for the prosecution to prove facts which . are especially within the knowledge of the opponent or the accused, it is not obliged to prove them as parts of its primary burden.\n\nSmuggling is clandestine conveying of goods to avoid legal duties.\n\nSecrecy and stealth being its covering guards, it is impossible for the Preventive Department to unravel every link of the process.\n\nMany facts relating to this illicit business remain in the special or peculiar knowledge of the person concerned in it. On the principle underlyings~ 106, Evidence Act, the burden to establish those facts is cast on the person concerned; and if he 'fails to establish or explain those facts, an adverse inference of facts may arise against him, which coupled with the presumptive evidence adduced by the prosecution or the Department would rebut the initial presumption of innocence in favour of that person, and in the result prove him guilty. As pointed out by Best in 'Law of Evidence', (12th Edn. Article 320, page 291), the \"presumption of innocence is, no doubt,. presumptio juris; but every day's practice shows that it may be successfully encountered by . the presumption of guilt arising from the recent (unexplained) possession of stolen property\", though the latter is only a presumption of fact.\n\nThus the burden on the proseeution or the Department may be con siderably lightened even by such presumption of fact arising in their\n\n(I) (1774) I, Cowp. 63 at p. 65.\n\nfavour.\n\nHowever, this does not mean that the special or peculiar A knowledge of the person proceeded against will relieve the prosecu' tion or tho Department altogether of the burden of producing\" some evidence in respect of that fact in issue.\n\nIt wii! only alleviate that burden to ischarge which very slight evidence may suffice.\n\nAnother point to be noted is that the incidence, extent and nature <Jf the burden of proof for proceedings for confiscation under the first part of the entry in the 3rd column of Clause (8) of s. 167, may not be the same as in proceedings when the imposition of the other kind of penalty under the second part of the entry is contemplated. We have already alluded to this aspect of the m.atter.\n\nIt will be sufficient to reiterate that the penalty of confiscation is a penalty in rem which is\n\nnforced against the goods and the second kind of penalty is .one in personam which is enforced against the person concerned in the smuggling of the goods. In the case of the former, therefore, it is not necessary for the Customs authorities to prove that any particular person is concerned with their illicit importation or exportation. It is enough if the Department furnishes prima facie proof of the _goods being smuggled stocks. In the case of the latter penalty, the Department has to prove further that the person proceeded against was concerned\n\nin the smuggling.\n\nThe propriety and legality of the Collector's impugned order had lo be judged in the light of the above principles.\n\nIt is not correct to say that this is a case of no evidence. While it is true that no direct evidence of the illicit importation of the goods was adduced by the Department, it had made available to the Collector several circumstances of a determinative character which coupled with the inference arising from the dubious conduct of Baboothmull. and Bhoormull, could reasonably lead to the conclusion drawn by the Collector, that they were smuggled goods. These circumstances have been set out by us earlier in this judgment. We may rccapitulat; only the most salient among them.\n\nThe importation of such goods into India had been banned several years, earlier, i.e. of some of them in 1957 and of others in 1960. These goods, without exception, were aJI of foreign origin. They were of large value of over Rs. 12,000/-. They were all lying packed: as if they had been freshly delivered, or were ready for despatch to a further destination. They were not lying exhibited for sale in the show cases of the shop. Baboothmull from whose apparent custody or physical possession, they were seized disclaimed not only their ownership but also all knowledge about the contents of the packages. He could not give a satisfactory account as to how those packages came into his shop. At first. he said that some nextdoor unknown broker had left them outside his shop.\n\nSome days later, he came out with another version viz., that one Bhoormull had left them there.\n\nEight days after, one mysterious person who gave out his name as Bhoormull,\n\nlaid claim to these goods. Despite repeated . requisitions, Bhoormull did not furnish any information regarding the source of the alleged acquisition of the goods. He never appeared personally before tho <Collector. He remained behind the scenes. He did not give addresses\n\nor sufficient particulars of the brokers who had allegedly sold the \\ gocids to him on the 3rd June. Whatever cryptic information was given by him, was also conflicting. Despite two show-cause notices, Bhoormull intransigently refused to disclose .any further information. Apart from making a bare claim, he did not furnish evidence of his ownership or even juridical possession of the goods. The totality of these circumstances reinforced' by the inferences arising from the co.nduct of Baboothmull and Bhoormull could reasonabiy and judicially lead one t<> concludo that these goods had been illicitly imported into Madras, a sea port.\n\nEven if the Division Bench of the High Court felt that this circum-\n\n' stantial evidence was not adequate enough to establish the smuggled character of the gooos, beyond doubt, then also, in our opinion, that was not a good ground to justify interference, with the CoJlector's order in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The function of weighing the evidence or considering its sufficiency was the business of the Collector or the appellate autho- rity which was the final tribunal of fact. \"For weighing evidence and drawing inferences from it'', said Birch J. in R. Madhub Chander(') \"there can be no canon. Each case presents its own peculiarities and in each common sense and shrewdness must be brought to bear upon\n\n.e facts elicited.\" It follows from this observation that so Jong as the Collector's appreciation of the circumstantial evidence before him was not illegal, perverse or devoid of common sense, or contrary to rules of natural justice there would be no warrant for disturbing his finding under Art. 226. The collector's order was not of this kind.\n\nIn the view that the initial onus of proof on the Department can be sufficiently discharged by circumstantial evidence, we are supported by the decision of this Court in lssardas Dau/at Ram'.s case (supra).\n\nThere, on September 14, 1954, that is, long before tlic insertion of s. 178-A in the Act, a quantity of gold to a refinery in Bombay was sent for the purpose of melting. The Cu.stoms authorities seized this gold when it was being melted. The gold was found to be of foreign origin and had been imported into In, dia in contravention of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947. The Collector of Customs confiscated it under s. 167(8) of the Act. The legality of confiscation was challenged by a petition under art. 2.26 of the Constitution before the High Court, on the ground that there was no evidence before the Collector to show that the gold had been imported into India after restrictions had been imposed in March 1947 on its importation. The High Court rejected this contention and dismissed the petition. The same argument was advanced before this Court in appeal by special leave. This Court also negatived this contention. While conceding that there was no direct evidence that the gold had been smuggled after March 1947, it was held that a finding to that effect could be reached by referring to \"the conduct of the appellant fo connection with\n\n(a) the credibility of the story about the purchase of this gold from three parties, (b) the price at which the gold was stated to have been\n\n(!) (!874) 21, W.R. Cr. 13, at 19.\n\npurh.ased. whic~ was less than the market price and ( c) the hurry exh1b1ted m trymg to get the gold melted at the refinery with a small !J!t of silver added' so as reduce the fineness of the gold and thus ppro x1mate the resultant product to licit gold found in the market.\"\n\nThe rule in /ssardas Daulat Ram's case was reiterated \\\\ith amplification in M/o. Kanungo ..,< Co.'r case (supra). 111erein, the appellant was a firm carrying on business as dealer, importer and repairer of watches. On a search of the firm's premises on October 17, 1959 the Customs authorities seized 390 watches out of which 250 were confiscated on the ground that they had been illicitly imported into India.\n\nThe firm's petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was allowed by a learned single Judge of the High Court and the order of confiscation was quashed on the ground that the customs authorities had failed to prove illicit importatfon of the watches. On appeal by the Department, the Division Bench of the High Court reversed the decision of the single Judge with these observations:\n\n\"The watches were seized from the possession of the respondent No. 1 (appellant) who had not obtained a licence or a cnstoms clearance permit for importation of the same.\n\nThey were of foreign make andi must have been imported across the customs frontier. The explanations offered by the Respondent No. 1 regarding its coming into possession of the same between 1956 and 1957 were found, upon enquiries by the customs authorities, to be false, t)te result of these enquiries were communicated to the Respondent No. 1 who was thereafter heard by the adjudicating officer. Yet no attempt was made by the respondent No. I to substantiate its claim regarding lawful importation of the watches. . . . . . . . The cnstoms authorities came to the conclnsion that the said 280 watches were illegally imported and thereupon made an order for confiscation of the same. It is not for this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution to revise, set aside or quash this order, in the facts of this case.\"\n\nJn appeal on certificate, it was contended before this Court that there was no evidence that these watches bad not been illicitly imported into India and that the impugned order wrongfully placed the burden on the appellants. Sikri C.J., speaking for the Court, repelled this contention thus :\n\n\"There is also no force in the second point because we do not read the impugned order as having wrongly placed the burden on the appellant. What the impugned order does is that it refers to the eYidence on the record which militates against the version of the appellant and then states that the appellant had not been able to meet the inferences arising therefrom.. . In our OP.inion, the High Court was riht in holding that the burden of proof had shifted on to the appellant after the Customs Authorities had informed the appellant of the results of the enquiries and investigations.\n\nThis also disposes of the first point. As we have said; the burden was on the Customs Authorities which they discharged by falsifying in many particulars the story put forwara by the appellam .............. It cannot be disputed that a false denial could be relied on by the Customs Authorities for the purpose of coming to the conclusion that the goods ha!l been illegally imported.\"\n\nIn the case before us, the circumstancial evidence suggesting the inference that the goods were illicitly imported into India, was similar and reasonably pointed towards the conclusion drawn by the Collector.\n\nThere was no violation of the rules of natural justice. The Collector had given the fullest opportunity to Bhoormull to establish the alleged acquisition of the goods in the normal course of business. In doing so, he was not throwing the burden of proving what the Department had to establish, on Bhoormull. He was simply giving him a fair opportunity of rebutting the first and te foremost presumption that aro\"' out of the tell-tale circumstances in which the goods were found, regarding their being smuggled goods, by disclosing facts within his special knowledge.\n\nAmba Lal's case (supra) strongly relied upon by Mr. Ramamurthi, is clearly distinguishable on facts. There, Amba Lal was originally a resident of Pakistan. He migrated into India on the partition of the Indian Sub-continent before March 1948 when the customs barrier between India and Pakistan was raised for the first time. The Department did not lead any evidence, circumstantial or direct, that the goods seized from Amba Lai had been illicitly imported. Amba Lal gave plausible explanation. that he had brought thoe goods along with him in 1947, when there were nb restrictions on their importation.\n\nThe Department however, tried to take advantage of certain alleged discrepancies in the statements of Amba Lal which were recorded in English. Amba Lal did l}Ot know English. He was not 'supplied with copies of those .statements, nor allowed to inspect them; This Court. therefore, held that the Department was not entitled to rely on those discrepancies.\n\nQuoting from Shambhu Nath Mehra v. !tate of Ajmer,(') the Court said thats. 106. Evidence Act \"cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that, save in a very exceptional class of cases, the burden is on the prosecution and never sifts.\" It was added :\n\n\"If s. 106 of the Evidence Act is applied. then, by analogy, the fundamental principles of criminal jurisdrudence must equally be invoked\",\n\nIf we may say so with great respect, it is not proper to read into the above observations more than what the context and the peculiar facts of that case demanded. While it is true that iit criminal trials to which. the Evidence Act, in terms. applies. this section is not intended to reheve the prosecution of the initial burden which lies on it to prove\n\n(1) [1956] S.C.R. 199.\n\ne positive facts of its own case, it can be said by way of generalisa- ;::, tton that the effect of the material facts being exclusively or especially within the knowledge of the accused, is tbat it may proportionately with the gravity or the relative triviality of the issues at stake, in some special type of cases, lighten the burden of proof resting on the prosecution. For instance, once it is shown that the accused was travelling without a ticket, a prima facie case against him is proved. If he once had such a ticket and lost it, it will be for him to prove this fact within his special knowledge. Similarly, if 3 person is proved to be in recent possession of stolen goods, the prosecution will be deemed to have established the charge that he. was either the thief or had received those stolen goods knowing them to be stolen. If his possession was innocent and lacked the requisite incriminating knowledge, then it will be for him to explain or establish those facts within his peculiar knowledge, failing which the prosecution will be entitled to take advantage of the presumption of fact arising against him, in discharging its liurden of proof.\n\n. These fundamental principles, shorn of technicalities, as we have discussed earlier, apply only in a broad and pragmatic way to proceedings under s. 167(8) of the Act. The broad effect of the application of the basic principle underlying s. I 06 Evidence Act to cases under s. 167(8) of the Act, is that the Department would be deemed to have discharged its burden if it adduces only so much evidence, circumstantial or direct, as is sufficient to raise a presumption in its favour with regard to the existence of the facts sought to be proved.\n\nAmba Lal's case was a case of no evidence. The only circumstantial evidence viz., the conduct of Amba Lal in making conflicting statements, could not be taken into account because he was never given an opportunity to explain the alleged discrepancies. The status of Amba Lal viz. that he was an immigrant from Pakistan and had come to India in 194 7 before the customs barrier was raised bringing along with him the goods in question, had greatly strengthened the initial presumption of innocence in his favour. Amba Lal's case thus stands on its own facts.\n\nThe present case is in line with the decisions jn I ssardas Daulatram\n\nv. Vnion of Jndia'and Mis. Kanungo & Co. v. Collector of Customs (supra). ··\n\nFor all the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the learned Judges of the High Court were in error in reversing the judgment of the learned: single Judge and in quashing the order of the Collector of Customs. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set .aside the\n\njtlllt under appeal and dismiss the writ petition. In view of the law point involved, we would leave the parties to bear their own costs.\n\nS.B.W.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 119, "entities": [{"text": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MADRAS AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MADRAS AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Sec. 167(8_)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 165, "end_char": 182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183, "end_char": 192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "DepartmtlJl-lndian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 305, "end_char": 336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 338, "end_char": 346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "DepartmtlJl-lndian Evidence Act", "statute": "DepartmtlJl-lndian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "Bhoormul", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1257, "end_char": 1265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then :; lated I.hat they were owned bv one Bhoormul.", "canonical_name": "D. Bhoormull"}}, {"text": "s 167(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1974, "end_char": 1982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1994, "end_char": 2005, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2075, "end_char": 2092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the single Judge of the Madras High Court rejected the writ petition but the Letters Patent Appeal was allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court."}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3418, "end_char": 3426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3430, "end_char": 3436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Babhoothmull", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3855, "end_char": 3867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first oart-of the e11trv in the third column of clause 8 of s. 167 of the Sea Custoo Act regardin\" the penalty of confiscation of the goods casts less ri'°rou-; burden on the prosecution a-; the order operates in rem and is enforced against the goods only [842 D; 841 D; EF]\n\n(II) Although no direct evidence of the illicit importation of g<?<JdS ~s adduced by the Department the fact that the goods were of foreign ong1n couoled with the inference arlsin~ from the dubiou; conduct of Babhoothmull and Bhoormal could reasonably lead to the conclusion drawn by the Collector that the goods were smuggled a:oods.", "canonical_name": "Babhoothmull"}}, {"text": "Bhoormal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3872, "end_char": 3880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first oart-of the e11trv in the third column of clause 8 of s. 167 of the Sea Custoo Act regardin\" the penalty of confiscation of the goods casts less ri'°rou-; burden on the prosecution a-; the order operates in rem and is enforced against the goods only [842 D; 841 D; EF]\n\n(II) Although no direct evidence of the illicit importation of g<?<JdS ~s adduced by the Department the fact that the goods were of foreign ong1n couoled with the inference arlsin~ from the dubiou; conduct of Babhoothmull and Bhoormal could reasonably lead to the conclusion drawn by the Collector that the goods were smuggled a:oods.", "canonical_name": "D. Bhoormull"}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4606, "end_char": 4618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi and .s."}}, {"text": "P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4627, "end_char": 4635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Nayar, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K. S. Ramamurthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4658, "end_char": 4674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Ramamurthy and B. R. Agarwala, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. R. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4679, "end_char": 4693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Ramamurthy and B. R. Agarwala, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4762, "end_char": 4770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :\n\nSARKARIA, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave arises out of the following facts :\n\nOn receiving information that some packages containing smuggled goods had been left by a person .in the premises of M/s. Sha Rupaji D Rikhabdas at 98, Narayana Mudali Lane, Madras-I and that these packages were about to be despatched to Bangalore for disposal, a posse of Preventive Officers of the Customs House went to the said shop on June 4, 1962."}}, {"text": "Bangalore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5079, "end_char": 5088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :\n\nSARKARIA, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave arises out of the following facts :\n\nOn receiving information that some packages containing smuggled goods had been left by a person .in the premises of M/s. Sha Rupaji D Rikhabdas at 98, Narayana Mudali Lane, Madras-I and that these packages were about to be despatched to Bangalore for disposal, a posse of Preventive Officers of the Customs House went to the said shop on June 4, 1962."}}, {"text": "June 4, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5180, "end_char": 5192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :\n\nSARKARIA, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave arises out of the following facts :\n\nOn receiving information that some packages containing smuggled goods had been left by a person .in the premises of M/s. Sha Rupaji D Rikhabdas at 98, Narayana Mudali Lane, Madras-I and that these packages were about to be despatched to Bangalore for disposal, a posse of Preventive Officers of the Customs House went to the said shop on June 4, 1962."}}, {"text": "Baboothmull", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5234, "end_char": 5245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baboothmull of M/s. Sha Rupaji Rikhabdas was present there.", "canonical_name": "Babhoothmull"}}, {"text": "D. Bhoormull", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6577, "end_char": 6589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 9, 1962, a letter was addressed by the said Baboothmull to the Collector, Customs, informing that on that date, the owner of the packages, one Mr. D. Bhoormull turned up to claim the goods; that his other partner was absent at the time iif the seizure of the aoods who knew about this affair and that he had spbsequently learnt from this partner that those goods belonged to D .. Bhoormull who left instructions for their storage in the shop.", "canonical_name": "D. Bhoormull"}}, {"text": "Madras-1", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7203, "end_char": 7211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eight days after the seizure, a letter dated June 12, 1962, was received by the Collector of Customs from one D. Bhoormull (Poona wala, temporarily at 98, Narayana Mudali Lane, Madras-1), claiming ownersl1ip of the goods."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7352, "end_char": 7358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this letter it was stated that he had pur chased these goods on June 3, 1962 in the local market at Madras through brokers; that he was packing the same till late in the evening, and since he was forced to leave for Bangalore on the call of a friend immediately, he instructed one of the staff of Sha Rupaji Rikhabdas to keep the goods in their shop until his return."}}, {"text": "Sha Rupaji Rikhabdas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7549, "end_char": 7569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this letter it was stated that he had pur chased these goods on June 3, 1962 in the local market at Madras through brokers; that he was packing the same till late in the evening, and since he was forced to leave for Bangalore on the call of a friend immediately, he instructed one of the staff of Sha Rupaji Rikhabdas to keep the goods in their shop until his return."}}, {"text": "Bhoormull", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7635, "end_char": 7644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This letter of Bhoormull did not contain the names or the particulars of the brokers from whom the goods were allegedly purchased; nor did it refer to any bill, voucher or other document to support the allegati0n of their having been purchased locally in the normal course .of business.", "canonical_name": "D. Bhoormull"}}, {"text": "Bhoormull", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8014, "end_char": 8023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhoormull, however, could not be contacted as he had gone away to Poona which was said to be his normal place of activity."}}, {"text": "Poona", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8080, "end_char": 8085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhoormull, however, could not be contacted as he had gone away to Poona which was said to be his normal place of activity."}}, {"text": "June 25, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8161, "end_char": 8174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another le; ter, dated June 25, 1962, was received by the Collector from Bhoormull urging for release of his goods at an early date ..\n\nOn July 3, 1962, a letter was received by the Collector from M/s.\n\nGagrat & Co., Solicitors, Bombay on behalf of Bhoormull, requesting for disclosure of the grounds for the seizure of the goods, and for supply of the copies of the M ahazarnama and other relevant documents relating to the seizure."}}, {"text": "July 3, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8277, "end_char": 8289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another le; ter, dated June 25, 1962, was received by the Collector from Bhoormull urging for release of his goods at an early date ..\n\nOn July 3, 1962, a letter was received by the Collector from M/s.\n\nGagrat & Co., Solicitors, Bombay on behalf of Bhoormull, requesting for disclosure of the grounds for the seizure of the goods, and for supply of the copies of the M ahazarnama and other relevant documents relating to the seizure."}}, {"text": "September 14, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8778, "end_char": 8796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by, another letter dated September 14, 1962 from M/s. Gagrat & Co./addressed to the Assistant Collector of Customs wherein the request for supply of the necessary information, was reiterated."}}, {"text": "Gagrat & Co./addressed", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8807, "end_char": 8829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by, another letter dated September 14, 1962 from M/s. Gagrat & Co./addressed to the Assistant Collector of Customs wherein the request for supply of the necessary information, was reiterated."}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9169, "end_char": 9174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9186, "end_char": 9197, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "October 26, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9301, "end_char": 9317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The A<sistant Collector of Customs on October 26, 1962 issued a notic.e_ to Boormull through."}}, {"text": "Boormull", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9339, "end_char": 9347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The A<sistant Collector of Customs on October 26, 1962 issued a notic.e_ to Boormull through.", "canonical_name": "D. Bhoormull"}}, {"text": "s. 167(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9597, "end_char": 9606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9614, "end_char": 9629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9640, "end_char": 9644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sea Customs Act", "statute": "Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "Imports and Exports Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9650, "end_char": 9681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "December 13, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9908, "end_char": 9925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply, a letter, dated December 13, 1962, was written by the Solicitors in which, it was inter alia stated that on Jun~ 4, 1962, at Madras, the goods, being items 2 and 4 to 8, were purchased by their client from Broker Ram Lal for a total price of Rs."}}, {"text": "Jun~ 4, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10000, "end_char": 10012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply, a letter, dated December 13, 1962, was written by the Solicitors in which, it was inter alia stated that on Jun~ 4, 1962, at Madras, the goods, being items 2 and 4 to 8, were purchased by their client from Broker Ram Lal for a total price of Rs."}}, {"text": "Ram Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10105, "end_char": 10112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply, a letter, dated December 13, 1962, was written by the Solicitors in which, it was inter alia stated that on Jun~ 4, 1962, at Madras, the goods, being items 2 and 4 to 8, were purchased by their client from Broker Ram Lal for a total price of Rs."}}, {"text": "Shanthi Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10195, "end_char": 10206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10,675 /-, and those shown as items 1 and 3, from Broker Shanthi Lal for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "March 27, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10392, "end_char": 10406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 27, 1963, a revised show-cause notice was sent under registered cover by the Collector of Customs to Bhoormull through bis solicitors requiring him to produce within a week the purchase receipts, bills, vouchers, Customs auction-receipts, Central excise auction receipts, licences or any other documents in his po<session and to furnish the names of the brokers in the market, their addresses etc."}}, {"text": "April 30,\n\n1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11097, "end_char": 11112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, on his behalf the Solicitors wrote to the Collector, a letter, dated April 30,\n\n1963, contending that the burden of proving that the seized goods had been illegally."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11208, "end_char": 11213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "imported into India lay on the Customs Department and the non-production of the documents or non-furnishing of the information asked for by the Collectorcould not justify an inference of illicit importation of the goods."}}, {"text": "August l, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11761, "end_char": 11775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, on August l, 1963, Shri J. R. Gagrat, of Mis Gagrat & Co. appeared before the Collector with a representative of Bhoormtill, and contended-that unless the Department had any other indication, it would not be necessary for Bhoormull to establish ownership of the goods; that there were no purchase vouchers; nor was he in a position to produce the broker who was supposed to have left the goods near the shop of Baboothmull."}}, {"text": "J. R. Gagrat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11782, "end_char": 11794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, on August l, 1963, Shri J. R. Gagrat, of Mis Gagrat & Co. appeared before the Collector with a representative of Bhoormtill, and contended-that unless the Department had any other indication, it would not be necessary for Bhoormull to establish ownership of the goods; that there were no purchase vouchers; nor was he in a position to produce the broker who was supposed to have left the goods near the shop of Baboothmull."}}, {"text": "Mis Gagrat & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11799, "end_char": 11815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, on August l, 1963, Shri J. R. Gagrat, of Mis Gagrat & Co. appeared before the Collector with a representative of Bhoormtill, and contended-that unless the Department had any other indication, it would not be necessary for Bhoormull to establish ownership of the goods; that there were no purchase vouchers; nor was he in a position to produce the broker who was supposed to have left the goods near the shop of Baboothmull."}}, {"text": "Bhoormtill", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11871, "end_char": 11881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, on August l, 1963, Shri J. R. Gagrat, of Mis Gagrat & Co. appeared before the Collector with a representative of Bhoormtill, and contended-that unless the Department had any other indication, it would not be necessary for Bhoormull to establish ownership of the goods; that there were no purchase vouchers; nor was he in a position to produce the broker who was supposed to have left the goods near the shop of Baboothmull.", "canonical_name": "D. Bhoormull"}}, {"text": "M/s. Gagrat & Co. of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13925, "end_char": 13952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tim came ... All the correspondence was exchanged with the firm of Solicitors, namely M/s. Gagrat & Co. of Bombay\"."}}, {"text": "Gagrat & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14264, "end_char": 14276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later on M/s. Gagrat & Co. cited two brokers whose addresses were not furnished."}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14530, "end_char": 14536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14553, "end_char": 14564, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "October 24, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14592, "end_char": 14608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this order dated October 24, 1963, Bhoormull carried an appeal under s. 131 of the Customs Act 1962 to the Central Board of Revenue which dismissed the same on September 7, 1964."}}, {"text": "Bhoormull", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14610, "end_char": 14619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this order dated October 24, 1963, Bhoormull carried an appeal under s. 131 of the Customs Act 1962 to the Central Board of Revenue which dismissed the same on September 7, 1964.", "canonical_name": "D. Bhoormull"}}, {"text": "s. 131", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14644, "end_char": 14650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14658, "end_char": 14674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Board of Revenue", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14682, "end_char": 14706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this order dated October 24, 1963, Bhoormull carried an appeal under s. 131 of the Customs Act 1962 to the Central Board of Revenue which dismissed the same on September 7, 1964."}}, {"text": "Aggrievoo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14754, "end_char": 14763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aggrievoo,\n\nBhoormull preferred a Revision Petition to the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14813, "end_char": 14831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aggrievoo,\n\nBhoormull preferred a Revision Petition to the Central Government."}}, {"text": "September 7, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14905, "end_char": 14922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was dismissed by the Secretary to the Government by an order, dated September 7, 1965."}}, {"text": "High Court at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14950, "end_char": 14970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhoormull then moved the High Court at Madras by a writ petition under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14996, "end_char": 15004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act 1962"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1974] 3 S.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15902, "end_char": 15939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the ordr of the learned Single Judge Bhoormull filed an appeal under Clause (15) of the Letters Patent to the Division Bench of the High Court which held that the onus on the Department to prove that the goods had been smuggled, could not-in this case did notsbift to Bhoormull and that the later's failure to appear personally or\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1974] 3 S.C.ll."}}, {"text": "Section 167(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16407, "end_char": 16421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16433, "end_char": 16444, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17050, "end_char": 17061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17494, "end_char": 17500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 168", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18243, "end_char": 18254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18358, "end_char": 18369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19000, "end_char": 19010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It says :\n\n\" ( 1) Where any goods to which the section applies are seized under this Act in the reasonable belief that they arc smuggled goods, the burden of proving that they are not smuggl!'<I goods shall be on the person from whose possession the goods were seized; ( 2) This section shall apply to gold, gold manufactures, diamonds and other precious stones, cigarettes and cosmetics and any other goods which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf;\n\n(3) Every notification issued under sub-section (2) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament as soon as may be after it is issued.\""}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19726, "end_char": 19733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus in England, s. 290(2) of the Customs and Excise Act, 1952 provides that where in any proceeding relating to ustoms or Excise any question arises as to the place from which any goods have been brought or as to whether or not any duty has been paid er any goods have been lawfully imported etc.,"}}, {"text": "s. 290(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19735, "end_char": 19744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs and Excise Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19752, "end_char": 19780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20123, "end_char": 20129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs and Excise Act, 1952", "statute": "the Customs and Excise Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Section 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20237, "end_char": 20248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs and Excise Act, 1952", "statute": "the Customs and Excise Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Section 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20656, "end_char": 20667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs and Excise Act, 1952", "statute": "the Customs and Excise Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21010, "end_char": 21036, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 167(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21101, "end_char": 21110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sanghi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21378, "end_char": 21384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sanghi, learned Counsel for the appellants, has advanced these arguments:\n\n_(a) B.ho?rmu!l had no locus standi to invoke the extraordmary 1unsd1ct1on of the High Court under Article 226 of."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21552, "end_char": 21563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22306, "end_char": 22312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22634, "end_char": 22640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhooormull", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22880, "end_char": 22890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This contumacious conduct of Baboothmull and Bhoormull strongly pointed towards the conclusion that the goods were smuggled stocks, and in that sense, the inference arising from the circumstances had shifted the onus on the Bhooormull to prove to the contrary. (", "canonical_name": "D. Bhoormull"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23545, "end_char": 23553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramamurthi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23681, "end_char": 23691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' B\n\nMr. Ramamurthi, learned Counsel for the Respondent, contends in reply, that all proceedings were conducted by -the Collector on the ~, assumption that Bhoormull was the claiment or the supposed owner of the goods; that at no st , ge, before the High Court an objection was taken that he had no locus standi to maintain the writ petition, because F he had no interest in the confiscated goods and consequently, this objection should not be entertained for the first time in this Court."}}, {"text": "AIR 1972 SC 2136", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 24968, "end_char": 24984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amba Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25108, "end_char": 25116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "them turn on their own facts and do )lot elucidate the principle beyond what was laid down in Amba Lal's case (supra)\n\nIt cannot be disputed that in proceeding for imposing penalties under Clause (8) of S.167 to which s. 178-A does not apply, the burden of proving that the goods are smuggled goods, is on the Depart ment.", "canonical_name": "Amba Lal"}}, {"text": "S.167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25217, "end_char": 25222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25232, "end_char": 25238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Brett", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25866, "end_char": 25871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "absolute certainty is a myth, and-as Prof. Brett felicitously puts it-\"all exactness is a fake\"."}}, {"text": "Mansfield", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26612, "end_char": 26621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other cardinal principle having an important bearing on the incidence of burden of proof is that sufficiency and weight of the evidence is to be considered-to use the words of Lord Mansfield in Bmch v. Archer(') \"according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to prove, and in the power of the other to have contra dieted\"."}}, {"text": "Article 320", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27811, "end_char": 27822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28816, "end_char": 28822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32580, "end_char": 32588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Birch", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32842, "end_char": 32847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For weighing evidence and drawing inferences from it'', said Birch J. in R. Madhub Chander(') \"there can be no canon."}}, {"text": "R. Madhub Chander", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32854, "end_char": 32871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For weighing evidence and drawing inferences from it'', said Birch J. in R. Madhub Chander(') \"there can be no canon."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33302, "end_char": 33310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 14, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33575, "end_char": 33593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, on September 14, 1954, that is, long before tlic insertion of s. 178-A in the Act, a quantity of gold to a refinery in Bombay was sent for the purpose of melting."}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33634, "end_char": 33640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33691, "end_char": 33697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, on September 14, 1954, that is, long before tlic insertion of s. 178-A in the Act, a quantity of gold to a refinery in Bombay was sent for the purpose of melting."}}, {"text": "Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33905, "end_char": 33943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 167(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33991, "end_char": 34000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947", "statute": "the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34077, "end_char": 34083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947", "statute": "the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "/ssardas Daulat Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35193, "end_char": 35212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rule in /ssardas Daulat Ram's case was reiterated \\\\ith amplification in M/o. Kanungo ..,< Co.'r case (supra)."}}, {"text": "October 17, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35435, "end_char": 35451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a search of the firm's premises on October 17, 1959 the Customs authorities seized 390 watches out of which 250 were confiscated on the ground that they had been illicitly imported into India."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35620, "end_char": 35631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36906, "end_char": 36914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37232, "end_char": 37237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sikri C.J., speaking for the Court, repelled this contention thus :\n\n\"There is also no force in the second point because we do not read the impugned order as having wrongly placed the burden on the appellant."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39199, "end_char": 39207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, Amba Lal was originally a resident of Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Amba Lai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39473, "end_char": 39481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Department did not lead any evidence, circumstantial or direct, that the goods seized from Amba Lai had been illicitly imported.", "canonical_name": "Amba Lal"}}, {"text": "s. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40291, "end_char": 40297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42117, "end_char": 42126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42245, "end_char": 42254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_847_851_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "RAJENDRA KUMAR CHATURVEDI\n\nTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nApril 4, 1974\n\nIM. H. BEG AND R. S. SARKARIN, JJ .]\n\nPractice-:-Criminal P1'octdllre-Dismissal of appeal b)' High Court sumr.1a. U_v-D11f)• tn Rh•e a rtucned onler.\n\nlbc Soeciat JudJe, after a very thorough. and careful assessment of the whole evidence in the cue. had come to the conclusion that the prosecution case apimt the appelluit was established beyond reasonable doubt and convicted him under sections 1208 as well as 161 read with s. 34 l.P.C. and also under se:tions S(l)(d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The\n\nHigh Court dismisaed the ppellant's appeal summarily without giving any reasons.\n\nDismissinR the apeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : ( t) It is necessary for the High Courts, even when they dismiss criminal -3Rpeals summarily on facts found, to record the reason'i briefly.\n\nIt is often difficult in a criminal case to say whether any material error was committed by the trial court in arriving at its findings of fact without atleast some e; xamination and consideration of the main features of the evidencewhich only a reasoned order would disclose. [85 I E-G]\n\n(2) An examination of the evidence by this Court, because of such summary dismissal, hover, sho\\VS that the findings of the trial court must be up-held. it must be deemed that the High Court had affirmed the findings of the trial .\n\nCort when it dismissed the appeal summarily, and therefore, there is no reason to depart from the general rule that this Court will .not interfere with concurrent findings of fact except under very exceptional circumstances. [851 D-El\n\nB. c. Go.swanii V • . Del/ii Administration, followed.\n\nCRIMINAL APPEi.LATE JurusmcnoN : Criminal Appeal No. 200 of 1970. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 13th October, 1970 of the Bombay High Court at Bombay in Crimi- F nal Appeal No. 1112 of 1970.\n\nS. N. Misra and M. V. Goswami, for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Bhandare and S. P. Nayer, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBEG, J.-J\"he Special Judge of Greater Bombay tried the appealiant, a Su6 lnsP\"ctor in the Railway Production Force, togethr with three other members of the Force, serving under him, on charges for , offences punishable under Section 120B and 161 Indian Penal Code and Sections 5(1) (d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.\n\nIt was alleged that the appellant1 and tlle Rakshaks serving under him at Bhusaval Central Railway Station had conspired to extort mol)ey from Shivaji Ogale, P.W.2, a merchant owning property and goods estimated by him at Rs. 1,50,000/-, ?nd paying Income, tax and Salestx. The .appellant is alleged to hve stopped Shivaji from removing ' his goods from the goods yard ori the ground thai the .truck brought L84Sup.Cl/74 ,\n\n8~8 SUPREMil COURT REPORTS\n\n[1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nb~ im was parked at tl\\e wrong place. Tl!e ap!J!!llant, with the Jielp A ot his Rakshaks/ was said to ha.ve threatened Kalandar Khan, P. W. 3, the driver oi the truck, and to ha1c actually handcuffed him and tied him With a rope and taken him to the appellant's office at some distance from the goods ~'Ord. Shivaji was himself said to be present at the scene at that time which wan about 4 p.m. on 17-1-1968. The appellant and his co-accus:d, Hari Rachu, were alleged to have demanded Rs. 20:J/- as bribe for releasing the truck driver without B whom the truck could not be driven away. The vexed Shivaji. is said to have fallen at the feet of the appellant and to have begged him to release his driver. The appellant then reduced his demanu to Rs. 100/-.\n\nShivaji is said to have sent his son Sarjearao, P.W. 4, to his shop to\n\nget Rs. !OWwhich were hroug.t in Rs. 101notes within half an hour and handed over to the extortionists. The appellant is said to hav~ released the driver and allowed the truck to go away after this C payment had been actually made.\n\nThe Special Judge had eamined the whole evidence in great detail. He observed about Shivaji, P.W. 2:\n\n\"It saw his demeanour when he was in the witness box and it ne-1er appeared to me that he was gifted with krtile D imagination or that the present prosecution was the product of a deliberate conspiracy between him, Vishwanath, Vasant and Rambabu Kate as alleged by the Learned Advocates for the accused. Had they really intended to do so, their natural conduct would have b:en to approach railway police them selves or local police or ACB. Police Bhusaval but neither Shivaji nor Vasant did so and they preferred to write out E a complaint in the complaint Book at Ex. 10 regarding the incident which took place on the 17th as it really occurred'\"\n\nThe complaint mentioned above was lodged at about 8 a.m. on 18-1-1 %8 after an imposition of Rs. 7. JO as wharfage charges as all the goods could not be removed on 17-1-1968 presumably .because of the interruption caused by the action of the appellant and his associates. Shivaji had also stated that he had related \"everything\" to the Chief Goods' Clerk of Bhusaval, P.W. 8, about 6 p.m. on 17-1-1968.\n\nThe Goods' Clerk deposed that Shivaji came to his office at that time and \\old him :\n\n\"xx thre was all darkn\"ss in the State.. bribe was demanded from bim; hand-i:u!i's were being pu('on, we and our lllboun:rs were being harassed. After having told me this G he went awy. As my duty hours were over I made no further enquiry and Shivaji went away\"\n\nThe Goods' Clerk had taken down •he complaint of Shivnji next morning after fixing the wharfage charges. Apparently, Shivaji, P.W. 2: an old man cf seventv, was very agitated by what had taken place. fhe Goods' Clerk stated that Shivaji was in an exasperated state of mind 11 when he came to him on the evening of 17-1-1968.\n\nUnder cross cxainination. the witness stated that he.must have told the police during the investigation that Shivaji had said. that bribes were. bein& taken.\n\n' (\n\n11[\n\nR. K. CHATURVEDI v. ~AHARASHTRA (Beg,!.) 849,\n\nThis statement in Court was made on 14-8-1970, more than 2t years\n\nafter the occurrence. Therefore, the mere fact that, in his e:Millinationin:chief, he did not state . that Shivaji had actually mentioned the passing of money on the evening of 16-1-1968 does not seem to be material. Sbivaji's complaint next morning contained a!l the detailed allegations. The accused could not give any. reason why this witness should dep!1SC at all falsely against him. His testimony corroborates Shivaji's version.\n\nFurthermore, there is corroboration of the statement of Shivaji from die statements of not only his son Sarjerao, P.W. 4, who brought money from the shop, bis nephew, Visbwanath, P.W. 5, who had gone to the scene of occurrence as there was delay in the arrival of goods, and, Vasant; P.W. 6, who bad given out Rs. 100/- to bis brother Sarjerao, p, w. 4, at Shivaji's shop, 'but also from the statement of Abdul Jabar, P.W. 10, who was an Assistan.t Sub Inspector of the Railway .Protecti9n Force and a colleague of the appellant. Abdul la bar's evidence, characterised by the Trial Court as \"independent\", disclosed that Kalandar Khan was actually arrested by the appellant a fact denied and left unexplained .by the appellant.\n\nAnother piece of corroborative evidence offered by the prosecution was the \"pucca\" entry of a disbursement of Rs. 1001as bribe and Rs. 7.10 as wharfage shown on 17-1-1968 in the cash book of Shlvaji. But, as this account boolt was not produced at the time of the enquiry held by the Inspector .Hanotia of the Railway Protection Force\n\niBto tile allegations and the entry was admitted to have been made on 19-1-1968 although the disbursement is shown on 17-1-1968 it cannot b relied upon.\n\nThere is force in the conl.enlion that. it app, ars to have been made to support the prosecution case.\n\nThe wharfage charge of Rs. 7-10 was not even fixed on 17-1-1968. However, as the entry was admitted by the prosecution to have been actually made on 18-1-1968, it can be ignored as a piece of corroborative evidence. The mere f&ct that it must have been made on 18-1-1968 to support the version of Shivaji and is admitied to have been SO\\ made does not take away the value of the evidence of Shivaji which impresse~ the Trial Court and whic11 was corroborated by other pieces of unimpeachable evidence.\n\nCCmsK!crale sess is laid on the fact that Shivaji bad pointed out, at a test 1entification parade, the aci; used No. 2, Hari Rachu, as the perso11 to whom the money was paid, but, t the trial, he stated that it was paid to the appellant accused No. 1 who handed it over to aecused No. 2. A 1ong period of time had elapsed between the occurretice and depositions at the trial by witnesses. Their memory could very wll have become blurred as to who actually got the money first if the money was passed by one accused person to another as it seems\n\nlo baye n. 'I:heie could be an honest lapse of memory about. the :\"xact sequence, The infirmity is not so serious as to be attribut-d . to nothing except mendaciousness.\n\nThe Special Judge, after a very through and carelul assessment of the whole evidence in the case, \"had come to the conclusion that the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1974] 3 s.C.R •.\n\nprosecution case against the appellani was establisiied beyond reason~\n\nable doubt. He had convicted the appellant under Section 120B as well as Section 161 read with Section 34 I.P.C. and also under Section 5(l)(d) and Sec. 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 300/-, and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for two months, on each one of the three counts, but the substantiYe sentences were made concurrent.\n\nThe appellant as well asthe other convicts had appealed to the High .Court of Bombay.\n\nThe appellant's appeal had been dismissed summarily. The appeal of the three convicted co-accused was admitted, but it was finally dismissed, except as regards one of the accused who was held to be merely present and to have carried out the orders of the appellant before us in writing up a document alid then destroying it. The reasons given in the judgment of the Bombay High Court, on that appeal, reponed as Hari Rachu Kanadi v. The State of Maharashtra('), are relied upon as arguments before us for accepting the prosecution case.\n\nWe may here mention a fact which the Bombay High Court took into account in confirming the convictions of two of the ce>-accused in this case. It has been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the State before_ us. It is that, under the provisions of the Railway Pr0tection Force, the members of that Force are not Police Officers at all in the ordinary sense, and that the appellant had apparently exceeded his powers of ar.rest.\n\nThe powers of.arrest without a warrant under Section 12, vested in Superior Officers of the Force, are laid down in the following terms :\n\n\"Power to arrest without warrant.\n\n(12). Any superior officer or member of the Force may, without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest-\n\n( a) any person who has been concerned in an offence relating to railway property punishable with . imprisonment F for a term exceeding six months, or against whom a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been .so concerned, or\n\n(b) any person found taking . precautions to. conceal his presence within railway limits under circumstances which afford reason to believe. that he is taking such precautions with a View to committing theft of. or damage to, railway G property\"\n\nIt has not been shown to us what justifiable ground the appellant had to arrest or cause the arrest of Kalandar Khan. This indicates that th~ r::ason for the arrest could be an attempt to extort a bribe as alleged by the prosecution. The appellant had, no doubt, denied the arrest.\n\nThis denial was clearly false in view of the statements of witnessc5 H\n\n(1) 1973 Bombay Law Reporter (Vol. 71) p. 891.\n\nf .\n\n' '\n\nR. K. CHATURVEDI v. MAHARASHTRA (Beg, !.) as 1\n\nA who included Abdul Jabar, P.W.10, a fellow member of the protection Force to which the appellant belonged.\n\nThe established fact of this arrest of Kalaodar together with the false denial of it by the appellant indicate the dishonesty of the appellant's stand. It also corroborates the prosecution version.\n\nIt is true that the statement of Kalandar Khan, P.W.3, the driver B of the truck, contradict~ the prosecution case, as given out by Shivaji and his son, so far as the actual arrest of Kalandar Khan is concerned.\n\nBut, even Kalandar Khan had deposed that the appellant had threatened him. He then went on to state that there was a quarrel as a consequence of it and nothing more. lie was declared hostile by the prosecution. He was cross-examined about the statements made by him during investigation showing that he was arrested and that he C actually saw the handing over of money as a bribe for his release. He denied making such statements to the police. As there is no reason whatsoever shown why the Investigating Officer should be prejudiced against the appellant and falsely record statements, the Trial Court was right in holding that Kalandar Khan was a thoroughly unreliable\n\n., wi.ness.\n\nThe rcsu1t is that we see no reason to depart in this case from the general rule laid down by this Court in numerous cases, such as B. C. Goswami v. Delhi Administration, that this Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact except under very exceptional circumstances. The High Court must be deemed to have aflirmeil the findings of fact of the Special Judge when it dismissed the appellant's appeal summarily even if it did not give its reasons. It is because of such a dismissal by it that we have examined the evidence in the case ourselves. We may here observe .th.at, although we uphold the fit\\dings of the Trial Court which would be deemed to be affirmed by the High Court, we consider it very n-..-cessary for High ourts to at least record their reasons briefly even when they dismiss criminal appeal summarily on facts found. It is often difficult in criminal cases to say whether any material error was committed by the Tritil Court ill arriving at its. findings of fact without at least some examina\\ion and consideration of the main features of the evidence which only a: reasoned order could disclose. It was mainly because reasons for summary dismissal of the appellant's appeal were not given by the High Court that the appellant seems to have. obtained Special Leave to appeal to this Court.\n\nWe hereby dismiss thi~ appeal and co.nfirm the convictions and sentences passed against the appellant who is on bail. He shall surrender forthwith and serve out the remaining period of his concurrent sentences. .\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dim1/ssed.", "total_entities": 55, "entities": [{"text": "RAJENDRA KUMAR CHATURVEDI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJENDRA KUMAR CHATURVEDI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 4, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 66, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAJENDRA KUMAR CHATURVEDI\n\nTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nApril 4, 1974\n\nIM."}}, {"text": "IM. H. BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "sections 1208", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 455, "end_char": 468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 494, "end_char": 499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 555, "end_char": 589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "13th October, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1806, "end_char": 1824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 13th October, 1970 of the Bombay High Court at Bombay in Crimi- F nal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1832, "end_char": 1859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 13th October, 1970 of the Bombay High Court at Bombay in Crimi- F nal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "S. N. Misra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1902, "end_char": 1913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Misra and M. V. Goswami, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. V. Goswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1918, "end_char": 1931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Misra and M. V. Goswami, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Bhandare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1953, "end_char": 1967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare and S. P. Nayer, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1972, "end_char": 1983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare and S. P. Nayer, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2050, "end_char": 2053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBEG, J.-J\"he Special Judge of Greater Bombay tried the appealiant, a Su6 lnsP\"ctor in the Railway Production Force, togethr with three other members of the Force, serving under him, on charges for , offences punishable under Section 120B and 161 Indian Penal Code and Sections 5(1) (d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act."}}, {"text": "Section 120B and 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2275, "end_char": 2295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2296, "end_char": 2313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2318, "end_char": 2331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2352, "end_char": 2380, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Shivaji Ogale", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2526, "end_char": 2539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged that the appellant1 and tlle Rakshaks serving under him at Bhusaval Central Railway Station had conspired to extort mol)ey from Shivaji Ogale, P.W.2, a merchant owning property and goods estimated by him at Rs."}}, {"text": "Shivaji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2698, "end_char": 2705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .appellant is alleged to hve stopped Shivaji from removing ' his goods from the goods yard ori the ground thai the .truck brought L84Sup.", "canonical_name": "Shivaji"}}, {"text": "Kalandar Khan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2971, "end_char": 2984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tl!e ap!J!!llant, with the Jielp A ot his Rakshaks/ was said to ha.ve threatened Kalandar Khan, P. W. 3, the driver oi the truck, and to ha1c actually handcuffed him and tied him With a rope and taken him to the appellant's office at some distance from the goods ~'Ord."}}, {"text": "17-1-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3251, "end_char": 3260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shivaji was himself said to be present at the scene at that time which wan about 4 p.m. on 17-1-1968."}}, {"text": "Hari Rachu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3296, "end_char": 3306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant and his co-accus:d, Hari Rachu, were alleged to have demanded Rs."}}, {"text": "Sarjearao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3647, "end_char": 3656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shivaji is said to have sent his son Sarjearao, P.W. 4, to his shop to\n\nget Rs. !"}}, {"text": "Shivaji", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3999, "end_char": 4006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He observed about Shivaji, P.W. 2:\n\n\"It saw his demeanour when he was in the witness box and it ne-1er appeared to me that he was gifted with krtile D imagination or that the present prosecution was the product of a deliberate conspiracy between him, Vishwanath, Vasant and Rambabu Kate as alleged by the Learned Advocates for the accused."}}, {"text": "Vishwanath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4232, "end_char": 4242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He observed about Shivaji, P.W. 2:\n\n\"It saw his demeanour when he was in the witness box and it ne-1er appeared to me that he was gifted with krtile D imagination or that the present prosecution was the product of a deliberate conspiracy between him, Vishwanath, Vasant and Rambabu Kate as alleged by the Learned Advocates for the accused."}}, {"text": "Vasant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4244, "end_char": 4250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He observed about Shivaji, P.W. 2:\n\n\"It saw his demeanour when he was in the witness box and it ne-1er appeared to me that he was gifted with krtile D imagination or that the present prosecution was the product of a deliberate conspiracy between him, Vishwanath, Vasant and Rambabu Kate as alleged by the Learned Advocates for the accused."}}, {"text": "Rambabu Kate", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4255, "end_char": 4267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He observed about Shivaji, P.W. 2:\n\n\"It saw his demeanour when he was in the witness box and it ne-1er appeared to me that he was gifted with krtile D imagination or that the present prosecution was the product of a deliberate conspiracy between him, Vishwanath, Vasant and Rambabu Kate as alleged by the Learned Advocates for the accused."}}, {"text": "18-1-1 %", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4726, "end_char": 4734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10 regarding the incident which took place on the 17th as it really occurred'\"\n\nThe complaint mentioned above was lodged at about 8 a.m. on 18-1-1 %8 after an imposition of Rs."}}, {"text": "Bhusaval", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5024, "end_char": 5032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shivaji had also stated that he had related \"everything\" to the Chief Goods' Clerk of Bhusaval, P.W. 8, about 6 p.m. on 17-1-1968."}}, {"text": "Shivnji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5468, "end_char": 5475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As my duty hours were over I made no further enquiry and Shivaji went away\"\n\nThe Goods' Clerk had taken down •he complaint of Shivnji next morning after fixing the wharfage charges.", "canonical_name": "Shivaji"}}, {"text": "14-8-1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5997, "end_char": 6006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "849,\n\nThis statement in Court was made on 14-8-1970, more than 2t years\n\nafter the occurrence."}}, {"text": "16-1-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6205, "end_char": 6214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that Shivaji had actually mentioned the passing of money on the evening of 16-1-1968 does not seem to be material."}}, {"text": "Sbivaji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6245, "end_char": 6252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sbivaji's complaint next morning contained a!l the detailed allegations.", "canonical_name": "Shivaji"}}, {"text": "Sarjerao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6568, "end_char": 6576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Furthermore, there is corroboration of the statement of Shivaji from die statements of not only his son Sarjerao, P.W. 4, who brought money from the shop, bis nephew, Visbwanath, P.W. 5, who had gone to the scene of occurrence as there was delay in the arrival of goods, and, Vasant; P.W. 6, who bad given out Rs."}}, {"text": "Visbwanath", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6631, "end_char": 6641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Furthermore, there is corroboration of the statement of Shivaji from die statements of not only his son Sarjerao, P.W. 4, who brought money from the shop, bis nephew, Visbwanath, P.W. 5, who had gone to the scene of occurrence as there was delay in the arrival of goods, and, Vasant; P.W. 6, who bad given out Rs."}}, {"text": "Abdul Jabar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6869, "end_char": 6880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "100/- to bis brother Sarjerao, p, w. 4, at Shivaji's shop, 'but also from the statement of Abdul Jabar, P.W. 10, who was an Assistan.t Sub Inspector of the Railway .Protecti9n Force and a colleague of the appellant."}}, {"text": "Abdul la bar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6994, "end_char": 7006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul la bar's evidence, characterised by the Trial Court as \"independent\", disclosed that Kalandar Khan was actually arrested by the appellant a fact denied and left unexplained .by the appellant."}}, {"text": "Kalandar Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7085, "end_char": 7098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul la bar's evidence, characterised by the Trial Court as \"independent\", disclosed that Kalandar Khan was actually arrested by the appellant a fact denied and left unexplained .by the appellant."}}, {"text": "Shlvaji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7384, "end_char": 7391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7.10 as wharfage shown on 17-1-1968 in the cash book of Shlvaji.", "canonical_name": "Shivaji"}}, {"text": ".Hanotia", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7486, "end_char": 7494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, as this account boolt was not produced at the time of the enquiry held by the Inspector .Hanotia of the Railway Protection Force\n\niBto tile allegations and the entry was admitted to have been made on 19-1-1968 although the disbursement is shown on 17-1-1968 it cannot b relied upon."}}, {"text": "19-1-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7598, "end_char": 7607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, as this account boolt was not produced at the time of the enquiry held by the Inspector .Hanotia of the Railway Protection Force\n\niBto tile allegations and the entry was admitted to have been made on 19-1-1968 although the disbursement is shown on 17-1-1968 it cannot b relied upon."}}, {"text": "18-1-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7935, "end_char": 7944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, as the entry was admitted by the prosecution to have been actually made on 18-1-1968, it can be ignored as a piece of corroborative evidence."}}, {"text": "Hari Rachu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8409, "end_char": 8419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, Hari Rachu, as the perso11 to whom the money was paid, but, t the trial, he stated that it was paid to the appellant accused No."}}, {"text": "Section 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9304, "end_char": 9316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9328, "end_char": 9339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9350, "end_char": 9360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9361, "end_char": 9366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 5(l)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9383, "end_char": 9398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Sec. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9403, "end_char": 9412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9416, "end_char": 9444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High .Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9772, "end_char": 9793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant as well asthe other convicts had appealed to the High .Court of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10162, "end_char": 10179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reasons given in the judgment of the Bombay High Court, on that appeal, reponed as Hari Rachu Kanadi v. The State of Maharashtra('), are relied upon as arguments before us for accepting the prosecution case."}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10812, "end_char": 10822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kalaodar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12152, "end_char": 12160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The established fact of this arrest of Kalaodar together with the false denial of it by the appellant indicate the dishonesty of the appellant's stand."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_84_86_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "SK.AMIR\n\nTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nJanuary 9, 1974.\n\n[M. H. BEG ANDY. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.j\n\nDrugs and Cosmetics Act (23 of 1940)-Ss. 18 and 27-'Stockedfor sale' 1neaning a11A .scope of.\n\nImmediately after he had obtained delivery of a parcel from the railway authori tie1, the appellant was apprehended by a railway constable. The parcel was found to contain 95,000 capsules of a sedative agent commonly used for intoxication,, He was charged with the offence of stocking foi sale a misbranded drug without a licence under s. l8(a) (ii) and s.J8(c) read withs. 27(a) (ii) and 27(b) of the Dra115 and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the trial Court convicted him. The District Judge OJ) appeal, acquitted the appellant. The High Court on further appeal sentenced the appellant to a minimum sentence of one year's imprisonment prescribed by the Act.\n\nDisnti&sing the appeal to tiiis Court, HELD: Sections l8(a), l8(c) and 27(a) do not use the word stock\" in any technical sense. The plain meaning of the word \"stock\" in these provisions of the Act i! \"to keep\" and the injunction of the law means no more than this that no per!on\n\nshall keep for sate a misbranded drug or a drug in respect of which a valid licence is not held. It is not necessary that the drug should be 'stored' in a place in order that it can be said to have been \"stocked\" for sale. If any one keeps or carries a drug on his person in contravention of the terms of the Act and it is proved that the drug is kept or carried for sale, the act must fall within the mischief of the law. What is \"intended for sale\" can as much be stocked on one's perSon as in a shop or in a godown. \"Keeping\" for sale is of the essence of the matter, not tho mode and the manner of keeping. To keep for sale is to stock f<;>r sale. [86C] In the instant case a large quantity of capsules found in the possessioJt of the appellant leaves no doubt that be had stocked or kept the drug for sale.\n\nDlraram Deo Gupta v. State. A. I. R. (1958) All. 865, referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 149of197.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 18th/20th July, 1970 of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench at Nagpur in Criminal Appeal No. 20 of 1968.\n\nU. P. Singh and Santokh Singh, for the appellant.\n\nS. B. Wad and M. N. Shroff, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, J. On March 19, 1966 the appellant was apprehended by a Railway constable at the gate of the Malkapur railway G station immediately after he had obtained the delivery of a parcel.\n\nThe prcel was found to contain 95,000 capsules of Seco Barbital Sodium which is a sedative agent and is commonly used for intoxication.\n\nThe intoxicant is popularly called \"Lal Pari\".\n\nThe appellant was tried by the learned Judidal Magistrate, First Class, Malkapur for offences under sections 18(a)(ii) and 18(c) read with sections 27(a) (ii) and 27(b) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 23 H of 1940, on the charge that he had stocked for sale a misbranded drug and that he had no licence for stocking the drug for sale. The appellant admitted that he was carrying the parcel at the time of his arrest but his\n\ns. K. AMIR v. MAHARASHTRA (Chandrachud, J.) 85\n\ndefence was that he took delivery of the parcel on behalf of one Mohamad Jamadar who had represented to him that the parcel contained a 'science apparatus' meant for a school. The Magistrate rejected this defence as untrue, convicted the appellant and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 1200.\n\nIn appeal the learned Sessions Judge, Buldana acquitted the appellant on the view that though the facts raised a suspicion that the apl:'ellant or some other person on whose behalf the appellant had taken delivery of the parcel may have had the object of selling the capsules, the mere fact that the appellant was carrying the parcel would not justify the inference that the drug was stocked for sale.\n\nThat decision was set aside in appeal by the High Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench) which held that the prosecution had proved conclusively that the accuse had stocked the drug for sale. The High Court sentenced the appellant to the minimum sentence of one year's imprisonment, prescribed by the Act. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court.\n\nUnder section 3(b) (i) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, 'drug' includes \"all medicines for internal or external use of human beings or animals and all substances intended to be used for or in the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of disease in human beings or\n\nanimals\". Section 17 by its seven clauses defines inisbranded drugs and clause(e) thereof, which is here relevant, says that a drug sha11 be deemed to be misbranded if it is not labelled in the prescribed manner. Section 18(a) (ii) provides that \"no person shall himself or by any other person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or sell, or stock or exhibit for sale, or distribute any misbranded drug\" ... Section 18(c) provides that no person shall \"manufacture for sale, or se11, or sto.ck or exhibit for sale, or distribute any drug or cosmetic, except under, and in accordance with the conditions of, a licence issued for such purpose\" ....\n\nSection 27(a) provides that whoever himself or by any other person on his behalf manufactures for sale, sells, stocks or exhibits for sale or distributes any drug (i) deemed to be misbranded under clauses (a), (b), (c),(d), (f) or (g) of section 17, or (ii) without a valid licence as required under section 18(c), shall be punishable with imprisonment, for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine, provided that the Court may, for any special reasons to be recorded in writing, impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year. ·\n\nIt is common ground that the substance which the appellant was found carrying is a 'drug' and a 'misbranded drug' and that he had no Yalid licence to stock it for sale. Before the High Court and the lower courts it was also common ground that the appellant had 'stocked' the drug. The controversy was limited to the question whether the appellant had stocked the drug 'for sale'. The trial court and the High Court relied upon various circumstan.ces particularly the circumstance that the appellant was found in possession of as many as 95,000 capsules, in support of their conclusion that the appellant bad stocked\n\n86 SUPREi\\.lE COURT REPORTS\n\n[19741 3 S.C.&.\n\nthe drug for sale. The Sessions Court, on the other hand, thought that A there was no reliable evidence to show that the appellant had stocked the drug for sale.\n\nBefore us, the argument has taken a different shape. It is urged that at the highest, the drug was found on the person of the appellant, which is not enough to establish that the appellant had stocked the drug.\n\nWe see no substance in this argument. Section IS(a) of the Act which lays down an injunction that no person shall 'stock' for sale a drug of certain description, seotion IS(c) which says that no person shall 'stock' for sale a drug except in accordance with the conditions of a licence issued for such purpose and section 27(a) which prescribes a penalty, for a perso11 who stocks for sale a misbranded drug or a drug in respect of which no valid licence is held, do not use the word 'stock' i11 any technical sense. The plain meaning of the word 'stock' in these provisions of the Act is 'to keep' and the injunction of the\\a\\\\ means no more than this that no person shall keep for sale a misbranded drug or a drug ilt respect of which a valid licence is not held. It is not necessary that the drug should be 'stored' in a place in order that it can be said to have been 'stocked' for sale. If anyone keeps or carries a drug on his person in contravention of the terms of the Act and it is proved that the drug is kept or carried for sale, the act must fall within the mischief of the law under consideration. In busy commercial cities, the streets are crowded with mobile hawkers who display their wares on their person. It is neither sound commonsence nor sound law to say that such wares are not stocked for sale. What is intended for sale can as much be stocked on one's person as in a shop or in a godown. 'Kee ping' for sale is of the essence of the matter, not the mode and the manner of keeping. To keep for sale is to stock for sale. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Third Edition p. 2025) gives the meanin~ of the word 'stock' as \"To lay up in store; to form a stock or supply of (a commodity) .... To keep (goods) in stock for sale\" ..\n\nThe judgement of the Allahabad High Court in Dhar am Deo Gupta Vs. State, (') on which the appellant relies deals with a different point and lays down that mere stocking of goods unless it is for the purpose of sale, does not a1nount to an offence within the nleaning of section 18 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. It was found in that case that the accused had to stock certain ampoules of injection under the terms of a contract between him and the Government of India.\n\nThe large quantity of 95,000 capsules found in the possession of the appellant leaves no doubt that he had stocked or kept the drug for sale. It could not have been meant for his personal use and his defence that he had received the parcel on behalf of another person, not knowing what it contained, was rightly rejected by all the three courls.\n\nAcvordingly we dismiss the appeal and confirm the order of convic tion and sentence.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed\n\n()) A.T.R. 1958 All. 865,", "total_entities": 32, "entities": [{"text": "SK.AMIR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 7, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SK.AMIR", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9, "end_char": 33, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 9, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 50, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SK.AMIR\n\nTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nJanuary 9, 1974."}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG ANDY. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ss. 18 and 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act", "statute": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act"}}, {"text": "Cosmetics Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 600, "end_char": 619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2235, "end_char": 2246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. P. Singh and Santokh Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Santokh Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2251, "end_char": 2264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. P. Singh and Santokh Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. B. Wad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2286, "end_char": 2295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. B. Wad and M. N. Shroff, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2300, "end_char": 2312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. B. Wad and M. N. Shroff, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2379, "end_char": 2390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, J. On March 19, 1966 the appellant was apprehended by a Railway constable at the gate of the Malkapur railway G station immediately after he had obtained the delivery of a parcel."}}, {"text": "March 19, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2398, "end_char": 2412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, J. On March 19, 1966 the appellant was apprehended by a Railway constable at the gate of the Malkapur railway G station immediately after he had obtained the delivery of a parcel."}}, {"text": "sections 18(a)(ii) and 18(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2858, "end_char": 2886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 27(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2897, "end_char": 2911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2934, "end_char": 2957, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mohamad Jamadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3296, "end_char": 3311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant admitted that he was carrying the parcel at the time of his arrest but his\n\ns. K. AMIR v. MAHARASHTRA (Chandrachud, J.) 85\n\ndefence was that he took delivery of the parcel on behalf of one Mohamad Jamadar who had represented to him that the parcel contained a 'science apparatus' meant for a school."}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge, Buldana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3547, "end_char": 3570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal the learned Sessions Judge, Buldana acquitted the appellant on the view that though the facts raised a suspicion that the apl:'ellant or some other person on whose behalf the appellant had taken delivery of the parcel may have had the object of selling the capsules, the mere fact that the appellant was carrying the parcel would not justify the inference that the drug was stocked for sale."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3973, "end_char": 4007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That decision was set aside in appeal by the High Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench) which held that the prosecution had proved conclusively that the accuse had stocked the drug for sale."}}, {"text": "section 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4314, "end_char": 4326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4338, "end_char": 4367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4597, "end_char": 4607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Section 18(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4800, "end_char": 4813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Section 18(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4995, "end_char": 5008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Section 27(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5235, "end_char": 5248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940", "statute": "the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5473, "end_char": 5483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5535, "end_char": 5548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7198, "end_char": 7211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8660, "end_char": 8680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Third Edition p. 2025) gives the meanin~ of the word 'stock' as \"To lay up in store; to form a stock or supply of (a commodity) .... To keep (goods) in stock for sale\" ..\n\nThe judgement of the Allahabad High Court in Dhar am Deo Gupta Vs."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8910, "end_char": 8920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Drugs and Cosmetics Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8928, "end_char": 8951, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9089, "end_char": 9108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was found in that case that the accused had to stock certain ampoules of injection under the terms of a contract between him and the Government of India."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_852_856_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS., MADRAS & ANR.\n\nC.TARACHAND\n\nApril 5, 1974\n\n[M. H. BEG AND R. S. SARKARIA, JI.]\n\nImports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947-S. 3-Scope of.\n\nThe respondent had imported sewing machine needJcs under a licence.\n\nClaiming that the import licence did not cover the needles for domestic sewing machines the Custom.Ii Authorities imposed a penalty and confiscated the goods.\n\nThe 1t$pondent cJaimed that the needles imported could be used in both domestic and industrial 11ewing Ipachines or were interchangeable and that the prohibition\n\nwas not meant for such interchangeable needles which could be used for c \"domestic\" as welt as \"industrial\" sewing machines but was confined to needles capable of being used only for domestic sewing machines. A single Judge of the High Court :.et aside the penalty but confirmed the order of confiscation.\n\nOn appeal the Division Bench; without going into the other question raised by the respondent. held that there was no prohibition or restriction during the relevant period for the import of domestic sewing machine needles. It therefore quashed the confiscation order.\n\nAllowing the appeal and ren1itting the case to the High Court, D\n\nlfELD : There was the required prohibition against import without licence of needles specified. Sec. 3 of the im_ports & xports (ControJ) Act, 1947 clearlv providesfor .Prohibition and restriction of imports and cl. 3 of the Import Control Order directly prohibits, in unambiguous and mandatory terms that \"no iJCrson shall import any goods of the description specified in Schedule I except under and in accordance with the licence or a customs clearance permit granted by the Central Government or by any officer specified in Schedule II''.\n\nThis ianguage cannot have a meaning other than that the prohibition was there so E long as the goods of the description given in the schedule were not imported in accorda; Dce with the import licence. [856 E; 854 H; 855 A-Bl\n\n(2) The prohibition is conditional in as mu Ch as it can be lifted by a licence which permits it; the question whether the respondent's licence covered the particular goods imported, was not specifically considered or decided by the division bench. . The division bench did not also consider it necessary to decide\n\nwhether any rules of natural justice weI'e violated at the inquiry held.\n\nIf the customs authorities had not acted in accordance with law in holding the F imported goods to be of the prohibited category the High Court could correct th; s error of law. [855 DEl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1161 of 1973.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the judgment and order <lated the 26th June, 1973 of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal Nos. 381 of 1972 and 106 of 1973.\n\nG. L. Sanghi and S. P. Nayar, for the appellants.\n\nK. Jayaram, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBEG, J.-The Colleetor of Customs, Madras, has c.ome up, by 11 grant of special leave to appeal, against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court quashing an order of the Cenral Government which confirmed an order of' the appellant confiscatmg\n\na . large quantity of sewing mai:hine needles. The respondent had imported the llf!Cl(lles under a liceuce which did not, according to the case of the Customs' Department, cover the goods imported. A learned Single Judge of the High Court had set a5ide .a penalty of Rs. 5,000/· imposed upon the respondent as the sewing needles imported by tlie petitioner-respondent were not, according to the learned Judge, proved to belong to the prohibited class, but the confiscation order had, rather incoosistently, been maintained. On an appeal by the respondent against the refusal toquash the confiscation order, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court came to the conclusion that there was no prohibition at all as contemplated by Section 3 of the Import Control Order, 1955, made under Sections 3 & 4A of the Imports & Exports-\n\n(Control) Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), so that no further questiol). need be considered. The Division Bench, therefore, did not go into the Other questions raised by the respondent, who wa.• petitioner before the High Court, relating to violation 6f rules of natural justice or the merits of the case that the sewing needles imported were covered by the licence. It, therefore, held that the confiscation order could not stand and bad to be quashed with the penalty.\n\nThe Division Bench was of opinion that a prohibition or restriction authorised by the Act should be imposed by a Control Order such as the Control Order of 1955 duly notified in tbe official Gazette and not by any Other means. It held I.hat the prohibition relied upon by the Customs Department in the instant case did not satisfy this requirement.\n\nSectioo 3 of the Act reads as follows:\n\n\"3. Powers to prohibit or restrict imports and exports.\n\n( 1) The Central Government may, by order published in tht official Gazette; make provisions for prohibiting, restricting or otherwise controlling in all cases or in specified classes of cases, and subject to Such exceptions, if any, as may be made by or under the order :-\n\n(a) the import, export, carriage coastwise or shipment as ships stores of goods of any specified descriptio'!;\n\n(b) the bringing into any port or place in India of gop<ls\n\nof any specified description intended to be taken out pf India without being removed from the ship or conveyance in which they are being carried.\n\n(2) All goods to which any order under sub-section ( l) applies shall be deemed to be goods of which the import or export has been prohibited under section 11 of the CustonLs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), and all the provisions of that Act shall have effect accordingly.\n\n(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the aforesaid Act, the Central Government may, by order published in the Official Gazette, prohibit, restrict or impose conditions on !lie -clearance, whether for home-· consumption or for sbip\n\nment abroad of any goods or class of goods imported inlo India\".\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1974] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nAnd clause 3 of the Import Control Order 1955 lays down : A\n\n\"3. Restriction, of Import of certain goods.-(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Order, no .person shall import any goods of the description specified in Schedule I, except under, and in accordance with, a licence or a customs clearance permit granted by the Central Government or by any officer specified in Schedule 11. n\n\n(2) If, in. any case, it is found that the goods imported unc!er a licence do not conform to the description given in the licence or were shipped prior to the date of issue of the licence under which they are claimed to.have been imported, then, without prejudice to any action that mav be 1akei1 against the licensee under the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), in respect of the said importation, the licence may be C treaied as having been utilised for importing the said goods\".\n\nItem 288 of Schedule I of the Control Order specifies :\n\n\" (a) parts of sewing machines domestic.\n\n(b) Needles for domestic sewing machines\".\n\nThe case of the Customs Department is that the imporied sewing D machine needles fall under this description.\n\nThe contention is that, as they were duly notified, no question of any failure to impose a prohibition in accordance with the provisions of the Act arose.\n\nThe Division Bench had held :\n\n\"Our attention, however, was invited by the learned Counsel for the Central Government to &ction 3 of the Act E and the Import Control Order, 1955. That Section merely invests the Central Government with power to prohibit, re~ trict or otherwise control specific goods or classes of goods specified, subject to exceptions.\n\nSuch prohibition or restriction should be made by an order published in the official Gazette.\n\nThe Imports Control Order, 1955, as applicabk to the relevant year, did not specify, as far as our attention F was drawn, the goods imported in the instant case. Section 3 in the order does not prohibit the import of any goods whatever, if it is done under a licence. But what it does is to prohibit a person from importing any goods of the description specified in Scheudle I, except as specified and permitted by the proper' authority. It follows, therefore, that there was no prohibition or restrictio.n during the relevant period to the Ci importation of domestic sewing machine needles. The word 'nil' in the policy book does not mean anything in the nature of prohibition or restriction\".\n\nWe regret that we are unable to concur with the reasomng of the Division .Bench.\n\nWe find that Section 3 of the Act clearly provides for prohibition and resrriction of imports and tliat clause 3 of the ff Control Order directly prohibits, in unambiguous and mandatory terms, that \"no person shall import any good of the description specified in Schedule I except under and in .accordance with the licence or a\n\n( ,\n\nCustoms clearance p, rmit granted by the Central Govt. or by any officer specified in Scliedule 2\". This language cannot have a meaning other than that the prohibition i~ there so long as goods of the description given . in the schedule are not imported in accordance with an impon licence.\n\nThe case of the Department is that the import licence ol the respondent does not cover \"needles for domestic sewing machines\" which the respondent had imported.\n\nIt was urged on behalf of the respondent that it was demonstrated that the needles actually imported could be used in both domestic and industrial sewing machines or were interchangeable. According to the respondent, the prohibition was not meant for such interchangeable needles which could be used for \"domestic\" as well as \"industrial'\" sewing machines but was confined to needles capable of being used only !or domestic sewing machines.\n\nThis question, among other questions, was not specifically considered or decided by the Division\n\nHench.\n\nThe Divi<ion Bench did not consider it necessary to decide whether any rules of natural justice were violated at the iriquiry held.\n\nIf the Customs authorities had not acted in accordance with law in holding the imported goods t.o be of the prohibited category the High Court could correct its error of law. If they had violated any rule of natural justice the case could be remitted to them for decision afresh. lt is agreed by learned Counsel for both sides that the Division Bench should decide questions of law left undecided by it ii the Division Bench was in error in holding, on a preliminary question, that no prohibitiQn to import needles for domestic sewing machines without a licence had been imposed at all. As we are of opinion that the prohibition is conditional, in as much as it can be lifted by a licence which permits it, the real question which will, ultimately, have to be decided is whether the respondent's licence covers the particular goods imported.\n\nBefore proceeding further, we may observe that there were references in \\he order of the learned Single Judge as well as of the Division Bench, to what is known as the \"Red Book\" containing the .. Import Trade Control Policy\" with regard to various types of goods including needles for domestic sewing machines.\n\nIn the ''Red Book\" the word 'nil' appeared against the item in question in the column for \"policy\" for the relevant year.\n\nTherefore, the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court had relied upon a decision of this Court in the Joint Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, ,'; fadras v. M/S.\n\nAmichand Mutha etc.(') where it was held (at page 272) :\n\n\"The last point urged was that subsequent to October 1957, Government of India changed its policy with respect to import of fountain pens with which some of the present appeals are concerned. This it l!'.as urged amounted to a ban on the import of fountain pens and it would not be open to the Joint Chief Controller to issue any licence for any period, be it January-June 1957, after the import of fountain pens had been banned from Ootober 1957. Now there is no\n\nII) [1966) I SCR 262 rii 272.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1974) 3 S.C.R.\n\ndoubt that it is open to the Central Government under s. 3 /I to prohibit the import of any article but that can only be done by an order published in the official gazette by the Central Government under s. 3. The High Court has found that no such order J!nder s. 3 of the Act has been published.\n\nNor hos any such order by the Central Government been brought to our !JOtice. All that has been said is that in the declaration of policy as to import, the word\"nil\" appears B against fountain pens. .That necessarily dor, i; not amount to prohibition of import of fountain pens unless there is an order of the Central Government to that effect published in the official gazette. We therefore agree with the High Court that unless such an order is produced it would be open to the licensing authority to issue a licenc> for the period of January, -June 1957 eve, n after October 1, 1957\" C\n\nWe do not think that the above mentioned refercn:e to the Rd Book was at all neceMary here or that a decision in a case where the Customs authorities relied merely on something found in the Red Book assists us in the case before us. Here, we have the item No. 288 in Schedule I read with clause 3 of the Control Order which was dilly published in. the Official Gazette. This had the effect of a eategorieal D prohibition against needles satisfying the description but not covered by a licence. We thi!lk that a reference to the Red Book, in the instant case, seems to have misled learned Judges in the High Court.\n\nThe result is that we hold that there is the required prohibition against import without licence of needles specified.\n\nOther questions of law which were not gone into by the High Court can now be on- E sidered and decided bv it. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the Diyision Bench, so that the appeal is now restored to its original number in the High Court. It may be heard and decided in accordance with law.\n\nIn the circumstances of the case, we award no costs of the appeal to this Court.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nA µpeal allowed.", "total_entities": 38, "entities": [{"text": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS., MADRAS & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS., MADRAS & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C.TARACHAND", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "C. TARACHAND", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 5, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.TARACHAND\n\nApril 5, 1974\n\n[M. H. BEG AND R. S. SARKARIA, JI.]"}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1288, "end_char": 1294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1404, "end_char": 1409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1565, "end_char": 1575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1669, "end_char": 1687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 of the Import Control Order directly prohibits, in unambiguous and mandatory terms that \"no iJCrson shall import any goods of the description specified in Schedule I except under and in accordance with the licence or a customs clearance permit granted by the Central Government or by any officer specified in Schedule II''."}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1719, "end_char": 1730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2755, "end_char": 2767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi and S. P. Nayar, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2772, "end_char": 2783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi and S. P. Nayar, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K. Jayaram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2806, "end_char": 2816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Jayaram, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2883, "end_char": 2886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBEG, J.-The Colleetor of Customs, Madras, has c.ome up, by 11 grant of special leave to appeal, against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court quashing an order of the Cenral Government which confirmed an order of' the appellant confiscatmg\n\na ."}}, {"text": "Cenral Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3070, "end_char": 3087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBEG, J.-The Colleetor of Customs, Madras, has c.ome up, by 11 grant of special leave to appeal, against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court quashing an order of the Cenral Government which confirmed an order of' the appellant confiscatmg\n\na ."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3777, "end_char": 3794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On an appeal by the respondent against the refusal toquash the confiscation order, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court came to the conclusion that there was no prohibition at all as contemplated by Section 3 of the Import Control Order, 1955, made under Sections 3 & 4A of the Imports & Exports-\n\n(Control) Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), so that no further questiol)."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3874, "end_char": 3883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 3 & 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3930, "end_char": 3945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5339, "end_char": 5344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(b) the bringing into any port or place in India of gop<ls\n\nof any specified description intended to be taken out pf India without being removed from the ship or conveyance in which they are being carried."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5651, "end_char": 5661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CustonLs Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5669, "end_char": 5687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6116, "end_char": 6124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the CustonLs Act, 1962", "statute": "the CustonLs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6330, "end_char": 6340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the CustonLs Act, 1962", "statute": "the CustonLs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Schedule 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6485, "end_char": 6496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the CustonLs Act, 1962", "statute": "the CustonLs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Customs Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6829, "end_char": 6846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6994, "end_char": 7004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8004, "end_char": 8013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8633, "end_char": 8642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8724, "end_char": 8732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8883, "end_char": 8893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amichand Mutha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11542, "end_char": 11556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court had relied upon a decision of this Court in the Joint Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, ,'; fadras v. M/S.\n\nAmichand Mutha etc.(')"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11659, "end_char": 11678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "where it was held (at page 272) :\n\n\"The last point urged was that subsequent to October 1957, Government of India changed its policy with respect to import of fountain pens with which some of the present appeals are concerned."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12190, "end_char": 12194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12340, "end_char": 12344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12397, "end_char": 12401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13291, "end_char": 13301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13312, "end_char": 13320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_857_862_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "VASANT KRISHNARAO PATURKAR & ANR. v.\n\nD. R. MAJRAMK'.AR & OTHERS\n\nApril 8, 1974,\n\n[H. R. KHANNA AND P. N. GosWAMI, JJ.]\n\nS1ates' Reorganisation Act, 1956--S. 115 and l11-Whetl1er Higf1 Court can decide issues of gradation senioriJy etc. of officers (lllotted to the bilingual state\n\nof Bombal' after reorca11isation of States.\n\nThe appellants and the first 19 res, Pondents and respondents 22 to 24 re the employees in the Agriculture Dept. of the State of Maharashtra following reorganisation of states.\n\nRespondents 1 to 19 were the original petitioners in S.C.A. No. 1354/70.\n\nThey were offi:cers of the former Hyderabad State. They prayed in their application for a writ to set aside the Bombay Government's Resolutions dated 17th February 1958 and 16th fay 1969 and.the provisional gradation List of 27th Seotemb:r 1969 and the promotion orders of 5th and 6th June 1970 and other coitsequential reliefs.\n\nThe Bombay High Court disposed of the application on merits ln favour of th.e appellants. The orders oC the High Court affected the interests of the present appellants. • Before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court, appellant No. 1 and three other officers lodged an applicaon impleading the State of Maharashtra and 88 other respondents including the present respondent 1 to 19. Respo_ndents 1 to 19 and others contested the application before the Nagpur bench unsuccessfully.\n\nThe Nagpur b:!nch allowed the writapplication and quashed the resolution of the Government dated 9-9-1960 and combined Seniority List of 22-8-62 and quashed the order of absorption of the petitioners and respondents 3 to 89.\n\nThe respondents, who were Agricultural officers from Hyderabad Region.\n\nPreferred an appeal against the judgment of the Nagpur High Court fore the Supreme Cou1i. They were, allowed to withdraw the same without prejudice to all paties affected to make representations to the Government .in accordanc~\n\nwith :;. 115 of the Staes Reora, anisation Act 1956.\n\nThe Govern; nent of .Maharashtra made a new gradation list on 27-9·69 and allowed certair. consequential orders of promotion on 5th,, and 6th June, 1970.\n\nThis, therefore led to the Special Civil Application No. 1354 of 70 at the instance of respondents 1 to 19.\n\nThe appellant and another 1;1erson had also filed Special Civil Application No. 1126/71 in the Nagpur Bench for quashing the resolution of Bombay Government of 16th Mav 1969 on certain grounds. That matter is still pending in the Nagpur Bench. The respondents 1 to 19 were impleaded as respondents in that application but they, did not file anv affidavits in suppol't of their case.\n\nWhen the matter came up for hearing, the appellants knew that another petition in the same subject was already decirled bv the Bombay High Court.\n\nThe appellants took immediate stet?s in the Bombay High Court but failed to obtain\n\nany favourable orders. although they prayed for rehearing of the writ petition.\n\nThe oroblem is a difficult one to decide gradation, seniority etc. when officers of 3 different States are alloted to the new bilingual state of Bombay under the provisions of the States Reorganisation Act. Setting aside the impugned judg~ ment and order of the Botnba.y High court and directing restoration of the Special Civil Application No. 1354/70 and disposal of the same in accordance v.ith law,\n\nHELD : {I) There is sufficient guideline in Part X of the States Reorganisation Act 1956 and als9 in Part Vlll of the Bomtiav Reorganisation Act 1960\n\nthat lhe Government of India is the final authority in the matter of division and A integration of services among the new states tO ensure a fair and equitab1e 1reatment to all perons affected by the reorganisation including proper consider-\n\n11:tion of any representation made by concerned persons.\n\nFurther it. is well\n\nsettld that the Central Government under Sec .. 115 or the Act has to determine the principles governing equation of pests and prepare common gradation lists by integration of services an•j in doing so to ensure fair and equitable treatment to all persons concerned: [860 H; 861 A-B] I\n\nQ. Rajian Rai 11nd Ors. v. Union of b1dia & Or.if. A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 457, N.\n\nS11bbe1 RC10 etc. v. Union of India & Ors. [1972] 2 S.C.C. 862; and Uh.ion of /11d111 and a1101/ier v. P. K. Roy & Ors. [1968] 2 S.C.R. 186, referred to.\n\n(II) The High Court cannot clothe upon itself the authority for pedormin1 the functions which are :>pecifically and expressly intended to be the duty of the •..:entral Government under the Act.\n\nTherefore, the High Court was not right in directing the State Government to do that which under the provisions of the Act is within the domain of the Central Government and secondly, in fixing a\n\nime limit for action and if the same is exceeded, directing an auto1natic entitlement tO the :iecond relief as to equation, ab.iorption and fixation of seniority as pr;:iJed for by respondents 1 to 19. [861 D]\n\n(111) Jn the .Present case, a1though the High Court observed that there was sufficient cause for rehearing the special Civil application; it wrOngfuUy did not give any Opportunity to th!! petitioners nd b'le State of Maharashtra tQ convass their respective poinl'!. of view against the writ petition.\n\nUnder the circumstances, this Court -directs rehearing of the sped-Ill civil applicatiol). no. 1354/70 after givi!J.g opportunities to a]) the parties concerned. [862 Q\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :-Civil. Appeal No. 1227 ot 1972.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 9th December, 1971 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1354 of 1970.\n\nM. N. PJ.adke, Naunit Lal and Lalita Kohli, for the appellant.\n\nS. c. Agarwala, K. K. Singhvi, R. K. Garg., S.S. Bhatf>/iagar and\n\nv. J. Francis, for respondent Nos. 10.& 14.\n\nM. C. Rhandare and M. N. Shroff, for respondentNos. 20--24.\n\nThe J utlgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nGmwA M 1, J.-This appeal by special leave is dirocted against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay of 9th December, 1971, in Special Civil Application (S.C.A.) N<>. 1354 of 1970 under Article 226 of the Constitution. The appellants and the first nineteen .re,..\n\npondents and respondents 22 to 24 are at present the employees in the Agriculture Department of the State of Maharashtra following reorgani .. tion of States on !st November, 1950.\n\nRespondents I to 19 were the original petitioners in S.C.A. No. 1354 of 1970. They were officers from the former Hyderabad State\n\np1ior to the State.s Reorganisation Act, 1956, (briefly called the Act).\n\nThey prayed in their said application for a writ to set aside the Bombay Government's Resolutions of 17th February, 1958 and\n\nI 6th May, 1969 and the provisional gradation list of 27th September, 1969 and the promotion orders of 5th and 6th June, 1970\n\n.,.\n\n... .. ,\n\n' c\n\nand other consequential reliefs.\n\nThey h'!d impleaded in the said application five respondents, the first two being the State of Maharashtra and the Director of Agriculture, Maharashtra and the remain ing three respondents were the three Agricultural Officers impleaded in a representative capacity by leave of the High Court under order 1, rule 8, Civil Procedure Code.\n\nThese respondents (Nos. 3 to 5) did not appear to contest the application in th~ Bombay High Court and it is alleged that they had no interest in the matter and were in collusion with the appellants. Even the first two respondents, namely, the State of Maharashtra and the Director of Agriculture, went by default, although a belated prayer to enter appearanc.e had been made through counsel on behalf of the State of Maharashtra after commencement of arguments, on the day of final hearing, which was, however, rejected by the High Court. The application was then disposed of, ex parte, on merits by the High Court in favour of the applicants. It is not disputed that the order of the High Court directly affects the interests of the present appellants, who are Agricultural Officers from the Madhya Pradesh region.\n\nFrom Bombay we may now turn to the Nagpur Bench of the said High Court. Tliere the appellant No. 1 and three other Agricul'ural Ofticers lodged a Special Civil Application No. 361 of 1964 impleading the State of Maharashtra and 88 other respondents, including the present respondents 1 to 19.\n\nRespondents. 1 to 19 and others contested the application before the Nagpur Bench unsuccessfully .. The Nagpur Bench of the High Court allowed the Writ application by its judgment and order dated 6th December, 1967 and the operative part of the same may be quoted.\n\n\"Accordingly, we allow the petition and quash the resolution of the Government dated 9-9-1960 and combined seniority list issued by the Government on 22-8-1962.\n\nIf the State Government wants to alt.er the basis of equation originally fixed on 17-2-1958, an opportunity to make representation against ihe proposed alteration has to be given to the persons likely to be affected.\n\nThe State Government will now take an appropriate action.\n\nThe neces· sary correspondence of quashing of these two orders is that the irtermediate order of absorption which is necessary step after inter se seniority and gradation list can be compiled is also to be quashed.\n\nAcoordingly, we quash the order. of absorption, so far as these petitioners and respondents No. 3 to 89 are concerned, dated 11.5.1962 ..... \".\n\nThe respondents, '.!'ho were Agricultural Officers from Hyderabad region, preferred an appeal against the judgment of.-Oie Nagpur Bench being No. 1366 of 1968 in this Court. They were, however, allowed by this Court on 23rd January, 1969, to withdraw the same \"without prejudice to all parties affected to make representations to the Government in accordance with section 115 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956\"\n\nAfter the above order of this Court, it is said that many Agri- A cultural Officers made representations to the Government of India under section 115 of the Act. The Government of Maharashtra possed a Resolution of 16th May,, 1969, purporting to be an order giving new equation of posts in the Agricultural Departmnt in pursuance of which a gradation list was made on 27th September, 1969.\n\nThen followed certain consequential orders of promotion of 5th and 6th June, 1970.\n\nThis, as already noticed, led to the Special Civil B Application No. 1354 of 1970 at the instance of respondents 1 to 19 \"\"d the operative part of this impugned order of 9th Decembor J9il, is. m the tollowing terms :- '\n\n\"For the reasons stated in the accompanying judgment, the Court makes absolute with costs the rule granted by it on 30. 6. 70 in terms of the prayer (a) of the petition. The c Court further directs that if respondent No. 1 fails to decide the question of equation of posts held by the petitioners in the former Hyderabad Sta.te in acordanc-o. with law and the observa'.ions in this Judgment within three months from 9.12.71, Respondent No. I shall equate the posts of Agricultural Assistant of the former Hyderabad State in the scale of Rs. 176-300 with the posts of Agricultural Officer, D Grade I of the former Bombay State in the scale of Rs. '210-10-300 and to absorb the petitioners and to fix their\n\nsoniority on that bosis with effect from the 1st day of November 1956\"\n\nThe appellant and another person had also filed Special Civil Application No. 1126 of 1971 in the Nagpur Bench for quashing tile\n\nF - Resolution of the Bombay Government of 16th May, 1969, on certain grounds. That matter is still pending in the Nagpur Bench. The respondonts I to 19 were impleaded as respondents in that application and although they had been served, they did not file any return when the said application came up for hearing at Nagpur on 2nd February, 1972.\n\nThe learned Government Advocate, however, mentioned to the court that another petition on the same subject had F already been decided by the Bombay High Court. It is said that this was the first time when the appellants came to know of the impugned judgment and took immediately steps in .the Bombay High Court to set aside the order and for rehearing the writ petition, but failed to obtain favourable orders.\n\nThe problem is indeed ticklish and sensitive concerning integra- G tion, absorption, gradation and fixation of appropriate seniority o[ the officers throwing by act of the State their common lot from different areas, namely, the former State of Madhya _Pradesh, former State of Hyderabad and the former State of Bombay allotted to the new bilingual State of Bombay under the provisions Of the satcs Reorganisation Act. It is, however, cleat that there is sufficient guideline in Part X of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 as also u larer in Part VIII of the Bombay Reorganisation Act 1960 and it is reserved for the Government of India, advisedly, to be the final authority in the matter of division and integration of services amoug\n\n' '\n\n' A :the new States to ensure a fair and equitable treatment to all persons\n\n:iliected by the reorganisation including proper consideration of any representation made by concerned persons. (See section 115 and section 117 of the Act and sections 81 and 83 of the Bombay Ro ,, rganisation Act, 1960).\n\nIt is well settled that the Central Government under section 115 d the Act has to de-termine the principles governing equation of posts and prepare common gradation lists by integration of services\n\nnd in doing so to ensure fair and equitable treatment to all persons concerned. The Central Government is also required to give opportunities to the parties affected to make their representations. (See D. Rajian Raj & Others v. Union of India & others('); N. S11bba Rao etc. v. Union of India and Others( 2) and Union of India & Anr. v. P. K. Roy & Ors.(3) ).\n\nThe High Court cannot clothe upon itself the authority for performing the functions which are specifically atiil expressly intended to he the obligation and duty of the Central Government under the Act.\n\nThe High Court is, therefore, not right in two matters namely, in directing the S•ate Government to do that which under the provi D sions of the Act is within the domain of the Central Government and secondly in fixing a time limit for action and, if the same is exceeded, directing an. automatic entitlement to the second relief as to equation, absorption and fixation of seniority is prayed for by respondents 1 to 19. This view of the High Court is clearly erroneous in view of the provisions of the Act.\n\n£ That, however, does not dispose of this matter. Mr. Phatlkc, learned counsel for the appellants, raises several questions before us.\n\nFirstly, that the Division Bench of the High Court could not sit in appeal against the Division Bench decision of the Nagpur Bench which is binding on the respondents, 1 to 19. Secondly, that there is clear violation of the principles of natural justice in disposing of the writ pe'ition by the High Court, ex parte, and in not reviewing its order F when sufficient cause was shown by the appellants herein.\n\nThirdly, that the High Court should not have allowed the application under order I, rule 8, Civil Pro:edure Code, and should have insisted upon personal service of the rule nisi on the affeced petitioners in a service matter of such implications.\n\nG Mr. Bhandare, learned counsel for the Stale of Maharashtra, also, inter a/ia, took the point that the Central Government was a necessary party and the petition should have been dismissed by the High Court for non-joinder of that Government.\n\nlt is not necessary for us to go into these questions in. view of the High Court's order of December 24, 1971~ in Civil Application No. 3261 of 1971, of the State of Maharashtr~ and the Director of\n\n(I) A, tR. 1974 SC 457-1973 (I) sec 61\n\n(2) 1972 (2) s.c.c. 8<2 (l} [19681 (2) SCR 186.\n\nAj; riculture praying for permission to file an affidavit in reply to the, ... A writ petition and for 'contesting the petition on merits. The High Court observed \"we are satisfied on reading these affidavits that there was sufficient cause for rehearing the Special Qvil Application\", but on perusal of the affidavit in reply and hearing counsel for the State rejected th~ said petition.\n\nThe High Court also dismissed the petitioners' application for rehearing the writ application.\n\nWe are not satisfied that the High Court was right in not allowing_ an cippcrtunity to the petitioners as well as to the State to canvass their respective points of view before it against the writ application, particularly so when the matter bad been heard in a representative writ application and not one of the actually affected persons had been impleaded as a respondent even to represent their category.\n\nThe High Court itself observed, as noticed above, \"there was sufficient cause for rehearing\".\n\nWithout, therefore~ going into the various points raised before us, we set aside the impugned judgment and order of tiie Bombay High Court of 9th December, 1971 and direct restoration of the Special Civil Application No. 1354 of 1970 to its file for disposal of the same in accordance with law after giving opportunity to all the parties concerned.\n\nWe further direct that respondents 1 to 19 shall take steps in the High Court to implead the Central Government as well as. the present appellants and all other officers affected by the orders sought to be quashed in the Special Civil Application No. 1354 of 1970\n\nThe appeal is allowed on the terms indicated above. There will bt: 110 order as to costs in this appeal.\n\ns.c.\n\nAppeal (I/lowed.", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "VASANT KRISHNARAO PATURKAR & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 32, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VASANT KRISHNARAO PATURKAR & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. R. MAJRAMK'.AR & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D. R. MAJRAMKAR & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 8, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 79, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AR & OTHERS\n\nApril 8, 1974,\n\n[H. R. KHANNA AND P. N. GosWAMI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. N. GosWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reorganisation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reorganisation Act, 1956", "statute": "Reorganisation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 914, "end_char": 931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bombay High Court disposed of the application on merits ln favour of th.e appellants."}}, {"text": "State of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1207, "end_char": 1227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and three other officers lodged an applicaon impleading the State of Maharashtra and 88 other respondents including the present respondent 1 to 19."}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1364, "end_char": 1370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respo_ndents 1 to 19 and others contested the application before the Nagpur bench unsuccessfully."}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1740, "end_char": 1757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Preferred an appeal against the judgment of the Nagpur High Court fore the Supreme Cou1i."}}, {"text": "Govern; nent of .Maharashtra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1979, "end_char": 2007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Govern; nent of .Maharashtra made a new gradation list on 27-9·69 and allowed certair."}}, {"text": "27-9·69 and", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2037, "end_char": 2048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Govern; nent of .Maharashtra made a new gradation list on 27-9·69 and allowed certair."}}, {"text": "5th,, and 6th June, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2103, "end_char": 2127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "consequential orders of promotion on 5th,, and 6th June, 1970."}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3115, "end_char": 3140, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "is sufficient guideline in Part X of the States Reorganisation Act 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3356, "end_char": 3427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Part Vlll of the Bomtiav Reorganisation Act 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3440, "end_char": 3488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3499, "end_char": 3518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1354/70 and disposal of the same in accordance v.ith law,\n\nHELD : {I) There is sufficient guideline in Part X of the States Reorganisation Act 1956 and als9 in Part Vlll of the Bomtiav Reorganisation Act 1960\n\nthat lhe Government of India is the final authority in the matter of division and A integration of services among the new states tO ensure a fair and equitab1e 1reatment to all perons affected by the reorganisation including proper consider-\n\n11:tion of any representation made by concerned persons."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3828, "end_char": 3846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is well\n\nsettld that the Central Government under Sec .. 115 or the Act has to determine the principles governing equation of pests and prepare common gradation lists by integration of services an•j in doing so to ensure fair and equitable treatment to all persons concerned: [860 H; 861 A-B] I\n\nQ. Rajian Rai 11nd Ors."}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4176, "end_char": 4179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part Vlll of the Bomtiav Reorganisation Act 1960", "statute": "Part Vlll of the Bomtiav Reorganisation Act 1960"}}, {"text": "[1968] 2 S.C.R. 186", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4296, "end_char": 4315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. N. PJ.adke", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5624, "end_char": 5637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. PJ.adke, Naunit Lal and Lalita Kohli, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5639, "end_char": 5649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. PJ.adke, Naunit Lal and Lalita Kohli, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Lalita Kohli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5654, "end_char": 5666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. PJ.adke, Naunit Lal and Lalita Kohli, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. c. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5688, "end_char": 5702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. c. Agarwala, K. K. Singhvi, R. K. Garg.,"}}, {"text": "K. K. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5704, "end_char": 5717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. c. Agarwala, K. K. Singhvi, R. K. Garg.,"}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5719, "end_char": 5729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. c. Agarwala, K. K. Singhvi, R. K. Garg.,"}}, {"text": "S.S. Bhatf>/iagar and", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5732, "end_char": 5753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.S. Bhatf>/iagar and\n\nv. J. Francis, for respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "M. C. Rhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5800, "end_char": 5814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Rhandare and M. N. Shroff, for respondentNos."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5819, "end_char": 5831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Rhandare and M. N. Shroff, for respondentNos."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5990, "end_char": 6010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The J utlgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nGmwA M 1, J.-This appeal by special leave is dirocted against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay of 9th December, 1971, in Special Civil Application (S.C.A.) N<>."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6096, "end_char": 6107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reorganisation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6508, "end_char": 6532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Maharashtra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6954, "end_char": 6974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They h'!d impleaded in the said application five respondents, the first two being the State of Maharashtra and the Director of Agriculture, Maharashtra and the remain ing three respondents were the three Agricultural Officers impleaded in a representative capacity by leave of the High Court under order 1, rule 8, Civil Procedure Code."}}, {"text": "Director of Agriculture, Maharashtra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6983, "end_char": 7019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They h'!d impleaded in the said application five respondents, the first two being the State of Maharashtra and the Director of Agriculture, Maharashtra and the remain ing three respondents were the three Agricultural Officers impleaded in a representative capacity by leave of the High Court under order 1, rule 8, Civil Procedure Code."}}, {"text": "order 1, rule 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7166, "end_char": 7181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reorganisation Act, 1956", "statute": "Reorganisation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7183, "end_char": 7203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8000, "end_char": 8014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that the order of the High Court directly affects the interests of the present appellants, who are Agricultural Officers from the Madhya Pradesh region."}}, {"text": "9-9-1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8669, "end_char": 8677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"Accordingly, we allow the petition and quash the resolution of the Government dated 9-9-1960 and combined seniority list issued by the Government on 22-8-1962."}}, {"text": "22-8-1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8734, "end_char": 8743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"Accordingly, we allow the petition and quash the resolution of the Government dated 9-9-1960 and combined seniority list issued by the Government on 22-8-1962."}}, {"text": "17-2-1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8828, "end_char": 8837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the State Government wants to alt.er the basis of equation originally fixed on 17-2-1958, an opportunity to make representation against ihe proposed alteration has to be given to the persons likely to be affected."}}, {"text": "11.5.1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9364, "end_char": 9373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 to 89 are concerned, dated 11.5.1962 ..... \"."}}, {"text": "23rd January, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9603, "end_char": 9621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were, however, allowed by this Court on 23rd January, 1969, to withdraw the same \"without prejudice to all parties affected to make representations to the Government in accordance with section 115 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956\"\n\nAfter the above order of this Court, it is said that many Agri- A cultural Officers made representations to the Government of India under section 115 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9748, "end_char": 9759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9767, "end_char": 9798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9939, "end_char": 9950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the States Reorganisation Act, 1956", "statute": "the States Reorganisation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Government of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9967, "end_char": 9992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Maharashtra possed a Resolution of 16th May,, 1969, purporting to be an order giving new equation of posts in the Agricultural Departmnt in pursuance of which a gradation list was made on 27th September, 1969."}}, {"text": "16th May,, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10016, "end_char": 10031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Maharashtra possed a Resolution of 16th May,, 1969, purporting to be an order giving new equation of posts in the Agricultural Departmnt in pursuance of which a gradation list was made on 27th September, 1969."}}, {"text": "27th September, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10169, "end_char": 10189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Maharashtra possed a Resolution of 16th May,, 1969, purporting to be an order giving new equation of posts in the Agricultural Departmnt in pursuance of which a gradation list was made on 27th September, 1969."}}, {"text": "30. 6. 70", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10613, "end_char": 10622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "m the tollowing terms :- '\n\n\"For the reasons stated in the accompanying judgment, the Court makes absolute with costs the rule granted by it on 30."}}, {"text": "1st day of November 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11248, "end_char": 11272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "210-10-300 and to absorb the petitioners and to fix their\n\nsoniority on that bosis with effect from the 1st day of November 1956\"\n\nThe appellant and another person had also filed Special Civil Application No."}}, {"text": "2nd February, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11731, "end_char": 11749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondonts I to 19 were impleaded as respondents in that application and although they had been served, they did not file any return when the said application came up for hearing at Nagpur on 2nd February, 1972."}}, {"text": "Part X of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12643, "end_char": 12688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Part VIII of the Bombay Reorganisation Act 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12708, "end_char": 12755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13101, "end_char": 13112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VIII of the Bombay Reorganisation Act 1960", "statute": "Part VIII of the Bombay Reorganisation Act 1960"}}, {"text": "section 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13117, "end_char": 13128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VIII of the Bombay Reorganisation Act 1960", "statute": "Part VIII of the Bombay Reorganisation Act 1960"}}, {"text": "sections 81 and 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13144, "end_char": 13162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VIII of the Bombay Reorganisation Act 1960", "statute": "Part VIII of the Bombay Reorganisation Act 1960"}}, {"text": "section 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13261, "end_char": 13272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VIII of the Bombay Reorganisation Act 1960", "statute": "Part VIII of the Bombay Reorganisation Act 1960"}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13666, "end_char": 13669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VIII of the Bombay Reorganisation Act 1960", "statute": "Part VIII of the Bombay Reorganisation Act 1960"}}, {"text": "Government to do that which under the provi D sions of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14058, "end_char": 14120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Phatlkc", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14535, "end_char": 14542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Phatlkc, learned counsel for the appellants, raises several questions before us."}}, {"text": "Bhandare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15280, "end_char": 15288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G Mr. Bhandare, learned counsel for the Stale of Maharashtra, also, inter a/ia, took the point that the Central Government was a necessary party and the petition should have been dismissed by the High Court for non-joinder of that Government."}}, {"text": "December 24, 1971~", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15610, "end_char": 15628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "view of the High Court's order of December 24, 1971~ in Civil Application No."}}, {"text": "State of Maharashtr~", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15675, "end_char": 15695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3261 of 1971, of the State of Maharashtr~ and the Director of\n\n(I) A, tR. 1974 SC 457-1973 (I) sec 61\n\n(2) 1972 (2) s.c.c."}}, {"text": "sec 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15749, "end_char": 15755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court of 9th December, 1971", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16917, "end_char": 16956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Without, therefore~ going into the various points raised before us, we set aside the impugned judgment and order of tiie Bombay High Court of 9th December, 1971 and direct restoration of the Special Civil Application No."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_863_866_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "KHEM KARAN AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER April 8, 1974.\n\n(M .. H. BEG, Y. V. CllANDRACHUDAND V .• R .. KRISHNA IYER, JJ.J\n\nCode of Criminal Pr'Ocedure, 1908-A.ppeal against acqui1tal-Propriety oft Court of Appeal convicting sQme of the acquit1ed persons-Group clash-Scope\n\nof High CC?_url's power to re-evaluate evidence-Foundation for acquittal is remov~ by otherwise credi'ble testimony.\n\nIn a background of bitter hclstility, there was a confrontation and exchange of violence between the comp1ainants' group and that of all the ccused-appel lants. Several. on the prosecution side sustained gunshot wounds, although not fatal, while the three accused-appellants received lathi blow injuries. The com.;.. plainatit'.s plea was that when attacked by guns, he and his men went at them~ di'sarD; Ied . them and beat them with lathis. Twenty-three accused stood trial.\n\nThe trial court disbelieved the defence version out. found that the prosecution testimony too partisan, and consequently acquitted everyone. The High Court maintained the acquittal of all but the three appellants-accused. In respect of the latter, it found tht1.t the injuries on the persons of the three appe1lants and the fact that one of them had a gun in his hands at the time of the occurrence. were sufficient, together with the Qt her eVienCe to hold them guilty.\n\nOn appeal by special leave to this Court by the said three appellants,\n\nHELD: (1) The principle of law is well established that merely b:cause a diffcrept view of the evidence is possible, you cannot cancel a finding against guilt Dot the appellate Court is untrammelled in its power to re-evaluate the eviden~ bearing in minQ the seriousness of overthrowing an acquittal once recorded. In. that view we cannot find any error of 'aw in th~ High Court reconsidering ¢he probative value of the oral and circumstantial evidence in the case.\n\nNor are we persuaded to think that the a!')pellate Court has failed to observe. the built-in. -restraints on .exercise of rower while upsetting an acquittal.\n\nOn the other hand~ the Court has made the correct approach that only those accused against whom there was additional probative rei_nforcement could be convicted. [864 G-865 BJ\\\n\n(II) Neither mere possibilities nor remote pro 1babilities nor mere doubts which are not reasonable can, without danger to the administration. of justice,. be the foundation of the acquittal of an accused person, if there is Qt[herwise fairly credible testimony.\n\nIf a trial Courts~ judgment vrges on the perverse, the appellate Court has a duty to set the evaluation right and that is about all that has happened in this case. [865 E-F]\n\n(III) . The fact that a large numb:r of accused have been. acquitted and th:· remaining who have been convicted are less than five cannot vitiat'! th~ con viction under s. 149 read with the substantive offence if-as in this case the Court has taken care to find-'-there are other persons who might not have been identified or convicted but were party to the crime and together constituted the statutory number. On this basis, the convktion under s. 307, .read with s. 149' has to be sustned. [866 AB] ·\n\nSukh Ram v. State of U.P. A~I.R. 974, S.C. 323, referred to.\n\nBharwad Mepa Dana v. State of Bombay. [1962) 2 S.C.R. 172. relied Oll.\n\nCRIMIN, AL AnELLATE JURISDICTION :-Criminal Appeal No. 40 of 1971.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment anrl Order dated the 21st September, 1970 of the Allahabad High. Court at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 944 of 1967.\n\n12-LB4Sup. CI/75\n\n8 A4 SUPREME COURT REl'ORTS\n\n[1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\n/\\. L. Ko.'ili, for the appellant.\n\n0. l'. Rana; for respondent No. 1, ·\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by:_\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-This appeal by special leave, by three out of twenty three, who alone were convicted by the High Court in .reversal of a total aoquittal by the trial court, turns on the propriety of the Court of _Appeal convicting accused persons whose initial advantage of a presumption of innocence has been strengthened by a judicial affir.mation at the first level.\n\nThe !ew facts are these. Two groups-the complainants' and the accused's-have been on terms of bitter hostility-a background mate\n\nrial ,\\hich has kgitimately induced both the courts to be very sceptical about the veracity of the prosecution witnesses in the absence of unlying corroborat10n.\n\nAs found by both the courts, a confron\" talion and exchange of violence occurred on June 22, 1964 each party caliing the other aggressor.\n\nAnyway, several on the prosecution side. dia receive gunshot wounds, although luckily not fatal, and three among the accused bunch had on their person lathi blow injuries.\n\nThe trial Judge disbelieved the version of the defence but found the P.Ws. too partisan to pin his faith on, and in consequence acquitted everyone. The High Court agreed that unless the infirmity of interested testimony was cur, d by other credible evidence the fate of the case would be the same and on that basis dismissed the State's\n\nappeal against ali but the three appellants befor-e us.\n\nWas this exceptional treatment justified (a) by the evid_ence, and (bl in the light cf first court's acquittal ?\n\n. - • • I - .An encounter did take place and a case and counter-case ensued.\n\nThe accused-except a few who pleaded alibi in vain-daimed that faey were attacked.\n\nEven the trial court has rejected this contention 1nd the High Court has held that, having regard to the number and nature of injuries an:d the number of persons who bave been hit by fire power, the accused were the attackers. We see no reason to disturb this conclusion.\n\nEven so, how could you hand-pick three out cf twentr three for punishment?\n\nThe complainant's plea is that when attacked by guns he and his men went at them, disarmed them\n\nand boat them with lathis. The convkted three have injnries which fit in with this version.\n\nThe appellate Court has taken these injuries :is corroborative of participation in the rioting and attempt to murder\n\n(reod with s. 149, J.P.C.) charged against all the accused.\n\nThe short question is whether these wound bring home the guilt so .strongly as to warrant upsetting of an earlier acquittal. : .\n\n The principle of law is well-settled that merely because a differeni view of the evidence is possible--minds differ as rivers differyou cannot cancel a finding against guilt. But the appellate Court is untrammelled in its power to re-evaluate the evidence bearing in mind the seriousness of overthrowing an acquittal once recorded.\n\nIn that view we cannot find any error of law in the High Court\n\n' • ...\n\n._ __ _\n\nKllEM KARAN v. u. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) ' 865\n\nA rec:onsidering the probative value of the oral and circumstantial evidence in the case.\n\nNor are we persuaded to think that the appellate Court has failed to observe the bui!Hn restraints on exercise ol power while l!psdting an acquittal.\n\nOn the other lund. the Cour< has made the correct approach that only those accused against whom there was additional probative reinforcement could be convicted. So, it found. that the injuries on the persons of the three appellants and the fact B . that Si ya Ram, appellant No. 2, had a gun in his hands at the time of the occurrence were sufficient, together with the other evidence, to hole the appellants guility.\n\nWe cannot part with this case without mentioning the serious error sonie subordinate courts commit in. the application of the rule of benefit of reasonable doubt.\n\nFor instance, in the preocnt case the learned Sessions Judge has misguided himself by chasing bare possibilities 6l' doubt and exalting them into sufficiently militating factors justifying acquittal.\n\nThe following passage illustrates the grievous mistake of the learned Judge :\n\n\"I must concede that probabilities for such a situation are remote but possibilities cannot be ruled out.\n\nWe hav~ to see whether the incident took place in the manner as alleged by the prosecution or not. To inspire confidence of _ the Court the prosecution has to establish each link in its version beyond all doubts.\n\nWhen other links in the prosecution, as discussed above; have failed to inspire confidence, I think in such a case the benefit of doubt prevailing around the remaining links in the version must go to the accused.\"\n\nNeither mere possibilities. nor remote probabilitie~ nor mere doubts which are not reasonable can, without danger to the admhllstration of justice, be the foundation cif the acquittal of art accused person, if there js other}Yise fairly credible testimony. If a trial court's judgment verges on the perverse, the .appellate court_ has a duty to set the evaluation right and that is about all that has happened in this case. The High Court has given a large margin for reasonable donbt and confirmed the acquittal of a considerable number of the accused. --\n\n--~\n\nAlthough the surviving accused who have been convicted are only three, s. 149, and in any case s. 34, I.P.C., will rope in the appelants by way of constructive liability.\n\nThis Court has, in Sukh Ram\n\nv. State of U.P.,( 1) held that the acquittal of two out of three named accused does not bar the conviction of the third under s. 302, read with s. 34, if he is shown to have . committed the offence with unknown companions. As in that case, here also no possible prejudice can be claimed by the accused-appellants by the invocation of s.34, LP.C., even if twn!y out of twentv three have been acquitted. Moreover, this Court has in Bharwad Mena Dana v. State of, Bombay(2)\n\n(I) A.T.R. 1974 S.C. 323. (21\n\n(1962] 2 SCR J72. . ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\ntaken the view that nothing in .law prevents the .court from fin.cling A that the unlawful assembly consisted of less than five convicted persons and some unidentified persons together numbering more than !iv,.._ In: our view, the fact that a large number of accused have been acquitted and the remaining who have been convicted are less than five cannot vitiate the conviction under s. 149 read with the substantive offence if-as in this case the Court has taken care to\n\nfindthere are other persons who might not have be-on identified or B convicted but were party to the crime and together cc/nstituted the statu'.ory number.\n\nOn this basis, the conviction under s. 307, read with s. 149, has to be sustained.\n\nWhat remains is the Question of sentence. It is true that those assailants who did not receive injuries have escaped punishment aed conviction has been clamped down on those who have sustained inju ries in the course of the clash. It is equally true that those who have allegedly committed the substantive offences have jumped the gauntlet of the law and the appellants have been held guility only con,._ trUctively.\n\nWe also notice that the case has been pending for around ten years and the accused must have been in jail for some time, a circumstance which is relevant under the new Criminal Procedure Code rhou~ it has come iriJ.i.i operation only from April 1, 1974.\n\nTaking a conspectus of the 'Various circumstances in the case, some of which are indicated above, we are satisfied that the ends of justice would bo met by reducinii the sentence to three years rigorous imprisonment under s. 307, read with s. 149, and one yeacrigorous impri<onment under s. 147, I.P.C., the two terms running concurrently. \\ViL'i this modification regarding sentence, we dismiss the appeal.\n\nS.B.W.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 28, "entities": [{"text": "KHEM KARAN AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KHEM KARAN AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M .. H. BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y. V. CllANDRACHUDAND V .• R .. KRISHNA IYER, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2837, "end_char": 2843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3114, "end_char": 3120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3133, "end_char": 3139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1962) 2 S.C.R. 172", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3272, "end_char": 3291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L. Ko", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3605, "end_char": 3610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CI/75\n\n8 A4 SUPREME COURT REl'ORTS\n\n[1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\n/\\. L. Ko."}}, {"text": "l'. Rana", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3640, "end_char": 3648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'."}}, {"text": "June 22, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4470, "end_char": 4483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As found by both the courts, a confron\" talion and exchange of violence occurred on June 22, 1964 each party caliing the other aggressor."}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6037, "end_char": 6043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Si ya Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7182, "end_char": 7191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that Si ya Ram, appellant No."}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8961, "end_char": 8967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8985, "end_char": 8990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8992, "end_char": 8997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9218, "end_char": 9224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9236, "end_char": 9241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s.34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9426, "end_char": 9430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10042, "end_char": 10048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10324, "end_char": 10330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10342, "end_char": 10348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10958, "end_char": 10981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 1, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11029, "end_char": 11042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We also notice that the case has been pending for around ten years and the accused must have been in jail for some time, a circumstance which is relevant under the new Criminal Procedure Code rhou~ it has come iriJ.i.i operation only from April 1, 1974."}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11267, "end_char": 11273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11285, "end_char": 11291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11333, "end_char": 11339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11341, "end_char": 11346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_867_871_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "BIHAR STATE BOARD OF HINDU RELIGIOUS TRUSTS\n\nBHUBNESHWAR PRASAD CHOUDHARY & ANR.\n\nApril 9, 1974.\n\n[K. K. MATHEW AND A. ALAGIRISWAMI, JJ.) B BUrar Hindu Religious Trusrs Ac!, s. 2-Dedicatio1i of properties to idol- Wlien a religious trust. ·\n\nThe members of a family executed various documents the effect of which was that the executants had completelv dive.stetl themselves of any title to or interest in certain properties dedicated to a deity, and which, thereby, became the propertie~ of the deity. The appellant called upon the respondent, who had been appointed shebait and manager of all the dedicated properties, to furnish returns and the respondent filed a suit contending that the temple was not a religious trust within the meaning of the terms in s. 2 ( 1) of the Bihar Hindu .Re1igious Trusts Act but that it was a private endowment. The trial court held that the trust was one in which the public were interested. The High Court, in appeal, took a contrary view.\n\nAllowing_ the appeal to this Court,\n\nJI.ELD : On the facts of this case the trust should be deemed to be religious trust. as the DUblic are interested in it.\n\nThe temple Was sitriated within independent compound walls and not within the residential precincts of the founders.\n\nThere was provision for the appoint~ anent and dismissal of pujaris. The onlv right that the members of the family had was to have a member of the f<imi!y as manager or shebait; but the shebait was subject to the superinte.ndence and control of a body of outsiders\n\n(t>anches) who were given the power to remove the shebait if he did not act properly_ There could be no better indication of the fact that -the members of the public were associated with the management of the temple and interest in its management was created in them, thus bringing the trust directly within s. 2(g) of the Act. The tact that the provision regarding the panches was to come into effect oilly after the death. of the executants of the deed, does not affect the merits of the questiou. There was also provision for expenses over faquirs, -Sadhus and occasional festivals. Since the endowment was in favour of the idol itself proof of user by the public without interference would be cogent evidence that dedication was in favour of the public. (870 F-H; 871 C-D]\n\nDeoki Nandan v. Murlidhar [1956] S.C.R. 756, followed,\n\nF Bh'agwan Din v ... Har Saroop AJ.R. 1940' P.C. 7 and Ranzsaran DaJ v. Jai Ram Das, A I.R. 1943 Pat. 135, explained.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE J\\JRISDICTION :--Ovil Appeal No. 1871 of f967.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 3rd May, 1965 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original J; Jecree No. 345 of G 1960.\n\nD. Goburdhan, for the Appellant.\n\nK. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha, for Respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by- ALAGIRISWAMI, J.-The question for decision in .this appeal is whether the temple of Shree Maharaja Ram Janki Lacchuman Maha raj in the village of Mauza D(ogan in the State of Bihar is a religious trust within the meaning of the term in section 2, clause (1) of the Bibar Hinliu Religious Trusts Act, or a private endowment.\n\nTwo broth., rs, Ram Adhikari Choudhary and Ram Lochan Choudhary, and Amir Prasad Choudhary, son of their brother, for hims., lf and as guardian of Ramakant Prasad Choudhary, who were all members of joint Hindu family executed OJl 17: 6 .1921 a samarpannama by which they dedicated certain properties to the above mentioned temple.\n\nBy that deed of dedication they completely divested themselves of any interest in the properties except that Ibey and the m_embers of their families were to be shebaits. By the same deed five persons, who were absolute strangers to the family, were appointed panches \"to take the rendition of account of the income and ex?\"ndi\n\nture from the manager, shebait for the time being year after ye.ar on the death of the executants .... J, f in the opiniort. of the said panches the manager and shebait for the time being be found (illeg) and extravagant or there be any loss in respect of the income of the dedicated _property or the dedicated property which is at present or be acquired in future, in that case they should discharge the manager shebait for the time being and (appoint) other deserving manager, shebait, who be deemed according to the conditions mentioned ohove, in his place from among the _members of the family of the_ executants.\" The panches were given power to fill up vacancies in their ranks.\n\nD On 7·12-1928 Ram Adhikari Choudhary al0ne executed another samarpannnma endowing some further properties in favour of the temple, containing similar terms as in the earlier samarpannama; but in place of five panches mentioned in the earlier deed he appointed a fresh set of five panches, of whom only one belonged to the earlier set of panches. In this deed also it was provided that \"if any future E shebait fails to manage the dedicated properties, arrange ragbhog to the aforesaid deities properly, show negligence, spoil the property, and incur (un)-necessary expenses, the said panches will be competent to dismiss the said shebait and appoint another one out of the members of the family of me, the executant, who happens to be holli!st and capable.\"\n\nOn 14. 7 .1934 Ram Adhikari Choudhary executed aaother deed called 'ekrarnama' referring to the fact that he had adopted Bhagwat Prasad Choudhary, the present first respondent, and that he had been appointed shebait and manager c~ all the dedicated properties covered by the earlier two samarpannaas. He also directed that \"the stipulations contained irl th• sllmarpannama dated the 7th December, 1928 in respect of maintenance of account qf income and expenditure of the dedicated property, shalt hold good in respect of the management of the dedicated property and maintenance of the account of income a'nd expenditure.\" He mentioned nothing about the panches mentioned in the earlier deed, but provided that \"as (to) the appoidtment of shebaits in future, the practice to be followed will be that the shebait in office shall be fully competent to (appoint) during his life time or that after him he who amongst his sons be alive and most capable shall be appointed shebait of the said deities one after another. In case there be no male issue in the family of\n\nth~ shebait in office, firstly, amongst the male issue or in case there\n\nb~ no capable malt amongst the children of th~ aforesaid persons, the shebait in office shall be competent to appoint a shebait amongi; t\n\nthe children of my cousin (father's brother's sons) brothers, deemed to be capable.\n\nBut the shebait in office is and shall nof be competent to appoint a shebail from the family of other persons.\"\n\nIt is unnecessary for the purpose of this case to go into the ques;- tion whether by executing the samarpannama of 7.12.1928 and ek\n\nrarnama of 14.7, 1934 Ram Adhikari Choudhary was competent to change the provisions of 1921 document. It is not even clear whether .by this document he had intended to do away with the provisions contained in the earlier documents regarding the panches and their powers.\n\nBe that as it may, we are of opinion that the main point regarding :ill these documents is the fact that the executants had completely divested themselves of any title to or interest in the dedicated properties which thereby became the properties of the deity.\n\nThe only power which the members of the family thereafter had was to be shebaits arij managers of the temple.\n\nThe Subordinate Judge who tried this suit considered that the 1921 document created a trust in which the public were interested.\n\nBut in this to some extent he seems to have been inffuenced by a wrong reading of section 2(g) (i) of the Act, especially the words\n\n\"to participate in any religious or charitable ministration under such trust\".\n\nHe mistook the word 'ministration' to b'e 'administration'.\n\nThe difference between the woiqs would make all the difference as to whether any member of the public ccr.ild be said to be interested in the religious trust We have called for and perused the copy of the Act as printed in the official publicatio11 and we find that the word used is 'tninistration' and not 'administration'.\n\nThe question for decision in this case' therefore, has to be decided on the grounds other than the supposed presence of the word 'administration' in section 2(g)(i).\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court on the other hand took the view that the mere fact that the temple was situated within independent compound walls, though near the house of the founders, could not by itself indicate that the temple was meant. for public purposes. They further took the view that \"the cost over faqirs, sadhus and the occasional festivals would be ancillary to the main purpose, that is, for puja of the deity,\" As regards the panches mentioned in the documents they were of opinion that they had no opportunity to function or take any part in the affairs of the temple and the trust properties, and that there was nothing to indicat~ that the founder or founders of the trust intended that members of the public should be associated with the managementof the temple and the trust properties and the puja.\n\nThey also held that \"the mere fact that some other members of the public might be attending festivals like Ram Navami. Janmashtami etc. does not justify the inference that the trust or temple was created for the benefit or worship of the public at large or of some considerable portion of it\"\n\nWe find ourselves unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High_ Court. We are of opinion that the judgment of the High Court proceeds from failure to appreciate the effect of the judgment of this Court in Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar (1956 SCR 756). In that case the dedication of the properties was not as complete and as categorical as in the present case. Only in the absence of male issue, the entire immovable property was to stand endowed in the name of the deity.\n\nHalf of the income from the properties was to be taken by the two wives of the testator for their maintenance during their lifetime. If a son was born to the testator then the properties were to be divided between the son and the temple. A committee of four persons was appointed to look after the management of the temple and its proper .. ties, and of these, two were not the relations of the testator. The committee \"may appoint the testator's nephew as Mutawalli by their unanimous opinion''. The documents in the present case are only slightly different in that they providefor the members of the. family being shebaits. But the panches are all outsiders. In Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar this Court referred to certain facts as indicating that the endowment is to the public :\n\n\"Firstly, there is the fact that the idol was installed not within the precincts of residential quarters but in a separate building constructed for that very purpose on a vacant site.\n\nAnd as pointed out in Delroos Banoo Begum v. Nawab Syud Ashgur Ally Khan('), it js a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether a11 endo:, vment is private or public, whether the place of worship is located inside a private house or a public building. Secondly, it is admitted that some of the idols are permanently installed on a pedestal within the temple precincts. That is more consis.tent with the endowment being public rather than private. Thirdly, the puja in the temple is performed by an arhaka appointed from time to time.\"\n\nIn the present case the first factor is present. There is no evidence about the second. There is also provision for appointment and dimissal of pujaris. Though there is no evidenc_, in.this case, as in that case, that the temple was built at the request of the public we do not think that it makes much difference. We are particularly of the view that as the only right which the family had was to have a member of the family as a manager or shebait and the shebait was subjed to superintendence and control by a body of 011tsiders, who were given the power to remove the shebait if he did not act properly, it is decisive of the question as to the public character c( the temple. There could be no better indication of the fact that the members of the public were associated with the management of the iemple and interest in its management was created in them, thus bringing the matter directly within clause (g) of section 2 of the Act. The fact that this provision regarding the panches was to col1le into ~!feet only after the death of the executants of the deed, does not affect the merits of the question.\n\nWe are also of opinion that the learned Judges of the High Court were\n\n(I) 1875 15 B:n. LR. 167, 186.\n\nnot correct in their view that the fact that members of the public took part in the worship in the temple and the provision for faqirs etc. was of no signifjcance, and in rejying, upon the decision of the Privy Council in Bhagwan Din v. Har Saroop (AIR 1940 PC 7) for this purpose. In that case the properties were granted not in favour of an idol or temple, but in favour of a private illdividual., who was maintaining a temple, and his heir~. The contention in that case was that subsequent to the grant the family of the grantee must be held to have dedicated the temple to the. public for purposes of worship and it was this contention that was repel!ed' by the Privy Cou:ncil by observing that as the grant was initially to-mrcindividual, a plea that it was subsequently dedicated by the family to .the public requi.red to be ciearly made out and it was not made out rrierely by showing that the public was allowed.to worship at the temple. But in the present case, as in the case pf Deoki Na; ldan\n\nv. Murlidhar, the endowm_ent is in favour o[ the idol itself and in such circumstances proof of user by the public without interference would be cogent evidence that dedication was in favour of the public. The decision of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Ramsara11\n\nDas v. Jai Ram Das (AIR 1943 Pat 135) tha.t \"a mere provision for the service of sadhus, occasional guests and \\vayfarers in a dedication to an idol does not render the dedication substantially for public purpose\" must be understood in the background of that case where the properties originally stood in the names o'f various mahants and. the property was to be held by the grantee generation after generation and the Court held that the gift was to. the mahant personally.\n\nWe arc, therefore, satisfied that on the facts of this caso the trust should be deemed to be a religious trust as the public are interested E in it. The appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the High Court set aside, restoring the judgment of the learned Subordimte Judge. The 1st respondent will pay t\\te costs of the appcll.ant. The\n\nC.M.~. No. 3132 of 1973 is allowed.\n\nV.P .• S.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n. I", "total_entities": 30, "entities": [{"text": "BIHAR STATE BOARD OF HINDU RELIGIOUS TRUSTS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIHAR STATE BOARD OF HINDU RELIGIOUS TRUSTS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHUBNESHWAR PRASAD CHOUDHARY & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUBNESHWAR PRASAD CHOUDHARY & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 9, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 95, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 9, 1974."}}, {"text": "K. K. MATHEW", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. ALAGIRISWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. 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Sinha, for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "ALAGIRISWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2806, "end_char": 2818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- ALAGIRISWAMI, J.-The question for decision in .this appeal is whether the temple of Shree Maharaja Ram Janki Lacchuman Maha raj in the village of Mauza D(ogan in the State of Bihar is a religious trust within the meaning of the term in section 2, clause (1) of the Bibar Hinliu Religious Trusts Act, or a private endowment."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2981, "end_char": 2986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- ALAGIRISWAMI, J.-The question for decision in .this appeal is whether the temple of Shree Maharaja Ram Janki Lacchuman Maha raj in the village of Mauza D(ogan in the State of Bihar is a religious trust within the meaning of the term in section 2, clause (1) of the Bibar Hinliu Religious Trusts Act, or a private endowment."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3042, "end_char": 3051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Adhikari Choudhary", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3147, "end_char": 3169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rs, Ram Adhikari Choudhary and Ram Lochan Choudhary, and Amir Prasad Choudhary, son of their brother, for hims.,", "canonical_name": "Ram Adhikari Choudhary"}}, {"text": "Ram Lochan Choudhary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3174, "end_char": 3194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rs, Ram Adhikari Choudhary and Ram Lochan Choudhary, and Amir Prasad Choudhary, son of their brother, for hims.,"}}, {"text": "Amir Prasad Choudhary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3200, "end_char": 3221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rs, Ram Adhikari Choudhary and Ram Lochan Choudhary, and Amir Prasad Choudhary, son of their brother, for hims.,"}}, {"text": "Ramakant Prasad Choudhary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3278, "end_char": 3303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lf and as guardian of Ramakant Prasad Choudhary, who were all members of joint Hindu family executed OJl 17: 6 .1921 a samarpannama by which they dedicated certain properties to the above mentioned temple."}}, {"text": "7·12-1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4482, "end_char": 4491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D On 7·12-1928 Ram Adhikari Choudhary al0ne executed another samarpannnma endowing some further properties in favour of the temple, containing similar terms as in the earlier samarpannama; but in place of five panches mentioned in the earlier deed he appointed a fresh set of five panches, of whom only one belonged to the earlier set of panches."}}, {"text": "14. 7 .1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5240, "end_char": 5251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 14."}}, {"text": "Ram Adhikari Choudhary", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5252, "end_char": 5274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 .1934 Ram Adhikari Choudhary executed aaother deed called 'ekrarnama' referring to the fact that he had adopted Bhagwat Prasad Choudhary, the present first respondent, and that he had been appointed shebait and manager c~ all the dedicated properties covered by the earlier two samarpannaas.", "canonical_name": "Ram Adhikari Choudhary"}}, {"text": "Bhagwat Prasad Choudhary", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5358, "end_char": 5382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 .1934 Ram Adhikari Choudhary executed aaother deed called 'ekrarnama' referring to the fact that he had adopted Bhagwat Prasad Choudhary, the present first respondent, and that he had been appointed shebait and manager c~ all the dedicated properties covered by the earlier two samarpannaas."}}, {"text": "7th December, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5620, "end_char": 5638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also directed that \"the stipulations contained irl th• sllmarpannama dated the 7th December, 1928 in respect of maintenance of account qf income and expenditure of the dedicated property, shalt hold good in respect of the management of the dedicated property and maintenance of the account of income a'nd expenditure.\""}}, {"text": "7.12.1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6826, "end_char": 6835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is unnecessary for the purpose of this case to go into the ques;- tion whether by executing the samarpannama of 7.12.1928 and ek\n\nrarnama of 14.7, 1934 Ram Adhikari Choudhary was competent to change the provisions of 1921 document."}}, {"text": "section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7701, "end_char": 7713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(g)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8368, "end_char": 8383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12410, "end_char": 12419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13962, "end_char": 13978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Ramsara11\n\nDas v. Jai Ram Das (AIR 1943 Pat 135) tha.t \"a mere provision for the service of sadhus, occasional guests and \\vayfarers in a dedication to an idol does not render the dedication substantially for public purpose\" must be understood in the background of that case where the properties originally stood in the names o'f various mahants and."}}, {"text": "AIR 1943 Pat 135", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14013, "end_char": 14029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_872_881_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "8 72\n\nMANAGEMENT COMMITTEE T. K. GHOSH'S ACADEMY A v.\n\nT. C. PALIT & ORS.\n\nApril 9, 1974.\n\n(P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.) B Con3ti111tion of lridia. 1950-Art. 133( 1) (a)d:(b)-Distinction beJween clause (a) and (b).\n\nThe plaintiff-respondents filed a suit for the efcctment of the defcndantappellant from the premises in dispute and for recovery of certain amount on account of arrears of rent The defendant-appellant on the other hand claimed that under the deed of trust they were entitled to occupy the satd premises\n\nwithout payment of rent.\n\nThe lower court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents. On a9peal the High Court set aside the decree for eject- C ment and reduced the amount for recovery.\n\nThe High Court,.granted certificate of fitness under clauses (a) and (b) of Art. 133(1) of the Constitution.\n\nOn apPeal it was contended by the respondents that the Hi_.Jl Court was wrong in granting the certificate of fitness aµd that it should be cantcned.\n\nDismissing the a99lication for cancellation of certificate of fitness, HELD: The appeal is maintainable under Art. 133(l)(b) of th.e Constitution.\n\nTo attrac; l the applkation of Art. 133(1)(b) it is essential that there must be a judgment' involving directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting\n\nproperty or an amount or value not less than rupees twenty thousand. The variation in the language used in clauses (a) and (b) of Art. 133(1) pointedly highlights the conditions which attract the application of the two clauses. Under\n\nclause (a) what is decisive is the amOunt or value of the subject matter in the court of first instance and ·still in dispute\" in appeal to the Supreme Court : under clause (b) it is the aniount or value of the property rcspCcting which a claim or question is involved in the judgment sought to be appealed from. The expression \"property'' is not defined but having regarJ to the use of the expression .. amount'' it would apparently include money.\n\nBut the property respecting which the claim or question urises must be property in addition to or other than the subject matter of the dispute. If in a proposed appeal there is no claim or question raised respecting property other than the subject matter, clause (a) will apply : if there is involved in the appeal a claim or question respectin$ pro- . perty of an amount or value not less than rupee twenty thousand in addition to or other than the subject matter of the dispute clause (b) will apply. [878 F-H]\n\nChhitannal v. Mis. Shah Pa111wlal Clzand11lal, [19651 2 S.C.R. 751, referred lo.\n\nThe judgment of the High Court in the present case plainly did not affirm the decision of the trial court b;?cause the High Court set aside the decree fllr ejectroent_and also reduced the amount for the recovery of which decree for ejectmcnt and also reduced the amount. for the recovery of which decree had been awarded by the trial court. The variation of the decree of the trial court was in favour of tho defendants-appellants but that circumstance would not detract from the fact that the judgment of the High Court was not one of affirmance of the decision of the trial court. In determining the character of the appellate decree what has to be looked into is the appellate decree taken in its entu-ety and compare it with the decision of the trial court as a whole and decide whether the appellate decree is one of affirmance or not. In this enqutry the nature of the variation made whether it is in favour of the intending appellant or otherwise would not be relevanl. [877 G-HJ\n\nTiumalachetti Rajarani v. Tirunralachelti Radlwkris/Jnayya Chell) .. , [1'62] 2 S.C.R. 452, followed.\n\nJn the illstant case tbe said Premises were admittedly of the value of more than rupees twenty thousand. The school premises were plainly not the subject\n\n. B\n\nMA!(AGEMENT GHFSH ACADEMY v. T. c. PALIT (Khanna, /.) 873\n\nmatter of tho dispute because if that bad been so the case would have fallen undor clauoe ·(a). On the contrary the present was a case IOlating to a claim n:ing property of the vah1e of more than rupees t\\\\tenty thousand. The ea:1e as such would fall within the ambit of clause ( b). [879 CJ\n\nSIU'Qpati Roy & Ors. v. Rant Narayan Muklzerji &: Ors., .50 Indian Appeal11 15.5, relied on.\n\nBombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Jagan Nalh Pandurang & Anr. [1972] 3 S.C.R. 92~, held inapplicable •\n\nCIVIL APPJ,.LLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 570 ol 1969.\n\nFrom the Judgment and decree dated the 29th September, 1967 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 459 of 1961. c D. P. Uniyal and S. N. Singh, for the appellant.\n\nS. C. Agarwala, V. /. Francis and s. S. Bhatnagar, for respondent nos. 1 and 2.\n\nThe J udi:mcnt of the Cou:t was delivered h~ - -\n\nKH.•NNA, J .. A decree for ejectment from the premises in dispute and for recovery of Rs. 7, 163/12/3 was awarded by learned Additional Sub Judge Patna in favour of the two plajntitl-respondents against the Board of Trustees T. K. Ghosh s Academy Patna and other defendants.\n\nOn appeal filed by some of the defendants tbc Patna High Court set aside the decree for ejectmcnt.\n\nThe .amount for the recovery of which decree had been awarded by the trial. court was aL; o reduced to Rs. 3,725/2/-.\n\nThe present appeal has been filed on certificate bv the Managing Comm\\ttec T. K.\n\nGhosh's Academy and other defendants against the decision of the High Court.\n\nThe two plaintifirespondents are the sons o[ Shri Jadu Nath.\n\nPaJit who founded in 1876 a school known as T. K. Ghosh\"s Ac:.demv.\n\nThe school attracted some of the best students and Dr.\n\nRajendra Prasad, Dr. B. C. Roy, Mr. Hasan Imam and Mr. Sachidanand Sinha received their education in this school. The school was run in premises which originally belonged to one Mr. Boilard.\n\nShri Jadu Nath died in 1901 leaving behind three minor sons, two of v; bom. were the plaintiff-respondents and the third was their brother Dr. K. L. Pali!.\n\nAfter Jadu Nath\"s death, the management of the school was looked after bv the sons of Shri T. K. Gh<>sh in whose memory the school had bee.n founded.\n\nShri T. K. Ghosh was th<> brother-in-law of Shri J_a!!.u Nath.\n\nA Managing Committee was formed bv the sons of T. K. Ghosh for the management of the school in 1905 or 1906. Nearabout 1914 the management of the school was taken over bv Shri Jadu Nath's sons.\n\nIn 1918-19 the Managing Committee of the school wa~ reformed under the directions of \\he Board of Second_ary Education.\n\nOn September 11, 1919 the school building was purchased by the three sons of Shri Jadu Nath from Mr. Boi!arll as per sale deed Ex.C. On July. 28, 1930 Dr. K. L Palit sold his share in the school building in favour of his two brothers. 1iz., the plaintiff-respondents, as per sale deed Ex.CL\n\nOu August 13, 1950 the two plaintiff-respondents executed Deed_ of Trust Ex.P appointing Rai Bahadur Nirmal Chandra Ghosh, Retired Dis:rict and Sessions Judge and six others as trustees of the school.\n\nThe object an'd the subject matter of the trnst would be clear from . the following :\n\n\"Whereas the setljors are the proprietors ol the Hig_h l!ng1ish School named T. K. Ghosh's Academy new located in a building owned alld possessed by the settlors situated in Ma, halla Chowahatta thana Pirbahore district Patna. .\n\nAnd whereas the settlors being desirous of the continuance of. the school and the perJietuation of the memory of. the person after whom it is named and the association of same with the name of the institution, of the retention in it of Bengali as a subject of instruction and also as a mttiium of instruction as far as possible and also of the improvement. extension or alteration as regards the standard and subjects of instruction in the institution as may be considered suitable for the benefit of students, have decided to settle in trust for this purpose the said school consisting of its name good will together tvith its funds, furniture, library an\\! .other educational appliances and equipments as a functionin£ institution affiliated to the Patna University in the oanner and on the condition hereinafter following.\n\nNow this Deed witnesses. as follows :-\n\n1. In pursuance oLthe said desire of the settlors the sett1ors do hereby transfer and assign unto the trustees the S, llid High School T. K. Gosh's Academy with all that prope1ty consistin)! of the funds, furniture, library and equipments described and Uetailed ill the schedule hereto to hold the same upon trust to .fulfil the object Of the settlers and . on. the conditions and With_ and subject to the powers provisions and agreements herei!l contained.\"\n\nClauses 4, 6, 9; 10, 11 and 15 of the trust read as under : . ~'(4) -The trustees will be entitled to nominate 2 (two) . members out of. themselves, to the managing committee of the school in addition to the Headmaster who will ex-officio be a member. ·\n\nc 61 At !east one male descendant of Ilabu Jadu Nath Palit deceased shall. if available. be always a member of the body of trustees . • ( 9) The trustees shall find other premises for the location cf the school and. shift the school there within 5 (five l -vcars of the date of the deed and vacate the present premises\n\nto the settlors.\n\n110) The trustees shall forthwith start a building fund for the school.· · ·\n\n... c\n\nE --·\n\nJIIANAGEMENT GHFSH ACADEMY v. -T. c. PALIT (Khanna, !.) ~75\n\n(11) The settlors will receive a house rent of Rs. 250/- per month for the said period of 5 (five) years for the premises now occupied by the school as owners of the premises.\n\nThe settlors have agreed that any surplus left over therefrom, after deducting the amount spent on necessary repairs of the house and on taxes, ground rent and other necessary outgoings in respect of the premises for the said period of 5 (five) years will go as the contribution of the settlors to the buil'ding fund as provided in the preceding paragraph, and the trustees will be entitled to receive directly from the school such surplus and deposit it in the said building fund.\n\n(15) All matters and questions relating to the proprietary rights in the school (exclusive of the land and buildings where in the school is at present located, which does not from part of the trust property) and its properties will be disposed of by the trustees.\" It may be stated that the school building initially stood on holding .\n\nNo. 20. In 1951 the building was extended to holding No. 22 also.\n\nThe upper portion of the building on holding No. 22 is used for the headmaster's residence and the lower portion for running the classes.\n\nAccording to the plaintiff-respondents, jt was agreed that they would be paid a rent of Rs, 37 /8 /- for the building on holding No. 22. The\n\ntotal rent thus came to Rs. 287/8/- i.e. Rs. 250 for the building on holding No. 20 and Rs. 37 /8/- for the building on holding No. 22. It is fu{ther the case of the plaintiffs that in or about June 1956 it was settled by the trustees and ihe Managing Committee of the school with the consent of the plaintiffs that out of the monthly rent of Rs. 287 /8 fa cash amount of Rs. ,190/- would be paid directly to the plaintiffs. and the balance of Rs. 9718 /- could be paid by the Managing Committeeof the school to the trustees for p_ayment of latrine and water taxes of the municipality and for meeting costs of periodical repairs.\n\nAs the premises were not vacated within five years of the execution of the Ded of Trust, the plaintiff-respondents after serving notice of demand filed the present suit on July 28, 1959 against the Board of Trustees T. K. Ghosh's Academy and other defendants. One of the reliefs claimed was for ejctment of the defendants from the premises in dispute. The other relief claimed was for recovery of Rs. 7,163/12/3' on account of arrears of rent frclm August, 1956 till July, 1959 and\n\n- -other items, the details of which were given in Schedule I to the plaint.\n\nThe suit was contested by defendants No. 2, 3, 7 and 12 in their capacity as members of the Managing Committee. The other defendants, including the trustees, did not contest the suit. According lo the contesting defendants, there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and T. K. Ghosh's Academy and its Managing Committee. It was also stated that there was no contract to pay the rent of Rs. 287 /8/- per month. The Deed of Trust was stated by the -\n\ncontesting defendants to be fraudulent, illusory and void . document.\n\nAccording further to the contesting defendants, the school was founded\n\nby the father of plaintiffs for the uplift of education and for public good with no motive to derive any personal benefit. The building was\n\nalso stated to have been dedicated by the founder for the use of the public. ·\n\nThe trial court, as mentioned earlier, decreed the suit. It was held that the Deed of Trust was a genuine and valid document and was binding on the school and its Managing Committee. As regards the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant. the trial court held that the contract of.tenancy was evidenced by the Deed of Trust and was binding upon the parties.\n\nIn appeal before the High Court contention was advanced on behalf of the contesting defendants that there had been a dedication of the school building in favour of the school by the fat\\ler of the plaintiffrespondents who had founded the school.\n\nArgument was further advanced that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the Deed of Trust was not binding upon the contesting defendants. Contention was also raised that the suit for ejectment was not maintainable unless the tenancy had been determined by the giving of a notice under section I 06 of the Transfer of Property Act The High Court rejected t'ie contention that there had been dedica tion of the school building. Likewise, the contention that there did no arise the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was rejected. The High Court set aside the decree for .ejectment because it was of the xiew that such decree could be awarded only after determination of the tenancy by giving a notice under section IG6 of the Transfer of Property Act. The High Court further reduced the amount for the recovery of which the decree had been awarded, because it was of the view that certain deductions were permissible out of the amounts claimed by the plaintiffs. In the result the amount for which decree had been awarded was reduced to Rs. 3,725/2/7•\n\nAt the hearing of the appeal Mr. Agarwal on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents has contended that the High Court was in error in granting. a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court in favour of the defendant-appellants. An application has also been filed on. behalf of the plaintiff-respondents for cancelling the certificate of fitness granted by the High Court. This application has been resisted by the appellants.\n\nWe may state at the outset that the High Court granted the ccrtifi cate of fitness under clauses (a) and (b) of article 133(1) of the Constitution. Mr. Uniyal on behalf of the appellants has frankly stated that the certificate could be granted only under clause\n\n(b) and not under clause (a). We agree with Mr. Uniyal in this respect. and are of the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for cancelling the certificate of fitness.\n\nThe plaintiff-respondents. as would appear from the resume o[ facls given above, had prnyed fqr a decree of ejcct1ncnt fron1 the pr.:1nises in dispUic and for r:'CO\\'ery of J{s. 7.163 1 76 -. rh.: jurisdictional \\'~1luc of the suit was mentioned to be Rs. 10.613/76/- consisting of the amount of Rs. 7,163/76 and Rs. 3450 representing 12 months rent at the rate of Rs. 287/50. The present case did not fall under clause\n\n(a) of article 133(1) because it could not be said that the amount or\n\n1,!ANAGEMENT GHOSH ACADEMY v. r. c. PALIT (Khanna, J;) 8 77\n\nvalue of the subject-matter of the dispute was not less than twenty thousand rupees. Question then arises whether the defendant-appellants were entitled to certificate under clause (b) of article 133(1).\n\nArticle 133(1) at the relevant time read as under: ·\n\n\"133 (1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court lrom any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies- { a) that the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less than twenty thousand rupees or such other sum as may bi' specified in that behalf by Parliament by Jaw; or\n\n(b) that judgment, decree or final order involves direct!)' or indirectly some claim or question respecting properti of the like amount or value; or ( c) that the case is a lit one for appeal to the Supreme\n\nCourt;\n\nand, where the judgment, decree or fincl c:oer appealed fron:i affirms the decision of tbe court i:nrr; cdiately below in any case other than a case referred to in sub-clause ( c) if the High Court further certifies tbat the &ppeal involves some substantial questio:i of law.\" It may be stated that there has been a subsequent amendment of article 133(1) by the Constitution (Thirtieth Amendmont) Act,\n\n1973. We are, however, in the present case concerned with the article as it stood before the amendment. Perusal of clause (b) of article 133 (I) shows that an appeal shall lie to this Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court if the High Court certifies that the judgment, decree or final order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of the value of not less than twenty thousand rupees. It is further necessary that where the judgment, decree or final order appeal.id from affirms the decision of the court immediately below, the High Cotirt should certify that the appeal involves some substantial question of law. The judgment of the High Court in the present case plainly did not affirm the decision of the trial court because. the High Court set aside the decree for ejectment and also reduced the amount for the recovery of which decree had been awarded by the trial court. It is no doubt true that the variation of the decree of the trial court was in favour of the defendant-appellants but that circumstance would not detract from the fact that the judgment of the High Court was not one of affirmance of the decision of the trial court. As observed by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Tirumalachetti Rajamm\n\nv. Tirimwlachetti Radhakrishnayya Chelly( 1). in delerntining the character of the appellate decree, we have to look at the appellate decree taken in its entirety and compare it with the decision of the !rill court\n\n(I) [1962] 2 SCR 452.\n\n. as a whole and decide whether the appellate decree is one of affirmance or not. In this enquiry the nature of the variation made whether it is in favour of the intending appellant or otherwise would not be relevant.\n\nAs regards the applicability of clause (b) of article 133(1), we may obser\\'~ that there is a vital distinctiori between clauses (a) and\n\n(b) of article 133(1) and the areas covered by the two clauses are clearly demarcated. Clause (aJ speaks of the subject-matter of the dispute and what is required by the clause to bring a case within its ambit is that the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the court of first instance and still in dispute was and is not less than twenty tl; ousand rupees or such other sum as may be specified in that behalf by Parliament by law. As against that, clause (b) of Article 133(1) makes no mention of the subject-matter of the dispute and it is immate:ial for this clause as to what is the amount or value of the subject-matter in dispute. What is essential to invoke clause (b) is that the judgment, decree or final order should involve directly or indirectly some claim or quesiion respecting property of the amount or value of not less than tv.:enty thousand rupees or such other sum as may be specified in that behalf by ParEament by law. Clause (b) thus deals with a claim or question respecting property. If a judgment, decree or final order inYolves claim or question respecting property and it is shO\\Vn that the property is of the an1ount or value of not less than twer,!y thousand rupees. the clause would be attracted. It is plain fror,1 the language of clause (b) that the property respecting v.; hich cJai:-n or question i.s involved in the judgn1cnt, decree or final order is r.ci the subject matter of the dispute, ior if that property were the subject matter of the dispute the case would fall not under clause\n\n(b) but under clause (a) of artick 133(1). It may also be mentioned that the requirement of clause (b) would be satisfied if the judgment, decree or final order involves, not directly but even indirectly, some claim or question' respecting property of the amount or value of not less than twenty thousand rupees.\n\nTo a<lract the application of article 133 (I) (b) it is essential that there must be-omitting fron1 consideration other conditions not material-a ju<lg:inent involvin~ directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of an amount or value not less than Rs.20,QOG.\n\nThe vari<1tion in the JanQuac used in clauses (a) and (b)of article 133 poir.tedly highlights -theconditions which attract the app'icati0-1 of the t\\\\'O clauses. Under clause (a) y, rhat is decisive is the nn1ount er value of the subject-matter in the court of first instance and ''still in\n\ndispute\" nrpeal to the Supreme Court : under clnuse (b) it is the amount er \\'alue of the property respecting \\Vhich n c1aim or qtcstion\n\nj') in:volvc<l in the judg1nent sough_t to b:: appe1.lled fr?1n The cxpr.;:s sion 'propcrty\".'is not defined in. the Code, but hav1n~ regard to Lhc us;:: of the expression \"an1oun~\" 1t wou]~ apparcnty incl.udc 111on:J'- But the property respecting \\Vlnc~ the cla1n1 r question arises rn_ust be\n\nproperty in addition to or other tnan the subiect-mattcr _of the d1spte.\n\nIf in a proposed appeal thc1:-::: is no claim or quesho~ ra1s1::<l rcs.cct1ng property other than the ub1c.1-~1atter, clai.; c (al \\VIII .apply: H there is invohrcd in the appeal a c1a11n or question respecting property of\n\nMANAGEMENT GHOSH ACADEMY v. T. c. PALIT (Khanna, J.) B79\n\nan amount or value not. less than Rs. 20,000 in addition to or other than the subject-matter of the dispute clause (b) will apply (see Chhitarma/ v. \"M/s Shah Panna/al Chandu/al(1).\n\nKeeping the above principles in view, we have no doubt that the .:ase of the appellant falls under clause. (b) of article 133(1). As would appear from the resume of facts given earlier, the case of the plaintiffs was that the defendants were liable to pay rent for being .in occupation of the school premises. As against that, the case of the defendant-appellants was that they were entitled to occupy the &afd premises for carrying on the school without payment of rent. It is manifest that the judgment and decree of the High Court as well as the trial court involved a claim or question respecting the school prcmisea: The said premises are admittedly of the value of more than\n\nrup<:es twenty thousand.\n\nTh.o school premises were plainly not the subject-matter of the dispute because if that had been so, \\It• case would have fallen under clause (a). On the contrary, the present was a case relating to a claim respecting property of the value of more than rupees twenty thousand. The case as such would fall within the admit of clause (b). We may in this context refer to a decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Surapati Roy & Ors. v. Ram Narayan Mukherji & Ors.( 2 ). Question which arose in that case was regarding the validity of a certificate granted by the High Court under section\n\n110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though the rent claimed in the suits was less than Rs. 10,000 the High Court granted a certificate of fitness.\n\nObjection was taken before the Judicial Committe, e regarding the validity of the certificate on the ground that the subject-matter was of a value of less than Rs. 10,000. The objectioµ was repelled by the Judicial Committee in the following words :\n\n\"The subject matter in dispute relates to a recurriny liability and is in respect of a property considerably above the appealable value. The certificate in the circumstances is\n\nquite in order.\"\n\nReference has been made by Mr. Agarwal to the_ decision of this Court in the case of Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. lagan Nath Pa11durang & Anr.('). The respondent in that case filed applications under the\n\nPayment of Wages Act claiming overtime wages for the period 1957 to 1958 and wages for weekly off days for the period 1962 to 1963.\n\nThe appellant filed appeal to this Court against the judgment of the High Court setting aside the order of the appellate authority holding the claim to be time-barred. The appeal was filed on the basis of a certifica.te under article 133(1)(b). It was held that the certificate issued by the High Court under article 133 ( l) (b) was not proper.\n\nQuestion was posed in that case that the certificate could be granted under the above clause as there was a recurring liability which if calcuMed for subsequent yeors would come to Rs. 20,0CO or more.\n\nThis Court was not impressed with the above argument. The said case\n\n(I) (19651 2 SCR 751.\n\n(3) (1972] 3 SCR 929.\n\nI l-84SupCi/75\n\n(2) 50 Indian Appeuls 155.\n\ncannot be. of much assistance to, the. plaintiff-respondents _because in that case there was .no claim' or question respecting property of the A value of more than Rs.' 20;000 .. in he preSent case we have both the elements, namely, of a recurring claim and of a claim in respect of property of the value of more than Rs. 20,000. We, therefore, hold that the appeal is maintainable under article l33(1J(b) of the Constitu- . tion. The application for cancellation ct. the certificate of fitness granted by the High Court is dismissed. _\n\nComing to the merits of the appeal, we find that till the execution of the Deed of Trust on August 13, 1950, the school in question was treated as a proprietary school. This is clear from the inspection note dated December 10, 1947 of the Inspector of Schools. According to the inspection note, this institution was a proprietary school and the proprietors made good any deficit that accrued in running the school efficiently. In the annual statement dated January 8, 195Q relating to the school which had to be furnished by the school authorities to the Board of Secondary Education, it was mentioned that the proprietors of the school were the plaintiff-respondents. It was by Deed .of Trust dated August 13, 1950 that the plaintiff-respondents transferred and assigned to the trustees property consisting of the funds, furniture, library and equipment described and detailed in the Schedule to the Trust Deed. The Trust Deed, however, made it clear that the land and building wherein the school was located did not form part of the trust property. As the school did not own any building of its own and was being run in the building belonging to the plaintiff-respondents, it was reSolved by the trustees that efforts be made for acquiring land for the school building and for collecting and depositing funds for the . co!l!truction of the building. This is clear from the resolutions passed in the meetings of the trustees held on May 21, 1951 and April 20, 1952.\n\nIt has been argued on behalf of the appellants that no liability for . payment of rent call. be fastened upon the defendants and that the High Court was in error in holding to the con(!:ary. There is, in our opinion, no force iti this contention. It has been proved upon the material on record that the Managing Committee has been receiving deficit grants from the Government on the basis of statements showing house rent payable by it for school building to be Rs. 250 plus .. Rs. 37.50 per\n\nmonth. In view of the fact that the school receives grant from the Government on the representation that an amount of Rs. 287.50 has to be paid on account of house rent, it hardly lies in the mouth of the appellants to assert that there is no liability for the payment of rent for the school building. Jn. addition to that, we find that the Managing\n\nI \\J -,\n\n:. __\n\nMANAGEMENT GHOSH ACADEMY \"· T. c. PALIT (Khanna, /.) 881\n\nCommittee in its resolution'/passed in the meeting held on December 23, 1954 admitted that an amount of Rs. 287.50 was to be paid as rent to the proprietors for the school premises including the portion in the occupation o.f the headmaster. The fact that rent of Rs. 287.50 wns agreed to be paid for the school buildings was also ment:oned in the audit report relating to the school for ihc period April 1956 to October 1956.\n\nJn view of the above material, we find no cogent ground to interfere with the judgment of the High Court maintaining decree for recovery of money to the extent of Rs. 3,725/2/· in favour of the plaintiff-respondents. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed, C but in tl1c circumstances \\Vithout osts.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dis111iset1.", "total_entities": 74, "entities": [{"text": "72\n\nMANAGEMENT COMMITTEE T. K. GHOSH'S ACADEMY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE T. K. GHOSH'S ACADEMY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "T. C. PALIT & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "T. C. PALIT & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 9, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 88, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 9, 1974."}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 133( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167, "end_char": 179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 812, "end_char": 823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1106, "end_char": 1120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1175, "end_char": 1189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1435, "end_char": 1446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1684, "end_char": 1697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under\n\nclause (a) what is decisive is the amOunt or value of the subject matter in the court of first instance and ·still in dispute\" in appeal to the Supreme Court : under clause (b) it is the aniount or value of the property rcspCcting which a claim or question is involved in the judgment sought to be appealed from."}}, {"text": "[1972] 3 S.C.R. 92", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4334, "end_char": 4352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "D. P. Uniyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4573, "end_char": 4585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c D. P. Uniyal and S. N. Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4590, "end_char": 4601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c D. P. Uniyal and S. N. Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "s. S. Bhatnagar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4657, "end_char": 4672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Agarwala, V. /. Francis and s. S. Bhatnagar, for respondent nos."}}, {"text": "KH.•NNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4754, "end_char": 4761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The J udi:mcnt of the Cou:t was delivered h~ - -\n\nKH.•NNA, J .. A decree for ejectment from the premises in dispute and for recovery of Rs."}}, {"text": "Board of Trustees T. K. Ghosh s Academy Patna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4961, "end_char": 5006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7, 163/12/3 was awarded by learned Additional Sub Judge Patna in favour of the two plajntitl-respondents against the Board of Trustees T. K. Ghosh s Academy Patna and other defendants."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5076, "end_char": 5092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal filed by some of the defendants tbc Patna High Court set aside the decree for ejectmcnt."}}, {"text": "Jadu Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5459, "end_char": 5468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two plaintifirespondents are the sons o[ Shri Jadu Nath.", "canonical_name": "Jadu Nath\"s"}}, {"text": "T. K. Ghosh\"s", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5515, "end_char": 5528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PaJit who founded in 1876 a school known as T. K. Ghosh\"s Ac:.demv.", "canonical_name": "T. K. Ghosh\"s"}}, {"text": "Rajendra Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5596, "end_char": 5611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The school attracted some of the best students and Dr.\n\nRajendra Prasad, Dr. B. C. Roy, Mr. Hasan Imam and Mr. Sachidanand Sinha received their education in this school."}}, {"text": "B. C. Roy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5617, "end_char": 5626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The school attracted some of the best students and Dr.\n\nRajendra Prasad, Dr. B. C. Roy, Mr. Hasan Imam and Mr. Sachidanand Sinha received their education in this school."}}, {"text": "Hasan Imam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5632, "end_char": 5642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The school attracted some of the best students and Dr.\n\nRajendra Prasad, Dr. B. C. Roy, Mr. Hasan Imam and Mr. Sachidanand Sinha received their education in this school."}}, {"text": "Sachidanand Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5651, "end_char": 5668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The school attracted some of the best students and Dr.\n\nRajendra Prasad, Dr. B. C. Roy, Mr. Hasan Imam and Mr. Sachidanand Sinha received their education in this school."}}, {"text": "Boilard", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5778, "end_char": 5785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The school was run in premises which originally belonged to one Mr. Boilard."}}, {"text": "K. L. Pali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5931, "end_char": 5941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "were the plaintiff-respondents and the third was their brother Dr. K. L. Pali!.", "canonical_name": "K. L. Pali"}}, {"text": "Jadu Nath\"s", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5951, "end_char": 5962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After Jadu Nath\"s death, the management of the school was looked after bv the sons of Shri T. K. Gh<>sh in whose memory the school had bee.n founded.", "canonical_name": "Jadu Nath\"s"}}, {"text": "T. K. Gh<>sh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6036, "end_char": 6048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After Jadu Nath\"s death, the management of the school was looked after bv the sons of Shri T. K. Gh<>sh in whose memory the school had bee.n founded.", "canonical_name": "T. K. Ghosh\"s"}}, {"text": "T. K. Ghosh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6101, "end_char": 6112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri T. K. Ghosh was th<> brother-in-law of Shri J_a!!.u Nath.", "canonical_name": "T. K. Ghosh\"s"}}, {"text": "J_a!!.u Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6145, "end_char": 6157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri T. K. Ghosh was th<> brother-in-law of Shri J_a!!.u Nath."}}, {"text": "September 11, 1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6479, "end_char": 6497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 11, 1919 the school building was purchased by the three sons of Shri Jadu Nath from Mr. Boi!arll as per sale deed Ex."}}, {"text": "Boi!arll", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6577, "end_char": 6585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 11, 1919 the school building was purchased by the three sons of Shri Jadu Nath from Mr. Boi!arll as per sale deed Ex."}}, {"text": "July. 28, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6612, "end_char": 6626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. On July."}}, {"text": "K. L Palit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6631, "end_char": 6641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "28, 1930 Dr. K. L Palit sold his share in the school building in favour of his two brothers.", "canonical_name": "K. L. Pali"}}, {"text": "August 13, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6771, "end_char": 6786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CL\n\nOu August 13, 1950 the two plaintiff-respondents executed Deed_ of Trust Ex."}}, {"text": "Rai Bahadur Nirmal Chandra Ghosh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6857, "end_char": 6889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P appointing Rai Bahadur Nirmal Chandra Ghosh, Retired Dis:rict and Sessions Judge and six others as trustees of the school."}}, {"text": "Patna University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8038, "end_char": 8054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".other educational appliances and equipments as a functionin£ institution affiliated to the Patna University in the oanner and on the condition hereinafter following."}}, {"text": "Ilabu Jadu Nath Palit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8906, "end_char": 8927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "east one male descendant of Ilabu Jadu Nath Palit deceased shall."}}, {"text": "July 28, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11508, "end_char": 11521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the premises were not vacated within five years of the execution of the Ded of Trust, the plaintiff-respondents after serving notice of demand filed the present suit on July 28, 1959 against the Board of Trustees T. K. Ghosh's Academy and other defendants."}}, {"text": "Board of Trustees T. K. Ghosh's Academy", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11534, "end_char": 11573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the premises were not vacated within five years of the execution of the Ded of Trust, the plaintiff-respondents after serving notice of demand filed the present suit on July 28, 1959 against the Board of Trustees T. K. Ghosh's Academy and other defendants."}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11870, "end_char": 11880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13699, "end_char": 13723, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14139, "end_char": 14163, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Agarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14499, "end_char": 14506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,725/2/7•\n\nAt the hearing of the appeal Mr. Agarwal on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents has contended that the High Court was in error in granting."}}, {"text": "article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15006, "end_char": 15020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uniyal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15046, "end_char": 15052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Uniyal on behalf of the appellants has frankly stated that the certificate could be granted only under clause\n\n(b) and not under clause (a)."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15506, "end_char": 15510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15759, "end_char": 15773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16072, "end_char": 16086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16089, "end_char": 16103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16292, "end_char": 16297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 133(1) at the relevant time read as under: ·\n\n\"133 (1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court lrom any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies- { a) that the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less than twenty thousand rupees or such other sum as may bi' specified in that behalf by Parliament by Jaw; or\n\n(b) that judgment, decree or final order involves direct!)'"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16561, "end_char": 16571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 133(1) at the relevant time read as under: ·\n\n\"133 (1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court lrom any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies- { a) that the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less than twenty thousand rupees or such other sum as may bi' specified in that behalf by Parliament by Jaw; or\n\n(b) that judgment, decree or final order involves direct!)'"}}, {"text": "Supreme\n\nCourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16783, "end_char": 16797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or indirectly some claim or question respecting properti of the like amount or value; or ( c) that the case is a lit one for appeal to the Supreme\n\nCourt;\n\nand, where the judgment, decree or fincl c:oer appealed fron:i affirms the decision of tbe court i:nrr; cdiately below in any case other than a case referred to in sub-clause ( c) if the High Court further certifies tbat the &ppeal involves some substantial questio:i of law.\""}}, {"text": "article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17140, "end_char": 17154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17332, "end_char": 17343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18447, "end_char": 18465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Tirumalachetti Rajamm\n\nv. Tirimwlachetti Radhakrishnayya Chelly( 1)."}}, {"text": "Tirumalachetti Rajamm", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18495, "end_char": 18516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Tirumalachetti Rajamm\n\nv. Tirimwlachetti Radhakrishnayya Chelly( 1)."}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 SCR 452", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18738, "end_char": 18754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19022, "end_char": 19036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19121, "end_char": 19135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19597, "end_char": 19611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21003, "end_char": 21014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21315, "end_char": 21326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22633, "end_char": 22647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23815, "end_char": 23827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23831, "end_char": 23858, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24618, "end_char": 24638, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 133(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24977, "end_char": 24994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25060, "end_char": 25071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1972] 3 SCR 929", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 25396, "end_char": 25412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "December 10, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26211, "end_char": 26228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is clear from the inspection note dated December 10, 1947 of the Inspector of Schools."}}, {"text": "January 8, 195Q", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26454, "end_char": 26469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the annual statement dated January 8, 195Q relating to the school which had to be furnished by the school authorities to the Board of Secondary Education, it was mentioned that the proprietors of the school were the plaintiff-respondents."}}, {"text": "May 21, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27431, "end_char": 27443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is clear from the resolutions passed in the meetings of the trustees held on May 21, 1951 and April 20, 1952."}}, {"text": "April 20, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27448, "end_char": 27462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is clear from the resolutions passed in the meetings of the trustees held on May 21, 1951 and April 20, 1952."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_87_91_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "STATE OF MYSORE\n\nC. R. SESHADRI & ORS.\n\nJanuary 10, 1974\n\n(V.R. KRISHNA IYER AND R.S. SARKARIA, JJ.]\n\nCivil Serrice-Promotion-Duty of Executive and Courts ill rt/Mtion thereto.\n\nThe respondent came into Class I post from October 2.,, 1946. From that daY till July 23, 1954, he was Private Secretary to three ministers. Without giving credit for bis service as Private Secretary his immediate junior was promoted as Deputy Secretary, The respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court praying that the order denying him credit for service as Private Secretary may be quashed and for a direction for payment of such amounts as he would have got had bis due inttr 1; e seniority and promotion been accorded to him. The High. Court granted both the reliefs,\n\nJn appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : (i) The High Court was right in holding that the respondent '6'as catitlcd to count his service from October 27, 1~6, for fixation of his seniority in the gradatioo list. •\n\n(2) The High Court, however, erred in directing the appellant to give the respondent notional promotion as Deputy Secretary with effect from the date on whiclt his junior secured such promotion and for payment of the excess salary accruini to him on that footing.\n\nThe power to promote an officer bClongs to the executive and the judicial power may control or review government action but cannot extend to acting as if it were the Executive. The proper direction therefore, can only be that the government should reconsider the case of the respondent afresh for purposes of notional pi:omotion. If the set\\licc rule entitles him to promotion on the ground of seniority\n\nalone, Government should, except for the strongest reason, grant the benefit of promotion with effect from the date when his junior became Deputy Secretary especially, because, nothing had been suggested against the respondent in his career to disentitle him to promotion. However, if the criterion for promotion is one of seniority-cum-merit comparative merit may ha,•e to be assessed if length of service is equal, or an outstandmg junior is available for promotion. [88F)\n\n(3) The appellant State should apply to the respondent the same rule of pro motion as was applied to his junior and not to act adversely without giving him u opportunity. Since the respondent had retired from service, the appellant shoultl a1so consider promptly bis claim and make payment to hint of what is due to hi.a without further delay. [91A]\n\nStace of Mysore v. Syed Malunood, [1968) 3 S. C.R. 363, 366 and State nf MysDl't\n\nv. P. N. Nanjlllldiah, [1969] 3 S. C. C. 633,637 followed.\n\n(4) The appellant's inexplicable indifference is not placing before the Court the relC\\'ant rule regarding Promotion to the post of Deputy Secretary merits the order that the appellant should pay the costs of the respondent even though the appeal is partly allowed.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION of 1968.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 175\n\nH From the judgment and order dated the 28th July 1967 of the Mysore High Court at Bangalore in Writ Petition No. 2378 of 1965.\n\nV.S .. Desai and M. Vurappa, for the appellant.\n\nB.R.L. Jyangar, S.S. Javali and A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent No. J.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. The State of Karnataka, appellant bcforo\n\nns has raised two contentions, the first being the more B\n\nmterial but less meritorious and the second secondary but substantial. The first respondent herein filed a petition under art. 226 seeking several reliefs including (a) the quashing of an order denying him credit for service while he was Private Secretary to three Ministers beginning from October 27, 1946 till July 23, 1954 (with minor interruptions when he served in other capacities, an inconsequential circumstance in this case) when he was n1ade C Assistant Secretary, and (b) a direction for payment of such amounts as he would have got had his due inter se seniority and promolio11 been accorded to him. The High Court granted both reliefs and they are challenged in this Court. There is no doubt, on the pleadings and indubitable evidence on record, that the petitioner came into a Class I post from October 27, 1946 and hi.s claim to service since then running continuously, is undeniable. Learned counsel for the appellant D has fairly and rightly conceded the legitimacy of this claim. Indeed, the State Government had accepted the petitioner's right based on the equivalence of the past of Private Secretary and of Assistant Secretary but the Central Government did not agree, and when confronted in Court with overwhelming proof pleaded apologetically that they were not in possession of the full facts when rejecting the petitioner's seniority plea. We affirm that the first respondent is entitled to count hh ser- E vice from October 27, 1946 for fixation in the gradntion list.\n\nFlowing from this finding is the direction by the High Court to give the p•titioner notional promotion as Deputy Secretary with effect from the date on which one P. Venkataraman, next below him, secured such promotion and for payment of the excess salary accruing to him on that footing. This part of the judgment is attacked as F beyond the power of the Court. We see the soundness of this submission. In our constitutional scheme, a broad three-fold division exists. The power to promote an officer belongs 10 the Executive and the judicial po\\ver may control or review government action but cannot extend to acting as if it were the Executive. The Court may issue directions but leave it to the Executive to carry it out. The judiciary cannot promote or demote officials but may demolish a bad G order of Government or order reconsideration on correct principles.\n\nWhat has been done here is in excess of its jurisdiction. Assuming the p.!titioner's seniority over Venk.ataraman, how can the Court sav that the former would have been, for certain, promoted ? Basica1!);. it is in governn1ent's discretionary power, fairly exercised to pro1note a government servant. If the rule of promotion is one of sheer senio~ rity it may well be that promotion is a matter of course. On the other 11 hand if seniority-cum-merit is the rule, as in the Supreme Court decisions cited before us, promotion is problematical. In the absence of positive proof of the relevant service rules, it is hazardous to assume\n\nMYSORE V. C. R. SESHADRI (KRISHKA IYER, J.) 89\n\nthat by effiux of time the petitioner would have spiralled up to Deputy Secretaryship. How could we speculate in retrospect what the rule was and whether the petitioner would have been selected on merit and on the strength of such dubious hypothesis direct retro-active promotion and back pay? The frontiers of judicial power cannot be stretched thus for. The proper direction can only be that government will re-consider the case of the petitioner afresh for purposes of notional promotion. If the service rule entitles him to promotion on the ground of seniority alone, Government will, except for the strongest reason grant the benefit of promotion with effect from the date Venkataraman became Deputy Secretary. Nothing has been suggested against the petitioner in his carrier to disentitle him to promotion and we have no doubt Government will give him his meed. However, if the criterion for promotion is one of seniority-cum-rneriti comparative merit may have to be assessed if length of service is equal or an outstanding junior is available for promotion. On the facts before us, there is no reason to regard the petitioner's eligibility on merit for\n\nDeputy Secretaryship to be denied or delayed when Venkataraman was promoted.\n\nCounsel for, the State made reasonable efforts to help the Court with the relevant rule but his client's cooperation was not forthcoming.\n\nWe direct the appellant to apply to the first respondent the same rule of promotion as :Was applied to Venkataraman and, to be fair enougl1, not to act adversely without giving him an opportunity. In the light of the State's reluctance to produce the rule we almost think the High Court order is substantially just. Even so, it is for the Government to promote with retrospective effect.\n\nWe, therefore, set aoide the second part of the High Court's order in the judicial hope that justice wi\\\\ be done to the petitioner.\n\n1, The pragmatic limitation on judicial power we have set is not novel but traditional, as is evident from the two recent rulings of this Courtboth rendered in appeals from the Mysore High Court-where probably judicial promotion of executive officers was perhaps not viewed as an avoidable encroachment.\n\nIn State of Mysore v. Syed Mahmood(!). Bachawat J., speaking Jor the Court, held in a case where the promotion of an officer -was\n\ninvolved that the proper direction should be that the State Government should \"consider the fitness of Syed Mahmood and Bhao Rao for promotion in 1959 .... The State Government would upon such consideration be under a duty to promote them as from 1959 if they were then fit to discharge the duties of the higher post and if it fails to perform its duty, the Court may direct it to promote them as from 1959.\" The Court concluded in that case thus :\n\n\"We direct the State Government to consider whether Syed Mahmood and Bhao Rao should have been promoted to the posts of senior statistical assistants on the relevant dates when of!i,-crs junior to them were promoted, and if so, what nsequential monetary benefits should he allowed to thCnl\\\" '(iJ [1968)3 S.C.R. 3~. 366.\n\nSimilarly, in State of Mysore v. P. N. Nunjundioh(I), Ramaswami, J., speaking for the Court, dealt with a service dispute and wbilc agreeing with the substantive conclusion of the High Court_modified the order in so far as the promotion was ordered by the Court. The learned Judge observed :\n\n\"The argument. was stressed on behalf of the appellants that in any event the High Court was not right in issuing a writ of mandamus \"directing the appellants to promote res pondent No. 1 as Overseer with effect from February 1, 1961 and as Supervisor with effect from April 1, 1963 and to give him all consequential benefits. In our opinion there is justification for this argument. It has been pointed out by this Court in Tire State of Mysore v. Syed Mahmood and others (supra) that in matters of this description the High Court ought not to issue writs directing the State Government to promote the aggrieved officers with retrospective effect. The correct procedure for the High Court was to issue a writ to the State Government compelling it to perform its duty and to consider whether having regard to his seniority and fitness the 1st respondent should have been promoted on the relevant date and so what consequential benefits should be allowed to him. In the present case we are informed that both respondent No. I and respondent No. 2 have been promoted as Overseers after the filing of the writ petition. In the circumstances we consider that proper course is to issue a direction to the appellants to consider whether the respondent No. 1 should have been promoted to the post of Overseer with effect from December 1, 1961 and as a Supervisor with effect from April 1, 1963, what should be the relative seniority as between respondent No: 1 and respondent No. 2 and what consequential benefits should be allowed to respondent No. I\".\n\nWe respectfully agree with the guideline furnished by these two decisions which fortify the view we have taken.\n\nWhile we agree that the High Court has been impelled by a right judicial instinct to undo injustice to an individual, we feel that a finer perception of the limits of judicial review would have forbidden it from going beyond directing the Jlxecutive to reconsider and doing it on its own, venturing into an area of sunnisc and speculation in regard . to the possibilities of escalation in service of the appellant. Judicial expansionism, like allowing the judicial sword to rust in its armoury where it needs to be used, can upset the constitutional symmetry and damage the constitutional design of our founding document.\n\nThe length of this litigation has really disappointed the petitioner by denying him the enjoyment of likely promotion. He retired the day before the judgment of the High Court. No one in service would be affected by the allowance 'of the petitioner's claim and what was a service issue has now been reduced. to one of money payment. A retired government official is sensitive to delay in drawing monetary benefits. And to avoid posthumous satisfaction of the pecuniary\n\n(l) [196913 s.c.c. 633, 637.\n\nMYSORE v .. C. R. SESHADRI (KRISHNA !Yl!I\\, J.) 91\n\nexpectation of the superannuated public servant-not unusual ill' government-we direct the appellant to consider promptly the claim of the petitioner in the light of our directions and make payment of what is his due-if so found-on or before April 15, 1974. The government's inexplicable indifference in not placing before the Cour~ (he relevant rule regarding promotion to the post of Deputy Secretary merits the order that the appellant pay the costs of the petitioner/ first respondent ; for, the wages of winner's sloth is denial of costs, and something more.\n\nIn the result the appeal fails in the first part and is allowed in the latter part on the lines indicated above and subject to the direction& regarding costs just stated. ·\n\nApptal partly aUowtd:-\n\nV.P.S.", "total_entities": 29, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MYSORE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MYSORE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. R. SESHADRI & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "C. R. SESHADRI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 10, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 56, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 10, 1974\n\n(V.R. KRISHNA IYER AND R.S. SARKARIA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.S. SARKARIA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "[1968) 3 S. C.R. 363", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2497, "end_char": 2517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V.S .. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3064, "end_char": 3076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.S .. Desai and M. Vurappa, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. Vurappa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3081, "end_char": 3091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.S .. Desai and M. Vurappa, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B.R.L. Jyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3113, "end_char": 3127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.R.L. Jyangar, S.S. Javali and A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S.S. Javali", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3129, "end_char": 3140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.R.L. Jyangar, S.S. Javali and A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "A.G. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3145, "end_char": 3161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.R.L. Jyangar, S.S. Javali and A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3230, "end_char": 3242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. The State of Karnataka, appellant bcforo\n\nns has raised two contentions, the first being the more B\n\nmterial but less meritorious and the second secondary but substantial.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "State of Karnataka", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3251, "end_char": 3269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. The State of Karnataka, appellant bcforo\n\nns has raised two contentions, the first being the more B\n\nmterial but less meritorious and the second secondary but substantial."}}, {"text": "art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3470, "end_char": 3478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 27, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3638, "end_char": 3654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 seeking several reliefs including (a) the quashing of an order denying him credit for service while he was Private Secretary to three Ministers beginning from October 27, 1946 till July 23, 1954 (with minor interruptions when he served in other capacities, an inconsequential circumstance in this case) when he was n1ade C Assistant Secretary, and (b) a direction for payment of such amounts as he would have got had his due inter se seniority and promolio11 been accorded to him."}}, {"text": "July 23, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3660, "end_char": 3673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 seeking several reliefs including (a) the quashing of an order denying him credit for service while he was Private Secretary to three Ministers beginning from October 27, 1946 till July 23, 1954 (with minor interruptions when he served in other capacities, an inconsequential circumstance in this case) when he was n1ade C Assistant Secretary, and (b) a direction for payment of such amounts as he would have got had his due inter se seniority and promolio11 been accorded to him."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4504, "end_char": 4522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, the State Government had accepted the petitioner's right based on the equivalence of the past of Private Secretary and of Assistant Secretary but the Central Government did not agree, and when confronted in Court with overwhelming proof pleaded apologetically that they were not in possession of the full facts when rejecting the petitioner's seniority plea."}}, {"text": "P. Venkataraman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5006, "end_char": 5021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Flowing from this finding is the direction by the High Court to give the p•titioner notional promotion as Deputy Secretary with effect from the date on which one P. Venkataraman, next below him, secured such promotion and for payment of the excess salary accruing to him on that footing.", "canonical_name": "P. Venkataraman"}}, {"text": "Venk.ataraman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5812, "end_char": 5825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assuming the p.!titioner's seniority over Venk.ataraman, how can the Court sav that the former would have been, for certain, promoted ?", "canonical_name": "P. Venkataraman"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6186, "end_char": 6199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other 11 hand if seniority-cum-merit is the rule, as in the Supreme Court decisions cited before us, promotion is problematical."}}, {"text": "KRISHKA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6372, "end_char": 6384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the absence of positive proof of the relevant service rules, it is hazardous to assume\n\nMYSORE V. C. R. SESHADRI (KRISHKA IYER, J.) 89\n\nthat by effiux of time the petitioner would have spiralled up to Deputy Secretaryship.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Venkataraman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7072, "end_char": 7084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the service rule entitles him to promotion on the ground of seniority alone, Government will, except for the strongest reason grant the benefit of promotion with effect from the date Venkataraman became Deputy Secretary.", "canonical_name": "P. Venkataraman"}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8472, "end_char": 8489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, The pragmatic limitation on judicial power we have set is not novel but traditional, as is evident from the two recent rulings of this Courtboth rendered in appeals from the Mysore High Court-where probably judicial promotion of executive officers was perhaps not viewed as an avoidable encroachment."}}, {"text": "Syed Mahmood", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8834, "end_char": 8846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bachawat J., speaking Jor the Court, held in a case where the promotion of an officer -was\n\ninvolved that the proper direction should be that the State Government should \"consider the fitness of Syed Mahmood and Bhao Rao for promotion in 1959 .... The State Government would upon such consideration be under a duty to promote them as from 1959 if they were then fit to discharge the duties of the higher post and if it fails to perform its duty, the Court may direct it to promote them as from 1959.\""}}, {"text": "Bhao Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8851, "end_char": 8859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bachawat J., speaking Jor the Court, held in a case where the promotion of an officer -was\n\ninvolved that the proper direction should be that the State Government should \"consider the fitness of Syed Mahmood and Bhao Rao for promotion in 1959 .... The State Government would upon such consideration be under a duty to promote them as from 1959 if they were then fit to discharge the duties of the higher post and if it fails to perform its duty, the Court may direct it to promote them as from 1959.\""}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9557, "end_char": 9566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, in State of Mysore v. P. N. Nunjundioh(I), Ramaswami, J., speaking for the Court, dealt with a service dispute and wbilc agreeing with the substantive conclusion of the High Court_modified the order in so far as the promotion was ordered by the Court."}}, {"text": "1, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10071, "end_char": 10078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 as Overseer with effect from February 1, 1961 and as Supervisor with effect from April 1, 1963 and to give him all consequential benefits."}}, {"text": "1, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11124, "end_char": 11131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 should have been promoted to the post of Overseer with effect from December 1, 1961 and as a Supervisor with effect from April 1, 1963, what should be the relative seniority as between respondent No: 1 and respondent No."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11169, "end_char": 11182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 should have been promoted to the post of Overseer with effect from December 1, 1961 and as a Supervisor with effect from April 1, 1963, what should be the relative seniority as between respondent No: 1 and respondent No."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_882_890_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "GANGA BAI v.\n\nVIJAY KUMAR & ORS . . April 9, 1974.\n\n[M. H. BEG AND Y. V. CliANDRACHUD, JJ.]\n\nC.P.C.-Anrendnrent of the fe1110 of Appeal after 7} years lvitho1.et any application of condonatio11 of delay or good cause sho1vn-Whether proper- Appeal againrt a 111ere /illding of fact-iV/iether niaintainable. - .\n\nIn 1953~ defendant 1 executed on behalf of himSelf and his minor son, defendant 2, a deed of mortgage in favour of the plaintiff. Deft. 3 ls also a son of deft; 1 who was born after the mortgage deed. In 1956, a regd. deed of partition \\\\'as executed amongst the defendants under which the mortgaged property ..._ \\Va'> allotted to the share of <lefts 2 & 3.\n\nThereafter, the mortgagee filed a civil suit to enforce the niortgage and the trial court passed a preliminary decree for sale of deft. l's interest in the mortgaged property. It held that part of the consideration for the mortgage was not su.pported by legaL necessity and the balance of the debt incurred was tainted '\\\\-ith immorality. Therefore; the debt was. held not binding on the one half share of deft. 2 in the mortgaged property .. As regards the partition, the trial court held that it was a colourable transaction effected to delay or defeit the creditors. · D\n\nBeing aggrieved, pltf. filed an appeal (40/59) in the I-Ugh Court. Deft. 1 & 2 against '\\Vhom the suit was dismissed, also filed an-appeal (72/59) apinst the tir:zdi'ng of the trial court that the partition \\•las a colourable transaction.\n\nDuring the pendency of these 2 appeals, the preliminary decree was made final by the trial court and in 1960, the plaintiff purchased with the permission of the court. a joint half share of the mortga£; ed property in full satisfaction of his decree. Thereafter, the auction sale \\Vas confirmed and the laintiff '\\Vas put in E joint possession of the property. - ·\n\nThereafter, the appeals filed by theplaintiff and defendants 2 and 3 came up for hearing and while the appeals were part-hard, defts 2 & 3 applied on August 2, 1966 (nearly 71; years after filing the appeals). applied for amendment of their\n\nfemorandum of appeal in first appeal No. 72/59 and sought permission of the I1igh Court to challenge the preliminary decree passed by the trial COurt. The plaintiff opposed that amendment and applied that she did not desire to prose cute first appeal No. 40/59 filed by her.\n\nThe High Court did not pass any orders either on the application for amend n1cnt or the plaintiff's appeal, but adjourned the hearing of the appeals for 3 mouths to enable defendants to pay the am_ount due under the preliminary decree.\n\nAccordingly the defendants deposited the money towards the satisfaction of the preliminary decree .\n\n. 1\\fter about 2 years, another dhision bench of the High Court, alJov.ed the amendments of the defendants' iremo of Appeal in .1\\ppeal No. 72/59 ancl G\n\nallowd time to the 'defendants to pay the deficit Court fee. which they paid. The High Court,\"then took the 2 appeals for hearing and dismissed appeal No. 40/59 for non-prosecution and confirmed the findings of the trial court in favour of the defendants.\n\n As regards appeal. No. 72/59, the High C.ourt held that in vfew of Order 41, Rule 2 C.P.C., it '\\Vas open to the de_fendants. '\\Vith the leave of the court, to urge additional grounds without amending the Pwiemo of Appeal and therefore, the objection raised by the plaintiff that amendment should not be allowed, cannot\n\nI ( l:io upheld'. 1.be High Court further held that the defendant-.\" appeal was com~ pctent :l.nd they had the righ, t to reeeem the mortgap:e.\n\nOn the merits. the Hib Cburt held that the partition '\\\\'as real and genuine. In the result. the High Court :set aside the preliminary decree as also the fmal demea11d with it the auction\n\nGA.:<:GA BAI v. VJJAY KUMAR (Chmuf!'.aclzud, I.) 883\n\nA sale in favour of 111~ plainliff. The High Court passed a fresh preliminary Jecree under order 34, Rule 4 C.P.C .• directing that that the plaintiff was entitled\n\nto recover Rs. 34,~8~/- and odd .and directed the defendants to pay the entire decretal amount '''Ithrn 6 months of th~ date of decree. 1he plaintiff questions the correctness of the decree bfore this Court.\n\nThe appeal filed by defendants 2 & 3 \\Vas against the finding recorded by the trial court that the partition between deft. 1 and hi\" sons was a colourable trru:Jii;-\n\nnci'?n. Therefori;:, 1t V.'as clear that the appeal filed by defts. 2 & 3 \\Vas directed\n\nortnafly not against any part of the preh, ninary decree but again'it a mere .fin.ding recorded by the trial court that the partition was not genuine_ Before this Court, the main question v:as whether that appeal was maintainable and secondly, whether it \\\\as prOper for the High Court to allO\\V the amendment of the -!\\Iei:no of appeal after 71 years \\vithou: good cause shown and without any . application for condonatton of delay .. A1Iov11ng the appeal,\n\nl!ELD: (i) There is a basic distinction between the right of suit and the right oi' appeal. There is an inherent right in every pers0n to bring a suit of . a civil nature, but the right of appeal inheres in no one and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law. . The various provisions in the C.P.C. show that under the CO('e, an.appeal lies only as against a decree or as against an orderpassed under rules from which -an appeal is expressly allowed by Order 43, Rule 1. No appeal can lie against a mere finding for the simple reason that the Codes does not provide for any such appeal. Therefore, the first appeal filed by defendants 2 and 3 in the High Court was not maintainable :as it was directed againt a mere finding record.:d by the trial court. [886 D-HJ\n\n(ii) The Hi_gh Court should not have allowed the amendment of the ?vferno of Appeal particularly when de_fendants 2 & 3 had neither explained the long- Je1ay nor sought its condonation.\n\nDefendants 2 & 3 \\Vere not denied by - t.'le preliminary decree the right to pay the <lecretal amount and the t\\vo defen<lan.ts could even have applied under order 21, Rule 89 for setting aside the sale in fa':our .of the appellant; but they failed to do so. The prelimil!ary tl:cree had remained unchallenged since September., 1958 and by lapse of time a valuabJe ri.!!ht had ;<1.ccn1ed in favour of the decree-holder. Therefore, to allow the amend-· ment after such a long time \\\\rithout a good cause was not a yropcr exercise of judicial discretion in the circumstances r.:f te cas_e. [888 D-E\n\nf'JVIT. APPEi I.ATE. JURISDICTIO\" : Civil Appeal No. 582 of 1969 .\n\n. Apreal from the Judgment' anll Decree dated the 19th March, 19(>8 o( the Bombav Hi!!h Court at Na_gpur in Firot Appeal No. 72 of 1959. - M. N. Phadke, R. A. Gupta and K. B. Rohalgi for the Appellant.\n\nB. i\\\". Lokur, Arwz Kumar Sanglzl and A. G. Rat;; aparklz(for the R<;!'pondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by- CHANDRACHUD, J. This is a plaintiff's appeal on a certificate granted by the Hi_gh Court of Bombay, Nagpur Dor.ch, under Artick\n\n133(i)(al of the Constitution_\n\nOn March 24,· 1953 defendant 1 executed on behalf of himself and his minor son defendant 2. a deed of mortgage in favour of the pfaintiff.\n\nDefendant 3 is also a son of. defendant 1 but he was born.\n\naftr the mortgage deed. on September 30, 1955. On January 11, 1956 a t\\~£:lstcrctl deed of partition was cxecured amongst the defendants un<ler which the mortgaged property was allotted to the share of defendants-~ and .3. ·\n\nOn September 1, 1956 the mortgagee filed Civil Suit No. 3A of 1956 to enforce the mortgage. On September 20, 1958 the trial court passed a preliminary decree fc~ sale of defendant l's interest in the mortgaged property. It held that part of the consideration for the mortgage was not supported by legal , necessity and the balance of the debt incurred on the mortgage was tainted with immorality. Though, therefore, defondant 1 had executed the mortgage as a manager of the jcpnt Hindu family consisting of himself and defendant 2, the debt was hel.d not binding on the one-half share of defendant 2 in the mortgaged property.\n\nOn the issue relating to the genuineness of the partition eiiected by defendant 1 between himself and his suns, the trial court r!X'<}rded a finding that it was a. sham and colourable transaction and\n\nits obiect was to delay or Uefeat the creditors.,\n\nBeing aggrieved bv. the ..decree directing the sale cf half the mortgaged property only, the jllaintiff filed First Appeal No. 40 of 1959 in the High Court of Bombay. Though the suit was dismissed as against defendants 2 and 3, they also filed an appeal in the High Court to\n\nchllilenge the finding of the trial court that the deed of partition was a sham and colourable transaction.\n\nThat was First Appeal No. 72 of 1959 ..\n\nDuring the pcndency of these two appeals, the preliminary decree was made final by the trial court on October 23, 1958. On March 2,\n\n1960 the plaintiff purchased, with the permission of the court, a joint half share in the mortgaged property in full satisfaction of his decree.\n\nOn September 21. 1960 the auction sale was confirmed and on l\\ovcm- . • ber 25. 1960 the plaintiff.w.as put in joint possession o( the property.\n\nOn March 15. 1966 th.e aPjlC.:.tls filed by lhe plaintiff and by defendants 2. a_nd 3 came up for hearing before a Division Bench consisting of Abhyinkar and Deshmukh JJ. The hearing of the appeals was adjourne!d from time to timi: and while the appeals were part-heard, . defendant• 2 and 3 applied m August 2, 1966 for amendment of their Mcmorondum of Appeal in~First Appe\"al No. 72 of 1959. Bv the pr()l)osed amendment they sought leave of the High Court t'l challenge the preliminary decree passed by the trial court. The plaintiff opposed that amendment and applied that she did not desire to prosecute Erst Appeal No. 40 of 1959 filed by her.\n\nThe High Court did not pass any orders either on the application for amendment made by defendants 2 and 3 or on the application of the plaintiff asking that her appeal be dismissed for non-prosecuticn.\n\nOn August 24, 1966 the High Court adjourned the hearing of the appeals for three months to enable defendants to pay the amount due under the preliminary decree. On November 24, 1966 defendants 2 and 3 deposited Rs. 12,500 and applied for an extension of two mcilths for paying the balance. The extension was granted by the High Court\n\nand on January 25, 1967 'defendants 2 and 3 deposited a further sum . of Rs. 25,000 towards the satisfaction of the preliminary decree.\n\nOn Februarv 1¢. 1968 another Division Bench of tite High Court (Tambe and Badkas, JJ.) allowed the application of defendants 2 and 3 for amendment of their Memorandum of Appeal in Frrst\n\n•• c\n\nGANGA llAI v .. VIJAY ll:UMAR (Chandrachud, /.) 885\n\nA Appeal No. 72 of 1959. On an application made by their counsel, the High COurt granted !Cf those defendants time till February 2:i, 1968 io pay the deficit court fees, which they did. The High Court then took up the two F1tst Appeals for hearing in March, 1968.\n\nAs the plaintiff bad applied that she did not desire to proceed with First Aooeal No. 40 of 1959 filed by her, the Hii::t, Court dismissed\n\nthat appeal for non-prosecution. As a conseq'uence of this order the Hil!h Court observed that the findings recorlled by the trial court\n\nin favour of the defeltiants and adverse to the plaintiff would stand confirmed. '\n\nIn First Appeal No. 72. of. 1959 filed by defendants 2 and 3 it was uraed bv the plaintiff that as the ai>Peal was originally filed to challenire the. findina of the trial co1'rt on the question of genuinene1& of the partition. defendants 2 and 3 were not .mlilled to include new\n\nounds in the Memonutlum of Appeal and that the Memorandum\n\nshould not have been pennitted to be amended. 'the High Court he'd that in view of the provisions of Order 41, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. it was OPCn to fendants 2 and 3, with leave of the court, to urge additional grounds in their appeal without amending the Memorandum of appeal and therefore the objection raised by the plaintift as\n\nagainst the amendment was futile.\n\nThe Hiah Coutt further held that the appeal filed by defendants 2 and 3 was competent even thoURh the suit was wholly dismissed as against them.\n\nAccordina to the High Court, defendants 2 and 3 were aeerieved by t'ie adverse lindilllt on the question of partition nnd further they were denied under the preliminary decree the right to pay the decretal anionnt and to redeem the mortage. It was therefore ooen to them. to file an appe3! a1ainst that decree.\n\nOn the merits of the ap; ieal •. the High Court set aside the findinf, of tbe tr•a! court and h!l1d that the partition was \"real .and enuine'\n\nnd that it was not effected in order to defe•t 'he creditors. Defendants 2 and. 3 had therefore be<xlme owners of th' equity of redemption and they could not be deprived of the right to re<leem the mortgage.\n\nIn the result, the High Court set aside ihe, preliminary decree as also the l\\nal decree and with it the auction s3Ie .in favour of the plaintiff. The High Court passed a fresh preliminary decree under Order 34, Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code declaring that the plaintiff was entitled to recover Rs. 34, 386 and odd and directing the defendants to pay the entire decretal amount within six months of the date of decree.\n\nThe plaintiff questi011s the correctness of that decree in this appeal.\n\nH It is necessary first to understand the nature of the appeal filed by defendants 2 and 3 in the Hi$ Court and the relief they soUMt therein. That appeal WllS in terms filed only ainst the finding 'recorded by the trial court that the partition between. defendant 1 and his llOllS was a sham and colourable transaction intended to defeat or delav the\n\ncre<litors. The Memorandum Of Apoeal as filed orinally contained\n\nseven grounds, each of which was directed against the findin& , lliven by the trial court on the question of partition. The Memorandum contained a note that as the subject-matter in dispute was not capable of being estimated in tenns of a money value, a fixed court fee of Rs. 20 was paid thereon. Only one prayer was originally made in the Memorandum of Appeal that the partition deed be declared as genuine.\n\nCounsel for defendants 2 and 3, furnished to the registry of the High Court a written explanation as required by Rule 171 of the High Omrt Rules that as defendants 2 and 3 were only challenging the finding recorded by the trial court on the question of partition and as they were merely seeking a declaration that the partition was genuine, the fixed court fee of Rs. 20 was properly paid.\n\nIt is thus clear that the appeal filed by defendants 2 and 3 in the High Court was directed originally not agaist any part of the preliminary decree but against mere finding recorded by the trial court that the partition was not genuine. The main controversy before us centres round the question whether that appeal was maintainable on this. question. the position seems to us well-established.\n\nThere is. a basic distinction between. the right of suit and the right of appeal. There is an inherent right in every person to bring suit of a civil nature and unless the suit is barred by statute one may, at ones peril, bring a suit of one's choice. It is no answer to a suit, howsoever frivolous the claim, that the Jaw confers no such right to sue. A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit. But the position in regard to appeals is 4uite the opposite. The right of appeal inheres in no one and there fore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of Jaw. That explains why the right of appeal is described as a creature of statute.\n\nUnder section 96(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, save where otherwise expressly provided by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal lies from every decree passed by any court exercising original jurisdiction, to the court authorised to hear appeals from the decisions of such court. Section 100 provides for a second appeal to the High Court from an appellate decree passed by a court subordinate to the High Court. Section 104(1) provides for appeals against orders of the kind therein mentioned and ordains that save as otherwise expressly provided by the Code or by any law for the time being in foree an appeal shall lie \"from no other orders'\" Clause (i) of this section provides for an appeal against \"any orders made under Rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by rules\". Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code; which by reason of clause (i) of section 104(1) forms a part of that section, provides for appeals against orders passed under various rules referred to in clauses (a) to\n\n(w) thereof. Finally, section 105(1) of the Code Jays down that save as otherwise expressly provided, no appeal shall lie from any order made by a court in exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.\n\nThese provisions show that under the Code of Civil Procedure, an appeal lies only as against a decree or as against an order passed under rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by Order 43, Rule I.\n\n...\n\nE '\n\nG ..\n\n. >\n\nOANGA BAI V. VJ.JAY KUMAR (C/randrachud, /.) 8~ j\n\nNo appeal can lie against a mere finding for .the silllple reas<?, n that lhe Code does not provide for any such appeal. It must follow that F1rst Appeal No.- 72 of 1959 filed by defendants 2 and 3 was not. maintainable as it was directed against a mere finding recorded by the trial court.\n\nThe High Court .mixed up two distinct issues.: one, whether it_ was competent to defendants 2 and 3, if they were agieved by the preHrninary decree of file an appeal against that decree; and two, whether the appeal such as was filed by them was maintainable. If it be correct that defendants 2 and 3 could be said to have been aggrieved by the preliminary decree, it was certainly competent for them to challenge that decree in appeal. But they did not file an appeal against the preliminary decree and therefore the questiol\\ whether. they were aggrieved by that decree and could file an appeal therefrom was irrelevant. While deciding whether the -appeal filed by defendants 2 and 3 was maintain. able, . the High Court digressed into the question of the competence of defendants 2 and 3 to file an appeal against the preliminary decree and taking the view that it was open to them to challenge that decree even though the suit was wholly dismissed against them, the High Court hC!d that the apjleal, which in fact was directed against a finding given by th_e trial court, was maintainable. It the High Court had appreciated that the two questions were distinct and separate, it would not have fallen into the error of deciding the latter question by considering the former.\n\nAdverting to the question which the High Court did consider, namely, whether defendants 2 and 3 could be said to be aggrieved by the preliminary decree, there is nothing in the terms of that decree which. precluded those defendants from depositing the decretal amount to be able to redeem the mortgage. The trial court had passed the usual preliminary decree for sale in Form No. 5A, under Order 34., Rule 4 .\n\nCivil Procedure Code. If the amount found due to the appellant under the decree was paid into the court within the stipulated or extended yeriod, the appellant would have been obliged to deliver to the mortgagors all the documents in her possession or power relating to tho mortgaged property and to deliver up to the defendants quiet and peaceable possession of the property free from the mortgage.\n\nThe amount declared to be due to the appellant by the preliminary decree was _not paid by the defendants, from which it .wottld appear that they were not interested in paying the amount. It is significant that defendants 2 and 3 were served th the notice of final decree proceedings and they appeared th_erein. The Code is merciful to morgors and perhaps rightly, because the mortgagee ought to have no grievance if the loan advanced by him is repaid with permissible interest,· costs and expens\\'8. Under Order 21; Rule 89, it was open to defendants 2 arid 3 as late as after the appellant purchased the property in the auction sale, to pay the amount due to her. These defendants had interest in the mortgaged property by virtue of a title acquired before the sale. that is, under the tegistered partition dated January 11, 1956. Under Order 21, Rule 89, where illlmovable property is sold in execution of a deeree, any person owing the property or holding an interest there-\n\n888 SUPJ.l!Mll COUllT J.l!PORTS [1974) 3 s.c.11.\n\nin by virtue of a title acqu\\red before the sale, can apply to have the A • sale set aside qn his depositing in Court, for payment to the purchaeer a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase-money and for payment to the decree-bolder, tho amount specified in the proclamation of sale ll!I that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered. Nothing of the kind was done and even the last significant opportunity was not availed of by the defendants. Counsel for the appellant seems right that the defendants were content that only half the mortgaged property was B directed to be sold and that it was only because of the. later appreciation in prices of real property that defendants 2 and 3 awoke to the exigency of challenging the preliminary decree. That was much too late.\n\nSo late indeed, that not having any plausible reason to assi111 for the inordinate delay caused in applying for an amendment of the appeal, they preferred not to file an application for condoW1tion of delay at all. The appeal was filed on January 4, 1959 while the appli\n\ncation for amendment was made. on August 2, 1966. Event though no explanation was offered for the long delay of over 7t years, the High Court allowed the amendment with a laconic orcjer \"Application for amendment allowed\".\n\nThus, the appeal filed by defendants 2 and 3 being directed against D a mere finding given by the trial court was not maintainable; defendants 2 and 3 were not denied by the preliminary decree the right to pay the decretal amount; and the two defendants could even have applied under Order 21, Rule 89, for setting aside the sale in favour of the appellant but they failed to do so as, presumably, they were not interested in paying the amount. The High Court was therefore wholll in error in allowing the amendment of the Memorandum of Appea , E particularly when defendants 2 and 3 had neither explained the long delay nor sought its condonation. ·\n\nThe preliminary decree had remained unchallenged since September -1958 and by lapse of time a valuable right had accrued in favour of the decree-holder. The power to allow an amendment is un doubtedly wide and may at any stage be appropriately exercised in F the interest of justice, the law of limitation notwithstanding. But the exercise of such far-reaching discretionary powers is governed by judicial considerations and wider the discretion, greater ought to be the care and circumspection on the part of the .court. The apJl:al in terms was originally directed against the finding given by the tnal court that the partition was sham and colourable. \"Being aggrieved by the finding given in the Judgment and the Decree .......... it is humbly prayed G that findings given by the learned Judge in Para 34 of his Judgment may kindly be set aside, and instead the partition deed dated 11-1-56 may kindly be declared as genuine\"--so ran the Memorandum of Appeal. Defendants 2 and 3 reiterated through their counsel by filing a note to explain the payment of fixed court fees of Rs. 20 that they were \"seeking the relief of declara'ion only\" and therefore the court fee paid was proper and sufficient. Long years thereafter, the High H Court allowed the Memorandum to be amended not a reason was cited\n\nto explain the delay and not a reason was given to condone it. And it was not appreciated that in granting time to defendants 2 and 3 to\n\nGANGA BAI v. VIJAY KUMAR (Chandrachud, J.) 8~&\n\nmake up the deficit of the court fees 7 t years after the aal was li)ed, an amendment was being allowed which had its impact nCJ only on the preliminary decree but on the final decree which was passed in the meanwhile, the auction sale which was held in pursuance of the final decree and the sale certificate which was granted to .the appellant who, with the leave of the court and in full satisfaction of her decree, had purchased a joint 1/3 share in the mortgaged property. With the\n\nstriking down of the preliminary decree, these proceedings had to fall but the error really lay in allowing the amendment so as to permit, without good cause shown, a belated . challenge to the preliminary decree.\n\nOne other aspcct of the question relating to the mai!ltainability of the appeal yet remains to be examined. Counsel for the respondenL•· argues that the finding of the trial court on the issue of partition would have operated as res judicata against them and they were therefore entitled to appeal therefrom.\n\nIn Ha, rchandra Das v. Bholanath Das on which the learned counsel for the respondents relies in support of this submission, a suit for prmption was dismissed by the trial court on the ground of limitation. In an ap~ filed by the plaintiff, the District Court reversed that findin!!l but confirmed the decree dismissing the suit on the ground that the sale effected by defendants 4 and 5 in lavour of defendants I, 2 and 3 was not validly registered and there being no \"sale\", there can be no right of preempti.on. Deiendants I to 3 preferred an appeal to the High Court against the finding recorded by the District Court that the sale effected in their favour by defendants 4 and 5 was not valid as it was not lawfully registered. On a preliminary objection\n\nraised by the plaintiffs to the maintainability of the appeal, the High Court of Calcutta held that though under the Code of Civil Procedure there can be no appeal as against a mere finding, \"it may be taken to be the view of courts in India generally, that a party to the suit adversely affected by a finding contained in a judgment, on which a decree is based, may appeal; and the test applied in some of the cases for the purpose of determining whether a party has been aggrieved or not was whether the finding would be res judicata in other proceedings\". The High Court, however, upheld the preliminary objection on the ground that the issue regarditig validity of the sale which was decided against defendants l to 3 would not operate as res judicara in any subseque0t proceeding and therefore the appeal which was solely directed against the finding on that issue was not maintainable.\n\nThe position here is similar to that in the Calcutta case. The trial court decreed the mortgagee's suit only as against defendant 1, the father, and directed the sale of his one half interest in the mortgaged property on the ground that part of the consideration for the mortgage was not supportO<j by legal necessity, the remaining part of the consideration was tainted with immorality and therefore the mortgage was not binding on the interest of the sons, defendants 2 and 3. Whether the partition between the father and sons was sham or real had no\n\n(I) I.L.R. (19351 62 Cal. 701.\n\n:impact on the judgment of the trial cc!W't and made no material diffe- .rence to the decree passed by it. The finding recorded by the trial court that the partition was a colourable transaction was unnecessary for the decision of the suit because even if the court were to find that the partition was genuine, the mortgage wollid only have bound the interest of the father as the debt was not of a character which, under the Hindu law, would bind the interest of the sons. There is no substance in the submission made on behalf of the sons that if the partition was held to be genuine, the property would have been wholly freed from the mortgage encumbrance. The validity or the binding nature of an alienation cannot depend on a partition effected after the alienation; or else, a sale or a mortgage effected by the Karla of a joint-Hindu family can easily be avoided by effecting a partition amongst the members of the joint family. As the mat_ter relating to the partition was not directly and substantially in issue in the suit, the finding that the partition was sham cannot operate as res judicata. Therefore, the appeal filed by defendants 2 and 3 against that finding was not maintainable, even on .the assumption that the High Court of Calcutta is right in its view\n\nthat though under the Code there could_ be no appeal against a finding, yet \"On grounds of justice\" an appeal may lie against a finding provided that it would operate as res judicata so as to preclude a party aggrieved by the finding from agitating the question covered by the findinll in any other proceeding. It is not necessary here to determine whether the view of the Calcutta High Court is correct.\n\nFor these reasons we allow the appeal with costs, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial court.\n\ns. c.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 57, "entities": [{"text": "GANGA BAI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 9, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GANGA BAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIJAY KUMAR & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14, "end_char": 31, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIJAY KUMAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. 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16094, "end_char": 16105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 104(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16227, "end_char": 16241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 43, Rule 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16600, "end_char": 16616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 104(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16663, "end_char": 16677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 105(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16824, "end_char": 16838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17044, "end_char": 17071, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19272, "end_char": 19292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 11, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20487, "end_char": 20503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that is, under the tegistered partition dated January 11, 1956."}}, {"text": "Order 21, Rule 89", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20511, "end_char": 20528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 4, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21722, "end_char": 21737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal was filed on January 4, 1959 while the appli\n\ncation for amendment was made."}}, {"text": "August 2, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21789, "end_char": 21803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on August 2, 1966."}}, {"text": "Order 21, Rule 89", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22263, "end_char": 22280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "11-1-56", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23518, "end_char": 23525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Being aggrieved by the finding given in the Judgment and the Decree .......... it is humbly prayed G that findings given by the learned Judge in Para 34 of his Judgment may kindly be set aside, and instead the partition deed dated 11-1-56 may kindly be declared as genuine\"--so ran the Memorandum of Appeal."}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24098, "end_char": 24109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And it was not appreciated that in granting time to defendants 2 and 3 to\n\nGANGA BAI v. VIJAY KUMAR (Chandrachud, J.) 8~&\n\nmake up the deficit of the court fees 7 t years after the aal was li)ed, an amendment was being allowed which had its impact nCJ only on the preliminary decree but on the final decree which was passed in the meanwhile, the auction sale which was held in pursuance of the final decree and the sale certificate which was granted to .the appellant who, with the leave of the court and in full satisfaction of her decree, had purchased a joint 1/3 share in the mortgaged property.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25958, "end_char": 25980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a preliminary objection\n\nraised by the plaintiffs to the maintainability of the appeal, the High Court of Calcutta held that though under the Code of Civil Procedure there can be no appeal as against a mere finding, \"it may be taken to be the view of courts in India generally, that a party to the suit adversely affected by a finding contained in a judgment, on which a decree is based, may appeal; and the test applied in some of the cases for the purpose of determining whether a party has been aggrieved or not was whether the finding would be res judicata in other proceedings\"."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26004, "end_char": 26031, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26127, "end_char": 26132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a preliminary objection\n\nraised by the plaintiffs to the maintainability of the appeal, the High Court of Calcutta held that though under the Code of Civil Procedure there can be no appeal as against a mere finding, \"it may be taken to be the view of courts in India generally, that a party to the suit adversely affected by a finding contained in a judgment, on which a decree is based, may appeal; and the test applied in some of the cases for the purpose of determining whether a party has been aggrieved or not was whether the finding would be res judicata in other proceedings\"."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26828, "end_char": 26836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position here is similar to that in the Calcutta case."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29020, "end_char": 29039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not necessary here to determine whether the view of the Calcutta High Court is correct."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_891_895_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "BHAJAN SINGH & ORS.\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nApril 9, 1974\n\n[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, P. K. Gos\\VAMI AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.]\n\nIndian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), s. 149--Scopt of.\n\nCo11.r1itutio11 of !11dia, 1950, Art. 136-Crhnbral appeal-lluerference by Supreint Court.\n\nThe three appellants and two others were convicted for an offence under s. 302/149, I.P.C. and sentenced to imprisonment for life by the Hig1t Court, affirming the judgtnent of the t.rial court,\n\nC Dismissing the appeoil by special Jeave,\n\nHELD: (I) Jn an appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution this Court is \\'Cry slow to interfere with the concurrent conclusions of the two courts below with r; egard to appreciation of evidenci: of tfie witnesses.\n\nThe accused must be ; iblc to make out an extraordinary case of gross and palpable injustice to induc~\n\nthis Court to take a view conlrary to th<it arrived at by the High Court [893 EJ\n\n{2) The evidence disclosed that tht! rive accused were men1bers of an un- Jc1wful assembly with the common object to kill the deceased.\n\nTh~ ntanner in which the defence was conducted in the tri'<tl court shows that the accused v.erc not prejudiced by the use of the Word 'beat' in the charge. [893 G-894 DJ\n\n(3) Even if the accused were originally members of unlawful assembly wilft the common object of only beating the deceased they would be guilty under s. 302 read with the second limb of s. 149. Since they came armed with\n\ndeadly weapons and knew that' by using thOSe deadly weapans upon the deceased death would be caused. This is not a case where something f'oreign or unknown to the original object had taken place all of a sudden. Even <1ssunting that the unlawful assembly was formed originally only to beat, it is clearly established in the evidence that the said object is well-knit with what followed a.s the dangerous finale of the beating. It was the execution of the same common object which assumed the fearful character implicit in the illegal\n\naction undertaken by the five accused.\n\n[894 F-G; 895 A~E]\n\nK. C. Mathew t111d otl1ers v. Tlie State of Trara11core-Cochbz I1955J 3 S.C.R. 1057, followed.\n\n(-4) There is no circumstance in the case which can bring it under s. 304'\n\nI. P .C. [894GJ\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 1970.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 29th August. 1960 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 568 o! 1967.\n\nC. L. Sarin and R. L. Kohli, for the appellants.\n\nD. P. Uniyal and o. P. Rana, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Qiurt was delivered by\n\nGosWAMI, J. This criminal appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court affirming the conviction of the five appellants, Bhajan Singh, Chain Singh, Bald•o Singh\n\nJagat Singh and Gurbachan Singh under seetion 302/149 I. P. C. and\n\n892 SUPREME COURT Rl!PORTS\n\n(1974] 3 6.C.R.\n\n, sentence of illlprisonment for Ji& oo each of them. ~~,:!:'\" Singh, Chain Singh ap.d Jagat Singh have further been convicted secticJi 147 J. P. C. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year eaeh and the two other appellants have also been convicted under section\n\n148 I. P. C. and sentenced to one and a half years rigorous imprisonment each. Special leave was refused to Baldev Singh and Gur&achan Singh.\n\nThe prosecution case may brielly be stated :\n\nChain Singh and Baldeo Singh arc sons of Bhajan Singh, Gurbachan Singh is the n of J agat Singh. The deceased is Baklisheesh Singh, who was the brother of Major Singh and a cousin of appellant, Bhajan Singh. Major Singh had purchased some land in their village C Paivandkheri from one Sohan Singh and Gurbachan Singh was in unlawful possession of over 15. to 16 bighas of the said land. There was litigation between Gurbachan Singh and Major Singh in re>pect of this land. Gurbachan Singh subsequently sold his entire land including the .disputed area to Bhajan Singh. Thereafter Major Singh and hfa father\n\nUjagar Singh asked Bhaja~ Singh to give up possession over the lanu purchased by Major Singh and, on the day before the occurrence, sug- I> gested to him that they should go to the Patwari and settle the matter to which Bhajan Singh agreed. On September 17, 1964, at about 11.30 A.M. Bakhshecsh started on a cycle for the house of the Patwari with papers in connection with the disputed land. He was followed on foot, by his father, Ujagar Singh and brother Major Singh. When Ba:khsheesh\n\nSingh had hardly gone a distance of about 20 or 25 paces from his house, the five appellants accosted him, Baldeo Singh was armed with t; a spear and Gurbachan Singh with a gandasa and the three other appellants were armed with lathis. Ba:khsheesh Singh got down from the cycle and Bhajan Singh caught hold of him and incited the other appellants to beat him. Baksheesh Singh requested the appellants to accompany bim to. the Patwari to settle the dispute, but Jngat Singh said that they would settle it on the spot. Baldev Singh then give a spear blow to Bakhsheesh Singh, Gurbachan Singh gave him a F gandasa blow on the head and Chain Singh beat him with his lathi.\n\nThereafter the appellants ran away. The occurrence was witnessed by Ujagar Singh (P.W. 3), Major Singh (P.W. 2) and Jogendar Kaur, widow of the deceased (P.W. 4) and Sadhu Singh, Sardari Singh and Prakash Singh, who were servants of Ujagar Singh. Ba:khsheesh Singh was injured in the abdomen and his intestines came out. The injury was bandaged with the turbans of the deceased and Ujagar Singh and (; he was taken to the police Station, Afzalgarh, where a first information report was lodged by Major Singh at 12.45 P.M. The police sent him to the hospital at Sherkot where Dr. Y ogendra Pal (PW 4 in the Committing . Court) examined him. From there he was take.n to the District Hospital, Bijnor. As his condition was serious, a dying declaration (Ex. Ke-8) was recorded at 9.30 P.M. by the Ta:hsi.ldar- . Magistrate, Shri Balbir Singh (P.W. 1). Ba:khsheesh Singh died next\n\nday, September 18, 1964, in the afternoon. Postmortem examination H was perfom1ed by Dr. P. P. Agarwal on 19th September, 1964. According to the Doctor death was due to shock and haemorrhage from the injuries.\n\n,..\n\n. \\ \\ -b/\n\n.. '\n\nIt appears that Gurbachan Singh and Chain Singh had some simple injuries o.n their person but they did not report to the police llOI' were\n\nthey examined by Dr. K. C. Gupta (D. W. 4) earlier than September 20, 1964, at 4.00 P. M .\n\nThe defence plea is an absolute denial by. Bhajan Singh, Baldeo Singh and Jagat Singh while Chain Singh an~ Gurbachq S_ingh gave a different version of the occurrence. Accordmg to Cham Smgh he and Gurbachan Singh were grazing .their cattle by the side of the canal when one Sardar Singh and Bakhsheesh Singh came there.\n\nBakbsheesh Singh abused them and there was grappling with him. Major Singh came from behind with a karauli and gave him a blow with ii When for the second time Major Singh tried to assault him with the karauli in struck Bakhsheesh Singh. According to Gurbachan Singh he tried to intervene and received lathi blows from Sardar Singh.\n\nThe prosecution relies upon, besides the medical evidence, the evidence ci. the three eye witnesses as noted above namely, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4 and also upon the statement of Sadhu Si1gh recorded in the court of the Committing Magistrate and admitted in the Court ol Sessions under section 33 of the Evidence Act as well as upon the dying declaration of Bakhsheesh Singh to establish the charges. The High Court has relied, as the Sessions Ju.dge earlier did, upon the evidence of the three eye witnesses and has found that their evidence was\n\ncarroborated by the dying declaration as well as by the medical evidence, as properly scanned by the courts.\n\nIn an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution this Court is very slow to interfere with the concurrent conclusions of the two courts below with regard to the appreciation of evidence of the witnesses. The accused must be able to make out an extraordinary case of gross and palpable injustice to induce us to take a contrary view from that arrived at by the High Court in this case.\n\nEven so, the learned counsel r tbe, appellants submits that the High Court has erred in relying upon the testimony of these partisan witnesses since they are all related to the deceased. But even the deceased is the cousin or the appellant, Bhajan Singh.\n\nWe have perused the evidenee of the three eye witnesses and could not find any ground to disbelieve their testimony. The learned counsel\n\nalso could nc~ draw our attention to any serious infirmity in the evidence except characterising their testimony as interested.. Counael further submits that their statements are falsified by the medical evidence. He also submits that the eye witnessei; have not given any explanation for the injuries received by the accused and, therefore, their evidence should be rejected. The same grounds were also pressed into service before the trial court and in the High Court and both the ccilrts repelled the same with good reasons with which we concur .\n\nThe learned counsel contends that the common object of the unlawful ass.zmbly is only to beat Bakhsheesh Singh and not to kill him. He submits that even on the evidence acceotcd by the High Court charllC under section 302/149 l.P.C. has not been established against the accused. The learned counsel draws our attention to the word 'maro'\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS •\n\n[1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nused by the witnesses before the assault started. On the other hand, our attention is drawn , by the learned counsel for the State, to the F.I.R.• where it is mentioned that Jagat Singh •said, \"let us settle the matter here. What will the Patwari do? Kill the sala\".\n\nNothing turns decisively on the word 'maro' used by the witnesses and we have to see the entire surrounding circumstances and the quick sequence of events that immediately followed thereafter. It is clear that all the five accused came armed with deadly weapons and oJle of them, namely, BhajaJl Singh was the first to catch hold'of the deceased and shouted \"beat the sa\\a\", while accused J agat Smgh said that they would not go to the Patwari and decide the matter on the spot. He a\\so said ·beat this sala\". Thereupon Baldeo Singh gave a barchhi blow which . hit the deceased's abdomen. It is, therefore, clear from the llbove version, which has been accepted by the courts below and which we have no reason to disbelieve, that the five accused were members of an unlawful assembly 'with the common object to kill Bakhsheesh Singh.\n\nWe dci not give much importance to the word 'beat' used in the charge in this case and we po not think that the accused have been prejudiced. . by such a recital in the charge from the manner in which the defence\n\n was conducted iu the trial court in answer to the evidence addressed by the prosecution.\n\nThe learned counsel strenuously contends that the. accused cannot\n\nb~. convicted under section 302/149 l.P.C. as the common object of the assembly was not to kill the deceased. The learned counsel, how-\n\n.over, fails to take note of.the fact that section 149 has got two limbs;\n\n\"If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of, the common object oi that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, r:very\n\nperson who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence\".\n\nEven if, therefore, the accused were originally members of an unlawful ·\n\nassembly with the common object of only beating Bakhsheesh Singh F having come armed with deadly weapons, some with spear and gan- . dansa and some with lathis, in the desperate manner they have done,\n\nand if the members of the assembly knew .that by using these weapons upon Jlakhsheesh Singh death would be caused they are guilty of section 302 read with section 149 I.P.C. There is ncl circumstance in the case which can bring down this case to one under section 304 I.P.C. The intention was clear to kill Bakhshcesh Singh and all the G accused are guilty of the offenc\" charge namely, section 302/149\n\nI.P.C. .\n\n• The learned counsel relied upon a 9ecision of this court in S!U1J11bhu Nath Singh and Others v. State of Bihar(') and also upon ancither decision in The Queen v. Sabid , Ali and Others(2). We are unable to appreciate how these decisions help the. accused in the present H case. We arc absolutely satisfied that all the five accused came armed\n\n{I) AIR (1960) S.C. ns.\n\n(2) 1873 Weekly Reporter (20), S.\n\n~-\n\nA with deadly weapons despite the arrangement on the previous day to accompany Major Singh and Bhajan-Singh had agreed to go to the Pat- \"vari.\n\nBy turn of events they took a different posture to challenge Bakhsheesh Singh and party on their wa'y to the Patwari, dealt with th-em in the manner they have done resulting in the death of Bakhsheesh Singh. We are of the view that even the second limb of section 149 B I- P. C. is established .on the evi_dence in this case.\n\nFrom the commencement of the interception of the cqmplainant's party by the accused armed with deadly weapons and first accosting of the deceased by Bhajan Singh with a challenging posture upto the running away of the five accused together after causing fatal injuries on the deceased, there is no escape from the conclusiqn that all the five accused came and worked with one design and object and they were definitely in the know of the fat'll consequence that, actually ensu:1d as a result of the conjoint attack to make them all vicariously responsible under section 149 I.P.C. ·\n\nSection 149 I.P.C. constitu•es, per sea substantive offence although the punishment is under the section to which it is tagged being committed by the principal offender in tee unlawful assembly, known or unknown: Even assuming that the unlawful assembly was formed originally only to beat, it is clearly established in the evidence that the said object is well-knit with what followed as the dangerous finale of, call it, the beating. This is not a case where something foreign or unknown to the object has taken place all of a sudden. It is the execution of the same common object which assumed the fearful character implicit in the illegal action undertaken by the five accused. (See also K. C. Mathew and Others v. The State of Travancore-Cochin( 1).\n\nSince all the accused are convicted under seotion 302/149 I.P.C. there is no further necessity, in the circumstances of this case, for their separate conviction unde< section 147 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code. Conviction and sentence of Bhajan Singh, Chain Singh and Jagat Singh under section 147 l.P.C. set aside. The conviction of all accused under section 302/149 I.P.C. and their sentence of life imprisonment on each of them are affirmed. 'The appeal is dismiss-ed subject to the above modification. 1\n\nWe may conclude by observing that this murder case has resuited in conviction in spite of the police at the instance of a privat-~ complainant \\vho made serious allegations in court against the invzstigating agency.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(I) [1955) (2) S.C.R. 1057. 14-L84SupCl/75", "total_entities": 96, "entities": [{"text": "BHAJAN SINGH & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAJAN SINGH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 9, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 49, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF U.P.\n\nApril 9, 1974\n\n[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, P. K. Gos\\VAMI AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Y. V. CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 200, "end_char": 208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 330, "end_char": 336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 342, "end_char": 347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 527, "end_char": 535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1357, "end_char": 1363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1393, "end_char": 1399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2187, "end_char": 2193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C. L. Sarin", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2425, "end_char": 2436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. L. Sarin and R. L. Kohli, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "R. L. Kohli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2441, "end_char": 2452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. L. Sarin and R. L. Kohli, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "D. P. Uniyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2475, "end_char": 2487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Uniyal and o. P. Rana, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2495, "end_char": 2502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Uniyal and o. P. Rana, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "GosWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2569, "end_char": 2576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Qiurt was delivered by\n\nGosWAMI, J. This criminal appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court affirming the conviction of the five appellants, Bhajan Singh, Chain Singh, Bald•o Singh\n\nJagat Singh and Gurbachan Singh under seetion 302/149 I. P. C. and\n\n892 SUPREME COURT Rl!PORTS\n\n(1974] 3 6.C.R.\n\n, sentence of illlprisonment for Ji& oo each of them."}}, {"text": "Bhajan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2729, "end_char": 2741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Qiurt was delivered by\n\nGosWAMI, J. This criminal appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court affirming the conviction of the five appellants, Bhajan Singh, Chain Singh, Bald•o Singh\n\nJagat Singh and Gurbachan Singh under seetion 302/149 I. P. C. and\n\n892 SUPREME COURT Rl!PORTS\n\n(1974] 3 6.C.R.\n\n, sentence of illlprisonment for Ji& oo each of them.", "canonical_name": "BHAJAN SINGH & ORS"}}, {"text": "Chain Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2743, "end_char": 2754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Qiurt was delivered by\n\nGosWAMI, J. This criminal appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court affirming the conviction of the five appellants, Bhajan Singh, Chain Singh, Bald•o Singh\n\nJagat Singh and Gurbachan Singh under seetion 302/149 I. P. C. and\n\n892 SUPREME COURT Rl!PORTS\n\n(1974] 3 6.C.R.\n\n, sentence of illlprisonment for Ji& oo each of them.", "canonical_name": "Chain Singh"}}, {"text": "Bald•o Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2756, "end_char": 2768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Qiurt was delivered by\n\nGosWAMI, J. This criminal appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court affirming the conviction of the five appellants, Bhajan Singh, Chain Singh, Bald•o Singh\n\nJagat Singh and Gurbachan Singh under seetion 302/149 I. P. C. and\n\n892 SUPREME COURT Rl!PORTS\n\n(1974] 3 6.C.R.\n\n, sentence of illlprisonment for Ji& oo each of them.", "canonical_name": "Bald•o Singh"}}, {"text": "Jagat Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2770, "end_char": 2781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Qiurt was delivered by\n\nGosWAMI, J. This criminal appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court affirming the conviction of the five appellants, Bhajan Singh, Chain Singh, Bald•o Singh\n\nJagat Singh and Gurbachan Singh under seetion 302/149 I. P. C. and\n\n892 SUPREME COURT Rl!PORTS\n\n(1974] 3 6.C.R.\n\n, sentence of illlprisonment for Ji& oo each of them.", "canonical_name": "J agat Singh"}}, {"text": "Gurbachan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2786, "end_char": 2801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Qiurt was delivered by\n\nGosWAMI, J. This criminal appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court affirming the conviction of the five appellants, Bhajan Singh, Chain Singh, Bald•o Singh\n\nJagat Singh and Gurbachan Singh under seetion 302/149 I. P. C. and\n\n892 SUPREME COURT Rl!PORTS\n\n(1974] 3 6.C.R.\n\n, sentence of illlprisonment for Ji& oo each of them.", "canonical_name": "Gurbachan Singh"}}, {"text": "Chain Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2953, "end_char": 2964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh, Chain Singh ap.d Jagat Singh have further been convicted secticJi 147 J. P. C. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year eaeh and the two other appellants have also been convicted under section\n\n148 I. P. C. and sentenced to one and a half years rigorous imprisonment each.", "canonical_name": "Chain Singh"}}, {"text": "Jagat Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2970, "end_char": 2981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh, Chain Singh ap.d Jagat Singh have further been convicted secticJi 147 J. P. C. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year eaeh and the two other appellants have also been convicted under section\n\n148 I. P. C. and sentenced to one and a half years rigorous imprisonment each.", "canonical_name": "J agat Singh"}}, {"text": "section\n\n148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3149, "end_char": 3161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Baldev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3266, "end_char": 3278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Special leave was refused to Baldev Singh and Gur&achan Singh.", "canonical_name": "Bald•o Singh"}}, {"text": "Gur&achan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3283, "end_char": 3298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Special leave was refused to Baldev Singh and Gur&achan Singh.", "canonical_name": "Gurbachan Singh"}}, {"text": "Baldeo Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3363, "end_char": 3375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case may brielly be stated :\n\nChain Singh and Baldeo Singh arc sons of Bhajan Singh, Gurbachan Singh is the n of J agat Singh.", "canonical_name": "Bald•o Singh"}}, {"text": "Bhajan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3388, "end_char": 3400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case may brielly be stated :\n\nChain Singh and Baldeo Singh arc sons of Bhajan Singh, Gurbachan Singh is the n of J agat Singh.", "canonical_name": "BHAJAN SINGH & ORS"}}, {"text": "Gurbachan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3402, "end_char": 3417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case may brielly be stated :\n\nChain Singh and Baldeo Singh arc sons of Bhajan Singh, Gurbachan Singh is the n of J agat Singh.", "canonical_name": "Gurbachan Singh"}}, {"text": "J agat Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3430, "end_char": 3442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case may brielly be stated :\n\nChain Singh and Baldeo Singh arc sons of Bhajan Singh, Gurbachan Singh is the n of J agat Singh.", "canonical_name": "J agat Singh"}}, {"text": "Baklisheesh Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3460, "end_char": 3477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased is Baklisheesh Singh, who was the brother of Major Singh and a cousin of appellant, Bhajan Singh.", "canonical_name": "Baklisheesh Singh"}}, {"text": "Major Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3502, "end_char": 3513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased is Baklisheesh Singh, who was the brother of Major Singh and a cousin of appellant, Bhajan Singh."}}, {"text": "C Paivandkheri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3608, "end_char": 3622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Major Singh had purchased some land in their village C Paivandkheri from one Sohan Singh and Gurbachan Singh was in unlawful possession of over 15."}}, {"text": "Sohan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3632, "end_char": 3643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Major Singh had purchased some land in their village C Paivandkheri from one Sohan Singh and Gurbachan Singh was in unlawful possession of over 15."}}, {"text": "Ujagar Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3955, "end_char": 3967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter Major Singh and hfa father\n\nUjagar Singh asked Bhaja~ Singh to give up possession over the lanu purchased by Major Singh and, on the day before the occurrence, sug- I> gested to him that they should go to the Patwari and settle the matter to which Bhajan Singh agreed.", "canonical_name": "J agat Singh"}}, {"text": "Bhaja~ Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3974, "end_char": 3986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter Major Singh and hfa father\n\nUjagar Singh asked Bhaja~ Singh to give up possession over the lanu purchased by Major Singh and, on the day before the occurrence, sug- I> gested to him that they should go to the Patwari and settle the matter to which Bhajan Singh agreed.", "canonical_name": "BHAJAN SINGH & ORS"}}, {"text": "September 17, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4199, "end_char": 4217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 17, 1964, at about 11.30 A.M. Bakhshecsh started on a cycle for the house of the Patwari with papers in connection with the disputed land."}}, {"text": "Bakhshecsh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4239, "end_char": 4249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 17, 1964, at about 11.30 A.M. Bakhshecsh started on a cycle for the house of the Patwari with papers in connection with the disputed land.", "canonical_name": "Ba:khsheesh\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Ba:khsheesh\n\nSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4431, "end_char": 4449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Ba:khsheesh\n\nSingh had hardly gone a distance of about 20 or 25 paces from his house, the five appellants accosted him, Baldeo Singh was armed with t; a spear and Gurbachan Singh with a gandasa and the three other appellants were armed with lathis.", "canonical_name": "Ba:khsheesh\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Ba:khsheesh Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4680, "end_char": 4697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ba:khsheesh Singh got down from the cycle and Bhajan Singh caught hold of him and incited the other appellants to beat him.", "canonical_name": "Ba:khsheesh\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Baksheesh Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4804, "end_char": 4819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baksheesh Singh requested the appellants to accompany bim to.", "canonical_name": "Baklisheesh Singh"}}, {"text": "Jngat Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4905, "end_char": 4916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Patwari to settle the dispute, but Jngat Singh said that they would settle it on the spot.", "canonical_name": "J agat Singh"}}, {"text": "Bakhsheesh Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5000, "end_char": 5016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baldev Singh then give a spear blow to Bakhsheesh Singh, Gurbachan Singh gave him a F gandasa blow on the head and Chain Singh beat him with his lathi.", "canonical_name": "Ba:khsheesh\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Ujagar Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5182, "end_char": 5194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The occurrence was witnessed by Ujagar Singh (P.W. 3), Major Singh (P.W. 2) and Jogendar Kaur, widow of the deceased (P.W. 4) and Sadhu Singh, Sardari Singh and Prakash Singh, who were servants of Ujagar Singh."}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5211, "end_char": 5216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The occurrence was witnessed by Ujagar Singh (P.W. 3), Major Singh (P.W. 2) and Jogendar Kaur, widow of the deceased (P.W. 4) and Sadhu Singh, Sardari Singh and Prakash Singh, who were servants of Ujagar Singh."}}, {"text": "Jogendar Kaur", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5230, "end_char": 5243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The occurrence was witnessed by Ujagar Singh (P.W. 3), Major Singh (P.W. 2) and Jogendar Kaur, widow of the deceased (P.W. 4) and Sadhu Singh, Sardari Singh and Prakash Singh, who were servants of Ujagar Singh."}}, {"text": "Sadhu Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5280, "end_char": 5291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The occurrence was witnessed by Ujagar Singh (P.W. 3), Major Singh (P.W. 2) and Jogendar Kaur, widow of the deceased (P.W. 4) and Sadhu Singh, Sardari Singh and Prakash Singh, who were servants of Ujagar Singh."}}, {"text": "Sardari Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5293, "end_char": 5306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The occurrence was witnessed by Ujagar Singh (P.W. 3), Major Singh (P.W. 2) and Jogendar Kaur, widow of the deceased (P.W. 4) and Sadhu Singh, Sardari Singh and Prakash Singh, who were servants of Ujagar Singh.", "canonical_name": "Sardari Singh"}}, {"text": "Prakash Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5311, "end_char": 5324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The occurrence was witnessed by Ujagar Singh (P.W. 3), Major Singh (P.W. 2) and Jogendar Kaur, widow of the deceased (P.W. 4) and Sadhu Singh, Sardari Singh and Prakash Singh, who were servants of Ujagar Singh."}}, {"text": "Afzalgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5552, "end_char": 5561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The injury was bandaged with the turbans of the deceased and Ujagar Singh and (; he was taken to the police Station, Afzalgarh, where a first information report was lodged by Major Singh at 12.45 P.M. The police sent him to the hospital at Sherkot where Dr. Y ogendra Pal (PW 4 in the Committing ."}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5616, "end_char": 5621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The injury was bandaged with the turbans of the deceased and Ujagar Singh and (; he was taken to the police Station, Afzalgarh, where a first information report was lodged by Major Singh at 12.45 P.M. The police sent him to the hospital at Sherkot where Dr. Y ogendra Pal (PW 4 in the Committing ."}}, {"text": "Sherkot", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5675, "end_char": 5682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The injury was bandaged with the turbans of the deceased and Ujagar Singh and (; he was taken to the police Station, Afzalgarh, where a first information report was lodged by Major Singh at 12.45 P.M. The police sent him to the hospital at Sherkot where Dr. Y ogendra Pal (PW 4 in the Committing ."}}, {"text": "Y ogendra Pal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5693, "end_char": 5706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The injury was bandaged with the turbans of the deceased and Ujagar Singh and (; he was taken to the police Station, Afzalgarh, where a first information report was lodged by Major Singh at 12.45 P.M. The police sent him to the hospital at Sherkot where Dr. Y ogendra Pal (PW 4 in the Committing ."}}, {"text": "District Hospital, Bijnor", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5786, "end_char": 5811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From there he was take.n to the District Hospital, Bijnor."}}, {"text": "Ta:hsi.ldar- . Magistrate, Shri Balbir Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5907, "end_char": 5951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ke-8) was recorded at 9.30 P.M. by the Ta:hsi.ldar- ."}}, {"text": "khsheesh Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5965, "end_char": 5979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ba:khsheesh Singh died next\n\nday, September 18, 1964, in the afternoon.", "canonical_name": "Ba:khsheesh\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "P. P. Agarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6080, "end_char": 6093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Postmortem examination H was perfom1ed by Dr. P. P. Agarwal on 19th September, 1964."}}, {"text": "19th September, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6097, "end_char": 6117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Postmortem examination H was perfom1ed by Dr. P. P. Agarwal on 19th September, 1964."}}, {"text": "K. C. Gupta", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6385, "end_char": 6396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-b/\n\n.. '\n\nIt appears that Gurbachan Singh and Chain Singh had some simple injuries o.n their person but they did not report to the police llOI' were\n\nthey examined by Dr. K. C. Gupta (D. W. 4) earlier than September 20, 1964, at 4.00 P. M ."}}, {"text": "Jagat Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6530, "end_char": 6541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhajan Singh, Baldeo Singh and Jagat Singh while Chain Singh an~ Gurbachq S_ingh gave a different version of the occurrence.", "canonical_name": "J agat Singh"}}, {"text": "Gurbachq S_ingh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6564, "end_char": 6579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhajan Singh, Baldeo Singh and Jagat Singh while Chain Singh an~ Gurbachq S_ingh gave a different version of the occurrence.", "canonical_name": "Gurbachan Singh"}}, {"text": "Cham Smgh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6636, "end_char": 6645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordmg to Cham Smgh he and Gurbachan Singh were grazing .their cattle by the side of the canal when one Sardar Singh and Bakhsheesh Singh came there."}}, {"text": "Sardar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6730, "end_char": 6742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordmg to Cham Smgh he and Gurbachan Singh were grazing .their cattle by the side of the canal when one Sardar Singh and Bakhsheesh Singh came there.", "canonical_name": "Sardari Singh"}}, {"text": "Bakbsheesh Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6777, "end_char": 6793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bakbsheesh Singh abused them and there was grappling with him.", "canonical_name": "Baklisheesh Singh"}}, {"text": "Sadhu Si1gh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7285, "end_char": 7296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the three eye witnesses as noted above namely, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4 and also upon the statement of Sadhu Si1gh recorded in the court of the Committing Magistrate and admitted in the Court ol Sessions under section 33 of the Evidence Act as well as upon the dying declaration of Bakhsheesh Singh to establish the charges."}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7392, "end_char": 7402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7783, "end_char": 7794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Counael", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8675, "end_char": 8682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel\n\nalso could nc~ draw our attention to any serious infirmity in the evidence except characterising their testimony as interested.. Counael further submits that their statements are falsified by the medical evidence."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9307, "end_char": 9318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BhajaJl Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10034, "end_char": 10047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clear that all the five accused came armed with deadly weapons and oJle of them, namely, BhajaJl Singh was the first to catch hold'of the deceased and shouted \"beat the sa\\a\", while accused J agat Smgh said that they would not go to the Patwari and decide the matter on the spot.", "canonical_name": "BHAJAN SINGH & ORS"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10973, "end_char": 10984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11133, "end_char": 11144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jlakhsheesh Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11871, "end_char": 11888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dansa and some with lathis, in the desperate manner they have done,\n\nand if the members of the assembly knew .that by using these weapons upon Jlakhsheesh Singh death would be caused they are guilty of section 302 read with section 149 I.P.C. There is ncl circumstance in the case which can bring down this case to one under section 304 I.P.C. The intention was clear to kill Bakhshcesh Singh and all the G accused are guilty of the offenc\" charge namely, section 302/149\n\nI.P.C. .", "canonical_name": "Ba:khsheesh\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11930, "end_char": 11941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11952, "end_char": 11963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11964, "end_char": 11969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12053, "end_char": 12064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12065, "end_char": 12070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bakhshcesh Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12104, "end_char": 12120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dansa and some with lathis, in the desperate manner they have done,\n\nand if the members of the assembly knew .that by using these weapons upon Jlakhsheesh Singh death would be caused they are guilty of section 302 read with section 149 I.P.C. There is ncl circumstance in the case which can bring down this case to one under section 304 I.P.C. The intention was clear to kill Bakhshcesh Singh and all the G accused are guilty of the offenc\" charge namely, section 302/149\n\nI.P.C. .", "canonical_name": "Ba:khsheesh\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12184, "end_char": 12195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12201, "end_char": 12206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bhajan-Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12716, "end_char": 12728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) 1873 Weekly Reporter (20), S.\n\n~-\n\nA with deadly weapons despite the arrangement on the previous day to accompany Major Singh and Bhajan-Singh had agreed to go to the Pat- \"vari.", "canonical_name": "BHAJAN SINGH & ORS"}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13022, "end_char": 13033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13655, "end_char": 13666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13667, "end_char": 13672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13677, "end_char": 13688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13689, "end_char": 13694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14490, "end_char": 14495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 147 and 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14599, "end_char": 14618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14626, "end_char": 14643, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14720, "end_char": 14731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14786, "end_char": 14797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14802, "end_char": 14807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "\\vho", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15086, "end_char": 15090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\nWe may conclude by observing that this murder case has resuited in conviction in spite of the police at the instance of a privat-~ complainant \\vho made serious allegations in court against the invzstigating agency."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_896_901_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "GURDIT SINGH AND OTHERS\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS\n\nApril 10, 1974\n\n(K. K. MATHEW AND A, ALAG!RISWAMI, JJ.]\n\nPepJu Tenancy and Agricuilural La11ds Act, 19SS-As amended by Act 16 <>! 1962 introducinl! Sec. 32~DD(b)-Retrospective effect of-Determination of\n\nsztrplus area-Prei•ious order declaring no surplus land on basis of judgment and decree of Civil -court-Whether ca11 be reviewed Ullder Sec. 32~DD(b} Natural iusltce .\n\n. Judgment-Connotation of-Interpretation Qf statutes--Object of provision is circumscribed by the language of the section. ·\n\nThe lands in question were bequeathed to appellants 2 and 3, sons of the first appellant, by their grandfather. After the death of the testator mutations in favour of appellants 2 and 3 were effected in the revenue records in 1939. 'Ibe first appellant managed to get the mutation of the land in bis name in 1944 for the reason that he wanted to get licence for a gun. Jn 19SS, when lhe Act came into force, the first appelJant was shown to be the owner of the land in the revenue records.\n\nOn October 30. 1956 the Act was amended so as to impose\n\na ceiling on the holding of land. [)\n\nAppellants 2 and 3 filed a suit in the civil court for a declaration that the Jand belonsed to them and that there v.\"as no transfer of the land to the first appellant. 'Ibe latter, who was the only defendant, did not contest the suit and it was decreed on February 14, 1961. Thereafter, in proceedings under the Act, by order dated March 28, 1961 the CoUector declared on the basis of the jadgment and decree of the civil court that there was no surplus land in the ownership and pOssessiOh of th~ first appellant.\n\nThe Act was amended by Act 16 of 1962 and S. 32-DD was introduced into the Act with retrospective effect from October 30, 1956, i.e. the date of the earlier arnednment. Section 32-DD rOYided inter alia that for the purposes of determining the surolu:; area of any penon, any judgrnent, decree or order of n Court obtained after the commencement of the amending Act of 1956 and having lhe effect of diminishing the area of such person which could have been declared as his surpJn, area shall be ignored.\n\nThe Collector, acting purportedly\n\nundr Sec. 15 of the Punjab land Revenue Code reviewed bis order dared farch 28, 1961. By order dated May 20, 1963 be refused to give effect to the judgment and decree by ignoring them as enjoined by ction 32-DD and included the land in the hQ)ding of the first appellant.\n\nThe appellnnts fited a writ petition -in the lligh Court to quash this \\'.>rder.\n\nTiie Hilb Court overruled the contentions of the appellants und di, missed iln: writ petition.\n\nBefore this Court. the appellants raised the same contentions. namely : (i) that the. Co1lector had no jurisdiction to review his order dated\n\nfarch 28. 1961; Oil that lhe order in review-was passed without notice lo the appellants; and (iii) lhat. in any event. the iudgn1ent of the civil court was not of the nature.contemplated by section 32-DD.\n\nAllowing th~ appeal,\n\nflELD: (1) The order of the Collector dated March 28, 1961, was in perfectly\n\nvalid 1>ne wh'n h \\\\\"as pas-red.\n\nNo one challeng!d that order and it became final for alt p; irposes. Th: Collector cou1d not have anticipated th~ enactmnt of thp sectioa with rtff'Mpecthe effect and passed the order conformtn& to its provisions. we cannot subscrib.! to the view that the order of th~ Col!cctor passed H bn MarCh 28, 1961, became null and void merely hcauie he failed to takeint<' account the provision~ of Sec. 32-DD even if bv virtue of the fiction it is to be assumed that the section was on the statute book when he passed it. Vle do not\n\nA think that we can extend the ratio of thedecision in the Anisminic case (infra) to a case where the provision overlooked during the course of the enquiry \\vas not on the statute book but was beaotten and brought into being sub&equently, though with retrospective vitality. The order of the Collector dated March 28, 1961 cannot, therefore, be regarded as null a_nd void. There was no proviM.on in the amending At wPich enabled the_ Collector to review it, We cannot stretch the fiction of retrospectivity so far as to make the order nuU and void witbOut further ado. [899 D-900 B] B\n\nAnmini1: Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commissio11, [1967] 3 W.L.R. 382, distingQished. •\n\n(II) we are also not satisfied that the Collector was acting in comonance with ihe principles of natural justice when he passed the order dated May 20, 1963, as he gave no opportunity to appellants 2 and 3 of being heard. The fact that the first appellant was heard before that order was J)assed is of no moment because the persons who were. vitally concerned in re-opening the case wre appeIJants 2 and 3. Admittedly, no notice of the proceedings to re-open the case was given to them.\n\nIf notice had been given to them, they could have shown the true nature and character of the jadgment of the civil court . upon which they re!fed. [900 B-D]\n\n(111) Nor are we satisfied that every judgment which has the apparent effect of diminishing the area of land of a person would be within the ambit of S. 32- DD(b ). The judgment of the civil court adjudicated on the rights of the parties as they existed before the suit and' when it declared that the mutation was effected not with the idea of transferring the properly to the first appellant but for some other reason. the. effect of the declaration was that there was no real transfer Qf\n\nthe property in favour of the first appellant and that the property remained always in the ownership of appellants 2 and 3, notwithstanding the purported transfer evidenced by the mutation in the revenue records.\n\nIt is impermisible to give the wide Janguage employed in clause (b) of Sec. 3200 an unconfined operation. If the effect of the judgment is only to declare that the land never belonged to the first appellant, it has not the effect of diminishing the area of land in his possession. The ob; E:ct of this provision in an Act like the one under consideration is to prevent circumvention of its provisions by dubious and indirect methods.\n\nRut that is no reason why we should put a construction upon the section which its language can hardly bear. The High Court went wrong in assuming that the Collector was right when he ignored the judgment by his order dated May 20, 1963 on the ground that it had effect of diminishing the area of the first appellant which could have been declared as his surplus.\n\n[900 F- 901 G]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1897 of 1967.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated the 27th September, 1966, of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in Civil Writ No. 1371 of 1963.\n\nS. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagara; a, M. Qamaruddill and Vinod Dhawan, for the appellants.\n\nV. C. Mahajan, O. P. Sharma and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMATHEW, J. The first appellant is the father of appellants 2 and 3.\n\nThe property in question belonged to the father of first appellant. By a will executed by him, he bcqu•athed the property to appellants 2 and 3. After the death of the tastator, mutations in favour of appellants 2 and 3 were effected in the revenue records in the year 1996 B.K. (1939). The first appellant managed to get the mutation of the land\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nin his name in 1944 for the reason that he wanted to get licence for a gun. In 19.55; when the Pepsu Tanancy and Agricultural Lands Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) came into force, the first appellant was shown to be the owner of the land in the revenue records. Chapter IV-Ai of the Act was inserted by Pepsu Act No. 15 of 1956 on October 30, 1956 and by s. 32A of this chapter, ceiling was placed on the holding of land.\n\nA suit was filed by appellants 2 and 3 for a declaration that the land belonged to them, thal the mutation of the land in the name of the first appellant in the revenue records was for the purpose of enabling him to obtain a gun licence and that there was no transfer of the land to first appellant. The first appellant was the only defendant in the suit. He did not contest the suit and it was decreed on February 14, 1961. A few weeks later, the question of declaration of the surplus area of the land in the hands of tQ.e first appellant came up for consideration before the Collector of Bhatinda. On the basis of the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court that there was no transfer of the land to the first appellant, the Collector, by his order dated March 28, 1961, declared that there was no surplus land in the ownership and possession of the first appellant.\n\nThe Act was amended by Act No. 16 of 1962 and s. 32-DD was introduced into the Act with retrospective effect fro1n October 30,\n\n1956. That section reads:\n\n\"32-DD. Future tenancies iu surplus area and certaill judg1nents etc. to be ignored-Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, for the purposes of determining the surplus area of any person-\n\n(a) a tenancy created after the commenceinent of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second A,.mendment) Act, 1956, in any area of land which could have been declared as the surplus area of such person; and\n\n(b) any judgment, decree or order of a court or other authority, obtained after the commencement of that Act and having the effect of diminishing the area of such person which could have been declared as his surplus area shall be ignored.\"\n\nThe Collector thereupon made a reference presumably under s. 15 G of the Punjab Land Revenue Code for sanction to the Commissioner of Patiala to review his order dated March 28, 1961, as it omitted to include the land in question in the holding of the first appellant on the basis of the judgment and decree.\n\nThe sanction was given, the Collector reviewed the order and he refused to give effect to the judgment and decree by ignoring them as enjoined by s. 32-DD and included the land in the holding of the first appellant.\n\nThe appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court of Punjab to\n\n1 quash this order. Before the High Court, three contentions were raised\n\nby the appellants : ( 1) that the Collector had no jurisdiction to review' his order dated March 28, 1961; (2) that the order in review was passed without notice. to the appellants; and ( 3) that, in any event, the judgment of the civil court only made a declaration as regards rights of the parties on the date of the suit and it was not, therefore, a judgment of the nature contemplated bys. 32-DD. The High Court overruled all the contentions and hdd that the order of the Collector was rendered null and void by virtue of the provisions of s. 32-DD and, therefore, the Collector had the power to determine by his order dated May 29, 1963, the surplus area after ignoring the judgment and decree.\n\nThe High Court said that since mandatory provisions of s. 32-DD which has retrospective operation were not taken into consideration, the order passed by the Collector on March 28, 1961 was non est as being one made without jurisdiction and that, the order dated May 20, 1963, must° be deemed to be the order determining the holding of the first appellant for the purpose of the Act as amended.\n\nWe are not satisfied that this is a correct approach'to the question.\n\nThe Collector purport\\'d to act under s. 15 of the Land Revenue Code, which, obviously, has no application. The High Court did not rest its decision on s. 15 of the Punjab Land Revenue Code for holding that Collector had jurisdiction to pass the order dated May 20, 1963. When the Collector passed the order dated March, 28, 1961 determining the surplus area in the hands of the first appellant, he took into consideration the effect of the judgment of the civil court declaring that the muta_ tion of the name of the first appellant in the revenue record was effect- ed only to enable him to obtain a gun licence. That order of the .Collector dated March 28, 1961 was a perfectly valid one when it was passed. No one challenged that order and it became final for all purposes.\n\nIt was only when s. 32-DD was incorporated in the Act with retrospective effect from October 3p, 1956 that the question arose whether that order was valid.· Tpe Collector could not have anticipated the enactment of the section with retrospective effect and passed the order conforming to °its provisions. It is rather curious that the draftsman of the amending Act No. 16 of 1962 did not incrporate a provision for re-opening orders. already passed before s. 32-DD came to be enacted as that section was made retrospectiv0. We cannot subscribe to the view that the order of the Collector passed on March 28, 1961 became null and void merely because he failed to take into account the provisions of s. 32-DD even if by virtue of the fiction it is to be assumed that the section was on the statute book when he passed it. We are aware that in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission(') the House of Lords has held that even if a tribunal had jurisdiction to enter upon an enquiry, the fact that it overlooked an applicable mandatory provision in the course of the enquiry would denude it of its jurisdiction; but we doubt whether that principle has any application in a case when the provision overlooked was not in actual existence at the time when the inquiry was conducted and the order was 'J>assed. In other words, we do not think that we can extend the ratio of the decision in that case to a case where the provision overlooked during the course of the inquiry\n\n(!) (1967) 3 W.L.R. 382,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1974] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nwas not on the statute book but was begotten and brought into being subsequently, though with retrospective vitality. The imagination sometimes has to boggle before .stark reality. The order of the Collector dated March 28, 1961, cannot, therefore, be regarded as null and void.\n\nIt was a valid order when it was passed, and there was no provision in the amending Act which enabled the Collector to review it; We cannot stretch the fiction so far as to make the order null and void without further ado.\n\nWe are also not satisfied that the Collector was acting in consonance with the principles of natural justice when he passed the order dated May 20, 1963, as he gave no opportunity ta appellants 2 and 3 of being heard. The fact that the first appellant was heard before that order was passed is of no moment because the persons who were vitally concerned in re-opening the case were appellants 2 and 3. Admittedly, no notice of the prcr.eedings to re-open the case was given to them. It is not for us to speculate what defences were available to them and whether the defences available would have materially affected the des tiny of the decision. We do not think it necessary to decide in this case whether the failure to observe the rule audi a/teram partem \"Would per se vitiate an crder or whether it is also necessary to show prejudice to the person affected resulting from the failure to observe the rule.\n\nSuffice. it to say that in the present case we are of the view that if notice had been given to appellants 2 and 3. they could, at any rate, have shown the true nature and character of the judgment of the civil court upon which they relied.\n\nIt is relevant to note that the judgment itself was not challenged as collusive by the respondents. We are quite aware that the defendant in the suit in which the judgment was obtained, namely, the first appellant, did not put forward any contention. But it would be rash to jump to the conclusicl!l from the mere fact that no defence was put forward by the\n\nfirst appellant in the suit that the decree was obtained collusively. U!ider s. 43 of the E.vidence Act, a person who is not a party to a judgment can show that it was obtained by fraud or collusion. No such attempt was made in this case. ·\n\nNor are we satisfied that every judgment which has the apparent effect of diminshing the area of land of a person would be within the ambit of s. 32-DD(b). Generally speaking. a judgment adjudicates on the rights of the parties as they existed before the suit in which it was obtained.\n\nA judgment is an aftlrn1ation of a relation between a particular pre dicate and a particular subject. So. in law. it is the affirmation by the G law of the legal consequences attending a proved or admitted state of facts. It is always a declaration that a liability, recognised as within the jural spJ; i<; re, does or does not exist. A judgment. as the culmination of the action, declares the existence of the right, recognizes the commission of the injury. or negatives of the allegaticn of one or the other(').\n\nA judgment of a court is an affirmation, by the authorised societal H agent of the state. speaking by warrant of law and in the name of the\n\n(I) See Black on Judgments, Vol. 1, 2nd ed., pp. 1-2.\n\n. -:-.\n\nGURD!T SINGH v. PUNJAB (Mathew, /.) 901\n\nstate, of the legal consequences attending a proved or admitted state of facts. Its declaratory, determinative and adjudicatory function is its distinctive characteristic. Its recording gives an official certification to a pre-existing relation or establishes a new one on pre-existing grounds(').\n\nThe judgment of the civil court with which we are concerned, adjudicated on the rights of the parties as they existed before the suit and when it declared that the mutation was effected not with the idea of transferring the property to the first appellant but for some other reason, the effect of the declaration was that there was no real transfer of the property in favour of the first appellant and that the property remained always in the ownership of appellants 2 and 3, notwithstanding the purported transfer evidenced by the mutation in the revenue records. It is impermissible to give the wide language employed in clause (b) of s. 32-DD an unconfined operation. When a transfer or mutation is made on account of fraud or mistake and if a suit is filed for a declaration that the transfer or mutation was made on account of fraud or mistake and a judgme, nt obtained, certainly the judgment would not have the effect of diminishing the area of a person which could have been declared as a surplus area within the meaning of s. 32-DD (b). The legal effect of such a declaration would be that the transferee or the person in whose name the mutation was effected had no right in the property. The land must have belonged to the first appellant prior to the judgment in crder that it might be postulated that the judgment has the effect of diminishing the total area in his hands. To put it differently, prior to the judgment, the land must have belonged to him in order that it may be said that the effect of the judgment is to diminish the area of his holding. If the effect of the judgment is only tci declare that the land never belonged to the first appellant, it has not the effect of diminishing the area of land in his possession. We are aware that the object of this provision in an Act like the one under consideration is to prevt circumvention of its provisions by dubious and indirect methods. But that is no reason why we should put a construction upon the section which its language can hardly bear. It wculd have been open to the respondents to allege and prove that the judgment was obtained collusively. But that could have been done only after notice to appellants 2 and 3 and atfer giving them an opportunity of being heard. Therefore, to say, as the High Court has said, that no prejudice was caused to appellants 2 and 3 fci\" want of an opportunity to them of being heard, is neither here nor there. We think the High Court went wrong in assuming that the Collector was right whert he ignored the judgment by his order dated May 20, 1963 on the ground that \" had the effect c{ diminishing the area of the first appellant which could have been declared as his surplus.\n\nWe, therefore, set aside the order of the High Court and allow the appeal. We make no order as to costs.\n\nS.B.W.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n~-- - (I) See Borchard, \"Declaratory Judgments\", 2nd ed., pp. 8~10 .", "total_entities": 52, "entities": [{"text": "GURDIT SINGH AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GURDIT SINGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 10, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 67, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GURDIT SINGH AND OTHERS\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS\n\nApril 10, 1974\n\n(K. K. MATHEW AND A, ALAG!RISWAMI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "K. K. MATHEW", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Sec. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 201, "end_char": 208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 393, "end_char": 400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 30. 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1046, "end_char": 1062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 30."}}, {"text": "February 14, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1395, "end_char": 1412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ibe latter, who was the only defendant, did not contest the suit and it was decreed on February 14, 1961."}}, {"text": "March 28, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1471, "end_char": 1485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, in proceedings under the Act, by order dated March 28, 1961 the CoUector declared on the basis of the jadgment and decree of the civil court that there was no surplus land in the ownership and pOssessiOh of th~ first appellant."}}, {"text": "S. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1697, "end_char": 1702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 30, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1765, "end_char": 1781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act was amended by Act 16 of 1962 and S. 32-DD was introduced into the Act with retrospective effect from October 30, 1956, i.e. the date of the earlier arnednment."}}, {"text": "Section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1824, "end_char": 1834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2199, "end_char": 2206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2979, "end_char": 2989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MarCh 28, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3420, "end_char": 3434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the view that the order of th~ Col!cctor passed H bn MarCh 28, 1961, became null and void merely hcauie he failed to takeint<' account the provision~ of Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3520, "end_char": 3527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 20, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4476, "end_char": 4488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(II) we are also not satisfied that the Collector was acting in comonance with ihe principles of natural justice when he passed the order dated May 20, 1963, as he gave no opportunity to appellants 2 and 3 of being heard."}}, {"text": "S. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5128, "end_char": 5133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 3200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5754, "end_char": 5763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6693, "end_char": 6704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagara; a, M. Qamaruddill and Vinod Dhawan, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K. R. Nagara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6706, "end_char": 6718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagara; a, M. Qamaruddill and Vinod Dhawan, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "M. Qamaruddill", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6723, "end_char": 6737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagara; a, M. Qamaruddill and Vinod Dhawan, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Vinod Dhawan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6742, "end_char": 6754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagara; a, M. Qamaruddill and Vinod Dhawan, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "V. C. Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6777, "end_char": 6790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. Mahajan, O. P. Sharma and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "O. P. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6792, "end_char": 6804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. Mahajan, O. P. Sharma and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6809, "end_char": 6823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. Mahajan, O. P. Sharma and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "MATHEW", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6891, "end_char": 6897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMATHEW, J. The first appellant is the father of appellants 2 and 3."}}, {"text": "Chapter IV-Ai of the Act was inserted by Pepsu Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7620, "end_char": 7670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 32A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7713, "end_char": 7719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV-Ai of the Act was inserted by Pepsu Act", "statute": "Chapter IV-Ai of the Act was inserted by Pepsu Act"}}, {"text": "Bhatinda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8372, "end_char": 8380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A few weeks later, the question of declaration of the surplus area of the land in the hands of tQ.e first appellant came up for consideration before the Collector of Bhatinda."}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8704, "end_char": 8709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 30,\n\n1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8773, "end_char": 8790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16 of 1962 and s. 32-DD was introduced into the Act with retrospective effect fro1n October 30,\n\n1956."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9523, "end_char": 9528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patiala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9599, "end_char": 9606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Collector thereupon made a reference presumably under s. 15 G of the Punjab Land Revenue Code for sanction to the Commissioner of Patiala to review his order dated March 28, 1961, as it omitted to include the land in question in the holding of the first appellant on the basis of the judgment and decree."}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9921, "end_char": 9926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10036, "end_char": 10056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court of Punjab to\n\n1 quash this order."}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10679, "end_char": 10684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10891, "end_char": 10896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11340, "end_char": 11345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11454, "end_char": 11459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March, 28, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11616, "end_char": 11631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Collector passed the order dated March, 28, 1961 determining the surplus area in the hands of the first appellant, he took into consideration the effect of the judgment of the civil court declaring that the muta_ tion of the name of the first appellant in the revenue record was effect- ed only to enable him to obtain a gun licence."}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12098, "end_char": 12103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 3p, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12166, "end_char": 12182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was only when s. 32-DD was incorporated in the Act with retrospective effect from October 3p, 1956 that the question arose whether that order was valid.·"}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12537, "end_char": 12542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12779, "end_char": 12784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1974] 3 S.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13584, "end_char": 13621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1967) 3 W.L.R. 382,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1974] 3 S.C.ll."}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15717, "end_char": 15722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16025, "end_char": 16030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "state", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16929, "end_char": 16934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GURD!T SINGH v. PUNJAB (Mathew, /.) 901\n\nstate, of the legal consequences attending a proved or admitted state of facts."}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17865, "end_char": 17870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18260, "end_char": 18265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Borchard", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20067, "end_char": 20075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~-- - (I) See Borchard, \"Declaratory Judgments\", 2nd ed.,"}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_902_906_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "ANIL KUMAR BOSE\n\n.v.\n\nSTATE OF BIHAR\n\nApril 10, 1974\n\n[H. R. KHANN1\" AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ, J\n\nPenal .Code....:...$. 420--G11i!1J intention an essential ingredient of offence of cheating-mens rea.\n\nThe appellants. an accountant and a cashier, along with another person, were !\"1.Ccused of preparing false pay bills and disbursing the amounts drawn from Lhe treasury iO a'ictitious pet'sons.\n\nThe Sessions Judge convicted and sentenced them under S. 420. read with s. 34, I.P.C. Oil appeal, the High Court confirmed the convictions and sentences passed against both of. them.\n\nOn further appeal to this Court,\n\nAllowing the appeals,\n\nHELD : For lhe purpos~ of holding the appellants guilty the evidence adduc_ ed mst establish beyond reasonable doubt mea11s rra on their part. [904 E]\n\nOn the evidence all that could be :oaid at the highest was that it was a faiiurc Qn the 'part of the accountant to perform his duties or to observe the rule:; of procedure laid down in he duty chart in a proper manner and may therel'ore be an administrative lapse on his part.\n\nWithout, however, anything more it will not be correct to impute guilty intention which is an essential ingredien1 of the offence of cheating. [905 D]\n\nThe material b.!fore the High Court together with the significant observations made byit against. the Superintendent and Deputy Superintendent do make out a case for giving bnefit of reasonable doubt to the cashier as well. It is not possible to hold that the requisite means J'ea had been established against him.\n\n[906 Fl\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 223 and.224 of 1970. Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 4th August 1970 of the Patna High Court in Cr!.\n\nAppeals Nos. 213 and 236 of 1967.\n\nS. Ba/akrishnan, N. M. Ghatate and B. Chakravarti, for the appel !ant (in Cr!. A. No. 223/70).\n\nNuruddin and S. M. Singh for the appellant (in Cr!. A. No. 224 of 1970).\n\nR. C. Prosad for the Respondent (in Cr!. A. No. 223/70).\n\nD. Gobrurdhan for the Respcndent (in Cr!. A. No. 224/70).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGoswAMI, J.\n\nThese appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment of the Patna High Court convicting the two appellants and another under section 420/34, Indian Penal Code. They have each been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one ye\"r and a fine of Rs. 200/-, in default regorous imprisonment for six months.\n\nDr. Rama Shankar (PW 14) and Dr. Ram Balak-Singh (PW 4) were\n\nA. K. BOSE v. BilIAR (Goswami,].) 903\n\nA House Physicians and Dr: Saile'ndra Kumar (PW 5) was a Hcu>e Surgeon in the Durbhanga Medical College Hospital. Hospital House Surgeons or House Physicians are usually appointed for different sections of the Hospital by the Superintendent of the Hospital for a period of six months, January to June and July to December and their monthly emoluments total Rs. 125/-; Rs. 75/- towards stipend and Rs. 50 as\n\ndiet allowance.\n\n. The prosecution case is that for the month of March 1963 a fictitious pay bill for Rs. 125 /- . was prepared in the name of Dr.\n\nRama Shankar, who had worked only for six months up to December, 1962 and had made over charge in January 1963. A similar pay bill for March 1963 was prepared for Dr. Sailandra Kumar, who was working in Ear, Nose and Throat Department, but this bill was prepared in the Pediatric Sectic1I1. Likewise another fictitious pay bi!J for the same month was prepared in the name of Dr. Ram Balak Singh, although he never joined that post and he was substituted by Dr. Rana Chandraketu. The amounts of the three aforesaid pay bills were drawn from the Treasury and disbursed to fictitious persons.\n\nThe letters of appointment and the joining reports of the various House Staff were as usual sent to the Accounts Department for preparation of the pay bills. •\n\nY ogesh Prasad Thakur was the Bill Clerk, who has not appealed against his conviction. The Accountant, Raghunath Prasad and the Cashier, Anil Kumar Bose, are the twci appellants before ns. Criminal Appeal No. 223 of 1970 is by Anil Kumar Bose and Criminal Appeal No. 224 of 1970 is. by Raghunath Prasad. Both these appeals are heard together and are disposed of by this common i1ldgment.\n\nAccording to the rules of procedure, such pay bills used to be prepared by the Bill Clerk, checked by the Accountant and then placed for signature before the Superintendent of the Hospital. After his signature, the bills were handed over to the peon of the Hospital who took these to the Treasury and after collecting the money therefrom made over the same to the Cashier, who made relevant entries in his cash Book and other connected registers. Then, in accordance with the Acquittance Roll, the money used to be disbursed to the various persons who signed in token of receipt of the amounts on the Acquittance Roil. After disbursement of the money, a certificate used to be given by the Deputy Suprinten.dent to the effect that the money had been disbursed in his presence. ·\n\nSome time in may 1963, in the course of preparation of the Annual Establishment Return for submission, to the Accountant General, Bihar, the Head Clerk, Bhola Nath Jha (PW 3) noticed that in the Acquittance Roll for March 1963, there were names of more Housemen than the sanctioned strength. After enqlliry by several officers at different levels, an information was lodged to the police who ultimately submitted a charge-sheet again.st the two appellants and Yogesh Prasad Thakur, the Bill Clerk. The accused were tried by\n\nthe Court of Sessions .ending in their conviction under section 420/ A 34 I.P.C. The High Court orJ appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence.\n\nHence these appeals by special leave.\n\nWe are not concerned with tne conviction of the Bill Clerk, Yogesh PrasadThakur, who accepted the same.\n\nThe defence of the Accountant, Raghunath Prasad, is that these bills did not pass through him and so he had no knowledge about the correctnjess of the same and they were directly put up before the Superintendent of the Hospital for his signature arid he signed them. Thereafter these were sent to the Treasury for encashment arid after that he had nothing to do with those. pay bills.\n\nThe defence of the Cashier, Anil Kumar Bose, is that he has nothing to do with the preparation of the bills. He came into the picture when the entire cash of these bills and other bills was handed over to him and he disbursed the money in accordance with the Acquittance Roll, as prepared by the Accounts Department. He did not know these three Doctors personally and h.e was not guilty of cheating.\n\nSince the Bill Clerk's conviction stands, it may be accepted that he prepared the three fictitious biils .with ~· view to cheat the Govern~ ment.\n\nWe are now concerned whether the two appellants also are guilty under section 420 /34 I.P.C.\n\nFor the purpose of holding them guilty, the evidence adduced must establish, beyond reasonable doubt, mens rea on their part. We will, therefore, consider the case of each appellant from that aspect.\n\nWith regard to the Accountant, Raghunath Prasad, the c_vidence relied upon by the High Court for its conclusion of guilt of this appellant may be set out in its own words :\n\n\"Ext. I is the duty chart of the Accountant. The first item of this chart is 'Sole in charge of accounts and to exercise general supervision on all staff worki11g under him for the efficient working of the Accounts Section'. The third item of this chart is 'To complete the Bill Book and get it checked and signed by the Dy. Superintendent'. I must point out that this duty has not been performed by the. Accountant in the case of these disputed bills. Tne hfth item of his duty is 'To put up all salary bills prepared by the dealing assistant daily before the Superintendent'. The Superintendent, PW 9 Dr. Safdar Ali Khan has stated that the Accountant is responsible for keeping the Acquittance Roll in order ....\n\nIt is stated in paragraph 21 that the Accountant should check the b; I! and then place for signature of higher .officers.\n\nOf course, it 1s in evidence that the Superintendent had asked the office to place all bills for his signature in the office on his table and no clerk should stand there when he\n\n- /\n\nA. K. BOSE v. BIHAR (Goswami,/.) 905\n\nwould sign on those bills. This direction is clearly against item No. 5 of the Duty Chart of ihe Accountant. I do not know for what purpose he made this il\\novation in the pr~ cedure. But this procedure would not absolve the Accountant of his duty to check the pay bills and other bills before sending them to the Superintendent. ....... It is further interesting to note that the disputed pay bills do not bear the initial or signature of the Accountant below the signature of the Superintendent. . . . . . As the evidence shows, the Accountant did not purposely sign on these forged bills with \\1 view to get himself absolved of the responsibility ....... .\n\nAs a matter of course, the work of this Accountant was to get pay bills prepared, check them and then put up before the Superintendent for his signature so that after obtaining his signature the bills may be sent to the treasury for encashment\".\n\nOn the above evidence at the highest it was a failure on the part of the Accountant to perform his duties or to observe the rules of procedure laid down in the Duty Chart in a proper manner and may, therefore, be an administrative lapse on his part about which we are not o required to pronounce any opinion in this case.\n\nWithout, however, anything more we do not think it will be correct to impute to this appellant a guilty intention which is one of the essential ingredients of the offence of cheating under seetion 420 I.P.C.\n\nApart from this, the High Court is not correct and indeed had no material to hold that \"the Accountant did not purposely sign on these forged bills with a view to get himself absolved of the responsibility\". The evidence of the Superin- E tendent, which is extracted above, runs counter to that conclusion.\n\nWith regard to the other appellant, the Cashier Anil Kumar Bose, we may read what the High Court has relied upon for its finding :\n\n\"Cor.1ing to the case of the Cashier, I find that his Duty Chart is Ext. 1/1. His first duty is 'Daily receipt and disbursement of cash'. A note in this Duty Chart shows 'To be solely responsible for the performance of above duties' ....\n\nThe Deputy Superintendent (PW 6) has stated in paragraph 8 of his depo$ition that it was the duty of the Cashier to see that the payment was made to the correct or right person.\n\nOf course, in the Duty Chart jt is not written in so many words.\n\nBut as his duty was to disburse the money, this disbursement was to be made in a bona fide manner, that is, after due enquiry about the payee, if the latter is not known to the Cashier.\n\nIn case of P.W. 5 one payment was made on the 5th April for the month of March and the next payment to a person of that name was 111ade on 10th April, that is, only after five days.\n\nThe Ca, hicr ought to have detected this if his case of bona {ides is to be accepted.\n\nThe argument advanced on his behalf is that it was not possible for him to know all the Housemen. It may be so, but he cannot be allowed to take shelter thai he paid the money without ascertaining who was the real recipient. It was also the\n\npractice to make the payment in presence of the Deputy Superintendent and then to take his initial below the seal, that, is, rubber stamp. In these disputed cases no such signature was obtained of the Deputy Superintendent, and there is no explanation as to why this was not done.\n\nThe Deputy Superintendent has clearly stated that against these disputed entries his signature was not obtained and no rubber stamp concerning the payment was affixed •..• In my opinion, therefore, the Cashier also cannot claim to be absolved of the charge against him. It was his duty to have seen that the payment was made to the correct person. It is not clear in evidence that these payments were made in presence of the Deputy Superintendent of. the said Hospital. , The witnesses have spoken only about the usual practice\".\n\nThe learned Judge of the High Court made a significant observation in the following terms :'- '\n\n\"l am constrained to remark that both, the Superintendent and the Deputy Superintendent have shown carelessness in their duties and these things came to happen because of the latitude which they had given to these employees. \"Had the Superintendent been careful to see whether the signa- . ture of the Accountant was given in the pay bills, he must have detected that in the disputed pay bills there was no signature of the Accountant, and that should have aroused his suspicion about the correctness of the pay bills\".\n\nEven on the finding of the High Court, there was nothing in the Duty Chart that the duty of the Cashier was to see that the payment was made to the correct or right person. There is further no evidence that these three Doctors were known to the Cashier.\n\nOn the other hand, the High Court has not absolutely repelled the argument advanced on his behalf that it was not possible for him to know all the Housemen.\n\nThe High Court has come to an adverse conclusion against him on account of his not properly \"ascertaining who was the_ real recipient\" of the money before he disbursed t!Je same.\n\nThe material before the High Court together with the significant observation against the Superintendent and the Deputy Superintendent do make out a case for giving benefit of reasonable doubt to the Cashier as well.\n\nOn the e\\1dence which the High Court has relied upon against hitn, it is not possible to hold that the requisite mens rea has been established against this accused.\n\nAs observed in the case of the Accountant, it may be at the highest a case of an error of judgment or breach of performance of duty which, per se, cannot be equated with dishonest intention to establish the charge under section 420 l.P.C. In the result, the appeals ·<ire allowed.\n\nThe judgment of the High Court so far .as these two appellants are concerned is set aside.\n\nThe two appellants herein are <icquitted of the charge and shall be discharged from their bail bonds.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nApp.eals allowed.\n\nE >", "total_entities": 41, "entities": [{"text": "ANIL KUMAR BOSE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANIL KUMAR BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 10, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 52, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF BIHAR\n\nApril 10, 1974\n\n[H. R. KHANN1\" AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ, J\n\nPenal .Code....:...$. 420--G11i!1J intention an essential ingredient of offence of cheating-mens rea."}}, {"text": "P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 446, "end_char": 452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 464, "end_char": 469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 471, "end_char": 476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. Ba", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1763, "end_char": 1768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Ba/akrishnan, N. M. Ghatate and B. Chakravarti, for the appel !"}}, {"text": "N. M. Ghatate", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1780, "end_char": 1793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Ba/akrishnan, N. M. Ghatate and B. Chakravarti, for the appel !"}}, {"text": "B. Chakravarti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1798, "end_char": 1812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Ba/akrishnan, N. M. Ghatate and B. Chakravarti, for the appel !"}}, {"text": "Nuruddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1859, "end_char": 1867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nuruddin and S. M. Singh for the appellant (in Cr!."}}, {"text": "S. M. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1872, "end_char": 1883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nuruddin and S. M. Singh for the appellant (in Cr!."}}, {"text": "R. C. Prosad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1933, "end_char": 1945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. C. Prosad for the Respondent (in Cr!."}}, {"text": "D. 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Gobrurdhan for the Respcndent (in Cr!."}}, {"text": "GoswAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2094, "end_char": 2101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGoswAMI, J.\n\nThese appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment of the Patna High Court convicting the two appellants and another under section 420/34, Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2179, "end_char": 2195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGoswAMI, J.\n\nThese appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment of the Patna High Court convicting the two appellants and another under section 420/34, Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2244, "end_char": 2255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2260, "end_char": 2277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Rama Shankar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2426, "end_char": 2438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Rama Shankar (PW 14) and Dr. Ram Balak-Singh (PW 4) were\n\nA. K. BOSE v. BilIAR (Goswami,].)"}}, {"text": "Ram Balak-Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2455, "end_char": 2470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Rama Shankar (PW 14) and Dr. Ram Balak-Singh (PW 4) were\n\nA. K. BOSE v. BilIAR (Goswami,].)"}}, {"text": "Saile'ndra Kumar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2550, "end_char": 2566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "903\n\nA House Physicians and Dr: Saile'ndra Kumar (PW 5) was a Hcu>e Surgeon in the Durbhanga Medical College Hospital."}}, {"text": "Durbhanga Medical College Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2601, "end_char": 2635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "903\n\nA House Physicians and Dr: Saile'ndra Kumar (PW 5) was a Hcu>e Surgeon in the Durbhanga Medical College Hospital."}}, {"text": "Rama Shankar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3079, "end_char": 3091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was prepared in the name of Dr.\n\nRama Shankar, who had worked only for six months up to December, 1962 and had made over charge in January 1963."}}, {"text": "Sailandra Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3246, "end_char": 3261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar pay bill for March 1963 was prepared for Dr. Sailandra Kumar, who was working in Ear, Nose and Throat Department, but this bill was prepared in the Pediatric Sectic1I1."}}, {"text": "Ram Balak Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3458, "end_char": 3473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Likewise another fictitious pay bi!J for the same month was prepared in the name of Dr. Ram Balak Singh, although he never joined that post and he was substituted by Dr. Rana Chandraketu."}}, {"text": "Rana Chandraketu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3540, "end_char": 3556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Likewise another fictitious pay bi!J for the same month was prepared in the name of Dr. Ram Balak Singh, although he never joined that post and he was substituted by Dr. Rana Chandraketu."}}, {"text": "Prasad Thakur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3839, "end_char": 3852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y ogesh Prasad Thakur was the Bill Clerk, who has not appealed against his conviction."}}, {"text": "Raghunath Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3934, "end_char": 3950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Accountant, Raghunath Prasad and the Cashier, Anil Kumar Bose, are the twci appellants before ns."}}, {"text": "Anil Kumar Bose", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3968, "end_char": 3983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Accountant, Raghunath Prasad and the Cashier, Anil Kumar Bose, are the twci appellants before ns.", "canonical_name": "ANIL KUMAR BOSE"}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5130, "end_char": 5135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some time in may 1963, in the course of preparation of the Annual Establishment Return for submission, to the Accountant General, Bihar, the Head Clerk, Bhola Nath Jha (PW 3) noticed that in the Acquittance Roll for March 1963, there were names of more Housemen than the sanctioned strength."}}, {"text": "Bhola Nath Jha", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5153, "end_char": 5167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some time in may 1963, in the course of preparation of the Annual Establishment Return for submission, to the Accountant General, Bihar, the Head Clerk, Bhola Nath Jha (PW 3) noticed that in the Acquittance Roll for March 1963, there were names of more Housemen than the sanctioned strength."}}, {"text": "Yogesh Prasad Thakur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5460, "end_char": 5480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After enqlliry by several officers at different levels, an information was lodged to the police who ultimately submitted a charge-sheet again.st the two appellants and Yogesh Prasad Thakur, the Bill Clerk.", "canonical_name": "Yogesh Prasad Thakur"}}, {"text": "section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5581, "end_char": 5592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5599, "end_char": 5604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Yogesh PrasadThakur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5770, "end_char": 5789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are not concerned with tne conviction of the Bill Clerk, Yogesh PrasadThakur, who accepted the same.", "canonical_name": "Yogesh Prasad Thakur"}}, {"text": "section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6819, "end_char": 6830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6835, "end_char": 6840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Safdar Ali Khan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7825, "end_char": 7840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Superintendent, PW 9 Dr. Safdar Ali Khan has stated that the Accountant is responsible for keeping the Acquittance Roll in order ....\n\nIt is stated in paragraph 21 that the Accountant should check the b; I!"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9712, "end_char": 9717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Anil Kumar Bose", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10076, "end_char": 10091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With regard to the other appellant, the Cashier Anil Kumar Bose, we may read what the High Court has relied upon for its finding :\n\n\"Cor.1ing to the case of the Cashier, I find that his Duty Chart is Ext.", "canonical_name": "ANIL KUMAR BOSE"}}, {"text": "section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13970, "end_char": 13981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_907_914_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "STATE OF IDMACHAL PRADESH & ANR.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC .\n\n. April 10. 1974\n\nB (A. N. RAY, C.J., Y. V. CHANDRACHUD AND V. R. KRISHNA !YER, JJ.j\n\nPunjab Reorganisation Act, 1956, ~·. 82(6)-Punjab officers allocated to Himachal Prade.sh-Mode of integration of Punjab o{!icers and Himachal Pradesh officers.\n\nThe. app.el!ants were upgraded fro~ the post of Sub-Inspectors to Inspectors of. tax<it1on in the for!ller State of PunJab on 1st April, 1966.\n\nThey were ullocat ed tQ the State of H1machal Pradesh on 1st November, 1966, the appointed day under the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966. The respondents were Excise Sub- In'.:.pectors in Himachal Pradesh on that date.\n\nOn 14th February, 1967, the Central Government gave instructions for equating posts for the purpose of integration .in the services.\n\nOn the 26th Arri!, 1969, th;! Central Govern1nent wrote to the State Government that 45 posis of Excise and Taxatfon Sub- Inspect?fS in Himac.hal Pradesh may be abolished and in their place 33 posts of Excise and Taxation Jnspectors may be created. The State Government gave effect to the directions of the Central Government and upgraded the Excise Sub- Inspectors to Inspectors, with effect from 1st I\\fay, 1969. Thus, the upgrading was done with the sanction of the Central Government in accordance with the provisions of s. 82(6) of the Act. On 29th May, 1971 the State of Himachal Pradesh, by an execulive decision. changed the date of upgrading of the respondellts from 1st May, 1969 to tst April, 1966.\n\nThe State prepared two seniority lists in one of which one of the, appellants was mentioned along with the officers of Himachal Pradesh, and in the other~ the other appellants were shown as juniors to the officers of Himacha1 Pradesh.\n\nThe State Government also appointed four Excise Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh as Assistant Excise and Taxation Officers.\n\nThe appellants challenged (a) the change in the date of promoti6n of the officers of Himachal Pradesh to 1st April, 1966, (b) the two seniority lists and\n\n(c) the four promotions as Assistant Excise and Taxation Officers.\n\nThe High Court set aside the two seniority lists and the four promotions and gave the follo\\ving directions regarding the preparation of seniority lists, namely,\n\n(i) that the appellants should be equated with the Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh that is. that all inspectors of Himachal Pradesh should be taken as Excise and Taxation Inspectors and that their cadre should be taken as joint;\n\n(ii) that the date of continuous ani:iointment in an equated post shall govern the seniority, (iii) that specific approval of the Central Government is to be takenunder s. 82(6) if the date of upgradation is to be fixed as 1st April, 1966; and\n\n(iv) that the rules of promotion to th~ Posts of Assistant Excise and Taxation Officers should be prepared after getting the approval of the Central Government.\n\nJn appeal to this Court, the appelTants contended that the directions given regarding the preparation of seniority lists should be set aside. on the ground that the appellants were deprived of their quota of promotion under r.6 of Class 111-A Punjab Rules, 1956, that the posts of Excise Inspectors and Taxation Inspectors belonged to different cadres, that the appellants belonged to the Taxation Cadre, and that for oromotion under the Punjab Rules, 3 years continuous ser- H vice as Inspectors was sufficient.\n\nHELD : (I) If the State Government of B.imachal Prdesh wished to cbang.r the date of upgradation to 1st April, 1966 the State Government cannot do so without the sanction of the Central Government under s. 82(6) of the Act.\n\nThe State of Himachal Pradesh not only set at naught the direction of the\n\nCentral Government, but by givins a retrospective validation to the date up- A gradation, changed the con 'ltions of services of the appellants to their dis .1dvantage.\n\nHence lhe direction :hat if the State Government wanted to alter the date of upgrdation of posts of Himachal Pradesh Sub-Inspector;; to 1st April,\n\n1966, i.he :; ancbon of the Central Government should have been obtained is correct. [912 D-E, 913 HJ\n\n(2) The other direction given by the High Court that the rules for promotion lo the post of Excise and Taxation Inspector shall be finalised after getting the B approval Of the Central Government is also correct. [913 H]\n\n(3) If the State Government wishes to equate the appellant~ with lhe Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh the State of llimachal Pradesh will have 1.0 follow the provisions of the State Reorganisation Act in that b::half.\n\nThe date of continuous appointment of appellants and the respondents in the equated posts will also have to 00 in compliance with the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe appellants were also not heard regarding equation of posts and with regard to the seniority lists.\n\nTherefore, all facts and circumstances affecting the servict: C conditions of Jnsnectors of both the States will have to be placed by lhe State Government befOre the Central Government for the decision and approval of the latter under s. 82(6). [912 E-F; 913 E-FJ\n\nCtVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :-Civil Appeals Ne$. 1324 and 2648 of 1972. \"'\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated the 10th August, 1971 of D tho Himachal Pradesh High Court at Simla in Civil Writ Petition No. 113 of 1970.\n\nV. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant (in C.A. 1324 /72 and for respondents 1-3 (ia C. A. 2648).\n\nS. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja, M. Qamuruddin for the respondents E 2-Jl (in C.A. 1324/72> and for the appellant (in C. A. 2648).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nRA Y, C. J.-These two appeals are by certificate from the common judgment dated 10 August, 1971 of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh.\n\nThe State and the Taxation Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh arc the appellants inl Civil Appeal No. 1324 of 1972. The ten appellants i11 Civil Appeal No. 2648 of 1972 are Taxation Inspectors of the former State of Punjab. They were allocated to Himachal Pradesh because of reorganisation of the State of Punjab. The first seven appellants were confirmed as Taxation Inspectors.\n\nThe other three appellants were Taxation Inspectors but were not confirmed in that post.\n\nThe appellants in the former State -of Punjab were SubInspectors of Taxation. On 1 April, 1966 the appellants were upgraded from the pos! of Sub-Inspectors to Inspectors of Taxation. When the appellants \"vere allocated to Himachal Pradesh on the appointed day on 1 Novemher, 1966 they were Inspectors of Taxation.\n\nThe respondents were Excise Sub-Inspectors in Himachal Pradesh on the appoin!ed day.\n\nThe respondents were upgraded from the position of Excise JnS P'ctors to Inspec'ors with effect from 1 May, 1969. That upgrading\n\n\\ i\n\nA was with the sanction and under the directions of the Central Government iii accordance with the provisions of section 82 ( (;) of the Piinjab Reorganisation Act 1966 referred to as the Act. On 29 May, 1971 the State of Himacbal Pradesh by an executive. decision changed the date of upgrading of the respondents from 1 May, 1969 IQ l. April,\n\n1966. This 11pgriiding was done by the State of Himachal Pradesh ·\n\n8 without sanction and direction of the Central Go\\'errunent under section 82 (6) of the Act.\n\nThe preent question which falls for consideration is whether the conditions of servi\"C of the appellll!ltS have been changed to their disadvantage by the executive decision of the State of Himachal Pradesh on 29th May, 1971 tq upgrade the posts of Sub, Inspectors of C Excise Departent of Himachal Pradesh to Inspectors with effect from 1 April, 1966. The corollary to this question is whether the executive decision of the State of Himachill Pradesh is invalid by reason of noncompliance with the provisions contained in section 82 ( 6) of the Act.\n\nThe appellants impeached the two seniority lists prepared by U1e State.\n\nIn one of the seniority lists appellant Jadgish Ram has been mentioned along with Excise Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh. The other appellants who were confirmed Taxation Inspectors have en shown in the second impeached seniority list as juniors to several unconfirmed Sub-Inspectors of Excise and Taxation belonging to Himachal Pradesh.\n\nThe appellants contend that they never worked on the Excise side.\n\nThey further allege that their ca<lte was different from . that of Taxation Inspectors.\n\nThe appellants imP, ugned the second seniority list on the ground that the Excise and Taxation Sub- Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh were treated at par with Taxation Inspectors of the former State of Punjab. In the sec.end seniority list there is a note to the effect that Excise and Taxation Sub.JtllpeCtors of Hima<:hal Pradesh WC!'.• being promoted and confirmed with effect from 1 April, 1966, add their cases were sent to the .Ministry of Home Affairs for necessary orders. The appellants impeached this note as illegal.\n\nThe contention of the appellants is that the promotion and confirmation of Excise Sub-Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh could not take place with. retrospective effect so as to prejudice the rights of the appellants.\n\n The grievance of the appellants is that the seniority list of Taxption Inspectors should have been prepared separately. The appellan!s contend that while they were in the former State of Punjab they belonged to Taxation Cadre and there was a quota fixed in the Punjab Excise and Taxation Service Cass III-A Rules 1936 in their favour for promotion as. Excise and Taxation Officers. The appellants cont.end that they have been deprived of this quota benefit as they were placed in a joint list along with unconfirmed Excises illllpeCtotll of H Himachal Pradesh.\n\nThe .state of Hima1:hal Pradesh appointed four Excise 111$1l1Cklrs as Assistant Exicse and Taxation Officers. The appellants challenged\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1974] 3 S.C.R. ~'. those four. appointments and contended. that the benefit of promotion A saould have been given. to the appellants. .\n\nThe principal contention of the appeliants is that section s2(6) of the Act prohibits any change in the conditions of service of th.e appellants which are disadvantageous to them without prior sanction of the Central Government. The State of Himachal Pradesh after the reorganisation on 1 Novemb\", 1966 asked for directions of the Central Government with regard to tipgradation of Excise and Taxation Sub- Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh. . ·\n\nThe Central Government gave instructions in a letter dated 14 February, 1967 for equating posts for the purpose of integration in the services. The four factors for determining the equation of a post are : first, the nature and duties of a post; second, the responsibilities and powers exercised by the officer holding the post and the extent of territorial or other charge .held or responsibilities discharged; third, the minimum qualifications, if any, prescribed for recruitment to the post; and, fourth, the salary of the post. The Central Governmnet in the said letter dated 14 February, 1967 further said that two factors would be taken into account for determination of relative seniority.\n\nFirst is the len!gth of continuous service whether temporary or perma nent in the equivalent post; this should exclude periods for which an appointment is held in a purely stop-gap or fortuitous arrangement.\n\nSecond is the age of the person.\n\nOther factors being equal seniority may be determined on the basis of age.\n\nIt is also important to consider the letter dated 26 April, 1969 written by the Central Government to the State Government. There were 45 posts of Excise and Taxation Sub-Inspectors in Himachal Pradesh. The Central Government stated that those 45 posts of Sub-\n\nInspectors might be abolished and in their place 33 posts of Excise . and Taxation Inspectors might be created. The new posts of Excise and Taxation Inspectors were to be 'offered to the existing incumbents of the posts of Excise a, nd Taxa'ion Sub-Inspectors in order of seniority.\n\nThe Central Government stated that the order would take effect from 1 May, 1969: ·\n\nThe State, Government by letter dated 19 July, 196.9 gave effect to the directions of the Central Government. The Lieutenant Governor was pleased to accord sanction to the creation of 33 permanent posts of Excise Inspectors in the scale of Rs. 150-10-200/10-300 in the Excise and Taxation Department, Himachal Pradesh with effect from 1 May, 1969.. . . .\n\nConsequent upon the abolition of 12 permanent pbsts of Taxation Sub-Inspectors under the Excise and Taxation Department, Himachal Pradesh with effect from 1 May, 1969, 8 Excise and Taxation Sub Inspectors were rendered surplus and they were appointed as Taxation Inspectors. against 8 temporary posts of Inspectors created for. survey work.\n\nE )\n\n::I'he Central .Government directed and. sanctioned that Sub-Inspectors orHjmachal Pradesh .could be promoted as Inspectors with effect from 1 May, 1969. The State of Himachal Pradesh implemen, ted that .direction of the Central Government. Later on the St.ate of Himachal Pradesh superseded the previous order and promoted Su 1>·\n\nInspectors of Himachal Pradesh as Inspectors with effect from 1 April,\n\n1~66. The 'appellants contend that the State Qf Himachal Pradesh thereby not only violated the direction of the Central Government under section 82 of the Act but also changed the conditions of service of the appellants to their disadvantage without obtaining the sancti9n of the Central Goverpment.\n\nOne of the contentions of the appellants in the High Court was that in Himachal Pradesh the posts of Excise Inspectors and Taxation Inspectors bolonged to different cadres. The appellants contended that in Himachal Pradeh posts were sanctioned separately for the Taxation and the Excise Departments. The State on the other hand contended that there was one common cadre of Excise and Tax.tation Inspectors.\n\nThe High Court found that the apP, Cllants belonged to the separate cadre of .Taxation .Inspectors at the t1ine when they were a!lgcated to Himachal Pradesh.\n\nJn Punjab it is also found by the High Court as n fact that there were two cadres and the appellants did not belong to the cadre of Excise Inspectors.\n\nThe appellants relied on Rule 6 of Class III'A Punjab Rules, 1956.\n\nUnder that rule when any vacancy occurs the Government E shall determine in what manner it shall be filled provided that 50 per 'cent of the vacancies shall be filled by direct appointment, 25 % by promotion of Taxation Inspectors, 12i% by transfer of members of the ministerial establishment of the Excise and Taxation Department.\n\nThe appeliants, therefore, contend that 25 % promotion quota of the post of Assistant Excise and Taxation Officers should go to Taxation Inspectors and in this manner the Excise Wpectors could not be F p1omoted.\n\nFurther, the appellants contend .that the date of substantive appointment should be taken. into consideration for determination of seniority.\n\nThe Himachal Pradesh Excise and Taxation Department Inspectorate Class Ill Service Recruitment, Promotion and certain Conditions of Service Rules, 1963 are relied on by the appellants. Rule 12(2) states that subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3), permanent officers of each grade shall be ranked senior to persons who are officiating in that grade. Rule 9 of the Punjab Rules, 1943 on which the apoellants relied .sta'ed thar the seniority of members of the services in so far as eac:1 class of post specified in Appendix 'A' therefo is concerned. be determined. by the date of their substantive. aooointment to a nost in that cla% provided that if two or more members are confirmed in tliai same class of pest on the same date, their seniority shall be determined by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner w.hose decision hall .be final. ·\n\n15-'.~ ISup.Cl/75\n\n912 SUPREM~ COURT UPORtS [1974] 3 s.c.11.\n\nThe contention of the appellants is that under their conditioal of service when they weto allocated to Himachal Pradesh, on ti\" *!'P\"i&. ,. ted. date 1 November, 1966 they were conlirmed Taxation Inspectors with effect from 1 April, 1966 in t~ former State of Punjab. In accordance with the directions of the Central Government contained in the letter dated 14, February, 1967 the appellants contend that tb; date of sub; tantive appointment, viz., 1 April, 1966 is therefore to be considered for seniority as well as promotion. For promotion the appellants contended that Class III-A Punjab Rules provided three years continuous service as Inspector to be sufJicient. Confirmed Inspectors would be senior to unconfirmed Inspectors. In. this background the appellants contend that the seniority list wrongly shows that appellant No. 1 was placed along with the Excise Inspectors and in the other seniority list all Inspectors of Punjab were equated with Sub-lnspectors of Himachal Pradesh. Further, it is contended that Sub-Inspectors of 1-limachal Pradesh who were unconfirmed were made senior to the appellants.\n\nOn behalf of the State it was contended that the employees _of Hima. cha! Pradesh could be given the same benefit of Inspectors by varying the conditions of service which were to their benefit and the sane- D lion of the Central Government under section 82(6) of the Act would not be required for that purpose. It is also said that the conditions of service which govern the appellants who were employees of tho\n\nformer S!nte of Punjab were not varied to their disadvantage. This contention is utterly unsound. The seniority list bas been prepared by giving the employees of Himachal Pradesh the benefit of the date of upgradation as 1 April, 1966. The Government of India sanctioned E the date 1 May, 1969. The State of Himachal Pradesh is not only setting at naught the direction but is giving a retrospective validation\n\nto the date of upgradation. That is a lll'atter which changes the conditions of service of the appell1111ts. The appellants are deprived of their continuous period of service. The appellants are deprived of their quota of promotion.\n\nThe appellants were not heard with regard to equatiOll!l of posts of Excise Inspectars and Taxation Inspectors. The F appellants were not heard with regard to their seniority list.\n\nThe appellants, therefore, rightly contend that the conditions of service applicable to them before the appointed day have beerl altered to their disadvantage without the previous approval of the Central Gomnment. Again, if the State of Himaeha! Pradesh wants to equate\n\nTaxation Inspec!ors with Excise Inspectors the approval of the Cen- G tral Go-nment will be required because the appellants may represent their case of promotion quota under these Rules.\n\nThe High Court correctly held that if the State Government wanted to alter the upgradation of the pos!s of Himachal Pradesh Sub-Inspeo. tors with effect from I April,. 1966, the sanction of the Central Gov\n\ncrmncnt was to be obtained. The High Court rightly set aside the II exec-utive decision changing the date of promotion of Himachal Pra deSh Snb-Tnspectors from 1 May, 1969 to 1 April, 1966 and !he seniority lists as well as the four promotions.\n\nH. P STAtE v. UNION (Ra;)', CJ.) 913\n\nTITe a!'pellants contended that the directions given by the High \\ Co11rt Witlr reprd to preparation of seniority lists should be t ~.\n\nThe dittctions given by the High (:ourt were these. The appellants should be equated with the Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh and thereby the High Court held that all Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh; 'lihould be taken as Excise and Taxation Inspectors and their cadre should be taken as joint. The second direction is that the date of c<1Dtinuous appointment in an equated pot shall goern the seniority as provided in the letter dated 14 February, 1967 of the Central Government, The third direction is that specific approval of the Central Government is to be taken under section 82(6) of the Act if the date of promotion or upgradation from the post of Sub-Inspectors is fixed as 1 April,\n\n1966. The fouirth direction is that the Rules for promotion to the posts of Assistant Excise and Taxation Officers should be prepared and the same shall be finalised after getting the approval of the Central Government.\n\nThe appellants main contention is that there were two distinct cadres of Inspectors in Hiinachal pradesn before reorganisation, viz., one cadre of Taxation Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors and the other D cadre of Excise Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors. The respondents on the other hand contended that there was 'one .cadre in Himachal Pradesh.\n\nIt was also the contention of the respondents that there was unification' of cadres in Himachal Pradesh before the reorganisation of the State.\n\nIf the State of Himachal Pradesh. wishes to change the _date of upgradation of Himachal Pradesh Sub-Inspectors to 1 April, 1966 the State Government canilot do so without sanction of the Central Government under section' 82 ( 6) of the .. Act. If the State Government wishes to equate the appellants with the Inspectors of Himchal Pradesh the State of Himachal Pradesh will have to follow the• provisions of the Slates Reorganisation Act in that behalf. The date of continuous appointment of the appellants and the respondents in the equated 'post will also have to be in compliance with the provisions of the States Reorganisation Act.\n\nAll facts and circumstances affecting the service conditions of Inspectors of both the States will have .to be placed by the S•ate Government before the Central Government for decision of the Central G Government whether it should give approval .under section 82(6)-of\n\nthe Act. to upgradation of Sub Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh with effect from 1 April 1966.\n\nThe direction given by the High Court that the State Government shall obtain approval of the Central Government under section 82(6) of the Act in regard to the date of Promotion or upgradatiori' ot Sub- H Inspectors is correct and upheld.\n\nThe other direction given by th~ .\n\nHigh Court that the Rules for promotion to the post of Excise and'· Taxation Inspectors shall be finalised after getting the approval of the Central Government is correct and upheld.\n\nFor these reasons the appeal of the State is . dismissed. The appeaJ. .of the appellants is accepted in part. Equation of the appellants with t1ie Inspectors of HimacbaJ\". Pradesh and the date of continuoµs appointment in equated posts can. be only in accordance with the wovisions. of. the Punjab Reorganisation Act. parties wHI pay a0<L!>ear their own costs\n\nV.; P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 65, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF IDMACHAL PRADESH & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 31, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF IDMACHAL PRADESH & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 10. 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 79, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 10."}}, {"text": "B (A. N. RAY, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y. V. CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 559, "end_char": 590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 702, "end_char": 720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 14th February, 1967, the Central Government gave instructions for equating posts for the purpose of integration .in the services."}}, {"text": "s. 82(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1333, "end_char": 1341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966", "statute": "the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966"}}, {"text": "29th May, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1357, "end_char": 1371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 29th May, 1971 the State of Himachal Pradesh, by an execulive decision."}}, {"text": "State of Himachal Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1376, "end_char": 1401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 29th May, 1971 the State of Himachal Pradesh, by an execulive decision."}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1638, "end_char": 1654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State prepared two seniority lists in one of which one of the, appellants was mentioned along with the officers of Himachal Pradesh, and in the other~ the other appellants were shown as juniors to the officers of Himacha1 Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Himacha1 Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1736, "end_char": 1752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State prepared two seniority lists in one of which one of the, appellants was mentioned along with the officers of Himachal Pradesh, and in the other~ the other appellants were shown as juniors to the officers of Himacha1 Pradesh."}}, {"text": "s. 82(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2662, "end_char": 2670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Rules, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3143, "end_char": 3161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State Government of B.imachal Prdesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3432, "end_char": 3468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HELD : (I) If the State Government of B.imachal Prdesh wished to cbang.r the date of upgradation to 1st April, 1966 the State Government cannot do so without the sanction of the Central Government under s. 82(6) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 82(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3617, "end_char": 3625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Rules, 1956", "statute": "Punjab Rules, 1956"}}, {"text": "State of Himachal Pradesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3643, "end_char": 3668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Himachal Pradesh not only set at naught the direction of the\n\nCentral Government, but by givins a retrospective validation to the date up- A gradation, changed the con 'ltions of services of the appellants to their dis .1dvantage.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF IDMACHAL PRADESH & ANR"}}, {"text": "State of llimachal Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4461, "end_char": 4487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "913 H]\n\n(3) If the State Government wishes to equate the appellant~ with lhe Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh the State of llimachal Pradesh will have 1.0 follow the provisions of the State Reorganisation Act in that b::half.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF IDMACHAL PRADESH & ANR"}}, {"text": "s. 82(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5071, "end_char": 5079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. C. Mahajan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5321, "end_char": 5334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant (in C.A. 1324 /72 and for respondents 1-3 (ia C. A. 2648)."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5339, "end_char": 5353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant (in C.A. 1324 /72 and for respondents 1-3 (ia C. A. 2648)."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5433, "end_char": 5444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja, M. Qamuruddin for the respondents E 2-Jl (in C.A. 1324/72> and for the appellant (in C. A. 2648)."}}, {"text": "K. R. Nagaraja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5446, "end_char": 5460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja, M. Qamuruddin for the respondents E 2-Jl (in C.A. 1324/72> and for the appellant (in C. A. 2648)."}}, {"text": "M. Qamuruddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5462, "end_char": 5475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja, M. Qamuruddin for the respondents E 2-Jl (in C.A. 1324/72> and for the appellant (in C. A. 2648)."}}, {"text": "RA Y", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5606, "end_char": 5610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nRA Y, C. J.-These two appeals are by certificate from the common judgment dated 10 August, 1971 of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh."}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6858, "end_char": 6868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Piinjab Reorganisation Act 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6882, "end_char": 6913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "29 May, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6941, "end_char": 6953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 29 May, 1971 the State of Himacbal Pradesh by an executive."}}, {"text": "State of Himacbal Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6958, "end_char": 6983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 29 May, 1971 the State of Himacbal Pradesh by an executive."}}, {"text": "Central Go\\'errunent", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7198, "end_char": 7218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This 11pgriiding was done by the State of Himachal Pradesh ·\n\n8 without sanction and direction of the Central Go\\'errunent under section 82 (6) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7225, "end_char": 7235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Piinjab Reorganisation Act 1966", "statute": "the Piinjab Reorganisation Act 1966"}}, {"text": "1 April, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7590, "end_char": 7603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The preent question which falls for consideration is whether the conditions of servi\"C of the appellll!ltS have been changed to their disadvantage by the executive decision of the State of Himachal Pradesh on 29th May, 1971 tq upgrade the posts of Sub, Inspectors of C Excise Departent of Himachal Pradesh to Inspectors with effect from 1 April, 1966."}}, {"text": "State of Himachill Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7677, "end_char": 7703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The corollary to this question is whether the executive decision of the State of Himachill Pradesh is invalid by reason of noncompliance with the provisions contained in section 82 ( 6) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7775, "end_char": 7785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Piinjab Reorganisation Act 1966", "statute": "the Piinjab Reorganisation Act 1966"}}, {"text": "Jadgish Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7917, "end_char": 7928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In one of the seniority lists appellant Jadgish Ram has been mentioned along with Excise Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh."}}, {"text": ".state of Hima1:hal Pradesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9679, "end_char": 9706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .state of Hima1:hal Pradesh appointed four Excise 111$1l1Cklrs as Assistant Exicse and Taxation Officers.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF IDMACHAL PRADESH & ANR"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1974] 3 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9812, "end_char": 9850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants challenged\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1974] 3 S.C.R. ~'."}}, {"text": "s2(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10032, "end_char": 10037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State of Punjab they belonged to Taxation Cadre and there was a quota fixed in the Punjab Excise and Taxation Service Cass III-A Rules 1936", "statute": "State of Punjab they belonged to Taxation Cadre and there was a quota fixed in the Punjab Excise and Taxation Service Cass III-A Rules 1936"}}, {"text": "1 Novemb\", 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10260, "end_char": 10275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Himachal Pradesh after the reorganisation on 1 Novemb\", 1966 asked for directions of the Central Government with regard to tipgradation of Excise and Taxation Sub- Inspectors of Himachal Pradesh. . ·"}}, {"text": "14 February, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10475, "end_char": 10492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government gave instructions in a letter dated 14 February, 1967 for equating posts for the purpose of integration in the services."}}, {"text": "26 April, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11483, "end_char": 11497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also important to consider the letter dated 26 April, 1969 written by the Central Government to the State Government."}}, {"text": "1 May, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12047, "end_char": 12058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government stated that the order would take effect from 1 May, 1969: ·\n\nThe State, Government by letter dated 19 July, 196.9 gave effect to the directions of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "State, Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12067, "end_char": 12084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government stated that the order would take effect from 1 May, 1969: ·\n\nThe State, Government by letter dated 19 July, 196.9 gave effect to the directions of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "19 July, 196.9", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12101, "end_char": 12115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government stated that the order would take effect from 1 May, 1969: ·\n\nThe State, Government by letter dated 19 July, 196.9 gave effect to the directions of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Central", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12773, "end_char": 12780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E )\n\n::I'he Central .Government directed and."}}, {"text": "State of Himachal Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12924, "end_char": 12949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Himachal Pradesh implemen, ted that .direction of the Central Government.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF IDMACHAL PRADESH & ANR"}}, {"text": "State Qf Himachal Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13209, "end_char": 13234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 'appellants contend that the State Qf Himachal Pradesh thereby not only violated the direction of the Central Government under section 82 of the Act but also changed the conditions of service of the appellants to their disadvantage without obtaining the sancti9n of the Central Goverpment.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF IDMACHAL PRADESH & ANR"}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13307, "end_char": 13317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Goverpment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13450, "end_char": 13468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 'appellants contend that the State Qf Himachal Pradesh thereby not only violated the direction of the Central Government under section 82 of the Act but also changed the conditions of service of the appellants to their disadvantage without obtaining the sancti9n of the Central Goverpment."}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradeh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13677, "end_char": 13692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants contended that in Himachal Pradeh posts were sanctioned separately for the Taxation and the Excise Departments."}}, {"text": "Punjab Rules, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14237, "end_char": 14255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Promotion and certain Conditions of Service Rules, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15043, "end_char": 15098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Rules, 1943", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15314, "end_char": 15332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16782, "end_char": 16788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 was placed along with the Excise Inspectors and in the other seniority list all Inspectors of Punjab were equated with Sub-lnspectors of Himachal Pradesh."}}, {"text": "section 82(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17214, "end_char": 17227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17621, "end_char": 17640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India sanctioned E the date 1 May, 1969."}}, {"text": "State of Himaeha! Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18436, "end_char": 18461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, if the State of Himaeha!"}}, {"text": "section 82(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19865, "end_char": 19878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Himchal Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21015, "end_char": 21030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the State Government wishes to equate the appellants with the Inspectors of Himchal Pradesh the State of Himachal Pradesh will have to follow the• provisions of the Slates Reorganisation Act in that behalf."}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21302, "end_char": 21327, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 82(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21582, "end_char": 21595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21812, "end_char": 21825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court that the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21970, "end_char": 21995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22445, "end_char": 22470, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_915_930_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "\"-.\n\nRAMAGYA PRASAD GUPTA 8f OR~.\n\nMURLl PRASAD & ORS .\n\nApril 11, 1974\n\n[P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY; H. R: KHANNA AND p, K. GosWAMI, JJ.]\n\nli1dia11 Electricity Act-1910 read with the Indian Contract A.er-Whether 1no11tY ndvanced by partners in pursuance of an agree111ent whicli subsequenlly beco111ts l'Ofd is recoi•erable.\n\nOne M obtained a licence for electrification of the Chapra town. Later the licence was assigned to J and thereafter to the Chapra Electric Supply Co.· Ltd; which went into voluntary liquidation in 1944.\n\nThereafter, .5 penons entered into an oral agreement of partnership to buy the undertaking and .. their respective hares were :- A 8 annas. M 4 annas, P had 2 annas and G &: N had one anua each. lt was also agreedthat the licence will be obtained in the name of Mu alone. 'Thereafter, the Electrical undertaking was sold by the official liquidator on Spt. 15. 1.944 to Mu.\n\nEach partner contributed in pro portion to their respective shares in the partnership and the total purchase price was paid in 3 instalments. Before the last instalment was paid, the oral agrce-- ment entered into between the partners was incorporated into a partnership deed executed on July 10, 1945 and registered under the Indian Registration .t\\ct.\n\nThereafter; A advanced some money to buy some new plant and machinery and when Mu. and another sold one anna share each out of their i-espective shares.\n\nThus the share of A. increased to 10 annas. while that of Resp. I & P reduced to 3 annas and one anna respectively. 1\"hereafter, the partners contributed the amount in accordance with their respective shares and a second deed was executed to this effect on Aua-. 31. 1950.\n\nAfter the registration of the second partnership, the Electrical Inspector, Government of Bihar addressed a letter to Resp. I in \\Vhich be stated that the partnership was illegal and void as it contravened the provisions of Indian Electricity Act and that, therefore, the Government did not recognise the partnership. Thereafter. one of the partners filed a suit for a declaration that the partnership had been dissolved by service of notice .on the partners and for rendition of accounts. During the pendency of the suit, however, the Government of Bihar acting under S. 4(1) of the Indian Electrictiy Act, 1910 revoked the licence. to Resp. I with the result that according to S. S(l)(a) of the Act, all powers and .liabilities Of the licensees stood determined. A recti\\ler W3.S\" appointed who took over the electrical concern from Resp. I and R. . After th\" receh.•er had taken possesslon, 1he Government decided to. purchase the under taking and deposited a sum of 3 lakhs in the Court as part of purchase money payaQle to the owners of the undertaking. Resp., I thereafter, filed a suit for a declaration that he. beingthe sole licensee was the exclusive owner of the undertaking and as such. he was entitled to receive the entire price paid or payable bv the Government.\n\nHe also averred that he alon~ paid the entire\n\npurchae money and others are only his employees.\n\nThe trial Court dismissed Resp. l's Title Suit but :the Hih .Court reversed lhe trial Court's judgment and decree by granting a declaration that Resp. .I wa.\"! entitled to the entire money deposited by the State; because the partnehip wa!I i11e.a1 and void.\n\nBefore this Court two questions arose for decision :-\n\n\\!) Whether because of dismissal of C.A. No. 1711/67 and 1985/68 which arose out ot the 1\"itle Suit No. 68/54, the present two appeals are barred on the ground of res-iudicata and (2) Whether Resp. I was entitled to the entire mpney.\n\nAllowing the appeals, ·\n\nHELD. (1) 'the doctrine of res-judicata applies where a suit has been tried and finally decided on the merits, if the defeated party wishes in another suit\n\nbetween the same parties, relating to the e property, to re-agitate the same\n\nt,1uestion~. he cannot be allowed to do so because his cause of action has passed into a iudgment and the matter has become res-iudicata. The test is \"whether the judge has applied his mind to tf1e decision of the issue involved in the two 1iuits twice or whether there bas been in reality but one trial, one finding and one derisio~.\" [922 D-Fj Jn the instant case, whatever may have been the common issues between the two suits, one issue which is not common otud makes the subejct-matter of both tile suits different is that whether the plaintiff in Title Suit No. 94 of 19S6, is sdlely entitled to compensation from the State of Bihar or whether they are\n\nentitled to recover their respective shares from the compensation amount. This wa's not the subject-matter of Title Suit No. 68 of 1954. Therefore, no question of res-judicata could arise in the circumstances of the two cases. l921 E-F1\n\n923 H-924 HJ\n\n(2) From the documentary and other ornl evidence, it is clear that the first respondent did not contribute the entire amount for the purchase of the underui.klng arid under S. 65 of the Contract Act, when an agreement is discovered to be void. or even a contract becomes void. any rson whu has re\"ived any advantagf.\" under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it or to make compenscition to the person from whom he received it. [929 A-C]\n\nBudhu Lal v.\n\nDeccan Banking Company Ltd. A J.R. 1955 Hyd. 69, referred to.\n\nTherefore, whether the agreement was void ab initio or was void or valid initially but bt:came void or discovered to be void subsequently, the appellants ai:e entitled to share the compensation money in proportion to their respective shares as specified in the partnership deed of August 31, 1950, after paying the outstanding Jiabilities of the Chapra Electric Supply Works. [930 C-E]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1710 of 1967 and 1986 of 1968.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Decree/Order dated the 7th May, 65 of the Patna High Court iu Appeals from O:iginal Decree No>. 160 and 161 of 1959 and in First Appeal No. 160 of 1959 respectivdy.\n\nA. /). N. Sinha, .R. N. Sahay, B. Kumar and S. N. Prasad, for the \"'ppellants (in CA 1710/67).\n\nP. C. Bhartari and D. N. Misra, for the Respondents No. 9 & 10 (in CA 1710/67).\n\nU, P. Singh and S. R. Tiwari, for Appellants (in CA 1986/78).\n\nS. C. Agarwa/a, R. K. Garg and V. J. Francis, for respondent No. 17 (in CA 1986/68).\n\nM. B. Lal, for Respondent No. 1 (in both the appeals).\n\nB. P. Singh, for Respondent No. 2 (in both the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANMOHAN REDDY, J.-These appeals are by certificate against the judgment of the Patna High Court which reversed the judgment a.nd decree of the Trial Court in Title Suit No. 94 of 1956 filed by the first respondent-Murli 'Prasad, H A brief history of this case will be necessary . for understanding the several contentions urged before us. One Ma\\lendra l•1asad obtained a licence for electrification of the Chhapra town\n\nJl. p, GUPTA v. MVJlLI PllASAD (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.) 917\n\nwh W'IS granted to lliJ!1 ii! 1932.\n\nTh~ !i\\:tllce was thereafter assi¥n- , , ell to J; m111dh11,11 Prasad Varma after the deatb of his father Mahendra Prasad in 1936. Tbis licence ws subsequently assi, We4 to the Cnluipra Eli:ctric Supply Co., Ltd.,. whih. however, went into voluntary Jiquidation in 1944. It Wl!S decided to sell the electricity undertaking b) public auction and. assign the licenc~ lo the purchaser with the previous sanction of the Government. In pursuance of th:S dechion, the liquidator invited bidders for purchasing the electricity c.oncern.\n\nBut before the :date of public auction, it is l!ileged that five persons, nallll'ly, Ayodbya Prasad, Murli Prasad Respondent No. 1, Par.isnath Prasad, Gurbll\\lran Shah an<! Nandkishore Prasad entered into an oral agreellll'nt of partnership to purchase the electticJI undertaking in the name of Murli Prasad, the share of Ayqdhya wru; 8 annas, thlt or Murli Prasad 4 annas, Parasnath Pruad had 2 annas and Gurbharan Shah and Nandkishore Prasad had one anna ea:h. It was also agreed tliat the licern:e will be obtained In the name o[ Murli Prasad atone, though each partner had to contribute to the total purchase\n\nmony in proportion of their respective shares in the partnership.\n\nThereafter the. elettrical undertaking was sold by the official liqaida• tPl on September 15,1944 to Murli Prasad as his was the highest bid of Rs. 4,10,000/-. Thereafter each of the plrtners including Murli Prasad contriblited in proportion to their resp, ctive shares in the partnership to ma)<e up the total sum of Rs. 4,10,000/-. Payments to the official liquidator were made in three instalments.\n\nIt also appears that before the last. instalment of Rs. 2,50,000/- was paid on July 13, 1945, the oral agreement entered. into between the partners was incorpor~ into a partnership deed executed on July 10, 1945 and registered un!ler the Indian Registration Act: (Exbibit 'G').\n\nEach of the partners had plid the following sums in accordance with their respective shares and in this manner all of them contri'Juted Rs. 4,10,000/- towards .the purchase' money paid to 'the liquidator: Ajodhya Prasad Gupta-Rs. 2,05,000/-; Murli Prasad-Rs. 1,02,500/-; Parasnath Prasad-Rs. 51,250/-; Gurbharan Shah Rs.\n\n25,62~/- and Nandkishore Prasad-Rs. 25,625/-. Nandkishore Prasad, however, retired from the plftnerhip with the consent of all the partners and his one anna share was taken over by Gurbharan Shah.\n\nIt' also appea~ that in 1950 a further sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- was urgently requited for taking delivery of some new phnt and machinery which had arrived at the Chhapra Railway Station. Murli Prasad and Parasnath Prasad expressed t1ieir inabilitv to contribote the sum of Rs. t,50,000/- in 'PfOportion to their shares, so this amount was al<o paid bv Ajodhya Prasad Gupta to whdm Murli .Prasad ahd Paras~ nath Prasad sold one anna share each out of their respective sh1res.\n\nThus. the share of Aioclhva Prasad inctea<ed to 10 annas while that of Murli Prasad and Parasnath Prased reduced to 3 annas and one anna fC!'PCCtively.\n\nThereafter tne partners contributed the amount in accordance with their nspective shares. This re-allrc•tion or shares became. the occa•ion for execution of a Recond Dartnership deed Ill! Aul!lfst 31. 1950 which was alo re!istered under tlie Tnian\n\ne•istntion Act: Ext. 9. The oartnenhio Act n Mav B. 1'l53, Ext. 'C'. One otherfact must also be stated at this stage. and th•t\n\n911 SUP, lll!ME COUll.J' llEPO.llTS\n\n[1974) 3 S.C.R.\n\nis, Ajodhya Prasad and Murli Prasad being Kartas of their. respective\n\njoint ramilities, had entered into partnership in that capacity.\n\nTbc IO anuas share held by' Ajodhya Prasad and 3 annas snare oeld by Murli Prasad weredivided &m0\\111 the members of their respective joint families. The share of Murli Prasad was divided bctwoen himsell, Dnarindhar Prasad each having one anna share, while tnc sons of Murli Prasad and Dharmdhar Prasad, namely, Chandrcsbwar l'rilsad Gupta and Kamles.bwar Prasad Gupta and each 6 pies Jhare.\n\nSimilarly, Ajodhya Prasad's and his brother Ram Sharan Shah got 3 -annas 9 pies each while the two sons of Ram Sharan Shah, Brahmadev Prasad Gupta and Ramagya Prasad Gupta and respectively I anna 3 pies. There was no change in the shares oJ the two remaining parteners Parasnath Prasad and Gurbharan Sh•h who held one anna and two annas share respectively.\n\nIt appears that some time after this revised partnership was registered, the Electrical Inspector, Government of Bihar, addrescd a letter to Murli Prasad In which he stated that the partnership was illegal and void as it contravened the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act . and that, therefore, the Government did not recognise the partnership. The Government ultimately cancelled the licence. It is D alleged that all this was due to .the manipulation of. Murli Prasad who, taking advantage of the letter of the Electrical Inspector, tried to take forcible possession and wanted to dispossess the managing partner of the electrical undertaking.\n\nThis attempt gave rise to proceedings under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which, however, were decided on April 14, 1954, in favour of Rarnagya Prasad Gupta and the other partners. Thereafter it is allegec! that Murli Prasad got E Parasnath Prasad a partner and sqn-in'law of Murli Prasad's brother t-0 institute Title Suit No. 68 of 1954, on May 28, 1954 .. This suit was for a . declaration that the pannership had been dissolved by service of notice on the partners and for rendition of accounts by Rama- )!ya Pr_asad Gupta principally and by other p•rtners. During the pendency. of the suit, as stated earlier, the Government of Bihar llC!ing F under s. 4(1) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910--hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'-revoked the licence of Murli Prasad \\\\ith the result that according to s. 5(1){a) of the Act all powers and liabilities of the licensee stood determined. l'arasnath Prasad the phintiff in that suit prayed for' appointment of the Additional District Maeistrate, Chhapra,- as receiver. Tile Court granted his prayer and the Receiver in due course took over the electrical concern from Murli G Prasad and Ramagya Prasad.\n\nAfter the Receiver had taken possession, the Government dor.:ided to purchase the undertakin)! on October 20, 1955 and deposited H on the same day a sum of Rs. 3,00.000/- in the Court as part of the purchase money payable to the owners of the undertakin~. Murli Pra<ad thereafter filed a Title Suit No. 94 of 1956 on November S,\n\nt 956, for a declaration th•t he boing the sole licensee, was the exclusive owner of the undertalcin~. and as such he was the only person who was entitled to receive the entire price paid or payable by the\n\nc . '\n\nR. P. GUPTA v. MURLI PRASAD (Jagamnohan Reddy, !.) 919\n\nGovernment in respect of the assets of the Chhapra Electric Supply Works.\n\nIn this sun Murli Prasad had averred that it was he and he alone who had paid the entire auction money for the purchase of the undertakmg on July 13, 1945 and thereafter he became the sole licencee in charge of the undertaking and that Ramagya Prasad Gupta was a mere employee and. servant und.er him. The partnership was\n\n~!so characterised as illegal and void. Both the Title Suits No. 68/54 hied by .Parasnath Prasad and No. 94156 filed by Murli Prasad were COlll>olidated.\n\nIt may also be .mentioned that N andkishore Prasad who was the original partner and who had retired from the partnership and whose share had been taken ovr by Gurbharan Shah also filed a suit No. 113/5T on September 21, 1957 for a declaration that he was still a partner and has 1 anna share. This suit was transferred to the Court where the other two title suits were b•ing tried. Ail the three suits were thereafter consolidated and tried togetl)er. They were also disposed of by a . ommon judgment dated February 10,\n\nJ 959 passed by the 5th Add1t1onal Subordinate Judge, Chhapra.\n\nThe Trial Court decreed P.i!rasnath Prasad's Title Suit No. 68/54 anti dism, issed Murli Prasad's Title Suit No. 94/56 and Nandkisre Prasad's Title Suit No •. 11~/57. Murli Prasad. filed First Appeal No.\n\n160 /59 against the jugnient and decree of the Trial Court in his Title Suit No. 94/96 and First .Appeal No. 161/59 against the judg- _rnent and decree of the Trial Court passe_d in Title Suit No. 68/54.\n\nNandkishore Prasad 'filed a First Appeal No. 154/59 against the decree in his Title Suit No. 113/57 but .l•ter he withdraw it and aecor<lingly it was dismissed for non-prosecution. .The remaining two appeals filed. by Murli Prasad were heard together and were dispo.sed of by a common jud$ment by which the High Court reversed the Ttial Court's judgment and decree in Title Suit No. 94/56 by ;; ranting a declaration to Murli Prasad •as prayed for that he alone\n\nwas entitled to the entire money deposited or to be deposited by the State of Bihar as price for the assets purchased by them. This decisiol\\ was based on the view that the partnership contravened t)!e provisions <>f the Act and was accordingly illegal and void.\n\nAgainst this decision of the High Court, Ramagya Prasad Gupta one of the respondents in the two First Appeals before tpe H, igh Court filed two appeals in. this Court, namely Civil Appeal No. 1710/67 against the judgment and decree of the High Court passed in First Appeal No. 160/59 which arose out of Title Suit No.,. 94/56 and Civil Appeal No. 1711/67 against the judgment and decree passed by the High Court in First Appeal No. 161159 whkh arose out of Title Suit No. 68/5\\l'.\n\nBrahmadeo Prasad, another part11er who was a defendant in both the Title Suits Nos; 68/54 and 94/56 and one of the respondents in the two appeals, namely, First Appeal Nos. 160-161/59 in the High Court, preferred an appeal, namely, Civil Appeal No. 19$6/\n\n68 against the judgment pf the High Court in First Appeal No. 160/ 59 in respect of Title Suit No. 94/56 and Civil Aopeal No. 1985/68 passed in Civil Appeal No. 161/59 in resoect of Title Suit No. 68/54.\n\nIt mav here be statoo that in the Title Suit No. 68/54 filed by Parasnath Prasad for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts,\n\n(1974] 3 S, C.R.\n\nJ(uldip Narain, Jagdish Narain µnd Kedar Nath Sah applied for and were lidded as defendants 12, 13 and 14 on the ground that they as members of the joint family of Parasnath Praslld, should ~. partie~ to the suit.\n\nAccordingly, thy were also parties in the High Court appeii]s as well as in !he Supreme Court appeals Nos. 1711/67 and 1985/68 arising out of Title Suit No. 68/54. It may furthr bo mentioned that these interveners were not parties either in the Title sit No. 94i56 or in the First Appeal arising therefrom, or in lhe appeal before this Coµrt, namely, Civil Appeals No. 1710/67 and No. 1986/ 68 which are the two appeals before us.\n\nBefore those four appeals came up for hearing, J agdish Narain one of the interveners/ defendanL<, namely, defendant No. 13 and who was a respondent in Civil Appeals Nos. 1711/67 and. 1985/68 died.\n\nHis legal representatives were not brought on record and conseq\"ently these two appe'1s were said to have abated as a whole and were dismissed on that account.\n\nAt the very threshold it was sought to be contended that the appeals only abated as against Jagdish Narain for not bringing his legal representatives on record but not as a whole.\n\nThis que; tion\n\nwas CO!!Sidered by this Court in. Ramagya Prasad Gupta v. Murii Prasll</(1) where by a majority, Vaidialingam & Palekar, JJ., Mathew, J.\n\nD dissenting, held that the appeal could not be pro:eeded w:tb and must be dismissed.\n\nWe are not concerned with the reasoning for !)le dismissal. except to say that the question whether these two appeals would also abate seems to have been considered by this Court, because they observed at p. 68 : ·\n\n\"We are not concerned with those two appeals at dm E stage because J agdish Narain bad not been made a party to the Original Suit filed by Murli Prasad nor bad be app lied to be made a party.\n\nCon5equently Jagdisb Narain docs not and did not figure in the appeals from the de;:ree passed in Suit No. 94/56.\"\n\nAt the hearing, a preliminary objecticm has been r •ised by the learned Advocate for the respondents that having regard to the abatement and dismissal of Civil Appeals Nos. 1711 of 1967 and 1985 of 1968 which arose out of '.Title Suit No. 68/54, the present two aals are barred under s. II of the Code of Civil Procedure and/ or on the general principles of rt!S judicata and should be dismissed. It is contended that the existence of a valid partnership was a ground of attack in Tiile Suit No. 68/54 and the ground of dofence in Title Su'.t No 94/56 and, therefore, that question was directly and sub; tanfally\n\nin issue in both suits; (2) that the plrlies in the two suits \"-ere also th., same; at any rate the parties in the present suit No. 94/S6 who will be affected arc the same. The learnect Advocate for the respon dents therefore contends t]lat the tri'1 of the suit bc'M by the same court, the two other conditions necessary for a bar of res judicate, namely, the subject-matter of the two suits and the\n\n(I) (1973) I S.C.R. 63.\n\nll. P. GUPTA v. MURLI PRASAD (laganmohan Reddy,!.) 92(..\n\npanics being the sme .. are fully sati&ficd. TllC appellants' Advocate,\n\nnower, i:onlfOve~ these contentions and subm1u that not only is the subject-Jllatter in dispute in Tiile Suit No. 68 of 54 different from tlie subject-matter of title in Suit No. 94 of 56, but the panics in Title Suit No. 68 Of 54 are not the same as tnose ill Tiile Suit No. 94 of 56, inasmuch as defendanll! Nos. 12, 13 and 14 wh.o were parties in Title Suit No. 68 of 1954 were not parties in Title Suit No. 94 of 1956. It is contended that in the fortner suit, which was instituted during the. subsistence of both electti-· ci1y licence and electrical undertaking, the subject-matter was limited to a consideration of: (1) Existence of a legal and v.!lid partnership;\n\nand (2) Legality and validity of the notice of dissolution oi partnership alleged to have been served prior to the suit; and (3) tte\n\nliability of Ramagya Prasad Gupta or other partners to rcltder accounts to the plaintiff.· Jn other words, it was a simple suit for rendition of accounts, for dissolution and for such sum of money as might be due to the plaintiff in that suit. The suit out of which these two appeals arise having been filed a yeJr and a half thennfter was not concerned with any of the question because by that time the sub ject-matter of the partnership havin~ d\"sappeired by the cm:ellation of the licence of Murli Prasad and by the purchase of the unertak ing by the Government under s. 7(a) of the Act, the pn\"y question was whether Murli Prasad is entitled to the entire money deposited in Court and to be deposited thereafter by the Government or whether the persons who were erstwhile partners and who had -contributed the eapital could have a claim to that money in accorcfance with their shares. As the subject-matter of the two suits was different it is contended that the appeals are neither barred by s. 11 nor by any\n\not11er principle on Res Judicata.\n\nAt the hearing a grat many authorit; zs were cited and certain broad propositions were sought to be canvassed, as for instance, the priciple that when there are two suits which have been tried togeth-r and disposed of by a common judgment and two appeals are taken therefrom, the judgment appaled against ceases to be res judicata even if one of the appeals is dismissed on the ground of limitation or otherwise because the\n\nvrry judgment, which is sought to be pleaded in bar, is still subjudice.\n\nTn support of this proposition. the view expresSed by the Lahore High Court Full Bench in Lakshmi v. Bhuli(1) has been cited and it was submitted that this view was approved by this Court in Narhari v.\n\nSankar('i. which it is submi'ted; has been followed in various decisions of the different High Courts. As against this view, it is claimed that this Court subsequently in Sheoilan Singh v. Mst. Daryao Kaur(') tool; a different view, but according to the learned Advocate for the appellants, this case did not consider the correctness either f Naihi:rrs (supra) decision or of the Lahore Full Bench case m IAkshmi v: BhuU (supra). Jn a case where a suit or an appeal is said\n\n(1) tt.11.. 8 Lahore 384 •\n\n. (2) (19501 S.C.R. 754.\n\n0) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 300.\n\nto be barred by res judicata the. question would arise whether that bar is by virtue of s. 11 of the. Code. of. Civil Procedure, or dehors tbat section by the general principles of res judicata, and if s. 11 is appli cable, whether it applies to suits only and not to appeals, and if to suits only, whether the general principles of res judicata apply to appeals. Where two suits having common issues are either by consent of the parties or by order of the Court tried together, the evidence being written in one record and both suits disposed of by a single judgment, the question would arise as to whether there have been two distmct and independent trials.\n\nTek Chand J., who delivered the majority judgment of the Full Bench in Lakshmi's case (supra) gave ti1e answer at p. 400 thus :\n\n\"There has been in substance as well in form but one trial and one verdict, and I venture to think, it will be a travesty of justice to stifle the hearing of the appeal against such a judgment on the ground that the findings contained in it ope\n\nrat> as res judicata. In such. a case there can be no question of the succossful being \"vexed twice\" over the same matter, nor does the hearing of the appeal in any way militate against any rule of public policy, which requires that there must be an\n\nnd of litigation. There is not only µothing here to attract the principles underlying the rule of res judicata, but, on the other hand, it seems to me, that the acceptance of such a plea in such circumstances would strike at the very root of the basic conception of the doctrine which requires that a party must have at least on~ fair trial of the issue resulting in a decision by the Court of ultimate appeal as allowed by the law for the time being in forces.\" The test suggested by the learned Judge at p. 401 was \"whether the judge has applied his mind to the decision of the issue involved in the two suits twice or whether there has been in reality but one trial. one finding and one decision\".\n\nAccording to him, the detern1ining factor is not the decree but the decision in the matter in controversy.\n\nIt is clear thab where a suit has been tried and finally decided on the merits, if the defeated parby wishes in another suit between the same parties relating to the same property to have the same questions re agitated, he cannot be allowed to do so, because his cause of action has passed into a judgment, and the matter has become res judicata. Even where two appeals have been taken from the same judgment by two different parties to which all others are parties either as appellants or respondents and one of the appeals is dismissed either on merits or for any oth<r reasons, it has been held by some of the High Courts, but we express no Opinion th!reon, that the other appeal' has, also to be dismised, beause it is barred by the principles of res judicata as otherwise there will be conflict in the decrees.\n\nIn the Lahore decision there were two _cross suits about the same subjectmatter filed simultaneously between the same parties and two decrees were prepared. An appeal being filed in respect of one decree and not in respect of the other, the questio11 was whether the non-filing of the appeal against that decree creates an estoppel against the hearing of the other appeal. In Narhari's case (supra) what this Court held was, where there has been one trial, one finding and one\n\n\"ii( ' \"l\n\nR. P. Gl!PTA v. J\\jURLI PRASAD (Jaganmoha11 Reddy, J.) 923\n\ndecision, there need not b~ two appeals even though two decrees may have been drawn up and consequently the fact that one of the appeals was time barred does not bar the other appeal on the ground of res judicata. In this case, these questions need noi be considered; Nor is it relevant to consider whether there is any con, llict between the decision in this case and Sheodan Singh's case (supra). In Sheodan Singh's case two suits were field in the Court of the Civil Judge, one for a declaration of the tiVe to the suit property and the second for other re!iefts and consequently two other suits were filed by the respondents in the Munsif's court against the appellant claiming joint ownership to the suit property and other reliefs. The four suits were tried together by the Civil Judge. Some of the issues were common to all the suits and one of the commons issues relating to the title of the parties was found in favour of the respondent.\n\nThe Civil Judge dismissed the appellant's title suit, decreed his other suit partly, and decreed the two suits of the respondent.\n\nThe appellant filed appeals against the decree. in each ; uit. The High Court dismissed the two appeals arising out of the respondent's suits, one as time barred, and the other for failure to apply for translation and printing of the record.\n\nAs the title of the respondent to the suit property had become final on account of such dismissal, the respondent prayed for the dismissal of the other two appeals also, as the main question involve4 therein was the same. The High Court agreed that the appeals WOTe barred by res judicate and dismissed them. Against these. order of dismissal, the appellant filed\n\noppeals to this Court and contended that-( l) title to the propecty \\Vas not directly and substantially in issue in the respondent's suits ; (•2) the Munsif's Court could not try the title suit filed by the appellant;\n\n(3) it could not be said that appeals arising out of the respondent's m; is were former suits as such the bar of res judicata will be inappiica ble; and ( 4) the two appeals which were dismissed-one on the ground of limitatior> and the other on the ground of not printing 1he records, could not be said to be heard and finally decided. This Court hcid that the High Court was right in dismissing the appeals as being barred by res judicata inasmuch as the issue as to the title was raised in respondent's uits and it was directly and substantially in issue in those suits also and did arise out of the pleadings of the parties, and further the High Court's decision in the 1wo appeals arising from the respondent's appeals were undoubtedly earlier and, therefore the condition that there should liave been a decision in a former sit to give rise to res jµdicata in a subsequent suit was satisfied in that case. The decision in Narhari's case (supra) was distinguished by this Court in !hat case so !hat it coud. not. be caid that that decision was in any way m conflict with the dec1S1on m Narhari's case (supra). In appeals arising ot of a subsequent suit and an earlier suit where there were comm9~ issues, common subject-matter and common trial and the appeals ansmg out of the subsequent suit were dismissed, a question would\n\nnse as to whether the. ao_oeals from te earlier suit which were pending arc barred by res 1ud1cata A ques!Jon may also arise where the subject-matter is the same and the issues are common in the two suits\n\nbut oe of the parties are dierent in one suit,. whether the bar of res 1ud1cata would operate against the parties who are common. All\n\n9.24 SUPlt£ME COURT REPORTS\n\n{ 1974) 3 S.C.R.\n\n.these aspects need not be considered in these appeals because, in our view, the subject-mattet of Title Suit No. 68 of 1954 and that of Title Suit No. 94 of 1956 are entirely direct. Even if the issues that .; ire common in the two suits, and it has been admitted by the learned\n\nAdvocate for the appellants that some of the issues might be commou lo both the suits, issues Nos. 4, 9, 12, 13 and 14 !II any rate surviv<,\n\n. and consequently ihe bar of res judicata would not apply. The issu.:s Which are said to be surViving are as follows : B \"'4. Whether the p!ointiff of T.S. 94 /56 the sole ficensee of the Chapra Electric Supply Works before it was takn over by the State of Bihar ?\n\n9. ls plaintiff of T.S .. 94/ 56 only entitled to compensation from the State of Bihar ?\n\n12. Is the suit 94/56 barred urider section 42 of Specific Relief Act, estoppel and waiver ?\n\n13. ls the amount of court fee filed in T.S. 94/56 sufficient?\n\n14. To what relief or raliefs plaintiff of the two suits entitled?\" Jgnoring issues 13 & 14 it will be seen that issues 4, 9 & . 12 are con- .tmed only to Suit No. 94 of 1956 in which respondent No. 1 is seeking to have himself declared as the sole licensee and entitled to the entire amount of compensation on the ground that be and he alone .has contributed to the capital; that the defendants in that suit were\n\nnot his partners but servants and such a suit is not bar; ed under s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act on the ground of estoppel & waiver l:ecause of bis conduct and admissions. As we have seen, Title Suit No . . 68 of 1954 postulates the existence of a partnership in which the lirst respondent is a partner, and for disolution of putne1ship and\n\nrndition of accounts. Whatever may have been the common issues between the two suits, one issue which is not common and makes the subject-matter of both the suits different is that wheth\" the plaintiff in Title Suit No. 94 of 1956, that is the first respondent in these appeals, is solely entitled to compensation from the State o'. Bihar.\n\nThi~ issue is not necessarily confined to the existence or val'doty of the partnership but as to whether the other parties to the s\"it have contributed to the capital of the firm or paid Murli Prasad any .amounts which they are entitled to recover from out of the compensation amount.\n\nThis was not the subject-matter of Title Suit No. 68 of 1954. Even as the learned Advoate contends, there is no longer any question of partnership being dissolved once the subject-matter has disappeared by the revocation of the licence and after the entire assets of the .partnership were taken over by the Governn1ent.\n\nEven if the partnership was illegal and void as contended by the respondent in the other title suit, the same question. namely, whether the plaintilI/tirst respondent alone would be entitled to the entire compensation,. was not the subject-matter of the Title Suit No. 68 of 1954.\n\nIf so, no question of res judicata would arise.\n\nThe preliminary objection is accordingly overruled.\n\nOn the merits the appellants' case is unassailable.\n\nThe case of . -the first respondent that he paid the entire money for the purchase of . the undertaking is, in our view, a dishonest pica. .There is ample\n\n• '\n\nR. p, GUPTA v. MURU PllA:SAD (laganmohati Reddy, J.) 925\n\nevidence in ihe case io establish that !hough Murli Prasad WllS. the highest bidder at the auction at wh'.ch the undertaking was sold to him aitd the J:cence was granted to him, the:e was an oral agreement\n\nwhich preeeded the bidding at the auction whereunder five persons as stated already, including the first respondent, constituted a partnmhip. They also contributed the capital in proportion in their shares. Though at first denied it was subsequently admitted by !he first respondent as we shall presently see.\n\nAfter the bidding of Murli Prasad was accepted as alreJdy stated, the partn'Is contributed their shares and there was. a registered partnership deed.\n\nAnother partnership deed was susequently executed and registered\n\nafter there was a reshuffling in the partners as we1 as in their respective shares. The definite case of the first respondent as set but in para 5 of the plaint is that he had paid the entire amount of sale money bf July 13, 1945 and the liquidator granted a rec.eipt to the plaintiff for the auction money paid to him. In para 8 of. the plaint \"(Suit No. 94 of 1956) he says that defendants who had a coveting eye persuaded\n\nhim illegally to enter into a partnership with them and the plaintiff. being misled by them and under a misapprehension entered into a P'artnership with _the defendants on July 10, 1945 and the same was renewed on August 31, 1950. It is, therefore, clear that he does not deny the execution of these partnership deeds and yet claims that he alone contributed the amounts for the purchase of the undertaking.\n\nIf he contributed the entire \"amount and the other partners did not contribute any amounts, where was the question of their persuading him to enter jnto a partnership. On the very face of ii, the pleadin!!!l belfo the case of the first respondent. The documentary and <>ral evidence amply supports the conclusion that the first respondent has put forward a false claim and has not hesitated to suppress the truth which, notwithstanding his efforts, could not be suppressed. The first respondent passed a receipt on July 13, 1945, ori the dtte when the partnership deed was .registered, in favour of Ajodhya Prasad who, as we have seen had a 8 annas share in the partnership in terms of the oral agreement which was incorporated _in the partnership agreement of July 13, 1945. The half share of the capital of Rs. 4, t 0,000 which Ajodhya Prasad had to pay was Rs. 2,05,000. This is exactly the amount that he paid to the first rewondent, who passed a receipt in his favour, Ext. F-1. In the xeceipt Murli Prasad says that he had previously received Rs. 1,000 out Qf Rs. 2,05,001} being the proportionate 8 annas share out of Rs. 4, 10,000 from Babu Ajodhya Prasad and the remaining nmount of Rs. 2,04,0:JO was being paid by a cheque No. 34463 drawn upon the Central Bank, elated July 13, 1945 from the said Babu Saheb.\n\nThis amount was debiied to the Bank account of Ajodhya Prasad and credited to the Bank account of Murli Prasad.\n\nExhibit M-'- Ledger Account of M/s Ajodhya Prasad Gupta & Co. in the Central Bank, Chhapra, shows that on July 14, 1945 Rs. 2,04,000 was deb.i~ to llin1 on account of cheque No. 34463 drawn in favour of Blbu MurTI Prasad the number of which tallies with the number mentioned in the receipt Ext. F-1. Similarly, Ext. M-1. Ledger Ac, count of Murli Prasad in the Central Bank, Chhapra, shows that 011 July 14, 1945 a sum\n\nof Rs. 2,04,000 was paid int.o the account by cheque and credited to his account.\n\nIn his evidence Murli Prasad denies in examination-in chief that there was a completed agreement before the auction sale between Ajodhya Prasad, Parasnath, Nandkishore Prasad and himself-each representing their respective families to enter into n partnership and that he had not purchased at the auction on behalf of the partners or on behalf of any other person, but had purchased it at the auction for himself alone. He also oenies that the licence was obtained in his name with .their consent or the transfer of the licence in his favour was secured for their benefit. He also denies that Ajodhya Prasad paid Rs. 1,000 for bidding and denies that Parasoath Prasad, Nandkishore Prasad and Gurbharan Shah contributed any sum towards the auction purchase. He further says that it is not a fact that later on Ajodhya Prasad paid him Rs. 2,04,000. His case is that he was fraudulently and illegally induced by the rest of the parties to enter into a partnership on July 10, 1945 and August 31, 1950 which are both invalid and illegal. In crossexamination, he admits that he did not have Rs. 2,00,000 with him at the time but was sure that he could arrange for .the purchase money. He, however, states that only 4 or S months after the auction sale he had an idea to enter into a partnership by which time he had already deposited Rs. 2,05,000 towards the purchase money which he did from his personal fund. He wants us to believe that he signed the partnership deed without reading nor did any one read and explain to him. He signed it because of his faith in Ajodhya Prasad. In cross-examination he admits that the in\" tending partners had come to him and expressed their intention o[ having a share in the concern. AjodhyaPrasad wanted 8 annas share, Parasnath Prasad two. annas, Gurbharan Shah and Nandkishorc Prasad 1 anna share each and that he (Murli Prasad) expressed his licsirc to have 4 annas share. He also admits that it \\\\'.1S agreed that each would contribute in proportion to his respective share. He further admits that though he did not read the partnership dee<l at that time he had got it read subsequently by Ganga Prasad, Pleader, and he found that .the deed embodied all the terms they had previously agreed to.\n\nAs for the second partnership deed, he also admits that his share was reduced to three annas from four annas. Similarly, the share of Parasnath's family \\Vas reduced to one anna from two annas and that the share of the family of A.iodhya Prasad increased from 8 arinas to 10 annas. What is curious is, he says, that he knew the pfrrtnership deed to be illegal but entered into it because be got the assurance that nothing would happen. He also admits that after the account was audited, a balance sheet was prepared and a copy of such balance sheet used to be sent to each of the partners and the State Government, another factor which shows that the first respondent was fully aware of the partnership and the shares of each of the partners •and that there was nothing secret or sinister about the agreement or partnership. When the partnership decided to have some new machinery, it required Rs. 1,50,000 to take delivery of that machinery.\n\nThe proceedings of the meeting of the partners. Ext. E-1 dated August 28, 1950 clearly show that this amount was to be jointly coUccted from H all the partners.\n\nBut since some of them were not able to get the money, Babu Parasnath proposed to sell his ooe annas share and\n\nIt. j>, GUPTA v. MlJRLI .PRASAD (laganinohan Reddy, !.) I 921\n\nretain his one anna only and Mtirli Prasad, that is respondent No. 1 also proposed to dispose of his one anna share, out of 4 annas share.\n\nThese two annas were offered to any ol the partners who was willin!J\n\nand take in. Ajodhya Prasad was agreeabie to purchase these shares and the shares were re-constituted and the amount that each one had to contribute according to his share has been set out in that document, The amount of Rs. 1,)0•,000 has been divided exactiy according to the snares that each of the family has to pay. These proceedings, Ext . .R-1 was shown to respondent No. 1 and while he admits his signature thereon, he denies that he consented to these proceedings. Yet he contr&d1cts hi1n!:clf by saying that thre was res11uttling of the shnres and because money was reqmred for the purchase of new machinery, ; ince there was no money with him, he gave one anna out of his share; and that since the date the concern came to his hand till the date it passed to the Government there was never any profit init. And yet, the learned advocate for respondent No. l would have us believed that large sum towards profits were due from Ramagya Prasad who was managing the concern. It is also clear from the balance-sheet which Murli Prasad admitted were being sent regularly to the partners and the Government, that though the first respondent was shown as the licensee, he is also stated to be a partner. In the certificate given by the Chartered Accountant it is stated that the amount hvcstcd by the licensee and his partners are shown in form 3 capital amount against their respective names and this amount has been shown in Ext. X-1 dated 31-12-1949: Murli Prasad Rs. 1,02,500; Ajodhya Prasad Rs. 2,05,000; Parasnath Rs. 51,250 and Gurbharan Shah Rs. 51,250, thus making Rs. 4,10,000. In each one of these balance sheets Murli Prasad has been shown as partner. It is, therefore, iclle to suggest that the entire amount has been contributed by Murli Prasad and that 03hers did not have any connection with the partnership. Nor could it be said that they had not contributed towards the capital in accordance with their shares. The High Court rather strangely either misread the evidence or misappreciated it when it held that the partnership having not come into existence at any time in the eye of law, Murli had no advance in his hands on accom1t of -the partnership, there was no acquisition by the partnership of the undertaking and the license; and the source from which he paid the consideration money of the bargain between him and the liquidator would not clothe the creditors with the title to the undertaking and the licence or to the benefit of the purchase. The money Jent by the partners to Murli may, of course, be recoverable subject to the Jaw of limitation, but not the properly acquired with the money, since no fiduciary obligation in the eyes of Jaw could arise as between him and the various lenders. In this view, it thought that the claiin. of the partners to recover the money having regard to section 65 of the Contract Act and Art. 62 of the limitation Act is barred by limitation, because the suit of Parasnath was filed more than 3 years after 13-7-45 by which date they were aware of the fact fr, at consent ol the 'Government had ncit been obtained to transfer the licence. This view of the High Court cannot be sustained. It appears to us that there is nothing to suggest that the partners knew or were aware that their partnership was illegal; nor could it be said because at the time when\n\n928 ·•UPRllME COU&T REPORTS [1974] 3 s.c.R.\n\nthey entered into the agreement of partnership, this is clearly estab., lished, as no licence had been granted to Murli Prasad. The amounts were contributed by all the partners in accordance with their shates before the licence was assigned to Murli Prasad. Even on the admission of the first respondent, on behalf of the partnership balancc-shets were being prepared and they were being forwarded not only to the partners but to the Government also. If so, the Government as well as the Electrical Inspector, as is evident from several letters Exts. D-4, D-6, D-10, D-12, D---30, D-32, D-44, D---45, C-3jl and C• 4/1, were made aware of the partnership. If they did not take notice it was not the fault of the partners nor does it show that there was pnything secret in that partnership. The openness with which U1e entire business was run clearly establishes that the partners at any rate were p.ot aware of the illegality. It may be true that under the Act prcmission may be necessary to obtain a licence or io have a licence assigned 1to a partnership, but there is nothing in the Electricity Act to warrant µte submission that because no permission was taken for assignment of the licence in the name of the partnership, the claims of the partners ; igajnst each other cannot be adjdicated upon, and that the partners 1will have no rights in the assets held by the partnership. Cwfously, the High Court, when the above exhibits were brought to its notice, tried •to gl:\\ over it by saying that the words \"we\" and ''us\" which have been used in Ext. D---6 do not by themselves indicate partnership and that they were apparenfly used for the Chhapra Electric Supply Works.\n\nThis conclusion is unjustified and is against the weight of evidence in the case. The i\\lellality, if any, was discovered only after the Government issued a notification, Ext. F-1 dated May 19, 1955, revoking the licence. It may also be noticed that Title Suit No. 94 of 1956 was filed on November 5, 1956, while the earlier Suit No .. 68 of 1954 was filed on May 22, 1954, even before the cancellation of the licence. None of these suits can, on any account, be said to be barred by limitation.\n\nIn any case, the persons who have contributed the money to provide the capital for the undertaking are entitled to recover t.'Ie amounts in accordance with their respective shares. This relief is not dependent upon the validity of .the partnership either of 1945 or of 1950. The nrrangement betweeno the partners and the licensee does not attract slib-ss. (2) and (3) of s. 9 of the Act which merely debar a licensee's association in the business of supplying energy under the same licence.\n\nSub-section (2) inhibits the licensee from assigning his licence or transferring his undertaking or any part thereof by saic, mortgage etc. without the previous consent in writing of the .State Government. Subsection (3) makes an agreement relating to auy transaction described in sub-s. (2), u'1less made with or subject to the previous consent as aforesaid, void. Owning of the properties by the Corporation was not in contravention of any of the provisions of the Act. The agreement, therefore, is not void. In these appeals it is not necessary to decide the question whether the carrying on of the business of partnership as an electricity undertaking, when the licence stood in the name of Murli' Prasad is invalid. Even if it is void, what we have to consider is, as pointed out earlier, whether the money of the partners which went to purchase the electrical undertakings at the auction sale and which by virtue of s. 14 of the Partnership Act became the assets of the partnership, those assets which have been convc; tcll iuto money\n\nR. P. GUPTA v. MURLI PRASAD (laganmohan Reddy, /.) 929\n\nwhich has been deposited in \\!ie Court, can be claimed by all those who had originally contributed 'the amount. Section 65 of the Contract Act will readily come to the resct1e of the partners. That section lays down that when an agreement is discovered to be void, ot when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or .contract is hound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it. A Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court in Bildhu Lal v. D=an Banking\n\nCompany Ltd(') to which one of us y, us a party had occasion to consider the question that where money has been paid under the instrument which has been held. to he void, could money paid thereundet' be.recovered. After a review of the case law in India, the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Harnath Kaur v. lnder Bahadw' Singh(') and the observations in the 7th Edition of Pollock and\n\nMulla's Indian Contract and Specific Relief Act pp. 346-347 to the effect that section 65 of the Indian Contract Act does .not apply to agreements which ilre void under s. 24 by reason of an unlawful consideration or object and' there beingno other provision in the Act under which money paid for an unlawful purpose may be recovered back, an analogy of the English .law will be the best guide, that Court had held that money paid in such circumstances can be recovered.\n\nThe reasoning which the learned authors gave for their view was stated in that judgment to be that \"if the view of the Privy Council is right, namely, that 'ag-reements discovered to be void' apply to all\n\nagreements whicb are db initio void including agreements based on unlawful consideration, it follows that the person who has paid money or transferred oroperty to another for an illegal pUl'POSe can recover dt back from the transferee under this section even if the illegal nurpose' is carried into execution and both the transferor 8Jid transferee are in nari cfelicto.\" In respect of this reasoning the Court observed at p. 75:\n\n\"In our opinion, the view of the learned authors is neither supported by any of the subsequent Privy Council decisions nor iB it consistent with the natural meaning to be given to the provisions of s. 65. The section by using the words 'when an •!!reement is discovered to be void' means nothing more nor less than : when the plaintiff comes to know or finds out that the agreement is void.\n\nThe word 'discovery' would imply the ore-existence of somethin~ which subsequently found out and it may he observed that s. 66, Hyderabad Contract Act makes the knowledee (ilm) of the\n\na11)'eement being void as one of the pre-requisites for resti: tution and is used in the sense of an agreement being dis covered to be void. If knowledge is •n essential reQuisite even an agreement ah initio void can be discovered to be void .subsequently. There mav be cases where parties enter\n\ninto ;; ii ~;:ee~nt hon.estly \"thinkin~ that it is a perfectly legal agreement and where oric ;; f !.em sues the other or\n\n(1\\ A.T.R. (1Q;<\\ Hv~. 69,\n\n(2) A.T.R. (1922) P.C. 40}\n\n/ -, '\n\nwants the other to act on it, it is then that he may discover it to be void. There is nothing specific in s. 65. fodian Contract Act or its corresponding section of the Hyderabad Contract Act to make it inapplicable to the such cases.\"\n\nThe above view, which has been noticed in subsequent edition of Pollock's Book (See 9th Edition, p. 463 Note 41), is in consonance With authority, cqity tnd good' reason. After this conclusion it is not necessary to consider whether s. 70 of the Contract Act or ss. 39 and 41 of the Speqific Relief Act can be invoked jn aid of the appellants.\n\nOn any view of the matter whether the agreement was void ab initio, or was void or valid initially but became void or discovered to be void subsequently, the appellants are entitled to succeed in these appeals. We accordingly allow these appeals, reverse the judgment and decree of the High Court and dismiss Suit No. 94 of 1956 with costs.\n\nWe hold that the first respondent Murli Prasad is not entitled solely to the whole of the compensation money, but that all those whose names appear in the partnership deed of August 31, 1950, or the legal representatives or assignees of such of them who are dead, arc otherwise entitled to share the compensation money in proportion to their respective shares as specified in the said document. The compensation amount which is so distributed is the balance of the amount remaining after payment of the outstanding liabilities of the Chhapra Electric Supply Work~. The Trial Court will give the necessary directions to the Receiver in this behalf. s.c.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 167, "entities": [{"text": "\"-.\n\nRAMAGYA PRASAD GUPTA 8f", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "\"-.\n\nRAMAGYA PRASAD GUPTA 8f", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MURLl PRASAD & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MURLl PRASAD & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 11, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 71, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 11, 1974\n\n[P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY; H. R: KHANNA AND p, K. GosWAMI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R: KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. GosWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 130, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 157, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chapra Electric Supply Co.· Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 443, "end_char": 474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later the licence was assigned to J and thereafter to the Chapra Electric Supply Co.· Ltd; which went into voluntary liquidation in 1944."}}, {"text": "15. 1.944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 880, "end_char": 889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15."}}, {"text": "July 10, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1186, "end_char": 1199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the last instalment was paid, the oral agrce-- ment entered into between the partners was incorporated into a partnership deed executed on July 10, 1945 and registered under the Indian Registration .t\\ct."}}, {"text": "Aua-. 31. 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1664, "end_char": 1678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\"hereafter, the partners contributed the amount in accordance with their respective shares and a second deed was executed to this effect on Aua-."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1771, "end_char": 1776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the registration of the second partnership, the Electrical Inspector, Government of Bihar addressed a letter to Resp."}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1912, "end_char": 1927, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2217, "end_char": 2236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the suit, however, the Government of Bihar acting under S. 4(1) of the Indian Electrictiy Act, 1910 revoked the licence."}}, {"text": "S. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2250, "end_char": 2257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vhich be stated that the partnership was illegal and void as it contravened the provisions of Indian Electricity Act", "statute": "Vhich be stated that the partnership was illegal and void as it contravened the provisions of Indian Electricity Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Electrictiy Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2265, "end_char": 2293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4951, "end_char": 4956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 31, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5586, "end_char": 5601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, whether the agreement was void ab initio or was void or valid initially but bt:came void or discovered to be void subsequently, the appellants ai:e entitled to share the compensation money in proportion to their respective shares as specified in the partnership deed of August 31, 1950, after paying the outstanding Jiabilities of the Chapra Electric Supply Works. ["}}, {"text": "Chapra Electric Supply Works", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5651, "end_char": 5679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, whether the agreement was void ab initio or was void or valid initially but bt:came void or discovered to be void subsequently, the appellants ai:e entitled to share the compensation money in proportion to their respective shares as specified in the partnership deed of August 31, 1950, after paying the outstanding Jiabilities of the Chapra Electric Supply Works. ["}}, {"text": "N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5967, "end_char": 5975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Sinha, .R. N. Sahay, B. Kumar and S. N. Prasad, for the \"'ppellants (in CA 1710/67)."}}, {"text": ".R. N. Sahay", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5977, "end_char": 5989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Sinha, .R. N. Sahay, B. Kumar and S. N. Prasad, for the \"'ppellants (in CA 1710/67)."}}, {"text": "B. Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5991, "end_char": 5999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Sinha, .R. N. Sahay, B. Kumar and S. N. Prasad, for the \"'ppellants (in CA 1710/67)."}}, {"text": "S. N. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6004, "end_char": 6016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Sinha, .R. N. Sahay, B. Kumar and S. N. Prasad, for the \"'ppellants (in CA 1710/67)."}}, {"text": "P. C. Bhartari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6056, "end_char": 6070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. C. Bhartari and D. N. Misra, for the Respondents No."}}, {"text": "D. N. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6075, "end_char": 6086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. C. Bhartari and D. N. Misra, for the Respondents No."}}, {"text": "P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6140, "end_char": 6148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U, P. Singh and S. R. Tiwari, for Appellants (in CA 1986/78)."}}, {"text": "S. R. Tiwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6153, "end_char": 6165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U, P. Singh and S. R. Tiwari, for Appellants (in CA 1986/78)."}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6200, "end_char": 6212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Agarwa/a, R. K. Garg and V. J. Francis, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6216, "end_char": 6226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Agarwa/a, R. K. Garg and V. J. Francis, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "V. J. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6231, "end_char": 6244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Agarwa/a, R. K. Garg and V. J. Francis, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. B. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6286, "end_char": 6295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. B. Lal, for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6342, "end_char": 6353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. P. Singh, for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6444, "end_char": 6460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANMOHAN REDDY, J.-These appeals are by certificate against the judgment of the Patna High Court which reversed the judgment a.nd decree of the Trial Court in Title Suit No.", "canonical_name": "JAGANMOHAN REDDY"}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6526, "end_char": 6542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANMOHAN REDDY, J.-These appeals are by certificate against the judgment of the Patna High Court which reversed the judgment a.nd decree of the Trial Court in Title Suit No."}}, {"text": "Murli 'Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6661, "end_char": 6674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "94 of 1956 filed by the first respondent-Murli 'Prasad, H A brief history of this case will be necessary .", "canonical_name": "MURLl PRASAD & ORS"}}, {"text": "Ma\\lendra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6790, "end_char": 6799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Ma\\lendra l•1asad obtained a licence for electrification of the Chhapra town\n\nJl."}}, {"text": "Jaganmohan Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6900, "end_char": 6916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p, GUPTA v. MVJlLI PllASAD (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.) 917\n\nwh W'IS granted to lliJ!1 ii!", "canonical_name": "JAGANMOHAN REDDY"}}, {"text": "Cnluipra Eli:ctric Supply Co., Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7141, "end_char": 7176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tbis licence ws subsequently assi, We4 to the Cnluipra Eli:ctric Supply Co., Ltd.,."}}, {"text": "Ayodbya Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7580, "end_char": 7594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But before the :date of public auction, it is l!ileged that five persons, nallll'ly, Ayodbya Prasad, Murli Prasad Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Murli Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7596, "end_char": 7608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But before the :date of public auction, it is l!ileged that five persons, nallll'ly, Ayodbya Prasad, Murli Prasad Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "MURLl PRASAD & ORS"}}, {"text": "Par.isnath Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7627, "end_char": 7644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, Par.isnath Prasad, Gurbll\\lran Shah an<!", "canonical_name": "P.i!rasnath Prasad"}}, {"text": "Gurbll\\lran Shah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7646, "end_char": 7662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, Par.isnath Prasad, Gurbll\\lran Shah an<!"}}, {"text": "Nandkishore Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7668, "end_char": 7686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nandkishore Prasad entered into an oral agreellll'nt of partnership to purchase the electticJI undertaking in the name of Murli Prasad, the share of Ayqdhya wru; 8 annas, thlt or Murli Prasad 4 annas, Parasnath Pruad had 2 annas and Gurbharan Shah and Nandkishore Prasad had one anna ea:h. It was also agreed tliat the licern:e will be obtained In the name o[ Murli Prasad atone, though each partner had to contribute to the total purchase\n\nmony in proportion of their respective shares in the partnership.", "canonical_name": "N andkishore Prasad"}}, {"text": "Parasnath Pruad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7869, "end_char": 7884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nandkishore Prasad entered into an oral agreellll'nt of partnership to purchase the electticJI undertaking in the name of Murli Prasad, the share of Ayqdhya wru; 8 annas, thlt or Murli Prasad 4 annas, Parasnath Pruad had 2 annas and Gurbharan Shah and Nandkishore Prasad had one anna ea:h. It was also agreed tliat the licern:e will be obtained In the name o[ Murli Prasad atone, though each partner had to contribute to the total purchase\n\nmony in proportion of their respective shares in the partnership.", "canonical_name": "E Parasnath Prasad"}}, {"text": "Gurbharan Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7901, "end_char": 7915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nandkishore Prasad entered into an oral agreellll'nt of partnership to purchase the electticJI undertaking in the name of Murli Prasad, the share of Ayqdhya wru; 8 annas, thlt or Murli Prasad 4 annas, Parasnath Pruad had 2 annas and Gurbharan Shah and Nandkishore Prasad had one anna ea:h. It was also agreed tliat the licern:e will be obtained In the name o[ Murli Prasad atone, though each partner had to contribute to the total purchase\n\nmony in proportion of their respective shares in the partnership.", "canonical_name": "Gurbharan Sh•h who"}}, {"text": "July 13, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8658, "end_char": 8671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,50,000/- was paid on July 13, 1945, the oral agreement entered."}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8824, "end_char": 8840, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ajodhya Prasad Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9063, "end_char": 9083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4,10,000/- towards .the purchase' money paid to 'the liquidator: Ajodhya Prasad Gupta-Rs.", "canonical_name": "Ajodhya Prasad Gupta"}}, {"text": "Parasnath Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9129, "end_char": 9145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,02,500/-; Parasnath Prasad-Rs.", "canonical_name": "E Parasnath Prasad"}}, {"text": "Murli .Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9756, "end_char": 9769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t,50,000/- in 'PfOportion to their shares, so this amount was al<o paid bv Ajodhya Prasad Gupta to whdm Murli .Prasad ahd Paras~ nath Prasad sold one anna share each out of their respective sh1res.", "canonical_name": "MURLl PRASAD & ORS"}}, {"text": "nath Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9781, "end_char": 9792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t,50,000/- in 'PfOportion to their shares, so this amount was al<o paid bv Ajodhya Prasad Gupta to whdm Murli .Prasad ahd Paras~ nath Prasad sold one anna share each out of their respective sh1res."}}, {"text": "Aioclhva Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9870, "end_char": 9885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the share of Aioclhva Prasad inctea<ed to 10 annas while that of Murli Prasad and Parasnath Prased reduced to 3 annas and one anna fC!'PCCtively."}}, {"text": "Parasnath Prased", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9939, "end_char": 9955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the share of Aioclhva Prasad inctea<ed to 10 annas while that of Murli Prasad and Parasnath Prased reduced to 3 annas and one anna fC!'PCCtively.", "canonical_name": "E Parasnath Prasad"}}, {"text": "Ajodhya Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10439, "end_char": 10453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J' llEPO.llTS\n\n[1974) 3 S.C.R.\n\nis, Ajodhya Prasad and Murli Prasad being Kartas of their.", "canonical_name": "Ajodhya Prasad Gupta"}}, {"text": "Dnarindhar Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10777, "end_char": 10794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The share of Murli Prasad was divided bctwoen himsell, Dnarindhar Prasad each having one anna share, while tnc sons of Murli Prasad and Dharmdhar Prasad, namely, Chandrcsbwar l'rilsad Gupta and Kamles.bwar Prasad Gupta and each 6 pies Jhare."}}, {"text": "Dharmdhar Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10858, "end_char": 10874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The share of Murli Prasad was divided bctwoen himsell, Dnarindhar Prasad each having one anna share, while tnc sons of Murli Prasad and Dharmdhar Prasad, namely, Chandrcsbwar l'rilsad Gupta and Kamles.bwar Prasad Gupta and each 6 pies Jhare."}}, {"text": "Chandrcsbwar l'rilsad Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10884, "end_char": 10911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The share of Murli Prasad was divided bctwoen himsell, Dnarindhar Prasad each having one anna share, while tnc sons of Murli Prasad and Dharmdhar Prasad, namely, Chandrcsbwar l'rilsad Gupta and Kamles.bwar Prasad Gupta and each 6 pies Jhare."}}, {"text": "Kamles.bwar Prasad Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10916, "end_char": 10940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The share of Murli Prasad was divided bctwoen himsell, Dnarindhar Prasad each having one anna share, while tnc sons of Murli Prasad and Dharmdhar Prasad, namely, Chandrcsbwar l'rilsad Gupta and Kamles.bwar Prasad Gupta and each 6 pies Jhare."}}, {"text": "Ram Sharan Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11009, "end_char": 11024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, Ajodhya Prasad's and his brother Ram Sharan Shah got 3 -annas 9 pies each while the two sons of Ram Sharan Shah, Brahmadev Prasad Gupta and Ramagya Prasad Gupta and respectively I anna 3 pies."}}, {"text": "Brahmadev Prasad Gupta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11089, "end_char": 11111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, Ajodhya Prasad's and his brother Ram Sharan Shah got 3 -annas 9 pies each while the two sons of Ram Sharan Shah, Brahmadev Prasad Gupta and Ramagya Prasad Gupta and respectively I anna 3 pies.", "canonical_name": "Brahmadev Prasad Gupta"}}, {"text": "Ramagya Prasad Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11116, "end_char": 11136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, Ajodhya Prasad's and his brother Ram Sharan Shah got 3 -annas 9 pies each while the two sons of Ram Sharan Shah, Brahmadev Prasad Gupta and Ramagya Prasad Gupta and respectively I anna 3 pies.", "canonical_name": "\"-.\n\nRAMAGYA PRASAD GUPTA 8f"}}, {"text": "Gurbharan Sh•h who", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11255, "end_char": 11273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was no change in the shares oJ the two remaining parteners Parasnath Prasad and Gurbharan Sh•h who held one anna and two annas share respectively.", "canonical_name": "Gurbharan Sh•h who"}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11585, "end_char": 11600, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12020, "end_char": 12026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Murli Prasad In which he stated that the partnership was illegal and void as it contravened the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act", "statute": "Murli Prasad In which he stated that the partnership was illegal and void as it contravened the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12034, "end_char": 12060, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "April 14, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12094, "end_char": 12108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This attempt gave rise to proceedings under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which, however, were decided on April 14, 1954, in favour of Rarnagya Prasad Gupta and the other partners."}}, {"text": "Rarnagya Prasad Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12123, "end_char": 12144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This attempt gave rise to proceedings under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which, however, were decided on April 14, 1954, in favour of Rarnagya Prasad Gupta and the other partners.", "canonical_name": "\"-.\n\nRAMAGYA PRASAD GUPTA 8f"}}, {"text": "E Parasnath Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12217, "end_char": 12235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that Murli Prasad got E Parasnath Prasad a partner and sqn-in'law of Murli Prasad's brother t-0 institute Title Suit No.", "canonical_name": "E Parasnath Prasad"}}, {"text": "May 28, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12331, "end_char": 12343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68 of 1954, on May 28, 1954 .. This suit was for a ."}}, {"text": "Rama- )!ya Pr_asad Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12490, "end_char": 12514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "declaration that the pannership had been dissolved by service of notice on the partners and for rendition of accounts by Rama- )!"}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12643, "end_char": 12650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12658, "end_char": 12686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12796, "end_char": 12803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "l'arasnath Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12879, "end_char": 12896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'arasnath Prasad the phintiff in that suit prayed for' appointment of the Additional District Maeistrate, Chhapra,- as receiver.", "canonical_name": "E Parasnath Prasad"}}, {"text": "Additional District Maeistrate, Chhapra,-", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12954, "end_char": 12995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'arasnath Prasad the phintiff in that suit prayed for' appointment of the Additional District Maeistrate, Chhapra,- as receiver."}}, {"text": "Murli G Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13108, "end_char": 13122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tile Court granted his prayer and the Receiver in due course took over the electrical concern from Murli G Prasad and Ramagya Prasad.", "canonical_name": "MURLl PRASAD & ORS"}}, {"text": "Ramagya Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13127, "end_char": 13141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tile Court granted his prayer and the Receiver in due course took over the electrical concern from Murli G Prasad and Ramagya Prasad.", "canonical_name": "\"-.\n\nRAMAGYA PRASAD GUPTA 8f"}}, {"text": "Murli Pra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13400, "end_char": 13409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,00.000/- in the Court as part of the purchase money payable to the owners of the undertakin~. Murli Pra<ad thereafter filed a Title Suit No.", "canonical_name": "MURLl PRASAD & ORS"}}, {"text": "Chhapra Electric Supply Works", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13787, "end_char": 13816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "919\n\nGovernment in respect of the assets of the Chhapra Electric Supply Works."}}, {"text": ".Parasnath Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14221, "end_char": 14238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68/54 hied by .Parasnath Prasad and No.", "canonical_name": "E Parasnath Prasad"}}, {"text": "N andkishore Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14328, "end_char": 14347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may also be .mentioned that N andkishore Prasad who was the original partner and who had retired from the partnership and whose share had been taken ovr by Gurbharan Shah also filed a suit No.", "canonical_name": "N andkishore Prasad"}}, {"text": "September 21, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14503, "end_char": 14521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "113/5T on September 21, 1957 for a declaration that he was still a partner and has 1 anna share."}}, {"text": "February 10,\n\nJ 959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14804, "end_char": 14823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ommon judgment dated February 10,\n\nJ 959 passed by the 5th Add1t1onal Subordinate Judge, Chhapra."}}, {"text": "P.i!rasnath Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14906, "end_char": 14924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Trial Court decreed P.i!rasnath Prasad's Title Suit No.", "canonical_name": "P.i!rasnath Prasad"}}, {"text": "Nandkisre Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15005, "end_char": 15021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "94/56 and Nandkisre Prasad's Title Suit No •. 11~/57.", "canonical_name": "N andkishore Prasad"}}, {"text": "Murli Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15049, "end_char": 15061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Murli Prasad.", "canonical_name": "MURLl PRASAD & ORS"}}, {"text": "Nandkishore Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15292, "end_char": 15310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nandkishore Prasad 'filed a First Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "N andkishore Prasad"}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15824, "end_char": 15838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "94/56 by ;; ranting a declaration to Murli Prasad •as prayed for that he alone\n\nwas entitled to the entire money deposited or to be deposited by the State of Bihar as price for the assets purchased by them."}}, {"text": "Brahmadeo Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16501, "end_char": 16517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brahmadeo Prasad, another part11er who was a defendant in both the Title Suits Nos; 68/54 and 94/56 and one of the respondents in the two appeals, namely, First Appeal Nos.", "canonical_name": "Brahmadev Prasad Gupta"}}, {"text": "J(uldip Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17120, "end_char": 17134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68/54 filed by Parasnath Prasad for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts,\n\n(1974] 3 S, C.R.\n\nJ(uldip Narain, Jagdish Narain µnd Kedar Nath Sah applied for and were lidded as defendants 12, 13 and 14 on the ground that they as members of the joint family of Parasnath Praslld, should ~. partie~ to the suit."}}, {"text": "Jagdish Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17136, "end_char": 17150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68/54 filed by Parasnath Prasad for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts,\n\n(1974] 3 S, C.R.\n\nJ(uldip Narain, Jagdish Narain µnd Kedar Nath Sah applied for and were lidded as defendants 12, 13 and 14 on the ground that they as members of the joint family of Parasnath Praslld, should ~. partie~ to the suit.", "canonical_name": "J agdish Narain"}}, {"text": "Kedar Nath Sah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17155, "end_char": 17169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68/54 filed by Parasnath Prasad for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts,\n\n(1974] 3 S, C.R.\n\nJ(uldip Narain, Jagdish Narain µnd Kedar Nath Sah applied for and were lidded as defendants 12, 13 and 14 on the ground that they as members of the joint family of Parasnath Praslld, should ~. partie~ to the suit."}}, {"text": "Parasnath Praslld", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17284, "end_char": 17301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68/54 filed by Parasnath Prasad for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts,\n\n(1974] 3 S, C.R.\n\nJ(uldip Narain, Jagdish Narain µnd Kedar Nath Sah applied for and were lidded as defendants 12, 13 and 14 on the ground that they as members of the joint family of Parasnath Praslld, should ~. partie~ to the suit.", "canonical_name": "E Parasnath Prasad"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17415, "end_char": 17428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he Supreme Court appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "J agdish Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17814, "end_char": 17829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before those four appeals came up for hearing, J agdish Narain one of the interveners/ defendanL<, namely, defendant No.", "canonical_name": "J agdish Narain"}}, {"text": "Vaidialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18421, "end_char": 18433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramagya Prasad Gupta v. Murii Prasll</(1) where by a majority, Vaidialingam & Palekar, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Palekar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18436, "end_char": 18443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramagya Prasad Gupta v. Murii Prasll</(1) where by a majority, Vaidialingam & Palekar, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18450, "end_char": 18456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mathew, J.\n\nD dissenting, held that the appeal could not be pro:eeded w:tb and must be dismissed."}}, {"text": "Jagdisb Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18971, "end_char": 18985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Con5equently Jagdisb Narain docs not and did not figure in the appeals from the de;:ree passed in Suit No.", "canonical_name": "J agdish Narain"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19367, "end_char": 19394, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19823, "end_char": 19825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramagya Prasad Gupta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21066, "end_char": 21086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "subsistence of both electti-· ci1y licence and electrical undertaking, the subject-matter was limited to a consideration of: (1) Existence of a legal and v.!lid partnership;\n\nand (2) Legality and validity of the notice of dissolution oi partnership alleged to have been served prior to the suit; and (3) tte\n\nliability of Ramagya Prasad Gupta or other partners to rcltder accounts to the plaintiff.·", "canonical_name": "\"-.\n\nRAMAGYA PRASAD GUPTA 8f"}}, {"text": "s. 7(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21624, "end_char": 21631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22050, "end_char": 22055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lahore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22660, "end_char": 22677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the view expresSed by the Lahore High Court Full Bench in Lakshmi v. Bhuli(1) has been cited and it was submitted that this view was approved by this Court in Narhari v.\n\nSankar('i."}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 S.C.R. 300", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 23337, "end_char": 23356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23447, "end_char": 23452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23561, "end_char": 23566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tek Chand", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24020, "end_char": 24029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tek Chand J., who delivered the majority judgment of the Full Bench in Lakshmi's case (supra) gave ti1e answer at p. 400 thus :\n\n\"There has been in substance as well in form but one trial and one verdict, and I venture to think, it will be a travesty of justice to stifle the hearing of the appeal against such a judgment on the ground that the findings contained in it ope\n\nrat> as res judicata."}}, {"text": "Lakshmi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24091, "end_char": 24098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tek Chand J., who delivered the majority judgment of the Full Bench in Lakshmi's case (supra) gave ti1e answer at p. 400 thus :\n\n\"There has been in substance as well in form but one trial and one verdict, and I venture to think, it will be a travesty of justice to stifle the hearing of the appeal against such a judgment on the ground that the findings contained in it ope\n\nrat> as res judicata."}}, {"text": "Lahore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26280, "end_char": 26286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Lahore decision there were two _cross suits about the same subjectmatter filed simultaneously between the same parties and two decrees were prepared."}}, {"text": "Narhari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26649, "end_char": 26656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Narhari's case (supra) what this Court held was, where there has been one trial, one finding and one\n\n\"ii( ' \"l\n\nR. P. Gl!PTA v. J\\jURLI PRASAD (Jaganmoha11 Reddy, J.) 923\n\ndecision, there need not b~ two appeals even though two decrees may have been drawn up and consequently the fact that one of the appeals was time barred does not bar the other appeal on the ground of res judicata."}}, {"text": "Sheodan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27191, "end_char": 27204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case, these questions need noi be considered; Nor is it relevant to consider whether there is any con, llict between the decision in this case and Sheodan Singh's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "S. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31024, "end_char": 31029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31263, "end_char": 31273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31277, "end_char": 31296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31363, "end_char": 31368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act", "statute": "Specific Relief Act"}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31867, "end_char": 31872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act", "statute": "Specific Relief Act"}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31880, "end_char": 31899, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "laganmohati Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33721, "end_char": 33738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".There is ample\n\n• '\n\nR. p, GUPTA v. MURU PllA:SAD (laganmohati Reddy, J.) 925\n\nevidence in ihe case io establish that !"}}, {"text": "Babu Ajodhya Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36463, "end_char": 36482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, 10,000 from Babu Ajodhya Prasad and the remaining nmount of Rs."}}, {"text": "Central Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36577, "end_char": 36589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34463 drawn upon the Central Bank, elated July 13, 1945 from the said Babu Saheb."}}, {"text": "Babu Saheb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36626, "end_char": 36636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34463 drawn upon the Central Bank, elated July 13, 1945 from the said Babu Saheb."}}, {"text": "Ajodhya Prasad Gupta & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36787, "end_char": 36813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit M-'- Ledger Account of M/s Ajodhya Prasad Gupta & Co. in the Central Bank, Chhapra, shows that on July 14, 1945 Rs."}}, {"text": "Central Bank, Chhapra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36821, "end_char": 36842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit M-'- Ledger Account of M/s Ajodhya Prasad Gupta & Co. in the Central Bank, Chhapra, shows that on July 14, 1945 Rs."}}, {"text": "July 14, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36858, "end_char": 36871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit M-'- Ledger Account of M/s Ajodhya Prasad Gupta & Co. in the Central Bank, Chhapra, shows that on July 14, 1945 Rs."}}, {"text": "Blbu MurTI Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36955, "end_char": 36972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34463 drawn in favour of Blbu MurTI Prasad the number of which tallies with the number mentioned in the receipt Ext."}}, {"text": "Central Bank,", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37113, "end_char": 37126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ledger Ac, count of Murli Prasad in the Central Bank, Chhapra, shows that 011 July 14, 1945 a sum\n\nof Rs."}}, {"text": "Chhapra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37127, "end_char": 37134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ledger Ac, count of Murli Prasad in the Central Bank, Chhapra, shows that 011 July 14, 1945 a sum\n\nof Rs."}}, {"text": "Parasnath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37400, "end_char": 37409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his evidence Murli Prasad denies in examination-in chief that there was a completed agreement before the auction sale between Ajodhya Prasad, Parasnath, Nandkishore Prasad and himself-each representing their respective families to enter into n partnership and that he had not purchased at the auction on behalf of the partners or on behalf of any other person, but had purchased it at the auction for himself alone.", "canonical_name": "E Parasnath Prasad"}}, {"text": "Parasoath Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37905, "end_char": 37921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,000 for bidding and denies that Parasoath Prasad, Nandkishore Prasad and Gurbharan Shah contributed any sum towards the auction purchase.", "canonical_name": "E Parasnath Prasad"}}, {"text": "AjodhyaPrasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38970, "end_char": 38983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AjodhyaPrasad wanted 8 annas share, Parasnath Prasad two.", "canonical_name": "Ajodhya Prasad Gupta"}}, {"text": "Nandkishorc Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39054, "end_char": 39072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "annas, Gurbharan Shah and Nandkishorc Prasad 1 anna share each and that he (Murli Prasad) expressed his licsirc to have 4 annas share.", "canonical_name": "N andkishore Prasad"}}, {"text": "Ganga Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39382, "end_char": 39394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further admits that though he did not read the partnership dee<l at that time he had got it read subsequently by Ganga Prasad, Pleader, and he found that .the deed embodied all the terms they had previously agreed to."}}, {"text": "A.iodhya Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39717, "end_char": 39732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, the share of Parasnath's family \\Vas reduced to one anna from two annas and that the share of the family of A.iodhya Prasad increased from 8 arinas to 10 annas.", "canonical_name": "Ajodhya Prasad Gupta"}}, {"text": "Babu Parasnath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40649, "end_char": 40663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But since some of them were not able to get the money, Babu Parasnath proposed to sell his ooe annas share and\n\nIt."}}, {"text": "Mtirli Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40798, "end_char": 40811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I 921\n\nretain his one anna only and Mtirli Prasad, that is respondent No."}}, {"text": "31-12-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42423, "end_char": 42433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "X-1 dated 31-12-1949: Murli Prasad Rs."}}, {"text": "Murli", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43087, "end_char": 43092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court rather strangely either misread the evidence or misappreciated it when it held that the partnership having not come into existence at any time in the eye of law, Murli had no advance in his hands on accom1t of -the partnership, there was no acquisition by the partnership of the undertaking and the license; and the source from which he paid the consideration money of the bargain between him and the liquidator would not clothe the creditors with the title to the undertaking and the licence or to the benefit of the purchase.", "canonical_name": "MURLl PRASAD & ORS"}}, {"text": "section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43801, "end_char": 43811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43836, "end_char": 43843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43851, "end_char": 43865, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "13-7-45", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43955, "end_char": 43962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "62 of the limitation Act is barred by limitation, because the suit of Parasnath was filed more than 3 years after 13-7-45 by which date they were aware of the fact fr, at consent ol the 'Government had ncit been obtained to transfer the licence."}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45436, "end_char": 45451, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "May 19, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46213, "end_char": 46225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F-1 dated May 19, 1955, revoking the licence."}}, {"text": "November 5, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46316, "end_char": 46332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "94 of 1956 was filed on November 5, 1956, while the earlier Suit No .. 68 of 1954 was filed on May 22, 1954, even before the cancellation of the licence."}}, {"text": "May 22, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46387, "end_char": 46399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "94 of 1956 was filed on November 5, 1956, while the earlier Suit No .. 68 of 1954 was filed on May 22, 1954, even before the cancellation of the licence."}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46895, "end_char": 46899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47938, "end_char": 47943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Owning of the properties by the Corporation was not in contravention of any of the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Owning of the properties by the Corporation was not in contravention of any of the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48226, "end_char": 48236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Owning of the properties by the Corporation was not in contravention of any of the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Owning of the properties by the Corporation was not in contravention of any of the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48604, "end_char": 48613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court in Bildhu Lal v. D=an Banking\n\nCompany Ltd(') to which one of us y, us a party had occasion to consider the question that where money has been paid under the instrument which has been held."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48904, "end_char": 48909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a review of the case law in India, the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Harnath Kaur v. lnder Bahadw' Singh(') and the observations in the 7th Edition of Pollock and\n\nMulla's Indian Contract and Specific Relief Act pp."}}, {"text": "Pollock", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49049, "end_char": 49056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a review of the case law in India, the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Harnath Kaur v. lnder Bahadw' Singh(') and the observations in the 7th Edition of Pollock and\n\nMulla's Indian Contract and Specific Relief Act pp."}}, {"text": "Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49062, "end_char": 49067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a review of the case law in India, the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Harnath Kaur v. lnder Bahadw' Singh(') and the observations in the 7th Edition of Pollock and\n\nMulla's Indian Contract and Specific Relief Act pp."}}, {"text": "Indian Contract and Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49070, "end_char": 49109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49141, "end_char": 49151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Contract and Specific Relief Act", "statute": "Indian Contract and Specific Relief Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49159, "end_char": 49178, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49231, "end_char": 49236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Contract and Specific Relief Act", "statute": "Indian Contract and Specific Relief Act"}}, {"text": "s. 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50369, "end_char": 50374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50684, "end_char": 50689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hyderabad Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50691, "end_char": 50713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51338, "end_char": 51343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hyderabad Contract Act", "statute": "Hyderabad Contract Act"}}, {"text": "Contract Act or its corresponding section of the Hyderabad Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51352, "end_char": 51423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51702, "end_char": 51707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Contract Act or its corresponding section of the Hyderabad Contract Act", "statute": "Contract Act or its corresponding section of the Hyderabad Contract Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 39 and 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51731, "end_char": 51744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Contract Act or its corresponding section of the Hyderabad Contract Act", "statute": "Contract Act or its corresponding section of the Hyderabad Contract Act"}}, {"text": "Murli Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52190, "end_char": 52202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We hold that the first respondent Murli Prasad is not entitled solely to the whole of the compensation money, but that all those whose names appear in the partnership deed of August 31, 1950, or the legal representatives or assignees of such of them who are dead, arc otherwise entitled to share the compensation money in proportion to their respective shares as specified in the said document.", "canonical_name": "MURLl PRASAD & ORS"}}, {"text": "Chhapra Electric Supply Work~.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 52690, "end_char": 52720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The compensation amount which is so distributed is the balance of the amount remaining after payment of the outstanding liabilities of the Chhapra Electric Supply Work~. The Trial Court will give the necessary directions to the Receiver in this behalf."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_92_100_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "RAGHUNANDAN v.\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nJanuary JO, 1974\n\n(M. H. BEG AND Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]\n\nMurder-Criminal Procedure Code-Ss.162, 428 and 540-Duty of co.urt to put , e5Sential questions-Evidence Act, s. 165-SCfJpe of.\n\nAll the appellants were tried for various offences under the Penal Code. The first appellant (Cr. A. 10 of 1973) was held guilty of th.e offence of murder of the deceased by shooting him with a gun while the other appellants Vi'Cre held guilty or -0ffences under Ss. 147 and 148, I. P. C. All the appellants were held guilty of offences punishable under Ss. 307 and 323 read withs. 149. The first appellant was sentenced to death while the others to imprisonment for life. The High Court confirmed the sentences.\n\nAllowing the appeals in part and remitting the cases to the High Court for disposal,\n\nHELD : Several material points escaped consideration by the High Court.\n\nIn a case of death sentence one would have expected a closer and a more critical scrutiny and a fuller discussion by the High Court of the evidence in the case and of the material questions arising for decision before it together with its decisions suppor ted by more than what could appear as perfunctory reasoning. [99E; lOOB]\n\n(1) The more important questions emerging from a reading of the poSt~ 1nortem report regarding the contents of the stomach of the deceased, .-considered in the context of the alleged time of the murder have not\n\nbeen discussed at aU by the High Court. It is precisely questions of this kind which, even if the prosecution or the defence counsel omitted to .put, the trial court could and should have put to the doctor who conducted the post mortem to clear up the position. If the trial Court had failed to consider their importance, the High Court itself could and should have taken furher expert medical evidence under Ss. 540 and 428, Cr. P. C. on this question.\n\n[9F]\n\n(2) It is true that the ban imposed bys. 162, Cr. P. C. against the use of a state ment of a witness recorded by the police during investigation, appears sweeping and wide. But at the same time, the powers of the court under s. 165 of the Evidence Act to put any questions to a witness are also couched in very wide terms authoris. ing the judge \"in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts\" to \"ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties, about any fact relevant or irrelevant\". The first proviso to s. 165, Evidence Act, enacting that, despite the powers of the court to put any question to a witness, the judgment must be based upon facts declared by the Act to be relevant, only serves to emphasise the width of the power of the court to question a witness.\n\nThe second proviso in this section preserves the privileges of witnesses to rerulic to answer certain questions and prohibits only questions which would be considered i1nproper under Ss. 148 and 149, Evidence Act. Statements of witnesses made to the pOlice during the investigation do not fall under any prohibited category mentioned ins. 165, Evidence Act. Ifs. 162 Cr. P. C. was meant to be so wide in its sweep it could make a further in, road upon the powers of the judge to put questions under s. J65, £\\.'!dencc Act. If that was the correct position atJcasts. 162, Cr. P. C. would l.1ave said so explicitly. Section 165, Evidence Act was .already on the stu!ute book whens. 162, Cr. P. C. 'vas enacted.\n\nIt is certainly quite arguable thats. 162. Cr. P. C. docs an1ount to a prohibition 11 gainst the use even by the court of statements mentioned there. Nevertheless, the purpose of the prohibition of s. 162, Cr. P. C. being to prevent unfair use by the prosecution of statements made by witnesses to the police during the course of in ·vestigation, \\Vhile the proviso is intended for the benefit of the defence, it could be\n\nRAGHUNANDAN 1'. U. P. S'J'.ATE (Beg, J.) 93\n\nA urged that, in order to secure the ends of justice, the pr\"hibition, by taking into account. its purpase and the mischief it was designed to prevent as well as its context, must be confined in its scope to the use by parties only to a proceeding of statements mentioned therein,\n\nThe language of s. 162, Cr. P. C., though wide, is not explicit or specific enough to extend the prohibition to the use of the wide and special powers of the court to question a witness, expressly and explicitly given bys. 165, Evidence Act in order to secure the ends of justice. A narrow and restrictive construction put upon the prohibition in s, 162 Cr. P. C. so as to confine the ambit of it to the use of statements by witnesses, by parties only to a proceeding before the court, would reconcile or harmonize the two provisions and also serve the ends of justice. Therefore s. 162, Cr.\n\nP. C. does not impair the special powers of the court under s. 165 Evidence Act\n\n(98A-H]\n\nIn the instant case a person who was said to be an eye witness was not examined by the prosecution. But this witne1S was considered so important that the trial court examined hi.nl as a court witness. While some of the prosecution witn~ stated that this witness was present at the time and _place of occurrence, the witness himself stated to the police that he was not an eye witness to the occurrence but came there Jater. This witness ought to have been confronted by the trial court itself with his previous statement to the police and that statement could have been proved by the investigating officer. After that, a better appraisal of the other evidence in the ca!!ie than was possible now could take place. The High Court, without considering or\n\ndiscing the significance of the presence or absence of this witness at the house at the time of the occurrence, had merely observed that he also suped the prosecution. If this witness was not really present the evidence of witnesses who were prepared to state that be was present, though not necessarily false about the occurrence has to be appraised Jess uncritically.\n\nEmptror v. Lal Mian A. I. R. 1943 Cat. 521, approved.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. JO & II of 1973.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 28th October, 1971 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 351 of 1971 and Referred No. 31 of 1971.\n\nFrank Anthony, E. C. Agrawala, M. M. L. Srivasta1•a and A.T.M.\n\nSampath, for the appellants.\n\nO. P. Rana. for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBEG. J,-The appellants Raghunandan, Ganga Sahai, Ghalendra, Khem Singh, and Sohan Singh, in the two Criminal Appeals now before us by special leave, were tried by a Civil & Sessions Judge of Moradabad tor various offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 302, 307, 323 and 452 read with section 149 Indian Penal Code.\n\nRaghunandan was held guilty of the offence of murder by shooting one Sriram with a gun on 12-12-1969, at about I p. m., while the deceased was sitting in front of his cattle shed in his outer court yard and talking to Hari Singh, a neighbour, who was also injured by gun shots. The appellants Ganga Sahai and Sohan Singh were held guilty. of Offences punishable under section 148 Indian Penal Code while Khem Singh and Ghalendra were found guilty punishable under Section 147 Indian Penal Code. All the appellants were held guilty of Offences punishable under Section 30 I and 323 read with Section 149 Indian Penal Code and Section 452 Indian Penal Code.\n\nSUPREl'vlE COURT REPORTS\n\n[J 974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nBut,. no separate sentences were passed against any of the accused persons for these Offences as Raghunandan was sentenced to death under section 302 Indian Penal Code and the other four appellants\n\nwrc sentenced to life in1prison1nent under section 302 read \\Vith section 149 Indian Penal Court. The High Court of Allahabad had accepted the death reference, arnl, dismissing the appeals of all the appellants, had confirmed their se11tences.\n\nThe Trial Court as well as the High Court had recorded concurrent findings of fact that the appellants formed themselves into an unlawful assembly armed with a gun, bal!ams, and lathis, and shot SririJ.m and Hari Singh, and, also injured Smt. Brahma, P. W. 2, the wife of Hari Singh, who is said to have covered her husband Hari Singh during the attack, and, Durga Prasad, P.W .6, the brother of murdered man. The prosecution case is also supported by Bhai Singh, P.W.J, a brother of Raghunandan, and by Rameshwar, P.W. 5, a resident of Village Karimpur, who was said to be passing by at the time of the occurrence.\n\nThe appellants pleaded that they had been falsely implicated due to enmity.\n\nThe~ produced Gokul, D. W. !, who deposed about an occurrence which was alleged to have taken place at the house of Hari Singh in the early hours of the morning presumably of 12th of December, 1969. He stated that the cause of the occurrence was that Rohan, the brother of Hari Singh, had abducted Stnt. Rukia of Naurangabad and brought her to village Karimpur where she was living. He asserted that her husband and other residents of Naurangabad forming a party of ten to twelve, had come to take her away. its members were said to have been armed with a Gun, Ballams, and Lathis, which they were alleged to have used against Hari Singh and the deceased Srirams and Durga Prasad. He deposed that Sriram, Hari\n\nSingh, and Durga Prasad were fired at. He stated thatthe Naurangabad party caught hold of Smt. Brahma and that her husband, Hari Singh, had tried to save her. GoJ..\"UI alleged that Srira111 was struck by gun shots. He suggested that Hari Singh may also ha\\'e bcrn similarly injured. He stated that Durga Prasad was not hit.\n\nThe Trial Court, which had the advantage of seeing the witne; sos <lepose, accepted the evidence of the four eye witnesses, who included two injured persons. It rejected the story put forward by Gokul in defence as incre.dible.\n\nApart from the fact that the defence version did not clearly explain the Ballam injury on Durga Prasad, the cpla nation for the gun shot wounds on . the chest, stomach, and forcann of Sriram, which had resulted in his death, suggesting that he was the principal target of the attack, did not quite fit in with the defence -version. The Trial Court had also observed that the accused had reserved their defence up to the last stage and had not revealed it\n\narlier either in the Committing Magisuate's Court or at the time of applying for bail.\n\nIt is true that what seems to be the principal 111otivc set up by the W: 11rosecution helps the defence more than it assists the prosecution case.\n\nThis was that there was rivalry for election to the office of the Pradhan .of the Gram Sabha between Sriram deceased and Ganga Sahai,\n\n!!AGHUNANDAN V. U. P. STATE (Beg,/.) 95\n\nappellant, who was Pradhan of the village at the time of the murder.\n\nAccording to the prosecution version, Sriram, who had been a Pradhan of the village for about 8 to I 0 years, was threatened with dire consequences by Ganga Sahai if he stood again for the office. Bhai Singh, P. W. I, had stated that, out of fear, Sriram did not stand for election so that Ganga Sahai won an uncontested election and became the Pradhan. If that was so, Ganga Sahai should have felt obliged to Sriram for not contesting the election. There was no suggestion that another election was near at the time of the occurrence or that Sriram was conspiring to get Ganga Sahai unseated.\n\nOther motives were also set up. Ganga Sahai and other accused persons were said to have demolished the mend of Bhai Singh's field and taken his land under cultivation so that Bhai Singh had complained about it to people of his own village and other villages. It was alleged that the accused persons formed one set and used to threaten the family of Bhai Singh and Sriram and Durga Prasad who were said to be joint in cultivation and mess.\n\nIt was also allged that Sriram had gone with a friend of his, named Sahi Ram, to Police Station Bejoi to lodge a report relating to the beating up of Sabi Ram by Sohan Singh and Raghunandan appellants. Furthermore, Brahma, P. W. 2, had deposed that her husband Hari Singh, who had sustained gun shot injuries at the occurrence under consideration but had survived was threatened by the accused persons that, if he gave evidence against them, he would be killed.\n\nHari Singh had actually been murdered about 7 months before Smt. Brahma gave evidence in Court on 11.1 J.70.\n\nThe prosecution, therefore, suggested that the appellants formed a. set of bullies and thought that they could do what they liked to the family of Sriram, deceased, and its property. 'Enmity, as it has been often observed, is a double edged weapon.\n\nWe, therefore, refrain from saying more than that there should be an attempt to determine, in such a case, the direction in which enmities set up were more likelyto operate.\n\nIf the eye witnesses could be believed it was really not necessary to support the .prosecution case by giving satisfactory evidence of the motive to murder. The real and more important question to decide here was whether the four alleged eye witnesses produced, out of whom twd were brothers o'r the deceased Sriram, one a chance witness, and the fourth, the injured wife of a close friend of the deceased, who was also injured, were sufficiently reliable.\n\nThe alleged eye witnesses no doubt seem to have impressed the Trial Court which bad the advantage of seeing them depose.\n\nThere are, however, atleast two features of this case which could provide serious grounds for suspecting the prosecution version.\n\nWe now proceed to examine these two features.\n\nIt was repeatedly emphasised by the1earned counsel for the appellant that the post-mortem examination report disclosed that the small intestine as well as the large intestine of' the deceased contained faecal matter and were distended with gas whereas the stomach was found empty.\n\nIt was submitted before us that it was quite unnatural\n\nthat a healthy villager, even though bis age was estimated by the Doctor as 60 years (found erroneously mentioned as 80 in the judgment of the High Court before us), would not eat until I p.m. during the day, or, in any case, that be would not defecate until that time during the day when there was nothing in evidence to show that he was suffering from constipation.\n\nIt was contended that the Trial Court had uncritically and too easily accepted the explanation given by the prosecution witnesses that the deceased alone bad not eaten up to 1 p:m. as he bad a stream of visitors that morning.\n\nIt is apparent from the testimony of Durga Prasad that he and his brother-in-law Jailal, C.W. J, who was not produced by the prosecution (although examined as a Court witness), was also said to be staying) at the house, and to have taken his food with Durga Prasad before 1. p.m.\n\nWe find that although Dr. J.P. Chaturvedi, P. W. 8, who performed the post-mortem examination, and Dr. D. P. Manchanda, who bad admitt<d Hari Singh into the hospital on 13-12-1969 at 11-40 a.m., were examined at the Trial, no question was pui by either side to elicidate wbtther the contents of the small intestine and the large intestine could remain in that condition until 1 p.m. during the day assuming that Sriram was quite healthy.\n\nThe post-mortem examination took place at 2-40 p.m. on 13-12-1969, and the intestines were thenfound distended with gas.\n\nWe do. not know whether this could be their condition at 1 p.m. on 12-12-1969 or its effect. It is precisely questions of this kind which, even it the prosecution or the defence counsel omit to put them, the Trial Court could and should have put to doctors to clear up the position. If the Trial Court had failed to consider their importance, the High Court could have and shouldhave taken further evidence on this matter under Section 540 Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nIn a criminal case, the fate of the proceeding cannot always be left entirely in the bands of the parties.\n\nThe Court has also a duty to see that essential questions are not, so far as reasonably possible, left unanswered, We are surprised to find, from the judgment of the High Court, that the questions mentioned above, arising out of the post-mcrtfm report, were not, for some reason, even mentioned there.\n\nWe find it very difficult to believe that, in a case with a death sentence a matter of such significance, which was noticed by the Trial Court, was not raised at all by Counsel fQ, r the appellants.\n\nIn any event, it ought to have been dealt with by t1ie High Court after taling appropriate ad\\litional expert medical evidence under Section 540 read with Section 428 Criminal Pt0cedure Code if that was considered necessary before deciding it.\n\nAnother question raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant relates to the testimony of Jailal, the brother-in-law of Sriram; He \\Vas said to be an eye witness.\n\nBut, he \\\\'as neither mentioned in the F I. R., although he was said t.o be present at the Police Station when the F. f. R. was lodged at 5 p.m., nor was he produced by the pro, secution.\n\nIndeed, Rameshwar, P. W. 5. had stated that be bad ni>t seen Jailal at all there. Jaila!'''was considered so important a witness by the Trial Court that he was examined as a Court witne5'.\n\nHe denied having made any statement to the Police althoush it is in evidence that he did make a statement to the Police. The Trial\n\nA , .\n\nRAGHUNANDAN V. U. P. STATB (Beg, /.) 97\n\nCourt bad not permitted the contents of that statement, which indicated that Jailal was not an eye witness but .came there at a time when the Corpse of Sriram was being removed, to be used to contradict his version as a Court witness.\n\nSmt. Brahma, P. W. 2, as well as Du1ga Prasad, P. W. 6, the injured eye witnesse•, as well as Bhai Singh, P. W. I, stated that Jailal was present at the time of the occurrence.\n\nLearned Counsel for the appellant submitted that Jailal's statement before the Police suggested that he had come in the morning, Jong before I p.m., and had found that Sriram had already been murdered.\n\nThis, it is urged indicates that Sriram must have been murdered either by Naurangabad people or by unknown persons during the night.\n\nWe do not find material on record to support the suggestion that Jailal must have reached the house in the morning at a time when Sriram's murder had been already committed. The Trial Court had discussed the evidence of Jailal at some length and had opined that his name was not mentioned in the F.I.R. as be w11s related to the accused persons also. That may be the reason why Jailal was distrusted. If, however, Rameshwar, P.W.5, a chance witness, who claimed to be present at the time of the alleged occurrence and to have seen it, is to be believed, Jailal was not to be seen at all at that time at the house. If Jailal was really not p1csent, the evidence of witnesses who were prepared to state, for some oblique reason, that he was present, though not necessarily false about the whole occurrence, has to be appraised less uncritically. The High Court, \\Vithout considering or discussing the significance of the presence or absence of Jailal at the house at the time of the occurrence, had merely o!)scrved that Jailal, C.W. I, also supported the prosecution version.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant submitted that the testimony of Jailal could not have been accepted by the High Court because Jailal had not been confronted with his previous statement.before the police.\n\nHe urged, relying upon Emperor v. Lal Mian (I). that, even if the statement of a witness, recorded by tho Police during the investigation, cannot be used for \"any purpose\" other than the ones mentioned in Section I 62 Criminal Procedure Code, yet this prohobition applies only to the parties to the proceedings and does not operate against the powers of the Court itself when it considers the testimony of a witness to be necessary. Although, the Trial Court considered Jailal's evidence important enough to examine him under Section 540 Criminal Procedure Code, yet it disabled itself from testing its worth by putting an alleged contradiction to the witness on a matter of some importance in the case.\n\n11 is urged by learned counsel for the appellants that the powers of the Court to question a witness are regulated by the special provisions of Section 165 of the Evidence Act exclusively, so that a previous statement of the witness, who is called as a Court witness, can be used by the Court to contradict him even if it was made to the police during the investigation. This, it is submitted, is the effect of the special powers of the Court under Section I 65 Evidence Act.\n\n(t) AJ.R. 1943 Cal. 521. 8-852SCI/n\n\nIt is true that the ban, imposed by section 162 Criminal Procedure Oodc, against the use of a statement of a witness recorded by the Police during investigation, appears sweeping and wide. But, at the same time, we and that the powers of the Court, under section 165 of the Evidence Act, to put any question to a witness. are also couched in very wide terms authorising the Judge \"in order to discover or to obtain proper procf of relevant facts\" to \"ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties, about any fact relevant or irrelevant\". The first proviso to section 165 Evidence Act, enacting that, despite the powen of the Court to put any question to a witness, the judgment must be based upon facts declared by the Act to be relevant, only serves to emphasize the width of the power of the Court to question a witness. The seC8nd proviso is this section preserves the privileges of witnesses to refuse to answer certain questions and prohibits only questions which would be considered improper under section 148 and 149 of th• Evidence Act. Statements of witnesses made to the police during the investigation do not fall under any' prohibited category mentioned in Section 165 Evidence Act. If Section 162 Criminal Procedure Code was meant to be so wide in its sweep as the Trial Court thought it to be, it would make a further inroad upon the powers of the Judge to put questions under Section 165 Evidence Act. If that was the correct position, atleast Section 162 Criminal Procedure Code would have said so explicitly.\n\nSection 165 of the Evidence Act was already there when section 162 Criminal Procedure Code was enacted,\n\nIt is certainly quite arguable that Section 162 Criminal Proceaure Code does amount to a prohibition against the use even by the Court of statements mentioned there. Nevertheless, the purpose of the E prohibition of Section 162 Criminal Procedure Code being to prevent unfair use by the prosecution of statements made by witnesses to the Police during the course of investigation, while the proviso is intended for the benefit of the defence, it could also be urged that, in order to secure the ends of Justice, which all procedural law is meant to subserve, the prohibition, by taking into account its purpose and the mischief it was designed to prevent as well as its context, must be confined F in its scope to the use by parties only to a proceeding of statements mentioned there.\n\nWe are inclined to accept the argument of the appellant that the language of Section 162 Criminal Procedure Code, though wide, is not explicit or specific enough to extend the prohibit on to the use of the wide and special powers of the Court IC> question a witness, G expressly and explicitly given by Section 165 of the India~ Evidence Act in order to secme the ends of jmtice.\n\nWe think tb.t a narrow and restrictive construction put upon the prohibition in Sect on 162 Criminal Procedure Code, so as to . confine the ambit of it to the u•e of statements by witnesses by parties only to a proceeding before the Court, would reconcile or harmonize the two provisions considered by us and also serve the ends of justice.\n\nTherefore, we hold that H Section 162 Criminal Procedure Code does not impair the special powers of the Court under Section 165 Indian Evidence Act.\n\nConsequently, we think that the Trial Court could and should have itself\n\n, \\\n\nRAGHUNANDAN v. U. P. STATE (Beg,'!.) 99\n\nmade use of the statement made by Jailal during the course of the investigation.\n\nIf that had been done, it is possible that it may have affected appraisal of evidence of other prosecution witnesses.\n\nWe also find that the Trial Co11rt as well as the High Court had brushed aside the objection that the blood recovered from the place of occurrence was not sent for chemical examination. We thinl:: that a failure of the police to send the blooj for chemioal examination ina serious case of murder, such as the one before us, is to be deprecated.\n\nIn such cases, the place of occurrence is often disputed.\n\nIn the instant case, it was actually disputed.\n\nHowever, such an omission need not jeopardise the success of the prosecution case where there is other reliable evidence to fix the scene of occurrence.\n\nThe High Court had dealt with the contention that there was some conftict between medical evideace and the evidence about the distances from which shootings are said to have taken place. It held that, if correctly interpreted, medical evidence corroborated the accounts of eye witnesses.\n\nBut, the High Court had not 'imilarly discussed or dealt with the infirmities in the statements of prosecution witnesses, which were placed before us, such as the denial by Smt. Brahma, P. W. 2 that she went to the police station to lodge a report in respect of the murder of Hari Singh.\n\nIt was urged on behalf of the appellants that this deliberately mendacious denial by her was made to conceal the fact that her report was untrue.\n\nMatters which may shake the credibility of a witness must be taken into account although they may not be enough to discard the whole statement of a witness.\n\nWe have indicated a number of points on which, in a case of a death sentence, one would have expected a closer and a more critical scrutiny and a fuller discussion by the High Cowt of the evidence in the case and cf the material questions arising for decision before it together with its decisions on these supported by more than what could appear as perfunctory reasoning.\n\nWe have also indicated the rather important question which was, surprisingly, not discussed at all by the High Court, emerging from a reading of the post-mortem report considered in the context of the alleged time of the murder.\n\nWe think that the High Court itself could and should have taken further expert medical evidence, under Sections 540 and 428 Criminal Procedure Code, on this question.\n\nFor the reasons already given, we also think that Jailal, C. W. I, ought to have been confronted by the Court itself with his previous statement before the police and that statement could be proved by the Jnve>tigating officer.\n\nAfter that, a better appraisal of other evidence in the case than is possible now, on the present state of the record, could take place.\n\nWe have anxiously considered the question whether this is a case in which we should consider the merits of the whole case ourselves on the evidence on record or send it back for further consideration and decision in accordance with the law, as laid down above, either by the High Court or by the Trial Court.\n\nWe do not think that in a serious case of murder such as the one before us, persons who were, if the prosecution case is true, acting as utterly irresponsible and callous bullies, should be judged on the evidence as it stands\n\nwithout the additional evidence mentioned above by us. We mst emphasise that, whatever may be the nature of the offence or the actions of the accused, as revealed by evidence, the accused, are entitkd to a fair trial which a well considered judgment, dealing satisfactorily with the material points in the case, evidences.\n\nFor the reasons given above, we think that several material points ave escaped con-\n\n; ideration by the High Court.\n\nConsequently, we allow this appeal to the extent that we set aside the judgnu:nt and orders of the High Court and sent back the case to it for reconsideration and decision in accordance with Jaw as explained by us.\n\nNo opinion which may have been expressed unwittingly by us on questions of. fact would bind the Court or affect an untettered consideration of the merits of the respective cases of the two sides by the High Court in accordance with the law as laid do\\vn by us.\n\nAppeal rartly allowed,\n\nP.B.R.", "total_entities": 123, "entities": [{"text": "RAGHUNANDAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUNANDAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "v.\n\nSTATE OF U", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. 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C. Agrawala, M. M. L. Srivasta1•a and A.T.M.\n\nSampath, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "E. C. Agrawala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6309, "end_char": 6323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony, E. C. Agrawala, M. M. L. Srivasta1•a and A.T.M.\n\nSampath, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "M. M. L. Srivasta1•a", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6325, "end_char": 6345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony, E. C. Agrawala, M. M. L. Srivasta1•a and A.T.M.\n\nSampath, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "A.T.M.\n\nSampath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6350, "end_char": 6365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony, E. C. Agrawala, M. M. L. Srivasta1•a and A.T.M.\n\nSampath, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "O. P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6388, "end_char": 6398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O. P. Rana."}}, {"text": "Raghunandan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6488, "end_char": 6499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J,-The appellants Raghunandan, Ganga Sahai, Ghalendra, Khem Singh, and Sohan Singh, in the two Criminal Appeals now before us by special leave, were tried by a Civil & Sessions Judge of Moradabad tor various offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 302, 307, 323 and 452 read with section 149 Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUNANDAN"}}, {"text": "Ganga Sahai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6501, "end_char": 6512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J,-The appellants Raghunandan, Ganga Sahai, Ghalendra, Khem Singh, and Sohan Singh, in the two Criminal Appeals now before us by special leave, were tried by a Civil & Sessions Judge of Moradabad tor various offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 302, 307, 323 and 452 read with section 149 Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "Ganga Sahai"}}, {"text": "Ghalendra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6514, "end_char": 6523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J,-The appellants Raghunandan, Ganga Sahai, Ghalendra, Khem Singh, and Sohan Singh, in the two Criminal Appeals now before us by special leave, were tried by a Civil & Sessions Judge of Moradabad tor various offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 302, 307, 323 and 452 read with section 149 Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "Khem Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6525, "end_char": 6535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J,-The appellants Raghunandan, Ganga Sahai, Ghalendra, Khem Singh, and Sohan Singh, in the two Criminal Appeals now before us by special leave, were tried by a Civil & Sessions Judge of Moradabad tor various offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 302, 307, 323 and 452 read with section 149 Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "Sohan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6541, "end_char": 6552, "source": "ner", "metadata": 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null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6755, "end_char": 6766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6767, "end_char": 6784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sriram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6856, "end_char": 6862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghunandan was held guilty of the offence of murder by shooting one Sriram with a gun on 12-12-1969, at about I p. m., while the deceased was sitting in front of his cattle shed in his outer court yard and talking to Hari Singh, a neighbour, who was also injured by gun shots.", "canonical_name": "Srirams"}}, {"text": "12-12-1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6877, "end_char": 6887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghunandan was held guilty of the offence of murder by shooting one Sriram with a gun on 12-12-1969, at about I p. m., while the deceased was sitting in front of his cattle shed in his outer court yard and talking to Hari Singh, a neighbour, who was also injured by gun shots."}}, {"text": "Hari Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7005, "end_char": 7015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghunandan was held guilty of the offence of murder by shooting one Sriram with a gun on 12-12-1969, at about I p. m., while the deceased was sitting in front of his cattle shed in his outer court yard and talking to Hari Singh, a neighbour, who was also injured by gun shots.", "canonical_name": "Hari\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7155, "end_char": 7166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7167, "end_char": 7184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7251, "end_char": 7262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7263, "end_char": 7280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7347, "end_char": 7357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7378, "end_char": 7389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7390, "end_char": 7407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 452", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7412, "end_char": 7423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7424, "end_char": 7441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "SUPREl'vlE COURT REPORTS", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7444, "end_char": 7468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREl'vlE COURT REPORTS\n\n[J 974] 3 S.C.R.\n\nBut,."}}, {"text": "Raghunandan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7585, "end_char": 7596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "no separate sentences were passed against any of the accused persons for these Offences as Raghunandan was sentenced to death under section 302 Indian Penal Code and the other four appellants\n\nwrc sentenced to life in1prison1nent under section 302 read \\Vith section 149 Indian Penal Court.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUNANDAN"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7626, "end_char": 7637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7638, "end_char": 7655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7730, "end_char": 7741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7753, "end_char": 7764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7789, "end_char": 7812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Allahabad had accepted the death reference, arnl, dismissing the appeals of all the appellants, had confirmed their se11tences."}}, {"text": "SririJ.m", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8127, "end_char": 8135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Trial Court as well as the High Court had recorded concurrent findings of fact that the appellants formed themselves into an unlawful assembly armed with a gun, bal!ams, and lathis, and shot SririJ.m and Hari Singh, and, also injured Smt."}}, {"text": "Brahma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8175, "end_char": 8181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brahma, P. W. 2, the wife of Hari Singh, who is said to have covered her husband Hari Singh during the attack, and, Durga Prasad, P.W .6, the brother of murdered man."}}, {"text": "Durga Prasad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8291, "end_char": 8303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brahma, P. W. 2, the wife of Hari Singh, who is said to have covered her husband Hari Singh during the attack, and, Durga Prasad, P.W .6, the brother of murdered man."}}, {"text": "Bhai Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8384, "end_char": 8394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case is also supported by Bhai Singh, P.W.J, a brother of Raghunandan, and by Rameshwar, P.W. 5, a resident of Village Karimpur, who was said to be passing by at the time of the occurrence."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8436, "end_char": 8445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case is also supported by Bhai Singh, P.W.J, a brother of Raghunandan, and by Rameshwar, P.W. 5, a resident of Village Karimpur, who was said to be passing by at the time of the occurrence."}}, {"text": "Karimpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8477, "end_char": 8485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case is also supported by Bhai Singh, P.W.J, a brother of Raghunandan, and by Rameshwar, P.W. 5, a resident of Village Karimpur, who was said to be passing by at the time of the occurrence."}}, {"text": "Gokul", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8640, "end_char": 8645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The~ produced Gokul, D. W. !,"}}, {"text": "12th of December, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8801, "end_char": 8823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "who deposed about an occurrence which was alleged to have taken place at the house of Hari Singh in the early hours of the morning presumably of 12th of December, 1969."}}, {"text": "Rohan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8877, "end_char": 8882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He stated that the cause of the occurrence was that Rohan, the brother of Hari Singh, had abducted Stnt."}}, {"text": "Rukia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8930, "end_char": 8935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rukia of Naurangabad and brought her to village Karimpur where she was living."}}, {"text": "Naurangabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8939, "end_char": 8950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rukia of Naurangabad and brought her to village Karimpur where she was living."}}, {"text": "Srirams", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9281, "end_char": 9288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "its members were said to have been armed with a Gun, Ballams, and Lathis, which they were alleged to have used against Hari Singh and the deceased Srirams and Durga Prasad.", "canonical_name": "Srirams"}}, {"text": "Durga Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9293, "end_char": 9305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "its members were said to have been armed with a Gun, Ballams, and Lathis, which they were alleged to have used against Hari Singh and the deceased Srirams and Durga Prasad."}}, {"text": "Hari\n\nSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9331, "end_char": 9342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He deposed that Sriram, Hari\n\nSingh, and Durga Prasad were fired at.", "canonical_name": "Hari\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Brahma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9432, "end_char": 9438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brahma and that her husband, Hari Singh, had tried to save her."}}, {"text": "Srira111", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9518, "end_char": 9526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GoJ..\"UI alleged that Srira111 was struck by gun shots."}}, {"text": "Gokul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9857, "end_char": 9862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It rejected the story put forward by Gokul in defence as incre.dible."}}, {"text": "Ganga Sahai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10704, "end_char": 10715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was that there was rivalry for election to the office of the Pradhan .of the Gram Sabha between Sriram deceased and Ganga Sahai,\n\n!!", "canonical_name": "Ganga Sahai"}}, {"text": "Sriram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10867, "end_char": 10873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the prosecution version, Sriram, who had been a Pradhan of the village for about 8 to I 0 years, was threatened with dire consequences by Ganga Sahai if he stood again for the office.", "canonical_name": "Srirams"}}, {"text": "Bhai Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11535, "end_char": 11545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ganga Sahai and other accused persons were said to have demolished the mend of Bhai Singh's field and taken his land under cultivation so that Bhai Singh had complained about it to people of his own village and other villages.", "canonical_name": "Hari\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Sahi Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11932, "end_char": 11940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also allged that Sriram had gone with a friend of his, named Sahi Ram, to Police Station Bejoi to lodge a report relating to the beating up of Sabi Ram by Sohan Singh and Raghunandan appellants.", "canonical_name": "Sahi Ram"}}, {"text": "Police Station Bejoi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11945, "end_char": 11965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also allged that Sriram had gone with a friend of his, named Sahi Ram, to Police Station Bejoi to lodge a report relating to the beating up of Sabi Ram by Sohan Singh and Raghunandan appellants."}}, {"text": "Sabi Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12014, "end_char": 12022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also allged that Sriram had gone with a friend of his, named Sahi Ram, to Police Station Bejoi to lodge a report relating to the beating up of Sabi Ram by Sohan Singh and Raghunandan appellants.", "canonical_name": "Sahi Ram"}}, {"text": "Sohan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12026, "end_char": 12037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also allged that Sriram had gone with a friend of his, named Sahi Ram, to Police Station Bejoi to lodge a report relating to the beating up of Sabi Ram by Sohan Singh and Raghunandan appellants.", "canonical_name": "Sohan Singh"}}, {"text": "11.1 J.70", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12425, "end_char": 12434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brahma gave evidence in Court on 11.1 J.70."}}, {"text": "Jailal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14635, "end_char": 14641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is apparent from the testimony of Durga Prasad that he and his brother-in-law Jailal, C.W. J, who was not produced by the prosecution (although examined as a Court witness), was also said to be staying) at the house, and to have taken his food with Durga Prasad before 1."}}, {"text": "J.P. Chaturvedi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14861, "end_char": 14876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p.m.\n\nWe find that although Dr. J.P. Chaturvedi, P. W. 8, who performed the post-mortem examination, and Dr. D. P. Manchanda, who bad admitt<d Hari Singh into the hospital on 13-12-1969 at 11-40 a.m., were examined at the Trial, no question was pui by either side to elicidate wbtther the contents of the small intestine and the large intestine could remain in that condition until 1 p.m. during the day assuming that Sriram was quite healthy."}}, {"text": "D. P. Manchanda", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14938, "end_char": 14953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p.m.\n\nWe find that although Dr. J.P. Chaturvedi, P. W. 8, who performed the post-mortem examination, and Dr. D. P. Manchanda, who bad admitt<d Hari Singh into the hospital on 13-12-1969 at 11-40 a.m., were examined at the Trial, no question was pui by either side to elicidate wbtther the contents of the small intestine and the large intestine could remain in that condition until 1 p.m. during the day assuming that Sriram was quite healthy."}}, {"text": "13-12-1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15004, "end_char": 15014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p.m.\n\nWe find that although Dr. J.P. Chaturvedi, P. W. 8, who performed the post-mortem examination, and Dr. D. P. Manchanda, who bad admitt<d Hari Singh into the hospital on 13-12-1969 at 11-40 a.m., were examined at the Trial, no question was pui by either side to elicidate wbtther the contents of the small intestine and the large intestine could remain in that condition until 1 p.m. during the day assuming that Sriram was quite healthy."}}, {"text": "Section 540", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15824, "end_char": 15835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15836, "end_char": 15859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 540", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16606, "end_char": 16617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Section 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16628, "end_char": 16639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "RAGHUNANDAN V.", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17403, "end_char": 17417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAGHUNANDAN V. U. P. STATB (Beg, /.) 97\n\nCourt bad not permitted the contents of that statement, which indicated that Jailal was not an eye witness but .came there at a time when the Corpse of Sriram was being removed, to be used to contradict his version as a Court witness."}}, {"text": "Du1ga Prasad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17713, "end_char": 17725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brahma, P. W. 2, as well as Du1ga Prasad, P. W. 6, the injured eye witnesse•, as well as Bhai Singh, P. W. I, stated that Jailal was present at the time of the occurrence."}}, {"text": "Jailal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17807, "end_char": 17813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brahma, P. W. 2, as well as Du1ga Prasad, P. W. 6, the injured eye witnesse•, as well as Bhai Singh, P. W. I, stated that Jailal was present at the time of the occurrence.", "canonical_name": "Jailal"}}, {"text": "Jailal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18812, "end_char": 18818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If Jailal was really not p1csent, the evidence of witnesses who were prepared to state, for some oblique reason, that he was present, though not necessarily false about the whole occurrence, has to be appraised less uncritically.", "canonical_name": "Jailal"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19696, "end_char": 19719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 540", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20004, "end_char": 20015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20016, "end_char": 20039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20327, "end_char": 20338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20733, "end_char": 20744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20952, "end_char": 20963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21299, "end_char": 21310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 148 and 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21744, "end_char": 21763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21909, "end_char": 21920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21938, "end_char": 21949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21950, "end_char": 21973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22131, "end_char": 22142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22199, "end_char": 22210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22211, "end_char": 22234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22267, "end_char": 22278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22322, "end_char": 22333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22334, "end_char": 22357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22408, "end_char": 22419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Proceaure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22420, "end_char": 22443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22588, "end_char": 22599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Proceaure Code", "statute": "Criminal Proceaure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22600, "end_char": 22623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23235, "end_char": 23246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23247, "end_char": 23270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23461, "end_char": 23472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23631, "end_char": 23654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23907, "end_char": 23918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23919, "end_char": 23942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23997, "end_char": 24008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24009, "end_char": 24028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 540 and 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26550, "end_char": 26570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26571, "end_char": 26594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_931_934_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "RAMAUTAR LAL JAIN\n\nMAYA KAUR & 13 ORS.\n\nApril Ir, 1974\n\n[A. N. RAY, C.J., Y. V. C!IANDRACHUD AND V. R. KRISHNA IYER, JJ.]\n\n_Motor Vehicles Act, 1939-Scrt.'on 46-J11ri.1d.\"ciion of tl1e RegJonal 1'ronsport .Authority to t1flow substN11ti:)ll of h 'irs of n deceased applicant for stage earriage f1ern1its.\n\nOn the question whether th::. Rcgiona! Transport Authority had jurisdiction under s. 46 or the Motor Vehicles Act to allow or refu3e substitution of heirs in the case Of death of an applicant for the grant of stage carriage permit before the gr_ant of a permit.\n\nHELD : The decision of the Appeal Beard as well as of the Minister \\Vas wronll' in holding that the Regiontil 1\"ran~Dort Authority had acted beyond jurisdiction. The Regional Transport Authority has jurisdiction and discretion in the matter of allowing or refusing substi1ution. ln the case Of death. of an applicant for the grant of a stage c:irriag~ pcrn1it .b:.-fore the grant of a pern1it, the heirs can apply for sub)titution in place of the original applicant. If the\n\noroceedinR~ are likely to be delayed or a sub-:tit.ution will br detrimental to the interests of the oublic the Regional Tran\">port Authority is not bound to allow rub1titution.\n\nThere is iurisdictiori to grant or allow or refuse substitution.\n\nThe\n\nReional Transoort' Anthoritv will exercise di;; cretion in a judicious manner in\n\nhe facts and circumstances of each case a5 to whether the substitution may be nllowed. f9i4 C-D; 933 G-HJ\n\nIn the instant case the Regional Trans;>ort Authority granted the permit in the name of the firm after observing the procedure prescribed under the Act\n\nDha.ni Dt>vi v. Sant Biliari &: Ors., (1969l 2 S.C.R. 507 and Mis. Ram Autar Lal Jain v. The Mi11ister of Transport & Ors. C.A. No. 2606 of 1969 decided on 28 November. 1973 referred to.\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal .No. 259J of 1969.\n\nFrom the judgmeni and decree dated 24th March, 1967 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurb\\liction Case No. 459 of 1966.\n\nK. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha, for the app, l\\ant.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by:_\n\nRAY, C. J. : This appeal by certificate is from the judgment dated 24 March, 1967 of the High Court of .Patna.\n\nRam Autar Lal Jain filed an applicafon under section 46 of the Motor Vchicfos Acl, 1939 hereinafter called the Act for grant. of the\n\nstae carriae permit on the route Da1fooani to Mahuataur in Bihar.\n\nBefore .the apnlication coulrl be disnosrd of bv the Revional Transnort Authority Ram Autar Lal Jain died on 1 June, . 1964. There- r. Kamal Kum•r rain the .son of R•m Autar Lal Jain made an aoolication to Reional Transport. A nthnri'\" , tatin~ tha( the annlicRtion filed by his deceased father might be treated to be one on bebaif of himself and on behalf of his two minor brothers. It was also stated in the application that Ram Autar Lal fain had died leaviM his sons ~\n\nas hirs .. On 4 Allj(llst, 1964 another application was filed by Kamal\n\nKumar Jain praying that the application ftled by the deceased father might be treated as the application of a firm called Mis. Ram Autar Lal Jain the appellant herein. It was stated there that the three sons and the widmif of Ram Autar Lal Jain carried on business in partnership under the name and style of M/s Ram Autar Lal Jain.\n\nThe minors were said to be admitted to the benefit of the partnership. On receipt of the application the matter was notified in the Bihar Gazette on 9 September, I 964 for the purpose of inviting objections, if any.\n\nNo objections were filed.\n\nOn 24 July, 1965 the Transport Authority passed an order granting a permit in favour of Mis. Ram Autar Lal Jain for the 'route.\n\nThe Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority found that the application for permit had been made by Ram Autar Lal Jain and that the Chotanagpur Regional Transport Authority had no jurisdiction to grant permit in favour of the appellant.\n\nThe appellant preferred an appeal to t!ie Minister.\n\nThe Minister lipheM the view of the Appeal Board and dismissed the appeal.\n\nTI1e appellant in an application under Articles Z26 and 227 of the Constitution asked for a writ of certiorari to quash the orders of the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority, Patna and of the Minister of Transport, Government of Bihar, Patna.\n\nThe question which was raised before the High Court was whether the Aopeal Board erred in holding that the firm was a tlifl'erent entity from the heirs of Ram Autar Lal Jain.\n\nTt was said by the Appeal Board that the firm could not be equated with the legal representatives of the deceased.\n\nThe High Court held that on the facts it .was not possible to hold that the Appeal Board was in ·rror in holclitlg that the firm was a different entity.\n\nThis Court in Dhani Devi v. Sanr Bihari & Ors.\n\n(I) (1969] 2 S. C. R. 507 held that in the case of death of an applicant before the final disoosal of his application for the grant of permit in respect of his vehicle the Regional Transoort Authority has power to substitute the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicles in place of the deceased applicant and to allow the successor to prosecute the application. The ratio of the decision is that as the relief sought for in the application is dependent upon and related to posse3sion of the vehicles the application is capable of bein!( revived at the instance of the person succecdinc to the oossession of the vehicles.\n\nA person in possession of a transport vehicle is not entitled to a nermit as a matter of right. The only right is to make the application for the 2rant of a permit.\n\nThere is no provision in the Act as to what haoocns on the death of an applicant for nermit durin.g the pendency of the application. The Regional Transport Auihori!y has jurisdiction nnrl discretion in the matter of allowing or rcrusing substitution.\n\nIf a person dies after obtaining the permit the Regional Transport Aut11orit.v has power under section 61 (2) of the Act to transfer the\n\nR. L. JAIN v. MAYA KAUR (Ray, C.J.) 933\n\npermit to the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicJe. in place of the deceased applicant. '!_he Regional Transport Authority may similarly deal with the case of an applicant dyin& during the pendency of an application under secon 57 ( 8) of the Act for varyin& the conditions of the permit. An appli(; ation for renewal of a perlllit u1*Jer section 58 of the Act may raise a similar situation and the Regional Transport Authority may equally deal with it.\n\nIn the recent unreported decision in Mis Ram Autar Lal lain v.\n\nThe Minister _of Transport & Ors.(2) (Civil Appeal No. 2606 of 1969 decided on 28 November, 1973) this Coun dealt with another •J:)peal preferred by the s~ l!JJPCllant against the judgment of the Patna Hi&h Court In that' appeal the application made by Rm Autar Lal Jain was oaJ!owed to be prosecuted by the firm of M/s. Ram Autar Lal Jain and permit was granted to the appellant. The Minister rejected tl!e application of the firm' of M/s. Ram Autar Lal Jain on two grotinds. First the firm not being an heir to Ram Atitar Lal Jain should not have been allowed to prosecute the application before the Regional Transport Authority. Secondly, the appellant did not satisfy the criterion set up by the Regional Transport Authority in so far as the appellant was neither new-comer nor a small operator. The second 8!0UBd is on merits.\n\nThe firm of Ml s Ram Autar Lal Jain challen~ the order before the Patna High Court.\n\nThe Patna Hi&h Court dismiss~ the petition. This Court dismissed the appeal on the &r0w*1 that where the heirs of the deceased applicant are not in 1.oossession of a vehicle the decision in Dhani Devi(l) case (supra l would not applv.\n\nIii Dhani Devi case (supra) the Regional Transport Authority tranSfcrred to her all the permits held by her husband for other routes.\n\nThe Regional Transport Authority allowed Dhani Devi to prosecute the application filed by her husband and finally granted .permit to her on that application. This Coun found in Dhani Devi case\n\n(supra) that the High Court ws in error in holding that the Regional Transport Authority acted without .iurisdiction in allowing Dhani Devi to prosecute her husband's application.\n\nJn the case, of eath of an. applicant'for the grant of a stage carriage permit before the. grant of a permit the heirs can apply for substitution in place of the original applicant There is no legal right to the grant qf a permit. The Regional Transport Authority lias jurisdic tion and discretion in the matter of allowing or refusing substitution.\n\nIf -the proceedings are likely to be delayed or a substitution will be , detrimental to the interest of the publio, the Regional Transport Authority is-not bound to allow substitution. There is jurisdiction to grant or allow or refuse substitution. The Regional Tran.•port Authority v.ilr exe_rcisc discretion. in a judicious manner in the facts and circum&tances of each case as to whether a substitution may be allowed.\n\nIt appears that this Court in the unreported decision in M / s Ram Autar Lal lain (2) case (supra) found that the absence of possession\n\nof a vehicle by the successor of the applicant was a proper exercise of\n\nA <liscreli011 by authorities on the facts of that case.\n\nIn the present case, the application of the firm !of' permission to continuo the proceedings after the death of Ram Autar Lal Jain was notified in the Gazette.\n\nObjections were invited. No objections were filed bv anv one.\n\nThe Regional Transport Authority granted the permit in the name of the firm. The Appeal Board held that Regional B Transport Authority had no jurisdiction to grant pcrli1it in favour of the appellant.\n\nThe Regional 'I'ransport Authority acted within jurisdiction in ollowing substitutioa.\n\nThere was no jurisdictional error of the Rcuinnal Transport Authority.\n\nI< is a different matter whether the order was jmtified on merits. The Appeal Board .ind the Minister did not consider whether the order of the Regional Tramport Authority was justified on the merits of the case but merely held that the C order was without jurisdict\\,10.\n\nThe decision of the Appeal B\"3rd as well os of the Minister was wrcng in hollling that the Re, ional Transport Authcrity had acted beyond jurisdiction.\n\nFo: th\"c reasons, the dec'sion of the High Court which did not interfere with the decision of the Appeal Board and of the Minister is set aside.\n\nThe matter is remanded to the Appeal Board for a considerotion of the application of the firm on the merits of the case.\n\nAll facts 'and circumstances as welt as public interest wit1 be considered by the Appeal Board. The appeal is allowed. Thcrn will be no order as to costs.\n\n1'.ll.R.\n\nAppeal al/owed.", "total_entities": 31, "entities": [{"text": "RAMAUTAR LAL JAIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Ram Atitar Lal Jain", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAYA KAUR & 13 ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAYA KAUR & 13 ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 388, "end_char": 393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 401, "end_char": 419, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "K. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2014, "end_char": 2022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha, for the app, l\\ant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2027, "end_char": 2038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha, for the app, l\\ant."}}, {"text": "RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2107, "end_char": 2110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:_\n\nRAY, C. J. : This appeal by certificate is from the judgment dated 24 March, 1967 of the High Court of .Patna."}}, {"text": "Ram Autar Lal Jain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2219, "end_char": 2237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Autar Lal Jain filed an applicafon under section 46 of the Motor Vchicfos Acl, 1939 hereinafter called the Act for grant.", "canonical_name": "Ram Atitar Lal Jain"}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2264, "end_char": 2274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Autar Lal fain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2847, "end_char": 2865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also stated in the application that Ram Autar Lal fain had died leaviM his sons ~\n\nas hirs .. On 4 Allj(llst, 1964 another application was filed by Kamal\n\nKumar Jain praying that the application ftled by the deceased father might be treated as the application of a firm called Mis.", "canonical_name": "Ram Atitar Lal Jain"}}, {"text": "Kamal\n\nKumar Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2959, "end_char": 2976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also stated in the application that Ram Autar Lal fain had died leaviM his sons ~\n\nas hirs .. On 4 Allj(llst, 1964 another application was filed by Kamal\n\nKumar Jain praying that the application ftled by the deceased father might be treated as the application of a firm called Mis."}}, {"text": "Ram Autar Lal Jain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3093, "end_char": 3111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Autar Lal Jain the appellant herein.", "canonical_name": "Ram Atitar Lal Jain"}}, {"text": "9 September, I 964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3448, "end_char": 3466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On receipt of the application the matter was notified in the Bihar Gazette on 9 September, I 964 for the purpose of inviting objections, if any."}}, {"text": "24 July, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3546, "end_char": 3559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 24 July, 1965 the Transport Authority passed an order granting a permit in favour of Mis."}}, {"text": "Chotanagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3809, "end_char": 3820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority found that the application for permit had been made by Ram Autar Lal Jain and that the Chotanagpur Regional Transport Authority had no jurisdiction to grant permit in favour of the appellant."}}, {"text": "(1969] 2 S. C. R. 507", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4796, "end_char": 4817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5938, "end_char": 5948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6375, "end_char": 6385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "28 November, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6634, "end_char": 6651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2606 of 1969 decided on 28 November, 1973) this Coun dealt with another •J:)peal preferred by the s~ l!JJPCllant against the judgment of the Patna Hi&h Court In that' appeal the application made by Rm Autar Lal Jain was oaJ!owed to be prosecuted by the firm of M/s. Ram Autar Lal Jain and permit was granted to the appellant."}}, {"text": "Patna Hi&h Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6751, "end_char": 6767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2606 of 1969 decided on 28 November, 1973) this Coun dealt with another •J:)peal preferred by the s~ l!JJPCllant against the judgment of the Patna Hi&h Court In that' appeal the application made by Rm Autar Lal Jain was oaJ!owed to be prosecuted by the firm of M/s. Ram Autar Lal Jain and permit was granted to the appellant."}}, {"text": "Rm Autar Lal Jain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6808, "end_char": 6825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2606 of 1969 decided on 28 November, 1973) this Coun dealt with another •J:)peal preferred by the s~ l!JJPCllant against the judgment of the Patna Hi&h Court In that' appeal the application made by Rm Autar Lal Jain was oaJ!owed to be prosecuted by the firm of M/s. Ram Autar Lal Jain and permit was granted to the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Ram Atitar Lal Jain"}}, {"text": "Ram Atitar Lal Jain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7068, "end_char": 7087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First the firm not being an heir to Ram Atitar Lal Jain should not have been allowed to prosecute the application before the Regional Transport Authority.", "canonical_name": "Ram Atitar Lal Jain"}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7454, "end_char": 7470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The firm of Ml s Ram Autar Lal Jain challen~ the order before the Patna High Court."}}, {"text": "Dhani Devi(l", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7663, "end_char": 7675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court dismissed the appeal on the &r0w*1 that where the heirs of the deceased applicant are not in 1.oossession of a vehicle the decision in Dhani Devi(l) case (supra l would not applv.", "canonical_name": "Dhani Devi(l"}}, {"text": "Iii Dhani Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7709, "end_char": 7723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Iii Dhani Devi case (supra) the Regional Transport Authority tranSfcrred to her all the permits held by her husband for other routes."}}, {"text": "Dhani Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7885, "end_char": 7895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Regional Transport Authority allowed Dhani Devi to prosecute the application filed by her husband and finally granted .permit to her on that application.", "canonical_name": "Dhani Devi(l"}}, {"text": "Ram Autar Lal lain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9056, "end_char": 9074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that this Court in the unreported decision in M / s Ram Autar Lal lain (2) case (supra) found that the absence of possession\n\nof a vehicle by the successor of the applicant was a proper exercise of\n\nA <liscreli011 by authorities on the facts of that case.", "canonical_name": "Ram Atitar Lal Jain"}}, {"text": "Rcuinnal Transport Authority", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9816, "end_char": 9844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was no jurisdictional error of the Rcuinnal Transport Authority."}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_101_108_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "SHIKHARCHAND JAIN\n\nI'.\n\nDJ GAMBER JAIN PRABAND KAR!NI SABHA AND OTHERS\n\nJan11a1J' 11, 1974. [P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, S.N. Dw1vEDI AND P.K. Gosw.\"11, JJ.]\n\nCivil Procedure Code-Amend111ent of the written shUe1ne11t during pe11d1:11cy of the appeal-Whether Appellate Court can order amend111e11t of the written statement in l'ieft' of cltange of circwnstances not co11te111plated at the time of i11stitu1ioJt of the suit.\n\nThe respondent no.1, Digamber Jain Praband Karini Sabha instituted a suit agJinst the appellant for recovery of possession of certain agricnltllral land, Respondent Smt. Rajrani was the malik maqbooza of the land who, in 1954, gifted the land by a registered gift deed in favour of respondent no. 1. The third and fourth rspondcnts were cultivating the land. Respondent no. 1 sued them for possession but they pleaded that the appellant had sub-let the land to them. The suit was decreed.\n\nTheir appeals \\verc disnlisscd. The appellant thereafter had filed a suit against respondent no. l for a declaration that the gift made by the 5th respondent in favour of the 1st respondent was void; but the suit was dismissed for default.\n\nThe suit from which the present appeal arose, was filed and all the defendants except Smt. Rajrani filed their written statement. The trial court decreed the suit in favour of respondent no. 1. On appeal, the first appellate court allowed the appeal but on a second appeal, the High Court reversed the decree of the appllate court and restored the decree of the trial court and hence the present appeal before this Court.\n\nRemanding the case to the trial court,\n\nHELD : (1) In his written statement, the appellant had admitted Smt. Rajrani's ownership of the land. But he had pleaded that he became the owner of the land by adverse possession for more than 12 years from 1937. The khasra entries from 1937- 38 to 1941-42 and 1943-44 to 1951·52 are all in favour of Smt. Rajrani. Further, assuming that the appellants• adverse possession started in 1937 and continued till\n\n1949, he becan1e the owner of the land in dispute in 1950. -Nevertheless, he did not move the appropriate revenue authority to correct the entries in the record of rights. Again one of his own witnesses, has admitted that the appellant had been paying rent of the disputed land on behalf of Smt. Rajrani till 1958-59. Had he became an owner by adverse possession in 1950, he would never have paid rent on bcha1f of Smt. Rajrani.\n\nMaharaja Srischandra Nandy v. &ajna1h Jugal Kishore 62, Indian Appeals 40; Deity Paltabhiramaswanzy v. S. H::inym1yya, A.LR. 1959 S. C. 57 and H. R.\n\nRaniacha11dra11 Ayyar v. Ramalingani Clzettiar, [1963) 3 S.C.R. 604, referred to.\n\n(2) During pendency of the appeal, as Smt. Rajrani died in 1968, the appeallant filed an application for substitution of himself as her legal representative in place of Smt. Rajrani. No order has yet been made on this application. Now he has made another application in the course of hearing seeking amendment of his written statement in view of the changed circumstances to the effect that as the limited owner\n\nSmt. Rajrani died, he is entitled to the disputed property as the sole reversioner and respondent no. 1 and no right in the said lands.\n\nlt is, therefore open to the Court, including a court of appeal to take notice of events which have happened afrer the institution of the suit and afford relief to the parties.\n\nRai Charan lv/amlal and 01101/ier \\', Bisll'anath 111andal and others A.LR. 1915 Cal. I 03, referred to.\n\n(3) Under .the circumstances, since the death of Smt. Rajrani creates a fresh [cause of action to the appellant who claims to be her next reversioner, it will be just and proper to allow the amendment. Therefore, the amendment is allo\\\\'ed and\n\nthe case will go back to the trial court and the trial court will give reasonable time to the respondent to file a reply to the amended written statement. The trial Court will then record its findings and the new plea raised by the appellant and shall forward them to this Court through High Court within 4 months of the receipts of the record.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1598 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated October 17, 1966 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 521 of 1962. V. M. Tarkunde, S. L. Jain and M. S. Gupta, for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Chagla, S. K. Bagga, S. Bagga, Yash Bagga and Rani 4rora, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDWIVEDI, J.-Jt is the defendant's appeal. The plaintiff Digamber Jain Praband Karini Sabha, Panagar, instituted a suit against the defendant Shikharchand Jain for recovery of possession over certain agricultural lands situate in mauza Jmlai. Smt. Rajrani, fifth defendant (now dead) was the proprietor of a Patti in mauza Imlai. The land in dispute fell in that Patti. It was her sir. The area of the land is 12 86 acres. Smt. Rajrani became malik maqbooza of the land on the abolition of the proprietary rights in the State in 1951. On Janua1y 18, 1954, she gifted the land by a registered gift deed in favour of the plaintiff (which is registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act, 1951). Ram Das and Ballu, the third and fourth defendants, were cultivating the land. The plaintiff instituted a suit against them on July 15, 1954. In the said suit they pleaded that Shikharchand had sub-let the land to them. The suit was decreed. Their appeals were dismissed on May 4, 1957. Shikharchand also instituted a suit on November 3, 1955 against the plaintiff and Smt. Rajrani for a declaration that the gift made by her would be void after her death.\n\nWe are told that the suit has been dismissed in default. As the aforesaid defendants are disputing the plaintiff's title, the suit was instituted. All the defendants except Smt. Rajrani filed a joint written statement. They denied the plaintiff's title to the land. Smt. Rajrani held a limited estate in the land and the gift deed would be ineffective after her death. She could not gift the entire property.\n\nShikbarchand has been in possession over the land since 1937 as an owner thereof and has acquired rights of an owner by adverse possession for more than 12 year!. Smt. Rajrani filed a separate written statement. She has supported the case of the plaintiff. The trial court framed a number of issues. Of them, only two now survive for consideration. '.fhey are issues Nos. I and 4.\n\nIssue No. 1 is :\n\n\"l(a) Whether the defendant No. 5 Smt. Rajrani was the owner of the suit fields till 18-1-1954?\n\n(b) whether she was also in possession of the suit fields till 18-1-1954 ?\n\n4. (a) whether defendant No. 1 (Shikharchand) has been in exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the suit\n\nA fields since 1937 adversely t() the defendant N(). 5 and the plaintiff?\n\n\"(b) whether, therefore, the defendant N(). I has p>rfected his title by adverse possessi()n ?\n\nIssue No. 1 was answered in fav()ur ()f the plaintiff. Issue N(). 4 was answered against Shikharchand. The trial court held that he was in possession for and on behalf of Smt. Rajrani and n()t in bis own right. The trial court granted a decree for possessi()n to the plaintiff.\n\nDefendants Nos. 1 to 4 went in appeal. The first appellate court all()wed the appeal and set aside the decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit, The plaintiff then filed a second appeal in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The High Court has reversod the decree of the first appellate court and restored that of the trial court. Hence this apj:Jeal by Shikharchand.\n\nThe first appellate court has held that Shikharchand was in possession over the disputed land since 1937 and has become the ()Wfter\n\nthereof by adverse possession before Smt. Rajrani transferred the land to the plaintiff. Sri Tarkunde, counsel for Shikharchand, says that it is a finding .of fact and that accordingly the High Court could not interfere with it in second appeal. It appears that the High Court was aware that it was interfering with a finding of fact in a second appeal. So the High Court has explained. \"(Defendants 1 to 4) clearly failed to establish by positive evidence the adverse possession of (Shikbarchand) for more than twelve years at any point of time so as to rebut the statutory presumption of possession arising in favour of the appellant and its predecessor-in-title Smt. Rajrani. Therefore, with due respect to the learned appellate Judge, I might say that the question has been absolutely misconceived by him and he has not approached the que, tion in a proper and legal manner with a view to apply the law to the facts found established from the record. In this view, the decree passed by the first appellate court cannot be sustained either on facts or law.\" So according to the High Court the finding recorded by the first appellate court was arrived at by overlooking the statutory presumption of possession in favour of the plaintiff and Smt. Rajrani and his apprc>ach to the issue. before him was not proper and legal. In other words, the High Court intervened under cl. (c) of s. 100(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to the High Court, the finding of the first appellate court suffered from a \"substantial error or defect in the procedure provided ...• by any other law for the time being in force, which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits.\"\n\nIt is now to be seen whether the first appellate court's finding really falls within the grip of s. IOO(!Xc) of the Code of Civil Prc>ce dure. In his written statement Shikbarchand has admitted Smt.\n\nH Rajrani's ownership of the land. But he has pleaded that he has become the owner of the land on account 'of adverse possession for more than 12 years from 1937. The burden of proving the acquisition of ownership by adverse possession lay on him. The Khasra\n\nentries from 1937-38 to 1941-42 and 1943-44 to 1951-52 arc all in A favour of Smt. Rajrani. They show that she was in possession Over the land during those years. Khasra is a record of right according to s. 45(2) of the Central Province• Land Revenue Act, 1917. Section 80(3) of that Act provides that entries in a record of risgt shall be presumed to be correct unless the contrary is shown. Tuts providon raises a pre•umption cf correctnes• of the aforesaid Khasra entries.\n\nThe burden of proving adve1•e posses!ion acco1dinqly Will a heavy B one. The judgment of the fhst appellate couit shows that it has not kept in mind this aspect while examining the evidence. In the ti-st step, it has proceeded to assess the evidence adduced by Shikharchand.\n\nAfter discussing' that evidence, it has recorded a finding that he was in possession. Thereafter, in the second step, it has proceeded to take the view that no reliance can be placed on Khasra entries. It has summed up the discussion thus : C\n\n\"(A) II these witnesses (of Shikharchand) have stated that the 'possession of the fields was with Shikhatchand. Their statements are further supported by documentary evidence and, therefore, there is no room for any doubt that the possession was not with Shikharchand. It is ttue that in Patwari papers Mst.\n\nRajrani's name appears and that the dues were deposited on behalf of Mst. Rajrani. But in my opinion the entries in.\n\nKhasra and the fact that the receipts we1 e issued in the naine of Mst. Rajrani would not by themselves establish the fact of pbssession. Tt is settled law that entries in Khasra have only presumptive value, and it is difficult to conclude from these entries that the possession was with Mst. Rajrani. The falsity of the entries in Khasra is clear from the fact that fr9m 1937 to 1947 the name ofMst. Raj1ani appeared iiilhe Khasra Panchsala and yet Mst. Rajrani's admission in D/1. shows that she was . not in possession. This fact is enough to show that no reliance could be plaeed on the Khura entries.\"\n\nAs already pointed out, this passage shows that the first appeUate court proceeded in the reverse order. Moreover, the Kh11Sra entries have been discarded solely for the reason that Smt. Rajrani has admited in Ex. D/I that she was not in possession. But Ex. D/l has been entirely misunderstood by the first appellate court. Exhibit D/I is a 'copy of the plaint filed by Smt. Rajrani in a suit for profits against Shikharchand. Shikharchand was Lambardar of the muhal in which the Patti belonging to Smt. Rajrani was situate~ Jn the first paragraph of her plaint she has mentioned this fact. Thereafter she went on to say that she was entitled \"to get her share of profits from the defendant.\" In paragraph 2 she has said : \"That the defendant is in possession of all the sir and khudkasht land of her full ...... patti of the village ...... that as the defendant did not render an account, nor paid any thing in spite of repeated demands and a notice by the plaintiff, he is liable to pay interest by way of damages at the rate of -/8/- per cent per month\" and the amount detailed in the schedule of accounts attached to the plaint. In the schedule she has sllown the amount of rent recovered by Shikharchand from the tenonts. 1 She has also shown the estimated income from sir and\n\nkhudkasht land belonging to her. After making certain deductions, a total amount of Rs. 318/7 /- was claimed from Shikharchand. The suit was filed in July 1942. The suit for profits related to a period between 1938-39 and 1940-4!. We do not think that paragraph 2 of the plaint can be read in the manner it has been read by the first appellate court. It was a suit for profits by a co-sharer against the Lambardar. It was not a suit for mesnc profits which an owner of land may claim from a trespasser. It was really a suit for accm111ts from the Lambardar. So it is not possible to spell out from paragraph 2 an admission from Smt. Rajrani that Shikharchand was Jl1 adverse possession over her sir land. Further Shikharchand did n?t\n\nfile a copy of his own written statement, nor a copy of the judgment m the suit. If he had denied his possession over her sir land, the suit for profits from sir land would have been dismissed. If he had pleaded adverse possession, over her sir, then also her suit for profits from sir land would have been dismissed. If, on the other hand, the suit for profits of sir land were decreed, it would follow that Shikharchand was held to be in permissive possession and not in adverse possession.\n\nJn the result, we are of opinion that the first appellate court was wholly wrong in discarding the Khasra entries on the solitary statement m paragraph 2 of her plaint. The High Court could, therefore, interfere with its finding under s. lOO(l)(c).\n\nThe High Court has considered afresh the entire evidence on record and bas held that Shikharchand has failed to establish by poSltive evidence his adverse possession for more than 12 years. The appellant could not show to us that the finding is not ustainable on the evidence on record. It is not necessary for us to reappraise that evidence again, but we may point out two circumstances which heavily tell against the appellant. Assuming that his adverse possession started in 1937 and continued till 1949, he became the owner of the land in dispute in 1950. Nevertheless he did .not move the appropriate revenue authority for the correction of the entries in the record of rights. He did not get the name of Smt. Rajrani expunged from the record and his name entered therein. Again, Beni Ram, one of his witnesses, has admitted that Shikharchand had been paying rent of the sir land of Smt. Rajrani on behalf of Smt. Rajrani until 1958-\n\n59. Had he become an owner by adverse possession in 1950, he would never have paid rent on behalf of Smt. Rajrani.\n\nCounsel for the appellant has referred us to Maharaja Srischandra Nandy\n\nv. Baijnath Juga/ Kishore,(1) Deity Pattabhiramaswamy \\'.\n\nS. Hanymayya(2) and R. Ramachandran Ayyar v. Rama/ingam Chettiar(3) But none of these cases help the appellant on the facts of this case.\n\nIn the last case this Court said : \"(l)f in dealing with a question of fact .the fir_st appellat~ court has placed the onus on a wrong party and its findmg of fact 1s the result, substantially of this wrong appro ach, that my be regarded as a defect in procedure under s. IOO(l)(c).\" The same view has been expressed in Ladli Prasad Jais val. v. Kamal\n\nDistillery Co. Ltd.(4) In this case the High Court has ut a finding\n\n(I) 62 Indian Appeals 40.\n\n(3) (1963]\n\n3 S. C. R. 604.\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1959 S.C. 51.\n\n(4) [1964( 1 S. C. R. 270.\n\nof fact recorded by the lower apJ>l'llate court inter alia on the ground that the burden of proof was wrongly placed on the plaintiff. Shah J., while affirming the judgment of the High Court, said: \"A decision of the first appellate court reached after placing the onus wrongly .... is not conclusive and a second appeal lies to the High Court against that decision.\"\n\nIn Jai Krishna v. Babu. (1) it was held that possession of a nonowner after partition is adverse. No exception may be taken to this preposition. But we fail to understand how this case will assist the appellant.\n\nWe now pass on to another aspect of the case. During pendency of this appeal Smt. Rajrani died on December 5, 1965. The appellant first filed C.M.P. No. 1377 of 1969 for his substitution in place of Smt. Rajrani, the fifth respondent, as her legal representative. No order has yet been made on this application. Now he has made another application in the course of hearing. By this application he seeks to amend his written statement. He wants to make this addition to the written statement :\n\n\"12(a) that the gift deed dated 18-1-1954 was executed by Smt.\n\nRajrani who was a limited owner having a widow's estate on the date of the execution of the gift deed. Assuming though not admitting the said gift deed was valid it is submitted that the above gift could at most enure for the life of the defendant No. 5.\n\nThe plaintiff cannot have any rights in the suit lands after the death of Smt. Rajrani and the defendant as the sole surviving reversioner becomes the owner of the lands and resist. the claim of the plaintiff.\n\n(b) that the geneology of the family is as under :\n\nDakhandji (died issuelcss)\n\nBihari Lal .\n\nBhagwan'dasji\n\nNathulalji (died issue1ess, husband of defandant l No.2)\n\nMonLlalji (died issueless)\n\nShrichandji\n\nKaplhandji\n\nShikharchld\n\n(plaintiff) \"12(c) that the deceased Smt. Rajrani could not transfer the suit property even for the religious and charitable purposes as it was the entire property she had and such a transfer is not binding on the defendant after her death.\"\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1933 Nagpur 112.\n\ns. JAIN v. PRABAND SABHA (Dwivedi,, J.) 107\n\nHe also prays for the renumbering of present paragraph 12 as paragraph 13 of the written statement. Sri Tarkunde has submitted that if the assertions made in the new paragraph 12 are accepted by the Court, the respondent's suit will have to be dismissed.\n\nI_t is also said that the new situation arising on the death of Smt. Rajrani during pendency of the appeal can be considered by the Court in order to mould the decree in the suit out of which this appeal has arisen. In our view, Mr. Tarkunde, is right in this submission. Ordinarily, a snit is tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed on the date of its institution. But it is open to a Court (including a court of appeal) to take notice of events which have happened after the institution of the suit and afford relief to the parties in the changed circumstances where it is shown that the relief claimed originally has (I) by reason of subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate, or (2) where it is necessary to take notice of the changed circumstances in order to shorten the litigation, or (3) to do complete justice between the parties (See Rai Charan Manda/ and another v.\n\nBiswanath Manda/ and others)(').\n\nSri Chagla, counsel for the respondent, has submitted that the application for amendment of the written statement should not be allowed. It is said that the appellant has alleged in his written statement that Smt. Rajrani could not transfer the disputed land as she was a limited owner having a widow's estate. The trial court had framed specific issue on this aspect and recorded a finding against the appellant. The trial court said : \"(Smt. Rajrani) is a jain widow and therefore she is competent to transfer the suit lands for rcligioas and charitable purposes.\" The trial court decreed the suit. The appellant filed an appeal. The appeal was allowed and the decree of the trial court was set aside. The respondent then filed a second appeal in the High Court. M already stated, the High Court set aside the decree of the first appellate court and restored the decree of the trial court. It is said by Sri Chagla that as the appellant did not challenge the validity of the gift either in the first appellate court or in. the High Court, he should not be allowed to challenge it now by an amendment of his written statement. We find it difficult to accept this submission of Sri Chagla, Even if the assertions made in the application for amendment of the written statement are found to ht\" true, the appellant could not have non-suited the respondent during the life time of Smt. Rajrani. The gift was valid during her life time ..\n\nHer death gives a fresh cause of action to the appellant who claims. to be her next reversioner. It appears to us that it will be just and proper to allow the amendment sought for. It will shorten litiga-- t1on.\n\nS~ Chagla has also pointed out that the respondent has acquired! new nghts under the Land reform measures passed by the Madhya Pradesh Legislature. It will be open to the respondent to file a reply to the amendment when the case goes back to the trial court and raise an~ plea which according to it is likely to defeat the appellant's new claim.\n\n(I) A.J.R. 1915 Cal. 103\n\nSo we allow the application for amendment of the written statement on payment of Rs. 200 as costs to the respondent. The case will now go back to the trial court. The trial court will allow reasonable time to the resp:indent to file a reply to the amended written\n\ntatement. Thereafter the trial court will record evidence on the\n\nnew plea raised by the appellant by his amendment and by the respondent in its reply. The trial court will then record its findings and forward them to this Court through the High Court. The trial , court should send the findings within four months of the receipt of the record from this Court. C.M.P. No. 1377 of 1969 is dismissed as infructuous on receipt of findings, the appeal will be listed for hearing before the Court.\n\ns.c.\n\nCase Remanded.\n\n• •", "total_entities": 49, "entities": [{"text": "SHIKHARCHAND JAIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHIKHARCHAND JAIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DJ GAMBER JAIN PRABAND KAR!NI SABHA AND OTHERS\n", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DIGAMBER JAIN PRABAND KARINI SABHA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 112, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 152, "end_char": 172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rajrani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1240, "end_char": 1247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajrani filed their written statement.", "canonical_name": "H Rajrani"}}, {"text": "[1963) 3 S.C.R. 604", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2650, "end_char": 2669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "October 17, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4231, "end_char": 4247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated October 17, 1966 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4255, "end_char": 4280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated October 17, 1966 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No."}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4315, "end_char": 4329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, S. L. Jain and M. S. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. L. Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4331, "end_char": 4341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, S. L. Jain and M. S. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. S. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4346, "end_char": 4357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, S. L. Jain and M. S. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4379, "end_char": 4391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, S. K. Bagga, S. Bagga, Yash Bagga and Rani 4rora, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S. K. Bagga", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4393, "end_char": 4404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, S. K. Bagga, S. Bagga, Yash Bagga and Rani 4rora, for the respondents.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Bagga"}}, {"text": "S. Bagga", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4406, "end_char": 4414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, S. K. Bagga, S. Bagga, Yash Bagga and Rani 4rora, for the respondents.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Bagga"}}, {"text": "Yash Bagga", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4416, "end_char": 4426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, S. K. Bagga, S. Bagga, Yash Bagga and Rani 4rora, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Rani 4rora", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4431, "end_char": 4441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, S. K. Bagga, S. Bagga, Yash Bagga and Rani 4rora, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "DWIVEDI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4509, "end_char": 4516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDWIVEDI, J.-Jt is the defendant's appeal."}}, {"text": "Digamber Jain Praband Karini Sabha, Panagar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4565, "end_char": 4608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff Digamber Jain Praband Karini Sabha, Panagar, instituted a suit against the defendant Shikharchand Jain for recovery of possession over certain agricultural lands situate in mauza Jmlai."}}, {"text": "Shikharchand Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4650, "end_char": 4667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff Digamber Jain Praband Karini Sabha, Panagar, instituted a suit against the defendant Shikharchand Jain for recovery of possession over certain agricultural lands situate in mauza Jmlai.", "canonical_name": "SHIKHARCHAND JAIN"}}, {"text": "Janua1y 18, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5046, "end_char": 5062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Janua1y 18, 1954, she gifted the land by a registered gift deed in favour of the plaintiff (which is registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act, 1951)."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5168, "end_char": 5205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ram Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5208, "end_char": 5215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Das and Ballu, the third and fourth defendants, were cultivating the land."}}, {"text": "Ballu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5220, "end_char": 5225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Das and Ballu, the third and fourth defendants, were cultivating the land."}}, {"text": "July 15, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5335, "end_char": 5348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff instituted a suit against them on July 15, 1954."}}, {"text": "Shikharchand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5385, "end_char": 5397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the said suit they pleaded that Shikharchand had sub-let the land to them.", "canonical_name": "SHIKHARCHAND JAIN"}}, {"text": "May 4, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5482, "end_char": 5493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their appeals were dismissed on May 4, 1957."}}, {"text": "November 3, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5534, "end_char": 5550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shikharchand also instituted a suit on November 3, 1955 against the plaintiff and Smt."}}, {"text": "Shikbarchand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6076, "end_char": 6088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shikbarchand has been in possession over the land since 1937 as an owner thereof and has acquired rights of an owner by adverse possession for more than 12 year!.", "canonical_name": "SHIKHARCHAND JAIN"}}, {"text": "18-1-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6561, "end_char": 6570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajrani was the owner of the suit fields till 18-1-1954?"}}, {"text": "Shikharchand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6681, "end_char": 6693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 (Shikharchand) has been in exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the suit\n\nA fields since 1937 adversely t() the defendant N().", "canonical_name": "SHIKHARCHAND JAIN"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7422, "end_char": 7450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first appellate court all()wed the appeal and set aside the decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit, The plaintiff then filed a second appeal in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Tarkunde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7822, "end_char": 7830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Tarkunde, counsel for Shikharchand, says that it is a finding .of fact and that accordingly the High Court could not interfere with it in second appeal."}}, {"text": "s. 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9113, "end_char": 9122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9126, "end_char": 9153, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "H Rajrani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9643, "end_char": 9652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H Rajrani's ownership of the land.", "canonical_name": "H Rajrani"}}, {"text": "s. 45(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10107, "end_char": 10115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Revenue Act, 1917", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10141, "end_char": 10163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 80(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10165, "end_char": 10178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act, 1917", "statute": "Land Revenue Act, 1917"}}, {"text": "Shikharchand", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10928, "end_char": 10940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has summed up the discussion thus : C\n\n\"(A) II these witnesses (of Shikharchand) have stated that the 'possession of the fields was with Shikhatchand."}}, {"text": "Shikhatchand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10998, "end_char": 11010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has summed up the discussion thus : C\n\n\"(A) II these witnesses (of Shikharchand) have stated that the 'possession of the fields was with Shikhatchand.", "canonical_name": "SHIKHARCHAND JAIN"}}, {"text": "Khasra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11659, "end_char": 11665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The falsity of the entries in Khasra is clear from the fact that fr9m 1937 to 1947 the name ofMst."}}, {"text": "Raj1ani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11728, "end_char": 11735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raj1ani appeared iiilhe Khasra Panchsala and yet Mst.", "canonical_name": "H Rajrani"}}, {"text": "Lambardar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13622, "end_char": 13631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was a suit for profits by a co-sharer against the Lambardar."}}, {"text": "Beni Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15482, "end_char": 15490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, Beni Ram, one of his witnesses, has admitted that Shikharchand had been paying rent of the sir land of Smt."}}, {"text": "(1963]\n\n3 S. C. R. 604", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16477, "end_char": 16499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16693, "end_char": 16697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah J., while affirming the judgment of the High Court, said: \"A decision of the first appellate court reached after placing the onus wrongly .... is not conclusive and a second appeal lies to the High Court against that decision.\""}}, {"text": "December 5, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17238, "end_char": 17254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajrani died on December 5, 1965."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19922, "end_char": 19928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Chagla, counsel for the respondent, has submitted that the application for amendment of the written statement should not be allowed."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21570, "end_char": 21576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S~ Chagla has also pointed out that the respondent has acquired!"}}]}
{"document_id": "1974_3_109_113_EN", "year": 1974, "text": "RATAN LAL SHARMA\n\nPURSHOITAM HARIT January 11, 1974\n\n[P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, S. N. DWIVEDI\n\nAND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.]\n\n1 O!)\n\nArbitratinn Act. 1940, Sec. 11-Award-Whether, one assig11ing share in partnership or one creating rights in i11m1ovable propetty worth more than Rs. 100/·.\n\nRegistration Act 1908-Requireme11t of registration under Sec. 17.\n\nHeld, court cannot pronounce judg111en1 in tern:s of uwegistered award creatii1g rights in in1111ovable property ll'orth abo~'e Rs. 100/·\n\nThe appellant and the respondent set up a _partnership business in December,\n\n1962. The partners soon fell out. At the time the disputes arose, the running busi~ ncss had a factory and various movable and immovable properties. On August '.!2, 1963, by agreement in wriling, the parties referred \"the disputes of our concern\" to the arbitration of two persons and &ave .. the arbitrators full authority to decide our dispute\". The arbitrators gave their award on September IO, 1963.\n\nThe award made an exclusive allotment of the partnership assets, inclu~ ding the factory, and liabilities to the appellant. He was \"absolutely entitled to the same\" in consideration of a sum of Rs. 17,000/~ plus half the amount of the rea~ Usable debts of the business to the respcndent and of the appellants renouncement of the right to share in the amounts already received by the respondent. The award, stipulated that the appclfant should not run the factory unless he has paid the awarded consideration to the respondent. The arbitTators filed the award in the High Court on November 8, 1963. On September 10, 1964, the respondent filed an application for dctennining the validity of the agreement and for setting aside the award. On May 27, 1966, a learned -single judge of the High Court dismissed the application as time barred. But he decUned the request of the appellant to proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award because in his view; (i) the award was void for uncertainty and (ii) the award, which created rights in favour of the appellant over immovable property worth over Rs. 100/-, required registration .and was.\n\nunrgistered. From this part of the order, the appellant filed an appeal which was dismissed as not maintainable by the Division Bench of the High Court. In this Court, the appeUant ?referred an appeal by special leave against the decision of the sing]e Judge declining to pronounce judgement in accordance with the award. He also filed a special Jea\"ve petition against the judgement of the DiVision Bench. In the appeal before this Court, the appellant contended : (i) that the award.is not void for uncertainty; (ii) that the award seeks to assign the respondent's share in the part~ nerhsip to the appellant and so does not require registration; (iii) that under sec. 17 of the Arbitration Act, the court was bound to pronounce judgment in accordance with the award after it had dismissed the respondent's application for setting it aside.\n\nDismissing both the appeal and the special leave petition,\n\nHELD : (i) The share of a partner in the assets of the partnership, which has also inuno\\'able properties, is movable property and the assignment of the share does not require registration under Sec. 17 of the Registration Act. But the award in the instant case does not seek to assign the share of the respondent to the appellant, either in express words or by necessary iaiplication. The award expressly makes an exclusive allotment of the partnership assets including the factory and liabilities to the\n\nppellant. It gees further and makes him \"absolutely entitled to the same''. in consideration of a sun1 of Rs. 17000/- plus hair of the amount of Rs. 1924 88P. to the respondent and the appeUant's renouncement of the right to share in the amounts already received by the respondent. In express words the award purports to create rights in immovable. property worth above Rs. lOOJ in favour of the appellant. It would accordingly require registration under Sec. 17 of the Registration· Act. [111D; 112F]\n\nAiudhia Parshad Ram Porshad v. Sha111 Sunder and Ors. A. I. R. 1947, Labore 13 A at p. 20, Addanki Narayan v. Bhaskara Krishtappti, [1966]3 S.C.R. 400 at pp 406 and 407 and Commissioner of lncon1e Tax v. West Bengal, Calcutta v. J11ggi!al Ka111alapat !19671 S.C.R. 784at p. 790referred to.\n\nSotish Kumar and Others v. Surinder Kumar and others [1969] 2 S.C.R. 244 at pp. 251-252 applied.\n\n(ii) As the award is unregistered, the Court could not look into it. The award being inadmissible in evidence for want of registration the Court couJd not\n\n:Q' pronounce judgment in accordance with it. Sec. 17 of the Arbitration Act preiiuppose an award which can be validly looked into by the Court. The appellant cannot successfully invoke sec. 17. The award is an inseparable tangle of several clauses and cannot be enforced as to the part not dealing with immovable property. {112Hl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : CIVIL Appeal No. 1625 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by Special leave from the judgment and order dated the C 27th May, 1966 of the Calcutta High Court in Award Case No. 320\n\n1963.\n\nS. K. Mehta, K.R. Nagaraja, M. Qamaruddin and Vinod Dhawan, for the appellant and petitioner.\n\nB.P. Maheshwari, Suresh Sethi and R. K. Maheshwari, for the respondent.\n\nD The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDWJVEDI, J.,-Before us there is this associate litigation-the civil appeal and the special leave petition for admission. Its history runs thus : There is the New Bengal Engineering Works. It has a factory and various movable and immovable properties. It is a running business.\n\nThe business was set up by the appellant and the respondent as E partners in December 1962. As usual with many partnerships, the partner did not march in step for long Within six months they fell out. On August 22, 1963, they could, however, agree to refer their disputes to the arbitration of two persons, Sri R.N. Sharma and Sri\n\nC.M. Sharma. The agreement is in writing. It referred \"the disputes of our concern\" and gave \"the arbitrators full authority to decide our dispute\". The arbitrators gave their award on September 20, 1963.\n\nF They filed the award in the high Court on November, 1963. On September I 0, 1964 the respondent filed an application for determining the validity of the agreement and for setting aside the award. On May 27, 1966 a learned single Judge of the High Court dismissed the application as time-barred. But he declined the request of the appellant to proceed to pronounce judgement according to the award. From this\n\npart of the order the appellant filed an appeal, but the appeal was G dismissed as unmaintainable by a Division Bench. The appellant has now preferred the present appeal against the decision of the single Judge declining to pronounce judgementin accordance with the award. He has also filed the special leave petition against the judgment of the Division Bench. .\n\nWe shall first take up the civil appeal. The special leave petition will become infructuous or anaemic after our decision for or against the appellant. The learned Single Judge refused to pronounce judgment in accordance with the award because (I) ai:cording to\n\nR. L. SHARMA Y. P. HARIT (Dwivedi, J.) 111\n\nhim the award was void for uncertainty, and (2) the award, which created rights in favour of the appellant over immovable property worth over Rs. 100/-, required registration and was unregistered.\n\nCounsel for the appellant has advanced three arguments : (l) the award is not void for uncertainty; (2) the award seeks to assign the respondent's share in the partnership to the appellant and so does not require regi•tration; and (3) under s. 17 of the Arbitration Act, the Court was bound to pronounce judgment in accordance with the award after it had dismissed the respondent's application for setting it aside.\n\nIt is not necessary to express any opinion on the first argument as we arc of opinion that the award requires registration and, not being registered, is inadmissible in evidence for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in accordance with it. So we pass on to the remaining two arguments of the appellant.\n\nIt is well settled now that the share of a partner in the assets of the partnership which has also immovable properties is movable property and the assignment bf the share does not require registration under s. 17 Registration Act. (See Ajudhia Parshad Ram Parshad v.\n\nSham Sunder and others (I) Addanki Narayanappal v. Bhaskara Kristappa(') and Commissioner of Income-tax, west Bengal Calcutta v. Juggila/\n\nKamalapal (3). But the award with which we are ;:oncerned docs not seek to assign the share of the respondent to the appellant, either in express words or by necessary implication. We set out the relevant portion of the award :\n\n\"<We) make our award as follows :\n\n(I) The factory and all assets and propert; es of New Bengal Engineering Works are exclusively allotted to Dr.\n\nRatan Lal Sharma, who is absolutely entitled to the same.\n\nHe will pay all liabilities of \\he factory.\n\n(2) Dr. Ratan Lal Sharma shall have no claim for the re ccipts assigned by Sri Purushottam Harit.\n\n(3) Payment of all cheques issued by Dr. Ratan Lal\n\nharma on behalf of Modern Processors to Shri Purushottam Harit shall be treated invalid_\n\n(4) Dr. Ratan Lal Sharma shall pay Rs. 17,000/-(Rupee• seventeen thousand only) to Shri Purushottam Harit.\n\n(5) Shri Purushottam Harit shall render all assistance to Dr. Ratan Lal Sharma for realising all the dues of the said firm as and when necessary and for transfer of tenancy right of the Factory in favour of Dr. Ratan Lal Sharma.\n\n(6) All papers and documents in respect of the said business shall be made over to Dr. Ratan Lal Sharma.\n\n(I) A. I. R. 1947 Lahore 13 at p. 20.\n\n(2) [1966] 3 S. C.R. 400 at pp, 406 and 407.\n\n(3) [1967) r s. c. R. 784 at p. 790.\n\n(7) The following sums when realised shall be divided A equally between Dr. Ratan Lal Sharma and Shri Purushottam Harit.\n\nNRme of Debtors\n\nI. Associated Engineering Co, rporation\n\n2. Link Machinery Ltd.\n\n3. Clendent Products\n\n4. Minerva Engineering Works\n\nTotal\n\nAmount\n\nRs. 284·17 Rs. 1079·28 Rs. 47·25 Rs. 514·18\n\nRs. 1924·88\n\nN.B. (8)-The factory should not be run by Dr. Ratan Lal\n\nSharma until and unless the payment of the award is not made to Shri Purushottam Harit\".\n\nThe word \"not\" is a slip here. The patties conceded before the learned Single Judge that the award deals with immovable property worth above Rs. JOO/-. So if it is found by us that_ the award purports to croate rigl1ts in the appellant over immovable property, it would require registration under s. 17 Registration _Act. (See Satish Kumar and othPl's v. Surinder Kumar and others (I).\n\nOn_ the dissolution of the partnership or with the retirement of a partner frofu the partnership the share of the partner in the partnership assets is equal to the value of his share in the net partnership assets after deduction of all liabilities and prior charges. Even during the subsistance of the partnership, he may assign his share to another partner. In that event the assignee partner would get only the right to receive the share of profits of the assigner. (See Narayanappa (supra) at p. 407).\n\nNow the award does not transfer the share of th~ respondent, interpreted in the aforesaid sense, to the appellant in express words.\n\nNor such is the necessary intendment of the award. It expressly makes an exclusive.allotment of the partnership assets including the factory and liabilities to the appellant. It goes further and makes him \"absolutely entitled to the same\". in consideration of a sum of Rs. 17000/- (See clause 4) plus half of the amount of Rs. 1924·88 p. to the respondent and the appellant's renouncement of the right to share in the amounts already received by the respondent. So in express words it purports to create rights in immovable property worth above Rs. 100/- in favour of the appellant. It would accordingly require registration under S. 17, Registration Act. As it is unregistered, the Court could not look ; nto it. If the Court could not, as we held, look in to it, the Court could not pronounce judgment in accordance with it. Sections 17 Arbitration Act presupposes an award which can be validly looked into by the Court. The appellant cannot successfully invoke s. 17.\n\n(I) [196912 S. C.R. 244 al pp. 251-252.\n\nR. L. SHARMA v. P. l!ARIT (Dwivedi, /.) 113\n\nThe award is an inseparable tangle of several clauses and cannot be enforced as to the part not dealing with immovable property. As already stated, various other relevant clauses constitute consideration for. cla use(!), that is, for the creation ofabsolute rights in the factory and other properties in favour of the appellant. This is perfectly clear from the note of the arbitrators appended to the award as clause 8. The appellant is not given a right to run the factory unless he had paid the awarded consideration to the respondent.\n\nFor the reasons a'ready discussed, we agree with the learned sintfe Judge that the award requires repistration and not being registered, no judgment could be pronounced upon it. Jn the view that we have taken, the special leave petition cannot be admitted.\n\nThe appeal as well as the special leave petition are accordingly dismissed. The respondent shall ger his costs in the appeal.\n\nS.B.W.\n\nAppeal and }Jftitio'n disn1iss£'d.\n\n9.,-M852 Sup. Cl/74", "total_entities": 58, "entities": [{"text": "RATAN LAL SHARMA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Ratan Lal\n\nSharma", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PURSHOITAM HARIT", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PURSHOTTAM HARIT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. N. DWIVEDI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.N. DWIVEDI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. K. 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