UNION OF INDIA v.

MAJ. I. C. LALA ETC. ETC.

March 29, 1973 [A. ALAGIRISWAMI, I. D. Dl!A AND C. A. VAID!ALINGAM, JJ;}

Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), Ss. I2()B, 420 and 511, Preven tion of Corruption Ac; (2 of 1947), s. 5(1)(d), 5(2) and 5A, Criminal law Amendment Act, 1952 Ss. 6 and 7(3) Code of Criminal Procedure Act 5 of 1898), Ss. 196A, 235 and 239-0fjence committed at more than one place-Order of which magistrate necessary--Cognizable and noncognizab/e offences-Crit'erion-Jurisdiction to try non-Government sel'~ vant with Governnient servants.

Practice-Duty of court to decide on genuineness of sanctfion.

Two army officers and a businessman were put up for trial before the Special Judge under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952.

They \\ere all charged with offences of conspiracy under s. J 20B, I.P.C. read with s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and s. 420 I.P.C. The businessman was charged under s. 42() and ss. 420 and 511, l.P.C. The two army officers were also charged with the offences under s. 420 I.P.C. read withs. 5(1J(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. After some \\'itnesses were examined by the prosecution, on a petition by the three accused, the High Court quashed the charges and the proceedings on the grounds. ( 1) that the officer who investigated the case was not competent to do so; (2) that the offences were non-eognizable and hence the Special Judge could not take cognizance of them without sanction under s. 196A.

Cr.P.C.; and (3) in view of the enormous length of time that elapsed between the date the registration of the case and the examination of the

\\'itnesss (about 4! years), to proceed further with the case would be an abuse of the process of Court causing harassment to the accused.

Allowing the appeal to this Court, HELD; (I) (a) Under s. 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, before it was amended in 1964, no officer below the rank of Deputy Supe~ rintendent of Police could investigate into .offences punishable under Ss .. 161, 165, 165A l.P.C., or under s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, without the orders of a Presidency Magistrate or the Magistrate First Class.

Where an offence is committed in more than one place the order of every Magistrate within \Vhose jurisdiction the offence or part of the offence was committed was not necessary to enable the investigation to be carried on.

All that is necessary is that the fagistrate who makes the order under s. 5A should have territorial jurisdiction over the place where any part of the offence took p1ace.

In the present case; the offence of conspiracy was aileged to h.ave been committed both at Tejpur as well as at Gauhati and the Inspector concerned had obtained the order Of the First Class Magistrate, Tejpur.

[821H; 822A-C]

Chinnappa v. State of Mysore, A.LR. 1960 Mysore 242, Chatterjea v.

Delhi Special Police Establish111ent I.L.R. 1969 Assarn and Nagaland 275 and Union of India v. B. N. Ananthdpadn1anabbiah, A.LR. 1971

S.C. 1836, referred to.

(b) The High Court expressed doubt whether the order of the Magis trate of Tejpur was a genuine one.

If he had any such doubt it was the Juty of the Judge to have gone into the matter thoroughly and satisfied

.lL_ _

himself whether the order was genuine or not, and given a categorical finding on the matter. There should have been no room allowed for any doubt, or 5uspicion of any underhand dealing or unfair conduct, in a matter of this kind. [823A-Cj

(2) Under Schedule II of the Criminal Procedure Code offences under Ss. 161 to 165, I.P.C. and offences punishable with imprisonment for life or impri"onment o'f 7 years and up\vards are shown as cognizable offences.

Under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act the sentence may extend to 7 years.

Therefore, an offence under s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is a cognizable offence.

The words 'notwhhstanding any thing .contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure", in the section merely carve out a limited exemption from the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code in so far as they limit theclass of_ persons who are competent to investigate, and to arrest without a warrant. The mere fact that under the Act certai, n restrictions are placed as to the officers who are competent to investigate into the offences mentioned in s. SA would not make those 1 offences any the less cognizable. Therefore, the offences under s_ 161, 165 and 165A of the l.P.C. and s. 5, Prevention of Corruption Act, are cognizable offence!; i and there is no question of_ their being cognizab~ i'_[ 'investigated bya Deputy Superintendent of Police and non-cognizable

\\hen investigated by an Inspector of Police; nor can there be any question of these offences being cognizable if --investigated under s. 156, Cr.P.C. but not when investigated under s_ SA, Prevention of Corruption Act . It is illogical to say that offences would be cognizable in certain circumstances and nori-cognizable in certain other circumstances. Therefore, the need for a sanction under s. 196A, Cr.P.C. does not arise.

[824A-H;

815A-D; 827]

Uni.on of India v. B. N. AnanthapadmGnabhiah, A.I.R . .1960 Mysore 242, Uni@n of India v. Mahesh Chandra, A.I.R. 1957 Madhya Bharat E 43 and Public Prosecutor v. Sheikh Shariff, A.LR. 1965 A.P. 372, referred to. '

Taj Khan v. The Stare, A.I.R .. 1956 Rajasthan 37, Ram Bijhuma/ v.

The State, A.LR. 1958 Bombay 125 and Gulabsingh v. State, A.I.R. 1962 Bombay 263, approved. . · . •

. G. K. Apte. v. Uio~ of: India, A.I:R. 1970. Assam & Nagal~d 43, F disapproved. ." .

(3) The need to order re-investigation or to begin the trial° again after the sanction u:ider s_ 196A is _obtained, and the consequent inordinate <lelay and harassment of the officers concerned; do not arise at all. Hence, there is no questin of quashing the charges on that ground. [827G-H] ·

(4) Under s. 6 and 7(3) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, and Ss. 235 and 239, Cr.P.C. the businessman (private individual) and the two army officers, (public servants) could be tried together. [829ACC]

The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kandimalla Suhbaiah & Anr. [19621 1 S.C.R. 194, followed. . . .

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JuRISDSCTION: Criminal Appeals.Nos. 161 to 163 of 1970. __ . .

. Appeals by certificate from the judgment and order dated May 23, 1969 of the Assam and Nagaland High Conrt at Ganhati in Cr. Rev. Nos. 36, 39 and 46 of 1968. ·

D. Mookherjee, A vtar Singh, G. Das, S. P. Nayar and R. N.

Sachthey, for the appellant.

Nuruddin Ahmad and N. N. Keswani, for the respondent.

Harbans Singh, for the respondents.

V. M. Tarkunde, A. L. Arora and D. D. Sharma, for the res- B pondent.

The Judgment of the Coul"l was delivered by

ALAGIRISWAMI, J.-Two o, f the appellants, Major Lala and Lt. Col. Khanna are Army officers and the appellant in the 3rJ .appeal, Gupta, is a businessman of Gauhati.

All of them were put up for trial b., fore 1he Special Judge appointed under tl:~ Criminal Law Amendment Act 1952.

One charge which WJ-' common to all the three of them was that between June 1962 and January 1963 all of them agreed to commit or cause to be committed offences under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and of chealing punishable under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, and 1hese offences having been committed in pursuance of a conspiracy were punishable under section 120B

o.f the Indian Penal Code read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and section 420 I.P.C. Mr. Gupta. the businessman was charged under section 420 I.P.C. as well as section 511 read with section 420 I.PcC The two Army officers were al'o charged with offences under section 420 read with section 5 (I) ( d) Qf the Prevention of Corruptioll Act.

The case was filed before !he Special Judge on 28-6-1963 and the charge was framed on 13-2-65. After about 18 out of the 52 witnesses cited by the prosecution had been examined the three respondents filed pe1itions under section 56JA read with section 439 of Code of Criminal Procedure before the High Court of Assam & Nagaland on 28-3-68, 1-4-68 and 10-4-68 respectively lor quashing the charges. A learned Single Judge allowed these petitions on 23-5-1969 and q11ashed the charges and the proceedings before !he learned Spedal Judge. He did this on three , grounds : (I) that the officer who investigated the case was not competent to do so;

(2) that the offences that were ¢ing tried were , noncognizable and the Special Judge could not have taken cognizance of them without sanction under section 196A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and ( 3 ) tha1 in view of the enormous length of time bet-

'Yeen 2-2-63, the date on which the case was

registered and 1-4-68, upto which date some witness had been examined, the last witness having been examined on 15-1-67, it entailed undue harassment to the accused persons and the .. proceedings have to be quashed to prevent fur: ther harassment, abuse of the process of the court and vexation to the accused persons.

These three appeals have, therefore, been filed by the Union of India by certificate grantd by the High Court.

We shall first oi all deal with the question whether the officer who investigated into these cases was not properly authorized to do so. The officer was an Inspector of the Delhi Special Police Establishment. Under section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption

At, btefore it was amended in 1964, no officer below the rank of the Deputy fpperintendent of Police could investigate into offences punishable under sections 161, 165 and 165A of the Indian Penal

Code or under section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act without the order of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class.

In this case the Inspector concerned had obtained the order of the First Class Magistrate of Tezpur.

The argument before the High Court, which was accepted by the learned Judge, was that as the offences of conspiracy were alleged to have Geen committed both at Tezpur as well as at Gauhati, the investigation based on the order of the Tezpur Magistrate alone was not a proper one. In other words, the.. argument was thut unless the Inspector had been authorized to investigate not only by the First Class Magistrate of Tezpur but also by the First Class Magistrate of Gauhati district, he could not have done so.

The learned Judge referred to and relied upon the decision in Chinnappa v. State of Mysore('). It was decided in that case that any First Class Magistrate appoirrte\I in a district can issue orders under section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act for investigation of a case. From this the learned Single Judge drew the conclusion that in respect of an offence said to have been committed at Gauhati as well as at Tezpur the order oi the Tezpur Magistrate was noti enough. He also relied upon the decision of the High Court of Assam and Nagaland in Chatterjee v.

Delhi Special Police Establishment( 2 ), This decision has been upheld by this Court in Union of India v. B. N. Ananthapadmanabhiah(8 ). But that was a case of a Delhi Magistrate sanctioning an investigation of offences committed in Assam and it was held that such an order was not valid.

That decision is no authority for the propositiorr that where an offence is committed in more than one place the order of every Magistrate within whose jurisdiction the offence or part of the offence was committed was necessary in order to

(1) A. I. R. 1960 Mysore 242.

(2) J. L. R. 1969 Assam & Nagaland 275.

()) A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 1836.

822 SUPREME COURT REl'OR TS [1973] 3 s.c.R.

enable the investigation to be carried on. All that is necessary is that the Magistrate who makes the order under section 5A should

ave territorial , iurisdiction over the place where any part of the ingredients of the offence took place.

That criterion is amply satisfied in this case. On principle also such a contention seems to be devoid of any. substance. The offence o.f conspiracy or fo:· that matter any ather offence might consist of a series of 11cts and incidents spread over the whole country. Very often one conspirator or one of the offenders might not have even met the other conspirator or offender.

To accept this contention would be to hold that the Police should go to every Magistrate within whose jurisdiction some part of the conspiracy or one of the ingredients of the offence has taken place. We have no hesitiition in rejecting it.

He also seemed to have had some doubt as to wtiether the order of the Magistrate of Tezpur produced before him was a genuine one. To say the least, the attitude of the learned Judge is most surprising. To put it in his own words :

"It does not appear that any order of a Magistrate form part of the record. But at the time of hearing, such an order was placed before me on behalf of the Prosecution. The application on which the order is said to have been passed by the Magistrate appears to have l*en addressed to the Court of the Magistrate first class at Te2'Pur, wherein it was stated that for preoccupation of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, th~ investigation was sought to be made by an Inspector of Police. The petition is unnumbered undated. What appears curious is that although the application was made before a Magistrate of the first class, the order passed is supported by a seal of the District Magistrate, Darrang. The order of the Magistrate runs as follows :-

"Paper and F.I.R. seen. Shri H. B. D. Baijal, Inspector is permitted to investigate the case."

There is an illegible signature with date 4-2-63 and below the signature the official designation has not .been stated. It appears that no order-sheet of the Magistrate has been produced in this regard and in above circumstances, it cannot be unequivocally said that this document was obtained in due course of business in compliance with section SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Even assuming that the order is free from doubt, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has urged before me that since the venue of the offences has been clearly stated in the charge, the pennission given by the Magistrate for investigation of the offences at Gauhati is not valid."

-..:

If he had any doubts about the genuineness of the order of sanction it was his duty to have gone into 'the matter thoroughly and satisfied himself whether the order was genuine or not. It was his duty to have given a categorical' finding regarding the matter.

There should have been no room allowed for any doubt or suspicion of any underhand dealing and unfair conduct in a matter ol this kind. It was even alleged on behalf of the respondents that an order was produced for the first time before the learned Judge and it was taken back by the prosecution. If that was so it proves a woeful lack of care on the part of the learned Judge. He should have retained th~ order on file and called for the necessary records and information in order to find out whether the order was a genuine one or not. We have 1*[ore us the order_ of the Superintendent of the Special Police Establishment dated 2-2-63 entrusting the invetigation to Inspector Baijal and directing him to obtain the necessary permission from a competent Magistrate for doing so. We have also been shown the papers relating to the prosecution, papers given •to the accused under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Item 71 of those papers relates to the order of santion dated 4-2-1963 given by the Magistrate of Tezpur authorizing the Inspector of the S.P.E. to investigate. Thus, there is no doubt at all that Inspecor Bai.ial had been authorized to in vestigale into this case. It only shows rather superficial way the learned Judge chose to deal with this matter.

The next question is whether offences under section 161, 165 and 165A of the Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) ol the Prevention of Corruption Act are cognizable or non-cognizable offences.

This becomes important for the purpose of deciding whether a sanction under section 196A is necessary. The sanction necessary under section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been accorded by the Government of India. What was contended by the respondents before the High Court and was accepted by that Court was that these offences being non-cognizable offences a sanction under section 196A(2) is necessary and that prosecution without such sanction is bad. Cognizable offence is defined in

ection 4(1)(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as an offence for which a police officer, within or without the presidency towns, may in accordance with the second schedule, or under any law for the time bieing in force, arrest without warrant. The argument which appealed to the learned Judge of the Higli Court was that as under section SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act no officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police could investigate or make any arrest without a warrant in respect of offences punishable under section 161, 165 or 165A I.P.C. and section 5 of the Prevention ol Corruption Act, they were not offences for which any police officer can arrest without warrant, and therefore,

they are not cognizable offences. The same argument was repeated before this Court by Mr. Tarkunde, emphasising that "a police officer" means "any police officer" and as any police officer cannot, under section SA of the Prevention of CorruJl'lion Act, arrest wilhout warrant but only offipers of and above he rank of Dy.

Superintendent, the offences mentioned in that section are noncognizabj.e offences. If we pursue the same line of argument and look at the definition of non-cognizable offence in section 4( 1 )(n) which defines non-cognizable offence as an offence for which a police officer, within or withoU't a Presidency-town, may not arrest without warrant, H might mean that as these are cases where a police officer of the rank of Dy. Superintendent and above can arrest without warrant these are not non-cognizable offences either.

How can there be a case which is neither cognizable nor-cognizable ? It was sought to be argued tha! these offences would be cognizable offences when they are investigated by the Deputy Superintendents of Police and suprior officers and non-cognizable when they are investigated blY officers below the rank of Deputy Superintendents.

We fail to see how an offence would be cognizable in certain circumstances and non-cognizable in certain other circumstances. The logical consequences of accej>ting this argument would be that if the offences are investigated by Deputy Superintendents of Police and superior officers no sanction under section 196A(2) would be necessary but sanction would be necessary if they are investigated by officers below the rank of Deputy Superintendents o.f Police.

One supposes the argument also implies that the fact that an officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent is authorized by a Magistrate under the provisions of section SA would not make any difference to this situation. We do not consider that this is a reasonable interpretation to place.

Under Schedule II of the Code of Criminal Procedure offences under sections 161 to 165 of the Indian Penal Code are shown as cognizable offences. At the end of that Schedule offences punishable with death, imprisonment for lite or imprisonment for 7 years and upwards are also sh6wn as cognizable offences. Under section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act the sentence may extend to seven years. Therefore, an offence under section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is according to the provision in Schedule 1I to the Code o( Criminal Procedure a cognizable offence.

Therefore,· the mere fact that under the Prevention of Corruption Act certain restrictions are placed as to the officers who are competent to investigate into offences mentioned in section 5A would not make those offences any the less cognizable offences.

The words "notwithstanding anything corrtained in the Code of Crimi nal Procedure" found at the beginning of section SA( 1) merely carve out a limited exemption from the provisjons of the Code of Crir.1inal Procedure in so far as they limit the class of persons who

are competent to investigate into offences mentioned in the section and to arrest without a warrant. It does not mean that the whole of. the Code of Criminal Procedure, including Schedule Inhereof, is made inapplicable. Under section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure all offences under the Indian Penal Code shall or> investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions therein contained. Also, all offence> und; ir any other law (which would include the Prevention of Corruption Act) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions but subject to any enactment for the time hieing in force regulating the manner or place Cl[ inwstigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.

Section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act should be related to this provision in section 5 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which limits the application of the provisions Of that Code to be subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring

into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.

TI1e only change which section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act makes is with reisard to officers competent to investigate and arrest without warrant, in all other respects the Code of Criminal Procedure applies and, therefore, there is no doubt that all offences mentioned in section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act are

cognizable offences.

The Assam High Court seem~ to have taken a line of its own in this matter. In G. K. Apte v.

Union of India('1) curiously enough the Bench, of which the learned Judge who dealt with this case was a member, took the view that though an offence under section 161 is a cogni:z:able offence, if investigations were made under section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. there would be no need for a sanction under section 196A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and there can be a conviction under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, but if the investigation is mad~ under section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act it will b~ an investigation into a non-cognizable offence and there should be

a sanction under section 196A for the trial following such investigation. For this conclusion the decision of this Court in H. N.

Rishbud & Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi(') was relied upon.

We can see nothing in that case to support this conclusion.

Nor are we able to see how if the investigation into an offence of misconduct punishable under section 5 (2) is done by a police officer of high rank the offence is cognizable and if inves'tigated by an officer of a lower rank it is non-cognizable.

That cannot be a proper criterion for deciding whether an offence is cognizable or non-cognizable.

Unless there are clear and compelling reason>

(I) A.I. R.1970 Assm & Nagaland 43. 5-L 797Sup.C. I. /73

(Cl A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 196.

to hold otherwise the division of offences given in the Code of Criminal Procedure as cognizable and non-cognizabje should be given effeot to.

When the same Code makes sanction undr s. 196A necessary for trial of non-cognizable offences it clearly contemplates non-cognizable offences as defined in the Code.

Ther~ is no justification for relying upon extraneous considerations mid far-fe_tched reasoning in order to get over !he effect of these pro-

• • l vmons.

We may now refer to certain decisions oJ' various High Courts on this point. In Taj Khan v. The State(') it was held :

"The fact that the power to investigate or to arrest without warrant has been circumscribed by certain conditions (which conditions were clearly provided for the purpose of safeguarding public servants from harassment at !he hands of subordinate police officers) under the proviso to S. 3 of the said Act cannot lead to the conclusion that such offence is non-cognizable."

In Ram Rijhumal v. The State(') it was held :

"The provisions of S. 3, Prevention of Corruption Act can only have one meaning, and the meaning is that an offence under S. 16SA of the Penal Code has to be deemed to be a cognizable. offence for the purpose of 'the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is only (1ecause the Legislature enacted S. S-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act that, so far as the Presidency town of Bombay was concerned, no police officer below the rank of a Superintendent of Police could in the case cif an offence under S. l 6S A of the Penal Code, investigate it without the order of a Presidency Magistrate.

There is nothing in the language of S. S-A which would suggest that an offence under S. 16S-A oJ' the Penal Code is not to be treated as a cognizable offence."

In Gulabsingh v. State(') it was held that:

"Offencjl under S. 161, I.P.C. is a cognizable offence.

Its nature is not affected by either S. 3 or S.

SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The requirement that in a cognizable offence, a police officer should be able to arrest without warrant, is without any limitation and section SA cannot be split up to mean that an offence can be cognizablle in reference to one officer and nO! in reference to another."

( 1) A. I .R. 1956 Rajasthan 37.

(3) A. I .R. 1962 Bombay 263.

(2) A. I .R. t958 Bombay 125.

The learned Judges specifically dissented from the decision in Union of India v. Mahesh Chandra(1). In Public Prosecutor v.

Shaik Sheriff(') it was held that "these offences cannCYt be treated as non-cognizable offences when investigated by an officer below the rank of Del?uty Superintendent of Police simply on the ground that such investigation cannot be done without the order of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of th~ First Class. In the same way, offences under section 5 of the Act cannot be treated as non-cognizable even when investigated by a low rank officer.

Thus, the provision .in S. SA is of the nature of a special provision which applies to offences specified therein which are cognizable offences including 1hose under section S under all circumstances." They also referred to the deciSion in Union of India v. Mahesh

Chandra (supra) to the effect that an offence under S. 161 l.P.C. and under sub. s. 2 of S. S, Prevention of Corruption Act is cognizable so far as officers of the rank of a Deputy Superintendent o4' Police and above are concerried, but so far as the officers .below

the rarik of Deputy Superintendent of Police are concerned the said ,11Iences are non-cognizable in so far as they cannot investiga1e them without the permission of a Magistrate of the Fil ; t Class, and held that :

"the learned Judges only intended to emphasise the provision in S.S-A and chose to refer to it as a noncognizable aspect of the offences comprise.ct in the Act and to describe that aspect also as non-cognizable for the limited purpose of the provision in S. S-A." Thus, the preponderance of opinion. of the various High CouPts is in favour of the view we are taking.

We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that the offences under sections 161, 16S and 16SA of the Indian Penal Code and section 5 of 1he Prevention of Corruption Act are cognizable offences and there is no question of their being cognizable if investigated by a Deputy Superintendent of Police and non-cognizable when investigated by an Inspector of Police. Nor can there be any question of those offences being cognizable if they are investioated under section 1S6 of the Cr. P.C. but not when investigated in accordance with the provisions of section SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The question, therefore, of the need for a sanction under section 196A does not arise.

Consequently, the need to order re-investigation or to begin the trial again after the sanction under section 196A is obtained, and the consequent inordinate delav and harassment of the officers concerned, reasons that weiihed with the learned Single Judge for quashing the charges, does not arise. It may incidentally be mentioned that the respondents took nearly three years before they moved the High

(1) A. I. R. 1957 Madhya Bharat 43.

(2) A. I. R. 1965 A. P. 372.

Court for quashing the charges and are, thus, to a considerable extent responsible for the delay.

On hlehalf of Mr. Gupta it was argued that he cannot be tried along with the two Anny officers. Under section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1952 the Special Judge may try any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any abetment of any of the offences punishable under section 161, 165 or 165A of the Indian Penal Code or sub-section ( 2) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and under sub-section ( 3) of section 7 of the same Act a special judge, when trying any case, may also try a.ny offence other than an offence specified in section 6 with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Proce dure, 1898, be charged at the same trial. Under section 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if in one series of acts so connected together as to fonn the same transaction, more offences than one are committed by the same person, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such offence, and under section 239 persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of. the same transaction, as well as persons accused of an offence and persons accused of abetment, or of an attempt to commit such offence may be charged and tried together. In The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kandimalla Subbaih & Anr.(1), this Court observed :

"No doub.t, the offence mentioned in charge No. 1 is alleged to have been committed not by just one person but by all the accused and the question is whether aJI these persons can be jointly tried in resoect of all these offences.

To this kind of charge s. 239 would apply.

This section provides that the following persons may be charged and tried together. namely : ( 1 ) persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction;

(2) persons accused of an' offence and persons accus

ed of abetment or an attempt to commit such an offence;

(3) persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction.

Clearly, therefore, all the accused persons could be tried together in respect of all the offences now comprised in charge No. 1."

In that case the first accused was a public servant and the other accused were private individuals to whom the first accuoed was alleged to have sold transport permit books intended to be issued

(I) [1962] I S. C. R. 194.

Ul<ION v. I. c. LALA (Alagiriswami, I.) 829

to Central Excise Officers for granting permits to perSQns applying bona fidie for licences to transpoit to1*tcco.

This Coun also pointed out that "sub-s. (3) of s. 7 provides that when trying any case, a special judge may also try any offences other than an offence specified in s. 6 with which the accused may under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 be charged at the same trial, and clearly, therefore, accused no. 1 could be triec; I by the Special Judge for offences under s. 12()B read with ss. 466, 467 and 420 I.P.C., and similarly the other accused who are said to have abetted these offences could also be tried by the Special Judge."

There is, therefore, no objection to Mr. Gupta being tried along with the two Army officers.

Though in the revision petitions filed before the _High Court the question as to whether on the evi<!ence produced before the

Special Judge the offences with which the respondents had been charged coulq be said to have been prima facie established, was raised, the learned Single Judge has not dealt with that question apparently because it was not argued before him.

We do not, therefore, propose to say anything about the merits of the case.

It is not necessary to refer to the decision in Madan Lal v. state of Punjab(1 ) and Bhanwar Singh v. Rajasthan(2 ) which are relied upon on behalf of the appellants in the view that we have taken that all the offences with which the accused are charged are cogn.izable offences, and therefore, the question whether charges which requ.ire sanction under s. 196A could be tried alongwith charges whichdid not require such sanction and the entire charges are vitiated for want of sanction, as held by the learned Single Judge, does not arise.

The appeals are allowed and the order of the learned Single Judge is set aside.

The Special Judge will now proceed to deal with the cases aiid dispose of them as expeditiously as possible as the matter has been pending for a long time.

V.P.S.

Appeals allvwed.

(I) [1967] 3 S. C. R. 439.

(2) [1968] 2 S. C. R 528.

UNION OF INDIA

MAJ. I. C. LALA ETC. ETC

March 29, 1973

A. ALAGIRISWAMI

Indian Penal Code

s. 5(1)(d), 5(2) and 5A

Criminal law Amendment Act, 1952

Ss. 6 and 7(3)

Code of Criminal Procedure Act

Ss. 196A, 235 and 239

Criminal Law Amendment Act

I.P.C

s. 5(2)

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 420

I.P.C

s. 42()

ss. 420 and 511

s. 420

I.P.C

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 196A

Cr.P.C

s. 5A

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 5

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 5A

Tejpur

Gauhati

Schedule II

Ss. 161 to 165

I.P.C

s. 5(2)

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 5

Prevention of Corruption Act

Code of Criminal Procedure

Criminal Procedure Code

s. 5

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 156

Cr.P.C

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 196A

Cr.P.C

s. 6 and 7(3)

Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952

Ss. 235 and 239

Cr.P.C

A vtar Singh

G. Das

S. P. Nayar

R. N.

Sachthey

Nuruddin Ahmad

N. N. Keswani

Harbans Singh

V. M. Tarkunde

A. L. Arora

D. D. Sharma

ALAGIRISWAMI

Lala

Khanna

Gupta

Gauhati

Criminal Law Amendment Act 1952

section 5(2)

Prevention of Corruption Act

section 420

Indian Penal Code

section 120B

Indian Penal Code

section 5

Prevention of Corruption Act

section 420

I.P.C

Gupta

section 420

I.P.C

section 511

section 420

section 420

section 5

Qf the Prevention of Corruptioll Act

section 56J

section 439

Code of Criminal Procedure

High Court of Assam & Nagaland

section 196A

Code of Criminal Procedure

Union of India

section 5A

sections 161, 165 and 165A

section 5

Prevention of Corruption Act

Tezpur

Gauhati district

section 5A

Prevention of Corruption Act

High Court of Assam and Nagaland

Assam

SUPREME COURT REl'OR TS [1973]

section 5A

District Magistrate, Darrang

H. B. D. Baijal

SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act

Baijal

section 173

Code of Criminal Procedure

S.P.E.

Inspecor Bai.ial

section 161, 165 and 165A

Indian Penal Code

section 5(2)

Prevention of Corruption Act

section 196A

section 6

Prevention of Corruption Act

section 197

Code of Criminal Procedure

Government of India

section 196A(2)

Code of Criminal Procedure

Prevention of Corruption Act

section 161, 165

I.P.C

section 5

Tarkunde

section 4( 1 )(n)

section 196A(2)

Schedule II

Code of Criminal Procedure

sections 161 to 165

Indian Penal Code

section 5

Prevention of Corruption Act

section 5

Prevention of Corruption Act

Schedule 1

Prevention of Corruption Act

section 5A

Code of Criminal Procedure

Schedule I

section 5

Code of Criminal Procedure

Indian Penal Code

Prevention of Corruption Act

Section 5A

Prevention of Corruption Act

section 5

Code of Criminal Procedure

section 5A

Prevention of Corruption Act

Code of Criminal Procedure

section 5A

Prevention of Corruption Act

Assam High Court

section 161

section 156

Code of Criminal Procedure

section 196A

Code of Criminal Procedure

section 161

Indian Penal Code

section 5A

Prevention of Corruption Act

section 196A

section 5

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 196A

S. 3

S. 3

Prevention of Corruption Act

S. 16S

Penal Code

Code of Criminal Procedure

Prevention of Corruption Act

Bombay

Penal Code

S. 16S

Penal Code

S. 161

I.P.C

S. 3

SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act

section 5

S. 161

s. 2

Prevention of Corruption Act

sections 161, 16S and 16S

Indian Penal Code

section 5

Prevention of Corruption Act

section 1S

SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act

section 196A

section 196A

section 6

Criminal Law Amendment Act 1952

section 161, 165

Indian Penal Code

section 5

Prevention of Corruption Act

section 7

section 6

Code of Criminal Proce dure, 1898

section 235

Code of Criminal Procedure

section 239

s. 239

s. 7

s. 6

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898

s. 12()

ss. 466, 467 and 420

I.P.C

s. 196A

[1967] 3 S. C. R. 439

[1968] 2 S. C. R 528


SAXBY AND FARMER. (INDIA l PVT. LTD. v.

THEIR WPRKMEN

March 29, 1973

(A. N, GROVER AND C. A. VA!DIALANOAM, JJ.]

Lubour Law-Conipany producing essential goodi for ratlways- Wliether workmen entitled to unpaid festival holida, vs In addition to ren paid holidays.

The appellant company was a unit of the Engineering Industry in West Bengal having three factories in varibus parts of Calcutta. It was solely engaged in the production of brakes and signalling equipment for the railways.

The Government of West Bengal declared the appellant to be a public utility service in exercise of power conferred by s. 2(c) (vi-) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and also an 'essential service' under the Defence of India Rules..

At the instance of the appellant company the Government of West Bengal re

1ferred to the Industrial Tribunal the question \Vhether the nine unpaid festival holidays allowed by the COIDw pany to its workmen in addition to paid festival and other holidays should be continued.

The Tribunal, impressed by the fact that unpaid festival

holidys had been enjoyed by the workmen for a long time gave its award in fa, nur of the workmen.

Allowing the company's appeal,

HELD : The Tribunal was whoijy oblivious of .the present day conditions and the necessity for increased producti.on, particularly, in the n1attcr of utility companies and the companij!s that are producing goods E. for essential services like those carried on by the Indian Railways.

This Court has observed on more than one occasion that it is generally accepted that there .are too many public holidays in our country, and that when _the need for industrial production is urgent and paramount, it may be advisable to reduce the nu.mber of such holidays in industrial concerns.

Indeed it cannot be disputed that a necessary step in the direction of increasing the country's productivity is the reduction of number of ~~~.

Ther~ was accordingly no reason or justification for unpaid holidays not being curtailed in the present case.

All the conditions which were necessary had been satisfied and the appellant was carrying on the kind of \vork which requires efficiency and increased productio:o. ![833E, 834AJ

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1923 of !968.

Appeal by special leave from the Award dated March 11, 1968 of the VIIth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal Calcutta in Case No. VHI-287 of 1966 published in the Calcutta Gazette dated April 18, 1968.

D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant.

The respondent did not appear.

SAXBY & PARMBR PVT. LTD, V; WORKMBN ( GrO\'tr, J.) 8 31

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ,

GROVER, J.

This is a .. appeal by special leave from the award of the Seventh Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal.

The appellant company is a unit of the Engineering Industry in West Bengal having three Factories in various parts of Calcutta.

The company employs about 1650 workmen in all these factories.

According to the appellant, it is solely engaged in the production of brakes and signalling equipment for the railways.

Its products, it is claimed, are essential for tile smooth working of the railways, which are its sole customers.

In order to ensure smooth production and uninterrupted flow of supply, the government of West Bengal declared the appellant to be a public utility service in exercise of the power conferred by sub-clause (vi) of clause (c) of s. 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7, and also as 'essential service' under the De.fence of India Rules.

It is said as a unit of engineering industry, the appellant was a party to certain omnibus major awards made in 1958 and the earlier awards of 1949 and 1950. Ln these awards, the service conditions, including leave and holidays of the workmen were standardised.

The appellant has been granted leave and holidays as per those awards and in accordance with the provisions of the Factories Act, the Shops and Establishment Act and the Employees State Insurance Act. The paid holidays which are being granted are ten in a year.

There used to be a system in the appellant company's establishment of granting nine days unpaid festival holidays in addition to the paid festival and other holidays.

It is pointed out that in no other major industry in the region this system of unpaid festival holidays is being followed any longer.

At the instance of the appellant-company, the government of F West Bengal referred the following issue by an order dated June 7, 1966 to the industrial tribunal for adjudication.

"Curtailment of unpaid festival holidays".

In the written statement, which was filed by the appellant, it was stated in para. 8 that the company allows nine festival unpaid holidays, and the conti- G nuance of the said holidays would not only entail loss of wages to the workmen but also Joss of production and would prejudicially affect the country's economy. It was also asserted that the system of granting unpaid holidays was no longer being followed in the engineering industry.

Moreover, other holidays enjoyed by the! workmen along with the workmen of other similar units were far H in excess of what prevails in other countries.

The union filed a written statement on behalf of the workmen.

In reply, the position takenup was that the assertion of the com-

SUPRE11E COURT REPORTS

(1973] 3 S.C.R.

pany that the nine unpaid holidays should be discontinued, was in clear disregard of the principle and practice followed so far in the matter of giving benefits in the industrial concerns.

It was said that the trend of the decisions of the Industrial Tribunals in respect of major Engineering concerns has always been against the curtailment of the existing facilities, and that the management of the appellant-company had made an unfair attempt to curtail those benefits, relating to unpaid festival holidays.

The main ground given was that in the interest of industrial peace, production and better relations between the workmen and the management, the workmen should be kept contented.

Any attempt to curtail the existing benefits according to time, honoured practice, would pro voke discontent and labour unrest.

Each side examined one witness, P.W. I, Gobind Day, who appeared on behalf of the appellant, supported the assertions made in the written statement filed on behalf of the appellant.

In other words, he stated that 19 holidays were being given to the workers at present, out of which ten were paid holidays and the rest, without pay.

Ten festival holidays were allowed on the basis of the award made by the tribunals.

He admitted in his cross-examina tion that in Bengal holidays for certain days like Netaji's birthday or for religious festivals, were considered very essential. O.P.W.!, who appeared on behalt of the workers and who was the working president of the Union at the time he gave evidence, merely con tented himself by saying that nine unpaid festival holidays had been enjoyed by the workers since he joined the factory and prior to

that time.

According to him, even on festival holidays, 11orkers attended the factory and worked there and drew wages.

Overtime wages were paid at the rate of 150% of the basic wages.

The industrial tribunal does not appear to have given any substantial reasons for coming to the conclusion that the unpaid holidays should not be curtailed.

According to it, there was no evidence to show to what extent the Railways which were the sole customers of the company, depended on the company to meet their requirements.

The tribunal proceeded to say that the company might be solely engaged in the production of signalling equipment, but that was not sufficient to show the nature and extent of the dependence of the Railways on the supplies of the company. The representative of the company had argued that because the number of the holidays was large, the production was suffering and the company was unable to meet the demands of the Railways in time.

The Tribunal, however, thought that in the absence of any evidence to that effect, it could not be held that the production was not adequate or was suffering because of the number of holi-

SAXBY & FARMER PVT, LTD. v. WORKMEN (Grover,!.) 833

days for the workers.

This is how the Tribunal reasoned in the matter:

" .... in my humble opinion without reducing the number of important festival holidays of any community in India-which is the home of different communities and religions the number of working holidays can be increased as a compensatory measure by converting a good many Sundays to working days.

I think this is quite a feasible proposition and can be offered as a suggestion to those who take the view that as festival and religious holidays are quite large in number they should be reduced without reference to the feelings of the affected religious group or community. But then this is too wide and too large a question for my embarkation and perhaps such views will not find favour with the west oriented intellect and so-called cosmopolitan outlook.

Anyway, that I say is that there is no good ground to cut down the number of festival holidays simply because the number of overall holidays is large." The tribunal appears to have been impressed by the contention raised on behalf of the workmen that they had enjoyed the facilities for a long time.

It appears that the tribunal was wholly oblivious of the present day conditions and the necessity for increased production, particularly, in the matter of utility companies and the companies \hat are producing goods for essential services like those carried on by the Indin Railways. This Court has observed on m.ore than one occasion that it is generally accepted that there are too many public holidays in our country, and that when the need for industrial production, is urgent and paramount, it may be advisable to reduce the number of such holidays in industrial concerns.

Indeed, it cannot be disputed that a necessary step in the direction of increasing the country's productivity is the reduction of number of holidays.

See Pfizer (P) Ltd. Bombay v. The Workmen (1) and Associated Cement Staff Union and another v.

Associated Cement Company and others. (2 ) In Pfizer's case, the holidays which were being granted were reduced lo ten .from the inumber

which the workers were enjoying previously in accordance with those sanctioned under the Negotiable Instruments Act i.e., 16 holidays.

(l) [1963) Supp, 2 S. C.R. 627, 651. (2l [1964) 1 L L.J. 12. 15.

, .. ,,

SUPRBME COURT REPORTS [1973] 3 s.c.R.

On giving the matter careful consideration, we find no reason or justification for unpaid holid11ys not being cllrtailed in the present caso. All the conditions which are necessary have been satisfied and the appellant is carrying on the kind of work which requires efficiency and iqcreased production.

There should be more concentration 011 increase of production and efficiency than on enjoying the holidays if this country is to march ahead on the road to prosperity. We would, accordingly, allow this appeal and set aside the award. In other words, the system of unpaid holidays will not continue with effect from the 1st January, 1973.

There will be no order as to costs.

G.C.

Appeal allowed.

SAXBY AND FARMER. (INDIA l PVT. LTD

March 29, 1973

GROVER

Wliether workmen

West Bengal

Calcutta

Government of West Bengal

s. 2(c)

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Indian Railways

D. N. Mukherjee

GROVER

government of West Bengal

s. 2

Industrial Disputes Act

Factories Act

Insurance Act

government of F West Bengal

June 7, 1966

Gobind Day

Bengal

Netaji

India

Indin Railways

Pfizer

Negotiable Instruments Act

1st January, 1973


UNION OF INDIA v.

M/S. MODI INDUSTRIES LTD.

March 30, 1973

(A, N. G!lOVBll AND K. K, MATHEW, JJ,)

/mlian Rai/wC<ys Act, 1890 Ss. 26 and 41-Compku'nt In rtsptct of past dues cannot be made under s. 41 before Railway Rates Trlbuna!-In •uch cases s. 26 of Act is not a bar to a suit In civil court and question of reasonableness of charges can be gone Into by civil court.

By agreement dated July 4, 1933 the respondent company was liable. to pay charges for a railway siding at agreed rates. Clause 23 of the agreement laid down that it shall be open to the Railway Administration on giving six months notice of sum. ihtent, to revise the said charges.

Clause 24 related to t\?rmination of the agreement in the event of nonpaxment of dues within one month Cl[ demand. On March 26, 1949 the railway authorities informed the respondent that the rates were proposed to be increased with effect from April l, 1949. The respondent objected to the increase as being against clause 23 of the agreement.

By a subsequent letter in September 1951 the Divisional Superintendent of the Railway asked the respondent to pay the charges at much higher rates. There was prolonged correspondence between the parties without the respondent. agreeing to pay the higher rates demanded. On September 29, 1955 the- Divisional Engineer addressed a letter to the respondent proposing revision of the siding charges with effect from April l, 1956 after the expiry of six months according to clause 23 of the agreement.

These proposed charges were much lower than the charges demanded by the earlier letters.

On May 17, 1957 the General Manager of the Railway sent a letter to the plaintiff for payment of Rs. 93,981-8-0 in respect of the period December I

19'49 to March 31, 1956. It was intimated that on failure to make the said payment within one month the supply of wagons would be stooped and steps to determine the agreement would be taken. In May 1957 the respondent served a notice under s. 80 Of the Code of Civil Procedure and thereafter filed a suit.

The trial .court partly decreed the suit. The High Court. decreed it in toto.

In the appeal by certificate to this Court, filed on behalf of the lJnion of India, the questions that fell for. consideration were : (i) whether the civil court had jurisdiction in view of Ss. 26 and 41 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, to detennine the reasonableness of the charges: (ii) whether the courts below if they had jurisdiction were justified in holding the charges to be unreasonable.

Dismissing the appeal,

HELD : (i) From the facts it appeared that the rates are being rev is-· ed and actually enhanced, but then the matter was kept pending and there was exchange of correspondence and discussion between the parties from time to time.

No effort was made to enforce the demand made in the various letters and the plaintiff was allowed to make payments according to the rates originally areed. It was only in May 1957 that the respondent wa. really threatened to mak<: payment of the outstanding amount calculated at the revised rates on pain of the supply elf wagons being stopped and the agreement being determined.

According to the decisions of this Court it was hardly open to the respondent to file a complaint under s. 41 of the Act with regard to the

nasonableness or otherwise of the rates and charges which had already llecome due and payable. The plaintiff had no grievance whatsoe\er with

regard to the charges which had been fixed with effect from April 1, 1956.

By means of the letter dated September 29, 1955, and therefore there was no question of its filing a complaint with regard to those charges. Its grievance was confined only to the amount which was being demanded On the basis of the revised enhanced rates between the period December t, 1949 and March 1, 1956. If that amount had actually been realised by the railway authorities the plaintiff could only file a suit for its refund and could not have laid a complaint under s. 4 J of the Act before the Railway Tribunal. By analogy the plaintiff could not have filed a com- plaint with regard to the past dues as the Railway Tribunal could not have given any relief in respect thereof 'following the law laid down by this Court. In this view of the matter apart from other questions involving the validity of clause 23 of the agreement as also of the notice or intimation of rates on the ground on non-compliance \vith its terms the suit cou1d not be held barred under s. 26 of the Act and the civil court could grant the relief claimed.

[842H-843PJ Union of India v. The Indian Sugar Mills Association, Calcutta . . f1967] 3 S.C.R. 219, Raichand Amulakh Shah v. Union of India, [1964] 5 S.C.R-

148 and Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Slwhdara (Delhi) Salwranpur .Light Railway Company Ltd., [1963] 2 S.C.R. 333 at p. 342, referred to.

(ii) There was no serious infirn1ity in the reasoning of the High Court by which it arrived at the conclusion that the question of reasonbleness of the charges, keeping in mind the 'facts of this case, was justiciable.

Nor had any justification been shown 'for rconening the concurrent finding of the two Courts below that the rates which were demanded for the period in question were unreasonable.

The suit \\'as thus rightly de.:reed. f843EJ

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1616 of 1967.

Appeal by cevtificate from the judgment and order da•ted September 30, 1966 of the Allahabad High Court in First Apoeal No. 198 of 1960.

Gobind Das and B. D. Sharma, for the appellant.

C. B. Agarwala, Uma Mehta, S. K. Bagga, Swreshta Bagga and Rani Arora, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GROVER, J .-This is an appeal by certificate from a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in a suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent for an injunction against the defendant-appellant restraining it from realizing the sum ol Rs. 93,981-8-0 on account of the alleged siding charges for the period December 1, 1949 10 March

31, 1956 and from stopping 'the supply of wagons in the railway siding of the plaintiff and further from cancelling the agreement dated July 4, 1933 for the aforementioned reason.

The facts necessary for deciding the appeal may be stated. By means ol an agreement dated. July 4, 1933 the plaintiff entered into an agreement with the Secretary of State for India-in-Council through the agent of the North Western Railway (now represented

by the Union of India) whereby it was agreed that the former shall Jay a railway siding from Begamabad Station Yard of that railway for enabling the plaintiff to carry on its business at its. premises.

Clause 13 of the agreement was as follows:-

"Freight for all classes al goods will be charged upto and from Begumabad Station. Railway Receipts and invoices shall be issued to and from the station only and in accordance with the rates from time to time published in the Goods Traffic Books of this Railway Administration will make the following charges in each direction from every wagon loaded or empty in or removed from the lines A and a mentioned in clause 15 below :--

(J) Per 4 wheeled wagon

(2) Per 6 wheeled wagon

(3) Per 8 wheeled wagon

Re. One.

Re. One and annas eiaht Re. two."

D Clause 23 of the agreement provided :-

"Notwithstanding anything laid down in the foregoing clauses of this Agreement, it shall be open to the Railway Administration on giving six months notice ot

such intent, to revise the charges laid down in clauses 8, 12, 13 and 19 of this Agreement".

Clause 24 related to termination of the agreement in the event of non payment of duc:S within one month of demand.

On March 26, 1949 the Divisional Superintendent of the E.P. Railway (successor in interest of the North Western Railway) informed the plaintiff that the rates were proposed to be increased with effect from April 1, 1949, the increased charges being mentioned in that letter. As this intimation was not in accordance with clause 23 of the agreement the plaintiff refused to agree to the increase. Other objections were also raised, one al the objections being that the charges were excessive. The Divisional Superintendent addressed another letter on May 18, 1949 informing the plaintiff that with effect from December 1, 1949 the charges mentioned therein would be made. A good deal of correspondence and discussions between the representatives of the plaintiff and the railway authorities took place and by a letter dated July 20, 1951 the Divisional Superintendent intimated that the revised siding charges in force from December 1, 1949 were purely provisional and were subliect to revision. Meanwhile and subsequent to the above date the required tests were made to <!!:'!ermine the charges. In Septelllber 1951 the Divisional Superintendent wrote to the plaintiff that the siding charges should be paid with effect ·

from December 1, 1949 to September 30, 1951 at the following rates :-

(I) Per 4 wheeled waaon (II) Per 6 wheeled waaon (Ill) Per 8 wheeled wagon

Rs.

S/· Rs. 7/8/- Rs. 10/·

The plaintiff protested against what was called the exorbitant nature of the charges and made it clear that the letter of September 1951 did not comply with clause 23 of the llireement and that the charges were unreasonable and could not be legitimately made.

Another letter dated October 26/November 6, 1951 was sent by the Divisional Supetintenden1 saying that the siding charges to b\e .levied with effect from first October 1951 were being assessed and would be intimated to the plaintiff and meanwhile it should continue to pay the charges demanded in the letter of September

1951 provisionally.

The Divisional Superintendent addressed another letter dated November 27, 1951 explaining the result of the test and the actual cost of the shunting etc. A demand was made that the revised siding charges should be paid from December 1949 to September 30, 1951 at Rs. 4/- per 4 wheeler, Rs. 6/- per 6 wheeler and Rs. 8/- per 8 wheeler. The plaintiff, however, did not pay the increased rates demanded. On September 29, 1955 the Divisional Superintendent addressed a letter to the plaintiff

proposing revision of the siding charges with effect from April 1, 1956 after the expiry of six months according to clause 23 of the agreement.

The charges as demanded were as follows :-

4 wheeled wagon 6 wheeled wagon 8 wheeled wagon

- Rs. 1 20/·

Rs. 2 10/-

Rs J. 50/·

On May 17, 1957 the General Manager of the Railway sent a letter to the plaintiff for payment of the amount of Rs. 93,981-8-0 representing the difference between the amounts due from December 1, 1949 to March 31, 1956. It was intimated that on failure to make the said payment within one month ihe supply of wagons would be stopped ancl steps to determine the agreement would be taken.

In May 1957. the plaintifi served a notice under s. so of the Civil Procedure Code to be defendant and thereafter in October 1958 the suit out of which the appeal has 'arisen was filed.

Out of the issues framed by the trial court on the pleadings of the parties the following need be mentioned :

( 1 ) "Whether the enhancement of the siding charges

by the defendant is unjustified, exorbitant and illegal ? -

(2) Whether the demand of Rs. 93,981-8·0 by the defendant is illegal ?

(3) Whethe; the court has no .jurisdiction to try the suit ?" On issue No. 1 'the trial court held that the charges demanded were uniustified and exorbitant.

It was held that out of the demand of Rs. 93,981-8-0 the demand for Rs. 22,111-3-0 was illegal. On issue No. 4 the trial court expressed the view that it had jurisdiction to try the suit in respect of that portion o[ the claim whereby the legality of the enhanced siding charges had been challenged on account of being in violation of clause 23 of the agreement but it had no jurisdiction to try the suit in respect of the second ground whereby the enhanced siding charges had been challenged as unjustified and exorbitant.

The plaintiff appealed to the High Court and the defendant filed cross otections. The High Court affirmed the finding of the courts below thirt the enhancement made by the Railway Administration was highly unjustified and exorbitant. But it did not accept i1s finding about the legali'ty of the enhancement and also on the question of the jurisdiction of the civil court. The appeal

was consequently allowed in toto and the cross objections were dismissed.

The principal question which has been -ai:itated before us relates to the jurisdiction of the civil court to determine the reasonableness of the charges. A subsidiary question has ben raised that assuming the civil court had the jurisdiction, whether the courts below were justified in holding that to be unreasonable.

For the purpose of determining the question of jurisdiction we shall have to examine ilie relevant provisions of the Indian Railways

Act, 1890, hereinafter called the 'Act'.

Section 3 contains the definitions. Clauses 11 and 13 defining the words "traffic" and "rates" are as follows :-

" ( 11) "trafic" includes rolling stock of every description as well as passengers; animals and goods; ( 13) "rate" includes any fare, charge or other payment for the carriage of any passenger, animal or goods"; Chapter V headed "traffic facilities" commences with s. 26. Ac

cording to that section except as provided in the Act no suit shall be instit\lted or proceedings taken for anything d<?ne or any omission made by the Railway Administration in violll; llon or con travention of any provision of that Chapter.

Section 27 ( 1) places a duty on every Railway Administration to afford a!I rea sonable facilities for the receiving, forwarding and delivermg of traffic upon and from the several railways belonging to or worked

by it and for the return of the rolling stock.

Section 29 is ay follows :-

S.29 ( 1) "The Central Government may by general or special order fix maximum and minimum rates for the whole or any part of a railway and prescribe the conditions in which such rates will apply.

(2) The Central Government may, by a like order, fix the rates of any other charges for 'the whole or any part of a railway and prescribe the conditions in which such rates of charges shall apply.

(3) Any complaint that a railway administration is C contravening any order issued by the Central Government under sub-section ( 1) shall be determined by the Central Government".

Section 34 relates to the constitution of the Railway Rates Tribunal for the purpose of discharging functions specified in Chapter V.

Sections 39 ai:d 40 give the jurisdiction and powers of the Tribunal.

I> Sectfon 41 to the extent it is material may be reproduced :-

S.41 (l) "Any complaint that a railway administration-

( a) is contravening the provisions of s. 28 or ( b) is charging for tile carriage or any commodity between two stations a rate which is unreason- E able c~ ( c) is levying any other charge which is unreasoncble,

may be made to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall hear and decide any such complaint in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter".

'2) ......................... . ( 3) In the case of a complaint under clause (b) or

clause ( c) of sulj-section (1), the Tribunal may fix such rate or charge as it considers reasonable : Provided that ............................. .

(4) ...........................•.. ,, On behalf of the appellant the bar created by the s. 26 to the jurisdiction of ordinary courts has been .invoked.

It has been argued that s. 29 (2) postulates the fixation of rates of charges other than those contemplated by sub-s. (l). II there is any grievance that the railway administration is levying a charge which is unreasonable it will be covered bys. 4l(l)(c) and therefore, only a complaint can be made to the railway-administration in tha't matter. The jurisdiction of the civil court will be barred because exclusive jurisdiction has been conferred on 'the Railway !-lates Tribunal for determining whether the charge being levied is unreasonable.

. According to the High Court Chapter V has nothing to do with charges which are payable under a contract.

The validity and interpretation:of clause 23 of the agreement between the parties was a matter for the interpretation of the civil cour't and could not possibly be brarred by s. 26 of the Act. Section 41 (1) ( c) has no application to an enhancement already made in the purported exercise of the right under a contract.

Now section 26 only bars the institution of a suit or proceedings for anything done or any omission made in violation or contravention of any provision of Chapter V. Section 29(2) empowers the Central Government to fix the rates cf any other charges by a general or special order. In view of 1he language of s. 41 (1 )(c) if it is assumed that the rates cannot be unreasonable and if the Central Government fixes unreasonable rates it may be possible to say that there Iias been a tontravention hr violation of s. 29(2). But such fixation of rates under that provision has to be a general or special order. It has been suggested that a communication made under a contract cannot fall within the meaning of the word "order" as contemplated by s. 29.

Prima facie, there may be some difficulty in acceding to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that any part c.f s. 29 will cover a revision of rates made by the railway authority in terms of a contract but the matter seems to s1and concluded by the decision of this Court in Union of India v. The Indian Sugar Mills Association, Calcutta(') according to which it is immaterial that the charges being levied by the railway administration arise as a result of a voluntary agreement. The real difficulties in th~ way of the appellant are two fold; firstly, if any question arises about the validity of a clause oi. a contract that will be entertainable by a civil court. As laid down in Raichiznd Amulakh Shah

v. Union of India( 2 ) the Railways Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide whether the rules empowering the railway administration to levy a particular charge are ultra vires or whether the railway administration collected amounts in excess of the charges which it can legally levy under a rule.

In Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shahadara (Delhi) Saharanpur Light Railway Company Ltd.(') two main points arose; one was whether the Railway Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as regards the reasonableness of the rates prior to the institution of the complaint

) [t957] 3 S. C.R. 219. (2\ [t9641 5 S, c: R. 148. (3\ [t963] 2 S. C. R. 333 at p. 342. 6-L797SuPCl/73

and the other was whether it had jurisdiction to 2rant refund for the aforesaid period. This is what was said by Das Gupta J. :

"The words "charging" in cl. (b) and "levying" in

cl. ( c) were used in the one and the same sense. We find it impos3ible to agree however that they were used to include "collecting".

It appears to be clear that if the intention of the legislature was to give the Tribunal j urisdiC"tion over complaints in connection with charges already made the legislature would have used the words

"has charged and is charging" and would not merely say "is charging". Special jurisdiction of such a nature would be given clearly and the very fact that the words "has charged" have not been .used is sufficient ground for thinking that it was not the legislature's intention to give the Tribunal jurisdiction over complaints in connec!ion with charges made in the past. In our opinion, the words "is charging" in cl. (b) and "is levying" in

cl. ( c) must be construed to mean "is_ demanding a price at the present time for services to be rendered".

Coming to the facts of the present case it is apparent that one of the main questions involved was whether clause 23 of the contract between the parties was not void because it contravened s. 29 of the Indian Contract Aot. Another question which had to be investigated was whether a proper notice regarding the enhancement of rates had been given in accordance with the terms of the said agreement.

From the facts which have been stated it appears that the rates were being revised and actually enhanced, but then the matter was kept pending and there was exchange of correspondence and discussion betweenthe. parties from time to time.

No effort was made to enforce the demand made in the various letters and the plaintiff was allowed to make payments according to the rates originally agreed. It was only in May 1957 that the plaintiff was really threatened to make payment of the outstanding amount calculated at the revised rates on pain of the

supply of wagons being stopped and the agreement being determined. H is somewhat surprisin.e; that in September 1955 the rates which were revised were very much less. than those which were demanded for the prior period. The position thus remained in a ftexib)e state and there is a good deal of substance in the submission on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent that a complaint was not filed under s. 41 of the Act because the rates which were being-paid and actually accepted were the S311\e as the contractual rates and not the revised or enh~ rates.

According to the decisions of this Court referred to before it was hardly open to the plaintiff to file a complaint with regard to the reasonabJeness or otherwise of the rates and charges which had already become due

and payable.

The plaintiff had no grievance whatsoever with regard to the charges which had been fixed with effect from April l, 1956 by means of the letter dated September 29, 1955 aqd therefore there was no question of its filing a complaint with regard to those charges.

Its grievance was confined only to the amount which was being demanded on !he basis of the revised enhanced rales between the period Derember _1, 1949 and March I, 1956. If that amount had actually been realised by the railway authorities the plaintiff could orily file a suit for its refund and could not have laid a compaint under s. 41 of the Apt be.fore the Railway Tribunal. By analogy the plaintiff could not have filed a complaint with regard to past dues as the Railway Tribunal could not have given any relief in respect thereof following the law laid down by this Court. In this view of the matter appart from other questions involving the validity of clause 23 of the agreement as also cl the notice or inlimation of enhancemeilt of rates on the ground of non-compliance . with its terms the suit could not be held barred under s. 26 of the Act and the civil court could grant the relief claimed.

We have not been shown any serious infirmity in the reason- :ing of the High Court by which it arrived at the conclusion that

the qustion of reasonableness of. the charges, keeping in mind the facts of this case, was justiciable. Nor has any justification been shown for reopening the concurrent finding o.f the two. courts below that the rates which were demanded for t]le period in question were unreasonable. The suit was thus rightly decreed.

The appeal fails .and it is dismissed; but we make no order as to costs.

G.C.

Appeal dismissed.

UNION OF INDIA

S. MODI INDUSTRIES LTD.

March 30, 1973

MATHEW, JJ

Ss. 26 and 41

s. 41

s. 26

July 4, 1933

Clause 23

Clause 24

March 26, 1949

April l, 1949

clause 23

September 29, 1955

April l, 1956

clause 23

May 17, 1957

March 31, 1956

s. 80

the Code of Civil Procedure

India

Ss. 26 and 41

Indian Railways Act, 1890

s. 41

April 1, 1956

March 1, 1956

s. 4

clause 23

s. 26

1967] 3 S.C.R. 219

[1963] 2 S.C.R. 333

Gobind Das

B. D. Sharma

C. B. Agarwala

Uma Mehta

S. K. Bagga

Swreshta Bagga

Rani Arora

GROVER

Union of India

Clause 13

clause 15

Clause 23

Clause 24

North Western Railway

clause 23

May 18, 1949

December 1, 1949

July 20, 1951

clause 23

October 26/November 6, 1951

November 27, 1951

clause 23

clause 23

Act, 1890

Section 3

s. 26

Section 27

Section 29

Central Government

Section 34

Sections 39

s. 28

s. 26

s. 29

clause 23

s. 26

Section 41

section 26

Section 29(2)

s. 41

s. 29(2)

s. 29

s. 29

Das Gupta

clause 23

s. 29

s. 41

s. 41

clause 23

s. 26


.844

NETI SREERAMULU v.

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

April 2, 1973

[K. K, MATHEW AND J. D. DUA, JJ.J

Indian Pane! Code, s. 302-Accused convicted for murder-Whether ientence .to be reduced from death to life imprisonment.

Appellant, aged 20, was convicted and sentenced to death for murdering hJS wife on October 30, 1971 and the High Court confirmed the death sentence on January 24, 1972. The appeal tu this Court was limited only to the question of sentence.

Jn the High Court it was argued that the sentence should be reduced to Iife imprisonment because, the appellant was a young man of 20 years of age, the iilcident arose out of sexual jealousy and the crime was not pre-meditated'.

The High Court did not consider these circumstances to be sufficient to merit a lesser sentence.

Jn this Court it was contended that appellant acted under grave provocation and secondly, the Courts below had ignored the effect of the recent amendment of s. 357 Cr.P.C.

Allowing the appeal,

HELD : (I) While confirming the capital sentence, the High Court has an obligation to itself to consider why sentence should be imposed and should not be content with the trial cburt's decision on the point.

It is the duty di the High .Court to consider the proceedings in all their aspects and come to an independent conclusion on the materials, apart from the view expressed by the Sessions Judge.

In so doing, the High Court will be assisted by the opinian expressed by the Sessions Judge but the Jaw requires that the High Court should come to an independent conclusion of its own.

[847EJ

Jumman & others v. The State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 469, referred tn.,

(ii) In the present case, assuming the trial court was justified in imposing the capital sentence, the Jong lapse of time since the imposition of the capital sentence by the trial Court and the consideration of the question by tihs Court, constitutes a relevant ground for reducing the sentence to 1ife imprisonment. The appellant must have been in the condemned cell ever since the death penalty was imposed on him.

The appellant must have been subjected to acute mental agony ever since the death penalty was imposed on him. Therefore, the sentence of capital punishment must be reduced to life imprisonment in the present case.

[848C] .

In Piare Dusadh & Others v. Emperor A.LR. 1944 F.C. 1, the sentence of death was reduced to one of transportation for li'fe when the convict had inter alia, been awaiting execution of death sentene for over a year.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. so of 1973.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 24, 1972 of. the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Cr. A.

No. 796 of 1971 and Referred Trial No. 9 of 1971.

0. P. Rana, for the appellant.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DuA, J.-In this appeal from the judgment and order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court convicting the appellant for the murder of one Gadusula Seetha under s. 302, I.P.C. and sentencing him to death, special leave granted by this Court was limited only to the question of sentence. The preparation of the record was dispensed with and the appeal was directed to be heard on the S.L.P. paper book. In the order granting special leave dated March 1, 1973 it was specifically directed as under :

"Let an actual date of hearing of the appi; al be fixed which will not be longer than one month from today, and notice of the actual date of hearing oi the appeal shall be sen1 to the respondent forthwith." Earlier, on July 5, 1972 the special leave petition .has been placed before the vacation Judge (K. K. Mathew J) and notice was directed to go to the respondent to show cause why special leave should not be granted in regard to the sentence only. It is unfortunate that the matter could not be placed before the Bench after service of show cause notice for nearly eight months. The appellant had been sentenced to death as far ck as October 30, 1971 by the Additional Sessions Judge, West Godavari Division at Eluru and the death sentence was confirmed by the High Court on January 24, 1972.

The prosecution story as upheld by the High Court stated briefly is that the deceased, who was a married woman, was having an illicit intimacy with the appellant and they were both living ; at Tadimalla.

Before they came to Tadmalla to settle down there, the deceased was married to one Basavaiah of Eythapuram,

There, she had developed illicit intimacy with her husband's brother and is stated to have eloped with him.

Sometime later, G .she patched up with her husband and they both then went down

tto Tadimalla to live. there, which was the native village of the

deceased.

But there also the deceased developed illicit intimacy with the appellant who belonged to Harijan community.

Apparently the deceased belonged to a higher caste. It appears that

the appellant and the deceased started living together in a portion of the appellant's house in Harijanwada of Tadimalla village.

According to the testimony of Osha Tharmaiah (P.W. 14) even when the deceased was living with the appellant she was having a liaison with this witness.

The deceased met with her death on

April 24, 1971 at about 6 a.m. About 20 days prior to this date, the deceased left the appellant's house and started Jiving in a portion of the house of Gapapati Bapanamma (P.W. 13), the maternal grandmother of Osha Thammaiah (P.W. 14). According to P.W. 14 the deceased did so in order to continue her illicit intimacy with that witness.

The appellant apparently felt distressed on account of this conduct on the part of the deceased.

On 1he morning c.f April 14, 1971, the deceased went to the Panchayat well to take water to her house and while she was standing there on the platform of the well, the appellant went there, caught hold of her pig-tail from behind with his left hand and delivered two blows on the left side of her neck and gave two or three .blows on her left upper fore-arm. The deceased tried to free herself from the appellant's grip but fell down flat about six yards away from the well. The appellant is said to have delivered another blow with the knife on the left side of her abdomen which resulted in her intestines protruding out. The deceased it a11pears died soon after the receipt of these injuries.

In the High Court on behalf of the .appellant it was argued that the sentence should be reduced to life imprisonment because : ( 1) the appellant is a very young man of about 20 years of age; ( 2) the incident arose out of sexual jealously and ( 3) 6e crime was not pre-meditated.

The High Court did not consider these circumstances to be sufficient to merit a lesser sentence, because from the evidence of the doctor and the postmortem certificate given b~ him it was evident that the a11pellant had inflicted as many as ten incised injuries out of which two injuries were fatal and even after inflicting the injuries on the deceased indiscriminately the appellant stabbed her in the abdomen with such violence that the intestines actually came out and this happened after the deceased had fallen down. From the injuries caused by the appellant to the deceased the High Court felt that the accused must have intended to murder her and his intention in attacking the deceased was only to chastise her or to teach her a lesson. Finding no reason to reduce the sentence passed by the trial court the High Court confirmed the capital sentence.

In this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that there was grave provocation for the appellant in that the appellant had sacrified everything for the sake of keeping the deceased with him but she had proved unfaithful and had not only started living with someone else but had even ridiculed him. It was also con tended that the courts below had completely ignored the effect of the recent amendment of s.357, Cr. P.C. and that they have proceeded as if there must be some mitigating circumstance in order to justify the imposition of a lesser penalty in case of con viction under s. 302, 1.P .C.

'f!le learned additional Sessions Judge, when dealing with the quest1<; n of. sentence observed that there were "absolutely no extenuatmg circumstances to justify imposition of lesser sentence".

No doubt, according to the trial court the murder was committed in btoad day-light in the presence of any persons in the heart of the Harijanwada and nothing had transpired on the day of the occurrence which could have conceivably given any provocation to. the appellant so as to incite him to commit the offence and the murder was committed in cold blood with pre-meditation. But it does appear to us that the learned additional Sessions Judge was perhaps not fully conscious of the amendment and his approach suggests that he was looking for some mitigating circumstance to

justfy the imposition of lesser penalty. Having found none, the capital sentence was imposed.

In the High Court also when the question of sentence was raised it was observed as follows :

"It is clear !hat the accused intended to murder the deceased.

We do not find any reason to reduce the sentence passed by the lower court.

We confirm the .sentence."

While confirming the capital sentence the High Court had quite clearly an obligation to itself c~:msider what sentence should b<i imposed and not be content with the trial court's decision on the point unless some reason was shown for reducing that sentence~

As observed in Jumman & others v. The State of Punjab('), in such a case, "it is the duty of the High Court to consider the proceedings in all their aspects and come to an independent con-· clusion on the materials, apart from the view expressed by the Sessions Judge. In so doing, the High Court will be assisted by the opinion expressed by the Sessions Judge, but under the provisions of the law above-mentioned it is for the High Court to ccme to an independent conclusion of its own."

No doubt, as observed by the High Court, tbere were as many as ten incised injuries on the deceased and injuries nos. 1 and 4 were considered by the medical evidence to be fatal. It is also clear that on the. day of the incident nothing had. happened to cause sudden provocation which should be grave enough to make the appellant lose his balance of mind. But in that case an argument would be open to take the offence out of the purview of ss. 300 and 302, I.P.C. That point does not appear to be open to the appellant because this appeal was not admitted. on the

merits and we are only required to consider whether on the conclusions of the High Court and on the assumption that the offence

(1) A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 469.

is one of murder, lesser penalty should be imposed in the pre, ent case. Apart from the question of what sentence should have been imposed by the trial court, in our opinion, it is open to this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution to see what sentence pennissible under the law would meet the ends of .iustice now when we are called upon to consider that question.

The appellant was clearly on terms of improper intimacy with the deceased and was perhaps overcome by a sense of jealousy or indignation of what he thought was unfaithfulness on the part of the deceased, Assuming the trial court was justified in imposing the capital sentence, the long lapse of time since the imposition of the capital sentence by the trial court and the consideration of the question of sentence by us, in our opinion, constitutes a relevant ground for reducing the sentence to life imprisonment. In the present case the 3ppellant must have been in the condemned cell ever since October 30, 1971 when the sentence of death was imposed on .him by the trial court.

The High Court confirmed the sentence as far back as January 24, 1972.

Since then the agonising consciousness and feeling of being under the sentence of death must have constantly haunted the appellant.

No doubt, this delay has been caused because of the time taken biY the High Court in disposing of the applica:tion for leave to appeal to this Court and because of the pendency of the application for special leave to appeal in this Court since October, 1972.

But that cannot detract from the acute mental agony to which the appellant must have been subjeC'ted ever since the imposition of the capital sentence on him.

We find thM in July, 1972 this Court issued notice to the res pondent State to show cause why special leave should not be granted in regard to the sentence.

The notice was apparently issued without any delay. Btl't the matter was unfortunately not set down for hearing till March 1, 1973. This delay wa; perhaps due to the fact that the respondent-State did not put in appearance.

Indeed, he State was not represented at the hearing either of the special leave petition or of the appeal before us.

Now the. im portance of speedy disposal of cases involving sentence of death has been recognised by this Court, for, in r. 21 (2) of O.XXI, it is expressly provided that in such cases the printed record shall be made ready and despatched to this Court within a period of 60 days after the receipt oi intimation from the registry of this Court of the filing <Jlthe petition of appeal or of the order granting special leave to appeal. The same anxiety ang concern for speedy disposal of special leave petitions in such cases. is equally desirable.

It appears that the importance of speedy hearing of the petition for special leave was not realised in this case. In our view, the neglect or unwillingness of the Slate to enter appearance should not have prevented the postin!! or the special leave petition for bearing with the greatest possible dispatch.

NET! SREEllAMULU v. A. P. STATE (Dua, J.) 849

On the facts and circumstances of this case we feel that rhe interests of justice require that the sentence of death should be reduced to that of life imprisonment and we so order. The fact that the State of Andhra Pradesh has not cared to enter appearance in spite of notice suggests that in the opinion of the legal advisors of the State there was no g<>od cause to show against the reductioa

of sentence. In Piare Dusadh & others v. Emperor(1) the sentence of death was reduced to one of transportation for life when the conviot had inter alia been awaiting execution of death

entencc for over a year. The Federal Court there observed :-

"In committing the offence the appellant must have been actuated by jealousy or by indignation either of which would tend further to disturb the balance of his mind.

He has besides been awaiting the execution of his death sentence for over a year.

We think that in this case a sentence of transportation for life would be more appropriate than the sentenee of death."

These observations are equally pertinent to the case in hand.

The appeal is accordingly allowed and the appellant's sentence is reduced to that 'of imprisonment for life. .

s.c.

Appeal a/lowd.

(I) A.l.R. 1944 F.C.I.

844

NETI SREERAMULU

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

MATHEW

D. DUA, JJ

s. 302

s. 357

Cr.P.C

P. Rana

DuA

Gadusula Seetha

s. 302

I.P.C

March 1, 1973

July 5, 1972

K. K. Mathew

October 30, 1971

January 24, 1972

Tadimalla

Tadmalla

Basavaiah

Eythapuram

Tadimalla village

Osha Tharmaiah

April 24, 1971

Gapapati Bapanamma

Osha Thammaiah

April 14, 1971

s. 302, 1

ss. 300 and 302

I.P.C

Art. 136

State of Andhra Pradesh