GARIB SINGH & ORS.

STATE OF PUNJAB

March 22, 1972

[A. N. GROVER A:ND M. H. BEG, JJ.]

A.vrJreciation of Evidence-Prin-:iples-Reversal of judgment f acquittal by High Court when just(lied-Indian Penal Code. s. 34, appl1• caoiuty of. ·

Five persons including the three apj>ellants were jointly charged .and tried for rioting and offences comrn.tted m the coutse of it. The Sess16ns C Juuge acqu.lted. au tne accused oe..; au:ie he found th~ .prosecu ion stry to be art ficial.

He also took into account the de.ay in lodg.ng the first information report and the fact tha there were no blood mar ks foo.ld where the injured peiSons were alleged to have fallen down.

The H gh Court in appeal filed by the State re-assessed the evidence and reversed the judgment of acquittal in respect of the th ee appellants. The appellants had been charged in respect of v:carious offences uniter .s. 149 of I> the Indian Penal Code, but the High Court, in v:ew di the acquittal of two of the five accused, convicted he. appella'lts in respect of those offences under s. 34 of the Code.

In appeal by special leave this Court had to consider (i) whether the reversal of the judgment of the trial d>urt by the High Court was justified with .reference to pr.nciplcs 'di appreciation of evidence and the decisions of the Court; (ii) whether the conviction of the ppellants by recourse to ~. 34 was justified on the facts of the case.

HELD: (i) Perhaps there is no uniform method of arriving at correct or at least satislfactory conclusio11s upon veracity of versions placed before the Court wh ch cart be applied to all cases.

It may be possible to decide ffiany cases by detenni!ling the main or crucial poin~ on which the dec:sion of the case Me way or the other may tur1. In other cases,

whre mariy disputable points are i., vo!ved, none of which is conclusive, a more elaborate and cotnprchensive treatment of the var:ous points F involved in the whole case may be necessar)'. Courts have, hov.'ever, to attem"Jt to separate the "chaff from the grain" in every case.

TI1ey ca'l not abandon this attemp· on the ground that the case is baffling unless the evidence is really so confus:ng or conflicting that the process cannot be reasonably carried nut. r983 H~984 Bl

Chet Ram v. State, [1971] 1 S.L.J. 153, referred to.

(ii) In judging the credibility of a version the Court must apply the standards of a reasonable and prudent man. r983 F]

(i'i) In the present case the High Court had u"doubtedly corrected the erroneous approach of the learned Sessions Judge by poi'lting out obviou<i answers to the poi., ts which. the Ses-.ions Ju'.dge seemed to regard

a~ riddles iiicpable of solution.

For example, the delay in lodging the First Informatton Reoo"rt. although susoicious, could certai11ly be safsfactorily exo1aiT"ted by the fact that the stab wound in the stomach of O""'e of the victims was so ser'ou! th':!t his statement could not be taken for several days afterwards. The absence of blood at the place of occurrence

A was given undue importance by the trial court inasmuch ; is the ~<><!d might have got soaked in the clothes of the victims. Secondly, after tlic occu.rence, a numoer ot persons must have passed to and tro over the path, where the occu.rei.1ce took place, be1ore the arrival of the police next day. The principles Ja:d down by this Court were applied by the High Court in dealing with the case and interference by this Court in respect of the appraisal of evidence by the H.gh Court would not be B just.fied. i,984 F-G; 986 A-BJ

Khed11 Mohton & Ors. v. State of Biliar, [19711 1 S.C.R. 839 and Laxman Kalu Nikalie v. The State of Maharashtra, [19681 3 S.C.R. 685, referred to.

(iv) The High Court bowewr erred in applying s. 34 I.P.C. to the facts of the present case.

Taking the total.ty of circumstances, parti- C cul.arly the nature of injilries, the Oiwa; i night, and the place . of occur.eilce on a public thorouJhfare iJto account, the pattern of the case was not that of a pre-planned attack.

MC,.e carrying of spears which was not unusual for Sikhs would not establish pre-planning.

The convict' on of the appellants with reference to. s. 34 must therefore be set

aside. j,987 D-G; 989 G-Hl

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Cr:imilial Appeal No. 165 of 1969.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 15, 1969 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 876 of 1966.

Nur-ud-dht Ahmed and J. P. Aggarwal, for the appellants.

V. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Beg, I, Garib Singh, aged 36 years, Mohinder Singh, aged 15 years, Bhagat Singh, aged 25 years, Ram Singh, aged 65 years, Gurdial Singh, aged 66 yeur, were jo'.Jitry charged and tried by the Additional Sessions Judge of Patilila for rioting and offences committed in the course bf it. Garib Singh Wlls charged separately under Sections 148 and 307 Indian Penal Code for an injury he was allllJ.ed t<> have given in the abdomen of Sarwan Singh (P.W. 1rWith a Barthha:, and for offences.punishable under Sections 324 and 323 Indian Penal Code With the aid of Section 149 Indian Penal Code. Mohinder Singh WaS separately charged under Sections 148 and 324 Indian Penal Code for.inflicting an incised wound on Chanan Singh (P.W. 8) with a spear, and, under Sections 307 and 323 read with Section 149 Indian Penal Code. Bhagat Siugh was separately charged under Sectionsl47 and 323 Indian Penal Code for causing simple injuries with a Jathion Gurdev Singh (P.W. 9) and Ralla Singh (P.W. 10) and with the aid of section .149. Ind\an Penal Code for offences pu,., hh•

abie under Sections 307 and 324 Indian Penal Code.

Ram Singh

980 SUPREME COURT REPOll.TS

[1972] 3 S.C.R.

and Gurdial Singh, who were also .said to have been members of A an unlawfill assembly which caused injuries to the party of the complainant Sarwan Singh at about sunset on 24-10-1965, the date on which the festival of Diwali fell, were alleged to have only instigated their companions by giving lalkaras and saying that,.

Sarwan Singh should not be spared.

They were, therefore, charged separately only under Section 14 7 ndian Penal Code and B for qffences under.Sections 323, 324, and 307. Indian Penal Code. with the help of Section 149 Indian Penal Code.

None of the accused persons was, however, charged with any offence with the aid of Section 34 Indian Penal Code.

The learned Sessions' Judge who tried the accused persons had, C after elaborately examining the prosecution and defence versions, found the prosecution case to be "shroded in mystery as to how all the accused got together, armed variously in the house of Ram Singh and assaulted him (i.e.- Sarwan Singh) all of a sudden by darting out of the house of Ram Singh".

The picture thus paint- .ed by the learned Sessions' Judge to convince himself of the mclo- D dramatic artificiality of the prosecution version did not really accord . with prosecution evidence which was that, when Sarwan Singh

was passing in front of the house of Ram Singh, the accused came out and surrounded him, and that Sarwan Singh thereµpon raised an alarm which brought the other injured witnesses, who had tried to save him, to the scene.

It was only when Ram Singh.and Gurdlal Singh gave, 'lalkaras' or instigated the others to attack and E not to spare Sarwan Singh that the assault was alleged to have begun. It is not unlikely that even this version did not bring out the whole truth.

The defence version, put forward through Kartar Singh (D.W. 2), was that, on the Diwali night of 24-10-1965, at about 8 p.m., one Gurdev Singh (P.W. 12) son of Mangal Singh, had come with Chanan Singh (P.W; 8) the injured artd Ralla Singh (P.W. 10) and:Gurdev Singh Harijan and had a ijuarrel with Sarwan Singh (P; W. 7) injured, and with one Gurbux Singh (parentage not given) over the ownership of a tractor which was parked nearby.

It was stated by Kartar Singh that both sides were drunk and that G Gurdev Singh son of Mangal Singh had given a barchha blow to Sarwan Singh and Gurbux Singh had given a barchha blow to Chanan Singh. It was sought to be proved by the defence,· through other witnesses, that, after this incident, there was a compromhe between the two si.des so th•t Gurdev Singh son of MangalSingh, at the instance, of Sarwan Singh, agreed to forego the unpaid price of the tractor,. amounting to Rs. 5.000/-, and to oatch uo the quarrel. It was not even attempted to be explained by the defence version how an'!igreement could emerge so suddenly not

GARIB SINGHV, PUNJAB (Be-g; J,) 9_81

only. to patch up a quarrel in which a very serious injury was sus~

tained by Sarwan Singh but also to involve accused persons in place of the actual assailants of Sarwan Singh and others.

The suggestion, however, was that the prosecuti6n case, according to which .there was litigation between Ram Singh and Bhagat Singh accused on one side and Sarwan Singh (P.W. 7) on the other, and the intervention of Chanan Singh (P; W. 8), who had his.own scores to settle with Garib Singh, explained the implication of all .the accused persons.

The learned Sessions' Judge was, we find, more mystified by certain features in the prosecution case than impressed by the very unnatural and incredible defence version.

He had, therefore, acquitted all the accused persons for what )\e considered to be .the weaknesses of!he prosecution case, but he had . also mentioned the defence version as though it could con• ceivably contain some truth.

On an appeal filed by the State of Punjab, a Division Bench of the High Court listed and then examined each of the features :n of the evidence in the case which had baffied the learned Sessions .Judge.

It then re.assessed the whole prosecution evidence itself.

It came to the c0nclusion that the injured eye witnesses, namely, 'Sarwan Singh (P.W. 7), Chanan Singh (P.W. 8), Gurdev Singh

son of Sadda Ram (P.W. 9), Ralla Singh(P.W. 10) must be believed, at any rate with regard to the three accused persons, namely, Garib Singh, Mohinder Singh, and Bhagat Singh who were alleged to have actually caused injuries to them.

It, therefore, convicted the three appellants before us by special leave by applying Section 34 LP .C. Garib Singh was convicted under Section 307 l.P.C. separately, for the injury caused to Sarwan Singh (P.W. 7) and sentenced to five years' rigorous imprisonment and he was also .convicted and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment under F, Section 324/34 and to three months' rigorous imprisonment under Section 323/34 I.P.C. Mohinder Singh was convicted separately 'imd.,.sentenced to one y~'s rigorous "imprisonment under. Section 324 LP .C., to .three years' rigorous imprisonment under ·. Section 307 /34 Indian Penal Code, and to three months' rigorous/imprisonment _under Section 323 /34 LP .C.

Bhagt Singh was convicted separately and sentenced to three months' rigorous imprion ment under Section 323 I.P .C., to Jive years' rigorous imurisonment under Section 307/34 LP.C., and to one year's rigorous imprisonment under Section 323/34 I.P.C.

All the .sentences were directed to run concurrently.

The High Court had sustained the acquittal of Ram Singh and Gurdial Singh for two reasons : firstly, 'because the delay, in the making of the First Information Report, which was shown to have beenJodged on the next day i.e. to say 25-10-1965 at .11.30 a.m .

at Po!ice Station .Ghanaur District Patiala at a distance of only 1 t m!les from Village Burki where the occurrence was shown to have taken place; and, secondly, because both Ram Singh arid Gurdial Singh "are said to have been empty handed at the time of the occurrence and to neither of whom ariy injuries are atiri buted".

It may be recalled here that these two accused persons were only sai~ to have participated by giving lalkarasand. saying that Sa.rwai; Smgh sh?ul~ n<?t be spared. .The High Court thought that this ev1\lence of mstJgatJon was not enough to establish beyond

rasonble doubt . the prticipation of Ram Singh and Gurdial Smgh m the assault which took place upon the irijured persons.

Such allegations of participation by giving lalkaras are sometimes made only to show additional. overt acts so as to take in at leas't

five persons and make out the ingredients of an offence . under

ction 147 ai; ainst all of them.

When delayed lodging of the First InformatJon Report indicated that deliberation and consultation for implication of some innocent persons with guilty ones 'was possible, this distinction made by the High Court could not be said to be unreasonable.

The High Court had, after examining the evidence of each of the defence witnesses, emphatically, rejected the unnatural defence version as utterly unworthy of credence. .It had rejected the testimony of Kartar Singh (D.W. 2), the only alleged eye witnes$ of the defence version, on the ground that he st-ated that he had not, before he appeared to give evidence in the witness box oil 7-4-1966, disclosed anything about the incident to anyone.

It considered this statement of the witness to be wholly unnatural.

On examining the evidence of this witness, we find that he had also stated that he was not examined by the Police, and. presum- . ably to explain this allegation, he had even stated that the Police had not come to the village.

Furthermore, he had stated . that Gurbux Singh (whose identity is uncertain, as there are more than on.e Gurbux Singh mentioned in the evidence on record, and, for al(we lnow, there may be others with this name) had gi.ven a barchha blow to Chanan Singh on his umblicus which is quite

absurd as there was no iniurv at all on the um.blicus of f'hanan .Sirigh.

The witness stated that, although SarWan Singh, Chanan Singh, Ralla Sjngh, Gurdev Singh. were all armed with hthis no blow with lathis were given bv them.

His evidence does not explain the lathi.injuries of anv of the injured per; ons at alL flis statement could not, therefore. be characterised as even.an attemot to satifactorily exolain injuries.

We have no doubt, after examining his evidence. that he could not be an eve .witne., of the occurrence at an.

The remalninq defence witnesses, .. Gurbux Singh CDW. !) Babu Singh ID W 3). and Vishnu Sarno (D W, 4}, either made statements based on hear-say or ltemnted to nrnve

the highly unnatural alleged agreement ot compromise between

Sarwap Singh wh<>se condition. disclosed by medical evidence; was such !Mt he could not be in a position to say .much about anything for several days let alone enter into negotiations .and compromise.

We have, therefore, no doubt in our minds that the

Hig~ Court was quite righ, t in completely rejecting the defence ".ersion which coul~ not even pass muster. as a possible explanatton, for whatever 1t may be worth, .as the learned Sessions Judge wrongly seemed to think that it could.

We have only disposed of the defence version first because the learned Counsel for the appellants placed it in the forefront and tried to convince us that it ; was not as incredible as the High Court thought it to be.

Learned Counsel for the appellants .asserted that truth is stranger than fiction.

We think that, at any rate in appraising evidence Jed in Jaw Courts, suqh an assumption would be extremely hazardous oi1e to adopt.

If it were. ad(lpted it would introduce an illegal criterion for appraising . evidence.

Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act enables a Court to employ only tile standards of a pruent man in judging wat is to be deemed to be proved accordmg to law.

And, Sechon 114 of thy Evidence Ai::t enables Courts to presume only that wliich accords with tlie ordinary course of events and human nature and not what would be an ab\<lrration from such a course.

Indeed, if such a principle was to be applied in judging some of the features of the prosecution case before us, wliich are itssaifed by the.· learned Counsel for the appellants, these features will appear to be more and not less credible.

The degree which proof must reach, bef()re a Court trying, a. criminal case Will convict is no doubt that which. a prudent mail .will employ in reacfiing a. condilsi~ beyond rea- . sonable doubt whereas an accused need not prove his, case to the same extent in order to succeed.

But, the standards employed ID, judging each .version are those of. a reas.onaj)Je al)d pl'\1<1e11t man.

Such .a man can only adopt what Is natural to expect and . what accords with common sense and ordinarv experience but not what Is extraordinary al}d unexpected as a reliable test of credibility of witnesses. .· ·

The approach of the learrted Sessions Judge to the wilole case seems to us to have beeti aJfected by an over-emnhasis of minor points .emergh1g from yvidence in the cae whjch -\,'\'ere magnified into major defects of the prosecution case... Perhans there is no uniform method of arriving. at correct or at least atisfctory conclusions upon veracity of versions. plai; ed before the Court whih can be apolied to all cases. It may be oossible to . decide many

case~ !iv determining the main or crucial no)nt on which the .de\:iion of the case one w.ay or the other may turn.. lo othe( cases,

where manv disputable point~ are involved'., noile of which IS conclusive, a more elaborate and comprehensive treatment of thevarious points involved in the whole case may, became necessary.

A Courts have, however to attempt to separate the "chaff from the grain" in every case.

They cannot abandon this attempt on the ground that the case is baffling unless the evidence is really so confusing or conflicting that the process cannot be reasonably carried out.

The method to be employed in making this attempt was stated as follows by one of us (Beg, J.) in Chet Ram v. 8 State(');

"Courts, in search of the core of truth, have to beware of being misled by half truths or individually defective pieces of evidence.

Firitly, undeniable facts and circumstances should be examined.

Secondly, the pattern qf the case thus revealed, in the context of a whole sequence of proved f11cts, must be scrutinized to determine whethera natural; or probable and, therefore, a credible course of events is disclosed.

Thirdly, the minutias of evillence, including established discrepancies, should be put in the crucible of the whole context of an alleged crime or occurrence and tested, particularly with reference to the proved circumstances which generally provide a more reliable indication of truth than the faulty human testimony, so that the prpcess of separating the grain from the chaff .may take place.

Fourthly, in arriving at an assessment of credibility of individual witnesses, regard must be .had to the possible motives for either deliberate mendacity or subconscious bias.

Lastly, the demeanour and bearing of a witness in Court should be carefully noticed and an appellate Court should remember that a trial Court has 'had, in this respect, an advantage which it does not possess".

It seems to us that the High Court had undoubtedly corrected the erroneous approach of the learned Sessions Judge by pointing out .obvious answers to the points which, the learned Sessions Judge seemed to regard as riddles incapable of solution: For example, the delay in lodging the First Information Reoort, although suspicious, could certainly be satisfactorily explained by the fact that the stab wound in Sarwan Singh's stomach was so serious that his statement could not be taken for several days afterwards.

Dr. Prem Nath (P.W. 1), who examined him at 5.25 a.m. on 25-10-1965 found that a small portion of the omentum was protruding from the wound, 5 c.m. X 3.5. c.m., and the injured was found in severe pain.

The only other injury on his body was an abrasion 1 c.m. X t c.m. on the margin of tl)e right elbow joint.

Dr. H. M. Nahar (P.W. 2), stated that the ioiured remained under the effect of morphine sulphate upto 26-10-1965,

(I) (197 J) (I) Simla Law Journal p. 153 @ p. J57.

after which his condition iinproved.

The abdominal injury was considered by the Doctor to be dangerous to life.

Another in jured person Chanan Singh (P.W. 8), whose brother was said to have filed a 'Civil, suit against Nand Singh, the father of Garib Singh appellant, and Jaiinal Singh, brother of Gufdial accused, was not shown to be connected with Sarwan Singh.

Indeed, as already mentioned above, the suggestion of the defence was that he had come to the scene with persons opposed to Sarwan Singh.

He had an oblique incised penetrating wound It" X t" X 4" on the right side of his chest and a swelling on the left elbow.

Just as Sarwan Singh was taken in a cart to Patiala after the occurrence, he had been taken to Rajpura alongwith Ralla Singh (P.W. 10) c who had received three simple injuries with a blunt weapon.

Gurdev Singh (P.W. 9), who had received two contusion and a faint contusion with blunt weapons had also gone with Chanan Singh and Ralla Singh to Rajpura, where they were all medically examined.

It, therefore, appears thai the injured were, quite naturally, more concerned with getting their injuries attended to

than with lodging a report immediately at the nearest Police Station.

The High Court had in these circumstances, .not given undue importance to the delay in the lodging of a First Information Report on 25-10-l965 signed by Chanan Singh.

The learned Sessions Judge had used another fact against the prosecution without looking at the obviously good answer to it found in the evidence. This fact was that, on 25-10-1965 at

8.30 a.m.

Head Constable Kartar Singh (P.W. 14) had been given the injury reports and the First Information Report signed by Chanan Singh, when Gurdev Singh met him but did not tell him that he had himself. witnessed the occurrence.

Kartar Singh (P.W. 14 ), had said that' he had waited: to ascertain facts from Chan an Singh himself, who was lying injured in a. hospital . at Rajpura, before sending the, First Information Report to the Police Station so that the case may be registered.

In these circumstances, we think that the High C, ourt was quite right in not using ... $ome delay in the lodging .6f the First Information Report, iii tb.e' same, way as. the learned Sessions Judge had done it.

The High Court used it, no doubt, as one of the grounds for finding hllegl\tions against the alleged inst:i<tators as possible exaggerations brit. it had not doubted the bona' {ides of the whole prosecution case on. this ground ..

Another fact which had impressed the trial court very, much was. the failure of the Police to find any marks of blood on the H path in front of ihe houiie of Ram Singh where the oecufiehce was Shown to have taken place. It had to be remembered that there were oii!y two injurie8,- one on the body of Sarwan Singh.' and

another on the body of Chanan Singh,"which could bleed and tJiat

SUPREME COURT REl'ORTS [lg72] 3 S.C R.

the blood would first get soaked in the clothes of the 'injured. ..,.

oreqver, by the time the police had come to the spot nextday quite a nu.mber of people and vehicles may have passed to and fro over the path.

After the occurrence, even during the preceding night, which was that of Diwali, a number of persons must have passed over the path.

Hence the failure of the police to find any bl<;>Gd in front of the house of Ram Singh was also not so B inexplicable as the learned Sessions Judge seems to have thought it to be.

Another feature on which considerable emphasis was placed, m the course of arguments. before us, was that Garib Singh appellant was alleged te have inflicted the most serious injury of all in c this case, on the abdomen of Sarwan Singh, when this accused was an important witness of the case of Sarwan Singh against Ram Singh and Bhagat Singh who had challenged the adoption of Sarwan Singh.

Garib Singh was said to be a witness of the adoption deed put forward by Sarwan Singh. It was, therefore, contended .that Sarwan Singh would not have liked to displease I) Garib Singh.· It was also urged that there was no reason why . Garib Singh shoutd take it into his head to suddenly attack Sarwan

Singh, whose alleged adoption deed had. been witnessed by him.

This may appear to be a somewhat peculiar feature in the case.

But we have no evidence before us to sh9w what Garib Singh was qoing in the company of Ram Singh and Bhagat Singh.

It is not inconceivable that either these two told him something to put him

I!; up against Sarwan Singh; or, Sarwan Singh, finding him in the company of his adversaries, had said something.

Garib Singh, who denied participation in the occurrence, could not be expected _to say what had incensed him.

We think that, the High Court had taken a correct and reasonable view in"holding that, unless Garib Singh had actually caused the injury to Sarwan Singh, it would be I! most unnatural for Sarwan Singh, situated as he was in his litigation with Ram Singh and Bhgat Singh, to make such an allegation against Garib Singh.

This interence was far more . natural and reasonable than that Garib Sinh was falsely implicated by all the witnesses simply to oblige Chanan Singh.

An overall consideration of all the facts and circumstances in G the case, the important features of which have been noticed by us, and' a reading of the Judgments of the Sessions Judge as well as of the H'.igh Court have led us to the conclusion that, whatever error tbere was in the apprmi£h of the learned Sessions Judge in apprais• jug the worth of the prosecution and defence versions, was recti- H by the High Coun.. We are of opinion that those features of the case to wl:iich the learned Sessions.Judge bad attached q.isprop.Qrtionate importance were put in their prope; .perspectiv.e by .tli.e Uil!h Coun. We, therefore, do not .think that tbiS is a fit case for

interference by this Court in this appeal by special leave with the view of the High Court aboui the substantial truthfulness of the prosecution case and the utter incredibility of the defence version.

There is, however, one essential aspect of the case which seems to have escaped the attention of the High Court.

It is that the B whole pattern of the case indicates that there was very little likelihood of any pre-concert.

The High Court haQ, itself rejected the version that Ram Singh and Gurdial Singh hall instigated and said that Satw3l)c Singh should not be spared. If this instigation was there and had been acted upon Sarwan Singh would have c

received many more injuries.

The nature of the injuries, proved by the medical evidence, indicated umnistakably that the occurrence was a short and sudden affair.

Such a short and sudden occurrence could take place on the evening of Diwali at a chance meeting when Sarwan Singh found Garib Singh in the company of his adversarie~, Ram Singh and Bhagat Sipgh. It is possible that something Wns said to Garib Singh either by Sarwan Singh when he found him in the company of his adversaries. or. before that, by Ram Singh and Bhagat Singh which impelled Garib Singh

to attack Sarwan Singh.

These, however, are matters of pure conjecture. Nevertheless, taking the totality of facts and circumstances particularly the nature of injuries, the Diwali night, and the place. of occurrence on a public thoroughfare, into account, we are inclined to believe that the pattern of the case was not that of a pre-planned attack.

There was some force in the submission, which was noticed by the Sessions Judge, that a pre-planned attack was more likely to have taken place .elsewhere and not on a public thoroughfare in front of the house of Ram Singh.

The learned Counsl for the appellant also submitted that Ram Singh and his associates were not_!ikely to know the time at which Sarwan Sin?hwould pass Rani Singh's house that evening.

The prosecution evidence is that Sarwan Singh was going to untie his cattle. It is possible that it was known in the village that Sarwan Singh passed the house of Ram Singh at that time every evening, but there was no evidence led to show that this was so and that. therefore, the accused were waiting for him to come.

Mere carrying of spears, which is not unusual for Sikhs, would not establish pre, planning.

A consideration of the above mentioned asJ>!!ct, which was not pus~ by the High Court. leads us to the conclusion that thiS oti .was not a case in which Section 34 Indian Penal Code, for :which'

#I.ere was not even a. charge framed against the appellants, could

.~ ._ppli, ed s. o !lnbesita'jingly as the High .. _co.urt .had . done. It

V/QiJJd he been possible to apply it ~VeQ th<>µgh no c; lillf~Cj I!'i!S

frame<Hor it if the evidence establishing it had been clear and free from doubt. ·

We may also mention the two cases cited before us to contend that the High Court should not have interfered at all with the appraisal of evidence by the trial Court.

Th!lSe were : Khedr1 Mohton & Ors. v. State of Bihar('), and Lilxman Kalu Nikalje a

v. The State of Maharashtra(').

In Khedr1 Mohton's case( 1 ), an appellate court had set aside the conviction of the accused persons on certain grounds including that the four eye Witnesses of the alleged occurrence were unreliable because they were interested persons.

The High Court had interfered with an acquittal by an appellate Court.

This Court had said, with regard to the conclusion reached in that particular case by the acquitting Judge :

. "Unless the conclusions reached by him are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or that his decision is likely to result in grave injustice, the High Court should be reluctant to interfere. with his conclusions. If two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on record then the view in support of the acquittal of the accused should be preferred.

The fact that the High Court is inclined to take a different view of the evidence on record is not sufficient to interfere with the order of acquittal".

We. think that the present case is distinguishable from that case in as much as the approach of the Trial Court, in the case before us, .shows that it was misled by attaching undue importance to il)dividual features of the case which hac! been viewed in their correct perspective by the High Court.

The Trial Court had ignored the very important fact that it is contrary to the ordinary course of human nature for injured persons, without ,.showing strong grounds for it, to omit the names of their actual assailants and to substitute wrong persons in their places.

Implication of the innocent with guilty ones is more easily credible than a wholesale substitution, out of enmity, of the innocent for the , actual assailants.

Such quick substitution was not, f<>r the reasons already mentioned, conceivable in the present case.

As we have already indicated, the High Court, in the case before us, had corrected an error in the approach and in the reasoning of the Sessions Judge rather than upset the findings of the Sessions' Judge ·

on the credibility of witnessess at the trial.

The trial Court had not held that the injured eye witnesses could not be believed. It H .had not weighed evidence so much as given a catalogue of reaSori~ .for .suspecting the prosecution case without considering . what

• (I) I 19711 S:C.R; .ll39 @ 840·841. . . (2) rt968f (3) s.c.R: 68S:!

Gt&IB SINGH v:. PUNJAB ·(Be.a,/.) 889 .

Cf))Jld be said in answer. Appraisement involves weighing of on1 set of.facts or inferences from them against the opposite one fair!: and reasonably. . Irr Laxman K; alu Nika/je's case( 1) it was laid down by ihi Court at page 688 : . / "We may say here that it is now the settled law that the powers of the High Court in an appeal against the acquittal are. not different from the powers of the same cour1 in hearing an appeal against a conviction. The.

High Court in dealing with such an appeal can go into

all questions of fact and law and reach its own conclusions on evidence provided it pays due regard to the fact that the matter had been before the Court of Sessions and the Sessions Judge had the chance and opportunity of seeing the witnesses depose to the facts.

Further the High Court in reversing the judgment of the Sessions Judge must pay due regard to all the reasons given by the Sessions Judge for disbeliewing a particular witness and must attempt to dispel those reasons effectively before taking a contrary view of the matter. It may also be pointed out that an accused starts with a presumption of innocence whe:1 he is put up for trial an<l his acquittal in no sense weakens that presumption, and this presumption must also receive adequate consideraion from the High Court."

We \!.link that the principles laid down above by this Court were applied by the High Court in dealing wiih the case before us. It had not set aside, as already indicated, the verdict of a Court of trial based upon the special advantage it derives from watching witnesses depose.

As we have already observed, we think that the High Court had erred in applying Section 34 Indian Penal Code to the facts and 'Circumstances of the .. case before us.. . As we are satisfied that the occurrence which led to the prosecution of the appellants must have arisen out of a sudden quarrel over some exchange of words in circumstances which have not b_een brought out by the evidence in the case, we are unable to hold the appellants guilty of any offence with the aid of Section 34 Indian Penal Code.

We, therefore, set aside the convictions and sentences of Garib Singh under Section 324/34 and 323/34 Indian Penal Code but

we maintain his conviction under Section 307, and, in the special circumstances of this case, reduce his sentence to three yem rigorous imprisonment from five years rigorous imprisonment. We also set aside the convictions and sentences of the appellant Bhagat Singh under. Section 307 /34 and 324/34 Indian Penal

(I) [1968) 2 S. C.R. 685.

17-1061Sup Cl/72 .

SUP1lBMB COU1T RBPOllTS

[19'72] 3 S.C.R.

Code, but maintain his conviction under Section 323 Indian A Penal Code and sentence of three months rigorous imprisonment for that offence. As regards Mohinder Singh appellant, a youngster who was bound to have been misguided by the example of older people and against whom no previous conviction is disclosed, while setting aside his conviction and sentence under Section 307 /34 and 323/34 Indian Penal Code, we maintain his convicii tion under Section 324, Indian Penal Code, but reduee his ' sentenceurider Section 324 India Penal Code to the period already undergone.

This appeal is partly alli5wed to the extent indicated above.

f!.C.

App.ea/ allolfled in part.

...

GARIB SINGH & ORS

STATE OF PUNJAB

March 22, 1972

A. N. GROVER A:ND M. H. BEG, JJ.

Indian Penal Code

s. 34

s. 149

Indian Penal Code

s. 34

s. 34

I.P.C

s. 34

-ud-dht Ahmed

J. P. Aggarwal

V. C. Mahajan

R. N. Sachthey

Garib Singh

Mohinder Singh

Bhagat Singh

Ram Singh

Gurdial Singh

Additional Sessions Judge of Patilila

Garib Singh

Sections 148 and 307

Indian Penal Code

Sarwan Singh

Sections 324 and 323

Indian Penal Code

Section 149

Indian Penal Code

Mohinder Singh

Sections 148 and 324

Indian Penal Code

Chanan Singh

Sections 307 and 323

Section 149

Indian Penal Code

Bhagat Siugh

Indian Penal Code

Jathion Gurdev Singh

Ralla Singh

Penal Code

Sections 307 and 324

Indian Penal Code

Sarwan Singh

Section 14

Penal Code

Sections 323, 324

Indian Penal Code

Section 149

Indian Penal Code

Section 34

Indian Penal Code

Ram Singh.and

Gurdlal Singh

Kartar Singh

Gurdev Singh

Mangal Singh

Gurdev Singh Harijan

Gurbux Singh

Kartar Singh

G Gurdev Singh

Gurbux Singh

Chanan Singh

Gurdev Singh

MangalSingh

GARIB SINGHV

Bhagat Singh

State of Punjab

Sadda Ram

Ralla Singh(P.W.

Section 34

Garib Singh

Section 307

Section 324

Section 323

I.P.C

Section 324

Section 307

Indian Penal Code

Section 323

Bhagt Singh

Section 323

Section 307

Section 323

I.P.C

Burki

Gurdial

SarWan Singh

Ralla Sjngh

Babu Singh

Vishnu Sarno

Sarwap Singh

Section 3

Indian Evidence Act

Beg

Prem Nath

H. M. Nahar

Nand Singh

Jaiinal Singh

Gufdial

Patiala

Rajpura

Ralla Singh

Chan an Singh

Chanan Singh,"which

Sarwan

Singh

Bhgat Singh

Garib Sinh

Bhagat Sipgh

Sarwan Sin?hwould

Section 34

Indian Penal Code

Mohton

Laxman K

alu Nika

Section 34

Indian Penal Code

Section 34

Indian Penal Code

Section 324

Indian Penal Code

Section 307

Bhagat Singh

Section 307

[1968) 2 S. C.R. 685

Section 323

Indian A Penal Code

Mohinder Singh

Section 307

Indian Penal Code

Section 324

Indian Penal Code

Section 324

India Penal Code


PRABHAWATI

DR. PRITAM KAUR

March 22, 1972

[K. S, HEGl>E, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND G. K. MITTBR, JJ.]

. . U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1941-S. 3- /ts scope-.Qrder of the HIRh •Court dil't!ctinR the State Govt. to rehear a rtvislon pttltlon-R<spondent filed eviction suit before rehearing--

Whether the tuit for eviction maintainable,

The. appellant,' a tenant, was sought to be evicted by Respondent.

She applied to the Distri<:t Magistrate, who was also the Rent Controller under s .. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act

1947, for permission to sue the appellant for her eviction and the permission was granted.

As against that order, the appellant went up iii revision to the State Government.

During the pendency of that proceeding, the State Government passed an order staying the operation of the permission granted by the Commissioner pending consideration of the case by the State Government. La•er, the State Government allowed the revision petition and set aside the premission granted.

Respondent challenged the legality of the order made by the .. State Govt. before I/le High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The High Court set aside the order of the Government on the ground that the State Govt. in deciding the revision petition had allowed itself to be inftuenced by irrelevant considerations.

It directed the State Govt. to rehear the appellant's revision application according to law. This order was passed on February 28, 1967. On the very next day, the respondent filed a suit for eviction of the appellant. When the revision petition came up for hearing before the State Govt., the Respondent submitted that in view of the institution of the suit, the State Govt. was not competent to hear the revision petition and accordingly, the State Govt, dismissed the petition on the sole ground that the proceeding be'fore it became infl'l;'ctunus in view of the institution of the civil suit.

The appellant challenged thai order of the State Government by means of a writ petition before the High Court. The High Court held that the stay grnnted _by the State Govt. had lapsed when the revision petition was

dispOSCd of.

Therefore, on the institution of the civil suit for. e\iction, her revision petition before the State Govt. became infructuous.

As against that order, this appeal. has been brought by special leave. Allowing the appeal, and directing 'the State Govt. to restore and decide the revision petition according to law.

HELD : The State Government and the High Court were not justified in dismissing the revision petition as being infructuous because of the institution of the suit. One of the implications of the order di the High Court directing the State Government to rehear the revision petition of the appellant was that the respondent was precluded from filing the intended suit for eviction till .the State Government heard the rvision petition. Otherwise, the direction given by the High Court would remain unobeyed.

The respondent cannot be permitted 'o obotruct the implellMll!tation of that direction and that too, a direction given at her instance.

~11)1. Ir n()! open to the t te ~ .Wt befo~

SUPREME C<:JUR T REPORTS

[1972] 3 S.C.R.

the revision petition was disposed of by the State Government.

The A suit filed by the respondent was a premature one. Such a suit did not bar the State Government from disposing of the revision pet:tion in pur~ •uance of the order made by the H; gh Court. [999 BJ

Paras Nath, , 1969] 2 S.C.R. 297 a;:d Mohammad Ismail v. Naney Lal, rt 9691 3 .S. C.R. 894, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1813 of 1971. '

Appeal by special leave from the jud 0 ment and decree dated February 5, 1971 of the Allahabad High Court. in Special Appeal No. 1116 of 1969.

M. V. Ta.k1mde and S.S. Shukla, for the appellant.

M. C. Chag/a and Rameshwar Nath, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Hegde, J. though this appeal relates to a comparatively small maiter, it has exposed several disturbing features.

Hence it is necessary to set out the facts of the case in some detail.

The appellant is a tenant of the respondent.

She is occupying one of the premi 0.es belonging to the respondent.

The respondent is seeking to evict her from the said premises.

For that purpose she applied to the District Magistrate. Dehradun, who is also the Rent Controller, under s. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act,_ 1947 (to the hereinafter referred to as the Act) for permission to sue the appellanv for her eviction.

The permission asked for was granted by the Rent Controller.

As against that order, the appellant went up in revision to the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut who affirmed the order of the District Magistrate.

Thereafter the appellant went up in revision to the State Government.

During th~ pendency of that proceeding the State Government passed an order of stay which reads :

"Operation of the permission under s. 3 of the Act granted by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut to the opposite party, landlady to tile the suit for the petitioner's ejectment from the house in question is stayed pending consideration of the case by the State Government."

Later the State Government allowed the revision petition and set aside the .Permiss.ion granted. , The respondent challned the legalitj 'of: the O'rilet, made by the State Government 1:1efore the

•' PRA!IHAWAU v .. PRIIAM KAUR .(Hegde, _J,) i-U

A High Court of Allahabad in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The High Court set aside the order of the Government on the ground that the State Government in deciding the revision petition had allowed itself to be influenced by irrelevant considerations. The concluding portion of the order of the High Court reads : B "The petition is allowed.

The order of the ·-State Government dated 14-6-1966 ( Annexure E to the peti tion) is quashed. The State Government is directed to rehear Smt. Prabhawati Devi's revision under section 7F of (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, according to law. The petitioner shall get costs of this petition from respondent No. 1."

This order was passed on Februa17 28, 1967. On the very next day, the respondent filed a suit for eviction of the appellant. _ When the n; vision petition came up for hearing before the State

Government, the respondent submitted before the State Govem- 0 ment that it was not competent to hear the revision petition in view of the institution of the suit and for that purpose, it relied on a decision of the High Court holding that a revision petition pending before the State Government becomes infnlctuous orice a suit for eviction is filed in pursuance of the permission gi\len by the Commissioner. The State Government accepted that contention and dismissed the revision petition on the sole ground that the E proceedi n$ before it became infructuous in view of the institution ot the civil suit. The appellant challenged _that order by means of a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court. The High Court came to the conclusion that the stay granted by the State

Government had lapsed when the revision petition was disposed

F of and the same did not stand revived when the High Court direct ed the State Government to rehear the matter and dispose of the same according to Jaw.

Consequently, on the institution of the . civil suit for eviction of the appellant, her revision petition before the State Government became infructuous. As agamst that order, . this appeal has been brought by special leave. ·

G Before proceeding to discuss the points arising for decision, ft will be convenient to read the relevant provisions of the Act.

Though the Act purports to be a temporary measure, It hu continued to be in force from 1947. This Is but a smlll anomaly

compared with the difficulties created. by some of ita. provisions.

Now let us have a look at thoie provisions. They read : ll "Restrictions on eviction.- . (I) Subject to any order passed under sub- !lilctiOJ1_(3 ), iio suitshall, without the permissiQ11 of the

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[ 1972] 3 S.C.R.

District Magistrate be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds :

(a) that the tenant is in arrears OL rent for more than three months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of notice of demand;

(b) that the tnant has wilfully caused or permitted to be caused suhstantiul damage to the accom modation;

(c) that the tenant has, without the p.ermission in writing of the landlord, made or permitted to he made any such construction as, in the opinion of the court, has materially altered the accom modation or is likely substantially to dimi; h its value;

(d) that the tenant has created a nuisance or has done any act which is inconsistent with the. pur pose for which h~ was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodntion, or which is likely to affect adversely and substar.tially the landlord's interest therein;

( e) that the tenant has on or after the I st day of October, 1946, sub.let the whole or any portion of the accommodntion without the permission of the landlord;

(f) that the tenant has renounced this character as such or denied the title of the landlord and the

latter has not waived his right or condoned the F conduct of the tenant;

(g) that the tenant was, allowed to occupy the accommodation as a oart of his contract of employment under the landlord and his employment has been determined.

Exp/anation.-For the purposes of sub-section (e) lodging a person in a hotel or a lodging house shall not be deemed to be subletting.

2. Where any application has been made to the District Magistrate for permission to sue a tenant for eviction from any accommodation and the District Magistrate grants c;>r refuses to grant the permision, the

i'tY , a1'1'1e~ by his order. may withln.<10 clays ftW1

' B

PRABl!AWATI V. PRITAM .KAUR (tf6gde,'J,) ~6

the date on which the order is communicated to him apply to the Commissioner to. revise the order.

3. The Commissioner shall hear the application made under sub-section ( 2), as far as may be, within six weeks from the date of making it, and he may, if he is not satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order passed by the District Magistrate' or as to the regularity of proceedings held before him, alter or reverse his order or make such other order as may be just and proper.

4. The order of the Commissioner under sub-section ( 3) shall, subject to any order passed by the State Government under section 7-F be fin~!."

The only other relevant section for our present purpose u s. 7-F which says : / ·

"Power of State Government-The State Government may call for the record of any case granting or .refusing to grant permiflsion for the filing of a suit for eviction referred to in section 3 or requiring any accOl!l modation to be let or not to be let to any person under section 7 or directing a person to vacate any accom!llOdation under section 7 -A and may make such order as appears to it necessary for the ends of justice." .

Providing against unlawful eviction is undoubtodly a laudable object. It is necessary in social interest that improper eviction of tenanats should be prohibited.

Various States have enacted laws prohibiting the landlords from evicting . their tenants except

on grounds mentioned in those laws.

The implementation of those measures is left in the handiifof either regular courts or regularly constituted tribunals who are the principal repositories of the judicial power of the State and not with execuive authorities burdened with other duties.

But strangely enough under the Act two rounds of litigations are provided for.

A landlord sebkillg to evict a tenant must first go to the District Magistrate fer pet mission.

As against the order of the District Mastrate the aggrieved party can go up i11 revision to the Commiss1oncr. The order of the Commissioner, subject to any order .passed by the State Government under section 7-F of the Act, is final.

Section 7-F empowers the State. Government to revise the order of the order of the Commissioner at any time it pleases. There Is no time limit for exercising that power.

This .entire Iona drawn out process is only for the purpose .of decidini.whther tho perminlon should:be granted to !he landlord to sueibls wn0n(f91' -.i1G11Dent.

'SUPll!ME OOlJRT REPORTS [1!172] 3 s.c.a.

If the permission sought is granted then starts another round of A litigation from one court to another.

The principal function of courts and tribunals is to settle the dispute between the parties and thereby give a quietus te the .social frictions generated by the un- . resolved disputes.

As long as a litigatiort )asts, the tension coli tinues and useful energies will be wasted. . 'fhis is not all.

Every litigation means heavy financjal burden.to the.parties.

The merryll go-round of litigation provided by the Act instead of helping the tenants who ordinarily belong to the weaker sectionsof the society is likely to result in their ruination. These problems are for the legislatures to consider.

The power conferred on the District Magistrate, the Commissioner an\! the State Government has been .held to be a judicial C power by this Court-see Shri Bhagwan and anr. v. Ramachand and anr. (1).

Therefore let us see how that power is required to be exercised.

Neither s. 3 nor s. 7; p prescribes under what cir cwilstances the pemiission asked for should be granted and on what grounds the same can be refused.

Prima facie the power conferred on the authorities under ss. 3 and 7-F has no limits. It r.. is neither controlled nor guided.

The validity of that p0wer cannot be and was not challenged in these proceedings.

Hence we

hall not go into it. If one desires to know how and to what extent the power conferred on the. authorities under those rrovisions can be misused, one has only to look to the facts I) this case.. E The appellant filed the revision petition before the State Gov~ enunent on April 2, 1965.

On the same day she sent a.copy of ihat petition alongwith an application to the Minlster.foYlrrigation whO had nothing to do with the revision petition in question as revision petitions under s. 7-F were being dealt with by the Ministty .of Civil Supplies.

It is reasonable to infr that she.m)lst have done so because either she or. some of her fnends or relations had F SOllle influence with that Minister.

Otherwise there was no pui' Pose in sending a copy of. the rvision petition to the Ii:rigation

Mil)ister.

The Irrigation Minister sent the copy received by him to the Secretary, Civil Supplies after making the following .note thereon;

 "Pl. look into it.

So much Is In mY knowledge that occupants are vetl very old tenant . of this shop. l .hope .•. proper view will be taken of the dispute."

Thereafter some official in the Secretariat prepared a detailed note • giving the history of the case.

That office note concluded thus : l

"In this connection observations of Minister for

. Irrigation and Power on serial No. 12 and orders of J.S.

1rfi§~513 s-:-'c:-'R.. 21s. ··

A at the bottom thereon may also please be seen, submitted. , J(.R may please see for orders."

In due course the Government allowed the revision petition. That order has its own special features.

It reads :

"GOYERMENT OF UTTAR PRADESH

RENT CONTROL DEPARTMENT No. 1696/E-1(10)II965,

Dated Lucknow, June 14, 1966.

ORDER

C Subject : Smt. Prabhawati versus Dr. Pritam Kaur.

regarding a portion of premises No. 11 Rarnpur Mandi Road, Debra Dun.

With reference to her petition dated April 2, 196.5.

Smt. Prabhawati is informed that after a careful examination of the records of the case and consideration of the version of the opposite party and also in view of other facts relevant to the case, it appears expedient in the ends of justice that the petitioner should not be dispossessed from the disputed premises.

Therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 7-F of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 194 7, the Governor is please(! to _ revoke the permission under section 3 of the said Act granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer Debra Dun and confirmed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, vlde his orders dated March 30,

1965, passed in revision No. 13, to file a civil suit of ejectment . against the petitioner from the premises in dispute.

Sd - B. N. Chaturvedi Anu Sachiv.''

One would search this order in vain for the reason that persuaded the State Government to allow the revision petition. Not a single reason is given for setting aside the order of the Commls-·

ioner. But if one delves into the records of the Government as High Court of Allaha\>ad did, one is left with a feeling that the note of the Irrigation Minister must have weighed heavily on the H concerned authority. Our ellperience in dealing with litigations of this type does not embolden us to say. that what happened in this case is a rare ellception to the rule;

998 SUPR5'4B GOUR}' lllil10R'lll [i.972] 3 S.C.R.

Ii!llilY also be noted that when tjle re~OJJ.p, etition was pend- ·"- ing before te State Government, some i>Q$y bOdy by . name Ramesh Pun wrote a letter to the Minister for Fciod and Civil

Suply on May 16, 1966 recommending the case of the appellant.

In his letter he set forth his qualifications as a "'social worker aad a lighr. for freedom .since childhood''. T)iat letter appears to have found a resPeCtable place in .the records qf the case. One 11: can only regret for this sorry state of alfaitS. ·

The appellant has found a match in the res]:>oni!Cnt.

It is' interosting to note how the respondent cleverly queered the pitch against the appellant.

We h~YF wlier noticed that it was at her instance the High Court had quashed the order of the State Govent and directei! the State Oovent to re)l!l!ll' 1111d dis- '. pose of tµe revision petition according to Jaw.

Soon after getting that order, she tried to over-reach tl)at order by filing a suit' for eviction the very next day after the High court passed its order.

The High C!>µrt of Allahabad as we!! as th~ O:>urt have held that a suit validly instituted after obtaining the required permission under s. 3 ( 1) does not cease to be maintainable because of any order made by the State Government under s. 7-F during the pen dency of the suit-see Bhagw(ln Das v. Paras Noth( 1) and' Mohamm(ld Ismail v. Nanney Lal('). In a rather desperate bid' to take some advantae from those decisiOns, tho re!!Jioodent ·

appears to have rushed to the Civil court even before the ink on the I:ligh C<iint's. order had drie4. IJP F111vjpg h1stit11~ the suit she mnwd to Government what. aj w jle. r ws a fait acco(l!pli; Tue State Oovepup~111111 pienttqne4 eiµ-Jier flt that

.the r~. yis10. n ti\ipn before it be~.Ml!P. illfructµl)Us aus~ of the . :illltitu!i<, lll pf the suit. l!nfortµMf.ly gh COi!~ ~!!~ with ttit view. ·

Mr. Taunde, lemed Counl for the apl?"'llant ended before us tht no sooner the Hi~ Court set asiae the order of the Goveinment and directed the State Government to and dispOsC of the matter accor!fing to law, the inte$1 enler of stay passl!ll by . t)I~ St Ille. Government stood. revived. In s}lppOtt of that contn!iP!l of ts, he hs placed reliance on the dectSlon of the Patna High Court m Bilnk1m Chandra and ors. v. Chand/ Prasad(•); the decisions of the Mi1dr; lll ffigil (:q9~ jn Tqvvple Veeraswami "· Pulim Raman1ia and ors.(') ll!l!l Sfll'.qngthn 4iYQllil!I' v ..

. Muthiah Mooppanar and Rf'S.(') .an!! the i~Qll qf,.. ~""~'

High Court in Sushi/a Bali . .Pasi v. G.uest J;, een WUli@Ws 44.(•).

We do not think it is necessary to cOl)S. i\ler tht CQllte.n.. . ti()!! .P, i. J1'js appeal. The principle of law cpnt, ond!ICJ fgr by Mr .. 'fl\l'li:., fl

" (I) ji9'69j '2. s.c.i\.' 297; '(2)' [1969) 3!'S.C.R. 894; (3) AIR 19,6 l'lt.f27t.

(4) 1:L.ll. ls, Mad. 721; (S) 6l, M.L.J. 844; . {6) T.L.R. (1949) Vol. J Cal. 177.

has several facets; but there is no need to go into those facets in A this appeal. In our opinion this appeal has to succeed on a much broader ground. No party to a litigation can be permitted to frustrate the decision rendered by having recourse to trickery. The true effect of the order made by the High Court in the writ petition was that the question whether the respondent should be permitted to tile a suit tor ejectment of the appellant or not must be gone B into and decided afresh by the State Government.

One of the

unplicatins flowing from that order is that the respondent is precluded from filing the intended suit for eviction till the Sta, te Government decides the revision petition. Otherwise the direction given by the High Court would remain unobeyed.

The respondent cannot be permitted to obstruct th~ implementation of that c direction and that to a direction given at her instance.

Consequently it was not open to the respondent to file the suit before the

revision petition was disposed of by the State Government.

In our opinion, the suit filed by the respondent was a premature one.

Such a suit does not bar the State Government from disposing of the revision petition in pursuance of the order made by the High Court. The State Government. was not justified in dismissing the o

revision petition as being infructuous.

In the resuit this appeal i.s allowed, the order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition as well as the order of the State Government dismissing the revision petition are set aside. Further the State Government is directed to restore the said revision and E dispose of the same according to law. 'This, has been a long drawn out litigation.

Hence it is necessary fell' us to direct the State Oovernmeat to dispose of the revision petition within four months frpm the date of the receipt of this order. Meanwhile it is open to the respondent to move the court in' which she has filed the civil suit to stay further proceedings. In the circumstances of F the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs both in the High Court as well as in this Court.

s.c.

A />f'eal allowed.

PRABHAWATI

PRITAM KAUR

March 22, 1972

P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY

Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1941

S. 3

Control of Rent and Eviction Act

Art. 226

February 28, 1967

1969] 2 S.C.R. 297

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Allahabad High Court

M. V. Ta.k1mde

S.S. Shukla

M. C. Chag

Rameshwar Nath

Hegde

District Magistrate. Dehradun

s. 3

Control of Rent and Eviction Act

s. 3

High Court of Allahabad

Art. 226

Prabhawati Devi

section 7F

Control of Rent and Eviction Act

Februa17 28, 1967

V. PRITAM .KAUR

section 7

s. 7

section 3

section 7

section 7

section 7

Section 7

s. 3

s. 7

ss. 3 and 7

April 2, 1965

s. 7

S.

1

GOYERMENT OF UTTAR PRADESH

Prabhawati

Pritam Kaur

Prabhawati

Section 7

Control of Rent and Eviction Act

section 3

Debra Dun

B. N. Chaturvedi Anu Sachiv

High Court of Allaha\>ad did

Ramesh Pun

High C!>µrt of Allahabad

s. 3

s. 7

Taunde

Pulim Raman1ia

Muthiah Mooppanar


STATE OF UITAR PRADESH & ORS.

RAJA nTENDRA SINGH

January 18, 1972

[S. M. SIKIU, C.J., A. N. RAY AND M. H. BEG, JJ.]

U.P. Lar11e fand Ho/din[l3 Tax Act No. 31 of 1951 and Rules mad• thereund•l<-Rule 6-A coming into force 011 23 AprU 1958-RJ.le whether app/ir.able to assessment year 1365 Fasli-Jurisdiction of High Court in ntatter of construction of Rule.

C The Uttar Pradesh Large Land Holdings Tax Act No. 31 of 1357 came into force on I July 1957. The Rules under the Act were pub!Wied in the U.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 23 November 1957.

Rule 6-A was added to the Rules by anamendment on 23 April 1958. Rule 6-A states that where any land holdings has been legally sub-let by a disabled landholder mentioned in sub-section ( !) of section 157 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 the holdina tax D rJlall be remitted to the extent of thar chargeable on the land sub-Jet if ita annual value was arrived at by mul~ng the rent by 10}. The respondent was prior to the abolition of indari in Uttar Pradesh, the Raja of properties consistlru! of 28 villages in District Rai Bareilly. He was a mmor till 3 Mal'ch 1°§58 and attained majority on 4 March 1958.

The properties were under the management of the Court of Warda from

1945 to 1953, and, thereafter, under the management of the District Judge Rai Bareilly up to 4 March 1958. On I April, 1958, the Tax E Assessment Officer sttved a notice, under s. 7(2) of the 1957 Act on the respondent, for the assessment Fasli year 1365 commencing on 1 July 1951 and ending on 30 June, 1958. The respondent filed a return ana claimed benefit of exemption under Rule 6-A of the said Rules in respect of land which had been sub-let to tensnts under the order of the Court of Wards and the District Judge when the respondent's pl'operties were under their management. The claim was rejected. The Commissioner in appeal held that Rule 6-.A was not applicable to assessment for F t~ year 1365 Fasli year. The writ petition filed by the respondent challel)glnf the. Commi88ioner's order was allowed by the Sinale Judge. n lll'Pt• by special leave the State contended before this Court that (1) '111e tax was to 'be assessed on the armuaJ value of the landholding as on 1 Jillv 1957, and,' in as much as Rule f>.A did not come into existence on I !u!y. 1957, the respondent waa not entitled to the benefit of the rule; (ii). l\l!le 6-A was not applicable because it was not proved that the llllld was la#Qlly. sub-let; (iii) The High Court was wrong in issu\na the writ. !>" G the sround of mionstructlon of Rule 6-A by the assess10g autbonties because it was not a petent error.

•HeJd: (i) (a) Rule 6-A is to be l'ead with sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Act. Assessme11t was for the entire agricqJtural year from 1 July 1957 30 June 195&. The land whii:h had been lawfully sublet by the Olllrt of Ward, and the District Judge could not be in the pooseooi()ll of the resPQDdent in the &WSlilllent year. Therefore, in assesain& the IJ.Dct W holfor the year 1365 Fasli, th: respondent wss entitled to claim "-'"

jt, Rule 6-A in respect of land which had been legally sub-let. The fact tb.ilt! he beaime a major from 4 March 1958 did not deprive hlm of' the benefit. u 02 J>.FJ

(b) The Act came into force on 1 July 1957.

The assessmeat was A to be made for the year commencing 1 July 1957. Rules were made under s. 29 of the Act.

Rules, obviously came into existence subsequent to the Act coming into force.

Rules are procedural.

Rules relate to assessments. The assessment is for the '1'ntire year. The assessment in the particular instance was made after Rule 6-A came into force.

Tile assessment was pursuant to notice which was delivered on 1 April 1958.

The assessment was for the whole year ending 30 June 1958. Therefore, B Rule 6-A would be applicable to the assessment which was not only pending but would be upto 30 June, 1958 within which period the rule became effective for the assessment yea~. The contention that Rule 6-A was not made retrospective and therefore did not apply for an assessment for Fasli 1365 was devoid of merit. r102 H-103 Cl

(ii) Jn the High Court, the State did not dispute the legality of subletting. It was, therefore, not open to the State to raise the contention c that the land had not been legally sub-let. f103 D1

(iii) The respondent raised a contention as to the application of Rule 6-A. This is a question of construction of the statute and rules in respect of assessment.

The High Court was justified in issuing u.e writ. [103 El

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 238 of D 1967.

Appeal from the judgment and decree dated February 9, 1965 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 310 of 1960.

G. N. Dikshit and 0. P. Rana, for the appellant.

J. P. Goyal and R. A. Gupta, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Ray, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment dated 9 February, 1965 of the High Court at Allahabad F dismissing the_ appeal filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh against the judgment of the learned Single Judge quashing the assessments of the respondent under the Uttar Pradesh Large Land Holdings Tax Act No. 31 of 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and further holding that the respondent was entitled to the benefit

under rule 6-A of the Uttar Pradesh Large Land Holdlngs Rules, G 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules) .

. The respondent Raja was prior to the abolition of 1.amindari in the State of Uttar Pradesh the Raja of the properties known as Chandapur Raj consisting of 28 villages in the Tahsil Maharajganj in the District of Rae Bareli. The re5pondent was a minor .till 3 March, 1958 and he attained majority on 4 March, 1958. H The properties were under the management of the Court of Wards from 1945 to 1953 and thereafter under the management of the District Judge, Rae Bareli up to 4 March, 1958.

U.P. STATE V. JlTENDRA SINGH (Ray, ],) l 01

A O:n 1 April, 1958 the Tax Assessment Officer, Maharajganj Sub-Division served a notice under section 7(2) of the 1957 Act on the respondent for the assessment Fasli year 1365 oommencing on 1 July, 1957 and ending on 30 June, 1958. The respondent was required by thci said notice to file a return for the agricultural year of the land holding of the respondent. The respon- B dent filed a return and clainled benefit of exemption under rule 6-A of the said Rules in respect of the agricultural land which had been sub-let to tenants under the orders of the Court of Wards and the District Judge when the respondent's properties were under their management. On 16 July, 1958 the Sub-Divisional

Officer, Maharajganj being the Assessing Officer dismissed the c respondent's claun for exemption in respect. of the land holding

sub-let and passed an assessment order imposing tax on the land holding of the respondent for the sum of Rs. 62,011.39. It may be stated that the assessment according to the respo.ndent should have been Rs .. 34,274-6-10 as a result of the exemption under rule 6-A. The respondent preferred an appeal before the Commissioner, Lucknow Division. The appeal was dismissed. On 9 D September, 1958 the Commissioner held that rule 6-A was not applicable to assessment of tax for the 1365 Fasli year.

The respondent thereafter on 29 September, 1958 filed a writ yetition in the High Court at Allahabad challenging the validity of the Act and for quashing the assessment orders.

The learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court on 2c; February,' 1960 held that the Act was valid and allowed the writ petition in part by holding that the respondent was entiled to the benefit of rule 6-A and therefpre quhed the assessment order.

The State filed an appeal. The High Court dismissed the appear and upheld the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge.

Counsel on behalf of the State raised three contentions. First, it was said that tax was to be assessed on the annual value of land holding as on 1 July, 1957 and inasmuch rule 6-A did not come into existence on i July, 1957 the respondent was not entitled to the benefit of the rule. Secondly, it was said that rule 6-A was not at all applicable because it was not proved that the G land was lawfully sub-let. Thirdly, it was said that the Hig!J

Court was wrong in issuing the writ on the ground of mis-construction 0£ rule 6-A by the assessing authorities because it was not a patent error.

The 1957 Act came into force on 1 July, 1957. Section 2'i H of the Act empowered the State Governnient to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. The rules were published in the U.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 23 November, 1957.

Rule 6-A was added to the Rules by an amendment on 23 April,

1958. The contention on behalf of the State was that because A rule 6-A was not made retrospective with effect from 1 July 1957 .but that rule 6-A came into existence on 23 April 195S the .said e would not be applicable in respect of asse'ssmcnt' commencmg 1 July, 1957. This contention is unacceptable as it is unsound.

Under section 3 of the Act holding tax at the rate& specified in the Schedule of the Act is levied for the agricultural B _year on the annual value of each land holding. Section 4 of the Act defines 'land holding'. Section 5 of the Act deals with annual value of the land. Rule 6-A states that where any land holding has been legally sub-let by a disabled land-holder mentioned in sub-section ( 1) of section 157 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 19 50 the holding tax shall be remitted to the extent of that chargeable on the land sublet if its annual C value were arrived at by multiplying the rent payable by lOt.

The respondent was a disabled land-holder within the meaning of section 157 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,

1950. The land had been lawfully sub-let while the properties were under the management of the Court of Wards and thereafter

the District Judge. The contention of the appellant that the res- D pondent became a major on 4 March', 1958 and therefore.he could not get benefit of the rule is untenable.

Rul~ 6-A refers to land which has beein legally sub-let. Therefore; the sub-letting must be anterior to the making of the rule on. 23 April, 1958. The entire fallacy of the appellant is that to make rule 6-A effective from 23 April, 1958 would be to rob rule 6-A of its extent and content in respect of assessment. Rule 6-A is to be read with sections 3, E 4 and 5 of the Act. The assessment was for the entire agricultural year from 1 July, 1957 up to 30 June, 1958. Tiie land whii:h had been lawfully sub-let could not be in the possession of the respondent in the assessment year. Therefore in assessing the land holding for the year 1365 Fasli the respondent was entitled to claim benefit under Rule 6-A in respect of land which had been p 1egally sub-let.

Rules are made for carrying out the purposes of the Act. One of the purposes is to assess the land holding for the agricultural year. Rules are in regard to filing of the return and manner and mode of computation of annual value. Exemption under rule 6-A is a benefit in relation to assessment by reason of the process ol G computing the valuation of land holding.

The contention on behalf of the State that Rule 6-A was not made retrospective and therefore it does not apply is devoid of merit.

To accede to the contention of the State would mean that the rules which came into existence on 23 November, 1957 W9lJ\d not at all the applicable to the assessment which commenced on ff 1 July, 1957. That would be am absurd position. The Act came into force on 1 July, 1957. The assessment was to be made for the

U.P. STATE v. JITENDRA SINGH (Ray, J.)

I 03

A year commencing 1 July, 1957. Rules were made under section 29 of the Act. Rules obviously came into existence subsequent to the Act coming into force. Rules are procedural. Rules relate to the assessments. The assessment is for the entire year. The assessment in the particular instance was made after rule 6-A came into effect. The assessment was pursuant to notice which B was delivered on 1 April, 1958. The assessment was for the whole year ending 30 June, 1958. Therefore, rule 6-A would be applicable to the assessment which was not only pending but would be up to 30 June, 1958 within which period the rule became effective for the assessment year. It is also important to notice that the benefit under rule 6-A enures to the land holding which has been C legally sub-let. The land holding fulfils that character during the assessment year with the resulf that rule 6-A is attracted by the quality of land for quantifying the assessment.

The second contention of the State that the land had not been legally sub-let cannot be entertained. In the High Court the State did noi dispute the lel!ality of sub-Jetting. It is, therefore, not D open to the State to raise that contention. .

The third contention of the State that there is no patent error and therefore the High Court was wrong in issuing a writ is un atable. The respondent Raja raised a contention as to the application of rule 6-A. This is a question of construction of the

-~ statute and rules in respect of assessment. The High Court was E justified in issuing the writ.

The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.

G.C.

Appeal dismissed.

STATE OF UITAR PRADESH & ORS

RAJA nTENDRA SINGH

A. N. RAY

M. H. BEG, JJ.

23 April 1958

section 157

Uttar Pradesh

Rai Bareilly

s. 7(2)

sections 3, 4 and 5

s. 29

Allahabad High Court

0. P. Rana

J. P. Goyal

R. A. Gupta

Rae Bareli

V. JlTENDRA SINGH

section 7(2)

Lucknow

9 D September, 1958

29 September, 1958

High Court at Allahabad

2c; February,' 1960

1 July, 1957

Section 2

23 November, 1957

23 April 195S

section 3

Section 4

Section 5

section 157

section 157

sections 3

section 29

30 June, 1958

Raja

The respondent Raja raised a contention as to the application of rule 6-A. This is a question of construction of the
~ statute and rules in respect of assessment.