{"document_id": "1972_2_1005_1013_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "tOOS\n\nMAHANTBHAGWANBHAGAT v.\n\nG. N. BHAGAT AND ORS.\n\nJanuary 4, 1972\n\n[J. M. SHELAT, I. D. DuA, H. R. KHANNA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.)\n\nCrtstom-Mutt-Method of choice of successor to office of mohunt.\n\nThree aspects have to be borne in mind in connection with tho question of succession to the office of a mobunt : (i) if the rounder or endower bus laid down any particular rule of succession, that is to be given effect to; (ii) in the absence of the above the usage of the partic_ular institution is to be followed; and (iii) the party who lays claim to the office on the strength of any suc-h usage must establish it affirmatively.\n\nThe fact that the defendant is a trespasser would not entitle the plaintiff to succeed, un- Jes:; he suceeds in proving tb~ particular usage under which he claims.\n\n!1009 E-G]\n\nIn a Mourasi mutt the office of the mohunt is hereditary and -~volves. upon a disciple of the existing mohunt who usually nominates him as the successor.\n\nThough generally the senior disciple succeeds, a junior disci ple may succeed if he is found more capable and if he is selected by thelast mohunt as his successor.\n\nTh~ appointment or nomination is done by the rigning mohLmt during his life time or shortly before his death and it is posible for the mohunt to make over the endowment during his lifetime to the mcccssor. [1010 BD, F]\n\nJ n the present case, the mutt was a Mourasi mutt and the second respondent was its mohunt.\n\nHe nominated the first respondent as his successor by a deed, and by a second deed, surrendered to him his right to the office of mohunt. The appellant claimed the office as the senior disciple on the contention that the devolution to the office was to the senior disciple according to the tenets and customs of the sect which established the mutt.\n\nThe trial court decreed the suit but the High Court set aside the decree\n\nDismissing the appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : The appellant had not discha:rged the onus which lay on him to substantiate the custom pleaded by him. The documentary evidence, which was ante Jitern motam did not support the appellant's case that invarinbly only the senior disciple was selected.\n\nOn the contrary, the entire evidence in the case led to the conclusion that in the matter of nomination of a suCC1!Ssor to the offie of mohunt seniority was not thedecisive factor, but that ability and fficiency in management coupled with a good moral character, adherence to the religious rites practised at the mutt and a spirit of service to the sadhus etc. entered into consideration in the selection of a successOl'. [11)12 A-D]\n\nCrvrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 171 ot 1967. .\n\nAppeal lrom the judgm6nt and decree dated April 12. 1966 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 445 of 1963.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 2 s.c.R.\n\nD. V. Patel and U. P. Singh, for the appellant.\n\nC. B. Agarwala, Umesfz Chandra Sinha, R. Goburdhun and D. Goburdhun, forrespondtmt No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J.\n\nThis is an appeal from a judgment of the Patna B High Coui't reversing the decree in favour of the plain1iff-appellant declared to be the duly installed Mahant of Turki Math and of all its subsidiary maths and as such entitJed to possession of the properties covered by the. decree.\n\nThe undispu1ed facts are as follows.\n\nIn the village of Turki in Not1th Bihar there is a Math or asthal of the Kabirpanthi Bhagatatha Vairagi sect established over a century back. There are asthals subordinate to the principal one at Turki located in .different districts of Bihar. Devolution of the Mahantship has always been from a Guru 1to his Chela.\n\nDefendant No. 2 executed a deed dated December 17, 1951 nominating the first defendant as his successor to the Mahantship and a second deed on september 15, 1952 surrendering his right to the Mahantship in favour of the first defendant with immediate effect.\n\nThe suit . of the appellant was launched in 1959 for a declaration that he himself was the duly installed Mahant of saddar asthal Turki in the circumstances mentioned in the plaint, lthat 1he second defendant bad ceased to be the Mahant by his voluntary of retirement and the first defindant being a junior Chela could h3ve no right or claim 1o the Mahan'tship.\n\nAs a coro1lary to the above declaration, he also asked-for a decree for recovery of possession of all the properties of the asthal including those which had been purported to be transferred by the first two defendants.\n\nThe appellant made a two-fold claim in his plaint.\n\nI1 was 11is case that under the te.nets and the customs of the asthal and\n\nBhagataha sect of Kabirpanthies, the devolution of the office of Mahantship is always trom a Guru to the senior celebate Chela either on the death of the Mahant for the time .being or by the said Mahani nominating his successor by deed and himseJf retiring from the Mahantship.\n\nIn either case, after the deah or retirement of the Mahant for the time being, the snior chela suc- <::eeds to the Mahantship and is duly installed on the Gaddi after the performance of Bhandara in an assemblage of Mahants and sadhus of the sec't and respectable persons of the Jocality at which 1he Chaddar of Mahanthi is bestowed on the new Mahant bv -the Mahfint of Acharya Math Dhanauti in the. District of Saran. !he qs of 1951 anp 1952 bei1ng in violation of the anaient custom of the asthal, the first defendant was never recogpised as or became the Mahant of Turki nor was any Chaddar ceremony\n\nH (\n\nM. B. BHAGAT V. G. N. BHAGAT (Miner, J.) 1007\n\nperformed at any requisite ceremony in recognition of such succession.\n\nThe appellant had filed a suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge at Muzaffarpur in the year 1953 for declaration of his rights and for setting aside the deeds of 1951 and\n\n1952. After the suit was pending for some time, a compromise was arrived at whereby it was agreed that •the appellant should assume the office of Mahantship and take possession of all the properties of the Math.\n\nThe appellant put his signature on a sheet of blank paper for recording the tenus cf settlement.\n\nHe had actually assumed the office 'of the Mahant of Turki in April 1954, and an elaborate ceremony was performed on the 16th February 1956 wh.:.; reat he was installed as the Mahant of Turki and given the Chaddar of Mabanti by 'the Acharya of Dhanauti be{ore a big gathering.\n\nA document known as the Surat Hall was prepared regarding the plaintiff's installation. This bore the\n\nsignature of innumerable persons.\n\nThis was followed by his taking charge of all the properties of the saddar and subordinate asthals.\n\nThe first two defendants thereafter dispossessed him and being unsuccessful in proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure for securing possession of the math and its properties,\n\nhe was com{)elled to file the suit.\n\nRespondenrts 1 and 2 filed a ioint written statement.\n\nThey pleaded that the custom and usage of the Turki Math relating\n\nto devolution of Mahantship was for the Mahant for the time being nominating a fit and . proper person as his successor from amongst his Chelas irrespective of his seniority and the person so nominated invariably became the Mahan't on the demise or retirement of the inc_umbent Mahant. A ceremony of installation of the new Mahant on the Gaddi and the bestowing of a Chaddar on him were nat essential for es'tablishing his title to this office in place of the retiring or the deceasing Mahant.\n\nThe defendants denied the factum of the installation of the appellant relied on in the plain't.\n\nAccording to rthem the appellant had .at all times knowledge of the nomination of the first defendant bv the deed of December 17. 1951 and his appointment with imme-- diate effect by the deed of SeP'tember 1 5, 1952. It was on realisa!tion of the weakness of his case that he had approached the defendants for a compromise agreeing to given up his claim in the suit of 1953. He had appended his signature to the petition of compromise in that suit being fully conversant with the terms thereof.\n\nThe two :rn!lin issues framed by the trial court and relevant for the disposal of this appeal bear on the custom governing the succession to the MahantshiP of the Turki Math and the right of the incubent Mh\"-nt to .nominate a junior Chela in preference to a semor Chela. Issues were al&o frm~ by the trial court as to whether an installation o::remony was an e'isential pre-requisite\n\nto a Mahant's lawfully functioning as such and whether the plaintiff had factually been installed as a Mahant of the Turki Math.\n\nThe findings of the trial court were as follows :-\n\n1. From 1899 onwards only senior Chelas had succeeded their Gurus.\n\n1. According to the custom of the Muth the Mahant had the right to nom.itnate his successor and the choice rested upon the senior Chela unless he suffered from any disqualification or was found to be unfit for the office.\n\nThe right of nomination was not ab89lute but was subject to the approval of others.\n\n3. An installation ceremony was not essential to complete the title of the Mahant. Such a ceremony had been performed in the case of the plaintiff in 1956 and he became the Maham: of Turki although not in possession of the properties thereof at the\n\n1time of the suit.\n\nThe High Court rejected the custom as to succession set up by the plaintiff. . It found-\n\n1. Since the time of the founder, Chaturbhuj Gosala, six Mahants had occupied the office of whom three were descdbed\n\nas junior Chelas by some of the wrtnesses on the defendant's side.\n\nThe evidence did not establish that there was an invariable custom of the senior Chela being nominated by the outgoing Mahant.\n\n2. The Mahant in office had an undoubted right to nominate his successor and ordinarily 1the right of appointment was exercised in favour of the senior Chela but the choice was exercised in favour of a celeba1e chela taking into account his all round ability and character.\n\nThe second defendant had as a matter of fact nominated one Ganesh Bhagat as his successor even before the deed of nomination of 1951 in favour of 'the first defendant.\n\nThis nomination of Ganesh Bhagat was cancelled as he was found to be unfit.\n\nCompared to the plaintiff, the. first defendant was decid•.!dly suprior in learning, ability and conduct : as the main function of the Mahan't was to propagate the Kabirpanthi cult and the maintenance of a peaceful and hannonious atmosphere in the mutt where people were expected to congregate for religious discussion and discourses and other benevolent functions the choice of the first defendant by the second defendant in preference to the plaintiff was not undeserved and must be taken as fm.al.\n\n3. The High Court did not examine the question as to whether an installation ceremony was necessary to perfect the tWe cf Mahantship in view of the concession by counsel for the plaintiff.\n\nDiffering from the finding of the trial court, the High Court held that no ceremony of installation of 1he plaintiff had been performed in 1956 as alleged in the plaint.\n\n' A\n\nH .\n\nII'\\\n\nM. B. BHAGAT V. G. N. BHAGAT (MlUer, J.) 1009\n\n4. The deeds of nomination and surr:nder in 1951 and 1952 by the first defendant were valid and binding.\n\nThe general law as to succession to Mahantship is now well settled by innwnerable decisions of 1the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and some decisions of this Court. It will be enough to quote some passages from Mukharii's book on the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts. The learned author states (third edition, p. 257):\n\n\"Once a Mutt is established, succession to headship takes place within the spiritual family according to the usages that grow up in \" particular institution.\"\n\n\"The primary purpose of a Mutt ...... js to encourage and foster spiritual learning by maintenance of a competent line of teachers who impart religious instructions to the disciples and followers of the Mutt and try to strengthen tthe doctrines of the particular school or order of which they profess to be adherents.\"\n\nAt page 269 :\n\n\"In a Muott. . . . it is the custom or practice of a particular institu1tion which determines as to how a successor is to be appointed.\"\n\nThree aspects have to be borne in mind in connection with the question of succession to the office of a Mahant ( p. 269) :\n\n\"The first is that if rthe grantor has laid down any particular rule of succession, that is to be given effect to. Secondly, in the absence of any grant the usage of the particular institution is 1to be followed; and in the third place, the party who lays claim to the office of a Mohunt on the strength of any such usage must establish i't affirmatively by proper legal evidence. The fact that the defendant is a trespasser would not entitle the plaintiff to succeed even though he be a disciple of the last Mohunt, unless he succeeds in proving the particular usage under which succession talres place in the\n\nparticular institution.\"\n\nAt p. 270:\n\n\"Generally speaking, the Mutts are divided inlo three classes aGcording to the different ways in which the heads or superiors are appointed. These three descriptions of Mutts are Mourasi, Panchayati and Hakimi.\n\nIn the first, the office of the Mohunt is hereditary and devolves upon the chief disciple of 1the existing Mohunt\n\nwho moreover usually nominates him as his successor; in the second, the office is elective, the presiding Mohunt , being selected by an assembly of Mohunts. In the third, . !the . appointment of the presiding Mohunt is vested in .the ..ruling power or in the party who has endowed the temple ..... .\n\n. , In a Mourasi Mutt the chela or disciple of the last . Mohunt succeeds 'to the office ...... when there are more . chelas than one, the eldest generally succeeds, but a junior . -chela may succeed if he is found more capable and if he is selected by the laslMohunt as his successor ....... .\n\n~: - • .: • ' - ; • ,; ~ ••\n\n... •• J ··· -·-· . ....... • : • , j. i ~- -· ' . !\n\n~:; i. }~!J.nvtiQP, s Jnstituti9J?.S tlw c~$tp, mj~ tht~~A:pr9; er , to ;.(}lltHlei..J4 cl:Jela.. to s:ucyd, he :must be .appomted 9r ... rioiiiinated by the reigning Mohunt during his life. time , or . .shortly:.before his death and this may be don~ either\n\n.:by a .written declaration or some sort of testamentary document. ln other cases again, the nominee is formally installed in the office and some sort of recognition is accorded to him by the members of the particular sect either . during the life time of the last Mohunt or when the funeral ceremonies of the latter are performed.\"\n\nAt p. 273 :\n\n.. _,. .• .. , .\n\n. \"When the Moht.mt has the right to appoint his successor, he may exercise the right by an act inter vivos or by will.''\n\nAt p. 274 :\n\n' i -~ ' .\n\n.~'ln a. Mourashi. Mutt it is possible for the Mohunt , ,, tQ; make .over the endowment during his life time to his chela whom he appoints as a successor.\"\n\n. At p, 275 :\n\n. \"In many cases. whn a successor is appointed by Mohunt, he is installed in office wirth certain' ceremonies.\n\nThis cannot be deemed to be essential.\"\n\nAdmittedly Turki was a Mourasi Mutt. The evidence as to · custom adduced in the case is both documentary and oral. The oral evidence which will be noted hereafter is discrepant and mostly of persons who were not disintorested. The documentary evidence undoubtedly furnishes more reliable testimony being ante litem ,;.motam and:brought into existence at a time w.hen .t\\le pla.intiff was\n\nnot on the scene and when no dispute as to suCcession to Mahantship was raging.\n\n1 i\n\nM. B. BHAGAT v, G. N. BHAGAT (Ml'tter, J.) lOU\n\nThe earliest document exhibited in this case is that of 1899 execU'ted by Mahant Lal Bahadur Bhagat in favour of Ram\n\nBhagat describing him as the seniorchela, able, clever, literate and by all means fit for the Mahantship. Mahant Ram Bhagat in his turn nominated Mahadeo Bhagat as his successor by a deed of November. 1910. Like the document of 1899 this deed also describes dw nominee as able, clever and. fit 1o discharge the duties of the Mahant. Mahadeo Bhagat however is not described as the senior Chela but only as a disciple of the executant. By a deed of August 1937 Mahant Mahadeo Bhagat nominated Narsingh Bhagat, defendant No. 2 as his successor describing the laNer as h!s only disciple worthy, clever and fit in all respects for the { c Oaddi. Bv a document of June 1947 Narsingh Bhagat nominated 'one Ganesh Bhagat as his suc-.; essor to the Gaddi. This nomiira~\n\ntion. was cancelled by Narsingh Bhagat on the ground of unfi'tness of the nominee for the office but mention is made in this document of 1947 ohhe practice and custom relating to the succession to the office of the Mahant. This document goes against the con- •\n\ntention of the plaintiff that by custom the enior Chela was eligible to the office in preference to all others. It recites :\n\n\"It has been the practice in the Asthal from the time of my predecessors that the Gadinashin leads a life of Brahmacharya and he does not marry. One Mahanth Gadinashin appoints and nominates his able Bralunachari disciple as Gadinashin and future successor during his life1ime.\n\nAfter the death of his Guru, the rightful disciple becomes heir and Gadinashin of the Asthal of the Sadar Nath at Turki. I the executant thought it proper to make over the management of the property .. under a will, according to previous cus'l:om and appoint Ganesh Bhagat as my successor.\" r .\n\nThis was followed by a description of the nominee as literate, able .and efficient. The document of December 1951 by N arsingh\n\nBhagai in favour of Giriia Nandan Bhagat, the first defendant,\n\n. describes the nominee as fit and qualified in all respects to be lfhe\n\nMahant and recites the custom as in 1the case of Ganesh Bhagat.\n\nThe trial Judge's view that the nominations if 1899, 1910 and\n\n1937. being invariably in favour of the senior disciple went a long way 1o establish the custom relied on by the plaintiff was nlYt accpted by the High Court. Apparently the trial Judge was of the vtew that Mahadeo Bhagat who became the Mahant in 1910 was\n\nthe only disciple of Ram Bhagat and it was therefore not feH necessary to mention him as the senior chela.\n\nQuite a number of defendants' witnesses made statements to the effect hat 'Ram Bhagat h'ad a number of Chelas. The trial Judge obviously overlooked the statement of the plaintiff in his cross-examination 1hat\n\n101:!\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972] 2 S.C.R.\n\nRam Gossai had 5 or 6 Chelas and he himself had seen all of them. A fairly larp; e number of witnesses stated tha~ the .qualifi cations for a person's nomination t~ :be Mahantship dt~ not depend only on seniority but on dbdtty to. manage! cehbacy, adherence to religious principles and a habtt of serv10g sadhus, fakirs and visitors besides a good moral character.\n\nSome even\n\nsuggesd that it was the ablest Chela who was made the Mabant.\n\nMaking due allowance for the witness-;:s who cme to support. the case of the party examining them, the oral teston:y unque3tlOn ably leads us to hold that in the matter of nommatton ci a successor to the Mahantship seniority was not the decisive factor but that ability and efficiency in management coupled wi'th a ,~::ood moral character a.nd adherence to the religious rites practised at\n\nthe mutt and a spirit of servico;: to sadhus etc. all entered into con sideration in the selection of a successor by a Mahant. This con I elusion is fortified by the documents exhibited.\n\nAs already noted they do nat support the plaintiffs version that invariably the senior Chela was selecred. In our view the document executed by Narsingh Bhagat in favour of Ganesh Bhagat sets out the custom as to succession fairly accurately.\n\nTI1e argumerrt :dvano!d on behalf of the appellant that the plaintiff was installed as the Mahant of Turki in 1956 before a wide athering of sadhus and respectable persons at which the Chaddar ceremony was performed does not mrit any elaborate or serious consideration.\n\nAs noted already, the tdat court did not take the view that the performance of the Chaddar ceremony was an essential pre-requisite to a person becoming a Mahant and before the Hi:!h Court counsel for the plaintiff expressly gave up that point.\n\nAlthou~ the trial court found in favour of the plaintift that such a eremony had ctually been performed, the High Court came on different concluson .. One of the reasons which prompted\n\nhe HtJ!h Court to take tlus Vh!W was that the document evidencinr the installation ceremony l'>tyled the Surat Hall had not en produced in any court or law before the institution of the suit of 1959 although liti,11.ation in respect of the properties of the mutt and the plaintiffs riJilit to possession were being canvassed before courts of Jaw.\n\nTh~: Jlieh Court also relied on the f:ct that a respectable :1nd reliable witness like the Mahant of <he Ach:uya Mutt dl!nied havin, l! siJ,!ned thi~ document Ex. 1 and no attempt\n\nwns mad.e o!' bch:lf or the P)intiff to controvert the said denio! hv ex:Jmm::rtton .or a handwntmg expert. Relinnce was 3tso\n\npla~d by the Htgh Court on th>! fact that the plaintiff who filed n\n\npe!lho~ under ss. 107 and 145 Cr. P.C. against the first defendant\n\nand 1other' on 8th December. 1956 de!>cribed himself as the !\"fohant of <; hanwa. Math and made no reference in the ctition\n\nttelf to the.tnstallahon ceremony nt Turki. The Hi, l!..h Cort :ls<' did nnt 1-ehevc the plaintiff's version thnt he had sined a blnnk\n\nc .\n\n:i i\n\nf j I . ' t\n\nM. B. BHAGAT v. G. N. BHAGAT (Mit.ter, J.) 1013\n\nsh\\!et of paper to be used as a compromise petition in the earlier\n\nsuit filed by him and nothin.2 has been shown to us as to why w.:! should take a different view.\n\nIn the result we hold that the phintifT was unable to discharge the onus Mti.ch lay on him to substantiate the custom as to suc<:es- B sion pleaded in his plaint He also failed t-o establish 1hat he had in fact been installed as the Mahant of the said Ma'lh. The appenl fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed c\n\n17-736 Sup CJ172", "total_entities": 49, "entities": [{"text": "MAHANTBHAGWANBHAGAT v", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHANT BHAGWAN BHAGAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. N. BHAGAT AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G. N. BHAGAT AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 4, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 68, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 4, 1972\n\n[J. M. SHELAT, I. D. DuA, H. R. KHANNA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DuA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 130, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2723, "end_char": 2739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1966 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No."}}, {"text": "D. V. Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2828, "end_char": 2839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nD. V. Patel and U. P. Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2844, "end_char": 2855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nD. V. Patel and U. P. Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. B. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2877, "end_char": 2891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala, Umesfz Chandra Sinha, R. Goburdhun and D. Goburdhun, forrespondtmt No."}}, {"text": "Umesfz Chandra Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2893, "end_char": 2913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala, Umesfz Chandra Sinha, R. Goburdhun and D. Goburdhun, forrespondtmt No."}}, {"text": "R. Goburdhun", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2915, "end_char": 2927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala, Umesfz Chandra Sinha, R. Goburdhun and D. Goburdhun, forrespondtmt No.", "canonical_name": "R. Goburdhun"}}, {"text": "D. Goburdhun", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2932, "end_char": 2944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala, Umesfz Chandra Sinha, R. Goburdhun and D. Goburdhun, forrespondtmt No.", "canonical_name": "R. Goburdhun"}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3012, "end_char": 3018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J.\n\nThis is an appeal from a judgment of the Patna B High Coui't reversing the decree in favour of the plain1iff-appellant declared to be the duly installed Mahant of Turki Math and of all its subsidiary maths and as such entitJed to possession of the properties covered by the."}}, {"text": "Patna B High Coui't", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3065, "end_char": 3084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J.\n\nThis is an appeal from a judgment of the Patna B High Coui't reversing the decree in favour of the plain1iff-appellant declared to be the duly installed Mahant of Turki Math and of all its subsidiary maths and as such entitJed to possession of the properties covered by the."}}, {"text": "Turki", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3364, "end_char": 3369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the village of Turki in Not1th Bihar there is a Math or asthal of the Kabirpanthi Bhagatatha Vairagi sect established over a century back."}}, {"text": "Kabirpanthi Bhagatatha Vairagi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3419, "end_char": 3449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the village of Turki in Not1th Bihar there is a Math or asthal of the Kabirpanthi Bhagatatha Vairagi sect established over a century back."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3583, "end_char": 3588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are asthals subordinate to the principal one at Turki located in .different districts of Bihar."}}, {"text": "september 15, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3806, "end_char": 3824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 executed a deed dated December 17, 1951 nominating the first defendant as his successor to the Mahantship and a second deed on september 15, 1952 surrendering his right to the Mahantship in favour of the first defendant with immediate effect."}}, {"text": "Mahant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4964, "end_char": 4970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In either case, after the deah or retirement of the Mahant for the time being, the snior chela suc- <::eeds to the Mahantship and is duly installed on the Gaddi after the performance of Bhandara in an assemblage of Mahants and sadhus of the sec't and respectable persons of the Jocality at which 1he Chaddar of Mahanthi is bestowed on the new Mahant bv -the Mahfint of Acharya Math Dhanauti in the."}}, {"text": "Bhandara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5098, "end_char": 5106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In either case, after the deah or retirement of the Mahant for the time being, the snior chela suc- <::eeds to the Mahantship and is duly installed on the Gaddi after the performance of Bhandara in an assemblage of Mahants and sadhus of the sec't and respectable persons of the Jocality at which 1he Chaddar of Mahanthi is bestowed on the new Mahant bv -the Mahfint of Acharya Math Dhanauti in the."}}, {"text": "M. B. BHAGAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5520, "end_char": 5532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he qs of 1951 anp 1952 bei1ng in violation of the anaient custom of the asthal, the first defendant was never recogpised as or became the Mahant of Turki nor was any Chaddar ceremony\n\nH (\n\nM. B. BHAGAT V. G. N. BHAGAT (Miner, J.) 1007\n\nperformed at any requisite ceremony in recognition of such succession."}}, {"text": "G. N. BHAGAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5536, "end_char": 5548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he qs of 1951 anp 1952 bei1ng in violation of the anaient custom of the asthal, the first defendant was never recogpised as or became the Mahant of Turki nor was any Chaddar ceremony\n\nH (\n\nM. B. BHAGAT V. G. N. BHAGAT (Miner, J.) 1007\n\nperformed at any requisite ceremony in recognition of such succession.", "canonical_name": "G. N. BHAGAT AND ORS"}}, {"text": "16th February 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6247, "end_char": 6265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had actually assumed the office 'of the Mahant of Turki in April 1954, and an elaborate ceremony was performed on the 16th February 1956 wh.:.;"}}, {"text": "Mabanti", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6343, "end_char": 6350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "reat he was installed as the Mahant of Turki and given the Chaddar of Mabanti by 'the Acharya of Dhanauti be{ore a big gathering."}}, {"text": "Dhanauti", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6370, "end_char": 6378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "reat he was installed as the Mahant of Turki and given the Chaddar of Mabanti by 'the Acharya of Dhanauti be{ore a big gathering."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6744, "end_char": 6770, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Turki", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9201, "end_char": 9206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a ceremony had been performed in the case of the plaintiff in 1956 and he became the Maham: of Turki although not in possession of the properties thereof at the\n\n1time of the suit."}}, {"text": "Chaturbhuj Gosala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9412, "end_char": 9429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the time of the founder, Chaturbhuj Gosala, six Mahants had occupied the office of whom three were descdbed\n\nas junior Chelas by some of the wrtnesses on the defendant's side."}}, {"text": "Ganesh Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10026, "end_char": 10039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second defendant had as a matter of fact nominated one Ganesh Bhagat as his successor even before the deed of nomination of 1951 in favour of 'the first defendant."}}, {"text": "MlUer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11122, "end_char": 11127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II'\\\n\nM. B. BHAGAT V. G. N. BHAGAT (MlUer, J.) 1009\n\n4."}}, {"text": "Mukharii", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11465, "end_char": 11473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be enough to quote some passages from Mukharii's book on the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts."}}, {"text": "Mohunt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13679, "end_char": 13685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohunt succeeds 'to the office ...... when there are more ."}}, {"text": "Mahant Lal Bahadur Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15694, "end_char": 15719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 i\n\nM. B. BHAGAT v, G. N. BHAGAT (Ml'tter, J.) lOU\n\nThe earliest document exhibited in this case is that of 1899 execU'ted by Mahant Lal Bahadur Bhagat in favour of Ram\n\nBhagat describing him as the seniorchela, able, clever, literate and by all means fit for the Mahantship."}}, {"text": "Ram\n\nBhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15733, "end_char": 15744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 i\n\nM. B. BHAGAT v, G. N. BHAGAT (Ml'tter, J.) lOU\n\nThe earliest document exhibited in this case is that of 1899 execU'ted by Mahant Lal Bahadur Bhagat in favour of Ram\n\nBhagat describing him as the seniorchela, able, clever, literate and by all means fit for the Mahantship.", "canonical_name": "Ram\n\nBhagat"}}, {"text": "Mahant Ram Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15844, "end_char": 15861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahant Ram Bhagat in his turn nominated Mahadeo Bhagat as his successor by a deed of November."}}, {"text": "Mahadeo Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15884, "end_char": 15898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahant Ram Bhagat in his turn nominated Mahadeo Bhagat as his successor by a deed of November."}}, {"text": "Mahant Mahadeo Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16197, "end_char": 16218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a deed of August 1937 Mahant Mahadeo Bhagat nominated Narsingh Bhagat, defendant No."}}, {"text": "Narsingh Bhagat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16229, "end_char": 16244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a deed of August 1937 Mahant Mahadeo Bhagat nominated Narsingh Bhagat, defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Narsingh Bhagat"}}, {"text": "Narsingh Bhagat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16406, "end_char": 16421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bv a document of June 1947 Narsingh Bhagat nominated 'one Ganesh Bhagat as his suc-.;", "canonical_name": "Narsingh Bhagat"}}, {"text": "Mahanth Gadinashin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17037, "end_char": 17055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Mahanth Gadinashin appoints and nominates his able Bralunachari disciple as Gadinashin and future successor during his life1ime."}}, {"text": "Gadinashin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17113, "end_char": 17123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Mahanth Gadinashin appoints and nominates his able Bralunachari disciple as Gadinashin and future successor during his life1ime."}}, {"text": "N arsingh\n\nBhagai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17580, "end_char": 17597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The document of December 1951 by N arsingh\n\nBhagai in favour of Giriia Nandan Bhagat, the first defendant,\n\n."}}, {"text": "Giriia Nandan Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17611, "end_char": 17631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The document of December 1951 by N arsingh\n\nBhagai in favour of Giriia Nandan Bhagat, the first defendant,\n\n."}}, {"text": "Ram Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18134, "end_char": 18144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apparently the trial Judge was of the vtew that Mahadeo Bhagat who became the Mahant in 1910 was\n\nthe only disciple of Ram Bhagat and it was therefore not feH necessary to mention him as the senior chela.", "canonical_name": "Ram\n\nBhagat"}}, {"text": "Ram Gossai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18478, "end_char": 18488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972] 2 S.C.R.\n\nRam Gossai had 5 or 6 Chelas and he himself had seen all of them."}}, {"text": "Chela", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18886, "end_char": 18891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some even\n\nsuggesd that it was the ablest Chela who was made the Mabant."}}, {"text": "ss. 107 and 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21182, "end_char": 21197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_2_1014_1030_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "MC)HD. MAQBOOL DAMNOO\n\nv .. .STATE OF JAMi\\IU AND KASHMIR\n\nJanuary, 5, 197'<.--\n\n[S. M. SIKRI, C.J., J. M. SHELAT,\n\n1. D. DUA, H. R. KHANNA\n\nAND G. K. MITTER, JJ.] B\n\nCom•1itu1ion of Jammu and KWihmir (olh Amendment) Act, 1965l'ruvullng }or appointnU.tnt of <iovernor in pJa,:e uf :>adar-i-J:{iyc.sat_J\n\nValidity .of amendment in view o} /;, xpJa11u11on to Amel<' 3700) of t; onslltllltWn oj lntlia still re)ernng to Sadar-i~Kiyasat as Head of State-\n\nAssent of Goyernor of Ja1nnzu anct Kashuiir 10 Preventive JJetention .t \\Amendment) Ac/, 1%7 wlle1/1er resul<s in rulid law-Amendment of C Art. 367 Uf Cu11stitutio11 Of India tu tile enect I/Jal reference to Sadar-i- 'Riyasat shall be read as re/eren1.:e to Goveruur whc:ther amounts to a1nendmem of A:rl. 370\\1) by backdoor-l'roviso to sectio11 8(1) of De1en1ion Act WIJef/ier suiJers jrv11i excesive delegalivn-Proviso whether bad because it cunftcts with section 103 of Constitution of Jammu and Kaslunir- Whether detention order violates .Art. 21 and 22 of Com1it11tio11-Whether\n\ndetention bad b_ecause detaining autliority had noi applied its mind- Whether order of detention served and executed in accordanc:e with law.\n\nUnder the Explanation to Article 370(1) as originally enac,'ted the Gowrnment of the State of Jammu and Kashmir meant the person for the time being reco&nised by the President of 1ndia as Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers. In 1952 the Constituent Assembly oi the State resolved that the Maharaja ohall be replaced by an elected head of the State designated as the Sadar-i- Riyasat. Conse'luential ahangcs were made in Article 370(i) of the Constitution of India and in the Explanation to the Arlicle the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was defined to mean the person for the time being recognised as the Sadar-i-Riyasat o1 Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers. By the Constitution. of Jammu and Kashmir (6th Amendment Act) 1965 which receiyed the assent of the Sadar-i-Riyasat the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir provided for the appointment of a Governor in place of Sadar-i-Riyasat.\n\nNo consequential change was made in Art. 370(1) of the Constitution of\n\nIndia, but Article 367 was amended to the effect that references to the Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir shall be construed as reference to the Governor of J ammu and Kashmir and reference to the Government of the said St'lte shall be constrncd as including references to the Governor of J ammu and Kashn1ir acting on the ad...-ice of his Council of Minist-ers. lhe Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1967 (J & K Act 8 of 1967) alter being passed bv the Legislative Assembly _received the assent of the Governor of Jammu anJ Kashmir.\n\nThe petitioner was detained under the provisions of this Act by the order of the District Magistrate .dated June 24. 1970. In a writ petition under article 32 of the Constitution the petitim\"r contended (i) that the hmmu and Kashmir Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act. 1967 was invalid as it was not assented to by thr.! Sadar-i-Riyasat \\Vho alone was mentioned as Head of the State in the Explanation to Article 370( I); (ii) that the proviso inserted by \"'ction 4( 2) in sub-section (I) of Section 8 of the Detention Act was bad because it suffcrred from excessi\\\"e delegation;\n\n(iii) that the<e had been violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution: (iv) that '3t any rate. the proviso was bad because it conflicted with Section !03 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir; (v) that the\n\n/\" '\n\nM. M. DAMNOO V. J. & K. STATE 1015\n\ndetention order was bad because the detaining authority had not applied its mind; and (vi) that the order of detention was bad because it was not served or executed in accordance with law.\n\nHELD: (i) (a) The essential feature o'f Article 370 sub-clause (1) (b) and ( d) is the peo, ssity of concurrence of the State Government or te consultation of the State Government. What the State Government rs\n\nat a particular time bas to be determined in the context of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir.. The Explanation did no more than recognise the constitutional provision as it existed on that d\".lte and the Explanation as substituted from November 17, 1952 also did not more than recognise the constitutional provision in the State. Therefore, there IS no difficulty in holding that Article 370(1) (b J and Article 370(1) (dJ place no limitation on the framing and amendment of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. If there is a limitation it must be found in the Constitution of the State.\n\nSection 147 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir itself provides that under that sec'tion the Indian Constitution cannot be amended. [1025 F-G]\n\n(b) The Explanation to Art. 370(1) had ceased to operate because there was no longer any Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir. If the definition contained in the Explanation cannot apply to the words 'Government of the State' the meaning given in Article 367 ( 4) as amend- 41' ed will have to be given to it. If this meaning is given it is quite clear that the Governor is competent to give the concurrence, stipulated in Article 370 and perform other functions laid clown by the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution. [1026 B-C]\n\nSampar Prakal'h v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 365; re1erred to.\n\n{.c) The contention that section 147 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir contemplates perpetual existence of Sadar-i-Riyasat because this section expressly bars the Assembly from amending any provision of Art. i47 and one of the provisions continued in. this section is that the assent 1:0 the amendment of the Constitµtion must be given by the Sadari-Riyasat, cannot be accepted. The Constitution itself contains section 18 whicl{ provides that unless the context otherwise requires the General Clauses Act, Samvat 1977 shall applv for the. interpretation of this Constitutioji as it applies for the interpretation of the Act of the State legislature, By \"irtue of this Act the Governor is the rnco'8sor to the Sadar-i-Riyasat.\n\nHe -would be entitled to exercise all the powers of the Sad\".lf-i-Riyasat.\n\nThtfre is no doubt that he is the sucossor. It is. quite clear from section's 26,... 27 and 28 of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution that the Sadar-i- Riyasat is really the name given to the Head of the State. Under the said Constitution as amended the head of the State is designated as the Gover-\n\n- i:ror.\n\nSub-section (2) of section 26 as amended vests the executive powers gf the State in hirrt The Governor is not elected as was the Sadar-i- .· Riyasat, but tm mode of appointment would not make him anv the Jess a successor to the Sadar-i-Riyasat.\n\nBoth are heads of the State. [1026 D-\n\n1027 CJ\n\n(d) The rule laid down in Golaknath's case was not attracted to the facts of the present case. It is not as if State Government has been made irresponsible to the legislature or its fundamental character as a responsible government is altered.\n\nJust as a change in the designation of the head of the government was earlier brought about b<\\< the introduction o~ the. offic~ of .Saclar-i-Riyasat, so too a change had been brought about m hrs dergna!ton, from that of Sadar-i-Riyasat to the Governor.\n\nThat was necessitated bv reason of the Governor having been substituted\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT~\n\n[1972 J 2 S.C.R.\n\nin place of Sadar-i-Riyasat. There is no question of such hange being one in the character of that government from a democratic to a non democratic system. [1027 G-1028 BJ\n\nGolaknath v. State of Pun; ab, [1967J 2 S.C.R. 762; distinguished.\n\n(e) Clauses (a) and (bl of article 367(4) as substituted by C.O. 74 of 1965 (The Constitution Application to Jammu and K .. hmir) B Second Amendment Order, 1965 cannot be said to be an amendment of Article 370 ( 1) by back door. The Explanation had become otiose and\n\nreferences to the Sadar-i-Riyasat in other parts of the Constitution bad also become otiose. There were two alternatives, first, either to leave the courts to interpret the words \"Government of the State\" and give it its legal meaning or secondly to give legal meaning in a definition clause.\n\nWhat bas been done is that by adding clauses (aa) and (b) a definition is supplied which th., Courts would have in any event given. [1028 D-EJ C\n\nAccordingly, it must held that the amendin2 Act was validly assented to by the Governor. [1028 G]\n\n(2) The Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention (Amendment) •Act, 1967 did not delegate any legislative powers to anybody. It con fers executive. powers on the detaining authority by the insertion of the proviso to section 8 to direct that the person detained may be informed that it should be against public interests to communicate to him the grounds on which the detention order had been made. When the detain\n\ning authority chooses to so direct it cannot be said that the detainin.2 authority is exercising any legislative power. [1028 H-1029 A]\n\n(3) The detention cpuld not be said to be in violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution because they were excluded by Article 35(c) of the Constitution. [I 029 BJ\n\n( 4) The order expressly directed that the petitioner be detained in Central Jail Srinagar and a copy of the Order was endorsed to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, as required by S. 4 of the Detention Act.\n\nSection 75(i) Cr. P.C. !lad been complied with as the order was in Miting and had been signed by the detaining authority.\n\nSection 76 Cr. P.C. had ne application to the case because it applies only when the Court directs that security be taken. f1029 C-E)\n\n( 5) The contention that the proviso to section 8 inserted by the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act. 1967 was in conflict with section 103 of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution could not be accepted. It is quite clear that the Legislature has no riht to directly amend section 103 nor has it the power to make the exercise by the High Court of its jurisdiction under s. 103 illusory. But it cannot be held that the proviso is ultra vires because the proviso and the Act do not bar the High Court or this Court from looking into the validity of the detention. The High Court and this Court are free to exercise the jurisdiction by calling upon the State ht appropriate case to produce before it the grounds of detention and other material in order to satisfy itself that the detenp was being detained in accordance with law.\n\nFrom the file produced before the High Court bv the State the grounds on which detenu has been detained were shown to have relevance to the security of the State and it could not be said that the detaining authoritv had not applied its mind to the facts of the case. [1029 F-1030 G] ·\n\nPrem Chand Gar11 v. Excise Commissioner U.P., [1963] Suppl. l S.C.R.\n\n~85; A: K. Gopa/an v. The State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 8·8 referred to.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 144 of 1971.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the B nature of habeas corpus.\n\nR. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal, A. K. Gupta and R. K. Jain for the petitioner. '\n\nIshwar Si1agh Bakshi, Advocate-General for the State of Jammu and Kashmir, M. C. Chag/a, R. N. Sachthey and S. K. Dho/akia, c for the respondent. .\n\n!lliren Defor the Attorney-General for India; R. N. Sachthev and Ram Panjwani, Advocates, with him. ·\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSikri, C.1. This is a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the detention of the petitioner under the J ammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964 (J. & K. Act XIIl of 1964 )-hereinafter reierred to as the Act.\n\nOn June 24, 1970, th'e District Magistrate of Baramula passed the impugned detention order in the following terms :\n\n\"OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT\n\nMAGISTRATE,\n\nBARAMULLA\n\nORDER\n\nNo. PDA/IMB/81 Dated 24-6-1970\n\nWhereas I, S. S. Rizvi, District Magistrate, Baramula, ain satisfied that with a view to preventing Mohammad Maqb!ool Damnoo s/s Ghulam Mohi-un-Din Damnoo alias Madha Joo r/o Sangrampora from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State, it is necessary so to do;\n\nNow, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 (2) read with section 5 of the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964, I, S. S. Rizvi, District Magistrate, Baramulla hereby direct that the said Mohammad Maqbool Damnoo be detained in the Cn tral Jail Srinagar, subject to such conditions as to mamtenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipli:ne as have been specified in the J & K Detenus General Order, 1968.\n\nNo. Con/826-30 Dated 24-6-1970\n\nSd/- District Magistrate, Baramulla.\n\nCopy forwarded :-\n\n1. Sbri Abdul Majid Lone. Dy. S.P. Sopore in duplicate for execution ol the order as provided by section 4 of the J & K Preventive Deiention Act, 1964.\n\nNotice of the order shall be given to Mohammad Maqbool Damnoo by reading over the same to him and one copy duly executed, returned to this office.\n\nOn the same date, the District Magistrate passed an order under s. 8, read with s. 13-A of the Act directing that the petitioner be informed that it was against the public interest to disclose to him the grounds on which his detention was based. On E July 11, 1970, the Government having considered the order of detention, the report of the District Magistrate, the grounds on which tbe order had been. made, and other particulars baring on the matter approved the said detention order.\n\nThe petitioner sent an application to this Court dated April F 10, 1971 requesting that he be produced before this Court so as to enable him to file an appropriate writ challenging his detention.\n\nThis Court on May 11, 1971 directed that th}s application be treated as writ petition under art. 32 of the Constituiton and directed issue of rule nisi.\n\nThe Court further directed that the petitioner be produced before it two days before the hearing of G the petition.\n\n• The State filed an affidavit in reply.\n\nThe petitioner then filed the foi:mal writ petition through an advocate on July 27, 1971.\n\nThe State agam filed an affidavit in reply.\n\nOn an application having been made for permitting to raise additional grounds the .Court allowed the petitioner to file a comprehensive amended petition. On October 9, 1971, thi: amended writ petition was filed ltll this .Court. The State filed another affidavit in reply.\n\nMr. Garg, who appeared on behalf of the petitioner, raised the following points before us : ( 1) that the J ammu & Kashmir Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1967 (J&K Act VIII of 1967 )-hereinafter referred to as the Amending Actwas invalid as it was not assented to by the Sadar-i- Riyasat;\n\n(2) that the proviso inserted by s. 4(2) in sub-s. ( 1) of s. 8 is bad because it suffers from excessive delegation;\n\n(3) there has been violation oi Art. 21 and Art. 22 of the Constitution; ( 4) at any rate, the proviso is bad because it conflicts with s. 103 of the Cqnstitution of J ammu & Kashmir; ( 5) that the detention order is bad because the detaining authority has not applied its mind; and ( 6) that the order of detention is bad because it was not served or execu'ted in accordance with law. ln support of his first contention the learned counsel urged that under Art. 3 70 of the Indian Constitution the only authority which is recognised as 'the Government of the State of Jammu & Kashmir is the Sadar-i-Riyasat, Article 370 contemplates that the Sadar-i-Riyasat would be •the head of th>~ State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly had no power to abolish the office of the Sadar-i-Riyasat.\n\nHe further urged that s. 14 7 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir also contemplates that the Sadar-i-Riyasat shall exist and be the head of 'the State.\n\nHe urged that the only possible way of getting .rid of the Sadar-i-Riyasat would be the amendment of the Constitution of India as applied to Jammu and Kashmir.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General, who appeared on behalf of the Government of India, and Mr. Chagla, who appeared for the State, contended that the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1965, which had received the assent of the Sadar-i-Riyasat, validly amended the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir and validly provided for the appointment of a Governor in place of the Sadar-i-Riyasat, and therefore, the Govemor was competent to give assent to the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1967.\n\nH In order to appreciate the points raised before us it is necessary to give a brief history of the various constitutional changes which took place in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.\n\nH. H.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPC!RTS\n\n\nthe Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir, in a letter dated Octor 26, 1947, addressed to His Excellency the Governor-General of India, offered to accede to the Dominion of India.. On October 27, 194 7, tlie Governor-General accepted the offer and made certain stipulations with which we are not concerned.\n\nOn March 5, 1948, H. H. the Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir issued a proclamation forming a responsible Govt. of a Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister which was to take steps to constitute a National Assembly based on adult franchise to form a separate Constitution for the State.\n\nOn June 20, 1949 Maharaja Sir Hari Singh entrusted his legjsJative, executive and judicial functions to his son, Yuvraj Karatll Singh for a temporary period~\n\nOn November 25, 1949 a proclamation was issued by Yuvraj Karan Singh directing that the Constitution of India to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India be adopted by the Constituent Assembly in so far as it was applicable in Jammu and Kashmir in order to govern the relationship of the State and the contemplated Union of India.\n\nThe Constitution of India was adopted on November 26, 1949 1md on the same date certain provisions came into force and the remaining provisions came into force on January 26, 1950.\n\nArticle 370 of the Constitution dealt with the relationship of the State of Jammu & Kashmir with the Union of India.\n\nArticle 370 reads as follows :\n\n370. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Const:itution,-\n\n(a) the provision of article 23 8 shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir;\n\n(b) the power of arliament to make laws for the F said State shall be limited to--\n\n(i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the Presiden~ to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession G governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for tha~ State; and\n\n(ii) such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of R f the . State, the President may by order specify.\n\nExplanation-For the purposes of this article the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the President as the Maharaj a of J ammu and Kas\\lmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers for the time being in office under the Maharaja's proclamation dated the fifth day of March, 1948;\n\n(c) the provisions of article (1) and of this article shall apply in relation to that State;\n\n(d) such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that State subject to such excptions and modifications as the President may by order specify :\n\nProvided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession of the Sta~ referred to in paragraph (i) of sub-clause (b) shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the State;\n\nProvided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred to in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government.\n\n(2) If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in paragraph (ii) of sub-clause (b) of clause (1) or in the second proviso to sub-clause (d) of that clause be given before the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly. for such decision as it may take thereon.\n\n(3) Notwithstanding anything in the foreg0ing provisions of this article, the President may, by public notification, declare that this article shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may specify :\n\nProvided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification.\n\nOn January 26, 1950 the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1950 was made by the President. On April\n\n~O, 1_95 L the Maharaj a ?f Jammu & Kashmir issued a proclamation m pursuance of which the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was convened on November 5, 1951. On June 10,\n\n1952 the Basic Principles Committee of Jammu and Kaslun!r Constituent Assembly submitted 1Jhe interim report to the Constituent Assembly and recommended that :-\n\n(a) the form of the future constitution of Jammu & Kashmir shall be wholly democratic,\n\n( b) the institution of hereditary Rulership shall be terminated, and\n\n( c) the office of the Head of .the State shall be elective.\n\nThe <;:onstituent Assembly by a resolution adopted these recommendations. The following part of the resolution is rele\".ant : c\n\n\"Now, therefore, in pursuance of the resolution, dated the 12th June, 1952, and having considered the report of the Drafting Committee, this Assembly resolves:\n\n1. (i) that the Head of the State shall be tihe person recognised by the President of Union on the recommendations of the Legislative Assembly of the State;\n\n(ii) he shall hold office during the pleasure of the President;\n\n(iii) he may, by writing under his hand, addressed to the President resign his office;\n\n(iv) subject to the foregoing provisions, the Head of the State shall hold office for a term. of five years from the date he .enters upon his office;\n\nProvided that he shall, notwithstanding the expiration .of his 11erm, contim,1e to' hold the office until his successor enters upon his office;\n\n2. that the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the State in respect of the recognition of the Head of the State specified in sub-para (i) of paragraph 1, shall be made by election; ...\n\n4 .• that the Head of the State shall be designated as the\n\nSadat-i-Riyasat.\n\nOn November 15, 1952, the President made Order No. C.O. 44 to the following effect :\n\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred by this article (art. 370) the Presidenn, on the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State of J arnmu and Kashmir, declared that, as from the 17th day of November, 1952, the said art. 370 shall be operative with the modification that for the Explanation in cl. (1) thereof, the following Explanation is substituted, namely :-\n\n\"Explanation.-F or the purposes of this article, the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the President on the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the State as the Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers of the State for the time being in office.\"\n\nD On May 14, 1954, in exercise of the powers conferred by cl. ( 1) of art. 370 of the Constitution, the President with the concurrence of the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. made the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order,\n\n1954. It superseded the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1950. It applied various provisions of the Indian .E Constitution to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Under Art. 35, after clause (b) the following clause ( c) was added :\n\n\"(c) no law with respect to preventive detention made by the Legislature of the State of J ammu & Kashmir, whether before or after the commencement of the ConstiliUtion (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order. 1954, shall be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Part, but any such law shall .. to the extent of such inconsistency, cease to have effect on the expiration of five years from th7 commencement of the said Qrder, except as respects thmgs done or omitted to be done before the expiration thereof.\"\n\nWe may notice two other applications. Under art. 361, after\n\ncl. (4) the following clause was added, namely:\n\n\"(5) The provisions of this article shall apply. in relation to the Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jarnmu and Kashmir as they apply in relation to a Rajpramukh, but without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution of that ~~\" .\n\nTo art. 367 was added the following clause, namely :-\n\n\"( 4) For the purposes of this Constitution as it applies in relation to rhe State of Jammu and Kashmir- ( a) reference to this Constitution or to the provisions thereof shall be construed as references to the Constitution or the provisions thereof as applied in relation to the said State;\n\n(b) references to the Govemment of the said State shall be construed as including references to the Sadari-Riyasat acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers ......... \"\n\nTo art. 368 was added the following proviso:\n\n\"Provided further that no such amendment shall have effect in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir unless applied by order of the President under clause (1) of article 370.\"\n\nWe may mention that, as far as the State of Jammu and Kashmir was concerned, some entries in t'he Union List were modified, entry 97 was omitted, and the State List and the Concurrent List were omitted.\n\nOn November 17, 1956 the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution was adopted. Some sections came into force on that date and the remaining sections cme into force on January 26. 1957.\n\nOn November 6, 1957 Karan Singh was elected Sadar-i-Riyasat for the second time. On October 31, 1962, Karan Singh was elected Sadar-i-Riyasat for the third time.\n\nOn April 10, 1965 Jarnmu and Kashmir Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1965 received the assent of the Sadar-i-Riyasat.\n\nOn November 24, 1965, the President, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of art. 370 of the Constitution, with the concurrence of 11he Government of the State of Jammu. and Kashmir, made the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Second Amendment Order,\n\n1965. Under this Order, for sub-cl. (b) of cl. (4) of art. 367 the following clauses were inserted :\n\n\"( aa) references to the person for the time being recognised by the President on the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the State as the Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of the, Council of Ministers of the State for the time being in office, shall be construed as references to the -Governor of Jammu & Kashmir;\n\n'(b) references to the Government of the said State shall be construed as including references' to the Gov~-\n\nf I II\n\n\\;' H\n\nnor of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers;\n\nProvided that in respect of any period prior to the 10th day of April, 1965, such references shall be construed as including references to the Sadar-i-Riyasat acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers.\"\n\nI 025'\n\nThe main point of dispute between the parties is the position, and importance of the Explanation in art. 370 of the Constitution.\n\nAccording to the .Attorney-General this is a mere definition inserted for the purpose of the article in accordance with the constiWtional conditions prevailing at that time.\n\nAccording to Mr.\n\nGarg, this is the king\"pin of the whole relationship between the Vnion of India and the State of Jammu and Kashmir. According to him neither the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly nor the President were competent to impair the functioning of the Sadar-i- Rivasat and insofar as the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir (Si°xth Amendment) Act, 1965 replaced the Sadar-i-Riyasat by the Governor it is ultra-vires. According to him, either there has to be an amendment of the Constitution of India under art. 368 and art. 370{3) or a fresh Constituent Assembly has to be convened to amend the Explanation.\n\nHe said that if the text of the Constitution is explicit, effect must be given to it and it is not the duty of the Courts to improve upon the Constitution because the constitution-makers had not anticipated such a change.\n\nIt seems to us that the essential feature of art. 370, sub-clauses l(b) and (d) is the necessity of concurrence of the State Government or the consultation of the State Government.\n\nWhat the Stak Government is at a particular time has to be determined in the context of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. The Explanation did no more t; han recognise the constitutional position as it existed on that date and the Explanation, as substituted from November 17, 1952, also did no more than recognise the constitutional position in the Statll.\n\nWe have, therefore, no difficulty in holding that art. 370(l)(b) and art. 370(1)(d) place no limitation on the framing or amendment of the Constitution of Jammu anrl Kashmir.\n\nTf there is a limitation it must be found in the Constitution of the State. Section 147 of the Constitution of Jammu and 'Kashmir itself provides that under that section the Indian Constitution cannot be amended.\n\nThe learned counsel, relying on Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu and Kashmir( 1) contended that the only way of modifying art. 370 is specified in art. 370(3) itself. He said that this was\n\n(I) [19681 2 S.C.R.365.\n\nexpressly laid down by this Court in the decision just referred to.\n\nWe are not concerned with the question whether art. .3 70 ( 3) can now be utilised to ameJJd the provisions of art. 370(1) and (2), and therefore we do not press any opinion on that point. We are now not .concerned with an amendment of art. 370(1). We are concerned with thesituation where the explanation ceased to operate. It had ceased to operate because there is no longer any Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir. If the definition contained in the Explanation cannot apply to the words \"government of the State\" then the meaning given in art. 367 ( 4), as amended, will have to be given to it. If this meaning is given, it is quite clear that the Governor is competent to give the concurrence stipulated in l!rt. 370 and perform other functions laid down by the .Jam mu and Kashmir Constitution.\n\nThe learned Counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to s. 147 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. He said that even this section contemplates the perpetual existence of the Sadari-Riyasat because this section expressly bars the Assembly from amending any provision of art. 14 7 and one of the provisions contained in this section is that the assent to an amendment of the Constitution must be given by the Sadar-i-Riyasat. It is true that s. 14 7 provides that \"an amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the introduction of a Bill for the purpose in the Legislative Assembly, and when the Bill is passed in each House by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total membership of that House, it shall be presented to the Sadar-i-Riyasat for his assent and, upon such assent being given to the Bill,' the Constitu- . tion shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill.\" But the Constitution itself contains s. 158 which provides that \"unless the context otherwise requires the General Clauses Act, S.\n\n1977, shall apply for the interpretation of this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation <:Jf an Act of the State Legislature.\" The General Clauses. Act contains s. 18 which reads :\n\n\"18. In any Act made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of indicating the relation of a law to the successors of .any functionaries or of corporations having perpetual succession.\n\nG to express its relation to the functionaries or corporations.\"\n\nBy virtue of this Act, if the Governor is the successor to the Sadari-Riyasat, he would be entitled to exercise all the powers of the sadar-i-Riyasat. There is no doubt that he is the successor. The original constitution, by s. 26, provided :\n\n \"26(1). The Head of the State shall be designated as the Sadar-i-Riyasat.\n\n(2) The executive power of the\n\nl c t\n\n~· H\n\nState shall be vested in the Sadar-i-Riyasat and shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with this Constitution .. ,, ....\n\nSection 27 provided for the election of the Sadar-i-Riyasat aud s. 28 for the term of office.\n\nIt is quite clear from these provisions that the Sadar-i-Riyasat is really the name given to the head of the State.\n\nUnder the State Constitution as amended the Head of the State is designated as the Governor.\n\nSub-s. (2) of s. 26, as amended, vests the executive powers of the State in him.\n\nIt is true that the Governor is not elected as was the Sadar-i- Rivasat. but the mode of appointment would not make him any\n\nth~ less a successor to the Sadar-i-Riyasat.\n\nBoth are heads of the State.\n\nMr. Garg argued that the amendment of ss. 26 and 27 of the Comtitution of Jammu & Kashmir was bad.\n\nIn support of his argument. he relied on the following passage in Golaknath v.\n\nState of Punjab(') :\n\n\"The next argument is based upon the expression \"amendment\" in art. 368 of the Constitution and it is contended that the said expression has a positive and a negative content and that in exercise of the power of amendment Parliament cannot destroy the structure of the Constitution, but it can only modify the provisions thereof within the framework of the original instrument for its better effectuation. If the fundamentals would . be amenable to the ordinary process of amendment with a special majority, the argument proceeds, the institution of the President can be abolished, the parliamen- Wry executive can be removed. the fundamental rights can be abrogated, the concept of federalism can be obliterated and in short - the sovereign democratic republic can be converted into a totalitarian system of go\\ern'l'lent.\n\nThere is considerable force in this argument.\" \"\n\nBu: the passage cited by him can hardly be availed of bv him for the re:i 0.on that the amendment impugned by him, in the light of what we have already stated about the nature of the explanation t? Art: 370. of our Constitution, does not bring about any alteration either m the framework or the fundamentals of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution.\n\nThe State Governor still continues to be the head of the Government aided by a council of ministers, and the only change effected is in his designation and the mode\n\n(J) [1967! 2 S.C.R. 762.\n\n-Of his appointment.\n\nIt is not as if the State Government, by such .a change, is made irresponsible to the State Legislature, or its fundamental character as a responsible Government is alterad.\n\nJust as a change m the designation of the head of that Government was earlier brought about by the introduction of the office -0f Sadar-i-Riyasat, so too a change had been brought about in his designation from that of Sadar-e-Riyasat to the Governor.\n\nThat was necessitated by reason of the Governor having been substituted in place of Sadar-e-Riyasat.\n\nThere is no quesfion of such a change being one in the character of that Government from a democratic to a non-dem9cratic system.\n\nA comprehensive argument, which was raised in Golaknath's case and with reforence to which the aforesaid observations were made, was not raised before us, and therefore, we are not required at present to go into it.\n\nMr. Garg drew our attention to els. (aa) and (b) o.f art. 367(4), as substituted by C.O. 74 of 1965 [The Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Second Amendment Order, 1965]. We have already set them out above.\n\nHe said that this was amendment of art. 370( 1) by the back-door and the President could not exercise these powers under art. 370(1) when he had not purported to exercise these powers under art. 3 70 ( 3). But, as we have already said, the explanation had become otiose and references to the Sadar-i-Riyasat in other parts of the Constitution had also become otiose.\n\nThere were two alternatives; first, either to leave the courts to interpret the words \"government of the State\" and give it its legal meaning, or secondly, to give the legal meaning in a definition clause.\n\nWhat has been done is that by adding els. ( aa) and (b) a definition is supplied which the Courts would have in any event given. Therefore, we do not agree that there has been any amendment of art. 370(1) by the back-door. - If we had regarded this as an amendment to art. 3 70 ( 1), then we would have to consider whether the amendatory powers had been validly exercised or not, but as we have said, we are not concerned with this question.\n\nIn conclusion we hold that the Amending Act was validly assented to by the Governor.\n\nComing to the second point urged by Mr. Garg, we are unable to appreciate how the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1967 delegates any legislative powers to anybody. It confers executive powers on the detaining authority by the insertion of the proviso to s. 8 to direct that the person detained may be informed that it would be against the public interest to communicate to him the grounds on wh.ich the\n\n<' H\n\ndetention order had been made.\n\nWhen the detaining authority chooses so to direct, it cannot be said that the detaining authority is exercising any legislative power.\n\nIn view of this matter it is not necessary to refer to various authorities of this Court where the question of delegation or excessive delegation of legislative powers has been considered.\n\nIt is also not necessary to dwell on the third point, namely, violation of arts. 21 and 22 of the Constitution because it is clear that they are excluded by art. 35 ( c) of the Constitution.\n\nRegarding the sixth point that the order of detention was not served or executed in accordance with law, we are unable to find any force in this point. The order expressly directed that the petitioner be detained in the Central jail, Srinagar, and the copy of the order was endorsed to Shri Abdul Majid Lone, Dy. S.P., Sopore, in duplicate, for execution of the order, as provided by s. 4 of the J ammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act.\n\nIt was urged by Mr. Garg that there is no endorsement below this note, but we are unable to see that the law requires that every copy forwarded should be signed by the detaining authority himself.\n\nThere is no doubt that the order was executed as directed.\n\nIt was suggested thats. 75(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code was violated, but it seems to us that s. 75 (1) has been clearly complied with inasmuch as the detention order is in writing and has been signed by the detaining authority.\n\nReference was made to s. 76, Cr. P.C., but this provision has no application.\n\nIt only applies when the Court directs that security be takem.\n\nThe fourth point is that the proviso to s. 8 inserted by ihe Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1967 is bad because it is in conflict withs. 103 of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution. It is quite clear that the legislature has no right to directly amend s. 103, nor has it the power to make the exercise by the High Court of its jurisdiction under s. 103 illusory. (See Prem Chand Garg v.\n\nExcise Commissioner U.P.('), where this Court struck down r. 12, 0. XXXV Suprem~ Court Rules on the ground that it retarded the assertion or vindication of the fundamental rights under art. 32.) Mr. Garg said that it was impossible for the detenu to satisfy the Court that\n\ne had 1?een unlawfully detained because he had been given no Jllformation whatsoever as to the reasons for his detention and to tell him that he had been detained to prevent him from cting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State is to tell him next to nothing, and it may be that the real grounds on which he had been detained have no relation to the security of the State.\n\nThere is some force in what Mr. Garg contends, but\n\n(!) [1963] Suppl. I S.C.R. 885.\n\nwe are unable to hold that this proviso is ultra vires because the proviso and the Act do not bar the High Court or this Court from looking into the validity of the detention. It should be remembend that in A. K. Gopa,/.an v. The State of Madras(!) s. 14 of the Preventive Detention Act was struck down.\n\nKania, CJ., observed on this point at page 130 :\n\n\"By that section the Court is prevented (except for the purpose of punishment for such disclosure) from being informed, either by a statement or by leading evidence, of the substance of the grounds conveyed to the detained person under section 7 on which the order was made, or of any representation made by him against such order. It also prevents the Court from calling upon any public officer to disclose the substance of those grounds or from the production of the proceedings or report of the advisory board which may be declared confidential.\n\nIt is clear that if this provision is permitted to stand the Court can have no material before it to determine whether the detention is proper or not.\n\nI do not mean whether the grounds are suffi. cient or not.\n\nIt even prevents the Court from ascertaining whether the alleged grounds of detention have anything to do with the circo1mstances or class or classes of cases mentioned in section 12 (1 )(a) or (b).\"\n\nBut fortunately there is no similar provision in this Act and it leaves the High Court and the Supreme Court free to exercise the jurisdiction by calling upon the State in appropriate cases to produce before it the grounds of detention and other material in order to satisfy itself that the detenu was being detained in accordance with law. If it were not so, we would have difficulty in sustaining the proviso.\n\nWe have looked into the file produced before us by the State\n\nand we are satisfied that the grounds on which the detenu has been detained have relevance to the security of the State. and with this also fails the fifth point raised by Mr. Garg that the G detaining authority had not applied its mind to the facts of the case.\n\nIn the result the petition foils and is dismissed\n\nG.C.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\n(I) [1950] S.C.R. 88.\n\nL736 Sup Cl/72-2500-21-J-73-GIPF.", "total_entities": 206, "entities": [{"text": "MC)HD. MAQBOOL DAMNOO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHD. MAQBOOL DAMNOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "1. D. DUA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 162, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 591, "end_char": 599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 910, "end_char": 921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 995, "end_char": 1009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 370(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1204, "end_char": 1218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "the State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1260, "end_char": 1290, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 370(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1642, "end_char": 1656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1664, "end_char": 1685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1728, "end_char": 1772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Conse'luential ahangcs were made in Article 370(i) of the Constitution of India and in the Explanation to the Arlicle the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was defined to mean the person for the time being recognised as the Sadar-i-Riyasat o1 Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers."}}, {"text": "Art. 370(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2191, "end_char": 2202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2210, "end_char": 2225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2238, "end_char": 2249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of\n\nIndia", "statute": "the Constitution of\n\nIndia"}}, {"text": "Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2299, "end_char": 2335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "370(1) of the Constitution of\n\nIndia, but Article 367 was amended to the effect that references to the Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir shall be construed as reference to the Governor of J ammu and Kashmir and reference to the Government of the said St'lte shall be constrncd as including references to the Governor of J ammu and Kashn1ir acting on the ad...-ice of his Council of Minist-ers."}}, {"text": "Kashn1ir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2530, "end_char": 2538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "370(1) of the Constitution of\n\nIndia, but Article 367 was amended to the effect that references to the Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir shall be construed as reference to the Governor of J ammu and Kashmir and reference to the Government of the said St'lte shall be constrncd as including references to the Governor of J ammu and Kashn1ir acting on the ad...-ice of his Council of Minist-ers."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2935, "end_char": 2945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of\n\nIndia", "statute": "the Constitution of\n\nIndia"}}, {"text": "Sadar-i-Riyasat \\Vho alone", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3110, "end_char": 3136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sadar-i-Riyasat \\Vho alone was mentioned as Head of the State in the Explanation to Article 370( I); (ii) that the proviso inserted by \"'ction 4( 2) in sub-section (I) of Section 8 of the Detention Act was bad because it suffcrred from excessi\\\"e delegation;\n\n(iii) that the<e had been violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution: (iv) that '3t any rate."}}, {"text": "Article 370( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3194, "end_char": 3209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of\n\nIndia", "statute": "the Constitution of\n\nIndia"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3281, "end_char": 3290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3409, "end_char": 3427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "M. M. DAMNOO V. J. & K. STATE 1015", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3594, "end_char": 3628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "03 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir; (v) that the\n\n/\" '\n\nM. M. DAMNOO V. J. & K. STATE 1015\n\ndetention order was bad because the detaining authority had not applied its mind; and (vi) that the order of detention was bad because it was not served or executed in accordance with law."}}, {"text": "Article 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3860, "end_char": 3871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "November 17, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4272, "end_char": 4289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What the State Government rs\n\nat a particular time bas to be determined in the context of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir.. The Explanation did no more than recognise the constitutional provision as it existed on that d\".lte and the Explanation as substituted from November 17, 1952 also did not more than recognise the constitutional provision in the State."}}, {"text": "Article 370(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4416, "end_char": 4430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 370(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4440, "end_char": 4454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4627, "end_char": 4638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 370(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4799, "end_char": 4810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4884, "end_char": 4901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "370(1) had ceased to operate because there was no longer any Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "Article 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5023, "end_char": 5034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5199, "end_char": 5210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1969] 2 S.C.R. 365", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5348, "end_char": 5367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5408, "end_char": 5419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5802, "end_char": 5812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5876, "end_char": 5895, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6270, "end_char": 6274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sadar-i- Riyasat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6336, "end_char": 6352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "quite clear from section's 26,... 27 and 28 of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution that the Sadar-i- Riyasat is really the name given to the Head of the State.", "canonical_name": "Sadar-i- Riyasat"}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6523, "end_char": 6533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Golaknath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6824, "end_char": 6833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1026 D-\n\n1027 CJ\n\n(d) The rule laid down in Golaknath's case was not attracted to the facts of the present case."}}, {"text": "Sadar-i-Riyasat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7424, "end_char": 7439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was necessitated bv reason of the Governor having been substituted\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT~\n\n[1972 J 2 S.C.R.\n\nin place of Sadar-i-Riyasat.", "canonical_name": "Sadar-i- Riyasat"}}, {"text": "article 367(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7680, "end_char": 7694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7851, "end_char": 7862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8674, "end_char": 8683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9068, "end_char": 9086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 35(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9137, "end_char": 9150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9366, "end_char": 9370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 75(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9394, "end_char": 9407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9517, "end_char": 9527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9691, "end_char": 9700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9799, "end_char": 9810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9941, "end_char": 9952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10039, "end_char": 10045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10989, "end_char": 10999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11007, "end_char": 11028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11075, "end_char": 11085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal, A. K. Gupta and R. K. Jain for the petitioner. '"}}, {"text": "A. K. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11102, "end_char": 11113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal, A. K. Gupta and R. K. Jain for the petitioner. '"}}, {"text": "R. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11118, "end_char": 11128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal, A. K. Gupta and R. K. Jain for the petitioner. '"}}, {"text": "Ishwar Si1agh Bakshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11152, "end_char": 11172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ishwar Si1agh Bakshi, Advocate-General for the State of Jammu and Kashmir, M. C. Chag/a, R. N. Sachthey and S. K. Dho/akia, c for the respondent. ."}}, {"text": "M. C. Chag", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11227, "end_char": 11237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ishwar Si1agh Bakshi, Advocate-General for the State of Jammu and Kashmir, M. C. Chag/a, R. N. Sachthey and S. K. Dho/akia, c for the respondent. ."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11241, "end_char": 11255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ishwar Si1agh Bakshi, Advocate-General for the State of Jammu and Kashmir, M. C. Chag/a, R. N. Sachthey and S. K. Dho/akia, c for the respondent. .", "canonical_name": "R. N. Sachthey"}}, {"text": "S. K. Dho", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11260, "end_char": 11269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ishwar Si1agh Bakshi, Advocate-General for the State of Jammu and Kashmir, M. C. Chag/a, R. N. Sachthey and S. K. Dho/akia, c for the respondent. ."}}, {"text": "!lliren Defor", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11301, "end_char": 11314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "!"}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthev", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11347, "end_char": 11361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lliren Defor the Attorney-General for India; R. N. Sachthev and Ram Panjwani, Advocates, with him. ·", "canonical_name": "R. N. Sachthey"}}, {"text": "Ram Panjwani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11366, "end_char": 11378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lliren Defor the Attorney-General for India; R. N. Sachthev and Ram Panjwani, Advocates, with him. ·"}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11448, "end_char": 11453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSikri, C.1."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11485, "end_char": 11492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "District Magistrate of Baramula", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11705, "end_char": 11736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 24, 1970, th'e District Magistrate of Baramula passed the impugned detention order in the following terms :\n\n\"OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT\n\nMAGISTRATE,\n\nBARAMULLA\n\nORDER\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "S. S. Rizvi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11898, "end_char": 11909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PDA/IMB/81 Dated 24-6-1970\n\nWhereas I, S. S. Rizvi, District Magistrate, Baramula, ain satisfied that with a view to preventing Mohammad Maqb!ool Damnoo s/s Ghulam Mohi-un-Din Damnoo alias Madha Joo r/o Sangrampora from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State, it is necessary so to do;\n\nNow, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 (2) read with section 5 of the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964, I, S. S. Rizvi, District Magistrate, Baramulla hereby direct that the said Mohammad Maqbool Damnoo be detained in the Cn tral Jail Srinagar, subject to such conditions as to mamtenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipli:ne as have been specified in the J & K Detenus General Order, 1968."}}, {"text": "Mohammad Maqb!ool Damnoo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11987, "end_char": 12011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PDA/IMB/81 Dated 24-6-1970\n\nWhereas I, S. S. Rizvi, District Magistrate, Baramula, ain satisfied that with a view to preventing Mohammad Maqb!ool Damnoo s/s Ghulam Mohi-un-Din Damnoo alias Madha Joo r/o Sangrampora from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State, it is necessary so to do;\n\nNow, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 (2) read with section 5 of the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964, I, S. S. Rizvi, District Magistrate, Baramulla hereby direct that the said Mohammad Maqbool Damnoo be detained in the Cn tral Jail Srinagar, subject to such conditions as to mamtenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipli:ne as have been specified in the J & K Detenus General Order, 1968.", "canonical_name": "Mohammad Maqb!ool Damnoo"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12224, "end_char": 12233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution challenging the detention of the petitioner under the J ammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964", "statute": "the Constitution challenging the detention of the petitioner under the J ammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12248, "end_char": 12257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution challenging the detention of the petitioner under the J ammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964", "statute": "the Constitution challenging the detention of the petitioner under the J ammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964"}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12265, "end_char": 12313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mohammad Maqbool Damnoo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12390, "end_char": 12413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PDA/IMB/81 Dated 24-6-1970\n\nWhereas I, S. S. Rizvi, District Magistrate, Baramula, ain satisfied that with a view to preventing Mohammad Maqb!ool Damnoo s/s Ghulam Mohi-un-Din Damnoo alias Madha Joo r/o Sangrampora from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State, it is necessary so to do;\n\nNow, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 (2) read with section 5 of the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964, I, S. S. Rizvi, District Magistrate, Baramulla hereby direct that the said Mohammad Maqbool Damnoo be detained in the Cn tral Jail Srinagar, subject to such conditions as to mamtenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipli:ne as have been specified in the J & K Detenus General Order, 1968.", "canonical_name": "Mohammad Maqb!ool Damnoo"}}, {"text": "Abdul Majid Lone", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12718, "end_char": 12734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sbri Abdul Majid Lone.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Majid Lone"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12807, "end_char": 12816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964", "statute": "the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964"}}, {"text": "Preventive Deiention Act, 1964", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12830, "end_char": 12860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13075, "end_char": 13079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Deiention Act, 1964", "statute": "Preventive Deiention Act, 1964"}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13091, "end_char": 13096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Deiention Act, 1964", "statute": "Preventive Deiention Act, 1964"}}, {"text": "July 11, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13262, "end_char": 13275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On E July 11, 1970, the Government having considered the order of detention, the report of the District Magistrate, the grounds on which tbe order had been."}}, {"text": "April F 10, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13554, "end_char": 13570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner sent an application to this Court dated April F 10, 1971 requesting that he be produced before this Court so as to enable him to file an appropriate writ challenging his detention."}}, {"text": "May 11, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13710, "end_char": 13722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court on May 11, 1971 directed that th}s application be treated as writ petition under art."}}, {"text": "art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13788, "end_char": 13795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Deiention Act, 1964", "statute": "Preventive Deiention Act, 1964"}}, {"text": "October 9, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14302, "end_char": 14317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 9, 1971, thi: amended writ petition was filed ltll this .Court."}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14423, "end_char": 14427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Garg, who appeared on behalf of the petitioner, raised the following points before us : ( 1) that the J ammu & Kashmir Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1967 (J&K Act VIII of 1967 )-hereinafter referred to as the Amending Actwas invalid as it was not assented to by the Sadar-i- Riyasat;\n\n(2) that the proviso inserted by s. 4(2) in sub-s. ( 1) of s. 8 is bad because it suffers from excessive delegation;\n\n(3) there has been violation oi Art.", "canonical_name": "Garg"}}, {"text": "s. 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14749, "end_char": 14756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14775, "end_char": 14779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14866, "end_char": 14873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14878, "end_char": 14885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14970, "end_char": 14976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15292, "end_char": 15298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of the State of Jammu & Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15376, "end_char": 15418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 70 of the Indian Constitution the only authority which is recognised as 'the Government of the State of Jammu & Kashmir is the Sadar-i-Riyasat, Article 370 contemplates that the Sadar-i-Riyasat would be •the head of th>~ State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly had no power to abolish the office of the Sadar-i-Riyasat."}}, {"text": "Article 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15443, "end_char": 15454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15555, "end_char": 15581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 70 of the Indian Constitution the only authority which is recognised as 'the Government of the State of Jammu & Kashmir is the Sadar-i-Riyasat, Article 370 contemplates that the Sadar-i-Riyasat would be •the head of th>~ State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly had no power to abolish the office of the Sadar-i-Riyasat."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15664, "end_char": 15669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15905, "end_char": 15926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16021, "end_char": 16040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Attorney-General, who appeared on behalf of the Government of India, and Mr. Chagla, who appeared for the State, contended that the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1965, which had received the assent of the Sadar-i-Riyasat, validly amended the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir and validly provided for the appointment of a Governor in place of the Sadar-i-Riyasat, and therefore, the Govemor was competent to give assent to the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1967."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16050, "end_char": 16056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Attorney-General, who appeared on behalf of the Government of India, and Mr. Chagla, who appeared for the State, contended that the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1965, which had received the assent of the Sadar-i-Riyasat, validly amended the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir and validly provided for the appointment of a Governor in place of the Sadar-i-Riyasat, and therefore, the Govemor was competent to give assent to the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1967."}}, {"text": "H. H.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16672, "end_char": 16677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. H.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPC!RTS\n\nthe Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir, in a letter dated Octor 26, 1947, addressed to His Excellency the Governor-General of India, offered to accede to the Dominion of India.. On October 27, 194 7, tlie Governor-General accepted the offer and made certain stipulations with which we are not concerned."}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16855, "end_char": 16872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. H.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPC!RTS\n\nthe Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir, in a letter dated Octor 26, 1947, addressed to His Excellency the Governor-General of India, offered to accede to the Dominion of India.. On October 27, 194 7, tlie Governor-General accepted the offer and made certain stipulations with which we are not concerned."}}, {"text": "October 27, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16878, "end_char": 16895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. H.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPC!RTS\n\nthe Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir, in a letter dated Octor 26, 1947, addressed to His Excellency the Governor-General of India, offered to accede to the Dominion of India.. On October 27, 194 7, tlie Governor-General accepted the offer and made certain stipulations with which we are not concerned."}}, {"text": "March 5, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17005, "end_char": 17018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 5, 1948, H. H. the Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir issued a proclamation forming a responsible Govt."}}, {"text": "H. H. the Maharaja of", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17020, "end_char": 17041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 5, 1948, H. H. the Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir issued a proclamation forming a responsible Govt."}}, {"text": "Jammu & Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17042, "end_char": 17057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 5, 1948, H. H. the Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir issued a proclamation forming a responsible Govt."}}, {"text": "June 20, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17297, "end_char": 17310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 20, 1949 Maharaja Sir Hari Singh entrusted his legjsJative, executive and judicial functions to his son, Yuvraj Karatll Singh for a temporary period~\n\nOn November 25, 1949 a proclamation was issued by Yuvraj Karan Singh directing that the Constitution of India to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India be adopted by the Constituent Assembly in so far as it was applicable in Jammu and Kashmir in order to govern the relationship of the State and the contemplated Union of India."}}, {"text": "Maharaja Sir Hari Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17311, "end_char": 17334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 20, 1949 Maharaja Sir Hari Singh entrusted his legjsJative, executive and judicial functions to his son, Yuvraj Karatll Singh for a temporary period~\n\nOn November 25, 1949 a proclamation was issued by Yuvraj Karan Singh directing that the Constitution of India to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India be adopted by the Constituent Assembly in so far as it was applicable in Jammu and Kashmir in order to govern the relationship of the State and the contemplated Union of India."}}, {"text": "Yuvraj Karatll Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17407, "end_char": 17427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 20, 1949 Maharaja Sir Hari Singh entrusted his legjsJative, executive and judicial functions to his son, Yuvraj Karatll Singh for a temporary period~\n\nOn November 25, 1949 a proclamation was issued by Yuvraj Karan Singh directing that the Constitution of India to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India be adopted by the Constituent Assembly in so far as it was applicable in Jammu and Kashmir in order to govern the relationship of the State and the contemplated Union of India.", "canonical_name": "Yuvraj Karatll Singh"}}, {"text": "November 25, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17456, "end_char": 17473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 20, 1949 Maharaja Sir Hari Singh entrusted his legjsJative, executive and judicial functions to his son, Yuvraj Karatll Singh for a temporary period~\n\nOn November 25, 1949 a proclamation was issued by Yuvraj Karan Singh directing that the Constitution of India to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India be adopted by the Constituent Assembly in so far as it was applicable in Jammu and Kashmir in order to govern the relationship of the State and the contemplated Union of India."}}, {"text": "Yuvraj Karan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17503, "end_char": 17521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 20, 1949 Maharaja Sir Hari Singh entrusted his legjsJative, executive and judicial functions to his son, Yuvraj Karatll Singh for a temporary period~\n\nOn November 25, 1949 a proclamation was issued by Yuvraj Karan Singh directing that the Constitution of India to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India be adopted by the Constituent Assembly in so far as it was applicable in Jammu and Kashmir in order to govern the relationship of the State and the contemplated Union of India.", "canonical_name": "Yuvraj Karatll Singh"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17541, "end_char": 17562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17796, "end_char": 17817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "November 26, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17833, "end_char": 17850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution of India was adopted on November 26, 1949 1md on the same date certain provisions came into force and the remaining provisions came into force on January 26, 1950."}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17955, "end_char": 17971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution of India was adopted on November 26, 1949 1md on the same date certain provisions came into force and the remaining provisions came into force on January 26, 1950."}}, {"text": "Article 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17974, "end_char": 17985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Jammu & Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18041, "end_char": 18065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 370 of the Constitution dealt with the relationship of the State of Jammu & Kashmir with the Union of India."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18075, "end_char": 18089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 370 of the Constitution dealt with the relationship of the State of Jammu & Kashmir with the Union of India."}}, {"text": "Article 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18092, "end_char": 18103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18204, "end_char": 18214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18252, "end_char": 18278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) Notwithstanding anything in this Const:itution,-\n\n(a) the provision of article 23 8 shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir;\n\n(b) the power of arliament to make laws for the F said State shall be limited to--\n\n(i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the Presiden~ to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession G governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for tha~ State; and\n\n(ii) such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of R f the ."}}, {"text": "Government of R f the . State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18813, "end_char": 18842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) Notwithstanding anything in this Const:itution,-\n\n(a) the provision of article 23 8 shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir;\n\n(b) the power of arliament to make laws for the F said State shall be limited to--\n\n(i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the Presiden~ to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession G governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for tha~ State; and\n\n(ii) such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of R f the ."}}, {"text": "Kas\\lmir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19049, "end_char": 19057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Explanation-For the purposes of this article the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the President as the Maharaj a of J ammu and Kas\\lmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers for the time being in office under the Maharaja's proclamation dated the fifth day of March, 1948;\n\n(c) the provisions of article (1) and of this article shall apply in relation to that State;\n\n(d) such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that State subject to such excptions and modifications as the President may by order specify :\n\nProvided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession of the Sta~ referred to in paragraph (i) of sub-clause (b) shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the State;\n\nProvided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred to in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government."}}, {"text": "fifth day of March, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19180, "end_char": 19204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Explanation-For the purposes of this article the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the President as the Maharaj a of J ammu and Kas\\lmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers for the time being in office under the Maharaja's proclamation dated the fifth day of March, 1948;\n\n(c) the provisions of article (1) and of this article shall apply in relation to that State;\n\n(d) such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that State subject to such excptions and modifications as the President may by order specify :\n\nProvided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession of the Sta~ referred to in paragraph (i) of sub-clause (b) shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the State;\n\nProvided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred to in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government."}}, {"text": "June 10,\n\n1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21000, "end_char": 21014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 10,\n\n1952 the Basic Principles Committee of Jammu and Kaslun!r Constituent Assembly submitted 1Jhe interim report to the Constituent Assembly and recommended that :-\n\n(a) the form of the future constitution of Jammu & Kashmir shall be wholly democratic,\n\n( b) the institution of hereditary Rulership shall be terminated, and\n\n( c) the office of the Head of .the State shall be elective."}}, {"text": "Basic Principles Committee of Jammu and Kaslun!r Constituent", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21019, "end_char": 21079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 10,\n\n1952 the Basic Principles Committee of Jammu and Kaslun!r Constituent Assembly submitted 1Jhe interim report to the Constituent Assembly and recommended that :-\n\n(a) the form of the future constitution of Jammu & Kashmir shall be wholly democratic,\n\n( b) the institution of hereditary Rulership shall be terminated, and\n\n( c) the office of the Head of .the State shall be elective."}}, {"text": "12th June, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21581, "end_char": 21596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following part of the resolution is rele\".ant : c\n\n\"Now, therefore, in pursuance of the resolution, dated the 12th June, 1952, and having considered the report of the Drafting Committee, this Assembly resolves:\n\n1. ("}}, {"text": "November 15, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22568, "end_char": 22585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 15, 1952, the President made Order No."}}, {"text": "art. 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22705, "end_char": 22713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "17th day of November, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22844, "end_char": 22870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "370) the Presidenn, on the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State of J arnmu and Kashmir, declared that, as from the 17th day of November, 1952, the said art."}}, {"text": "art. 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22881, "end_char": 22889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of the State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23082, "end_char": 23105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) thereof, the following Explanation is substituted, namely :-\n\n\"Explanation.-F or the purposes of this article, the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the President on the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the State as the Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers of the State for the time being in office.\""}}, {"text": "May 14, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23377, "end_char": 23389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D On May 14, 1954, in exercise of the powers conferred by cl. ("}}, {"text": "art. 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23442, "end_char": 23450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23811, "end_char": 23818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 361", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24472, "end_char": 24480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24765, "end_char": 24773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sadari-Riyasat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25209, "end_char": 25223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "367 was added the following clause, namely :-\n\n\"( 4) For the purposes of this Constitution as it applies in relation to rhe State of Jammu and Kashmir- ( a) reference to this Constitution or to the provisions thereof shall be construed as references to the Constitution or the provisions thereof as applied in relation to the said State;\n\n(b) references to the Govemment of the said State shall be construed as including references to the Sadari-Riyasat acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers ......... \"\n\nTo art.", "canonical_name": "Sadar-i- Riyasat"}}, {"text": "art. 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25289, "end_char": 25297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25410, "end_char": 25436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "368 was added the following proviso:\n\n\"Provided further that no such amendment shall have effect in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir unless applied by order of the President under clause (1) of article 370.\""}}, {"text": "article 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25498, "end_char": 25509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "November 17, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25720, "end_char": 25737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 17, 1956 the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution was adopted."}}, {"text": "January 26. 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25874, "end_char": 25890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some sections came into force on that date and the remaining sections cme into force on January 26."}}, {"text": "November 6, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25896, "end_char": 25912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 6, 1957 Karan Singh was elected Sadar-i-Riyasat for the second time."}}, {"text": "Karan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25913, "end_char": 25924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 6, 1957 Karan Singh was elected Sadar-i-Riyasat for the second time."}}, {"text": "October 31, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25977, "end_char": 25993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 31, 1962, Karan Singh was elected Sadar-i-Riyasat for the third time."}}, {"text": "April 10, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26059, "end_char": 26073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 10, 1965 Jarnmu and Kashmir Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1965 received the assent of the Sadar-i-Riyasat."}}, {"text": "November 24, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26182, "end_char": 26199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 24, 1965, the President, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of art."}}, {"text": "art. 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26269, "end_char": 26277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of the State of Jammu. and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26328, "end_char": 26373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "370 of the Constitution, with the concurrence of 11he Government of the State of Jammu."}}, {"text": "art. 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26511, "end_char": 26519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27430, "end_char": 27438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27654, "end_char": 27658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mr.\n\nGarg, this is the king\"pin of the whole relationship between the Vnion of India and the State of Jammu and Kashmir.", "canonical_name": "Garg"}}, {"text": "Vnion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27719, "end_char": 27733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mr.\n\nGarg, this is the king\"pin of the whole relationship between the Vnion of India and the State of Jammu and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28116, "end_char": 28137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "art. 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28144, "end_char": 28152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28157, "end_char": 28165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28515, "end_char": 28523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 370(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29065, "end_char": 29079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 370(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29084, "end_char": 29098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29267, "end_char": 29278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29527, "end_char": 29535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 370(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29552, "end_char": 29563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 370(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29800, "end_char": 29811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 370(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29925, "end_char": 29936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30233, "end_char": 30241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30553, "end_char": 30559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30772, "end_char": 30779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30943, "end_char": 30948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 158", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31449, "end_char": 31455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31519, "end_char": 31538, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S.\n\n1977", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31540, "end_char": 31548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31716, "end_char": 31721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32250, "end_char": 32255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32569, "end_char": 32579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32633, "end_char": 32638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32889, "end_char": 32894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 26 and 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33196, "end_char": 33209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33423, "end_char": 33431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33582, "end_char": 33592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "368 of the Constitution and it is contended that the said expression has a positive and a negative content and that in exercise of the power of amendment Parliament cannot destroy the structure of the Constitution, but it can only modify the provisions thereof within the framework of the original instrument for its better effectuation."}}, {"text": "Sadar-e-Riyasat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35308, "end_char": 35323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was necessitated by reason of the Governor having been substituted in place of Sadar-e-Riyasat.", "canonical_name": "Sadar-i- Riyasat"}}, {"text": "art. 367(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35727, "end_char": 35738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 370( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35930, "end_char": 35942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 370(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36016, "end_char": 36027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36085, "end_char": 36091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 370(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36663, "end_char": 36674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36738, "end_char": 36744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37277, "end_char": 37281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "arts. 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37866, "end_char": 37881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37948, "end_char": 37955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Srinagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38217, "end_char": 38225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order expressly directed that the petitioner be detained in the Central jail, Srinagar, and the copy of the order was endorsed to Shri Abdul Majid Lone, Dy."}}, {"text": "Abdul Majid Lone", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38274, "end_char": 38290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order expressly directed that the petitioner be detained in the Central jail, Srinagar, and the copy of the order was endorsed to Shri Abdul Majid Lone, Dy.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Majid Lone"}}, {"text": "Sopore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38302, "end_char": 38308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.P., Sopore, in duplicate, for execution of the order, as provided by s. 4 of the J ammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38367, "end_char": 38371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38390, "end_char": 38422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38782, "end_char": 38787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "s. 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38940, "end_char": 38945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39101, "end_char": 39105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "s. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39336, "end_char": 39342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "s. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39430, "end_char": 39436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39657, "end_char": 39664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40470, "end_char": 40475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40526, "end_char": 40531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kania, CJ.,"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40812, "end_char": 40821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41510, "end_char": 41520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 41634, "end_char": 41647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But fortunately there is no similar provision in this Act and it leaves the High Court and the Supreme Court free to exercise the jurisdiction by calling upon the State in appropriate cases to produce before it the grounds of detention and other material in order to satisfy itself that the detenu was being detained in accordance with law."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_2_937_947_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "STATE OF PUNJAB\n\nM/S. ASSOCIATED HOTELS OF INDIA LTD.\n\nJanuary 4, 1972\n\n[S . .M. S!KRI, C.J., J. M. SHELAT, I. D. DuA, H. R. KHANNA\n\nAND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]\n\n S11les-rt1.t-Sale and contract of H'ork and serl'ice-Distinction nnd fC'SIS,\n\nThe respondent-company was running the business of a hotelier and was registered as a dealer under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act 1948. lt applied for a declaration that it was not liable to sales-tax in 'respect\n\nof meals served to the guests staying in the hotel on the grounds that :\n\n(1) the hotel receives guests primarily for the purpose of lodging;. (2) when so receil\"zd the management provides him with a number of amenities including meals at fixed hours, incidental to such lodging and with a view to render his stay comfortable; (3) the transaction between the respondent and the guests is one for the latter to stay and not one of sale of food stuffs supplied; ( 4) the bill given by the respondent and paid by the guest is one and indivisible, being a fixed amount per day during his stay in the hotel and does not consist of separate items in respect of the several amenities furnished to him, and (5) the transaction does not envisage any sale of food since the guest cannot demand a rebate or deduction if he were to miss a meal or meals nor is he entitled to carry a\\vay or deal with. in any n1anner, the food sen1ed on his table if a part of it is not consumed.\n\nThe dcpartmi.:nt rejected the companys npplication but the High Court allowed its writ petition.\n\nDisn1issing the appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : The transaction is one essentially of sorvice in the performance of which and as part of the amenities incidental to that service, the h~1teli'i!r se1ves n1eals at stated hours.\n\nThe Revenue, the'refore, was not entitled to split up the transaction into two parts one of service and the other of sale of food stuffs and to split up the bill charged as consisting of charges for lodging and charges for food stuffs sel'\\\"Od with a view to bring the latter uml•\" the Act.[947 F-G]\n\nThe distinction between a 'Contract of sale and a contract of work and service is fine especially when the contract is a composite one iiivoTving both.\n\nIn considering whether a transaction is a sale falling within the purview of sales-tax 1t is necessary to determine the nature of the contract involved on the facts of each case.\n\nA coniract of sale is one whose main object is the transfer of property and delivery of possesi; ion of a chattel to the buyer: but the mere passing of property in an arti- (:}c or con1moditY during the course of .tlrperfonnance of a tf'3nsaction does not render It a transaction of sale when there is no intention to sdl and purchase.· When the principal object of work undertaken bv the payee of the p'rk,. is not the transfer of a chattel qua chattel tlie contract is one of work and labour. The test is whether or not the work or labour bestowed ends in anything that can properly become the subject ,, f sak: neither the ownership of the matcriah nor the value of the skill\n\n938 stlilltfii:E Ci'.l'UltT REPO!l TS\n\n(1972] 2 S.C.R.\n\nand labour as \"; o_Jllpared with the value of materials is conclusive, although such matters may be taken into consideration.\n\nIn every case the court would M\\re to find out what is the primary object of the transactibtl and the intention of the parties while cnbzring into it. L942 D-G:\n\n944 F-G. HJ\n\nThe fransaction in the present case is one and indivisible, namely, one of receiving .a customer in. the. hotel to stay. The bill is not capable of being split up into one for residence and another for sale of meals.\n\nJl.ll!enities ittduding m<!al&, are µart and parcel of the ser\\>ice which, iri reality; is the transaction between the parties.\n\nEven if it was. to be disintegfatect the Stipplv of meals during such stav does not constitute\n\n~ sepat'iite coiifr'_act of sale, since no intention on the part of the parties ti> sell nl!d J)utchase the foild stuffs supplied durin.g meal time can be spelt out. ~945 G-H; 946 A-CJ\n\n. Mar/ras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. Ltd., i 1959] S.C.R. 379, Mohan/al J'.D1iflil1 Rice & Atill Mills. v. Assdm [1953] 4 S:f.C. 129, Masanda & Co. v.\n\nIJ6tfllltf~Ofl~ of Saler-lax, f,1957] 8 S.T.C. 370, United Bleachers .Ltd. v.\n\nMilifl\"~. (1960) 9 S.'I'.C. 278, Krishna & Co. Ltd. v. Andhra Pradesh.\n\n[1956] 7 S.T.C. 26, Palllaik & Co. v.\n\nOrisa. [19651 16 S.T.C. 364, Andhra Pradesh v. Grmtur Tobaccos Ltd. [1%5] 2 S.C.R. 167 and English\n\nLaw atld United States Law, referrea to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISOICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1207 of 1968.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May I 0, 1967 of the PunjaQ and Haryana High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 159 of 1966.\n\nV. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey., for the appellants.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, M. C. Bha11dare, Rameshwar Nath, T. R.\n\nBhasin and Lalit Bhasin, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSlf'el:tt; J, The respondent-company carries on . business as\n\nff()tl!lirs and conducts several hotels including lhe 'Cecil Hotel' dt Simla. mSides cohducting hotels, it also carries on restaurant 6ttsiness. Ag part of its business as hoteliers, the company receives guests in its several hotels to whom, besides furnishing fodging, it also serves seeral other amenities, such as public and f}rivate room, brtth with liot and cold running water, linen, meals during stated hours etc.\n\nThe bill tendered to the guest is an all inclusive olte, that is to say, a fixed amount for the stay in the hotel for each day and does not contain different items of each of the aforesaid amenities.\n\nThat is, however, not the case in its i'estnill'i!nt. busilte~ where a cusfolner takes his meal consisting either of it'errts or fobd of liis clioice or a fixed menu. The primary functfoh of such a restautiltlt is to etve meals desifed 6~ a\n\ncllstonl.et, alllltiu!lft rtlbttg witH ttle foot!, tile cuktbmer gl'its ceffllih othet amenities also, such as seNil:e, litten ek, tlie bill \\icli\n\nthe customer pays is for the various food items which he consumes or at a definite rate for the fixed menu, as the case may be, which presumably takes into account service and other related amenities.\n\nThe respondent-company, as such hoteliers, has been registered as a dealer under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, XL VI of 1948 and has been filing quarterly returns and paying sales tax under that Act.\n\nOn September 2, 1958 the company applied for a declaration that it was not liable to pay sales tax in respect of meals served in the said Cecil Hotel to the guests coming there for stay.\n\nIn support of its plea, the company raised the following contentions : ( 1) that the hotel receives guests primarily for the purpose of lodging, ( 2) that when so received, the management provides him with a number of amenities incidental to such lodging and with a view to render his stay in the hotel comfortable in\n\n.uding meals at fixed hours, ( 3) that the transaction between the c<Jmpany and such a guest is one for the latter to stay and not one of sale of food stuffs supplied as one of the incidental amenities, ( 4) that the bill given by the company and paid by the guest is one and indivisible, that is, a fixed amount per day during his stay in the hotel and does not consist of separate items in respect of the several amenities furnished to him including meals served to him, and ( 5) that the transaction so entered into does not envisage any sale of food since the guest cannot demand a rebate or deduction if he were to miss a meal or meals, nor is he entitled to carry away or deal with in any manner the food served at his table, if a part of it remains unconsumed.\n\nIt is, on the other hand, the management which has the right to deal with such unconsumed remainder as it likes.\n\nSuch a position, therefore, is inconsistent with a sale under which the property in the whole must pass to the purchaser, and who can deal with the remainder in any manner he likes.\n\nThe Sales Tax Officer rejected the company's application on the ground that the transaction which takes place between the\n\nmanasement and a resident guest takes in both lodging and boarding and the hotel charges include consideration for both.\n\nA revision under s. 21 of the Act by the company to the Commissioner met the same fate.\n\nThe company then filed a writ petition for an order quas'.\\ing the said decision as also the notices issued by the Sale.s Tax authorities under the Act.\n\nThe grounds put forward in the writ petition were almost the same which the company had previously urged in its application for declaration.\n\nThere was no dispute regarding the facts stated in the writ petition and particularly with regard to the fact that the transaction whic~ a. \".iiting reident e.nters into with the management is one !111~ !nd1v1S1ble, that the bill charged ori him is likewise one and m~1v1s1ble, that .the chages are for each day of stay, and that that bemg so, the bill was mcapable of being split up into separate chai:g~~ for ech of the amnities furnished and availed of by such a VISltmg resident.\n\nThe dispute was as to the nature of the transaction and whether such transaction included sale of food stuff supplied at various meals supplied to such a customer.\n\nThe High Court, on a consideration of the arguments urged before it and relying mainly upon the decision of this Court in Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley and Ccr. Ltd.('), to the effect that where a transaction is one and indivisible it cannot be split up so as to attract the Sales Tax Act to a part of it, allowed the writ petition.\n\nIt held that a transaction between a hotelier and his resident visitor did not involve a sale of food when the fonner supplied meals to the latter as one .of the. amenities during his residence, and that if there was one inclusive bill, it was incapable of being split up in the absence of any rates for the meals agreed to between the parties as part of the transaction between the two.\n\nThe High Comt also held that the transaction was primarily one for lodging, that the board supplied by the management amounted to an amenity considered essential in these days in all properly conducted hotels, and that when so supplied, it could not be said to constitute a sale every time a meal was served to such a resident visitor.\n\nThis appeal, by special leave, is filed against this view of the High Court.\n\nThe question in this appeal, it would appear, arises in the present form for the first time.\n\nThere are, therefore, no previous decisions to guide its detennination.\n\nIt would, however, be helpful to consider certain decisions both of this Court as also of the High Courts, in which different types of transactions which came up before them for consideration in sales tax cases have been dealt with and which might throw some light upon the problem before us. ·\n\n, In a case arising under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 194 7 though there was no express sale in respect of gunny bags in which rice, an exempted commodity, was supplied to Government, they were held to form assessable turnover.\n\nThere was, however, in that case evidence that the assessees had charged the Government for those bags (Mohan/al Jogani Rice & Atta Mills\n\nv. Assam)(\").\n\nIn D. Masanda and Co. v.\n\nCommissioner of Sales Tax( 8 ), the question was whether photographic materials imported and\n\n(l) [1959] S.C.R. 379.\n\n(2) [1953J 4 S.T.C. 129.\n\n(3) [195 -.11 s S.T.C. 370. !\n\n\\ A\n\nPUNJAB v. ASSOCIATED HOTELS (She/al, J.) 941\n\nused in the process of manufacturing photographic work, copies of which were supplied by the assessee to a customer, was a transaction involving sale of those materials.\n\nThe High Court held that such a transaction did not cease to be a sale merely because the materials were not sold directly in their original form but in another fom1, forming the components of the finished product, namely, the copies of the photograph, and that the transaction was not merely the performance of skilled services but the supply of finished goods.\n\nThis was, however, a border line case.\n\nThe transaction might well be coosidered as one of service, during performance of which, a transfer of certain materials, in respect of which there was no contract for sale, either express or implied, may be said to have taken place.\n\nAn illustration of such a kind is furnished by the case of United Bleachers Ltd. v. Madras(').\n\nIn that case the assessee bleached and dyed, calendered, pressed and folded unbleached yarn and cloth manufactured by his customer textile mills.\n\nThe bills issued by the assessee contained, (a) bleaching charges, and (b) charges for stitching, folding, stamping, baling etc., but did not contain separately charges for the materials used for those purposes.\n\nThe Revenue contended that there was transfer of those materials and separately assessed the charges of those materials holding that though the assessee did not specifically deal in those materials, a portion of the profit earned in the business of bleaching and calendering could legitimately be attributed to the packing materials and the transaction involved a sale of them for consideration.\n\nOn a reference, the High Court held that the case was one of contract of service as distinguished from a sale of a principal commodity, such as rice in Assam case (supra) and salt in Varasuki and Co. v. Madras(').\n\nOn the other hand, where a contract is to supply such commodity in a packed condition, it coufd be inferred, though the contract might not be express that the intention of the parties was to give and accept delivery of the goods in a packed condition and not to take the principal commodity alone so that in the contract of sale of such a commodity there was implicit the sale of packing material as well.\n\nEven in a contract of service such as bleaching and calendering where the goods after such processing are delivered packed a sale of packing materials is possible, quite apart from the contract of service.\n\nThe question in such cases would be one of evidence, whether there is such a contract besides the one of service.\n\nWhere however there are no such distinct contracts and the contract is one and indivisible, the essential part of which is one of service, packing would be part of or incidental to the service, and unless an intention to charge for the materials used in the packing can be spelt out, the Revenue would not be\n\n(I) [1960] 9 S.T.C. 278. (2)\n\n[1950] 2 S.T.C. 1.\n\nentitled to split up the contract, estimate approximately the charges for such materials and treat them as chargeable on the mere ground that the transaction involved transfer of packing materials, whose value must have been taken into consideration while fixing charges for the service.\n\nSuch an implied contract of supply of packing materials was inferred in a contract of service, namely. drying raw tobacco in Krishna and Co. Ltd. v. A ndhra Pradesh ('1). But the decision in that case did not rest on there being a transfer of packing materials in favour of the customer.\n\nThere was evidence that such a transfer was for consideration, inasmuch as the amounts charged as remuneration for service also contained charges for the packing materials though such charges were not separately shown in the assessee's accounts.\n\nIn such a state of evidence it would be possible for the Court to infer a separate implied contract of sale of packing materials and not as part of the service of drying raw tobacco and delivering it in packed condition.\n\nThe difficulty which the Courts have often to meet with in construing a contract of work and labour, on the one hand, and a contract for sale, on the other, arises because the distinction between the two is very often a fine one.\n\nThis is particularly so when the contract is a composite one involving both a contract of work and labour and a contr<ict of sale.\n\nNevertheless, the distinction between the two rests on a clear principle.\n\nA contract of sale is one whose main object is the transfer of property in, and the delivery of the possession of, , i chattel as a chattel to the buyer.\n\nWhere the principal object of work undertaken by the payee of the price is not the transfer of a chattel qua chattel, the contract is one of work and labour.\n\nThe test is whether or not the work and labour bestowed end in anything that can properly become the subject of sale; neither the ownership of materials, nor the value of the skill and labour as compared with the value of the rnhterials, is conclusive, although such matters may be taken into consideration ir. determining. in the circumstances of a particular case, whether the contractis in substance one for work and labour or one for. the sale o.f a chattel( 2 ).\n\nIn Pa!naik and Co. v.\n\nOrissa('). a difference of opi:nion arose because of the fine distinction between the two types of contract.\n\nThe contract there was for constructing and fixing bus bodies on the chassis supplied by the Orissa Govermnent.\n\nThe contract, inter alia, provided that the appellants were to constr11ct the bus bodies in the most substantial and workmanlike manner\n\n(1) [1956) 7 S.T.C. 26.\n\n(1) • Halsbury's Lah's of E11g/1111d. 3rd Ed. Vol. 34, 6-7.\n\n(J) [1965] 16 S.T.C. 364.\n\nboth as regards materials and otherwise in every respect in strict compliance with the specifications and should deliver them to the Governor on or before the dates specified therin.\n\nThe majority rejected the contention that that was a contract of work and labour and held that the transaction was one of sale.\n\nThe question primarily was one of construction of the contract, and the majority held that both the agreement and the .sale related to one kind of property, namely, the bus bodies.\n\nThe reason for so holding was stated to be that it was clear from the contract that the property in the bus bodies did not pass on their being constructed on the chassis, but only when the vehicles including the bus bodies were delivered.\n\nSuch a contract was unlike a building contract or a contract under which a movable is to be fixed on to another chattel or on the land, where the intention plaioly\n\nis not to sell that article but to improve the land or the other chattel and the consideration is not for the transfer of the chattel but for the work and labour done and the materials furnished.\n\nThe contract in question was to manufacture a bus body and fix it on the chassis supplied and transfer the bus body so constructed for consideration.\n\nIn Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley and Co. Ltd.(') the main question was as regards the vires of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939. as amended by Madras Act XXV of 1947 which widened the definition of 'sale' by including, inter alia, in it a transfer of property in the goods involved in the execution of a works contract.\n\nUnder this definition, the Sales Tax authority bniught into chargeable turnover the materials used in the construction works carried out by the company.\n\nThis Court held that a power to enact a law with respect to tax on sale of goods under entry 48 of List II in the 1935 Constitution Act must, to be inJra vires, be one relating in fact to a sale of goods and that a Provmcial Legislature could not, in the purported exercise of its power, tax transaciions which were not sale;, by enacting that they should be deemed to sales, that to construe a transaction as sale there should be an agreement relating to goods to be supplied by passing title in those goods, and that it was of the essence of such a concept that both the agreement and the sale should relate to one and the same subject matter.\n\nThe conclusion arrived at was that in a building contract, even if it were to be disintegrated. there was no passing of title in the materials as movables in favour of the other party of the contract.\n\nThe contract was one and indivisible, there was no sale of materials, and consequently, there was no question ot title to the materials used by the builders passing to the other party to the contract.\n\nEven where the thing produced under a contract is movable property, the materials in-\n\n(ll !1959]1.S.C.R. 379.\n\n.corporated into it might pass as a movable.\n\nBut there would be no taxable sale if there was no agreement to sell the materials as such.\n\nIn arriving at this conclus10n, the Court relied upon Appleby v. Myres( 11 ), and the. observations of Blackbum, J., at 659-660 of the report to show that thread stitchetl into a coat which is under repair becomes part of the coat, but in a contract for repairing the coat the P'!rties surely did not enter into an agreement of sale of that thread. In Andhra Pradesh v. Guntur Tobaccos Ltd. (2). the transaction was for redrying tobacco entrusted to the respondent-company by its customers.\n\nThe process involved the keeping of the moisture content of tobacco leaf at a .particular level and for that purpose the leaf had to be packed in bales, in water-proof packing material, as it emerged from the reconditioning plant.\n\nThe tobacco was then returned to the customer packed in costly packing material.\n\nIn the company's charges for redrying there was no separate charge for the value of such packing material.\n\nIt was held that the redrying process could not be completed without the use of the packing material, that packing formed an integral part of that process, .and that although the redried tobacco wa! returned together with the packing materials there was no sale of those materials as there was no intention on the part of the parties to enter into any transaction of sale as regards those materials.\n\nThe mere fact that in such a contract of work or service property in goods which belonged to the party performing service or executing the work stands transferred to the other party is not enough.\n\nTo constitute a taxable sale, the Revenue has to establish that there was a sale, distinct from the contract of work or service, of the property so passing to the other party.\n\nThus, in considering whethr a transaction falls within the purview of sales tax, it becomes necessary at the threshold to determine the nature of the contract involved in such a transac- tion for the purpose of ascertaining whether it constitutes a contract of sale or a contract of work or service. If it is of the latter kind it obviously would not attract the tax.\n\nFrom the decisions earlier cited it clearly emerges that such determination depends in each case upon its facts and circumstances.\n\nMere passing of property in an article or commodity during the course of the performance of the transaction in question does not render it a transaction of sale.\n\nFor, even in a contract purely of .work or service, it is possible that articles may have to be used by the person executing the work and property in such articles or materials may pass to the other party.\n\nThat would not necessarily convert the contract into one of sale of these materials.\n\nJn every case the Court would have to find out what was the prima.ry\n\n(!) (1867) L.R. 2 C.P. ~<1\n\n(2) [1965] 2 S.C.R. 167.\n\nobject of the transaction and the intention of the parties while entering into it. It may in some cases be that even while entering into a contract of work or even service, parties might enter into separate agreements, one of work and service and the other of sale and purchase of materials to be used in the course of executing the work or performing the service.\n\nBut, then in such cases the transaction would not be one and indivisible, but would fall into two separate agreements, one of work or service and the other of sale.\n\nWhat precisely then is the nature of the transaction and the intention of the parties wheQ a hotelier receives a guest in his hotel ? Is there in that transaction an intention to sell him food contained in the meals served to him during his stay in the hotel ?\n\nIt stands to reason that during such stay a well equipped hotel would have to furnish a number of amenities to render the customer's stay comfortable.\n\nIn the supply of such amenities do the hotelier and his customer enter into several contracts every time an amenity is furnished ? When a traveller, by plane or by steam-ship, purchases his passage-ticket, the transaction is one for his passage from one place to another.\n\nIf, in the course of carrying out that transaction, the traveller is supplied with drinks or meals or cigarettes, no one would think that the transaction involyes separate sales each time any of those things is supplied.\n\nThe transaction is essentially one of carrying the passenger to his destination and if in performance of the contract of carriage something is supplied to him, such supply is only incidental to that services, not changing either the pattern or the nature of the contract.\n\nSimilarly, when clothes are given for washing to a Iaundery, there is a transaction which essentially involves work or service, and if the launderyman stitches a button to a garment which has fallen off, there is no sale of the button or the thread.\n\nA number of such cases involving incidental uses of materials can be cited, none of which can be said to involve a sale as part of the main transaction ..\n\nThe transaction in question is es_sentially one and indivisible. namely, one of receiving a customer in the hotel to stay.\n\nEven if the transaction is to be disintegrated, there is no question of the supply of meals durirrg such stay constituting a separate contract of sale, since no intention on the part of the parties to sell and purchase food stuff supplied during meal times can be realistically\n\nspelt out.\n\nNo doubt, the customer, during his stay, consumes a number of food stuffs. It may be possible to say that the pro perty in those food stuffs passes from the hotelier to the customer\n\nat least to the extent of the food stuffs consumed by him.\n\nEven if that be so, mere transfer of property,\" as aforesaid, is not conclusive and does not render the event of snch supply and con-\n\n946 SUt'REME COURT REPORTS\n\n\nsumption a sale, since there is no intention to sell and purhase. The transaction essentially is one of service by the hotelier in the performance of which meals are served as part of and incidental to that service, such amenities being regarded as essential in all well conducted modern hotels.\n\nThe bill prepared by the hotelier is one and indivisible, not being capable by approximation of being split up into one for residence and the other for meals.\n\nNo doubt, such a bill would be prepaed after consideration of the costs of meals, but that would be so for all the other amenities given to the customer.\n\nFor example, when the customer uses a fan in the room allotted to him, there is surely no sale of electricity, nor a hire of the fan.\n\nSuch amenities, including that of meals, are part and parcel of service which is in reality the transaction between the parties.\n\nEven in the case of restaurants and other such places where customers go to be served with food. and drink for immediate consumption at the premises, two conflicting views appear to prevail in the American courts.\n\nAccording to one view, an implied warranty of wholesomeness and fitness for human consumption arises in the case of food served by a public eating place.\n\nThe transaction, in this view, constitutes a sale within the rules giving rise to such a warranty.\n\nThe nature of the contract in the sale of food by a restaurant to customers implies a reliance, it is said, on the skill and judgment of the restaurant-keeper to furnish food fit for human consumption.\n\nThe other view is that such an implied warranty does not arise in such transactions.\n\nThis view is based on the theory that the transaction does not constitute a sale inasmuch as the proprietor of an eating place does not sell but \"utters\" provisions, and that it is the service that is predomill!lnt, the passing of title being merely incidental (11). The two conflicting views present a choice between liability arising from a contract of implied warranty and for negligence in tort, a choice ihdicative of a conflict, in the words of Dean Pound, between social interest in the safety of an individual and the individul interest of the supplier of food.\n\nThe principle accepted in cases where warranty has been spelt out was that even though the transaction is not a sale, the basis for an implied warranty is the justifiable reliance on the judgment or skill of the warrantor and that a sale is not the only transaction in which such a warranty can be implied.\n\nThe relationship between the dispenser of food and one who consumes it on the premises is one of contractual relationship, a relationship of such a nature that an implied warranty of wholesomeness reflects the reality of the transaction involved and an express obligation understood by the parties in the sense that the customer does, in fact, rel~' upon such dispenser\n\n(I) Corpus Juri~ Sccundu111, VoJ. 77, 1215~1216.\n\nPUNJAB v. A&sOCIATED HOTELS (She[at, J.) 947\n\nof food for more than the use of due care. (see Cushing v Rodman('). A representative case propoundin~ the opposite view is the case of F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Wilson( ), citing Nisley v.\n\nChilds Co.('), wherein the principle accepted was that such cases involved no sales but only service and that the dispenser of food, such as a restaurant or a drug store keeper serving food for consumption at the premises did not sell and warrant food but uttered and served it and was liable in negligence, the rule in such cases being caveat emptor.\n\nIn England, a hotel under the Hotel Proprietors Act, 1956 is an establishment held out by the proprietor as offering food, drink, and if so required, sleeping accommodation, without special contract, to any traveller presenting himself and who appears able and willing to pay a reasonable sum for the services and facilities provided. This definition, which is also the definition of an inn, still excludes, as formerly, boarding houses, lodging houses and public houses which are merely alehouses and in none of which there is the obligation to receive and entertain guests.\n\nAn innkeeper, that is to say, in the present days a hotel proprietor, m his capacity as an inkeeper is, on the other hand, bound by the common law or the custom of the realm to receive and lodge in his inn all comers who are travellers and to entertain them at reasonable prices without any special or previous contract unless he has some reasonable ground of refusal ( •). The rights and obligations of hotel proprietors are governed by statute which has more or less incorporated the common Jaw.\n\nThe contract between such a hotel proprietor and a traveller presenting himself to him for lodging is one which is essentially a contract of srvice and facilities provided at reasonable price.\n\nThe transaction between a hotelier and a visitor to his hotel is thus one essentially of service in the performance of which and\n\nas part of the amenities incidental to that service, the hotelier serves meals at stated hours.\n\nThe Revenue, therefore, was not entitled to split up the transaction into two parts, one of service and the other of sale of food stuffs and to split up also the bill charged by the hotelier as consisting of charges for lodging and charges for food stuffs served to him with a view to bring the latter under the Act.\n\nThe conclusion arrived at by the High Court is one with\n\nwich we agree.\n\nConsequently, the appeal fails and is dismissed mth costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nH Appeal dismissed.\n\nill 104 American LR. 1023; 82 T.R. 2nd Srs. 864, 868. (2) 74 F.R. 2nd Srs. 439.\n\nOl 103 N.J. Law 464. i_4) Hals/Jury's Law.1<0/ England, 3rd EJ., Vol. 11. 445-446.", "total_entities": 25, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M/S. ASSOCIATED HOTELS OF INDIA LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S. ASSOCIATED HOTELS OF INDIA LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 4, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 70, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 4, 1972\n\n[S ."}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DuA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 154, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. C. Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4742, "end_char": 4755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey.,"}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4760, "end_char": 4774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey.,"}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4798, "end_char": 4812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, M. C. Bha11dare, Rameshwar Nath, T. R.\n\nBhasin and Lalit Bhasin, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "M. C. Bha11dare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4814, "end_char": 4829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, M. C. Bha11dare, Rameshwar Nath, T. R.\n\nBhasin and Lalit Bhasin, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4831, "end_char": 4845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, M. C. Bha11dare, Rameshwar Nath, T. R.\n\nBhasin and Lalit Bhasin, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "T. R.\n\nBhasin", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4847, "end_char": 4860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, M. C. Bha11dare, Rameshwar Nath, T. R.\n\nBhasin and Lalit Bhasin, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Lalit Bhasin", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4865, "end_char": 4877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, M. C. Bha11dare, Rameshwar Nath, T. R.\n\nBhasin and Lalit Bhasin, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "September 2, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6430, "end_char": 6447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 2, 1958 the company applied for a declaration that it was not liable to pay sales tax in respect of meals served in the said Cecil Hotel to the guests coming there for stay."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8262, "end_char": 8267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13325, "end_char": 13330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a reference, the High Court held that the case was one of contract of service as distinguished from a sale of a principal commodity, such as rice in Assam case (supra) and salt in Varasuki and Co. v. Madras(')."}}, {"text": "Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18585, "end_char": 18619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Act XXV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18635, "end_char": 18657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Blackbum", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20372, "end_char": 20380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "observations of Blackbum, J., at 659-660 of the report to show that thread stitchetl into a coat which is under repair becomes part of the coat, but in a contract for repairing the coat the P'!rties surely did not enter into an agreement of sale of that thread."}}, {"text": "[1965] 2 S.C.R. 167", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 23018, "end_char": 23037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dean Pound", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28070, "end_char": 28080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two conflicting views present a choice between liability arising from a contract of implied warranty and for negligence in tort, a choice ihdicative of a conflict, in the words of Dean Pound, between social interest in the safety of an individual and the individul interest of the supplier of food."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29509, "end_char": 29516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In England, a hotel under the Hotel Proprietors Act, 1956 is an establishment held out by the proprietor as offering food, drink, and if so required, sleeping accommodation, without special contract, to any traveller presenting himself and who appears able and willing to pay a reasonable sum for the services and facilities provided."}}, {"text": "Hotel Proprietors Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29536, "end_char": 29563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_2_948_964_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "S. L. GOSWAMI v.\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH January 4, 1972\n\n[P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND D. G. PALEKAR, JJ.J\n\nEvidence-Burrfen of Proof in crin1inal cc.:se-ProJ'ecution must establish ingredients of offence before burden shifts ti accused-Accused's burden discharged if reasonable doubt created against prosecution cau.\n\nThe appellant was Professor and Head of the Department of Pharmacology and Therapeutics in the Medical College Jabalpur. In connection with a reseai:ch project to be carried out by him in collaboration with the Atomic Energy Commision a Doutle Distillation Apparatus was purchased from Messrs S. K. Biswas and Co. Calcutta for Rs. 450/ - in September 1964.. In 1965 the Indian Council of Medical Research entrusted him with another research project for which be required a Double Distillation apparatus of 10 litres capacity. An order for the supply of the same was placed with Messrs Goverdhandas Desai P..t. Ltd. Bombav.\n\nThey were asked to send their acceptance and bills in triplicate immediately.\n\nMessrs Goverdhandas aforesaid sent their acceptance and bills in triplicate for Rs. 969-10. A draft for that sum was issued by the Accounts offirer Indian Council of Medical Research in favour of Messrs Goverdhandas and was received by the appellant on April 12,\n\n1965. The appellant thereafter wrote to Messrs Goverdhandas that he did not wnt the apparatus as shown in the sketch shown by them but wanted it according to the orignal order placed by him.\n\nMessrs Goverdbandas replied expressing their inability to supply the same. In May 1965 the appellant happened to be in Bombay. He asked Messrs Goverdhandas to accept the draft for Rs. 969 in their favopr and to issue a bearer cheque for the same amount to him so that he could purchase the apparatus required by him in Bombay. A receipt for the draf. was given to the appellant bv Messrs Goverdhandas an<l he issued a receipt for the cheque to them. The appellant was subsequently tried for misappropriation of the amount. According to the prosecution he did not purchase any apparatus in Bombay and continued to use the apparatus earlier purchased from Calcutta. According to the appellant however. he contracted one Rasikl al Shah (DW3) a partner of Messrs Scientific Sales\n\nSyndicate who after a telephonic conversation wrote to him a letter introducing one D'Souza who could supply the apparatus to the appellant.\n\nThe appellant claimed that he purchased the apparatus from D'Souza. obtained a receipt for the amount paid and brought the apparatus to Jabalpur and used it in , his laboratory. The bill given to the appellant by D'SouZ'3 bore the nam'.:: of M.B. Corporation.\n\nAn 'apparatus Art.\n\nA \\\\'a5 seized by the police fron1 the appellant's laboratory which accordin, q to the prosecution was the apparatus purchased in 1964 but according t(i\n\nthe appellant was the one purchased in Bombay. The appellant produced before the investigating officer the letter written by Rasiklal Shah as well as other documents connected, according to him, with the purcha\".e.\n\nThe trial court convicted the appellant of offences under ss. 409 and 42il I.P.C. ands. 5(2) of the Prevention of corruption Act. The High Cq11n dismissed his appeal. This Court .in appeal by special leave,\n\nHELD The onus of provinr all the ingredients of an offence is always upo~ the prosecution and at no stage does it shift to the accused.\n\nIt is no part of the prosecution duty to somehow hook the crook.\n\nE:·· .. in cascs whre the defence of the accused docs not appesr to be c, red1b1c\n\nor is palpably false that burden does not become any the. less. It is only when this burden is discharged that ·; t will be for the accused to explain or controyert the essential elements in the prosecution case \\vhich would negative it. It is not however for the accused even at the initial stage to prove something whic!J has to be eliminated bv the prosecution to establish the ingredients of the offence with which he is charged, and even if the onus shifts upon the accused and the accused has to establish his plea, the standard of proof is not the saine as that which rests upon the prosecution. Where the onus shifts to the accused, and the evidence\n\non his behalf probabilises the plea he will be entitled to the benefit o'\n\nreasonabl~ doubt. [954 C-E]\n\nJn the present case the High Court itself held th'.lt it was not possible on the evidence of the prosecution witnesses to hold that the apparatus Art.\n\nA could be identiffod as the one purchased in September 1964. The oral evidence produced by the appellant to the. effect that a new apparatus\n\nhad been purchased in 1965 was wrongly reiected by the courts below.\n\nThe evidenc~ of DW3 regarding the enquiry made by the api:ellant !or a doub!e distillation apparatus and his sending D'Souza with a lant. \\Vhch conformed to the specifications given by the appellant and sending it with a covering letter could not be assailed and bad not been reiectecl by the High Court. There was no suggestion that this letter 'va' fabricated er got up sub:equently.\n\nOnce the genuineness of the letter \"\"nt by DW3. to the appellant was believed it corroborated his plea.\n\nOnce the probab1l•!\\' of the accused's plea is established he must be given the benefit of douht.\n\nThe appellant had at the va-y initial stage even before the F.l.R. was issued produ;; ed the original receipt and given a copy of the same to the investigating officer.\n\nTh; s will indicate that the bill and the receipt were genuine.\n\nThe appellant was not responsible if no such fi:rm as M.B. Corporation acturi\\ly existed and a suurious bill (assuming that it was so) was given to him. [958 G.H; 962 D; 963 B-D]\n\nOn the facts and circumstances of tlie case the appellant had established his plea and the courts below were wrong in holdin~ that he had failed to d.isc.harge the burden of proof that lay upon him.\n\nCRIMINAL APPEtLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 69 l'Jf 1969.\n\nF Appeal by Special Leave from the judgment and order dated\n\nJanuary 24, 1969 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 942 of 1968.\n\nA. S. R. Chari, R. Nagaratnam, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the appellant.\n\nl. N. Shroff and M. N. Shroff, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nP. Jaganmoban Redrly, J.-The appellant who was Professor\n\nnd Head '?f the Department of Phamrncology and Theapeutics m th.e l\\!ed1cal College. Jabalpur, has been convicted by the Special _Jndge. Jabalpr under s. 5(1)(d) read with s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act to one year's riaorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. I 000 and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. He was further convicted of ff 13-L7J6Sup CT/7~ 0 encc.,\n\n950 SUPRllME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972] 2 S.C.R.\n\nunder ss. 409 and 420 I.P.C. and was awarded sentences of six months rigorous imprisonment in respect 0f each of them. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. An appeal against this conviction and sentence to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh was dismissed. This appeal is by special leave.\n\n• Shortly stated the case of the prosecution is that the appellant who waS\" employed in the Medical College, Jabalpur, with the permission of the Government of Madhya Pradesh given on December 20; 1962. accepted a grant-in-aid for carrying out a research project entitled \"Study of Manganese in Health and Disease by Neutron Activation Analysis\". This Research Project was to be carrii; d on in collaboration with the Atomic Energy Commission of the Government of India for three years 1963-64, 1964-65 and 1965-66. The appellant began his research work in July 1963 and sometime thereafter on September 30, 1964, an instrument for distillation of water known as the Stadler Still Double Distillation Apparatus was purchased from Messrs S. K. Biswas & Company of Calcutta-a firm of scientific instruments manufacturers and dealers of Calcutta, for Rs. 450. On April 11, 1964, the Indian Council of Medical Research known as the I.C.M.R. entrusted him with the research project on \"Effect of Hypoxia and Decompression on Body Temperature as function of Adaptation to Hypoxia at various altitude\".\n\nThe terms and conditions of grant-in-aid were mentioned in the circular letter Ext. P-32 dated April 11, 1964, and were current for the years 1965-66 and 1966-67. For this project the appellant wanted to purchase another double distillation apparatus and after inquiry from several firms placed an order with Messrs Goverdhandas Desai Private Ltd. Bombay (hereinafter -<:ailed 'Messrs Goverdhandas') as per Ext. P-5 dated February 20, 1965 for a double distillation appara• tus, horizontal type, Double Stage, capacity 10 litres, pyrex glass for Rs. 890 and asked them to inform him of their acceptance telegraphically and send triplicate l:.ills in advance.\n\nMessrs Goverdhandas sent wire Ext. P-6 and the advance bills Exts. P-8, P-9, and P-10 to the appellant on March 3, 1965. This apparatns was entered in the stock register of the l.C.M.R. Hypoxia Enquiry as per Ext. P-44 in accordance with the details shown in the bills and the triplicate bills for Rs. 969 .10 inclusive of sales-tax and packing and freight charges were presented for payment. It may be mentioned at this stage that the appellant was on leave from February 9, 1965 to March 20, 1965 because of heart trouble and the inquiry and the order were placed during that period. A draft in favour of Messrs Goverdhandas was subsequently issued by the Accounts Officer. I.(.M.R. and was received by the appellant on April 12, 1965. On the same day the appellant wrote a letteir Ext. P-16 to Messrs Goverdhandas saying that he did not want the apparatus as. shown in the skl'tch sent by them but wanted it\n\naccording to the original order placed by him. He therefore requested them to expedite the order urgently as he had received the payment against the bills and was withholding the same for want of apparatus. As the firm was not able to supply the apparatus as per the specifications the order was cancelled by letr Ext. P-17 dated April 24, 1965. Thereafter the appellant was in Bombay between May 15, 1965 and May 25, 1965 where he had gone for a medical check-up and was staying in the M.L.As. Rest House. On May 17, 1965, he met Mr. Patel a Director of Messrs Goverdhandas and asked him to receive 'the draft and give him a cheque in order to enable him to purchase the apparatus he wanted from the Bombay market. This was agreed to, and accordingly the draft was handed over to Mr. Patel and a receipt Ext. P-24 was obtained from him on behalf of Messrs Goverdhandas.\n\nAt the same time the appellant also passed a receipt for the bearer cheque which he received from Mr. Patel for the same amount. On the same day the appellant telephoned to one Rasiklal Shah a partner of the Scientific Sales Syndicate D. W. 3 and enquired whether he could supply the distillation plaint as per the specifications given by him.\n\nD.W. 3 said he did not have ifi.\n\nLater, however, one D'souza a broker who was sitting with D.W. 3 at the time informed him that he could supply the intrument wanted by the appellant. D.W. 3 says he tried to ring the appellan~ back but could not get any reply so he sent D'souza with the apparatus along with the introductory letter copies of which are Ext. P-70 and D-13. According to the appellant on the same day l!he man sent by Rasiklal Shah is said to have brought the apparatus the cost of which was Rs. 989.35.\n\nThe appellant paid the money, obtained a receipt and brought it to Jabalpur.\n\nThe crucial question in this case is whether the accused as alleged by the prosecution did not btiy another apparatus for which he had received a draft from the I.C.R. But in fact has been carrying on the work with the distillation apparatus purchased from Messrs S. K. Biswas & Company in Septiember 1964, for the project for which he was receiving a grant-in•aid. from the At<>l!1ic Energy Commission of th~ Government of Ind1~, by pretendmg that it is the apparatus which he had prchased .m Bombay. By this device it is said the appellant has m1sappropnated the amount of the draft sent by the I.C.M.R.\n\nThere are in this case certain undisputed facts which are :-\n\n(!) That a double distillation apparatus was purchased for the project of the At0mic Energy Commission from M!'5srs S. K.\n\nBiswas & Company on September 30. 1964. and m respect of which entries were made in the stock register of the Atomic Energy\n\nCommission.\n\n(2) That the order for the purchase of !, he second double stage distillation plant was placed with Messrs Goverdhandas which was accepted by them on March 3, 1965. This firm had along with the acceptance sent a packing note and bills in triplicate on the strength of which a claim was made to the I.C.M.R. which issued a demand draft in favour of Messrs Goverdhandas. The demand draft was received by the appellant on April 12, 1965. Chokasey P.W. 21 ri.iade entries in the stock register of the I.C.M.R. that the apparatus was received as soon as the blills were received and submitted forpayment.\n\n(3) The appeJlant on the same day, i.e. April 12, 1965 as indicated in Ext. P-16 had informed Messrs Goverdhandas that the - sketch sent by them was not in accordance with the original order C and while informing them that he had received payment against the bills asked them urgently to inform whether they could supply the apparatus as per the specifications.\n\n( 4) That inasmuch as Messrs Goverdha, ndas could not supply the apparatus as per the specifications the order was cancelled on April 24, 1965 by letter Ext. P-17.\n\n(5) That the appellant went to Bombay on May 17. 1965 and handed over the demand draft Issued by the I.C.M.R. in favour of Messrs Goverdhandas to Mr. Patel and obtained a receipt from him.\n\nThe appellant also obtained from Messrs Goverdhandas a bearer cheque for the same amount for which he gave a receipt to Mr. Patel and cashed the cheque.\n\nIt appears from the first information report Ext. P-46 dated August 12, 1966, that during the course of investigation on information received through a source Shri Shyam Biharilal Shrivastava, Deputy Superintendent of the Special Police Establishment, Jabalpur, came to know that the appellant the Head of the Pharmacology Department in charge qf the Research Laboratory had placed an order. on February 20, 1965 for purchasing a distillation apparatus, horizontal type, double stage, capacity IO litres pyrex valued at Rs. 969-10 from Messrs Goverdhandas in connection with research of 'Hypoxia Enquiry' entrusted to him by the I.C.M.R., New Delhi, and he had. written to the said firm to send bill in advance. On receiving three copies of the bill from the firm, it was shown in the stock register that the said distillation apparatus was recieved when in fact no such type of apparatus was at all purchased from the said firm.\n\nHe then sent two copies of the said bill to the I.C.M.R., New Delhi and acquired a demand draft for Rs. 969-10 from it. What the prosecution has. not disclosed eithc; r in the F.I.R. or in the chargesheet filed\n\nagaist te appellant . 1s that the appellant during the course of the mvestigation had stated that he had in fact purchased the\n\ndouble stage distillation plant in Bombay on May 17, 1965, from out of the account of the bearer cheque received from Messrs Goverdhandas in exchange for the demand draft handed over to their Mr. Patel. Nor did the proseeution mention either the fact that the appellant had obtained a receipt from Messrs Goverdhandas for the demand draft handed over to them or that he had given a receipt for the bearer cheque obtained in exchange by him from Messrs Goverdhandas.\n\nThere was also no mention in the said document that the appellant had handed over a copy of the receipt for payment of Rs. 989-35 for the purchase of the other apparatus on May 17, 1965, to the investigating officer and had informed him that Rasiklal Shah had sent some one with the apparatus along with the introductory letter dated May 17, 1965. It is not as if the investigating officer had not verified the information given by the appellant that Rasiklal Shah had given such a letter, because a copy of that letter was seized from the Scientific Sales Syndicate even before the F.1.R. was issued and the charge-sheet was filed. It was only after the accused had made an apPlication during the trial on September 16, 1968, for summoning Rasiklal Shah and requesting the Court to call for the copy of the letter seized by R. N, Dube, Deputy Superintendent of Police, from Rasiklal Shah under a seizure memo that the copy was produced by the prosecution. The accused in his statement under s. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure produced another copy of this letter as well as the bill with the original receipt a copy of which had been handed over to the investigating officer even before the F.I.R. was issued.\n\nOnce these facts had come to the knowledge of the investigating officer, it was his duty to have placed them before the Court.\n\nIn the absence of such a disclosure it is contended by the learned advocate for the appellant that for the prosecution to bring home the offence to the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt, it should also establish that the appellant did not in fact purchase the apparatus and that the said documents were spurious and got up for tbe purpose of the defence.\n\nThe burden of establishing this, it is averred, is also upon the prosecution and not upon the defence bec:mse unless the probability of the appellant having purchased the apparatus is eliminated, the C!\\Se against the appellant cannot be said to be established beyond a reasonable doubt.\n\nIt may, however, be pointed out that in determining this question the Special Judge as well as the High Court seem to have laid greater emphasis on the fact that the accused had not proved that he had purchased the apparatus as contended by him. While no doubt the questiQil whether the accused purchased the apparatus in Bombay with the money he got under the draft issued by the I.(:.M.R. in favour of Messrs Goverdhandas may have to be\n\nestablished by the accused, he can take full advantage of the circumstances appearing in the prosecution case itself to probabi!ise his plea that he did.\n\nThe High Court posed the question for detenniination as fo!Iows :\n\n\"Thus, the short question that fell for determination by the Special Judge was whether the amount received back by the appellant from Messrs Goverdhandas Desai of Bombay was utilised or not by him in purchasing the apparatus as stated by him and sought to be proved by him, burden of which fact was on him, through his defence witnesses.\"\n\nThis approach both of the Special Judge as well as the High Court is not altogether correct one.\n\nIn our view, the onus of proving all the ingredients of an offence is always upon the prosecution and at no stage does it shift to the accused. It is no part of the prosecution duty to somehow hook the crook.\n\nEven in case~ where the defence of the accused does not appear to be credible or is palpably false that burden does not become any the less.\n\nIt is only when this burden is discharged that it will be for thy accused to explain or controvert the essential element. in the prosecution case which would negative it.\n\nIt is not however for the accused even at the initial stage to prove something which has to be eliminated by the prosecution to establish the ingredients oi the offence with which he is charged, and even if the onus shifts upon the accused and the accused has to establish his plea, the standard of proof is not the same as thilt which rests upon the prosecution.\n\nWhere the onus shifts to the accused, and the evidence on his behalf probabilises the plea he will be entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt.\n\nIn this case the prosecution seeks to establish the case against the appellant by showing-( l) that there is no firm by the name F of M.B. Corporation from which the appellant is saTd to have purchased the apparatus on May 17, 1965; and (2) that the distillation apparatus which was first purchased in September 1964 is the same as Article A which the Spcial Police had seized and not that which the appellant alleges he had purchased and\n\n(3) that the apparatus purchased in September ! 964 which had G been shown as broken on February 1, 1965 and written off has been in fact not broken but has been e.ntered as such in the registers fraudulently.\n\nThe evidence on behalf of the prosecution can be classified under three main heads : Firstly, with regard to the entry in the stock register that the double distillation apparatus purchased in September 1964 was broken and written off;\n\nSecondly, that the distillation apparatus purchased in May 1965 was the one which was being used in the Laboratory by the appellant and is the same as Article A which was seized by the Special Police; and\n\nThirdly, that there was no firm by the name of M.B. Corporation from which the accused is alleged to have purchased the subsequent distillation plant on May 17, 1965, and that he did not in reality purchase it.\n\nThe first allegation is sought to be established by Kamlesh Grover P.W. 22, who was working on the post of Research Assistant in the Pathology Department of the Medical College, Jabalpur from October 1, 1964 to September 30, 1965. The witness was posted from October l, 1965 as a Senior Scientific Assistant in the research of the Atomic Energy Commissfon and from December 15, 1965 in the Hypoxia Enquiry and was working under the appellant. According to her, although it was riot part of her duties, she was required to do clerical work as there were no other persons and that as the appellant told her that some articles had been broken and the persons who were working previously had not made entries she should make the same as she was a Research Assistant.\n\nBecause of this she made the entry and as far as she could remember it, that entry was made on September 19, 1966. Till this stage she made no assertion that she was asked to do something which to her knowledge was .false.\n\nThe learned Advocate for the prosecution however put her a question which we think is in the nature of a cross-examination d'e.5igned to support the allegation that she did not make the entry willingly.\n\nThis was:\n\n\"Question :-Whether Dr. Goswami asked you fo sign thereon or not?\n\nAnswer :-Dr. Goswami asked me to sign thereon, but I refused to sign.\"\n\nEveu then she said that the appellant asked her to get a copy made thereon because the b1akage register was to be sent and accordigly she made the entry which was in her handwriting and she sighea hereon. Tt was then that she said that the appellant had asl<ed her to put the same date in her signature, on which he told her\n\ntat the apparatus was broken. She identified the appellant's init.1als and asserts tat se prepared the breakage register on 5eprem• her 19. 1966. This eVJdence does not estab1ish that the distillaf18n apparatus was not in fact broken. However, iri cr()Sg-efamiiiatibW ghe was asked whether she saw the distillation appdtatlis before' !l'1ie was deputed to the Hypoxia Enquiry and her answer was that she\n\ndoes not remember and then said : \"Wait for a minute\", and after trying to recollect her memory she answered that she saw the apparatus.\n\nBut she does not know whether there was any mono gram on that apparatus and claims that she can identify if two or three apparatuses of the same type are kept because of their being old or new. Again she says if two or three apparatuses are kept, it will be difficult to identify. When asked whether she kt a note of ii anywhere in respect of the breakage or was speakmg from memory, she said that she had not kept a note thereof any where but remembered it because the appellant had returned from foreign tour at that time, and had joined on Monday September 11, 1966.\n\nShe said that Shri Dube, Deputy Superintendent of Police made enquiry from her in March 1967, which she stated was on the basis of the note in her diary Ext. D-9 that on Septem ber 19, 1966 the appellant called her in his room and asked her to prepare accounts of t'he articles of the Atomic Energy Commission.\n\nShe had told Dube, Deputy Superintendent of Police, about the note-book. This was in direct contradiction of her previous denial that she had kept a note of it.\n\nHer evidence in respect of this note-book was not accepted by both the Trial Court as well as the High Court. It would appear that she having enter ed in the register that the apparatus was broken and written off is really anxious to exculpate herself because she was probably made to believe that it was in fact not broken and she was made to do something which was untrue.\n\nThis anxiety dominates her evidence which read as a whole does not inspire confidence and gives the impression that she was trying to put a sinister interpreta\n\ntion of what may appear to have been prolJably true.\n\nFor instance. she says that she realised that she had to make an entry of the article as broken and thought over it very much.\n\nAfter that she started to note down in her note book and told this fact to some other men in the Department in the general talk.\n\nShe informed Mr. Rao, Dr. Goswami and Dr. Harshwardhan who were sitting there.\n\nThough she first admits that she did not tell them that the appellant had got an entry made by her in the stock register and got breakage register prepared by her, she later says that she told them that distillation plant was shown as broken. It was then that the appellant called her in the office and said that breakage register was to be prepared and sent to the Atomic Energy Commission and asked her to prepare the register and make entry in the stock register.\n\nNone of the witnesses named by her however say anything about her having informed them.\n\nThat the distillation apparatus purchased in September 1964 was the same as Article A has been spoken to by several witnesses with which we will presently deal.\n\nBut before we do so, it is necessary to notice that according to Nirodh Ranjan Ghosh P.W. 13, Manager of Messrs S. K. Biswas & Company a similar apparatus\n\nA -\n\n- c\n\nas the one supplied by them to the appellant could be purchased also in Bombay, so that the probability of the accused having pur chased a similar apparatus with the markings of Mes.srs .s. K.\n\nBiswas & Company in Bombay cannot be ruled out.\n\nThis w1tni; ss, however, does not say that Article A is the same as the one which his firm had supplied.\n\nIt may be mentioned that Mr. ube who was investigating the offence against the accused had wntten a letter to Messrs. S. K. Biswas & Company on December 30, 1966, enquiring whether the type of the stadler still supplied by them was available in the Bombay market, whether they were supplied to M/s M. B. Corporation, Nagar Niwas C. P. Tank Road, _Bombay-4 7 for sale and whether some body from their firm could identify the. apparatus suppli.d to the J abalpur Medical College.\n\nIn answer to these queries Messrs. Biswas & Company wrote to Dube that they had not supplied the type of stadler still to Messrs. M. B. Corporation which however may be available in\n\nthe Bo1ul:>ay market and that it was not possible to identify the apparatus'st!pplied to the Jabalpur Medical College.\n\nEven the High Court, after considering the evidence ot Dr. Rajkumar Gupta, P.W. 15, working as a Demonstrator in the Medical College, under the appellant since the year 1958, Shri A. S. Venkat. Subbarao P.W. 16 working as Assistant Professor . in the Department of Pharmacology Medic_al College during the relevant period, and Dr. Harshwardhan P.W. 19 working aS :Demonstrator in the :Department of Pharmacology during the\n\nrelevant time observed that all these witnesses have admitted that they are unable to identify the double distillation apparatus from another apparatus of the same quality and same markings.\n\nThere is also the evidence of other witnesses, namely, B. P. Namdeo P, W. 20 a research scholar, M. L. Chokasey, P.W. 21 a Laboratory Assistant in the Research Scheme & a Lower Division Clerk, Jamund Prasad Khare P.W. 23 a Laboratory Assistant, and Rashid Khan P.W. 24 a Laboratory Assistant who said that they were working during the relevant period in the research work entrusted to the appellant by the Atomic Energv Commission of the Government of India and the I.C.M.R.\n\nThese witnesses deposed about having seen Article A in the Laboratory, first in the Laboratory opposite to the appellant's room.. though one of them Chokasey P.W. 21 said that he saw it in the verandah, which was later shifted into another room.\n\nChokasey says he did not disclose to any body and only did so when he re;; eived the summons and gave his evidence. If so how did the policecame to know is difficult to understand.\n\nThough we do not pay much attention to this incongruity, we are referring to it because the High Court while dealing with the evidence of D. W. 2 rejected it merely on the ground as will be seen when we discuss that evidence and at the same time accepted the\n\neviddence of this witness. That this witness had a grouse against appellant because he had asked for a certificate of <,:haracter which the appellant is said to have given to him, but says tlieteafter it was snatched from him and the appellant called for his explanation. It was suggested to him he was making a false statement that a character certificate was given to him by the appellant. This suggestion appears to be justified is evident from his admission. He also admits that the appellant had writfun a letter to Dr. Relen when he was working with him, which was shown to him by Dr. Relen. That letter is . from the Superintendent, Medical College, asking for Chokasey's explanation.\n\nIt. says :\n\n\"Yonr former employer in the I.C.M.R. Scheme who is the Professor of Pharmacology as well reports that you had been indulging in derogatory activities against hlm in the sense that you were typing the application on behalf of Shri J.P. Khare while in this office and from the typewriter of this office.\n\nPlease let me know why you should not be strictly warned.\n\nYour explanation should reach to this office within 24 hours from the date of receipt of this memo.\"\n\nJamuna Prasad Khare P.W. 23 was working in the Department from August 5, 1964 to October 30, 1965, but the work started orllv three or four months thereafter that is from November or December. He says that the distillation apparatus received from Messrs. Biswas & Company was there upto May-June 1965. This witness on his own admission was dismissed by the appellant and was given service by the Dean of the Medical College.. The appa, llant 11ad made a complaint against him to the Director of Medical Services and was unemploye'd when Dube made enquiry of him, about the double distillation apparatus. Even though he WrOfc to the I.C.M.R. about the termination of his services he adinitted that he did not write anything therein regarding this double distillation apparatus.\n\nThe onher witnesses also are not in a position to identify the apparatus as the one which was purchased in September 1964.\n\nIn our view, when as clearly admitted by the seniar members of the staff working in the Laboratory for quite some time that they could not identifv that Article A was the same as tha't purchased in September 1964, it is difficult to believe that there two witnesses or any other witnesses could have done so, particularly when the High Court itself held that1 it was not possible on the evidence of the three witnesses to which we have referred that the apparatus could be identified as the one purchased in September 1964.\n\n6iftheotherhand there is the evidence of A. S. Venkatsubbarao 'P:w. {6 which clearly indicates that there was another double\n\nF ,\n\ndistillation apparatus a.part from Article A the one purchased .i, n September 1964.\n\nIn the examination-in-ehief itself, the witness says that from 1964 till the apparatllS was packed during the period one more double distillation apparatus wafl received in the Department to the best of his knowledge for JeSearch.\n\nThe apparatus was in use few days till it was packed and taken away. The apparatus was packed when it was seized and that it is Article A. This admission not only negatives the prosecution case that no apparatus was purchesed in May 1965 as alleged by the appellant, but definitely probabilises it.\n\nThat apart, there is another circumstance which goes to support the statement of P .W. 16 that there was another double distillation apparatus which is not the same as the one purchased in September 1964 and which could be Article A.\n\nIt is seen that the apparatus which was purchased in September 1964 though it was said to be a double distillation apparatus it cost only Rs. 486-62 -but a similar distillation apparatus said to have been purchased in May 1965 by the appellan~ cost Rs. 969-10.\n\nIf these two apparatuses are similar, then the cost ot the one said to have been purchased in May 1965 has doubled within one year which, prima facie, raises doubts about the genuineness of the transaction. A closer scrutiny however would show that the apparatus purchased in September 1964 from Messrs.\n\nBiswas & Company may not be of the same cap_acity as the one said to have been purchased in May 1965 whlch is of ten litre capacity. From a comparative statement of quotations from difierent companies, Ext. P-38, it is apparent that the quotation called in 1965 was for a distillation apparatus horizontal type capacity 10 litres for whlch M/s. Unique Trading Corporation, Bombay, quoted Rs. 925/-, Messrs. Goverdhandas Rs. 890/- and M/s. Scientific Instrument Company Ltd., Allahabad Rs. 1229/- duty free price and Rs. 1920/- duty paid, for which an import licence was requested.\n\nFrom Ext. P-28-Extracts of order register of Messrs Goverdhandas it also appears that the price of a single stage distillation apparatus was Rs. 450 /- which was the one that was cancelled on Apnl.24. 1965. ?\".idently Messrs. Goverdhanaas wanted to sell two smgle stage d1stillation apparatuses and it was because of this that the appellant had cancelled the order.\n\nWe have already seen that what was purchased from Biswas & Company ws a stdler still, q_uickfit type of double distillation, automatic with special type clamp. But there is nothing to show from Ext. P-49A that it was for a 10 litre capacity. Nor is the, re any other evidence as fairly admitted by the learned advocate for the prosecution from which we can ascertain what was the capacity of that apparatus or that of Article A. This would leave a lacuna in the prosecution case and probablise 'the appellant's\n\nContention that the apparMus Article A is not the same as that purchased earlier for th(( Atomic Energy Commission, but is the one which he purcb, ased in Bombay in 1965.\n\nIt is contended by Mr. Chari for the appellant that the evidence of the prosecution must be read in the light of the intense feeling of dislike and hostility exhibited by the Dean of the Medical College, against the appellant due to enmity and jealousy in his having been given projects of national importance.\n\nHe has referred to certain evidence tp show that at every stage the Dean has been concerned with the invetigation. It is not necessary to go into all the minute details of this controversy except to touch on the broad features.\n\nIt is in evidence that initially the grant-in-aid was routed through the Dean in 1963-64 and 1964-65, but later from 1965-66 it was given direct to the appellant. The reason for this was explained by Durgacharan Chopra, P.W. 11, Under Secretary to.the Government of India in the Di:.oartment of Atomic Energy with headquarters at Bombay to be due to some trouble between the Dean and the appellant, because of which they had decided to place the grant at the disposal of the appellant for the year 1965-66.\n\nBesides, Dr. Barat D.W. 1 whose evidence will be dealt with latter in his letter to Dr. Subramanian, Ext. D-15, says that the appellant was treated badly. He said that he had learnt that the appellant was physically obstructed by the College Chowkidar when he tried to return the equipment belonging to the witness. in which the appellant sustained minor injuries which he saw when he came to him with the apparatus.\n\nHe also says in that letter that Dr.\n\nChowdhary rang him up in the evening of Monday on February\n\n14. 1967, that Dr. Subramanian did not want t!he removul and return of the articles by the appellant saying that he cannot understand when the articles did not belong to the Government, and were loaned to the appellant through him, and asks why they could not be removed by the appellant when a legal notice was served on him.\n\nWe have already noticed how after the appellant dismissed Khare P.W. 23 he was immediately employed by, the Dean. All this would indicate that there has been a great• deal of ill-will and hostility between the appellall't and the Dean.\n\nApart from viewing the prosecution evidence in the light of this background, there is the defence evidence.\n\nThis evidence has been summarily rejected, and, in our view, without any cogent reasons.\n\nDr. Baral D.W. 1 says that he was the one who had started the research of the I.C.M.R. and Atomic Energy Commission Projects.\n\nHe is a member of the executive council of the Jabalpur University and is a consulting pliysician.\n\nHe says that a.fter the sudden death of Professor Dr. Wahi from coronery heart\n\ns. L. GOSWAMI v. M.P. STATE(laganmohan Reddy, J.) 961\n\ntrouble, the appellmt started getting pain in the chest . and he consulted him. He had taken his E.C.G. and referred him to Dr.\n\nDatey, President of Cardiological Society .of India for a thorough check-up.\n\nAs there was some abnormality he was asked to go for another check-up to Bombay from where the appellant returned after his second check-up, some time in the month of May 19?5.\n\nThe witness had sent his car to bring the appellant from station and to take him to Me\\iical College and the appellant had dropped in at his place to see him on his way to the Medical College. When the appellant came to see him two packages were lying in his car on the black seat by his side and the witness asked him what those were.\n\nThe appellant told him that 'he had bought some apparatus'.\n\nIt appears that in the High Court some interpolation _was made in this evidence which would indicate that the appellant had showed him \"a glass distillation apparatus\". We are not now concerned with this interpolation, but as the evidence was recorded it shows that the appellant had told the witness that he had bought some apparatus.\n\nAfter a week or two when the witness went to the Medical College to see the appellant in his Department he enquired from the appellant as to what he had bought and the appellant showed him a double distillation apparatus with some modification for triple distillation and the apparatus appeared to be new.\n\nThe witness also says that the appellant complained to him about the treatment given to him by the Dean oi the Medical College Dr.. B.\n\nH. Choudhary. On hearing this complaint the witness had written to the Director of Health Services, Madhya Pradesh, Ext. D-15, and forwarded a copy of the Jetter to the appellant for his information.\n\nThe High Court thought that this evidence is not direct evidence to show that really a double distillation apparatus was purchased by the appellant in Bombay.\n\nWith this bare comment his evidence was discarded, and we think. without justification, because it is difficult to understand how and what D.W.1 has said is not direct evidence. What he saw, what he observed, and what he was told by the appellant when that is in issue cannot, biut be direct evidence.\n\nSimilarly another witness Hamidullah Khan D.W.2 who was supplying animals for the experiments and who had made a clamp for the double distillation apparatus in October-November 1964\n\n(which is the one obtained from Biswas & Compa'lly) was charactensed as a purely chance witness and there is nothing in his examination to show how the appellant happened to know that he had se, en\n\nthe apparatus in a broken condition or that he is likely to be a possible defence witness in this case. This witness had gone to the Medical College during the period when the appellant was laid up with ; t heart aitack which was about the 1st week of February 1965. He says it was then that he saw the double distillation apparatus lying in a broken condition. After the appellant came back from\n\nSUPRE?d.E CoU)lT REPORTS\n\n(1972) 2 S.C.R.\n\n:Bomq\\ly in the last week of May 1965 he had again been to the\n\nI; Jyp9, llia Laboratory and saw. the appellant fiing a doue distillat1oh apparatus which was opened from packing.\n\nWe have gone through , the cross-ex; imination of this witness and we find that there is , nothi,1,1g n !hat evidence which would make it unacceptable. 'I):lere 1i$ il\\O , g4e:>tion of tl:lis witness being a chance witness.\n\nHe was nqt , only clirectly connected with the Department, but had also made a .cl; imp for ti\\e double distil!ation apparatus and was visiting the appellant's office.\n\nWhen asked about the broken distination app; iratus he said that he came to know from a part of the apparaws which was still attached to the clamp that it was broken.\n\nFrom the mere fact that he said that the appellant had told him that day in the morning .that he was cited as a witness though he did not tell him what the case was, his evidence has been disbelieved.\n\nWe .do not think that this by itself is such as to destroy the substantive part of his evidence.\n\nIn .any case the evidepce , of Rasiklal Shah D.W. 3 regarding tne enguiry Jl, lflde by !he appellant for a double distillation apparatus ancl his fl\\ld.iµg D'souza with a plant which conformed to the specific; ations givc; n py .(he appellant and sending it with a covering\n\nJeer. cannot .be ; issailed, and in fact has not been rejected by the High .Court. It however observed that his evidence was not direct eY.i.slence on the point that a double distillation apparatus was pur- <; llased by the appellant on May 17, 1965. It is true that D.W. 3 did not know whether in fact the appellant had purchased the dqub!e distillation apparatus.\n\nBut that he did send one through D'souza with a covering letter cannot be gainsaid.\n\nThe letter which is an important piece of evidence is ; is follows :\n\n\"Sub :-Standler Quickfit type Double Distillation extra strong Pyres SKB.\n\nWe refer to your telephonic talk and.have to inform you that we are out of stock of the above cited item, but the other party is having, who is coming with this letter-to you, with the Apparatus, if it serves your purpose, you may buy the same directly from him. against cost, for Rs. 989.35 nett. only.\n\nWe are really sorry to ]earn from your phone message that you ; ire not keeping well, and hope, you will be a\\l i:ight yery soon.\"\n\nN:ot\\ling )has :been urged why this Jetter should i11ot be accepted , in\n\ney; i\\l, e)lc;~. f]Jere is no uggestion or whisper that it was fabricated O)' i!l_Ot yp sub'i; equently. Once the genuineness of the letter sent p.W,: 3 o :t\\le appellant is believed, it corroborates ; his ; P!a .th<J, t\n\ne , il, i\\, i malce .ugl, liries from Rasiklal 1Shah, and that Rasildal §4ah\n\nhad sent a person with the apparatus for which he paid the amount and obtained a receipt.\n\nIt was urged that neither D'souza nor J. R. Patel who gave the receipt were examined.\n\nWe have had occasion to observe earlier that the standard of proof which the accused may adduce in support of his plea in defence is not the same which the prosecution is required to adduce.\n\nOnce the probability of the accused's plea is established, we must give him the 'benefit of doubt.\n\nThere is nothing to show that the accused fabricated the receipt. As we have pointed out, the appellant had at the very initial stage, even before the F.l.R. was issued, produced the original receipt and gave a copy of the same to the investigating officer.\n\nThis would indicate that the. bill and the receipt were genuine.\n\nThe prosecution, however, has sought to establish by evidence that there was no such firm as M.B. Corporation.\n\nBut the appellant is not responsibile if a spurious bill (assumj.ng that it was so) was giverr to him or that he knew that it was spurious.\n\nThis cannot therefore affect the case of the appellant that he had purchased the double distillation apparatus on May 17, 1965 and paid for it.\n\nIn fact he paid for it about Rs. 20/. more than he got from the .demand draft. If he wanted to misappropriate the money by producing a bogus receipt, he could have got the receipt for the exact amount of the draft.\n\nIt may be mentioned that Taneja Bansilal P.W. 14 Director-General of the I.C.M.R. also admitted that the appellant had come to De.li in connection with the purchase of the apparatus and told him that the apparatus was purchased from some firm, whose name he did not remember, but jt was not the firm of Messrs Goverdhandas. In the circumstances the plea of the appeliant is substantiated.\n\nNo doubt in th_is case .the prosecution has established that the appellant has drawn a bill and obtained a draft for Rs. 969-10 before the apparatus was supplied. But this is an irregularity and does no~ show that he had no intention of purchasing the apparatus or to m1sappn; ipriate. te m?ney. cademician~ are not generally !mown for their admm1stra!Ive sagacity or for bemg conversant with\n\n~II the complicated techD:ical ruls. We do not by this in'tend to unply that the rules and 1nstruct10ns should not bie complied with but when it is apparent from the evidence that the appellant had n~\n\nclerical staff to assist him and was anxious to carry on his research work, any lapse on this account does not make him criminally liable.\n\nThe appellant, in our view, has been the victim of suspicion probably due to the unfriendliness, hos'tility and enmity of the Dean of the Medical College, which ultimately resulted in his being. if we my say \"SO, subjected to this prosecution which must have\n\ncaused him great distress and anguish apart from the Department being deprived of his services in a project of national importance. ·\n\nWe have no hesitation in holdhig that the accused is innocent.\n\nThe appeal is allowed and the c1; mvic1ions and sentences in respect of the several offences are set aside.. The bail bond will be cancelled.\n\nThe fine if paid will be refunded.\n\nG.C.", "total_entities": 131, "entities": [{"text": "S. L. GOSWAMI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 13, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. L. GOSWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. Jaganmoban Redrly", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. G. PALEKAR, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.G. PALEKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Atomic Energy Commision", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 527, "end_char": 550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In connection with a reseai:ch project to be carried out by him in collaboration with the Atomic Energy Commision a Doutle Distillation Apparatus was purchased from Messrs S. K. Biswas and Co. Calcutta for Rs."}}, {"text": "S. K. Biswas and Co. Calcutta", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 609, "end_char": 638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In connection with a reseai:ch project to be carried out by him in collaboration with the Atomic Energy Commision a Doutle Distillation Apparatus was purchased from Messrs S. K. Biswas and Co. Calcutta for Rs."}}, {"text": "Indian Council of Medical Research", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 686, "end_char": 720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "450/ - in September 1964.. In 1965 the Indian Council of Medical Research entrusted him with another research project for which be required a Double Distillation apparatus of 10 litres capacity."}}, {"text": "Goverdhandas Desai P..t. Ltd. Bombav", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 901, "end_char": 937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An order for the supply of the same was placed with Messrs Goverdhandas Desai P..t. Ltd. Bombav."}}, {"text": "April 12,\n\n1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1272, "end_char": 1287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A draft for that sum was issued by the Accounts offirer Indian Council of Medical Research in favour of Messrs Goverdhandas and was received by the appellant on April 12,\n\n1965."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1594, "end_char": 1600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In May 1965 the appellant happened to be in Bombay."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2129, "end_char": 2137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the prosecution he did not purchase any apparatus in Bombay and continued to use the apparatus earlier purchased from Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Rasikl al Shah", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2193, "end_char": 2207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he contracted one Rasikl al Shah (DW3) a partner of Messrs Scientific Sales\n\nSyndicate who after a telephonic conversation wrote to him a letter introducing one D'Souza who could supply the apparatus to the appellant."}}, {"text": "Messrs Scientific Sales", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2227, "end_char": 2250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he contracted one Rasikl al Shah (DW3) a partner of Messrs Scientific Sales\n\nSyndicate who after a telephonic conversation wrote to him a letter introducing one D'Souza who could supply the apparatus to the appellant."}}, {"text": "D'Souza", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2336, "end_char": 2343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he contracted one Rasikl al Shah (DW3) a partner of Messrs Scientific Sales\n\nSyndicate who after a telephonic conversation wrote to him a letter introducing one D'Souza who could supply the apparatus to the appellant.", "canonical_name": "D'SouZ'3"}}, {"text": "Jabalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2530, "end_char": 2538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "obtained a receipt for the amount paid and brought the apparatus to Jabalpur and used it in , his laboratory."}}, {"text": "D'SouZ'3", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2607, "end_char": 2615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The bill given to the appellant by D'SouZ'3 bore the nam'.::", "canonical_name": "D'SouZ'3"}}, {"text": "M.B. Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2636, "end_char": 2652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of M.B. Corporation."}}, {"text": "Rasiklal Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2954, "end_char": 2967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant produced before the investigating officer the letter written by Rasiklal Shah as well as other documents connected, according to him, with the purcha\".e."}}, {"text": "ss. 409 and 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3103, "end_char": 3117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3120, "end_char": 3125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Prevention of corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3145, "end_char": 3173, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "A. S. R. Chari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6090, "end_char": 6104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, R. Nagaratnam, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Nagaratnam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6106, "end_char": 6119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, R. Nagaratnam, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6121, "end_char": 6132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, R. Nagaratnam, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6134, "end_char": 6145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, R. Nagaratnam, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. R. Nagaraja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6150, "end_char": 6164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, R. Nagaratnam, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "l. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6186, "end_char": 6198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l. N. Shroff and M. N. Shroff, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "l. N. Shroff"}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6203, "end_char": 6215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l. N. Shroff and M. N. Shroff, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "l. N. Shroff"}}, {"text": "P. Jaganmoban Redrly", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6282, "end_char": 6302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nP. Jaganmoban Redrly, J.-The appellant who was Professor\n\nnd Head '?", "canonical_name": "P. Jaganmoban Redrly"}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6491, "end_char": 6501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6512, "end_char": 6519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6527, "end_char": 6555, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 409 and 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6791, "end_char": 6806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6807, "end_char": 6812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7011, "end_char": 7039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An appeal against this conviction and sentence to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh was dismissed."}}, {"text": "Government of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7235, "end_char": 7263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• Shortly stated the case of the prosecution is that the appellant who waS\" employed in the Medical College, Jabalpur, with the permission of the Government of Madhya Pradesh given on December 20; 1962."}}, {"text": "Study of Manganese in Health and Disease by Neutron Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7362, "end_char": 7417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Atomic Energy Commission of the Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7507, "end_char": 7558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Research Project was to be carrii; d on in collaboration with the Atomic Energy Commission of the Government of India for three years 1963-64, 1964-65 and 1965-66."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7683, "end_char": 7701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant began his research work in July 1963 and sometime thereafter on September 30, 1964, an instrument for distillation of water known as the Stadler Still Double Distillation Apparatus was purchased from Messrs S. K. Biswas & Company of Calcutta-a firm of scientific instruments manufacturers and dealers of Calcutta, for Rs."}}, {"text": "S. K. Biswas & Company of Calcutta", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7826, "end_char": 7860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant began his research work in July 1963 and sometime thereafter on September 30, 1964, an instrument for distillation of water known as the Stadler Still Double Distillation Apparatus was purchased from Messrs S. K. Biswas & Company of Calcutta-a firm of scientific instruments manufacturers and dealers of Calcutta, for Rs."}}, {"text": "April 11, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7949, "end_char": 7963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 11, 1964, the Indian Council of Medical Research known as the I.C.M.R. entrusted him with the research project on \"Effect of Hypoxia and Decompression on Body Temperature as function of Adaptation to Hypoxia at various altitude\"."}}, {"text": "I.C.M.R.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8017, "end_char": 8025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 11, 1964, the Indian Council of Medical Research known as the I.C.M.R. entrusted him with the research project on \"Effect of Hypoxia and Decompression on Body Temperature as function of Adaptation to Hypoxia at various altitude\"."}}, {"text": "Goverdhandas Desai Private Ltd. Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8502, "end_char": 8540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For this project the appellant wanted to purchase another double distillation apparatus and after inquiry from several firms placed an order with Messrs Goverdhandas Desai Private Ltd. Bombay (hereinafter -<:ailed 'Messrs Goverdhandas') as per Ext."}}, {"text": "February 20, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8608, "end_char": 8625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-5 dated February 20, 1965 for a double distillation appara• tus, horizontal type, Double Stage, capacity 10 litres, pyrex glass for Rs."}}, {"text": "March 3, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8952, "end_char": 8965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-8, P-9, and P-10 to the appellant on March 3, 1965."}}, {"text": "February 9, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9310, "end_char": 9326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned at this stage that the appellant was on leave from February 9, 1965 to March 20, 1965 because of heart trouble and the inquiry and the order were placed during that period."}}, {"text": "March 20, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9330, "end_char": 9344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned at this stage that the appellant was on leave from February 9, 1965 to March 20, 1965 because of heart trouble and the inquiry and the order were placed during that period."}}, {"text": "April 12, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9568, "end_char": 9582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.(.M.R. and was received by the appellant on April 12, 1965."}}, {"text": "April 24, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10088, "end_char": 10102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-17 dated April 24, 1965."}}, {"text": "May 15, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10151, "end_char": 10163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the appellant was in Bombay between May 15, 1965 and May 25, 1965 where he had gone for a medical check-up and was staying in the M.L.As."}}, {"text": "May 25, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10168, "end_char": 10180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the appellant was in Bombay between May 15, 1965 and May 25, 1965 where he had gone for a medical check-up and was staying in the M.L.As."}}, {"text": "May 17, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10268, "end_char": 10280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 17, 1965, he met Mr. Patel a Director of Messrs Goverdhandas and asked him to receive 'the draft and give him a cheque in order to enable him to purchase the apparatus he wanted from the Bombay market."}}, {"text": "Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10293, "end_char": 10298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 17, 1965, he met Mr. Patel a Director of Messrs Goverdhandas and asked him to receive 'the draft and give him a cheque in order to enable him to purchase the apparatus he wanted from the Bombay market."}}, {"text": "Scientific Sales Syndicate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10838, "end_char": 10864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day the appellant telephoned to one Rasiklal Shah a partner of the Scientific Sales Syndicate D. W. 3 and enquired whether he could supply the distillation plaint as per the specifications given by him."}}, {"text": "D'souza", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11029, "end_char": 11036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, however, one D'souza a broker who was sitting with D.W. 3 at the time informed him that he could supply the intrument wanted by the appellant.", "canonical_name": "D'SouZ'3"}}, {"text": "I.C.R.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11734, "end_char": 11740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The crucial question in this case is whether the accused as alleged by the prosecution did not btiy another apparatus for which he had received a draft from the I.C.R. But in fact has been carrying on the work with the distillation apparatus purchased from Messrs S. K. Biswas & Company in Septiember 1964, for the project for which he was receiving a grant-in•aid."}}, {"text": "K. Biswas & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11840, "end_char": 11859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The crucial question in this case is whether the accused as alleged by the prosecution did not btiy another apparatus for which he had received a draft from the I.C.R. But in fact has been carrying on the work with the distillation apparatus purchased from Messrs S. K. Biswas & Company in Septiember 1964, for the project for which he was receiving a grant-in•aid."}}, {"text": "S. K.\n\nBiswas & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12358, "end_char": 12381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That a double distillation apparatus was purchased for the project of the At0mic Energy Commission from M!'5srs S. K.\n\nBiswas & Company on September 30."}}, {"text": "September 30. 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12385, "end_char": 12403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That a double distillation apparatus was purchased for the project of the At0mic Energy Commission from M!'5srs S. K.\n\nBiswas & Company on September 30."}}, {"text": "Chokasey", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12938, "end_char": 12946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chokasey P.W. 21 ri.iade entries in the stock register of the I.C.M.R. that the apparatus was received as soon as the blills were received and submitted forpayment."}}, {"text": "May 17. 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13673, "end_char": 13685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(5) That the appellant went to Bombay on May 17."}}, {"text": "August 12, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14037, "end_char": 14052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-46 dated August 12, 1966, that during the course of investigation on information received through a source Shri Shyam Biharilal Shrivastava, Deputy Superintendent of the Special Police Establishment, Jabalpur, came to know that the appellant the Head of the Pharmacology Department in charge qf the Research Laboratory had placed an order."}}, {"text": "Shyam Biharilal Shrivastava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14140, "end_char": 14167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-46 dated August 12, 1966, that during the course of investigation on information received through a source Shri Shyam Biharilal Shrivastava, Deputy Superintendent of the Special Police Establishment, Jabalpur, came to know that the appellant the Head of the Pharmacology Department in charge qf the Research Laboratory had placed an order."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14615, "end_char": 14624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "969-10 from Messrs Goverdhandas in connection with research of 'Hypoxia Enquiry' entrusted to him by the I.C.M.R., New Delhi, and he had."}}, {"text": "I.C.M.R., New Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14955, "end_char": 14974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then sent two copies of the said bill to the I.C.M.R., New Delhi and acquired a demand draft for Rs."}}, {"text": "September 16, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16421, "end_char": 16439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was only after the accused had made an apPlication during the trial on September 16, 1968, for summoning Rasiklal Shah and requesting the Court to call for the copy of the letter seized by R. N, Dube, Deputy Superintendent of Police, from Rasiklal Shah under a seizure memo that the copy was produced by the prosecution."}}, {"text": "R. N, Dube", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16539, "end_char": 16549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was only after the accused had made an apPlication during the trial on September 16, 1968, for summoning Rasiklal Shah and requesting the Court to call for the copy of the letter seized by R. N, Dube, Deputy Superintendent of Police, from Rasiklal Shah under a seizure memo that the copy was produced by the prosecution."}}, {"text": "s. 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16706, "end_char": 16712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16720, "end_char": 16746, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "February 1, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20372, "end_char": 20388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "964 which had G been shown as broken on February 1, 1965 and written off has been in fact not broken but has been e.ntered as such in the registers fraudulently."}}, {"text": "Kamlesh Grover", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21202, "end_char": 21216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first allegation is sought to be established by Kamlesh Grover P.W. 22, who was working on the post of Research Assistant in the Pathology Department of the Medical College, Jabalpur from October 1, 1964 to September 30, 1965."}}, {"text": "October 1, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21342, "end_char": 21357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first allegation is sought to be established by Kamlesh Grover P.W. 22, who was working on the post of Research Assistant in the Pathology Department of the Medical College, Jabalpur from October 1, 1964 to September 30, 1965."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21361, "end_char": 21379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first allegation is sought to be established by Kamlesh Grover P.W. 22, who was working on the post of Research Assistant in the Pathology Department of the Medical College, Jabalpur from October 1, 1964 to September 30, 1965."}}, {"text": "October l, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21409, "end_char": 21424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness was posted from October l, 1965 as a Senior Scientific Assistant in the research of the Atomic Energy Commissfon and from December 15, 1965 in the Hypoxia Enquiry and was working under the appellant."}}, {"text": "Atomic Energy Commissfon", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21481, "end_char": 21505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness was posted from October l, 1965 as a Senior Scientific Assistant in the research of the Atomic Energy Commissfon and from December 15, 1965 in the Hypoxia Enquiry and was working under the appellant."}}, {"text": "December 15, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21515, "end_char": 21532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness was posted from October l, 1965 as a Senior Scientific Assistant in the research of the Atomic Energy Commissfon and from December 15, 1965 in the Hypoxia Enquiry and was working under the appellant."}}, {"text": "September 19, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22009, "end_char": 22027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Because of this she made the entry and as far as she could remember it, that entry was made on September 19, 1966."}}, {"text": "Goswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22377, "end_char": 22384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was:\n\n\"Question :-Whether Dr. Goswami asked you fo sign thereon or not?"}}, {"text": "Eveu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22492, "end_char": 22496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eveu then she said that the appellant asked her to get a copy made thereon because the b1akage register was to be sent and accordigly she made the entry which was in her handwriting and she sighea hereon."}}, {"text": "Monday September 11, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23904, "end_char": 23929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When asked whether she kt a note of ii anywhere in respect of the breakage or was speakmg from memory, she said that she had not kept a note thereof any where but remembered it because the appellant had returned from foreign tour at that time, and had joined on Monday September 11, 1966."}}, {"text": "Dube", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23951, "end_char": 23955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She said that Shri Dube, Deputy Superintendent of Police made enquiry from her in March 1967, which she stated was on the basis of the note in her diary Ext.", "canonical_name": "Dube"}}, {"text": "Septem ber 19, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24102, "end_char": 24121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D-9 that on Septem ber 19, 1966 the appellant called her in his room and asked her to prepare accounts of t'he articles of the Atomic Energy Commission."}}, {"text": "Atomic Energy Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24217, "end_char": 24241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D-9 that on Septem ber 19, 1966 the appellant called her in his room and asked her to prepare accounts of t'he articles of the Atomic Energy Commission."}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25272, "end_char": 25275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She informed Mr. Rao, Dr. Goswami and Dr. Harshwardhan who were sitting there."}}, {"text": "Harshwardhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25297, "end_char": 25309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She informed Mr. Rao, Dr. Goswami and Dr. Harshwardhan who were sitting there."}}, {"text": "Nirodh Ranjan Ghosh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 26119, "end_char": 26138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But before we do so, it is necessary to notice that according to Nirodh Ranjan Ghosh P.W. 13, Manager of Messrs S. K. Biswas & Company a similar apparatus\n\nA -\nc\n\nas the one supplied by them to the appellant could be purchased also in Bombay, so that the probability of the accused having pur chased a similar apparatus with the markings of Mes.srs .s."}}, {"text": "S. K. Biswas & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26166, "end_char": 26188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But before we do so, it is necessary to notice that according to Nirodh Ranjan Ghosh P.W. 13, Manager of Messrs S. K. Biswas & Company a similar apparatus\n\nA -\nc\n\nas the one supplied by them to the appellant could be purchased also in Bombay, so that the probability of the accused having pur chased a similar apparatus with the markings of Mes.srs .s."}}, {"text": "K.\n\nBiswas & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26410, "end_char": 26430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.\n\nBiswas & Company in Bombay cannot be ruled out."}}, {"text": "ube", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26598, "end_char": 26601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that Mr. ube who was investigating the offence against the accused had wntten a letter to Messrs. S. K. Biswas & Company on December 30, 1966, enquiring whether the type of the stadler still supplied by them was available in the Bombay market, whether they were supplied to M/s M. B. Corporation, Nagar Niwas C. P. Tank Road, _Bombay-4 7 for sale and whether some body from their firm could identify the.", "canonical_name": "Dube"}}, {"text": "December 30, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26713, "end_char": 26730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that Mr. ube who was investigating the offence against the accused had wntten a letter to Messrs. S. K. Biswas & Company on December 30, 1966, enquiring whether the type of the stadler still supplied by them was available in the Bombay market, whether they were supplied to M/s M. B. Corporation, Nagar Niwas C. P. Tank Road, _Bombay-4 7 for sale and whether some body from their firm could identify the."}}, {"text": "M. B. Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26867, "end_char": 26884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that Mr. ube who was investigating the offence against the accused had wntten a letter to Messrs. S. K. Biswas & Company on December 30, 1966, enquiring whether the type of the stadler still supplied by them was available in the Bombay market, whether they were supplied to M/s M. B. Corporation, Nagar Niwas C. P. Tank Road, _Bombay-4 7 for sale and whether some body from their firm could identify the."}}, {"text": "J abalpur Medical College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27020, "end_char": 27045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "apparatus suppli.d to the J abalpur Medical College."}}, {"text": "Biswas & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27083, "end_char": 27099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In answer to these queries Messrs. Biswas & Company wrote to Dube that they had not supplied the type of stadler still to Messrs. M. B. Corporation which however may be available in\n\nthe Bo1ul:>ay market and that it was not possible to identify the apparatus'st!pplied to the Jabalpur Medical College."}}, {"text": "Jabalpur Medical College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27324, "end_char": 27348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In answer to these queries Messrs. Biswas & Company wrote to Dube that they had not supplied the type of stadler still to Messrs. M. B. Corporation which however may be available in\n\nthe Bo1ul:>ay market and that it was not possible to identify the apparatus'st!pplied to the Jabalpur Medical College."}}, {"text": "Rajkumar Gupta", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27410, "end_char": 27424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even the High Court, after considering the evidence ot Dr. Rajkumar Gupta, P.W. 15, working as a Demonstrator in the Medical College, under the appellant since the year 1958, Shri A. S. Venkat."}}, {"text": "A. S. Venkat. Subbarao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27531, "end_char": 27553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even the High Court, after considering the evidence ot Dr. Rajkumar Gupta, P.W. 15, working as a Demonstrator in the Medical College, under the appellant since the year 1958, Shri A. S. Venkat."}}, {"text": "Harshwardhan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27682, "end_char": 27694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the Department of Pharmacology Medic_al College during the relevant period, and Dr. Harshwardhan P.W. 19 working aS :Demonstrator in the :Department of Pharmacology during the\n\nrelevant time observed that all these witnesses have admitted that they are unable to identify the double distillation apparatus from another apparatus of the same quality and same markings."}}, {"text": "B. P. Namdeo", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 28022, "end_char": 28034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also the evidence of other witnesses, namely, B. P. Namdeo P, W. 20 a research scholar, M. L. Chokasey, P.W. 21 a Laboratory Assistant in the Research Scheme & a Lower Division Clerk, Jamund Prasad Khare P.W. 23 a Laboratory Assistant, and Rashid Khan P.W. 24 a Laboratory Assistant who said that they were working during the relevant period in the research work entrusted to the appellant by the Atomic Energv Commission of the Government of India and the I.C.M.R.\n\nThese witnesses deposed about having seen Article A in the Laboratory, first in the Laboratory opposite to the appellant's room.. though one of them Chokasey P.W. 21 said that he saw it in the verandah, which was later shifted into another room."}}, {"text": "M. L. Chokasey", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 28064, "end_char": 28078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also the evidence of other witnesses, namely, B. P. Namdeo P, W. 20 a research scholar, M. L. Chokasey, P.W. 21 a Laboratory Assistant in the Research Scheme & a Lower Division Clerk, Jamund Prasad Khare P.W. 23 a Laboratory Assistant, and Rashid Khan P.W. 24 a Laboratory Assistant who said that they were working during the relevant period in the research work entrusted to the appellant by the Atomic Energv Commission of the Government of India and the I.C.M.R.\n\nThese witnesses deposed about having seen Article A in the Laboratory, first in the Laboratory opposite to the appellant's room.. though one of them Chokasey P.W. 21 said that he saw it in the verandah, which was later shifted into another room."}}, {"text": "Jamund Prasad Khare", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 28160, "end_char": 28179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also the evidence of other witnesses, namely, B. P. Namdeo P, W. 20 a research scholar, M. L. Chokasey, P.W. 21 a Laboratory Assistant in the Research Scheme & a Lower Division Clerk, Jamund Prasad Khare P.W. 23 a Laboratory Assistant, and Rashid Khan P.W. 24 a Laboratory Assistant who said that they were working during the relevant period in the research work entrusted to the appellant by the Atomic Energv Commission of the Government of India and the I.C.M.R.\n\nThese witnesses deposed about having seen Article A in the Laboratory, first in the Laboratory opposite to the appellant's room.. though one of them Chokasey P.W. 21 said that he saw it in the verandah, which was later shifted into another room."}}, {"text": "Rashid Khan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 28216, "end_char": 28227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also the evidence of other witnesses, namely, B. P. Namdeo P, W. 20 a research scholar, M. L. Chokasey, P.W. 21 a Laboratory Assistant in the Research Scheme & a Lower Division Clerk, Jamund Prasad Khare P.W. 23 a Laboratory Assistant, and Rashid Khan P.W. 24 a Laboratory Assistant who said that they were working during the relevant period in the research work entrusted to the appellant by the Atomic Energv Commission of the Government of India and the I.C.M.R.\n\nThese witnesses deposed about having seen Article A in the Laboratory, first in the Laboratory opposite to the appellant's room.. though one of them Chokasey P.W. 21 said that he saw it in the verandah, which was later shifted into another room."}}, {"text": "Atomic Energv Commission of the Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28373, "end_char": 28424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also the evidence of other witnesses, namely, B. P. Namdeo P, W. 20 a research scholar, M. L. Chokasey, P.W. 21 a Laboratory Assistant in the Research Scheme & a Lower Division Clerk, Jamund Prasad Khare P.W. 23 a Laboratory Assistant, and Rashid Khan P.W. 24 a Laboratory Assistant who said that they were working during the relevant period in the research work entrusted to the appellant by the Atomic Energv Commission of the Government of India and the I.C.M.R.\n\nThese witnesses deposed about having seen Article A in the Laboratory, first in the Laboratory opposite to the appellant's room.. though one of them Chokasey P.W. 21 said that he saw it in the verandah, which was later shifted into another room."}}, {"text": "Relen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29657, "end_char": 29662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also admits that the appellant had writfun a letter to Dr. Relen when he was working with him, which was shown to him by Dr. Relen."}}, {"text": "Chokasey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29800, "end_char": 29808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from the Superintendent, Medical College, asking for Chokasey's explanation."}}, {"text": "J.P. Khare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30068, "end_char": 30078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "says :\n\n\"Yonr former employer in the I.C.M.R. Scheme who is the Professor of Pharmacology as well reports that you had been indulging in derogatory activities against hlm in the sense that you were typing the application on behalf of Shri J.P. Khare while in this office and from the typewriter of this office."}}, {"text": "Jamuna Prasad Khare", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 30302, "end_char": 30321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jamuna Prasad Khare P.W. 23 was working in the Department from August 5, 1964 to October 30, 1965, but the work started orllv three or four months thereafter that is from November or December."}}, {"text": "August 5, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30365, "end_char": 30379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jamuna Prasad Khare P.W. 23 was working in the Department from August 5, 1964 to October 30, 1965, but the work started orllv three or four months thereafter that is from November or December."}}, {"text": "October 30, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30383, "end_char": 30399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jamuna Prasad Khare P.W. 23 was working in the Department from August 5, 1964 to October 30, 1965, but the work started orllv three or four months thereafter that is from November or December."}}, {"text": "A. S. Venkatsubbarao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 31770, "end_char": 31790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6iftheotherhand there is the evidence of A. S. Venkatsubbarao 'P:w. {6 which clearly indicates that there was another double\n\nF ,\n\ndistillation apparatus a.part from Article A the one purchased .i, n September 1964."}}, {"text": "Unique Trading Corporation, Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33625, "end_char": 33659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-38, it is apparent that the quotation called in 1965 was for a distillation apparatus horizontal type capacity 10 litres for whlch M/s. Unique Trading Corporation, Bombay, quoted Rs."}}, {"text": "Scientific Instrument Company Ltd., Allahabad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33719, "end_char": 33764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "890/- and M/s. Scientific Instrument Company Ltd., Allahabad Rs."}}, {"text": "Apnl.24. 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34054, "end_char": 34067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "450 /- which was the one that was cancelled on Apnl.24."}}, {"text": "Chari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34936, "end_char": 34941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is contended by Mr. Chari for the appellant that the evidence of the prosecution must be read in the light of the intense feeling of dislike and hostility exhibited by the Dean of the Medical College, against the appellant due to enmity and jealousy in his having been given projects of national importance."}}, {"text": "Durgacharan Chopra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 35654, "end_char": 35672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reason for this was explained by Durgacharan Chopra, P.W. 11, Under Secretary to.the Government of India in the Di:.oartment of Atomic Energy with headquarters at Bombay to be due to some trouble between the Dean and the appellant, because of which they had decided to place the grant at the disposal of the appellant for the year 1965-66."}}, {"text": "Barat", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 35975, "end_char": 35980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides, Dr. Barat D.W. 1 whose evidence will be dealt with latter in his letter to Dr. Subramanian, Ext."}}, {"text": "Subramanian", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36050, "end_char": 36061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides, Dr. Barat D.W. 1 whose evidence will be dealt with latter in his letter to Dr. Subramanian, Ext."}}, {"text": "Chowdhary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36418, "end_char": 36427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also says in that letter that Dr.\n\nChowdhary rang him up in the evening of Monday on February\n\n14."}}, {"text": "February\n\n14. 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36468, "end_char": 36486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also says in that letter that Dr.\n\nChowdhary rang him up in the evening of Monday on February\n\n14."}}, {"text": "Khare", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 36864, "end_char": 36869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already noticed how after the appellant dismissed Khare P.W. 23 he was immediately employed by, the Dean."}}, {"text": "Baral", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 37246, "end_char": 37251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Baral D.W. 1 says that he was the one who had started the research of the I.C.M.R. and Atomic Energy Commission Projects."}}, {"text": "Jabalpur University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37416, "end_char": 37435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He is a member of the executive council of the Jabalpur University and is a consulting pliysician."}}, {"text": "Wahi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37523, "end_char": 37527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He says that a.fter the sudden death of Professor Dr. Wahi from coronery heart\n\ns. L. GOSWAMI v. M.P. STATE(laganmohan Reddy, J.) 961\n\ntrouble, the appellmt started getting pain in the chest ."}}, {"text": "Datey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 37733, "end_char": 37738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had taken his E.C.G. and referred him to Dr.\n\nDatey, President of Cardiological Society .of India for a thorough check-up."}}, {"text": "B.\n\nH. Choudhary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39163, "end_char": 39179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness also says that the appellant complained to him about the treatment given to him by the Dean oi the Medical College Dr.. B.\n\nH. Choudhary."}}, {"text": "Hamidullah Khan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 39857, "end_char": 39872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly another witness Hamidullah Khan D.W.2 who was supplying animals for the experiments and who had made a clamp for the double distillation apparatus in October-November 1964\n\n(which is the one obtained from Biswas & Compa'lly) was charactensed as a purely chance witness and there is nothing in his examination to show how the appellant happened to know that he had se, en\n\nthe apparatus in a broken condition or that he is likely to be a possible defence witness in this case."}}, {"text": "Rasiklal Shah", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41727, "end_char": 41740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In .any case the evidepce , of Rasiklal Shah D.W. 3 regarding tne enguiry Jl, lflde by !"}}, {"text": "D'souza", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 42371, "end_char": 42378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But that he did send one through D'souza with a covering letter cannot be gainsaid."}}, {"text": "Rasildal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43364, "end_char": 43372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Once the genuineness of the letter sent p.W,: 3 o :t\\le appellant is believed, it corroborates ; his ; P!a .th<J, t\n\ne , il, i\\, i malce .ugl, liries from Rasiklal 1Shah, and that Rasildal §4ah\n\nhad sent a person with the apparatus for which he paid the amount and obtained a receipt."}}, {"text": "J. R. Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43508, "end_char": 43519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged that neither D'souza nor J. R. Patel who gave the receipt were examined."}}, {"text": "Taneja Bansilal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 44813, "end_char": 44828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that Taneja Bansilal P.W. 14 Director-General of the I.C.M.R. also admitted that the appellant had come to De.li in connection with the purchase of the apparatus and told him that the apparatus was purchased from some firm, whose name he did not remember, but jt was not the firm of Messrs Goverdhandas."}}, {"text": "De.li", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 44915, "end_char": 44920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that Taneja Bansilal P.W. 14 Director-General of the I.C.M.R. also admitted that the appellant had come to De.li in connection with the purchase of the apparatus and told him that the apparatus was purchased from some firm, whose name he did not remember, but jt was not the firm of Messrs Goverdhandas."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_2_965_979_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "S. V. KANDASKAR v.\n\nV. N. DESHPANDE & ANR.\n\nJanuary 4, 1972\n\n[S. M. S1KR1, C.J., J. M. SHELAT, I. D. DuA, H. R. KHANNA\n\nAND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J\n\nIncome Tax-S. 148 and Companies Act-S: 446(1 )-Whether lnconie Tax Officers require leave of the liquidation Court to reopen assessment of a con1pc..ny for escaped income.\n\nA company (in liquidation) was ordered by the High Court to be wound up and the official liquidator was appointed its liquidator. Thereafter the l.T.0. issl>'d notices under s. 148 of I.T. Act proposing to reopen tbe assessment of the Company in respect of the assessment years 1950-51 to 195,5-56. The I.T.O. further notified tbe official liquidator to produce account• and documents specified at the back of the notices.\n\nThe offidal liqujdator made an application before the High Court questioning the jurisdiction of the I.T.O. to issue the said notices without the leave of the High Court, as required under S. 446(1) of the Companies Act.\n\nThe learned single Judge of the High Court issued an injunction restrainin2 th~ I.T.O. to reassess the said Company. On appeal, the appellate bench gf the High Court reversed the order and set aside the injunction.\n\nOn apl)eal to this Court only one question arose for determination as to 'whether it was necessary for the I.T.O. to obtain leave of the liquidation court when he wants to reassess the company for escaped income in resoect of the past years.\n\nDismissi, ng the appeal,\n\nHELD : The Income Tax Officer need not obtain leave of the winding up court for commencing or continuing assessment or reassessment\n\nproceedings. The Income-tax Act is a complete Code and s. 147 empowers the Income Tax Officer to assess or reassess escaped .income.\n\nFurther while holding these assessment proceedings, the Income Tax Offic•r does not oel\"form the functions of a Court as contemplated by s. 446(2) of the Act.\n\nThe liouidation court cannot perform the functions of Income Tax Officers while assessing the amount of tax oavable bv the assessees even if the assessee be the Companv which is being wound up, by the Court.\n\nIt 'von'd le11d to anoma 1ons chnseouencrs if the winrfinI? up Court were to be held empowered to transfer the assessment proceedings to itself and assess the Comoanv to Income tax. [Q78 B-Dl\n\nGn1•P-,.nnr-rrenerrrf in Cn1rncil v. Sh;,., unani Srtf!'1r Mil's Ltd .• f1946) F.C.R. 40. Shakrmtala v. The Peoples' Bank of Northern India Ltd. (in\n\nliquidation). rtQ41] I.LR. 22 Lah. 760 and M. K. Rnnanathan v. Stai. of Mndms. fl 9551 2 S.C.R. 374, refel\"red to and di<cussed,\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1650 of 1970.\n\nAooeal from the Judgment and order dated January 31, 1970 H of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 94 of 1967.\n\nS. T. DPsai. P. C. Bhartnri Aiit MPhta. Kirit MPhfa. J. B.\n\nDmf,, rhanji. 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant. 14-L73fiS,1pCJl72\n\nB. Sen, S. K. Aiyar and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment the Court was delivered by\n\nDua, J.-The Colaba Land and Mills Co., Ltd., (il}. liquidation) was ordered by the Bombay High Court on Octobe,1)7, 1959 to be wound up under the provisions of the Companies Ac(, 1 of 1956 and tlie Official Liquidator was appointed its liquidator.\n\nEadierpn May 1, 1959 the Official Liquidator had been appointed by the High Court its provisional liquidator. On August 23, 1966 the Income-tax Officer (Companies Circle) concerned issued six different notices under s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 proposing to reopen the assessment of the Company and to re-assess it in respect of the assessment years 1950-51 to 1955-56. On December 31, 1966, the Income-tax Officer served further notices under s. 142(1) of the Income-tax Act upon the Official Liquidator calling upon him to produce accounts and documents specified at the back of the notices and to furnish any information called for by the said officer. At the foot of the said notices it was stated that failure on the part of the Official Liquidator to comply with the terms of those notices would not only result in exparte assessment against the Company but might also entail penalty under s. 271 of the Income-tax Act. Certain negotiations followed between the Official Liquidator and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax but they were infrilctuous. On an application made by the Official Liquidator in the High Court questioning the jurisdiCtion of the Income-tax Officer to issue the said notices or to proceed with the re-assessment of the Company without the leave of the High Court winding up the Company, Vimadlal J., on 28th September, 1967 held that the income-tax authorities were not entitled to commence the assessment or reassessment proceedings contemplated against the Colaba Land and Mills Co., Ltd., or to .continue the same without obtaining leave of the Court under s. 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 (Act No. 1 of 1956) (hereinafter called the Act).\n\nThe learned Judge on this view granted an injunction restraining the Incometax Officer from assessing or re-assessing the said Company for the assessment years 1950-51 to 1955-56. ·\n\nOn !lPpeal by the Inome-tax Officer and the Union of India before the aP, pellate bench of the High Court against the order of injunction, the Division Bench (Modi and Desai, JJ.) reve\"sed the order of the learned. single Judge and set aside the in junction issued by him. Before the appellate bench two contentions were raised on behalf of the Income-tax-Officer: (1) ihat notices for reassessment issued under s. 148 were not legal proceedings within the meaning of that phrase as used in s. 446(1) of the Act, and\n\n(2) that, assuming the re-assessment proceedings started under the\n\nH !\n\nsaid notices to be leg~! proceedings. leave of the Company Court under s. 446(1) of the Act was not necessary because the Income• tax Officer had exclusive jurisdiction to make re-assessment and to determine the tax liability. The proceedings by way of assessment before the Income-tax Officer, according to the contention were outside the pale of jurisdiction of all civil courts including the Cpmpany Court. . The appellate bench did not consider it neces- Sary to decide the first contention because, on the aut:hority of Damji Valji Shah v. Life ln.rurance Corparation of India('), the\n\nsecond contention deserved to be accepted and that was considered sufficient to conclude the appeal.\n\nThe Official Liquidator, after securing a certificate of fitneas from the High Court under Art. 133(1)(c) of the Constitution has appealed to this Court and the only question which requires consi deration here is, if it is necessary for the Income-tax Officer to obtain leave of the liquidation court when he wants to re-aMel!l!I the company for escaped income in respect of past years.\n\nSection 446 of the Act reads :\n\n\"(l) When a winding up order has been made or the Official Liquidator has been appointed as provisional liquidator, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be commenced, or if pending at the date of the winding up order, shall be proceeded with, against the company. except by leave of the Court and subject to such terms as the Court may impose.\n\n(2) The Court which is winding up the company shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in fore~, have jurisdiction to entertain, or dispose of-=- ·\n\n(a) any suit or proceeding by or against the company;\n\n(b) any .claim ade by or aainst the company (inludm~ claims by or agamst any of its branches lil India);\n\n(c) any question of priorities or any other question whatsoever, weter of law or fact, which may relate to or anse m course of the winding up of the company;\n\nhther such suit or roceeding as been institut~ or ismstltuhted, o1 r. suc; h clha1mbeeor quest10n has arisen or arises _or sue app 1cat10n as n made or is made before or\n\n{I) A.I.JI.. 1966 S.C. 135.\n\nSUPREME COUJ.T REPORTS\n\n[1972] 2 S.C.R.\n\nafter the order for the winding up of the company, or before or after the commencement of the Companies {Amendment) Act, 1960.\n\n(3) Any suit or proceeding by or against the company which is pending in any Court other than that. in which the winding up of the company is proceedmg may, net'lyithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. be transferred to and disposed of by that Court.\n\n(4) Nothing in sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) shall apply to any proceeding pending in appeal before the Supreme Court or High Court.\"\n\nTo appreciate and understand the precise scope of this sect:ion so far as it concerns us in the present controversy, we consider it pr().\n\nper to turn to the scheme of the Act on this aspect. Chapter ll of Part VII of the Act beginning with s. 433 deals with winding up by the Court. Section 439 provides for applications for winding up and s. 441 tells us when the winding up of a company is !P be deemed to commence.\n\nSection 442 which confers power oli courts to stay or restrain proceedings against the company reads : ·\n\n\"442. At any time after the presentation of a winding up petition and before a winding up order has been made, the compan_y or any creditor or contributory may-·\n\n(a) where any suit or proceeding against the company is pending in the Supretne Court or in any High Court, apply to the Court in which the suit or proceeding is pending for a stay of proceedings therein; and\n\n(b) where any suit er proceeding is vending against the company in any other Court, apply to the Court having jurisdiction to wind. up the com- pany, to restrain further proceedings in the suit or proceeding;\n\nand the <; ourt to , which. ?PPlication is so made may stay or restram the pfoceed1.6gs accordingly, on such terms as it thinks fit.\" '\n\nSection 444 enjoins the Court making an order for the winding up of a company to cause intimation thereof to be sent forthwith to the Official Liquidator and the Reg; strar appointed, uhder the Companies Act. Official Liquidators attached to the l-Iigh Courts are appointed by the Central Govemment under s. 448 and the Registrars by the Central Government under s. 609 of the Act.\n\nIt is the duty of the petitioner in the winding up proeecdings and also of the company to file under s. 445 a certified copy of the order of winding up with the Registrar who has to notify in the Official Gazette that such an order has been made. Such order is to be deemed to be a notice of discharge of the officers and employees of the company except when the buiness of the company\n\nis continued; vi de s. 445 ( 3). Then comes s. 446, which has already been set out. The present sub-s. (2) of this section was substituted for the Clld one in 1960 by Act 65 of 1960 and sub-&.\n\n( 4) was also added by that Act. Sub-section (2) is on the lin~ of s. 7 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909, s. 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 and s. 45B of the Banking Companies Act. The object of this sub-section appears to be to empower \"the court as in exercise of insolvency jurisdiction to decide all claims made by or against any company and other questions whatsoever so that winding up proceedings might be expedited\" Sub-sections (2) and (3) both seem to have been inserted to give effect to the recommendation of the Company Law Committee Report contained in para 207(c), namely, fb1lt \"all suits by or against a company in winding up should, notwithstanding any provisions in any law for the time being in force, be instituted in the court in which the winding up proceedings are pending\".\n\nThis was considered to ~. to quote the exact words \"on balance an advantage to all concerned, including_ -the parties which have a claim against the companies, to institute suits relating to its :iffa!rs in the Cou~ where the. winding up proceedings are pendmg'.\n\nLn the Indian Companies Act, 1913, s. 171 provided for preventing litigation against a company in the process of being wound up and it read as :\n\n\"171. When a winding up order has been made or a provisional liquidator has been appointed no suit or other legal proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the\n\nourt, and subject to such terms as the Court may IIllpose.\"\n\nThe words underlined were inserted by the Companies Amend- G ment Act, 193~ which followed the English Act. It is nardl\n\necessary to pomt out that company legislation in India has evlr smce th~ first enactment of 1850 (Registration of Joint.'.stock <; ompames Act, No. XLIII of 1850) broadly been followin the lmes of devel.opmet of the company law in England. The otject\n\nof ~· 171 was des1gnd to achieve was to prevent all litigation H aamst the company in the process of being wound up ex t with the consen~ ?f the coui; i. We have reproduced this seciliin as~ the dec1s1ons to which reference has been made by Shri sa1 ID the very beginning of his arguments relate to the construction of this section by the Federal Coui; t of India and by this Court. The Federal Court in The Governor-General in Council v.Shiromani Sugar Mills Ltd. (1) while construing this section held that the words \"other legal proceedings\" in this section comprise any proceedings by the revenue authorities under s. 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act and accordingly, before. forwarding the requisite certificate under s. 46 (2) to the Collector, which would put the machinery for the collection of the arrears of land revenue .into motion, the Income-tax Officer should have applied under s. 171 of the Indian Companies Act for leave of the wi.nding up Court. The passage on which Shri Desai specifically relied is where, disagreeing with the observation~ of a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Shakuntla v. The People's Bank of Northern India Ltd. (In Liquidation)(2 ), Spens, C.J. observed that the expression \"or other legal proceedings\" in s. 171 need not and, therefore, should not be confined to \"original proceedings in a court of first instance analogous to a suit initiated by means of a petitiQn similar to a plaint\". The learned Chief Justice there went on to observe :\n\n\"Section 171 must, in our judgment, be construed with reference to other sections of the Act and the general scheme of administration'of the assets of a company in liquidation laid down by the Act. In particular, we would refer to s. 232. Section 232appears to us to be supplementary to s. 171 by providing that any creditor (other than Government) who goes ahead, notwith standing a winding up order or in ignorance of it with any attachment, distress, execution or sale, without the previous leave of the Court, will find that such steps are void. The reference to 'distress' indicates that leave of the Court is required for more than the initiation of original proceedings in the nature of a suit in an ordinary Court of law. Moreover, the scheme of the application of the company's property in the pari passu satisfaction of its liabilities, envisaged in s. 2.11 and other sections of the A9t, cannot be made to work in coordination, unless all creditors (except such secured creditors as are 'outside the winding up' in the sense indicated by Lord \\Vrenbury in his speech in Food Controller v. Cork(\") are subjected as to their actions against the property of the company to the control of the Court. Accordingly, in our judgment; no narrow construction should be placed upon the words 'or other legal proceeding' in s.\n\n171. In our judgment, the words can and should be held\n\n(I) (1946[ F.C.R. 40.\n\n(2) [1941] I.LR. 22 Lah. 760.\n\n(3) l192J] A.C. 647.\n\nto cover distress and execution proceedings in the ordinary Courts. In our view, such proceedings are other legal proceedings against the company, as contrasted with ordinary suits against the company.\"\n\nJn that case a com?any was ordered to be wound up in April, 1942 and an order of rssessment to income-lax of the profits made by the company in the year ending May 31, 1940 was made in 1943 and the Income-tax Officer, without obtaining leave of the winding up court, commenced proceedings for recovery of tax as if it were an arrear of land revenue.\n\nIt was on these facts that it was observed that the words \"or other legal proceedings\" can and should be held to cover distress and execution proceedings.\n\nThis expression was not held to cover assessment proceedings to which apparently no objection was raised by the parties though they were represented by eminent counsel. The decision of this Court to which Shri Desai has next referred is M. K.\n\nRanganatlzan v. Government of Madras(-1). The head-note which gives a clear idea of the ratio of this decision is in these words :\n\n\"The secured creditor is outside the winding up and can realise his security without the leave of the winding up Court, though if he files a suit or takes other legal proceedings for the realisation of his security he is bound under s. 171 of the Indian Companies Act to obtain the leave of the winding up Court before he can do so although such leave would almost automatically be granted.\n\nIt is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them. It is also a well-recognized rule of construction that the Jeaislature does not intend to make a substantial alteratio~ in the law beyond what it explicitly declares either in express . words or by clear implication and that the general words\n\no~ the Ac_t are not to be so construed as to alter the previous P?ltcy of the law, unless no sense o~ meaning can be applied to those words consistently with the intention of preserving the existing policy untouched . . Held, therefore, that having regard to the context in which the words 'any sale held without leave of the Court of any of the properties' added in s. 232(1) by\n\nlhe <n.1ndi~~ \"\\'.:! XXII of 1936 have been used in juxtapos1tton with any attachment, distress or execution put into force without leave of the Court against the estate or effects\" it would be a legitimate construction to\n\n( 1)\n\n(1955] 2 S.C.R. 374.\n\nbe put upon them that they refer only to sales held through the intervention of the Court and not to sales effected by the secured creditor outside the winding up and without the intervention of the Court, and that the amendment was not intended to bring within the sweep of the general words sales effected by the secured creditor outside the winding up.\n\nHeld accordingly that in the present case the sale effected by respondent no. 2 as the receiver of the trustees of the debenture holders in July 1954 was valid and binding on all parties concerned and could not be challenged as it was sought to be done by the Official Receiver.\"\n\nIn this case the observations alreafiy reproduced from the judgment of the Federal Court in Shakuntla's case (supra) were approved. It may also be pointed out that in this decision this Court observed that the winding up c6urt assures pro rata distribution of the assets of the company in the same way in which the court under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act or the Provincial Insolvency Act ensures such distribution of assets. Section 232 ( 1) of the Act of 1913 which was held supplemental to s. 171 was also stated to have reference to legal proceedings in the same way as such proceedings were envisaged by s. 171. These two decisions in our opinion do not lay down that assessment proceedings under the Income-true Act should be held to be within the contemplation of s. 171 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913. The next decision to which reference has been made by Shri Desai fa Union of India v. India Fisheries (P) Ltd. (1).\n\nIn that case the respondents, Fisheries (P) Ltd., had been directed to be wound up by the winding up court and an Official Liquidator had been appointed by an order of the High Court in October, 1950. The head-note in that case gives a clear idea of the facts and the decision. It reads :\n\n\"The respondent company was directed to be wound up and an official liquidator appointed by an order of the High Court in October, 1950. In December 1950 the respondent was assessed to tax amounting to Rs. 8737 for the year 1948-49. A claim made for this tax on the official liquidator was adjudged and allowed as an ordinary claim and certified as such in April, 1952.\n\nThe Liquidator declared a dividend of 9} annas in the Rupee in August, 1954 and paid a sum of Rs. 5188 to the Department, leaving a balance of Rs. 3549.\n\n---\"\"\n\n(1) (1965] 3 S.C.R. 678.\n\nIn June, 1954, the Department made a demand from the respondent and was paid Rs. 2565 as advance tax for the year 1955-56. On a regular assessment being made for that year, only Rs. 1126 was assessed as payable so that a sum of Rs. 1460, inclusive of interest, became refundable to the respondent. However, the Income Tax Officer, purporting to exercise the power available to him under s. 49E of the Income Tax Act, 1922, set off this amount against the balance of Rs. 3549 due for the year 1948-49. A revision petition filed by respondent in respect of this set off was rejected by the Commissioner of Income-tax.\n\nThereafter, petition under Art. 226 filed by the respondent to set aside the orders of_the Income Tax Officer and Commissioner was allowed by the High Court, on the ground that the demand for Rs. 8737 in respect of 1948-49, being adjudged and certified came to have all the incidents and character of an unsecured debt payable by the liquidator to the Department; it was therefore governed by the provisions of Company Law and no other remedy or method to obtain satisfaction of the claim was available to the creditor.\n\nIn the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that s. 49E gave statutory power\n\nto Income Tax Officer to set off a refundable amount against any tax remaining payable and that this power was not subject to any provision of any other Jaw.\n\nHeld the Income Tax Officer was in error in applying s. 49E and setting off the refund due to the respondent.\n\nTh~ eect of ss. 228 and 229 of the Companies Act, 1?J3, 1s, mter alia, that an unsecured creditor must prove his debts and all unsecured debts are to be paid par! passu.\n\nOnce the claim of the Department has to be proved and is. roved in .liquidation proceedings, it cannot, by exerc1smg the nght under s. 49E get priority\n\novr other unsecured creditors and thus defeat the very obiect of ss. 228 and 229 of the Companies Act. Fur- !herrnore, if there is an apparent conflict between two mdependen.t provisions of law, the special provision must prevail. Section .49E is .a general provision applicable to all assessees m all circumstances; ss. 228 and 229 deal with proof of debts and their payment in liquidation.\n\nSection 49E can be reconciled with ss. 228 and 229 by holding that s. 49E applies when insolvency rules do not apply.\"\n\nIn our opinion this decision is of no greater assistance to the appellant on the narrow point which requires determination by us. On the contrary to some extent it goes against Shri Desai because the assessment made in December, 1950, after the appointment of the Official Liquidator was assumed to be in order. It may be recalled that in Shiromani Sugar Mills case (supra) the assessment made after the winding up order was not challenged though on the argument addressed by Shri Desai before us it could have been challenged.\n\nThe ratio decidendi or the principle accepted and applied in none of the decisions cited supports the appellant's contention on the precise point of assessment of tax. Shri Desai has next referred us to a more recent decision of this Court in Ba/want Singh v.\n\nL. C. Bharuma/, Income-tax Officer, New Delhi. (1) In this case the Incometax Officer was held to be a court for the purpose of s. 195(1 )(b), Cr. P. C. though it was added that the Income-tax Officer could not be treated as a revenue court and, therefore, neither s. 476 nor s. 479-A, Cr. P. C. would be applicable. This decision has been cited for the purpoiie of contending that if the expression \"other legal proceeding\" in s. 446 is to be construed to mean a proceeding in a court, then, the Income-tax Officer must be considered to be a court when holding assessment or re-assessment proceedings.\n\nThis contention may be disposed of with the observation that mrely becall.9C the Income-tax Officer is considered to be a court for the purpose of s. 195(l)(b), Cr. P. C. it does not necessarily follow that the said officer must be considered to be a court for the purposes of s. 446 of the Act.\n\nThere is no justification for extending the scope of this decision beyond i\\s own facts. The decisions which apparently seem to lend more direct support to the appellant's contention are Union of India v. Seth Spinning Mills Ltd., (In Liquidation)( 2 ) and Mysore Spun Silk Mills Ltd., (In Liquidation), In re Official Liquidator v. Commissioner of lncort1¢-tax, Bangalore(•). Both of them are decisions by single Judges, the former by the Punjab High Court and the latter by \\he Mysore High Court.\n\nIn Seth Spinning Mills case (supra) it was observed \"that s. 171 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 provideii that wben a winding up order has been made no suit or other legal proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the court and subj; ct to. suc)l tenns as the court mav impose. The language of this sect10n 1s wide en(mgh to include proceedings under the Income-tax Act.\n\n(i)[i968]-7o I.T~R. 89 (Sc.)\n\n(2) [1962] 46 I.T.R. 193.\n\n(3) [1968] 68 J.T.R. 295.\n\n' A\n\nH i\n\nNo leave of the court has been obtained.\n\nIn view of this the claim of the petitioner for Rs. 4,000 on account of the penalty order passed on 14th April, 1956 cannot be entertained\". In this case the Union of India though the Commissioner of IncomC:.:tax\n\nhad applied to the learned single Judge, who was apparently fimctioning as a company Judge, praying that the department's claim amounting to Rs. 16,500 should have been admitted by the Official Liquidator and that his refusal to do so was not justified in law.\n\nThis amount, it appears, consisted of the penalty imposed by the Income-tax Department.\n\nPart of the penalty was imposed by means of an order passed prior to the company's going into liquidation but a sum of Rs. 4,000 related to the penalty imposed after the date of winding up.\n\nTjle learned single Judge while dealing with that petition observed :\n\n\"Section 171 of the Indian Cunpanies Act, 1913, provides that when a winding up order has been made no suit or other legal proceedings shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court may impose.\n\nThe language of thi! section is wide enough to include proceedings under the Income-tax Act. . No leave of the court has been obtained. In view of this, the claim of the petitioner for Rs. 4,000 on account of the penalty order passed on 14th April, 1956, cannot be entertained.\"\n\nIn the Mysore case it appears that in the course of winding up of the mills in liquidationJarge sums of money came into the hand' of the liquidator which could not be immediately applied for distribution of dividends to Jhe creditors.\n\nThose moneys were invested pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Companiei; (Court) Rules.\n\nThe question arose whether in respect of the receipts of income the liquidator was liable to pay income-tax on those receipts.\n\nThe learned single Judge, after discussing the scheme of the Companies Act, observed :\n\n\"The liquidator is only an officer of the court. Unlike a receiver in the case of insolvency, properties of the insolvent do not vest in him but come within the control of the court. All his actions arc subject to the control pf the court for which purpose the court issues to him appropriate directions from time to time in the course of winding up.\n\nNo court or other authority (subject to the exception contained in sub-section ( 4) of section 446 of the Companies Act) can take any proceedinzs or attach or otherwise reach any of the matters, the winding up court treats the liquidator as its special\n\nofficer specially charged with the duty of representing the company and protecting its interests in winding up.\n\nIn the light of the above principles, it is the duty of the court to see that all liabilities of a company are properly met in accordance with the provisions of the law and the special provisions in that behalf contained in the Companies Act. Liability to income-tax is also one of the liabilities which the court is expected to provide for in the course of winding up.\n\nSuch being the position, the question is whether, because the liquidator does not answer the dcription of the principal officer as defined in the Income-tax Act, the liability, if any, of the company for payment of income-tax itself comes to an end and therefore the winding up court may ignore that liability.\"\n\nThe Court thereafter observed that the corporate existence of l> the company continues even after the winding up order; but after the winding up order the question of payment oi income-tax has to be dealt with or answered on a joint application of the terms or provisions of the Income-tax Act and the Companies Act. After so observing the court proceeded :\n\n\"that even after a winding up order is passed, the company continues to be a person within the meaning of section 4 of the Income-tax Act, that therefore any receipt in the course of winding up which would attract liability to income-tax under appropriate provisions of the Income-tax Act would be liable to income-tax or for payment of tax under Income-tax Act, but that before any action can be taken by the appropriate Incometax Officer under the Income-tax Act for the purpose of quantification or collection of the income-tax he should obtain the leave of the winding up court under section 446 of the Companies Act, and further that the collection Of the tax can only be by securing the orders of the winding up court for payment of tax in the light of the appropriate provisions of'the Companies Act.\"\n\nl n this case so far as collection of the tax assessed is concerned there can scarcely btl any difficulty ip agreei.ng with the view taken there.\n\nBut it is only when the court said that for the purpose of quantification of the income-tax also leave under s. 446 of the Act has to be obtained that we have to consider if this view\n\nis correct. It is ocn this observation that Shri Desai has princi pally -relied.\n\nThe decisions of the Federal Court and of this Court already cited by Shri Desai, it may be recalled, do not support this view.\n\nReference by Shri Desai has also 1*:en made to Abdul Aziz Ansari v. The State of Bombay(') in which assessment proceedings under the Bombay Sales. Tax Act, 1946 were considered to be legal proceedings for the purpose of continuance of those proceedings alter repeal of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946 bys. 48(2) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 3 of 1953.\n\nWe do not think this decision is of any assistance for considering the question whether assessment or re-assessment proceedings can be considered to be legal proceedings as contemplated by s. 446 of the Act.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant has also drawn our attention to Shiromani Sugar Mi/ls v. Governor General in Council(') where, after referring _to ft. 171 of the Companies Act, 1913 it was held by the Allahabad High Court, that initiation by the Income-tax Officer of steps to recover the amount of assessment under s. 46 of the Income-tax Act of 1922 and the prosecution by the Collector of those steps amounted to \"commencement\" or \"proceeding with\" a \"suit or other legal proceeding.\" Needless to point out that this is the view which the Federal Court on appeal upheld in the decision already referred to.\n\nThe further submission pressed by Shri Desai that s. 446 of the Act is a special provision and s. 148 of the Income-tax Act a gene•al provision of law was sought to be supported by reference to India Fisheries case(8 ).\n\nIt may here be pointed out that 1n that case it was, while dealing with s. 49E of the Income-tax !'.ct, that this Court observed that the revenue could , not, by exercising the right under that section get priority over other unsecured creditors, and it wa; in this context that it was said that there being apparent conflict between two independent provisions of law the special provision must prevail.\n\nIn order to understand and aopreciate the binding force of a decision it is always l[}ecessary to see what were. the facts of the case in which the decision was given and wh•t was the point which had to be dcided. Tims considered India Fisheries case(8 ) lends no assistance to Shri Desai and we are unable to constme the observations in that decision to support Shri Desai's contention that s. 446 of the Act is a special provision as against s. 148 of the Income-tax Act under which Income-tax Officers hold nrocedings for assessment or re-assessment of income-tax nd that therefore the former should prevail over tha latter. ---- . -- ··---\n\n(1) A.1.R. 1958 Born. 279.\n\n(2) I.LR. 1945 Allahabad 352,\n\n(3) [1965) 3 S.C.R. 678.\n\nTurning now to the Income-tax Act it is noteworthy that s. 148 occurs in Chapter XIV which beginning with s. ~39 prescribes the procedure for assessment and s. 14 7 provides for assessment or re-assessment ()j' income escaping assessment. This section empowers the Income-tax Officer concerned subject to th~ provisions of ss. 148 to 153 to assess or re-assess escaped income.\n\nWhile holding these assessment proceedings the Income-tax Officer does not, in our view, perform the functions of a court a~ comtemplated by s. 446 ( 2) of the Act.\n\nLooking at the legislative history and the scheme of the Indian Companies Act, particularly the language of s. 446 read as a whole, it appears to us that the expression \"other\" legal proceeding\" i'u sub-s. ( 1) and the expression \"legal proceeding\" in sub-s. (2) convey the same sense and the proceedings in both the sub-sections must be such as. can appropriately be dealt with by the winding up court. The Incometax Act is, in our opinion, a complete code and it is particularly so with respect to the assessment and re-assessment of income-tax with which alone we are concerned in the present case.\n\nThe fact that after the amount of tax payable by an assessee has been determned or quantified its realisation from a company in liquidation is governed biy the Act because the income-tax payable also being a debt has to rank pari passu with other debts due from the company does not mean that the assessment proceedings for computing the amount of tax must be held to be such other legal proceedings as can only be started or continued with the leave of the liquidation court under s. 446 of the Act.\n\nThe liquidation court, in our opinion, cannot perform the functions of Income-tax Officers while assessing the amount of tax payable by the assessees even. if the assessee be the company which is being wound up by the court.\n\nThe orders made by the Income-tax Officer i, n the course of assessment or re-assessment proceedings are subject to appeal to the higher hierarchy under the Income-tax Act. There are also provisions for reference to the High Court and for appeals from the decisions of the High Court to the Sunreme Court and then there are provisions for revision by the Commissioner of Income-tax. It would lead to anomalous consequences if the winding up court were to be held empowered to transfer the assessment proceedings to itself and assess the company to income-tax.\n\nThe argument on behalf of the appellant by Shri Desai is that the winding up .court is empowerell in its discretion to decline to transfer the assessment proceedings in a given case blut the power on the plain language of s. 446 of the Act must be held to vest in that court to be exercised only if considered expedient.\n\nWe are not impressed by this argument.\n\nThe lan)nJage of s. 446 must be so construed as to eliminate such startling crmsequences as investing the windin~ up court with the powers of an Income-tax Officer conferred Ojl him by the Incometax Act, because in our view the legislature could not have intended such a result.\n\nThe argument that the proceedings for assessment or re assessment of a company \\\\'hich is being wound up can only be started or continued with the leave of the liquidation court is also, on the scheme both of the Act and of the Income-tax Act, unacceptable.\n\nWe have not been shown any principle on which the liquidation court should . be vested with the power to stop assessment proceedings for determining the amount of tax payable by the company which is being wound up.\n\nThe liquida tion court would have full power to scrutinise the claim of the' revenue after income-tax has been determined and its payment demanded from the liquidator.\n\nIt would be open to the liquida tion court then to decide how far under the law, the amount of Income-tax determined by the department should be accepied as a lawful liability on the funds of the company in liquidation. At\n\nchat stage the winding up court can fully safeguard the interests of the company and its creditors under the Act.\n\nIncidentally, it may be pointed out that at t]le bar no English decision was brought to our notice under which the assessment proceedings were held to be controlled by the winding up court.\n\nOn the view that we have taken, the decisions in the case of Seth Spinning Mills Ltd., (In Liquidation )( 1) and the Mysore Spun Silk Mills Ltd., (In Liquidation)(') do not seem to lay down the correct\n\nrnle of law that the Income-tax Officers must obtain leave of the winding up court for commencing or continuing assessment or reassessment proceedings. ·\n\nFor tlie f?regoing reaons we have no hesitation in dismissing the iJppeal with costs.\n\ns.c.\n\n(I) 461.T.R. 193.\n\n(2) 68 I.T.R. 695.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 180, "entities": [{"text": "S. V. KANDASKAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. V. KANDASKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. N. DESHPANDE & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. N. DESHPANDE & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 4, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 4, 1972\n\n[S. M. S1KR1, C.J., J. M. SHELAT, I. D. DuA, H. R. KHANNA\n\nAND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J\n\nIncome Tax-S. 148 and Companies Act-S: 446(1 )-Whether lnconie Tax Officers require leave of the liquidation Court to reopen assessment of a con1pc..ny for escaped income."}}, {"text": "S1K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 71, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DuA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 166, "end_char": 179, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 491, "end_char": 497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 446(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 930, "end_char": 939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 947, "end_char": 960, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1598, "end_char": 1612, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1636, "end_char": 1642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 446(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1852, "end_char": 1861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1946) F.C.R. 40", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2350, "end_char": 2365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2686, "end_char": 2703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aooeal from the Judgment and order dated January 31, 1970 H of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "S. T. DPsai. P. C. Bhartnri Aiit MPhta. Kirit MPhfa. J. B.\n\nDmf,, rhanji. 0. C. Mathur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2731, "end_char": 2817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. DPsai."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2822, "end_char": 2837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2877, "end_char": 2883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14-L73fiS,1pCJl72\n\nB. Sen, S. K. Aiyar and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S. K. Aiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2885, "end_char": 2896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14-L73fiS,1pCJl72\n\nB. Sen, S. K. Aiyar and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2901, "end_char": 2915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14-L73fiS,1pCJl72\n\nB. Sen, S. K. Aiyar and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Dua", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2980, "end_char": 2983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment the Court was delivered by\n\nDua, J.-The Colaba Land and Mills Co., Ltd., (il}."}}, {"text": "Colaba Land and Mills Co., Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2992, "end_char": 3023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment the Court was delivered by\n\nDua, J.-The Colaba Land and Mills Co., Ltd., (il}."}}, {"text": "s. 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3445, "end_char": 3451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3459, "end_char": 3479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "December 31, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3608, "end_char": 3625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 31, 1966, the Income-tax Officer served further notices under s. 142(1) of the Income-tax Act upon the Official Liquidator calling upon him to produce accounts and documents specified at the back of the notices and to furnish any information called for by the said officer."}}, {"text": "s. 142(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3679, "end_char": 3688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3696, "end_char": 3710, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 271", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4131, "end_char": 4137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4145, "end_char": 4159, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Vimadlal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4568, "end_char": 4576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On an application made by the Official Liquidator in the High Court questioning the jurisdiCtion of the Income-tax Officer to issue the said notices or to proceed with the re-assessment of the Company without the leave of the High Court winding up the Company, Vimadlal J., on 28th September, 1967 held that the income-tax authorities were not entitled to commence the assessment or reassessment proceedings contemplated against the Colaba Land and Mills Co., Ltd., or to .continue the same without obtaining leave of the Court under s. 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 (Act No."}}, {"text": "28th September, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4584, "end_char": 4604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On an application made by the Official Liquidator in the High Court questioning the jurisdiCtion of the Income-tax Officer to issue the said notices or to proceed with the re-assessment of the Company without the leave of the High Court winding up the Company, Vimadlal J., on 28th September, 1967 held that the income-tax authorities were not entitled to commence the assessment or reassessment proceedings contemplated against the Colaba Land and Mills Co., Ltd., or to .continue the same without obtaining leave of the Court under s. 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 (Act No."}}, {"text": "Colaba Land and Mills Co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4740, "end_char": 4771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On an application made by the Official Liquidator in the High Court questioning the jurisdiCtion of the Income-tax Officer to issue the said notices or to proceed with the re-assessment of the Company without the leave of the High Court winding up the Company, Vimadlal J., on 28th September, 1967 held that the income-tax authorities were not entitled to commence the assessment or reassessment proceedings contemplated against the Colaba Land and Mills Co., Ltd., or to .continue the same without obtaining leave of the Court under s. 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 (Act No."}}, {"text": "s. 446(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4841, "end_char": 4850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4858, "end_char": 4877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Modi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5271, "end_char": 5275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lPpeal by the Inome-tax Officer and the Union of India before the aP, pellate bench of the High Court against the order of injunction, the Division Bench (Modi and Desai, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5280, "end_char": 5285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lPpeal by the Inome-tax Officer and the Union of India before the aP, pellate bench of the High Court against the order of injunction, the Division Bench (Modi and Desai, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Desai"}}, {"text": "s. 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5524, "end_char": 5530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 446(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5603, "end_char": 5612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 446(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5774, "end_char": 5783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Cpmpany Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6098, "end_char": 6111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proceedings by way of assessment before the Income-tax Officer, according to the contention were outside the pale of jurisdiction of all civil courts including the Cpmpany Court. ."}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6487, "end_char": 6501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 446", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6784, "end_char": 6795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7502, "end_char": 7507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) The Court which is winding up the company shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in fore~, have jurisdiction to entertain, or dispose of-=- ·\n\n(a) any suit or proceeding by or against the company;\n\n(b) any .claim ade by or aainst the company (inludm~ claims by or agamst any of its branches lil India);\n\n(c) any question of priorities or any other question whatsoever, weter of law or fact, which may relate to or anse m course of the winding up of the company;\n\nhther such suit or roceeding as been institut~ or ismstltuhted, o1 r. suc; h clha1mbeeor quest10n has arisen or arises _or sue app 1cat10n as n made or is made before or\n\n{I) A.I.JI.. 1966 S.C. 135."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8438, "end_char": 8451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) Nothing in sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) shall apply to any proceeding pending in appeal before the Supreme Court or High Court.\""}}, {"text": "Chapter ll of Part VII of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8661, "end_char": 8694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 433", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8710, "end_char": 8716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter ll of Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter ll of Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8753, "end_char": 8764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter ll of Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter ll of Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 441", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8810, "end_char": 8816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter ll of Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter ll of Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 442", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8889, "end_char": 8900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter ll of Part VII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter ll of Part VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 444", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9715, "end_char": 9726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9909, "end_char": 9922, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 448", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10020, "end_char": 10026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10053, "end_char": 10071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Official Liquidators attached to the l-Iigh Courts are appointed by the Central Govemment under s. 448 and the Registrars by the Central Government under s. 609 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 609", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10078, "end_char": 10084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 445", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10199, "end_char": 10205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 445", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10505, "end_char": 10511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 446", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10529, "end_char": 10535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10746, "end_char": 10750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10758, "end_char": 10795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10797, "end_char": 10801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909", "statute": "the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909"}}, {"text": "Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10809, "end_char": 10840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 45B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10845, "end_char": 10851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920", "statute": "the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10867, "end_char": 10880, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ln the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11765, "end_char": 11798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11800, "end_char": 11806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ln the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "Ln the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12530, "end_char": 12537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XLIII of 1850) broadly been followin the lmes of devel.opmet of the company law in England."}}, {"text": "s. 46(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13170, "end_char": 13178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13193, "end_char": 13207, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13276, "end_char": 13281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13447, "end_char": 13453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13468, "end_char": 13481, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13544, "end_char": 13549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The passage on which Shri Desai specifically relied is where, disagreeing with the observation~ of a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Shakuntla v. The People's Bank of Northern India Ltd. (In Liquidation)(2 ), Spens, C.J. observed that the expression \"or other legal proceedings\" in s. 171 need not and, therefore, should not be confined to \"original proceedings in a court of first instance analogous to a suit initiated by means of a petitiQn similar to a plaint\".", "canonical_name": "Desai"}}, {"text": "Lahore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13637, "end_char": 13654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The passage on which Shri Desai specifically relied is where, disagreeing with the observation~ of a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Shakuntla v. The People's Bank of Northern India Ltd. (In Liquidation)(2 ), Spens, C.J. observed that the expression \"or other legal proceedings\" in s. 171 need not and, therefore, should not be confined to \"original proceedings in a court of first instance analogous to a suit initiated by means of a petitiQn similar to a plaint\"."}}, {"text": "Shakuntla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13658, "end_char": 13667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The passage on which Shri Desai specifically relied is where, disagreeing with the observation~ of a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Shakuntla v. The People's Bank of Northern India Ltd. (In Liquidation)(2 ), Spens, C.J. observed that the expression \"or other legal proceedings\" in s. 171 need not and, therefore, should not be confined to \"original proceedings in a court of first instance analogous to a suit initiated by means of a petitiQn similar to a plaint\"."}}, {"text": "Spens", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13734, "end_char": 13739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The passage on which Shri Desai specifically relied is where, disagreeing with the observation~ of a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Shakuntla v. The People's Bank of Northern India Ltd. (In Liquidation)(2 ), Spens, C.J. observed that the expression \"or other legal proceedings\" in s. 171 need not and, therefore, should not be confined to \"original proceedings in a court of first instance analogous to a suit initiated by means of a petitiQn similar to a plaint\"."}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13807, "end_char": 13813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14046, "end_char": 14057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14276, "end_char": 14282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14284, "end_char": 14295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14332, "end_char": 14338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14905, "end_char": 14909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "\\Vrenbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15099, "end_char": 15108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover, the scheme of the application of the company's property in the pari passu satisfaction of its liabilities, envisaged in s. 2.11 and other sections of the A9t, cannot be made to work in coordination, unless all creditors (except such secured creditors as are 'outside the winding up' in the sense indicated by Lord \\Vrenbury in his speech in Food Controller v. Cork(\") are subjected as to their actions against the property of the company to the control of the Court."}}, {"text": "s.\n\n171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15368, "end_char": 15375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16824, "end_char": 16830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16845, "end_char": 16858, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17054, "end_char": 17064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them."}}, {"text": "s. 232(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17741, "end_char": 17750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1955] 2 S.C.R. 374", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17985, "end_char": 18004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shakuntla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18737, "end_char": 18746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case the observations alreafiy reproduced from the judgment of the Federal Court in Shakuntla's case (supra) were approved."}}, {"text": "Section 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19078, "end_char": 19089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19145, "end_char": 19151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19261, "end_char": 19267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19423, "end_char": 19429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These two decisions in our opinion do not lay down that assessment proceedings under the Income-true Act", "statute": "These two decisions in our opinion do not lay down that assessment proceedings under the Income-true Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19437, "end_char": 19463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Fisheries (P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19612, "end_char": 19630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case the respondents, Fisheries (P) Ltd., had been directed to be wound up by the winding up court and an Official Liquidator had been appointed by an order of the High Court in October, 1950."}}, {"text": "(1965] 3 S.C.R. 678", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20408, "end_char": 20427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 49E", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20817, "end_char": 20823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20831, "end_char": 20851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21074, "end_char": 21082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 49E", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21645, "end_char": 21651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 49E", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21886, "end_char": 21892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 228 and 229", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21956, "end_char": 21971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21979, "end_char": 21992, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 49E", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22247, "end_char": 22253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 228 and 229", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22333, "end_char": 22348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22356, "end_char": 22369, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 228 and 229", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22585, "end_char": 22600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 49E", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22661, "end_char": 22672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 228 and 229", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22696, "end_char": 22711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49E", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22728, "end_char": 22734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shiromani Sugar Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23120, "end_char": 23141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be recalled that in Shiromani Sugar Mills case (supra) the assessment made after the winding up order was not challenged though on the argument addressed by Shri Desai before us it could have been challenged."}}, {"text": "s. 195(1 )(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23699, "end_char": 23712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 476", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23836, "end_char": 23842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 479", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23847, "end_char": 23853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 446", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23999, "end_char": 24005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 195(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24322, "end_char": 24334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 446", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24452, "end_char": 24458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mysore Spun Silk Mills Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24729, "end_char": 24756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decisions which apparently seem to lend more direct support to the appellant's contention are Union of India v. Seth Spinning Mills Ltd., (In Liquidation)( 2 ) and Mysore Spun Silk Mills Ltd., (In Liquidation), In re Official Liquidator v. Commissioner of lncort1¢-tax, Bangalore(•)."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24912, "end_char": 24929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both of them are decisions by single Judges, the former by the Punjab High Court and the latter by \\he Mysore High Court."}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24952, "end_char": 24969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both of them are decisions by single Judges, the former by the Punjab High Court and the latter by \\he Mysore High Court."}}, {"text": "Seth Spinning Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24975, "end_char": 24994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Seth Spinning Mills case (supra) it was observed \"that s. 171 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 provideii that wben a winding up order has been made no suit or other legal proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the court and subj; ct to."}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25030, "end_char": 25036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25044, "end_char": 25070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25375, "end_char": 25389, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25686, "end_char": 25700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case the Union of India though the Commissioner of IncomC:.:tax\n\nhad applied to the learned single Judge, who was apparently fimctioning as a company Judge, praying that the department's claim amounting to Rs."}}, {"text": "Section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26356, "end_char": 26367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Cunpanies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26375, "end_char": 26401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26705, "end_char": 26719, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "14th April, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26865, "end_char": 26881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4,000 on account of the penalty order passed on 14th April, 1956, cannot be entertained.\""}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26915, "end_char": 26921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Mysore case it appears that in the course of winding up of the mills in liquidationJarge sums of money came into the hand' of the liquidator which could not be immediately applied for distribution of dividends to Jhe creditors."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27430, "end_char": 27443, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 446", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27896, "end_char": 27907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27915, "end_char": 27928, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28404, "end_char": 28417, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28693, "end_char": 28707, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29139, "end_char": 29153, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29162, "end_char": 29175, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29325, "end_char": 29334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29342, "end_char": 29356, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29493, "end_char": 29507, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29566, "end_char": 29580, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Incometax Officer under the Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29641, "end_char": 29683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 446", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29807, "end_char": 29818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Incometax Officer under the Income-tax Act", "statute": "Incometax Officer under the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29826, "end_char": 29839, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30012, "end_char": 30025, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 446", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30285, "end_char": 30291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Incometax Officer under the Income-tax Act", "statute": "Incometax Officer under the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Tax Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30719, "end_char": 30732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30845, "end_char": 30871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 446", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31113, "end_char": 31119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946", "statute": "the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31301, "end_char": 31320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31340, "end_char": 31360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "171 of the Companies Act, 1913 it was held by the Allahabad High Court, that initiation by the Income-tax Officer of steps to recover the amount of assessment under s. 46 of the Income-tax Act of 1922 and the prosecution by the Collector of those steps amounted to \"commencement\" or \"proceeding with\" a \"suit or other legal proceeding.\""}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31455, "end_char": 31460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31468, "end_char": 31482, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 446", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31800, "end_char": 31806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "s. 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31845, "end_char": 31851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31859, "end_char": 31873, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 49E", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32043, "end_char": 32049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "s. 446", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32768, "end_char": 32774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32820, "end_char": 32826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32834, "end_char": 32848, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1965) 3 S.C.R. 678", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 33084, "end_char": 33103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Turning now to the Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33106, "end_char": 33139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33162, "end_char": 33168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Turning now to the Income-tax Act", "statute": "Turning now to the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33263, "end_char": 33268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Turning now to the Income-tax Act", "statute": "Turning now to the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 148 to 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33429, "end_char": 33443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Turning now to the Income-tax Act", "statute": "Turning now to the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 446", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33625, "end_char": 33631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Turning now to the Income-tax Act", "statute": "Turning now to the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Looking at the legislative history and the scheme of the Indian Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33650, "end_char": 33727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 446", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33758, "end_char": 33764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Looking at the legislative history and the scheme of the Indian Companies Act", "statute": "Looking at the legislative history and the scheme of the Indian Companies Act"}}, {"text": "s. 446", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34735, "end_char": 34741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35138, "end_char": 35152, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sunreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35272, "end_char": 35285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are also provisions for reference to the High Court and for appeals from the decisions of the High Court to the Sunreme Court and then there are provisions for revision by the Commissioner of Income-tax."}}, {"text": "s. 446", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35764, "end_char": 35770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 446", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35921, "end_char": 35927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Officer conferred Ojl him by the Incometax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36049, "end_char": 36106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36412, "end_char": 36426, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Seth Spinning Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37419, "end_char": 37443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the view that we have taken, the decisions in the case of Seth Spinning Mills Ltd., (In Liquidation )( 1) and the Mysore Spun Silk Mills Ltd., (In Liquidation)(') do not seem to lay down the correct\n\nrnle of law that the Income-tax Officers must obtain leave of the winding up court for commencing or continuing assessment or reassessment proceedings. ·"}}, {"text": "Mysore Spun Silk Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37475, "end_char": 37502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the view that we have taken, the decisions in the case of Seth Spinning Mills Ltd., (In Liquidation )( 1) and the Mysore Spun Silk Mills Ltd., (In Liquidation)(') do not seem to lay down the correct\n\nrnle of law that the Income-tax Officers must obtain leave of the winding up court for commencing or continuing assessment or reassessment proceedings. ·"}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_2_980_991_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "S. G. MERCANTILE CORPN. (P) L1D. v.\n\nTilE C.I.T., CALCUTI' A\n\nJanuary 4, 1972 .[J. M. SHELAT, I. D. DuA, H. R. KHANNA AND G: K. MITTER, JJ.]\n\nIncome Tax Act; 1922, ss. 10, 1ompany formed with the object of acquiring or taking on lease laltds buildings et'C. c:nd dealing with them .commercially-Company taking on lease market place and letting it out-\n\nIncome from the leasehold property whether to be assessed unde s. 10 or s. 12-..:.Tests for petermtning. ·\n\nThe appellant company was formed with the object, inter alia, to pur- .c:hase, take on lease or otherwise acquire and to hold, cultivate, improve,\n\nlease, sell, exchange, mortgage, or otherwise dispo_e of lands or houses . .and other real and personal property and to deal with the same commercially. The company took on lease a market place on a monthly rent with the right to sub-let the different pOrtions. The company's aCtivity , dl¢ng the period covered by the assessment years 1956-'56, 1957-'5& '3Ild 195p-'59\n\nwas that of developing the demised premises and letting out the portions of the same as shops, stalls and ground space. In assessment proceedings, the company claimed that its income from the lease hold property fqr the .assessment years had to be assessed under s. 10 of the Income T!!X Act.\n\n1922 as Jeiting om of properly was its business authorised by the, ¢emorandum of association. The b_lcoroe Tax Officer, and the Appellate A,8sistant Commi sioner in appel, rejected the company's claim and made assessment under s. 12 of the Act as \"income from other .source.\" The .appellate Tribunal held that the income of the appellant company from\n\nsub-letting of the stalls was income from business taxable under s. 10 of the Act.\n\nAccording to the Tribunal the decision could only tum 1,1pon the object for which the company was formed and upon the activities. of the company during the relevant accounting years.\n\nThe High COurt, ·n reference, answered that the income was not assessaole under s.: 10. It observed that by letting out shops and stalls the assessee could not bo said to be carrying on any activity in the nature of trade or was dealing with . them commercially.\n\nIn appeal by pecial leave,\n\nHELD: The income was assesSable under s. 10 and not under s. 12 Of the Act.\n\n(i) There is no finding in the prent case that the appellant company is the owner of the property in question or any part thereof. Therefore, s. 9 does not apply. The liability under s. 9 of the Act is of the owner of the buildings or lands appurtenant thereto. In case the assessee is the owner he -would be liable to pay tax under s. 9 even if the object of the assessee in purchasing the landed property was to promote and develop market thereon. It would also make no difference if the assessee was a company which had en incorpdrated with the object of buyi1.1.& and developing landed properties and promoting and setting up market thereon.\n\nThe income derived by such a company from_ the tenants .of the shops and stalls constructed on the land for the purposes of settmg .up\n\nmarket would not be taxed as \"business income\" under s. 10 of the Act.\n\n.[985 D-G]\n\nEast India Housing Esta~ case, [1961] 42 J.T.R. 49, referred to.\n\n; i\n\nH { -\n\nS. G. MERCANTILE CORP. v. C.I.T. (KJumna, /.)\n\n(ii) Section 12 which deals with the residuary head of income can be resorted to only if none of the specific heads is applicable to the income in question. Therefore, s. 12 can be invoked in the present case only if the applicaoility of s. 10 is excluded by holding that the income of the appellant company from the p!'OJX'rty in question is not income from J>usiness. [987 D)\n\n(iii) The dcfinitio:1 of the word \"business'' in s. 2(4) embraced within itself dealing in real property as also the activity of taking a property on lease, setting up a market thereon and letting out the shops and stalls in the market. The important question which arises in e latter case is whether the acquisition of the property on leas<! and lettinl! out of the shops and sfalls wa~; in th') course of investm:!nt or whether it was ·sen\n\ntially a part of the business and trading operation of the assssce. The paramount consiri•ration which would weigh is whether the acquisition\n\nof the property was by way of investment and whether the property was let out b->..cause of the a sessee having a title in the same, or whether the acquisition 'lnd letting out of the property constituted business and trading activity of the asses9!e. The question as to whether the activity is being carried on by an individual or il company and in the latter case the further question as to whether carrying on of the said activity was the object of the incorporation of tlw company as given in tm Memorandum of Association would also have some relevance; &987 E-H]\n\nThe conclusion of the Tribunal that the activities of the appellant in taking lease and sub-letting demised premises were undertaken with the object of doing business was warranted on the facts of the case.\n\nLik:ewil>·~ the conclusion of the Tribunal tlnt the a!)t)ellant cdmpany in letting out the lease-hold prooerty was not actin~ a~ owner but as trader was borne out bv the material on record. [990 Bl\n\nCommissioner of Inland Revenul!!· v. Korean Syndicc.'te Ltd., U92t] 12 Tax Cas. 181 and KaranDura Develo, ment Co. Ltd. v. Comml.rrioner of Income-tax, West Bengal [1962) 44 I.T.R. 362, referred to.\n\nFry v. Salisbury /{014e Estate Ltd .. [1930) A.C. 432 an, d East India\n\nHousin~ Estate cas:, [ 1961)42 I.T.R. 49, distinguished.\n\n{iv) Therefore. where, as in the !)resent case the income can ap'ropriately fall under s. 10 as bein~ busineliS income. no resort an be made to s. 12 of the Act.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil A!)peals Nos. 1748 1750 of 1968.\n\nAn?eals by soecial leave from the judgment and orrler dated July 20. 1967 of the Calcutta High Court in Income-tax Reference No. 144 of 1963.\n\nM. C. Chagla and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appelant (in all the a?peals).\n\nS. C. Monchrmd'l, R. N. Sachthey and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent (in all the appeals).\n\nH The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhn~ J.-Th.is itdon1ent would disoose of civil apoeals No. 1748 to 1750 o( 1968 filed by special leave against\n\nJ.S -L7J(jS .P Cl/7:\n\n982 SUPilEME COURT REPORTS\n\n. }1972] 2 S.C.R.\n\nthe judgment of the Calcutta High Court whereby the question referred to that Court under section 66 ( 1 ) of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922, hereinafter referred to as the Act, was answered . in favour of the revenue and against the appellant company.\n\nThe appellant, a private limited company, was incorporated\n\non January 25, 19~5. The objects for which the Company was B established were given in the clauses of paragraph 3 of the Mem(). randum of Association.\n\nA number of business activities were mentionedin thpse clauses.\n\nClauses 6 and 7 of that paragraph were as under :--:---\n\n\"6. To purchase take on lease or otherwise .acquire and to hold, cultivate, improve, lease, sell, exchange, C mortgage, or, otherwise, dispose of land, houses, mines, minerals, mining and other real and personal property and to deal with the same commercially.\n\n7. To develop the resources of the same property by building, reclaiming, clearing, draining, and other- D wise improving framing and planting on any terms or system that may be considered advisable.\"\n\nWith effect from February 5, 1955, the appellant company took on lease a market place known as TaJoUa Bazar in the city of Calcutta from Shrimati Sujata Tagore and her sons on a monthly rent of Rs. 3,000 for a term of 50 years, with option E to the lessee to renew the lea<e for the further period of 40 years.\n\nThe deed of lease in this connection was executed on September 5,\n\n1956. Clauses 4, 5 and 13 of the lease deed were as u::der:\n\n\"4. The Lessee shall have the option to e;.ect, rebuilt, remodel and reconstruct and repair the existing structures upon the demised premises from time to time during the tenn of these presents at its own costs in a substantial and workmanlike manner whh good material of the several kinds in accordance with the plans elevations sanctions and specifications according to the choice of the Lessee (and whenever necesc; arv to get such plans sanctioned by the Corporation of Calcutta) under the supervic; ion of a first class Engineer to he elected by the Lessee on notice to the Lessors and shall spend upon such works such sum or sumo;; as the Lesc; ee may in its absolute discretion think fit and proper but the entire total sum or sums so to be expended by the Lessee as aforesaid sh::tll not be less than R:upees Five Lacs and the same shaH be spent within the period of five years from date of these presents.\n\nThe Lessors shall be at liberty to appoint at their own costs a valuer\n\nB ( .\n\nS. G. MERCANTILE CORP. v. C.I.T. (Khanna, J.) 983\n\nand surveyor to verify such expenditure if required for their satisfaction after the completion of the said work.\n\n5. If the Lessee constructs any new structures and/ or buildings as mentioned in the preceding clauses the said structures and/or buildings or erections together with all alterations renovation remodelling reconstruction thereto shall belong absolutely to the Lessors on the expiration or sooner determination of the term hereby granted and/ or the renewed period thereof as hereinafter mentioned.\n\n13. That the Lessee shall not assign this lease without first obtaining the permission in writing of the Lessors but such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.\n\nThe lessee shall prior to any such assignment of this demise give notice thereof to the Lessors in writing containing the name of the assignee and f'qrnish other necessary particulars concerning sucb assignlllent.\n\nNotwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained the Lessee shall subject to the conditions and convenants herein contained he entitled to sublet or underlet the demised premises or any part or portion thereof and/or grant sublease or sub-leases in respect of the demised premises or any portion or portions thereof for a term not exceeding or beyond the tenn hereby granted including the renewed and/or optional period in case of renewal subject to the terms and conditions of these presents.\"\n\nThe appellant company's activity during the period covered by assessment years 1956-57, 1957-58 and 1958-59 was that of developing the demised premises and letting out portions of the same as shops, stalls and ground spaces to shopkeepers, stallholders and daily casual market vendors.\n\nThe appellant claimed that its income from the leasehold property for the above mentioned three assessment years should be asessed under section 10 of the Act as letting out of that property was its business authorised by the Memorandum of Association.\n\nThe appellant had shown losses in its return for all the three years and the above claim was made on its behalf obviously for the purpose of carrying forward such losses. The Income-tax O\"fficer rejected the appellant's claim and made assessments under section 12 of the Act. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner in appeal by a consolidated order held that the appellant had been rightly assessed under section 12 of the Act.\n\nOn further appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, the Tribunal referred to clauses 6 and 7 of paragraph 3 of the Memorandum of Association and\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] zs.c.P..\n\ncame t.o the conclusion that the activities of the appellant com~ pany in taking the lease and subletting the demised premis~\n\nwere undertaken with the object of doing business. The Tribunal observed that normally where the assessee was not the owner of the buildin_g t eavned rent by subletting the same, such income could only be charged under section 12 as income from other sources.\n\nThe difficulty, however, arose in cases where letting out of lease hold property was the business of the assessee.\n\nIn such cases, according to the Tribunal, the decision could only turn upon the object for which the company was formed and upon the activities of the company during the relevant accounting years. It was held that if the activity of the appellant company amounted to carrying on the business of taking on lease and letting out the leasehold property, the company was not acting as owner but as trader.\n\nThe income accruing from such a source, in the opinion of the Tribunal, must be held to be income from business assessable under section 10 of the Act. The Tri- bunal accordingly held that the income of the appellant company from subletting of the stalls in question was income from business taxable under section 10 of the Act.\n\nAt the instance of the res,!)ondent, the Tribunal referred the followi..<tg question to the High Court :\n\n\"Whether, under the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the income from subletting the stalls of Taltolla Bazar was assessab1e under section 10 or sec\n\ntion 12 of the Income-tax Act, 1922?\"\n\nThe learned judges of the High Court held that the income from subletting of the stalls in question was not assessable under section 10 of the Act. In arriving at this conclusion, the learned judges 0bserved :\n\n\"The assessee had taken lease of a market or Bazar.\n\nAfter having reconstructed or renovated the buildings, it is letting out shops and stalls to shopkeepers and\n\nstllholders. This is a normal activity of a owner or a lessee of such a _market or Bazar. It could not be said that by letting out the shops and stalls to shopkeepers • and stallholders, the assessee was carrving on any activity in the nature of trade and was utilising or exploit~\n\ning real estate in the best possible way or in other words was dealing with it commercially. The ratio of\n\nthe Supreme Court decision in East India Houfif!t Estate case(!) is fullv af}olicabl~ to the case before us and it must be held that the Tribunal was in error in its conclusion that lhe income of the assessee -fi6m\n\n0) [19tllJ 4:'.1T .R\n\n~C>.\n\n'1 c\n\nll (\n\ns. G. MERCANTILE CORP. V. C.I.T. (Khanna, J.) 985\n\nsubletting the stalls of !altolla Bazar was assessable under section 10 of the ndtan Income-ta~ Act, 1922. In the premises the .questton referred .to thts Court is answered in the followmg manner, that ts to say, that the income from subletting the stalls of Taltolla Bazar was not assessable under section 1 0.\"\n\nWe have heard Mr. Chagla on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Manchanda on behalf ?f the respondent and are of the view that the judgment of the Htgh Court cannot b<! sustained. Section 6 of the Act enumerates the various heads of income, profits and gains chargeable to ic?me-ta~:. Those heads are (i) Salaries;\n\n(ii) Interest on secunttes;\n\n(m) Income from property; (iv) C Profits and gains of business, professions or vocation; ( v) Income from other sources; and (vi) Capital gains.\n\nSection 9 of the Act deals with income from property. According to that section, the tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head \"Income from Property\" in respect of the hona D fide annual value of property consisting of any buildings or lands\n\nappurtenant thereto of which he is the owner, other than such portions of such property as he may occupy for the purposes of any business, profession or vocation carried on by him the profits of which are assessable to tax, subject to certain allowances which are mentioned in that section but wirh which E we are not concerned. It is noteworthy that the liability to tax\n\nunder section 9 of the Act is of the owner of the buildings or lands appurtenant thereto. In case the assessee is the owner of the buildings or lands appurtenant thereto, he woul~ be liable 10 pay t~:t under the above provic; ion even if the object of the assessee m purchasinn the landed property was to promote .md develop market thcrn. It would also make no differenc~ if the f ~~>; essee was .a company which liad been inco; porated wtth be\n\nlect of buysng and developing landed propertrcs and promotrng and_ '\\ettinj! uo m:trkets thereon. The income derived by such a COmpany from the tenants of the shops and staUs, contructed n the land for the purooses of setting uo market. would not .be ; x.ed as \"business income\" under section 10 of th'! Act, to whtch\n\nktore det1iled reference would be made hereafter, but under td on 9 of the Act.\n\nA concrete ir\"'ance of thi<: tvne i<: aff~•d r, Y the cae of ,::,.1 '\"'na /frtu•;, v nnd Ln\"\" Dev,.lnnment\n\nflr( Lt1\n\nW • 8\"n1/( I) lhe a., v. Commisri'>ner nf f, cnm~-tax, e~. . the ob l'lcllant comnanv in th:tt cnc:e h'd bce11 incornorated th ll and ~~:~ ·~ of buvi11~ dcvcJ,.,.., i., g larrded prnner•ie~ and ormotm~ . . land i~ l'l~ uo m:rke•~. The comr.>anv. purch1<ed ten h•!tha~ ., f l\n\nqutio th~ own of C<>lcutt'l noel <; et uo a market thereon; The -( • 11 Which aroe for detennination was whether the mcome \\} (19 --;:;=-=---- 6lJ4l I.T.R.. 49\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972]. 2 S.C.R.\n\nrealised from the tenants of shops and stalls was liable to be taxw as business income under section 10 of the Act or income from property under seclion 9. This Court held that the ln.come derived by tne company from shops and stalls was income recei~ ved from property and fell under the specific head described in sec lion 9. it was observed in this connection :\n\n\"Income-tax is urldoubtedly. levied on the total taxable income of the taxpayer and the tax levied is a single tax on the aggregate taxable receipts from all the sources; it is not a collection of taxes separately lev1ed on distinct head$ of income.\n\nBut the distinct heads specified in secLion 6 indicating the sources are\n\nmuually exclusive and income derived from different sources falling under specific heads has to be computed for the purpose of taxaLion in the manner provided by the appropriate section. If the income from a source falls within a specific head set out in section 6, the fact hat it may indirectly be covered by another head will not make the income taxable under the latter ; head.\n\nThe income derived by the company from shops and stalls is income received from property and falls under the specific head described in section 9.\n\nThe character of that income is not' altered because it is received bY a company formed with the object of developing and setting up markets.\"\n\nThere is no finding in the present case that the appellant company is the owner of the property in question or any part thereof.\n\nAs such, no reference was made to section 9 of the Act in the assessment proceedings. The learned counsel for both the parties agree, and in our opinion rightly, that the question of making the assessment against the appellant, in the circumstances under section 9 of the Act does ; not arise. The stand of Mr. Chagla, on behalf of the appellant, is that the assessment against the appellant in respect of the income from the property in question should be made under section 10, while according to Mr. Manhanda, learned counsel for the respondent, the assessment should be under sedon 12 of the Act.\n\nSection 10 of the Act deals with in com~ from business and the material uortion with which we are concerned is given in sub-section ( i) of that section.\n\nAccording to that sub-section, the tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head \"Profits\n\n. '\n\nS. G, :MERCANTILE COJlP, l': C.LT. (Khanna, ] . .)\n\n8S7\n\nand gains of uness, profsion. Qr vtion\". in re&t of he profits and gains of any busmess, professton or vocaton earned on by him. \"Business':, according to section 2(4) of the Act, includes any trade, commerce, or manufacture or any adventure or concern in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture.\n\nSection 12 of the Act deals with income from other sources.\n\nSub-section ( 1) of that section reads as under. :\n\n\" ( 1) .The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head \"Income from other sources\" in respect of income, profit and gains of every kind which may be ipcluded ih his total income (if not included under any Of the preceding heads.),\n\nSection 12 deals with the residuary head of income and applies to all such taxable income, profits and gains as are not covered by preceding specific heads. The residuary head of income can be resorted to only if none of the specific heads is D applicable to the income in question; it comes into operation oruy after the preceding heads are excluded.\n\nIt is, therefore, manifest that section 12 of the Act can be invoked in the present case only if we exclude the applicability .of section 10 by holding that the income of the appellant com- E pany from the property in question is not income from business.\n\nThe definition of the word \"Business\", as givn in section 2( 4) and reproduced above shows its wide amplitude and we agree with Mr. Chagla that it can embraee within itself dealing in real property as also the activity of taking a property on lease, setting up a market thereon and letting out the shops and stalls in the I' market.\n\nThe important . question which arises in the latter case is whether the :.acqisition of the property on lease and letting out of the shops and stalls was in the course of investment or\n\nwhethr it was essentially a part of the businesc; and tra<Jing operation of the assessee.\n\nThe paramount consideration which would eigh is whether the acquisition of the property was by G way of mvestment and whe•her the property was let out because o.f the assess~ having a title in the same ?r whether the acquisition and lettmg out of the property constttuted the business and trading activity of the assessee. The question as to whether the above activity is being carried on by an inrlividual or a com., anv and in the latter case, the further Question as to whether th~ H .. carrying on of the said activity wa5 the object of the. incorooratio.n of the company as givn in the Memorandum of Association would also have some relevance. Reference iii thic; context may\n\nbe .made to the observations of Lord Stem4a}e, M.R. in~ case\n\n988 [1972] 2 S.c.R.\n\nof Commissioners. of -Inland Reven.ue Ltd.(l) : v.\n\nKorean Syndical~\n\n\"If . you once get the individual and the company spending exactly on the same -basisJ then there would be no difference between them at all.\n\nBut the fact that the limited company comes into existence in a 'different way is a matter to be considered. An individual comes into existence for many purposesJ or perhaps sometimes for noneJ whereas a limited company comes ito 'existence for the particular purpose of carrying out a t an action by get mg. possessiJn of concessions and turning them to accountJ then that is a matter to be con.>idered when you come to decide whether doing that is carrying on a business or not.\"\n\n''The abOve observations were quoted with approval 'by this Court in the case of Karanpura Development Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengale). The' assessee company in the last mentioned case was formed with the objects, inter alia, of acquiring and disposing of underground coal mining rights in certain cJa. field>.\n\nThe Mem::>randum of Association of the company enumerated other objects, such as coal raising, but the assessee restricted is activities to acquiring coal mining leases over large areasJ developing them as coal fields and then subleasing them to collieries and. other companies. The [eases were acquired for a term of 999 years and the coal fields were sublet for the balance of the term of the respective leases minus two days.\n\nThe company never wxked the coal fields with a view to raising coal, nor did it acquire or sell coal raised by the sublessees.\n\nAs a'!ainst a, salami of Rs. 40 per bigha which. the '\n\nasessee had paid, it realised from the sub-lessees Rs. 400 per bigha as sal-ami.\n\nIn ddition, the assessee c)larged certain royal;. ties at rtes higher than those it had aqreed. to pay u.nder the brad , leases.\n\nThe question . which arose for determination was whether the amount received bv the assec; see as salami for granting sub-lease constiutd tradng receipts and the profits therefrom was assessable.\n\nIt was held that the tran<:actions of, a.cQuir- , ing ]eases anri e:rantinq sub-leao; es were in the nature of trading with; n the objcts of the company and not enjoyment of the property as landowner.\n\nIt_was observed in this connection:\n\n\"As has been already . oointed out in connection , with the other two cases wnere there is a let•im! out of ' premises and collection of rents the assessment on property, oasis mav be correct but n, ot so, where the letting\n\n. (1) rt92iJ 12 Tax Cas. 181.\n\n(2) [1962] 44 I.T.R. 362.\n\nS. G. MER.CANnLE COR.P. v. c.r.T. (Khanntl. J.) J.l.\n\nor subletti.DJt is part of a trading operation. The divid ing line is difficult to find; but in the case of a company\n\nwtth its professed objects and the manner of its acti vities and the nature of its dealins with its property_ it is possible to say on which side the operations fall and to what head the income is to be assined.\n\nOwnership of property and leasing it out may be done as a part of business, or it may be done as landowner.\n\nWhether it is the one or the other must necessarily depen.d upon the object with which the act is done.\n\nIt rs not that no company can own property and enjoy it as property, whther by itself or by giving 1he\n\nuse of i'l: to another on rent.\n\nWhere this happens, tthe appropriate head to apply is \"income from property\"\n\n( sec'tion 9), even though the company may be doin~ extensive busine>s othe wise. But a company formed with the specific object oi acquiring properties not with the view to basing them as propety but to selling them or\n\nturning them to account even by way of leasing them ou~ as an integral part of its bushes~, cannot be said to treat them as landowner but as trader.\"\n\nThe above observations have a direct bearing. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to say anything, bryond what has already been said while dealing with s-ection 9 of the Act, about the view exptessed in the above passage regarding the rental income of an owner bein!Z treated as business income in case it is reooived as :pa\"rt of trading activity, because we are concerned in the in<; tant' case with an assessee who is lessee and not the owner of the property in question.\n\nThe assessee in the cited case of Karanpura Development Co. Ltd. too was 1essee of the coal fields.\n\nSo far as such ac; seo; seeo; aN concerned, who as part of their essential trading activity take le1Se . of p; o\"e Jy and sublet parts thereof with a view to make profits, the dictum l<dd down above, in our ooinion, !would hold good and e profits would have to be trearted as business income. .' , .\n\n'lite appellant ccmpa1'1)', as stated earlier was incorp•ratcd on January 25, 1955. Th~ obier.t: for which the comoany was formed, inter alia, was to tak~ on lease or otherw; se acquire and to hold, improve, lease or otherwise dispOse of, la11d, houses and. other real ancl oersonal oropertv and to deal vith the same com mercially.\n\nWithin less than two weeks of its incorporation the appellant comoanv took on lease the orooertv in question. and undertook to soend R \"· 5 Iakhs for the ouroo-se of remodelling and reoairin!!' the structure on he site.\n\nThe appel]ant was also given the right to sublet the different portions.\n\nThe appellant's\n\n9.9.0 SUPREME OOVRT RBPOJt, T~\n\n[1972]2 S.C.R.\n\nactivit}' during . the period of three years in question consisted of devetopmg, lhe aemised property and letting out ponions of the same as shops, stalls and ground spaces.\n\nAll the.; e facts point to the conclusion that the takinj!; of the property on lease and subletting portions of the same was part of the business and tradinj!; activity of the appellant.\n\nThe conclu.sion of the Tribunal that the activi1ies of the appellant in takinj!; lease and subletting the demised premises were undertaken with the object of doing . business was warranted on 1he facts of 'the case.\n\nLikewise, the conclusion of the Tribunal that the aooellant company in letting out the leasehold property was not acting as owner but as tl ader was borne out by the material on record.\n\nReference on behalf of the respondent has been made by Mr. Manchanda to the decision of the H.use of Lords in Frv v. Salisbury House Estate Ltd. (1 ) In that case the assessee company which had been formed to acquire, manage and deal with a block of buildl11gs, let out the rooms as unrurnished offices to tenants.\n\nThe company provide1 a staff to operate the lifts and to act as porters and watch and protect the bui ding.\n\nThe c-mpany al5o provided certain sevices--such as heating and cleaning-for the tenants if required, at an additional charge. For four years the company was assessed under Schedule A to income-lax on the gross value of the building as appearing in the valuation lic; t. The company admitted its liability to be assessed in respect of profits from the service supplied to the tenants under Schedule D, but he Cron claimed in makin~ the assessment under Schedule D Ito include the rents of the offices as part of the receipts of trade, making allowance for tax assess•.xl under SChedule A. It may be men ioned that the -scheme of the English Income-tax Act is tto povide for the taxation of specific properties under schedules appropriate to them and under a general Schedule D. to provide for taxa ion of income not dealt with specifically. Schedule A provides for the 'taxation of. income derived from proi>ertv. in land; B (or incom.'!s derived from occupation of land, C for irl'come drived from. Government . securities and E for income from employment in the public ser- . vice. The. Ho\\lc; e of Lords held in othe above citefl ca\"'~ that he\n\nrents were P!Ofits arising from the ownership o~ land in respect of which the assessment under Schedule A was exhaustive and that thev,' therefore/Could not be included in the assessment under\n\nSchedule D as trade 're'ceipts of the company, The assec:see com -pany, in the cited case, was the owner of the Salisbury Houc:.e. and -the decision of the House of Lords re.c; ted on the view that Sche-\n\n-dule A was exhaustive in respect of profits aisina from ownehil> / of land. The above decision is not of much helo to the respandent because the assessee in the present case is not the owner\n\n(1) ·{1930} A.C. 432.\n\nA .. ,~\n\nS. G. MERCANTILE CORP. v. C.I.T. (Khanna. /,) 99l\n\nbut only a lessee of the prOperty in question; and section 9, which is anruogou.§ to Schedule A of the English Act, applies to income fwm property consistin~ of buildings orlands appurtenant hereto of wtuch the assessee is the owner.\n\nThe respondent can also have not much support from the decision of East India Housing and Land Development Trust V'.\n\nCommissio11er of Income-tax(!) because what was decided therein was Lhat in the case of income from landed property by the owner company, the income would tall under the spectfic head:\n\ndescribed in section 9 and not under section 1 0 even though the company had been incorporated with the. object of buying and\n\ndev~Jloping landed p1 operty and promoting a market thereon.\n\nSection 9, as mentioned earlier, does not apply to the present case because the appellant is not owner of the .property in question. As such there arises no question in this case of the exclu.: sion of seotion 10 on the eround that section 9 is the specifichead.\n\nIn the instant case the revenue relies not' upon the specifichead given in section 9 but upon the residuary head given in sectio.n 12 of te Act. It is p1ain that the considerations which would weigh for applying section 9 on the ground .of being a specific head would not hold good for invoking section 12 which\n\ncan come into picture only if all the preceding heaqs of income, including b11siness incom.e as given in section 10, are ruled out.\n\nWhere, as in the present case, the income can appropriately fall under section 10 as being business income, no resort can be made to section 12 of the Act.\n\nAs a result of the above, we acceot the aooeal and set ac; ide the judgmem of the High Court.\n\nThe answer to the ques'ion referred by the Tribunal is that the income in ouestion wa~ asc; essabl•.! under section 10 and not under section 12 of the Act.\n\nThe appellant shall be entitled to 'the costs of this Court as weU as: th0l1e of the Hiah Court.\n\nOne hearin2 fee.\n\nK.B.N.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n(l) [1961]42 I.T.R..~J", "total_entities": 98, "entities": [{"text": "S. G. MERCANTILE CORPN. (P) L1D", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 31, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. G. MERCANTILE CORPN. (P) LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 4, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 77, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P) L1D. v.\n\nTilE C.I.T., CALCUTI' A\n\nJanuary 4, 1972 .[J. M. SHELAT, I. D. DuA, H. R. KHANNA AND G: K. MITTER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DuA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G: K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 10, 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 164, "end_char": 173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act", "statute": "Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 416, "end_char": 421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act", "statute": "Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 425, "end_char": 430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act", "statute": "Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1243, "end_char": 1248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1501, "end_char": 1506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1691, "end_char": 1696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2224, "end_char": 2229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2244, "end_char": 2249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2405, "end_char": 2409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2446, "end_char": 2450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2596, "end_char": 2600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3099, "end_char": 3104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "East India Housing Esta~ case, [1961] 42 J.T.R. 49", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3130, "end_char": 3180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".[985 D-G]\n\nEast India Housing Esta~ case, [1961] 42 J.T.R. 49, referred to."}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3260, "end_char": 3270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3423, "end_char": 3428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3493, "end_char": 3498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3683, "end_char": 3690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5613, "end_char": 5618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5670, "end_char": 5675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5840, "end_char": 5859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1967 of the Calcutta High Court in Income-tax Reference No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Chagla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5902, "end_char": 5914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appelant (in all the a?peals)."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5919, "end_char": 5934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appelant (in all the a?peals)."}}, {"text": "S. C. Monchrmd'l", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5976, "end_char": 5992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Monchrmd'l, R. N. Sachthey and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5994, "end_char": 6008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Monchrmd'l, R. N. Sachthey and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6013, "end_char": 6025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Monchrmd'l, R. N. Sachthey and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6386, "end_char": 6396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Incometax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6410, "end_char": 6436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 25, 19~5", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6613, "end_char": 6629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, a private limited company, was incorporated\n\non January 25, 19~5."}}, {"text": "February 5, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7365, "end_char": 7381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With effect from February 5, 1955, the appellant company took on lease a market place known as TaJoUa Bazar in the city of Calcutta from Shrimati Sujata Tagore and her sons on a monthly rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7471, "end_char": 7479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With effect from February 5, 1955, the appellant company took on lease a market place known as TaJoUa Bazar in the city of Calcutta from Shrimati Sujata Tagore and her sons on a monthly rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "Shrimati Sujata Tagore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7485, "end_char": 7507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With effect from February 5, 1955, the appellant company took on lease a market place known as TaJoUa Bazar in the city of Calcutta from Shrimati Sujata Tagore and her sons on a monthly rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "September 5,\n\n1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7713, "end_char": 7731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deed of lease in this connection was executed on September 5,\n\n1956."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10649, "end_char": 10659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11019, "end_char": 11029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Assistant Commissioner", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11056, "end_char": 11078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellate Assistant Commissioner in appeal by a consolidated order held that the appellant had been rightly assessed under section 12 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11169, "end_char": 11179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11728, "end_char": 11738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12418, "end_char": 12428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12595, "end_char": 12605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12866, "end_char": 12876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12900, "end_char": 12920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13049, "end_char": 13059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13692, "end_char": 13705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ratio of\n\nthe Supreme Court decision in East India Houfif!t Estate case(!)"}}, {"text": "East India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13718, "end_char": 13728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ratio of\n\nthe Supreme Court decision in East India Houfif!t Estate case(!)"}}, {"text": "G. MERCANTILE CORP", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13947, "end_char": 13965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'1 c\n\nll (\n\ns. G. MERCANTILE CORP."}}, {"text": "C.I.T. (Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13970, "end_char": 13984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C.I.T. (Khanna, J.) 985\n\nsubletting the stalls of !"}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14056, "end_char": 14066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14294, "end_char": 14303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14327, "end_char": 14333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have heard Mr. Chagla on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Manchanda on behalf ?"}}, {"text": "Manchanda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14369, "end_char": 14378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have heard Mr. Chagla on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Manchanda on behalf ?", "canonical_name": "Manchanda"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14485, "end_char": 14494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14796, "end_char": 14805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15427, "end_char": 15436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16152, "end_char": 16162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16956, "end_char": 16966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17809, "end_char": 17818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18073, "end_char": 18082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18393, "end_char": 18402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18614, "end_char": 18623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18827, "end_char": 18837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Manhanda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18862, "end_char": 18870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The stand of Mr. Chagla, on behalf of the appellant, is that the assessment against the appellant in respect of the income from the property in question should be made under section 10, while according to Mr. Manhanda, learned counsel for the respondent, the assessment should be under sedon 12 of the Act.", "canonical_name": "Manchanda"}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18961, "end_char": 18971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19429, "end_char": 19441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19577, "end_char": 19587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19930, "end_char": 19940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20315, "end_char": 20325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20413, "end_char": 20423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20590, "end_char": 20603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Stem4a}e", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21870, "end_char": 21878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference iii thic; context may\n\nbe .made to the observations of Lord Stem4a}e, M.R. in~ case\n\n988 [1972] 2 S.c."}}, {"text": "Karanpura Development Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26200, "end_char": 26230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee in the cited case of Karanpura Development Co. Ltd. too was 1essee of the coal fields."}}, {"text": "s\n\n9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27211, "end_char": 27215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME OOVRT RBPOJt", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27220, "end_char": 27240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's\n\n9.9.0 SUPREME OOVRT RBPOJt, T~\n\n[1972]2 S.C.R.\n\nactivit}' during ."}}, {"text": "Schedule D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28843, "end_char": 28853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28906, "end_char": 28916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29094, "end_char": 29108, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Schedule D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29219, "end_char": 29229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29795, "end_char": 29805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30327, "end_char": 30336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule A of the English Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30361, "end_char": 30390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30828, "end_char": 30837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule A of the English Act", "statute": "Schedule A of the English Act"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30852, "end_char": 30861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule A of the English Act", "statute": "Schedule A of the English Act"}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31004, "end_char": 31013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule A of the English Act", "statute": "Schedule A of the English Act"}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31236, "end_char": 31245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule A of the English Act", "statute": "Schedule A of the English Act"}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31343, "end_char": 31352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule A of the English Act", "statute": "Schedule A of the English Act"}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31480, "end_char": 31489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31563, "end_char": 31573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31686, "end_char": 31696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31785, "end_char": 31795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31847, "end_char": 31857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32074, "end_char": 32084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32099, "end_char": 32109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_2_992_1004_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. v.\n\nM. RA VI VARMA AND ORS. ETC.\n\nJanuary 4, 1972\n\nJJ. M. SHELAT, I. D. DUA, H. R. KHANNA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.) B\n\nCivil Service--0/]ice Memorandum of Union Mjnistry oi Home ADair& dated June 22, 1949 laying. down that seniority of Central Government &trvt.:nts , in the same gradt shalt be !fOVerned by length o/ jervice-Sub1• que'!t(v Office Memorandum dated December 20, 1959 lavin.~ down that\n\n.s~lority to be deter1nined on 1he basis of general principles anne:ced 10\n\nMemorandum-Memorandum of 1959 is not retrospective--Persons DPpo/hted 6efore it are goverlled by 1949 Memorandum.\n\nIn. fdel\" t~ provide for the seniority of Centrai Government servants displ, aeed 'from Pakistan the Home Ministry by Office Memorandum dated JUne 22, 1949 laid down that the seniority o( all Central Government servants in the same grade shall be governed by the length of their service in that grade.\n\nBy 1959 the object underlying that memorandum had been achieved.\n\nAccordingly by another memorandum dated Ocember 20, 1959 the Home Ministry decided that in respect of persons appointed after that date the' !}'neral rules annexed to the memorandJm sl\\all apply, one of those being that seniority shall be governed by the date of cbn- firmation and not length of service.\n\nIn 1957 the Central Board of ReVenue issued a circular wheteby seniority in. the: offices under it was to be determined on the basis of date of eonfirmation. In. 1962 a revised seniority list of employees under the Central Board pf Revenue was prepared on the basis of date of confirmation~ As a result respondents G and R wh<i were Inspectdrs of Central Excise lost several positions in the seniority. These respondents had been appointed in 1947 and confirmed in 1956. They filed writ petitions in the High . Court of Mysore. The High Court held that the memoran- , dum of ,1949 applied to their case and their sen'ority must.be decided on the basis. of length of service and not the date of confirmation.\n\nS and T wore employees under the Directorate General of Health Services, Government of India.\n\nThey had jo'ned service in 1950 and !951 respectively.\n\nIn the seniority list, which had h'en prepared on the basis of leng'h of service in accordance with the Office Mem0ranum of 1949 their po, itions were 32 and 34. Su'Jsequent!y Memorandum dated June 19 1963 was is•ued by the D'rectdrate Ge\"eral of Hea!th Services in which it was stated that Scheduled Cas'tes and Sched•_1Jrd TriJ., es\n\nc\"andidates who _were confirrMd in reserved vacancies wo'11d rank senior to temryorary. includin~ quasi-permanent pers0n'\\ ir .. eoective of their pOsitions in the seniority list.\n\nAs a t-eslllt of the a'\"lolicat:on of this orin- ciple S and T lost seniority bv several positions. Tliev filed writ \"etitions in the Hioh Court of Puni•h and Haryana.\n\nThe Single Judge di•missed their petitions but the Division Bench allowed them on the ground that the Memorandum d1ted June 19, 1963 iss•ied by the Directorate of Health S<>:rvicP:S--wfl~ not in consonance with the Home Ministry's Memo--- randa 1949 and 1959.\n\nAgainst the judl!IIlents of the High Courts the Uriioo of India and -0thcrs 3ppealed to this Court,\n\nDismissing the appeals,\n\nHELD : (I) The Ollie'!: Memorandum dated December 22, 1959' expressly made it clear that the general principles embodied in the anoexure thereto were not to have retrospective effect.\n\nIn order to put. the matter beyond any pale of controve'rsy, it was mentioned that \"hereafter the seniority of all persons appointed in the various Central Services after the date of these instructions should be determined in accordanceo with the General .principles annexed hereto\".\n\nH was, therefOre, manifest. that except in cenain cases with which the present appeals were not COD• cerw..d the Office Memorandum dated Dec'ember 22, 1959 and the provisions laid do\\.\\'ll in the Annxure thereto could not apply to pefsons ap pointed to the various central services before the date of that Mem<>- randum. LI 000 G]\n\nthere was thus no escape from the conclusion that the seniority of G arid respondents who were appointed p:rior to December 22, 1959 would C have to be determined on the basis of their length of servire in accordance with the Office Memorandum dated June 22, 1949 and not on the basis of date of their confirmation, This position was conJirm'd by the Ceritral Board of Revenue in its letter dated August 27, 1971 addressed. to all Collectors of Central Excise. [1002 B; 1001 El\n\nMerv.vn Coutindo &: Ors. v. Collector of Custon1s, Bonr.bay & Ors., [1966] 3 S.C.R. 600, reforred to.\n\n(ii) It was no doubt tru' that a direction was given in the Memoranand R respondents who were appointed prior to December 22, 1959 would and Scheduled Tribe candidates confirmed in reserv'd vacancies should be ranked senior to temporary, including quasipermanentpersons ifres pective of their pos.ition in the seniority Jist but such direction Went beyond the rule of seniority contained in the office Memorandum dated'.\n\nDecember 22, 1959 .issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs in respect of employees appointed bef<*e the' date.\n\nIt was not disputed that accord-· ing to the Government of India allocation of Business Rules, 1961 gene' ral questions relating to recruitment promotion and seniority in Central services had to be dealt with by the Min'stry of Home Affairs.\n\nAs S and: T respondents were apoointed prior to December 22, 1959 their seniority wac; governed by the rule of length of service_ as contained in the A.nnexurelo the Memorandum dated December 22, 1959. [I 003 E-HJ\n\nC1v1L APPELLATE 1UR1SDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1845 and 1846 of 1968.\n\nAppeals by spi; cial leave from the judgment and order dated' January JO. 1968 and October 20, 1967 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 1519 of 1967 and 1216 of 1965\n\nrespectiv~'y. ·\n\nJagdish Swarup .. Solicitor-General of India al; td S. P. Nayar, for the appellants ( m all the appeals). ·\n\nS. S. Jam/i an1 M. Veerappa, C.As. Nos. 1845 and l 846 of 1968). for respondent No. I (irr\n\nS. L Bhatia, for respondents Nos. I and 2 (in C.A. No. 5() of 1969).\n\nS. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the Inter- A vener (in C.A. No. 1845 of 1968).\n\nthe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J, Whether the criterion to determine the seniority -Of Ravi Varma and Ganapathi Kini resp0ndents shou:d be length of service in accordance with the Office Mem()randum dated June 22, 1949 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs,' as claimed by the said respondents, or wheLher it should be the date of confirmation, as claimed by the appellants, is the main question which arises for decision in civil appeals Nos. 1845 and 1846 of 1968 which have oeen filed by the Umon of India and two others by special leiive against the judgment of Mysore High Court. Simi.ar question arises in respect of the seniority of Suresh Kumar and.\n\nTara Chand Jain, respondents in civil appeal No. 50 of 1969 which has been filed by the Union of India and two others on a certificate granted by the Punjab and Haryana High Court agdinst the judgment of that Court reversing in Letters Patent appeal the -Oecision of the single judge and i; suing a writ in favour of those respondents.\n\nThe High Court heid jn all the cases that the seniority of the concerned respondents should .be determined on the basis of the length of service in accordance with the above mentioned Office Memorandum. '\n\nBefore giving the facts of the three cases, it would be pertinent to refer to two Office Memoranda issued biy the Ministry of HJme Affairs. One of 'the memoranda is dated June 22, 1949.\n\nIt was mentioned in this memorandum that the Government of India had under consideration the question of the. fixation of seniority of displaced government servants and tempoary employees in the various grades.\n\nEmployees of the Central Government who were displaced' from their offices in Pakistan, according to the memorandum, had been absorbed in offices under thi: control of the same administrative ministry or on nC'mination by the Transfer Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affair~ in other offices.\n\nAll those persons had been appointed, with a few exceptions, on temporary basis.\n\nThe Ministry of Home Affairs accordingly con-\n\n- veyed the following decision :\n\n\"It has now been decided in consultation with the Federal Public Service Commission that the question of seniority in each grade should also be examined in the same context and specific rules suitable for each service prescribed in framing those instructions.\n\nThe question of seniority of Assis•ants in the Secret1riat was recently examined very carefully in consultation with all the Ministries and Federal Public Service Comm.ission and the decisions reached are incorporated iii para 8 of the 'Instructions for the initial constitution ol\n\nthe grade of Assistants' an extract of which is attached.\n\nIt has been decided that this rule should genera]. y be taken as the model in rraming tlie rules of seniority for other services and iii respect of persons employed in any parucular grade seniority should, as a general rule, be deterniilied on the l; jasis of the length of service in that Grade irrespective of whether the latter was under .the Central or Provincial Gove.nment of India or Pakistan. It has been found difficult to work on the basis of 'comparable' posts or grades and it has therefore been deciJed that 'Service in an equivalent Grade', should, generally be defined as service on a rate of pay higher than the minimum of the time scale of the grade concerned.\n\nThe seniority of persons appointed on permanent or quasi-permanent basis before the 1st J anuary, 1944 should, however not be disturbed.\"\n\nDirection was accordingly issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs that the principles given in the Mcmoandum be borne in mind in determining the seniority of 'Government servants of various categories employed under the Minis ry of Finance, etc.' On December 22, 1959 another Office Memorandum was issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs on the sutect of the general principles for determining seniority of various ca•egories of ]*t!rsons employed in Central services.\n\nMaterial part of this memorandum was as under :\n\n\"The instructions contained in this Ministry's Office Memorandum No. 30/44/48-Apptts, dated the 22nd June, 1949, were issued in order to safeguard the interests of disp1aceu Government servan!s appointed to the Central Services affer partition.\n\nAs it was not possible to reu'ate the seniority of only di 0placed Government servants by giving them credit for previous service, the instructions were made applicable to all categories of persons appoin:ed to Central S 'rvices.\n\nThe principles contained in the 22nd June, 1949, orders were extended to-\n\n(i) ex-Government servants of Burma appointed to Central Services; and\n\n(ii) the employees of former part 'B' States taken over to the Centre as a result of Federal Financial Integration.\n\n996 SUPREME COUkT REPORTS [1972J 2 s.c.:a.\n\nThe instructions contained in this Ministry's Office Memorandum No. 32/10/49-CS dated the 31st March,\n\n1950 and No. 32/49-CS(C), dated the 20:h September, 1952 similarly regulate the seniority cf candida1es with war service appointed to the Central Services.\n\n2. The question has been raised whether it is neces. sary to contmue to apply the instructions contained in the Office Memoranda cited above. Displaced Govern- 1rient servants have by and large been absorUed\" in the various Central Services and their seniority has been fixed with ret'erence to the p:.evious service rendred by them.\n\nSimilarly, the seniority of ex-employees of the Govemmrnt of Burma and of Part 'B' States as we I as of candidates with war service has already been determined in accordance with the instructions ci1ed above.\n\nAs the specific objects underlying the instructions cited above have been achieved, there is no longer any re1son to apply those instructions in preference to the normal principles for determination of seniorLy.\n\nIt has, therefore, been decided in ccnsultation with the Union PubEc Se'.vice Commis; io:i, that hereafter the sen:ority of all persons appointed to the variou'i Central Services a.ter the date of these instructions shou:d be determined in accordance with the General principles annexed hereto.\n\n3. The instructions contained in the variou5 office memoranda cited in paragrah l above are hereby cancelled, except in regard to delennimtion of senicr'.ty of persons appointed to the va\"iou; Central Service; prior to the dale of this Office Memcrandum.\n\nThe revised General pinciples emtodied in the Anncxure wi'l not apply with retrospective effect, hut wi11 ccme into force with effect from the date of issue of these orders. unless a differen• date in ,-espect of any particular service/ grade from which these revied princip:es are to be adopted for ourposs of cetenninin!!; senbritv _has already been or is hereafter agreed to by this Ministry.\"\n\ni::.\n\nRe!evant parts of paragrarh; 1. 3 and 4 of the Annexure to this\n\n G Memorandum were as under :\n\n\"2. Subject to the provi, ion of para 3 bi!low. persons appointed in a substantive or officiating capacity to a grade prior to the issue of these general principles shall retain the relative seniority already asil!/nej to them or such seniority as may hereafter be assined to them under the existing orders applicable to their cases H •\n\n. ; f\n\nand shail en-bloc be senior to all .others in that grade.\n\n3. Subject to the provisions of para 4 below, permanent' officers of each grade shall be ranked senior to persons who are officiating in that grade.\n\n4. Direct Recruiis :\n\nNotwithstanding the provisions of para 3 ab'ove, the 1elative seniority of all direct recruits shall be determined by the order of merit in which they are selected for such appointment, on the recommendations of the U.P.S.C. or other selecting authority, persons appointed as a result of an earlier selection being senior to those appointed as a result of a subsequent selection. . .... \"\n\nRavi Varma, respondent No. 1 in civil appeal No. 1845 .:•: 1968, was appointed as an Inspector in the Central Excise Co'- lectorate in Madras on 27-5-47 and was confirmed on 7-4-56.\n\nGanapathi Kini, respondent No. 1 in civil appeal No. 1846, was appointed as an Inspector in the Central Excise Collectorate in Madras on 28-5-47.\n\nIn view of the war service rendered by Ganapathi Kini, his service for purposes of seniority was computed with effect from 10-10-46 and he was confirmed on 7-4-56.\n\nGanapathi Kini and Ravi Varma were shown at serial Nos. 115 and 141 in accordance with the length of service in seniority list of inspectors prepared in 1959.\n\nSubsequently on the directions of the Central Board of Revenue contained in letter dated October\n\n19, 1962, a revised seniority list was prepared in 1963 by computing seniority from the date oi confirmation.\n\nIn the revised list Ganapathi Kini and Ravi Varma were shown at serial Nos. 149 and 150, junior to persons to whom they had been shown senior in the earlier seniority list. Ganapathi Kini and Ravi Varma thereupon filed petitions under article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for quashing the revised seniority list prepared in\n\n1963. The main ground taken in the wri't petitions was that the seniority should be determined according: to length of service in terms of Office Memorandum dated June 22, 1949 of the Ministry of Home Affairs.\n\nImpleaded in the writ petitions as respondento were the Union of India. the Central Board of Revenue and !he Collector of Central Excise as also those inspectors of Central Excise who, according to the petitioners, were junior to them but who on account of being shown senior to the petitioners in the revised seniority list, had been appointed as Senior Grade Inspectors of Central Excise.\n\n1 0 The above mentioneJ writ petitions were resisted by the appellants.\n\nThe learned judges of the Mysore High Court referred to the memoranda dated June 22, 1949 and Decem1*r 22, 1959 1&-L7JoSuvcrnz\n\nand held that the altered rule embodied in the Memorandwn dated December 22, 1959 for the determination of seniority would be inapplicable to persons appointed before June 22, 1949 like Ganapathi Kini.\n\nArgument was advanced on behalf of the appellants that on July 3, 1957 the Central Board of Revenue had again adopted the rule that the date of the confirmation should form the basis for determination cl seniority.\n\nThis argumen't did not find favour with the learned judges and it was observed :\n\n\"But what is however clear is that in the case of a person like the petitioner who was appointed before June 22, 1949 the rule made by the Ministry of Home Affairs on that date was what constituted the basis for the determination of seniority and not the rule which was revived by the Central Board of Revenue on July 3, 1957.\"\n\nDirection was accordingly issued that Ganapathi Kini's seniority should be determined on the basis of the formula contained in the Office Memorandum dated June 22, 1949 and the revised seniority D list be rectified accordingly.\n\nIn the petition filed lt' Ravi Varma the High Court made a short order wherein, after referring 'the decision in the case of Ganapathi Kini, the learned judges granted similar relief to Ravi Varma.\n\nSuresh Kumar, respondent No. 1 and Tara Chand Jain, respondent No. 2 in civil appeal No. 50 of 1969 were appointed as Lower Division Clerks in the Medical Stores Depot, Kamal under the Directorate General of Healih Services on October 9, 1950 and November 26, 1951 respectively.\n\nBoth of them were confirmed on March 31, 1960. In the seniori'; y list which was prepared in accordance with Office Memorandum dated June 22, 1949 Suresh Kwnar and Tara f:hand Jain, respondents, were shown at serial Nos. 32 and 34 in accordance with their forigth of service. Subsequently Memorandum dated June r9, 1963 was received from the Directorate General of Health Services in which there was a reference to the Ministrv of Home Affab Office Memorandum dated December 22: 1959. It was stated in the Memorandum from the Directorate Geneoal of Health Services that scheduled castes and scheduled tribes candidates who were confirmed in reserved vacancies would rank senior to temporary, including quasi-permanent persons irrespective of their positions in the seniority list. A revised seniority list was thereafter prepared and a .number of scheduled castes candidates who had been ; recruited later but had been confit\"med earlier than Suresh Kumar\n\nand Tara Chand Jain were shown senior.\n\nSuresh Kumar and\n\nH -(\n\nA Tara Chand Jain were thus shown at serial Nos. 40 and 42 in the revised seniority lit. Suresh Kumar and Tara Chand Jain thereafter filed petition under article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the instructions contained in the Memorandl!m dated June 19, 1963 issued by the Directorate General of Health Services as we!J as the revised seniority list and other conse- B quential reliefs.\n\nImpleaded as respondents in the petition were the Union of India, the Director General of Health Services, the Deputy Assistant Director General Medical Stores, as well as 10 other scheduled castes employees of the Medical Stores Depot .\n\nKamal who had been shown senior to the peti'tioners in the revised\n\n• H\n\nseniority list.\n\nThe above petitions were resisted biy the appellants and \\Yere dismissed by the learned single judge. On Letters Patent appeal the judgment of the single judge was reversed and it was held that Suresh Kumar and Tara Chand Jain having been appointed prior to December 22, 1959 were governed by the rule of seniority contained in the Office Memorandum dated June 22, ,1949 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs.\n\nThis position, in the opinion of 'the learned judges, was not affected by tl)e subsequent Office Memorandum issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs.\n\nSo far as the Memorandum dated June 19, 1963 issued by the Directorate General of Health Services was concerned, it was found to be. not in consonance with the Office Memoranda issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs on June 22, 1949 and December 22, 1959. As such, the Memorandum issued by the Directorate General of Health Services, according to the learned judges, could not affect the seniority of Suresh Kumar and Tara Chand Jain. . In the result the revised seniority list was held to be invalid and the Union of India and two other appellants were directed to prepare a revised seniority list in accordance with the original seniority o.f Suresh Kumar and Tara Chand Jain.\n\nThe learned Solicitor General on behalf of the appellants has at the outset referred to Memoranda dated June 22, 1949 and Decemtler 22, 1959 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs and has argued that after the issue of the latter Memorandum the seniority of all Central Government employees should be determined by the date of their confirmation and not on the basis of the length of service.\n\nIn this connection, we find that the migration of a la1'ge number of Government employees after the partition of the country from areas now forming part of Pakistan, resulted . in J situation wherein the Government had to review the rules\n\nre!ating to seniority.\n\nAs most of those displaced Government\n\nsrvants had been employed on temporary basis and as it was felt that they , should be given some weightage in the marter of seniority on compassionate grounds, the rule was evolved ihat the seniority\n\nshould be determined on the basis of the length of service in equivalent grades.\n\nThe seniorrty of persons appointed on permanent basis or quasi-permanent basis be.fore January l, 1944 was, however, left undisturbed.\n\nFurther, as it was not possible to regulate the seniority of only displaced Government servants by giving them credit for previous service, the instructions were made applicable to ali categories of persons appointed to Central services. Office Memorandum dated June 22, 1949 was consequently issued. The above principles were also extended to other category of Government employees, including those with war service.\n\nThe matter was reviewed thereafter in 1959. The Government then found that dispraced Government servants had by and large been absorbed in the various Central services and their seniority had been fixed with reference to the previous service rendered by them.\n\nSame was found to be the position of other Government servants who had been given the benefit of the prineiples contained in Memorandum dated June 22, .1949. As the objects underlying the instructions of June 22, 1949 had been achieved and it was no longer considered necessary 'to apply those instructions in preference to the normal principle for determination of seniority, it\n\nwas decided that the seniority of Central Government employees would henceforth be determined in accordance with the general principles contained in Annexure 'to the Office Memorandum issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs on December 22, 1959.\n\nOne of those principles was that permanent officers of' each grade would bie ranked senior to persons who were officiating in that grade.\n\nThe effect of that, as submitted by the learned Solicitor General, was that the seniority was to be determined by the date of confirmation and not on the basis of length of service as was the rule contained in the Office Memorandum dated June 22, 1949.\n\nThe Office Memorandum dated December 22, 1959, however, expressly made it clear that the general principles embodied in the Annexure thereto were not to have retrospective effect.\n\nIn order to put the matter beyond any pale of controversy, it was mentioned that 'hereafter the seniority of all persons' appointed to the various Central Services after the date of these instructions shonld be determined in accordance with the General principles annexed hereto'. It is, therefore, manifest that except in certain cases with which we are not concerned, the Office Memorandum dated December 22, 1959 and the provisions laid down in the Annexure _thereto could not apply to persons appointed to the various Central services before the date of that Memorandum.\n\nTt may also be mentioned that while dealing with the above Memorandum, this Court in the case of Mervyn Coutindo & Ors.\n\n• ' c\n\nv. Collector of Customs, Bombay & Ors. (1) observed that these principles were not to apply retrospectively 1*it were given effect to fonn the date of their issue, subject to certain reservations with which we are not concerned.\n\nIt has next been argued by the learned Solicitor General that whatever might be the position in respect of the employees in other Central services, so far as the clerk;, supervisors and inspectors under the Central Board of Revenue were concerned, a decision was taken that for purposes of promotion, the pennanent employees should have precedence before non-permanent employees.\n\nOur attention in this connection has been invited to letter dated March 15, 1958 sent by the Central Board of Revenue to all Collectors of Central Excise. In this letter there was a reference to an earlier Jetter dated July 3, 1957 from the Board and it was mentioned that the instructiQIIS contained in the earlier letter that for purposes of promotion from ministerial grade to inspectors grade, permanent clerks would first be considered before considermg persons who were non-permanent, should be followed in respect of promotions to other grades also.\n\nThe Solicitor General accordingly contends that the direction contained in the Memoranduin dated December 22, 1959 that it could not apply to employees appointed before that date would not hold good in the case of clerks, supervisors and inspectors functioning under the Central Board of Revenue.\n\nIt is, in our opinion, not necessary to go into this aspect of the matter because we find that the Central Board of Revenue as per letter dated August 27, 1971 addressed to all Collectors of Central Excise, gave fresh instructions regarding the principles of seniority.\n\nIn this letter there was a reference to the Office Memorandum dated December 22, 1959 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs and it was stated :\n\n\"In supersession of all previous orders on the suQject, it has now been decided that in so far as the nongazetted staff in the Central Excise. Customs and Narcotics Departments and other subordinate offices are concerned, the seniority of persons appointed to various posts and services after receipt of these orders should be regulated in accordance with the Ministry of Home Affairs 0.Ms. referred to above.\"\n\nIt would follow from the above that so far as the non-gazetted staff H in the Central Excise, Customs and Narcotics Departments and other subordinate offices of the. Central Board of Revenue are\n\n(ll !l966] l S.C.R. 600.\n\nconcerned, the question of seniority would have to be decided in accordance with the Office Memorandum dated 19,10-1959. As the said Office Memorandum has, except in certain cases with which we are not concerned, applied the rule of seniority contained in the Annexure thereto only to employees appointed after the date of. that Memorandum, there is no escape from the conclusion that the seniority of Ganapathi Kini and Ravi Varma, respondents, who were appointed prior to December 22, 1959, would have to be determined on the basis of their length of serviee in accordance with Office Memorandum dated JU; ne 22, 1949 and not on the basis of the date of their confirmation.\n\nIn civil appeal No. 50 of 1969 the learned Solicitor General has referred to.Office Memoranda dated January 28, 1952, April 20, 1961 a.nd March 27, 1963 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs to show a departure from the rule of seniority for the bonefit o.f members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Office Memorandum dated January 28, 1952 makes provision for communal representation in services for candidates longing to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes as also the Anglo-Indian community. The Memorandum gives a model roster which should be applied in filling the vacandes.\n\nPerusal of the Memorandum shows that it relates only to recruitment and has nothing to do with the rule of seniority.\n\nOffice Memorandum dated April 20, 1961 deals with the question of sel).iority of direct recruits who were confirmed jn an order different from the original order of_ merit.\n\nAccording to the Memorandum, it often happens that a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe candidate occupying a lower position in the merit list is appointed permanently to a reserved vacancy, while candidates above him in the merit list are not appointed at that time. If such candidates are appointed in the following year, they are not entitled to a higher seniority on the ground that in the previous year they had obtained a higher position in the merit list. It is pfain that the above Office Memorandum did not deal with the question of seniority on the basis of length of service as contained in Office Memorandum dated June 22, 1949 but with the question as to what would be the effect if a direct recruit scheduledcaste or scheduled tribe candidate though occupying a lower position in the merit list, is confirmed earlier in a reserved vacancy. We are in the present case not concerned with any merit list nor with any question of seniodty based on s11cb a list. As such, Office Memorandum dated Aµri! 20, 1961 is also of not any material help to the appellants. It may be stat.ed that. the. counsel for the appellants in the High Court conceded that the above Memorandum had no direct relevance in the present controversy.\n\n• A\n\n• c\n\nThe third Office Memorandum dated March 27, 1963 referred to by the learned Solicitor General deals with the subject of maintenance of roster for giving effect to the reservations provided for scheduled castes and scheduled tribies in Central Government services.\n\nThis Memorandum has a bearing only on the question of recruitment and provides no guidelines for determining seniority.\n\nWe, thus, jind that none of the three Office Memoranda relied upon by the Solicitor General is of any material assistance to the appellants. '\n\nWe may now advert to the Memorandum dated June 19, 1963 issued by the Directorate General of Health Services.\n\nAFJ mentioned earlier, it was after the receipt of this Memorandum that the seniority list of class III employees of the Government Medical Stores Depot, Karnal was revised. and the seniority was determirled\n\non the basis of the date of confirmation and not on the bsis of length of service. The above Memorandum from the Directorate General of Health Services expressly refers to the Office Memorandum datd December 22, 1959 issued by the Ministry of_ Home Affairs and seeks implementation of that. It is no doubt true that a direction was given in the Memorandum of the Directorate General of Health Services that scheduled caste and scheduled tribe candidates confirmed in reserved vacancies should be ranked senior to temporary, inclu.ding quasi-permanent persons, irrespective of their position in the seniority list, but such a direction went beyond the rule of seniority contained in the Office Memorandum dated December 22, 1959 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs in respect of employees appointed bfore that date. As mentioned earlier Office Memorandum dated December 22, 1959 did not disturb the seniority of Central Government employees who had been appointed prior to the date of that Memorandum, except in certain cases with which We are not concerned.\n\nIt is not disputed that according to the Government of India Allocation of Business Rules, 1961 general questions relating to recruitment, promotion and seniority i.n Central services like the one with which we are concerned, have to be dealt with by the Ministry of Home Affiars.\n\nAs Suresh Kumar and Tara Chand Jain, respondents, were appointed prior to December 22, 1959 their eniority was governed by the rule of length of service as contained in Office Meinorandum\n\nA dated June 22, 1949 and not by the rule based upon date of confumation as contained in the Annexure to the Memorandum dated December 22, 1959.\n\nReference was made by the learned Solicitor General to the case of Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of lndia( 1) wherein it has been laid dow.n that the service rules may be framed and altered unilaterly by the Government.\n\nNo occasion for invoking the above dictum arises in this case because the learned counsel for the contesting respondents have not questioned the right of the Government to frame and alter unilaterly the service rules.\n\nIn the result, all the three appeals fail, and are dismissed with costs.\n\nOne hearing fee.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeals dismissed .\n\n.t)ll96SJ 1s.c.R.1ss.\n\n-;;;:\n\nr '~\n\n~ \"\n\n1V ,.", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. RA VI VARMA AND ORS. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. RAVI VARMA AND ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JJ. M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DUA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Central Board of ReVenue", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1301, "end_char": 1325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1957 the Central Board of ReVenue issued a circular wheteby seniority in."}}, {"text": "High . Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1793, "end_char": 1815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They filed writ petitions in the High ."}}, {"text": "Hioh Court of Puni•h and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2800, "end_char": 2832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tliev filed writ \"etitions in the Hioh Court of Puni•h and Haryana."}}, {"text": "Ceritral Board of Revenue", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4375, "end_char": 4400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LI 000 G]\n\nthere was thus no escape from the conclusion that the seniority of G arid respondents who were appointed p:rior to December 22, 1959 would C have to be determined on the basis of their length of servire in accordance with the Office Memorandum dated June 22, 1949 and not on the basis of date of their confirmation, This position was conJirm'd by the Ceritral Board of Revenue in its letter dated August 27, 1971 addressed."}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 S.C.R. 600", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4571, "end_char": 4590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India allocation of Business Rules, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5184, "end_char": 5238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5777, "end_char": 5794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1968 and October 20, 1967 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Jagdish Swarup", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5866, "end_char": 5880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdish Swarup .. Solicitor-General of India al; td S. P. Nayar, for the appellants ( m all the appeals). ·"}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5918, "end_char": 5929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdish Swarup .. Solicitor-General of India al; td S. P. Nayar, for the appellants ( m all the appeals). ·"}}, {"text": "S. S. Jam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5975, "end_char": 5984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. Jam/i an1 M. Veerappa, C.As."}}, {"text": "S. L Bhatia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6067, "end_char": 6078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I (irr\n\nS. L Bhatia, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6137, "end_char": 6148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the Inter- A vener (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6150, "end_char": 6161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the Inter- A vener (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "K. R. Nagaraja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6166, "end_char": 6180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the Inter- A vener (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6278, "end_char": 6284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J, Whether the criterion to determine the seniority -Of Ravi Varma and Ganapathi Kini resp0ndents shou:d be length of service in accordance with the Office Mem()randum dated June 22, 1949 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs,' as claimed by the said respondents, or wheLher it should be the date of confirmation, as claimed by the appellants, is the main question which arises for decision in civil appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Ravi Varma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6342, "end_char": 6352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J, Whether the criterion to determine the seniority -Of Ravi Varma and Ganapathi Kini resp0ndents shou:d be length of service in accordance with the Office Mem()randum dated June 22, 1949 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs,' as claimed by the said respondents, or wheLher it should be the date of confirmation, as claimed by the appellants, is the main question which arises for decision in civil appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "Ravi Varma"}}, {"text": "Ganapathi Kini", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6357, "end_char": 6371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J, Whether the criterion to determine the seniority -Of Ravi Varma and Ganapathi Kini resp0ndents shou:d be length of service in accordance with the Office Mem()randum dated June 22, 1949 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs,' as claimed by the said respondents, or wheLher it should be the date of confirmation, as claimed by the appellants, is the main question which arises for decision in civil appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "Ganapathi Kini"}}, {"text": "Umon of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6751, "end_char": 6764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1845 and 1846 of 1968 which have oeen filed by the Umon of India and two others by special leiive against the judgment of Mysore High Court."}}, {"text": "Suresh Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6896, "end_char": 6908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Simi.ar question arises in respect of the seniority of Suresh Kumar and.", "canonical_name": "Suresh Kumar"}}, {"text": "Tara Chand Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6915, "end_char": 6930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tara Chand Jain, respondents in civil appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Tara f:hand Jain"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7003, "end_char": 7017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50 of 1969 which has been filed by the Union of India and two others on a certificate granted by the Punjab and Haryana High Court agdinst the judgment of that Court reversing in Letters Patent appeal the -Oecision of the single judge and i; suing a writ in favour of those respondents.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Ministry of HJme Affairs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7572, "end_char": 7596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before giving the facts of the three cases, it would be pertinent to refer to two Office Memoranda issued biy the Ministry of HJme Affairs."}}, {"text": "June 22, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7629, "end_char": 7642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of 'the memoranda is dated June 22, 1949."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7690, "end_char": 7709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was mentioned in this memorandum that the Government of India had under consideration the question of the."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7874, "end_char": 7892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Employees of the Central Government who were displaced' from their offices in Pakistan, according to the memorandum, had been absorbed in offices under thi: control of the same administrative ministry or on nC'mination by the Transfer Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affair~ in other offices."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7935, "end_char": 7943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Employees of the Central Government who were displaced' from their offices in Pakistan, according to the memorandum, had been absorbed in offices under thi: control of the same administrative ministry or on nC'mination by the Transfer Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affair~ in other offices."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affairs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8236, "end_char": 8260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Ministry of Home Affairs accordingly con-\nveyed the following decision :\n\n\"It has now been decided in consultation with the Federal Public Service Commission that the question of seniority in each grade should also be examined in the same context and specific rules suitable for each service prescribed in framing those instructions."}}, {"text": "Federal Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8363, "end_char": 8396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Ministry of Home Affairs accordingly con-\nveyed the following decision :\n\n\"It has now been decided in consultation with the Federal Public Service Commission that the question of seniority in each grade should also be examined in the same context and specific rules suitable for each service prescribed in framing those instructions."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9298, "end_char": 9303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "y be taken as the model in rraming tlie rules of seniority for other services and iii respect of persons employed in any parucular grade seniority should, as a general rule, be deterniilied on the l; jasis of the length of service in that Grade irrespective of whether the latter was under .the Central or Provincial Gove.nment of India or Pakistan."}}, {"text": "1st J anuary, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9679, "end_char": 9697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The seniority of persons appointed on permanent or quasi-permanent basis before the 1st J anuary, 1944 should, however not be disturbed.\""}}, {"text": "December 22, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9983, "end_char": 10000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 22, 1959 another Office Memorandum was issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs on the sutect of the general principles for determining seniority of various ca•egories of ]*t!rsons employed in Central services."}}, {"text": "22nd June, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10347, "end_char": 10362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "30/44/48-Apptts, dated the 22nd June, 1949, were issued in order to safeguard the interests of disp1aceu Government servan!s appointed to the Central Services affer partition."}}, {"text": "U.P.S.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13898, "end_char": 13906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Direct Recruiis :\n\nNotwithstanding the provisions of para 3 ab'ove, the 1elative seniority of all direct recruits shall be determined by the order of merit in which they are selected for such appointment, on the recommendations of the U.P.S.C. or other selecting authority, persons appointed as a result of an earlier selection being senior to those appointed as a result of a subsequent selection. . .... \""}}, {"text": "Ravi Varma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14072, "end_char": 14082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ravi Varma, respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Ravi Varma"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14207, "end_char": 14213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1845 .:•: 1968, was appointed as an Inspector in the Central Excise Co'- lectorate in Madras on 27-5-47 and was confirmed on 7-4-56."}}, {"text": "27-5-47", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14217, "end_char": 14224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1845 .:•: 1968, was appointed as an Inspector in the Central Excise Co'- lectorate in Madras on 27-5-47 and was confirmed on 7-4-56."}}, {"text": "7-4-56", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14246, "end_char": 14252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1845 .:•: 1968, was appointed as an Inspector in the Central Excise Co'- lectorate in Madras on 27-5-47 and was confirmed on 7-4-56."}}, {"text": "Ganapathi Kini", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14255, "end_char": 14269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ganapathi Kini, respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Ganapathi Kini"}}, {"text": "28-5-47", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14392, "end_char": 14399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1846, was appointed as an Inspector in the Central Excise Collectorate in Madras on 28-5-47."}}, {"text": "10-10-46", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14525, "end_char": 14533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the war service rendered by Ganapathi Kini, his service for purposes of seniority was computed with effect from 10-10-46 and he was confirmed on 7-4-56."}}, {"text": "Ganapathi Kini", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14956, "end_char": 14970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the revised list Ganapathi Kini and Ravi Varma were shown at serial Nos.", "canonical_name": "Ganapathi Kini"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15171, "end_char": 15182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15190, "end_char": 15211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Board of Revenue", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15560, "end_char": 15584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Central Board of Revenue and !"}}, {"text": "July 3, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16338, "end_char": 16350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Argument was advanced on behalf of the appellants that on July 3, 1957 the Central Board of Revenue had again adopted the rule that the date of the confirmation should form the basis for determination cl seniority."}}, {"text": "Central Board of Revenue", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16355, "end_char": 16379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Argument was advanced on behalf of the appellants that on July 3, 1957 the Central Board of Revenue had again adopted the rule that the date of the confirmation should form the basis for determination cl seniority."}}, {"text": "Suresh Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17335, "end_char": 17347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suresh Kumar, respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Suresh Kumar"}}, {"text": "Kamal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17504, "end_char": 17509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50 of 1969 were appointed as Lower Division Clerks in the Medical Stores Depot, Kamal under the Directorate General of Healih Services on October 9, 1950 and November 26, 1951 respectively."}}, {"text": "October 9, 1950 and", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17562, "end_char": 17581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50 of 1969 were appointed as Lower Division Clerks in the Medical Stores Depot, Kamal under the Directorate General of Healih Services on October 9, 1950 and November 26, 1951 respectively."}}, {"text": "November 26, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17582, "end_char": 17599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50 of 1969 were appointed as Lower Division Clerks in the Medical Stores Depot, Kamal under the Directorate General of Healih Services on October 9, 1950 and November 26, 1951 respectively."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17646, "end_char": 17660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both of them were confirmed on March 31, 1960."}}, {"text": "Suresh Kwnar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17762, "end_char": 17774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the seniori'; y list which was prepared in accordance with Office Memorandum dated June 22, 1949 Suresh Kwnar and Tara f:hand Jain, respondents, were shown at serial Nos.", "canonical_name": "Suresh Kumar"}}, {"text": "Tara f:hand Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17779, "end_char": 17795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the seniori'; y list which was prepared in accordance with Office Memorandum dated June 22, 1949 Suresh Kwnar and Tara f:hand Jain, respondents, were shown at serial Nos.", "canonical_name": "Tara f:hand Jain"}}, {"text": "June r9, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17921, "end_char": 17934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently Memorandum dated June r9, 1963 was received from the Directorate General of Health Services in which there was a reference to the Ministrv of Home Affab Office Memorandum dated December 22: 1959."}}, {"text": "Tara Chand Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18576, "end_char": 18591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A revised seniority list was thereafter prepared and a .number of scheduled castes candidates who had been ; recruited later but had been confit\"med earlier than Suresh Kumar\n\nand Tara Chand Jain were shown senior.", "canonical_name": "Tara f:hand Jain"}}, {"text": "article 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18790, "end_char": 18809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18817, "end_char": 18838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 19, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19968, "end_char": 19981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the Memorandum dated June 19, 1963 issued by the Directorate General of Health Services was concerned, it was found to be."}}, {"text": "Directorate General of Health Services", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19996, "end_char": 20034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the Memorandum dated June 19, 1963 issued by the Directorate General of Health Services was concerned, it was found to be."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20446, "end_char": 20460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result the revised seniority list was held to be invalid and the Union of India and two other appellants were directed to prepare a revised seniority list in accordance with the original seniority o.f Suresh Kumar and Tara Chand Jain.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Decemtler 22, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20739, "end_char": 20757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Solicitor General on behalf of the appellants has at the outset referred to Memoranda dated June 22, 1949 and Decemtler 22, 1959 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs and has argued that after the issue of the latter Memorandum the seniority of all Central Government employees should be determined by the date of their confirmation and not on the basis of the length of service."}}, {"text": "June 22, .1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22555, "end_char": 22569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Same was found to be the position of other Government servants who had been given the benefit of the prineiples contained in Memorandum dated June 22, .1949."}}, {"text": "Mervyn Coutindo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24287, "end_char": 24302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tt may also be mentioned that while dealing with the above Memorandum, this Court in the case of Mervyn Coutindo & Ors."}}, {"text": "March 15, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24995, "end_char": 25009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our attention in this connection has been invited to letter dated March 15, 1958 sent by the Central Board of Revenue to all Collectors of Central Excise."}}, {"text": "January 28, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27846, "end_char": 27862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Office Memorandum dated January 28, 1952 makes provision for communal representation in services for candidates longing to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes as also the Anglo-Indian community."}}, {"text": "April 20, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28248, "end_char": 28262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Office Memorandum dated April 20, 1961 deals with the question of sel).iority of direct recruits who were confirmed jn an order different from the original order of_ merit."}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29356, "end_char": 29359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government Medical Stores Depot, Karnal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30404, "end_char": 30443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AFJ mentioned earlier, it was after the receipt of this Memorandum that the seniority list of class III employees of the Government Medical Stores Depot, Karnal was revised."}}, {"text": "Ministry of_ Home Affairs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30723, "end_char": 30748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The above Memorandum from the Directorate General of Health Services expressly refers to the Office Memorandum datd December 22, 1959 issued by the Ministry of_ Home Affairs and seeks implementation of that."}}, {"text": "is not disputed that according to the Government of India Allocation of Business Rules, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31557, "end_char": 31649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affiars", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31809, "end_char": 31833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that according to the Government of India Allocation of Business Rules, 1961 general questions relating to recruitment, promotion and seniority i.n Central services like the one with which we are concerned, have to be dealt with by the Ministry of Home Affiars."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_104_110_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. ETC.\n\nS. K. KRISHNAMURTBI, ETC. ETC.\n\nJanuary 18, 1972\n\n(K. S. HEGDE, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND D. G. PALBKAR, JJ.)\n\nMadras EducaUonal Rules and Text-Book Committu Rules-Nature of-Rights of Publishers .of approve!{ text-books-Government, if .stopped from chan11in11 text books.\n\nJn furtherance of the policy of the appellant.State to nationalise textbooks for schools, directions were issued to District Collectors and Local Board authorities that they should intimate publishers of the text-boob which were prescribed for the year 1969-70, that, after .the end of the school year they will no longer be prescribed. The publishers challenged the validity of the directions. The . High Court allowed the petitions on the ground that though the. Madras Educational Rules and the Tex1>-Book Committee Rules-under which lists of approved text-books are published in the Gautte-are administrative instructions and are not framed for the benefit of publishers, nonetheless, under those rules, a publisher of text-books could proceed on the basis that be has an assurance that once his books had been selected and prescribed as text-books, they will continue to be prescribed .for 3 year8.\n\nAllowing the appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : (!) The Ru)es are in the nature of Departmental Instructions and do not confer any right on the publishers, nor are they designed to safeguard the interest of publishers. They are conceived in public interest and the Government is at liberty to change the textbooks and delete from and add to the list of approved text-books or even\n\nprescribe books which are not in the list. Therefore, the impugned directions have been issued by the Government in exercise of the powers reserved to it by the Rules themselves, !IOS C.E, F-01\n\n(2) There is no warrant for concluding that the Rules held out any kirid of representation or assurance to the publishers, or that the Rules envisaged their participation in the scheme and as such the Government was estopped fro01 resiling from the representation that the period of 3 vears will not be altered. f107 D-Fl\n\nThe selection of text ))oaks by the Text-Book Committee does not involve any assurance to the publishers that their text-books will be prescribed. The selection only implied that the books have been approved. ll any of the schools prescnbed any of the appro,-ed text-books there is no assurance as to the number Of books that may be required. The period during whicih a text book once prescribed is to continue, is an injunction to the Managers of schools tel avoid hardship to failed candidates or to poor students intending to buy second hand books.\n\nIt is not an aSStbnce to the publishers, because, the Managers can change the text-books within the specffied period with the approval of the prescribed authority. [108 E-H:\n\n109 A-CJ H\n\nStale of Assam v, Ajit Kumar Sharma & Ors., U96S] 1 S.C.R., 890, followed.\n\nTAMlL NADU v. KRISHNAMURTHI (Jagallfr!Ohan Reddy, I.) 105\n\nA Union of l1tdia v. Mjs. Indo-Afglian Agencies Ltd., Ll968] 2 S.C.R.\n\n366, Sank,;; ranarayanan, etc. v. State of Kera/a, [1971] 2 S.C.R. 361 and M/s. Narinderchand Hemraj & Ors. v. LD. Gbvernor, Union Tern'tory Himadwl Pradesh & Ors., C.A. No. 1313/70 dt. 5-10-71, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : C.A. No. 557 to 575 of 1971.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated September 3, 1970 of the Madras High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. '768, 1465 and 1483 of 1970.\n\nS. Govind Swaminadhan, Advocate-General for the State of Tamil Nadu, S. Mohan and A. V. Rangam, for the appellants (in all the appeals) .\n\nK. K. Venugopal and K. R. Nanibiar, for the respondents (in (C.A.s No. 557 to 559 and 561to575 of 1971).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by P. Jaganmoban Reddy, J. 22 Writ Petitions were filed in the 0 High Court of Madras by publishers of text-books for Government Schools, Dist!. Board and Municipal Council Schools challenging the directions of the Deputy Secretary to Government, Education Department, contained in his D.O. letter No. 454582/ E5/69. Education, dated 12th August 1969, addressed to District Collectors and Local Board authorities that they should intimate to the publishers of the books which are prescribed for the year E 1969-70 that after the end of the School year they will no longer be prescribed. A Division Bench of the High Court .allowed the Writ Petitions. From this decision, 19 appeals are before us by certificate.\n\nIt appears that the Government of Tamil Nadu in furtherance of its policy to nationalise text-books for schools, was intending to publish them through the Tamil Nadu Text Books F Corporation pursuant to which it had issued the impugned D.O.\n\nJeiter.\n\nThe writ petitions which are the subject matter of these appeals raise similar grounds and we will adopt the averments in Writ Petition No. 768/70 as being typicl of the other Writ Petitions, wich course was also adopted by the High Court.\n\nThe respondent in that appeal, alleged that the impugned D.O.\n\nG letter giving the aforesaid directions is illegal and void as being coqtrary to the Madras Educational Rules and the Text-Book Committee Rules made by the Governor of Tamil Nadu in pursuance of the powers vasted under Article 162 of the Constitution and affected respondent's fundamental rights under Article 19 (1) ( g) of the Constitution inasmuch as his business of publishing Text- H Books has been seriously jeopardised and has practically been brought to a stililld-still; that it is not open to the Government of Tamil Nadu to act contrary to the general rules made under Article 162 of the Constitution; tha~ the policy of nationalisation of the 8-L864SupCl{72\n\ntext-books is itself illegal and void; that the principles of natural A justice have been violated in that under the rules once text-books have been approved and selected for the schools arid have been prescribed. they remaiiied current for three years, as such to cancel this continuance for the remaining period without notice and\n\n- without hearing would result in heavy financial loss; and that as under Article 19(6) of the Constituon the trade carrfod out 'by B the private citizens can be restricted only in pursuance of a law which enables the State to have a monopoly of that trade, it will not be open to the State to set up a Text Books Society to have a monopoly over the text-books trade without the authority: of law and an executive order purporting to do this would be violative of Article 19(1){f) & (g) of the Constitution. It was further c averred that even if it is assumed that Article 19(6) does not apply to their case, their fundamental rights cannot be restricted only for the purpose of enabling a State or the Corporation owned or controlled by the State to carry on the particular trade to the exclusion of private citizens. The High Court disposed of the Writ Petitions merely on the ground !, hat even though the Madras Education Rules like the Text Book Committee rules have been issued D in exercise of the administrative powers vested in the Government, the inhibition against change of selected text-books within a period of three years is not for the purposes of safeguarding the interest of the publishers but is conceived in public interest, namely, that the instit; ution concerned should not be at liberty to change the books every year \\vhich may involve hardships to the students.\n\nE Nonetheless it was of the view that a publisher of text-books could proceed on the basis that he has some sort of assurance that once his books have been selected _and prescribed as text-books, those books will remain to be so prescribed for three years, on which expectation he may, from a business point of view, have the requisite nnmber of text-books printed.in advance or stock the same.\n\nF It further observed that the publisher can well say unless the rules _ are changed, by no administrative instructions, the three years' period can be curtailed to his prejudice. On this assumpt)ion it held that \"if a representation is made to some one of a particular state of affairs to continue over a time and he acts on it and as a result does something which has cost him time and money the representator or the person who induced the belief and expectation G will not be at liberty to go back upon his representation or holding out of expectation and withdraw hjs stand to the prejudice of the one who has acted upon it\". The petitioner was, therefore, entitled to invoke this principle in his favour in the instant case. The contention urged on behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu that the rules being merely in the nature of administrative instructions, do H not have the force of law and cannot be enforced in courts was negatived on two grounds, firstly, that even as an administrative instruction, if it has the -force of representation which a n11blisher\n\nA may well rely 01;1 and commit himself to a certain position, it is not open tx:> the authority to resile from it to his prejudice and secondly, that .the rules referred io. are obviously traceable to the executive power of• the Government under Article 162 of the Constitution and provide for the procedure for registration of\n\npublisher~, submission of books by them for approval and their B selection, which. books if approved !llld selected, are to be valid for\n\n. a certain duration.\n\nFor these reasons the High Court observed that \"even 11$ an administrative instruction when it is codified in that form, it is boui; td to be followed\", and therefore, the executive cannot say that because they have the administrative power they are enl; itled to use and invoke such administrative power and act c for the purpose of its adoption in individual cases contrary to the generality and tenor .of ihe rules.\n\nBefore us it is submitted on behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu by the learned Advocate General that the High Court adopted two contradictory positions in that while holding that the rules approving the text-books and prescribing them for schools though D administrative in character are not for the benefit of the publishers nonetheless a representation is said to have been made to them that once. they are prescribed they will not be changed for three years.\n\nThere is in our view no warrant for concluding that the Madras ·.Education Rules and the Text Book Committee Rules :hold out any.representation or eVen an assurance. to the publishers E lhat the books once prescribed will not' be changed nor as contended by the respondent's advocate is there any justification for the assumption that these rules envisage the participation of the publishers in the scheme and as such tbll Government will be estopped from resiling from the representation that the period will not be altered.\n\nThe Madras Education Rules though called rules are\n\nII' administrative instructions for !:he guidance pf !he Department. .Rule 58 which deals with the text-books, staies that a consolidated list oftext-books authorised by the Governmenn to be used under the several subjects is published annually in the Fort St. George Gazette; that Managers of schools. are at liberty. to select from the latest list such books as they may deem most suitable proVi.ded that the text-books so selected shall not be changed within. three G years of their introduction in any of the schools except with \"the previous approval of the Distric~ Education Officer in -the. :cise .of . bofs' schools and the Inspectress in the case of girls' scho6ls. It further states that no books (other than books for relie:ious instruction) not authorised by the Government 'shall be used in any recognised school. The Government, however, reserve to itself the H right to forbid or to prescribe the use of any book or books in the recognised schools. The rules relating to Madras text-books . Committee which were iss11ed on November 26. 1965, set out the ob.iects of the Committee, its constitution, fhe general grounds on\n\nA which the books may be described as unsuitable, expression, printlii ing and get-up, registration of publishers, rules relating to recognised schools, fees for scrutjny of books submitted for approval of the text-book committee,, etc. In Rule 27, it i$ provided that any book approved _for use in recognised schools as text-book shaU retain its approval for five Yelll'S and in. Rule 30 it is provided that all text-books used in recognised schools shall be selected B only from the approved list of text-books issued during the year excepting books published by or on behalf of the Government.\n\nIt is also provided in Rule 32 that under the powers delegated to him by the Government, the Director retains on behalf of the Government the right to prescribe text-books in a particular subject for use in recognised schools, even though such books have C not been approved by the text-book committee.\n\nA perusal of these rules show that they are in the nature of Departmental instructions and do not confer any right on the publishers. Nor are they, as held by the High Court, designed to safeguard the interests of the publishers but are conceived in public interest.\n\nThe Government is at liberty to change those text-books or to delete from or add to the list or even prescribe books which are D not in the list.\n\nWhen once it is accepted tliat those instructions do not confer any right on nor create an interest in the publishers but are conceived in the public interest and the Government has full liberty in the matter of approval as well as the power of control over the kind of books that should be prescribed in the schools, the p\\!blishers cannot say that once they are prescribed I: they cannot be changed within the period for which they are stated to be current.\n\nThe period during which a Text-book once prescribed is to continue is more an injunction to the Managers of the schools than an assurance to the publishers that they will not be changed because that power, even if it is conferred by administrative rules made under Article 162, which in our view r they are not, empower the manage!'$ subject to the approval of the authority concerned to change them within the period specified therein or the Government to forbid or prescribe the use of any book or books in the recognised schools.\n\nThe impugned letter in this case can, therefore, be said to have been issued by the Government in exercise of the power reserved to it under those very rules.\n\nG Even dehors these provisions the instructions do not extend to the publishers any kind of representation or assurance.\n\nThe selection of any text-books by the Committee does not confei: any rights on the publishers that their text-books will be prescnbed.\n\nAll that the selection implies is that the books have been approved\n\nas fit and of the standard which can be prescribed (or respective fl classes in the schools by their managers.\n\nThere is no undertaking that they will be prescribed. If any of the schools prescribe the books in the approved list for their classes there is no\n\nA -assurance or a holding out by them that a particular number of\n\nbooks will be required. If the books that are printed are not sold the risk is that of the publishers.\n\nNor can the schools which have prescribed the book hold the publishers responsible if they cannot at any time supply sufficient number of books to cope with the needs of the school.\n\nAll that the instructions that a book B prescribed should not be changed for three years imply, as the High Court rightly recognised, is to avoid any hardship to the students.\n\nStudents may fail and have to repeat the course the next year, or those who are promoted may not afford new books but might go in for second hand books used in the previous years.\n\nThese are some of the hardships that may be sought to be avoided by requiring the books prescribed to be current for three C school years.\n\nIt is true that a representation can be made to a person either directly or indirectly if it was intended to be made to him when it is brought to his notice.\n\nBut that is not the case here as it D was in the Union of India & Ors v. Ml si lndo-Afghan Agencies Ltd. ( 1), where under a scheme to increase exports of woollen textiles, as an incentive it was provided that an exporter will be granted certificates to import raw materials of a total amount equal to 100% of the f.o.b. value of his exports.\n\nThe scheme was under the Imports (Control) Order 1955 made pursuant to\n\nE section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act 1947.\n\nClause I 0 of the scheme provided that the Textile Commissioner could grant an import certificate for a lesser amount if he is satisfied, after holding an enquiry, that the declared value of the goods c.ported is higher than the real value of the goods.\n\nThe Textile Commissioner collected evidence ex-parte and acting upon the report of a Committee appointed by him, passed orders reduc- F ing the import entitlements of the respondents without informing th_em or giving them an opportunity to explain the materials on the basis of which the said action was taken.\n\nThis Court held that it could not be assumed merely because the policy is general in terms and deals with the grant of licences for import of goods and related matters, that it is statuory in character. But even if G it is only executive or administrative in character, courts have power in appropriate cases to compel perfonnance of the ob!ia tions imposed by the scheme upon the Departmental authonttes.\n\nOn the terms of the scheme and the facts of the case, the action of the Textile Commissioner in reducing the \"import entitlement\" was considered to be bad and struck down.\n\nThis case was later considered and explained in Sankaranarayanan, etc. etc. v. The H State of Kerala('), and in an unreported decision in M/s.\n\n(I) [1968) 2 S.C.R. 366.\n\n\n.Varinderchand Hemra; and Ors. v. Lt. Governor, Union Terri- A tory, Hlmachal Pradesh. &: Ors.(1), to both of which one of \\IS\n\n(Hegde, J.) was a party. In the fonner case it was pointed out that \"there is .no question of any :representation having been made by the Government which was acted upon to their detriment by the appellants\". In the later case one of us, Hegde J, pointed out tliat in the Indo-Afghan Agencies' case \"This Court did not B hold that the Government was not competent to change the scheme. If the scheme had statutory force, it bound the Government as much as it bound the exporters.\n\nIn that event the Court was competent to compel the Government to act according to the scheme. If on the other hand the scheme contained merely administrative instructions then the Government having made the C representation referred to earlier, on the basis of which the exporters had exported certain goods, the Government was estopped from gomg back on the representation made by it''.\n\nThe case which is more analogous to the one before us is The State of Assam and Another v. Afit Kumar Sharma and Others(')\n\nwhere a Constitution Bench of this Court which considered the claim of the teacher of a private College affiliated to the Gauhati D Unive,\">ity in Assam which received grants-in-aid from the State on certain conditions set out in the form of Rules held that the was not entitled to maintain a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constituti9n. In that case Rule 7 of the Rules provided that if a teacher stood for elections to the Legislature, he should be on compulsory leave without pay from the date of the filing of E his nomination till the end of the next academic session or till the termination of the term of office to which he may be elected as the case may be.\n\nThe respondent who had recourse to this Rule had after obtaining permission, stood as a candidate for Parliament and was defeated.\n\nThereafter, he rejoined his post but was informed that he has been granted compulsory leave without pay till the end of the academic session.\n\nIt was against this direction F lhat he filed a Writ Petition challenging the rules as being with out legal force and not binding on the Governing Body or the respondent, which contention was, negatived on the ground that the rules were merely administrative instructions not having the force of the law as statutory rules and govern matters between private colleges and the Government. In any view of the mat- G ter, the claim of the respondents that there was any representation made to them or intended to be made is not justified.\n\nIn this view, the appeals are allowed but as some of the contentions raised im ihe petitions have not Ileen considered by the High Court, the matter is remanded to it for disposal according to law.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\n(t) C.A. 1313/70 decided on 5-10-71.\n\n(2) [I 965] I S.C.R. 890.", "total_entities": 38, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. K. KRISHNAMURTBI, ETC. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. K. KRISHNAMURTBI, ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 18, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 81, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 18, 1972\n\n(K. S. HEGDE, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND D. G. PALBKAR, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Madras EducaUonal Rules and Text-Book Committu Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Educational Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 769, "end_char": 793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Book Committee Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 808, "end_char": 828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1971] 2 S.C.R. 361", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3101, "end_char": 3120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. Govind Swaminadhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3458, "end_char": 3479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Govind Swaminadhan, Advocate-General for the State of Tamil Nadu, S. Mohan and A. V. Rangam, for the appellants (in all the appeals) ."}}, {"text": "S. Mohan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3527, "end_char": 3535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Govind Swaminadhan, Advocate-General for the State of Tamil Nadu, S. Mohan and A. V. Rangam, for the appellants (in all the appeals) ."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3540, "end_char": 3552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Govind Swaminadhan, Advocate-General for the State of Tamil Nadu, S. Mohan and A. V. Rangam, for the appellants (in all the appeals) ."}}, {"text": "K. K. Venugopal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3597, "end_char": 3612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Venugopal and K. R. Nanibiar, for the respondents (in (C.A.s No."}}, {"text": "K. R. Nanibiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3617, "end_char": 3631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Venugopal and K. R. Nanibiar, for the respondents (in (C.A.s No."}}, {"text": "P. Jaganmoban Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3746, "end_char": 3765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by P. Jaganmoban Reddy, J. 22 Writ Petitions were filed in the 0 High Court of Madras by publishers of text-books for Government Schools, Dist!.", "canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY"}}, {"text": "Government of Tamil Nadu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4476, "end_char": 4500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the Government of Tamil Nadu in furtherance of its policy to nationalise text-books for schools, was intending to publish them through the Tamil Nadu Text Books F Corporation pursuant to which it had issued the impugned D.O.\n\nJeiter."}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Text Books F Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4611, "end_char": 4646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the Government of Tamil Nadu in furtherance of its policy to nationalise text-books for schools, was intending to publish them through the Tamil Nadu Text Books F Corporation pursuant to which it had issued the impugned D.O.\n\nJeiter."}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5180, "end_char": 5190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent in that appeal, alleged that the impugned D.O.\n\nG letter giving the aforesaid directions is illegal and void as being coqtrary to the Madras Educational Rules and the Text-Book Committee Rules made by the Governor of Tamil Nadu in pursuance of the powers vasted under Article 162 of the Constitution and affected respondent's fundamental rights under Article 19 (1) ( g) of the Constitution inasmuch as his business of publishing Text- H Books has been seriously jeopardised and has practically been brought to a stililld-still; that it is not open to the Government of Tamil Nadu to act contrary to the general rules made under Article 162 of the Constitution; tha~ the policy of nationalisation of the 8-L864SupCl{72\n\ntext-books is itself illegal and void; that the principles of natural A justice have been violated in that under the rules once text-books have been approved and selected for the schools arid have been prescribed."}}, {"text": "Article 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5231, "end_char": 5242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5314, "end_char": 5324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5592, "end_char": 5603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6091, "end_char": 6104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6481, "end_char": 6494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6582, "end_char": 6595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9117, "end_char": 9128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10299, "end_char": 10305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is in our view no warrant for concluding that the Madras ·.Education Rules and the Text Book Committee Rules :hold out any.representation or eVen an assurance."}}, {"text": "Education Rules and the Text Book Committee Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10308, "end_char": 10357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "November 26. 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11861, "end_char": 11878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Committee which were iss11ed on November 26."}}, {"text": "Article 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14004, "end_char": 14015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16450, "end_char": 16459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1968) 2 S.C.R. 366", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17803, "end_char": 17822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17955, "end_char": 17960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ors.(1), to both of which one of \\IS\n\n(Hegde, J.) was a party."}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18895, "end_char": 18900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case which is more analogous to the one before us is The State of Assam and Another v. Afit Kumar Sharma and Others(')\n\nwhere a Constitution Bench of this Court which considered the claim of the teacher of a private College affiliated to the Gauhati D Unive,\">ity in Assam which received grants-in-aid from the State on certain conditions set out in the form of Rules held that the was not entitled to maintain a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constituti9n."}}, {"text": "Gauhati D Unive,\">ity", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19071, "end_char": 19092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case which is more analogous to the one before us is The State of Assam and Another v. Afit Kumar Sharma and Others(')\n\nwhere a Constitution Bench of this Court which considered the claim of the teacher of a private College affiliated to the Gauhati D Unive,\">ity in Assam which received grants-in-aid from the State on certain conditions set out in the form of Rules held that the was not entitled to maintain a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constituti9n."}}, {"text": "Assam which received grants-in-aid from the State on certain conditions set out in the form of Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19096, "end_char": 19196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19262, "end_char": 19273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Assam which received grants-in-aid from the State on certain conditions set out in the form of Rules", "statute": "Assam which received grants-in-aid from the State on certain conditions set out in the form of Rules"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19726, "end_char": 19736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent who had recourse to this Rule had after obtaining permission, stood as a candidate for Parliament and was defeated."}}, {"text": "5-10-71", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20725, "end_char": 20732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(t) C.A. 1313/70 decided on 5-10-71."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_111_117_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "DHARMADEO RAI\n\nRAMNAGINA llAI\n\nJanuary 18, 1972\n\n(J. M. SHELAT AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.]\n\nIndian Registration Act, 1916, 4' 83(1)-Section is permissive and not prohibitive-Does not prevent an aggrieved private person from filing a complaint.\n\nA private complaint in connection with the forgery of a zerpeshgi lease and its registration under the Indian Registration Act was filed against several persons including the appellant.\n\nThe appellant was aC<1uitted by the trial court.\n\nIn an appeal .filed by the complainant the High Court .cpnvioted the appellant under s. 82( d) of the Indian Registration Act for abetment of an offence under s. 82 after overriding his contention that the complaint was not maintainable without the permission as requied by s. 83 of the AcJ.\n\nUnder s. 83(1) a prosecution for any offence under the Act coming to the knowledge of a registering officer in his official capacity may be commenced by or with the permission of the Inspector-General, the Registrar or the Sub-Registrar in whose territories, district or sub~ distriGt as the case may be, the offence has been committed. In appeal by special leave before this Court the only point argued on behalf of the appellant \\\\:as that the complaint was incompetnt as it wa-s filed _by a person \\vithout obtaining the necessary permission under s. 83 of the Act and therefore the conviction of the appellant was bad and must be set aside.\n\nHELD : On a reading of the section it would be clear that it deals only \\\\'ith procution for an offence under the Act coming to the knowledge of the Registering Officer in his official capacty. It, in effect, provides that \\vhere an offence comes to the knowledge of the Registering Officer in his official capacity, a prosecution may be commenced by or with the pennission of any of the officers mentioned in the section. The section can possibly ha\\\"e no applic+ation to cases in which the offences are committed under the Act, but the offences do not come to the knowledge of the .Re\n\ngistering Officer in his official capacity. 'fl 13 HJ\n\nThe section is not prohibitory in that it does not preclude a private\n\nperon from commencing a prosecution.\n\nEven in a case where the commission of offence comes to the knowledge of the Registering Offir in his official capacity, the section does not prohibit a private person.from commencing a prosecution as the section is clearly permissive in Ianguae and intent. [114 BJ\n\nOne would have expected a more apt phraseology if the purpose of the Legislature was to prohibit the prosecution of an offence under the Act by a private individual.\n\nSeeing that a private person will be mdre seriously injured by the action of an offender who not only forges a document but endeavours to give it a higher effiejacy by registering it, there is no reason why the private person should be deprived of the liberty to J*ose cute the offender.\n\nThere is also no reaoon why a regi!; tering officer guilty of an offence under s. 81 of the Act should get Immunity from prosecution by a private individual injured ther<lby, In. s. 195(1) of the Criminal\n\nProcedure Code, s. 70(1) of the Indian Stamp Act ands. 29 of the Indian A Arms Act, !878 the language employed is prohibitory in character. Section 83 (I) of the Act is not prohibitory either in terms or in intention.\n\n[!16A-G]\n\nThe view taken by the Allahabad and Rangoon High Courts that the weird 'may' ins. 83(1) should be read as 'must' was not correct. [114 H•l 15 DJ\n\nGopinatlz v. Kulrflp Singh and Anr., I.LR. Calcutta Series, Vol. XI, 566, Re Piranu Nadathi and Anr. and Emperor v. Yesa Nana Didwagh and Ors., A.LR. 1937. Bombay 191, approved.\n\nNge Pan Gaing and Ors. v. King Emperor, A.I.R. 1927 Ranaoon 61 and Emperor v. Mohd. Mehdi and Ors., A.l.R. 1934 Allahabad, 963, dis approved.\n\nGanga Dibya and Anr. v. Emperor, A.LR. 1943 Patna 227 and Habib C Shah v. Mehda Shah, A.l.R. 1960 J & K. 18, referred to.\n\nK. M. Kane.vi v. State of Mysore, [11968] 3 S.C.R. 821. held inapplicable.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 33 of 1969.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judent and Order dated the 12th November, 1968 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 58 of 1966.\n\nS. N. Prasad, for the appellant.\n\nK. K. Sinha, for the respondent.\n\nR. C. Prasad, for the State of Bihar.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMathew, J.\n\nThis appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment passed in Criminal Appeal No. 58/1966 F whereby the High Court of Patna set aside the acquittal of the appellant by the Additional Sessions Judge of Chapra and convicted him under section 82 ( d) of the Indian Registration Act (hereinafter referred to 'as the Act) and sentenced him to six months' rigorous imprisonment\n\nOne Ramnagina Rai filed a complaint before the Sub-Divi- G sional Officer, Sadar, Chapra, against Bishundeo Rai, Sheo Deo Prasad Rai, Mohan Rai, Jangli Rai and the appellant stating that they entered into a conspiracy and forged a Zerpeshgi deed on 25-1-1964 purporting to be executed by Bishundeo Rai and Nageshwar Rai in favour of Jangli Rai in which Sheo Deo Prasad Rai falsely personated Nageshwar Rai. The Sessions Court, to which the case was committed, after trial, came to the conclusion H thatSheo Deo Prasad Rai, posing as Nageshwar, son of Bujhawan, executed the Zerpeshgi deed and that Sheo Deo Prasad\n\nA Rai falsely personated as Nageshwar before the Sub-Registrar,\n\ntha'. no such person as Nageshwar existed and that Bishundeo . Rai, the father of Sheo Deo Prasad Rai and co-executant of the document was a party to the forgery.\n\nThe Court, therefore, convicted Bishulldeo Rai and Sheo Deo Prasad Rai of offences under section 467 and section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code. Bishun- 11 deo and Sheo Deo Prasad were also convicteq under section 82(d) and 82(c) respectively of the Act.\n\nThe remaining three accused were given the benefit of doubt and acquitted.\n\nTwo appeals were filed from this judgment to the High Court, namely, Criminal Appeal No. 205/1966 and Criminal Appeal No. 58/ 1966.\n\nWe are only concerned with the appeal filed by the com C plainant against the acquittal of the appellant, namely, Criminal Appeal No. 58/ 1966. Jn that appeal, the High Court came to the conclusiQn that the Sessions Judge was wrong in acquitting the appellant as there was clear evidence that it was he who identified Sheo Deo Prasad Rai as Nageshwar, son of Bujhawan, before the Sub-Registrar.\n\nThe Court, therefore, convicted him under section 82(d) of the Act for abetment, of an offence under D s. 82 after overruling his contention that the complaint was not maintainable without the permission as required by section 83 of the Act.\n\nIn this Court, the only point argued on behalf of the appellant was that the complaint was incompetent as it was filed by a per- E son without obtaining the necessary permission under section 83 of the Act and, therefore, the conviction was bad and must be set aside. Section 83 of the Act provides :\n\n\"83 ( 1) A prosecution for any offence under this Act oming to the knowledge of a registering officer in his official capacity may be commenced by or with the permission of the Inspector General, the Registrar or the Sub-Registrar, in whose territories, district or subdistrict, as the case may be, the offence has been committed.\n\n(2) Offences punishable under this Act shall be triable by any Court or officer exereising powers not\n\n' G less than those of a Magistrate of the second class.\"\n\nOn a .reading of the section, it would be clear that it deals only with prosecution for an offence under the Act coming to the knowledge of the Registering Officer in his official capacity. It, in effect, provides that where 8!l offence comes to the knowlge H of the Registering Officer in his official capacity, a prosecution may be commenced by or with the permission of any of the officers mentioned in the section.\n\nTh~ section can possibly have no application to cases in which offences are committed under the\n\nAct, but the offences do not come to the. knowledge of the Regis- A tering Officer in his official capacity.\n\nIf the Registering Officer does not know in his official capacity that the document produced before him is a false document or that the person appearing before him is personating some other person, the section has no application.\n\nThe section is not prohibitory in that it does not preclude a private person from commencing a prosecution. Even B in a case where the commission of an offence comes to the know ledge of the Registering Officer in his official capacity, the section does not prohibit a private person from commencing a prosecu tion as the section is clearly permissive in its language and intent.\n\nIn other words, the section is an enabling one. It enables the rersons mentioned therein to commence a prosecution in cases C where the commission of the offence under the Act comes to the knowledge of the Registering Officer in his official capacity. The Section enables the officers named to use their official position for the purpose of prosecution without. personal risk.\n\nIn Gopinath v. Kuldip Singh and otliers(1), the question whether the section prohibits a private person from commencing D a prosecution without the permission as provided in the section, came up for consideration and a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court answered the question by saying that the section is not prohibitory in character and that it does not preclude a private person from commencing a prosecution for an offence under the Act without the permission as envisaged in the section. This case E has been followed. by the Madras High Court in Re Piranu Nadathi and others('). There also the Court has taken the view that the section is an enabling one in that it only authorises the authorities ment.ioned therein to commence a prosecution, and does nut prohibit a private person from commencing a prosecu tion without the permission as required by the section. In r Emperor v. Yesa Nana Bidwagh and others(•), Beaumont; C.J., speaking for the Court, said that the section is intended to provide only for cases where the knowledge of an offence under the Act comes to a Registering Officer in his official capacity and that it has no application when he has no such knowled$e• .. and that even in cases where he has knowledge of the comm1ss1on of the offence in his official capacity, the section is only enabling and G does not preclude a private person from launching a p.rosecution for the offence.\n\nThe same view was taken by a Bench . of the Patna High Court in Ganga Dibya and another v. Emperor(<) and also by the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in Habib Shah v. Mehda Shah(\").\n\nIn Nge Pan Gaing and other v. King Emperor('), the Rangoon High Court held that the word 'may' ff\n\n(1) l.L.R. Calcutta Series, Vol. XI, 566.\n\n(3) A.1.R. 1937 Bombay 191.\n\n(5) A.IR. 1960 J & K 18.\n\n(2) J.L.R. 40 Madras 880.\n\n(4) A.I.R. 1943 Patna 2'1:7.\n\nDHAIWADBO v. RAMNAGINA (Mathew, J.) 115\n\nA in section 8 3 of the Act should be read as equivalent to 'must be•\n\nand that a prosecution for an offence under the Act coming to theknowledge of a Registering Officer in his official capacity cannot be commenced by a private person without the permission mentioned in the section. A Full Bench il the Allahabad High Court, in Emperor v. Mohd. Mehdi and others('), took the view B that section 83 lays down a special procedure for prosecution of\n\nthe offences created by the Act and, therefore, that procedure should be followed; that although the word 'may' occurring in the section cannot be read as 'must', it has to be read in the context as having a mandatory character.\n\nThe Court said that the offences contemplated by sections 81 and 82 of the Act are c offences committed against registering authority, that only in-· directly that private persons would be affected and, therefore, the provisions of the section are prohibitory in character.\n\nIn our view, this reading of the section is inadmissible for the obvious reason that the section, as we have said, provides only for one type of cases, namely, cases in which the commission of an offence under the Act comes to the knowledge of the Registering l> Officer in his official capacity and even there, the language of the section is permissive and not mandatory.\n\nSection 81 of the Act makes the endorsing, copying, translating or registering of a document by a Registering Officer charged with those duties in a manner which he knows or believes to be incorrect, intending\n\nthereby to cause injury as defined in the Penal Code to any person, an offence punishable with impnsonment which may extend to seven years or with fine or with both.\n\nSection 82 deals with four classes of offences classified under (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the section.\n\nClause (a) deals with intentionally make false statements before officers acting under the Act, (b) with intentionally delivering to a registering officer a false copy or translation of a document or a false copy of a map or plan; and ( c) with false personation and presentation of a document or the making of an admission or a statement in the assumed character in any proceeding or enquiry under the Act.\n\nClause ( d) deals with the abetment of the above offences.\n\nIf the authorities mentioned in section 83 of the Act were tc>· collude with the person guilty of an offence under section 82 of the Act, or if they fail to launch a pution against the registering officer for an offence under section 81 of the Act, therewould be a total bar to prosecution by a private person in case we accept the reasoning of the Rangoon and Allahabad High Courts.\n\nWe do not think that a construction which would lead to that\n\nresult is warranted by the plain language of fhe section.\n\n(I) A.l.R. 1934 A11ahabad, 963.\n\nOne would have expected a more apt phraseology if the pur- A\n\npose of the Legislature was to prohibit the prosecution of an offence under the Act by a private individual.\n\nSeeing that a private person will be more seriously injured by the action of an offender who not only forges a document but endeavours to give it a higher e_fficacy by registering it, we can perceive no reason why the private person should be denied the liberty to prosecute B the offender.\n\nWe also see no re?son why a registering officer guilty of an offence under section 81 of the Act should get immunity from prosecution by a private individual injured thereby.\n\nCounsel for the appellant referred to the decision of this Court in K. M. Kanavi v. State of Mysore(') and contended that section 83 of the Act is prohibitory in character. There is no merit in c this contention as the language of the provision there considered was totally different.\n\nIt is permissible in this connection to look into the language employed in similar sections in other statutes where the legislature intended a prohibitory effect.\n\nSection 195(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that D \"No Court shall take cognizance, (a) of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned\".\n\nSection 70(1) of the Indian Stamp Act states that\n\n\"No prosecution in respect of any offence punishable under the Act. . . shall be instituted without the sanction of . the Collector or such other officer as the State Government generally, or the Collector specially authorises in that behalf\".\n\nSection 29 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878, says:\n\n\"No proceedings shall be instituted against any person in respect of such offence without the previous sanction of the Magistrate of the District or, in a presidency town, of the Commissioner of Police\".\n\nIn ull these sections, the language employed is prohibitory in G character.\n\nSection 8 3 ( 1) of the Act 1s not prohibitory either in terms or in intention.\n\nWe think that, on the point under consideration, the decisions in Gopinath v. Kuldip Singh and others('), Re Piranu Nadathi and others('), and Emperor v. Yesa Nana Didwagh and others(') lay down the correct law.\n\n(I) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 821.\n\n(2) J.L.R Calcutta, Vol. XI l66. (.l) l.L.R. 40 Mad•as 880.\n\n(4) A.J.R. 1937 Bom. 191.\n\nWe cannot appreciate or approve the reasoning in Emperor\n\nv. Mohd. Mahdi and others(') lliild Nga Pan Gaing and others v.\n\nKing Emperor(') or the cases followed in these rulings.\n\nThe result is that the appeal has to be dismissed and we do so.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 83, "entities": [{"text": "DHARMADEO RAI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 13, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DHARMADEO RAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 18, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 47, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DHARMADEO RAI\n\nRAMNAGINA llAI\n\nJanuary 18, 1972\n\n(J. M. SHELAT AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. K. MATHEW, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Registration Act, 1916", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 350, "end_char": 366, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 82( d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 562, "end_char": 571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Registration Act, 1916", "statute": "Indian Registration Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 586, "end_char": 602, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 636, "end_char": 641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Registration Act, 1916", "statute": "Indian Registration Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 751, "end_char": 756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Registration Act, 1916", "statute": "Indian Registration Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "s. 83(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 776, "end_char": 784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Registration Act, 1916", "statute": "Indian Registration Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1321, "end_char": 1326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2970, "end_char": 2975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "BJ\n\nOne would have expected a more apt phraseology if the purpose of the Legislature was to prohibit the prosecution of an offence under the Act", "statute": "BJ\n\nOne would have expected a more apt phraseology if the purpose of the Legislature was to prohibit the prosecution of an offence under the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3070, "end_char": 3079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "BJ\n\nOne would have expected a more apt phraseology if the purpose of the Legislature was to prohibit the prosecution of an offence under the Act", "statute": "BJ\n\nOne would have expected a more apt phraseology if the purpose of the Legislature was to prohibit the prosecution of an offence under the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 70(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3113, "end_char": 3121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "BJ\n\nOne would have expected a more apt phraseology if the purpose of the Legislature was to prohibit the prosecution of an offence under the Act", "statute": "BJ\n\nOne would have expected a more apt phraseology if the purpose of the Legislature was to prohibit the prosecution of an offence under the Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Stamp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3129, "end_char": 3145, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3171, "end_char": 3179, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3237, "end_char": 3247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "BJ\n\nOne would have expected a more apt phraseology if the purpose of the Legislature was to prohibit the prosecution of an offence under the Act", "statute": "BJ\n\nOne would have expected a more apt phraseology if the purpose of the Legislature was to prohibit the prosecution of an offence under the Act"}}, {"text": "Allahabad and Rangoon High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3348, "end_char": 3381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16A-G]\n\nThe view taken by the Allahabad and Rangoon High Courts that the weird 'may' ins."}}, {"text": "1968] 3 S.C.R. 821", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3953, "end_char": 3971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. N. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4199, "end_char": 4211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Prasad, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. K. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4233, "end_char": 4244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Sinha, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4267, "end_char": 4279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. C. Prasad, for the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4350, "end_char": 4356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMathew, J.\n\nThis appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment passed in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4478, "end_char": 4497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "58/1966 F whereby the High Court of Patna set aside the acquittal of the appellant by the Additional Sessions Judge of Chapra and convicted him under section 82 ( d) of the Indian Registration Act (hereinafter referred to 'as the Act) and sentenced him to six months' rigorous imprisonment\n\nOne Ramnagina Rai filed a complaint before the Sub-Divi- G sional Officer, Sadar, Chapra, against Bishundeo Rai, Sheo Deo Prasad Rai, Mohan Rai, Jangli Rai and the appellant stating that they entered into a conspiracy and forged a Zerpeshgi deed on 25-1-1964 purporting to be executed by Bishundeo Rai and Nageshwar Rai in favour of Jangli Rai in which Sheo Deo Prasad Rai falsely personated Nageshwar Rai."}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4606, "end_char": 4616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4636, "end_char": 4652, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ramnagina Rai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4751, "end_char": 4764, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Ramnagina Rai", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Chapra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4829, "end_char": 4835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "58/1966 F whereby the High Court of Patna set aside the acquittal of the appellant by the Additional Sessions Judge of Chapra and convicted him under section 82 ( d) of the Indian Registration Act (hereinafter referred to 'as the Act) and sentenced him to six months' rigorous imprisonment\n\nOne Ramnagina Rai filed a complaint before the Sub-Divi- G sional Officer, Sadar, Chapra, against Bishundeo Rai, Sheo Deo Prasad Rai, Mohan Rai, Jangli Rai and the appellant stating that they entered into a conspiracy and forged a Zerpeshgi deed on 25-1-1964 purporting to be executed by Bishundeo Rai and Nageshwar Rai in favour of Jangli Rai in which Sheo Deo Prasad Rai falsely personated Nageshwar Rai."}}, {"text": "Bishundeo Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4845, "end_char": 4858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "58/1966 F whereby the High Court of Patna set aside the acquittal of the appellant by the Additional Sessions Judge of Chapra and convicted him under section 82 ( d) of the Indian Registration Act (hereinafter referred to 'as the Act) and sentenced him to six months' rigorous imprisonment\n\nOne Ramnagina Rai filed a complaint before the Sub-Divi- G sional Officer, Sadar, Chapra, against Bishundeo Rai, Sheo Deo Prasad Rai, Mohan Rai, Jangli Rai and the appellant stating that they entered into a conspiracy and forged a Zerpeshgi deed on 25-1-1964 purporting to be executed by Bishundeo Rai and Nageshwar Rai in favour of Jangli Rai in which Sheo Deo Prasad Rai falsely personated Nageshwar Rai.", "canonical_name": "Bishundeo . Rai"}}, {"text": "Sheo Deo Prasad Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4860, "end_char": 4879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "58/1966 F whereby the High Court of Patna set aside the acquittal of the appellant by the Additional Sessions Judge of Chapra and convicted him under section 82 ( d) of the Indian Registration Act (hereinafter referred to 'as the Act) and sentenced him to six months' rigorous imprisonment\n\nOne Ramnagina Rai filed a complaint before the Sub-Divi- G sional Officer, Sadar, Chapra, against Bishundeo Rai, Sheo Deo Prasad Rai, Mohan Rai, Jangli Rai and the appellant stating that they entered into a conspiracy and forged a Zerpeshgi deed on 25-1-1964 purporting to be executed by Bishundeo Rai and Nageshwar Rai in favour of Jangli Rai in which Sheo Deo Prasad Rai falsely personated Nageshwar Rai.", "canonical_name": "Sheo Deo Prasad Rai"}}, {"text": "Mohan Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4881, "end_char": 4890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "58/1966 F whereby the High Court of Patna set aside the acquittal of the appellant by the Additional Sessions Judge of Chapra and convicted him under section 82 ( d) of the Indian Registration Act (hereinafter referred to 'as the Act) and sentenced him to six months' rigorous imprisonment\n\nOne Ramnagina Rai filed a complaint before the Sub-Divi- G sional Officer, Sadar, Chapra, against Bishundeo Rai, Sheo Deo Prasad Rai, Mohan Rai, Jangli Rai and the appellant stating that they entered into a conspiracy and forged a Zerpeshgi deed on 25-1-1964 purporting to be executed by Bishundeo Rai and Nageshwar Rai in favour of Jangli Rai in which Sheo Deo Prasad Rai falsely personated Nageshwar Rai."}}, {"text": "Jangli Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4892, "end_char": 4902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "58/1966 F whereby the High Court of Patna set aside the acquittal of the appellant by the Additional Sessions Judge of Chapra and convicted him under section 82 ( d) of the Indian Registration Act (hereinafter referred to 'as the Act) and sentenced him to six months' rigorous imprisonment\n\nOne Ramnagina Rai filed a complaint before the Sub-Divi- G sional Officer, Sadar, Chapra, against Bishundeo Rai, Sheo Deo Prasad Rai, Mohan Rai, Jangli Rai and the appellant stating that they entered into a conspiracy and forged a Zerpeshgi deed on 25-1-1964 purporting to be executed by Bishundeo Rai and Nageshwar Rai in favour of Jangli Rai in which Sheo Deo Prasad Rai falsely personated Nageshwar Rai."}}, {"text": "25-1-1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4996, "end_char": 5005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "58/1966 F whereby the High Court of Patna set aside the acquittal of the appellant by the Additional Sessions Judge of Chapra and convicted him under section 82 ( d) of the Indian Registration Act (hereinafter referred to 'as the Act) and sentenced him to six months' rigorous imprisonment\n\nOne Ramnagina Rai filed a complaint before the Sub-Divi- G sional Officer, Sadar, Chapra, against Bishundeo Rai, Sheo Deo Prasad Rai, Mohan Rai, Jangli Rai and the appellant stating that they entered into a conspiracy and forged a Zerpeshgi deed on 25-1-1964 purporting to be executed by Bishundeo Rai and Nageshwar Rai in favour of Jangli Rai in which Sheo Deo Prasad Rai falsely personated Nageshwar Rai."}}, {"text": "Nageshwar Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5053, "end_char": 5066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "58/1966 F whereby the High Court of Patna set aside the acquittal of the appellant by the Additional Sessions Judge of Chapra and convicted him under section 82 ( d) of the Indian Registration Act (hereinafter referred to 'as the Act) and sentenced him to six months' rigorous imprisonment\n\nOne Ramnagina Rai filed a complaint before the Sub-Divi- G sional Officer, Sadar, Chapra, against Bishundeo Rai, Sheo Deo Prasad Rai, Mohan Rai, Jangli Rai and the appellant stating that they entered into a conspiracy and forged a Zerpeshgi deed on 25-1-1964 purporting to be executed by Bishundeo Rai and Nageshwar Rai in favour of Jangli Rai in which Sheo Deo Prasad Rai falsely personated Nageshwar Rai.", "canonical_name": "Nageshwar Rai"}}, {"text": "thatSheo Deo Prasad Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5245, "end_char": 5268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sessions Court, to which the case was committed, after trial, came to the conclusion H thatSheo Deo Prasad Rai, posing as Nageshwar, son of Bujhawan, executed the Zerpeshgi deed and that Sheo Deo Prasad\n\nA Rai falsely personated as Nageshwar before the Sub-Registrar,\n\ntha'."}}, {"text": "Nageshwar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5280, "end_char": 5289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sessions Court, to which the case was committed, after trial, came to the conclusion H thatSheo Deo Prasad Rai, posing as Nageshwar, son of Bujhawan, executed the Zerpeshgi deed and that Sheo Deo Prasad\n\nA Rai falsely personated as Nageshwar before the Sub-Registrar,\n\ntha'.", "canonical_name": "Nageshwar Rai"}}, {"text": "Bujhawan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5298, "end_char": 5306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sessions Court, to which the case was committed, after trial, came to the conclusion H thatSheo Deo Prasad Rai, posing as Nageshwar, son of Bujhawan, executed the Zerpeshgi deed and that Sheo Deo Prasad\n\nA Rai falsely personated as Nageshwar before the Sub-Registrar,\n\ntha'."}}, {"text": "Sheo Deo Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5345, "end_char": 5360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sessions Court, to which the case was committed, after trial, came to the conclusion H thatSheo Deo Prasad Rai, posing as Nageshwar, son of Bujhawan, executed the Zerpeshgi deed and that Sheo Deo Prasad\n\nA Rai falsely personated as Nageshwar before the Sub-Registrar,\n\ntha'.", "canonical_name": "Sheo Deo Prasad Rai"}}, {"text": "Bishundeo . Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5478, "end_char": 5493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "no such person as Nageshwar existed and that Bishundeo .", "canonical_name": "Bishundeo . Rai"}}, {"text": "Bishulldeo Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5623, "end_char": 5637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court, therefore, convicted Bishulldeo Rai and Sheo Deo Prasad Rai of offences under section 467 and section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "Bishundeo . Rai"}}, {"text": "section 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5680, "end_char": 5691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5696, "end_char": 5707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5717, "end_char": 5734, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 82(d) and 82(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5797, "end_char": 5820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6494, "end_char": 6507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6555, "end_char": 6560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6671, "end_char": 6681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6879, "end_char": 6889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6963, "end_char": 6973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9345, "end_char": 9364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Gopinath v. Kuldip Singh and otliers(1), the question whether the section prohibits a private person from commencing D a prosecution without the permission as provided in the section, came up for consideration and a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court answered the question by saying that the section is not prohibitory in character and that it does not preclude a private person from commencing a prosecution for an offence under the Act without the permission as envisaged in the section."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9642, "end_char": 9659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the Madras High Court in Re Piranu Nadathi and others(')."}}, {"text": "Piranu Nadathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9666, "end_char": 9680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the Madras High Court in Re Piranu Nadathi and others(')."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10567, "end_char": 10583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Patna High Court in Ganga Dibya and another v. Emperor(<) and also by the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in Habib Shah v. Mehda Shah(\")."}}, {"text": "High Court of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10641, "end_char": 10672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Patna High Court in Ganga Dibya and another v. Emperor(<) and also by the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in Habib Shah v. Mehda Shah(\")."}}, {"text": "Rangoon High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10757, "end_char": 10775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Nge Pan Gaing and other v. King Emperor('), the Rangoon High Court held that the word 'may' ff\n\n(1) l.L.R. Calcutta Series, Vol."}}, {"text": "A.1.R. 1937 Bombay 191", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10852, "end_char": 10874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) A.1.R. 1937 Bombay 191."}}, {"text": "A.I.R. 1943 Patna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10934, "end_char": 10951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) A.I.R. 1943 Patna 2'1:7."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11006, "end_char": 11015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11306, "end_char": 11326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Full Bench il the Allahabad High Court, in Emperor v. Mohd."}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11390, "end_char": 11400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 81 and 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11730, "end_char": 11748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12330, "end_char": 12340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12583, "end_char": 12593, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12708, "end_char": 12718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13312, "end_char": 13322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13395, "end_char": 13405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13506, "end_char": 13516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rangoon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13629, "end_char": 13636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the authorities mentioned in section 83 of the Act were tc>· collude with the person guilty of an offence under section 82 of the Act, or if they fail to launch a pution against the registering officer for an offence under section 81 of the Act, therewould be a total bar to prosecution by a private person in case we accept the reasoning of the Rangoon and Allahabad High Courts."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13641, "end_char": 13662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the authorities mentioned in section 83 of the Act were tc>· collude with the person guilty of an offence under section 82 of the Act, or if they fail to launch a pution against the registering officer for an offence under section 81 of the Act, therewould be a total bar to prosecution by a private person in case we accept the reasoning of the Rangoon and Allahabad High Courts."}}, {"text": "pose of the Legislature was to prohibit the prosecution of an offence under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13881, "end_char": 13964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14358, "end_char": 14368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "One would have expected a more apt phraseology if the pur- A\n\npose of the Legislature was to prohibit the prosecution of an offence under the Act", "statute": "One would have expected a more apt phraseology if the pur- A\n\npose of the Legislature was to prohibit the prosecution of an offence under the Act"}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14581, "end_char": 14591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "One would have expected a more apt phraseology if the pur- A\n\npose of the Legislature was to prohibit the prosecution of an offence under the Act", "statute": "One would have expected a more apt phraseology if the pur- A\n\npose of the Legislature was to prohibit the prosecution of an offence under the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14909, "end_char": 14923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "One would have expected a more apt phraseology if the pur- A\n\npose of the Legislature was to prohibit the prosecution of an offence under the Act", "statute": "One would have expected a more apt phraseology if the pur- A\n\npose of the Legislature was to prohibit the prosecution of an offence under the Act"}}, {"text": "sections 172 to 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15040, "end_char": 15059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15067, "end_char": 15084, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 70(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15156, "end_char": 15169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Stamp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15177, "end_char": 15193, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15452, "end_char": 15462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Arms Act, 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15470, "end_char": 15491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15782, "end_char": 15791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Arms Act, 1878", "statute": "the Indian Arms Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "[1968] 3 S.C.R. 821", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16080, "end_char": 16099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "J.L.R Calcutta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16106, "end_char": 16120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) J.L.R Calcutta, Vol."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_118_128_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, WEST BENGAL A\n\nCHAMPA KUMARI SINGHI & ORS.\n\nJauary 19, 1972\n\n[K. S. HEGDE, A. N. GROVER AND A. N. RAY, JJ.]\n\nWealth Tax Act, 1957, Section 3-Jain undivided family, whether Hindu Vndivided Fa111ily.\n\nThe High Court held that the assessee, a Jain undivided family was not a Hindu undivided family within the meaning of section 3 of Wealth\n\nTax Act, 1957. According to the High Court, in order to form a Hindu C undivided family its members must be Hindus; the assessee family being Jains were not Hindus and so its members could not form a Hindu undivided family although it was \"capable of forming a unit of very much of the same type and g_overned by the law applying to a Hindu undivided family\". On the question whether the word 'Hindu' preceding the words undivided family signifies that the undivided family should be of th05e (i) who profess Hindu religion; or (ii) to whom Hindu Law applies; or,\n\n(iii) who though not professing Hindu religion have come to be regarded D as Hindu undivided family by judicial and legislative prac'ice,\n\nHELD : The expression Hindu undivided family includes 'Jain undivided family'.\n\nFor a Jong time Courts seem to have taken the view that Jains are Hindu dissenters. [.123 EJ ·\n\nBlzagwandas Tejmal v. Rajmal, (1873) 10 Bbm. HCR. 241, Lala Mohabeer Pershad v. Musammut Kundar Koover, 8 Cal. W.Rep. 116 Civ. Rul and Sheokuarbai v. Jeoraj, [1921) P.C. 77, referred to.\n\nThe above view has been challenged by Jain historians and writers and it has been maintained that Jains are quite distinct f:rom Hindus and have\n\na separate code of law which unfortunately was not brought to the notice of the courts. [124 EJ\n\nBobba/adi GatePP• v. Bobbaladi Eramma & Others, Al.R. 1927 Mad. 228 and C.R. Jain, Jain Law, (1926) pp, 3-23, 21~258, referred to.\n\nBut, the sugges'tion that Jain law which is found in the av&ilable books should still be applied and the error which bas crept in the matter of jains being governed by Hindu Law should be rectified cannot possibly be follow. ed partic; ularly in view of statutory enactment, s which in express tenns G lia\\e been made applicable to Jains. [125 BJ\n\nPanna Lal & Others v. Siiabai, I.L.R. 1954 Nagpur 30, Sheokuarbai v.\n\nJeoraj, p92!) P.C. 77, referred to.\n\nBefore the amendment and codification of major branches of Hindu law by the four statutes, i.e. the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Hindu\n\nSuccession Act, !956, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship -ct, i956, lithe Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, the undisputed position was that the Jains were governed by Hindu law modified by custom •Qd a Jain joint family was a Hindu joint family ·.with all the incidents\n\nA attached to such a family under the Hindu Law.\n\nThe legislative practice also was to generally treat Jains as included in the term 'Hindu' in various statutory enactments. Wherever Jains were mentioned in addition it was ex abundant/ cautela. The. new statutes did not change the situation. The\n\nfallacy underlying the reasonini of the High Court is that the artificial field of application of the law m those statutes shows that Jainism is not treated even as a form or a development of Hinduism.\n\nEven if the reli- B gions are different, what is common is that all those who are to be governed by the provisions of these enactments are included In the term 'Hindu'.\n\nThey ai:e to be governed by the same rules relating to marriage, succession, minority, guardianship, adoption and maintenance as HindUs. The statutes thus accord legislative recognition to the fact that even though Jains may not be Hindus by religion they are to be governed by the same laws as the Hindus. The expression 'Jain undivided family' is not known to law. The Jains are governed by all the incidents relating to the Hindu joint family.\n\nC Hindu undivided family is a legal expression which has been employed in taxation Jaws.\n\nIt has a definite connotation and embodies the meaning ascribed to the expression 'Hindu Joint Family'. [127 E128A)\n\nKamawali v. Digbijai, A.l.R. 1922 P.C. 14, Bachebi v. Makhan Lal & Another, I.LR. 3 All. SS Bhagwan Koer v. J. C. Bose, Ambalal v. Keshav .Bandhochand Gujar, I.LR, 1941 Bom. 2SO and Ka/ani Vithal Das v.\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax, L.R. 64 I.A. 28, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1090 of 1971 arid 1686 ol 1968.\n\nAppeals by special leave/certificate from the judgment and order dated August 25, 1967 of the Calcutta l; ligh Court in Wealth Tax Reference No. 435 of 1963.\n\n. S. Mittra, B. D. Sharma and R. N. Sachthe, v, for the appellant (m both the appeals).\n\nS. T. Desai, D. N. Mishra, J.B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondents (in both the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGrover, J. This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Calcutta High Court arising out of a reference under the Wealth Tax Act 1957 in which the question involved is one of imP!'rtance, namely, whether a Jain undivided family is included in the expression \"Hindu undivided family\" within s. 3 of the Act.\n\nThe facts are few and may be stated. For the assessment year 1957-58, the valuation date being 31-12-56 the Wealth Tax Officer assessed the family assets of the assessee iii the status of a Hindu undivided family.\n\nOn appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner the contentions raised, inter alia, were that (i) upon the description of the assessee in the notice of demand the assessment should be deemed to have been made in the status of an association of persons which was not a unit on which t!!X\n\ncould be levied under the Act; (ii) even if the assessee was to be A treated a1 a Hindu undivided family, the imposition of wealth tax on such family was ultra vires the Constitution.\n\nThese contentions failed before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.\n\nThe Appellate Tribunal, to whom the matter wa5 taken in appeal, held that the assessee followed the Jain religion ll and since the unit chargeable to wealth tax under s. 3 of the Act was either individual or Hindu undivided family or company none of the units covered the case of the assessee which was a Jain family.\n\nAccording to the Tribunal Jains were not Hindus and, therefore, the expression \"Hindu undivided family\" in s. 3 dhid not cover the cashe. of a Jain family. The Tribu~I et aside C: t e assessment on t 1s ground alone.\n\nThe Comm1ss1oner of Wealth tax filed an application under s. 27 ( 1) of the Act praying that the question of law which arose out of the order of the Tri bunal be referred to the High Court.\n\nAt the time of the hearing of that application it was suggested on behalf of the assessee that further questions arising out of the order of the Tribunal should n. also be referred.\n\nFinding that questions other than the question suggested by the Commissioner of Wealth tax arose out of the order, the Tribunal referred the following question of law for the opinion of the High Court :-\n\n\" l. Whether, the assessee, a Jain undivided family, was not a Hindu undivided family within the meaning of E s. 3 of the Wealth tax Act, 1957, and as such the Tri bunal was right in setting aside the assessment made on the assessee ?\n\n2. Whether levy of Wealth tax on Hindu undivided family or joint family governed under Mitakshra school of Hindu law was beyond the legislative compe- F tence of Parliament and ultra virts the Constitution of India?\n\n3. Whether the Wealth Tax Act in so far as it pur ports to levy Wealth tax on Hindu undivided families is void and inoperative as it offends Article 14 of the G Constitution of India ?\"\n\nThe High Court held that the Jains not being Hindus in the generally accepted sense of the term a Jain undivided family could not be a Hindu undivided family although the incidence of a Jain family and a Hindu family \"may be the same or largely the same''.\n\nAccording to the High Court, in order to form a H Hindu undivided family its members must be Hindus,_ the assessee family being Jains, were not Hindus and so its members.\n\nA could not form a Hindu undivided family although it was \"capable c>f forining a unit c>f very much of the same type and governed by the law applying to a Hindu undivided family\". The answer to the first question, therefore, was returned in the -affirmative and in favour of the assessee.\n\nThe other two questions were not pressed before the High Court, presumably in view of B the decision in Banarsi Dass v. Wealth Tax Officer, Special Circle, Meerut( 1).\n\nAccording to s. 2(c) of the Act assessee means a person by whom Wealth tax or any other sum of money is payable under the Act and includes :-\n\n( i) every person in respect of whom any proceedings under this Act has been taken for the determination of wealth tax payable by him or b} any other person or the amount of refund due to him or such other person;\n\n(ii) every person who is deemed to be an assessee under this Act;\n\n(iii) * * * * f, f * (•\"\n\nSection 3 is in the following terms :-\n\n\"Charge of wealth tax-Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, there shall be charged for every (assessment year) commencing on and from the first day of April 1957, a tax (hereinafter referred to as wealth tax) in respect of the net wealth on the corresponding valuation date of every individual, Hindu undivided family and company at the rate or rates specified in the schedule\".\n\nThe only other provision in the Act in which the expression \"Hindu\" undivided family\" occurs is s. 20. It deals with assessment after partition of a Hindu undivided family.\n\nUnder s. 3 G of the Act it is the Hindu undivided family which is one of the assessable entitieS. It should be distinguished from a Hindu co-parcenary which is a much narrower body than the Joint family.\n\nA Hindu joint family consists of all persons lineally descended from a common ancestor, and includes their wives and unmarried daughters.\n\nA Hindu coparcenary includes only those H who acquire by birth an interest in the joint coparcenary property, being the sons, grandsons and great grandsons of the holder of the joint property. Thus \\here can be a joint Hindu family\n\n(I) 56 1.T.R. 224. 9-L%lS\"PCl '72\n\n122 SUPREME COURT llBPORTS\n\n(1972) 3 S, C.R.\n\nconsisting of a single male member and widows of deceased A coparceners.\n\nIt must be remembered that the words \"Hindu undivided family\" are used ln th!!! Income tax statutes with refe rence not to one school of Hindu law only but to all schools. The sole previous decision in which an identical question came up for consideration under the Income tax law is that of the Nagpur Judicial Commissioner's Court in Nathu Sao v. Commissioner of B Income tax C.P. & Berar( 1). In that case the assessee was a member of the Lad Yaish community and was a Jain.\n\nHe claim ed to be governed by the Hindu law and contended that his widowed mother and widowed aunt who lived with him ronsti tuted a Hindu joint family.\n\nIt was held that ordinarily Hindu Law applied to Jains in the absence of proof of custom or usage to the contrary and that the expression \"Hindu undivided family\" C did not mean a Hindu coparcenary but was a wider expression which would take ln the widowed mother aald the widowed aunt of the assessee in that case.\n\nNo contrary view seems to have been expressed in any other case subsequently and it appears that it is for the first time that the Calcutta High Court in the judgment under appeal has upheld the contention that a Jain undivid D ed family cannot fall within the expression \"Hindu undivided family\".\n\nIt will not be out of place to mention that indisputably eVCll\" since income tax laws have been inforce no distinction has ever been made between a Jain undivided family and a Hindu undivided family and a Jain family has always been assessed as a Hindu undivided family.\n\nEven in the forms prescribed for E making returns of Income tax no such differentiation or distinction has ever been made.\n\nThe main reasoning which prevailed with the High Court is that although Hindu law applies to Jains except in so far as such law is varied by custom, Jains do not become Hindus in the same F way as Khojas and Cutchi Memons of Bombay and Sunni Borahs of Gujarat etc. cannot be regarded as Hindus although Hindu law applies to them in matters of inheritance and succession.\n\nMoreover, Hinduism does not include Hindu converts to Christianity and Islam and also dissenters from Hinduism who formed. themselves into distinct communities or sects with peculiar G religious usages so divergent from the principles of the Shastras that they could not be regarded as Hindus.\n\nReliance was placed on the decision of the Mysore High Court. in P. F. Pinto v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Mysore(•). In that case the ancestors of the assessee were originally Hindus.\n\nThey later on became converts to Christianity.\n\nIt was found that although for the purposes of succession to property the Hindu law was still applicable H to the family of the assessee, he could be assessed only as an\n\n(I) 2~1.T.R. 463.\n\n(I) 65 I.T.R. !23.\n\nCOMM~. WEALTH-TAX v. CHAMPA (Grover, J.) 123\n\nindividual for wealth tax purposes and could not be assessed in the status ?f Hindu undi.v.ided family.\n\nThe Mysore High Court was mctmed, to the view that the expression 'Hindu undivided family' in s. 3 of the Act was limited to Mitakshra families or. families of persons professing Hindu religion governed by M1takshra law and thus it could not include a Christian undivided fam!IY alth?ugh governed by Hindu law.\n\nThe Calcutta High Court ID the judgment under appeal, however, did not consider that the Myore High Court was right in holding that s. 3 of the Act was limited only to Mitakshra families.\n\nIt may be pointed out that so far as Income ta11: law IS cvno•rned the expression 'Hindu undivided family' has been held to have rerer•nce to all •chool• nf Hindu law and not one school only. [Se.. K .. 1,_,1.\n\nVithal Das v. Commissioner of Income tax(')].\n\nThe real question for detennination is whether the word 'Hindu' preceding the words 'undivided family' signifies that the undivided family should be of those (i) who profess Hindu D religion; or (ii) to whom Hindu Jaw applies; or (iii) who though not professing Hindu religion have come to be regarded as Hindu undivided family by judicial decisions and legislative prac'tice.\n\nIt may be mentioned that for a Jong time the courts and particularly the Privy Council seem to have taken the view that Jains are of Hindu origin; they are Hindu dissenters and although gene- E rally adhering to the ordinary Hindu Law they do not recognise any divine authority of the Vedas nor do they practice a number of ceremonies observed by the Hindus.\n\nBut the modern trend of authority is against the view that Jains are Hindu dissenters.\n\nAs a result of comparative research in Hinduism, Jainism and 'Buddhism, it is being emphatically claimed that the theory that Jains are Hindu dissenters is based on a misreading of the ancient F authorities relating to these religions (See C. R. Jain-'Jain Law'-pp. 3-23 and 219-258).\n\nOne of the early decisions in which Ji1ins were stated to be of Hindu origin being Hindu dissenters is that of Westropp C.J. in Bhagwandas Tejmal v.\n\nRa,;.. mal('). The learned Chief Justice based his view on high authority including the researches of Mr. Mountstuart Elphin- G stone, !.:ate Col. Mackenzie (9th Vol. of the Asiatic Reseaches. including the essay of Mr. Cole Brooke on the Sect of Jamas), the .work of Abbe Dubois on the Manners etc. of the People of India and tl1e elaborate account of the Jain sect in the First Volume of Prof. H. H. Wilson's work.\n\nHe also referred to certain decisions of the Sudder Divani Adault in Calcutta and the H High Court of Calcutta; in particular to the opinion of Peacock C.J. in Lala Mohabeer Pershad v. Musammut Kundar Koover(').\n\n(I) L.R. 64 I.A. 28.\n\n(1) (!873) IO llom. HCR 241.\n\n(3) 8 Cal. W. Rep. 116 Civ. Ru\\.\n\nThe following passage from the judgment of. W estropp CJ. ls noteworthy :-\n\n\"The term Hindu or Gentu, when used in Regulations Act, Statutes, and Charters in which Hindu.s or Gentus have been declared .entitled to the benefit of their own Jaw or succession and of contract, has been largely and liberally construed. See the remarks at pages 184, 185, 186, S Born. High C. RepOrts (Lopes\n\nv. Lopes), where Sir Edward Hyde East's evidence in 18 30 before the House nf Lords' Committee is mentioned, in which ho stated that Stlchs were treated as a sect of Hindus or Gentus of which they woro \" dissenting branch.\n\nThe authorities, already 9uoted, show thiit J ainas are regarded as a sect of Hindus.\"\n\nOut of the decisions of the Privy Council, we may mention Sheokuarbai v. Jeoraj(•1) in which their lordships relied on the statement in Mayne's Hindu law and Usage that Jains are of Hindu origin; they are Hindu dissenters and although \"generally D adhering to ordinary Hindu law, that is, the law of the three superior castes, they recognise no divine authority in the Vedas and do not practice the Shradha-or ceremonies for the dead\".\n\nThe above view has been challenged by 1 ain historians and writers and .it has been maintained that the 1ains are quite dis- E tinct f~ Hindus and have a separate code of law which unfortunately was not brought to the notice of then:ourts. Kumaraswami sastri, Officiating Chief 'Justice; delivering the. judgment of. the Bench in Bobbaladi Gateppa v. Bobbaladi Etmrtrila d: Others(2) elaborately diseussed the contrary view . and observed that if the matter wtiro res integra be wouldi •be inclined tt> hold that modern research had shoWn _that Jains' were' not Hindu' ells- Ii'_ senfers but that Jainism had an origin and tm.r long iilltetior to Smritis and commentaries which were recOiiil'sed authorities of Hindu law and •ilsage. Mr. C.-R. Jain hi his work \"Jain Law\"writtcm, ln 1926 has discusSed the finding& of varioui.Opentalists suent thoee mentioned in the. judf!1Cnt of Westiop}l C.J •. and bas: put fonv.al:ll G the thesis that Hindws!ll apd Jainism were parilllel creeds .th'!!Jjb they shared the same forni of social order lUi4 mode :,'of liVin,.\n\nJain Law was quite independent of Hindu, law.: . According -~ him the Courts had tried on each dccasion to.asi:ertaBi the,, Taiil Law but unfortunately for various -reasons .Jains concealed their\n\nShatras and objected : to their production in .Courts. He ... B emphasised that Jain 4tw which is found in the. available. boob should still be applied and the error which has CreJ>t in the matter ·\n\n(I) [1921] P.C. 77. .\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 228, _\n\nA of Jains being governed by Hindu Law should be rectifieil. Since\n\n1926 there have been several enactments apart from the codification of certain major Branches of Hindu law which in express terms have been made applicable to Jains. The course suggested by C. R. Jain cannot possibly be followed particularly in the presence of statutory enactments.\n\nB In Panna Lal & Others v. Sitabai(1), Hidayatullah J. (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the Divis.ion Bench observed that it was too late in the day to contend that \"Jains' are not included in the term \"Hindus\" for the purposes of law. He referred to Mayne's Hindu law as also the leading cases on the point apart from West and Buhler's Hindu Law (4th E<ln.), Gopal C Chandra Sarkar's Hindu Law (7th Edn.) and Harl Singh Gour's Hindu Code (4th Edn.). All these are acknowledged authorities and the conclusion which was derived not only from the statements contained in their works on Hindu law but also from decided cases was that the Jains were to be rearded as Hindus for the purposes of law though they seem to d1Ssent from eome of the D principles of orthodox Hinduism.\n\nIn the Nagpur cilSe the question which was being considered was whether The Hindu Women's Right to Property Act 1937 was meant to apply to Jains as weJI or to Hindus proper. It was in that CO!lpection\n\nthat the extent to which Jains were governed by Hiadu law or were to be treated as Hindus for purposes of that Jeilv came up E for discussion. The following passage may be 111*oduced with advantage :-\n\n\"The .legislature must be taken to be aware of the pronouncements of the Privy Council as well as the leading decisions of the Indian High Courts where a liberal interpretation was given to the tetlll 'Hilldu'.\n\nWe do not think that the Legislature used lhe term without advertence to these dicta and, in our judgment, the Legislature must be deemed to have used the term \"Hindu' in that larger sense which has beeo explailed by Mayne at page 5 of his treatise in the paS&age quoted by us elsewhere and which has been the fouodation of G decisions on the subject in the courts of Idia\";\n\nIt may be mentioned that the statement from Mayne's Hindu\n\nLaw referred to above is the same which was relied upon by the Privy Couneil in Sheokuarbai v. Jeoraj(\").\n\nWe may next notice certain decisions in which . the. word 'Hindu' as used in various statiites came to bci intetpreted by the H Courts.· In Kamawali v. Dlgbijai Singh( 8 ) s. 331 of the Indian\n\n(l) I.LR. 1954 N~BPur 30.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1921 P.C.14.\n\n(3) [1921] J'.C. 77.\n\n126 SUPREME COU!l.T REPORTS\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nSuccession Act 1865 had to be interpreted.\n\nAccording to that A section the provisions of that Act were not to apply to intestate or testamentary succession to the property of any Hindu.\n\nIt was held that the person who had .ceased to be a Hindu in religion and had become a Christian could not elect to be bound by the Hindu Law in the matter of succession after the passing of the Indian Succession Act and that a Hindu convert to Christianity B was solely governed by that Act.\n\nIn other words, according to the Privy Council a person who had ceased to be a Hindu by religion was not a Hindu within the meaning of s. 331 of the aforesaid Act. It was held in Bachebi v. Makhan Lal & Another(') that the term 'Hindu' ins. 331 of the Indian Succession Act 1865 included a Jain and consequently in matters of suces- C sion Jains were not governed by that Act. It was pointed out that the ordinary Hindu law of Inheritence was to be applied to Jains in the absence of proof of custom or usage varying that law.\n\nThe Privy Council in Bhagwan Koer v. J, C. Bose & Others(') expressed the view that a Sikh was a 'Hindu' within the meaning of that tern1 as used in s. 2 of the Probate and Administration Act 1881. It was pointed out that the Courts had always D acted upon the premise that Sikhs were Hindus and that Hindu Law applied to them in the same way as it applied to Jains in the absence of custom varying that Law. It was observed :\n\n\"It appears to their Lordships to be clear that in s. 331 the term \"Hindu' is used in the same wide sense as in earlier enactments, and includes Sikhs. If it be not E so, then Sikhs were, and are, in matters of inheritence. governed by the Succession Act, and Act based upon, and in the main embodying, the English law; and it could not be seriously suggested that such was the intention of the legislature\".\n\nIn Ambalal v. Keshav Bandlwchan& Gujar( 3 ) the question was whether Jains were governed by Hindu law of Inheritence (Amendment) Act 1929 which applied to all persons governed\n\nby Mitakshara as modified by the Mayukha. It was argued in that case that the Indiiin Succession (Amendment) Act of 1929 speaks of Jains as-well as Hindus and ss. 4 and 57 of the Indian G Succession Act 1925 also did the same.\n\nThe Court pointed out thats. 331 of the Indian Succession Act 1865 did not make any separate mention of Jains and even then it had been held that the term 'Hindu' included Jains.\n\nThe Hindu Wills Act of 1870 which applied to the territories under the Lt. Governor of Bengal and the cities of Bombay and Madras no doubt mentioned Jains as well as Hindus being governed by certain sections of the H\n\n(I) I.L.R. 3 All. 55.\n\n(2) l.L.R. 31 Cal. 11.\n\n(3) !.L.R. i 941 Born. 250.\n\nCOMMR. WEALTliTAX V, CHAMPA (Grover, I.) 127\n\nSuccession Act of 1865 and the Indian S11ecession Act 1925 was a cc111solid!lting At which repealed the previous Act of 1865 .. as well as H11;1du Wills Act of 1870. It was, therefore, probably th?ugh.t necessary emajore cautela to separately mentiOiD. the I ams m the consolidating measure.\n\nHowever in all the other e.nactmen~ affecting the Hindu Law there was' no separate men tion of Jams along with the Hindus.\n\nThe Jains were therefore governed by the Hindu Law of Inheritence (Amenent) Act\n\n1929. The mention of Jains separately in Article 25 of die Constitution was noticed in Panlltlla/ v. Sita Bai(1) and it was obse~ that the .framers of te Constitution felt, having regard to the differences m the two faiths that an express mention might c be made of all faiths ex-abundanti cautela and to put the matter beyond all controversy, and that faith is one thing and law is another and the Constitution could not be taken to ha.ve undone the long series of decisions on the subject.\n\nBefore the amend ment and codification of major branches of Hindu law by the four statutes, i.e. The Hindu Marriage Act 1955, the Hindu Succes\n\n0 sion Act 1956, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956, the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, the undisputed position was that the Jains were governed by the Hindu law modified by custom and a Jain joint family was a Hindu joint family with all the incidents attached to such a family under the_Hindu law.\n\nThe legislative practice also was to generally treat Jains as included in the tern1 'Hindu' in various statutory enactments.\n\nE Wherever Jains were mentioned in addition it was only by way of abundant caution.\n\nThe new statutes did not change the situation and it is not possible how the High Court in !'he judgment under appeal pressed them into service in support of its view.\n\nThe fallacy underlying the reasoiling of the High Court is that the artificial field of application of the law in those statutes shows that Jainism is not treated even as a forni or a development of Hinduism.\n\nThat is an erroneous approach.\n\nWe are not con F\n\ncerned with the question whether J ains are a sect of Hindus <!r Hindu dissenters.\n\nEven if the religions are different, what !s common is that all those who are to be governed by the prov1 s10ns of these enactments are included in the terni 'Hindu'. They are to be governed by the same rules relating to marriage, succes G sion, minority, guardianship, adoptin :ind m~nance as Hindus. The statutes thus accord legJSlative recogmtton to the .fact that even though J ains may not be Hindus by religion they are to be governed by the e lw~ as the . ?indus. . I~ tbfas view of the matter the expression Hindu undivided family will certainly include the 'Jain undivided f.amily'.\n\nThe latter class of family is not known to law: Th~ .Jruns ar; e gove!11ed by all. the incidents relating to the Hindu 1omt family.\n\nHmdu und1v1ded H\n\n(!) I.L.R.1954 Nagpur 30\n\nfam11y is a legal express.ion which has been employed in taxation A laws. It has a definite connotation and embodies the meaning ascribed to the expression 'Hindu joint family'.\n\nFor the above reasons the appeal is allowed and the question referred is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the a~. There will be no order as to costs in this Court. The appeal by Certificate (CA 1686/68) being defective for want of 8 reasons is het\"by dismissed.\n\nK.B.N.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 92, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, WEST BENGAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A\n\nCHAMPA KUMARI SINGHI & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHAMPA KUMARI SINGHI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 134, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159, "end_char": 168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 345, "end_char": 354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 366, "end_char": 379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "C.R. Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1749, "end_char": 1758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "228 and C.R. Jain, Jain Law, (1926) pp, 3-23, 21~258, referred to.", "canonical_name": "C.-R. Jain"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2364, "end_char": 2388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2476, "end_char": 2516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 64 I.A. 28", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4240, "end_char": 4255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. Mittra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4515, "end_char": 4524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Mittra, B. D. Sharma and R. N. Sachthe, v, for the appellant (m both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4526, "end_char": 4538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Mittra, B. D. Sharma and R. N. Sachthe, v, for the appellant (m both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthe", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4543, "end_char": 4556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Mittra, B. D. Sharma and R. N. Sachthe, v, for the appellant (m both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4602, "end_char": 4613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, D. N. Mishra, J.B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mishra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4615, "end_char": 4627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, D. N. Mishra, J.B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "J.B. Dadachanji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4629, "end_char": 4644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, D. N. Mishra, J.B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "0. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4646, "end_char": 4658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, D. N. Mishra, J.B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4663, "end_char": 4678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondents (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Grover", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4768, "end_char": 4774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGrover, J. This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Calcutta High Court arising out of a reference under the Wealth Tax Act 1957 in which the question involved is one of imP!'rtance, namely, whether a Jain undivided family is included in the expression \"Hindu undivided family\" within s. 3 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5072, "end_char": 5076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Calcutta High Court arising out of a reference under the Wealth Tax Act 1957", "statute": "This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Calcutta High Court arising out of a reference under the Wealth Tax Act 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6018, "end_char": 6022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6277, "end_char": 6281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6446, "end_char": 6451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7077, "end_char": 7081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wealth tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7089, "end_char": 7109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7396, "end_char": 7417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Whether the Wealth Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7423, "end_char": 7449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7561, "end_char": 7571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether the Wealth Tax Act", "statute": "Whether the Wealth Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7581, "end_char": 7602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8510, "end_char": 8517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8948, "end_char": 8957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9481, "end_char": 9486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9565, "end_char": 9569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nagpur Judicial Commissioner's Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10587, "end_char": 10623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sole previous decision in which an identical question came up for consideration under the Income tax law is that of the Nagpur Judicial Commissioner's Court in Nathu Sao v. Commissioner of B Income tax C.P. & Berar( 1)."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12161, "end_char": 12167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main reasoning which prevailed with the High Court is that although Hindu law applies to Jains except in so far as such law is varied by custom, Jains do not become Hindus in the same F way as Khojas and Cutchi Memons of Bombay and Sunni Borahs of Gujarat etc."}}, {"text": "Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12188, "end_char": 12195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main reasoning which prevailed with the High Court is that although Hindu law applies to Jains except in so far as such law is varied by custom, Jains do not become Hindus in the same F way as Khojas and Cutchi Memons of Bombay and Sunni Borahs of Gujarat etc."}}, {"text": "Hinduism", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12318, "end_char": 12326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover, Hinduism does not include Hindu converts to Christianity and Islam and also dissenters from Hinduism who formed."}}, {"text": "Islam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12379, "end_char": 12384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover, Hinduism does not include Hindu converts to Christianity and Islam and also dissenters from Hinduism who formed."}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12646, "end_char": 12663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed on the decision of the Mysore High Court."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13293, "end_char": 13297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Myore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13600, "end_char": 13616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Calcutta High Court ID the judgment under appeal, however, did not consider that the Myore High Court was right in holding that s. 3 of the Act was limited only to Mitakshra families."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13643, "end_char": 13647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Westropp", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15181, "end_char": 15189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the early decisions in which Ji1ins were stated to be of Hindu origin being Hindu dissenters is that of Westropp C.J. in Bhagwandas Tejmal v.\n\nRa,;.. mal(').", "canonical_name": "W estropp"}}, {"text": "Mountstuart Elphin- G stone", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15326, "end_char": 15353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Chief Justice based his view on high authority including the researches of Mr. Mountstuart Elphin- G stone, !"}}, {"text": "Cole Brooke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15440, "end_char": 15451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "including the essay of Mr. Cole Brooke on the Sect of Jamas), the .work of Abbe Dubois on the Manners etc."}}, {"text": "Abbe Dubois", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15488, "end_char": 15499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "including the essay of Mr. Cole Brooke on the Sect of Jamas), the .work of Abbe Dubois on the Manners etc."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15537, "end_char": 15542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the People of India and tl1e elaborate account of the Jain sect in the First Volume of Prof. H. H. Wilson's work."}}, {"text": "H. H. Wilson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15616, "end_char": 15628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the People of India and tl1e elaborate account of the Jain sect in the First Volume of Prof. H. H. Wilson's work."}}, {"text": "Sudder Divani Adault", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15683, "end_char": 15703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also referred to certain decisions of the Sudder Divani Adault in Calcutta and the H High Court of Calcutta; in particular to the opinion of Peacock C.J. in Lala Mohabeer Pershad v. Musammut Kundar Koover(')."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15707, "end_char": 15715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also referred to certain decisions of the Sudder Divani Adault in Calcutta and the H High Court of Calcutta; in particular to the opinion of Peacock C.J. in Lala Mohabeer Pershad v. Musammut Kundar Koover(')."}}, {"text": "H High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15724, "end_char": 15748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also referred to certain decisions of the Sudder Divani Adault in Calcutta and the H High Court of Calcutta; in particular to the opinion of Peacock C.J. in Lala Mohabeer Pershad v. Musammut Kundar Koover(')."}}, {"text": "Peacock", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15782, "end_char": 15789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also referred to certain decisions of the Sudder Divani Adault in Calcutta and the H High Court of Calcutta; in particular to the opinion of Peacock C.J. in Lala Mohabeer Pershad v. Musammut Kundar Koover(')."}}, {"text": "L.R. 64 I.A. 28", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15855, "end_char": 15870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "W estropp", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15981, "end_char": 15990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "W estropp CJ.", "canonical_name": "W estropp"}}, {"text": "Edward Hyde East", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16346, "end_char": 16362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High C. RepOrts (Lopes\n\nv. Lopes), where Sir Edward Hyde East's evidence in 18 30 before the House nf Lords' Committee is mentioned, in which ho stated that Stlchs were treated as a sect of Hindus or Gentus of which they woro \" dissenting branch."}}, {"text": "Mayne", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16773, "end_char": 16778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of the decisions of the Privy Council, we may mention Sheokuarbai v. Jeoraj(•1) in which their lordships relied on the statement in Mayne's Hindu law and Usage that Jains are of Hindu origin; they are Hindu dissenters and although \"generally D adhering to ordinary Hindu law, that is, the law of the three superior castes, they recognise no divine authority in the Vedas and do not practice the Shradha-or ceremonies for the dead\"."}}, {"text": "Kumaraswami sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17314, "end_char": 17332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kumaraswami sastri, Officiating Chief 'Justice; delivering the."}}, {"text": "C.-R. Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17812, "end_char": 17822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. C.-R. Jain hi his work \"Jain Law\"writtcm, ln 1926 has discusSed the finding& of varioui.", "canonical_name": "C.-R. Jain"}}, {"text": "C. R. Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18843, "end_char": 18853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The course suggested by C. R. Jain cannot possibly be followed particularly in the presence of statutory enactments.", "canonical_name": "C.-R. Jain"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18976, "end_char": 18988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B In Panna Lal & Others v. Sitabai(1), Hidayatullah J. (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the Divis.ion Bench observed that it was too late in the day to contend that \"Jains' are not included in the term \"Hindus\" for the purposes of law."}}, {"text": "West", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19267, "end_char": 19271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He referred to Mayne's Hindu law as also the leading cases on the point apart from West and Buhler's Hindu Law (4th E<ln.),", "canonical_name": "W estropp"}}, {"text": "Buhler", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19276, "end_char": 19282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He referred to Mayne's Hindu law as also the leading cases on the point apart from West and Buhler's Hindu Law (4th E<ln.),"}}, {"text": "Gopal C Chandra Sarkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19308, "end_char": 19330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal C Chandra Sarkar's Hindu Law (7th Edn.)"}}, {"text": "Harl Singh Gour", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19358, "end_char": 19373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Harl Singh Gour's Hindu Code (4th Edn.)."}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19730, "end_char": 19736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Nagpur cilSe the question which was being considered was whether The Hindu Women's Right to Property Act 1937 was meant to apply to Jains as weJI or to Hindus proper."}}, {"text": "Right to Property Act 1937", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19813, "end_char": 19839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 331", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21053, "end_char": 21059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Succession Act 1865", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21195, "end_char": 21214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "According to that A section the provisions of that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21239, "end_char": 21293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21578, "end_char": 21599, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 331", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21812, "end_char": 21818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "According to that A section the provisions of that Act", "statute": "According to that A section the provisions of that Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act 1865", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21929, "end_char": 21955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jain and consequently in matters of suces- C sion Jains were not governed by that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21967, "end_char": 22052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22354, "end_char": 22358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jain and consequently in matters of suces- C sion Jains were not governed by that Act", "statute": "Jain and consequently in matters of suces- C sion Jains were not governed by that Act"}}, {"text": "Probate and Administration Act 1881", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22366, "end_char": 22401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 331", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22684, "end_char": 22690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Probate and Administration Act 1881", "statute": "the Probate and Administration Act 1881"}}, {"text": "Mitakshara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23223, "end_char": 23233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ambalal v. Keshav Bandlwchan& Gujar( 3 ) the question was whether Jains were governed by Hindu law of Inheritence (Amendment) Act 1929 which applied to all persons governed\n\nby Mitakshara as modified by the Mayukha."}}, {"text": "Mayukha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23253, "end_char": 23260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ambalal v. Keshav Bandlwchan& Gujar( 3 ) the question was whether Jains were governed by Hindu law of Inheritence (Amendment) Act 1929 which applied to all persons governed\n\nby Mitakshara as modified by the Mayukha."}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23379, "end_char": 23391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Probate and Administration Act 1881", "statute": "the Probate and Administration Act 1881"}}, {"text": "Indian G Succession Act 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23399, "end_char": 23427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act 1865", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23488, "end_char": 23514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23751, "end_char": 23757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Governor of Bengal and the cities of Bombay and Madras no doubt mentioned Jains as well as Hindus being governed by certain sections of the H\n\n(I) I.L.R. 3 All."}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24006, "end_char": 24009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Succession Act 1865", "statute": "the Indian Succession Act 1865"}}, {"text": "Article 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24507, "end_char": 24517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Succession Act 1865", "statute": "the Indian Succession Act 1865"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25060, "end_char": 25083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25124, "end_char": 25164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25170, "end_char": 25210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26255, "end_char": 26258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K.B.N.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27374, "end_char": 27380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.B.N.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_129_137_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "GOUR! SHANKAR JHA\n\nTHE STATE OF BlllAR AND ORS.\n\nJanuary 20, 1972\n\n(J. M. SHELAT AND ff. R. KHANNA, JJ.]\n\nHabeas ('orpus-Reniand order-Mcgistrate can pass Order if for some reason the accused cannot he productd--Order sheet showing lvrongly that person in custody was produced before magistrate-Such wrong entry does not 1nean that renuznd order was not in fact oasstd •\n\n. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898-Ss. 167, 344-Scope of-Power under s. 34 can1bt exercised even lnjore submission of charge-shtet.\n\nJn the appeal against the order of the Hiah Court dismissing the appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus the appellant urged that be was not produced before a magistrate within 24 hours after biJ arrest as required by s. 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or even later; that he was never informed of the grounda for his arrest; that no custody D warrant was ever issued warran\\ing the jail authorities to keep the appeallant in jail custody; that the remand P.rders passed by the magistrate were under s. 167 and not under s. 344 !>f the Code, as the latter section did not apply at the stage of investigation and that even if s. 344 applied the\n\nmagi>tiate could not order detention for more than JS days in the whole.\n\nHe also urged that the Jail Superintendent did not prbduce befo!e the High Court the jail records but only produced his report. thus disabling the E. appellant from establishing his case.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : ( 1) The order sheet produced before the Hifh Coo.rt showed that the appellant wa< produced before the magistrate within 24 llours after his arrest and that the magistrate remanded him to jail custody. Tilough the order sheet had entries showing that on subsequent occasions when remand orders were made the appellant wa produced before the magistrate, the High Court has found that the Magistrate had wrongly recorded that the appellant was produced before him on those occasions. However, the wron,11 entries made by him do not mean that the remand orders were not in fact passed by him though he did so in the absence of the appellant; Such orders can be lawfully passed if an accused person caMot for some reason or the other be brought before the magistrate. [134 E-FJ\n\nRaj Nt:rain v. S1tf.trintelllle111, Central Jail, New Delhi, Writ Petition No. 330 of 1970, decided on Sept. 1, 1970, referred to.\n\n(ii) The facts negative the suggestion of the appellant being kepi in ignoranee of the reasons for his arrest. [135 Fl\n\n(iii) There is no reason to think that the magistrate ord.ered the appellant to be taken into jail custody without custody warrant. [ 136 A]\n\n(iv) S. 167 operates at a stage when a person is arrested and either an hlvestiption has started or is yet lo start, but is such that it cannot be completed within 24 hours. Section 344, on the otherband, ahowa that investiption has already begun and sufficient evidence has been obtained raising a suspicion that the accu\"'d person may have committed the offence\n\nand further evidence may be obtained, to enable tbe polioe to d\\) which, A a remand to jail custody is necessary. The fact that s. 344 occurs in the Chapter dealing with. inquiries and trials does not mean that it does not apply to cases in which the process of investigation and collection of evidence is still going on. Therefore, it is not as if the stage at which tbe Magistrate passed the remand orders was still the stage when s. 167 applied\n\nand not s. 334. The Magistrate, provided he complied with tbe condition to the Explanation, was competent to pass remand orders from time to 8 time subject to each order being not for a period exceeding 15 days. The Magistrate had satisfied that tondition.\n\n[136 GJ\n\nView contra in Artatran v. Orissa AIR 1956 Orissa 129 disapproved.\n\nA 'Lakshamanrao v. Judicial Magistrate, A.LR. 1971 S.C. 186, Chanaraattr v Slate, (1953) 3 B.L.J.R., 323 and Ajit Singh v. State, (1970) 76 Crl.L.H. 1075, referred to C\n\nThe appellant was content with the production of the superintendent's report.\n\nNo prejudice was caused to the appellant's case since the jail record could not have proved anything more than what the jail Sliperinten dent's report proved.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JTJRISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 123 of 1968.\n\nAppeal by special leave ftom the judgment and order dated May 3, 1968 of the Patna High Coun in Criminal W.J.C. No. 17 of 1968 and Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 447 of 1968.\n\nB. C. Ghose, S.\"N. Misra aind A. K. Nag, for the appellant.\n\nD. Goburdhun, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by- Shelat, J.\n\nThis appeal, by special leave, is against the dismissal by the High Court of Patna of the Writ Petition and an application under s. 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for a writ of habeas corpus and an order of a like nature. filed by the appellant. Both of them were heard together as they contained common allegations and both were dishlissed by a common judgment.\n\nIn the two aforesaid proceedings, the case of the appellant was that he was arrested on February 18, 1968, that since then he had been detained in, custody without being informed of the grounds for his arrest and detention and also without having been produced before a Magistrate either within 24 hours after his detention as requ:red under the Code, or even thereafter.\n\nOn February 21, 1968, he was removed to Darbhanga jail where he was threatened that he would be falsely involved in several cases of dacoity unless he made cenain incriminating statements which the police wanted him to make. He made two applications from jail one on February 25, 1968, and the other on February 28,\n\nG. s. JHA v. BIHAR (She/at, J.) 131\n\nA 1968 to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate.\n\nThe first was not received at all by the Magistrate, while the second was received but after a long time, and was rejec.ted.\n\nHe also alleged that thereafter he made two further applications, one dated March 22, 1968 and the other dated March 27, 1968 wherein he applied for directions to the police to furnish him witli particulars of B offences charged against him and for bail, but that he re, ceived no order on either of them.\n\nOn these allegations, he claimed release forthwith from detention and the quashing of the criminal proceedings ag_ainst him.\n\nIn the counter-affidavit filed by the State before the High C Court, it was stated that one Bilal Sahni and one Baleshwar Paswan made confessions before the Magistrate at Samastipur on 23rd and 24th January, 1968 confessing their own guilt and implicating the appellant and certain other persons in abou1 eight dacoity cases, all havilllg been committed in that locality Thereupon, the appellant was arrested on February 17, 1968 He was produced before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate ol D Samastipur on February 18, 1968, but was remanded to police custody by the said Magistrate for four days on an application by the police therefor.\n\nOn February 21, 1968, the ~!ant was once again produced before the same magistrate and on an application by the police he was remanded to jail custody .. :-The affidavit alleged that the appellant was involved in as many as E nine dacoity cases wherein remand orders had been passed from time to time and that that was how he had, since February 21, 1968, been detained as an undertrial prisoner.\n\nOn April 19, 1968, an identification parade was held in connection with one of the said nine cases whereat the relevant complainant identified the appellant. The case of the State was that the appellant was F one of the three leaders engaged with certain hardened criminals in the aforesaid several dacoity cases, that it was not true that he was unaware of the case against him or that he was not produced before the magistrate or that he was kept in prison without proper remand orders having been passed by the Magistrate.\n\nFive contentions were raised before the High Court, viz., G\n\n(1) that the appellant was never produced before any magistrate within 24 hours after his arrest or even thereafter; hence bis detention was in breach of Art. 22 of the Constitution, (ii) that although the order-sheet, in respect of Laheriasarai Police Station Case No. 1 of 1968, records that the appellant had been produced before the Magistrate on several days set out therein, H that order-sheet had been falsely made; (iii) that the magistrate had no powe.r to detain the appellant in jail in excess. of. 15 days in all, (iv) that even if he had the .power to remand hun m excess of 15 days in all, the condition for passil)g such orders was not\n\nsatisfied, and (v) that no remand order was factually ever passed.\n\nA None of these contentions was accepted by the High Court, and the High Court, therefore, dismissed, as aforesaid, both the applications on May 3, 1968.\n\nMr. Ghose, who appeared for the appellant before the High B Court and who appeared before us also raised the following points: ( 1) that the appellant was not produced before any magistrate either on February 18, 1968 or on any other date thereafter, (2) that the appellant was never infonned of the grounds for his arrest, and detention thereafter, (3) that no custody warrant was ever issued watranting the jail authorities to keep the appellant in jail custody, and ( 4) that assuming that C the said remand orders were passed, the appellant could not be kept in jail custody for more than 15 days in the whole.\n\nOn the basis of these four points he urged that the appellant's arrest and detention were illegal and that therefore he was entitled to be released forthwith and the criminal proceedings instituted\n\n~1gainst him by the police quashed.\n\nMr. Ghose also made a 0 point that the jail Superintendent did not produce before the High Court the jail records which would show his having been taken out of the jail for being produced before the Magistrate when the magistrate decided the applications for remand by the police and passed the remand orders said to have been passed by him and that instead the jail Superintendent produced his report, thus disabling the appellant from establishing his case as laid in his E writ petition.\n\nWe may at this stage dispose of Mr. Ghose's last point in regard to the non-production of the jail record before the High 'Court.\n\nIt is true that the appellant did ask for production of that record first in the writ petition, and then on April 22, F 1968 to which date the hearing of the writ petition was adjourn- ed. But the order-sheet maintained by :_the High Court in connection with the writ petition and the said application under s. 561A of the Code shows tliat when the writ petition came up for admission, the learned Judges called for the record of tho Magistrate's Court and report from the jail superintendent re- G garding the dates on which the appellant was said to have been produced before the Magistrate for the purpose, of the hearing of the remd applications. It appears that on April 22, 1968, to which date tbe writ petition was made returnable, neither the record of the Magistrate's Court nor the report of the jail Superintendent had arrived.\n\n01) that day, the appellant made an application for his J?roduction !n Court at the tiin~ of the hearing H and for the production of the Jail record. The Htgh Court, however, rejected the prayer for his production in . Court and as regards the jail' record ordered as follows:\n\nG. s. JHA v. BIHAR (Shelat, /,) 133\n\nA \"so far as the production of the record of the jail is concemed, an express reminder by telegram may be sent to the Superintendent of jail to send the report\n\nalready called' for immediately, if possible by a special messenger. A reminder may also be sent to the Court concerned to send tbe records immediately, if possible, B by a special messenger.\"\n\nThe High Court does not seem to have pressed for the production of the jail record as it presumably thought that the Court's record would show the dates when the appellant was produced before lL w1d the Superintendent's report would make that point C clear.\n\nIt appears trom that order that the appellant also was content with tbe production of the Superintendent's report and did not press for the calling of jail record. The judgment of the High Court also shows that that was also the case when tbe High Court heard the writ petition and tbe said s. 561A application.\n\nNeither the order-sheet nor the judgment of the High Court seems D to warrant the allegations made in para 28 of the Special Leave Petition that repeated prayers were made for the production of the jail rec.ord.\n\nIn any event, no prejudice apgears to have been caused to the appellant's case since tbe jail record could not have proved anything more than what the jail Superintendent's report prove<!.\n\nE Tne report, which was before the High Court, clearly pointed out !bat the appellant was remanded to jail custody. on February 21, 1968 by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar in the case under s. 395 of tbe Penal Code. The next date for his appearance was fixed on March 5, 1968, bllt the appellant refused t<> go to the Magistrate's Court on that day as 8JSo on March 20; F 1968 and Aril 4, 1968, on the ground !bat the identification parade for hun had not yet been held and his going to and appearing in the Court would expose him to possible witnesses.\n\nThe Magistrate, therefore, had to postpone his production before\n\nhim to April 18, 1968 when the appellant was produced and once again remanded to jail custody till the next date, that is, G May 2, 1968. The report of the jail Superintendent, thus, frankly conceded that the appellant could not be produced on the dates above-stated and that the Magistrate, therefore, had to pass remand orders in his absence. It is clear from the report that the appellant himself had refused to appear and be present before the Magistrate when he heard the remand applications.\n\nHe, therefore, cannot legitimately make a grievce that those H orders were passed in his absence. Those orders could be passed validly in his absence if his presence at .th~ tie could not b.e secured. This has been held by the ma1onty 1udgment of th1~\n\n134 SUPREME COUll.T REPORTS [1972] 3 s.c.R.\n\nCourt recently in Raj Narain v. Superintendent, Central Jail, A New Delhi.(')\n\nWe now proceed to consider the remaining points in the order in which Mr. Ghose raised them. The first point urged before us was that the appellant was not produced before a magistrate within 24 hours after his arrest as required by s. 167 of the Code of B Criminal Procedure, or even later and tluit therefore his arrest and the-detention were bad in law. The order-sheet of the Laheriasarai Police Station Case No. 1(i)68 produced before the High Court shows that the appellant was produced before the Magistrate on February 18, 1968, that is, within 24 hours after his \"''\"\"and\n\nthat the Magistrate remanded him to jail custody on the applica C tion by the police until March 5, 1968.\n\nSo far there is no diffi culty because these entries in the order-sheet are corroborated by the report of the Superintendent of jail.\n\nThe order-sheet, how- ' ever, has entries dated March15, 1968, March 20, 1968 and April 4, 1968 whe:i remand orders are shown to have been made, each for a period of 15 days, and further that the appellant was produced before the Magistrate on each of those three occasions. That, as D the High Court has rightly observed, was not correct as the jail Superintendent's report clearly showed that the appellant had refused to go from the jail for fear that he would be seen or be\n\nshown to probable witnesses.\n\nNo reason has been shown as to why we should not agree with the aforesaid observation of the High Court, viz., that the Magistrate had wrongly recorded that E the appellant was produced before him and that the remand orders were passed in his presence.\n\nThe wrong entries made by him, however, do not mean that the remand orders were not in fact passed by him though he did so in the absence of the appellant.\n\nSuch orders, as already pointed out, can be lawfully passed if an accused person cannot for some reason or the other be brought before the Magistrate. It is, therefore, not possible to say that F remand orders were not passed or that consequently his detention in the jail was without a valid basis. In the High Court no such contention, viz,, that remand orders were not passed on those three dates appears to have been raised.\n\nIndeed, the allegation that the appellant was never produced before the Magistrate is belied by an elaborate order made by the Magistrate on G March 28, 1968 when the appellant was represented by counsel.\n\nAt that stage his counsel did not argue that the appellant was never produced before the Court or that no remand orders were ever, passed. The argument urged at that time was that the proceedings at that stage attracted s. l 67 of the Code, 'hat the stage had not yet reached when s. 344 would operate and that therefore the Magistrate had no power to remand t!he appellant to jail cus- • H tody for more than 15 days in the whole.\n\nThat contention was\n\n(I) Writ Petition No. 330 of 1970, dee. on September l, 1970.\n\nG. S. JHA v. JllHAll (Shlat, /,) 135\n\nA rcJected by tho Magistrate holding that there was an inquiry befOre\n\nbun, and tha~ therefore, s. 344 applied and he was competent, therefOre, to pass remand orders from time to time so long as each of those orders was not for a period in excess of 15 days. By that very order, the Magistrate rejected the bail application made by the appellant's advocate holding that the investigation in the cases I of dacoity in which the appellant was concerned was going on at that stage and that release. of the appellant on bail would hinder its progress.\n\nThe next contention was that the appellant was never informed of the grounds of his detention and that that being so, his detention was invalid. Paras 3, 4 and 35 oflhis writ petition did not charge C that at the time of his arrest he was not informed of the grounds for his arrest and that even when he filed his writ petition he was\n\nnot informed of those reasons, and that that constituted breach of Art. 22(1). This allegation is . without any foundation. All throughout, his case was that the police had tortured him and threatened to involve him in a umber of. dacoity cases unless he D made certain incriminating statements which iliey wanted from him. What were those incriminating statements which the police were trying to get from him ? From the fact tha~ the police were wanting him to make those statements, he must have realised that those statements were related to the cases for which he had been arrested. Next, in the application he made from jail to the Magistrate on February 28, 1968, he alleged that the senior Sub- E Inspector of Police came to him on February 19, 1968, first abused him and then later on asked him \"to admit that offence and promised that by doing so I would be discharged\". According to that application he refused to admit the offence whereupon he was assaulted by the police.\n\nIt also appears that he knew that an identificat, ion parade was going to be held and therefore had re- F fused to be taken out of jail for being produced befOre the Magistrate. All these facts negative the suggestion of his being kept in ignorance of the reasons for his arrest or the cases charged against him.\n\nThe third contention was that no valid custody warrant was issued by the Magistrate. enabling the jail authorities to detain the G appellant in the Darbhanga jail and hence the detention must be\n\nheld to be without any legal authority. In support of the argument, counsel pointed out the custody warrant dated February 18, 1968 which according to him must be deemed to have been cancelled as at the foot of it there is the Magistrate's endorsement that the appellant was instead remanded to police custody. Assuming H that to be so, there is nothing to show that on February 21, 1968 when the Magistrate ordered the appellant to be taken into jail custody, a fresh custody warrant had not been issued by him. The Magistrate, while passing that order, must have known that the\n\njail authorities would not accept the appellant in jail unless the A police taking hin1 there produced a custody warrant.\n\nThere is no reason to think first that the Magistrate had not issued such a warrant, and secondly, that the jail Superintendent inducted the\n\nappellan~ in the jail without such a warrant. The contention, in our view, is wholly without any basis.\n\nThe last contention of Mr. Ghose was, firstly, that the remand orders passed by the Magistrate were under s. 167 and not s. 344, as the latter section did no! apply at that stage, and secondly, that even if s. 344 applied, the Magistrate could not order detention\n\nfor more than 15 days in the who.le. Sec. 167 appears in Ch. XIV which deals with information and investigation. As its language C shows, it deals with the stage when a person is arrested by the police on information that an offence has been committed. In providing tllat such a person must, ~1 terms of s. 61, be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours after his arrest, the section reveals the policy of the legislature that such a person should be brought before a magistrate with as little delay as possible. The object of the section is two-fold, one that the law does not favour D detention in police custody except in special cases and that also for reasons to be stated by the magistrate in writing, and secondly, to enable such a person to make a representatioo before a magistrate. In cases falling under s. 167, a magistrate undoubdly can order custody for a period at the most of 15 days in the whole and such custody can be either .police or jail custody. Sec.\n\nE 344, on the other hand, appears in Ch. XXIV which deal with inquiries and trials. Further, the custody which it speaks of is not such custody as t'he magistrate thinks fit as in s. 167, but only jail custody, the object being that once an inquiry or a trial begins it. is not proper to let tb, e accused remain under police influence.\n\nUnder this section, a magistrate can remand an accused person to custody for a term ot excCeding 1 S days at a time provided F that sufficient evidence has been collected to raise a suspicion that such an accused person may have committed an offence and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by granting a remand.\n\n. Thus, s. 167 operates at a stage when a person is arrest~.d and G either an investigation has started or is yet to start, but is such that it cannot be com11leted wiin 24 hours.\n\nSec. 344, on the other hand, shows that investigation has already begun and sufficient evidence has been obtained raising a suspicion that the accused person may have committed the offence and further evidence may be obtained, to enable the police to do which; a remand to H jail custody is necessary. The fact that s. 344 occurs in the Chapter dealing with inquiries and trials does not mean that it does not apply to cases in which the process of investi11ation a.nd\n\nG. s. JHA v. BIHAR (Shela/,/.) 137\n\nA collection of evidence is still going on. That is clear from the very language of sub-s. 1-A under which the magistrate has the power to postpone the commencement of the inquiry or trial. That would be the stage prior to. the commencement of the inquiry or trial which would be the stage of investigation. (see A. Lakshamanrao v. Judicial Magistrate('). Therefore, it is not as if the stage B at which the Magistrate passed the remand orders was still the\n\n stage when s. 167 applied and not s. 344. The decision of the Orissa High Court in Artatran v. Orissa('), to the effect that s. 344 does not apply at the stage of investigation and can apply only after the Magistrate has taken cognizance of and issued processes or warrant for the production of the accused if he is not C produced before him cannot, in view of A, Laks/UJmanrao's case(1),\n\nble regarded as correct. The power under s. 344 can be exercised even b, efore the submission of the charge-sheet, (cf. Chandradip\n\nv. State(') and Ajit Singh v. State('), that is, at the stage when , the investigation is still not over. If the view we hold is correct that s. 344 operated, the Magistrate, provided he complied with the condition in the Explanation, was competent 1io pass remand D orders from time to time subject to each order being not for a period exceeding) 5 days. There can be no doubt that the Magistrate had satisfied that condition. The judgmeni of the High Court in para 11 points out that the prosecution case was that the appellant had himself made a confession before the police. That was in addition to a confession by two others which implicat!ed the E appellant in the commission of offences under s. 395 of the Code.\n\nIn our view none of the contentions raised on behalf of 'the appellant can be sustained. The appeal, therefore, fails and has. to be rejected.\n\nK.B.N.\n\n(I) A.J.R. 1971 S.C. 186.\n\n(2) A.J; R. 1956 OrisBB 129.\n\nIO-L864Sll!iCI/72\n\nAppeal dismissed ..\n\n(3) (1955) Bihar Law Journal Reports, 323.\n\n(4) (1970) 76 Cr. LJ. 1075.", "total_entities": 80, "entities": [{"text": "JHA\n\nTHE STATE OF BlllAR AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BlHAR AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 20, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 65, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 20, 1972\n\n(J. M. SHELAT AND ff."}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ff. R. KHANNA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 374, "end_char": 406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ss. 167, 344", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 407, "end_char": 419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 441, "end_char": 446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 732, "end_char": 738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 746, "end_char": 772, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1020, "end_char": 1026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "s. 344", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1041, "end_char": 1047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "s. 344", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1145, "end_char": 1151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2249, "end_char": 2251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sept. 1, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2337, "end_char": 2350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "330 of 1970, decided on Sept. 1, 1970, referred to."}}, {"text": "S. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2633, "end_char": 2639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 344", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2802, "end_char": 2813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 344", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3121, "end_char": 3127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3426, "end_char": 3432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 334", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3450, "end_char": 3456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. C. Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4432, "end_char": 4443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. C. Ghose, S.\"N. Misra aind A. K. Nag, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S.\"N. Misra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4445, "end_char": 4456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. C. Ghose, S.\"N. Misra aind A. K. Nag, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. K. Nag", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4462, "end_char": 4471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. C. Ghose, S.\"N. Misra aind A. K. Nag, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. Goburdhun", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4493, "end_char": 4505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Goburdhun, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Shelat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4572, "end_char": 4578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- Shelat, J.\n\nThis appeal, by special leave, is against the dismissal by the High Court of Patna of the Writ Petition and an application under s. 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for a writ of habeas corpus and an order of a like nature."}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4647, "end_char": 4666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- Shelat, J.\n\nThis appeal, by special leave, is against the dismissal by the High Court of Patna of the Writ Petition and an application under s. 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for a writ of habeas corpus and an order of a like nature."}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4713, "end_char": 4720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4728, "end_char": 4754, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "February 18, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5045, "end_char": 5062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the two aforesaid proceedings, the case of the appellant was that he was arrested on February 18, 1968, that since then he had been detained in, custody without being informed of the grounds for his arrest and detention and also without having been produced before a Magistrate either within 24 hours after his detention as requ:red under the Code, or even thereafter."}}, {"text": "February 21, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5333, "end_char": 5350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 21, 1968, he was removed to Darbhanga jail where he was threatened that he would be falsely involved in several cases of dacoity unless he made cenain incriminating statements which the police wanted him to make."}}, {"text": "Darbhanga jail", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5370, "end_char": 5384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 21, 1968, he was removed to Darbhanga jail where he was threatened that he would be falsely involved in several cases of dacoity unless he made cenain incriminating statements which the police wanted him to make."}}, {"text": "February 25, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5597, "end_char": 5614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He made two applications from jail one on February 25, 1968, and the other on February 28,\n\nG. s. JHA v. BIHAR (She/at, J.) 131\n\nA 1968 to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate."}}, {"text": "March 22, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5928, "end_char": 5942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also alleged that thereafter he made two further applications, one dated March 22, 1968 and the other dated March 27, 1968 wherein he applied for directions to the police to furnish him witli particulars of B offences charged against him and for bail, but that he re, ceived no order on either of them."}}, {"text": "March 27, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5963, "end_char": 5977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also alleged that thereafter he made two further applications, one dated March 22, 1968 and the other dated March 27, 1968 wherein he applied for directions to the police to furnish him witli particulars of B offences charged against him and for bail, but that he re, ceived no order on either of them."}}, {"text": "Bilal Sahni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6377, "end_char": 6388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter-affidavit filed by the State before the High C Court, it was stated that one Bilal Sahni and one Baleshwar Paswan made confessions before the Magistrate at Samastipur on 23rd and 24th January, 1968 confessing their own guilt and implicating the appellant and certain other persons in abou1 eight dacoity cases, all havilllg been committed in that locality Thereupon, the appellant was arrested on February 17, 1968 He was produced before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate ol D Samastipur on February 18, 1968, but was remanded to police custody by the said Magistrate for four days on an application by the police therefor."}}, {"text": "Baleshwar Paswan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6397, "end_char": 6413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter-affidavit filed by the State before the High C Court, it was stated that one Bilal Sahni and one Baleshwar Paswan made confessions before the Magistrate at Samastipur on 23rd and 24th January, 1968 confessing their own guilt and implicating the appellant and certain other persons in abou1 eight dacoity cases, all havilllg been committed in that locality Thereupon, the appellant was arrested on February 17, 1968 He was produced before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate ol D Samastipur on February 18, 1968, but was remanded to police custody by the said Magistrate for four days on an application by the police therefor."}}, {"text": "Samastipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6456, "end_char": 6466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter-affidavit filed by the State before the High C Court, it was stated that one Bilal Sahni and one Baleshwar Paswan made confessions before the Magistrate at Samastipur on 23rd and 24th January, 1968 confessing their own guilt and implicating the appellant and certain other persons in abou1 eight dacoity cases, all havilllg been committed in that locality Thereupon, the appellant was arrested on February 17, 1968 He was produced before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate ol D Samastipur on February 18, 1968, but was remanded to police custody by the said Magistrate for four days on an application by the police therefor."}}, {"text": "23rd and 24th January, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6470, "end_char": 6497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter-affidavit filed by the State before the High C Court, it was stated that one Bilal Sahni and one Baleshwar Paswan made confessions before the Magistrate at Samastipur on 23rd and 24th January, 1968 confessing their own guilt and implicating the appellant and certain other persons in abou1 eight dacoity cases, all havilllg been committed in that locality Thereupon, the appellant was arrested on February 17, 1968 He was produced before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate ol D Samastipur on February 18, 1968, but was remanded to police custody by the said Magistrate for four days on an application by the police therefor."}}, {"text": "February 17, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6697, "end_char": 6714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter-affidavit filed by the State before the High C Court, it was stated that one Bilal Sahni and one Baleshwar Paswan made confessions before the Magistrate at Samastipur on 23rd and 24th January, 1968 confessing their own guilt and implicating the appellant and certain other persons in abou1 eight dacoity cases, all havilllg been committed in that locality Thereupon, the appellant was arrested on February 17, 1968 He was produced before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate ol D Samastipur on February 18, 1968, but was remanded to police custody by the said Magistrate for four days on an application by the police therefor."}}, {"text": "Sub-Divisional Magistrate ol D Samastipur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6742, "end_char": 6783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter-affidavit filed by the State before the High C Court, it was stated that one Bilal Sahni and one Baleshwar Paswan made confessions before the Magistrate at Samastipur on 23rd and 24th January, 1968 confessing their own guilt and implicating the appellant and certain other persons in abou1 eight dacoity cases, all havilllg been committed in that locality Thereupon, the appellant was arrested on February 17, 1968 He was produced before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate ol D Samastipur on February 18, 1968, but was remanded to police custody by the said Magistrate for four days on an application by the police therefor."}}, {"text": "April 19, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7322, "end_char": 7336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 19, 1968, an identification parade was held in connection with one of the said nine cases whereat the relevant complainant identified the appellant."}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8061, "end_char": 8068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Laheriasarai Police Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8140, "end_char": 8167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22 of the Constitution, (ii) that although the order-sheet, in respect of Laheriasarai Police Station Case No."}}, {"text": "May 3, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8768, "end_char": 8779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A None of these contentions was accepted by the High Court, and the High Court, therefore, dismissed, as aforesaid, both the applications on May 3, 1968."}}, {"text": "Ghose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8786, "end_char": 8791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ghose, who appeared for the appellant before the High B Court and who appeared before us also raised the following points: ( 1) that the appellant was not produced before any magistrate either on February 18, 1968 or on any other date thereafter, (2) that the appellant was never infonned of the grounds for his arrest, and detention thereafter, (3) that no custody warrant was ever issued watranting the jail authorities to keep the appellant in jail custody, and ( 4) that assuming that C the said remand orders were passed, the appellant could not be kept in jail custody for more than 15 days in the whole."}}, {"text": "April 22, F 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10365, "end_char": 10381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the appellant did ask for production of that record first in the writ petition, and then on April 22, F 1968 to which date the hearing of the writ petition was adjourn- ed."}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10565, "end_char": 10572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 22, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10927, "end_char": 10941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on April 22, 1968, to which date tbe writ petition was made returnable, neither the record of the Magistrate's Court nor the report of the jail Superintendent had arrived."}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12317, "end_char": 12324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12886, "end_char": 12918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on February 21, 1968 by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar in the case under s. 395 of tbe Penal Code."}}, {"text": "s. 395", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12937, "end_char": 12943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12951, "end_char": 12961, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "March 5, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13009, "end_char": 13022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next date for his appearance was fixed on March 5, 1968, bllt the appellant refused t<> go to the Magistrate's Court on that day as 8JSo on March 20; F 1968 and Aril 4, 1968, on the ground !"}}, {"text": "May 2, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13493, "end_char": 13504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Magistrate, therefore, had to postpone his production before\n\nhim to April 18, 1968 when the appellant was produced and once again remanded to jail custody till the next date, that is, G May 2, 1968."}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14477, "end_char": 14483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 28, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16561, "end_char": 16575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, the allegation that the appellant was never produced before the Magistrate is belied by an elaborate order made by the Magistrate on G March 28, 1968 when the appellant was represented by counsel."}}, {"text": "s. 344", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16905, "end_char": 16911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September l, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17121, "end_char": 17138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on September l, 1970."}}, {"text": "s. 344", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17275, "end_char": 17281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18131, "end_char": 18141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 28, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18715, "end_char": 18732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Next, in the application he made from jail to the Magistrate on February 28, 1968, he alleged that the senior Sub- E Inspector of Police came to him on February 19, 1968, first abused him and then later on asked him \"to admit that offence and promised that by doing so I would be discharged\"."}}, {"text": "February 19, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18803, "end_char": 18820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Next, in the application he made from jail to the Magistrate on February 28, 1968, he alleged that the senior Sub- E Inspector of Police came to him on February 19, 1968, first abused him and then later on asked him \"to admit that offence and promised that by doing so I would be discharged\"."}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20616, "end_char": 20622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 344", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20631, "end_char": 20637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 344", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20717, "end_char": 20723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20812, "end_char": 20820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21079, "end_char": 21084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21595, "end_char": 21601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21935, "end_char": 21941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22434, "end_char": 22440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 344", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22607, "end_char": 22615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 344", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22923, "end_char": 22929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23201, "end_char": 23205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23584, "end_char": 23590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 344", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23607, "end_char": 23613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23635, "end_char": 23652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Orissa High Court in Artatran v. Orissa('), to the effect that s. 344 does not apply at the stage of investigation and can apply only after the Magistrate has taken cognizance of and issued processes or warrant for the production of the accused if he is not C produced before him cannot, in view of A, Laks/UJmanrao's case(1),\n\nble regarded as correct."}}, {"text": "s. 344", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23698, "end_char": 23704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "UJmanrao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23942, "end_char": 23950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Orissa High Court in Artatran v. Orissa('), to the effect that s. 344 does not apply at the stage of investigation and can apply only after the Magistrate has taken cognizance of and issued processes or warrant for the production of the accused if he is not C produced before him cannot, in view of A, Laks/UJmanrao's case(1),\n\nble regarded as correct."}}, {"text": "s. 344", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24004, "end_char": 24010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 344", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24237, "end_char": 24243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 395", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24795, "end_char": 24801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_138_148_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "I. C. I. (INDIA) PRIVATE LTD.\n\nC. I. T., WEST BENGAL\n\nJanuary 20, 1972\n\n[A. N. GROVER AND M. H. BEG, JI.]\n\nIncome-tax Act, (1961) ss. 52 and 256--Dlrectlons by High Court to Tribunal to refer questions-Scope of High Court's ; urisdiction\n\nAfter negotiations in 1953 with the concerned Department of the Government of India and the Reserve Bank, a Company, incorporated in U.K. advanced large sums by way of loans to its subsidiary in India, namely the assessee, for subscribing for shares in 80llle Indian Companies. The cormpondence showed that the U.K. Company had the right to acquire at any time the shares at par, in satisfaction of the loans. ln 1961, the asseisee transferred the ahares when called upon by the U.K. Company to do ao.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer applied s. 52 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and\n\nuse&Sed the usessee to capital gains tax, which was not in existence in 1953 but was re-introduced in the Finance Bill of 1959. The Income-tax Officer held that the object Of the transfer was to avoid or reduce the assessee's liability to capital gains tax. The Appellate Aaistant Commissioner however, held that the assessee was not liable to capital gains tax, and the Appellate Tribunal, after an elaborate discussion of the cornspondence, confirmed the order, holding that the transfer was not effected with that object.\n\nThe Department applied to the Tribunal to refer the questions, (i) E whether certain documents were not properly construed, (ii) whether the Tribunal ignored evidence on essential matten, (iii) whether the finding of the Tribunal was perverse, and (iv) whether s. 52 was not applicable, u arising out the Tribunal's order.\n\nThe Tribunal rejected the application.\n\nThe Department then moved the Higb Court and the High Court direct. ed Tribunal to state a case in relation to the four questions, but the F High Court did not give any reasons for doini so.\n\nAllowing the appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : The Higb Court can exercise its jurisdiction in the matter or reference, (a) when the point for determination is a pure question of law, such as, the construction of a statute or a document of title; (b) when the point for determination is a mixed question of law and fact-(Wbile the findings of the Tribunal on the facts are final, its decision as to the leJnll effect of the findings is a question of law. Where, however, the findin1 is one of fact, the fact that it is an inference from other basic facts will not alter its character as one of fact); and (c) when a finding on a que•tion of fact is pervene. rl47C-EJ\n\nThe necessary ingredients of s. 52 are : (i) there should be a direct or indirect connection between the person who acquires a capital asset and the u9essee; (ii) the income-tax officer should have reason to believe that the transfer was effected with the object of avoidance or reduction of the liability of the assessee to capital gains; and (iii) if the ftnt two conditions\n\nare satisfied then the full value of consideration for the transfer may be tal<en to be the fair market value of the capital asset on the date of the transfer. The intention with which a particular transfer is made and the\n\nobject which is to be achieved . by such transfer are essentially questions of fact, the conclusion relating to which, are to be arrived at_ on a conside ration of relevant material; that is1 before the incometax .officer can have\n\nB any reason to believe that a transfer was effected with the object mentioned in the section facts, must exist showing that the object .was to avoid or reduce the liability to capital gains. [141 H; 142 AD]\n\nIn the present case, the orders of the Tribunal show that there was no dispute as to the construction of any expression in any letter or document, that no relevant evidence was overlooked, that the inference was drawn from other facts and, that no question was raised on the construction of s. 52. When the Tribunal found, as a fact, that before there was any C proposal to re-impose the capital gains tax which had remained abolished for some time, the scheme between the assessee and the U.K. Company had been fully evolved, the applicability of s. 52 could not be attracted.\n\nThe findings of the Tribunal that the object mentioned in the section could not be held to be established from the mere absence of a formal agreement between the assessee and the U.K. Company, is not perverse, but is supported by evidence and is eminently reasonable.\n\nIn view of the clear, cogent and precise findings and conclusions of the Tribunal, the Himt D Court should at least have recorded a speaking order showing how tlie questions of law of the nature sought to be referred arose from the order of the Tribunal. [146 BD; 141 A~. F; 148 C.D] Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd, v. C.1.T., Madras.\n\n31 I.T.R. 28, followed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1308 of E 1970.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the order dated September 8 .. 1970 of the Calcutta High Court in Income Tn Reference No. 50 of\n\n1971.\n\nN. A. Palkhivala, Veda Vyasa, T. A. Ramachandran and F. D. N. Gupta, for the appellant.\n\nV. S. Desai, S. K. Aiyar and H. D. Sharma, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGrover, J. This is an appeal by special leave from an order G of the Calcutta High Court directing the Income-tax Appellate\n\nTribunal, 'B' Br11<nch, Calcutta, to draw a statement of case relating to four questions of law which, it was stated, arose out of the order of the Trib/unal in the matter of assessment of the appellant which was the assessee in respect of the assessment year 1962-63.\n\nThe Appellate Tribunal had rejected the application of the Com- H missioner of Income-tax requiring it to refer those questions to the High Court. The High Court, on being moved, issued a rule nisi and then made it absolute after full arguments without giving any reasons, whatsoever.\n\nThe assessee is a 100% subsidiary of Imperial Chemical Jn.\n\nA dustries Ltd., iincorporated in the United Kingdom (hereinafter referred to as I.C.l. for convenience).\n\nI.C.I. advanced large amounts by way of loans to the assessee from time to time. This, it was claimed, was done for subscribing to shares in three Indian Companies called Indian Explosives Ltd., Alkalai & Chemical Corporation of India and Atic Industries Private Ltd., (herein- .B after called as I.E.L., A.C.C.I and A TIC respectively).\n\nSubsequently the assessee transferred the shares in the aforesaid companies at par to I.C.I. in satisfactiQ!l of the loans advanced by that company. The Income-tax Officer applied s. 52 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter called the 'Act') and assessed .. the assessee to capital gains.\n\nThe Appellate Assistant Commisc sioner took the contrary view and held that on the facts which had been established, the assessee was not liable to capital gains under the aforesaid section.\n\nThe Tribunal upheld the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by a detailed and well reasoned order.\n\nBroadly, the case of the assessee was that I.CJ. wanted to D make investments in India in sterling currency.\n\nThe assessee was already in. existeaiee but the other three companies which have been mentioned, were incorporated later.\n\nI.C.I. devised a scheme by which it .could make the investment as desired by it and by which it could also take advantage of the tax relief which could be availed of by the new enterprises under s. 15(CJ and 56(A) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The scheme in short was that I.C.I. \\\\'Ould arrange to let the assessee hold shares in the three companies by investing the money which was to be given by I.C.I. to\n\nthe assessee. 'The modus operandi was that I.C.I. would give that money by way of loans to the assessee who agreed that the shares in the three companies would be transferred to I. C.I. in satisfaction of the loans at par or issue price as and when desired F by I.C.I. All this Was done after negol!ations with the concerned Department of the Government of India at the highest level and with the approval of the Reserve Bank of India.\n\nThe entire scheme was conceived and was put into operation prior to 30th November 1956 when the Finance BilJ was introduced re-imposing capital gains tax which had remained abolished for certain .years.\n\nThere was a provision for charging ijnterest by the I.C.I. from the assessee at a rate not exceeding l /2% above the Indian Bank rate which came to 5 t % per annum hut the interest was not to exceed in any case the divideinds received by the assessee from those shares. It was claimed on behalf of the assessee tl1at\n\nthis arrangement was advantageous both to I.C.I. and the ff assessec.\n\nI.C.I. having taken the risk (of depreciation in shares or otherwise) attached to the new busiiness pioneering adventures, cnsiJred that capital appreciation of the shares, if any, also went\n\n.A to itself.\n\nThe assessee did not suffer any disadvantage because it had to pay no interest if no dividend was received and it could keep aind get the benefit of any dividend in excess of 5!%. As a result of I.C.I. investments being held through the assessee instead of directly, LC.I, achieved an advantage of saving tax in U.K. amounting to £ 68,000 in the relevant years.\n\nIn 1959 the structure of Lndian taxation regarding the grossing up of dividends was radically changed and by the Finance Act 1959, the system of grossing up of dividends (under s. 16(2) and 18 ( 5) of 1922 Act) was abolished and intercorporate dividends became liable to income tax at each stage.\n\nThus, the dividends passing from the three companies through the assessee C to I.C.L became liable to tax stages. This affected the net return of I.C.I. on its investments in the three companies substantially. In these circumstances, it was decided by LC.I. that the investments in the three companies should ]le held by it directly.\n\nFor that reason it called upon the assessee in February 1961 to transfer to it the aforesaid shares in the three companies at the D issue price in satisfaction of the sterling loans in accordance with the .previous agreements.\n\nThe approval of. the Reserve Baali:: to these transfers was received in February 1961 and the transfers were made in March/ April 1961. According to the assessee there was no question of the transfer of shares having been affected with the object of avoidance or reductiqn of the liability of the 'E assessee to capital gains which alone could attract the applicability of s. 52 of the Act. ·· ·\n\nSection 52 is in the following terms :-\n\n\"Consideration for transfer in cases of under-statement : Where th~ person who acquires a capital asset from an assessee is directly or indirectly connected with the assessee and the Income-tax Officer has n to believe that the transfer was effected with the object of avoidance or reduction of the liability of the assessee under s. 45, the full value of the consideration for the :transfer shall, with the previous approval of the Inspecting Asstt. Commissioner, be taken to be the fair market value of the capital asset on the date of the 1ransfer\".\n\nThe necessary ingredients of the section are : '\n\n(i) there should be a direct or indirect connection between the pe!Son who acquires a capital asset and the assessee; (ii) the H Income tax Officer should have reason to believe that the transfer was effected with the object of avoidance or reduction of the liability of the assessee to capital gains; (iii) if the first two conditions are satisfied then the full value of consideration for the\n\ntransfer can be taken to be the fair market value of the capital 4 asset on the date of the transfer.\n\ns regards the first requirement, that was admittedly satisfied m the present case. The second requirement could be satisfied only if there was any cogent material on which the Income tax Officer could have reason to believe that the transfers were B effected with the object of avoidance and reduction of liability to capital gains. It is abundantly clear that the intention with which a particular transfer is made and the object whiCh is to be achieved by such transfer is essentially a question of fact the conclusion relating to which is to be arrived at on a consideration of the relevant material. In other words, before the Income c tax Officer can have any reason to believe that a transfer was effected with the object mentioned in the section facts must exist showing that the object was to avoid or reduce the liability to capital gains.\n\nThe Tribunal examined folly the correspondence and the other material with regard to each of \"the three :(ndian companies D in which the investment had been made of the money advanced by I.C.L to the assessee.\n\nWe may briefly notice the discussion relating to each company. It was .in or. about 1949 that LC.I. was asked _by the Government of India to consider the manufacture of commercial Lasting High Explosives in India.\n\nNegotiations advanced more towards October 1953 when the E representatives of LC.I. met the officials of the Government of India. The Tribunal referred to the minutes of the meeting held on October 1, 1953 as also on the 6th October 1953. In the final draft of the Declaration of Intention dated November 5, 1953, it was mentioned that the Gove111llil.ent had agreed that if I. C.I. made a loan to the assessee the Iaiter would hold the shares in I.E.L. and that the loan \"may be repaid by a transfer of the F shares to I.C.I. at any time\".\n\nOn 21st December 1954, the assessee applied to the Reserve Bank of India for formal sanction for borrowing Rs. 160 lakhs from I.C.I. for the purchase of shares in I.E.L. in terms of the agreement dated November 5 1953. It was stated in the letter that I.CJ. would charge no\n\niterest until such time as the shares began to yield dividends.\n\nG The loans were advanced from 30th September 1954 to 30th June 1957 by the I.CJ. to the assessee of the equivalent. of Rs. 160 lakhs in Sterling.\n\nThe other correspondence relatmg to the aforesaid amount was also noticed by the Tribunal. In 1958 there was a Rights Issue by I.E.L. I.C.I. agreed to give a loan of Rs. 80 lakhs to the assessee to cover the Sterling require- 8 ment of I.E.L. The assessee was to take up shares of that amount. The terms of the loan were that I.C.I. had the right to acquire at any time the shares held bv the assessee in I.E.L.\n\nA at par in satisfaction of the loan and the rate of interest payable on the loan was to be 1 % above the Indian Bank rate. This was followed by other correspondence and a re.solution which was recorded on 30-9-1958 containing terms of the second loan of Rs. 80,00,000/-. It is not necessary to refer to the other correspondence looked into by the Tribunal with regard to that B loan. On 15-2-1961 the assessee was called upon by I.C.I. to transfer the investments in satisfaction of the loans. After the sanction was obtained from the Reserve Bank of India, the shares were transferred at par. The Tribunal referred to the undisputed facts relating to the Circumstances in which the scheme for advancing the loan to the assessee for investment in C I.E.L. came to be mooted and was ulti!llately approved by the Government. This is what the Tribunal said :\n\n\"The above background would show tllat the idea was not to make the assessee the real beaeficial owner of the shares. The fact that the shares should be held only for a time beneficially by the assessee is clear from the \"Declaration of Intention\" dated S-11-1953\"\n\nBefore the Tribunal the counsel for the Department had accepted the position that if there was an arm1F11ent or agreement before the reintroduction of capital gains tax he would have no case.\n\nAccording to him, until the transfers were actually made of the shares, there was no agreement on which the parties E could have gone to court in order to obtain the share transfers at par in favour of I.C.I. The Tribunal proceeded first to examine whether there was any kind of understanding between the assessee and I.C.I. regarding the transfer of shar.is at par.\n\nAfter recapitulating the correspondence and the relevant facts, the Tribunal came to the following conclusion: F \"Taking this along with the minutes of the meeting with the officials of the Government of India, in October 1953, it is clear that the whole idea of I.C.I. throughout was to make some funds available to the assessee so that the shares could be acquired in its name and that the shares could be transferred to I.C.I.\n\nG as and when it demanded\".\n\nIt 'was however stated by the Tribunal that taking into account the co;,.espondece and the documents referred to earlier it was satisfied with the assessee's case that the transfer of shares to London at issue price or at par was throughout the basis of the advances of loans to the assessee. It is necessary to reproduce H paragraph 31 of the order of the Tribunal :-\n\n\"In October 1953 the.re was no mention of any capital gains tax being' revived. At that time the assessee could not have had any idea of avoiding or reducing any liability to capital gains tax.\n\nThe learned counsel for the department laid some emphasis on the fact that there was no enforceable arrangement. The question as to whether there was an enforceable arrangement or not is not really material. What we have to find out is whether the object in putting through these transactions of taking over the shares at par or at issue price was one of avoidance or reduction of liability to capital gains tax. That object does not get established by the mere absence of an enforceable arrangement.\n\nHaving regard to the assessee being the subsidiary of I.C.I., there is nothing surprising about the arrangement not being so formal or not being put through after complying with all the necessary legal formalities.\n\nThe absence of formal agreement is thus understandable in this context and cannot by itself suggest anything in favour of the department.\n\nBusinessmen are not always motivated by legalistic considerations. Even taking that the arrangement was only binding morally and not legally, still so long as the assessee wanted to fulfil a moral obligation and had not the capital gains tax in mind, it cannot be said that the transaction was entered into with the object of avoidance or reduction of liability to capital gains tax\".\n\nThe Tribunal proceeded to say :\n\n\"We have to find out the object of the transaction.\n\nIt is removed in point of time from the result. In such a case one cannot try to infer the object from the results .. We really have to put ourselves at a point of time when the transaction was conceived ....... .\n\nTaking the materials before us, we consider that there is nothing to suggest that the parties had the capital gains tax in their mjnd in 1953 and later when they put through the aforesaid transactions. We have, therefore, to hold that the factual requisities of section 52 have not been established here\".\n\nIn dealing with the second Company, namely, A.C.C.I it was pointed out by the Tribunal that ·!he scheme for manufactur\n\ning Polythene was placed before the Government of India by a letter of the assessee dated 13-12-1955 addressed to Mr. H. V. R.\n\nIengar, Secretary, Minister of Commerce & Industry, in which it was specifically stated that to enable the assess.ee to subscribe for H the new shares I.C.I. would lend the subscription monies to the assessee on the understanding that at a later date I.C.I. could acquire at the issue price these new shares in satisfaction of its\n\nA Joan.\n\nThe Tribunal dealt with all the relevant facts relating to the loan advanced to A.C.C.I. including ithose stated in the affidavits of P. T. Manzies dated 17-8-1966 and U. R. Newbery dated 10-1-1967 and considered that the transaction relating to this Company was not in any way different from those relating to the I.E.L. ATIC, the third Company was incorporated jiri- B maray for the manufacture of certain Dye-stuffs. On 29-12-1955 I.C.I. agreed to advance Rs. 25 lakhs as Joan to the assessee The shares acquired under 1the loan could be transferred to I.C, t on request by the latter at the issue price. l.C.l. waived its right to interest on the loan until the commencement of the period in respect of which ATIC paid the dividend.\n\nThere was a funher C Joan of Rs. 35,00,000 on the same terms. These shares were al'o subsequently required to be transferred to I.C.I. in February\n\n1961. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner had referred to the affidavits which had been filed on behalf of the assessee and had mentioned that the Department had not cross-examined the deponents.\n\nBefore the Tribunal the counsel for the Department stated that he accepted the affidavits as correct in so far as facts D were concerned but he only disputed the inferences therefrom.\n\nThe Tribunal in this connection observed:-\n\n\"In our opinion, once the facts mentioned therein are taken as correct, the inference that the transaction was not for 11e purpose of avoiding or reducing liability to capital gains tax has to follow\".\n\nFinally the Tribunal, as stated before, confirmed the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the material on record did no! justify the conclusion of the Income tax Officer that the object of the transfer of the shares of all the three Companies by the .assessee to I.CJ. was the avoidance of liability to capital gains which would attract the applicability of s. 52 of the Act.\n\nThe Commissioner of Income tax asked for a reference on six questions.\n\nThe Tribunal again examined the further contentions of the Department in its order dated 28-7-1969 by which it declined to make the reference on the ground that no question of G Jaw arose oll't of the order of the Appellate Tribunal. Only four questions appear to have been pressed for being referred.\n\nAs regards question No. 1 (which was No. 3 before the Tribunal) it was pointed out that it proceeded on the basis tha! there was some dispu~ about the construction of the correspondence or documents.\n\nThe Tribunal ob!erved that '.here was no such dis- H pute and it had not been suggested that a particular expression in any letter or document had been wrongly construed.\n\nRegarding question No. 2 (which was No. 4 before the Tribunal), the Departmental representative was asked to particularise the documents or evidence omitted from consideration. He referred to A certain documents and evidence which according to him had not been conidered by the Tribunal. The Tribunal made it clear that all the relevant materials which had been referred to had been considered by i!.\n\nThese materials were distributed over four bulky vol1111les of typed records and, therefore, ead! document could not have been mentioned in the order.\n\nNothing relevant B was actually over-looked. At any rate the documents on which particular reliance was placed on behalf of the Department were considered and !he Tribunal observed that the grievance of omission of materials from consideration related to irrelevant matters.\n\nAs regards the other two questions, the Tribunal observed that the charge of perversity was only a desparate attempt at ex!racting C a question of law where none existed and that the object or intention of an assessee was always a question of fact. It was a factual inference to .be drawn from other facts.\n\nIt was pointed out that on the construction of s. 52, the par'ies had not joined any issue.\n\nWe may now mention the four questions which the High Court D directed to be referred :-\n\n1. \"whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and on a proper construction of the documents referred to and/or considered by it the Tribunal was right in arriving at the finding that the transfer of the shares to Imperial CMmical Industries Ltd., Loadon at the issue price or par was throughout the basis of the advance of loans to the assessee ?\n\n2. Whether, in arriving at the said finding the Tribunal misdirected itself in la)V in basing the said fiuding on evidence covering some matters only and ignoring evidence on other essential matters ?\n\n3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and particularly in view of the finding that there was. no enforceable 'agreement making it obligatory upon the assessee to transfer the shares to Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., London, at par or issue price the oonclusion of the Tribunal that the transfer of the shares by the assessee to the latter company at par was not effected with the object of avoidance or reduction of the liability of the assessee to capital gains tax was unreasonable or perverse ?\n\n4. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances\n\nof the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that\n\ns. 52 of the Income tax Act, 1961, was not applicable to the facts of the case ?\n\nOn the analysis o.f s. 52 of '!he Act made by us at a previous stage and the clear, cogent and precise findings and conclusions of B the Appellate Tribiunal, we are wholly unable to comprehend, how any question of law of the nature sought to be referred arose\n\nor arises from the order of the Appellate Tribunal.\n\nIt is unfortunate that in a case of this naure and magnitude, the High Court did hotichoose to record a speaking order to enable us to appreciate the reasons which prevailed with it for directing c the four questions o be referred.\n\nThe jurisdiction in the matter of reference can be exercised (i) when the point for determination is a pure question of law such 'as construction of a statute or document of title; (ii) when the point for derermination is a mixed question of law and fact. While the finding of the Tribu nal on the facts is final its decision as to the legal effect of those findings is a question of law, (iii) a finding on a question of fact D is . open to attack as erroneous in law when there is no evideince\n\nto support it or if it is perverse.\n\nWhere, however, the finding is one of fact, the fact that it is an inference from other sic facts will not alter its character as one of fact (See Sree Meenakashi\n\nMills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income tax, Madras(1). In that\n\ncase it was held that there was no question of construction of any statutory provision or document of title.\n\nThe issues which arose for derermination, whether the sales entered in books of the appellant in the names of the intermediaries were nuine, and if not, to whom the goods were sold 'and for what price, were all questions of fact.\n\nTheir determination did not involve the application of any Jegal principles to facts esblished by the evidence.\n\nThe findings of the Tribunal were amply supported by evidence .and were eminently reasonable.\n\nIt, therefore, followed that there was no question which could be referred to the Court under s. 66 (1) of the Income tax Act 1922. The same principles will apply when a reference is sought under s. 256 of the Act. We are altoirether unable to see how findings of the Appellate Tribu\"' nal that the transfer of shares in the present case was not made wi!h the intention or object of avoidance or reduction of liability to capital gains were not questions of fact and did not depend on inference of facts from the. evidence or the material before the Tribunal.\n\nIt can well be said that the determination of !he question whether the object of the assessee was to avoid or reduce its liability to' capital gains by niakin.R; the transfers in question did not involve tile applicadon of any le2al principles to the facts established by the evidence.\n\nThe findings of the Tribunal were amply supported by evidence and were eminently reasonable. It\n\n(I 31 I.T.R. 28.\n\nis true that the amount involved is very large but that cannot A justify a reference as under s. 256 of the Act neither the Appellate Tribunal could make a reference nor could the High Court direct the reference to be made to it by the Tribunal on pure questions .of fact.\n\nThe learned counsel for the Commissioner has sought to invite our attention <to certain parts of the order of the Tribunal and, B in particular, to the statement extracted by us at an earlier stage about the question whether 1he .assessee had held the shares benefically and the pc>int which was debated before the Tribunal\n\nwhether there was any binding legal agreement between 'the assessee and I.C.I. for transfer of the shares at par. We are unable to see how these matters were relevant for the purpose of determining the inteotion or object under-lying the transfer of the C shares to r.c.r. by the assessee. Once the Tribunal came to the conclusion which was purely one of fact that before there was any proposal to reimpose capitiil gains tax which came to be embodied in the Fin.ance Bill towards the end of November 1956, the scheme had been fully evolved between !he assessee and I.C.I. of making the loans by the latter to the former for being D invested in the three companies and that the shares would be\n\ntransferr~ at par by !he assessee to I.C.I. whenever desired, the applicability of s. 52 could not be attracted as the same depend- . ed on certain facts which must exist or must be found and which had not been s0 found by the Tribunal.\n\nIn the result the appeal is allowed and ithe order of the High E Court is hereby set aside.\n\nThe assessee shall be entitled to its costs in this Court.\n\nv.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 86, "entities": [{"text": "I. C. I. (INDIA) PRIVATE LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I. C. I. (INDIA) PRIVATE LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. I. T., WEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "C. I. T., WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 20, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 70, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. I. T., WEST BENGAL\n\nJanuary 20, 1972\n\n[A. N. GROVER AND M. H. BEG, JI.]"}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 121, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 52 and 256", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 331, "end_char": 343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "52 and 256--Dlrectlons by High Court to Tribunal to refer questions-Scope of High Court's ; urisdiction\n\nAfter negotiations in 1953 with the concerned Department of the Government of India and the Reserve Bank, a Company, incorporated in U.K. advanced large sums by way of loans to its subsidiary in India, namely the assessee, for subscribing for shares in 80llle Indian Companies."}}, {"text": "U.K.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 372, "end_char": 376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "52 and 256--Dlrectlons by High Court to Tribunal to refer questions-Scope of High Court's ; urisdiction\n\nAfter negotiations in 1953 with the concerned Department of the Government of India and the Reserve Bank, a Company, incorporated in U.K. advanced large sums by way of loans to its subsidiary in India, namely the assessee, for subscribing for shares in 80llle Indian Companies."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 434, "end_char": 439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "52 and 256--Dlrectlons by High Court to Tribunal to refer questions-Scope of High Court's ; urisdiction\n\nAfter negotiations in 1953 with the concerned Department of the Government of India and the Reserve Bank, a Company, incorporated in U.K. advanced large sums by way of loans to its subsidiary in India, namely the assessee, for subscribing for shares in 80llle Indian Companies."}}, {"text": "U.K. Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 550, "end_char": 562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The cormpondence showed that the U.K. Company had the right to acquire at any time the shares at par, in satisfaction of the loans."}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 773, "end_char": 778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 786, "end_char": 806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1600, "end_char": 1605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2588, "end_char": 2593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3893, "end_char": 3898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4150, "end_char": 4155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4806, "end_char": 4834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "N. A. Palkhivala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5003, "end_char": 5019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala, Veda Vyasa, T. A. Ramachandran and F. D. N. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Veda Vyasa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5021, "end_char": 5031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala, Veda Vyasa, T. A. Ramachandran and F. D. N. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "T. A. Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5033, "end_char": 5051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala, Veda Vyasa, T. A. Ramachandran and F. D. N. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "F. D. N. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5056, "end_char": 5070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala, Veda Vyasa, T. A. Ramachandran and F. D. N. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5092, "end_char": 5103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, S. K. Aiyar and H. D. Sharma, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. K. Aiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5105, "end_char": 5116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, S. K. Aiyar and H. D. Sharma, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "H. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5121, "end_char": 5133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, S. K. Aiyar and H. D. Sharma, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Grover", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5200, "end_char": 5206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGrover, J. This is an appeal by special leave from an order G of the Calcutta High Court directing the Income-tax Appellate\n\nTribunal, 'B' Br11<nch, Calcutta, to draw a statement of case relating to four questions of law which, it was stated, arose out of the order of the Trib/unal in the matter of assessment of the appellant which was the assessee in respect of the assessment year 1962-63."}}, {"text": "Imperial Chemical Jn.\n\nA dustries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5918, "end_char": 5956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee is a 100% subsidiary of Imperial Chemical Jn."}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5979, "end_char": 5993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A dustries Ltd., iincorporated in the United Kingdom (hereinafter referred to as I.C.l."}}, {"text": "I.C.I.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6048, "end_char": 6054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.C.I. advanced large amounts by way of loans to the assessee from time to time."}}, {"text": "Indian Explosives Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6219, "end_char": 6241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This, it was claimed, was done for subscribing to shares in three Indian Companies called Indian Explosives Ltd., Alkalai & Chemical Corporation of India and Atic Industries Private Ltd., (herein- .B after called as I.E.L., A.C.C.I and A TIC respectively)."}}, {"text": "Alkalai & Chemical Corporation of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6243, "end_char": 6282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This, it was claimed, was done for subscribing to shares in three Indian Companies called Indian Explosives Ltd., Alkalai & Chemical Corporation of India and Atic Industries Private Ltd., (herein- .B after called as I.E.L., A.C.C.I and A TIC respectively)."}}, {"text": "Atic Industries Private Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6287, "end_char": 6315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This, it was claimed, was done for subscribing to shares in three Indian Companies called Indian Explosives Ltd., Alkalai & Chemical Corporation of India and Atic Industries Private Ltd., (herein- .B after called as I.E.L., A.C.C.I and A TIC respectively)."}}, {"text": "A.C.C.I", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6353, "end_char": 6360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This, it was claimed, was done for subscribing to shares in three Indian Companies called Indian Explosives Ltd., Alkalai & Chemical Corporation of India and Atic Industries Private Ltd., (herein- .B after called as I.E.L., A.C.C.I and A TIC respectively)."}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6567, "end_char": 6572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6580, "end_char": 6600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 15(CJ and 56(A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7413, "end_char": 7431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7439, "end_char": 7459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "I.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7805, "end_char": 7807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The modus operandi was that I.C.I. would give that money by way of loans to the assessee who agreed that the shares in the three companies would be transferred to I. C.I. in satisfaction of the loans at par or issue price as and when desired F by I.C.I. All this Was done after negol!ations with the concerned Department of the Government of India at the highest level and with the approval of the Reserve Bank of India."}}, {"text": "C.I.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7808, "end_char": 7812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The modus operandi was that I.C.I. would give that money by way of loans to the assessee who agreed that the shares in the three companies would be transferred to I. C.I. in satisfaction of the loans at par or issue price as and when desired F by I.C.I. All this Was done after negol!ations with the concerned Department of the Government of India at the highest level and with the approval of the Reserve Bank of India."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7970, "end_char": 7989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The modus operandi was that I.C.I. would give that money by way of loans to the assessee who agreed that the shares in the three companies would be transferred to I. C.I. in satisfaction of the loans at par or issue price as and when desired F by I.C.I. All this Was done after negol!ations with the concerned Department of the Government of India at the highest level and with the approval of the Reserve Bank of India."}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8040, "end_char": 8061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The modus operandi was that I.C.I. would give that money by way of loans to the assessee who agreed that the shares in the three companies would be transferred to I. C.I. in satisfaction of the loans at par or issue price as and when desired F by I.C.I. All this Was done after negol!ations with the concerned Department of the Government of India at the highest level and with the approval of the Reserve Bank of India."}}, {"text": "30th November 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8132, "end_char": 8150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The entire scheme was conceived and was put into operation prior to 30th November 1956 when the Finance BilJ was introduced re-imposing capital gains tax which had remained abolished for certain .years."}}, {"text": "s. 16(2) and 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9404, "end_char": 9419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lndian taxation regarding the grossing up of dividends was radically changed and by the Finance Act 1959", "statute": "Lndian taxation regarding the grossing up of dividends was radically changed and by the Finance Act 1959"}}, {"text": "I.C.L", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9604, "end_char": 9609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, the dividends passing from the three companies through the assessee C to I.C.L became liable to tax stages."}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10461, "end_char": 10466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10485, "end_char": 10495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10857, "end_char": 10862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "LC.I.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12983, "end_char": 12988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Negotiations advanced more towards October 1953 when the E representatives of LC.I. met the officials of the Government of India."}}, {"text": "October 1, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13095, "end_char": 13110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal referred to the minutes of the meeting held on October 1, 1953 as also on the 6th October 1953."}}, {"text": "6th October 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13126, "end_char": 13142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal referred to the minutes of the meeting held on October 1, 1953 as also on the 6th October 1953."}}, {"text": "November 5, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13201, "end_char": 13217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the final draft of the Declaration of Intention dated November 5, 1953, it was mentioned that the Gove111llil.ent had agreed that if I. C.I. made a loan to the assessee the Iaiter would hold the shares in I.E.L. and that the loan \"may be repaid by a transfer of the F shares to I.C.I. at any time\"."}}, {"text": "I.E.L.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13352, "end_char": 13358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the final draft of the Declaration of Intention dated November 5, 1953, it was mentioned that the Gove111llil.ent had agreed that if I. C.I. made a loan to the assessee the Iaiter would hold the shares in I.E.L. and that the loan \"may be repaid by a transfer of the F shares to I.C.I. at any time\"."}}, {"text": "21st December 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13450, "end_char": 13468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21st December 1954, the assessee applied to the Reserve Bank of India for formal sanction for borrowing Rs."}}, {"text": "November 5 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13649, "end_char": 13664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "160 lakhs from I.C.I. for the purchase of shares in I.E.L. in terms of the agreement dated November 5 1953."}}, {"text": "I.CJ", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13699, "end_char": 13703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was stated in the letter that I.CJ."}}, {"text": "30th September 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13818, "end_char": 13837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G The loans were advanced from 30th September 1954 to 30th June 1957 by the I.CJ."}}, {"text": "30th June 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13841, "end_char": 13855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G The loans were advanced from 30th September 1954 to 30th June 1957 by the I.CJ."}}, {"text": "30-9-1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14554, "end_char": 14563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was followed by other correspondence and a re.solution which was recorded on 30-9-1958 containing terms of the second loan of Rs."}}, {"text": "15-2-1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14736, "end_char": 14745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 15-2-1961 the assessee was called upon by I.C.I. to transfer the investments in satisfaction of the loans."}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16687, "end_char": 16693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It 'was however stated by the Tribunal that taking into account the co;,.espondece and the documents referred to earlier it was satisfied with the assessee's case that the transfer of shares to London at issue price or at par was throughout the basis of the advances of loans to the assessee."}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18864, "end_char": 18874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "13-12-1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19119, "end_char": 19129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he scheme for manufactur\n\ning Polythene was placed before the Government of India by a letter of the assessee dated 13-12-1955 addressed to Mr. H. V. R.\n\nIengar, Secretary, Minister of Commerce & Industry, in which it was specifically stated that to enable the assess.ee to subscribe for H the new shares I.C.I. would lend the subscription monies to the assessee on the understanding that at a later date I.C.I. could acquire at the issue price these new shares in satisfaction of its\n\nA Joan."}}, {"text": "H. V. R.\n\nIengar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19147, "end_char": 19163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he scheme for manufactur\n\ning Polythene was placed before the Government of India by a letter of the assessee dated 13-12-1955 addressed to Mr. H. V. R.\n\nIengar, Secretary, Minister of Commerce & Industry, in which it was specifically stated that to enable the assess.ee to subscribe for H the new shares I.C.I. would lend the subscription monies to the assessee on the understanding that at a later date I.C.I. could acquire at the issue price these new shares in satisfaction of its\n\nA Joan."}}, {"text": "A.C.C.I.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19578, "end_char": 19586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal dealt with all the relevant facts relating to the loan advanced to A.C.C.I. including ithose stated in the affidavits of P. T. Manzies dated 17-8-1966 and U. R. Newbery dated 10-1-1967 and considered that the transaction relating to this Company was not in any way different from those relating to the I.E.L. ATIC, the third Company was incorporated jiri- B maray for the manufacture of certain Dye-stuffs."}}, {"text": "P. T. Manzies", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19632, "end_char": 19645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal dealt with all the relevant facts relating to the loan advanced to A.C.C.I. including ithose stated in the affidavits of P. T. Manzies dated 17-8-1966 and U. R. Newbery dated 10-1-1967 and considered that the transaction relating to this Company was not in any way different from those relating to the I.E.L. ATIC, the third Company was incorporated jiri- B maray for the manufacture of certain Dye-stuffs."}}, {"text": "17-8-1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19652, "end_char": 19661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal dealt with all the relevant facts relating to the loan advanced to A.C.C.I. including ithose stated in the affidavits of P. T. Manzies dated 17-8-1966 and U. R. Newbery dated 10-1-1967 and considered that the transaction relating to this Company was not in any way different from those relating to the I.E.L. ATIC, the third Company was incorporated jiri- B maray for the manufacture of certain Dye-stuffs."}}, {"text": "U. R. Newbery", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19666, "end_char": 19679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal dealt with all the relevant facts relating to the loan advanced to A.C.C.I. including ithose stated in the affidavits of P. T. Manzies dated 17-8-1966 and U. R. Newbery dated 10-1-1967 and considered that the transaction relating to this Company was not in any way different from those relating to the I.E.L. ATIC, the third Company was incorporated jiri- B maray for the manufacture of certain Dye-stuffs."}}, {"text": "10-1-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19686, "end_char": 19695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal dealt with all the relevant facts relating to the loan advanced to A.C.C.I. including ithose stated in the affidavits of P. T. Manzies dated 17-8-1966 and U. R. Newbery dated 10-1-1967 and considered that the transaction relating to this Company was not in any way different from those relating to the I.E.L. ATIC, the third Company was incorporated jiri- B maray for the manufacture of certain Dye-stuffs."}}, {"text": "29-12-1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19921, "end_char": 19931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 29-12-1955 I.C.I. agreed to advance Rs."}}, {"text": "I.C", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20054, "end_char": 20057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25 lakhs as Joan to the assessee The shares acquired under 1the loan could be transferred to I.C, t on request by the latter at the issue price."}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21390, "end_char": 21395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "28-7-1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21570, "end_char": 21579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal again examined the further contentions of the Department in its order dated 28-7-1969 by which it declined to make the reference on the ground that no question of G Jaw arose oll't of the order of the Appellate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23342, "end_char": 23347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Imperial CMmical Industries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23706, "end_char": 23738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and on a proper construction of the documents referred to and/or considered by it the Tribunal was right in arriving at the finding that the transfer of the shares to Imperial CMmical Industries Ltd., Loadon at the issue price or par was throughout the basis of the advance of loans to the assessee ?"}}, {"text": "Loadon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23740, "end_char": 23746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and on a proper construction of the documents referred to and/or considered by it the Tribunal was right in arriving at the finding that the transfer of the shares to Imperial CMmical Industries Ltd., Loadon at the issue price or par was throughout the basis of the advance of loans to the assessee ?"}}, {"text": "Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24252, "end_char": 24285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "no enforceable 'agreement making it obligatory upon the assessee to transfer the shares to Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., London, at par or issue price the oonclusion of the Tribunal that the transfer of the shares by the assessee to the latter company at par was not effected with the object of avoidance or reduction of the liability of the assessee to capital gains tax was unreasonable or perverse ?"}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24674, "end_char": 24679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24687, "end_char": 24707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24776, "end_char": 24781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26706, "end_char": 26711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income tax Act 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26723, "end_char": 26742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 256", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26808, "end_char": 26814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income tax Act 1922", "statute": "the Income tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 256", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27669, "end_char": 27675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income tax Act 1922", "statute": "the Income tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28952, "end_char": 28957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29080, "end_char": 29082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P.S.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29262, "end_char": 29266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_149_156_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "ZILEY SINGH, ETC •\n\n. v.\n\nREGISTRAR, CANE COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES,\n\nLUCKNOW AND ORS.\n\nJanuary 20, 1972\n\n[K. S. HEGDE, A. N. GROVER AND A. N. RAY, JJ.]\n\nU.P. Cooperati've Socleties Act, 1.965 and Cooperc. 1ti've Societies Rules>- 1961-Election of Committee of management of a society-S. 20 confer• one \\'Ot.e on. one 1nenzber-lnterpretation of Rule 40_9 by. Registrar by which each n1en1ber would cast more than one vote was againse statute-- Regi'itrar has no power under RuJe 409 to issue such circular.\n\nUnder s. 32 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 the business to be conducted at the annual general meeting of a society includes inter alia election of the committee of management of the sochty. Under Rule 409 of the Act namely the Cooperative Societies Rules, 1967 a cooperative society may, for the purpose of the election of the Committee of management, with the previous sanction of the Registrar of Cooperative Societies\n\n(a) divide its membership into different groups on territorial or any other rational basis, and (b) also specify the number or proportion of the members of the committee of management in such a manner that different areas or interests, as the case may be, in the society may, as far as may be, get suitable representation on the committee of management. On S 1'Jovember 1969' the Registrar issued a circular interpreting Rule 409 and laid clown the principle that \"all lhe members of the general body\" of the cootive society would \"exercise their right of vote in filling all the seats of Clected Directors\". Tho eledtions in the cooperative societies .concerned in tbe present appeals were held according. to the aforesaid directions . given by the Registrar. The elections were challenged and ,.t asid.e iti proceedings. under the Act. On the question whether the cirCular lntetj>ieting · Rule 409 issued by the Registrar was valid, this Court, ·\n\nHELD : Under role 409 the principal matters to be kept in the foietront are these.\n\nFirst, the society will divide the coilstituencies w territorial basis or any other rational . basis.\n\nBy territorial basis is. meant territory where the member will residi<. 'Residence is. tbOrefore 'the relative requirement of territorial basis. lf any other rational basis like occupation\n\nor vncatinn is determined to be the ballis of a cilmtituen.oy the persoos falling within the constituency will satisfy that test. Secondly, the society will specify the proportion of members of the committee in such a manner that different areas or interests may get suitable representation. The. inherent idea is that such areas or interest will obtain representation. If mem bership is on territorial basis the different areas will get representatiOn according to the interest of such territories. Again, if '!C'fupltional \" professional tests are . created for dividing groups such interests willlhhave to be given suitable represeritation. Representation is therefore wi reference to areas or interets. Judged by lite,. principles the impeached circular of the Registrar suffered from the vice of giving the' members the right of casting vote in constituencies to which they did not belong. This\n\nstrikes at tire ba!ic rOot of the fight of representation. This., also reads as under the principle of one member one vote which is , made a role elf law in the Act. [155 E-0)\n\nThe words 'affairs of the society' in s. 20 cannot be equated with tho A constituencies to give each member a right to vote for each constituency.\n\nThat would defeat the purpose of s. 20 and rule 409. The basic idea of representation for each constituency depends on the mandate of the respective constituency and not ofother constituencies. That is why s. 20 of tho Act speaks of one member having one vote irrespective of shareholding.\n\nIt means equality of votes of members. [155 HJ\n\nThe impeached circular of the Registrar was illegal and unwarranted.\n\nB The Registrar has no power to interpret rule 409. The Registrar has equally no power to express view with regard to the conduct of the election and regulate the voting rights by giving members more than one vote. The society is to frame rules for elections. The rules and the bye-laws cannot be in derogation of the statute and statutory rules. At an election of members of the committee of managemeni one member will have only one vote for the constituency to which he belongs. [156 E] c\n\nThe result was that the elections which were held following the circular <>f the Registrar were bad, •\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1533 of .. l971. ..\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment dated September D 18, 1971 of the S.D.0./ Arbitrator, Muza1farnagar . in Election Petition No. 140 of 1970. ·\n\nAND\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 1797 and 1798 ol 1971. Appeals by special leave from the judgments dated September 18, 1971 of the E District Magistrate/Registrar, Co-operative Societie8, Saharanpur in AP{>Cals Nos. 6 and 8 of 1971 wider s. 98(i)(h) U.P. Cooperative Societies Act.\n\nAND Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 3254 of 1971\n\nFrom the judgment dated September 16, 1971 of the Registrar, Co-operative Societies/District Magistrate Saharanpur in Appeal No. 5 of 1971 under section 98 ( i) (h) CO-Operative Societies Act.)\n\nJ. P. Goyal and V. C. Partishar, for the appellants (in C.As.\n\nG Nos. '1533 and 1797 of 1971) and the petitioners (in S.L.P. No. 3268 of 1971)\n\nR. K. Garg, S .. C. Agrawal and R. K. Jain, for the appellants (in C.A. No. 1798 of 1971) and the Petitio11, ers (in S.L.P. No. 3254 ot 1971) ff C. B. Agarwal and P. P. Juneja, lor respondents Nos. 7, 8 and 11 to 13 (in C.A. 1533 of 1971) ·\n\n0. P. Rana, for respondents Nos. 7 and 12 (in C.A. No. 1797 of 1972) and respondent No. 7 (in C.A. No. 1798 of 1971).\n\nM. C. Setalvad, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal and R. K. Jain, for the intervener.\n\nThe Judgment of. the Court was delivered by\n\nRay, J. These three appeals are by special leave.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 1533(N) of 1971 is by special leave against the judg• ment dated 18 September, 1971 of the Arbitrator setting aside the election of the Management Committee of the Co-operative Cane Development Union, hamli in an election petition filed under rule c 229(2) of the Co-operative Societies Rules, 1967 framed under the Uttar Pradesh Co-<JP.erative Societies Act, 1965. Civil Appeal No. 1797 of 1971 is by special leave against the order of the District Magistrate and Registrar, Co-operative Societies Sharanpur dismissing an appeal filed under sect'ion 98(i)(h) of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 against an order of the Arbitrator under section 70 and 71 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act.\n\nD 1965 setting aside the election of the Sahkari Ganna Vikas Samiti Ltd., Iqbalpur, District Saharanpur.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 1798 of 1971 is against the order and judgmt dated 16 September,.· 1971 of the District Magistrate, Saharanpur dismissing an appeal under section 98(i)(h) of the U.P, Co-operative Societies Act, ·.1965 against the order of the Arbitrator under sections.70 and 71 of the E U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 setting as, ide the election of the Sahkari Ganna Vikas Smiiiti Ltd., Lmwar, DiStrict Saharanpur. Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 3254 of 1971 is for leave to appeal against.the order of the Registrar, Co-operative Societies in appeal under section 98(i)(h) against the order of the Arbitrator under sections 70 and 71 of the U.P. Co-operative Socies Act, F 1965 setting aside the election of Sahkari Ganna Vikas Samiti, Sarsawa. Special. Leave Petition (Civil) No. 3268 of 1971 ill for leave to appeal against the order of th~ District Aulhority. Bui3ndshahr setting aside the election of the Committee of Management of the Co-operative Cane Development Union Ltd. on an application under rule 229 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Rules, 1968.\n\nG These matters raise a common question. These Co-operative Societies held their annual general meeting under the provisions of section 32 of the Uttar Pradesh CcH>perative Societies Act, 1965 (hereinafter called the Act). A( the general meetings the members of the Committee of Management of the Society were elected by members of the Society.\n\nThe Registrar of the U.P.\n\nH Co-operative Societies issued a circular dated S NCl'l'ember, 1969 interpming rule 409. of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Rules, 1968 (hereinafter called the Rules) and laid down the principle that all th~ members of the general body. ''of the Co-operative\n\nSociety would\" exercise their right of vote in filling all the seats A of elected Directors.\" The ques1fon in the present appeals is whether the Registrar had power to issue the circular interpreting rule 409 and secondly whether that in~rpretation is correct in terms of the Act and jhe Rules.\n\nThe Act deals with Co-operative Societies and inter alia their B members and their Committee of Management. The relevant sections for the purpose of present appeals and special leave petitions are sections 20, 29 and 32 of the Act. Section 20 of the Act speaks of vote of members. Under that section, a member of a Co-operative Society shall notwithstanding the quantum of his interest in the capital of the Society have one vote in the affairs of the Society. There are four provisos to section 20. Proviso (a) C deals with nominal or associate members who have no right of vote. Proviso (b) deals with a co-operative society, the State\n\nWarhousing Corporation or a body corporate being a member of such society in which case each delegate of such co-operative society, State Warehous_ing Corporation or body corporate shall have one vote. Proviso (c) deals with the State Government or the [) Central Government being a member of such society in which case a nominee of the State Government or the Central Government shall have one vote. Proviso (d) deals with a group of members or any class of members partaking in the affairs of the society through a delegate or delegates each delegate having one vote.\n\nSection 29 of the Act deals with the Committee of Manage- E men!..\n\nThe managemeJ)t of every co-operative society shall vest in a committee of rnruiagement. The tertn of the election members of the committee of. ml!nagement shall be such as may be provided in the rules and the bye-laws of the society. After the expliy of the term the co-operative society_ shall at the annual gel)eral meeting elect members 'for the committee of management as provided F in section 32(i)(b) of the Act. If a society fails to elect members for the committee. of manage1nent the Registrar shall ca11 upon the society by order in _writing to elect such members witl)in hree months from the date of tlfe communication of the order. If the society still fails to elect the memb.ers for the committee of management, the Registrar may himself nominate such persons as under the rules and the bye-Jaws are qualified for being elected as mem- G bers of the committee of management. Within six months from the date of nomination made by the Registrar, the Registrar sh.all call a general meeting for electing members of the committee of management.\n\nSection 32 of the Act speaks of annual general meeting which H shall be held ooce in 'a co-operative year.\n\nA co, operative year means the year commencing the first day of July and ending on the 30th June of next following.\n\nOne of the purposes Of the annual\n\n-\" general meeting is election of the members of the committee of management in accordance with the provisions of the rules and of the bye-laws of the society.\n\nRule 409 is as,, follows :-\n\n\"For the pur_J?oses of election to the membership of the committee of management a co-operative society may, with the previous sanction of the Registrar-\n\n( a) divide its membership into different groups on territorial or any other rational basis, and\n\n(b) also specify the number or proportion of the member of the committee of management in such a manner that different areas or interests, as the case may be, in the soclety may, as far as may be, get suitable representation on the committee or management.\"\n\nIn order to appreciate as to how rule 409 comes up for consideration in the present case it is necessary to refer to facts in Civil Appeal No. ,1533 (N) of 1971 as a typical case.\n\nThe Shamli Cane Development Union Ltd., Shammli. U.P. was registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912, It was deemed to be registered under the Act. The society had its E bye-laws with regard to the formation of the committee of management and its election including the election of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman.\n\nThe bye-laws provided for a committee of management consisting of. 14 members. The committee of management elects a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman. The delegates constituting the general body of the society are divided into p 14 constituencies.\n\nEach constituency elects one Director.\n\nThe delegates of the members of the society in a constituency elect a member of each single member constituency. The 14 members of the committee are elected on that basis whereby each delegate of each constituency exercises one vote for electing a member of that constituency.\n\nG The Secretary of the society fixed 13 October. 1970 as the date for filing the nomination for the office of the committee of management. 17 October, 1970 was the date for scrutiny of nomination papers. 19 October, 1970 was the date for withdrawal of nomination papers. 28 October, 1970 was the date of poll. By a letter dated 14 October, 1970 the Registrar, Co- .\n\nII operative Societies directed t.'iat \"the election of the members of the managing committee shall be done by all the representatives of the area of the society and not by the representatives of the related constituencies alone.\n\nThis means that every representative ll-L864Sup.Cl/72 .\n\nshall have as many votes as the members are to be elected\":· Ill A short, the Registrar's. inlerpretation of rule 409 as well as 1he letter stated that each delegate would vote for 14 members of the committee of management and thus each delegate would exercise 14 votes.\n\nThe rival contentions which.fall for determination are whether I the right of vote for eleetion of a member of the coiiuni.ttee ot mana, gement is confined to the delegates of the members of that particular constituency or whether a delegate would have the right to vote for all the constituencies constituting the committee of management.\n\nAs to the power of the Registrar. to interpret rule 409 it will C appear that the rule does not confer any power on the Registrar to interpret or to express views to guide the lights of members .to vote at the annual general meeting for the purposes of election cl the committee of management. On the contrary, under rule 409 the Co-operative Society may with the previous .sanction of the Registrar ( i) divide its membership into different groups on . tertj; 0 to rial or any other rational basis and .(ii) also specify the numbeJ or propoition of the members of the committee of management in such a manner that dilferent areas or interests, as the case may be, in the society may, as far.as may be, get suilable representatioo on the committee of management. Therefore, under rule 409 a co-operative society can divide its membership into different a groups on territorial or any other rational bru; is for. the pUfP95C' of election of the mem.Qers of the committee. Tbc rule also cmt•\n\npowers the . society to apportion the membership of the committot of management amongst .different groups intQ. which the member• ship is divided. The number or proportion of members of the committee of management will have to be apportioned in such a ., manner that the dilferent areas or interests into which the meni. bership of the society are .. divided may pbtain suitable represcn• Ill lion on the committee of management. The entire purpose , of division of membership into different groups and specifying :luitable representation of such group on the committee .of .. manage, ment is to emphasise the right of the particular group to send its representative to the committee. To illustrate if. a . !Ociety is cl divided into 14 separate groups on a territorial basis and one membciit of the cpmmittee cl management is allotted to' each group\n\nand :if delegates of one group have the right to cast 14 .voti!S t'No consequences will follow.\n\nFirst, the right of cho0$ittg a 'rq!i'esentative 'Of tfie constituency will be! 'not confined to that• co!IM$. tuency but will be enlarged to 91Jtiliders in other des. K Secondly; a member of the committee from one constituency nmy be elected by a majority of votes. , f'ifnii delegates of other OOrJ.su:. tuencies. If delegares residing otiide a' territorial c6ilstitllency\n\n. ZILBY SINGH v. CANB COOPBRATIVB SOCIBTIBS (Ray, I.) 155\n\nA take part at the election for member of a committee from territorial constituency within which he is not a resident it will not only amollll't to enlarging the right of representation be)'ond one'• territorial basis but also 'deny the delegate. within the constituency the right of electing their own representative.\n\nB It Wllfi s!IJ.d on behalf of the appellants that section 20 of the Act speaks of a member of the co-operative society having one vote in tlie affairs of the society with the result that each member is entitled to exercise as many votes as the members of the committee of management. Accent was placed on the words 'affairs\n\nof the society' and it was said that the constitution of the come mittee of management was one of the principal affairs of the society and therefore each member would bl:: entitle9. to cast as many votes as the strength of the committee .ol' management. The fallacy lies in overlooking the significant words in secticn 20 !Jf the Act that a member shall have one vote. It may also be noticed that if each member exercises by way of illustration 14 votes in regard to 14 members of the committee each member shall be.exercising D 14 votes in the affairs of the society.\n\nUnder rule 409 the principal matters to be kept in the forefront are these.\n\nFirst, the society will divide the constituencies on territorial basis or any other rational basis. By territorial basis is meant territory where. the member will reside.\n\nResidence is E thetefore the relative requirement of territorial basis. If any other rational basis like .occupation or vocation is determined to be the .basis of a constituency the persons falling within the constituenoy .will satisfy that test.\n\nSecondly, the society will specify the proportion af members of the committee in such a manner that different areas or interests may get suitable representation.\n\nThe inherent idea is that such areas or interests will obtain repre- F enttion. ,, Jf bership is on territorial basis the different areas wlll get' representation according to .the interest of such territories.\n\nAgain, if occu1?ational or vocational or professional tests are\n\nreated . for diV1d~ groups such interests will have to be given $Uitable rePreseJ\\tation. Representation is therefore with reference to areas or interests. Judged by these principles the impeached G circl!lar of the Registrar suffers from the vice of giving the members the ri.dit of •casting vote in constituencies to which they do not belong. This strikes at the basic root of right of representation. This also reads as under the principle of one member one vote which is made into a rule of law in the Act. [15 5 E-G]\n\nThe words 'affairs of the society' cannot be equated with the H Constituencies to give each member a right to vote for each constituency.\n\nThat would defeat the purpose of section 20 and rule\n\n409. Tho basic idea of a representative for each constituency\n\ndepends on the mandate of the respective COllStituency and not A of other constituencies. That.is why section 20 of the. Act speaks of one member having one vote irre>pective of shardwlding. It means equality of votes of members.\n\nThe constitution of the committee of management is indisputably one of the affairs of the society. If each member exercises B franchise with respect to the representation from his constituency he is not in any manner prevented from having a right to partake in the affairs of the society through a member elected from the constituency.\n\nSome reliance was placed by counsel for the appellants on rule 105 in support of the contention that every member would C have one vote for each member of the committee of management.\n\nRule 105 occurs in Chapter VII relating to meetings and speaks of matters before a committee being decided by a majority of vobls of the members present. That rule obviously has no reference to election but only to passing of resolution by majority at meetings.\n\nIt is obvious that members of the committee of management will D have the right to vote at all matters at the meeting and matters will be decided by a majority of votes.\n\nThe impeached circular of the Registrar is illegal and unwarranted Registrar has no power to iDterptet rule 409. The Registrar has equally no power to eKpreSS view with regard to conduct of the election and regulate the V01ing rights by giving the members _ K more than one vote. The society. is to frame rules •for lections.\n\nRuley require the sanction of the Registrar. Tiie rules and the bye-laws cannot be in derogatiQn of the statute and statutory rules. At an election of members of the committee of management one member will have only one vote for the constituency to which he belongs.\n\nThe result is that the elections which were held follbwing the circular of the Registrar are bad.\n\nFor these reasons the three appeals fail and are dismissed.\n\nThe two 'special leave petitions are illso dismissed. Parties will pay and bear their own costs.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 63, "entities": [{"text": "ZILEY SINGH, ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ZILEY SINGH, ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "REGISTRAR, CANE COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES,\n\nLUCKNOW AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "REGISTRAR, CANE COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES, LUCKNOW AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 281, "end_char": 286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 510, "end_char": 515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cooperative Societies Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 528, "end_char": 559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act namely the Cooperative Societies Rules, 1967", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 729, "end_char": 777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1296, "end_char": 1299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act namely the Cooperative Societies Rules, 1967", "statute": "the Act namely the Cooperative Societies Rules, 1967"}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3382, "end_char": 3387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3525, "end_char": 3530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3698, "end_char": 3703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 98(i)(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4948, "end_char": 4959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cooperative Societies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4965, "end_char": 4990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5191, "end_char": 5201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cooperative Societies Act", "statute": "Cooperative Societies Act"}}, {"text": "CO-Operative Societies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5211, "end_char": 5237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "J. P. Goyal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5241, "end_char": 5252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. P. Goyal and V. C. Partishar, for the appellants (in C.As."}}, {"text": "V. C. Partishar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5257, "end_char": 5272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. P. Goyal and V. C. Partishar, for the appellants (in C.As."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5385, "end_char": 5395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3268 of 1971)\n\nR. K. Garg, S .. C. Agrawal and R. K. Jain, for the appellants (in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Garg"}}, {"text": "S .. C. Agrawal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5397, "end_char": 5412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3268 of 1971)\n\nR. K. Garg, S .. C. Agrawal and R. K. Jain, for the appellants (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "R. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5417, "end_char": 5427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3268 of 1971)\n\nR. K. Garg, S .. C. Agrawal and R. K. Jain, for the appellants (in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Jain"}}, {"text": "C. B. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5530, "end_char": 5543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3254 ot 1971) ff C. B. Agarwal and P. P. Juneja, lor respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "C. B. Agarwal"}}, {"text": "P. P. Juneja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5548, "end_char": 5560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3254 ot 1971) ff C. B. Agarwal and P. P. Juneja, lor respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5630, "end_char": 5637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5746, "end_char": 5760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal and R. K. Jain, for the intervener."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5762, "end_char": 5772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal and R. K. Jain, for the intervener.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Garg"}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5774, "end_char": 5787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal and R. K. Jain, for the intervener.", "canonical_name": "C. B. Agarwal"}}, {"text": "R. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5792, "end_char": 5802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal and R. K. Jain, for the intervener.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Jain"}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5870, "end_char": 5873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Court was delivered by\n\nRay, J. These three appeals are by special leave."}}, {"text": "Co-operative Societies Rules, 1967", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6202, "end_char": 6236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Societies Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6283, "end_char": 6302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cooperative Societies Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6510, "end_char": 6541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 70 and 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6583, "end_char": 6600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cooperative Societies Act, 1965", "statute": "Cooperative Societies Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "Co-operative Societies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6613, "end_char": 6639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 98(i)(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6903, "end_char": 6919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Co-operative Societies Act", "statute": "Co-operative Societies Act"}}, {"text": "Co-operative Societies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6932, "end_char": 6958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Co-operative Societies Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7042, "end_char": 7074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 98(i)(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7319, "end_char": 7335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Co-operative Societies Act, 1965", "statute": "Co-operative Societies Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "sections 70 and 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7378, "end_char": 7396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Co-operative Societies Act, 1965", "statute": "Co-operative Societies Act, 1965"}}, {"text": "Co-operative Socies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7409, "end_char": 7432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Co-operative Societies Rules, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7789, "end_char": 7823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7954, "end_char": 7964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Co-operative Societies Rules, 1968", "statute": "Co-operative Societies Rules, 1968"}}, {"text": "Societies Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7999, "end_char": 8018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Committee of Management of the Society", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8092, "end_char": 8130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A( the general meetings the members of the Committee of Management of the Society were elected by members of the Society."}}, {"text": "Co-operative Societies Rules, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8301, "end_char": 8335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 20, 29 and 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8953, "end_char": 8975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Co-operative Societies Rules, 1968", "statute": "Co-operative Societies Rules, 1968"}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8988, "end_char": 8998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Co-operative Societies Rules, 1968", "statute": "Co-operative Societies Rules, 1968"}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9244, "end_char": 9254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Co-operative Societies Rules, 1968", "statute": "Co-operative Societies Rules, 1968"}}, {"text": "State\n\nWarhousing Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9388, "end_char": 9417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Proviso (b) deals with a co-operative society, the State\n\nWarhousing Corporation or a body corporate being a member of such society in which case each delegate of such co-operative society, State Warehous_ing Corporation or body corporate shall have one vote."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9651, "end_char": 9669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Proviso (c) deals with the State Government or the [) Central Government being a member of such society in which case a nominee of the State Government or the Central Government shall have one vote."}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9966, "end_char": 9976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32(i)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10425, "end_char": 10441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11091, "end_char": 11101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shamli Cane Development Union Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12238, "end_char": 12272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Shamli Cane Development Union Ltd., Shammli."}}, {"text": "Co-operative Societies Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12313, "end_char": 12345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "13 October. 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13163, "end_char": 13179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G The Secretary of the society fixed 13 October."}}, {"text": "17 October, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13265, "end_char": 13281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17 October, 1970 was the date for scrutiny of nomination papers."}}, {"text": "19 October, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13330, "end_char": 13346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 October, 1970 was the date for withdrawal of nomination papers."}}, {"text": "28 October, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13397, "end_char": 13413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "28 October, 1970 was the date of poll."}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17140, "end_char": 17150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19617, "end_char": 19627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19803, "end_char": 19813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_157_164_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "BALKISllANDAS & 1.Z OTHERS\n\nSTATE BANK OF HYDERAUAD AND ANR.\n\nJalfUary 20, 1972\n\n[K. S. HEGDE, P. JAGANMOHAN RBDDY AND D. 0. PALBKAR, JJ.]\n\nHyderabad Jaglrdars Debt Settlement Act, 1952-S. 11 and 25-IU scope-Mortgage executed In favour of Bank-Whethtr extinguished by virtue of S. 11 and 25 of the Act,\n\nRespondent I, a bank, filed a suit against appellants Nos. 1 to 4, mem hers of a joint family, for the recovery cif Rs. 5 lakbs on the basis of a mortgage deed executed in favour of the bank, by securing certain im movable properties without possession.\n\nDefendant No. 5 became a guarantor for the amount borrowed and executed a separate guarantee in favour of the Bank. The appellants, who were Iagirdars, had money transactions with the bank prior to the execution of the mortgage on three separate accounts. The accounts were however, closed by /'ayment from the amount of Rs. 5 lakhs advanced to them on the basis o the Mortgage deed .. As the defendants failed to pay the amounts which fell due under the terms of the mortgage, a suit was filed against all the ddfendants. The firm and the 5th defendant remained ex-parte, but defendants Nos. 2-4 defended the suit. The trial court, decred the suit against the appell\"'!ts and the High Court also confirmed the Judgment and decree of the. trial court. In an appeal by certificate, two main points were urged:-(!) that the suit debts were extinguished under S. 22 of the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act 1952, inasmuch as no application was presented by\n\nthe Bank u/s. 11 of the Act before the 30th June, 1953 which was the notified date and (2) the civil court had no jurisdiction to lry the suit be\n\ncause u/s 25 of the Act, all suits and proceedings for the recovery of a debt from a Jagirdar had to be transferred to the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board, which alone bad jurisdiction to oettlo it. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the mortgage executed by the appellants did not create any new debt but merely secured the payment of pnor debts which was the balance due to the Bank on the 3 accounts as on the date of the mortgage which debts were pending debts within the meaning of S. 25(1).\n\nDimiisaina the appeal,\n\nHELD : (i) From the terms of the mortgage deed, it was clear that the debt of lb. 5 lalcb1 was a freth debt created by and secured thereunder with intereot that may become due from the date of the mortgage and that there was no 'lu .. tlon of the mortgage deed having been executed as a aettlement of pnor debts so as to attract the provisions of Sections 11 and 25 of the Act. [163 Al\n\n(ii) The eipression 'pending' in Section 25 related to proceedinp which were pending on the notified date and.could not mean any pl-oceedings which were instit)lted after such date. In the facts and circumstances of the case the: del>.t created by !00 mortgaae deed is a fresh debt and ff therefore, the ~1oviaions of s. II and 2S are not attracted. [161 El\n\nJoint ftzmi/Y .o(Mukund Doss v. Stat• Bank of Hyd1rabad, {1971) 2 S.C.R. 136, followed.\n\n(iii) Once the proviliom of S. 11 and 25 wore shown to be not appli- A .. cable, the civil court had jurisdiction to try the suit and the decree granted by the Trial Court and confirmed by the Appellate Gour! did not suffer from. any infirmity. [163 HJ\n\nSlllle of JltJjasthan v. Mukund Chand, t1964] 6 S.C.R. 903, and Stale Bank of Hydmzbad v. Mukunda Rafa Bhagwandaa & Ors., 1963\n\n(II) Aildhra Weekly Reporter 14, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 547 of 1967.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated November 14, 1966 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Original Side Appeal No. 9 of 1959.\n\nA. R. Somnath Iyer, R. K. P. Shankardass, R. V. Ramarao and P. K. Pillai, for the appellants. ·\n\nS. V. Gupte, A. V. Rangam and A. Subhashini, for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nP. Jaganmoban Reddy, J. This appeal is by certificate against the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court which confirmed the judgment and decree of a single Judge of the Original _Side of that Court. The first respondent Blink filed a suit against the appellants-defendants Nos. 1-4 who are members E of the joint family finn, for tlie recovery o( a sum of I.G.\n\nRs. 5,00,000/- on the basis of a mortgage deed executed by them in favour or the Bank by securing certain immovable properties without possession. As a further security, the first defendant on behalf of the joint family, caused the 5th defendant-respondent 2 to guarantee the amount borrowed from the Bank and accordingly he executed a promissory note in favour of the 5th defendant on F 26-9-1953 for Rs. 5;00,000/- which he in turn endorsed in favour of the Bank. The 5th defendant also executed a separate guarantee in favour of the said Bani>. on the same date. As the defendants failed to pay the amounts which fell due under .the terms of the mortgage, a suit was filed as aforesaid against all the defendants. The 1st defendant who was the manager and Karta of the G joint family remained ex-parte. The 5th defendant though he appeared in the Court, did not file any written statement and chose to remain ex-parte throughout. Defendants 2-4 alone filed written statements resisting the suit on several pleas, two of which alone may be noticed for the purposes of this appeal, namely, (i) that the suit debts were extinguished under section 22 of. the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act 1952 (hereinafter called 'the Act'); inasmuch as no application was presented by the Bank under section 11 of. the Act before 30th June 1953 which was the notified\n\nA date; and (ii) the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit as under section 25 of the Act all suits and proceedings for the recovery of a debt due from a Jagirdar have to be transferred to the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board which alone had jursidiction to settle it. It appears that the appellants who it is admitted arc Jagirdars had money transactions with the Bank prior to the exc- B cution of the mortgage on three separate accounts.\n\nUltimately these accounts were closed by payment from the amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- advanced to them by the Bank on a cash credit account secured by the aforesaid mortgage deed. It was contended that as the amounts due on the three earlier accounts to the Bank were debts which were pending on the date of the Act and c since these loans were secured by the mortgage, the provisions of the Act are applicable and the debts got extinguished as the Bank had not applied under section 11 before 30-6-1953 to refer them for seitlement by the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board.\n\nThe trial court on the evidence held tliat the amounts due from the appellants on the three old accounts were Rs. 5,00,000/- made D up of (a)· Rs. 2,59,436-0-0 on the L.B.D.\n\nAccount; (b) Rs. 2,05,358-8-8 on Overdraft Accoun'I: (Clean) Ledger No.\n\n14) Dwarkadas Mukandas;\n\n(c) Rs. 35,205-7-4 on Overdraft Account (Clean) (Ledger No. 2) Dwarkadas Mukundas. It further held that at the request of the appellants they were granted by the first respondent a cash credit to the extent of Rs. 5,00,000/- E and in compliance with the terms of sanction the appellants executed a mortgage deed (Ex. P-10) in favour of the Bank; that from the fresh cash credit account which was opened on 8-8-1953 in the name of the appellant firm with the Bank, the appellants cleared the earlier liabilities under the three accounts mentioned a bcve which were closed and that on the same date the Bank F returned to the appellants thirteen bills duly endorsed in favour of the appellant firm. On these facts, the trial court held lhat as the 1st respondent was a Scheduled Bank, the provisions of the Act would not be applicable lfy virtue of section 3 ( v) and accordingly the Civil Court would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The suit was, therefore, decreed against the appellants and the second respandent, :against which an original side appeal was G filed in the High Court.\n\nBy the time the appeal came up for hearing a Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court in the case of State Bank of Hyderabad v. Mukundas Raja Bhilgwa11das and Sons and Ors.,(') held that under section 25(1) of theAct, ill\n\nsuits; appeals, applications for exeeution and proceedings othet than revisions, taken before the Courts in regard to debts for which applications under section 11 of that Act could be made to the H Board and involve the questions as to the status of the Debtor and the total extent of his debts; are liable to be transferred if they\n\n(1) (!963) (Il) Andhra Weekly Reporter, 147.\n\n160 SUl'RB)oill COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nwere P.ending on the date notified under section 11, i.e. 30-6-1953.\n\nA But, 1f they were filed after that date, they are liable to be transferred only on notice by the Board by reason of an application under section 11 or statement under section 21 of the Act. All othet suits, appeals, applications for execution or other proceedings, including cases relating to debts incurred subsequent to the notified date are clearly beyond the purvisw of section 25 and B are not liable to be transferred to the Board, as the Board itself cannot deal with such suits or proceedings because of the liinitations placed in the Act. What is meant by the expression 'pending' in section 25 ( 1) was interpreted as pending on the notified date. ln view of this decision, the questions that were urged before C the appellate court were whether the debt was a post-notification debt or a pre-notification debt, namely, whether it was contracted after 30-6-1953 or prior to that date. If it was a pre-notification debt, the said debt would be extinguished by virtue of ection 22 ·· of the Act. Even if it was a post-notification debt, it was urged that the civil court would not have jurisdiction under section 25 D notwithstanding the judgment of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court referred to above. Further, section 3 of the Act was also challenged as ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution of India on the application of the decision.of the Supreme Court in thi;_§tate of Rpjasthan v. Mukand Chand. (1 ) It was held by the B_ench that the drawing of money in the new account and the payment into the old accounts had discharged the old E debts which could not form the basis of a suit ap; ainst the defendants for recovery of the said amounts.\n\nAccordingly, following the Full Bench judgment, it was held that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the debt was a post-notification debt and in this view confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court.\n\nF In this appeal on the reasoning of the Court in Mukandchand's case(') the provisions of seotion 3 exempting Scheduled Banks frcm the application of the provisions of the Act equally offend Article 14 as was section 2(e) of the Rajasthan Act which was analogous so that the 1st respolldent's debts to a Jagirdar are liable to be challenged under any of the provisions of the Act like Q those of any pther creditor to whom section 3 was not made applicable.\n\nBefore dealing with the contentions raised before us, it is necessary to state that as a consequence of the abolition of Jagirs by the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs Regulation) 1358 Fasli (1949 A.D.) and the Hyderabad Jagirs (Commutation Regulation) 1359 F (1950 A.D.) passed on 25-1-1950, the re- 8 sources of the Jagirdars were greately affected and as a consequence the creditors of those J agirdars were also faced with a\n\n\nBALKISHAN v. STAT!! liANK (laganmohan Reddy, J.)\n\n!GI\n\ndifficult situation which affected their prospects of .recovering the loans.\n\nIt, therefore, becallle necessary to enact legislation to provide for this continge.ncy. It was in this background that the Act was passed which incorporated the provisions analogous to the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act 1947.\n\nUnder the scheme of the Act a Debt Settlement Board was created and the creditors who had claims against the erstwhile Jagirdars were required under section 11 to make application within the notified date, which as we have earlier stated, was 30-6-53, for settlement of their debts. This court had in another case between the same parties-It. Family of Mukund Das Raja Bhagwan Dass & Sons\n\netc. v. Staie Bank of Hyderabad,(') to which one of us was a party ( Hegde J), considered the scope and ambit of the Act and it is, therefore, unnecessary for us again to traverse the same ground. In th; tt case a similar question as that which falls for determination in this case was considered, namely, what are the conditions for the applicability of section 25 of the Act which provide for transfer of pending suits, appeals, applications and proceedings to the Board and deprive the civil courts of jurisdictio,1 in respect of debts which were the subject-matter of these proceedings. In that case tiledecision of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court to which reference has been made earlier, was also considered and its conclusion tllat tile expression 'pending' in sec. 25 relates to proceedings which were pending on the notified date and could not take in any proceedings. which came to be instituted after such date was approved. After examining the scheme and the several relevant provisions of. the Act it was held that the suit or proceedings must be pending on the notified date and could not take in any proceedings which came to be instituted after such date, and that they must be in respect of a debt with regard to which a Jagirdar or a creditor could make an application to tile Board on or before the notified date. Thus, only those debts which were due on or before the notified date from a debtor or in respect of which any proceedings were pending in any Court or ore the Board could be the -subject-matter of the settlement by the Board.. In that case the suit was filed by the respondent Bank on July 1956 against the appellant for the recovery of Rs. 40,000/- on account of cash credit account opened by the appellant with the respondent. The suit was decreed and in 1959 the Bank filed an execution petition for executing the decree. It was urged that the execution petition should be transferred to the J agirdars Debt. Settlement Board under section 25 of the Act. While negativing this contention, Grover J, observed at page 142 :-\n\n\"In our judgment the High Court came to the correct couclilsion that the expression 'pending' in s. 25 ( 1)\n\n\nmust relate to proceedings which were pending on the notified date and could not take m any proceedings which came to be instituted after such date. The other condition for the applicability of s. 25 was that the suit .or other proceedings must be in respect of a debt with regard to which a Jagirdar or the creditor could make an application to the Board on or before the date which the Government had notified for settlement of debts due by the Jagirdar. A close examination of s. 22 puts the matter beyond controversy. If no application had been made under s. 11 within the period specified therein or for recording a 'setUement made under s. 15 every debt due by the debtor was to stand extiillguished.\n\nIn a case of the present kind a debt would have stood extinguished if no application had been made under s. 11. within the specified period. Thus the material date would be the one notified It' the Government under s. 11 'and only those debts which were due on or before that date from a debtor or in respect of which any proceedings were pending in a court or before the Board would be the subject-matter of settlement by the Board\".\n\nIn view of this legal position, on behalf of the appellant it is urged that the mortgage executed by the appellants did not create any new debt but merely secured the payment of prior debts which\n\nwa~ the balance due to the Bank on the 3 accounts as on the date\n\nof the mortgage which debts were pending debts within the mean- E ing of ~. 25 ( 1). On this basis, it is contended that as no application was made under s. 11 in respect of the prior debts, the debts became extinguished and accordingly the mortgage deed lacked consideration to make it enforceable. Apart from the f:ict that both the courts on the evidence and on an interpretation of the mortgage deed, held that the mortgage transaction was in respect F of a fresh loan advanced to the appellants under that deed, no plea that the debt was not supported by consideration or that the earlier debts had been extinguished was either raised before the trial court or before the appellate .court. The learned advocate, however, referred us to prayer in para 9 of the written statement in which a plea was taken that the suit is not maintainable and G that \"the plaintiff ought to have submitted its claim before the Debts Settlement Board\". This plea is general in character and does not indicate that the suit is liable to be dismissed as the mortgage is unsupported by consideration. There was also neither an is.•ue in tire trial court nor has any ground been taken in the Memo of Appeal though as many as 75 grounds were urged agairist the judgment of the trial court.\n\nWe cannot, therefore, permit the H appellant to raise any contention based on the mortgage being unenforceable for want of consideration for the first time in this Court.\n\nA A perusal of the terms of , the mortgage deed clearly justifies the conclusions that the loan of Rs. 5,00,000/- was a fresh debt created by the mortgage deed. There is unimpeachable evidence to show, and this bas been accepted by both the courts that all the three prioi debts were paid from out of Rs. 5,00, oOo/- cash\" credit loan granted to the appellants under the mortgage deed B and the 13 bills of excli'ange, the time for payment of which had not fallen due and some of which were executed by parties other than the appellants, were endorsed in favour of the appellants and returned to them as a consequence of the discharge of the debts due on the 'three prior accounts.\n\nThe mortgage deed states that the properties detailed in C schedule annexed thereto were being mortgaged without possession as better security for the repayment of the sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- under the deed together with interest accruing in future and all other sums thereby secured. Clause 1 \"of the deed states that the mortgagor shall repay the said sum of Rs. 5,00,000 and all other sums secured thereunder within a period of 5 years from the date, D in \"the manner and subject to the conditions detailed thereafter~\n\nthat the mortgagors shall pay interest on the said sum oi Rs. 5,00,000/- or such other sum that may remain due from them to the mortgagees from time to time at the rate of six per cent per annum till the whole amount is fully repaid; that the mortgagors shall pay the interest accruing due every three months without E default, that the principal sum of not less than Rs. 1,00,000/·\n\nwas to be paid per year by the end of each year following; and that the pavments towards the principal shall not be less than Rs. 5.000/: at a time per month and the balance to make up Rs. 1,00, ffOO/- per annum payable shall be paid before the expiry of each year following. There are other terms to which it is not necessary to refer except the last one by which it is agreed that \"If the mortgagors commit breach of any of the conditions and covenants and the mortgage money becomes payable either by F\n\nreason of default or any other cause whatsoeve< and the mort gagors fail to pay the amount due on demand, the mortgagee will be entitled to sue and bring to sale the said properties hereby mortgaged and if the sale proceeds are not sufficient to satisfy G the mortgagee decree the mortgagors will pay the said balance personally and from their other properties both movable and immovable\". From the terms of this mortgagee it is evident that the.debt of Rs. 5,00,000/- is a fresh debt created by and secured thereunder with interest that may become due from\"\" the date of the mortgage and that there is, therefore, no question of the mort- H gage deed having been execute<! as a settlement of prior debts so as to attract the provisions of sections 11 and 25 of the Act.\n\nIn this view, the Civil Court had jurisdic\\ion and the decree\n\nwanted by the trial court and confirmed by the appellate court\n\n<loes .Hot suffer from any infirmity.\n\nThe appellants have asked fer a direction to allow them to pay the decretal amount by instalments but we do not think that there is any justification for granting this prayer.\n\nThe respondent, however, is prepared to give them time for payment provided half the amount is paid within a certain period and the balance thereof thereafter so that the entire decretal amount is payable within a year from the dat~ of this judgment.\n\nWe accordingly direct the appellants to pay within four months from the date of the judgment half the decretal amount with interest due thereon and the balance thereof together with further interest within 8 months thereafter. If half the decretal amount is not paid within four months as directed, the first respondent will be free to execute the entire decree. With these directions the appeal is dismissed with costs. s.c.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "BALKISllANDAS", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 13, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BALKISllANDAS & 1.Z OTHERS\n\nSTATE BANK OF HYDERAUAD AND ANR."}}, {"text": "STATE BANK OF HYDERAUAD AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE BANK OF HYDERABAD AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Hyderabad Jaglrdars Debt Settlement Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 11 and 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 186, "end_char": 198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hyderabad Jaglrdars Debt Settlement Act, 1952", "statute": "Hyderabad Jaglrdars Debt Settlement Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "S. 11 and 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 278, "end_char": 290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hyderabad Jaglrdars Debt Settlement Act, 1952", "statute": "Hyderabad Jaglrdars Debt Settlement Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "S. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1416, "end_char": 1421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1429, "end_char": 1473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1531, "end_char": 1536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act 1952", "statute": "the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act 1952"}}, {"text": "30th June, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1559, "end_char": 1574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the suit debts were extinguished under S. 22 of the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act 1952, inasmuch as no application was presented by\n\nthe Bank u/s. 11 of the Act before the 30th June, 1953 which was the notified date and (2) the civil court had no jurisdiction to lry the suit be\n\ncause u/s 25 of the Act, all suits and proceedings for the recovery of a debt from a Jagirdar had to be transferred to the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board, which alone bad jurisdiction to oettlo it."}}, {"text": "s 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1675, "end_char": 1679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act 1952", "statute": "the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act 1952"}}, {"text": "Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1790, "end_char": 1821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the suit debts were extinguished under S. 22 of the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act 1952, inasmuch as no application was presented by\n\nthe Bank u/s. 11 of the Act before the 30th June, 1953 which was the notified date and (2) the civil court had no jurisdiction to lry the suit be\n\ncause u/s 25 of the Act, all suits and proceedings for the recovery of a debt from a Jagirdar had to be transferred to the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board, which alone bad jurisdiction to oettlo it."}}, {"text": "S. 25(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2169, "end_char": 2177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act 1952", "statute": "the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act 1952"}}, {"text": "Dimiisaina", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2180, "end_char": 2190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dimiisaina the appeal,\n\nHELD : (i) From the terms of the mortgage deed, it was clear that the debt of lb."}}, {"text": "Sections 11 and 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2551, "end_char": 2569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2624, "end_char": 2634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1971) 2 S.C.R. 136", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3008, "end_char": 3026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 11 and 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3067, "end_char": 3079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1964] 6 S.C.R. 903", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3333, "end_char": 3351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3468, "end_char": 3496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "A. R. Somnath Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3663, "end_char": 3681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. R. Somnath Iyer, R. K. P. Shankardass, R. V. Ramarao and P. K. Pillai, for the appellants. ·"}}, {"text": "R. K. P. Shankardass", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3683, "end_char": 3703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. R. Somnath Iyer, R. K. P. Shankardass, R. V. Ramarao and P. K. Pillai, for the appellants. ·"}}, {"text": "R. V. Ramarao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3705, "end_char": 3718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. R. Somnath Iyer, R. K. P. Shankardass, R. V. Ramarao and P. K. Pillai, for the appellants. ·"}}, {"text": "P. K. Pillai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3723, "end_char": 3735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. R. Somnath Iyer, R. K. P. Shankardass, R. V. Ramarao and P. K. Pillai, for the appellants. ·"}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3760, "end_char": 3771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, A. V. Rangam and A. Subhashini, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3773, "end_char": 3785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, A. V. Rangam and A. Subhashini, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3790, "end_char": 3803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, A. V. Rangam and A. Subhashini, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. Jaganmoban Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3872, "end_char": 3891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nP. Jaganmoban Reddy, J. This appeal is by certificate against the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court which confirmed the judgment and decree of a single Judge of the Original _Side of that Court.", "canonical_name": "P. Jaganmoban Reddy"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3954, "end_char": 3979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nP. Jaganmoban Reddy, J. This appeal is by certificate against the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court which confirmed the judgment and decree of a single Judge of the Original _Side of that Court."}}, {"text": "Blink", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4096, "end_char": 4101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first respondent Blink filed a suit against the appellants-defendants Nos."}}, {"text": "26-9-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4626, "end_char": 4635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a further security, the first defendant on behalf of the joint family, caused the 5th defendant-respondent 2 to guarantee the amount borrowed from the Bank and accordingly he executed a promissory note in favour of the 5th defendant on F 26-9-1953 for Rs."}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5377, "end_char": 5387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5396, "end_char": 5440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5532, "end_char": 5542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act 1952", "statute": "the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act 1952"}}, {"text": "30th June 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5562, "end_char": 5576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Act before 30th June 1953 which was the notified\n\nA date; and (ii) the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit as under section 25 of the Act all suits and proceedings for the recovery of a debt due from a Jagirdar have to be transferred to the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board which alone had jursidiction to settle it."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5679, "end_char": 5689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act 1952", "statute": "the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act 1952"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6525, "end_char": 6535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30-6-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6543, "end_char": 6552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended that as the amounts due on the three earlier accounts to the Bank were debts which were pending on the date of the Act and c since these loans were secured by the mortgage, the provisions of the Act are applicable and the debts got extinguished as the Bank had not applied under section 11 before 30-6-1953 to refer them for seitlement by the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board."}}, {"text": "Dwarkadas Mukandas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6875, "end_char": 6893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14) Dwarkadas Mukandas;\n\n(c) Rs.", "canonical_name": "Dwarkadas Mukandas"}}, {"text": "Dwarkadas Mukundas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6959, "end_char": 6977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) Dwarkadas Mukundas.", "canonical_name": "Dwarkadas Mukandas"}}, {"text": "8-8-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7302, "end_char": 7310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-10) in favour of the Bank; that from the fresh cash credit account which was opened on 8-8-1953 in the name of the appellant firm with the Bank, the appellants cleared the earlier liabilities under the three accounts mentioned a bcve which were closed and that on the same date the Bank F returned to the appellants thirteen bills duly endorsed in favour of the appellant firm."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7743, "end_char": 7752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hyderabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8054, "end_char": 8074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the time the appeal came up for hearing a Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court in the case of State Bank of Hyderabad v. Mukundas Raja Bhilgwa11das and Sons and Ors.,(')"}}, {"text": "section 25(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8182, "end_char": 8195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8365, "end_char": 8375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8682, "end_char": 8692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8850, "end_char": 8860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8880, "end_char": 8890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9087, "end_char": 9097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9306, "end_char": 9316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9826, "end_char": 9836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9947, "end_char": 9956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10006, "end_char": 10016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10024, "end_char": 10045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10088, "end_char": 10101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, section 3 of the Act was also challenged as ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution of India on the application of the decision.of the Supreme Court in thi;§tate of Rpjasthan v. Mukand Chand. ("}}, {"text": "Mukandchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10675, "end_char": 10686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F In this appeal on the reasoning of the Court in Mukandchand's case(') the provisions of seotion 3 exempting Scheduled Banks frcm the application of the provisions of the Act equally offend Article 14 as was section 2(e) of the Rajasthan Act which was analogous so that the 1st respolldent's debts to a Jagirdar are liable to be challenged under any of the provisions of the Act like Q those of any pther creditor to whom section 3 was not made applicable."}}, {"text": "Scheduled Banks frcm the application of the provisions of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10735, "end_char": 10800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10816, "end_char": 10826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Scheduled Banks frcm the application of the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Scheduled Banks frcm the application of the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 2(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10834, "end_char": 10846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Scheduled Banks frcm the application of the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Scheduled Banks frcm the application of the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11048, "end_char": 11057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Scheduled Banks frcm the application of the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Scheduled Banks frcm the application of the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "Abolition of Jagirs Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11230, "end_char": 11260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "25-1-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11364, "end_char": 11373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before dealing with the contentions raised before us, it is necessary to state that as a consequence of the abolition of Jagirs by the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs Regulation) 1358 Fasli (1949 A.D.) and the Hyderabad Jagirs (Commutation Regulation) 1359 F (1950 A.D.) passed on 25-1-1950, the re- 8 sources of the Jagirdars were greately affected and as a consequence the creditors of those J agirdars were also faced with a\n\nBALKISHAN v. STAT!!"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12031, "end_char": 12041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It was in this background that the Act was passed which incorporated the provisions analogous to the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act 1947", "statute": "It was in this background that the Act was passed which incorporated the provisions analogous to the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act 1947"}}, {"text": "30-6-53", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12125, "end_char": 12132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the scheme of the Act a Debt Settlement Board was created and the creditors who had claims against the erstwhile Jagirdars were required under section 11 to make application within the notified date, which as we have earlier stated, was 30-6-53, for settlement of their debts."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12627, "end_char": 12637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It was in this background that the Act was passed which incorporated the provisions analogous to the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act 1947", "statute": "It was in this background that the Act was passed which incorporated the provisions analogous to the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act 1947"}}, {"text": "sec. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13056, "end_char": 13063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J agirdars Debt. Settlement Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14216, "end_char": 14249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged that the execution petition should be transferred to the J agirdars Debt."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14256, "end_char": 14266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Grover", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14313, "end_char": 14319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While negativing this contention, Grover J, observed at page 142 :-\n\n\"In our judgment the High Court came to the correct couclilsion that the expression 'pending' in s. 25 ( 1)\n\nmust relate to proceedings which were pending on the notified date and could not take m any proceedings which came to be instituted after such date."}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14445, "end_char": 14450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14652, "end_char": 14657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14938, "end_char": 14943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15018, "end_char": 15023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15101, "end_char": 15106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15271, "end_char": 15276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15381, "end_char": 15386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16019, "end_char": 16024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18275, "end_char": 18283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 11 and 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20144, "end_char": 20162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_165_171_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "UJ.JAL.MANDAL\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\n.January 21, 1972\n\n[J. M. SHl!LAT, H. R. ~NA AND K. K. MATHl!W, Jl\".]\n\nConstitution of India, 1950; Art. 22(4) and West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act (Presidenfs Act 19 of 1970), ss. 12 and 13- Detention beyond three months on Advisory Board's Report-Whether Government should .confirm detention order within three months from date of detention. -\n\nThe petitioner was arreste.d on May 11, 1971, under s. 3 of the West liengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970. His case was placed before the Advisory lloard and the Board submitted its report to the State Government on July 12, 1971 that there was sufficient cause for the petitioner's detention. The .. State Government confirmed the order fif detention on August 17, 1971.\n\nL Jn a petition under Art. 32,\n\nHELD : The deiention was illegal, since the' State Government confirmed the detention order beyond three months from the date of detention. . ' ' .\n\nArticle 22(4) has specified three mont!>-o. as the maximum period of initial detentio11 and dotetitiori ior a lo11ger period cao only be made on the basis of the re11ort bf the Advisory Board. Under ss. 12 and 13 of the I Act, the State Government has' power to detain a person beyond a period of 3 months but limited to u period of.one year, on the basis of tbe opinion of. the Board tliare ii [IUlfigjent cause for detention.\n\nWben the Stal.• Government receives the opi.Qion, i~ pas_ -:tbe option either to con1Um or not the detention order: It would riot be necessary to confirm the detention if the Government wants to continue the detention only fdr the period of three months. Whep, s. l2(1) sppak of 'and continu.e. the detention of the person concerned. 'fbr such period as it thinks fit', it can only mean continuance of tbe defention from the point of time at which the detention F\n\nwould become-illegal if the order of detention is not confirmed, namely, the expiry of three.111ontbs from thedate of detention. lfthat be so,, the order of detenticin .. must be confirmed beiore the expiry of the three m<11tths. [168 G; 169 C:-OJ\n\nDattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay, [1952] S.C.R.\n\nG 612, 626 and Deb Sadhan Roy v. State of West Bengal, W.P. No. 218/71, followed.\n\nAswini Kumar Banerjee v. State & Ors., C.W.N. LXXV, 1970-71, 866, Kaur Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1952 PBPSU 134. , sangappa Mulappa v, State of Mysore, A.LR. 1959 Mys. 7 and Bhupati Goswami v. C. R.\n\nKrishnamurthl & Ors., A. I. It.. 1991 Aasam 14, apprO\\-ed.\n\nH ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 420 ot 1971.\n\nUnder article 32 ol the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus.\n\nSantokh Singh, for the petitioner.\n\nP. K. Chakrovorty and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of µie Court was delivered by\n\nMathew, J. This is an application under Article 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ in. the nature of habeas corpus JI and for the release of the petitioner who is alleged to )le kept in illegal detention.\n\nOn 11-5-1971, the petitioner was arrested under an order made on 29-4-1971, by the District Magistrate, 24 Parganas, in the exercise ol' his power under sub-sectiqn ( 1) read with subt- C section (3) of section (3) of the West Bengal (Prevention. of Violent Activities) Act, 1970 (President's Act No. 19 of 1970), hereinfater called the Act. A copy of the grounds of detention was served on the petitiOi!ICr as required by section 8 of the Act on 11-5-1971. The District Magistrate reported to the State Government on 4-5-1971 about the passing of the o.rder of detention and the detention order was approved by the State Govern- D ment on 10-5-1971. The case ol' the detenu was placed bjefore the Advisory Board (hereinalter called the Board) on 9-6-1971.\n\nTwo rel?resentations were received by the State Government from the petitioner. They were rejected by orders dated 8-6-1971 and 7-7-1971. The representations were also forwarded to the Board.\n\nThe Board was of the opinion that there was sufficient E cause for the detention and it submitted its report to the State Government on 12-7-1971. The State Government confirmed the order of detention on 17-8-1971 and that was communicated to the detenu on 21-8-1971. · The only point taken on behalf of. the. petitioner in this writ petition is that since the detention order was confirmed by . the II State . Government only on 17-8·1971, it was beyond 3 months from the date of detention, namely 11-S-1971, and therefore, the detention of the petitioner after the expiry of 3 months from the date of detention was illegal.\n\nIt is necessary to examine the provisions of Article 22( 4) of the Constitution and the relevant sections of the Act to decide G this question.\n\nArticle 22(4) of'the Constitution provides:\n\n\" ( 4) No law providing for preventive detention s)lall auth!>rise . the detention of a persolll for a longer period than thteC months unless-.:.. · H\n\n(a) an AtviSory Board.consisting orpenons who are, or have been or are qualified to be 'appoiRted es,\n\nl)JJAL, MANDAL v .. WBST BENGAL (Mathew, J.) 167\n\nJudges :of a High Court has. reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention;\n\nProvidc; d that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person qeyond the maximum period prescribe<:! by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7); or (b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of . clause (7)\".\n\nSection 10 of the Act provides that in every case where a deten- C tion order has been made under the Act, the State Government shall, within ):hirty days from the date of. detention under the order, place before the Board, the grounds on which the order has been made and the rqiresentation, if any, made by the person affected by .the order, and in case where the order has been made an officer specified in sub-section ( 3) of section 3, also the D report made by such officer under sub-section ( 4) of section 3 ..\n\nSection 11 prescribes the procedure to be followed by the Board.\n\nIt says that the Board shall, after considering the materials placed before. it and after hearing the detenu in person, if he desires to be heard, submit its report to the State Government within ten weeks from ihe date of detention.\n\nSection 12 reads as follows :-\n\nE \"Action upon the report of Advisory Board : (1) In any cas~ where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its (, pinion, sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the State Governmcmt may confirm the detention or4er and continue the detention of the person epncemed for such period as it thinks fit.\n\n(2) Im l\\hy case where the Advisory Board has re~ ported 'that there is, in its opinion, no sufficient caUSe for the detention of the person' con¢rned, the State Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith.\" Section 13 provides ibat the maximu~ period fQr which a person G may be detained in pursuance to any detention order under sec\n\ntion 12 shall be 12 months from the date ol detention. , Section 14 provides thaHhe State Government may, at any time, revoke or modify the detentioo order.\n\nSince .the appropriate Government has to make .. the reference to the Board within a period qf thirty days (rom the date ofthe detention under seetion 10. and the .Board has to s1,1bmit its report within ten weeks from the date of detention under section 11, there would be ample time for the appropriate Government to\n\n168 sirP)lEME COURT REPORTS\n\n[J 972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nconsider the f!lp<?rt and confirm the . detention order '!Vi thin 3 A months of the date of detention,, if it decides to continue the detention.\n\nNow the Board has got to express its opinion only on. the point as to. whether there is sufficient cause for detention of the persoo concerned. It . is neither called upon nor is it competent to say B anything regarding the contiinuance of the• detention . _beyond 3 months. Once the Board expresses its view that there is sufficient cause for detention, what action is to be taken subsequently is left entirely to the appropriate Gove11llment. If the report records\n\nthe opinion that there is no sufficient cause for detention but no action is taken by the Government to rel.ease the detenu, the dete111:u is not aut9matically released. l, ikewise, if the opinion of C the Board is that there is sufficient cause for detention, but the Government does not confirm the order of . detention, the period of detention is not automatically extended beyQJid 3 months.. So when t~ report of the Board is received-'and that must be within 3 months--the appropriate Government must apply its mfnd and make an order or take an executive decision whether to confirm D the order of detention or revoke it.\n\nSection JI of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, where the phraseology employed is the same as iin section 12, came 'tip for consideration in Dattatreya Moreshwar .Pangarkilr v.· Stat~ of Bombay(1) before. this Court and this is wht Mukherjea J. said :\n\n\"In my opinion, the words 'for such PeriO<I as it thinks fit' presupe aoo imply that a!'til~ ~!J'! of e report Of the Advisory BO!ll'd the detaining authonty has to make up its mind as tb whether the original order of detention. should be confirmed !ind if so, fur what further period the detention is to continue. . Obviously, that is the proper stage tor making an or4er or decision of this description as the investigation with regard to a particular detenu. such as is. conte111Plated by the Preventive Detention Act is. then at an end 8lld the appropriate Government is in full possession of all the materials regarding him.\" · ·\n\nG Article 22 ( 4) of the Constitution has specified the inaxinilllii limit of initial detention, and detention for a lonser period thati 3 months can only be made on the basis of the 'rep<)tt of the Board. The Act authorises a possible. detantion of more - 3 months.\n\nIt is because the appropriate Goverlllllent wants to detain a person for more than 3 months that the matter.is.'~ a to the Board and it is only when the Bi>ard pia1ce., its. l'fiW~:il!lll\n\n(I) [19S2) S.C.R. 612, 626.\n\n' , A\n\nthe appropriate Government ca.n fix the period of detention under sul>6ection (1) oi section (12). So, when the Government receives the report of the Board stating that there is sufficient cause for detention of a person, if the <; Jovernmeot wants to detain\n\nhim for a period beyond 3 months, it has to pass an order or make a decision under section 12(1) to confirm the order. of B detention. The confirmation Of the detenti.on order without anything more would' result in an automatic continuation of the deten. tion, even if )here is no separate decision to continue the detention for any specific period as held by this Court in Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay(1). When section 12(1) of the Act speaks oi \"and continue the detention of the person cone cemed for such period as it thinks fit\", it can only mean continuance of detentmn from the point of time at which detention would become illegal if the order Of detention is not confirmed, namely, the expiry of 3 months from the date of detention. It would not be necessary to confirm the order of detention even after the receipt of the report of the _Board by the Government if~ the Government only wants to continue the detention for the D period of 3 months from the date of detention, as the initial order of detention would authorise the continuance of detention for that period without any confirmation. Confirmation is lllllCCSsary only to continue the detention after the expiry of 3 months. If that be so, it stands to reason to hold that the order of detentiqn. must be confirmed before the expiry of the 3 months.\n\nE To put the matter .i; n a nut-shell : the State Government has power under the Aet to detain a person without trial beyond a period of 3 months but limited to a period of one year.\n\nThat power the State Government may exercise on the receipt oi the\n\ninion of the Board that there is sufficient cause for the deteni' tion. ·. Wilen the State Government receives that opjnion, it has\n\nstill the option to exerci!e the power and to continue the detmtion ond the period of 3 months or not.\n\nCQD\\firmation is tile eiceroi, Co of the power to continue the detention aftei: the expiry of the tliree months. Unless that power is exercised within the period G't 3 months from the date of detention. the deteotion after the G expiry of that period would be without the aut):lority of the law .\n\n. In Aswini Kumar Banerjee v. The State and. others( 8), the Calcutta High Court, in considering the point in question has\n\nanalysed the relevant provisions of the Act in the light of article 22 ( 4) of the Constitution and come to the conclusion thllt the sine qua non for continuance of th11 detention made utnder sub- H section ( 1) read with sub•section ( 3) of section 3 of the Act\n\n(J) (1952) S.C.R. 612.\n\n(2) Calcutta Weekly Notei, Vol. LXXV, 1970-71 p. 866. 12-L864Sup CI/72\n\nbeyond the period of the 3 months are (a) a report by the Board A submitted to the State Govemment within 10 weeks from the date of detention recording its opinion th.!lt there is sutlicierit cause or the detention of the person concernelf, and (b) the confirmatiOlll thereafter of the said order of detention by the State Government within 3 months from the date of dete; ntion. ·\n\nThe question was considered by the High Court of Pepsu in Kaur Singh v. The State(') with reference to the provisions of sections 10 and 11 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, which\n\nare iin pari materia with sections 11 and 12 of the 6ct, and the Court came to the conclusion that without confirming the detention order within 3 months of the date oi detention, tlie detention c of a person c3jllllot be continued after the 3 months.\n\nThe Court said:\n\n\"The argument that the law does not enjoin that there must be an order of confirmation and that the mere fact that it continues to detain the person meains that the Government had decided to confirm the initial detention order, ignores a very important and the most effecitve part of sectiQU 11. What section 11 provides is that the Government 'may cOnfii111' and 'continue detention' have their own significance and they obviously mean that if the Govemiment decided to continue the detention it must confirm the order of detention, and that the non-confirmation of the order would result in its revocation and termination of the . detention. The verb 'may' only indicates that it is not obligatpry on the Government to confirm the detention order even though the Advisory Board has reported in favour of the necessity oi cootinuing the detention.\n\nThe phrase, read in its context, undoubtedly signifies that the Government, if it decides to continue the detention, must confirm the detention order.\"\n\nIn Sangappa Mallappa v. State of Mysore('), the High Court of Mysore held, after considering the provisions of section 11 of the Preve; ntive Detention Act, 1950, which, as already stated, are G identical with those of section 12 of the Act, that to continue the detenion of a detenu after the expiry of 3 months from the date of detention, it is essential that the order of detention must be cOlllfirmed within the 3 months.\n\nIn Bhupati Goswami v. C. R. Krishnamurti and others(•) the High Court of Assam, after considering the scheme of the Preven- H\n\n(I) A.l.R. 1952 Pepsu 124.\n\n(3) A.l.R. 1969 Assam 14.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1959 Mysore 7.\n\ntive Detention Act, 1950, held that although the provisions of A section 11 ( 1) of that Act does not in terms mentiqn any time limit for confirming the order of detention, the time limit of 3 months is impl.icit in the entire scheme of the Act.\n\nThe question was considered by this Court iri Deb Sadhan Roy_\n\nv. The State of West Bengal(') and the Court took the view that B the order of detention must be confirmed within 3 months of the date of detention : else the detention bey(\\rid that period would become illegal.\n\nWe see no reason to doubt the correctness of this decision and'we follow it.\n\nWe think that the detention of the petitioner is illega! and that he has to be released forthwith.\n\nWe order accordingly.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nPetition alloived,\n\n---- --· ----- (I) W.P. No. 218 o 1971.", "total_entities": 68, "entities": [{"text": "UJ.JAL.MANDAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 13, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UJJAL MANDAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": ".January 21, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 54, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UJ.JAL.MANDAL\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\n.January 21, 1972\n\n[J. M. SHl!LAT, H. R. ~NA AND K. K. MATHl!W, Jl\".]"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 22(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 165, "end_char": 190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 12 and 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 232, "end_char": 245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "statute": "Prevention of Violent Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 454, "end_char": 458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "statute": "Prevention of Violent Act"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 480, "end_char": 505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July 12, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 634, "end_char": 647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His case was placed before the Advisory lloard and the Board submitted its report to the State Government on July 12, 1971 that there was sufficient cause for the petitioner's detention."}}, {"text": "August 17, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 773, "end_char": 788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .. State Government confirmed the order fif detention on August 17, 1971."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 813, "end_char": 820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "statute": "Prevention of Violent Act"}}, {"text": "Article 22(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 972, "end_char": 985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "statute": "Prevention of Violent Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 12 and 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1171, "end_char": 1184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "statute": "Prevention of Violent Act"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2584, "end_char": 2594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2602, "end_char": 2623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Santokh Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2668, "end_char": 2681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Santokh Singh, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chakrovorty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2704, "end_char": 2721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chakrovorty and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2726, "end_char": 2742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chakrovorty and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2809, "end_char": 2815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of µie Court was delivered by\n\nMathew, J. This is an application under Article 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ in."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2849, "end_char": 2859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "11-5-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3030, "end_char": 3039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11-5-1971, the petitioner was arrested under an order made on 29-4-1971, by the District Magistrate, 24 Parganas, in the exercise ol' his power under sub-sectiqn ( 1) read with subt- C section (3) of section (3) of the West Bengal (Prevention."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3450, "end_char": 3459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "4-5-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3545, "end_char": 3553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Magistrate reported to the State Government on 4-5-1971 about the passing of the o.rder of detention and the detention order was approved by the State Govern- D ment on 10-5-1971."}}, {"text": "10-5-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3667, "end_char": 3676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Magistrate reported to the State Government on 4-5-1971 about the passing of the o.rder of detention and the detention order was approved by the State Govern- D ment on 10-5-1971."}}, {"text": "9-6-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3774, "end_char": 3782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case ol' the detenu was placed bjefore the Advisory Board (hereinalter called the Board) on 9-6-1971."}}, {"text": "8-6-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3900, "end_char": 3908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were rejected by orders dated 8-6-1971 and 7-7-1971."}}, {"text": "7-7-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3913, "end_char": 3921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were rejected by orders dated 8-6-1971 and 7-7-1971."}}, {"text": "12-7-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4114, "end_char": 4123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board was of the opinion that there was sufficient E cause for the detention and it submitted its report to the State Government on 12-7-1971."}}, {"text": "17-8-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4182, "end_char": 4191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government confirmed the order of detention on 17-8-1971 and that was communicated to the detenu on 21-8-1971. ·"}}, {"text": "21-8-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4235, "end_char": 4244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government confirmed the order of detention on 17-8-1971 and that was communicated to the detenu on 21-8-1971. ·"}}, {"text": "17-8·1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4408, "end_char": 4417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government only on 17-8·1971, it was beyond 3 months from the date of detention, namely 11-S-1971, and therefore, the detention of the petitioner after the expiry of 3 months from the date of detention was illegal."}}, {"text": "Article 22( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4650, "end_char": 4664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4750, "end_char": 4763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5407, "end_char": 5417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7); or (b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of ."}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5598, "end_char": 5608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6028, "end_char": 6037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6104, "end_char": 6113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6118, "end_char": 6128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6419, "end_char": 6429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7024, "end_char": 7034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7209, "end_char": 7219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7487, "end_char": 7489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7557, "end_char": 7567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section JI of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8919, "end_char": 8967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9019, "end_char": 9029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Section JI of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "Section JI of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9153, "end_char": 9162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this Court and this is wht Mukherjea J. said :\n\n\"In my opinion, the words 'for such PeriO<I as it thinks fit' presupe aoo imply that a!'til~ ~!J'!"}}, {"text": "Plated by the Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9656, "end_char": 9694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9812, "end_char": 9822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Plated by the Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Plated by the Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "Jovernmeot", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10535, "end_char": 10545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So, when the Government receives the report of the Board stating that there is sufficient cause for detention of a person, if the <; Jovernmeot wants to detain\n\nhim for a period beyond 3 months, it has to pass an order or make a decision under section 12(1) to confirm the order."}}, {"text": "section 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10646, "end_char": 10659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Plated by the Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Plated by the Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "section 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10996, "end_char": 11009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12753, "end_char": 12772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "others( 8), the Calcutta High Court, in considering the point in question has\n\nanalysed the relevant provisions of the Act in the light of article 22 ( 4) of the Constitution and come to the conclusion thllt the sine qua non for continuance of th11 detention made utnder sub- H section ( 1) read with sub•section ( 3) of section 3 of the Act\n\n(J) (1952) S.C.R. 612."}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12876, "end_char": 12886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13058, "end_char": 13067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta Weekly Notei", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13108, "end_char": 13129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Calcutta Weekly Notei, Vol."}}, {"text": "High Court of Pepsu in", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13594, "end_char": 13616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question was considered by the High Court of Pepsu in Kaur Singh v. The State(') with reference to the provisions of sections 10 and 11 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, which\n\nare iin pari materia with sections 11 and 12 of the 6ct, and the Court came to the conclusion that without confirming the detention order within 3 months of the date oi detention, tlie detention c of a person c3jllllot be continued after the 3 months."}}, {"text": "sections 10 and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13680, "end_char": 13698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13706, "end_char": 13736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 11 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13771, "end_char": 13789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14316, "end_char": 14326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15066, "end_char": 15086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sangappa Mallappa v. State of Mysore('), the High Court of Mysore held, after considering the provisions of section 11 of the Preve; ntive Detention Act, 1950, which, as already stated, are G identical with those of section 12 of the Act, that to continue the detenion of a detenu after the expiry of 3 months from the date of detention, it is essential that the order of detention must be cOlllfirmed within the 3 months."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15129, "end_char": 15139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15160, "end_char": 15179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15237, "end_char": 15247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "High Court of Assam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15504, "end_char": 15523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Bhupati Goswami v. C. R. Krishnamurti and others(•) the High Court of Assam, after considering the scheme of the Preven- H\n\n(I) A.l."}}, {"text": "Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15659, "end_char": 15678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15719, "end_char": 15729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "Detention Act, 1950"}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_172_182_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "CHIGURUPATI VENKATA SUBBAYYA & ORS •.\n\nv.·\n\nPALADUGA ANJ'AYYA & ORS.\n\nJanuary 24, 1972\n\n(K. S. HEGDE, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND D: G. PALEKAR, JJ.]\n\nMadras Estates Land Act (I of 1908), \"· 20A and 189, and lttm 6, Part B of ScMdule-Collecto1's order urider s. 20A-WMn affects th• comn1unal use of lands-Jurisdiction of Civil Courts, when ba\"ed.\n\nMadras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (26 of 1948), ss. 11 and 56-Power of Settlement Ofjicer to grant pat/a wilh respect to communal lands-Decision of Settlement Officer, when final.\n\nc A suit by the respondents for a declaration that certain lands were communal lands was decreed by the High Court in appeal. In appeal to this Court, it was contended that: (I) ihe Collector held under s.-20A of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, that the lands were no longer required for the purpose for which they were originally intended; (2) the first appellant had been in possession of the lands after obtaining a grant from the Zamindar; ( 3) after the abolition of Estate .under the Estates Abolition Act, 1948, the lands were granted to him by the Estates Manager; (4) D during the pendency of the suit, the Assistant Settlement ()fficer granted a patta to him under •· 11 of the Aholition Act; (5) the decision of the Aslistant Settlement Officer was final under s. 56 of the Abolition Act;\n\n(6) the Civil Court had no jurisdiction under s. 189(1) of the. Estates Land Act; and (7). that under s. 3 of the Abolition Act, the communal rights were abolished.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : ( 1) Under s. 20A of the Estates Land Act. before the chi lector can order di-sion of the use of any communal land, he should first dec1are that the land is no longer required for any of the purpceea referred to ins. 3(16) (a) and (b), then direct by order in wrltlllf that the\n\nland be used for any other specified communal purpose, and if it is not so require<!,· then it may be converted into ryotwari land or landholder's ryoti land according as the reversionary right vested in the Government the landholder. In tho present case, the Collector, apart from mat.Ing tlle order -that the lands were no longer requireit for the oriaiiial purpooe, did not make any other order in writing. {178 G-H; 179 ABJ\n\n(2) In view of ss. 20 and 20A of the Estates Land Act, the Zaniindar did not have any right to deal with the communal lands. [176 D-E]\n\n(3) The order of the Estates Manager is inelfective becaUIO it procee.i.. od on the .erroneous assumption that the lands had already been converted into ryotwari lands. [179 O.D]\n\n( 4) The lands in dispute are not Janka lands, nor were they declared to be ryoti lands either under the Abolition Act or the F.stab!s Land Act The Assistant Settlement Officer has no power to convert communal land\n\ninto ryoti land. Therefore, he has no competence under s. 11 '1f the Abolition Act to grant the ryotwari patta. fl80D-BJ H\n\nYalathar Moopananri v. Board of Revenue 1966 (1) M .L.J. approved,\n\nC!IlGURUPATI v. PALADUGA (Hegde, J.) l 7 3\n\n(5) Under s. 56 of the Abolition Act, the decision of the Settlement Officer is made final only with respect to matters referred to in s. 5&(1) but the question whether the lands in dispute continued to be communal lands does not fall within its scope. [181 B-C]\n\n(6) Under s. 189(1) of the Estates Land .Act the jurisdiction of the civil courts is taken away only in respect of suits or applications of the natnre specified in Parts A and B of the Schedule to the Act. Item S of Part B of the Schedule 'refers to a decision of the Collector under s. 20A (!), but, in the present case, there is no such order in writing. [181 F-0]\n\n(7) Under s. 3 of the Abolition Act, the lands vest in the Government, but the rights of tlie community over the lands were not taken away.\n\nUnder the Act, only the rights created by the principal or other laod holder were abrogated, but the rights of the community over the lands were not such rights. [182 D-E]\n\nCJ.VIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : C.A. 556 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by Special leave from the judgment , and decree dated August 29, 1966 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 644 of 1962. ' _ -\n\nR. Vas11dev Pillai and P. Kesava Pillai, for the appellants.\n\nK. R. Chaudhuri and K. Rajendra Chowdhary, for respondents Nos. 1 to 4.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J.\n\nThis is an a, ppeal by special leave.\n\nDefendants 2 to 7 in the suit are the appellants in this appeal. The plaintiffs who are respondents 1 to 4 herein sued for a declaration that Survey Nos. 12 to. 18 comprising an extent of 10 acres 54 cents in South . Va!Iur village of Vijayawada Taluk are communal lands,/ the villagers therein having rights of irrigation and drainage. In that suit they challenged the assignment or suit lands in favour of. the 2nd defendant (1st appellant) by the Estates Manager by his order of December 21, 1952. They also soughta permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the exercise of their rights in those lainds. Further they prayed for a mandatory injunction against defendants 2 to 7 directing them to restore \"Agakodu\" at their own cost to its original condition. The plaintiffs brought ·\n\nthe suit in a represntative capacity after obtining the permission 6f the court.\n\nThe 2nd defendant resisted <he suit on various grounds.\n\nHe pleaded that he had been in possession of Survey Nos. 12 to 15 ever since 1946, after obtaining a grant from the Zamindar of the South Vallur under Patta Ex. B-8 dated January 15, 1946.\n\nAccording to him after the abolition of the Estates under the Estates H Abolition Act, 1948 (in short the Estates Abolition Act), Survey\n\nNos. 16 to 18 were held to be unnecessary for the origlil!lll purpose\n\n!>}' the Collector.\n\nThereafter those Survey Nos. were granted to hun biy the Estates Manager under Exh. B-16.\n\nHe further pleaded A that during the pendency of the suit, a Patta for the suit lands was granted to him under s. 11 of the Estates Abolition Act by the Assistant Settlement Officer under Exh. B-30 dated December 10,\n\n1955.\n\nThe trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit upholding the con- B tentions ol the 2nd defendant. It came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs had failed to establish the communal character of the la.nds pleaded by them and further even if those lands were communal lands at one time, they had ceased to be such in view of the various orders passed by the authorities.\n\nThe first appellate court reversed the findings of the trial court C and decreed the plaintiffs' suit as prayed for.\n\nIt came to the cooclusion that the lands in question were communal lands and the villagers had rights of irrigation and drainage through those lands.\n\nIt further came to the cQllclusion that the various orders referred to by the 2nd def.endant in his written statement were either invalid or ineffective.\n\nThe High Court has affirmed the decision of the D 1st appellate court.\n\nMr. R. V. Pillai, the learned Counsel for the appellants formulated three contentions before us viz. ( 1) that the conclusion reached by the 1st appe!late court and affirmed by the High Court that the ands in question are comlllunal lands has no basis in E evidence; (2) that-the Civil court bad no jurisdiction to entertai, n the suit and (3) in any event the communal rights in the suit lands were extinguished under s. 3 of the Estates Abolitiooi Act.\n\nWe shali nowlJroceed to examine these contentions. But before doing so, it is necessary to point out that Mr. Pillai attempted to reopen questions of fact which appear to have been C<¥1Ceded F bjefore the High Court. We have not permitted him to do so.\n\nFrom the judgment of the High Court, it is clear that the arguments in that court proceeded on the basis that the suit lands were once communal lands; Suzyey Nos. 12 to 15 even now continue to be communal lands but Survey Nos. 16 to 18 ceased to be as such because of the order passed by the Collector, Krishna on October G 29, 1946 under s. 20-A(l) of the Madras Estates Land Act as well as that passed by the Estates Officer and Assistant Settlement Officer subsequently, to which we shali refer presently. In the course of the judgment the learned judge of the High Court observed :\n\n\"It is not in dispute that the lands S. Nos. 12 to 18 and measuring 10 acres and 54 cents, situate in South\n\nVallur village in Vijayawada taluk are poramboke lands.\n\nCHIGURUPATI V, PALADUGA (Hegde, J.) 175\n\nThat they were used for the purpose of irrigatiqn and drainage is lj]so not in dispute. It is common ground that under Ex. A-1, the Collector, Krishna passed an order under Section 20-A ( 1 )(a) of the Madras Estates Land Act as amended by Madras Act VITI of 1934 to the effect that lands, S. Nos. 16, 17 aind 18 were no longer required for the purpose for which . they were originally intended.\n\nUnder that order, the Collector asked the Zamindar to say whether he had got any 'reversionary rights in the lands. What happened subsequently is 111ot clear from the record.\n\nIt is however common ground that S. Nos. 12 to 15 (both inclusive) continued to .bje communal lands and no order under section 20-A (2) was at any time passed by Collector converting these communaJ lands into ryotwari lands or .assigned them to anyone till the estate was abolished. It will thus be clear that there was merely a declaration that S. Nos. 16, 17 and 18 were no longer required for the purpose for which they were originl!llY intended. No further order converting those lands to ryotwari lands was passed and that S. Nos. 12 to 15 continued to be commlllllal lands till the estate was abolished.\"\n\nIn view of the stand taken by the appellants before the High Court, it is not permissible for them to contend that Survey Nos.\n\nE 12 to 18 were at no time communal lands nor is it open to them to contend that Survey Nos. 12 to 15 \\lo not still continue to be communal lands. The controversy as regards the nature of the lands, therefore, must be confined to Survey Nos. 16, 17 and 18. In this view, the first contention of Mr. Pillai fails so tir as Survey Nos. 12 to 15 are cOlllcerned.\n\nF So far as Survey Nos. 16 to 18 are concerned, it was said that these lands had ceased to be communal lands as a result of the various orders passed by the authorities.\n\nLet us examine whether this contention is correct ? Before doing so it is necessary to refer to some of the provisiom in the Estates Land Act as well as the G Estates Abolition Act. No l)laterial was placed before the court to\n\nhow that the South Vallur Zamindari Estate included Survey Nos. 12 to 18. Section 3 of the Estates Land Act defines an \"Estate\" as meaning:\n\n(a) \"any permanently-settled estate or temporarilysettled zamindari;\n\n(b) any portion of such permanently-settled estate or temporarily-settled zamindari which is separately registered in the office of the Collector;\n\n(c) any unsettled palaiyam or jagir;\n\n( d) any inam village ell which the grant has n\n\nmade, confirmed or recognized by the Government notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant, the village has been partitioned emqng the\n\njl; rantees or the successors in title of the grantee or grantees.\n\nExplanation ( 1) Where a grant of an inam is expressed to be of a named village, the area which forms the subject-matter of the grap.t shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it di\\I not include certain lands in the village of that inam which have already been granted on service or other tenure or beqn reserved for communal purposes.\"\n\nThis definition does not help the appellants.\n\nThe appellants have failed to estal:>lish that the Zamindar could have conveyed any D right in the suit lainds to the appellants. In view of s. zo and 20-A of the Estates Land Act, to which we. shall refer a little later, no Zamindar appears to have had any right to deal with communal lands.. 'Hence the alleged grant by the Zamindar, does not appear to confer on the first appellaint any ti.tie.\n\nT-his takes us to the question whether the order made by the E Collector on October 18, 1946 (Exh. Al) can be considered as having conferred any tiUe on the Zamindar in respect of Survey Nos. 16, 17 and 18. That order reads:\n\n\"Re. A3-13 M.P. 46 Exhibit A.1\n\nProceedings of the Collector, Kl'ishna at Chilakatapudi.\n\nSub:: E.L. Act-Bezwada Taluk, South Vallur, S. Nos. 17, 18, 16 Enquiry under Section 20-A. Order under Section 20-A(l)(a) passed.\n\nRead : This office D. Dis. 5876-45 D/29-3-45 and RD.O's Dis. 9609/46 dated 18-10-46.\n\nORDER Under Section 20A(l )(a) of the Madras E.L. Act as amended by Madras Act VIII of 1934, the lands mentiooi:d in the schedule below are declared to be no longer required for the purpose for which they were originaliy intended.\n\nTaluk\n\nCl; llGURUPATI V. PALADUGA (Hegde, J.)\n\nI 77\n\nSCHEDULE\n\nVillage S.No.\n\nExtent Oriainal classifica\n\ntion.\n\nBczwada South Vcllur 16 17 18\n\nOBS\n\n1-72\n\n1-19\n\nAgakodu P.W.D.\n\nDrainage channel . Poramboke- . Sdl- •\n\n29/10 Collector\n\n( 2) Tho Zamindar is requested to state whether he has any oral or. documentary evidence to. prove that the reversionary right in the lands vest in him and to adduce it if any, before the Collector within sixty days from the\n\ndate of this order. Sd/- 22-10-53, Try. Deputy CoHector,\n\nKrishna\".\n\nFor detennining the effect of that order, it is necessary to refer to SOll1C of the provisions ot the Estates !; and Act. Section 3(2) of that Act defines \"ryot\" as meaning :\n\n\\ . \"a person who holds for the purpose of agnculture ryoti land in an estate on condition of paying to the landholder the rent which is legally due upon it\" \"Ryoti Jand\" is defined ins. 3(16) which says:\n\n\" \"Ryoti land\" means cultivable land in an estate other than private land but does not include-\n\n(a)\n\n(b) throshing-ftoor, cattle-stands, village sites, and\n\nother lands situated in any estate which are set apart for the common use of the villagers. (c) \" Section 20-A of the Estates Land Act says :\n\n\"(1) Subject to such rules as the State Government may prescribe illl this behalf, the District Collector may on the application of the landholder, a ryot or any other person interested-\n\n( a) declare that any land or any portion of any llUld\n\nwhich is set apart for any of the purposes referred to i.n sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause 16 of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 S.c.Il.\n\nsection 3 is no loni:er required for its original purpose; and\n\n(b) by order in writing direct- ( i) that any such land or portion in respect of which such declaration is made be used for any other specified commlll1llll purpose; or\n\n(ii) if such land or portion is not required for any communal purpose, that it hie converted into ryotwari land or landholder's ryoti land according as the reversionary rights in such land vest under the terms, express or implied of the siad, title-deed or other grant (in the Government) or in the landholder :\n\nProvided that before making any such declaratioo and order, the District Collector shall have due regard to any other customary rights oi the landholder or the ryots in the user of such land or portion and shall satisfy himself D that the exercise of such rights would otherwise be provided for adequately if the declaration and order are pJlt. into effect :\n\nProvided further that in the case of any land Of the description referred to in sub-cause (a) oi clause ( 16) of section 3 the reversionary righ!s in which vest in the landholder under the terms, express or implied, of the sanad, title-deed or other grant, any order under subclause (i) of clause (b) shall be made only with the consent of the landholder.\n\n( 2) Without the written order of the District Collector under clause (b) of sub-section ( l), no land which is set apart for any of the purposes referred to in. subclauses (a) and (b) of clause (16) of sectiQ!l 3 shall be assigned or used for any other purpose. Nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect or take away or be deemed to affect or take way the customary rights of the landholder or the ryots in the user of any such land.\"\n\nBefore the Collector can order the diversiQll of the use of any communal land, he sholud first declare that the land or any portion\n\nof that land is no more required for any of !he purposes referred to in sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (16) ofs. 3 and.he should further make an order in writing directing that the same .bli used H for any other specified communal purpose or if the salae is not required for any communal purpose, that it converted into ryotwari land or landholder's ryoti land, J; f 18 cleat from sub-s.\n\nCHIGURUPATI v. PALADUGA (Hegde, !.) 179\n\n(2) of s. 20-A that without a written.order of the District Collector A under cl. (b) of sub-s. (1), !IlO land which was set apart for any\n\n- • of the purposes referred to in sub-els. (a) and (b) of cl. (16) of s. 3 can be assigned or used for any other purpose.\n\nThe order of the Collector Qn which the first appellant has relied is an incomplete order. Apart from making a declaration that Survey Nos. 16 to 18 are no more required for purposes for which they were originally intended, the Col~ctor did not appear ito have made B any order under cl. (b) of s. 20-A. Hence despite the order of the Collector, Survey Nos. 16 to 18 continue to be communal lands.\n\nReliance was next placed by the appellants on the order of the Estates Manager dated December 21, 1952 (Ex. B-2) for claiming C title to the suit properties. In this order the Estates Manager proceded on the basis that the Collector's order to' which we have already qiaae reference had already converted Survey Nos. 16 to 18 into ryotwari lands.\n\nThis is -an erroneous assumption.\n\nThat assumption cannot confer any right on the 1st appellant.\n\nThe Estates Manager is not shown to have had any power under any D law to convert the communal lands into ryoti lands.\n\nHence his order cannot be considered as having validly converted the suit lands into ryoti lands.\n\nLastly appellants sought support from the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer made on Decem!J\\cr 10, 1955 (Ex. B-30). This order was made during the pendency of the suit ain'd without notice E to the plaintiffs-respondents. It is purported to have been made under s. 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act. Under that order the Assistant Settlement Officer granted to the !st 'appellant ryotwari patta in respect of Survey Nos. 16 to 18. Section 11 of the Estates Abolition Act, does not authorise the Assistant Settlement Officer to com'.}rt the communal land into a ryoti land. That section F reads:\n\n\"Every ryot in an estate shall, with effect on and from the notified date, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of-\n\n( a) all ryoti lands which, immediately before the notified. date, were properly included or ought to have been properly included in the holding and which are not either Janka lands or lands in respect of which a land-holder or some other person is tllltitled to a ryotwari patta under any other provision of this A ct; and\n\n(b) all Janka lands in his occupation immediately before the notified date, such lands having been\n\nin his occupation or in that of his predecessorsin-title continuously from the 1st day of July 1939:\n\nProvided that no person who has b(een admitted into possession of any land by a landholder on or after the 1st day of July,.1945 s)lall, except where the Government after an examination of all the circumstances otherwise direct,. be entitled to a ryotwari patta in. respect of such land. ·\n\nExplanation :-No lease of any Janka land and no persqn to whom a right to colle.ct the rent of any land has been leased before the notified date, including an ij8!dar or a farmer of rent, shall be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of such land under this section.\"\n\nThe lands with which we are concem:ed are not Janka lands nor were they declared to be ryoti lands either under the Abolition Act or under the Estates Land Act That being so, the Assistant Settlement Officer had no competence to grant ryotwari patta ill\n\nrespect of those lands-see the decision of the Jyladras High Court in Va/athar Mooppannar and ors. v .. The Board of Revenue, Madras('). That officer has purported to grant the patta in ques tion even without notice to the interested parties and that during the pendency of the snit.\n\nFor the reasons mentioned above, we are unable to accept the' contention of the appellants that Survey Nos. 16 tQ 18 have ceased to be communal lands or that the appellants had obtained any Jaw- . ful title to them.\n\nIt was urged that the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer \\vhether the same was in accordance with Jaw or not must be deemed to be final in view of s. 56 of the Abolition Act. This contention is again untenable.\n\nSection 56 says :\n\n. \"(1) Where after an estate is notified, a dispute arises as to (a) whether any rent due from a ryot for any fasli year is in arrear or (b) what amount of rent is in arrear or ( c) who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is, the dispute shall be decided by the Settlement Officer .\n\n. (2) Any person deeming himself aggrieved by any\n\ndec1s10~ o~ the Settlement Officer under sub-section (1) may, within two months from the date of the decision ot\n\n(I) (1966) 1.M.L.J. JSol\n\nClllGURUPATI v. PALADUGA (Hegde, J.) 181\n\nsuch further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow, appeal to the Tribunal and its decision shall be final and not be liabliLJo be questioned in any Court of lavl.\"\n\nThe decision of the Settlement Officer which is made fi:nal under this section must be a decision in respect of one of the matters referred to in sub-s. ( 1) of s. 56. The controversy with which we are concerned in this case viz. whether tho~ suit lands continue to be communal lands dcies not fall within the scope of that section.\n\nHence we are unable to accept the contention of the appellant that the order made the Settlement Officer has become final or conclusive. It is a wholly invalid order. In this view, it is not ll.CCessary to consider whether an order made under s. 11 without .. ce to the interested persons can be considered as a valid order.\n\nTI1e contention that the civil courts have no jurisdiction to go into the controversies arising for decision in this case in view of s. 189(1) of the Estates Land Act is again without merit. That section provides :\n\n\"A District Collector or CoJ!ector hearing suits or applications of the nature specified in Parts A and B of the Schedule and the Board of Revenue or the District Collector exercising appelate or revisionaJ jurisdictiqn therefrom shall hear and determine such suits or applications or exercise such jurisdiction as a Revenue Court.\n\nNo Civil court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall take cognizance of any dispute or matter in respect of which such suit or application might be brought or made.\"\n\nThe jurisdiction of the civil courts is taken way only in respect of suits or applications of the nature specified in parts (A) and (B) of the Schedule to the Act. No reliance was placed~· the appellants on any ol the matters mentioned in pa.rt (A) d. th• Schedule. Even as regards matters mentioned in part (B) reliance was only placed on item 5 of that Schedule. Part B refers to applications to be .disposed of by a Disct Collector or Collector.\n\nItem 5 refers to a decision of the Collector under s. 20-A( 1). We have already come to the conclusion that the Collector had made no order under that secti0\\11.\n\nHence s. 189 of the Estates Land Act is not attracted to the present case.\n\nThe dispute with which we are concerned is a civil dispute. Therefore the courts below hadjurisdiction to decide'the same under s. 9 of the Civil Procedure Code.\n\nThe only other contention that remains to be considered is that the communal rights in the suit lands stood abolished under s. 3 of\n\nthe Estates Abolition Act.\n\nThis contention does 111ot appear to have been taken before the High Court.\n\nTherefore we see no justificaJtion to .11;0 into that contention. That apart, there appears to be no basis for that co, ntention.\n\nSection 3 (a) oi the Estates Abolition Act, repeals several acts including the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. In view of cl. (bi) of that section all Estates including the communal lands, porambokes and other ryoti lands, waste 13!1lds, pasture lands, Janka lands, forests, mines and minerals, quarries, rivers and streams, tanks and irrigation works; fisheries and ferries stood transferred to the Government and vested in them free from all encumbrances.\n\nIt further provide&-that the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, 1864, the Madras Irrigation Cess Act, 1865\n\nand.i.i:I! other enactments applicable to ryotwari areas shall apply to 'ftW1X estate.\n\nClause 3 of that section prescribes that \"all rights and interests created in or over the estate before the notified date by the principal or any other landholder shall as against the Govetmment cease and determine.\"\n\nJt is true that the suit lands in view of s. 3 oi the Estates Abolition Act did vest in the Government.\n\nThat by itself does not mean that the rights of the community over it were taken away.\n\nOur attention has not beeai invited to any provision of law under which the rights of the community over those lands can be said to have been taken away.\n\nWhat has been abrogated is the rights and interests created in or over the estate before the notified date the principal or other landholder.\n\nThe rights of the community over the suit lands were not created by the principal or any other landholder.\n\nHence those rights cannot be said to have been abrogated by cl. ( c) of s. 3 of the Estates Abolition Act.\n\nIn the result this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 80, "entities": [{"text": "CHIGURUPATI VENKATA SUBBAYYA & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHIGURUPATI VENKATA SUBBAYYA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PALADUGA ANJ'AYYA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PALADUGA ANJAYYA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 24, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 86, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 24, 1972\n\n(K. S. HEGDE, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND D: G. PALEKAR, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D: G. PALEKAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.G. PALEKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Madras Estates Land Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 255, "end_char": 261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Estates Land Act", "statute": "Madras Estates Land Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 11 and 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 418, "end_char": 431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Estates Land Act", "statute": "Madras Estates Land Act"}}, {"text": "Madras Estates Land Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 768, "end_char": 797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Estates Abolition Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1044, "end_char": 1071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1326, "end_char": 1331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Estates Abolition Act, 1948", "statute": "the Estates Abolition Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 189(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1401, "end_char": 1410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Estates Abolition Act, 1948", "statute": "the Estates Abolition Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Estates Land Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1419, "end_char": 1435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1457, "end_char": 1461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Estates Land Act", "statute": "Estates Land Act"}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1563, "end_char": 1569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Estates Land Act", "statute": "Estates Land Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 20 and 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2275, "end_char": 2289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Estates Land Act", "statute": "Estates Land Act"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2847, "end_char": 2852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3038, "end_char": 3043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3163, "end_char": 3167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 189(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3302, "end_char": 3311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3576, "end_char": 3582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3670, "end_char": 3674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. Vas11dev Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4176, "end_char": 4194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Vas11dev Pillai and P. Kesava Pillai, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "P. Kesava Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4199, "end_char": 4215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Vas11dev Pillai and P. Kesava Pillai, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4238, "end_char": 4253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Chaudhuri and K. Rajendra Chowdhary, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "K. Rajendra Chowdhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4258, "end_char": 4279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Chaudhuri and K. Rajendra Chowdhary, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4355, "end_char": 4360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J.\n\nThis is an a, ppeal by special leave."}}, {"text": "December 21, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4887, "end_char": 4904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the 2nd defendant (1st appellant) by the Estates Manager by his order of December 21, 1952."}}, {"text": "According to him after the abolition of the Estates under the Estates H Abolition Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5549, "end_char": 5640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5981, "end_char": 5986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "According to him after the abolition of the Estates under the Estates H Abolition Act, 1948", "statute": "According to him after the abolition of the Estates under the Estates H Abolition Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "December 10,\n\n1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6074, "end_char": 6092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B-30 dated December 10,\n\n1955."}}, {"text": "R. V. Pillai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6967, "end_char": 6979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. R. V. Pillai, the learned Counsel for the appellants formulated three contentions before us viz. ("}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7382, "end_char": 7386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pillai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7529, "end_char": 7535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But before doing so, it is necessary to point out that Mr. Pillai attempted to reopen questions of fact which appear to have been C<¥1Ceded F bjefore the High Court."}}, {"text": "Krishna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7976, "end_char": 7983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16 to 18 ceased to be as such because of the order passed by the Collector, Krishna on October G 29, 1946 under s. 20-A(l) of the Madras Estates Land Act as well as that passed by the Estates Officer and Assistant Settlement Officer subsequently, to which we shali refer presently."}}, {"text": "October G 29, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7987, "end_char": 8005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16 to 18 ceased to be as such because of the order passed by the Collector, Krishna on October G 29, 1946 under s. 20-A(l) of the Madras Estates Land Act as well as that passed by the Estates Officer and Assistant Settlement Officer subsequently, to which we shali refer presently."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8012, "end_char": 8017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vallur village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8369, "end_char": 8383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12 to 18 and measuring 10 acres and 54 cents, situate in South\n\nVallur village in Vijayawada taluk are poramboke lands."}}, {"text": "Vijayawada taluk", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8387, "end_char": 8403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12 to 18 and measuring 10 acres and 54 cents, situate in South\n\nVallur village in Vijayawada taluk are poramboke lands."}}, {"text": "CHIGURUPATI V, PALADUGA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8426, "end_char": 8449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHIGURUPATI V, PALADUGA (Hegde, J.) 175\n\nThat they were used for the purpose of irrigatiqn and drainage is lj]so not in dispute."}}, {"text": "Krishna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8610, "end_char": 8617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A-1, the Collector, Krishna passed an order under Section 20-A ( 1 )(a) of the Madras Estates Land Act as amended by Madras Act VITI of 1934 to the effect that lands, S. Nos."}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8640, "end_char": 8650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9159, "end_char": 9169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10614, "end_char": 10623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before doing so it is necessary to refer to some of the provisiom in the Estates Land Act as well as the G Estates Abolition Act", "statute": "Before doing so it is necessary to refer to some of the provisiom in the Estates Land Act as well as the G Estates Abolition Act"}}, {"text": "October 18, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12065, "end_char": 12081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T-his takes us to the question whether the order made by the E Collector on October 18, 1946 (Exh."}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12382, "end_char": 12392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12408, "end_char": 12418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20A(l )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12534, "end_char": 12552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act as amended by Madras Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12572, "end_char": 12600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "llGURUPATI V. PALADUGA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12765, "end_char": 12787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Taluk\n\nCl; llGURUPATI V. PALADUGA (Hegde, J.)\n\nI 77\n\nSCHEDULE\n\nVillage S.No."}}, {"text": "Agakodu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12915, "end_char": 12922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bczwada South Vcllur 16 17 18\n\nOBS\n\n1-72\n\n1-19\n\nAgakodu P.W.D.\n\nDrainage channel ."}}, {"text": "Section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13405, "end_char": 13417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act as amended by Madras Act", "statute": "Act as amended by Madras Act"}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13921, "end_char": 13931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14296, "end_char": 14305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14350, "end_char": 14359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15370, "end_char": 15379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16633, "end_char": 16638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16837, "end_char": 16841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17185, "end_char": 17190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18224, "end_char": 18229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18395, "end_char": 18405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st day of July 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19187, "end_char": 19207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "date, were properly included or ought to have been properly included in the holding and which are not either Janka lands or lands in respect of which a land-holder or some other person is tllltitled to a ryotwari patta under any other provision of this A ct; and\n\n(b) all Janka lands in his occupation immediately before the notified date, such lands having been\n\nin his occupation or in that of his predecessorsin-title continuously from the 1st day of July 1939:\n\nProvided that no person who has b(een admitted into possession of any land by a landholder on or after the 1st day of July,.1945 s)lall, except where the Government after an examination of all the circumstances otherwise direct,."}}, {"text": "Jyladras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20075, "end_char": 20094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lands with which we are concem:ed are not Janka lands nor were they declared to be ryoti lands either under the Abolition Act or under the Estates Land Act That being so, the Assistant Settlement Officer had no competence to grant ryotwari patta ill\n\nrespect of those lands-see the decision of the Jyladras High Court in Va/athar Mooppannar and ors."}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20684, "end_char": 20689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Janka lands nor were they declared to be ryoti lands either under the Abolition Act or under the Estates Land Act", "statute": "Janka lands nor were they declared to be ryoti lands either under the Abolition Act or under the Estates Land Act"}}, {"text": "Section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20749, "end_char": 20759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Janka lands nor were they declared to be ryoti lands either under the Abolition Act or under the Estates Land Act", "statute": "Janka lands nor were they declared to be ryoti lands either under the Abolition Act or under the Estates Land Act"}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21629, "end_char": 21634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22045, "end_char": 22050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 189(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22261, "end_char": 22270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23358, "end_char": 23363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 189", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23476, "end_char": 23482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23674, "end_char": 23678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23833, "end_char": 23837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24078, "end_char": 24087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Estates Land Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24157, "end_char": 24186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Revenue Recovery Act, 1864", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24565, "end_char": 24598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Madras Irrigation Cess Act, 1865", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24604, "end_char": 24636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24726, "end_char": 24734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras Irrigation Cess Act, 1865", "statute": "the Madras Irrigation Cess Act, 1865"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24986, "end_char": 24990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras Irrigation Cess Act, 1865", "statute": "the Madras Irrigation Cess Act, 1865"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25615, "end_char": 25619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras Irrigation Cess Act, 1865", "statute": "the Madras Irrigation Cess Act, 1865"}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_183_192_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "SAMMBHU NATH JHA\n\nKEDAR PRASAD SINHA & ORS.\n\nJanuary 24, 1972\n\n(J.M. SHELAT AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.]\n\nContempt of Court-Publication in Newspaper of notification under s. 3 of Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 instituting inquiry against ers~ while ministers of Bihar Government-Allegation in notification against one of the ministers that he had against advice of officials ordered withdrawal of prosecution of criminal case and on trial court refusing permission to withdraw ordered filing of revision petition in High Court and thereby interfered with course of justice-Revision filea in~ Hig, h Court by accused also-Revisions pending in High Court at time of publication of notification in Newspaper-Such publication whether eo.nstitutes contempt of Court-Section 3(1) of Commissions of Inquiry Act whether makes it mandatory for Government to publish notification in official gazette.\n\nThe appellant who was a minister in the State Government of Biharissued to the press a copy of the notification published in the Bihar\n\nGazette Extraordinary dated March 12, 1968 whereby an inquiry bad been instituted, among others, against a former minister of the State Government. According to allegation No. J-4 in the schedule annexed to the notification the said minister had by misuse of his official position and power unnecessarily interfered with the administration of justice in a serious case of rioting and murder. It was alleged that he had1 against the opinion of the District Magistrate and the Law Secretary, ordere!l the withdrawal of the prosecution against two of the accuSed and the\"fWter when the Trial Court rejected the application for, withdrawal he caused a reVision petition to be filed in the High Court. The Searchlight of Patna in its issue of March 14, 1948 published the copy of the notification issued to it by the appellant, including the schedule of allegations. Ai\\. application was filed on March 25, 1968 by the two accused aforesaid in the High Court for initiating contempt of Court proceedings against several persons including the appellant and the printer and publisher of Searchlight. It was urged by the applicants that revision petitions filed by them and by the State Government against the orders of the Trial Court refusing l?\"rmission to withdraw the case were pending in the High Court at the time of publication and since allegation No. J-4 in the schedule to the notification was related to the subject matter of the said revision petitions the publication constituted interference with the course of justice inasmuch as it had prejudiced mankind against them.\n\nHELD : The Courts have power to take action against a person who •does an act or publishes a writing which is calculated to bring a court or judge into contempt or to lower his authority or to obstruct the course of justice or due administration of law. As intention of the contemner to oauae those consequences is not a necessary ingredient of contempt of court and it is enough to show that his act was calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course c!f justice and administration of law, there would be quite a number of cases where the contempt aneged would be of a teclmlca! nature.\n\nIn such cases, the court would exercise circumspectfon and judicial reru-aint in the matter of taking action for contempt cif coul'l.-The\n\ncourt bas to take into account the surrounding ci'rcumstances and the material facts of the case and on c0nspectus of them to come to a conclusion whether because of some contumacious conduct or other sulllcient reason the person proceeded against should be punished for comtempt of court. fl 89 E-0]\n\nReg. v. Gray (1900] 2 Q.B. 36; E.M.S. Namboodripad v.\n\nT. N.\n\nNamblar, [1970] S.C.C. 325; Re: P. C. Sen, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 649; Debi\n\nPrasad Sharma and Ors. v. The King Emperor, L.R. 70 I.A. at p. 224; Legal Remembrancer v. Matilal Ghose and Others. I.L.R. 41, Cal. 173, applied.\n\nPlain reading of S. 3(i) of the Commissions of Enquiry of Act makes it manifest that -the notification appointing a commission of inquiry must be published in the official gazette. It is an inperative requirement and cannot be dispensed with. The commisslon (J'f inquiry is appointed for the purpose of making an inquiry into some matter of public importance. The schedule containing the various allegations in the present case was a part of the notification dated March 12, 1968 nd specified definite matter of public importance which were to be inquired into by the Commission. As such the publication of the schedule in the official gazette should be held to be in compliance with the statutory requirement. The object of publication in an official aazette is twofold : to. give publicity to the notification and further to provide authenticity to the contents of that notification in case some dispute arises with .regard tp the contents. [190G-HJ\n\nIn the present case no undue emphasis was given to any portion of the notification as the whole notification as printed in the Gazette was given to the neW.paper for publication. Further, the subject matter of the inquiry before the Commission as set 'Iorlh in allegation No. I-4 was whether there was any misuse of official position on the part of the Minis- 1<1\" concerned when he directed against the re<:ommendation of the Law Sea:etary aad the District Magistrate, the withdrawal o'f the prosecution against the two accused in question. The question for decision which, liowever, was the subject of criminal revision petitions pending in Patna Court was whether the order of the magistrate dismissing the application for withdrawal of prosecution was contrary to law.\n\nThe two aatters were distinct and separate and not identical. It may be that some of tho matters which were connected with the criminal revision petitions\n\nwere tho subject of inquiry by the commission of inquiry, but that would aot. attract liabi)ity for contempt of court. [191 C-D]\n\n1., annat/i Rao v. Slate of Or)ssa, [1968] S.C.R. 789; referred to.\n\nThe jud1111ent of tho High Court must accordingly be set aside and the rule issued :tgainst the appellant for contempt of court must be discharged.\n\nG · (192 Cl\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 30 of. 1969.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 12th August, 1968 of the Patna High.Court in Original Crimi- 1-1 nal Miscellaneous Petition'No; 30 oi 1968.\n\nBasudev Prasad Sinha and B. P. Jha, for the Appellant.\n\ns. N. JllA v. K. P. S!NllA (Khanna, J.) i85\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nK11a1ma, J. This is an appeal by ; pecial leave by Sammbhu Nath Jha who along with two others has been found by the Patna l; ligh Court to be guilty ol contempt of court. In view of the fact tliat the contempt, in the opinion of the High Court, was of a technical nature, the contcmiriers were let off with a warning.\n\nOn January 2, 1966 a report was lodged wi1h the police ey Lachho Paswan that when he and his brother Dwarka Paswan were going to J amui market, Kedar Prasad respondent abused them.\n\nKedar Prasad also exhorted others to assult Dwarka Paswan.\n\nAtn assault was then made upon Dwarka Paswan and he was surrounded. Ariun Pandey thrust Saif in the chest of Dwarka Paswan,\n\nas a result of which he died on the spot.\n\nThe motive for the assault was stated to be that Lachho Paswan and Dwarka Paswain had voted against Kedar Prasad in the election to the office of Mukhia. The police on the basis of that report investigated the case and submitted a charge sheet for offences under sections 148 and 302 read with section 149 I.P.C. against a number of persons.\n\nNo charge sheet was submitted against Kedar Prasad and Arjun Pandey. During the course of commitment proceedings, the commitling magistrate ordered that Kedar Prasad and Atjun Pandey be sum mooed for May 15, 1966 as accused.\n\nKedar Prasad and Arjun Pandey filed revision petitions against the order ot the committing magistrate, but the same was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Monghyr as per order dated May 5, 1967. It was held that Kcdar Prasad and Atjun Pandey had ben rightly summoned.\n\nAfter the dismissal of the revision petition, an application was filed by the Assistant District Prosecutor on September 18, 1967 in the court of the learned magi>tratc for withdrawal of the case against Kedar Prasad and Arjun Pandey on the grO\\llld that it was inexpedient for State and public policy to prosecute them. After hearinp; the counsel for the complainant and others, the committing magistrate dismissed the said application on October 6, 1967. It was o1$erved that the application for withdrawal of the prosecution amounted to an abuse and improper inte1fcrQ11Ce in the normal course of justice.\n\nTwo revision petitions were filC<! against the above order dated October 6, 1967. One of the revision petitions was filed by the State of Bihar and the other was filed b¥ one Abani Kumar Ma, ndal.\n\nBoth the revision petitions were admitted by the High Court on November 30, 1967.\n\nDuring the pendency of the above mentioned criminal revision petitions, the Governor of Bihar as per notification dated March 13-18648 upCI/72\n\n12, 1968 appointed a Commission of Inquiry consisting of Shri T.\n\nL. Venkatarama Aiyer, retired judge of the Supreme Cou1t, under section 3 of the Commissions of .Inquiry Act, 1952 (Act 60 of\n\n1952) to inquire into a number of charges against 14 persons who had earlier held the offices of Chief Minister and ministers in ltte State of Bihar.\n\nOne of the persOQ!i against whom inquiry was ordered was Shri Hasibur Rahman who had held the office of Minister duri, ng the period from March 16, 1967 to January 28,\n\n1968. The allegations which were the subject matter of the inquiry were set forth in the schedule annexed to the notification.\n\nAllegation No. J-4 which was the subject of inquiry against Shri Hasibur Rahman was as under:\n\n\"Shri Kedar Prasad Sinha and Shri Arjun Pandey . were facing prosecution along with nine others in a serious case of rioting with murder which was pending before the Munsif-Magistrate, Jamui.\n\nThey filed a revision petition !:¢fore the Additional Sessions Judge, Monghyr against their prosecution, which was dismissed.\n\nThereupon on 6th June, 1967 they presented an application direct to the then Mster for Law, Shri Hasibur Rahman, who directed that the Law Secretary should examine the matter and report and in the meanwhile the District Magistrate was requested to take two months' adjournment of the case and also send the case diary with his report.\n\nOn 17th August, 1967, the District Magistrale sent his report opposing withdrawal cf the case. Even before lhe District Magistrate's letter was diarised in the Law Department, Shri Hasibur Rahman called for the file directly from the dealing assistant and ordered that a telegram should be sent to the District Magistrate to take further adjournment for a fortnight.\n\nThe matter was then examined thoroughly by the ofikers of the Law Department and in his note, dated 30th August, 1967, the Law Secretary recommended against withdrawal of the prosecution pointing out that there was a prima facie case and justice demanded that it 'houlcl be thrnshcd out in Court.\n\nShri Hasibur Ral11m111, howcwr, ignored the advice of the District Magistrate as well us of the Law Secretary and ordered on 10th September, 1967 that the case should be withdrawn.\n\nA petition for withdrawal was accordingly filed on l 81h Scplemhrr, 1967, hut was rejected by the trial court.\n\nThereupon Shri Hasibur Rahman directed !hat ;1 revision should be filcJ in the\n\nS, N., JHA v. K. P. SINHA (Khallll(I, J.) 187\n\nHigh Court against the refusal oi. the trial court to allow withdrawal of the case. A revision was accordingly filed, which is still pending before the High Court.\n\n\"Shri Hasibur Rahman thus by misuse of his official position and power unnecessarily interfered with the administration of justice in a senous case of rioting with murder.''\n\nThe notification relating to the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry along with the schedule containing the different allegations was published in the Bihar Gazette Extraordinary . dated March 12, 1968. The same day the appellant, who was one of the ministers of Bihar, gave ; for publication to the press a eopy _of the notification, including the schedule of allegations. Thesaid notification along with the schedule of allegations was published in the Searchlight of Patna in issues dated March 13, March 14 and March 15 of 1968. Allegation No. J-4 relating to the withdrawal of case regarding Kedar Prasad SWia was published in the issue of Searchlight dated March 14, 1968. Application dated March 25, 1968 was thereafter filed by Kedar Prasad and Arjun Pandey for initiating contempt of court proceedings against 25 persons, including the State of Bihar, th~ Chief Minister and Ministers of Bihar, the Chief Secretary of the Bihar Government as well as Shri Subhash Chandra Sarkar, Editor Jlnd Sbri Awadesh Kumar Tiwari, printer and publisher of the Searchlight. . The appellant was impleaded as respondent No. 3 ,\\Jl the application.\n\nIt was urged that the publication Of allegation No. J-4 related to\n\na matter which was the subject matter o~ criminal revision petitions in the High Court and had the result of interfering with the course of justice and prejudicing the mankind against the two applicants.\n\nThe learned jude who dealt with the application held that no case for contempt of court bad been proved against 22 out of 25 persons. The appel!ant was, however, found to be guilty of contempt of court, because it was be who had handed over the offonding matter to the press for publication in the newspaper.\n\nTh\" editor as also the printer and publisher of the Searchlight too were found uilty because of the publication of the news item in the aforesaid paper.\n\nWe have heard Mr. Basudev Prasad on behalf of the appellant.\n\nNo one has appeared on behalf of the respondents. After givin~ H the matter our consideration, we are of the opinion that the pesent is .not a fit case wherein action should hie taken for contempt of court. 14-L864 Sup.Cl/72\n\nThe law relati.ng to contempt of court is well-settled.\n\nAny act done or writing published which is calculated to bring a court or judge into contempt or to lower his authority or to interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the courts is a contempt of court [Reg, v. Gray( 1) ]. The law of contempt as observed by this Court in the case of E. M. S. Namboodrlpad v. T.\n\nN. Nambiar(2) stems from the right of the courts to pu.nish by imprisonment or fines pers<Jtlls guilty of words or acts which either obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice.\n\nThis right is exercised in India by all courts when contempt is committed in facie curaie and by the superior courts on their own bjeha.lf or on behalf of courts subordinate to them even if committed outside the courts.\n\nFonnerly, it was regarded as inherent in the powers of a Court of Record and now by the Constitution of lndia, it is a part of the powers of the Supreme Court and the High Courts.\n\nThere are many kinds of contempts.\n\nThe chief fonns of contempt are insult to judges, attacks upo_n them, comment on peinding proceedings with a tendency to prejudice fair trial, obstruction to officers of courts, witnesiies or the parties, abusing the process of the court, bre, tch of duty by officers connected with tjle court and\n\nscandallsin~ the judges or the oourts.\n\nThe last form occurs, generally speaking, when the conduct of a person tends to. bring the authority and administration of the Jaw into disrespect or disregard.\n\nJn this conduct ate included a.Ii acts which btjng the court into distepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity, affront its majesty or challenge its majority.\n\nThe matter was also dealt with by this Court Re: P. C. Sen(') and it was observed :\n\n\"Contempt by speech or writing may be by scandalising the Court itself, or J:ty abusing parties to actions, or by prejudicing mankind in favour of or against a party before the cause is heard.\n\nIt is incumbent upon Courts of justice td' preserve their proceedings ffOJll being misrepresented, for prejudicing the minds of the public against persons concerned as parties in causes befQre the cause is finally heard has pernicious consequences.\n\nSpeeches or writings mirepresting the proceedings of the Court or prejudicing the public for or against a party or involving reflections on parties to a proceeding amount to contempt. To make a speech tendmg to in'lluenee the result of a pending trial, whether civil or criminal is a grave contpt. Comments on pending proceedings, if emanating from the t>atties or their lawyers, are generally a mote serious contempt than those comlitg from independent sources.\n\nThe question in all cases of cotnment\n\n(I) (1900] . i Q.ll. 36.\n\n(2) [1970l s.c.c. 325. (Jl p969J 2 s.c.R. 649.\n\ns. N. JHA v. K. P. SINHA (Khanna,!.) 189\n\non pending proceed\\ngs is not whether the publication d9es interfere, but whether it tends to interfere, with the due course of justice. The question is not so much of the intention of the conteni.ner as whether it is calculated to interfere with the administration or justice ...\n\nReliance in the above cited case was placed upon the foJlowing observations of the Judicial Committee iii the case of Debi Prasad' Sharma and Ors. v. The King-Emperor(!).\n\n\". . . . the test applied by the . . . . . Board which jteard the reference was whether the words complained of were in the circumstances calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of -justice and the due administration of law.\" It has -also to be borne in mind, as observed in Re: P. C. Sen('),\n\nthat ordinarily a court will not initiate procedings for commitment for contempt where there is a mere technical contempt.\n\nThis Court referred in the above context to the observations of Jins, C.J., in Legal Remembrancer v. Matilal Ghose and Olhers(') that proceedings for contempt should be initiated with utm<>st reserve\n\nand no court in the due discharge of its duty ca.n afford to disregard them.\n\nIt would_ follow from the above that the courts have power to take action against a person who does an act or publishes a writing which is calculated to bring a court or judge into contempt or to lower his au1hority or to obstruct the due course of _justice or dll'~ administratiQn of law. As intention of the contemner to cause those consequences is not a necessary ingredient of contempt of court and it is en011gh to show that his act was calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice and administration\n\nof Jaw, there would be quite a number of cases wherein the contempt alleged would be of a technical nature. In such cases, the court would exercise circumspection and judicial restraint iu the matter of taking action for contempt of court The court h:is to take into account the surrounding circumstances and the material facts of the case and on conspectus of them to come to a conclusion whether because of some contumacious conduct or oilier sufficient reason the person proceeded against should be punished for contemptof cqurt.\n\nLet us now examine the fac!s of the present case in the light'of • what has bieQn stated above.\n\nThe gravamen of the charge against the appellant is that during the pendency in .the High Court of the two revi5ion petitions mentioned earlier, he handed over to the representatives of the press for publication in the µewspapers the\n\n. (I) LR. 70 I.A. at p. 224.\n\n(2) [969} 2 S.C.R. 649. (J) I.LR. 41 Cal. 173.\n\nl'llO\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\nnotification, including the schedule of allegations, which had been issued under section 3 of t.hc Commissions of Inquiry Act.\n\nThe learned judge in holding the appellant guilty ol contempt of court observed :\n\n. \"But the mischief in this case was committed by publicizing the said allegations with full knowledge that the two criminal revision petiiions were pending in this court and the question as to whether the withdrawal petitions were bonafide or not was still to be considered by this court.\n\nI have not lieen shown any statutory provision which lays down that allegations of the , Ilature contained in the offending matter must be printed in the official gazette or in the public press.\"\n\nIt would follow from the bove that the decision of the High Court was based upon the assumption that there was no statutory provisiqn which required that allegations of the nature contained in the offending matter should be printed in the official gazette.\n\nSuch an asumpti.on in our view was incorrect.\n\nThe material part of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Commissions of ]inquiry Act reads:\n\nThe appropriate Government may, if it is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, and shall if a resolution in this *half is passed by the House of the People or, as the case may _be, the Legislative Assembly of the State. by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and performing such functions m1d within such time as may be specified in the notification, and the Commission so appointed shall make the inquiry and perform the .:Unctions accordingly.\n\nPlain reading of the above sub-section makes it manifest that the notification appointing a commission of inquiry must be published in the official gazette. It is an imperative requirement and cannot be dispensed with.\n\nThe commission of inquiry is appointed for the purpose of making an inquiry into SOI11f matter of public importune.~. TI1e schedule containing the various allegations in the present case was a part of the notification dated March 12. 1968 and speified definite matters of public importance which were to be inquired into by the Commission.\n\nAs such, the publication of the schedule in the official gazette should ble held to be in compibnce with the statutory requirement.\n\nThe object of publication in an official gazette is twolold : to give publicity to the notification and further to provide authenticity to the contents of that notification in case some dispute arises with regard to the contents.\n\ns. N. JliA v. K. i>. SINHA (Khanna; J.) i9!\n\nWhat was given to the press for publication in the present case was the notificatiQn issued under section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act.\n\nThe present is not a case wherein only part of the notification or some portions of the allegations were given for publication to the press with a. view to give emphasis to ainy part of the allegation. On the contrary, what was given to the press was the entire notification.\n\nThe subject matter of the inquiry before the Con:tn1ission as set forth in aljegation No. J-4 was whether there was any misuse of official position on the part ol Shri Hasibur :Rahman when he directed against the_ recommendation of the Law Secretary and the District Magistrate, the withdrawal of the prosecution against Kedar Prasad aio.4 Arjun Pandey. The question for decision which, however, was the subject of criminal revision petitions pending in Patna High Court was whether the order of the magistrate dismissing the application for withdrawal of prosecution was contrary to law. The two matters were distinct aind separate and not identical. It may be that some of the matters which were connected with the criminal revision petitions were the subject of inquiry by the cemmissioll of\n\ninqlliry, but that would not attract liability for contempt of court.\n\nIn the case of JagallflQth Rao v. State of Orissa(1) the appellant had challenged a notification issued under section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act appointing a Commission of Inquiry to inquire into certain allegations against persons who had held the offices of Chief Mmisters and ministers in Orissa.\n\nAn arguiacnt was advanced iii -that case that one of the items of charges which were to be inquired into biy the commission was the subject matter Of an appeal pending in the High Court. Question arose~ that context whetherJ4e setting up of the commission of inquiry by the State Govern4J-etit or the continuation of the i.nquiry by the cOlllDlission would be tantamount to contempt of court. This Colltt held that the above !lcts would not · constitute contelllpt of court and observed: _ - --\n\n\"It was po\\nted out by this Court in Shri Ram Knmna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendo/kar(1) that the inquiry cannot be looked upon as a judicial inquiry and the order ultimately passed cannot be enforced proprio vi1ore.\n\nThe inquiry and the investigation by the Commission do not therefore amount to usurpation of the function of the courts of Jaw. The scope of the trial by the Courts of law and the Commissioµ of Inquiry is altogether different. In any case, it CllrinOt be said that the Commission of Inquiry would be liable for contempt of Court if it proceeded to inquire into matters referred to it by the\n\n---(I) [1968] _3 S.C.R. 789.\n\n(2) [1'S9] S.C.R. 279. 15-L864SupC.I./72\n\n192 SUl'ltEM!: COURT JtBl>ORtS (1972] 3 S.C It\n\nGovernment Notification. In appointing a Commission A of Inquiry under section 3 and in malting the inquiry contemplated qy the !l!Otification, the Commission is performing its statutory duty. We have already held that in the appointing of the Commission of Inquiry the Government was acting bona fide.\n\nIt is, therefore, not possible to accept the argunuint of the appellants that the B setting up of the Commission of Inquiry_ bx. the State Government or the continuance of the inquiry by the Commission so constituted would be tantamount to contempt of Court.\" In our view the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.\n\nW.e, therefore, accept the appeal, set aside the judgment C of the Higli Court and discharge the rule which was issued against the appeJlant for contempt of court.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 76, "entities": [{"text": "JHA\n\nKEDAR PRASAD SINHA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KEDAR PRASAD SINHA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 24, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 61, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 24, 1972\n\n(J.M. SHELAT AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 165, "end_char": 169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 173, "end_char": 205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 757, "end_char": 769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952", "statute": "Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Commissions of Inquiry Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 773, "end_char": 799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Searchlight of Patna", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1725, "end_char": 1745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Searchlight of Patna in its issue of March 14, 1948 published the copy of the notification issued to it by the appellant, including the schedule of allegations."}}, {"text": "March 14, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1762, "end_char": 1776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Searchlight of Patna in its issue of March 14, 1948 published the copy of the notification issued to it by the appellant, including the schedule of allegations."}}, {"text": "March 25, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1916, "end_char": 1930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ai\\. application was filed on March 25, 1968 by the two accused aforesaid in the High Court for initiating contempt of Court proceedings against several persons including the appellant and the printer and publisher of Searchlight."}}, {"text": "Searchlight", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2104, "end_char": 2115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ai\\. application was filed on March 25, 1968 by the two accused aforesaid in the High Court for initiating contempt of Court proceedings against several persons including the appellant and the printer and publisher of Searchlight."}}, {"text": "[1969] 2 S.C.R. 649", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3747, "end_char": 3766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 3(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3938, "end_char": 3945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 12, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4386, "end_char": 4400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The schedule containing the various allegations in the present case was a part of the notification dated March 12, 1968 nd specified definite matter of public importance which were to be inquired into by the Commission."}}, {"text": "Patna High.Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6319, "end_char": 6335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 12th August, 1968 of the Patna High."}}, {"text": "Basudev Prasad Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6403, "end_char": 6423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basudev Prasad Sinha and B. P. Jha, for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "Basudev Prasad Sinha"}}, {"text": "B. P. Jha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6428, "end_char": 6437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basudev Prasad Sinha and B. P. Jha, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "K11a1ma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6548, "end_char": 6555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. N. JllA v. K. P. S!NllA (Khanna, J.) i85\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nK11a1ma, J. This is an appeal by ; pecial leave by Sammbhu Nath Jha who along with two others has been found by the Patna l; ligh Court to be guilty ol contempt of court."}}, {"text": "Sammbhu Nath Jha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6599, "end_char": 6615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. N. JllA v. K. P. S!NllA (Khanna, J.) i85\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nK11a1ma, J. This is an appeal by ; pecial leave by Sammbhu Nath Jha who along with two others has been found by the Patna l; ligh Court to be guilty ol contempt of court.", "canonical_name": "SAMMBHU NATH JHA"}}, {"text": "January 2, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6870, "end_char": 6885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 2, 1966 a report was lodged wi1h the police ey Lachho Paswan that when he and his brother Dwarka Paswan were going to J amui market, Kedar Prasad respondent abused them."}}, {"text": "Lachho Paswan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6925, "end_char": 6938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 2, 1966 a report was lodged wi1h the police ey Lachho Paswan that when he and his brother Dwarka Paswan were going to J amui market, Kedar Prasad respondent abused them."}}, {"text": "Dwarka Paswan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6968, "end_char": 6981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 2, 1966 a report was lodged wi1h the police ey Lachho Paswan that when he and his brother Dwarka Paswan were going to J amui market, Kedar Prasad respondent abused them.", "canonical_name": "Dwarka Paswain"}}, {"text": "Kedar Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7011, "end_char": 7023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 2, 1966 a report was lodged wi1h the police ey Lachho Paswan that when he and his brother Dwarka Paswan were going to J amui market, Kedar Prasad respondent abused them.", "canonical_name": "Kedar Prasad Sinha"}}, {"text": "Ariun Pandey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7177, "end_char": 7189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ariun Pandey thrust Saif in the chest of Dwarka Paswan,\n\nas a result of which he died on the spot.", "canonical_name": "Ariun Pandey"}}, {"text": "Saif", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7197, "end_char": 7201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ariun Pandey thrust Saif in the chest of Dwarka Paswan,\n\nas a result of which he died on the spot."}}, {"text": "Dwarka Paswain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7344, "end_char": 7358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The motive for the assault was stated to be that Lachho Paswan and Dwarka Paswain had voted against Kedar Prasad in the election to the office of Mukhia.", "canonical_name": "Dwarka Paswain"}}, {"text": "Mukhia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7423, "end_char": 7429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The motive for the assault was stated to be that Lachho Paswan and Dwarka Paswain had voted against Kedar Prasad in the election to the office of Mukhia."}}, {"text": "sections 148 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7540, "end_char": 7560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7571, "end_char": 7582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7583, "end_char": 7588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Arjun Pandey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7675, "end_char": 7687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No charge sheet was submitted against Kedar Prasad and Arjun Pandey.", "canonical_name": "Ariun Pandey"}}, {"text": "Atjun Pandey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7790, "end_char": 7802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the course of commitment proceedings, the commitling magistrate ordered that Kedar Prasad and Atjun Pandey be sum mooed for May 15, 1966 as accused.", "canonical_name": "Ariun Pandey"}}, {"text": "Kedar Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7846, "end_char": 7858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kedar Prasad and Arjun Pandey filed revision petitions against the order ot the committing magistrate, but the same was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Monghyr as per order dated May 5, 1967.", "canonical_name": "Kedar Prasad Sinha"}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge, Monghyr", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7983, "end_char": 8017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kedar Prasad and Arjun Pandey filed revision petitions against the order ot the committing magistrate, but the same was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Monghyr as per order dated May 5, 1967."}}, {"text": "Kcdar Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8067, "end_char": 8079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held that Kcdar Prasad and Atjun Pandey had ben rightly summoned.", "canonical_name": "Kedar Prasad Sinha"}}, {"text": "September 18, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8235, "end_char": 8253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the dismissal of the revision petition, an application was filed by the Assistant District Prosecutor on September 18, 1967 in the court of the learned magi>tratc for withdrawal of the case against Kedar Prasad and Arjun Pandey on the grO\\llld that it was inexpedient for State and public policy to prosecute them."}}, {"text": "October 6, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8564, "end_char": 8579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After hearinp; the counsel for the complainant and others, the committing magistrate dismissed the said application on October 6, 1967."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8872, "end_char": 8877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the revision petitions was filed by the State of Bihar and the other was filed b¥ one Abani Kumar Ma, ndal."}}, {"text": "Abani Kumar Ma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8909, "end_char": 8923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the revision petitions was filed by the State of Bihar and the other was filed b¥ one Abani Kumar Ma, ndal."}}, {"text": "T.\n\nL. Venkatarama Aiyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9221, "end_char": 9245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the above mentioned criminal revision petitions, the Governor of Bihar as per notification dated March 13-18648 upCI/72\n\n12, 1968 appointed a Commission of Inquiry consisting of Shri T.\n\nL. Venkatarama Aiyer, retired judge of the Supreme Cou1t, under section 3 of the Commissions of .Inquiry Act, 1952 (Act 60 of\n\n1952) to inquire into a number of charges against 14 persons who had earlier held the offices of Chief Minister and ministers in ltte State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9289, "end_char": 9298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Inquiry Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9322, "end_char": 9339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hasibur Rahman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9565, "end_char": 9579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the persOQ!i against whom inquiry was ordered was Shri Hasibur Rahman who had held the office of Minister duri, ng the period from March 16, 1967 to January 28,\n\n1968.", "canonical_name": "Hasibur :Rahman"}}, {"text": "January 28,\n\n1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9659, "end_char": 9676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the persOQ!i against whom inquiry was ordered was Shri Hasibur Rahman who had held the office of Minister duri, ng the period from March 16, 1967 to January 28,\n\n1968."}}, {"text": "Hasibur Rahman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9865, "end_char": 9879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J-4 which was the subject of inquiry against Shri Hasibur Rahman was as under:\n\n\"Shri Kedar Prasad Sinha and Shri Arjun Pandey .", "canonical_name": "Hasibur :Rahman"}}, {"text": "Kedar Prasad Sinha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9901, "end_char": 9919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J-4 which was the subject of inquiry against Shri Hasibur Rahman was as under:\n\n\"Shri Kedar Prasad Sinha and Shri Arjun Pandey .", "canonical_name": "Kedar Prasad Sinha"}}, {"text": "Munsif-Magistrate, Jamui", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10061, "end_char": 10085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "were facing prosecution along with nine others in a serious case of rioting with murder which was pending before the Munsif-Magistrate, Jamui."}}, {"text": "17th August, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10554, "end_char": 10571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 17th August, 1967, the District Magistrale sent his report opposing withdrawal cf the case."}}, {"text": "30th August, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11019, "end_char": 11036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was then examined thoroughly by the ofikers of the Law Department and in his note, dated 30th August, 1967, the Law Secretary recommended against withdrawal of the prosecution pointing out that there was a prima facie case and justice demanded that it 'houlcl be thrnshcd out in Court."}}, {"text": "Hasibur Ral11m111", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11222, "end_char": 11239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Hasibur Ral11m111, howcwr, ignored the advice of the District Magistrate as well us of the Law Secretary and ordered on 10th September, 1967 that the case should be withdrawn."}}, {"text": "10th September, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11342, "end_char": 11362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Hasibur Ral11m111, howcwr, ignored the advice of the District Magistrate as well us of the Law Secretary and ordered on 10th September, 1967 that the case should be withdrawn."}}, {"text": "Kedar Prasad SWia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12580, "end_char": 12597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J-4 relating to the withdrawal of case regarding Kedar Prasad SWia was published in the issue of Searchlight dated March 14, 1968.", "canonical_name": "Kedar Prasad Sinha"}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12828, "end_char": 12842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Application dated March 25, 1968 was thereafter filed by Kedar Prasad and Arjun Pandey for initiating contempt of court proceedings against 25 persons, including the State of Bihar, th~ Chief Minister and Ministers of Bihar, the Chief Secretary of the Bihar Government as well as Shri Subhash Chandra Sarkar, Editor Jlnd Sbri Awadesh Kumar Tiwari, printer and publisher of the Searchlight. ."}}, {"text": "Bihar Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12914, "end_char": 12930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Application dated March 25, 1968 was thereafter filed by Kedar Prasad and Arjun Pandey for initiating contempt of court proceedings against 25 persons, including the State of Bihar, th~ Chief Minister and Ministers of Bihar, the Chief Secretary of the Bihar Government as well as Shri Subhash Chandra Sarkar, Editor Jlnd Sbri Awadesh Kumar Tiwari, printer and publisher of the Searchlight. ."}}, {"text": "Subhash Chandra Sarkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12947, "end_char": 12969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Application dated March 25, 1968 was thereafter filed by Kedar Prasad and Arjun Pandey for initiating contempt of court proceedings against 25 persons, including the State of Bihar, th~ Chief Minister and Ministers of Bihar, the Chief Secretary of the Bihar Government as well as Shri Subhash Chandra Sarkar, Editor Jlnd Sbri Awadesh Kumar Tiwari, printer and publisher of the Searchlight. ."}}, {"text": "Awadesh Kumar Tiwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12988, "end_char": 13008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Application dated March 25, 1968 was thereafter filed by Kedar Prasad and Arjun Pandey for initiating contempt of court proceedings against 25 persons, including the State of Bihar, th~ Chief Minister and Ministers of Bihar, the Chief Secretary of the Bihar Government as well as Shri Subhash Chandra Sarkar, Editor Jlnd Sbri Awadesh Kumar Tiwari, printer and publisher of the Searchlight. ."}}, {"text": "Basudev Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13880, "end_char": 13894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have heard Mr. Basudev Prasad on behalf of the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Basudev Prasad Sinha"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14765, "end_char": 14770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This right is exercised in India by all courts when contempt is committed in facie curaie and by the superior courts on their own bjeha.lf or on behalf of courts subordinate to them even if committed outside the courts."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15104, "end_char": 15117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fonnerly, it was regarded as inherent in the powers of a Court of Record and now by the Constitution of lndia, it is a part of the powers of the Supreme Court and the High Courts."}}, {"text": "P. C. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15893, "end_char": 15902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was also dealt with by this Court Re: P. C. Sen(') and it was observed :\n\n\"Contempt by speech or writing may be by scandalising the Court itself, or J:ty abusing parties to actions, or by prejudicing mankind in favour of or against a party before the cause is heard."}}, {"text": "Jins", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17940, "end_char": 17944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court referred in the above context to the observations of Jins, C.J., in Legal Remembrancer v. Matilal Ghose and Olhers(') that proceedings for contempt should be initiated with utm<>st reserve\n\nand no court in the due discharge of its duty ca.n afford to disregard them."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19740, "end_char": 19749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissions of Inquiry Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19758, "end_char": 19784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20703, "end_char": 20712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Commissions of Inquiry Act", "statute": "Commissions of Inquiry Act"}}, {"text": "March 12. 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21768, "end_char": 21782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The commission of inquiry is appointed for the purpose of making an inquiry into SOI11f matter of public importune.~. TI1e schedule containing the various allegations in the present case was a part of the notification dated March 12."}}, {"text": "SINHA (Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22270, "end_char": 22283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SINHA (Khanna; J.) i9!"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22392, "end_char": 22401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissions of Inquiry Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22409, "end_char": 22435, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hasibur :Rahman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22883, "end_char": 22898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J-4 was whether there was any misuse of official position on the part ol Shri Hasibur :Rahman when he directed against the_ recommendation of the Law Secretary and the District Magistrate, the withdrawal of the prosecution against Kedar Prasad aio.4 Arjun Pandey.", "canonical_name": "Hasibur :Rahman"}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23169, "end_char": 23185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question for decision which, however, was the subject of criminal revision petitions pending in Patna High Court was whether the order of the magistrate dismissing the application for withdrawal of prosecution was contrary to law."}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23625, "end_char": 23631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of JagallflQth Rao v. State of Orissa(1) the appellant had challenged a notification issued under section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act appointing a Commission of Inquiry to inquire into certain allegations against persons who had held the offices of Chief Mmisters and ministers in Orissa."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23692, "end_char": 23701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissions of Inquiry Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23709, "end_char": 23735, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25040, "end_char": 25042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25194, "end_char": 25203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_193_199_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "M/S. mTHMULL BBOJRAJ\n\nSTATE OF BmAR a ORS.\n\nJanuary 25, 1972\n\n[K. S. HEGDE, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND D. 0. PALElWl, JI.]\n\nLrmd Acquialtion Act (1 o/ 1874), u. 9 and 11-&o,. of.\n\nIn 1954 the lands in dispute were notifted under the Indian Act, 1927. Later, in order to acquire and include them in the adloinln.2\n\nGovernment forest, GoVel'llment notified them under s. 4 of thi Lani!\n\nAcquisition Act, 18!>4. Government also took action under s. 17(4) of the Act, dispenaed with the proceedings under s. SA, and iuued the nol!Acation under s. 6. Thueafrer, proceedings were taken under 91. 9 and 11, but Government decided that it was not worthwhile to acquire the entire area and withdrew some of the lands from acquisition. .\n\nThe appellant moved the High Court unsllCCelSfully, under Art. 226, for directions to award him compensation in reapect of those lands also.\n\nID _appeal to this Court, it waa contended that: (1) Since the Govern ment had taken possession in 1954, Government became full ownen of the lands when notifications were issued under. s. 6 of the. Land Acquisition Act; and (2) the lands had been actually taken ok>o of by the Col lector under s. 17 (I) and Gl!Vemment became full owners when pnblic notice was aiven under s. 9(1).\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : (I) There waa no satisfactory eVidence to show that the Government had taken possession of the lands in 1954. Therefore, tho High \"Court was justified in not pronouncing on the question in a petition under Art. 226.\n\n(2) (a) Under s. 17(1) the Collector cannot take poaaeuion unlea F Government directs him to do so. There is no material on record to show that Government had given any such direction, nor is there any material to show that theCollector had taken possession under s. 17(1). U960-H]\n\nLt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh v. Avlnash Sharma, (1971) I S.C.R. 413, explained and distinguished.\n\n(b) The expression 'whenever the appropriate Government ao directs' G in s. 17(1) refers to the taking df possession and not to the declaration of urgency. But even in caaes of urgency, Government may not think it necessary to take immediate profession. Hence, it could not be said that on the expiry of 15 days from the publication of the notice under s. 9( I), the lands had vested in the Govel\"nment. [198 G-H; 199 ArC)\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURlSDlCTION : C.A. No. 379 and 741 of 1967.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order da~ October 14, 1966 pf the Patna High Court in CivilWrii 1qrisdi~~ c.& No. 434 1111d 435 of 1966,\n\nR. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal and D. P. Singh, for the appellant (in C.A. 741 of 1967)\n\nA. K. Sl!h, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal and D. P. Singh, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 379 of 1967)\n\nNiren D~, Attorney General for India, D. Goburdhun, for the respondents (in both the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J; In tb, ese appeals by certificate, the only question that arises for decision is whether on the facts and in the circumstances of these cases, .the G_overnment oi Bihar was competent to withdraw fromacquisition certain lairids sought to be acquired under Acquisition Cases Nos. 3 and 4 of 1959-60 before the Additional Land Acquisition Officer, Hazaribagh.\n\nThe lands concerned in these cases were notified for acquisition in _1959 under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act) under two different notifications.\n\nAt abOut the same time, the Government also took action. under s. 17 (4) of the Act , and 4ispensed with proceedings under s. SA. Simultaneously. notifications under s. 6 were also issued.\n\nThereafter proceedings under ss, 9 and 11 were .taken.\n\nWhcm the acquisition proceedings were pending before the Land Acqub sition Officer, the Government withdrew from acquisitioo some ol the lands earlier notified under ss. 4 and 6.\n\nConsequently the Land Acquisition Officer excluded the comp insation jn: respect of those lands from the computation made b) him CJ.flier.\n\nThe appellant (common appellant in both the appc tis) )l&g aggrieved by that exclus_ion moved the High Court of Patna under Art. 226 of the Constitution seeking directions from _that court to the Land Acquisition Officer to award him compensation in respect of those lands as well.\n\nThe High Court rejected those writ petiti0111S.\n\nHence these appeals.\n\nThe lands in question are situate in the villages of Telaiya and Debipur.\n\nOn June 11, 1948, they were notified under ss. 14 and 21 of the Bihar Private Forest Act, 1947.\n\nThereafter they were again notified under s. 29 of the Indian Forest Act in 1953 and 1954.\n\nL'ater on the Government felt that in order to include those lancls in the adjoining Govemment forest, it would be necessary to acquire them.\n\nConsequently they were notified for acquisition.\n\nBut after the lands in question were tentatively valued, the-Government thought that it was not worthwhile to acquire entire area notified for acquisition.\n\nHence it withdrew from\n\nacquisi!ion~ ·ubs!antial port!<in of lands notified for acquisitiqn,\n\n- These in bnef are the matenal facts.\n\nJETHMULL v. BJHAR (Hegde, J.) 195\n\nThe allegation of the appellant is that after the lands in question were notified under s. 29 of the Indian Forest Act, the Forest Departme.nt unlawfully took possession of those lands and continued to be in possession ol. the same and therefore when notifications under s. 6 were issued, the Government became the owner of those lands and thereafter, it was not competent for the Government to withdraw from acquisition any of the lands notified under s. 6.\n\nAlternatively it was contended that the Government became the full owner of those lands when the Collector caused ·\n\na public notice to be given under s. 9(1) of the Act. Lastly it was contended that the lands in question had been actually taken possession of by the Collector under s. 17 (1) of the Act and hence they vested in the Government.\n\nThe Government of Bihar has denied all the above allegations. It denied that the Government took possession of the lands in question in 1954. It further denied that those lands had been taken possession of under s. 17 (1). The Government denied the allegation of the appellant that it became the owner of the lands in question either when notifications u.nder s. 6 or notices under s. 9 ( 1) were issued .\n\n. The High Court was not satisfied from the evidence adduced by the appellant that the Government had taken possession of the lands in question in 1954. It thought that this was a disputed question of fact and on the material before it, it was not possible to decide that question conclusively and hence it declined to pronounce on that question.\n\nThe High Court repelled the contention ol. the appellant that possession had been taken under s .. 17(1). It Plso did not accept the contention of the appellant that on the issue of :notices under s. 9 (1), Government had become the owner of the lands in question. In the result the High Court dismissed the writ petitions.\n\nThe very contentions taken before the High Court were repeated in this Court.\n\nNow comi.ng to the question whether the Government took possession ol. the lands in question in 1954, it was conceded that the Government was not competent to take possession of those lands either under the notifications issued under ss. 14 and 21 of the Bihar Private Forest Act 1947 or under the notifications issued under s. 29 of tl!e Indian Forest Act. The case of the appellant is that the Government runlawfully took possession of the properties. In support of that contention reliance was mainly placed on the letter written by the Divisional Forest Officer, Kodarma Division to lbe Range Officer, Kodarma on October 1, 1958 as well as on t'1e requisition sent to the Land Acquisition Officer by the same\n\n9ffi_cer.on January 24, 1959 (Annexure II). The concerned\n\nDivisional Forest Officer was one Brij Mohan Prasad. In the A letter in question he stated :\n\n\"The forest in the above villages are in possession of the Forest Department since sometime past .•. \"\n\nIn the requisition again, he mentioned :\n\n\"The land was previously notified under s. 29(3) of the I.F.A. and it was demarcated and possession taken.\n\nLater on it was found that the land in question was raiyati, it was necessary to acquire under the Land Acquisition Act.\"\n\nIn para 12 of that requisition, be further stated:\n\n\"it is already under possession and this is to be formally handed over immediately.\"\n\nThis Officer has filed an affidavit before the High Court.\n\nTherein he explained that he made the statements illl question D under an erroneous impression that the Government came into possession of the lands in question in view of the notification issued under s. 29 of the Indian Forest Act.\n\nThis statement of his receives support from his letter written to the Land Acquisition Officer on August 11, 1959 wherein he mentioned :\n\n\"With reference to your above letters, I have to say that Debipur Forest was notified under the Indian Forest Act on the 8th December, 1953 and that of Telaiya on the 22nd November. 1954.\n\nThus, date of\n\npossesion is 8th December, 1953 and 22nd November 1954 respectively.\"\n\nIt is possible that this officer had an erroneous impression as\n\nto the effect of a notification under s. 29 of the Indian Forest Act.\n\nThe other documents relied on by the appellant are wholly inconclusive.\n\nHence there is no need to refer to them.\n\nWe are in agreement with the High Court that there is no satisfactory evidence to show that the Government had taken possession of G these lands in 1953 or 1954.\n\nAs the parties had not enough opportunity to adduce evidence on this point, we will not be justified in finally deciding this question.\n\nIt is sufficient if we say that on the material on record, the Hiirh Court was justified in not pronouncing on this question in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution.\n\nIt is open to the appellant to seek such other H remedy as may be available to him under law if the Government had unlawfully taken possession of those lam.ds.\n\nThe question whether the Government had unlawfully taken possession of those\n\nJBtllMULL v. lintAR (Hegde, J.) 197\n\nlands in 1954, as we shall presently see, is wholly irrelevant for the decision of these appeals.\n\nThe next point that arises for decision is whether delivery of the lands notified for acquisition was taken under s. 17 ( 1) as contended by the appellant. The Government becomes the owner of the lands notified for acquisition only when the Collector takes possession of those lands either under s. 16 or Ui!lder s. 17 ( 1) .\n\nBoth thase provisions provide that when the Collector takes possession WJ.der those provisions, the lands notified for acquisition shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Until and unless possession is taken under either of those pxovisions, the lands notified for acquisition: do. not vest in the Government. Section 48 ( 1 ) of the Act provides : ·\n\n\"Except in the case provided for in section 36, the 'Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken.\"\n\nSection 36 is not relevant for our present purpose.\n\nPossession referred to in s. 48 necessarily is the possession taken either Utllder s. 16 or under s. 17(1). Section 17(1) says:\n\n\"In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the lll9tice mentioned in section 9 sub-section (1 ) , take possession of any waste or arable land needed for public purposes or for a Company.\n\nSuch land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Govemment free from all encumbrances.\"\n\nOrdinarily possession of any land notified for acquisition is taken when the Collector had made an award under s. U and not before it.\n\nBut an exception is provided under s. 17 (J). In cases ol urgency, if the G<ivernment so directs, the Collector may, though illO award has been made under s. 11, on the expiration of the 15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in s. 9 (1 ) take possession of any waste or arable land and the land shall thereupon vest. absolutely with the Government free from\n\nal.I encumbraJlce$. From this proviion, it is plain that the Collector cannot take possession of the land in question u.nless th, e Government directs him to do so.\n\nThe Government can direct him to do so only in cases of urgency.\n\nEven when the Government directs the Collector to take possession, he cannot do so until expiration of 15 days from the publication of a notice\n\nunder. s. 9 ( 1). There is no material oo record to show that: the A Government had given to the Collector any direction under s. 17 ( 1); nor is there any material to show tha!_ the lands iin question had been taken possession of by the Collector under s. 17 ( 1 ) .\n\nIt is true that in the order-sheet maintained by the Land Acquisi-.\n\ntion Officer, a note was made on October 17, 1959:\n\n\"Shri B. J. Yadav Kgo, to deliver possession at the spot to the representative of the R.0. on 16-11-59 Draft addressed to R.0. is signed.\" ·\n\nBut there is nothing to show that this order was implemented.\n\nAccording to the respondent this order was not implemented. . , .\n\nRel)ing on the decision of this Court in Lt. Governor of Himacha/ Pradesh v. A vinash Sharma (1) it was contended by Mr.\n\nR. K. Garg, the learned Counsel for the appellant that once it is established that the possession of the land notified for acquisition\n\nwas taken in 1953 or 1954, it was unnecessary for his client to establish that a.ny possession was taken under s. 17(1.). Aceord- J)i ing to him on the expiration of 15 days after the issue of notices u:nder s. 9 O), the lands in question vested in the Governuient.\n\nThe decision in question does not lend any support for this C011tention. In that case not oruy the property had been taken possession of by the Government even before the acquisition proceedings had started but appropriate proceedings under s. 9 ( 1) and s. 17 ( 1) were also taken though there was no actual taking\n\nE ! of possession under s. 17(1).\n\nUnder those .circumstances this Court observed :\n\n\"In the present case a notification under s: 17 ( 1) and ( 4) was issued by the State Government and possession which had preVJously beelll. taken must, froni the1 date of expiry of fifteen days from the publicatii>n of the notice under s. 9 (1), be deemllji to be the possession of the Governmen).\n\n In the present case, as mentioned earlier, o aaterfal .has, been placed before the Court to show that'actio11.unclcr s.17(1) had been taken. . .:\n\nIt was next contended by Mr. Garg and Mr. A.· K~ sen, th.Iii the expression ''whenever the appropriate government so dir@\" in s. 17 (1 ) refers to urgency not to the taking of possession of the lands notified for acquisition.\n\nTheir'. further ~1ion; was that no sooner the Government issued the notificati\"11 ll1!der s. 17 ( 4), the factum of urgency was established and hence , clD ttiO 1' expiration of the fifteen davR from the publication of notide 1'!ili:lt'\n\n(I) [1971] !.S.C.R. 413:\n\nJBTHMULL v. BIHAR (Hegde, I.) 199\n\ns. 9 ( 1 ) the lands which were already in the possession of the Government vested in the Government. We are unable to accept this construction of s. 17 ( 1). In our judgment s. 17 (I) is pl am and unambiguous.\n\nThe expression \"whenever the approprite gevernment so directs\" in that section refers to the taking of possession and not to the declaration of urgeincy.\n\nEven in case of urgency, the Government may not think it necessary to take immediate possession for good reasons.\n\nNeither the language of s. 17 ( 1) mor public interest justifies the construction sought to be placed by the learned Counsel for the appellant.\n\nFor the reasons mentioned above, these appeals fail and they are dismissed;'but in the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to b_ear their own costs in these appeals.\n\nBefore concluding 'th\\' case, it is necessary to record the assurance given by the Attorney-General on behalf of the State Government of Bihar that the Government of Bihar will not realise from 'the appellant any interest on the loans advanced for the development of the lands notified for .acquisition in the two Land Acquisition cases from the dates they were notified under s. 29 of the Indian Forest Act. A Memo. to thai effect has been filed.\n\nV.P.S. . .\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 106, "entities": [{"text": "M/S. mTHMULL BBOJRAJ", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S. JETHMULL BBOJRAJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 25, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 25, 1972\n\n[K. S. HEGDE, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND D. 0."}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Lrmd Acquialtion Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Act, 1927", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 230, "end_char": 246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 363, "end_char": 367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Act, 1927", "statute": "the Indian Act, 1927"}}, {"text": "s. 17(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 440, "end_char": 448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Act, 1927", "statute": "the Indian Act, 1927"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 537, "end_char": 541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Act, 1927", "statute": "the Indian Act, 1927"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 784, "end_char": 792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Act, 1927", "statute": "the Indian Act, 1927"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1053, "end_char": 1057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Act, 1927", "statute": "the Indian Act, 1927"}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1066, "end_char": 1086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1162, "end_char": 1167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1241, "end_char": 1248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1488, "end_char": 1496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 17(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1513, "end_char": 1521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 17(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1763, "end_char": 1771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 17(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1958, "end_char": 1966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 9( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2238, "end_char": 2246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2506, "end_char": 2516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "434 1111d 435 of 1966,\n\nR. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal and D. P. Singh, for the appellant (in C.A. 741 of 1967)\n\nA. K. Sl!h, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal and D. P. Singh, for the appellant (in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Garg"}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2518, "end_char": 2531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "434 1111d 435 of 1966,\n\nR. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal and D. P. Singh, for the appellant (in C.A. 741 of 1967)\n\nA. K. Sl!h, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal and D. P. Singh, for the appellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "D. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2536, "end_char": 2547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "434 1111d 435 of 1966,\n\nR. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal and D. P. Singh, for the appellant (in C.A. 741 of 1967)\n\nA. K. Sl!h, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal and D. P. Singh, for the appellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sl!h", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2590, "end_char": 2600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "434 1111d 435 of 1966,\n\nR. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal and D. P. Singh, for the appellant (in C.A. 741 of 1967)\n\nA. K. Sl!h, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal and D. P. Singh, for the appellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "Niren D~", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2690, "end_char": 2698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "379 of 1967)\n\nNiren D~, Attorney General for India, D. Goburdhun, for the respondents (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "D. Goburdhun", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2728, "end_char": 2740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "379 of 1967)\n\nNiren D~, Attorney General for India, D. Goburdhun, for the respondents (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2830, "end_char": 2835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J; In tb, ese appeals by certificate, the only question that arises for decision is whether on the facts and in the circumstances of these cases, .the G_overnment oi Bihar was competent to withdraw fromacquisition certain lairids sought to be acquired under Acquisition Cases Nos."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3278, "end_char": 3282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3290, "end_char": 3316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3459, "end_char": 3464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3562, "end_char": 3566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3808, "end_char": 3819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4060, "end_char": 4079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant (common appellant in both the appc tis) )l&g aggrieved by that exclusion moved the High Court of Patna under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4086, "end_char": 4094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Telaiya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4369, "end_char": 4376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lands in question are situate in the villages of Telaiya and Debipur."}}, {"text": "Debipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4381, "end_char": 4388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lands in question are situate in the villages of Telaiya and Debipur."}}, {"text": "June 11, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4394, "end_char": 4407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 11, 1948, they were notified under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4434, "end_char": 4447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Private Forest Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4455, "end_char": 4485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4530, "end_char": 4535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Private Forest Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bihar Private Forest Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4543, "end_char": 4560, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5187, "end_char": 5192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Private Forest Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bihar Private Forest Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5200, "end_char": 5217, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5370, "end_char": 5374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Private Forest Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bihar Private Forest Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5552, "end_char": 5556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5710, "end_char": 5717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5842, "end_char": 5847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5909, "end_char": 5928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Bihar has denied all the above allegations."}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6117, "end_char": 6122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6265, "end_char": 6269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6287, "end_char": 6291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6857, "end_char": 6861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7298, "end_char": 7311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Private Forest Act 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7319, "end_char": 7348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7389, "end_char": 7394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Private Forest Act 1947", "statute": "the Bihar Private Forest Act 1947"}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7403, "end_char": 7420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Kodarma", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7631, "end_char": 7638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of that contention reliance was mainly placed on the letter written by the Divisional Forest Officer, Kodarma Division to lbe Range Officer, Kodarma on October 1, 1958 as well as on t'1e requisition sent to the Land Acquisition Officer by the same\n\n9ffi_cer.on January 24, 1959 (Annexure II)."}}, {"text": "October 1, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7681, "end_char": 7696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of that contention reliance was mainly placed on the letter written by the Divisional Forest Officer, Kodarma Division to lbe Range Officer, Kodarma on October 1, 1958 as well as on t'1e requisition sent to the Land Acquisition Officer by the same\n\n9ffi_cer.on January 24, 1959 (Annexure II)."}}, {"text": "January 24, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7790, "end_char": 7806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of that contention reliance was mainly placed on the letter written by the Divisional Forest Officer, Kodarma Division to lbe Range Officer, Kodarma on October 1, 1958 as well as on t'1e requisition sent to the Land Acquisition Officer by the same\n\n9ffi_cer.on January 24, 1959 (Annexure II)."}}, {"text": "Brij Mohan Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7871, "end_char": 7888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The concerned\n\nDivisional Forest Officer was one Brij Mohan Prasad."}}, {"text": "s. 29(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8117, "end_char": 8125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Forest Act", "statute": "Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8708, "end_char": 8713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8721, "end_char": 8738, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Debipur Forest was notified under the Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8937, "end_char": 8992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "22nd November. 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9046, "end_char": 9065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This statement of his receives support from his letter written to the Land Acquisition Officer on August 11, 1959 wherein he mentioned :\n\n\"With reference to your above letters, I have to say that Debipur Forest was notified under the Indian Forest Act on the 8th December, 1953 and that of Telaiya on the 22nd November."}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9257, "end_char": 9262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debipur Forest was notified under the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "Debipur Forest was notified under the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9270, "end_char": 9287, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9850, "end_char": 9858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debipur Forest was notified under the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "Debipur Forest was notified under the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10370, "end_char": 10375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10552, "end_char": 10557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10569, "end_char": 10574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10921, "end_char": 10931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10999, "end_char": 11009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11134, "end_char": 11144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11213, "end_char": 11218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11270, "end_char": 11275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11285, "end_char": 11293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11295, "end_char": 11308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11526, "end_char": 11535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11905, "end_char": 11910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12025, "end_char": 12030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12113, "end_char": 12117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12628, "end_char": 12632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12748, "end_char": 12753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12875, "end_char": 12880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 17, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12992, "end_char": 13008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tion Officer, a note was made on October 17, 1959:\n\n\"Shri B. J. Yadav Kgo, to deliver possession at the spot to the representative of the R.0."}}, {"text": "B. J. Yadav Kgo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13017, "end_char": 13032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tion Officer, a note was made on October 17, 1959:\n\n\"Shri B. J. Yadav Kgo, to deliver possession at the spot to the representative of the R.0."}}, {"text": "16-11-59", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13105, "end_char": 13113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on 16-11-59 Draft addressed to R.0."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13405, "end_char": 13415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Governor of Himacha/ Pradesh v. A vinash Sharma (1) it was contended by Mr.\n\nR. K. Garg, the learned Counsel for the appellant that once it is established that the possession of the land notified for acquisition\n\nwas taken in 1953 or 1954, it was unnecessary for his client to establish that a.ny possession was taken under s. 17(1.).", "canonical_name": "R. K. Garg"}}, {"text": "s. 17(1.)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13652, "end_char": 13661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13749, "end_char": 13753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14049, "end_char": 14053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14063, "end_char": 14068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14149, "end_char": 14157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14447, "end_char": 14451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.17(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14628, "end_char": 14635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14687, "end_char": 14691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was next contended by Mr. Garg and Mr. A.· K~ sen, th."}}, {"text": "A.· K~ sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14700, "end_char": 14710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was next contended by Mr. Garg and Mr. A.· K~ sen, th."}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14784, "end_char": 14789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14975, "end_char": 14980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15184, "end_char": 15188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15331, "end_char": 15336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15359, "end_char": 15364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15690, "end_char": 15695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16128, "end_char": 16133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before concluding 'th\\' case, it is necessary to record the assurance given by the Attorney-General on behalf of the State Government of Bihar that the Government of Bihar will not realise from 'the appellant any interest on the loans advanced for the development of the lands notified for .acquisition in the two Land Acquisition cases from the dates they were notified under s. 29 of the Indian Forest Act."}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16368, "end_char": 16373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16381, "end_char": 16398, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_19_28_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "MAHARASHTRA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD AND THE\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nNAGPUR ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY LTD.\n\n&ANR. .\n\nJanuary 1, 1972\n\n(S. M. S!KRI, C.J., J. M. SHELAT, I. D. DUA, H. R. KKAN:<:A\n\nAND G. K. MITTER, JJ.)\n\nIndian Electricity Act 1910, S. 4(3)-A11iendnie11t of tenns & co11di tions of Nagpur , Electricity Licence-Validity of a1nend111e; nt niadc in 1.966--Lega/ity of notice undet s. 6 of Act for purchase of undertaking by Electricity Board.\n\nOn May 4, 1905 a J:ccnce was granted under s. -lll) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1903 to Crompton & Co. Ltd. for 1 he supply of electricity in the municipal area of Nagpur.\n\nA notification gnint:ng the above license was published in the Central Provinces Gazette on May 6. 1905.\n\nThe lic:cn'.!e provideCi that the right of the governtncnt to purchase the undertaking &hall arise after 42 years from the conimencen1ent of the license and aft!!r every, subsequent period of 10 years.\n\nPara 4 of thr license provided that it '\"'oul<l come into force c.tnJ have effect on the day \\Vhen the notification confirming it was published in the Central Provinces Gazette and that <lay would for the purpose of Act, be deemed to be the c'ommcnccment of the license. On January 1. 1911 the IncYan Electricity Act, 1910 came into force.\n\nOn June 28, 1913 a notificatio:i permitting the assignn1ent of the licence in favour of the Nagpur Electric Light and Power Company Ltd, (respondent herein) was published in the gazette.\n\nOn May 2. 1947 amendments in the -terms and conditions of the licence were made under s. 4(3) of the Act of 1910 and were published in the gazette.\n\nIn the preambJe it was stated that these a1nendments were \"in •he terms and conditions of the Nagpur Electric:ty licence\n\ngrante~. under the Public Works Dept!.\n\nNotification No. 45 dated 4th May 1905 .......... \" fa the various amendments made throughout the reference 'was made to May 4. 1947 as being the date when various changes were deemed to start or operate. In clause 3 paragraph ( o) (i) was provided that \"Option of purchase given by sub-section 1 of section 7 of the Act shall be exercisable on .the expiration of ten years or 4th May\n\n1957 and the expiration of every subsequent period of ten years during continuance of this licence.\" On September 4, 1948 the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 came into force.\n\nSection 71 of this Act provided that the rit and options to purchase under the Indian Electricty Act. 1910 were deemed to have been transferred to the Provincial (now State) Electricity Board. The Indian Electricity Amendment Act. 1959 (32 of 1959) amended Indian Electrictv Act. 1910. In the newly inserted section 4A(l) t.he proviso thereto said that no alterations or amendments in the\n\nlicense shall be made except with the consent of the lisensee unless such consent was in the opinion of the State aovernment unreuo.ably with held.\n\nIn the amended Act section Ii provided for the purchase of th<\" licensee's undertaking by the State Electricitv Boa...t. but the old section 7 was allowed to continue.\n\nOn Se!>tember 15, 1965 notice w1s g; ven to the resrondent under sub-section (I) and sub.-tion (61 of section 6 ' of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 whereby the respondent was required\n\nto sell its undertaking to the Board on the midnight of 3rd/4th May, l 967 being the date of the expiry of the licence granted to it. Doubts arose as to the interpretation of clause 3 paragraph (o) (i) of the licence because of the use of the word 'or' between words 10 years and \"the 4th May. 1957\" in the said clause. The State Government on April l 9, 1966 published a notification whereby in the said clause between the words \"IO years\" and \"the 4th May, 1957\" the \\\\-'Ord \"on\" was substituted, the effect of which was that the option to purchase became exercisable on the expiration of period of 10 years on the 4th MaY. 1957.\n\nAfter this amendment another notice was given under sub-section ( 1) and (6) of s. 6 of the Indian Electricity Act, .J910 on April 26, 1966.\n\nThe \\VOrds of this notice were the same as that of the earlier notice but it \\\\'as expressly given in supersession of the earlier notice.\n\nThe respondent filed a \\\\'fit petition under article 226 of the Constitution challenging the aforesaid notice dated April 26, 1966. The High Court held that since the operation of Jicense con1menced on May, 6, 1905 it could not terminate on May 4, 1957 and therefore the amendment of 1966 was invalid.\n\nJn appeal to this Court it was comn1on ground that the licensee had never replied to the letter of the State Electricity Board asking for its consent for the amendment of the licence in 1966 in tern1s of section 4A(l) of the Electricity Act.\n\nHELD : (i) In the circumstances of the case there could be no doubt that the State Government was entitled to hold the opinion that the consent of the licensee for the purchase of undertaking had been unreasonably withheld. r27 El\n\n(ii) Two interprctzitions were possible of clause 3 paragraph (o) (i) of the license. as it existed before the amendme-nt dated April 19, 1966.\n\nOne was that !he \\\\'Ord 'or' had been \\\\'rongly use<l by some printing mistake and the true word was \"on\". The other interpretation was that two dates had been provided for the exercise of the option; one, the expirat:on of ten years from May 6, 1947 the other being May 4, 1957.\n\nThus there was genuine doubts about the real date and if the State Government sought to clarify the point it cannot be said that it made\n\nan. unreasonable demand from the licensee.\n\nIt was not a case where governn1ent was providingfor the option to purchase which was not originally intended to be given. [26 F-HJ\n\n(iii) The High Court was wrong in holding that May 6 was the relevant date becatise the notification relating to the original license was published on M'Y 6, 1905. When te license was amended in 1947 with the consent of the 1icensee it proceeded on the basis that the 42 vears period expired on Mav 3, 1947 because throughout the cruci<l effective date in the amendments is May 4, 1947.\n\nPara 4 of the or'ginal license thus ceased to have effect for the purpose of construing the 1icense as amended in 1947 and subsequently.\n\n(iv) If clause (3) paragraph (o) (i) is interprete~. in the light of the rest of the amendments made in the license in 1947, it is quite clear that the previous period was deemed to have expired on Mav 3, 1947 and the fresh period started on Mav 4, 1947 and the $ubsequent periods of 10 vears ended on Mav 3. 1957 and Mav 3. 1967. lt is impo'5ible to read the license as amended in 1947 in any other wav than that it was agreed that the ueriod of 10 vears in the license would start from Mav 4. 1947. 'Tlie details of distribution svstem, the valuatiofl of assPts as on Mav 4, 1947 and other clauses all point to this conclusion.\n\nThe license riehtlv talked of Sec. 7 of the Electricity Act because the license stHl provided for the start of period of 10 years from May 194 7 and\n\n( . .\n\nMAHARASHTRA ELECT. BOARD v. NAGPUR ELECT. CO. ~T (Sikri, C.J.) A this could only be proyided for while the old sec. 7 stood. The notice dated April 26, 1966 was thus in accordanee with terms of the license and the Jaw.\n\nThe impugned notice did not suffer from any infirmity.\n\nThe appeal n.ust accordingly be allowed. [280-HJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1429 & 1764 of 1968.\n\nAppeal from the judment and order dated the 26th April, 1967 of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench in Special Civil Application No. 125 of 1967.\n\nNiren De, Attorney-General for India, A. G. Ratnaparkhi, C. K. Ratnaparkhi and Rajiv Shah, for the appe!lant (in C.A. No.\n\nC 1429 of 1968) and Responde11t No. 3 (in C.A. No. 1764 of B68.\n\nM. C. Setalvad and/. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in C.A. No. 1429 of 1968).\n\nB. D. Sharma, for respondent No. 3 (in C.A. No. 1429 of 1968).\n\nV. S. Desai, P. K. Chatterjee and B. D. Sharma, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 1764 of 1968).\n\nS. /. Sorabjee and /. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in C.A. No. 1764 of 1968).\n\nE S. I. Sorabjee, Ashok H. Desai and R. P. Kapur, for intervenar\n\nNo. 1 (in both the Appeals).\n\nR. N. Banerjee and R. P. Kapur, for Intervener No. 2 (in both the Appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSlkri, C. J.\n\nThese two appeals by certificate are d; rected against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay ( Abhyankar and Paranjpe, JJ). By this judgment the High Court came to the conclusion that the notice dated April 26, 1966, issued by the Maharashtra State Electricity Board under the provisions of s. 6 G of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, was invalid in law and was unenforceable having failed to satisfy the essential conditions of the notice.\n\nThe High Court accordingly allowed the petition under art. 226 of the Constitution and quashed the said notice.\n\nThe relevant facts for determining the points at issue before us are as follows : On May 4, 1905, a licence was granted H under s. 4(1) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1903, to Crompton & Co. Ltd., London, for the supply of electricity in the municipal area of Nagpur.\n\nA notification granting the above licence was\n\nSUPREMF. COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\npublished in the Central Provinces Gazette on May 6, 1905. On A January I, 1911, the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, came into . force. On June 28, 1913 a notification permitting the assignment of the licence in favour of the Nagpur Electric Light and Power Company Ltd., respondent before us, was published in the gazette.\n\nOn May 2, 194 7, amendments in the terms and conditions of the licence made in exercise of the powers conferred oy sub-s. (3) of B s. 4 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, were published. In the preamable it was stated that these amendments were \"in the terms and conditions of the Nagpur Electricity Licence, granted under the Public Works Department Notification No. 46, dated the 4th May, 1905 .... \" In the various ameindments made throughout, reference was made to May 4, 1947, as being the date when various C changes were deemed to start or operate.\n\nFor instance, in clause 2 paragraph ( v) the expression \"deposited map\" was defined as follows :\n\n\"2(v) the expression \"deposited map\" shall mean the plans and statements showing\n\n(a) the area of supply;\n\n(b) details of distribution system laid and in use as on 4th May 1947;\n\n( c) additions or alterations. or both to existing distribution system as on 4th May 1947 .... \"\n\nA.1tain clause 2 paragraph (ix) defined the expression \"Nett Book\n\nV aloe\" to. mean the written down value of the assets as on May 4, 1947. In clause 3 paragraph (b)(ii) it is provided that \"nothing in this licence shall be construed to prevent the Great Indian Peninsula Railway, the Bengal Nagpur Railway or the Provincial F Government or the Central Government from taking from the Government a supply of electrical energy for its exclusive use within the area of supply for new installations set up by them after 4th May, 1947\". Jin clause 3 paragraph (d) it was provided that \"the licencee shall, within six months from the 4th May 1947, reduce its retail rates for the supply of energy for various G purposes to its consumers .... \" In clause 3 paragraph (e)(i)\n\n(b) it was provided that the \"continuous current system shall bie in use for a limited period of 5 years up to 4th May 1952; or such longer period as the Government may direct. ... \" It was\n\npro\"ided further in clause 3 paragraph (f) (vii) as follows :\n\n\"It is desirable that the existing distribution system viz. as on 4th May, 194 7 should also conform with the foregoing in all respects .... \"\n\nMAHARASHTRA ELECT. BOARD V. NAGPUR ELECT. CO.\n\n(Sikri, C.l.) 23\n\nA In clause 3 paragraph ( o) (i), which is the clause which we hav~\n\nto interpret, it was provided as follows :\n\n\"The option of purchase given by sub-section ( 1) of section 7 of the Act shall be exercisable on the expiration of ten years or 4th May 1957 and the expiration of every subsequent period of tenyears during the continuance of this license.\" We may mention that there was some debate before us whether the word \"or\" in this para was a misprint for \"on\". We checked up the original and it is common ground that the word in the original license is \"or\" and not \"on\".\n\nIn 'the first annex~ headed \"Compulsory Works\" (5ee Clause C 3 of the License) it is provided that the \"existing distribution system together with transformers and control gear as laid in use on 4th May 194 7 in streets and roads delineated in the deposited map shall be the Compulsory Works for purposes of the section.\"\n\nOn September 10, 1948, the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, came i.nto force. We need only notices. 71 of this Act under which D the rights and options to purchase under the Indian Electricity Act.\n\n1910 were deemed to have been transferred to the Provincial (now State) Electricity Board.\n\nThe Indian Electricity (Amendment) Act, 1959 (32 of 1959) amended the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. We need only notice E the insertion of new section 4A ( 1) at present. This reads :\n\n\"4A. Amendment of licensees.-(1) Where in its opinion the public interest so permits, the State Government, on the application of the licensee or otherwise and, after consulting the State Electricity Board, and if the licensee is not a local authority, also the local authority, if any, concerned, may make such alterations and amendments in tenns and conditions of a license, including the provisions specified in section 3, sub-section (2), clause (f), as it thinks fit : Provided that no such alterations or amendments shall be made except with the consent of the licensee unless such consent has, in the opinion of the State Government, been unreasonably withheld.\" The purchase of undertakings is to be regulated by s. 6 which reads :\n\n\"6. Purchase of undertakings. ( 1) Where a license has been granted to any person, not being a local authority, the State Electricity Board shall,- ( a) in the case of a license granted before the commencement of the Indian Electricity (Amendment)\n\nAct •. 195?, on te expiration of each such period as is specified m the license; ..... .\n\nhave the option of purchasing the undertaking and such option shall be exercised by the State Electricity Board serving upon the licensee a notice in writing of not less than one year requiring the licensee to sell the undertaking lb it at the expiry of the relevant period referred to in this sub-section.\"\n\nSub-section ( 4) of s. 6 provides that \"if the State Eleciricity Board intends to exercise the option of purchasing the undertaking under this section, it shall send an intimation in writing of such intention to the State Government at least eighteen months before c the expiry of the relevant period referred to in sub-section ( 1) and if. no such intimation as aforesaid is received by the State Government the State Electricity Board shall be deemed to have elected not to purchase the undertaking. Sub-section (6) of section 6 provides that \"where a notice exercising the option of purchasing the undertaking has been served upon the licensee under this section, the licensee shall deliver the undertaking to D the State Electricity Board, the State Government or the local authority, as the case may be, on the expiration of the relevant period referred to in sub-section ( 1) pending the determination and payment of the purchase price\". Under sub.s. (7), s. 6, \"where an undertaking is purchased under this section, the purchaser shall pay to the licensee the purchase price detertniiled in accordance with E the provisions of sub-section ( 4) of section 7 A\".\n\nOn September 15, 1965 notice was given to the respondent under sub-s. ( 1) and sub-s. ( 6) of s. 6 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910,. as follows :\n\n\"I aril directed to give you notice that t'fte Maharashtta State Electricity Board has decided to pµrcqase yo11cr Electricity Oi1dertaking at Nagpur (District Nagpur) in exercise of the option t<:> purchase vested in the Board by sub-section (1) of section 6 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and to require you to sell your said undertaking to the Board on the midnight of 3rd/ 4th May 1967 being the date of expiry of the license granted to you by the Government under the said Act and also to call upon you under sub-section ( 6) of Section 6 of the said Act to deliver the said undertaking to the Board on the s'aid date of expiry of the said license pending determination and payment of purchase price.\"\n\nDoubts arose as to the interpretation of clause 3 paragraph ( o )( i) of the license, which we have set out above. The State\n\nMAHARASHTRA ELECT, BOARD v. NAGPUR ELECT. CO. 25 (Sikri, C.l.)\n\nA Government, therefore, decided to amend the para so as to re move any doubts that there might be on the matter, and on April\n\n19, 1966, published a notification which reads as follows :\n\n\"Whereas as required by sub-section ( 3) of Section 4-A of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (II of 1910) a draft of the further amendment proposed to be made by the Government o~ Maharashtra in the terms and conditions of the Nagpur Electricity License, granted by the Government of the Central Provinces, Public Works Department, Notification No. 46, dated the 4th May, 1905, as subsequently amended, was published in Government Notification, Industries and Labour Department No. LNA-(M)-1265/8126-Elec. 1, datd the 4th January, 1966, for inviting objections and suggestions : And whereas no objections or suggestions have been received by the Government of Maharashtra : And whereas the Government of Maharashtra has consulted the Maharashtra State Electricity Board and the local authorities concerned and obtained the consent of the Central Government.\n\nAnd whereas the Government of Maharashtra also requested the Licensee, the Nagpur Electricity Light & Power Company Limited, to give its consent to the proposed amendment, as required by the proviso to subsection (I) of the said sctiOil 4-A but, in the opinion of the Government of Maharashtra, such consent has been unreasonably withheld : And whereas in the opinion of the Government of Maharashtra, the Public interest so permits to make the proposed amendment :\n\nNow, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by the said section 4-A and of all other powers enabling it in this behalf, the Government of Maharashtra hereby amends the terms and conditions of the said licence, a~ follows :\n\nIn clause 3 of the license, in paragraph ( o) in subparagraph ( i) for the portion beginning with the words \"shall be exercisable\" and ending with the word and figures \"May 1957\" the following shall be substituted. namely :-\n\n\"Shall be exercisable on the expiration of the period of ten years on the 4th May 1957\" 3-L864SuiiCl/72\n\n.28 SUPREME COUIT llEPOltTS\n\n\nAfter this amendment, another notio:e was given under sub-ss.\n\n(1) and (6) of s. 6 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, on April 26, 1966.\n\nThe wording of this notice is similar to the notice dated September 15, 1965, which we have set out above. This notice was expressly given in supersession of the earlier notice.\n\nWhile approaching the Central Government for its consent, 8 the Government of Maharashtra in its letter dated January 17, 1966, stated that \"the draft aniendment seeks to remove the ambiguity, if any, .in respect of the date on which the option of purchase is exercisable under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910\".\n\nOn November 10, 1966, the licensee, the Nagpur Electric Light and Power Company Ltd., filed the petition under art. 226 C challenging the aforesaid notice dated Apnl 26, 1966.\n\nThe High Court held that the amendments in the license made in 1947 were in order.\n\nNo serious challenge to these amendments has been made biefore us.\n\nThe High Court, however, seems to have held that the amendment of 1966 was invalid.\n\nThe first D question which we may deal with is whether the High Court is right in holding that the amendment of April 19, 1966 was valid or not. It is common ground that the licensee did not send any\n\nreply to the demand of consent made by the State Government.\n\nThe question arises whether the licensee unreasonably withheld the consent~ It seems to us that in the circumstances of this case E there is na doubt that the State Government was entitled to hold the opfoion that the consent had been unreasonably withheld.\n\nTwo interpretations were possible of clause 3 paragraph ( o) ( i) of the license, as it existed before the amendment dated April 19, 1966. One was that the word 'or' had been wrongly used by some printing mistake and the true word was 'on'. The other F interpretation was that two dates had been provided for the exercise of the option; one, the expiration of ten years from May 6, 1947, the other being May 4, 1957. Thus there were genuine doubts about the real date and if the State Government sought to clarify the point it cannot be said that it made an unreasonable demand on the licensee.\n\nEvery licensee, under the Electricity G Act, 1910 <>r the earlier Act, knew that the statute gave an option to the State Government or a local authority or some board to purchase, and that option had to be exercised after the expiration of certain periods mCDlioned in the licence. So it was not a case where Government was providing for the option to purchase which was not originally intended to be given. We are unable to appreciate 11 the opinion of the High Court that the \"amendment effected in 1966 stating that the option to purchase under the Act shall be exercinble on the expiration of the period of ten years on\n\n<. ,. , ..\n\nMAHARASHTRA ELECT, BOARD V. NAGPUJ. BLECT, (l(), 27 (Sikrl, CJ.) A 4-5-1957, is saying something wl!ich is meaningleu and wienforceable.\" The High Court seems to think that the period of 10 years starting with the commencement of tllat period on May 6, 1947 could never end on May 4, 1957, But this was exactly the reason why the amellldment was sought to be made in the license. May 6, 194 7 was a date which had no relevance once B the amendments of 194 7 are taken into consideration, Tbe amendments of 194 7 all the time speak of May 4, 194 7 and not May 6, 1947, The date May 6, 1947 was derived by the follow ing process of reasoning, The original license provided that \"Che right to purchase (para (g)) the undertaking, in respect of which the license is granted, shall for the purposes of the provisions in c this behalf contained in the said Act enure after the fOllowing periods, that is to say :- ( i) after 42 years from the commencement of this Licence.\n\n(ii) after every subsequent period of 10 years, The terms of such purchase as aforesaid shall be those D set forth in Section 7 of the Act.\"\n\nPara 4 of the original license provided that \"this License shall come into force and have etlect upon the day when a notification confirming it is published in the Central Provinces Gazette, and that day shall for the purposes of the said Act be deemed to be the commencement of this License\". It is this para 4 tllat created E the dilliculty because although the notification is dated May 4, 1905, it was published on May 6, 1905. But wllm Ille 1iceme was .amended in 1947 with the consent of the lieensee it proceeded on the basis that tile 42 years period expired on May 3, 1'47, because throughoot the crucial eft'ective date in the IUllOIMfmeats is May 4, 1947, p\n\nIt seems to us that after the amendments para 4 of tbe origiaal licen!e ceased to have clfect fot the purposes of ooutruiog die license as amended in 1947 and subsequently,\n\nThis takes us to the question whether the notice dated April 26, 1966 is in accordance with law. For the sake of convenience G we may set out clause 3 paragraph ( o )( i) as amended :\n\n\"3(o)(i) The option of purchase given by subsection ( 1 ) of section 7 of the Act shall be exercisable on the expiration of the peri<id of ten years On the 4th May 1957, and the expiration of every subsequent period of ten years during the continuance of this license,\"\n\nIt is th!l case of the licensee thai the date in the notice, viz. the midnight of 314th May, 1967, is not in compliance with law and the terms of the licence,\n\nMr. Sorabjee further submitted the following propositions :\n\n( i) A day is regarded as indivisible period and the law does not regard fraction of a day;\n\n(ii) , Person for whose benefit period :S prescribed is entitled to the bentfit. of the entire period.\n\n(iii) Day of the happening of an event or the doing of an Act ought to be excluded rather than included.\n\n(iv) Notice under s. 6 is a condition precedent and must be strictly construed.\n\nHe also referred to us some authorities in support of these pro c positions.\n\nWe need not quarrel with these propositions but the first three must be regarded as ordinary principles of construction and yield to the wording and the context of the instrument.\n\nIt seems to us that if clause 3 paragraph ( o )( i) is interpreted in the light of the rest of the amendments made in the license in 194 7, it is quite clear that the previous period was deemed to D have expired on May 3, 1947 and the fresh period started on M; zy 4, 1947 and the subsequent periods of 10 years ended on May 3, 1957 and May 3, 1967. It is impossible to read the licenso as P.mended in 194 7 in any way other than that it was agreed that the period of 10 years mentioned in the license would start from May 4, 1947. The details of distribution system (para 2 extracted E above), the valuation of assets as on May 4, 194 7 and other elauses extracted above all point to this conclusion.\n\nIt was pointed out that the license still talked of sec. 7 of the Electricity Act. Why was this not amended when it was U11der sec. 6, as inserted in 1959, that the option to purchase became exercisable ? It seems to us that it was rightly not amended be- 1 cause the license still provided for the starting of the period of 10 years from May 4, 194 7. This could only be provided for while the old sec. 7 stood.\n\nIt seems to us that the notice dated April 26, 1966 was in accordance with the terms of the licence and the law.\n\nWe accordingly hold that the impugned notice does not suffer from any infirmity. The appeals are allowed, the judgment of the High Court reversed and the writ petition dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs throughout.\n\nParties may mention on the 17th January, 1972 for passing any . consequential and/or essential order which may be necessary in the circumstances.\n\nG. C.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 154, "entities": [{"text": "MAHARASHTRA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD AND THE\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHARASHTRA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD AND THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NAGPUR ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY LTD.\n\n&ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NAGPUR ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY LTD. & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 162, "end_char": 171, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DUA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 173, "end_char": 182, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 204, "end_char": 221, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 224, "end_char": 251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 253, "end_char": 260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Electricity Act 1910", "statute": "Indian Electricity Act 1910"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 399, "end_char": 403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Electricity Act 1910", "statute": "Indian Electricity Act 1910"}}, {"text": "May 4, 1905", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 465, "end_char": 476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 4, 1905 a J:ccnce was granted under s. -lll) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1903 to Crompton & Co. Ltd. for 1 he supply of electricity in the municipal area of Nagpur."}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1903", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 521, "end_char": 549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Crompton & Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 553, "end_char": 572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 4, 1905 a J:ccnce was granted under s. -lll) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1903 to Crompton & Co. Ltd. for 1 he supply of electricity in the municipal area of Nagpur."}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 629, "end_char": 635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 4, 1905 a J:ccnce was granted under s. -lll) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1903 to Crompton & Co. Ltd. for 1 he supply of electricity in the municipal area of Nagpur."}}, {"text": "May 6. 1905", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 730, "end_char": 741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A notification gnint:ng the above license was published in the Central Provinces Gazette on May 6."}}, {"text": "January 1. 1911", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1221, "end_char": 1236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 1."}}, {"text": "IncYan Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1241, "end_char": 1269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "June 28, 1913", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1291, "end_char": 1304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 28, 1913 a notificatio:i permitting the assignn1ent of the licence in favour of the Nagpur Electric Light and Power Company Ltd, (respondent herein) was published in the gazette."}}, {"text": "Nagpur Electric Light and Power Company Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1380, "end_char": 1423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 28, 1913 a notificatio:i permitting the assignn1ent of the licence in favour of the Nagpur Electric Light and Power Company Ltd, (respondent herein) was published in the gazette."}}, {"text": "May 2. 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1479, "end_char": 1490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 2."}}, {"text": "s. 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1562, "end_char": 1569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the IncYan Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the IncYan Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1995, "end_char": 2003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the IncYan Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the IncYan Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2074, "end_char": 2083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the IncYan Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the IncYan Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2087, "end_char": 2096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the IncYan Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the IncYan Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "4th May\n\n1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2164, "end_char": 2177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In clause 3 paragraph ( o) (i) was provided that \"Option of purchase given by sub-section 1 of section 7 of the Act shall be exercisable on .the expiration of ten years or 4th May\n\n1957 and the expiration of every subsequent period of ten years during continuance of this licence.\""}}, {"text": "September 4, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2277, "end_char": 2294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 4, 1948 the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 came into force."}}, {"text": "Electricity Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2299, "end_char": 2327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2346, "end_char": 2356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Electricity Supply Act, 1948", "statute": "the Electricity Supply Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Act provided that the rit and options to purchase under the Indian Electricty Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2365, "end_char": 2446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Electrictv Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2603, "end_char": 2624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2654, "end_char": 2667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Electrictv Act", "statute": "Indian Electrictv Act"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3018, "end_char": 3027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Electrictv Act", "statute": "Indian Electrictv Act"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3156, "end_char": 3165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Electrictv Act", "statute": "Indian Electrictv Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3175, "end_char": 3203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3416, "end_char": 3424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "April l 9, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3585, "end_char": 3600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government on April l 9, 1966 published a notification whereby in the said clause between the words \"IO years\" and \"the 4th May, 1957\" the \\\\-'Ord \"on\" was substituted, the effect of which was that the option to purchase became exercisable on the expiration of period of 10 years on the 4th MaY. 1957."}}, {"text": "4th MaY. 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3858, "end_char": 3871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government on April l 9, 1966 published a notification whereby in the said clause between the words \"IO years\" and \"the 4th May, 1957\" the \\\\-'Ord \"on\" was substituted, the effect of which was that the option to purchase became exercisable on the expiration of period of 10 years on the 4th MaY. 1957."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3954, "end_char": 3958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3973, "end_char": 3988, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "April 26, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3999, "end_char": 4013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After this amendment another notice was given under sub-section ( 1) and (6) of s. 6 of the Indian Electricity Act, .J910 on April 26, 1966."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4200, "end_char": 4211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "May, 6, 1905", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4357, "end_char": 4369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court held that since the operation of Jicense con1menced on May, 6, 1905 it could not terminate on May 4, 1957 and therefore the amendment of 1966 was invalid."}}, {"text": "section 4A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4662, "end_char": 4675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4683, "end_char": 4698, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4976, "end_char": 4984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6861, "end_char": 6867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6875, "end_char": 6890, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7099, "end_char": 7105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Niren De", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7531, "end_char": 7539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niren De, Attorney-General for India, A. G. Ratnaparkhi, C. K. Ratnaparkhi and Rajiv Shah, for the appe!lant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "A. G. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7569, "end_char": 7586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niren De, Attorney-General for India, A. G. Ratnaparkhi, C. K. Ratnaparkhi and Rajiv Shah, for the appe!lant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "C. K. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7588, "end_char": 7605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niren De, Attorney-General for India, A. G. Ratnaparkhi, C. K. Ratnaparkhi and Rajiv Shah, for the appe!lant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "Rajiv Shah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7610, "end_char": 7620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niren De, Attorney-General for India, A. G. Ratnaparkhi, C. K. Ratnaparkhi and Rajiv Shah, for the appe!lant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7719, "end_char": 7733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and/. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7740, "end_char": 7749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and/. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7809, "end_char": 7821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7873, "end_char": 7884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, P. K. Chatterjee and B. D. Sharma, for the appellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7886, "end_char": 7902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, P. K. Chatterjee and B. D. Sharma, for the appellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7974, "end_char": 7982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. /. Sorabjee and /. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "Sorabjee"}}, {"text": "E S. I. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8059, "end_char": 8075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E S. I. Sorabjee, Ashok H. Desai and R. P. Kapur, for intervenar\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "Ashok H. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8077, "end_char": 8091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E S. I. Sorabjee, Ashok H. Desai and R. P. Kapur, for intervenar\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "R. P. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8096, "end_char": 8107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E S. I. Sorabjee, Ashok H. Desai and R. P. Kapur, for intervenar\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "R. N. Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8155, "end_char": 8169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Banerjee and R. P. Kapur, for Intervener No."}}, {"text": "Slkri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8276, "end_char": 8281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSlkri, C. J.\n\nThese two appeals by certificate are d; rected against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay ( Abhyankar and Paranjpe, JJ)."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8365, "end_char": 8385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSlkri, C. J.\n\nThese two appeals by certificate are d; rected against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay ( Abhyankar and Paranjpe, JJ)."}}, {"text": "Abhyankar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8388, "end_char": 8397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSlkri, C. J.\n\nThese two appeals by certificate are d; rected against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay ( Abhyankar and Paranjpe, JJ)."}}, {"text": "Paranjpe", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8402, "end_char": 8410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSlkri, C. J.\n\nThese two appeals by certificate are d; rected against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay ( Abhyankar and Paranjpe, JJ)."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra State Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8524, "end_char": 8559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By this judgment the High Court came to the conclusion that the notice dated April 26, 1966, issued by the Maharashtra State Electricity Board under the provisions of s. 6 G of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, was invalid in law and was unenforceable having failed to satisfy the essential conditions of the notice."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8584, "end_char": 8588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8598, "end_char": 8626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8789, "end_char": 8797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8976, "end_char": 8983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1903", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8991, "end_char": 9019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9045, "end_char": 9051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant facts for determining the points at issue before us are as follows : On May 4, 1905, a licence was granted H under s. 4(1) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1903, to Crompton & Co. Ltd., London, for the supply of electricity in the municipal area of Nagpur."}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9290, "end_char": 9318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Nagpur Electric Light and Power Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9429, "end_char": 9473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 28, 1913 a notification permitting the assignment of the licence in favour of the Nagpur Electric Light and Power Company Ltd., respondent before us, was published in the gazette."}}, {"text": "May 2, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9531, "end_char": 9543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 2, 194 7, amendments in the terms and conditions of the licence made in exercise of the powers conferred oy sub-s. (3) of B s. 4 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, were published."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9659, "end_char": 9663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9671, "end_char": 9699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "4th May, 1905", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9912, "end_char": 9925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "46, dated the 4th May, 1905 .... \" In the various ameindments made throughout, reference was made to May 4, 1947, as being the date when various C changes were deemed to start or operate."}}, {"text": "May 4, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9999, "end_char": 10010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "46, dated the 4th May, 1905 .... \" In the various ameindments made throughout, reference was made to May 4, 1947, as being the date when various C changes were deemed to start or operate."}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10104, "end_char": 10112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10470, "end_char": 10478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10605, "end_char": 10613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Great Indian Peninsula Railway", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10711, "end_char": 10741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In clause 3 paragraph (b)(ii) it is provided that \"nothing in this licence shall be construed to prevent the Great Indian Peninsula Railway, the Bengal Nagpur Railway or the Provincial F Government or the Central Government from taking from the Government a supply of electrical energy for its exclusive use within the area of supply for new installations set up by them after 4th May, 1947\"."}}, {"text": "Bengal Nagpur Railway", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10747, "end_char": 10768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In clause 3 paragraph (b)(ii) it is provided that \"nothing in this licence shall be construed to prevent the Great Indian Peninsula Railway, the Bengal Nagpur Railway or the Provincial F Government or the Central Government from taking from the Government a supply of electrical energy for its exclusive use within the area of supply for new installations set up by them after 4th May, 1947\"."}}, {"text": "Provincial F Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10776, "end_char": 10799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In clause 3 paragraph (b)(ii) it is provided that \"nothing in this licence shall be construed to prevent the Great Indian Peninsula Railway, the Bengal Nagpur Railway or the Provincial F Government or the Central Government from taking from the Government a supply of electrical energy for its exclusive use within the area of supply for new installations set up by them after 4th May, 1947\"."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10807, "end_char": 10825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In clause 3 paragraph (b)(ii) it is provided that \"nothing in this licence shall be construed to prevent the Great Indian Peninsula Railway, the Bengal Nagpur Railway or the Provincial F Government or the Central Government from taking from the Government a supply of electrical energy for its exclusive use within the area of supply for new installations set up by them after 4th May, 1947\"."}}, {"text": "4th May, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10979, "end_char": 10992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In clause 3 paragraph (b)(ii) it is provided that \"nothing in this licence shall be construed to prevent the Great Indian Peninsula Railway, the Bengal Nagpur Railway or the Provincial F Government or the Central Government from taking from the Government a supply of electrical energy for its exclusive use within the area of supply for new installations set up by them after 4th May, 1947\"."}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10999, "end_char": 11007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4th May 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11091, "end_char": 11103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jin clause 3 paragraph (d) it was provided that \"the licencee shall, within six months from the 4th May 1947, reduce its retail rates for the supply of energy for various G purposes to its consumers .... \" In clause 3 paragraph (e)(i)\n\n(b) it was provided that the \"continuous current system shall bie in use for a limited period of 5 years up to 4th May 1952; or such longer period as the Government may direct. ... \""}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11204, "end_char": 11212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4th May 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11342, "end_char": 11354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jin clause 3 paragraph (d) it was provided that \"the licencee shall, within six months from the 4th May 1947, reduce its retail rates for the supply of energy for various G purposes to its consumers .... \" In clause 3 paragraph (e)(i)\n\n(b) it was provided that the \"continuous current system shall bie in use for a limited period of 5 years up to 4th May 1952; or such longer period as the Government may direct. ... \""}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11442, "end_char": 11450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4th May, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11551, "end_char": 11565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as on 4th May, 194 7 should also conform with the foregoing in all respects .... \"\n\nMAHARASHTRA ELECT."}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11699, "end_char": 11707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11860, "end_char": 11869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4th May 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12467, "end_char": 12480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 'the first annex~ headed \"Compulsory Works\" (5ee Clause C 3 of the License) it is provided that the \"existing distribution system together with transformers and control gear as laid in use on 4th May 194 7 in streets and roads delineated in the deposited map shall be the Compulsory Works for purposes of the section.\""}}, {"text": "September 10, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12598, "end_char": 12616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 10, 1948, the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, came i.nto force."}}, {"text": "Act under which D the rights and options to purchase under the Indian Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12705, "end_char": 12790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12955, "end_char": 12983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13028, "end_char": 13038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13485, "end_char": 13494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13791, "end_char": 13795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14479, "end_char": 14483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14980, "end_char": 14989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15421, "end_char": 15425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15613, "end_char": 15622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 15, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15631, "end_char": 15649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 15, 1965 notice was given to the respondent under sub-s. ( 1) and sub-s. ( 6) of s. 6 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910,."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15722, "end_char": 15726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15734, "end_char": 15762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Maharashtta State Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15826, "end_char": 15861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as follows :\n\n\"I aril directed to give you notice that t'fte Maharashtta State Electricity Board has decided to pµrcqase yo11cr Electricity Oi1dertaking at Nagpur (District Nagpur) in exercise of the option t<:> purchase vested in the Board by sub-section (1) of section 6 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and to require you to sell your said undertaking to the Board on the midnight of 3rd/ 4th May 1967 being the date of expiry of the license granted to you by the Government under the said Act and also to call upon you under sub-section ( 6) of Section 6 of the said Act to deliver the said undertaking to the Board on the s'aid date of expiry of the said license pending determination and payment of purchase price.\""}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16028, "end_char": 16037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16045, "end_char": 16073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16318, "end_char": 16327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16533, "end_char": 16541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "April\n\n19, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16803, "end_char": 16818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Government, therefore, decided to amend the para so as to re move any doubts that there might be on the matter, and on April\n\n19, 1966, published a notification which reads as follows :\n\n\"Whereas as required by sub-section ( 3) of Section 4-A of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (II of 1910) a draft of the further amendment proposed to be made by the Government o~ Maharashtra in the terms and conditions of the Nagpur Electricity License, granted by the Government of the Central Provinces, Public Works Department, Notification No."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16915, "end_char": 16924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16934, "end_char": 16962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Government of the Central Provinces", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17140, "end_char": 17175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Government, therefore, decided to amend the para so as to re move any doubts that there might be on the matter, and on April\n\n19, 1966, published a notification which reads as follows :\n\n\"Whereas as required by sub-section ( 3) of Section 4-A of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (II of 1910) a draft of the further amendment proposed to be made by the Government o~ Maharashtra in the terms and conditions of the Nagpur Electricity License, granted by the Government of the Central Provinces, Public Works Department, Notification No."}}, {"text": "4th January, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17388, "end_char": 17405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, datd the 4th January, 1966, for inviting objections and suggestions : And whereas no objections or suggestions have been received by the Government of Maharashtra : And whereas the Government of Maharashtra has consulted the Maharashtra State Electricity Board and the local authorities concerned and obtained the consent of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Government of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17516, "end_char": 17541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, datd the 4th January, 1966, for inviting objections and suggestions : And whereas no objections or suggestions have been received by the Government of Maharashtra : And whereas the Government of Maharashtra has consulted the Maharashtra State Electricity Board and the local authorities concerned and obtained the consent of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Nagpur Electricity Light & Power Company Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17804, "end_char": 17852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And whereas the Government of Maharashtra also requested the Licensee, the Nagpur Electricity Light & Power Company Limited, to give its consent to the proposed amendment, as required by the proviso to subsection (I) of the said sctiOil 4-A but, in the opinion of the Government of Maharashtra, such consent has been unreasonably withheld : And whereas in the opinion of the Government of Maharashtra, the Public interest so permits to make the proposed amendment :\n\nNow, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by the said section 4-A and of all other powers enabling it in this behalf, the Government of Maharashtra hereby amends the terms and conditions of the said licence, a~ follows :\n\nIn clause 3 of the license, in paragraph ( o) in subparagraph ( i) for the portion beginning with the words \"shall be exercisable\" and ending with the word and figures \"May 1957\" the following shall be substituted."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18260, "end_char": 18269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18431, "end_char": 18439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18867, "end_char": 18871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18879, "end_char": 18907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "January 17, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19218, "end_char": 19234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While approaching the Central Government for its consent, 8 the Government of Maharashtra in its letter dated January 17, 1966, stated that \"the draft aniendment seeks to remove the ambiguity, if any, .in respect of the date on which the option of purchase is exercisable under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910\"."}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19390, "end_char": 19418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "November 10, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19425, "end_char": 19442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 10, 1966, the licensee, the Nagpur Electric Light and Power Company Ltd., filed the petition under art."}}, {"text": "art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19533, "end_char": 19541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Apnl 26, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19583, "end_char": 19596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 C challenging the aforesaid notice dated Apnl 26, 1966."}}, {"text": "April 19, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19948, "end_char": 19962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first D question which we may deal with is whether the High Court is right in holding that the amendment of April 19, 1966 was valid or not."}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20395, "end_char": 20403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "May 6, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20733, "end_char": 20744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other F interpretation was that two dates had been provided for the exercise of the option; one, the expiration of ten years from May 6, 1947, the other being May 4, 1957."}}, {"text": "May 4, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20762, "end_char": 20773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other F interpretation was that two dates had been provided for the exercise of the option; one, the expiration of ten years from May 6, 1947, the other being May 4, 1957."}}, {"text": "Electricity G Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20980, "end_char": 21003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "MAHARASHTRA ELECT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21591, "end_char": 21608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHARASHTRA ELECT, BOARD V. NAGPUJ."}}, {"text": "NAGPUJ. BLECT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21619, "end_char": 21632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHARASHTRA ELECT, BOARD V. NAGPUJ."}}, {"text": "Sikrl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21644, "end_char": 21649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BLECT, (l(), 27 (Sikrl, CJ.)"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22677, "end_char": 22686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 6, 1905", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23120, "end_char": 23131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is this para 4 tllat created E the dilliculty because although the notification is dated May 4, 1905, it was published on May 6, 1905."}}, {"text": "May 3, 1'47,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23271, "end_char": 23283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But wllm Ille 1iceme was .amended in 1947 with the consent of the lieensee it proceeded on the basis that tile 42 years period expired on May 3, 1'47, because throughoot the crucial eft'ective date in the IUllOIMfmeats is May 4, 1947, p\n\nIt seems to us that after the amendments para 4 of tbe origiaal licen!e ceased to have clfect fot the purposes of ooutruiog die license as amended in 1947 and subsequently,\n\nThis takes us to the question whether the notice dated April 26, 1966 is in accordance with law."}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23687, "end_char": 23695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23791, "end_char": 23800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24165, "end_char": 24173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the midnight of 314th May, 1967, is not in compliance with law and the terms of the licence,\n\nMr. Sorabjee further submitted the following propositions :\n\n( i) A day is regarded as indivisible period and the law does not regard fraction of a day;\n\n(ii) , Person for whose benefit period :S prescribed is entitled to the bentfit.", "canonical_name": "Sorabjee"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24543, "end_char": 24547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24888, "end_char": 24896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 3, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25080, "end_char": 25091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems to us that if clause 3 paragraph ( o )( i) is interpreted in the light of the rest of the amendments made in the license in 194 7, it is quite clear that the previous period was deemed to D have expired on May 3, 1947 and the fresh period started on M; zy 4, 1947 and the subsequent periods of 10 years ended on May 3, 1957 and May 3, 1967."}}, {"text": "May 3, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25186, "end_char": 25197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems to us that if clause 3 paragraph ( o )( i) is interpreted in the light of the rest of the amendments made in the license in 194 7, it is quite clear that the previous period was deemed to D have expired on May 3, 1947 and the fresh period started on M; zy 4, 1947 and the subsequent periods of 10 years ended on May 3, 1957 and May 3, 1967."}}, {"text": "May 3, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25202, "end_char": 25213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems to us that if clause 3 paragraph ( o )( i) is interpreted in the light of the rest of the amendments made in the license in 194 7, it is quite clear that the previous period was deemed to D have expired on May 3, 1947 and the fresh period started on M; zy 4, 1947 and the subsequent periods of 10 years ended on May 3, 1957 and May 3, 1967."}}, {"text": "May 4, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25490, "end_char": 25502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The details of distribution system (para 2 extracted E above), the valuation of assets as on May 4, 194 7 and other elauses extracted above all point to this conclusion."}}, {"text": "sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25620, "end_char": 25626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25634, "end_char": 25649, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25695, "end_char": 25701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25967, "end_char": 25973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "17th January, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26353, "end_char": 26371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parties may mention on the 17th January, 1972 for passing any ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_1_18_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "A DEPUTY ASSTr. IRON & STEEL CONTROLLER & ANR.\n\nL. MANICKCHAND, PROPRIETOR, KATRELLA\n\nCORPN. MADRAS\n\nJanuary 5, 1972\n\nMETAL\n\n(J. M. SHELAT, I. D. DuA, H. R. KHANNA AND G. K. MITTER, 11.J\n\nImport Trade Control PoliGv-Appllcation for import licence-I/ <hould comidered in term. of the policy in force at the time of application or at the time of grant of licence.\n\nIn December, 1968 the respondent &plied for an import licence for importing stainless steel for the licensing period 1968-69. The registra lion certificate certified that he was engaged in the manufacture of hospital and surgical instruments and household utensils of stainless steel. Ac cording to the import policy for 1968-69 no priority was available for household utensils.\n\nSince the number of applicants for import licences for stainless steel, which was a sensitive item, was very large instructions were issued in January 1%9 that the applications should be scrutim.ed carefully after asking for information from applicants as to details of end products to be manufactured by an applicant. In May 1969 the respondent stated that the hospital requisttes intended to be manufactured by him were surgical bowls, spittoons and trays.\n\nThe Chief Controller, Imports and Exports. issued instructions that only 'medical and surgical , equipment and appliances' should have priority and not other types of hospital equipment such as bowls, trays, jugs etc. In April 1970, after a review of the situation the Chief Controllerlissued instructions to consi .. der the respondent 9s application in terms of the licensing policy for 197t. 71.\n\nThe respondent filed an application for the issue of a writ of rnandamru and the High Court allowed it directing that .the respondent's application may be dealt with in terms of the 1968-69 import policy.\n\nIn appeal, on tho question whether the application should be considered in accordance with the policy in force when the licence was granted or when the application was made.\n\nHELD: No case had been made out for a mandamus to consider the respondent's application in terms of 196&-69 policy, since there waa no undue !aches or delay in dealing with the respondent's application. and the instructions of the Chief Controller to consider the a~· cation in terms df 197~71 policy l\\'a& in accordance with para 91 of\n\n, IV of the Import Trade Control Handbook of Rules and Procedure. {l 168).\n\n[18 ~· Speedy disposal of applications for import licences is of t importance in order that available foreign exchange may be utilized Without delay; but, it is also to be borne in mind, that in the pment stage of JI o1lr industrial development. imports requiring foreisn exChange hne , tO\n\nbe cootrolled and regulated to prevent abuses of. import quota. Thill. m. eviblbly f<!!Ulres proper acrutiny of variouc applications for ilDpQrt In. grantipg li<>:nces for ilnports, the authority has to keep in vi• viii.,_..\n\nfactors which may have impact on import. of other items of. relati...,.\n\nA\\ gre.ater priority in the larger interests of the overall economy of the country which must be the supreme consideration. Moreover, in view of s. 3(l)(a) of the Imports and Expdrts Control Act, 1947 and cl. 6(1)(a) of the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, an applicant has no vested right to an import licence in terms of the policy in force at the time di his applica.- tion. f9 B-E; 16 B-E; 17 A-Hl The respondent's application included household utensils which was not a priority item and since clarification Was asked for ... the application B could not be disposed of during 1968-69. The details of end-products furnished by him contained items which were non-priority end-products and hence. the application had to be kept pending until completion of its examination, and the time taken for such examination was not unreasonable. fl6 Jl..Hl ·\n\nGlass Chaions .Importers and Users Assn. v. Union of India, [1962] 1 S.C.R. 866, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1053 Of 1971. '•\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 1971 of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal No. 120 Of 1971.\n\nV. S. Desai, M. C. Bhandere and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant.\n\nL. M. Singvi, A. V. Rangam, R. Krishnamoorlhi rund A. Subhashini, for respondent No. 1.\n\nM. V. Goswami, for the intervener.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by E\n\nDllll, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the Madras High Court dated March 25, 1971 dismissing at the stage of ad!llission an appeal under cl.\n\n(15) of the Letters Patent preferred by the appellant against the judgment and order of a learned single Judge of that Court dated F September l, 1970 allowing writ petition no. 933 of 1970' filed by the respondent praying for a writ of mandamus directing the Licensing Authority under the Imports & Exports (Control) Act, 194 7 to do his public duty and consider the applications for import licence made by the respondent.\n\nMore than 200 writ petitions were heard together and disposed of by a common G judgment of the learned single Judge, the facts in the respondent's writ petition No. 933 of 1970 being, by common consent, treated as ilJustrative of all the other cases as well.\n\n' On December 7, 1968 Lala Manickchand, proprietor of Messrs Katrella Metal Corporation, Madras, respondent in this\n\nCourt, submitted an application, as a new unit, for the licensing 8 period 1968,69 for the grant of an import liceitce for Rs, 9,9~/- for importing stainless steel as an actual user for mamiactunng\n\n'fRON & STEEL CONTROLLER v. MANICKCHAND (Dua, J.) 3\n\nA hospital requisites.\n\nThe registration certificate dated December 31, 1968 issued to the respondent as a small scale industry by the Additional Assistant Director of Land Commerce, District Madras.\n\nNorth, reads :\n\n\"DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIES & COMMERCE B\n\nSMALL SCALE INDUSTRIES DIVISION\n\nS. No. 571 Registration No. MS.N.SSI/506/033\n\nCERTIFICATE\n\nThis is to certify that M/s. Katrala Metal Corpora- C tion 54 Sydenbams Road, Madras 7 office at 90 N.S.C.\n\nBose Road, Madras 1 is a genuine Small Scale Industry engaged in the manufacture of Hospital and Surgical Instruments, Trays, Mugs, Basins and Household Utensils out of Stainless steel.\n\nD Sd/ S. Gopalakrisbnan Addi. Asst!. Director of Land & Commerce, District Madras North\n\n23-12-68\"\n\nAccording to Import Trade Control Policy (1968-69) lndos- E tries engaged in the manufacture of \"medical 'and surgical equipment and appliances\" were included in the list of priority industries at sl. no. 39 of Appendix I in Section V.\n\nThe import policy is announced and published by the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce, on the eve of each financial year by means or a Public Notice which is issued in the form of a book called the- F Import Trade Control Policy, commonly known as the \"Red ., Book\". Prior to 1962 the import policy used to be published\n\non half-yearly basis.\n\nBut with effect from the financial year 1962-63 the Red Book contains the policy for the whole year.\n\nAs a supplement to the Red book is the Handbook of Rules and Procedure on Import Trade Control.\n\nIts provisions are brought G into force by a Public Notice published in the Gazette of India-\n\nExtraordinary. tt embodies the procedures, rules and regula tions govermng the submission of applications, grant of licences, their validity and utilisation and other matters relating to import trade control.\n\nThe instructions contained in this book are applicable subject to future amendments and to the prOvisions of tbe\n\nH relevant import trade control policy book : vide cl. 6, qiaptet II of Handbook of Rules and Procedure, 1968. As ls obvious from the preface of the Red Book for the year 1968-69, in formulating the import policy, account is generaHy taken of all tbe\n\nsuggestions received from individuals, chambers and associations A of trade and industry, Export Promotion Councils, Commodities Boards, Board of Trade and others: It appears that according to this policy import for household utensils was not available as a priority item and this necessitated further clarification from the respondent.\n\nIn the meantime on January 30, 1969 Licensing Instruction No. 4/69 was issued from the Iro.n and Steel Con- B trol Department (I & E Division). It said :\n\n\"IRON & STEEL CONTROL (I & E DIVISION) Office Note: LICENSING INSTRUCTION No. 4/69 Dated 30-1-1969\n\n1. It has come to the notice of the Iron & Steel Controller that a large number of applications have been received for import of Stainless Steel Sheet plates and strips from newcomer units during 1968-69. As a measure of precaution, the Regional Office and Licensing section were requested to suspend further issue of licence vide Iron & Steel Controller's telegram dated 9th January, 1969.\n\n2. The position has been reviewed, in consultation with the Department of Iron & Steel, and it has been decided that the applications for Stainless Steel Sheets, plates and strips received from newcomer units during 1968-69 should be scrutinised by the Directors of Industries and the Regional Offii:es and Licensing Sections very carefully, before import licences are granted, with a view to e11suring that new units which are not well-equipped do not get away with import licences of this sensitive item.\n\n3. For the purpose of scrutinising the applications, it is necessary to call for the following data from the .applicant :\n\n.( 1) Date of registration of the unit.\n\n(2) Date o~ which power connection was obtained. ( 3) Details of the machinery installed.\n\n(4) Value of the machinery ed. ( 5) Whether ihe machinery is imported or indigenous. ( 6) The address of the firm from whom the machinery was purchased.\n\n(7) Date of )'.>urchase of the machinery, '\n\nIRON &.STEEL CONTROLLER v. MANICKCHAND (Dua, I.) s.\n\n( 8) Date of installation of the machinery. ( 9) Details of the end products to be manufactured. ( 10) Whether the unit is fully equipped to manufacture the items in question. ( 11) Past experience of the firm in manufacturing line. ( 12) Technicians employed and their technical qualifications. ( 13) Whether any market survey has been conducted for the disposal of the products to be manufactured. If so, the results thereof.\n\n4. Regional Offices and Licensing Sections are directed to write to all the new comers, who have sent their applications for Stainless Steel Sheets plates and strips to furnh the above information t.o the respective Directors of Industries <!irect, endorsing a copy to the Regional Offices and the Licensing Sections.\n\nCopies of these letters may be endorsed to the respective Directors of Industries, with the request that they should scrutinise the applications with reference to the date that may be furnished by the applicants carefully, and thereafter send their recommendations (revised recommendations as the case may be) to the licensing offices.\n\n5. Regional Office and Licensing Sections are directed to take immediate action on the lines indicated above.\n\nSd/ C. B. Mathur Officer on Special Duty.\"\n\nIt is quite clear from these instructions that stainless stdct sheets were considered a sensitive item and that a large number of newcomers had applied for import of stainless steel sheets, plates and strips whose applications required close scrutiny. Oa G May 2, 1969 the respondent, while giving information about end-products, stated in a letter that hospital requisites such as surgical bowls, spittoons and trays were intended to be manufactured by the industry. On May 19, 1969 the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and\n\nSupply issued General Licensing Instruction No. 29/69 on the subject of import licences to units engaged in the manufacture of H hospital equipments. These instructions pertained to the import policy for April 1969-March, 1970, and referred to \"medical anct surgical equipment and appliances\" which was the subject matter\n\nof Item. No. 39 in Appendix I of the Red Book for that year. In A para 2 1t was stated that some Licensing Authorities were treating the manufacture of \"hospital equipment\" as priority industry under the general heading ''medical and surgical equipment and appliances\".. It w~ pointed out that all types of hospital equipment and hospital appliances were not classified as priority industries and it '.\"'as added by way of illustration that lotion bowls, kidney trays, B 1nstt:u.nent trays, wash bowls, meas!Jring jugs, ointment jars and med1cme cups as end-products were m non-priority category.\n\nThe sponsoring authorities were accordingly directed to ensure that -0nly those hospital equipment and appliances were to be treated as priority industries which would appropriately be classified as ·\"medical and surgical equipment and appliances\".\n\nOn May 29, 1969 the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports issued General C Licensing Instruction No. 31 of 1969 on the subject of \"grant of import licence to units engaged in the manufacture of hospital equipment''.\n\nAfter inviting attention to the earlier G.L.I. No. 29/69 dated May 19, 1969 it was stated in this instruction that after further consideration in consultation with the D.G.T.D. a list had been prepared in respect of the end-products which alone D would be treated as priority industries under the general heading \"medical and surgical equipment and appliances.\" That list was enclosed for the guidance of the Licensing and Sponsoring authorities and in case of doubt those authorities were directed to refer the matter to head-quarters Special Licensing Cell.\n\nOn October 31, 1969 the Director of Industries, Madras, confirmed the Essen- E tia!ity Certificate already issued to the respondent. It was observed iu that letter that the firm had \"installed machinery and taken action to obtain power supply etc. Hence the Essentiality Certificate issued to the firm already is confirmed\". On Febr:uary 23, 1970 a leiteI' was written by the Dir&etor of Industries and Commerce, Madras to the Deputy Assistant Iron & Steel Controller, Madras, in which after referring to his earlier letter dated F October 31, 1969 and to the respondent's letter dated February o, 1970, it was stated :\n\n\"Jn view of the assurance iven by the firm that they would manufacture only Surgical Equipment like Sterilisers, Operation Tables, Auto-Claves etc,, I recommend that M/s. Katrella Metal Corporation, 54, Sydanhams Road, Madras for whom Essentiality Certificate has been issued for import of stainless steel sheets for the period April-March, 1969 may please be treated as PRIORITY INDUSTRY and licence issued to them on this basis.\"\n\nApparently, the Director of Industries was the sponsoring autho- H rity in this case. It was in .these circumstances that the respondent filed the writ petition in the High Court on March 30, 1970 claiming a writ of mandamus as stated earlier, the sole grievance\n\nIllON & STEEL CONTROLLER v. MAN!CKCHAND (Dua, I.) 7\n\nA being that the res-l'°ndent's application for import licence had during all this penod not been .taken up for final disposal.\n\nAccording to the respondent's case in the High Court, the firm's factory had been manufacturing various items since 1962 by purchasing raw material from local market with the annual turnover of about 8 to 10 lacs. With regard to the iespondent's applica- B lion for import licenee for manufacturing hospital and nrgical\n\nequipment it was added that the Director of Industries had, issued the Essentiality Certificate in April, 1969 and recommended the respondent for treating it as a priority industry on February 23,\n\n1970. In the counter-affidavit in that Court it was not contested that the writ petitioner was entitled to have his applications considered. According to para 10 of the counter-affidavit on which C the learned single Judge of the High Court, disposing of the writ\n\npetition, relied, it was stated inter alia :\n\n\"in the case of units engaged in the manufacture of non-priority end-products, as in the case of the petitioner, the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports had advised the department to keep the applications pending until the completion of the examination: The petitioner's application could not therefore be disposed of.\n\nHowever, instructions have since been received vlde the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, New Delhi letter dated 8-4-1970, which inter alia provides that applications received by the sponsoring authorities in time may be considered irrespective of the date on which they were forwarded to the licensing authorities and in terms of the licensing policy for 1970-71.\"\n\nIt was added in this para of the counter-affidavit :\n\n\"According to policy for 1970-71, the material stainless steel sheets is a canalised item for non-priority industries and release orders are to be issued on Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation.\"\n\nIn the judgment of the single Judge it wu stated to be G common ground that the application of the writ petitioners had to be dealt with in terms of the relevant import policy in force for the year 1968-69. However, a little lower down in that\n\njudgment, lifter reproducing the relevant portion of paragraph 10 of the counter-affidavit, it was also observed :\n\n\"Learned counsel for the Central Government urged that the Licensing Authority whoever it is, is prepared to consider the apPlications of each of the petitioners in this tCh of wot petitions, but such appraisal of the applications would be in terms of the licensing policy\n\nfor the year 970-71.\n\nThus in effect, the respondents A concede the nght of the petitioners to have their applications considered and disposed of in a manner known to law, but the only opposition is that such applications filed and now pending will be considered in the light of the licensing policy for 1970-7 l.\"\n\nIt wasin this context that the High Court observed that it was B: practically conceded that the rule nisi had to be made absolute and that some more directions were necessary.\n\nRelying on r. 7(2) in Chapter II of the Handbook of Rules of Procedure, Import Trade Control for the year 1968, according to which applications for licences were required to be considered in tenns ) of the relevant policy in force, the learned single Judge directed : C\n\n\"that the Licensing Authority do consider the applications now IJ\\lnding before him which are the subject matter of these writ petitions within six months from this date bearing in mind the above directions and in particular deal with the said applications, applying the import trade control policy prevailing in 1968-69 or D 1969-70, as the case may be according to the dates of application for licence.\"\n\nOn appeal before the division Bench under cl. (15) of the Letters Patent it was complained by the appellant, the Deputy Assistant Iron & Steel Controller, that the instructions of the E learned Judge interfered with the policy introduced in 1970-71 because under the new policy import of stainless steel was canalised through the Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation for non-priority industries. The division Bench did not consider this objection to be valid because in its view had the applications been considered in time and without delay and the import licence sought granted, these complications would not have intervened.\n\nF The Dc; partment, according to the High Court, could not take advantage of the delay in disposing of the applications for licence made earlier and then take the plea that they should be disposed of only in accordance with the curfont policy and instructions given as to canalis11tion.\n\nOn this view the appeal was dismissed but time for granting the import licence was extended by a fur- G ther period of three months from the date of the order viz. March 25, 1971.\n\nIn this Court the question .canvassed at the bar is a. very narrow one, namely, whether the application for the nnpo1t licence in question should be considered in accordance with the policy in force when the licence is granted or when the appli- H cation is made.· No point of miila {ides or. arbitrariness was argued in the High Court and no serious attempt was made on\n\nIRON & STEEL CONTROLLER v. MANICKCHAND (Dua, I.) 9\n\nA behalf of the respondent to sustain the impugned order of the High Court on that basis, as indeed, it is not possible for this\n\nCc, urt to entertain and adjudicate upon such a plea in this appeal m the absence of a considered opinion of the High Court.\n\nTue appellants' learned counsel Shri V. S. Desai at the outset drew our attention to s. 3 (I) (a) of the Imports & Exports (Control) B A ct, 18 of 194 7 which empowers the Central Government to prohibit, restrict or otherwise control imports and exports and to\n\ncl. 6(l)(a) of the Imports (Control) Order, 1955 made by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred on it by ss. 3 and 4 of Act 18 of 1947.\n\nClause 6(1) of the Order emc powers the Central Goverrunent or the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports to refuse to grant a licence or direct any other licensing authority not to grant a licence if no foreign exchange is available for the purpose or if the grant of a licence to an applicant is prejudicial to the interest of the State or if it has . been decided to canalise imports and distribution thereof through special or specialised agencies or channels.\n\nThe scheme of these D provisions, according to the submission, suggests that the respondent has no absolute right to the grant of a licence merely because his application has been recommended by the sponsoring authority and that the licensing authority may decline to grant the licence on other relevant considerations affecting the larger and more vital interests of the economy of the State and also other relevanr factors beyond the control of the State.\n\nIn this connection refe- E rence was also made to para 91 of Chapter IV of the Import\n\nTrade Control Handbook of Rules and Procedure ( 1968) which reads :\n\n\"Issue of import licences to actual users for back period 91 (I ) Where an application for import licence from an actual user is not disposed of during the licensing period concerned on account of any delay or !aches on the part of the applicant, no lice against such application will be issued after the expiry of the licensing period or after the close of the monetary ceiling.\n\nHowever, if the delay in the disposal of the application is on the part of the licensing authority or sponsoring authority or any other Government Department, the application will be considered on merits.\n\n(2) While dealing with an import application for a back period in appeal or otherwise, the authorities concerned will consider such an application having regard to the general principles laid down, that is, availability of monetary ceiling, availability of goods applied for from indigenous sources or other commercial channels, essentiality of the goods applied for, stocks held by the 2-L864Sup CI/72\n\napplicant and expected arrivals against licences in hana, past imports and consumption of the item(s) in question by the applicant, actual production during the preceding period, estimated production and other factors considered relevant and necessary.\n\n( 3) In case where the applications for licences are not disposed of during the licensing period concerned or before the close of the monetary ceiling on account of delay on the part of the sponsoring authority or the licensing authority or any other Goverrunent Department the value of the licences iswed in such cases will be treated as first charge on the monetary ceiling to be allocated for the next licensing period and the necessary intimation in this regard will be given to the sponsoring authority.\"\n\nAccording to Shri Desai the entire position of monetary ceiling, availability of goods applied for from indigenous sources, essentiality of the goods applied for and other relevant factors have to D be seen for considering the question of issuing import licences to actual users for back periods.\n\nThese considerations. said Shri Desai, indicate ihat if availability of the goods applied for, from indigenous sources, improves or the position in regard to foreign exchange deteriorates or there is a change in the matter of essentiality of the goods applied for, then, .it would be and, indeed, it E should be open to the licensing authority to come to a fresh decision on the question of issuing the licence uninfluenced by the consideration that during the previous licensing period, the situation being more easy, the import licence applied for would have been more readily granted.\n\nThe import policy is influenced by the condition of foreign exchange which depends on various factors, some of which may even be wholly beyond the control of F the State and, therefore, \\he licensing authority would be entitled to take ihem into account at the time when ihe licence is actually issued.\n\nShri Desai in support of his submission relied on the following observations from the decision of this Court in Glass Chatons Importers and Users' Association v. Union of lndia( 1) :\n\n\"It is obvious that if a decision has been made that imports shall be by particular agencies or channels the granting of licence to any applicant outside the agency or channel would frustrate the implementation of that decision. If therefore a canalization of imports is in the interests of the general public the refusal of imports licences to applicants outside the agencies or channels decided upon must necessarily be held also .in the\n\n(I) (1%2] J. S.C.R. 862 .al 866.\n\nIRON & STEEL CONTROLLER v. MANJCKCHAND (Dua, !.) 11\n\ninterests of the general public.\n\nThe real question therefore is : Is the canalization through special or specialized agencies or channels in the interests of the general public.\n\nB A policy as regards imports forms an integral part of the general economic policy of a country which is to have due regard not orily to its impact on the internal or international trade of the country but also on monetary policy, the development of agriculture and industries and even 0'1. the political policies of the country\n\ninvolvin& questions of friendship, neutrality or hostility with other countries.\" c\n\nThese observations have also been pressed into service by Shri Desai in support of his contention that canalising of applications for the import of stainless steel having been introduced since April I, 1970 it is not open now to issue the import licence to the D respondent without the application being canalised according to the prevailing procedure.\n\nThe learned counsel, however, offered, as agreed in the High Court, to consider the respondent's application according to 1970'.71 policy.\n\nShri Singhvi on behalf of the respondent controverted the I: appellant's argument by strongly relying on the letter dated February 23, 1970 from the Director of Industries to the Deputy Assistant Iron and Steel Controller in which reference was made to the respondent's assurance to \"manufacture only surgical equipments like sterlisers, operation tables, autoclaves etc.\" and it was recommended that import of stainless steel sheets for the period 1968-69 be treated as priority industry and licence issued F to the respondent on this basis. As canalising policy was intro\n\nduced only on April l, 1970, when the respondent's case, according to Shri Singhvi's argument, had already been completed as a result of the assurance contained in the letter of February 23,\n\n1970, the respondent's industry was not governed by this policy and was entitled to get the impor't licence. Shri Singhvi placed G strong reliance on r. 7 ( 2) contained in the Import Trade Control Handbook of Rules and Procedure of 1968 and contended that the applications for licences must be considered in terms of the relevant policy in force at the time of making the application.\n\nReference in this connection was also made to r. 81 ( c), according to which the role of the licensing authorities is :\n\nH \"(i) To issue licences on the basis of the recommendations of the sponsoring authorities where such recommendations are in consonance with. the policy/procedure in force;\n\n(ii) In the case of rejections, to communicate reasons thereof to the applicants;\n\n(iii) To take penal action against the licencees or importers for violations of impart and export control regulations. -\n\n(iv) To watch the utilisation of ceiling, if any\".\n\nIt was further contended that the recommendation of the sponsoring authority has to be given due consideration by the licensing authority as provided in r. 80.\n\nThe learned counsel submitted that if the import policy prevailing in 1968-69 is not applied to the respondent, then, the respondent would ouffer in respect of the applications made for the years 1969-70 and 1970-71 though this argument was not developed and the counsel was content merely by asserting prejudice to his client. It may be recalled thatthe respondent applied for the licence as a new unit.\n\nPara 82, sub-para 2 contained in the Handbook of Rules and. Procedure for 1968 provides :\n\n\"82(2) New Units (Priority industries) (a) The new units, both in the large and the small scale sectors, should make their first and second import applications for raw materials and components in a licensing period, through the sponsoring authority concerned, each covering their requirements for six months. Subsequent applications can be made by them on the basis of actual consumption, in the same manner as has been laid down for the existing units engaged in the priority Industries.\n\n(b) In the case of proposed units, the sponsoring authority will recommend a licence against the second application only after the unit has gone into production. ( c) \" Para 53 of the Red Book (1968-69) isin the same terms as para 82(2)(a).\n\nPrima facie, without the new units actually going into prouction, no question of recommendation for a licence against the G second application could arise.\n\nBut the point having not been fully pursued we express no opinion on this aspect.\n\nThe respondent's learned counsel also submitted that about 163 applications for import licences had been dealt with by the licensing authority and the licences granted to the applicants.\n\nReference in this • connection was made to the affidavit of Lala Manickchand filed H in the High Court in support of the writ petition in which it was asserted that licences had been issued in March, 1969 to 163 .applicants for the value of Rs. 9,900 each.\n\nThese licences,\n\njt:\n\nIRON \"' STEEL CONTROLLER v. MANICKCHAND (Dua, /.)' 13\n\nA according to the assertion in this paragraph, had been granted without any basis, though a little lower down it was added that those applicants were sunilarly placed as the respondent and, therefore, the issue of import licence to them showed discriminatory conduct violative of rules of natural justice and equalit)'.\n\nIt was also added that according to the respondent's informa- B tion another 321 applicants were going to get licences withc'>ut any proper basis or criteria.\n\nThe counsel also made a reierence to that part of the respondent's affidavit in the High Court where it was stated that if, as the respondent had reliably learnt, the\n\n300 applicants who had asked for import licences were lo be granted their prayers then the ceiling limit allotted for the year c\n\nwould be exhausted and the respondent would not get any relief.\n\nIt was for this reason that prayer was made in the High Court for restraining the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports from issuing any licence to any other person pending disposal of the respondent's application.\n\nAccording to Shri Singhvi 011 April 9, 1970 an undertaking was given by the State in the High Court that the plea of exhaustion of the quota would not be taken by it for defeating the respondent's claim.\n\nThis submission was apparently made for the purpose of controverting the contention that the availability of foreign exchange being one of the vital considerations determining the grant of import licence, it is the prevailing position of foreign exchange at the time of granting the licence which has to be seen.\n\nShri Desai having denied any such undertaking in the High Court and our attention having not been drawn to any such undertaking on the record ol the High Court, we do not consider it proper to take into account this assertion made on behalf of the respondent.\n\nShri Singhvi relied on a decision of the Madras High Court Sha Maggajee Saremal/ & Bros v. Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports(') the head-noteof which reads:\n\n\"Where a transfer of quota rights is effected as a result of change in the constitution of. the firm, the new constituted firm becomes entitled to the transferred quota as from the date on which the reconstitution was effected and not from the date on which the Chief Controller of Imports purports to accord recognition to such reconstitution.\n\nThe fact that a rule by way of an instruction has\n\nben introduced in the Red Bock limiting the consideration of applications only to the immediately prior period cannot have any value in so far as the rihts of parties come in for examination. The rights of the established importer to the licence for the back periods cannot be\n\n(I) A.LR. 1966 Mad. 3u9.\n\ndenied if his application had been kept pending for A reasons other than )aches on the part of the applicant.\n\nAn application for import licence for a particular period must be considered only in the light of the policy relevant to that period and cannot be refused on the basis of a later policy which might have changed the position with regard to the licences for the import of the Jl. item applied for.\n\nDecision in W.A. No. 15 of 1960 (Mad.) and in W.P. Nos. 27, 47, 48 of 1961 (Mad.) followed.\"\n\nThis decision deals with a situation created by the transfer of quota rights effected as a result of change Jn the constitution of an existing firm which was an established in1porter and, there c fore, cannot lend much assistance irr dealing with the facts before us.\n\nThe unreported decision of this Court in The Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay v. The Advance Builders India (Pvt.) Ltd.(1), also relied upori by Shri Singhvi merely lays down tht \"where a statute imposes a duty the performance or non-performance of which is not a matter of discretion; a D mandamus may be granted ordering that to be done which the statute requires to be done (Halsbury's Laws of England, Third edn. Vol. II, p. 90)\". Quite clearly, this decision only reiterate> the recognised rule in regard to the grant of mandamus and is of little help to the respondent.\n\nIn our view the plea of arbitrariness and ma/a {ides having £ not been pressed in the High Court it is not possible for this Court to consider it.\n\nThe material on the existing record lo which our attention was drawn is not enough to make out a prima facie case of either mala {ides or arbitrariness to justify any further scrutiny.\n\nIndeed, in the High Court the State had agreed to consider the respondent's application' and the only controversy F th,, ere was as to the year of which the import policy was to govern the respondent's application. For this purpose, reliance was placed neither on the plea of ma/a {ides nor of arbitrariness with the result that. we decline to go into these pleas.\n\nThere is no doubt that speedy disposal of applicatio11s for import licences is of the greatest importance.\n\nIndeed, in lhe G Import Trade Control Handbook of Rules and Procedure, 1968 paras 302 to 304 have been exclusively devoted to the subject of Checks on delays.\n\nThey provide; \"302(1) Every effort is made to avoid delays in the disposal of applications for licences or correspondence.\n\nReminders in regard to the delayed cases are attended H to promptly by the licensing authorities.\n\n(I) C.A. No. !l21 of 1970 decided on 2Sth August, 1971.\n\n\"11\n\nIRON & STEEL CONTROLLER v. MANICKCHAND (Dua, I.) 15\n\n(2) Complaints regarding delay addressed to the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, New Delhi, should be specifically marked \"Complaint against delay\" at the top of the communication containing the complaint.\n\n(3) The applicant .should also bring cases of delay to the personal notice of the Public Relations Officer 111 the Import Trade Control office concerned.\n\nThe Public Relations Officer of the rank of the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports has been appomted at the headquarters of the office of the Chief Controller of Imports and.Exports, New Delhi.\n\nIn the regional offices also, Public Relations Officers have been appointed.\n\nAddressing of communications to import trade control organisatkms :\n\n303. It is noticed that telegrams and jetters received tiy the licensing authorities from the trade by way of reminder do not often contain sufficient details to enable th~ licensing authorities to locate the previous papers.\n\nWith a view to avoid delay in the disposal of such communications the trade should give brief details of the reference received by those from the licensing authority concerned, the particulars of the goods sought to b~ imported and the I.T.C. classification of such goods.\n\nThe communication should also indicate its subject matter, the category of the importer, the type of the licence to which it pertains, whether it relates to the grant of the licence or amendment or revalidation thereof or an appeal, and it should also give the number and date of the relevant original application.\n\nEnquiries regarding the position of applications.\n\n304(a) The arrangement under which the importers could enquire the position of the import application by filling the import enquiry slip has been discontinued.\n\n(b) The licensing authorities will make every effort to dispose of the applications as quickly as possible. If an application for an import licence is not disposed of within one month from the date of its receipt in the licensing section the licing authority will issue an interim reply to the applicant. If an applicant does not receive an interim reply even after this time limit, he can bring the matter to the notice of the Public Relations Offieer in the import e control office concerned or book an interview with the officer\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 s.c.R. cohcerned through the Enquiry Officer in order to know the. reasons for the delay in the disposal of his application. ·\n\n( c) Where a licensing authority calls for certain docu!Uen.ts <;>r informa:ion. from the. applicant or any defic1enc1es m the apphcatton are comm.unicated to the applicant, and. the aplicant has furnished the required documents or mformation or made good the deficiencies but does not receive any further communication from the lic7nsing author.ity within 15 days thereafter, he can bnng the matter to the notice of the Public Relations Officer or book an interview with the Officer concerned to know the reasons for the delay in the disposal of the application.\n\n(d) Applications for import of capital goods and heavy electrical plant will take somewhat longer time.\n\nBut m such cases also, if the applicant finds that there has been a delay in the disposal of his application, he can bring the matter to the notice of Public Relations Officer or book an interview with the concerned officer to know the reasons for delay.\"\n\nThis importance is justified because it is necessary for our country to utiJ!se without undue delay the available foreign exchange, the supplies of which are limited, lest due to unforeseen circumstances beyond the control of the State the position in this rgard E deteriorates.\n\nPara 91 of this Handbook, which has already been reproduced, while properly safeguarding the right of the applicants for import licence also points out the consequences of delay and !aches on their part. In the present case, as is clear from the respondent's counter-affidavit and from what has already been stated earlier, in the advance copy of the respondent's appli- F cation, no particular end-use of the stainless steel sheets requirr.d was specified and the respondent was asked to furnish particulars of the end-use and other required information in April, 1969 . . The S.S.I. Registration Certificate was for the end-products \"hospital and surgical instruments and household utensils\".\n\nAs per policy, there was a ban on_ issue of licences for stainless steel sheets for manufacture of household utensils.\n\nIt was in May, G 1969 after the expiry of the period 1968-69 that the respondent firm stated that they were going to manufacture hospital requisites such as surgical bowls, spittoons and trays.\n\nIn the meantime, as is clear, there being a large number of new units who had applied for import licences, in April, 1969 the Department. considered it desirable to have a further scrutiny and fresh instruc- J; tions came into force with effect from April f 6, 1969 ( GLI No. 23 / 69). It is for these reasons, which cannot be con.sidered to be irrelevant, that the application could not be disposed of during\n\n!RON & STEEL CONTROLLER v. MAN!CKCHAND (Dua, J.) 17\n\n1968-69 period.\n\nWe are ignoring the fact that according to the counter-affidavit the respondent's application, along with the essentiality certificate, was received in the office of the Deputy Assistant Iron and Steel Controller on April 23, 1969 which was after the expiry of the 1968-69 period, and we are assuming without holding, that the respondent's application had reached 8 the appropriate authority during the 1968-69 period.\n\nIt is not possible for us, on the material on the record and on the arguments advanced at the bar, to hold that there was any undue delay, I aches or dilatoriness on the part of the Department in dispo; ing of the respondent's pplication during 1968-69.\n\nThe history of the correspondence between the respondent and the c\n\nDepartment, as already noticed, clearly shows that the respon dent's application included items of manufacture which were not covered by the priority list and as a result of a large number of new applicants for the sensitive item of stainless steel, the Department was compelled to hold a proper scrutiny in the larger intere>ts both of the healthy growth of industry and of the balanced econo111y of the country.\n\nFresh instructions for this purpose issued on June 4, 1969 became operative and the respondent was naturally required to comply with these instructions.\n\nSince the respondent's application contained items which were non-priority end-products this application was kept pending until the completion of its examination, and in our opinion this was not unreasonable.\n\nIt was on April 8, 1970 that the Chief E Controller of Imports and Exports, apparently after proper review of the situation, issued instructions providing for the consideration of applications like those of the respondent, irrespective of the date on which they were forwarded to the Department, in terms of the licensing policy for 1970-71.\n\nThough that period has expired, Shri Desai has fairly offered on behalf of his\n\nclients even now to consider the respondent's application in terms of the policy for that year.\n\nNow, it has to be borne in mind that in the present stage of our industrial development imports requiring foreign exchange have necessarily to be appropriately controlled and regulated.\n\nPossible abuses of import quota have also to be effectively checked and this inevitably requires proper scrutiny of the various applications for import licence.\n\nIn granting licences for imports. the authority concerned has to keep in view various factors which may have impact on imports of other items of relatively greater priority in the larger interest of the over-all economy of the country which has to be the supreme consideration; and an applicant has no absolute vested right to an imoort licence in terms of the policy in force at the time of his application because from the very nature of things at the time of granting the licence the authority concerned may often be in a better position to have a\n\nclearer over-all picture of the various factors having an impor- A tant impact on the final decision on the allotment of import quota to the various applicants.\n\nShri Singhvi's suggestion that the responde!lt's concern may have to close down if the import licence is not granted according to 1968-69 policy is difficult to accept in view of the assertion in the writ petition claiming turnover of 8 to 10 lacs by purchasing raw material from local markets.\n\nJn our opinion, no case has been made out on the present record for a mandamus to the Department to consider the respondent's application for import licence in terms of 1968-69 policy.\n\nIt is not possible on the existing material to conclude that the Department is guilty of any undue !aches or delay in dealing with the respondent's application which would justify the C - Court in granting the 111andam11.1 prayed for.\n\nThe High Court was thus not right in making the impugned order.\n\nAs Shri Desai has given an undertaking that the respondent's application would be considered in the light of the import policy for 1970-71 even though that period expired long ago, we need say nothing more on, this aspect.\n\nWe would accordingly allow the appeal D with the observation that the respondent's application be considered in accordance with the import policy for the year 19,70-71 without avoidable delay.\n\nIn the circumstances of the case there would be no order as to costs.\n\n\\'.P.S.\n\nAppeal allmred.", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "A DEPUTY ASSTr. IRON & STEEL CONTROLLER & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DEPUTY ASSTT. IRON & STEEL CONTROLLER & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MANICKCHAND, PROPRIETOR, KATRELLA\n\nCORPN. MADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANICKCHAND, PROPRIETOR, KATRELLA CORPN. MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 138, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DuA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 149, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 151, "end_char": 163, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 180, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "IV of the Import Trade Control Handbook of Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2324, "end_char": 2372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3133, "end_char": 3143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IV of the Import Trade Control Handbook of Rules", "statute": "IV of the Import Trade Control Handbook of Rules"}}, {"text": "Imports and Expdrts Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3151, "end_char": 3188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl. 6(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3193, "end_char": 3204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Imports and Expdrts Control Act, 1947", "statute": "the Imports and Expdrts Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "[1962] 1 S.C.R. 866", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3897, "end_char": 3916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4125, "end_char": 4136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, M. C. Bhandere and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "V. S. Desai"}}, {"text": "M. C. Bhandere", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4138, "end_char": 4152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, M. C. Bhandere and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4157, "end_char": 4168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, M. C. Bhandere and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "L. M. Singvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4190, "end_char": 4202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singvi, A. V. Rangam, R. Krishnamoorlhi rund A. Subhashini, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4204, "end_char": 4216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singvi, A. V. Rangam, R. Krishnamoorlhi rund A. Subhashini, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. Krishnamoorlhi rund A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4218, "end_char": 4254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singvi, A. V. Rangam, R. Krishnamoorlhi rund A. Subhashini, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. V. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4279, "end_char": 4292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. V. Goswami, for the intervener."}}, {"text": "E\n\nDllll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4358, "end_char": 4366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by E\n\nDllll, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the Madras High Court dated March 25, 1971 dismissing at the stage of ad!llission an appeal under cl."}}, {"text": "December 7, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5240, "end_char": 5256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' On December 7, 1968 Lala Manickchand, proprietor of Messrs Katrella Metal Corporation, Madras, respondent in this\n\nCourt, submitted an application, as a new unit, for the licensing 8 period 1968,69 for the grant of an import liceitce for Rs, 9,9~/- for importing stainless steel as an actual user for mamiactunng\n\n'fRON & STEEL CONTROLLER v. MANICKCHAND (Dua, J.) 3\n\nA hospital requisites."}}, {"text": "Lala Manickchand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5257, "end_char": 5273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' On December 7, 1968 Lala Manickchand, proprietor of Messrs Katrella Metal Corporation, Madras, respondent in this\n\nCourt, submitted an application, as a new unit, for the licensing 8 period 1968,69 for the grant of an import liceitce for Rs, 9,9~/- for importing stainless steel as an actual user for mamiactunng\n\n'fRON & STEEL CONTROLLER v. MANICKCHAND (Dua, J.) 3\n\nA hospital requisites.", "canonical_name": "Lala Manickchand"}}, {"text": "DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIES & COMMERCE B\n\nSMALL SCALE INDUSTRIES DIVISION", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5822, "end_char": 5892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "North, reads :\n\n\"DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIES & COMMERCE B\n\nSMALL SCALE INDUSTRIES DIVISION\n\nS. No."}}, {"text": "Katrala Metal Corpora- C tion 54 Sydenbams Road, Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5982, "end_char": 6037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MS.N.SSI/506/033\n\nCERTIFICATE\n\nThis is to certify that M/s. Katrala Metal Corpora- C tion 54 Sydenbams Road, Madras 7 office at 90 N.S.C.\n\nBose Road, Madras 1 is a genuine Small Scale Industry engaged in the manufacture of Hospital and Surgical Instruments, Trays, Mugs, Basins and Household Utensils out of Stainless steel."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6637, "end_char": 6656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "39 of Appendix I in Section V.\n\nThe import policy is announced and published by the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce, on the eve of each financial year by means or a Public Notice which is issued in the form of a book called the- F Import Trade Control Policy, commonly known as the \"Red .,"}}, {"text": "cl. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7606, "end_char": 7611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "II of Handbook of Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7621, "end_char": 7644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 30, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8164, "end_char": 8180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime on January 30, 1969 Licensing Instruction No."}}, {"text": "IRON & STEEL CONTROL (I & E DIVISION)", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8301, "end_char": 8338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It said :\n\n\"IRON & STEEL CONTROL (I & E DIVISION) Office Note: LICENSING INSTRUCTION No."}}, {"text": "30-1-1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8389, "end_char": 8398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4/69 Dated 30-1-1969\n\n1."}}, {"text": "Department of Iron & Steel", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8852, "end_char": 8878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position has been reviewed, in consultation with the Department of Iron & Steel, and it has been decided that the applications for Stainless Steel Sheets, plates and strips received from newcomer units during 1968-69 should be scrutinised by the Directors of Industries and the Regional Offii:es and Licensing Sections very carefully, before import licences are granted, with a view to e11suring that new units which are not well-equipped do not get away with import licences of this sensitive item."}}, {"text": "May 2, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11304, "end_char": 11315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Oa G May 2, 1969 the respondent, while giving information about end-products, stated in a letter that hospital requisites such as surgical bowls, spittoons and trays were intended to be manufactured by the industry."}}, {"text": "May 19, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11518, "end_char": 11530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 19, 1969 the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and\n\nSupply issued General Licensing Instruction No."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Foreign Trade and", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11585, "end_char": 11614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 19, 1969 the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and\n\nSupply issued General Licensing Instruction No."}}, {"text": "May 29, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12790, "end_char": 12802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 29, 1969 the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports issued General C Licensing Instruction No."}}, {"text": "October 31, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13570, "end_char": 13586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 31, 1969 the Director of Industries, Madras, confirmed the Essen- E tia!ity Certificate already issued to the respondent."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13615, "end_char": 13621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 31, 1969 the Director of Industries, Madras, confirmed the Essen- E tia!ity Certificate already issued to the respondent."}}, {"text": "Febr:uary 23, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13895, "end_char": 13913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Febr:uary 23, 1970 a leiteI' was written by the Dir&etor of Industries and Commerce, Madras to the Deputy Assistant Iron & Steel Controller, Madras, in which after referring to his earlier letter dated F October 31, 1969 and to the respondent's letter dated February o, 1970, it was stated :\n\n\"Jn view of the assurance iven by the firm that they would manufacture only Surgical Equipment like Sterilisers, Operation Tables, Auto-Claves etc,, I recommend that M/s. Katrella Metal Corporation, 54, Sydanhams Road, Madras for whom Essentiality Certificate has been issued for import of stainless steel sheets for the period April-March, 1969 may please be treated as PRIORITY INDUSTRY and licence issued to them on this basis.\""}}, {"text": "Katrella Metal Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14359, "end_char": 14385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Febr:uary 23, 1970 a leiteI' was written by the Dir&etor of Industries and Commerce, Madras to the Deputy Assistant Iron & Steel Controller, Madras, in which after referring to his earlier letter dated F October 31, 1969 and to the respondent's letter dated February o, 1970, it was stated :\n\n\"Jn view of the assurance iven by the firm that they would manufacture only Surgical Equipment like Sterilisers, Operation Tables, Auto-Claves etc,, I recommend that M/s. Katrella Metal Corporation, 54, Sydanhams Road, Madras for whom Essentiality Certificate has been issued for import of stainless steel sheets for the period April-March, 1969 may please be treated as PRIORITY INDUSTRY and licence issued to them on this basis.\""}}, {"text": "March 30, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14803, "end_char": 14817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was in .these circumstances that the respondent filed the writ petition in the High Court on March 30, 1970 claiming a writ of mandamus as stated earlier, the sole grievance\n\nIllON & STEEL CONTROLLER v. MAN!CKCHAND (Dua, I.) 7\n\nA being that the res-l'°ndent's application for import licence had during all this penod not been .taken up for final disposal."}}, {"text": "February 23,\n\n1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15572, "end_char": 15590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With regard to the iespondent's applica- B lion for import licenee for manufacturing hospital and nrgical\n\nequipment it was added that the Director of Industries had, issued the Essentiality Certificate in April, 1969 and recommended the respondent for treating it as a priority industry on February 23,\n\n1970."}}, {"text": "8-4-1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16341, "end_char": 16349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, instructions have since been received vlde the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, New Delhi letter dated 8-4-1970, which inter alia provides that applications received by the sponsoring authorities in time may be considered irrespective of the date on which they were forwarded to the licensing authorities and in terms of the licensing policy for 1970-71.\""}}, {"text": "Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16806, "end_char": 16845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was added in this para of the counter-affidavit :\n\n\"According to policy for 1970-71, the material stainless steel sheets is a canalised item for non-priority industries and release orders are to be issued on Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation.\""}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17235, "end_char": 17253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, a little lower down in that\n\njudgment, lifter reproducing the relevant portion of paragraph 10 of the counter-affidavit, it was also observed :\n\n\"Learned counsel for the Central Government urged that the Licensing Authority whoever it is, is prepared to consider the apPlications of each of the petitioners in this tCh of wot petitions, but such appraisal of the applications would be in terms of the licensing policy\n\nfor the year 970-71."}}, {"text": "Chapter II of the Handbook of Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17999, "end_char": 18034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 25, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19739, "end_char": 19753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 25, 1971."}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20473, "end_char": 20484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tue appellants' learned counsel Shri V. S. Desai at the outset drew our attention to s. 3 (I) (a) of the Imports & Exports (Control) B A ct, 18 of 194 7 which empowers the Central Government to prohibit, restrict or otherwise control imports and exports and to\n\ncl.", "canonical_name": "V. S. Desai"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20521, "end_char": 20525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 6(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20698, "end_char": 20709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20823, "end_char": 20834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20855, "end_char": 20866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Goverrunent", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20895, "end_char": 20914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause 6(1) of the Order emc powers the Central Goverrunent or the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports to refuse to grant a licence or direct any other licensing authority not to grant a licence if no foreign exchange is available for the purpose or if the grant of a licence to an applicant is prejudicial to the interest of the State or if it has ."}}, {"text": "Trade Control Handbook of Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21868, "end_char": 21899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23711, "end_char": 23716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Shri Desai the entire position of monetary ceiling, availability of goods applied for from indigenous sources, essentiality of the goods applied for and other relevant factors have to D be seen for considering the question of issuing import licences to actual users for back periods."}}, {"text": "Singhvi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26691, "end_char": 26698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Singhvi on behalf of the respondent controverted the I: appellant's argument by strongly relying on the letter dated February 23, 1970 from the Director of Industries to the Deputy Assistant Iron and Steel Controller in which reference was made to the respondent's assurance to \"manufacture only surgical equipments like sterlisers, operation tables, autoclaves etc.\""}}, {"text": "April l, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27275, "end_char": 27288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As canalising policy was intro\n\nduced only on April l, 1970, when the respondent's case, according to Shri Singhvi's argument, had already been completed as a result of the assurance contained in the letter of February 23,\n\n1970, the respondent's industry was not governed by this policy and was entitled to get the impor't licence."}}, {"text": "Lala Manickchand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30270, "end_char": 30286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference in this • connection was made to the affidavit of Lala Manickchand filed H in the High Court in support of the writ petition in which it was asserted that licences had been issued in March, 1969 to 163 .applicants for the value of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Lala Manickchand"}}, {"text": "April 9, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31644, "end_char": 31657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Shri Singhvi 011 April 9, 1970 an undertaking was given by the State in the High Court that the plea of exhaustion of the quota would not be taken by it for defeating the respondent's claim."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32435, "end_char": 32452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Singhvi relied on a decision of the Madras High Court Sha Maggajee Saremal/ & Bros v. Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports(') the head-noteof which reads:\n\n\"Where a transfer of quota rights is effected as a result of change in the constitution of."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34441, "end_char": 34448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd.(1), also relied upori by Shri Singhvi merely lays down tht \"where a statute imposes a duty the performance or non-performance of which is not a matter of discretion; a D mandamus may be granted ordering that to be done which the statute requires to be done (Halsbury's Laws of England, Third edn."}}, {"text": "Import Trade Control Handbook of Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35446, "end_char": 35484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "2Sth August, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35849, "end_char": 35866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l21 of 1970 decided on 2Sth August, 1971."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36492, "end_char": 36501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exports, New Delhi."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 38213, "end_char": 38248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If an applicant does not receive an interim reply even after this time limit, he can bring the matter to the notice of the Public Relations Offieer in the import e control office concerned or book an interview with the officer\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "April f 6, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40840, "end_char": 40855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "considered it desirable to have a further scrutiny and fresh instruc- J; tions came into force with effect from April f 6, 1969 ( GLI No."}}, {"text": "April 23, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41287, "end_char": 41301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are ignoring the fact that according to the counter-affidavit the respondent's application, along with the essentiality certificate, was received in the office of the Deputy Assistant Iron and Steel Controller on April 23, 1969 which was after the expiry of the 1968-69 period, and we are assuming without holding, that the respondent's application had reached 8 the appropriate authority during the 1968-69 period."}}, {"text": "June 4, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42275, "end_char": 42287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fresh instructions for this purpose issued on June 4, 1969 became operative and the respondent was naturally required to comply with these instructions."}}, {"text": "April 8, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42603, "end_char": 42616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was on April 8, 1970 that the Chief E Controller of Imports and Exports, apparently after proper review of the situation, issued instructions providing for the consideration of applications like those of the respondent, irrespective of the date on which they were forwarded to the Department, in terms of the licensing policy for 1970-71."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_200_207_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "GOVIND HANUMANTHA RAO DESAI\n\nNAGAPPA ALIAS NARAHARI LAXMAN RAO DESHPANDE\n\nAND & 7 ORS.\n\nJanuary 25, 1972\n\n(K. S. HEGDE, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND D. G. PALEKAR, JJ.]\n\nHindu Law-Adoption-Theory of relation hack-Adoption by widow of deceased coparcener-Before adoption partition of property b:y surviving coparceners-Share which adoptive son entitled to.\n\nThe appellant was adopted in 1955 by R's widow after R's death in\n\n1912. In 1933, there was a partition between K (R's father) and his third son L, the only two coparceners existink at that time. Thereafter, K. bequeathed his properties by will to some of his relations.\n\nLater, there was a further partition between L and his son.\n\nL died in 1952.\n\nA suit was filed in 1956 by the-.appellant, claiming half of the family properties. The trial court granted the appellant half share in the family properties. The High Court reduced the share awarded to the appellant\n\nfrom 1/2 to 1/3 of the properties held by it to be partible. The High Court also set aside the trial court's decree awarding a sum of Rs. 1500 to the appellant as his share of the consideration received under a sale deed;\n\nIn appeal to this Court the appellant contended that hl. adoption related back to the date of death of his adoptive father; by a fiction of law, be must he deemed to have been in existence when K and L divided the properties between them; the partition, having been effected without bis joinder, the same had to be ignored; and, therefore, he wa• entitled to a half share in the properties. Alternatively, it was urged that the appellant was entitled to get by succession, half share of the properties that fell to the share elf K.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD . ( i) The appellant must be deemed to have been adopted in 1912 when R died. Therefore, he must he deemed to have~ a co.- parccner in his adoptive father's family when. K and L partitioned the properties in 1933. The partition having been effected without his consent, 1t is not binding on him; but 'from this it cannot be said that K and L did not separate from the family. So far as the quantum of his share is concerned it must he determined after taking into consideration the fact that K & L separated from the family in 1933. The appellant can ignQre the actual partition, by meters aild bounds effected by K and L and ask for a repartition of the properties but bis adoption by itself cannot reunite\n\nthe divided family. The rights of an adopted son cannot be more than that df his adoptive father.\n\nThe fiction that an adoption relates back to tho date of the death of the adoptive lathe\\'. applies only wheo the claim\n\nof the adopted son relates to the estate of the adoptive father.\n\nH the appellant's adoptive father was alive in 1933, when the partition took pW:e, he could not have obtained anything more than I/3rd share in the family properties. Therefore, the ap_pellant's claim for a half share in the family properties is unsustainable. l204 O; 2<YT Bl\n\nlll\n\nThe ; uternative claim of the appellant is also not tenable because K disposed his share by a will and secondly, even if he had not disposed\n\nof his share, tho. same would have developed on L by succession and the property once vested:, cannot be divested as in that property the plaintiff'•\n\nadoptive father had no right of his own. The doctrine of relation back is only a legal fiction. When K. died, plaintiff's adoption father was not alive. The devolution of K's property must be held to have taken place as soon as K died. The property could not have remained in a suspended animation till the appellant was adopted. ~204 G]\n\nShrinivas 'Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango and ors., [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1; Anaizt Bhikappa Patil, Minor v. Shankar Ramchandra Patil, 70 I.A. 232; Baiirao and Ors. v. Ramkrishna, I.L.R. ~1941] Nag. 707 and K. R. Sankaraliam Pillai and Anr. v. Veluchaml Pillai, Minor, I.L.R. 119431 Mad. 309, referred to,\n\nRamachandra Srinivas v. Ramakrishna Krishna Rao, A.I.R. 1952 Bom. 453, disapproved.\n\n(ii) Both the courts below found the sale in question valid as the same was effected to meet family necessities.\n\nAs the appellant did not seek an accounting from the 2nd defendant, and as no case was made out for req_uiring the second defendant to account in respect of moneys ro- D ceived by him as Karta and as the plaint did not state that there was any cash in the bands of the 2nd defendant, the High Court was justified in reversing the decree of the trial court directing the payment of Rs. 1500 to the appellant. [203 El\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 527 ot 1967.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated August 2nd/3rd, 1965 of the Mysore Hgh Court in Regular First A.ppeal No. 14 7 of 1958.\n\nM. Natesan and K. Jayaram, for the appeltant,\n\n~· S. S. Shukla, for respondents Nos. 1 to 4.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHedge, J. This appeal by certificate arises from the decision of the Mysore High Court in R.A. No. 147 of 1958 on its file. The plaintiff is the appellant. The main question that arises for decision in this appeal is as to the share to which the plaintiff is entitled in the properties held to be partible by the High Court. other minor contention had also been urged which will be referrrit to and dealt with at the appropriate stage.\n\nThe facts as found by the High Court and which are no more in dispute may now be stated. '\n\nTlie . appellant is the adopted son of one . Ranga Rao . alias Ramachandra Rao who died in 1912. He was adopted by the\n\nsaid Ranga Rao's wid'Ow Seethabai on September 18, 1955. The A gi:neo!ogy of the family of Ranga Rao is as follows :\n\nKRISHNA RAO DESHPANDE (Died 1934) MARRIED RADHABAI (Died 1935)\n\nRanaa Rao alias Ramcbandra Rao\n\n(died 1912)\n\n. Mmied Seothabai\n\n(Defendant No. !)\n\nGovinda (Adopted on 1S..9-19SS)\n\nPlaintiff\n\nHanumantfu.\n\nRao (went out of tho family by adoption).\n\nI, aksh;,, ana Rao (died 6-9-19'2) Mmied\n\n.. •.\n\nvenkubai ·!st wife (died 1904)\n\n-~ ts; r· Deft. 3 Del\\·. s. .\n\nkiiuyabli Deft. 7\n\nHanumantha:.Rao went a.It of'the fiUmly 'havmgbeen ~\n\n into some other family. Then: W\\IS. a lion between Krislm&' Rao 'ud 1; aJcsbiwiJla Rao, the oiily twO existiili -~ that time, in 1933. After partition Krishna Rai> IS said to have ueathed his properties to SOll)e _of , Iris reJa.tiQllS as. per bis-will: R dated November 8, 1934. Sui1sequently there W84 a er partition between Laksbmana Rao and defendant No. Z Nagappa on\n\nFebruary 14, 1946. Lakshmana Rao died in 1952. As mentioned earlier, the plaintiff was adopted on September 18, 1955 and the suit-from which this appeal arises was instituted in 1956 by the plaintiff-appellant represented by his natural father as his next friend as he was a minor on the date of the suit. The trial court granted the plaintiff . half share in the properties that were held to be that of the family. The High Court modified the decree of the trial court in certain respects.\n\nIt is not necessary to refer to all the modifications made by the High Court.\n\nWe shall refer only to those modifications which are challenged in this appeal.\n\nThe High Court reduced the share awarded to the plaintiff from half to l/3rd of the properties l).eld by it to be partible. The correctness of this decision is questioned. The only other question is whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the trial court's decree awarding a sum of Rs. 1500/- to the plaintiff.\n\nBefore proceeding to examine the appellant's contention that he is entitled to a half share in properties held to be partible, it would be convenient to dispose of his contention relating to the money decree.\n\nThe trial court came to the conclusion that out of the consideration of Rs. 6500/- received under the sale deed Exh. 177, the second defendant had not accounted for Rs. 3000/-. Hence the plaintiff is entitled to a half share therein. The trial court as well as the High Court have found that the sale in question is valid as the same was effected to meet family necessities. The appellant did. not seek an accounting from the 2nd defendant.\n\nNo case was made out for requiring the 2nd defendant to account in respect of the amounts received by him as the karta of the family, nor did the plaintiff aver in his plaint that there was any cash in the hands of the 2nd defendant. Hence the High Court was justified in reversing the decree of the trial court directing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 1500/ -.\n\nThis leaves us with the question as to the share to which the plaintiff is entitled in the partible properties. Even before the plaintiff was adopted into the family, there was a partition betweea Krishna Rao and Lakshmana Rao.\n\nThe genuineness of that G partition is no more in dispute. After the partition Krishna Rao became absolutely entitled to his share of the properties and hence ' he was entitled to deal with that . property in the manner he thought best. As mentioned earlier he had beqthed his properties to others.\n\nBut it was urged on behalf of the appellant that his adoption dates back to the date of the death of his adoptive father, Ranga Rao; By a .fiction of law, he must deemed fi to have been .in .eliistence when Krishna Rao and Lakshmana ' - . .\n\nRao divided the properties amongst themselves. The said parti tion hav.iD.g been effected without his joinder, the same has tQ bo -\n\nignored. Hence he is entitled to a half share in the properties.\n\nA Alternatively, it was contended that the plaintiff is entitled to get by suecession half share in the properties that fell to the share of Krishna Rao.\n\nBefore proceeding to examine the decided cases referred to at the time of the arguments, let us proceed to examine the question 8 on first principles. It is true that by a fiction of law-well settled by decided cases-that an adopted son is deemed to have been adopted on the date of the death of his adoptive father.. He is the continuator of his adoptive father's line exactly as an aurasa son and an adoption, so far as the continuity of the line is concerned, has a retrospective effect. Whenever the adoption may be made there is no hiatus in the continuity of the line.\n\nFrom that it C follows that the appellant must be deemed to have be,,; n adopted in 1912. Consequently he is deemed to have been a coparcener in his adoptive father's family when Krishna Rao and Lakshmana Rao partitioned the properties. The partition having been effected without his consent, it is not binding on him. But from this it does not follow that Krishna Rao and Lakshmana Rao did not D separate froni the family at the time of the partition.\n\nIt was open to Krishna Rao and Lakshmana Rao to separate themselves from the family. Once they did separate, the appellant and his adoptive mother alone must be deemed to have continued as the members of the family. It is true that because the plaintiff's adoptive mother was alive, the family cannot be said to have come to an E end on the date of partition. But that does not mean that Krishna Rao and Lakshmana Rao did not separate from the family. When the partition took place in 1933, the appellant even if he was a coparcener on that day could have only got I/3rd share.\n\nWe fail to see how his position can be said to have improved merely because he was adopted subsequent to the date of partition. It is true that because he was not a party to the partition, he is e.ti- Y titled to ask for reopening of the partition and have his share worked out without reference to that partition. But so far as the quantum of his share is concerned, it must b determined after taking into consideration the fact that Krishna Rao and Lakshmana Rao separated from the family in 1933. The alternative contention of the appellant referred to earlier is also untenable firstly G because Krishna Rao disposed of his share of the properties by means of a will and secondly even if he had not disposed of his share of the property, the same would have devolved on Lakshmana Rao by succession and the property that had once. vested by succession cannot be divested as in that property the plaintiff's adoptive father had no right of his own. The doctrine of relation H back is only a legal fiction. There is no justification to logically eXtend that fiction. In fact the plaintiff had nothing to do with hfa adoptive .father's family when Krishna Rao died.\n\nOn that day\n\nGOV!ND v. NAGAPPA ,(Heg~, /.) 205\n\nhis adoptive father was not alive.\n\nThe devolution of Krishna Rao's property must be held to have taken place at the very moment Krishna Rao died. We know of no legal fiction under which it can be said to have been in a suspended animation till the plaintifl was adopted.\n\nThis lakes us to the decided cases. A long line of decisions has finnly laid down that an adoption dates back to the date of the death of the adoptive father. It is not necessary to refer to the catena of decisions on this point. Suffice it to ;:efer to the decision of this Court in Shrinivas Krishnnrao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango and Ors. (1).\n\nBut that fiction by itself does not help the plaintiff. That fiction merely enables him to establish that he must be deemed to have been in existence on the date of the death of his adoptive father. Division of status need not be effected by bilateral agreement. It can be effected by an unilateral declaration by a coparcener if the same is properly communicated.\n\nTherefore it was within the power of Krishna Rao and Lakshmana Rao to separa.te themselves from the family and in fact they did so in 1933.\n\nWe see no basis for the contention of the appellant that he can ignore the events that took place in 1933. He can no doubt ignore the actual partition by metes and bounds effected by Krishna Rao and Lakslunana Rao and ask for a repartition of the properties but his adoption by iiself does not and cannot re-unite the divided family. It is one thing •to say that an adopted son can ignore a partition effected prior to his adoption, which affects his rights and it is a different thing to say that his adoption wipes out the division of status that had taken place in his family.\n\nReliance was placed ori the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ramchandra Shrinivas and Ors. v. Ramkrishna Krishnarao( 2 ) in support of the proposition that the plaintiff can enter into the adoptive family on the basis that the family is a joint and undivided Hindu family andhis rights in the property of the family must be decided on that basis. It is true that this decision lends some support to the argument that despite the partition effected in 1933, the plaintiff can work out his rights on the basis that the family remains joint. The conclusion of the High Court that the adopted son is entitled to enter his adoptive family on the basis that the fami)y continues as a joint and undivided Hindu family and that his rights in the family property must be decided on that basis does. not appear to be supported by any Hindu law text or by any decision of this. Court or the Judicial Committee. The decision of the Judicial Committee in Anant Bhikappa P!llil, 1,1inor\n\nv. Slwnlcar ltamchandra Patil('), relied on by the High Court did not co!ISider that question.\n\nIt is true that some of the observations of Chief Justice Stone in Bajirao and Ors.\n\nv. Ram-\n\n(1) fl9SS) I S.C.R. I.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1952 Bam.463\n\n(3) 70 I.A. ~32.\n\nkrishna ( 1), does support the view taken by the Bombay High Court. But the question that arose for decision in that case was whether a person adopted, after a partition in his adoptive father's family cannot divest the properties that had vested in the other coparceners. It may be noted that in the course of his judgment, the learned Chief Justice observed :\n\n\"There can, in our opinion, be no question of a partition whereby the partitioning male members take away all the family property from a joint Hindu family unless the family can be wholly disrupted and finally brought to an end. We regard it as clear that a Hindu family cannot be finally brought to an end while it is possible in nature or law to add a male member to it. The family cannot be at an end while there is still a potential mother if that mother in the way of nat•ire or in the way of law brings in a new male member. The existing male members can separate off; they can take away their share.\n\nThey caamot prejudice by partitioning the rights of the after-born male member whether the birth is natural or legal. If in point of fact, before his arrival, the existing coparceners have partitioned the new arrival can obtain a re-opening of the partition and thereby get his share. How that share is to be calculated in various circumstances need not be decided here.\"\n\nThese observations in our opinion lay down the ratio of the decision and that ratio does not support the conclusion reached by the Bombay High Court. The decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in K. R. Sankaralingam Pillai and anr. v.\n\nVeluchami Pillai, Minor('), relied on by Bombay High Court merely laid down that an adopted son is entitled to reopen partition entered into in the family of his adoptive father, before his adoption.\n\nThat position is no more open to question and was not questioned in this appeal. We are only concerned with the quantum of share to which the plaintiff is entitled. Our attention has not been invited to any decision which supports the view taken by the Bombay High Court. We see no justification to accept that view.\n\nFurther the interest of the society is not advanced by engrafting one more fiction to the already existing fiction that an adopted son is deemed to have been bOm on the daie of death of his 'adoptive father. Acceptance of the new fiction canvassed on behalf of the plaintiff is bjound to create various complications. . Hinu widows in the past were proverbially long lived because of the child marriage system.\n\nAdoptions might take place and have taken place more. than half a century after the death of the adoptive\n\n~ (1) I.L.R. [1941] Nag. 7!17.\n\n(2) I.L.R. (1943] Mad. 309.\n\nA father.\n\nMeanwhile the other coparceners might have dealt with the family property on the ba8is of the then existing rights. They might have alienated the property.\n\nWe see no justification to create chaos by inventing a new fiction unknown to Hindu Jaw texts nor authorised by stare decisis.\n\nThis Court in Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango's case( 1) has laid down that the fiction that an adoption relates back to the date of the death of the adoptive father applies only when the claim of the adoptive son relates to the estate of the adoptive father. But where the succession to the property of a person other than the adoptive father is involved, the principle applicable is not the rule of relation back but the rule that inheritance once vested cannot be divested. It is true *at the question that arose for decision !n that case was whether an adoptive son can claim to succeed to a collateral's estate, divesting the property that had already vested in someone else.\n\nBut the rule laid down by this Court in that case is much wider than the limited question that arose for decision and the reasons given in support of that rule support our crmclusion. The rights of an adopted son cannot be more than that of his adoptive father. If the plaintiff's adoptive father was alive iii 1933 when the partiti9n took place, he could not have obtained anything more than I/3rd share in the family properties. It passes our comprehension how the plaintiff could acquire a greater right than his adoptive father could have had if he had been alive on the date of partition and that he could -hav-e got if he had been adopted prior to that date. In our judgment the plaintift's claim for a half share in the family properties is unsustainable.\n\nIn the result th.is appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs. s.c. 4ppeal dismissed.\n\n(I) [1955) l.S.C.R. I.", "total_entities": 35, "entities": [{"text": "GOVIND HANUMANTHA RAO DESAI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GOVIND HANUMANTHA RAO DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NAGAPPA ALIAS NARAHARI LAXMAN RAO DESHPANDE\n\nAND & 7 ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NAGAPPA ALIAS NARAHARI LAXMAN RAO DESHPANDE AND & 7 ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. G. PALEKAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 144, "end_char": 162, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.G. PALEKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 560, "end_char": 562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, K. bequeathed his properties by will to some of his relations."}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S.C.R. 1", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3676, "end_char": 3693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "August 2nd/3rd, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4643, "end_char": 4663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated August 2nd/3rd, 1965 of the Mysore Hgh Court in Regular First A.ppeal No."}}, {"text": "M. Natesan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4732, "end_char": 4742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Natesan and K. Jayaram, for the appeltant,\n\n~· S. S. Shukla, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "K. Jayaram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4747, "end_char": 4757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Natesan and K. Jayaram, for the appeltant,\n\n~· S. S. Shukla, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "S. S. Shukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4782, "end_char": 4794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Natesan and K. Jayaram, for the appeltant,\n\n~· S. S. Shukla, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4939, "end_char": 4956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHedge, J. This appeal by certificate arises from the decision of the Mysore High Court in R.A. No."}}, {"text": "Ranga Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5524, "end_char": 5533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was adopted by the\n\nsaid Ranga Rao's wid'Ow Seethabai on September 18, 1955."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA RAO DESHPANDE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5637, "end_char": 5658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The A gi:neo!ogy of the family of Ranga Rao is as follows :\n\nKRISHNA RAO DESHPANDE (Died 1934) MARRIED RADHABAI (Died 1935)\n\nRanaa Rao alias Ramcbandra Rao\n\n(died 1912)\n\n.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA RAO DESHPANDE"}}, {"text": "Ranaa Rao alias Ramcbandra Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5701, "end_char": 5731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The A gi:neo!ogy of the family of Ranga Rao is as follows :\n\nKRISHNA RAO DESHPANDE (Died 1934) MARRIED RADHABAI (Died 1935)\n\nRanaa Rao alias Ramcbandra Rao\n\n(died 1912)\n\n."}}, {"text": "Govinda", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5784, "end_char": 5791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Govinda (Adopted on 1S..9-19SS)\n\nPlaintiff\n\nHanumantfu."}}, {"text": "Hanumantfu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5828, "end_char": 5838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Govinda (Adopted on 1S..9-19SS)\n\nPlaintiff\n\nHanumantfu."}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5841, "end_char": 5844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rao (went out of tho family by adoption).", "canonical_name": "Rao"}}, {"text": "venkubai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5933, "end_char": 5941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, aksh;,, ana Rao (died 6-9-19'2) Mmied\n\n.. •.\n\nvenkubai ·!"}}, {"text": "Hanumantha:.Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6015, "end_char": 6030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7\n\nHanumantha:.Rao went a.It of'the fiUmly 'havmgbeen ~\n\n into some other family."}}, {"text": "Krishna Rai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6221, "end_char": 6232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After partition Krishna Rai> IS said to have ueathed his properties to SOll)e _of , Iris reJa.tiQllS as.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA RAO DESHPANDE"}}, {"text": "Laksbmana Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6397, "end_char": 6410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sui1sequently there W84 a er partition between Laksbmana Rao and defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Lakslunana Rao"}}, {"text": "Z Nagappa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6429, "end_char": 6438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Z Nagappa on\n\nFebruary 14, 1946."}}, {"text": "February 14, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6443, "end_char": 6460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Z Nagappa on\n\nFebruary 14, 1946."}}, {"text": "Lakshmana Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6462, "end_char": 6475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lakshmana Rao died in 1952.", "canonical_name": "Lakslunana Rao"}}, {"text": "Krishna Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8653, "end_char": 8664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even before the plaintiff was adopted into the family, there was a partition betweea Krishna Rao and Lakshmana Rao.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA RAO DESHPANDE"}}, {"text": "Lakshmana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9208, "end_char": 9217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it was urged on behalf of the appellant that his adoption dates back to the date of the death of his adoptive father, Ranga Rao; By a .fiction of law, he must deemed fi to have been .in .eliistence when Krishna Rao and Lakshmana ' - . .", "canonical_name": "Lakslunana Rao"}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9227, "end_char": 9230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rao divided the properties amongst themselves.", "canonical_name": "Rao"}}, {"text": "Lakslunana Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13733, "end_char": 13747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He can no doubt ignore the actual partition by metes and bounds effected by Krishna Rao and Lakslunana Rao and ask for a repartition of the properties but his adoption by iiself does not and cannot re-unite the divided family.", "canonical_name": "Lakslunana Rao"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14159, "end_char": 14176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed ori the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ramchandra Shrinivas and Ors."}}, {"text": "Anant Bhikappa P!llil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15061, "end_char": 15082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Judicial Committee in Anant Bhikappa P!llil, 1,1inor\n\nv. Slwnlcar ltamchandra Patil('), relied on by the High Court did not co!ISider that question."}}, {"text": "Stone", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15247, "end_char": 15252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that some of the observations of Chief Justice Stone in Bajirao and Ors."}}, {"text": "krishna", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15350, "end_char": 15357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "krishna ( 1), does support the view taken by the Bombay High Court."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16882, "end_char": 16899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in K. R. Sankaralingam Pillai and anr."}}, {"text": "Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18352, "end_char": 18378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court in Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango's case( 1) has laid down that the fiction that an adoption relates back to the date of the death of the adoptive father applies only when the claim of the adoptive son relates to the estate of the adoptive father."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_208_214_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "TRIBENI DEVI AND ORS.\n\nCOLLECTOR OF RANCm January 25, 1972\n\n[K. s. HEGDE, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND K; K. MATHEW, JJ.]\n\nLand Acquisition Act (1 of 1894)-Compensation-Principles for determing.\n\nAccording to the general principles set out in sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquision Act, 1894, for determining compensaticm, the com pensation payable to the owner of the land is the market value which is detennined by reference to the price which a seller might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser; but since it _may not be possible to ascertain this with any amount of precision the authority charged wtth the duty to award compensation is bound to make an estimate judged by an objective standard. The land acquired, has, therefore, to be valued not only wtth reference to its condition at the time of the declaraticm under s. 4 of the Act, but its potential value also must be .taken into account. This Court has laid down the methods of valuation to be adopted in ascertain ing the market value of the land on the date of the notification under s. 4, which are: (i) opinion of experts (ii) the price paid within a reasonable time in bona fide transactions of the purchase of the lands acquired or the lands adjacent to the lands acquired and possessing similar advanfages and\n\n(iii) a number of years purchase of the actual or immediately prospective profits of the lands acquired. These methods, however, do not preclude the Court from taking any other special circumstance into consideration, the requirement being always to arrive as near as possible an estimate of the market vaJue. In arriving at a reasonable correct market value it may be necessary to take even two or all these methods into account in as much as the exact valuation is not always possible as no two lands may be sarne either in respect of the situation or the extent or the potentiality, nor is it possible in alt cases to have reliable material from which that valuation can be accurately determined. f211 HJ\n\nSpecial Land Acquisition Officer Bengal\"re v.\n\nT. Adinarayan Setty. (1959\\ Supp, 1 S.C.R. 404, referred to.\n\nIn the present case, the High Court was not justified in adopting the sale-deed in respect of a land which was farther away not only from the land acquired, but from the town. The annual rental value of the land acquired, based on the rent fixed in 1944 when that land was not of such gI;.\"eat value as it had acquired at the time when section 4 notification was issued, woiild also not furnish a proper method of computation. The High Court was not justified in giv; ng 10 per cent towards potential value, be.\n\nca11'Se, that element was inherent in the fixation of market value of the land and could not be assessed separately .. The High Court was also not justi lied in disallowing 5 per cent awarded by the Judicial Commi~ as compensation for severance merely because there was an entrance to the land. When a portion of the land is acquired and a large portion left out there would be diminution in the value of land that is left out for which so:ne compensation has to be allowed. [214 Bl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C.A. Nos. 661, 1380, 1885 & 1886 of 1967.\n\nTRIBENI DEVI v. COLLECTOR RANCHI (!aga11moha11 Reddy, /.),209\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated February 25, 1965 of the Patna High Court in First Appeals Nos. 437 and 438 of 1959.\n\nS. V. Gupte. B. P. Rajgarhia and U. P. Singh, for the appellants .. (in C.A. Nos. 661 a:nd 1380 of 1967) and for respondent No. 1 (in C.A. Nos. 1885 and 1886 of 1967).\n\nD. Gcburdhm1, for the respondent (in C.A. Nos. 661 and 1380 of 1967 and for the appellant (in C.A. Nos. 1885 and 1886 of 1967).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nP. Jaganmoltan Reddy, J. These appeals arc by certificate against the judgment of tile Patna High Court in land acquisition appea]s.\n\nTwo notifications dated 7-7-1954 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (Act l of 1894) (hereinafter called 'the Act'), were issued one in respect of a portion of Plot Nos. 178 and 1784 admeasuring 2.65 acres and the other in respect of the whole of the plot No. 1783 admeasuring 2 acres situated in Ward No. 3 of Ranchi Municipality.\n\nSection 6 notification in respect of these lands was published on 7-9-1954\n\nMJd poswsion was taken on 23-9-1954 under section 17(1) after making a declaration under section 17 ( 4) tha•t !he provisions of section SA shall not apply.\n\nThe Col!ector awarded compensation of Rs. 1.20,419-6-11 in respect of the first acquisition and Rs. 47,648-13-6 in respect of the second. Thereafter, at the instance of 'the claimant, a reference under section 18 of the Act was made to the Judicial Commissioner of Chhota Nagpur, Ranchi who. while maintaining the market value of the land, awarded by the Collector, gave further compensation for severance at the rate of 5% and .10% in respect of potential value of the land.\n\nThe Judicial Commissioner. however, did not grant the 15% sclatium under section 23(2) of the Act.\n\nBeing dissatisfied, the claimants preferred appeals to the High Court.\n\nThe Hi.e; h Court revised the compensation and awarded Rs. 90,000/- per acre and 15% as solatium on the market value under section 23(2) of the Act bui did not g.rant them •the 5% '.owards sever\n\nancc. Interest at 6% per annum on the amount of enhanced compensation from 23-9-1954 together with costs was also decreed.\n\nAgainst 'the judgment and decree, the claimants have filed Civil Appeals 661 & 1380/67 while the State has filed Civit Appeals 1885-86/67.\n\nThe lands in question which have been acquil\"..d were earlier leased on 22-9-1944 to the Military authorities on a rem of Rs'. 600/- per montli for a period of 6 months under a registered\n\ndeed with option 'to renew for a maximum period of 10 yeari<.\n\nwhich period expired on 21-9-1954.\n\nOne of ·!he conditions of the lease was that on the termination of the lease, the lessor would exercise the option given under the lease to purchase all buildings, structures, gardens and any other strudtures constructed by the lessee during their occupation of the leased property, at 75 per cent of the valuation that would be determined b)< the Superintending Engineer, Chhota Nagpur Circle; and in case the lessors refused to purchase, the lessee was entitled to dismantle and take away the materials.\n\nTowards the end of !he lease period, the Government of Bihar decided to acquire the property for the State Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen's Board and initiated proceedings as aforesaid.\n\nIn these appeals the only question ithat has !o be determined is : What. is the market value of the property as on the date of . section 4 nQtification? In the yaluation report given by the Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi, Ex-1, the principle of capitalisajion\n\non the basis of 20 times the annual rental of Rs. 7,200/- at the\n\nrate of Rs. 600/- p.m. was adopted as the price of the lands. In D that report it was also pointed out thart the sale price of 1.085 acres out of the premises of the Ranchi Club as per registered sale-deed, Ex. C-1 dated 1-4-1953, was Rs. 41,470/- per actt, which was not fair.\n\nApart from these 25 other sale transactions in respect of portions of Plot No. 1789 between 1952 and 1953 were also referred in that report.\n\nSome of those lands were g situated opposite to the Ranchi Club and the sale price came .to 'Rs. 1092/- per katha, which is about Rs .. 60,000/- per acre. I!\n\nwas further pQinted out that some, other lands a little further away from rthe main road but belonltiog to the same Plot No. P89 were sold at !he rates between Rs. 250/- to Rs. 800/- per ka .. tha.\n\nThis report formed the basis of the award.made by the Colltor. 1 ,.\n\nThe High Court took judicial notice, and in our view !ightly,,1io, that after .the termination of the Second World War in 1945 <; here was a rise in land values due to the increased demand of hOmestead lands for building purposes. It also considered various sale-deeds produced and proved O!l behalf of the .claimants along with the oral evidence to determine the market value of the land.\n\nThe o)>jections from both the appellant .and the respondent were G taken into account in respect of each oJ these and most 'of - were considered as not fumishin11; a proper or adequate valuljoli -either havin.e; regard. to the distance of .the lands wl)ich were ~\n\nsubject-matter of the sale or the inadequacy of ~·infonilallan pertaining thereto.\n\nThe Hildi Court, however, adopted ~-price in the sale deedEic.C-1 executed on 6;5·1953 by .thelbJlcbi.Oub tl Ltd., in favour of Presideni of: India in riSpec~ :.Of LOSS lcrllf 3 bighas 5 kathM 10 chhataks in Plot No •. l:n 1 for Rs .. 4f 111tJ/:. as the basis for .amving at the market vue of the acquired tat\n\nTRIBENI DEVI v. COLLECTOR RANCHI (laganmohan.Reddy, J:) 21 )J\n\nThough the land in question was situated on the main Ranchi- Chaibasa Road, a strong objection was taken against adopting the price as a basis because it was not only t mile away from the land under acquisition but what was sold was only the leasehold right in the land.\n\nThese objections were rejected on the ground that for all practical purposes the interest that was held or sold B . by the Ranchi Club under Ex.C-1 was not inferior to an. absolute title.\n\nThe area of the land, the subject matter of the sale, was considered .to be fairly large being more than 1 acre and the situation was also the same as the land under acquisition except that\n\nit was farther away from it.\n\nIn these circumstances, the High Court thouii; ht, after a proper allowance is made for the difference c\n\nin distance, the transaction yields a more acceptable guide for determining the market value of the land under acquisition and accordingly, it adopted twice the price as charged for the land in Ext.C-1 as indicating a fair market value of the land in question.\n\nThe Hi.gh Court further added Rs. 7060/- per acre as the difference between tenure rights and lease-hold rights that were held by the. President of India and awarded Rs. 90,000/- per acre. This, it did notwithstanding the fact that it was conscious that there was no definit!l data for the two additions that have been made, because in its view, in cases of this nature a certain amount of estimate has to be made which may even be arbitrary.\n\nAccordingly, it awarded compensation for the 4.65 acres of land which was acquired by the Government at Rs. 90,000/ per acre together with 1 S % solatium payable under clause ( 2) of section 23 of the Act. 5% compensation for severance of land fro1;11. the claimants' other portion of. the land tltat remained with them after acquisition, ch wQ awarded. by the Judicial Commisioncr, Chhota Nayr, was disallowed on the ground (hat there wu an entrance to the back portion of the •land which was left with the t>wners and also because there was no evidence to show that in fact there had been any depreciation in he value of the remaining area anciif sc>, to What exnt: On the othet'hand, it l!laintained the 10% on the lharket, value of the land awlirded by the Land Accririsitiori Court on aecou, nt of' the' inerease in the). l!Otentialities of !Ile land. Tue basis adopted by the Jligh Court iS\n\nchallen~ on the ground that they are , contrary to the well established principles appliciible for determining the value of landS\n\nacquired under the Act. ·\n\nThe 11eneral principles for determining compensation have been set out in sections .. 23 & 24 of. the Act. The compensation payable to :the owner of the landr is. the market value which is determined by f.erence to the price which a seller might reasonab)'y expect to_obtain from awillin1!;\"purclwer, bat as this may not' be possible to ascertain with any .amount 1lf on, the Dllthoritv charged with the duty to award compensaion is bound to\n\n.make an estimate judged by an objective standard.\n\nThe land A .acquired has, therefore, to be valued not only with reference to\n\nits condition at the time of the declaration under section 4 of the Act but its potential value also must be taken into account. The sale-deeds of the lands situated in the vicinity and the comparable benefits and advantages which they have, furnish a rough and ready method of compnting the market value. This, however, is i!Ot the B only method. The rent which an owner was actually receiving at the relevant point of time or the rent which the neighbouring lands' of similar nature are fetchlng can be taken into a, ccount by capi- .talising the rent which according to the present prevailinl!l rate of interest is 20 times the annual rent.\n\nBut this also is not a conclusive method.\n\nThis Court had in Special Land Acquisition c Officer, Bang!J.lore v. T. Adinarayan Setty('), indicated at page 412 the methods of valuwtion to be adopted in ascertaining the market value of the land on the date of the notification under section 4(1) which are: (i) opinion of experts, (ii) the price paid within a reasonable time in bona fide transactions of purchase .of 'the )ands acquired or the lands adjacent to the lands acquired and possessing similar advantages; and (iii) a number of years' D purchase of the actual or immediately prospective profits of the lands acquired.\n\nThese methods, however, do not preclude the Court from taking any other special circumstances into consideration, he requirement bein111 always to arrive as near as possible an estimate of the market value.\n\nIn arriving to a reasonably correct market value, it may be necessary to take even two or all E of those methods into account inasmuch as the exact valuation is not always possible as no two lands may be the same either in Tespect of the situation or the extent or the potentially nor is it possible in all cases to have reliable material from which that valuation can be accurately determined.\n\nBearin1t 'these principles in. mind, we do not think that the High Court was justified in adopting the registered sale-deed, Ex.C-1 executed by ihe Ranchi Club, in favour of 1J.e President\n\nof India, bec<iuse that land is farther away not only from the land acquired but from the town though it is on the main Ranchi- Chaibasa Road.\n\nEven the High Court recognised that there was G no definite data for the two additions that have been made and in our view it-would not be a proper melthod of ascertaining the value of the land 'acquired.\n\nThe only two docu.ments that may be considered are Ex.10 and Exll which are in respect of the lands situated in i:he vicinity and on either side of the land acquired.\n\nThe other sale deeds are of smaller areas and do not furnish a proper basis for ascertainin1t the market value and have H been quite properly not relied upon by the learned Advocate for\n\n(1) (19S9) (Suppl. I) S.C.R. 404.\"!\n\nTR!BENI DEV! v. COLLECTOR RANCHI (Jagunmohan Reddy, J.) 213\n\nA lhe claimants.\n\nThe annual rental value of the land acquired, namely, Rs. 7,200/- will also not furnish a proper method of computation because that was a rent fixed in 1944 when that land was not of such grea! value as it had acquired at the 1time when sec. 4 notification was issued.\n\nA perusal of the c:Jrrespondence between the owners of the land and the Depuety Commissioner B of Ranchi would show tha!t the land owners had given it at consessional rate to the Military authorities having regard to the purpose for which it was being put to use.\n\nOn bel1alf of the claimants grea•t reliance is placed on Ex. I I which is a sale-deed executed on 16-12-1946 by the claimants the Ranchi Automobiles of an area of 1 biid1a 17 kathas equal to .617 acres for Rs. 1,45,000/ .. After deducting Rs. 15,403/- the price of the C structures according 1to the Engineer's report in 1959 (Ex.25), the net value of the land is Rs. 1,29,697 /-.\n\nThis value would work out to Rs. 2,08,135.70 per acre.\n\nThe High Court rejected this compu!_ation on the ground tha't though the knd was contiguous to the land under acquisition, neither the \\alue of the pump an!l the other strutures belonging to Bunnah Shell nor the D value of the structures that might have been on the land on the date of the sale which were built by the vendees as lcsr.ees could be ascertained either from the sale-deed or the evidne. Ex.10 is a lease in respect of 1/3 acre granted by the owners to Thakur Chandra Bali Shah and others executed on 20-2-1950 on a monthly rent of Rs. 157/-. The High Court calculated the E monthly rental of the land under acquisition at that rate to be not\n\nle~ than Rs. 2,000/- per month or Rs. 24,000/- per yar. On the basis of 20 times the annual rent ii computed R1. 4,80,000/- as the market value which works out at Rs. 1,03,226/-\n\nper acre. It is, however, pointed out on behalf of the claimants\n\ntha~ the High Court made a mistake in thinking that the rent for the land leased under Ex.10 was Rs. 157/- p:in. and on that F basis it calculated the annual rental value of 4.65 acres of the acquired land.\n\nWe have checked the figures from the original lease and find that in fact !he rent is Rs. 175/- and na~ Rs. 157 /-.\n\nOn this basis the rate per acre of 20 times annual rental value would come to Rs. 1,26,000/-. Even if Ex.11 is t1 be taken as the basis and it.he value of the sructures as given by the En.zineet G in Ex.25 is_ to be accepted that cannot furnish a proper basis because the land in question is a small area of .617 acres or just over t an acre.\n\nA smaller area such as this on a main road would certainly fetch a higher price compared to a larger undeveloped area even though it may have a frontage on the main road.\n\nIn order to develop that area atleast the value of 1/3 of\n\nH the land will have '.O be deducted for roads, draina,!!'e and other amenities.\n\nOn this basis, he value of the land at Rs. 2,08,135.70 per acre would, after deduction of 1/3 come to Rs. 1,38,757/- per acre.\n\nOn :he basis of the rental of Rs. 175/- p.m. in Ex.HJ,\n\nthe villue ~. 20 times the rental will work out as already seen at A Rs. 1,26,000/-. Allowing for an incre$e in rents from 1950\n\nto 1954, the date of section 4 notification, say at 5% the value per acre may be Rs. 1,33,000/- or thereabout. If we take the average Qf Ex.10 and Ex.11 as computed by us the value pet acre would come to about Rs. 1,35,878/-. In our view, Rs. 1,35,000/- per acre would be a reasonable rate at which B compensation could be awarded to the claimants.\n\nThe High Court was not justified in giving 10% towards potential value because that element is inherent in the fixation of the market value of the land and couJd not be assessed separately.\n\nThe High Court was illso not justified in disallowing 5% awarded by the Judicial Commissioner, Chhotanagpur as compensation for severance\n\nmerely because there was an ence to the land. When a por- C tion left out there would be a diminution in the value of the land that is left out .for which some compensation has to be allowed.\n\nThe 5% allowed by the Judicial Commissioner, Chhotanagpur is reasonable.\n\nIn this view, the claimants would be entitled to a decree as follows in respect ot the lands acquired :-\n\n(1) At the rate of Rs. 1,35,000 per acre for 4.65\n\nacreS;\n\n(2) 5% severence and 15% solatium on the market\n\nvillue computed as in (1 ) ; ( 3) Interest at 6 % from the date of taking posses.\n\nsion.\n\nThe appeals of the claimants are allowed to the extent of the variation and those by the ent are dismissed with costs.\n\nThe claimants will be enti:led to proportionate costs on the difference between the amounts decreed and those that are now awarded in.each of the two appeals filed by them.\n\nK.B.N.\n\n864Su!ICI/72·2S0()-17-4-73-0IPF.", "total_entities": 50, "entities": [{"text": "AND ORS.\n\nCOLLECTOR OF RANCm", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COLLECTOR OF RANCHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 25, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 58, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COLLECTOR OF RANCm January 25, 1972\n\n[K. s. HEGDE, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND K; K. MATHEW, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "K. s. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. Jaganmoltan Reddy", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. MATHEW, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 23 and 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 238, "end_char": 256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "Land Acquision Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 264, "end_char": 288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 839, "end_char": 843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquision Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquision Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1062, "end_char": 1066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquision Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquision Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2448, "end_char": 2457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3311, "end_char": 3327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "aga11moha11 Reddy, /.),209\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated February 25, 1965 of the Patna High Court in First Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3372, "end_char": 3383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte."}}, {"text": "B. P. Rajgarhia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3385, "end_char": 3400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. P. Rajgarhia and U. P. Singh, for the appellants .. (in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3405, "end_char": 3416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. P. Rajgarhia and U. P. Singh, for the appellants .. (in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "D. Gcburdhm1", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3541, "end_char": 3553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Gcburdhm1, for the respondent (in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "P. Jaganmoltan Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3714, "end_char": 3734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nP. Jaganmoltan Reddy, J. These appeals arc by certificate against the judgment of tile Patna High Court in land acquisition appea]s.", "canonical_name": "P. Jaganmoltan Reddy"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3887, "end_char": 3896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3904, "end_char": 3929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ranchi Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4172, "end_char": 4191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 of Ranchi Municipality."}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4194, "end_char": 4203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act 1894"}}, {"text": "7-9-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4260, "end_char": 4268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 6 notification in respect of these lands was published on 7-9-1954\n\nMJd poswsion was taken on 23-9-1954 under section 17(1) after making a declaration under section 17 ( 4) tha•t !"}}, {"text": "23-9-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4296, "end_char": 4305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 6 notification in respect of these lands was published on 7-9-1954\n\nMJd poswsion was taken on 23-9-1954 under section 17(1) after making a declaration under section 17 ( 4) tha•t !"}}, {"text": "section 17(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4312, "end_char": 4325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act 1894"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4359, "end_char": 4369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act 1894"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4630, "end_char": 4640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act 1894"}}, {"text": "Ranchi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4708, "end_char": 4714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, at the instance of 'the claimant, a reference under section 18 of the Act was made to the Judicial Commissioner of Chhota Nagpur, Ranchi who."}}, {"text": "section 23(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4978, "end_char": 4991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5200, "end_char": 5213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "22-9-1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5609, "end_char": 5618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lands in question which have been acquil\"..d were earlier leased on 22-9-1944 to the Military authorities on a rem of Rs'."}}, {"text": "21-9-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5813, "end_char": 5822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which period expired on 21-9-1954."}}, {"text": "Chhota Nagpur Circle", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6198, "end_char": 6218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he conditions of the lease was that on the termination of the lease, the lessor would exercise the option given under the lease to purchase all buildings, structures, gardens and any other strudtures constructed by the lessee during their occupation of the leased property, at 75 per cent of the valuation that would be determined b)< the Superintending Engineer, Chhota Nagpur Circle; and in case the lessors refused to purchase, the lessee was entitled to dismantle and take away the materials."}}, {"text": "Government of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6373, "end_char": 6392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he lease period, the Government of Bihar decided to acquire the property for the State Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen's Board and initiated proceedings as aforesaid."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6646, "end_char": 6655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1-4-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7067, "end_char": 7075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C-1 dated 1-4-1953, was Rs."}}, {"text": "laganmohan.Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8779, "end_char": 8795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as the basis for .amving at the market vue of the acquired tat\n\nTRIBENI DEVI v. COLLECTOR RANCHI (laganmohan."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10006, "end_char": 10011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "President of India and awarded Rs."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10485, "end_char": 10495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chhota Nayr", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10685, "end_char": 10696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the Judicial Commisioncr, Chhota Nayr, was disallowed on the ground (hat there wu an entrance to the back portion of the •land which was left with the t>wners and also because there was no evidence to show that in fact there had been any depreciation in he value of the remaining area anciif sc>, to What exnt: On the othet'hand, it l!laintained the 10% on the lharket, value of the land awlirded by the Land Accririsitiori Court on aecou, nt of' the' inerease in the)."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11982, "end_char": 11991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12856, "end_char": 12868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagunmohan Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14773, "end_char": 14789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. COLLECTOR RANCHI (Jagunmohan Reddy, J.) 213\n\nA lhe claimants."}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15055, "end_char": 15061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "16-12-1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15451, "end_char": 15461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I I which is a sale-deed executed on 16-12-1946 by the claimants the Ranchi Automobiles of an area of 1 biid1a 17 kathas equal to .617 acres for Rs."}}, {"text": "Ranchi Automobiles", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15483, "end_char": 15501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I I which is a sale-deed executed on 16-12-1946 by the claimants the Ranchi Automobiles of an area of 1 biid1a 17 kathas equal to .617 acres for Rs."}}, {"text": "Bunnah Shell", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15982, "end_char": 15994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court rejected this compu!_ation on the ground tha't though the knd was contiguous to the land under acquisition, neither the \\alue of the pump an!l the other strutures belonging to Bunnah Shell nor the D value of the structures that might have been on the land on the date of the sale which were built by the vendees as lcsr.ees could be ascertained either from the sale-deed or the evidne."}}, {"text": "Thakur Chandra Bali Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16257, "end_char": 16281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ex.10 is a lease in respect of 1/3 acre granted by the owners to Thakur Chandra Bali Shah and others executed on 20-2-1950 on a monthly rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "20-2-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16305, "end_char": 16314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ex.10 is a lease in respect of 1/3 acre granted by the owners to Thakur Chandra Bali Shah and others executed on 20-2-1950 on a monthly rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18009, "end_char": 18018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chhotanagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18906, "end_char": 18918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 5% allowed by the Judicial Commissioner, Chhotanagpur is reasonable."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_215_232_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "DEVIDAS VI111ALDAS Ii: CO.\n\nC.I.T., BOMBAY CITY\n\nJanµnry 28, 1972\n\n[S. M. S!KRI, C.J., J, M. SHELAT, H. R. KHANNA AND G. K. MIT'.l'ER, JJ .]\n\nJm:ome-tax-Capital or Re.en\"\" ex1mtdltuoodwill-D•ed of dissolution of partnership reciting \"sale\" of goodwUI In conslUratlon of share in the profits--Payment not related to any lumINum fixed as purcluue price-Duration of payment Indefinite and amount indt!(inite- Payment made by vendee If admissible deduction a.J revenue expendi~.\n\nP and A carried on business as Chartered accountants in the . name of D.V. & Co.. On P retiring from plrtnership a deed 6f dissOlution was executed which provided that the business would be carried on by A.\n\nBy clause 2 of the deed, P, who owned the rights and in!emt in the goodwill, \"agreed to sell\" the goodwill to A and \"as consideration for and in full satisfaction of the purchase price of the goodwill\" A was to y eight annas in the rupee in the net profits of the businoos payable . dunng the life time of P and after him during, the life time 'of his wife and then to their son during his life time. Clause 6 provided that in the event of A entering into pal'tnership or transferring or assigning his busV aell so long as the business was carried . on in the name of D.V. & Co.; the p:irtnership, the assignee or the transferee was to pay the share in the profits in the manner provided in cl. (2). A enla'ed into part:nttship with C, the deed of partnership reciting that the goodwill of the busineoa beloilged solely to P which A had \"bought\" in oonsideration of his agree.\n\nins to pay a share of eight annas in lhe rupee ond that the parties thereto pay fh1' annas four pies share in the profits, by way of purchase price of the goodwill \"\" agreed by P. The firm paid to P's wife, after the death of P, various amounts during the years 1955-59. It clsimed that those amounts should be deducted in its assessmenl9 for . those years.\n\nTho Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commi'8loner rejected the claim holding that the payments were capital and not revenue payments and the tnulsaction evidenced by the deed of dissolution was one . ot outright sale. On appe9l, the Tribunal held that the payments constituted only fee oi' rent for the use of the goodwill so long a.s it was used and accordingly they were in the nature of revenue expenditure.\n\nOn reference the High Court answered in favour of the Revenue.\n\nAllowing th~ appeal,\n\nHELD : (Sikri CJ. Dissenting) On the facts of the ca.so the tranaaotion was a licence and not a sale of the goodwill; the disbursements in question, therefore, were in the nature of royalty and must be treated as admissible deduction. [232 BJ\n\n(i) There is no single test of universal application for deciding the question whether an agreement is for payment of price in stlpufated instalments or folr making annual payment in the nature of income and, therefore, the Court has to look not only into the .document relating to the transaction, but also !he surrounding circumstances to decide its true nature, the nme which the parties give to it being of little C'Onsequence.\n\nSUPKEME COURT REPORTS\n\n( 1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nThis does not mean that the legal character of the transaction which is A 1he !\\()urce of the receipt in question can be ignored and substituted by what the taxing authority considers the substanc~ of the matter. [224 Bl\n\nTravancore Sugars a11d C/Jemicc./s Ltd. vs. C.l.T., (1966) 62 J.T.R. 566, referred to.\n\n(ii) One of the tests courts have applied in distinguishing between capital and revenue expenditure is whether the expenditure in question was for bringing into .existence an asset or an advantage of uan enduring nature'!, and is made \"once and for all\".\n\nIt may be payable not necess.arily '311 at once but even by instalments as against a recurrent expendi- Jure in the nature of operational expenses. The question in such cases\n\nwould be; is the expenditure the assessee's \\\\'orking expenditure laid out 3S part of the process of profit earning or a capital outlay necessary for the acquisition of a property dr rights of permanent character the posse!Sion of which is a condition of carrying on the trade. But the expressions \"enduring benefit'\\ and rights of a permanent character are only descriptive_ and not definitive and are. relative in meaning, not synonymous\n\nwith 'perpetual' ct 'ever1'3.Sting'. The expression \"enduring benefit\" is thus a relative term not enduring in the sense of its being permanent, but is •ufticiently durable depending upon the nature of the tenns upon which it can be acquired.\n\nSo also the the expression \"once and for all\" which does not mean payment at one time of the whole amount but includes payment of a luml\"\"wn, as distinct from recurrent, distributed in periodic instalments. [22 F]\n\nAtherton v. British Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd., 10 T.C. 155; Auam Bengal Cement Co, Ltd. v. CI..T. 27 I.T.R. 34, 46; Robert Addle and Sons' Collieries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 8 T.C. 671;\n\nCommissio11er of Taxes v. Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd.,\n\n(1965) 58 J.T.R. 241; C.l.T. West Bengal v. Coal Shipment (P) Ltd., Civil Appeals Nos. 1494 to 1498 of 1971, decided on Octobel- 14, 1971; C.l.T. v. Finlay Mills, (1951) 20 I.T.R. 475; Henriksen v. Grafton Hotel Ltd.; 24 T.C. 453 and Strick v. Regent Oil Co. Ltd., 43 T.C. I, 38 referred 10.\n\nThe other test sometimes '3.pplied, is payment when it is refeli:able 'o fixed capita] or capital assets as against payment eferrable to circulating capital or stock-in-trade. This test also is not capable of being treated as of unifonn application. [226 Fl\n\nAssam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v. C.I.T., 27 J.T.R., 34, 46, referred to.\n\n(iii) Acquisition of the goodwill of a business is, without doubt acqui~\n\nition of a capital asset, and therefore, its purcP:Jse price v•ould be capital expenditure.\n\nIt \\J.'ould not make any difference whether it is paid in a !ump-sum at one time or in instalments distributed over a specific period.\n\nWhere, however, the transaction is n\"t one for acquisition of the goodwill but, for the right to use it. the expenditure \\vould be a revenue expenditure. [226 HJ\n\nJn Re Ramjidas Jai11i & Co., (1945) J.T.R. 430; Kuppwwami Y.\n\nI C.l.T. (1954) 25 I.T.R. 349; .Ogde11 v. Medway Cinemas Ltd., 18 T.C. 691;\n\nThe Secretary of State for India v. Scoble, [1903], A.C. 299; Jones v. Com- 1nissioner of Inland Reienue, 7 T.C. 310; Conzmissioner of Inland. Revenue\n\nv. Ramsay, 20 T.C. 79; Vithaldas Thake.rdas and Co. v. C.1.T., (1946] l.T.R. 822 an<! Trava11core Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. v. C.l.T., (1966)\n\n~2 l.T.R. 566, referred to.\n\nDEVIDAS & CO. I', C.I.T. 217\n\n(iv) In the present case even though Cl. (2) of the deed of dissolu tion uses expressions such \"lS \"agreed to sell\" and ''the purchase price of the goodwill,\" these expressions are not determinative of the exact nature oi the transaction or the relationship between the parties arising therefrom.\n\nClause (2), no doubt, prescribes the mode and the quantum of payment.\n\nBut, the duration of payment is indefinite and secondly the amount is indefinite depending upon the rise nd fall in the profits of the business. The payment is not related to any lumpsum fixed as the purchase price. But on the contrary it is direqly related to and dependent upon whether at all and \\\\'hat profits are made.\n\nFurther, the document is totally silent as to what is to hppen to the goodwill if A, or his partners, if he were to enter into a partnership, cease to carry on the business in the name of D.V. & Co.\n\nThe transaction thus contains all the grounds given in the case of 'f'ravancore Sugars and Chentir11ls Ltd., upon which this Court concluded' that such p'1yments could not be treated as capital disbursement, namely, an indefinite period, absence of any expressed lumpsum and payment relating to profits and not being tied up with any fixed sum agree<l to as the purchase price_ of the capital mets, [230 F-H; 232 Bl\n\nTrava11<ore Sugars and C/lemirnls Ltd. v. C.I.T. (1966) 62 J. T. R. 566 applied.\n\n(v) Quite ·part, Cl (6) itself contains indication of the transaction n_O! being an outright purchase of the goodwill. If the transaction was an outright purchase of goodwill there was no neces.sity of Ct (6) provid ing for the partnership which A would enter into or his assignee or transferee having to pay the share. so Jong as he or they continued to carry on business in that name. (231 BJ\n\nPer Sikri, C.J. dissenting.\n\n(i) Clause (2) of the dissolution deed says what it meant to cbnvey, that is, there is an agreement to sell and sale of the goodwill of the p*1nership.\n\nThe words \"as. consideration for and in full satisfaction of the purchase price of the goodwill\" cannot be tered down by any of 1he subsequent clauses.\n\nFurhcr, the deed executed by A and C also recited that A had \"bought\" 'the goodwill in consideration of his agreeing 10 pay a share of the profits.\n\nIt is difficult to go against the express F wording of the deed when there j.., no clear clause overriding these wdrdS. , f216EJ ·\n\n(ii) A mo<lc of payment of purch-:isc price of any capital asset cannot convert a c'apit:il payment into a revenue payment in the hands of the vendec, It may be 1hat the mode of payment may affect the character of the receipt in the hands of the vendor. [218 H]\n\n(iii) The grounds adopted by this Court in Travancore Sugars c.-nd Chen1icals Ltd. cannot be ri:gardc<l a'i conclusive in a case \\.\\'here there can he no doubt that the capital asset ha< been sold. [219 BC]\n\nThe abcncc of a clause providing what is to hppen if the vendee of too .soodwrll , ceases to carry on the h•sincss further reinforces the con clus1on hat 1t was -an out and out sale.\n\nThi'i clause was not inserted\n\n~c; ausc 1t would be out of place in a case of sale. [219 DJ\n\n(v) C!ausc f6) does not have any bearing on the question under consrdcrat1on.\n\nThrs clause has been inserted in order to safeguard the rnter_est of the vendor who was keen to see that he would get ns much \"' possible for the sale of the goodwill. [219 Fl\n\nTherefore, on the facts, the goodwill was an asset of an endW'ing A nature. The fact that payment was to be made over a number ot yO'.U'S and the nature of a chartered accountant's business lead to this condusion. [219 FJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1452 to 1455 of 1968. ·\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated February 25, 1967 of the Bombay High Court in Income Tax Reference No. 49 of 1962.\n\n M. C. Chagla, Bhuva11t'Sh Kumari, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C.\n\nMathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant (in all the appeals).\n\nN. D. Karkhanis, R. N. Sachthey and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent (in all the appeals).\n\n SIKRI C.J. delivered a dissenting opinion. The Judgment of SHELAT, KHANNA and MITTER~ JJ.-was delivered by SHELAT, J.\n\nSikri, C.J., I have read the draft of the judgment prepared D by Shelat J ., but I regret I am unable to agree with his conclusions.\n\nHe has set out all the relevant facts and the relevant documents .and it is not necessary for me to burden my judgment with them.\n\nIt seems to me that there is 110 dif)iculty in interpreting clause 2 of the dissolution deed. It says what it meant to convey, that is, E there is an agreement to sell and sale of the goodwill of the partnership which belonged to Padamsi alone to Amratlal. It is dillicult to water down the words \"As consideration for and fn full sat.isfaction of the purchase price of the goodwill\" by any of the subsequent clauses.\n\nReliance is placed on the deed dated October 18,\n\n1955, F executed by Amratlal ancf1 one Chandrakant V. Parikh. This deed also recited that \"the goodwill of the said business belonged solely to the said Padamsi which he, the said Amratlal, had 'bought' in consideration of his agreeing to pay a share of eight annas in the rupee to Padamsi\".\n\nI find it again difficult to go against the express wording of the deed when there is no clear G clause overriding those words.\n\nI am not averse to discovering the substance of a transaction but there is a limit to the extent I can disregard the language in a commercial document. Reliance is placed on clause 5 of this deed. I am unable to say that this clause has the effect of converting a sale into a licence.\n\nIt is argued that the mode of payment of the purchase price shows that it was not a purchase. I am unable to see how a mode of H payment of purchase price of any capital asset can convert a capital payment into a revenue payment in the hands of the vendee.\n\nDEV!DAS & CO. v. C.l.T. (She/at, J,). '!j; ~/'.\n\nIt may be that the mode of payment may affect the character of the receipt in the hands of the vendor but as far as the vendee is concerned, I am unable to agree that the mode of payment can convert what is obviously a capital payment or expenditure into a revenue payment or expenditure.\n\nReliance was placed on the three grounds adopted by this Court in Travancore Sugars &: Chemicals Ltd. v. C.I.T.( 1) viz., indefinite period, absence of any expressed Jump sum, and payment relating to profits and not being tied up witli any fixed sum agreed to as the purchase price of a capital asset. I am unable to regard these grounds as coaclusive in a case where there can be no doubt that the capital asset has been sold. If A sells his house to a company for its office and stipulates that in full satisfaction of the purchase price he will. receive annual payments relating to profits without stipulating for a fixed sum, 1 doubt if anybody will argue that the company can peduct the annual payments as revenue expenditure.\n\nThe fact that it is a sale of a capital asset like goodwill does not make any diffc:rence.\n\nIt was urged that it is not really an out and out sale of goodwill because there is no clause providing what is to happen if the vendee of the goodwill ceases to carry on the business.\n\nTo my mind. the absence of such a clause further reinforces the conclu- . sion ihat it was an out and out sale. This clause was not inserted because it would be out of place in a case of sale,\n\nReliance was hlso placed on clause 6 which has been set out in detail in the judgment of Shelat J. In my view, this does not have any bearing on the question under consideration. It seems to me that this clause has been inserted in the deed in order to safeguard the interest of the vendor, who was keen to see that he would get as much as possible for the sale of the goodwill. On the facts I am also of the opinion that the goodwill was an asset of an enduring nature.\n\nThe very fact that payment was to be made over a number of years and. the nature.. of a chartered accountant's business lead to this conclusion.\n\nIn my view, it is a very ingenious attempt to avoid payment of tax by making it appear somehow that the payment of purchase money may be treated as payment of a royalty. In the view I take of the deed it is not necessary to discuss the numerous cases referred to by Shelat J.\n\nIn my opinion, the High Court came to the correct conclusion and the appeals should be dismissed with costs.\n\nSltelat, J.\n\nPrior to November 1948, one Padamsi Haridas carried on his profession as a chartered accountant in the name\n\n(I) [1966] 62 1.T.R. 566.\n\nSUPREME COURT RF.PORTS\n\n[1972) 3 S.C.R.\n\nof Devidas Vithaldas and C.o.\n\nBy a deed of. partnership, dated November 30, 1948, he took one Amratlal Parikh as a partner, reserving, however, to himself ail the rights and interests in the goodwill of that business.\n\nOn January 2, 1951, he retired from the said partnership.\n\nCl. ( 1) of the Deed of Dissolution executed on that occasion provided that the said partnership shall be deemed to have been dissolved as from December 31, 1950, but .the business shall, as from that date, be carried on in the said name by the said Amratlal alone.\n\nCl. (2) of the said deed ran as follows :\n\n\"2. The goodwill of the late partnership belonged to the said Padarnsi alone. He has agreed to sell the same to the said Arnratlal.\n\nAs consideration for and in full satisfaction of the purchase price of the goodwill. of the said late partnership the said Amratlal shall-\n\n( a) pay to the said Padamsi for -and during the terms of his natural life a share of eight annas in the rupee in the net profits of the said business or profession which the said Amratlal shall hereafter carry on in the said name of Devida~ Vithaldas & Co.,\n\n(b) on and after the death of the said Padarnsi, pay t~\n\nBai Premlata, the wife of the said Padamsi, (if she be then surviving), for ; md during the term of her natural life a share of eight annas in the rupee in the :net profits of the said business or profess10n which the said Amratlal shall hereafter carry on in the name of Devidas VithaJdas & Co., and\n\n( c) on and after the death of the said Padamsi as well as his said wife Bai Prem!ata, pay to Subhas the son of the said Padamsi for and during the term of his natural life a share of eight an:nas in the rupee in the net profits of the said business or profession which the said Amratlal shall hereafter carry on in the name of Devidas Vithaldas & Co.\" Q. ( 3) provided that nothing contained in the deed shall constitute or be deemed to constitute any future partnership between the parties to the deed or. between the said Amratlal and the said Bai Prem!ata, or the said Subhas in respect of the business to be carried on by Amratlal in the name of Devidas Vithaldas & Co.\n\nCl. ( 4) declared that accounts had been made up between the pa.'1ies, and 'that neither party had any claim against the other except as provided in said clause (2). By cl. (5) it was made clear that the said Amratlal shall henceforth remain liable for all\n\nB \\,\n\nDEV!DAS & CO. v. C.I.T. (She/at, /.) 221\n\nthe obligations a:nd liabilities. which might be incurred in rest of the said business to be carried on in the name of Devidas Vithaldas & Co., and he shall accordingly indemnify the said Padamsi against all actions, claims, demands, costs, charges and expenses whatsoever in respect of the same or in any other manner relating to the premises.\n\nLastly, cl. ( 6) provided that in the event of Amratlal transferring or assigning his said business to\n\nany person or persons, or carrying on the said business in partnership with some other person or persons, or remaining otherwise interested or concerned directly or indirectly in the business or profession of chartered accountants by whomsoever carried on in the name of Devidas Vithaldas & Co., or any other name resembling or similar thereto, or in the event of any of the heirs or legal representatives or nominees of Amratlal carrying on the said business or profession in the name of Devidas Vithaldas & Co., then in any such, events they and \"so long as any such business be carried on in the name style and firm of Devidas Vithaldas & Co. or any other name resembling or similar thereto, the assignees of the said Amratlal and/or the said Amratlal and/or any such other person or persons as aforesaid carrying on such business under the. :name style and firm of Devidas Vithaldas & Co. shaJl as aforesaid pay to the said Padamsi or his said wife Bai Premlata or his said son Subhas for and during the terms of their respec\" tive lives the said eight annas share in the rupee in the net profits\n\nof any such business as is hereinbefore directed to be paid by the said Amratlal under clause 2 hereof--\". The clause next provided that \"the said Amratlal shaJl not assign or transfer or otherwise dispose of the said business or the goodwill thereof or bequeat]j the same to any person whomsoever nor enter into any partnership or other arrangement with any other person or persons for carrying on the said business in the said name-except with a condition that the provisions of this Agreement shall be accepted by such person or persons or his legatees or successors or legal representatives, and with a further condition that any such person or persons or successors or legatees or legal representatives shall forthwith after being interested in any such business and whenever required by the said Padamsi or by his wife Bai Prcmlata or his said son Subhas, as the case may be, enter into an agreement with any of the last three named persons, as the case may be, similar to this agreement\".\n\nBy his letter dated October 13, 1955, Padamsi agreed to reduce the said share of eight annas in a rupee to five annas four pies.\n\nH Amratlal carried on the said business in the name of Devidas Vithaldas & Co. as the sole pr0prictor thereof till October 17,\n\n1955. Payments made by him during this period under els. (2) and ( 6) of the said deed of dissolution were added back in his\n\nassessments as capital payments. On October 18, 1955, he entered into partnership with one Chandrakant V. Parikh. The deed of partnership executed then by him and the said Chandrakant Parikh recited that the said Amratlal till then was carrying on the business in the name of Devidas Vithaldas & Co., that the goodwill of the said business belonged solely to the said Padam!i which he, the said Amratlal, had \"bought\" in consideration of his ; igreeing to pay a share of eight annas in the rupee to Padamsi, and after him his wife and then his son as aforesaid.\n\nCl. ( 5) of the deed then provided :\n\n\"The parties hereto shall pay 0/5/4 share in profits in a rupee as and by way of purchase price of goodwill of the said firm to the said Shri Padamsi Haridas or to his wife or to his son as stated in detail hereinbefore, instead of Re. 0/810 share in a rupee as agreed by the party of the First Part and Shri Padamsi Haridas. The said Shri Padamsi Haridas has agreed to this reduction in his share mutually with Shri Amratlal Kashandas Parikh and Shri Chandrakant V.\n\nParikh. After the said sh ate of 0/ 5 / 4 in a rupee is paid up as stated above the balance of the profit and loss of the firm shall be divided in two equal proportions between the parties of the First and the Second Part.\"\n\nThe firin constituted under this deed paid to Bai Prcmlata on ;1nd after the death of Padmsi various amounts during the years 1955-1959 under the said covenants.\n\nThe firm claimed that those amounts should be deducted in its assessments for those years on the ground that its income to the extent of those payments had been diverted as a result of the overriding title created by cl. ( 5) of the said ded of partnership.\n\nAssessments for the relevant years showed that the amounts paid to Bai Premlata were assessed as income in her assessments. so that, if he deductions claimed by the firm were not admitted the same amounts would be assessed twice over, first in the hm:ids of Bai Premlata and then in the assessments of the firm.\n\nThe Income Tax Officer, and in appeal the A.A.C., re_jected 1hc claim for deduction.< holding that the said payments were capital and not revenue payments, and that the transaction evidenced bv the said deed of dissolution was one of outright sale of the goodwill and the payments made thereunder were part of the purchase price.\n\nOn an appeal to the Tribunal, the Tribunal rejected the contention of the Revenue that the transaction was a sale of the goodwill in terms following :\n\n\"ft is no doubt true that clause 2 of the agreement refers to sale of goodwill and the agreed payments as\n\nDEVIDAS & CO. v. C.I.T. (She/at, J,) 223\n\nconstituting full satisfaction of the purchase consideration. If the payments are stopped, it is not stated that there will be any right of action for any definite quantified and liquidated amount. It would mean that with the stoppage of payments the assessee will only lose the right to its contact with the clientele and opportunity to earn profits thereafter.\n\nThese considerations only go to show that in the peculiar circumstances of the case the agreement is virtually a licence granted for user of the goodwill upon payment of one-third of the net profits derived for such user -·-.\" c In this view the Tribunal held that the payments constituted only a fee or rent for the use of the goodwill so long as it was used and accordingly they were in the nature of revenue expenditure.\n\nOn a reference to the High Court, the High Court held that :\n\n\"On the face of the document, therefore, we cannot accept the contention that it was a document merely granting a licence to use the goodwill or a mere transfer of the right of user thereof.\n\nIt was an outright sale of an asset of Devidas Vitha!das & Co. namely the goodwill which till then belonged to Padamsi and in which he had reserved his exclusive right at the time when he enteRd into partnership with Amratlal.\"\n\nIn this view, the High Court answered the questions referred to it in fa'f'Olll' of the\"Revenue.\n\nIt was true, the High Court observed, that.the Revenue had in the assessments of Bai Pren!lata taken the \\'iew tht \"Padamsi had not sold his right, title and i.nterest_in\n\nthe J!O(ld1rill and merely allowed the use of it for a number of years F and siiice the payment was for the user of the goodwill, lt could clMY be a revenue receipt in the hands of the assessee\". But it added that '!this was an incorrect view to take upon the faotsl!nd circumstallces that have been placed before us in the present case and upllll clhe terms of the document dated 2nd January 1951.\n\nTM ordei clearly shows that the document dated 2nd January,\n\n1951 was misconstrued\". It is against this view that these appeals G have been filed.\n\nThe question upon which they must tum is as to whether the payments in question made in pursuance of the transaction iru:orporated in the deed, dated January 2, 1951, were in the nature of ttvenue or capital expenditure.\n\nIf they are of the fom1er type, tblly woull obviously be admissible deductions under s. 10(2) of H the Income Tax Act, 1922.\n\nThat question, in its tum, depends upon the true nature of the transaction as embodied in the said deed, that is, whether it was a sale of goodwill or a licence in 2-LS87SuJICJ/12\n\nconsideration of Amratlal and/ or his assignees or transferees paying the aforesaid share until he or they used the said name.\n\nAs has been observed in a number of decisions, it is not always easy to distinguish whether an agreement is for the pay ment of price in stipulated instalments or for making annual pay ments in the nature of income, that there is no single test of universal application for a solution of the question, and that therefore, the Court has to look not only into the document relating to the transaction, but also the surrounding circumstances to decide its true nature, the name which the parties give to it being of little consequence.\n\nThis, of-course, does not mean that the legal character of the transaction which is the source of the re ceipt in question can be ignored and substituted by what the Taxing Authority considers the substance of the matter. The assessing authority is undoubtedly entitled and is, indeed, bound to determine the true legal relationship resulting from a transaction.\n\nIf the parties have chosen to conceal, by a device, the true legal relation, it is open to it to unravel such device and to ascertain the true nature of the relationship. If the transaction is embodied in a document, the liability to tax depends upon the meaning and content of the language used in it in accordance with the ordinary rules of construction. (1)\n\nIn distinguishing between capital and revenue expenditure, the courts have applied in different cases different tests.\n\nNonetheless, it i[ recognised that none of them by itself is conclusive, and the determination one way or the other has to be made on the facts and circumstances of each case.\n\nOne of the tests so applied is whether the expenditure in question was for bringing into existence. an asset or an advantage of \"an enduring nature\". (2 ) and is made \"once and for all\", meaning thereby an expenditure made once and for all for procuring an enduring benefit. It may be payable not necessarily all at once but even bv instalments as a11.ainst a recurren! expenditure in the nature of nnerational exoenses. (See A •.vam Ben11a/ Cement Co. Ltd. v. ClT( 8 ). The question in such cases would be, is the expenditure the assessee's workin11: exoenses laid out as oart\n\nof the process of profit earnin2 or a caoital outlav nece•sarv for the acauisition of a nrooerty or of rfoh•s of a oermanent character, the possession of which is a condition of carrvine on the trade.(') But the expressions, 'enduring: benefi!'. and 'rihts of a permanent\n\n(1) C.l. T. v. Kharwar, [1969] 721.T.R. 603 (2) Arherlion v l?riti.rh Tnsufated Nnd Helsby Cables Ltd, 10 TC 155\n\n(3)27TTR 34, 46\n\n(4) Robert Addle and Sons, Coll/ieres Ltd., v. Con1missioners of Tnland Revenue, 8 TC 671.\n\nDEVIDAS & co. v. C.J.T. (Shelat, J.) 225\n\nllll:ture', are ouly descriotive aud not definitive and are relative iu meaning, not synonymous with perpetual or everlasting.\n\nFor instance, an expenditure incurred in common with other com pauies producing copper to bring down production so as to prevent a steep fall in the prices was construed to mean for one of them to be out of production for J 2 months only and not for good.\n\nOn such construction, it was held that to call such an expenditure a capital expenditure would be contradiction in terms, for, it was not and was not intended to one for acquiring a right of an enduring benefit or as an accretion to the capital or income earni1u1; structure of 1h.~· business.(') CJ.T., West Bengal v. Coal Shipment (P) Ltd.,(') an agreement was arrived at between two companies exporting coal to Burma.\n\nThe assessee company agreed thereunder to pay, in considera!ion of the other company prebearing f om exportin~ and procuring coal for its export by the asses5ee company, five annas per ton (subsequently raised to Rs. 1-5-0 per ton).\n\nThe amounts so paid to the other company were taxed in the hands of that company.\n\nThe respondent-company claimed them as admissible business expenditure for the assessment years in question.\n\nThe Revenue, on the other hand, claimed that the payments were for acquiring monopoly and were therefore not allowable as revenue expenditure.\n\nThis Court upheld !he assessee's contention that the expenditures were not for acquiring the monopoly, but were made to make the business more facile and profitable, that they were made as a temporacy measure and not for deriving an advance of an endurinr, character.\n\nObserving that the agreement between the two companies was not for any fixed term and could be terminated at any time at the volition of any of the parties, it was held that\n\nalthough an enduring benefit need not be of an everlasting character, it should not at the same time be transitory or ephemeral. w that it can be terminated at any time at the volitior of either of 'lhe parties. . Payments to ward off competition would constitute capital expenditure, provided the objection is to derive an advanta2e by eliminatin11 the comoetition over some length of time but such a result would not follow if there is no certainty of duration [or such an advantage and the same could be put an end to at any time.\n\nThus, what the extent of durability or permanence should be depends on the facts of each case.\n\nPayments maqe by a lessee of a limestone quarry to thr. Government, who were 'the lessors, in con•ideration of a covenant which eliminated competition in the lessee's field of operations for twenty years, which was the lease period. were held to be capital expenditure for acquiring an enduring benefit to the\n\n(I) Com1nl.uim1ers : of Taxe.1 v, Ncha11g\" Co,,.tolldated Cop11tr 1'.fi11c.1' Ltd .. [19651 ~8 l.T.R. 241.\n\n(2) Civil Appeals Nr.s. 149410 1498 10 1971, dccrt.•n Ociobcr. 14. 1971..\n\n226 SUPllEME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1972) 3 S.C.R.\n\nlessee. ( 1) On the other hand, registration of trade-!lllib under the Trade Marks Act, 1940, valid for a period of - years only, on the expiry of which it had to be renewed 9y paying. fresh fees, was held not to bring any enduring benefit, and therefore, the fees paid for registration were not capital but reven11e\n\nexpenditure.(') Registration is only a mode of ellSllTin& the exclusive right in a trademark, and not the acquisition of the trade-mark itself, which would be an acquisition of a capital asset. Such a distinction was made in a case where expenditure was for the renewal of a licence, which was held to be a payment made as purchase price of a monopoly for the duration of the licence, which was only for twelve months.\n\nThe 1thing that was paid for, it was said, was a permanent quality, that is, the monopoly, although its permanence being conditioned by the renewal of the terms under which the licence was granted was shortlivcd.\n\nSuch an expenditure was treated as of that class to which a preriiium on the grant of a lease belong which admittedly is not deductible,\n\n(see Henriksen v. Grafton Hotel Ltd.(8 ) In Strick v. Regent Oil Co. Ltd. (') Lord Reid, however, limited the decision in Henriksen' s C41'e (') to its own special facts and expressed his disagreemem with it if it was to be held to have laid down any general proposition.\n\nThe expression 'enduring advantage' is, thus a relative term, not endurin11: in the sense of its being permanent, but is sufficiently durable depending upon the nature of the terms\n\nupon which it can be acquired. So also the expression •once and for all', which does not mean 'payment at one time of the whole am011Dt, but includes payment of a lump swn, as distict from recurrent, distributed in periodic instalments.\n\nThe other test sometimes applied is payment when it is referable to fixed c_apital or capital assets as against paymen! referab1e to circulating capital or stock-in-trade.\n\nBut this test also is not capable ol. being treated as of uniform application. Price pald for the acquisition of a capital asset may take sometimes the form of payments of a revenue character. The slmpliest example is interest paid on the unpaid purchase price of capital asset. Though in relation to and referable to acquisition of a capital asset, it is nonetheless a revenue disbursement. On the other band, in Assam Bengal Cement Co. v. C.l.T.( 1) where the paynwnt in question was for elimina!ing competition, the test of the expenditure having been incurred for and referable to a capital uaet was aJJPlicd.\n\nAcquisition of the goodwill. of the business is, without doubt, acquisition of a capital asset, and therefore, its purchase price H\n\n(I) 27 I.T.R. 34, 46.\n\n(2) CIT v Finlay Mil/1, [19, J] 20 I, T, R, 47'.\n\n(3) 24 TC 453\n\n(4) 43 TC I, 38\n\nDEVIDAS & CO. v. C, I.T. (Shet, J.) 227\n\nwould be capital expenditure. It would not make any difference whether it is paid in a Jump sum at one time or in instalments distributed over a definite period. (see In Re Ramjidas Jain & Co.(') and Kuppuswami v. C.I.T.( 2 ) . Where, however, the transaction is not for acquisition of the goodwill, but for the right to use it, the expenditure would be revenue expenditure.\n\nIIIustra!ive of such cases is the one in Ogden v. Medway Cinemas Ltd.,(8 ) where the respondent-company acquired by assignment the rights of the assignor under an underlease, by which he became the lessee of the cinema hall, together with the fixtures, fittings and furniture, at a yearly rent.\n\nThere was also a supplemental deed by which he was granted the goodwill of the cinema business on payment of £ 5001per annum.\n\nThe supplemental deed was to run concurrently with the underlease, that is for 13 years, and was to cease if the underlease was terminated. The deed also contained an option for the purchase of the head lease and the goodwill for £. 3,500/. The payment of\n\n£ 500/ • per annum under the supplemental deed was held to be admiWble deduction.\n\nAt page 695 of the report, Finlay, ]., pointed out that though the deed used the expression 'grant of 1'; oodwill for a period' there was no sum mentioned as being the\n\npayment for that, followed by dis!ribution of that sum in instal ments, \"but the thing is eXJ>ressed to be for a payment of £ 500 per annum\" without reference to any lump sum followed by a splitting up into annual payments. \"The substance of the matter here seems to me to be this-and I think it is supported by the actual language used, in particular by the expression provision contained later for the purchase in certaiq circumstances of the goodwill-that this is a revenue payment for the use during .a certain period of certain valuable things and rights.\" As Lord Halsbury put it in a case where a lump sum was expressly provided for but was payable by instalments, there is an aRteceqent debt and the instalments are paid in liquidation of that debt. (see The Secretary of State for India v. Scoble.(')\n\n' ' Another _case, illustrative of such a test, is in Jones v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue,(') where there was a sale of property for a lump sum of £, 750, £. 300 out of which were payable by three equal instalments, and the balance of £. 450 payable by a .royalty. The whole of £. 750 was treated as a capital sum, but there was a fur!her clause \"to pay by way of additio.nal consideration a further clause of 10% upon the invoice price of all machines constructed under 'the said inventions and sold during the period of ten years.\" In respect ol this latter\n\n(I) [194SJ!TR 430,\n\n(2) [1954)25ITR349\n\n(3) 18 TC 691.\n\n(4) [1903] AC 299.\n\n(S) 7 TC 310.\n\n228 SUPRB1>¥! COURT RllPO&TS\n\n(1912] 3 S.C.L\n\nsllll!, it was .held that since it wa's dependent on the volume of\n\n_busmes~, which rose and fell with the chances of' the business, It was mcome and not capital, although it was actually referable to the purchase price.\n\nIn Commissioners of Inland Revenue v.\n\nRmsay,(') the assessee purchased a dental practice for a primary\n\nP.nce of £. 15,000. That was to be satisfie<j firstby an immediate payment of £. 5,000 and as to the 'Wtlance of £. 10,000\n\nby payment each year, for ten years, of a silni equivalent ro 25% of the net profits of the practice for each year: Such annual payment obviously mie:ht vaiy from time !o time depending u11oi1 the quantum of business and the profits, Nerthelcss Ille price\n\nof £. 15,000 was not otiose, nor me balarice of £. 10,000 after the initial payment of £. 5,000. The only thing that was stipulated by the parties was that the vendor was satisfied with receiY C }ng 25% of the net profits\"Mth year forthe'periooof :rears, evert If the actual payment tiltned out on the whole to be more :or\n\nless than £ 15,000.\n\nA~ Looi. Wright' id, the \"1igure. of £. 15,000 \"pennea)es\"ihe whole of lthe contract lind> upon• which the wh\\, le colrtract clepel)ds. 'That being 'so, , I think'tha! lhe\n\n£'. 886 iri queS'!ion (one of the sums e'quivalent to'?5%ll'lf • .ttie net profits) 'l'.'as a 'Sum in the nature 'of capi:lll, and' therete, it\n\nwit~ not competent for the Responde11t' t<> deduct it in returning.\n\nhill', ttit~J income\". That the-sunt<of £!'15;-000 ·\"'35 'the lamp.\n\nsuni .Piirchase prici.l was also, made'dear by Ldtd 'Greeile when He said iliat a payment !es~ than thatnmount could be made on~ if clause t 4) of that agreement came into operation, :that is;· if thil' asse9See c0ntinued his practice for the whole cl the 'J>Criod. of ten years: If he were to cease to practise, say af!er seven years. be would b& liable tel pay the whole of the balance of £,, 15,000 then' remaining due. . The transaction was t!Jus viewed as a purchase of the business tor a fixed amount, payable in ten years by iUlnual instalments, which bly the mode of payment, agreed to between the parties, might at the end tum out to be more. or less than the agreed purchase price of £. 15,000. Unlike Ramsay's case,(!) .in Vithaldas Thakordas' and Co. v.\n\nC.l.T.,(1) there was no fixed lump sum, nor a definite period during which payments were to be made.\n\nOne Vithaldas Thakordas, who durinl? his life-time carried on bullion business in the name of Vithaldas Thakordas & Co., died in 1930 .leavin11: him surviving\n\nhis widow Bai Tarabai. Under an arranment made by the\n\nsaid Tarabai, first with five and later on with four persons, the name of .Vithaldas Thakordas & Co. was used by those p1rsons carrvlnl!: on their own business in partnership. The partnerihip deed provided that 'in consideration of . Bai Tarabai \"h•ving agreed to 8.llow the 1'ftr!nership to use the name of Vilbllldas.\n\nThakordas & Co. for the purposes of partnership\", the. pa$er- • ship would pay out of the net profits an amount equivalent to .\n\n(I) 20 TC 79\n\n(2) [1946] !TR 822.\n\nDEV.IDAS & co. v. c.1.T. (She/at; J.) 2 29\n\ntwo aimas in the rupee of the net profits.\n\nIt also provided 1that after payment of the said ainount out of the net profits, the balance of neit profits would be divided ainongst the partners according to their respective shares.\n\nNo term was fixed for the duration of the use of the goodwill.\n\nEvidently, the right to use the naine would cease when the partnership ceased to pay the\n\nainount of t.wo annas in the rupee in the partnership's net profits.\n\nOn a question whether the payment was an admissible deductim:, the High Court of Bombay, relying on Ogden v. Medway Cinemas\n\nLtd.(') helg that the payment was a revenue expenditure, the transaction between the partnership and the said Bai Tarabai being not a purchase of the capital asset. It is true that the words used in the document were such as one would find in a document of a licence.\n\nBut, as already stated, it is not form but the substance of the transaction that matters.\n\nBesides, he decision did not rest on those words but on what truly the nature of the transaction was am;! the analogy it bore with that in Ogden v.\n\nMedway Cinem'as Ltd. (1)\n\nA case of a similar nature is also to be found in Trarancore Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. v.\n\nC.l.T.(2 ). There the assesseecompany was floated to tilke over the assets of three undertakings run by Travancore Government, a sugar manufacturing concern, a distillery and a tincture factory.\n\nThe first was to be purchased for Rs. 3.25 Jacs, the second on a joint valuation of Jlllrties, and the third on the book value of the assets Cl. (7) of the agreement provided that apart from the cash consideration the Government would be entitled to 20% of the annual net profits subject to a maximum of Rs. 40,000 after providing for depreciation and\n\nthe remunenition payable to the company's treasurers and secretaries.\n\nThe question was whether a sum of Rs. 42,480 pald in the previous year in question was a capital or a revenue expenditure. Reversing the High Court's judgment, which held it to be a capital disbursement, this Court held that it was a revenue expenditure and gave for its decision three reasons, namely, (a) that the payment was for an indefinite period, (b) that it , was related to annual profits which flowed from the trading activities and had no relation to the capital value of tho~ assets, and ( c) that the payment was not related to, nor tied in any way to any fixed sum agreed between the t>arties as part of the purchase price of the three undertakings.\n\nThese were also the three considerations applied bv Lord Greene, M. R. in Commissioners of I11la11d Revenue v. 36/49 Holdings Ltd.(8) The ques!ion whether the disbursements in question µarfake the character of one or the other mainly deoends upon the construction of ithe document of January 2, 1951 and the true nature\n\n(1)18TC 691\n\n(2) (1966) 62 IT R 566,\n\n(3) 25 TC 173, 183\n\nof the transaction embodied tllerein.\n\nCl. (2) of the document, no doubt, uses expressions, such as \"agreed to sell\" and \"the purchase price of the goodwill\". These expressions, however, are, as repel!_tedly stated in a number of cases, not determinative of the exact na!ure of the transaction or the relationship between the parties arising therefrom.\n\nThough cl. ( 2) uses expressions which on a superficial view might appear to indicate a sale of the goodwill, neither that nor any other clause mentions what its purchase price was.\n\nThe document is not one of those where the price is expressed at a lump sum, and is made payable by specific instalments within a specified period.\n\nIn some cases, it may even be possible that parties might agree to a Jump sum as the price and yet, as in Ramsay's case, ( 1) agree that such sum should be payable out of the profits at a certain percentage, where the purchaser is not in a position to pay ilie price at a time or even by instalments, except at a particular rate from out of the profits of the business taken over by him.\n\nBu! in such a case the payment, even if out of the profits, is tied up with a lump sum, that is, with the purchase price agreed to between the parties and which assumes the character of a fixed debt. Cl. ( 2) clearly does\n\nnot fix such a price nor mention a Jump sum in respect of which annual payments as provided therein are to be made.\n\nThe cla!!se, no doubt, prescribes ilie mode and the quantum of the payment, that is, a share of five annas four pies in the rupee in the net profits of the business, payable during the life time of Padamsi and after him during the. lifetime of his wife Bai Premla!a if she were to survive him, and then to their son during his lifetime.\n\nTwo things, however, may at. once be ob served, firstly, that ithe duration of payment is indefinite, unlike Ramsay's case (') and secondly the amount is indefinite, depending as it does upon the rise and fall in ilie profits of the business.\n\nObviously, the payment is not related ito any Jump sum fixed as the purchase price. On die contrary, it is directly related to and dependent upon whether at all and what profits are made.\n\nFurther, the document is totally silent as to what is to hppen to the goodwill if Amratlal Parikh or his partners, if he were to enter into a partnership, cease to carry on the business in the name of Devidas Vithaldas & Co. or at all. I! is silent as to wheilier the\n\ngoowill would remain with him and/ or his partners, or whether it would revert to Padamsi or his heirs. The iransaction thus contains all the grounds given in the case of Travancore Sugars and Chemicals Ltd.(') upon which ithis Court concluded there that such payments could not be treated as capital disbursements, namely, an indefinite period, absence of any expressed lump sum, and payment relating to profits and not being tied up with any fixed sum agreed to as the purchase price of a capital asset.\n\n(I) 20 TC 79.\n\n(2) 62!. T.R. S66.\n\nDEVIDAS & CO. V. C.I.T. (She/at, /,) 231\n\nA Quite apart from these considerations, cl. (6) itself containll indications of the transaction not being an outright purchase of the goodwill. It will be recalled that that clause provides that in the event of Amratlal transferring or assigning his business to any one else or entering into partnership or otherwise remaining interested in the said business, by whomsoever carried on in the name of Devidas Vi'lhaldas & Co., then in any such events and \"so long as any such business be carried on in the name, style and fum of Devidas Vithaldas & Co. or any other name resembling or\n\nsimilar thereto\", the assignees of Amratlal and/ or any such otherperson or persons as aforesaid, carrying on the business in the said\n\nc name, shall pay the said share in the profits to Padamsi, fter him to his widow and after her to his son. The clause thus indicates that the payment is to be made so long as the business is carried\n\non in the name of Devidas Vithaldas & Co. and not otherwise. The clause further provides that the said Amratlal shall not assign or transfer or otherwise dispose of the said business or the goodwill thereof (meaning thereby the business carried on in the said name) excei11 upon a condition that such an assignee or transferee shall enter into a similar agreement with Padamsi or his wife or his said son, as the case may be, whensoever required to do so. When Amratlal took Chandrakant Parikh as his partner, it was -1n pursuance of this covenant that the deed of partnership between\n\nthem expressly provided for the payment of Of SI 4 in a rupee in the net profits and further provided that . it would be aftei such E payment was made .that the partners could divide the balance left as their shares of the profits.\n\nIf the transaction embodied in the deed, dated 1 antiary 2, 1951 was an outright purchase of goodwill, there was no necessity of cl. ( 6) in that deed providj.ng for the partnership which Amratlal would enter into in the future or his assignee or transferee F having to pay the said share so Jong as he or they continued to carry on business in the said name. It is also inconceiveable that if Padamsi was selling the goodwill, he would ell'ler into an agree.. ment which provided no fixed purchase price, no specific period during which the purchaser would be liable to pay it except an indefinite period, i.e., until the business was carried on in the G said name, leaving to the volition of the other party to use the said name or not or to cease to do so at any time. If the trallSIU:· _ tion was intended to be an outright sale of a capital asset, 'the deed incorPoratin11; it would have contained a fixed purchase price and even if such a fixed purchase price were to be payable not at once but by instalments, such payments would be relatable to and tied H up with such a Jump sum. Even if such instalments were to be payable out of !he profits of the business, such instalments would be relatable to the price, and for a period until it was satisfied and not to the profits which would fluctuate from year to year. In\n\nsµch a case, even if the purchase price is payable by instalments and out of profits, ithe document would contain both a fixed purchase price and a definite period during which such price would have to be liquidated.\n\nOn the facts. of the case, the conclusions is inescapable, even apart from the ratio in the Travancore Sugars and Chemicals' case ( 1) being applicable, that 1the transaction was, as held by the Tribunal, a licence and not a sale of the goodwill. The disbursements in question, therefore, were in the nature of royalty and mus! be treated as admissible deductions. In this view, it does not become necessary to go into the question whether cl. ( 6) in the deed, dared January 2, 1951 and cl. (5) in the deed, dated October 18, 19 51 contained overriding provisions by reason of which P.avments in question could not form part of !he assessable profits of the firm.\n\nThe ppeals are, in this view, allowed with costs, both here and in the High Court. The costs. however, will be only one set <if costs.\n\nORDER\n\nIn .view of the decision of . the majority, the appeals are allowed with costs in this Court and in the High Court. One set clcoots. · .\n\n(I) 621 TR 566.", "total_entities": 82, "entities": [{"text": "DEVIDAS VI111ALDAS Ii", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DEVIDAS VI111ALDAS Ii: CO.", "canonical_name": "Devidas Vithaldas & Co"}}, {"text": "T., BOMBAY CITY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "C.I.T, BOMBAY CITY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 687, "end_char": 695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1085, "end_char": 1093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Octobel- 14, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5190, "end_char": 5207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1494 to 1498 of 1971, decided on Octobel- 14, 1971; C.l."}}, {"text": "f'ravancore Sugars and Chentir11ls Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7616, "end_char": 7655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, the document is totally silent as to what is to hppen to the goodwill if A, or his partners, if he were to enter into a partnership, cease to carry on the business in the name of D.V. & Co.\n\nThe transaction thus contains all the grounds given in the case of 'f'ravancore Sugars and Chentir11ls Ltd., upon which this Court concluded' that such p'1yments could not be treated as capital disbursement, namely, an indefinite period, absence of any expressed lumpsum and payment relating to profits and not being tied up with any fixed sum agree<l to as the purchase price_ of the capital mets, [230 F-H; 232 Bl\n\nTrava11<ore Sugars and C/lemirnls Ltd. v. C.I.T. (1966) 62 J. T. R. 566 applied."}}, {"text": "Per Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8443, "end_char": 8452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "231 BJ\n\nPer Sikri, C.J. dissenting."}}, {"text": "Travancore Sugars c.-nd Chen1icals Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9365, "end_char": 9404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "218 H]\n\n(iii) The grounds adopted by this Court in Travancore Sugars c.-nd Chen1icals Ltd. cannot be ri:gardc<l a'i conclusive in a case \\.\\'here there can he no doubt that the capital asset ha< been sold. ["}}, {"text": "M. C. Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10488, "end_char": 10500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, Bhuva11t'Sh Kumari, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10525, "end_char": 10538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, Bhuva11t'Sh Kumari, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "C.\n\nMathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10543, "end_char": 10553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.\n\nMathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10558, "end_char": 10573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.\n\nMathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "N. D. Karkhanis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10616, "end_char": 10631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. D. Karkhanis, R. N. Sachthey and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10633, "end_char": 10647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. D. Karkhanis, R. N. Sachthey and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10652, "end_char": 10664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. D. Karkhanis, R. N. Sachthey and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10709, "end_char": 10714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SIKRI C.J. delivered a dissenting opinion.", "canonical_name": "SIKRI"}}, {"text": "SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10768, "end_char": 10774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of SHELAT, KHANNA and MITTER~ JJ.-was delivered by SHELAT, J.\n\nSikri, C.J., I have read the draft of the judgment prepared D by Shelat J .,", "canonical_name": "SHELAT"}}, {"text": "KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10776, "end_char": 10782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of SHELAT, KHANNA and MITTER~ JJ.-was delivered by SHELAT, J.\n\nSikri, C.J., I have read the draft of the judgment prepared D by Shelat J .,"}}, {"text": "MITTER~", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10787, "end_char": 10794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of SHELAT, KHANNA and MITTER~ JJ.-was delivered by SHELAT, J.\n\nSikri, C.J., I have read the draft of the judgment prepared D by Shelat J .,"}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10828, "end_char": 10833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of SHELAT, KHANNA and MITTER~ JJ.-was delivered by SHELAT, J.\n\nSikri, C.J., I have read the draft of the judgment prepared D by Shelat J .,", "canonical_name": "SIKRI"}}, {"text": "Shelat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10893, "end_char": 10899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of SHELAT, KHANNA and MITTER~ JJ.-was delivered by SHELAT, J.\n\nSikri, C.J., I have read the draft of the judgment prepared D by Shelat J .,", "canonical_name": "SHELAT"}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11153, "end_char": 11161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Padamsi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11323, "end_char": 11330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It says what it meant to convey, that is, E there is an agreement to sell and sale of the goodwill of the partnership which belonged to Padamsi alone to Amratlal.", "canonical_name": "Padarnsi"}}, {"text": "Amratlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11340, "end_char": 11348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It says what it meant to convey, that is, E there is an agreement to sell and sale of the goodwill of the partnership which belonged to Padamsi alone to Amratlal.", "canonical_name": "Amratlal Parikh"}}, {"text": "October 18,\n\n1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11549, "end_char": 11566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance is placed on the deed dated October 18,\n\n1955, F executed by Amratlal ancf1 one Chandrakant V. Parikh."}}, {"text": "Chandrakant V. Parikh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11601, "end_char": 11622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance is placed on the deed dated October 18,\n\n1955, F executed by Amratlal ancf1 one Chandrakant V. Parikh.", "canonical_name": "Chandrakant V.\n\nParikh"}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12158, "end_char": 12166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14100, "end_char": 14108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sltelat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15077, "end_char": 15084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sltelat, J.\n\nPrior to November 1948, one Padamsi Haridas carried on his profession as a chartered accountant in the name\n\n(I) [1966] 62 1.T.R. 566."}}, {"text": "Padamsi Haridas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15118, "end_char": 15133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sltelat, J.\n\nPrior to November 1948, one Padamsi Haridas carried on his profession as a chartered accountant in the name\n\n(I) [1966] 62 1.T.R. 566."}}, {"text": "Devidas Vithaldas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15270, "end_char": 15287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT RF.PORTS\n\n[1972) 3 S.C.R.\n\nof Devidas Vithaldas and C.o.", "canonical_name": "Devidas Vithaldas & Co"}}, {"text": "Amratlal Parikh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15362, "end_char": 15377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "partnership, dated November 30, 1948, he took one Amratlal Parikh as a partner, reserving, however, to himself ail the rights and interests in the goodwill of that business.", "canonical_name": "Amratlal Parikh"}}, {"text": "January 2, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15490, "end_char": 15505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 2, 1951, he retired from the said partnership."}}, {"text": "Padarnsi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15918, "end_char": 15926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The goodwill of the late partnership belonged to the said Padarnsi alone.", "canonical_name": "Padarnsi"}}, {"text": "Arnratlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15977, "end_char": 15986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has agreed to sell the same to the said Arnratlal."}}, {"text": "Bai Premlata", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16446, "end_char": 16458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the said late partnership the said Amratlal shall-\n\n( a) pay to the said Padamsi for -and during the terms of his natural life a share of eight annas in the rupee in the net profits of the said business or profession which the said Amratlal shall hereafter carry on in the said name of Devida~ Vithaldas & Co.,\n\n(b) on and after the death of the said Padarnsi, pay t~\n\nBai Premlata, the wife of the said Padamsi, (if she be then surviving), for ; md during the term of her natural life a share of eight annas in the rupee in the :net profits of the said business or profess10n which the said Amratlal shall hereafter carry on in the name of Devidas VithaJdas & Co., and\n\n( c) on and after the death of the said Padamsi as well as his said wife Bai Prem!ata, pay to Subhas the son of the said Padamsi for and during the term of his natural life a share of eight an:nas in the rupee in the net profits of the said business or profession which the said Amratlal shall hereafter carry on in the name of Devidas Vithaldas & Co.\" Q. ( 3) provided that nothing contained in the deed shall constitute or be deemed to constitute any future partnership between the parties to the deed or.", "canonical_name": "Bai Pren!lata"}}, {"text": "Bai Prem!ata", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16821, "end_char": 16833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the said late partnership the said Amratlal shall-\n\n( a) pay to the said Padamsi for -and during the terms of his natural life a share of eight annas in the rupee in the net profits of the said business or profession which the said Amratlal shall hereafter carry on in the said name of Devida~ Vithaldas & Co.,\n\n(b) on and after the death of the said Padarnsi, pay t~\n\nBai Premlata, the wife of the said Padamsi, (if she be then surviving), for ; md during the term of her natural life a share of eight annas in the rupee in the :net profits of the said business or profess10n which the said Amratlal shall hereafter carry on in the name of Devidas VithaJdas & Co., and\n\n( c) on and after the death of the said Padamsi as well as his said wife Bai Prem!ata, pay to Subhas the son of the said Padamsi for and during the term of his natural life a share of eight an:nas in the rupee in the net profits of the said business or profession which the said Amratlal shall hereafter carry on in the name of Devidas Vithaldas & Co.\" Q. ( 3) provided that nothing contained in the deed shall constitute or be deemed to constitute any future partnership between the parties to the deed or.", "canonical_name": "Bai Pren!lata"}}, {"text": "Subhas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16842, "end_char": 16848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the said late partnership the said Amratlal shall-\n\n( a) pay to the said Padamsi for -and during the terms of his natural life a share of eight annas in the rupee in the net profits of the said business or profession which the said Amratlal shall hereafter carry on in the said name of Devida~ Vithaldas & Co.,\n\n(b) on and after the death of the said Padarnsi, pay t~\n\nBai Premlata, the wife of the said Padamsi, (if she be then surviving), for ; md during the term of her natural life a share of eight annas in the rupee in the :net profits of the said business or profess10n which the said Amratlal shall hereafter carry on in the name of Devidas VithaJdas & Co., and\n\n( c) on and after the death of the said Padamsi as well as his said wife Bai Prem!ata, pay to Subhas the son of the said Padamsi for and during the term of his natural life a share of eight an:nas in the rupee in the net profits of the said business or profession which the said Amratlal shall hereafter carry on in the name of Devidas Vithaldas & Co.\" Q. ( 3) provided that nothing contained in the deed shall constitute or be deemed to constitute any future partnership between the parties to the deed or."}}, {"text": "Devidas Vithaldas & Co", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17076, "end_char": 17098, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Devidas Vithaldas & Co", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19369, "end_char": 19377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bai Prcmlata", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20107, "end_char": 20119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The clause next provided that \"the said Amratlal shaJl not assign or transfer or otherwise dispose of the said business or the goodwill thereof or bequeat]j the same to any person whomsoever nor enter into any partnership or other arrangement with any other person or persons for carrying on the said business in the said name-except with a condition that the provisions of this Agreement shall be accepted by such person or persons or his legatees or successors or legal representatives, and with a further condition that any such person or persons or successors or legatees or legal representatives shall forthwith after being interested in any such business and whenever required by the said Padamsi or by his wife Bai Prcmlata or his said son Subhas, as the case may be, enter into an agreement with any of the last three named persons, as the case may be, similar to this agreement\".", "canonical_name": "Bai Pren!lata"}}, {"text": "October 13, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20299, "end_char": 20315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his letter dated October 13, 1955, Padamsi agreed to reduce the said share of eight annas in a rupee to five annas four pies."}}, {"text": "H Amratlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20409, "end_char": 20419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H Amratlal carried on the said business in the name of Devidas Vithaldas & Co. as the sole pr0prictor thereof till October 17,\n\n1955.", "canonical_name": "Amratlal Parikh"}}, {"text": "17,\n\n1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20532, "end_char": 20541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H Amratlal carried on the said business in the name of Devidas Vithaldas & Co. as the sole pr0prictor thereof till October 17,\n\n1955."}}, {"text": "October 18, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20699, "end_char": 20715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 18, 1955, he entered into partnership with one Chandrakant V. Parikh."}}, {"text": "Chandrakant Parikh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20835, "end_char": 20853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deed of partnership executed then by him and the said Chandrakant Parikh recited that the said Amratlal till then was carrying on the business in the name of Devidas Vithaldas & Co., that the goodwill of the said business belonged solely to the said Padam!i which he, the said Amratlal, had \"bought\" in consideration of his ; igreeing to pay a share of eight annas in the rupee to Padamsi, and after him his wife and then his son as aforesaid.", "canonical_name": "Chandrakant V.\n\nParikh"}}, {"text": "Amratlal Kashandas Parikh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21681, "end_char": 21706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Shri Padamsi Haridas has agreed to this reduction in his share mutually with Shri Amratlal Kashandas Parikh and Shri Chandrakant V.\n\nParikh."}}, {"text": "Chandrakant V.\n\nParikh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21716, "end_char": 21738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Shri Padamsi Haridas has agreed to this reduction in his share mutually with Shri Amratlal Kashandas Parikh and Shri Chandrakant V.\n\nParikh.", "canonical_name": "Chandrakant V.\n\nParikh"}}, {"text": "Padmsi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22043, "end_char": 22049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The firin constituted under this deed paid to Bai Prcmlata on ;1nd after the death of Padmsi various amounts during the years 1955-1959 under the said covenants.", "canonical_name": "Padarnsi"}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23201, "end_char": 23209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Devidas Vitha!das & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24406, "end_char": 24429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was an outright sale of an asset of Devidas Vitha!das & Co. namely the goodwill which till then belonged to Padamsi and in which he had reserved his exclusive right at the time when he enteRd into partnership with Amratlal.\""}}, {"text": "Bai Pren!lata", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24775, "end_char": 24788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was true, the High Court observed, that.the Revenue had in the assessments of Bai Pren!lata taken the \\'iew tht \"Padamsi had not sold his right, title and i.nterest_in\n\nthe J!O(ld1rill and merely allowed the use of it for a number of years F and siiice the payment was for the user of the goodwill, lt could clMY be a revenue receipt in the hands of the assessee\".", "canonical_name": "Bai Pren!lata"}}, {"text": "2nd January 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25247, "end_char": 25263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this was an incorrect view to take upon the faotsl!nd circumstallces that have been placed before us in the present case and upllll clhe terms of the document dated 2nd January 1951."}}, {"text": "2nd January,\n\n1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25313, "end_char": 25331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TM ordei clearly shows that the document dated 2nd January,\n\n1951 was misconstrued\"."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25721, "end_char": 25729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25739, "end_char": 25759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Burma", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29544, "end_char": 29549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CJ.T., West Bengal v. Coal Shipment (P) Ltd.,(') an agreement was arrived at between two companies exporting coal to Burma."}}, {"text": "s. 149410", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31638, "end_char": 31647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31809, "end_char": 31830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Reid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32911, "end_char": 32915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such an expenditure was treated as of that class to which a preriiium on the grant of a lease belong which admittedly is not deductible,\n\n(see Henriksen v. Grafton Hotel Ltd.(8 ) In Strick v. Regent Oil Co. Ltd. (') Lord Reid, however, limited the decision in Henriksen' s C41'e (') to its own special facts and expressed his disagreemem with it if it was to be held to have laid down any general proposition."}}, {"text": "Henriksen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32950, "end_char": 32959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such an expenditure was treated as of that class to which a preriiium on the grant of a lease belong which admittedly is not deductible,\n\n(see Henriksen v. Grafton Hotel Ltd.(8 ) In Strick v. Regent Oil Co. Ltd. (') Lord Reid, however, limited the decision in Henriksen' s C41'e (') to its own special facts and expressed his disagreemem with it if it was to be held to have laid down any general proposition."}}, {"text": "Finlay", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35754, "end_char": 35760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At page 695 of the report, Finlay, ].,"}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36466, "end_char": 36474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Lord Halsbury put it in a case where a lump sum was expressly provided for but was payable by instalments, there is an aRteceqent debt and the instalments are paid in liquidation of that debt. ("}}, {"text": "Ramsay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39630, "end_char": 39636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Unlike Ramsay's case,(!)"}}, {"text": "Vithaldas Thakordas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39791, "end_char": 39810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Vithaldas Thakordas, who durinl?"}}, {"text": "Vithaldas Thakordas & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39881, "end_char": 39906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "his life-time carried on bullion business in the name of Vithaldas Thakordas & Co., died in 1930 .leavin11: him surviving\n\nhis widow Bai Tarabai."}}, {"text": "Bai Tarabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39957, "end_char": 39968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "his life-time carried on bullion business in the name of Vithaldas Thakordas & Co., died in 1930 .leavin11: him surviving\n\nhis widow Bai Tarabai."}}, {"text": ".Vithaldas Thakordas & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40076, "end_char": 40102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under an arranment made by the\n\nsaid Tarabai, first with five and later on with four persons, the name of .Vithaldas Thakordas & Co. was used by those p1rsons carrvlnl!:"}}, {"text": "Vilbllldas.\n\nThakordas & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40310, "end_char": 40338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bai Tarabai \"h•ving agreed to 8.llow the 1'ftr!nership to use the name of Vilbllldas."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 41053, "end_char": 41073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a question whether the payment was an admissible deductim:, the High Court of Bombay, relying on Ogden v. Medway Cinemas\n\nLtd.(') helg that the payment was a revenue expenditure, the transaction between the partnership and the said Bai Tarabai being not a purchase of the capital asset."}}, {"text": "Travancore Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41841, "end_char": 41862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There the assesseecompany was floated to tilke over the assets of three undertakings run by Travancore Government, a sugar manufacturing concern, a distillery and a tincture factory."}}, {"text": "Greene", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43079, "end_char": 43085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These were also the three considerations applied bv Lord Greene, M. R. in Commissioners of I11la11d Revenue v. 36/49 Holdings Ltd.(8) The ques!ion whether the disbursements in question µarfake the character of one or the other mainly deoends upon the construction of ithe document of January 2, 1951 and the true nature\n\n(1)18TC 691\n\n(2) (1966) 62 IT R 566,\n\n(3) 25 TC 173, 183\n\nof the transaction embodied tllerein."}}, {"text": "Bai Premla!a", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45069, "end_char": 45081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lifetime of his wife Bai Premla!a if she were to survive him, and then to their son during his lifetime.", "canonical_name": "Bai Pren!lata"}}, {"text": "Travancore Sugars and Chemicals Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46027, "end_char": 46063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The iransaction thus contains all the grounds given in the case of Travancore Sugars and Chemicals Ltd.(') upon which ithis Court concluded there that such payments could not be treated as capital disbursements, namely, an indefinite period, absence of any expressed lump sum, and payment relating to profits and not being tied up with any fixed sum agreed to as the purchase price of a capital asset."}}, {"text": "S66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46392, "end_char": 46395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "DEVIDAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46398, "end_char": 46405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DEVIDAS & CO."}}, {"text": "Devidas Vi'lhaldas & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46841, "end_char": 46865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be recalled that that clause provides that in the event of Amratlal transferring or assigning his business to any one else or entering into partnership or otherwise remaining interested in the said business, by whomsoever carried on in the name of Devidas Vi'lhaldas & Co., then in any such events and \"so long as any such business be carried on in the name, style and fum of Devidas Vithaldas & Co. or any other name resembling or\n\nsimilar thereto\", the assignees of Amratlal and/ or any such otherperson or persons as aforesaid, carrying on the business in the said\n\nc name, shall pay the said share in the profits to Padamsi, fter him to his widow and after her to his son."}}, {"text": "1 antiary 2, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48229, "end_char": 48246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the transaction embodied in the deed, dated 1 antiary 2, 1951 was an outright purchase of goodwill, there was no necessity of cl. ("}}, {"text": "Travancore Sugars and Chemicals", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49819, "end_char": 49850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the case, the conclusions is inescapable, even apart from the ratio in the Travancore Sugars and Chemicals' case ( 1) being applicable, that 1the transaction was, as held by the Tribunal, a licence and not a sale of the goodwill."}}, {"text": "October 18, 19", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50242, "end_char": 50256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5) in the deed, dated October 18, 19 51 contained overriding provisions by reason of which P.avments in question could not form part of !"}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_233_246_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nM/S. SAITH & SKELTON (P) LTD.\n\nlan, uary 28, 1972\n\n[C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, I. D. DUA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]\n\n.Arbitration Act (10 of 1940), ss. 2(c) and 14(2)-Power of r.rbitrator to file •ward suo motu--Court in which award should be filed-Power of arbitrator to 'awapd interest prior to date of reference or aWard.\n\nDisputes having arisen between the ppellant and the respondent with reference to the pe'rformance of a contract which provided for arbitration, steps were taken to appoint arbitrators .and an umpire.\n\nThe appellant filed a petition . ip the District Judge's Court, having jurisdiction over the matter, fOr settin(g aside the nominations.\n\nWhen the matter came up to this Court in appeal, this Court appointed a sole arbitrator v, ith consent of the panie•. Thereafter in the presence of counsel for both panics\n\nthis Court gave .directions in the ppeal. that the arbitration records be sent to the sole arbitrator, and .later extended the time for making the award, and gave directions regarding the venue. The arbitrator gave his aWard, directing the payment of a certain sum by the appellant to the respondent with simple interest at 9% &-om a date anterior to the, reference, .41Dd file~. the award in this Court the next day.\n\nThe respondent filed a petition for p-:tsSing a decree in terms of the a1,1.ard but the appellant opposed the petition.\n\nOn the queslions: (1) Whether the arbitrator had no pov-,.cr suo n1oru to file his award; (2) Whether the awrd should not have been filed in this Court as it is not the Court contemplated by ss. 2(q) and 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940; and (3) Whother the arbitrator had no juris diction to '3Ward the interest from a date anterior to the date of a\"rafd or reference,\n\nHELD: (I) There is nothing in s. 14(2) of the Act which precludes the arbitrator from filing the award suo 1110.qu and it is not cottect to •ay that the award should be filed only if the parties make a request to the arbitrator to file it, or make an applition to the Court for that purpose. The arbitrator having filed the award the next day after making it, no question of limitation arises. 1239 G-H]\n\nNarayan Bhawu v. Dewaiibhawu, A.I.R. 1945 Nag. 117, approved.\n\n(2) The expresion 'Court' occurring in s. 14(2) of the Act will have to be understood in the context in which it occurs, beqause, the definition of the word in s. 2(c) applies only when there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context. The word 'Court' would include 'an appellate court' and the wdrd 'suit' would include 'appellate proceedings'.\n\nMerely because the order of this Court appointing the sole arbitrator stated 'the 'lppeal is allowed' it is not as if this Court had lost 'all jurisdiction regard ing the arbitration proceedings.\n\nThe various directions given by this Court indicate that this Coun retaine~ full control over the arbitration prQCeedings. Therefore this Court is the Court under s. 14(2) where the arbitration award should be validly filed. [240 EH; 241 BDl\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 S.C.Jt\n\nCt. A. Ct. Nachiappa Chettiar & Ors. v. Ct. A. Ct. Subramaniam Chettiar, [.1960] 2 S.C.R. 209, referred to.\n\n(3) In the present case, all the disputes including the claim for the rayment of interest had been referred to the arbit, rator. The contract does not provide that no interest w-:is payable on the amount that may be found due.\n\nTherefore the respondent was entitled, under s. 61 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, to claim inte'rest from the date on which the price became due and payable. The arbitrator had found that the price had become payable from a date anterior to the date of the aw~. Theroiore, the award of interest from the anterior date was justified. The award of interest at 9% is also not exorbitant because the parties them selves claimed interest at 12%. [245 At-OJ\n\nUnion of India v. A. L. Rallia Ram, [1964} 3 S.C.R. 164 and Firm Madanlal Roshanlal Mahajan v. Hukumchand Mills Ltd. Indore, [1967} 1 S.C.R. 105, followed.\n\nClvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C. A. No. 136 Of 1971.\n\nAppeal by special leave from lhe judgment and order dated August 6, 1970 o( the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench in Civil Revision No, 415 of 196.9-\n\n1. N. Shroff, for the appellant.\n\nS. V. Gupte, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivere.d by.\n\nVaidialingam, J.-Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 5801 of 1971, is by the first respondent, is an application under ss. 17 and 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 {hereinafter to be referred as the Act) to pass a judgment and decree according to the Award of the arbitrator dated August 24, 1971 and to grant interest from the date of the decree, on he amount found payable by the appellant.\n\nCivil Miscellaneous Petition No. 5802 of 1971, by the State of Madhya Pradesh, the appellant in the Civil Appeal, is an appli cation requesting this Court to decline to take the. Award dated August 24, 1971 on its file.\n\nWithout prejudice to the above prayer, there is a further request made to this Court to set aside or modify the Award in certain respects.\n\nThe relevant facts leading up to the filing of the two applica tions may be adverted to : The erstwhile State of Madhya Bharat had entered into a contract with M / s. Saidi & Skelton\n\n(P.) Ltd., the first respondent, for the supply and erection of Pen• stocks for Gandhi Sagar Power Station, Chambal Hyde! workS.\n\nThe acceptance of the contract was by tender No. Project/SE/\n\nM.P. STATE v. SAITH & SKELTON (P) LTD. (Vaidialingam, 1.) 235\n\n2522-F/II/25 dated June 5, 1956. Under the said contract, the first respondent firm was required to supply material for the five penstocks of P.O.R. Jhalwar Road, Railway Station at ~· 1,5.70 per M. Ton within Ille time stipulated, the total quantity bemg 463.939 M. Tons.\n\nThe material was to be transported from Jhalwar Road Railway Station to the works site by the consignee, the Madhya Bharat Government, and the work of erection was to commence on the receipt at the work site of running length of 96 ft. for any of the pnstocks. Clause 21 of the contract provided for any question or dispute, arising under the conditions of the contract or in connection therewith, to be referred to the arbitrators, one to be nominated by the StaJe and the other by the fir, m.\n\nThe said clause also provided for the matter being referred to an Umpire to be appointed by the arbitrators in case of disagreement between them. That clause also referred to certain other matters relating to arbitration proceedings.\n\nDisputes arose between the appellant and the respondent firm with reference to the performan, ce of the contract. The firm intimated the appellant on December 31, 1959 nominating one Shri T. R. Sharma, as an arbitrator under Cl. 21 of the contract and also called upon the appellant to nominate an arbitrator. The Directorate General of Supplies and Disoosals, who were acting as the agent of the Madhya Bharat Government, nominated one Shri G. S. Gaitonde, as an arbitrator on behalf of the appellant.\n\nBut the said arbitrator resigned his appointment and in conse\" quence on April 26, 1960 one Shri R. R. Desai, was nominated as an arbitrator on behalf of the appellant. This nomination was also by the Direct/Orate General of Supplies and Disposals. On September 6, 1960, the two arbitrators appointed one Sri R. C.\n\nSoni, as an Umpire. The two arbitrators disagreed in their views resulting in the matter being referred to the Umpire on October 20, 1961. According to t; he appellant, the appointment of Shri Gaitonde, in the first instance and of Shri R. R. Desai, lat\", as an arbitrator, by the Directorate General of Supplies and Disposals was without any authority from the appellant. Later on, the Directorate General of Supplies and Disposals again reappointed Shri R. R. Desai as an arbitrator on behalf of the appellant on January 4, 1961.\n\nAccording to the appellant the appointment of Shri R. C.\n\nSone, as Umpire on September 6, 1960 was not valid. Accordingly, the appellant filed in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Mandsaur, Civil Miscellaneous Case No. 16 of 1962 under s. S of the Act, for setting aside the nominations, as arbitrators of Shri T. R. Sharma and Shri R. R. Desai, as well as the appointment by them of Shri R. C. Soni, as the Umpire. By order dated October 19, 1963, the Addi. Distriell Judge, Mandsaur held that the appointments of Shri R. R. Desai, as an arbitrator and Shri\n\nR. C. Soni, as Umpire, were both invalid and not binding on the A appellant.\n\nThe firm filed an appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh againsv the order of the Add!. District Judge.\n\nThis appeal was later on treated as a Revision. and numbered as Civil Revision No. 415 of 1969. The High Court, by its order dated August 6, 1970 appointed Shri R. C. Soni as . the Sole Arbitrator under s. 12(2) of the Act and accordingly modified the B order of the Add!. District Judge, Mandsaur.\n\nThe appellant filed Special Leave Petition No. 23 70 of 1970 in this Court for grant of Special Leave to Appeal against the order of the High Court dated August 6, 1970. The firm entered caveat. On January 29, 1971, thi~ Court granted Special Leave; c and, by consent of parties, appointed an arbitrator, whose Award is sought to be made a decree of the Court by the respondent in its application C.M.P. No. 5801 of 1971 and is sought to be set aside by the appellant hy C.M.P. No. 5802 of 1971. As the terms of the order passed by this Cour~ are materfol, it is reprodnced below:\n\n\"Special Leave is granted.\n\nThe appeal is •allowed.\n\nThe appointment of Shri R. C. Soni as the sole arbitrator is set aside by .consent of the parties.\n\nMr. V. S. Desai, Senior Advocate, is appointed Arbitrator by consent of the parties liO go into all the questions in this matter and make his awar.\n\nThe remuneration for the arbitrator would be Rs. 5,000, which will be shared by both the parties equally.\n\nThe arbitrator will make his award within three months from today.\n\nThe parties will be at liberty to mention for extension of time for making the award.\n\nSd. G. K. Mitter J.\n\nJanuary 29, 1971.\n\nSd. A. N. Ray J.\"\n\nOn February 1, 1971 this Court gave directions in the appeal, in the presence of the counsel for both parties, that the records of the G arbitration be called for forthwith and sent to the sole arbitrator Mr. y. S. Des.ai, appoin•ed s per ord7r dated January 29, 1971.\n\nAgam OD April 30, 1971, this Court, Ill the presence of the counsel for both the parties, extended the time for making the Award by four months and also permitted the arbitrator to hold the arbitration proceedini?s at Bombay.\n\nThe arbitrator gave his Award H on August 24, 19?1 and filed the same in this c; ourt, the next day.\n\nHe also gave notice to the parl!es of the making and signing of\n\nI I\n\nM.P. STATE v. SAITH & SKELTON (P) LTD. (Vaidialingarn; J.) 237\n\nthe Award. A signed copy of the Award was also sent to both\n\nt_h~ parties. The operative part of the Award is as follows :\n\n\"(l) The opponents, the State of Madhya Pradesh will pay IQ the claimants a sum of Rs. 1,79,653.18 p. for the balance payable to them in respect of the price of supply and erection of the 5 penstocks. ·\n\n(2) The State will also pay interest on the said amount at 9% per annum simple interest from 7th June, 1958 to the date of decree. The State will also refund to the claimants a sum of Rs. 15,414,19 p. which they have recovered from the claimants as excess railway freight.\n\nSd. V. S. Desai, Sole Arbitrator.\"\n\nIn C.M.P. No. 5801 of 1971, the firm prays for passing a judgment and decree, according to the Award and also prays for grant of interest from the date of decree at the rate of 9 % per annum. On the other hand, the appellant State, in its application C.M.P. No. 5802 of 1971 prays for an order declining to take\n\nthe Awd on its file or in any event to set aside or modify the\n\nward in respect of interest granted prior to August 24, 1971 as well as the direction regarding the refund by the appellant of the sum of Rs. 15,414.19 P. The Award is also sought to be modified on the ground that the award of interest at 9% is very excessive.\n\nThe question of pronouncing judgment according to the A l'iard, as provided under s. 17 of the Act and which is _the prayer in C.M.P. No. 5801 of 1971 will arise only if the prayer to set aside the Award made in C.M.P. No. 5802 of 1971, by the State, is rejected. Therefore, we wi.U proceed to consider the contentions raised by Mr. I. N. Shroff, learned counsel for the appellant, in rnpport of the application C.M.P. No. 5802 of 1971.\n\nMr. Shroff has raised the following four contentions : (1) The arbitrator had no power to suo molll file his Award, as he has done in this case, and as such no action can be taken on such -an Award;\n\n(2) This Court is not the Court as contemplated by s. 14(2) read with s. 2(c) of the Ac~. Hence the filing of the Award in this Court is illegal and ineffective in law; (3) The arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award interest from a period anterior to the date of the award or reference; and (4) The Arbitrator has committed a manifest error in directing the refund of Rs. 15,414.19 P. when this amount has alre\"dv been taken into account in arriving at the figure of Rs. 1,79,653.18 P.\n\nWe will now proceed to deal with these contentions scriatim.\n\nWith regard to the first contention, which relat, l:s to the vaEdity of the filing of the Award in this Court suo motu, riiance is placed by Mr. Shroff oil s. 14(2) of the Act. It is the contention of the counsel that under this section an arbitrator can cause an award to be filed iii court only under two circumstances : (a) whn a request to do so is made by any party to the arbitration agreement or any person cla(ming under such party; and (b) when the arbitrator is directed by the Court to file the award. In this c~>e. it is pointed out, that no such request was made by any of the parties to the arbitratiQn agreement or any person claiming under such party to e arbitrator to file the Award. It is pointed out that (here was no direction by this Court to the arbitrator to file the Award. Hence it is urged that the filing of the Award mo\n\nmotu is illegal, as being contrary to the terms of s. 14(2) of the Act.\n\nMr. S. V. Gupte, learned counsel for the respondent firm, re ferred us to s. 38 of the Act and pointed out that the scheme of the Act clearly shows that the Award has to be filed in the Court by the arbitrator either suo motu or on request made by the parties to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or on being directed by the Court. The counsel pointed out. there is no prohibition ins. 14(2) of the Act, against the arbitrator filing the Award in Court suo motu.\n\nThe question specifically arose before the Nagpur High Court in Narayan Bhawu. v. Dewa; ibhawu( 1). The High Court held that there is nothing in s. 14(2) of the Act, which precludes the arbitrator from filing the Award suo motu and it is not correct w say that the Award should be filed only if the parties make a request to the arbitrator to file the award or make an application to the Court .for that purpose. We are in agreement with this view of the law, especially when there is no prohibition in the Act, par~ ticular!y in s. 14(2) against the arbitrator filing suo motu hi; Award in Court.\n\nMr. Shroff referred us to the decision in Parasramka Commercial Company v. Union of India('). From the facts stated in the said decision, it is seen that the arbitrator made his Award and signed the same on April 26, 1950. The arbitrator without sending any notice of the making and signing of the Award, sent a copy of the signed Award to the paf(ies. The appellant therein acknowledged receipt of the said si.ened copy of the Award by his letters dated 5th and 16th May, 1950; but he filed an applicatlion on March 30, 1951 in the Subordinate Jud1te's Court for passing a decree in terms of the Award. An objection was raised by the (!)AIR l945Nag 117\n\n(2) [1970] 2 SC R 136\n\n' '\n\nM.P'. STATB v. SAITH & SKELTON (P) LTD. (Vaidlalingam, J.)239\n\nopponent that the application was out of time under Art. 178 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, as not having been filed within\n\n90 days of the date of service of the notice of the making -of the Award. It is also seen that the arbitrator on July 3, 1951 filed the original Award before the Court suo motu. The Subordinate Judge rejected the application filed on March 30, 1951 as barred by time. That order was confirmed by t11e High Court. This Court, after a consideration of s. 14(1) of the Act held tha~ the serving, by the arbitrator on the appellant before this Court of a signed, copy of the Award amounted to giving him notice in writing of the making of the Award. This Court further upheld, as correct, the view of the Subordinate Judge and the High Coun that the application filed by the appellant, beyond tlie period prescribed under Art. 178 of tlie Indian Limitation Act, 1908, was barred.\n\nThis Courq did not express any view regarding tlie action taken by the arbitrator in filing suo motu the Award and left open the question as follows :\n\n\" ..... But we make it clear tliat the other part of tlie case, namely what is to happen to uhe award sent by the Arbitrator himself to the court has yet to be determined and what we say here will not affect t11e determination of that question. Obviously enough that matt.er arises under the second sub-section of s. 14 and will have to be considered quite apart from the application made by the company to have the award made into rule \"f Court.\"\n\nAgain tlie question whetlier a plea of limitation can be raised witli respect to tlie suo motu filin12; of the award by the arbitrator was left open as follows :\n\n\" .... As to whether similar objections can be raised in answer to the award filed at the instance of the arbitrator is a question which we• cannot go into tlie present appeal and no expression of opinion must be attributed to us on that point.\"\n\nTherefore, it is clear from what is stated above -that in ihe said G decision this Court had no occasion to consider whether an award can be filed uo motu by an arbitrator; nor the further question whetlier such filing should be witliin the period of limitation provided under the relevant provisions of tlie Limitation Act. In the case before us the period of limitation is dealt with under Entry 119 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. As the arbi- H trator in this case made his Award on August 24, 1971 and filed the same the next day, the question of limitation, if any, does not at all arise.\n\nWe do not express any opinion whether the period of limitation will apply when the arbitrator files his award MW 3-L887Sap.C!/72\n\nmoiu. Ju the filin~ of the Award by !he Arbitrator suo motu is A legal, tho fim coirte11.tiou of Mr. Shroff has to be rejected.\n\nThe second canlal.tion of Mr. Shroff is that this Court is not the \"Court\" as defined under s. 2( c) of the Act, where the Award could be filed. Section 2(c) of the Act is as follows :\n\n\"2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-\n\n(c) \"Court\" means a Civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subjec~ matter of the reference if the same had been the subject martter of a suit, but does not, except for the purpose of arbitration proceedings under section 21, include a Small Cause Court.\"\n\nAccording to Mr. Shroff the Award should have been filed, not in this Court, but in the Court of the Addi. District Judge, Mandsaur, as that is the Court which will have jurisdiction to entertain the suit regarding the subject matter of the reference. We D are not inclined to accept this contenon of Mr. Shroff. It should be noted that the opening words of s. 2 are \"In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. Therefore the expression \"Court'' will have to be understood as defined in s. 2(c) of the Act, only if there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context. It is in that light that the expression \"Court\" occurr- E ing in s. 14(2) of the Aca will have to be understood and interpreted. It was this Court that appointed Shri V. S. Desai on January 29, 1971, by consent of parties, on an arbitrator and to make his Award.\n\nIt will be seen that no further directions were given in the said order which will indicate that this Court had not divested itself of its jurisdiction to deal with the Award or matters arising F out of the Award. In fact the :indications are to the contrary. The direction in the order dated January 1!9, 1971 is that the arbitrator is \"to make his Award\". Surely the law contemplates further steps to be taken after the Award has been made, and quite naturally the forum for taking the further action is only this Court. There was also direction to the effect that the parties are at liberty to apply for extension of time for making the Award. In the absence G of anv other court havin11 been invested with such jurisdiction bv the order, the only concluonsion that is possible is that such a request must be made only to tho court which passed that order, namely, this Court. ·\n\nThat this Court retained complete control over the arbitration proceedings is made clear by its orders dated February 1, 1971 and April 30, 1971. On the former daie, after hearing counsel for th the parties, this Court gave direction that the record of\n\nM.P. STATE v. SAITH a: SULTON (P) LTD. (Vaidialingam, I.) 241\n\nthe arbitration proceeding$ be called for and delivered to the Sole Arbitrator Mr. V. S. Desai. On the latter date, again, after hearing the couruel, this Court extended the time for making the Award by four month!J and further permitted the arbitrator to hold the arbitration proceedings at Bombay.\n\nThe nature of the order passed on January 29, 1971 and the subsequent proceedings, referred to above, clearly show that this Court retained full control over the arbitration proc~.\n\nMr. Shroff referred us to the fact that in the \"rder dated January 29, 1971, iU is ~!early stated \"The appeal is allowed\". Ae;- cording to him, when the appeal has come to an end finally, this Court had lost all jurisdiction regarding the arbitration proceed' ings and therefore the filing of the Award should be only in the Court as defined in s. 2(c) of the Act. Here again, we are not inclined to accep~ the contention of .Mr. Shroff. That the appeal was allowed, is no doubt correct. B\\'f.the appeal was allowed by setting aside the order of the High Court and this Court in turn appointed Mr. V. S. ai as the Sole Arbitrator. All other directions contained in the order dated January 29, 1971 and the further proceedings, as pointed out earlier, indicate the retention of full control by this Court over the arbitration gs.\n\nIn Ct. A. Ct. Nachiappa Chettiar and others v. Ct. A. Ct ..\n\nSubramaniam Chettiar('), the question arose whether the trial\n\neourt had jurisdiction to refer the subject-matter of a suit to an arbitrator when the decree passed in 'the suit was pending appeal before the High Court. Based upon s. 21, it was .urged before this Court that the reference made by the trial court, when the appeal was pending, and the award made in consequence of such reference, were both invalid as the trial court was .not competent to 1118ke the order of reference. This Court rejected the said conaention and .11fter a reference to ss. 2 ( c) and 21 of the Act held that the CXPfCSSion \"Court\" occurring in s. 21 includes also the Appellate C<>.utt, proceedings before which arc a continuance of the sui<t. It was further held that the word \"suit\" in s. 21 includes also appellate proceedings. In our opinion, applying the analogy of the above decision, the expression \"Court\" occurring in s. 14\n\n(2) of the Act will have to be understood in the context in which it occurs. So understood, it follows that this Court is the Court under s. 14(2) where the arbitration Award could be validly field.\n\nThe decision in Union of India v. Surjeet Singh Atwa/(1 ) relied on by Mr. Shroff, dealt with a different aspect and therefore, it is not necessary for !IS to refer to the same.\n\nThe above reasoning leads us to the conclusion that the filing of the Award in this Court by the arbitrator was valid. and legal. The second contention of Mr. Shroll.will stand rejected.\n\n(I) [1960) 2 s.c.R. 209.\n\n(2) (19691 2 S.C.R. 211.\n\nThe third contention of Mr. Shroff is that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award interest from a period anterior to the date of award or reference. Before we deal with this contention, it is necessary to refer to the findings of the arb!trator in his Award. Issues Nos. 6, 7 and 19 frame by the arbttrator and which are relevant on this aspect are as foilows:\n\n\"6 (a) Was the claimant entitled to the payment for supply as \\veil as for erection on the total weight of 463.939 M. tons inclusive of electrodes ?\n\n6 (b) If not, what are the weights on which the price of supply and the erection charges are to be cal- G culated.\n\n7. What is due to the claimant from the respondent in respect of the supply and erection of the penstocks ?\n\n19. Are any of the parties entitled to ill'lerest and/ or any other relief.\"\n\nOn iss~ No. 6 (a) the arbitrator found that the firm was entitled to the same weight both for the calculation of price as well as for the price for erection and the said weight was 463.939 M. Tons inclusive of electrodes. In view of the above finding on issue No. 6(a), the arbitrator held that issue No. 6(1:5) does not survive. On issue No. 7 he found that for the price of supply and erection of 463.939 M. Tons at the rate specified in contract, the total price due ¢0 the firm comes to Rs. 12,15,520.18P.\n\nIt was admitted before the arbitrator that the firm had been paid by the State of sum of Rs. 10,35,867/.\n\nIn view of this admission the arbitrator found that the balance payable to the firm towards the price for supply and erection is Rs. 1,79,653.18 P.\n\nOn issue No. 19, the arbitrator found that the firm is entitled to interest at 9% per annum on the balance of Rs. 1,79,653.18 P. from June 7, 1958, the date on which the final inspection of the penstock took place. The interest was to be paid till the date of the decree. It is on the basis of the above findings that the arbitrator made the Award, the operative part of which has already been extracted in the earlier part of the judgment. The direction regarding the payment of Rs. 1,79,653.18 P. is not challenged by the State. It is only the direction regarding the period fyom which interest is payable, that is under chailenge.\n\nThe arbitrator has made the interest payable from June 7,\n\nM.P. STATE v. SAITH\" SKELTON (!,') LTD. (Vaidialingam, 1.) 243\n\n1958, on the ground that it was the date on which final inspection took place and when the amount become payable to the respondent.\n\nMr. Shroff referred us to a decision of the Judicial Committee and to certain decisions of this Court to the effect that s. 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure will not apply to the proceedings before an arbitrator, as he is not a Court and that interest cannot be awarded by way ol damages. He further referred to those decisions in support of his contention. that in the absence of any usage or contract, express or implied, or of any provision of law, to justify the award of interest on an . amount for a period before the institution of the suit, interest anterior to the date of the suit' cannot be allowed. The decisions referred to by Mr. Shroff are Bengal Nagpur Raliway Company Limited v.\n\nRuttanji Ramji and others('), Seth 'J:hawardas Pherumal v.\n\nThe Union of lndia(2), Mahabir Prashad Rungta v. Durga Datt('), Union of India v. A. L. Rallia Ram('), Vithal Das\n\nv. Rupchand and others(') and Union of India v. Bungo Steel Furniture Pvt. Ltd. (6). It is no doubt true that for awardil)g interest under the Interest Act, 1939, or u.nder s. 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, certain circumstances must exist.\n\nBut one of the principles laid down is that interest prior to the institution of a suit can be awarded if there is any provision of a suit can be awarded if there is any provision of law to justify the award\n\nol such interest. In the cases, referred to above, it is seen that there was neither any agreement pleaded for payment of interest; nor was any provision of law entitling the party to recover interest prior to the period of the suit or arbitration proceedings, referred to or relied upon. Under such circumstances it was held that the arbitrator or a court had no power to award interest prior to the date of the Award.\n\nIn Union of India v. Bungo Steel Furniture Pvt. Ltd.(\") this Court recognised the power of an arbitrator to award interest on the amount of the award from the date of the award till the date ol the decree. According to Mr. Shroff, the power of the arblitrator to award interest is only from the date of the award and not for any period anterior to that date.\n\nIn Firm Madan/al Roshan/al Mahajan v. Hukamchand Mills Ltd. Indore('), the 'pOwer of the arbitrator, to whom the subject matter of a suit )lad l:J&en referred for arbitration, to award pendr ente lite intere5t 'was considered by this Court. It was held in\n\n(I) L.R. 65 I.A. 66.\n\n(2) [19l5] 2 S.C.R, 48.\n\n(3) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 639.\n\n(4) (1964} 3 s.c.11.. 164. (S) [1966] Supp, S.C.R. 164.\n\n(6) [1967] I s.c.R. 324.\n\n(7) [1967) I S.C.R. 105.\n\nthe said decision that all the disputes in the suit were referred to the arbitrator for his decision. One of the disputes, so referr7'1,. was whether the respondent therein was entitled to pendente lite mterest. It was held that though in terms, s. 34 C.P .C. does not apply to the arbitration, it was an implied term of the reference in: the suit that the arbitrator was to decide the dispute, according to law, to grant such relief with regard to pendente lite interest as the Court itself cowd give, if it decided the dispute.\n\nIt was further held that such a power of the arbitrator was not fettered either by arbitration agreement or by the Act. The decision in Seth Thawardas Pherumal v. The Union of India(') distinguished on the ground that the said decision is silent on the question whether an arbitrator can award interest during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings, if all the disputes in ili; e suit including the olaim for interCllt were referred for arbttion.\n\nFrom the decision in Firm Madan/al Roshanlol Mahajan v.\n\nHukamchllnd Mills Ltd. Indore('), it is clear that if all the disputes are referred for arbitration, the arQitrator has power to award interest pendente lite, i.e. durini: the. pendency of the arbitration proceedings.\n\nIn the case before there is no controvery that all the disputes including a claim for payment of the amount with interest was referred to the arbitrator. The arbitrator, as pointed out earlier, found that the firm was entitled to the payment as price in the\n\num of Rs. 1,79,653.18 P. The arbitrator has further found that this amount became payable as balance price for the goods supplied by the firm on June 7, 1958, on which date the final inspection took place. If that is so, section 61 of the Sate of Goods Act, 1930 squarely applies and it saves the right of the seller (in this case the !inn) to recover interest, where by law interest is recoverable.\n\nSub-section (2) of s. 61, which is material is as follows:\n\n\"61 (2) In the absence of a contract to the contrary the Court may award interest at. such rate as it thinks fit on the amount of the price-\n\n(a) to the seller in a suit by hinl for the amount of the price-from the date of the tender of the goods or from the date on which the price was payae.\n\n(b) to the buyer in a suit by him for the .refund of .the price in a case of a breach .of. the contract on the Part. of the seller-from the date on which the payment was made.\" ·\n\n(I) (1959] 2 S.C.R. 48.\n\n(2) [1967] 1 s.c.R. JOS.\n\nM.P. STATE v. SAITH & SKELTON (P) LTD. (Vaidialingam, 1.) 245\n\nIn the case before us, admittedly the contract does not provide that no interest is payable on the amount that may be found due to any one of them. If so, it follows that the seller, namely, the firm is entitled to claim interest from the date on which the price became due and payable. The finding of the arbitrator in this case is that the price became payable on June 7, 1958. As held by this Court in Union of India v . .A.. L. Rallia Ram(1), which related to an arbitration proceeding, under sub-section (2) of s. 61, in the aooence of a contract to the contrary, the seller is eligible to be awarded interest on the amount of the price for the goods sold.\n\nOn this principle it follows that the award of interest from June 7, 1958 is justified.\n\nIf the contention of Mr. Shroff that under no circumstances anarbitrator an (!Ward interest prior to the date of the Award, or prior to the date of reference, is accepted, then the _positioo will be very anomalous. As an illustration, we may pomt oUt that there may be cases where the only question that is referred to the arbitrator is whether any of the parties is entitled to claim interest on the amount due to him from a date which may be Jong anterio.r to the date of reference. When such a question is referred to the arbitrator, naturally he has to decide whether the claim for award of interest from the date referred to by the parties is acceptable or not. If the arbitrator accepts that claim, he will be awarding interest from the date which will be Jong prior even _ to the date of reference.\n\nTherefore, the question ultimately will be whether the dispute referred to the arbJitrator included the claim for interest from any particular period or whether the party is entitled by contract or usage or by a provision of law for interest from a particular date.\n\nMr. Shroff further contended that the award of interest at 9% per annum is exorbitant.\n\nThe short answer for negativing this contention is that it is seen from the claim statement filed by both the appellant and .the respondent-firm that each of them claimed for payment of the amount, d11e to them with interest at 12% per annum under s. 61 of the Sale of Goods Act. Therefore, it follows tJ\\at the rate of interest awarded is not excessive.\n\nAs we have already held that the arbitrator has got power in this case to award interest from June 7, 1958 at the rate specifiea by him, the third contention of Mr. Shroff will have to be rejected.\n\nThe last contention of Mr. Shroff relates to the direction regarding the refund of Rs. 15,414.19 P. The contention is that this amount has already been taken Into account by the arbitrator when he directed the payment of Rs. 1,79,653.18 P. Mr. Shroff\n\n(I) (1964] 3 S.C.R. 164.\n\n$UPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.R:.\n\nwas not able to satisfy us that the amount, directed to be paid ' as refund, has been already taken into account in the amount fixed as the balance price payable bfy the State. Therefore, this contention also will have to be rejected.\n\nNow that we have rejected all the contentions of Mr. Shroff raised in C.M.P. No. 5802 of 1971, it follows that the prayer asked for therein cannot be granted.\n\nNow coming to C.M.P. No. 5801 of 1971, filed by the firm, that application is accepted and a judgment and decree are passed on the basis of the Award as against the State is f11vour of the respondent-firm. The appellant State will pay to the respondent-firm a sum oi Rs. 1,79,653.18 P. with 9% per annum simple interest from June 7, 1958, till tl!e date of the decree and thereafter at 6% 1till the date of payment. The appellant State will also refund to the respondent-firm a sum of Rs. 15,414.19 P. which they have recovered from them as excess railway freight.\n\nIn the result, C.M.P. No. 5802'of 1971 will stand dismissed with costs. C.M.P. No. 5801 of 1971 is allowed wih costs. A decree as stated above will issue. ·\n\nV.P.S.", "total_entities": 122, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M/S. SAITH & SKELTON (P) LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S. SAITH & SKELTON (P) LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DUA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 2(c) and 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 162, "end_char": 180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 2(q) and 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1583, "end_char": 1601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arbitration Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1609, "end_char": 1630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1795, "end_char": 1803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Arbitration Act, 1940", "statute": "the Arbitration Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2272, "end_char": 2280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Arbitration Act, 1940", "statute": "the Arbitration Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2393, "end_char": 2400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Arbitration Act, 1940", "statute": "the Arbitration Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2945, "end_char": 2953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1960] 2 S.C.R. 209", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3139, "end_char": 3157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3446, "end_char": 3451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3463, "end_char": 3486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "N. Shroff", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4230, "end_char": 4239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Shroff, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4261, "end_char": 4272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "S. V. Gupte"}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4274, "end_char": 4285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4290, "end_char": 4301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Vaidialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4372, "end_char": 4384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vaidialingam, J.-Civil Miscellaneous Petition No.", "canonical_name": "Vaidialingarn"}}, {"text": "ss. 17 and 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4488, "end_char": 4501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arbitration Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4509, "end_char": 4530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4815, "end_char": 4838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5802 of 1971, by the State of Madhya Pradesh, the appellant in the Civil Appeal, is an appli cation requesting this Court to decline to take the."}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5235, "end_char": 5248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant facts leading up to the filing of the two applica tions may be adverted to : The erstwhile State of Madhya Bharat had entered into a contract with M / s. Saidi & Skelton\n\n(P.) Ltd., the first respondent, for the supply and erection of Pen• stocks for Gandhi Sagar Power Station, Chambal Hyde!"}}, {"text": "Saidi & Skelton\n\n(P.) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5289, "end_char": 5315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant facts leading up to the filing of the two applica tions may be adverted to : The erstwhile State of Madhya Bharat had entered into a contract with M / s. Saidi & Skelton\n\n(P.) Ltd., the first respondent, for the supply and erection of Pen• stocks for Gandhi Sagar Power Station, Chambal Hyde!"}}, {"text": "Gandhi Sagar Power Station, Chambal Hyde", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5386, "end_char": 5426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant facts leading up to the filing of the two applica tions may be adverted to : The erstwhile State of Madhya Bharat had entered into a contract with M / s. Saidi & Skelton\n\n(P.) Ltd., the first respondent, for the supply and erection of Pen• stocks for Gandhi Sagar Power Station, Chambal Hyde!"}}, {"text": "June 5, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5580, "end_char": 5592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "235\n\n2522-F/II/25 dated June 5, 1956."}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5944, "end_char": 5968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material was to be transported from Jhalwar Road Railway Station to the works site by the consignee, the Madhya Bharat Government, and the work of erection was to commence on the receipt at the work site of running length of 96 ft."}}, {"text": "Clause 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6096, "end_char": 6105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 31, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6716, "end_char": 6733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The firm intimated the appellant on December 31, 1959 nominating one Shri T. R. Sharma, as an arbitrator under Cl."}}, {"text": "T. R. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6754, "end_char": 6766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The firm intimated the appellant on December 31, 1959 nominating one Shri T. R. Sharma, as an arbitrator under Cl.", "canonical_name": "T. R. Sharma"}}, {"text": "Cl. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6791, "end_char": 6797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Directorate General of Supplies and Disoosals", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6880, "end_char": 6925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Directorate General of Supplies and Disoosals, who were acting as the agent of the Madhya Bharat Government, nominated one Shri G. S. Gaitonde, as an arbitrator on behalf of the appellant."}}, {"text": "G. S. Gaitonde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7008, "end_char": 7022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Directorate General of Supplies and Disoosals, who were acting as the agent of the Madhya Bharat Government, nominated one Shri G. S. Gaitonde, as an arbitrator on behalf of the appellant."}}, {"text": "April 26, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7143, "end_char": 7157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the said arbitrator resigned his appointment and in conse\" quence on April 26, 1960 one Shri R. R. Desai, was nominated as an arbitrator on behalf of the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. R. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7167, "end_char": 7178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the said arbitrator resigned his appointment and in conse\" quence on April 26, 1960 one Shri R. R. Desai, was nominated as an arbitrator on behalf of the appellant.", "canonical_name": "R. R. Desai"}}, {"text": "September 6, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7322, "end_char": 7339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 6, 1960, the two arbitrators appointed one Sri R. C.\n\nSoni, as an Umpire."}}, {"text": "R. C.\n\nSoni", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7379, "end_char": 7390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 6, 1960, the two arbitrators appointed one Sri R. C.\n\nSoni, as an Umpire.", "canonical_name": "R. C.\n\nSoni"}}, {"text": "October 20, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7507, "end_char": 7523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two arbitrators disagreed in their views resulting in the matter being referred to the Umpire on October 20, 1961."}}, {"text": "Gaitonde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7579, "end_char": 7587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to t; he appellant, the appointment of Shri Gaitonde, in the first instance and of Shri R. R. Desai, lat\", as an arbitrator, by the Directorate General of Supplies and Disposals was without any authority from the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. R. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7623, "end_char": 7634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to t; he appellant, the appointment of Shri Gaitonde, in the first instance and of Shri R. R. Desai, lat\", as an arbitrator, by the Directorate General of Supplies and Disposals was without any authority from the appellant.", "canonical_name": "R. R. Desai"}}, {"text": "January 4, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7901, "end_char": 7916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later on, the Directorate General of Supplies and Disposals again reappointed Shri R. R. Desai as an arbitrator on behalf of the appellant on January 4, 1961."}}, {"text": "R. C.\n\nSone", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7970, "end_char": 7981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the appellant the appointment of Shri R. C.\n\nSone, as Umpire on September 6, 1960 was not valid.", "canonical_name": "R. C.\n\nSoni"}}, {"text": "Court of the Additional District Judge, Mandsaur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8069, "end_char": 8117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, the appellant filed in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Mandsaur, Civil Miscellaneous Case No."}}, {"text": "T. R. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8240, "end_char": 8252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16 of 1962 under s. S of the Act, for setting aside the nominations, as arbitrators of Shri T. R. Sharma and Shri R. R. Desai, as well as the appointment by them of Shri R. C. Soni, as the Umpire.", "canonical_name": "T. R. Sharma"}}, {"text": "R. C. Soni", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8318, "end_char": 8328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16 of 1962 under s. S of the Act, for setting aside the nominations, as arbitrators of Shri T. R. Sharma and Shri R. R. Desai, as well as the appointment by them of Shri R. C. Soni, as the Umpire.", "canonical_name": "R. C.\n\nSoni"}}, {"text": "October 19, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8360, "end_char": 8376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By order dated October 19, 1963, the Addi."}}, {"text": "Addi. Distriell Judge, Mandsaur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8382, "end_char": 8413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By order dated October 19, 1963, the Addi."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8603, "end_char": 8631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The firm filed an appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh againsv the order of the Add!."}}, {"text": "August 6, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8811, "end_char": 8825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, by its order dated August 6, 1970 appointed Shri R. C. Soni as ."}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8883, "end_char": 8891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 29, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9178, "end_char": 9194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 29, 1971, thi~ Court granted Special Leave; c and, by consent of parties, appointed an arbitrator, whose Award is sought to be made a decree of the Court by the respondent in its application C.M.P. No."}}, {"text": "R. C. Soni", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9639, "end_char": 9649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appointment of Shri R. C. Soni as the sole arbitrator is set aside by .consent of the parties.", "canonical_name": "R. C.\n\nSoni"}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9719, "end_char": 9730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. V. S. Desai, Senior Advocate, is appointed Arbitrator by consent of the parties liO go into all the questions in this matter and make his awar.", "canonical_name": "y. S. Des.ai"}}, {"text": "G. K. Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10130, "end_char": 10142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. K. Mitter J.\n\nJanuary 29, 1971.", "canonical_name": "G. K. MITTER, JJ."}}, {"text": "N. Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10173, "end_char": 10179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Ray J.\"\n\nOn February 1, 1971 this Court gave directions in the appeal, in the presence of the counsel for both parties, that the records of the G arbitration be called for forthwith and sent to the sole arbitrator Mr. y. S. Des.ai, appoin•ed s per ord7r dated January 29, 1971."}}, {"text": "y. S. Des.ai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10394, "end_char": 10406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Ray J.\"\n\nOn February 1, 1971 this Court gave directions in the appeal, in the presence of the counsel for both parties, that the records of the G arbitration be called for forthwith and sent to the sole arbitrator Mr. y. S. Des.ai, appoin•ed s per ord7r dated January 29, 1971.", "canonical_name": "y. S. Des.ai"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10673, "end_char": 10679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agam OD April 30, 1971, this Court, Ill the presence of the counsel for both the parties, extended the time for making the Award by four months and also permitted the arbitrator to hold the arbitration proceedini?s at Bombay."}}, {"text": "August 24, 19?1", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10717, "end_char": 10732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arbitrator gave his Award H on August 24, 19?1 and filed the same in this c; ourt, the next day."}}, {"text": "Vaidialingarn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10894, "end_char": 10907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vaidialingarn; J.) 237\n\nthe Award.", "canonical_name": "Vaidialingarn"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11075, "end_char": 11089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The operative part of the Award is as follows :\n\n\"(l) The opponents, the State of Madhya Pradesh will pay IQ the claimants a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "7th June, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11339, "end_char": 11353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) The State will also pay interest on the said amount at 9% per annum simple interest from 7th June, 1958 to the date of decree."}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12277, "end_char": 12282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12528, "end_char": 12540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U proceed to consider the contentions raised by Mr. I. N. Shroff, learned counsel for the appellant, in rnpport of the application C.M.P. No."}}, {"text": "Shroff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12637, "end_char": 12643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Shroff has raised the following four contentions : (1) The arbitrator had no power to suo molll file his Award, as he has done in this case, and as such no action can be taken on such -an Award;\n\n(2) This Court is not the Court as contemplated by s. 14(2) read with s. 2(c) of the Ac~. Hence the filing of the Award in this Court is illegal and ineffective in law; (3) The arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award interest from a period anterior to the date of the award or reference; and (4) The Arbitrator has committed a manifest error in directing the refund of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12884, "end_char": 12892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12903, "end_char": 12910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13539, "end_char": 13547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14284, "end_char": 14292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14310, "end_char": 14321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. S. V. Gupte, learned counsel for the respondent firm, re ferred us to s. 38 of the Act and pointed out that the scheme of the Act clearly shows that the Award has to be filed in the Court by the arbitrator either suo motu or on request made by the parties to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or on being directed by the Court.", "canonical_name": "S. V. Gupte"}}, {"text": "s. 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14380, "end_char": 14385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14845, "end_char": 14862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question specifically arose before the Nagpur High Court in Narayan Bhawu."}}, {"text": "s. 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14947, "end_char": 14955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15332, "end_char": 15340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5th and 16th May, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15856, "end_char": 15878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant therein acknowledged receipt of the said si.ened copy of the Award by his letters dated 5th and 16th May, 1950; but he filed an applicatlion on March 30, 1951 in the Subordinate Jud1te's Court for passing a decree in terms of the Award."}}, {"text": "March 30, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15912, "end_char": 15926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant therein acknowledged receipt of the said si.ened copy of the Award by his letters dated 5th and 16th May, 1950; but he filed an applicatlion on March 30, 1951 in the Subordinate Jud1te's Court for passing a decree in terms of the Award."}}, {"text": "[1970] 2 SC R 136", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16060, "end_char": 16077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16199, "end_char": 16207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16215, "end_char": 16242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "July 3, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16390, "end_char": 16402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also seen that the arbitrator on July 3, 1951 filed the original Award before the Court suo motu."}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16627, "end_char": 16635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "the Indian Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Art. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16995, "end_char": 17003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "the Indian Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Indian Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17012, "end_char": 17039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17520, "end_char": 17525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "Indian Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18374, "end_char": 18388, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18474, "end_char": 18510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "August 24, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18565, "end_char": 18580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the arbi- H trator in this case made his Award on August 24, 1971 and filed the same the next day, the question of limitation, if any, does not at all arise."}}, {"text": "s. 2( c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19025, "end_char": 19033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963", "statute": "the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19078, "end_char": 19090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963", "statute": "the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19442, "end_char": 19452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963", "statute": "the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Addi. District Judge, Mandsaur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19586, "end_char": 19616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mr. Shroff the Award should have been filed, not in this Court, but in the Court of the Addi."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19843, "end_char": 19847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20003, "end_char": 20010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20150, "end_char": 20158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 1!9, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20642, "end_char": 20659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The direction in the order dated January 1!9, 1971 is that the arbitrator is \"to make his Award\"."}}, {"text": "February 1, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21341, "end_char": 21357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That this Court retained complete control over the arbitration proceedings is made clear by its orders dated February 1, 1971 and April 30, 1971."}}, {"text": "April 30, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21362, "end_char": 21376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That this Court retained complete control over the arbitration proceedings is made clear by its orders dated February 1, 1971 and April 30, 1971."}}, {"text": "s. 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22377, "end_char": 22384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. S. ai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22630, "end_char": 22638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B\\'f.the appeal was allowed by setting aside the order of the High Court and this Court in turn appointed Mr. V. S. ai as the Sole Arbitrator.", "canonical_name": "y. S. Des.ai"}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23153, "end_char": 23158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23475, "end_char": 23480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23550, "end_char": 23555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23694, "end_char": 23699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23833, "end_char": 23838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23978, "end_char": 23986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 7, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26179, "end_char": 26191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,79,653.18 P. from June 7, 1958, the date on which the final inspection of the penstock took place."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27057, "end_char": 27062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27066, "end_char": 27093, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Interest Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27952, "end_char": 27970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27982, "end_char": 27987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Interest Act, 1939", "statute": "the Interest Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27991, "end_char": 28018, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "L.R. 65 I.A. 66", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 29306, "end_char": 29321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1961] 3 S.C.R. 639", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 29353, "end_char": 29372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29730, "end_char": 29735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31224, "end_char": 31234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sate of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31242, "end_char": 31265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31423, "end_char": 31428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sate of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "the Sate of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "(1959] 2 S.C.R. 48", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 31943, "end_char": 31961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32569, "end_char": 32574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34215, "end_char": 34220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34228, "end_char": 34245, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "(1964] 3 S.C.R. 164", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 34778, "end_char": 34797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "UPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972]", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34801, "end_char": 34829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "$UPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.R:."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_247_288_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "247.\"\n\nSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS.\n\nU.S.V. BALRAM ETC.\n\nJanuary 28, 1972\n\n(C. A. VAID!ALINGAM AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.)\n\nAndhra PrGdesh M.B.B.S. course-Admission to Government Medical Colltf; ts by merit as a result of compett'tive examination-Students who had passed pre-University course or Higher Secondary Course (Multipurpose) eligible for examination--40% of seats reserved for candidates who had passed Higher Secondary Exarninc-.tion (Multipurpose)-Validity of such reservation-Whether violative of Art. 14, Constitution of Jndia- Reservation of 25% in favour uj Backwnrd classes as enumerated b, v Backward Cla1ses Commission-VGUdity of-Reservation lthether saved' by Art. 15(4).\n\nAdmission to the integrated M.B.B.S. Course in the government medic'31 co1Ieges in Andhra Pradesh was from two sources, namely, those who had passed the pre-University Course and those who had passed the Higher Secondary -Course (Multi-purpose) and a student from either course had to appear at a competitive test.\n\nBy G.0. No. 1648/Health dated July 23, 1970 40% of the seats were reserved for those candido.tes who had passed the Higher Secondary Course (Multi-purpose).\n\nSeats were al.>o 'reserved for Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Caste candidates.\n\nApart from these there was a reservation of 25% in favour of &lckward Clam as enumerated by the Andhra Pradesh Backward Classes Commission.\n\nThis reservation was provided by G.O. No. 1793/Education. dated September 23, 1970 .. The respondents who were 03ndidates at the entrance examination for admission to these co1leges were not selected. on account of these reservations.\n\nThey filed writ petitions in the High Court challenging rule 9 under which 40% reservation had been made in favour of those passing Higher Secondary Course (Multi-pulrpo6e) and the aforesaid G.0. moking 25% reservation in favour of the Backward Classes. The High Court by its judgment allowed the writ petitions and! directed the State to give admission to the writ petitioners in the !st.year, Integrated M.B.B.S. Course.\n\nThe High Court held that the only basis for selection for the first year course is the marks obtained by a candidate o.t the entrance test. The selection thereafter should only be on the basis of highest number of marks irrespective of the fact as to whether the candidate was from the plre-univen; ity course or the higher secondary course. Rule 9 providing for the reservation of the 40%, in favour of HSC (M.P.) .candidates was, therefore, struck down as offending Article 14 Of the Constitution. Regarding the 25 % seats in the colleges reserved for the Backward Cflsses the High Coolt held that the government order concerned was violative of Article IS(!) of the Constitution read with Artic, le 29 and that it was not saved by Article 1 S ( 4) of the Constitution.\n\nIn appeal by the State of Andhra Pradesh,\n\nHELD : (I) It ia no doubt open to the State to prescribe the source frQlll whii:h the <>011didates are declared eligible for applying fol' admission to the medical colleges; but when once a common entrance test has-. been prescribed for all the candidates on the basis of which the selection' bis to bll made the rule providing further that 40% of the seats wt'll have\n\nle be resemd for H.S.C. candidates is atbibry. In the first pbce after:-\n\ncommon test has been prescribed there cannot be a valid classification Of _PUC an~ HSC. canidates. Even assuming that such classification is V\"J.hd, the aid classifiauon has no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved, namely, selecting best candidate for the admission to the Medical Colleges.\n\nThe reservation of 40% to the H.S.C. candidates has \":0 reasonale relation to the said object.\n\nHence the High Court was right when 1t struck down this reservation under rule 9 contained in G.O.\n\nNo. 1648 of 1970 as violative of Article 14. [266 C-EJ\n\n<ii) (a) Though prima facie the list of Backward Classes which was under attack may be considered to be on the basis of caste a closer exami1;1ation would clearly show that it is only a descliption of 'the group folloW1ng the particular occupations or professions, exhaustively referred to by. the Commission. Even on the assumption that the list is based exclusively on caste, it was clear from the materials before the Com.mis sion. and the reasons given by it in its report that the entire caste ii socially and educationally backward and therefore the inclusion of subcaste in the list of Backward Classes is warranted by Art. IS ( 4). The groups mentioned therein have been included in the list of Backward Classes as they satisfy the various tests which have been laid down by this Court for 1!5Certaining social and educationally backward classea. 'Ibe list of Backward Classes as well as resel\"vation of 2S % of seats in Professional Colleges for the persons mentioned in the S3id list was valid and w\"' saved by Art. IS ( 4) of the Constitution and the High Court was wrong holdingto the contrary. [285 CD; 287 F-OJ\n\n(b) The actual living conditions of habitation of the classea under investigation can be satisfactorily judged and found out only on \" visit to the areas which will give a more accurate picture of theli\" living conditions and their surroundinl!\"· If the personal inlpression gathered by the menioers of the commission had also been utilised to augment the\n\nvarious other mterials gathered as a result of detailed investigation it could not be said that the report of the Commission suffered from any vice merely on the ground that they imported personal knowledge. [28S H\n\n286 AJ\n\n( c) The cciticiam that the Commission had divided cbsseca into mMI backward and 1... backward was not well founded.\n\nOn the other hand what the c.o.nmiMion had recommended was the distribution of -ts amongst the reaened clasees in proportion to their population. This was not a division of the Backward Clasoes as more backward and.less backward. [286 DJ\n\n(d) If a situation arises wherein the candidates belonging to the group included in the Jilt of backward classes are able to obtain more seats on the basil of their own merit it is the duty of the government to review the question of further reservation of seats fOI' auch groul\"!\n\nIf once a clo5s appears to have reached a stage of progress from ; which it .could be safely inferred that no further protection is necesaary the State will do well to review such instances and suitably revile the list of Backward <:lasses. [286 HJ\n\n(o) In the present cse under 0.0. No. 1793 of 1970 the total reoerva 1ion w\"' only 43%. The break up of that percentage is 2S%, 4% ond\n\n14% for 'the Backward Classes, Scheduled 'Fn\"bel and Scheduled Cutes respectively. .The quantum 'of reservation was thUi well within lllnlt 111entioned in Balaff•.case. [287 BJ\n\n$tale of A.ndhro Prad111h .11114. anDther 'v, , Lavu !'lndra Nai/t all4 Ot,,_.1, p971] 1, S.C.C. 6f17;.(JiJ/apalllNaguWartlRaoan; l 01M;1•v,\n\nPrincipal Medical College, Guntur and Others, A.I.R. 1962 A.P. 212, P.\n\nSagar and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh, represented by Health Department, Hyderabad and Others, A.I.R. 1968 A.P. 165, State of Altdhra Pradesh. and Another v. P. Sagar, [1968) 3 S.C.R. 595, Chitra Ghosh and Another. v. Union of India and Others, U9701 1 S.C.R. 413, Minor P. Rajendra v. State of Madras, fi1968] 2 S.C.R. 786, Ganga Ram and Others v. Union of India and Others, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2178, D. N.\n\nChanchala etc. v. State of Mysore artd Others A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1762, State of Maharashtra and Another v. Lok Shikshan Sanasotha and Ors.,,\n\nf,1971) 2 S.C.C. 410, Minor A. Periakaruppan and Anr. v. Slate of Tamil Nadu and Ors. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2303, P. Suklwdev v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1966 An. W.R. 294, Triloki Nath Tiku and Anr. v.\n\nState of Jammu & Kashmir and Ors. [1967] 2 S.C.R. 265, M. R. Balaji and Ors. v. State of Mysore, !1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 438, R. ChJtralekha and Anr. v. State of Mysore and Ors., ~1964] 6 S.C.R. 368, State of Madras v. Shrimati Champakam Dorairajan, [19511 S.C.R. 525 and Triloki Nath and Anr. v. State of Jammu & Kmhmir and Ors., [11>69] 1 S.C.R. 103, refened to.\n\nCivJL APPBLLATB JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal& Nos. 901 to 993 o! 1971.\n\n. Appeals 1jy special leave from the judgment and order dated May 13, 1971 o! the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 6090 of 1970, 221 o! 1971 and ~43 of 1971 respectively.\n\nS: Y. Gupte, p. S. Shankar and P. P. Rao, for the appellants (in C.A. No. 901of1971).\n\nP. S. Shankar and P. P. Rao, for the appellants (in C.A. Nos. 902 and 903 of 1971).\n\nV. M. Tarkunde and K. Rajendra Chowdhary, for the respondents (in C.A. No. 901of1971).\n\nG. Narasimhulu and P. A. Chowdhry, for the respondent (in p C.A. No. 902 of 1971).\n\nA. Subba Rao, for the respondent (in C.A. No. 903 of 1971).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nVPicliaJlngam, J. These three appeals, in which the State of Andhra Pradesh is the first appellant,. by . special leave, are directed against the judgment and order dated May 13, 1971 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in a batch of writ petitions, striking down Rule 9; in the Rules relating to the selection of candi.Jates for admission to the Integrated M.B.B.S. Course in th: Government Medical College in the Andhra Pradesh area, .issued G.O. No. 1648/Health elated July .23, 1970 as also under 0.0.\n\nNo. 1793/Educa.tion dated September 23, 1970, regarding re- SetYlltion of seats in professional colleges for. Backward Classes tugetlier with the . annexure to .. the said notification containing the\n\nlist of Socially and Educationally Backward Classes. The Addi.\n\nA Director cf Medical and Health Services, Hyderabad and Principal, Government Medical College, Guntur, are also appellants Nos .. 2 and 3 respectively in the appeals.\n\nThe Governme.nt of Andhra Pradesh by G.O. No. 1648/ Health dated July 23, 1970 announced Rules for the selection and admission of students to the Integrated M.B.B.S. Course in the Government Medical Colleges, in the Andhra area.\n\nThe rules provided a pattern of allotment of seats by reference\n\nto certair. qualifying examinations. The candidates eligible for admission to the Integrated M.B.B.S. Course, being largely taken from the students who had passed the qualifying examination for the Pre-University Course and those who had passed the Higher C Secondary Course (Multipurpose), the rules provided for a pattern of earmarking seats for the students according to the qualifying examinations taken by them. It may be mentioned at this stlge that the H.S.C. Course (Multipurpose) students are called Multipurpose candidates since they pass their examinations from Multipurpose Schools.\n\nRule 8 dealt with the pattern of allotment of seats in respect of , qualifying examination.\n\nRule 9 outlined the procedure. for selection.\n\nRule 10 provided that all the reservations woul:l be subject to the order of merit of marks obtained in the entrance\n\ntest by the students in the relevant category of reservations, namely, P .U.C. and H.S.C. Rule 24 provided that the selections E made under the Rules will be subject to any rules or orders that may be made in regard to the reservation of seats for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of students, having regard to the recommendations made by the Andhra Pradesh Backward Classes Commission. But there was a condition that such Rules or Orders should have been made by the Government before the F finalisation and communication of the selection of candidates.\n\nOn June 20, 1970, the Backward Classes Commission appointed . by the State, a couple of years back, made. its report regarding the yarious categories of persons who are to be treated as\n\nbek>nging to Backward Classes and recommended reservation of 30% of seats to persons belongin~ to the Backward Classes. The G State by G.0. No. 1793/Educatlon, dated September 23, 19i0 announced reservation of 25 % of tlie seats in the M.B.B.S.\n\nCourse for candidates belonginJ! to the various Backward Qasses enumerated therein on the basts of the report of the Backward Classes Commission. In or about August, 1970, the valilfity of.\n\nthe entrance test provided under the Rules issued by the G.O. 9 No. 1648 of 1970 was challenged before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in a batch. of writ petitions Nos. 3859, mt, 3955 attd 4052 of 1970. The challenge was on the groWld fttat\n\nthe State had no power or authority to determine admission by reference only to the result of the entrance test thereby ignoring the results of the qualifying examinations taken by the candidates.\n\nThese writ petitions were dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on September 5, 1970. But on Letters Patent Appeals by the candidates, a Division Bench of the High Court on\n\nSeptember 18, 1970 reversed the order of the Single Judge and struck down the provisions regarding holding of entrance test for admission to Government Colleges as illegal.\n\nThe State came to this Court in.Civil Appeal Nos. 2161A and 2162B of 1970.\n\nTh:S Court by its judgment dated February 11, 1971 allowed the appeals holding that the Government could hold an entrance test for selection eligible candidates for admission to the medical course in the colleges run by the Government. The said decision is State of Andhra Pradesh and another v. Narendranath and others(').\n\nOn the basis of the decision of this Court in the above appeals the Government on February 12, 1971, published an additional list of candidates selected on the basis of the entrance test for admission to the Integrated M.B.B.S. Course.\n\nOn December 21: 1970, the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 901 of 1971, who was a P.U.C. candidate filed in the High Court Writ Petition No. 6090 of 1970 challenging the v:i'lidity\n\nof the classification of candidates into two categories as P.U.C.\n\nand H.S.C.(M.P.) and reserving 40% of seats to the latter as also the G.O. No. 1793/Education dated September 23, 1970 specifying certain classes as being Socially and Educationally backward and providing for them a reservation of 25 % of seats in the colleges.\n\nCertain other candidates belonging to the H.S.C. (M.P.) category had filed writ petitions challenging G.0. No. 1793 of\n\n1970 regarding the reservation made for the Backward Classes.\n\nThe P .U .C. candidate contended that the classification and reser- • vation of 40% of seats for the H.S.C. (M.P.) candidates was violative of Art. 14 of the ConstitutiQn and that it was arbitrary and illegal.\n\nIn particular he contended that he has obtained more marks than some of the H.S.C(M.P.) candidates at the entrance test and that he was entitled to admission in preference to such candidates.\n\nBoth the P.U.C. as well as the H.S.C.(M.P.) writ petitioners attacked G.O. No. 1793 of 1970 regarding reservation of 25% of seats for the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes as violative of Art. 15 ( 1) read with Art. 29 and\n\nthat it has not been saved by Art. 15(4). According to them the classification of Backward Classes was not made on any reliable material and in the enumeration of such classes, the various principles laid down by this Court have not been given due regard.\n\n(1)[1971] I S.C.C. li07.\n\nThe State contested the writ petitioll5 on various grounds.\n\nRegarding rule 9 of G.0. No. 1648 of 1970, the stand taken by the State was that the P.U.C. and H.S.C. (M.P.) candidates formed two distinct categories and they did not form part of the same class. It was further contended that the State was .entitled to lay down the principles regarding the source from which the candidates are to be selected to the medical colleges which are run by the Government and that in providing for equal distribution of seats to the P.U.C and H.S.C. (M.P.) candidates, no discrimination has been made and there has been no violation of Art. 14.\n\nRegarding G.O. No. 1793 of 1970, the State referred to the appointment of a high powered commission to exhaustively investigate and report as to the persons who are to be considered as Backward Classes for the purpose of reservation being made in their favour. The Commission had gone into the matter and after considering the educational and social backwardness of the various classes of citizens in the State in the light of the various principles and tests laid down by this Court, had submitted its report on June 26, 1970 enumerating the various classes of persons who are to be treated as Backward Classes. The report accepted by the Government had also given the reasons for such classes being treated as backward.\n\nThe High Court by its judgment, under attack, allowed the writ petitions and also directed the State to give admissions to E the writ petitioners to the !st Year Integrated M.B.B.S. Course.\n\nThe High Court has held that the only basis for selection for the\n\nht Year Integrated M.B.B.S. Course in relation to the H.S.C. and P.U.C. candidates is the mark& obtained by them at the entrance test provided by the rules framed under G.O. No. 1648 of 1970. According to the High Court when once rules have F been framed in that manner, the selection of candidates from these categories must only be of those wno have obtained the highest_ number of marks in the said test irrespective of the fact as to which category they belonged. In view of the factthat the selection is sought to be made by earmarking 40% of seats to the H.S.C. (M.P.), the latter are having an unfair advantage over the P.U.C. candidates, who will be denied admission, though they have obtained higher number of mark~. In this view the High Court held that rule 9 providing for reservation of 40% to\n\nthe H.S.C. (M.P.) framed under G.O. No. 1648 of 1970 was iJJegal as being discriminatory and as such offends Arb. 14 of the\n\nConstitution. The said rule was struck down in consequence.\n\nRegarding the enumeration of Backward Classes by the Backward Class Commission, and the order of the Government,\n\nG.O. No. 1795 of 1970, reserving 25% of seats in the Colleges,\n\nthe High Court held that the Government order violalei Art. 15\n\n( 1) read with Art. 29 and that the reservation was not saved by Art: 15 ( 4). It is. the view of the High CoUrt that proper investigation and collection of data have not been done by tho Commission in accordance with the principles laid down by this Court in its various decisions.\n\nOn the other hand, the High Court has held that the Commission has merely enumerated the various persons belonging to a particular caste as Backward Classes, which is contrary to the decisions of this Court.\n\nWe will deal further with this aspect when we advert to the validity of G.O. No. 1739 of 1970. Suffice it to say that the High Court struck down the said Government Order as violative of Art. IS ( 1) and that it was not saved by Art. b,..; of the Constitution. The High Court declared that the writ petitioners were entitled to be admitted to the Integrated M.B.B.S. Course in the Medical Colleges in the Andhra area.\n\nBefore us, on behalf of the appellants Mr. S. V. Gupte, learned counsel has attacked the findings of the High Court striking down Rule 9, issued under G.0. No. 1648 of 1970, as well as the reservation of seats made in the Professional Colleges for the.\n\nBackward Classes by G.0. No. 1793 of 1970.\n\nWe will first deal with the validity of Rule 9 issued under G.O. No. 1648 of 1970 reserving 40% of seats for the H.S.C.\n\n(M.P.) candidates.\n\nBefore we consider the contentions urged in that regard by Mr. Gupte, on behalf of the State and Mr .. Tarkunde, on behalf of the respondents, it is necessary to broadly refer to some of the material rules issued under G.O. No. 1648 of 1970. The rules were issued as annexure to this Government Order. It was specifically stated in the said Government Order that the rules specified in the annexure have to be followed in respect of admissions of students to the Integrated\n\nM.B.B.S.\n\nCourse in the Government Medical Colleges in the Andhra area including Bhadrachalam Division of Khammam District and Mungala Division of Nalgonda District from the academic year\n\n1970-71.\n\nRule 1 referred to the availability of 550 seats in the 1st Year Integrated M.B.B.S. Course in the four Government Medical Colleges, referred to therein the Andhra area.\n\nRule 2 dealt with reservation of seats (viz.) for candidates outside the State, candidates distinguished in N.C.C., Presidents' Scouts and Guides and children of Ex. Servicemen and Armed personnel; and candidates belonging to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes, women candidates etc. Rule 3 deals with the age and educational qualifications. Regarding educational qualifications it is provided that candidates possessing the minimum qualifications of H.S.C ..\n\n254 SUPREME COURT llEPOllTS [1972] 3 S.C.ll.\n\n<(M.P.), I.S.C., P.U.C. and A.l.H.S.C. or equivalent qualifica- A\n\n-tio~ are eligible to appear in the Entrance Test. But there was a\n\nprovso to the effect that in the qualifying examination the candidates should have taken up physical sciences and biological sciences and must have obtained not less than 50% of marks in ·!hose subjects put together. But in respect of candidates belong mg to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the provision is B that they should obtain nt Jess than 40% of marks in those 11ubjects put together in their qualifying examination.\n\nRule 4 dealt with basis and method of admission. Clause ( i) Of this rule provides that all candidates who have applied for .admission and are found eligible will be required to take Entrance Test to be conudcted by the Director of Medical and Health C Services.\n\nThe said rule also dealt with the holding of the Entrance Test at the ceI!lres specified therein. Clause (v) specifically provided that the Entrance Test will consist of four papers of 50 .marks each in (a) subject of Physical Science (Chemistry and Physics), (b) subject of Biological Science (Zoology and Botany), •Clause (vi) provided for the examinations in Chemistry and D Physics being held in the morning and the remaining two i.e.\n\nZoology and Botany, in the evening session and that answers will be. written in separate answer books and that the Entrance 'Test will be conducted in a single day ..\n\nThe said rule also provided for the standard of test, type of E the test and the medium pf the test.\n\nRule 6 deals with the method of admission. It provides that based on the result of the Entrance Test, a separate Master List of eligible candidates will be prepared in order of merit and that the selection will be made keeping in view the various reservations mentioned itherein. It may be mentioned at this stage that r the reservations refered to therein are' for Scheduled Castes and Schedule Tribes, Women candidates, children of Ex. Servicemen etc. There is no reservation referred to therein either of H.S.C. or P.U.C. candidates.\n\nRule 7 deals with the distribution of seats. The total number of seats available is stated to be 550. But the actual number of G seats available to be filled up on the basis of merit at the Entrance Test is given as 532. The .said rule also provides for the distributiqn of seats to certain reserved groups such as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, women candidates etc. Here again there is no reservation for H.S.C. or P.U.C.. candidates.\n\nRule 8 deals with the pattern of allotment of seats in respect of qualifying examination. The seats are distributed as follows :\n\n40% each to Multipurpose and P.U.C. candidates; 5% to M.Sc.\n\nand B.Sc. candidates; 4% for N.C.C., President's Scouts and Guides and Ex. Servicemen and 11 % strictly in the order of merit in the Entranee Test from the general pool.\n\nRule 9 deals with the procedure for selection. Clause (D) dealing with the Multipurpose and P.U.C. candidates, refers to the fact that the total seats available are 545 and that according to the pattern of distribution, 40% of the seats are reserved for Multipurpose and 40% for P.U.C. (including I.S.C.)\".\n\nThe said clause further provides that the rate of seats to be filled up by the candidates from the P.U.C./Multipurpose and allied qualification holders should be done so as to keep the number of seats according to the ceiling, i.e., 40% as per the pattern of allot-· ment for each group. It is this provision that was really struck down by the High Court.\n\nRule 10 specifies that all reservations would be subject to the order of merit of marks obtained in the Entrance List. The other rules are not material.\n\nFrom a perusal of the rules, referred to above, two aspects underlying the scheme of selection broadly emerge : ( 1 ) that there is to be an Entrance Test for all the applicants for the admission to the 1st Year Integrated M.B., B.S. Course; and (2) that the result of the Entrance Test is to form the basis foradmis sion to the medical course. Under rule 3(2) candidates possessing the minimum qualification of H.S.C. (M.P.), l.S.C, P.U.C. and A.l.H.S.C. or equivalent qualification are eligible to appear in the Entrance Test. Therefore, it is clear that all the candidates possessing these qualffications are to be put on a par and are qualified to take the Entrance Test.\n\nF We have already referred to the fact that there is a proviso that the candidates excepting those belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes should have obtained in their qualifying examination not less than 50% of marks in Physical and Biological Sciences put together in their qualifying examination. There is no distinction made between a P.U.C. or Multipurpose candidate.\n\nBoth of them, in order to become eligible to aPPear in the En- G trance Tust, must have secured not less than 50% marks in their qualifying examinations in the two Ph.ysical and .Biol<?gicl Sciences put together.\n\nThe only relaxation, or exception, if 1t may be so called is regarding the candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes' and Scheduled Tribes. These candidates should have secured not less than 40% of the marks in those H subjects in their qualifying examination.\n\nRule 4 emphasises that all eligible candidates who have applied for admisison are bound\" to take the Entrance Test conducted by 4-L887 SuJi. Cl/72\n\nthe Director of Medical and Health Services. All the candidates, who take the Entrance Test, must take all the four papers, referred to therein. Here again, it will be seen that there is no distinction made between a P.U.C. and a Multipurpose candidate. Both of them must have obtained not less than 50% marks under rule 3 in Physical and Biological SCiences in their qualifying exa, ninations, and both of them will have to appear for those subjects in the Entrance Test, which is common to all the candidates.\n\nRule 6 specifically provides for the admission being made on the bas; s of the results of the Entrance Test. Rule 7 regarding distribution of seats specifically refers to 532 seats being avail- . able to be filled up on the basis of merit in the Entrance Test.\n\nBut when we come to rules 8 and 9, it is stated in the. former that 40% each is to be allotted on the basis of qualifying examination to Multipurpose and P.U.C. students and the latter refers_ to distribution in the same proportion to the two sets of candidates on the basis of the result of the Entrance Test. This is so, notwithstanding the fact that rule 10 provides even in respect of candidates for whom reservations have been made, their selection will be in the order of merit of marks obtained in the Entrance Test. When the scheme of the rules clearly shows that the basis of selection for the 1st Year Integrated M.B., B.S. Course is according to the result of the Entrance Test, the question is whether the reservation of 40% bf seats for the H.S.C. candidates under rule 9 is valid? Under this rule though a P.U.C. candidate may have got higher marks than a H.S.C. candidate, he may not be able to get admission because 40% of the seats allotted to the P.U.C. candidates would have been filled up; wheras a H.S.C. candidate who may have got lesser number of marks than a P.U.C. candidate may be eligible to get a seat because of 40% quota allotted to the H.S.C. candidates has not yet been completed. Does this amount to an arbitrary discrimination violative of Art. 14? Prima facie having due regard to the scheme of the rules and the object sought to be achieved, namely,, of getting the best students for\n\nthe Medical Colleges, the provision is discriminatory and it has no reasonable relation to the object, sought to be achieved.\n\nMr. Gupte, learned counsel for the State urged that the P.U.C. and H.S.C. candidates. form two separate categories and that unless such reservation of seats is made, the H.S.C. candidates may not be able to get adequate number of seats in the Medical Colleges. He further contended that the Medical Colleges being nm by the Government, it is open to the State to specify the sources from which the candidates will have to be selected for admission to those Colleges. He also pointed out that such a categorisation of students into two separate groups as P.U.C. and ll.S.C. has been held to be valid by the High Court.\n\nMr. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, urged that whatever may have been the circumstancs. at .origi11ally existed when the High Court then upheld the divmon mo separate groups of P.U.C. and H.S.C. students, when once the rules clearly specify that there is to be a common Ent_rance Test and that selections are to be made only on the basts of the results of such a test, the reservation of 40% in favour of the H.S.C:. cndidates is arbitrary, unjust nd discriminatory and as such. it violates Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nWe are in greement with the contention of Mr. Tarkunde regarding thls aspect and, in our opinion, the High Court was justified in striking down the provision regarding reservation of 40% of seats to the H.S.C. candidates under rule 9.\n\nWe have already indicated the scheme of t~:e Rules as well as the basis for selection, as could be gathered from these rules.\n\nWe will now briefly advert to the decisions referred to by the learned counsel on both sides. Mr. Gupte drew our attention to the following decisions.\n\nIn Gul/apal/i Nageswara Rao and others v. Principal Medical College, Guntur and others,.(1) the High Court had considered the provision made in a rule by the Government regarding reservation of I/3rd of total number of seats in favour of Multipurpose candidates in the Pre-Professional Course in medicine.\n\nThe rule, no doubt, provided that admission for the said course should be both from fue category of Multipurpose and P.U.c; students on the basis of merit. Nevertheless a reservation of 1 /3rd of the total number to be admitted was made in favour of H.S.C. This reservation was attacked as being arbitrary and unjust.\n\nOn behalf of the State it was urged that the said reservation is not hlt by Art. 14 as it was necessary to afford equal opportunities to Multipurpose candidates.\n\nThe High Court considered in this . connection the syllabus for study prescribed for the P.U.C. and\n\nH.S.C. candidates in their respective courses .. The High Court held that the ultipurpose candidates have to study more subjects than the P.U.C. candidates and that their examinations also covers a course extending over a period of four years. In this view the High Court held that the H.S.C. candidl\\tes are at a msadvantage in the matter of securing higher percentage of marks in their optional subjects, whereas a P .U.C. candidate had a distinct\n\nadwntage over them.\n\nIt was further held that in such a situation there are possibilities of P.U.C. candidates securing higher percentage of marks in their optinal s1;1bjects than the Multiurpos~ cn\n\ndidates and securing on the bastS of the result of thetr qualifymg examination a larger number ol. seats in the Pre-Professional Course in medicine.\n\nUltimately, the reservatiQ!l of 1/3rd number\n\n(1) A.I.R.1962 A.P. 212.\n\nof seats in favour of the H.S.C. candidates was held by the High Court.\n\nIt must be noted that at the time when the High Court dealt with the matter, there was no uniform Entrance Test to be taken by both the !'.U.C. and the H.S.C. candidates as is the position at present.\n\nOn the other hand, the selection to the Pre-Professional Course in medicine was then made on the basis of the marks obtained in the optional subjects by the respective students in their previous course of study.\n\nThe above decision, in our opinion, has no application to the facts of the present case.\n\nThe fact that the High Court approved of reservation in the circumstances then existing will not help the State in the case before us.\n\nThe next decision to which our attention was drawn by Mr.\n\nGupte is P. Sagar and a/hers v. State of Andhra Pradesh, reprl sented by Health Department, Hyderabad and others('). To this\n\ndecision we will have to revert when we deal with the validity of reservation made for the Backward Classes under G.0. No. 1793\n\nof 1970.\n\nBut so far as the question of reservation for the P.U.C.\n\nD and H.S.C. students is concerned, it is seen that certain rules provided for reservation of percentage of seats for the candidates be longing to the H.S.C. and P; U.C. Here again the rule was that 1/3rd of the total numiier of seats in all categories put toi1ether should be given to the H.S.C., Multipurpose and I.S.C. candidates and that at least 50% of the seats should be given to the P.U.C. candidates. It appears that the reservation of 50% of seats for P.U.C. candidates was challenged as being unjust.\n\nIt was urged before the High Court that the H.S.C. (Multipurpose) Examination is very difficult and as such those candidates will not be able to secure higher marks as compared to the P.U.C. candidates and in support of this contention the earlier decision in Gullapalli Nagara Rao and others v. Principal Medical College, Guntur P and others(\") was relied on.\n\nBufwe find that durinj: the course of the hearing the Advocate-General intimated the High Court that the Government was aware that the reservation of 50% seat8 to the P.U.C. candidates was working a hardship on the Multipurpose candidates and that the rules were being amended.\n\nIt was later on represented that rules had also been amended.\n\nTherefore, the High Court ultimately held that in view of the amendment to the rules, it was not :necessary to consider the challenge with respect to the reservations made for the Multipurpose and the P .U.C. candidates.\n\nHere again, it is to be stated that there was common Entrance test for ii11 the candidates belonging to the P.U.C. and H.S.C. categories. On the other hand, the selecticihs were made on the basis of the marks obtained by thei:p. in their· qualifying examinations. It was further held in the said decision that even\n\n(l)A.I.R.1968 A.P.165.\n\n(2) A.I.R.196:i A.P. 212..\n\nA on the basis that the qualifying examinations taken by the P.U.C.\n\nand H.S.C. candidates were equal, still the reservation is not invalid as discreminatory under Art. 14 of the Constitution. But here again it is to be noted that selection were made on the basis of the marks obtained in the qualifying examinations and not on the basis of marks obtained in a common Entrance Test held for all the B candidates uniformly. This decision is also, more or less similar to the one in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and others v. Principal Medical College, Guntur and others. (1)\n\nThe deision in Sagar and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2) had also to deal with the reservation of seat in the Professional Colleges for the Backward Classes on the basis of the C G.O. which was then in force. It was held that the said reservation was not saved by Art. 15 ( 4). The decision of the High Court striking down the reservation for the Backward Classes alone was challenged by the State in this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh a~ another v. P. Sagar.(') This Court upheld the decision of the High Court. .\n\nD We will Jw.ve to refer to the above sections of the High Court as well as of this Court when we deal with the second aspect which arises for consideration before us regarding the reservation made for the Backward Classes under G.0. No. 1793 of 1970.\n\nMr. Gupte then referred us to the decision in Chitra Ghosh E and another v . .Union of India and others,(') That decision related to a challenge made by certain students who were denied admission to the Maulana Azad Medical College, New Delhi. The said college was established by the Government of India. Of the 125 students, who are to be admitted annually, 15% of the seats are reserved for Scheduled Caste candidates and 5 % for candi- F dates belonging to the Scheduled Tribes, 25 % of the seats (excluding the seats reserved for Government of India nominees) were merved for girl students. In particular 23 seats were reserved to certain categories and they were to be filled up by the candidates who were nominated bly the Central Government. The categories to which the said nomination had to be so made were as folfows :\n\n( 1 ) Sons/ daughters of residents ol Union Territories\n\nSJ?CCified below including displaced persons registered therein and sponsored by their respecti\\le Administration of Territory :-\n\n(a) Himachal Pradesh, (b) Tripura, ( c) Manipur, (d) Naga Hills, (e) N.E.F.A. and (f)\n\nAndaman.\n\n(I) A.I.R.1%2 A.P. 212.\n\n(3) [1968J 3 S.C.R. s9s.\n\n(2) A.l.R.1968 A.P.16S.\n\n(4) [1910! I 8.C.R. 413.\n\n(2) Sons/daughters of Central Government servants posted in Indian Missions abroad.\n\n(3) Cultural Scholars.\n\n( 4) Colombo Plan Scholars.\n\n(5) Thailand Scholars.\n\n( 6) Jammu & Kashmir State Scholars.\n\nThe appel!ants therein had obtained about 62.5% marks and were domiciled in Delhi.\n\nAccording to them they were entitled to admission on the basis of merit and would )lave been so admitted but for the reservations, which were filled by the-nominations made by the Central Government.\n\nH was their further contention that the students who had been so nominated lfy the Central Government and got admission had obtained less percentage of marks than the appellants. Mainly the power of the Central Government to make the nominations was challenged on the ground that the provision for reservation in favour of such nominees 'ci Central Government was not based on any reasonable classification and suffered from the vice of dicrimination and hence the reserva' tion was hit by Art. 14 read with els. (A) and {iv) of Art. 15 and\n\nCl. (ii) of Art. 29.\n\nThis Court rejected the contention and held that neither els.\n\n(i) and (iv) of Art. 15 nor cl. (ii) of Art. 29 violated. In support of the challenge of discrimination under Art.\n\nE 14, it was claimed by the appellants that merit being the sole cri-' teria for admission, the provisions made for reservation for candidates to be nominated by the Central Government, introduced discrimination, or it had no reasonable nexus to the object sought td be achieved.\n\nAfter a reference to the provisions made in respect of each of the categories to be nominated by the Central Government on merits, it was held that the classification in all those cases was based on inte!ligib)e differentia, which distinguished them from the group to which the appellants belonged.\n\nIn particular, Mr.\n\nGupte relied on the following oqservations in the said decision :\n\n\"It is the Central Government which bears the financial burden of running the medical college.\n\nIt is for it to lay down the criteria for eligibility. From the very nature of things it is not possible to throw the admission open to students from all over the country.\n\nThe Government cannot be denied the right to decide from what courses the admission will be made. That essentially is a question of policy and depends inter-alia on all overall assessment and survey of the requirements of residents of particular territories and other catee:ories of persons for whom it is essential to provide facilities for medical\n\nA. P. STATE 1'. BALRAM (Vaidla!ingam, I.) 261\n\neducation. If the sources are properly class.med whether on territorial, geographical or other reasonable basis, it is not for the courts to interfere with the manner and method of making the classification.\n\nThe next question that has to be determined is whether the differentia on which classification has been made has rational relation with the object to be achieved. The main purpose of admission to a medical college is to impart education in the theory and practice of medicine. As noticed fore the sources from which students have to be drawn are primarily determined by the authorities who maintain and run the institution e.g., the Central Government in the present case.\n\nIn Minor P. Raje_ndran v. State of Madras(') it has been stated that the object of selection for admission is to secure the best possible material. _This can surely be achieved by making proper rules in the matter of selection but there can be no doubt that such selection has to be confinC)Ci to the sources that are intended to supply the material. If the sources have been classified in the manner done in the present case it is difficult to see how that classification has no rational nexus with the object of imparting medical education and also of selection for the purpose.\"\n\nBased upon these obl; ervations, Mr. Gupte, contended that the sources for selecting candidates as well as the reservation made in respect of admission to the Maulana Azad Medical College have both been approved by this Court as valid and not violative of Art .• 14. On this analogy, the counsel urged, the present classification of P.U.C. and H.S.C. into two categories and the reservation of 40% for H.S.C. candidates are valid. In our opinion, the above decision does not lead to the result contended on behalf of the State.\n\nThe special circumstances and the reasons for making the reservation to enable the Central Government to make nominations so that candidates belonging to those categories can get adequate representation by way of admission in the Medical Colles have been elaborately adverted to by this Court and it is on that basis that this Court accepted the classification as valid. It was further held that the said classification has got a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved.\n\nThe object was st.ated to be to impart medical education to the candidates belonging to those groups or area where adequate facilities for imparting such education were not available.\n\nBut the point to be noted in the said decision is that in respect of other candidates, who are not governed by any reservation, the selection on the basis of merit, namely, the marks obtained by them.\n\nOn the other hand, in the\n\n(1) [1968J 2 s.c.R. 786.\n\ncase before us, though a uniform Entrance Test has been prescribed for both the P.U.C. and H.S.C. candidates, still the selection is not made on the basis of the marks obtained in the Entrance Test. On the .other hand, the selections are made after disregarding those marks. At any rate, so far as some P.U.C. candidates are concerned it shows a preference to the H.S.C. candidates, who may have got lesser number of marks and would not have got admission, but for the reservation of 40% made for the group to which they belonged.\n\nIt is no dout true that it is open to the State to prescribe the sources from which candidates will be selected and also prescribe the criteria for eligibility. In fact, in the case before us, as we have already pointed out, the rules provide for the qualifications which. have to be satisfied to enable a candidate to apply and the sources from which selections will have to be made, have also been prescribed. .\n\nWe have also pointed out that in rspeot of eligibility for applying for admission to the 1st Year Integrated M.B.B.S. Course, no distinction has been drawn between P.U.C. ll3ld H.S.C. candidatel, both of whom have to get at least 50% marks in Physical and Biological Sciences.\n\nSo that clearly shows that they have been put on a par so far as eligibility is concerned. But the discrimination is made only after the Entrance Test is over bjy denying admission to the P .U.C. candidates who may have got higher marks than some of the H.S.C. candidates who get admission because of the 40% reservatian.\n\nMr. Gupte then referred us to the decision in Ganga Ram and E others v. The Union of India and others( 1), wherein the classification of direct recruits and promotees into two different categories in the Accounts Department of the Railway Establishment was held to be a reasonable classification not attracting the vice of Art. 14 or 16. hi that case this Court was considering a claim for promotion based upon the test of Seniority-cum-suitability. After consi- F derlng the background of the service concerned, it was held that the State which encounters diverse problems arising from a variety of circumstances is entitled to lay dOWIIl the conditions of efficiency and other qualifications for securing best service for being eligible for promotion in its different departments. It was emphasised that the object sought to be achieved by the relevant provisions which G were under attack was the. requisite efficiency in the Accounts De- . partment of the Railway Establishment. It was in that connection held that the direct recruits and promotees constitute different classes or categories and such a classification is sustalnabl.e on intelligible differentia, which has a reasonable connection with the object of efficiency in the Department.\n\nThis decision also does not help the appellants as there was no distinction made inter se between the promotees and the direct\n\n(I) A.I.R.1970 S.C. 2178.\n\nrecruits. On the other hand, the same c1iteria was adopted for purposes of promotion to the persons forming the class of direct recruits. Similarly, the same test was applied to the persons coming under the group of promotees. It was under such circumstances that this Court held the classification to be v_alid, and the situation which this Court had to consider in that connection was entirely different, from the one be.fore us where all the. candidates belonging to both the P.U.C. and H.S.C. merge under the Rules when they take the Entrance Test.\n\nIn D. N. Chancha/a etc, v. The State of Mysore and others('), one of the 9uestions this Court had to consider was the validity of the univers1tywise distribution of seats in the medical colleges run by the State of Mysore. There were three Universities in Mysore State, namely, Karnatak, Mysore and Bangalore Universities. The challenge to such distribution of seats was that candidates having lesser marks might obtain admission at the cost of another having higher marks from another ul)iversity. This Court after a refer-· ence to the different standards of examinations held in the three universities, rejected the challenge of. discrlmmation as follows :\n\n\"Further, the Government which bears the financial burden of running the Government colleges is entitled to lay down criteria for admission in its ow:n colleges and to decide the sources from which admission would be made, proyided of course, such classification is not arbitrary and has a rational basis and a reasonable connection with the object of the rules.\n\nSo long as there is no discrimination within each of such sources, the validity of the rules laying down such sources cannot be successfully challenged. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In our view the rules lay down a valid classification. Candidates passing through the qualifying examination held by a university form a class by themselves as distinguished from those passing through such examination from the other two universities. Such a classification has a reasonable nexus with the object of the rules, namely, to cater to the needs of candidates who would naturally look to their own university to advanee their training in technical studies, such as medical studies. In our opinion, the rules can- 119t justly be attacked on the ground of hostile discrimination or as being otherwise in breach of Article 14.\" It will be seen that the above decision has emphasised that the selection which was made on the basis of the marks ottained in the qualifying examination held by each of the universities was valid and the distribution of seats in the medical. colleges universitywise was also valid in view of the different standards adopted by each\n\n(!) A.I.R, 1971 S.C.1762.\n\nuniversity.\n\nAgain it is to be noted in the said .decision, there was . A no questicm of all the students of the three universities taking a common Entrance Test on the basis of which a selecti.on was made.\n\nThis decision also does not help the appellants.\n\nThe decision in The State of Maharashtra and another v. Lok Shikshan, Sansatha and others(!) which has laid down that in the matter of permitting colleges to be started in !'articular areas having due regard to the need of the area concerned, is essentially a matter of policy for the State which has to take a decision on overall assessment and summary o( the requirements of a particular area, so long as the decision is n<YI arbitrary or mala fide, it was further held that the courts will not interfere with the assessment made by the State in pursuance of its policy.\n\nThis decision is also of no avail to the appellants.\n\nMr. Tarkunde, apart from distinguishing the above decisions, for the reasons mentioned by us earlier pointed, out that. in Gullapal/i Nagcswara Rao and others v. Principal Medical College, Guntur and others('), the basis of classification of P.U.c.· and H.S.C. was not challenged as there was no necessity for those students to take a common test as in the case before us.\n\nHe referred us to the averments in the counter-affidavit filed by the Assistant Secretary to the Government in Writ Petition No. 3859 of 1970 in which conducting of Entrance Test was then challenged. The Assistant Secretary in paragraph 9 of the said counter-affidavit in respect of holding of the Entrance Test has stated that the selection of candidates for the 1st Year Integrated M.B.B.S. Course is made on the basis of marks oqtained at the Entrar1ce Examination, as such a method of selection ensures fair play and affords equal opportunity to all candidates.\n\nHe has again referred us to the fact that by introducing the method of selection by the Entrance Test the Government had done away with the reservations originally made for the P.U.C. and H.S.C. candidates and thus has offered equal opportunity to alJ candidates.\n\nHe has further stated that both the P.U.C. and the H.S.C. students apart from having obtained not Jess than 50% of marks in Physical and Biological Sciences to be eligible to apply for admission to the medical colleges, have also take the Entrance Test in the subjects mentioned in the rules.· According to the State, the result of the Entrance Test is a method of making selection to the medical co!Jeges, thus ensuring fair play and_ justice.\n\nIn the same Writ Petition the Addi. Director ol Medical and Health Services, (Professional Education) has referred to the necessity of holdin& an Entrance Test.\n\nIn this connection he refers\n\n(I) [1971! 2 S.C.C. 410.\n\n(2) A.1.R.1962 A.P. 212.\n\nI I .,\n\nto the marks obtained by certain P.U.C. and H.S.C. students in their qualifying examinations and also to their marks in the Entrance Test.\n\nThe Officer has stated that the marks obtained l;>y the candidates in their qualifying examinations are not a reliable guide to assess their merits as the marks obtained by those candidates in the Entrance Test were very poor.\n\nTherefore, it has been emphasised that the marks obtained in. the Entrance Test is the guiding factor to assess the merits of both the sets of candidates for admission to the Medical College.\n\nWe have referred to the averments contained in the counteraffidavit oi the two officers above as they form part of the present record and they have also been relied on for one purpose or other by both the State and the respondents.\n\nThe above averments clearly establish that even according to the State the marks obtained in the Entrance Test according to the rules is the decisive test for the purpose of considering the merits of the candidates, who see\\.: admission to the Medical College. These averments clearly show that there is absolutely no jurisiction for making of special reser- , ation of 40% in favour of H.S.C. candidates, when opce a common Entrance Test is held for all the candidates and selection is made on an assessment of merit of marks obtained at the said exan1ination.\n\nMr. Tarkunde referred us to Minor P. Rajendran v. State ,; f Madras and others(') where the validity of the scheme of districtwise distribution of seats as per the rules framed by the State of :Madras, to the Medical Colleges, was challenged as violative of Art. 14.\n\nThe State attempted to justify the said method of districtwise distribution on the ground that if districtwise distribution is not made, the candidates from Madras City would have an advantage and would secure the largest numbi:r of seats in the Medical Colleges, which will not be justified on the basis of the proportion cf population of the Madras City.\n\nThe challenge based . on discrimination under Art. 14 was accepted by this Court and it was held that the allocation of seats districtwise results in discrimination and there is no nexus between the districtwise distribution and the object to be achieved, rramely, admission of the best talent from the sources indicated in the rules.\n\nOn this ground, the allocation of seats on districtwise basis was struck down as violative of Art. 14.\n\nSimilarly unitwise distribution of seats in the Medical Colleges in Tamil Nadu was declared by this Court in Minor A. Periakeruppan and ano1her v. State of Tamil Nadu and others(') as violative of Arts. 14 and IS.\n\n(I) [1968] 2S.C.R. 786.\n\n(2) A. T.R. 1971 S.C. 2303.\n\n~UPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nThese two decisions clearly establish that a classification which has no rational basis and has no relation to the object sought to b¢ achieved is violative of Art. 14.\n\nIt is not necessary for us to refer to. the various decisions laying down the contents oi Art. 14.\n\nSuffice it to say that it does not forbid reasonable classification.\n\nIn order to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled : (1) The classification is founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those left out of the group, and (2) the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved.\n\nIt is no doubt open to the State to prescribe the sources from which the candidates are declared e!igi'ble for applying for admission to the Medical College; but when once a common Entraiice Test has been prescribed for all the candidates on the l:lasis of which selection is to be made, the rule providing further that 40% of the seats will have to be reserved for the H.S.C. candidates is arbitrary.\n\nIn the first place, after a common test has been prescrtbed, there cannot be a valid classification of the P.U.C. and H.S.C. candidates.\n\nEven assuming that sucb a classification is valid, the said classification has no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. namely, selecting the best candidates for admission to the Medlcal Colleges.\n\nThe reservation of 40% to the H.S.C. candidates has\n\nno reasonable relation or nexus to the said object. Hence we agree E with the High Court, when it struck down this reservation under rule 9 contained in G. No. 1648 of 1970 as violative of Art. 14.\n\nThe next question that arises for cideration is the correctness of the order of the High Court striking down the reservation of seats made for Backward Classes in the Professional Colleges under G.0. No. 1793 of 1970. The said reservation has been struck dow, n on the ground that it' violates Art. 15 (1) and falls outside Art. 15 ( 4) of the Constitution.\n\nThe view of the High Court is very strenuously challenged by Mr. s. V. Gupte, learned counsel for the appellants. Mr. V. M.\n\nTarkunde, learned counsel for the respondents, supported the Vll!ious reasons given by the High Court for striking down the said reservation.\n\nBefore we deal with the reasons given by the High Court :for striking down the reservation made for the Backward Classes un<!er .the said G.0., we will refer to the circumstances under which the Backward Classes Commission was appointed and whose report has formed the basis for providing the reservation for the variC>us persons mentioned therein.\n\n'• \"\n\n.4.\n\nA. P. STATE v. BALRAM (Vaidia!ingam, J.) 267\n\nThe State of Andhra was formed on October 1, 1953 and the Andhra Pradesh State came into existence with effect from November 1, 1956. The State of A; ndhra originally formed part of the Composite Madras State. The Composite Madras State had maintained a list of Backward Classes (other than the Scheduled Castes Tribes), in that State and had made special provisions with regard to admission to educational institutions, reservation of posts in Government Service, grant of scholarships and other concessions to assist those Backward Classes. After the formation of the Andhra State on October 1, 1953, the list maintained by the Composite Madras State was continued in the Andhra area with some modifications. The former Princely State of Hyderabad was also maintaining a list of Backward Clasess in that State, and this was also continued after the formation of Andhra Pradesh, which included Telang3;11a area. Thus with effect from November 1, 1956, there were two lists of Backward Classes in the State of Andhra Pradesh--0ne for Andhra area and the other for Telangana area. Bath the lists together comprised about 146 communities-86 and 60 in the Andhra and Telangana areas respectively,\n\nThe President of India appointed in January, 1953, a Backward Classes Commission under Art. 341 nf the Constitution headed by Sri Kaka Kalelkar, to determine the criteria to be adopted for treating any section of the people, other than Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, as socially and educationally Backward Classes.\n\nThe said Commission was also to draw up a list of such Classes on the basis of the criteria laid down by it. The report of this Commission was considered by the Central Government, which issued a memorandum pointing out that some of the tests applied by the Commission were very vague. It was further pointed out that if those tests were applied, a large majority of the Country's population will have to be considered backward.\n\nT11e Central Government decided to undertake further investigation to draw some positive and workable criteria for this purpose. The State Governments were desired in the meanwhile to render every assistance possible to those persons who, in the opinion of the State Governments were backward. Further attempts by the Central Government to draw up a list of Backward Classes on an All India basis did not meet with much of a success. Even here some State Governments were in favour of adopting economic backwardness as a criteria while others were inclined to stick on to the list prepared by them on the basis of caste. The Central Government conveyed to the State Governments on August 14, 1961 expressing its view that while the State Governments have the discretion to choose their own criteria for defining backwardness it , would be better to apply economic tests rather than classifyi, ng people their castes.\n\nThe State of Andhra Pradesh issued G.0. No. 1886 dated June A 21, 1963 specifying a list of certain persons as belonging to Backward Classes.\n\nThe list was prepared for the purpose of sele; ting candidates to the seats reserved for backward communities in the Medical Colleges in Andhra Pradesh. Under the said G.0., 25% of the seats were reserved for Backward Classes in accordance with f the list contained therein.\n\nThe reservation for the Backward B Classes. was challenged before the A11dhra Pradesh High Court by certain applicants on the ground that the Government order offonds Arts. 15 and 29 (2) of the Constitution.\n\nIt was alleged that the State Governmemt acting in fraud of its powers listed more than 139 castes as socially and educationally backward.\n\nIt was the further allegation that the list had been prepared exclusively on the c basis of caste.\n\nThe State Government contested the writ petitions on the ground that the Government was maintaining a list of Backward Classes based on socially and educationally backwardness of the caste and to such people 25 % of the seats had been reserved.\n\nIt was further averred that such reservation had been going on for a long time and the list was also bei11g suitably revised by making additions or deletions whenever found necessary.\n\nA learned Single Judge of the High Court in P. Sukhadev v.\n\nThe Government of Andhra Pradesh(') considered the validity of. the impugned G.0. No. 1886 of 1963 from two points of view: ( 1) whether the list of backward classes was based solely on , oonsideration of caste; and (2) whether the Government had adopted any standard or method of determining the social and educational backward11ess of the classes specified and, if so, the material upon which the Government has so acted.\n\nThe Hi, gh Court held that the State on which lay the onus of supporting the classificaition as valid had placed no materials before the Court as to the economic condition of the various classes, their occupatio, n :and habitation and social status and their educational backwardness.\n\nThe High Court. is also al the view that the enumeration of persons as Backward tlasses in the Government Order has hem made ahnost exclusively on the basis of caste.\n\nOn these grounds the Government Order was struck down as violative of Art. 15 ( 1) and 29(2) as being in fraud of powers conferred on the State.\n\nAfter the G.0. No. 1886 of 1963 was struck down by the High Court, the State Government decided that the criteria for determining backwardness should be only economic :factors and should be applied to individual family rather than to a whole caste. The Government issued a G.O. No. 301/Education dated February 3 1964 scrapping the then existing list of Backward Classes wit!~\n\n(1) [1966] An.W.R. 294.\n\n' A. P. STATE v. BALRAM (Vaidia/ingam, I.) 269\n\neffect from April 1, 1964 and directed that financial assistance be given to the economically poorer sections of the population, whose family income was below Rs. 1,500/- per annum. The State Government again took up the question of drawing up a list of Backward Classes in consonance with the l'rovisions of the Consiitution. For this purpose a Ca.binet Sub-Committee was constituted to draw up a list of persons who could be considered backward ..\n\nThe Cabinet Sub-Committee obtained information from Other\n\nStates and as per the advice of its Law Seccetary, it was decided that certain criteria is to be adopted for determining the backwardness of the people. The criteria included Poverty Low standard of education, Low standing of living, Place of habitation; Inferiority of occupation and caste.\n\nThe Cabinet Sub-Committee having taken a decision regarding the criteria to be applied, directed the State Director of Social Welfare to check up the lists of Backward Classes which had been scrapped on February 3, 1964 and to select from th1>se lists the castes or eommunities which could be considered backward on the basis of the above. criteria. The Director of Social Welfare, in consultation with the Law Secretary drew up a list of persons who could be included in the lis.t of Back.ward Classes. The said Cabinet Sub-Committee considere<l' the reCommendations made by the Director of Social Welfare and accordingly drew up a list of 112 communities which were considered as backward. Accordingly, G.O. No. 1880/Education dated July 29, 1966 was issued with a list showing 112 collllll1lllities as backward as being eligible for scholarships and reservati<ln of seats to Professional Colleges and Government Services. ·\n\nThe validity of the above Government Order was ; again challenged before the High Court of Aridbfa Pradesh on the ground flint the list was prepared solely on the basis of caste and violated I' the provisions of the Constitution; Here again the students who\n\nfiled the writ petitions in the High Court urged that there was no material difference between the list drawn up undet lhil•G.O. and the list which was struck down by the High Cou\"t as pet G.0 • .No.\n\n1~86 of 1963. The attac.k was that the list of.1966 was also prepared excll!Sively on the basis of castll. The State atWmpted to 1ustily the preparation of the list of Backward c1assea as having been properly done after. investigation by the Direotor of Social Welfare in consultation with the Law Secretary. The State further G\n\nurged that all relevant factors had been taken into acoolint by the Director of Social Welfare before preparing the iist. - . .\n\nJ:lie J?ivision Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in its H dec1soo in P . . Sagar and others v. State of Andhra 'Pradesh(')\n\nupheld the challenge levelled\" against the reservation made in the G.O. for Backward Classes on the ground that the State has-riot\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1968 A P.165. . .\n\nplaced materials which were available before the Cabinet Sub Committee or the Council ol Ministers.\n\nThe High Court is of the view that the list has been drawn up by the Director of Socia!\n\nWelfare and the Law Secretary, who cannot be considered in any sense to be experts and that they had made no investigation; nor collected material data for classifying the persons mentioned in the G.O. as backward. It was further emphasised that neither the Director of Social Welfare nor the Cabinet Sub-Committee had before them the population of the various classes, their economic conditions, percentage of literacy or their social and economic status.\n\nIt is the view of the High Court that no substantial change had been made from the list prepared under G.O. No. 1886 cf 1963 and which had already been struck down by the ~Iigh Court.\n\nUltimately, the High Court held that the preparation of the list of Backward Classes under G.0. No. 1880 of 1966 had been made without any material and as such the list was struck down as not being saved by Art. 15(4).\n\nWe have referred rather elaborately to the _list prepared by the State Government under Government Orders Nos. 1886 of 1%3 and 1880 of 1966 as well as the decisions of the High Court striking down those lists. Even at the time when the earlier decision was given by the Andhra Pradesh High Court i, n P. Sukhadev v.\n\nTbe Government of Andhra Pradesh(!), the decision of this Court in M. R. Ba/aji and others v. State of Mysore(') had been pronounced. It is really on the basis of the said decision, that the High Court, on the former two occasions struck down the reserva. tions made under the two Government Orders on the ground that the preparation of the two lists of Backward Classes had not been made in accordance with the principles laid down by this Court.\n\nIn fact, in both the decisions the High Court has emphasised that there has been no investigation whatsoever regarding the various factors that are necessary to be obtained as laid down by this Court for the purpose of making special provisions for the advancement of any socially and educationally Backward Cl!lsses of citizens as envisaged in Art. 15 ( 4). The sole reason given in the two deci sions by the High Court for striking down the reservation is the . fact that the necessary data or material, as laid down by this Court, had not been collected by the State Government.\n\nWe are aain emphasising this aspect because the High Court in the decision, which is under attack before us, has relied on the above two earlier decisions, to a large extent for coming to the oonclusion that the present list of Backward Classes suffers from the same infinnity. as pointed out on the former occasion. The High Court has further held that the same persons who had been included in the original list, as belonging to Backward Classes and which list was struck down twice, have again been included in the present G.0. No. 1793\n\n(!) 1966 A.N.W.R. 294.\n\n(2) [1963] Supp, I s.c.R. 439\n\nA. P. STATE v. BALRAM ( Vaidia/ingam, J.) 27 l\n\nof 1970. In the course of the judgment, we will be pointig out that the High Court has committed a basic error in proceeding on the 'basis that the present lists suffers from the same vice, pointed out in he earlier decisions l;>y the High Court.\n\nThe State of Andhra Pradesh challenged before this Court the decision of the High Court striking down the reservations made for Backward Classes as well as the preparation of list under G.0. No. 1880 of 1966. This Court in State of Andhra Pradesh and another\n\nv. P. Sagar(') upheld the decisi.on of the High Court striking down the reservation. This Court agreed with the 'ew of the High Court that no enquiry or investigation had b, een made by the State Government before preparing the list of Backward Classes enumerated in the said Government Order; It was further held that the State had placed no materials before the Court. on the basis of which the list of Backward Clas.ses was prepared, excepting relying on the fact that it was prepared by the Director of Social Welfare with the assistance of the Law Secretary. It is to be noted that this Court upheld the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in view of the fact that the State had made no investigatiQll or enquiry, nor had it collected the necessary materials to ascertain the socially and educationally backwardness of the persons mentioned in -the list.\n\nThe decision of this Court was rendered on March 27, 1968.\n\nOn April 12, 1968, the State Government by G.0. No. 870. appointed a Commission to determine the criteria to be adopted in. considering whether any sections of the citizens of India in the State of Andhra Pradesh are to be treated as socially and educationally Backward Classes. The Commission was also desired to prepare a list of such Backward Classes in accordance with the criteria to be adopted. The ConunissiQll consisted of nine members, presided over by the retired Chief Justice of the Andhrn Pradesh High Court. The other members of the Commission included the members of the State legislature. The terms of Reference have been printed as Appendix I in the report submitted by the Backward Classes Commission. A perusal of the terms of Reference shows that the Commission was desired to investigate and determine the various matters regarding the preparation of list of Backward Classes for providing a reservation in educational institutions and also for appointments for posts in Government service. The Commission was authorised to obtain any information that it considered necessary from the Government Departments, Collectors, Organisations, Individuals and from such other persons as it considered necessary.\n\nIt was also authorised to visit any part of the State for the purpose of investigation and enquiry'.\n\nH Later on, it is seen that the retired Chief Justice of the High Court. who was originally the Chairman of the Commission, resigned nnd\n\n(I) [ 1968] ) S.C.R. 59'. 5-LSS7Sup Cl/72\n\nthe Commission was headed by a retired I.C.S. Officer.\n\nThe terms of Reference were as follows :\n\n''The Commission shall-\n\n( i) determine the criteria to be adopted in considering whether any sections of citizens of India in the State of Andhra Pradesh (other than the Sche- B duled Castes and Scheduled Trbes specified by notifications issued by the President of. India under article 341 & 342 of the Constitution of.\n\nIndia) may be treated as socially and educationally Backward Classes and in accordance with such criteria prepare a list of such back- C ward classes setting out also their approximate numbers and their territorial distribution;\n\n(ii) investiate the conditions of all such socially and educationally backward classes and the difficulties under which they labour; and make recommendations as to the special provisions which may D be inade by the Government for their advancement and for promotion of their educational and economic interests, generally and with particular reference t<r-\n\n(I) the reservation in educational institutions maintained by the State or receiving aid out E of State funds;\n\n(2) the concessions, such as scholarships, which may be given by way of assistance;\n\n(3) the percentage or propprtion of such reservation the quantum of such assistance and the period during which such reservation or assistance may be made or given; and\n\n(iii) advise the Government as to the backward classes of citizens (other than the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes) which are not adequately represented in the services under the State and prepare a list of all such backward classes and make recommendation as to :\n\n(I) the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of such backward Classes, and\n\n(2) the percentage or proportion of such reservation and the period during which such reservation may be made. ..\n\nThe Commission submitted its report to the Government on June 20, 1970.\n\nThe report was placed before the State legislature as also the Andhia Pradesh Regional Committee. The Commission in its report had drawn up a list of 92 classes, which according to it, are socially and educationally backward and have to be classified as Backward Classes and for whom reservations have to be made.\n\nAfter having regard to the. views expressed by the Legislature as well as the Regional Committee and after an examination of the Report, the Government issued G.0. No. 1793 o( 1970.\n\nThe Government accepted the criteria adopted by the Commission for determining the social and educational backwardness of the citizens, namely, (i) the general poverty of the class or COll!munity as a whole;\n\n(ii) Occupations pursued by '.he classes of citizens, the nature of which must be inferior or unclean or undignified and unremunerative or one which does not carry influence or power;\n\n(iii) Caste in relation to Hindus; and (iv) Educational backwardness.\n\nThe Government also accepted the list drawn up by the Commission in toto Mld declared that the castes and communities specified in the annexure to the G.O. are socially and educationally Backward Classes for the purpose of Art. 15 ( 4) of the Contitu tion. Though the Commission had recommended reservation of 30% of seats for the Backward Classes in the Pmfessional Colleges, the Government in the Order decided that only 25 % of seats in the Professional Colleges should be reserved for Backward.Classes.\n\nThe Government also agreed to the recommendations of the Commission to the classification of the Backward classes into four groups; and directed that on the basis of the population of those fonr groups, the 25 % reservation of seats in the Prolessional Colleges was to be appertioned amongst the said four groups in the proportion mentioQed'in the Government Order. The Government made it clear that the acceptance of the recommendations ol the Commission regarding reservations shall be in force for a period of 10 years in the first instance and the positions will be reviewed thereafter .\n\n.We have referred to the circumstances leading up to the passing of the impugned G.O. No. 1793 of 1970. In order to appreciate the criticism made by the High Court regarding the a.pproach made by the Commission, it is necessary to refer to the salient features of the report of the Backward Classes Commission. The report of the Backward Classes Commission is Annexure B liefore us.\n\nAs soon as the Commission was appointed, the Commission issued a questionnaire and circulated it very widely to the various authorities and organisations mentioned in its report. ,. The questionnaire refers to various matters regarding the criteria to be adopted for\n\nascertaining the backwardness of persons as well as the information o:n matters relating to the social and educational backwardness of the persons.\n\nApart from ihe distribution of the questionnaire, the Commission called for information from the Heads of all Government Departments rearding the number of persons belonging to each class or commumty employed in their Departments. Information was. also asked from the Principals of Colleges, including the Professional and..TechnicaJ Colleges regarding the number of students belonging to each class or community in the academic year 1967-68. Similarly, the Head Masters of '1!1 the High Schools and Multipurpose High Schools in the State were also requested to furnish information regarding the total number of students belonging to each community who studied in those schools during the last 10 years as well as the number o4' students classwise :ind communitYV'{ise who studied in classes VI to XI in 1968-69.\n\nThe Commission toured all the districts in the State and recorded oral evidence on oath from therepresentatives of a number of communities.\n\nDuring the tour of the districts, the Commission visited the houses and huts belonging to different communities of the people and also made oral enquiries from the inmates about their conditions of living, their customs, relations _with other communities and their proMems. The names of places visited by the Commission together with the dates of such visits are given in Appendix IV of its Report.\n\nThe Commission also visited the neighbouring States of Madras, Mysore and Kerala with a view to have discussion with the officers of those Governments, which were connected with the welfare of Backward Classes.\n\nThe report says . that about 820 persons were examined at various places and that about 480 persons submitted written memoranda.\n\nA large number of replies were received from the public to the questionnaire issued by the Commission.\n\nThe Commission has stated that it had an opportunity, during its tour and visit ot the villages, of studying the living conditions and standard of life of the various communities.\n\nThe Commission has, no doubt, referred to the fact that upto date statistical information with regard to population of the several communities as well as the percentage of literacy was not availabe.\n\nThe difficulty was enhanced hy the fact that no castewise statistic had been collected after 1931 census.\n\nSo far as Andhra area .is concerned, the figures of 1921 census were available, a.<; it had been prepa1ed on castewise basis.\n\nRegarding: Telangana area, the 19 31 census of castewise statistic was availa1lle.\n\nIt had to estimate 1he 1968 population in the two areas on the basis of the respective census datas available. The popula1ion figures for 1968 for each caste was fixed by the Commission by the percentage of the incrase of the total population. The estimate so made by the Commission is given in Appendix V of the Report.\n\nRegarding literacy, the Commission adopted the percentage of student population per thous:, i:nd of particular class or community' in standards X and XI with reference to the average student population in the who!~ State. .,.he reasons for adopting this procedure have been given in Chapter VI. Though information was called for regarding the student population communitywise in standards X and XI from about 2224 High Schools and Higher Secondary Schools in the State, only about 50% of the institutions sent the information regarding the student population communitywise, n those two classes. The Commission worked out an average on the basis of the replies received from the 50% of the institutions which itself comes to nearly more than 1100 schools. It is not necessary to refer to the employment statistics colleeted by the Commission.\n\nThe Commission itself has indicated the difficult problems it had to tackle.\n\nChapters IV and V deal with the constitutional provisions regarding the Backward Class as well. as the general principles laid down by the High Court and this Court for ascertai.nment of their social and educational backwardness.\n\nChapter VI deals with the tests of criteria adopted by the Commission for ascertaining the social and educational b!ackwardness of persons. Regardng social backwardness, after a very exhaustive survey of the trade or occupations carried on by the persons concerned and other allied matters, the Commission has indicated that only such persons belonging to a caste or community who have traditionally followed unclean and undignified occupation, can bi grouped under (he classification of Backw_\\lrd Classes.\n\nIn this conneetion the Commission has adverted to the general poverty of the class or community as a whole, the occupation pursued by the class of citizens, the nature of which is co.usidered inferior and unclean, undignified or unremunerative or one which i:loes not carry influence or power, and caste in relation to Hindus.\n\nRegarding educational backwardness, the Commission has adyerted to the fact that during the past 1 O years, the State has introduced many measures for the general educational advancement of its people by introducinp; compulsory primary education for children and free education for boys upto Vlllth c:ass and for girls upto Xllth class. It has taken note of the fact that in 1968-69,\n\nfree education for boys was also extended upto High School stage.\n\nHaving ragard to the fact that because of literacy and educational advancement, passing in the School Final Class (XI Class) is taken as .the mini!llum qualification for appointment in Public Service as also for admission to University and Technical Education, the Commission is of the view that it is proper to take the last two classes, /\n\nnamely, Classes X and XI as standard for ascertaining the educa- . tional backwardness.\n\nIn this connection it has referred to the Report of the Backward Classs Committee,· appointed by the Jammu and Kashmir Government, presided over by Dr. P. B.\n\nGa.iendragadkar, former Chief Justice of India.\n\nThis Committee has expressed the view that the numtr of stude1ns on the rolls of IX and X classes should be ascertained for determining educational B backwardness.\n\nThe reasons given by the said Committee for this view arc quoted by the Commission in its report.\n\nThe Commission then has adverted to the fact that the average student populaticm in classes X and XI in the State works out to about 4.55 per thou>and.\n\nOn this basis, it has proceeded to apply the principle that communities whose stwient population in these standards is well below the State average, lrnve to be considered as educationally backward.\n\nHere again the Commission has referred to the fact that as only 50% of the schools had furnished figures with reference to the student population, it had to work out an average based on those figures applicable to the entire State.\n\nThough the figures received from the schools show that certain groups showed a slightly higher level of education, the Commission felt in the light of their having personally seen their living conditions, the percentage supplied by the schools may not be accurate. In view of this, the Commission has held even those persons as really backward from the educational point of view.\n\nChapter VII gives the list of socially and educationally Backward Classes and there is a very exhaustive note attached to each o.f these groups as to why the Commission regards them as socia'iy and educationally backward. In that Chapter the Commission has ulso exhaustively dealt with the names of the groups, . the subdivisions in those groups, their traditional occupation and various\n\nothr matters having a bearin~ on their social, economic and educational set up.\n\nAppendix VJ which enumerates the list qf socially and educationally Backward Classes item by item gives a tabular statement containing information about the name of the community, its traditional occupation as well as its population in 1968.\n\nAppendix VII contains a note about each of the classes enumerated by the Commission \"' Backwardness Clct\"cs.\n\nAppendix VU contains information regarding the principal occupation, approximate family income, percentage of school going students in the particular groups and various other information regarding the persons mentioned in the list.\n\nA perusal of the Appendix VII and VII shows lhat the traditional occupa1ions of he persons en'umerated as backward were of a very low order such as beggers, washermen, fisher-· men. watchmen at burial grounds etc. The Commission had made certain recommendations regarding reservation in the Governmeni Service and it had also made recommendations regarding other\n\nA assistance to be given to th.e Backward Classes.\n\nIn these appeals it is not necessary to refer to those recommendations. For the purposes of thes~ apP.eals it is only necessary to state that the observations made by this Court in Triloki Nath Tiku arid another\n\nv. State of Jammu & Kashmir and others(1) that the principles laid down in M. R. Ba/aji and others v. State of Mysore(') will equally B apply for consideration on a question arising under Art. 16 ( 4).\n\nWe have fairly elaborately dealt with the manner in which the Backward Classes Commission conducted its enquiries and investigation before submitting the report became that gives an idea of the complexity of the problem that it had to face. as well as the volume of materials collected by it.\n\nThe main grounds on which the High Court has held in1alid the enumeratian of the Backward Classes as well as the reservation made for them are as follows : The Commission has classified the groups as Backward Classes mainly on the basis of caste, which is contrary to the principles laid down by this Court lleginning from M. R. Balaji and others v. State of Mysore(2). The Commission has not collected the necessary data and particulars for the purpose of ascertaining the social and educational backwardness of the groups.\n\nThe Commission has committed a very serious error in taking census figures of 1921 and 1931 aor the Telangana and Andhra areas respectively and projecting those figures and arriving at a conclusion for enumeration of Backward Classes in 1968.\n\nCertain communities whose inclusion in the list of Backward Classes by Government Orders Nos. 18 86 and 1880 of 1963 and 1966 respectively and which had been struck down as invalid by the High Court have again been included in the list of Backward Classes. This, according to the High Court, shows that no proper investigation has been made by the Commission. The Commission committed a mistake in adopting the average of student population per thousand of a particular class or community in the X and XI Classes with reference to the State average for the purpose of determining educational backwardness. The Commission, and the Government through the vast machinery at their command should have collected more particulars on the various criteria which have. been laid down by this Court for ascertaining the backwardness of a particular group or class.. The Commission has ignored the principle laid down by this Court that the social and educational backwardness of persons classified in the list should be comparable or similar to the Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The groups in which the percentage of literacy is well above the State average have been included in the list of Backward Classes. The Commission has further sub-divided the groups into more backward and less backward classes.\n\n(1) [t967! 2 S.C.R. 26S.\n\n(2) [1963! Supp. I S.C.R. 439.\n\nWe have thus indicating broadly the reasons given by the High Court for striking down the reservation made for the Backward\n\nClaes.\n\nMr. Gupte, learned counsel for the appellants, urged that the High Court has grossly erred in striking do\\Vn the list of Backward Classes prepared by the Commission as well as the reserv!ltion made by the State. Mr. Gupte, at one stage even urged that the view of the :(Ugh Court that before a group can be included in the list of Backward Class, its social and educational backwardness must be similar or comparable to that of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, is erroneous.\n\nAccording to the learned counsel, there is no warrant for any such assumption on a clear reading of Art. 15 ( 4).\n\nCounsel further urged that to treat Art. 15 ( 4) as an exception is also equally erroneous.\n\nWe are not inclined to accept these two contentions of Mr.\n\nGupte because the said two principles hav~ been laid down by this Court in M. R. Balajl and others v. State of Mysore( 1), R. Chltralekha and another v. State of Mysore and others(') and in State of Andhra Pradesh and another v. P. Sagar(•). In all these deci sions it has been held that Art. 15(4) has to be read as a provisCI or exception to Arts. 15(1) and 29(2). The said decisions have also laid down that the Backward Classes for whose improvement special provision is contemplated by Art. 15 ( 4) must in the matter of their backwardness be comparable to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In fact the attempt of Mr. Guptc was that the principles laid down in the above decisions require reconsideration.\n\nIt is not necessary for us to consider that aspect in this particular case because as we will be indicating later, factually the classes enumerated as Backward Classes arc really socially and educationally backward, on the application of the principles laid down by this Court. It must be pointed out that none of the above decisions lay down that social and educational backwardness must be exactly similar in all respects to that of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.\n\nThose decisions also lay down that Art. 15(4) being in the nature of an exception, the conditions which justify the departure from Art. 15(1) must be strictly shown to exist.\n\nTherefore, we have to consider the correctness of the decision of the High Court taking into consideration also the abl:>ve principles laid down by this Court.\n\nBy Art. 15 of the Constitution, as origiaally enacted, it was previded that :\n\n\"(1) The State shall not discriminate, against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. (2)\n\n(l) [1963] Supp. I.S.C.R. 439.\n\n\n( 3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provisions for women and children.\" Article 29(2) provided that:\n\n\"No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintaned by the State or receiving out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.\" In Article 46, which occurs in Part IV of the Constitution relating to the Directive Principles of State Policy, the State has been enjoined to promote with special care the educational and econo1lllc interest of the weaker sections of the people and in particular of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and to protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. Articles 15 and 29, as originally framed, prohibited the making of any discrimination against any citizen on the gtound obly of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. In State of Madras\n\nv. Shrimati Champakam Dorairajan('), this Court had to consider the validity of an order issued by the Government of Madras. filting the number of students for particular communities for selec\\ion of candidates for admission tothe Engineering and Medical CQlleges in the State. The challenge was on the ground that it violated the guarantee against discrimination under Art. 29(2). This court held that the Government Order constitutes a violation . of the fundamental riht aranteed to the citizens of all by Art. 29(2) of the Constitution, notwithstanding the Directive Principles laid down in part IV of the Constitution. This led to Parliament 1j.dding Cl. (iv) in Art. 15 by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act,\n\n1951. Article 15(4) is as follows:\n\n\"15 ( 4) Nothing in this article, or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.\" This clause contained a special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. The reservation has to be adopted to advance the interest of weaker sections of Society, but in doing so it is necessary also to see that deserving and qualified candidates are not excluded from admission to higher educational institutions. In the determination of a class to be grouped as backward, a test solely based upon caste or community cannot be accepted as valid.\n\nBut, in our opinion, though Directive Principles cm)tained in Art. 46 cannot be enforced by courts,\n\n(I) [19ll) S.C.R. l2l.\n\nArt. 15 ( 4) wiH have to be given effect to in order to assist the A weaker sections of the citizens, as the State has been charged with such a duty.\n\nNo doubt, we are aware that any provision made under this clause must be within the well defined limits and should not be on the basis of caste alone.\n\nBut it should not also be missed that a caste is also a c!ass of citizens and that a caste as such may be socially and educationally backward. Ii after collecting the B necessary data, it is found that the caste as a whole is socialiy and educationally backward, in our opinion, the reservation made of such persons will have to be upheld notwithstanding the fact that a few individuals in that group may be both socially and educa- . tiona!ly above the general averag,:.\n\nThere is no gainsaying the fact that tl1ere are numero•1s cast•!s in the coun•try, which are socially and educationally backward and therefore a s, uitable provision will have to be made by the State as charged in Art. 15(4) to safeguard their in1erest.\n\nThe question before us is whether the Backward Classes Commission had before it the relevant data and materials for enumerating the persons included in the list as Backward Classes.\n\nVariou; factors or criteria to be adopled for such enumeration have been laid down in several decisions by this Court. In particular there is a very exhaustive discussion on all aspects bearing on this matter in M. R. Balaji and others v. State of Mysore(') regarding the factors to be taken into account for the purpose of ascertaining whether a particular class of persons are socially and educationally backward.\n\nThough Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the respondents, supported the various reasons given by the High Court for striking. down the reservations made for the Backward Classes, we are of the opinion that the criticisms levelled against the report of the Backward Classes Commission by the High Court are not justified. 1t may be that something more could have been done and some further investigation could have been carried out.\n\nBut. in our opinion. the question is whether on the materials collected~ the Commission and referred to in its report, can it be stated that those materials are not adequate or sufficient to support its conclusion that the persons mentioned in the'Iist as Back'Yard Classes are socially and educationally backward.\n\nWe may mention in passing that we have not been able to find any definite averment in the affidavits filed by the writ petitioners that any particular group or class included in the list by the Commission is not really socially\n\nand educationally backward. In our opinion, the Commission has taken considerable pains 10 collect as much relevant material as possible to judge tl1e social and educational backwardness of the H persons concerned.\n\nWhen, for instance, it had called for information regarding the student population in dasses X and XI from\n\n(I) [t963] Supp. I. S. C, R. 439.\n\nnearly 2224 institutions, if only 50% of the institutions sent replies, it is not the fault of the Commission for they could not get more particulars. If the Commission has only to go on doing the work of collecting particulars and materials, it will be a never ending matter. Jn spite of best efforts that any commission may make in collecting materials and datas, its conclusions cannot qe always B scientifically accurate in such matters.\n\nTherefore, the proper approach, in our opinion, should be to see whether the re!evant dafa and materials referred to in the report of the Commission justify its conclusions. In our opinion, there was sufficient material to enab!e the Commission to be satisfied that the persons included in the list are really socially and educationally backward.\n\nNo C doubt there are few instances where the educational average. h slightly above the State average, but that circumstances by itself is not enough to strike down the entire list.\n\nJn fact, even there, it is seen that when the whole class in which that particular group is included, is considered the average works out to be Jess than the State average.\n\nEven assuming there are few categories which are I ittle above the State average, in literacy, that is a matter for the D State to take note of and review the position. of such categories of persons and take a suitable decision.\n\nWe have been referred to various decisions particularly of this Court where reservations for Backward Classes made by the concerned State have been either accepted as valid or struck down.\n\nBut it is not necessary for us to re.fer to those decisions because E each case will have to be considered on its own merits, after finding out the nature of the materials collected by a co.mmission or by the State when it enumerated certain persons as forming the Backward Classes.\n\nBut one thing is clear that if an entire caste, is as a fact. found to be socially and educationally backward, their inclusion in the list of Backward Clas1es by their caste name is not violative of Art. 15(4).\n\nIn M. R. Ba/aji and other v. State of Mysore(') it was held that caste in relation to Hindus mav be a re:evant factor to consider in determining social backwardness of a group or class of citizens: but it cannot 'be made the sole or dominant basis in that b.half. In the said decision enumeration of persons as Backward Classes on the basis solely of caste was struck down.\n\nIn State of Andhra Pradesh and another v. P. Sagar(') a simi Jar list prepared by the State of Andhra Pradesh solely on the basis oi caste was struck down.\n\nIn Triloki Nath and another v.\n\nState of Jammu & Ka<hmir and others('), the Constitution Bench of this Court held that th~ members of an entire caste or com- H munity may in the social, economic and educational scale of values, at a given time be backward and may on that account be\n\n(I) [19631 Supp. 1.s.c.R. 439. (2) [1968\\ 3 s.c.R. 59;.\n\n(3) [1969] 1. C. S. R. JOJ,\n\ntrated as backward classes, but that is not because they are members of a caste or community but because they form a class.\n\nTherefore, it is clear that there may be instances of an entire caste or a community being socially and educationally backward for being considered to be given protction under Art. 15 ( 4).\n\nIn M. R. Balaji and others v. State of Mysore(1), it was ob- B served that it is doubtful if the test of average student population in the last, three High Schoo[ Classes as appropriate in determining the educational backwardness and that it may not be necessary or proper to put the test as high.\n\nEven in respect of educational State average it was observed in the said decision that the legitimate view to take would be that classes of citizens whose average is well below the State average can be treated as educationa!Iy backward.\n\nBut here again it was emphasised that the court does not propose to -Jay down any hard and fast rule as it is for the State to consider the matter and decide it in a manner which is consistent with the requirements of Art .. 15 ( 4). These ol1servations made by this Court in the above decisions have, in our opinion, been misapplied\n\nby the High Court to the case on hand.\n\nIt has proceeded on the D basis that it is aximatic that the educational average of the class should not be calculated on the basis of the student population in the last three high school classes and that only those classes whose average is below the State average, that can be treated as educationally backward.\n\nThis Court has only indicated the broad prindples to be kept in view when making the provision under Art.\n\n15(4).\n\nThe High Court has committed another error in that it has proceeded on the basis that the groups whose inclusion as backward classes in the 1963 and 1966 lists, prepared by the State, which were struck down by the High Court, have again been included in\n\nthe present list by the Commission.\n\nThe High Court has missed F the fundamental fact that .those two lists were struck down by the High Court on the ground that the State had made no investigation whatsoever, nor had the State collected the relevant materials before classifying the groups as Backward Classes. It was on that ground that those lists were struck down by the High Court. In fact this Court also affirmed the latter decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court striking down the 1966 list in its decision G in State of Andhra Pradesh and another v. P. Sagar( 2 ). Though we are not inclined to agree with the decision of the High Court that the cnwneration of groups as Backward Classes by the Commission is solely on the basis of caste, we will assume that the High Court i< right in that view.\n\nThere arc two decisions of this Court where the list prepared of Backward Classes on the basis of caste H 11ad been accepted as valid.\n\nNo doubt, this 'court was satisfied on\n\n(1) [1963] Supp. I\n\nS.C.R. 439. (2) [1968] 3.\n\nS.C.R. 595.\n\nA the materials that the classification of caste as Backward Classes was justified.\n\nThe first decision is Mmor P. Rajendran v. State of Madras.(') A Constitution Bench of this Court had to consider certain rules framed by the State of Madras for selection of candidates for ad- B mission to the 1st Year Integrated M.B.B.S. Course. One of the rules, the validity of which had to be considered, was rule 5 providing for reservation for socially and educationally Backward Classes, referred to in the Government Order No. 839 /Education, dated April 6, 1951, as subsequently amended.\n\nThe challenge was that the said rule violated Article 15 of the Constitution as the list prepared by the State was exclusively on the basis o( caste. The C State of Madras, after giving the history as to how the list of Back\n\nward Classes was made starting from the year 1906, had referred to the fact that the list was made upto date by making necessary amendments thereto. It was further pointed out on behalf of the State that the main criteria for inclusion in ithe list was the social and educational backwardness of the caste based on occupations D pursued. by those castes. It was further pleaded that as the memrs of the caste as a whole were found to be socially and educationally backward, they were put in the list. The State further pointed out that after the Constitution came into force, the lisrwas examined in the light of Art. 15 ( 4) and the same list which continued from 1906 wa$ adopted for purposes of Art. 15 ( 4) as the E entire caste was socially and educationally backward.\n\nThis Court accepted the explanation given by the State of Madras and held that though the list shows certain castes, members of those castes were really a class of socially and educationally backward citizens. This Court held as a faot that the list prepared by the State was castewise, nevertheless, as the castes F included in the list were as a whole socially and educationally backward, the list was not violative of Art. 15. In this view rule 5 was well as the lists of Backward Classes were l\\eld to be valid ..\n\nThe following observations of this Court are apposite :\n\n\"The contention is that the list of socially and educationally backward classes for whom reservation is made r. 5 nothing but a list of certain castes. Therefore, reservation in favour of certain castes, based only on caste considerations violates Art. 15 ( 1}, which prohibits discrimirtation on the ground of caste only. Now if the reservation in question had been based only on caste and had not taken into account the social and educational backwardness of the caste in question, it would be violative of Art. 15 (1). But it must not be\n\n(I) [1968] 2 S. C.R. 786.\n\nforgotten that a caste is also a class of citizens and if A the caste as a .whole is socially and educationally backward reservation can be made in favour of such a caste on the ground that it is socially and educationally backward class of citizens within the meaning of Art. 15 ( 4) .............. It is true that in the present cases the list of socially and educationally backward B classes has been specified by caste. llut that does not necessarily mean that caste was the sole consideration and that persons belonging to these castes are also not a class of socially and educationally backward citizzens . ..... \" The above decision has been quoted with approval in State of c And lira Pradesh and another v. P. Sagar, (1) and it was emphasised that the principles laid down therein do not make any departure from those laid down in the previous decision The next decision of this Court where a list prepared on the basis of caste, on the ground that the entire caste was socially and educationally backward was approved as valid under Art.\n\nD 15(4) is Minor A. Pertakaruppan v. State of Tamil Nadu and others.(') In this decision unitwise distribution of seats for the Medical Colleges was struck down by this Court as violative of Arts. 14 and 15, nevertheless the list of Backward Classes, which was challenged, as having been framed on the basis exclusively of caste, was held to be valid.\n\nThis Court after referring to the decisions in M. R. Balaji and others v. State of Mysore( 8 ) and <: R. Chitralekha and others v. State af Mysore(') held that caste is a relevant factor in ascertaining a class for the purpose of Art. 15(4). The decision in Minor P. Rajendran v. State of Madras and 01hers(') was also quoted with approval and the said decision was relied on as an authority for the proposirion tliat the classification of Backward Classes on the basis of caste is with- F in the purview of Art. 15 ( 4), if those castes are shown to be socially and educationally backward.\n\nAfter a perusal of the list of Backward Cla'ses, which was under challenge, this Court held that though the list has been framed on the basis of caste, it does not suffer from any infirmity because the entire caste was substantially socially and educationally backward.\n\nOn this basis the list G of Backward Classes was held on to be valid. It may be mentioned that the list which was under challenge was more or less substantially the same as this Court held to be valid in Minor P.\n\nRajendran v. State of Madras and others(\").\n\nAt this stage it may be recalled that the State of Andhra Pradesh originally formed part of the composite State of Madras. We ff\n\n\n(2) A.T.R. 1971 S.C. 2303.\n\n(3) [t963] Surp. 1.S, C.R. 439. (4) [196416 S.C.R. 368.\n\n(5) [1968] 2 S. C. R. 786.\n\n' c\n\nsent for the paper book in Writ Petition No. 285 of 1970, the decision of which is reported in Minor P. Rajendran v. State of Madras and , others. (1) On a comparison of the list, which was under challenge in the said decision, but accepted as correct by this Court, with the list which is under attack before us, we find that most of the groups whqse inclusion in the list by the State of Madras was held to be valid are also found in the list prepared by the Backward Classes Commission appointed by the Andhra Pradesh State.\n\nTo conclude, though prima facie the list of Backward Classes which is under attack before us may be considered to be on the _ basis of caste, a closer examination will clearly show that it is only a description of the group following the particular occupations or professions, exhaustively referred to by the Commission .. Even on the assumption that the list is based exclusively on caste, it is clear from the materials before the Commission and the reasons given by it in its report that the entire caste is socially and educationally backward and therefore their inclusion in the list of Backward Classes is warranted by Art. 15 ( 4). The groups mentioned therein have been included in the list of Backward Classes as they satisfy the various tests, which have been laid down by this Court for ascertaining the social and educational backwardness of a class.\n\nThe Commission has given very good reasons as to why it had to take into account 1he population figures based upon the 1921 and 1931 censuses.\n\nIt was also justified in taking the average student population of Classes X and XI, especially as the said procedure has been accepted by the Committee appointed by the Jammu and Kashmir Governments, presided by Dr. P. B. Gajendragadkar, former Chief Justice of India.\n\nThat Committee took into account IX and X standards average.\n\nThe decided cases have laid down the principles for ascertaining the social and educational backwardness of a class: The Backward Classes Commission in this case .has taken considerable pains in collecting data regarding the various aspects before including a particular group as Backward Class in the list.\n\nThere i• a criticism levelled that the Commission has used its personal knowledge for the purpose of characterising a particular group as backward.\n\nThat, in the circumstances of the case, is inevitable and there is nothing improper or illegal.\n\nThe very object of the Commission in touring the various areas and visiting the huts and habitations of people is to find out their actual living conditions.\n\nAfter all that infonnation has been gathered by the Commission not secretly but openly.\n\nIn fact the , actual Jiving conditions of habitation can be very satisfactorily judged\n\n(I) (19681 2 S. C.R. 786.\n\nand found out only _on a personal visit to the areas which will give A a more ccurate picture of thir living conditins and their surroundmgs. If the personal impressions gathered by the member~ of the Commision have also been utilised to augment the\n\nanol!s other maten~ gathered as a result of detailed investigatton, it cannot be said that the report of the Commission suffers from any vice merely on the ground. that they imported personal B knowledge.\n\nIn our opinion, the High Court has not been fair to the Commission when it says that whenever the Commission found the filil; lres obtained in i:, espec.t of certain groups as relating to their educational standard benig higher than the State average, it adopted an ingenious method of getting over that obstacle by import ing personal knowledge. In fact the Commission has categorically stated that the information received from the various scliools C showed that the percentage of education was slightly higher than tl1e State average in respect of certain small groups; but in view of the fact that their .living _conditions were deplorably poor, the slight higher percentage of 1iteracy should not operate to their disadvantage.\n\nRegarding the criticism that the Commission has divided D classes into more backward and less backward, in our opjnion, this is not also well founded.\n\nOn the other hand, what the Commission has recommended was the distribution of seats amongst the reserved classes in proportion to their population. This is not a division of the Backward Classes as more backward and less backward as was the case which was dealt with by this Court in l: M. R. Ba/aji and others v. State of Mysore.( 1)\n\nThere was a contention raised by Mr. Tarkunde, learned coun sel for the respondents, that the total number of seats that could be given to the candidates belonging to the Backward Classes cannot exceed the percent.age of reservation made in their favour.\n\nThat is, accordirig to the learned counsel, if more than the reserv• ed quota amongst the Backward Classes candidates, have secured seats on merit, there can be no further selection of candidates from the reserved group.\n\nNo doubt our attention was drawn to a decision of the Kerala High Court, which has held that the reservation is irrespective of some of the candidates belonginit to the Backward Classes, getting admis1ion on their. own merit.\n\nThe Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken a slightly different view. If a situation arises wherein the candidates belonging to the groups included in the list of Backward Classes, are able to obtain more seats on the basis of their own merits, we can only siate that it is the duty .of the Government to review the question of further reservation of seats for such groups.\n\nThis has to be emphasised because the\n\n(1) [1963] SupP. I S.C.R. 439.\n\nA Government should not act on the basis that once a claSs is considered as a backward class, it should continue to be backward for all time. If once a class appears to have reached a stage of progress, from which it could be safely inferred that no further protection is necessary, the State will do well to review such instances and suitably revise the list of Backward Classes. In fact B it was noticed by this Court in Minor A. Periakarauppan v. Stare of Tamil Nadu and others(') that candidates of Backward Classes had secured nearly 50% of seats in the general pool. On that ground this Court did not hold that the further reservation made for the Backward Classes is invalid.\n\nOn the .other hand it was held: c ''The fact that candidates of backward classes have secured about 50% of. the seats in the general pool does show that the time has come for a de novo comprehensive examination of the question.\n\nIt must be remembered that the Government's decision in this regard is open to judicial review.\"\n\nD The only other aspect that has to be dealt with is the quantum of reservation made for the Backward Classes.\n\nIt was held in M. R. Balaji and others v.\n\nState of Mysore(') that the total of reservation for Backward Classes, Scheduled Caste> anJ Scheduled Tribes should not ordinarily exceed 50% of the available seats. In the case before us, under G.0. No. 1793 of E 1970, the total reservation is only 43%. The break-up of that percentage is 25%, 4% and 14%, for the Backward Classes, Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes respectively. The quantum of. reservation is thus well within the limits mentioned in the decision, referred to above.\n\nFor the reasons given above, we are of the opinion that the F list of Backward Classes, as we!J as the reservation of 25 % of seats in Professional Colleges for the persons mentioned in the said list is valid and is saved by Art. 15 ( 4) of the Constitution.\n\nWe are not inclined to agree with the reasons given by the\n\nHih Court that the said G.0. offends Art. 15(4) of the Constitution.\n\nG ..\n\nTo conclude, we agree with the :fi; ndings of the High Court\\ that reservation of 40% of seats to the H.S.C. candidates to the 1st Year Integrated M.B.B.S. Course under rule 9 of.\n\nG.O.\n\nNo. 1648 of 1970 is invalid. That provision has been rightly struck down by the High Court. . To that extent the judgment a, nd orders of the High . Court are confirmed.\n\nH We, however, differ from the decision of .the High Court regarding the invalidity of G.O. No. 1793 of 1970. On the\n\n(I) A.l.R, 1971\n\nS.C. 2303. 6-L887SuPCl/72\n\n(2) [1963] Supp. I S. C.R. 439.\n\nother hand we hold that the said G.O. is valid and is saved by Art. 15 ( 4) of the Constitution.\n\nThe judgment and orders of the High Court to the extent of striking down the said G.0., in consequence set aside.\n\nIn the result, the judgment and orders of the High Court striking down G.0. No. 1793 of 1970 are set aside . and the appeals allowed in part to that txtent.\n\nIn other respects the appeals will sta, nd dismissed.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs in the appeals. It has been represented on behalf of the State that the admissions already given (o the writ petitioners will not be disturbed.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeals allowed in part.", "total_entities": 184, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 38, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S.V. BALRAM ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "U.S.V. BALRAM ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 28, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 77, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 28, 1972\n\n(C. A. VAID!ALINGAM AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. K. MATHEW, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 509, "end_char": 516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 679, "end_char": 689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 775, "end_char": 789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admission to the integrated M.B.B.S. Course in the government medic'31 co1Ieges in Andhra Pradesh was from two sources, namely, those who had passed the pre-University Course and those who had passed the Higher Secondary -Course (Multi-purpose) and a student from either course had to appear at a competitive test."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Backward Classes Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1343, "end_char": 1385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from these there was a reservation of 25% in favour of &lckward Clam as enumerated by the Andhra Pradesh Backward Classes Commission."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2516, "end_char": 2526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2782, "end_char": 2791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2838, "end_char": 2861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal by the State of Andhra Pradesh,\n\nHELD : (I) It ia no doubt open to the State to prescribe the source frQlll whii:h the <>011didates are declared eligible for applying fol' admission to the medical colleges; but when once a common entrance test has-."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3848, "end_char": 3858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4855, "end_char": 4857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1968) 3 S.C.R. 595", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7169, "end_char": 7188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1968] 2 S.C.R. 786", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7306, "end_char": 7324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 S.C.R. 265", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7789, "end_char": 7808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1964] 6 S.C.R. 368", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7933, "end_char": 7951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Y. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8380, "end_char": 8388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S: Y. Gupte, p. S. Shankar and P. P. Rao, for the appellants (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "p. S. Shankar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8390, "end_char": 8403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S: Y. Gupte, p. S. Shankar and P. P. Rao, for the appellants (in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "p. S. Shankar"}}, {"text": "P. P. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8408, "end_char": 8417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S: Y. Gupte, p. S. Shankar and P. P. Rao, for the appellants (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "P. S. Shankar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8464, "end_char": 8477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. S. Shankar and P. P. Rao, for the appellants (in C.A. Nos.", "canonical_name": "p. S. Shankar"}}, {"text": "M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8552, "end_char": 8563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde and K. Rajendra Chowdhary, for the respondents (in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "K. Rajendra Chowdhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8568, "end_char": 8589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde and K. Rajendra Chowdhary, for the respondents (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "G. Narasimhulu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8637, "end_char": 8651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. Narasimhulu and P. A. Chowdhry, for the respondent (in p C.A. No."}}, {"text": "P. A. Chowdhry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8656, "end_char": 8670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. Narasimhulu and P. A. Chowdhry, for the respondent (in p C.A. No."}}, {"text": "A. Subba Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8721, "end_char": 8733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Subba Rao, for the respondent (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "VPicliaJlngam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8827, "end_char": 8840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nVPicliaJlngam, J. These three appeals, in which the State of Andhra Pradesh is the first appellant,."}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8879, "end_char": 8902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nVPicliaJlngam, J. These three appeals, in which the State of Andhra Pradesh is the first appellant,.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9018, "end_char": 9043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "special leave, are directed against the judgment and order dated May 13, 1971 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in a batch of writ petitions, striking down Rule 9; in the Rules relating to the selection of candi."}}, {"text": "Director cf Medical and Health Services, Hyderabad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9598, "end_char": 9648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Director cf Medical and Health Services, Hyderabad and Principal, Government Medical College, Guntur, are also appellants Nos .. 2 and 3 respectively in the appeals."}}, {"text": "Governme.nt of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9769, "end_char": 9798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Governme.nt of Andhra Pradesh by G.O. No."}}, {"text": "Andhra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9981, "end_char": 9987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1648/ Health dated July 23, 1970 announced Rules for the selection and admission of students to the Integrated M.B.B.S. Course in the Government Medical Colleges, in the Andhra area."}}, {"text": "June 20, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11484, "end_char": 11497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 20, 1970, the Backward Classes Commission appointed ."}}, {"text": "Backward Classes Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11503, "end_char": 11530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 20, 1970, the Backward Classes Commission appointed ."}}, {"text": "September 23, 19i0", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11834, "end_char": 11852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1793/Educatlon, dated September 23, 19i0 announced reservation of 25 % of tlie seats in the M.B.B.S.\n\nCourse for candidates belonginJ!"}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12212, "end_char": 12240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1648 of 1970 was challenged before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in a batch."}}, {"text": "September 5, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12630, "end_char": 12647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These writ petitions were dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on September 5, 1970."}}, {"text": "September 18, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12737, "end_char": 12755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But on Letters Patent Appeals by the candidates, a Division Bench of the High Court on\n\nSeptember 18, 1970 reversed the order of the Single Judge and struck down the provisions regarding holding of entrance test for admission to Government Colleges as illegal."}}, {"text": "February 11, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13020, "end_char": 13037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th:S Court by its judgment dated February 11, 1971 allowed the appeals holding that the Government could hold an entrance test for selection eligible candidates for admission to the medical course in the colleges run by the Government."}}, {"text": "February 12, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13394, "end_char": 13411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the basis of the decision of this Court in the above appeals the Government on February 12, 1971, published an additional list of candidates selected on the basis of the entrance test for admission to the Integrated M.B.B.S. Course."}}, {"text": "December 21: 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13552, "end_char": 13569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 21: 1970, the respondent in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "P .U .C.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14246, "end_char": 14254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The P .U .C. candidate contended that the classification and reser- • vation of 40% of seats for the H.S.C. (M.P.) candidates was violative of Art.", "canonical_name": "P .U .C."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14385, "end_char": 14392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P.U.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14655, "end_char": 14661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the P.U.C. as well as the H.S.C.(M.P.) writ petitioners attacked G.O. No."}}, {"text": "H.S.C.(M.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14677, "end_char": 14688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the P.U.C. as well as the H.S.C.(M.P.) writ petitioners attacked G.O. No."}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14844, "end_char": 14851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14867, "end_char": 14874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14910, "end_char": 14920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H.S.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15320, "end_char": 15326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1648 of 1970, the stand taken by the State was that the P.U.C. and H.S.C. (M.P.) candidates formed two distinct categories and they did not form part of the same class."}}, {"text": "P.U.C", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15686, "end_char": 15691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further contended that the State was .entitled to lay down the principles regarding the source from which the candidates are to be selected to the medical colleges which are run by the Government and that in providing for equal distribution of seats to the P.U.C and H.S.C. (M.P.) candidates, no discrimination has been made and there has been no violation of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15789, "end_char": 15796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 26, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16312, "end_char": 16325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commission had gone into the matter and after considering the educational and social backwardness of the various classes of citizens in the State in the light of the various principles and tests laid down by this Court, had submitted its report on June 26, 1970 enumerating the various classes of persons who are to be treated as Backward Classes."}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18007, "end_char": 18014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18031, "end_char": 18038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18971, "end_char": 18982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before us, on behalf of the appellants Mr. S. V. Gupte, learned counsel has attacked the findings of the High Court striking down Rule 9, issued under G.0.", "canonical_name": "S. V. Gupte"}}, {"text": "Gupte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19430, "end_char": 19435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before we consider the contentions urged in that regard by Mr. Gupte, on behalf of the State and Mr .. Tarkunde, on behalf of the respondents, it is necessary to broadly refer to some of the material rules issued under G.O. No.", "canonical_name": "Gupte"}}, {"text": "Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19470, "end_char": 19478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before we consider the contentions urged in that regard by Mr. Gupte, on behalf of the State and Mr .. Tarkunde, on behalf of the respondents, it is necessary to broadly refer to some of the material rules issued under G.O. No.", "canonical_name": "M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "I.S.C.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20730, "end_char": 20736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<(M.P.), I.S.C., P.U.C. and A.l."}}, {"text": "P.U.C.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20738, "end_char": 20744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<(M.P.), I.S.C., P.U.C. and A.l.", "canonical_name": "P .U .C."}}, {"text": "N.C.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23467, "end_char": 23473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "candidates; 4% for N.C.C., President's Scouts and Guides and Ex."}}, {"text": "I.S.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23906, "end_char": 23912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause (D) dealing with the Multipurpose and P.U.C. candidates, refers to the fact that the total seats available are 545 and that according to the pattern of distribution, 40% of the seats are reserved for Multipurpose and 40% for P.U.C. (including I.S.C.)\"."}}, {"text": "P.U.C./Multipurpose", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24016, "end_char": 24035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said clause further provides that the rate of seats to be filled up by the candidates from the P.U.C./Multipurpose and allied qualification holders should be done so as to keep the number of seats according to the ceiling, i.e., 40% as per the pattern of allot-· ment for each group."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28171, "end_char": 28178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H.S.C", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29286, "end_char": 29291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at .origi11ally existed when the High Court then upheld the divmon mo separate groups of P.U.C. and H.S.C. students, when once the rules clearly specify that there is to be a common Ent_rance Test and that selections are to be made only on the basts of the results of such a test, the reservation of 40% in favour of the H.S.C:."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29589, "end_char": 29596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30836, "end_char": 30843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31639, "end_char": 31641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".U.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32108, "end_char": 32113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".U.C. and the H.S.C. candidates as is the position at present."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34964, "end_char": 34971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35641, "end_char": 35648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maulana Azad Medical College, New Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36352, "end_char": 36391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Union of India and others,(') That decision related to a challenge made by certain students who were denied admission to the Maulana Azad Medical College, New Delhi."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36433, "end_char": 36452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said college was established by the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36878, "end_char": 36896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In particular 23 seats were reserved to certain categories and they were to be filled up by the candidates who were nominated bly the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Andaman", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37254, "end_char": 37261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The categories to which the said nomination had to be so made were as folfows :\n\n( 1 ) Sons/ daughters of residents ol Union Territories\n\nSJ?CCified below including displaced persons registered therein and sponsored by their respecti\\le Administration of Territory :-\n\n(a) Himachal Pradesh, (b) Tripura, ( c) Manipur, (d) Naga Hills, (e) N.E.F.A. and (f)\n\nAndaman."}}, {"text": "s9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37309, "end_char": 37311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R.1968", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37323, "end_char": 37329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.1968 A.P.16S.\n\n(4) [1910!"}}, {"text": "Jammu & Kashmir State Scholars", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37533, "end_char": 37563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( 6) Jammu & Kashmir State Scholars."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37642, "end_char": 37647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appel!ants therein had obtained about 62.5% marks and were domiciled in Delhi."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38341, "end_char": 38348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38380, "end_char": 38387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38405, "end_char": 38412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38494, "end_char": 38501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38518, "end_char": 38525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Azad Medical College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41362, "end_char": 41382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Based upon these obl; ervations, Mr. Gupte, contended that the sources for selecting candidates as well as the reservation made in respect of admission to the Maulana Azad Medical College have both been approved by this Court as valid and not violative of Art .• 14."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44521, "end_char": 44528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46189, "end_char": 46204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In D. N. Chancha/a etc, v. The State of Mysore and others('), one of the 9uestions this Court had to consider was the validity of the univers1tywise distribution of seats in the medical colleges run by the State of Mysore."}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46414, "end_char": 46420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were three Universities in Mysore State, namely, Karnatak, Mysore and Bangalore Universities."}}, {"text": "Karnatak", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46436, "end_char": 46444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were three Universities in Mysore State, namely, Karnatak, Mysore and Bangalore Universities."}}, {"text": "Bangalore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46457, "end_char": 46466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were three Universities in Mysore State, namely, Karnatak, Mysore and Bangalore Universities."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47986, "end_char": 47996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of :Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 52691, "end_char": 52707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Tarkunde referred us to Minor P. Rajendran v. State ,; f Madras and others(') where the validity of the scheme of districtwise distribution of seats as per the rules framed by the State of :Madras, to the Medical Colleges, was challenged as violative of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52765, "end_char": 52772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras City", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 52932, "end_char": 52943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State attempted to justify the said method of districtwise distribution on the ground that if districtwise distribution is not made, the candidates from Madras City would have an advantage and would secure the largest numbi:r of seats in the Medical Colleges, which will not be justified on the basis of the proportion cf population of the Madras City."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53179, "end_char": 53186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53563, "end_char": 53570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 53641, "end_char": 53651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly unitwise distribution of seats in the Medical Colleges in Tamil Nadu was declared by this Court in Minor A. Periakeruppan and ano1her v. State of Tamil Nadu and others(') as violative of Arts."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53770, "end_char": 53778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54042, "end_char": 54049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54142, "end_char": 54149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55569, "end_char": 55576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55873, "end_char": 55880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55903, "end_char": 55910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. V. Gupte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56003, "end_char": 56014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view of the High Court is very strenuously challenged by Mr. s. V. Gupte, learned counsel for the appellants.", "canonical_name": "S. V. Gupte"}}, {"text": "V. M.\n\nTarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 56056, "end_char": 56071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. V. M.\n\nTarkunde, learned counsel for the respondents, supported the Vll!ious reasons given by the High Court for striking down the said reservation."}}, {"text": "State of Andhra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 56617, "end_char": 56632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. P. STATE v. BALRAM (Vaidia!ingam, J.) 267\n\nThe State of Andhra was formed on October 1, 1953 and the Andhra Pradesh State came into existence with effect from November 1, 1956."}}, {"text": "October 1, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56647, "end_char": 56662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. P. STATE v. BALRAM (Vaidia!ingam, J.) 267\n\nThe State of Andhra was formed on October 1, 1953 and the Andhra Pradesh State came into existence with effect from November 1, 1956."}}, {"text": "November 1, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56729, "end_char": 56745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. P. STATE v. BALRAM (Vaidia!ingam, J.) 267\n\nThe State of Andhra was formed on October 1, 1953 and the Andhra Pradesh State came into existence with effect from November 1, 1956."}}, {"text": "State of A; ndhra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 56751, "end_char": 56768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of A; ndhra originally formed part of the Composite Madras State."}}, {"text": "Andhra State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57183, "end_char": 57195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the formation of the Andhra State on October 1, 1953, the list maintained by the Composite Madras State was continued in the Andhra area with some modifications."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 57353, "end_char": 57362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The former Princely State of Hyderabad was also maintaining a list of Backward Clasess in that State, and this was also continued after the formation of Andhra Pradesh, which included Telang3;11a area."}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh--0ne", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 57614, "end_char": 57642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus with effect from November 1, 1956, there were two lists of Backward Classes in the State of Andhra Pradesh--0ne for Andhra area and the other for Telangana area."}}, {"text": "Telangana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 57677, "end_char": 57686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus with effect from November 1, 1956, there were two lists of Backward Classes in the State of Andhra Pradesh--0ne for Andhra area and the other for Telangana area."}}, {"text": "President of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 57812, "end_char": 57830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bath the lists together comprised about 146 communities-86 and 60 in the Andhra and Telangana areas respectively,\n\nThe President of India appointed in January, 1953, a Backward Classes Commission under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 341", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57895, "end_char": 57903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kaka Kalelkar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 57938, "end_char": 57951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "341 nf the Constitution headed by Sri Kaka Kalelkar, to determine the criteria to be adopted for treating any section of the people, other than Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, as socially and educationally Backward Classes."}}, {"text": "August 14, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59243, "end_char": 59258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government conveyed to the State Governments on August 14, 1961 expressing its view that while the State Governments have the discretion to choose their own criteria for defining backwardness it , would be better to apply economic tests rather than classifyi, ng people their castes."}}, {"text": "A11dhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 59969, "end_char": 59995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was challenged before the A11dhra Pradesh High Court by certain applicants on the ground that the Government order offonds Arts."}}, {"text": "Arts. 15 and 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60066, "end_char": 60081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61788, "end_char": 61795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 3, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63321, "end_char": 63337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Cabinet Sub-Committee having taken a decision regarding the criteria to be applied, directed the State Director of Social Welfare to check up the lists of Backward Classes which had been scrapped on February 3, 1964 and to select from th1>se lists the castes or eommunities which could be considered backward on the basis of the above."}}, {"text": "July 29, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63853, "end_char": 63866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1880/Education dated July 29, 1966 was issued with a list showing 112 collllll1lllities as backward as being eligible for scholarships and reservati<ln of seats to Professional Colleges and Government Services. ·"}}, {"text": "High Court of Aridbfa Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 64123, "end_char": 64152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The validity of the above Government Order was ; again challenged before the High Court of Aridbfa Pradesh on the ground flint the list was prepared solely on the basis of caste and violated I' the provisions of the Constitution; Here again the students who\n\nfiled the writ petitions in the High Court urged that there was no material difference between the list drawn up undet lhil•G.O. and the list which was struck down by the High Cou\"t as pet G.0 • .No."}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66297, "end_char": 66307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67421, "end_char": 67428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 27, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69721, "end_char": 69735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of this Court was rendered on March 27, 1968."}}, {"text": "April 12, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69741, "end_char": 69755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 12, 1968, the State Government by G.0."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 69914, "end_char": 69919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "considering whether any sections of the citizens of India in the State of Andhra Pradesh are to be treated as socially and educationally Backward Classes."}}, {"text": "Andhrn Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 70233, "end_char": 70258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ConunissiQll consisted of nine members, presided over by the retired Chief Justice of the Andhrn Pradesh High Court."}}, {"text": "article 341 & 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71624, "end_char": 71641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhia Pradesh Regional Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 73234, "end_char": 73267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report was placed before the State legislature as also the Andhia Pradesh Regional Committee."}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74357, "end_char": 74364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 77446, "end_char": 77452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commission also visited the neighbouring States of Madras, Mysore and Kerala with a view to have discussion with the officers of those Governments, which were connected with the welfare of Backward Classes."}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 77465, "end_char": 77471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commission also visited the neighbouring States of Madras, Mysore and Kerala with a view to have discussion with the officers of those Governments, which were connected with the welfare of Backward Classes."}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 81831, "end_char": 81859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection it has referred to the Report of the Backward Classs Committee,· appointed by the Jammu and Kashmir Government, presided over by Dr. P. B.\n\nGa.iendragadkar, former Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "P. B.\n\nGa.iendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81882, "end_char": 81904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection it has referred to the Report of the Backward Classs Committee,· appointed by the Jammu and Kashmir Government, presided over by Dr. P. B.\n\nGa.iendragadkar, former Chief Justice of India.", "canonical_name": "P. B.\n\nGa.iendragadkar"}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85042, "end_char": 85049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87160, "end_char": 87170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88199, "end_char": 88206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88250, "end_char": 88257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88655, "end_char": 88665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 15(1) and 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88711, "end_char": 88732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88858, "end_char": 88865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Guptc", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 88995, "end_char": 89000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact the attempt of Mr. Guptc was that the principles laid down in the above decisions require reconsideration.", "canonical_name": "Gupte"}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89598, "end_char": 89608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89694, "end_char": 89704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89903, "end_char": 89910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90267, "end_char": 90280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90494, "end_char": 90504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 15 and 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90874, "end_char": 90892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 91184, "end_char": 91204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In State of Madras\n\nv. Shrimati Champakam Dorairajan('), this Court had to consider the validity of an order issued by the Government of Madras."}}, {"text": "Art. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91451, "end_char": 91461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91590, "end_char": 91600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 91717, "end_char": 91727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This led to Parliament 1j.dding Cl. ("}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91749, "end_char": 91756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91807, "end_char": 91820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91891, "end_char": 91901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92708, "end_char": 92715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92771, "end_char": 92778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93761, "end_char": 93771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97789, "end_char": 97799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 98410, "end_char": 98428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Triloki Nath and another v.\n\nState of Jammu & Ka<hmir and others('), the Constitution Bench of this Court held that th~ members of an entire caste or com- H munity may in the social, economic and educational scale of values, at a given time be backward and may on that account be\n\n(I) [19631 Supp."}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99005, "end_char": 99012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100347, "end_char": 100358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 101888, "end_char": 101903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Constitution Bench of this Court had to consider certain rules framed by the State of Madras for selection of candidates for ad- B mission to the 1st Year Integrated M.B.B.S. Course."}}, {"text": "Article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102291, "end_char": 102301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103084, "end_char": 103091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103169, "end_char": 103176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103667, "end_char": 103674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104070, "end_char": 104077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104331, "end_char": 104338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1968] 2 S. C.R. 786", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 104368, "end_char": 104388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104663, "end_char": 104670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105631, "end_char": 105646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106023, "end_char": 106033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106301, "end_char": 106308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1968] 2 S. C. R. 786", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 107135, "end_char": 107156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 107670, "end_char": 107690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) On a comparison of the list, which was under challenge in the said decision, but accepted as correct by this Court, with the list which is under attack before us, we find that most of the groups whqse inclusion in the list by the State of Madras was held to be valid are also found in the list prepared by the Backward Classes Commission appointed by the Andhra Pradesh State."}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108318, "end_char": 108325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir Governments", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 108870, "end_char": 108899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also justified in taking the average student population of Classes X and XI, especially as the said procedure has been accepted by the Committee appointed by the Jammu and Kashmir Governments, presided by Dr. P. B. Gajendragadkar, former Chief Justice of India."}}, {"text": "P. B. Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108917, "end_char": 108937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also justified in taking the average student population of Classes X and XI, especially as the said procedure has been accepted by the Committee appointed by the Jammu and Kashmir Governments, presided by Dr. P. B. Gajendragadkar, former Chief Justice of India.", "canonical_name": "P. B.\n\nGa.iendragadkar"}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 112163, "end_char": 112180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No doubt our attention was drawn to a decision of the Kerala High Court, which has held that the reservation is irrespective of some of the candidates belonginit to the Backward Classes, getting admis1ion on their."}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114661, "end_char": 114668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114793, "end_char": 114803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115448, "end_char": 115455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_289_295_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "PARLE PRODUCTS (P) LTD.\n\nJ. P. & CO. MYSORE\n\nJanuary 28, 1972\n\n[C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, I. D. DUA AND G. K. MITTER, JI.]\n\nTrade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, s. 2(d)-'Deceptivel.v si111i/ar'-Proper approach by court for deter111ining if one 1nark is deceptirely sin1ilar to another.\n\nThe appellants filed a suit for an injunction restraining the respondents from infringing their registered trade mark used on packets of bi>cliits manufactured by them.. The suit was dismissed by the trial. court and the High Court.\n\nAllowing the appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD: (I) Under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, a registe'red trade mark is infringed by a person who uses, in the course of trade, a mark which is identical with or deceptively similar to, the trade mark, in relation to any oodS in respect of which the trade mark is registered; and the expression 'deceptively similar' means a mark which so nearly resembles another mark as likely to deceive or cau~ confusion.\n\nJn order to come to the conclusion whether one mark is deceptively similar to another the broad end essenti(ll features of the two arc to be considered. . They should not be plaed side by side to find out if there are any dif!erenc~ in the design, and if so, whether they a~ of such character as to prevent one d .. ign from being mistaken for the other. Jt would be enough if the. impugned mark bears such on overall .similarity to the registered mark as would be likely to mislead a person usually doaling with one to accept the othe'r if offered to him. [292 B-D; 294 DFJ\n\nIn this case, the packets of biscuits manufactured by ihe appellants and respondents were practically of the same size, the colour scheme of tho two wrappers was almost the same, and the designs on both, though not identical, bore such a close resemblance that one ci:>uld easily be mistaken for the other. If one was not careful enough to note the peculiar featurea of the wrapper on the phintiffs' goods, he might easily mistake the Jefendants' wrapper for the plaintiffs' if shown to him some time after he had seen the plaintiffs' wrapper. Though the trial court and the High . Court had concurrently lound that the defendants' wrapper was not deceptively similar to thot of the plaintiffs, the finding must be set aside as it 11'0s not arrived at on a proper consideration of the Jaw. [294 F-Hl\n\nDurga Dutt v. Navaratna Laboratori<S L196S] I S C.R. 737 followod.\n\nKarly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, 9th ed. para 338 referrid to.\n\nC1VIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C.A. No. 1051 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated July 5, 1966 of the Mysore High Court in Regular First Appeal No. 170 of 1963.\n\nS. T. Desai and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant.\n\nS. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judent of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgml\\nt of the Mysore High Court confirming the dismissal of a suit for an injunction restraining the respondent from infringing the registered trade mark of the plaintiffs used on packets of biscuits.\n\nThe facts are as follows.\n\nThe plaiJltiffs-appellants before us are manufacturers of biscuits and confectionery and are owners of certain registered trade marks. One of them is the word \"Gluco'' used on their half pound biscuit packets. Another registered trade mark of theirs is a wrapper with its colour scheme, general set up and entire collocation of words registered under the Trade Marks Act 1940 a> No. 9184 of 7th December, 1942.\n\nThis wrapper is used in connection with the sale of their biscuits known as \"Parle's Gluco Biscuits\" printed on the wrapper. The wrapper is of buff colour and depicts a farm yard with a girl in the centre carrying a pail of water and cows and hens around her on the background of a farmyard house and trees. The plaintiffs claim that they have been selling their biscuits on an extensive scale for many years past under the said trade mark which acquired great reputation. and goodwill among the members of the public.\n\nThey claimed to have discovered in March 1961 that the defendants were manufacturing, selling and offering for sale biscuits in a wrapper which according to them was deceptively• similar to their registered trade mark. The plaintiffs assert that this act of the defendant constitutes an infringement of their trade mark rights.\n\nAs in spite of lawyer's notice the defendants per, sisted in manlifacturing, selling and using the wrappers complained of with regard to their biscuits, the plaintiffs filed the suit claiming injunction as already mentioned.\n\nThe defendants pleaded ignorance of the registration of the trade marks claimed by the plaintiffs. They denied that the wrapper used by them in connection with the sale of their biscuits was deceptively similar to the plaintiffs' trade marks as alleged or that they had in any way infringed the trade mark rigl!ts of the plaintiffs.\n\nThey .pleaded further th.at there was a good deal of difference in the design of their wrapper from that of the plaintiffs and relied on certain features of their design which were said to be quite dissimilar to those of the plaintiffs' wrapper inasmuch as the defendant's wrapper contained the picture of a girl supporting with one hand a bundle of hay on her head and carrying a sickle and a bundle of food in the other, the cows and hens being unlike\n\nthose of the plaintiffs' wrappers. There was also said to be difference in the design of the buildings on the two wrappers and the\n\nwords printed on the two wrappers were. distinct and separate.\n\nThe trial court meticulously examined the features found on the two wrappers aild the packets of biscuits produced before it and took the view that there were greater points of dissimiiari1y than of similarity between' the two and as such it was unlikely that the defendants, goods could be passed off as and for the goods of the plaintiffs.\n\nAfter pointing out the distinguishing features of the wrappers; th(l: trial court concluded that there was no chance of a seller committing fraud on a customer and an ordinary pur-' chaser would certainly refuse to purchase the defendants' goods if he was offered them as and for the p!intiffs' goods. Accordingly the trial court held that the plaintiffs had failed lo establish their tase.\n\nAlthough the High Court held that in such a case it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to adduce evidence that any particular indiv.idual had been deceived by the defendants' wrapper and it wa& undeniable that the general get up of the two wrappers was more or Jess similar, it went on to observe that the courtl!ad to. bear in mind that it was dealing with packets of biscuits which were generally used by people of the upper classes, and a purchaser desirous of getting a packet of Parle biscuits would go and ask for the same as such, in which case there could be no scope for deception; again the plaintiffs could have no cause for :grievance if a purchaser was content to buy any biscuits which were offered to liim by the shopkeeper.\n\nThe High Court also took the. view that there were several distinguishing features between the two wrappers and these could be noticed even from a distance.\n\nAccording to the High Court, the similarity in the two wrappers lay in the facts that l>oth were oartly yellow and partly white. in colour and both bore the delign ol a Wei and some bird~. \"But\" the High Court said \"there the sirnilanty ends.\n\nThe lady m the wrapper used by the plaintiff company has a pot on her hand while the lady in the wrapper used by the defendant has a hay-bundle on her head. In fact, they are not identical features: !n, the defendants' wrapper we have got a cow and m t?e plamtiffs wrapper we have got two calves.\n\nThe upper portion of the defendants wrapper is not similar to that of the plaintiffs' wrapper.\" 'the Righ Court went on to comment:\n\n \"It is true that in a passing off action, one is not to look to minor details but must take into c'onsideration the broad features. Even if we take the broad features ef the two wrappers into consideration we do not think ithat they Jlre similar. At any rate, they are not so sirni tar 11s to deceive an ordinary purchaser of biscuits.\"\n\nWith due respect to the learned Judges of the High Court, we are constrain¢ to.remark that they fell into an error. The plain(iffs' marks were registered under the Trade Marks Act, 1940 which was however repealed by s. 136 of the. Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. Under sub-s. (2) of the said section any registration under the Act of 1940 if in force at the commencement of the Act of 1958 was to continue in force and have effect as if made, issued and given under the corresponding provisions of the Act of 1958. Under s. 21(1) of the Ac.t of 1940 the registration of a person iii the register as proprietor of a trade mark in respect of any goods gave to. that person the exclusive right to the use of the Trade mark in relation to those goods and that right was to be deemed to be infringed by any person who, not being the proprietor of the trade mark or a registered user thereof using by way of the permitt.ed use, used a mark identical with it or so narly resembling it as to be likely to deceive or cause 9onfusion, in the course of trade, in relation to any goods in respect of which it was registered.\n\nUnder s. 28(1) of the Trade and Merc1_1andise Marks Act, 1958 the registration of a trade mark in Part A or Part B of the register gave to the registered proprietor of the trade mark the exclusive right to the use of the trade mark in relation to the goods in respect of which the trade mark was registered and to obtain relief in respect of the infringement of the trade mark in the manner provided by the Act.\n\nUnder s. 29(1) :\n\n\"A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being the registered proprietor of the trade mark or a registered user thereof using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of a 'trade a mark which is identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trade mark, in relation to any goods in respect of which the trade mark is registered and in such manner as to render the use of the mark likely to be taken as being used as a trade mark.\"\n\nThe expression '.'deceptively similar\" has now been defined under s. 2(d) of..the Act of 1958 thus:\n\n\"A mark shall. be deemed to be deceptively similar to another mark if it so nearly resembles that other mark as to be likely to <!eceive or cause col'lfusion;\"\n\nIt is 1IO be noted .that although there was no such provision in the definition section of the Act of 1940 s. 21 ( 1 )' of the said Act was to the same effect.\n\nThe Indian Trade Marks Act of 1940 was based on the English Trade Marks Act, 19 3 8 and s. 21 of the Act of 1940 was more or less similar to s. 4 of the English Act of 1938. ·\n\nTo decide the question as to whether the plaintiffs' right to a trade mark has been infringed in a particular case, the approach must not be that in an action for passing off goods of the defendant as and for those of the plaintiff. According to this, Court in Durga Dutt v. Navaratna Laboratories( 1):\n\n\"While an action for passing off is a Common Law remedy being in subs\\allce an action for deceit, that is, a passing off by a person of his own goods as those of another, that is not.the gist of an action for infringement.\n\nThe act; ion for infringement is a statutory remedy conferred on the registered proprietor of a registered trade mark for the vindication of the exclusive right to the use of the trade mark in relation to those goods (vide s. 21 of the Act). The use by the defendant\\ of the trade mark of the plantiff is not essential in an action for passing off, but is the sine qua non in the case of an action for infringement.\"\n\nIn the above case the <::ourt further pointed out :\n\n\"In an action for infringement, the plaintiff must, no doubt, make out that the use of the defendant's mark is likely to deceive, but where tlhe similarity between the plaintiff's and the defendant's mark ls so close either visually, phonetically or otherwise and tho court reaches the conclusion that there is an imitation, no further evidence is required to establish that the plaintiff's rights are violated.\n\nExpressed in another way, if the essential features of the trade mark of the plaintiff have been adopted by the defendant, the fact that the get-up, packing and other writing or 1narks on the goods or on the packets in which he offers his gooas for sale show marked differences, or indicate clearly a trade origin different from that of the registered proprietor __ oJ the mark would be immaterial; whereas in the case of passing off, the defendant may escape liability if he can show that the added matter is sufficient to distinguish his goods from those of the plaintiff.\"\n\nAccording to Karly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade (9th edition paragraph 838) :\n\n\"Two marks,_ \"\".hen placed side by side, may exhibit many and various differences vet the main idea left on H the mind by both may be the same. A penen acquainted with one mark, and not having the. two side by side\n\n(I) [1965] I S.C'.R. 737. 754 0\n\nfor comparison, might well be deceived, if the goods were allowed to be impressed with the second mark, into a belief that he was dealing with goods which bore the same mark as that with which he was acquainted.\n\nThus, for exampLe, a mark may represent a game of football; another mark may show players in a different dress, and in very different positions, and yet the idea conveyed by each might be simply a game of football.\n\nIt would be too much to expect thiit persons de.aling\n\nwith trade-marked goods, and relying, as they frequently do, uµon marks, should be able to remember th.e exact details of the marks upon the goods with which they are in the habit of dealing. Marks are remembered rather by general impressions or by some significant detail than by any photographic recollection of the whole. Moreover, variations in detail might well be supposed by customers to have been made. by the owners of the trade mark they are already acquainted with for reasons of their own.\"\n\nIt is .therefore clear that in order to come to the conclusion whether one mark is. deceptively similar to another, the broad and essential features of the t:wo are to be considered. They should not be placed side by side to find out if there are any differences in the design and if so, whether they are of such character as to prevent one desi2n from hein2 mistaken for the other.\n\nIt would be enough if the impugned mark bears such an overall .similarity to the regiStered mark ils would be likely to mislead a person usually dealing with one to accept the other if offered to him:. In this case we find that the packets are practically of the same size, the colour scheme of the two wrappers is almost the same; the design on both though not identical bears such a Close resemblance that one can easily be mistaken for the other.\n\nThe essential features of both are that there is a girl with one arm raised and carrying something in the other with a cow or cows near her and hens or chickens in the foregi'ound. In the background there is a farm house with a fence.\n\nThe word \"Gluco Biscuits\" in· one and \"Glucose Biscuits\" on the other occupy a prominent place at the top with a good deal of similarity between the. two writings.\n\nAnyone in our opinion who has a look at one of the packets to-day may easily mistake the other if shown on another dav as being the same article which he had seett before. U one was not careful enough to note the peculiar features of the wrapper on the plaintiffs' goods. he might easilv mistake the def Pndants' wrapper for the plaintiffs' if shown to him some time after he had seen the -\n\nplaintiffs'.\n\nAfter_all, an ordinary l'\\Jrc_haser is not gifted with\n\nthe powers of observation of a Sherlock Holmes.\n\nWe have therefore no doubt that the defendants' wrapper is deceptively similar to the plaintiffs' which was registered.\n\nWe do llot think it necessary 1to refer to tl!e decisions referred to at the Bar as in our view each case will have to be judged on its own features and it would be of no use to note on how many points there. was similarity and in how many others there was absence of it.\n\nIt was arued before us th.wt as both the trial court and the High Court had come to the same conclusion namely, that the defendants', wrapper was not deceptively similar to the plaintiffs', the finding is one of fact which should not be disturbed by this .\n\nCourt.\n\nNormally, no doubt this Court does not disturb a concurrent finding of fact.\n\nBut where, as here, we find that the finding was arrived at not 011 proper consideration of the law on the subject it js our duty to set the same aside on appeal.\n\nIn the result, we hold tha~ the defendant had infringed the . registered trade. mark of the. plaintifl and the suit of the plaintiff should be decreed and -an injunction granted restraining the defendant-respondent from selling or using il1 any manner what• soever biscuits in wrappers similar in appearance to the registered trade mark of the pbintiffs on their packets.\n\nThe appellants will be entitled to their costs throughout.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal allo\\ved.", "total_entities": 31, "entities": [{"text": "PARLE PRODUCTS (P) LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PARLE PRODUCTS (P) LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "J. P. & CO. MYSORE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J. P. & CO. MYSORE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 28, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 61, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MYSORE\n\nJanuary 28, 1972\n\n[C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, I. D. DUA AND G. K. MITTER, JI.]"}}, {"text": "I. D. DUA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 157, "end_char": 164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958", "statute": "Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 573, "end_char": 610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Karly", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2423, "end_char": 2428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Karly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, 9th ed."}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2631, "end_char": 2648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated July 5, 1966 of the Mysore High Court in Regular First Appeal No."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2691, "end_char": 2702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2707, "end_char": 2719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2741, "end_char": 2752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2757, "end_char": 2768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2833, "end_char": 2839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judent of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgml\\nt of the Mysore High Court confirming the dismissal of a suit for an injunction restraining the respondent from infringing the registered trade mark of the plaintiffs used on packets of biscuits."}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3473, "end_char": 3493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "7th December, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3509, "end_char": 3527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9184 of 7th December, 1942."}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8404, "end_char": 8425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8456, "end_char": 8462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940", "statute": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8471, "end_char": 8508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 21(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8768, "end_char": 8776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958", "statute": "Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "s. 28(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9367, "end_char": 9375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958", "statute": "Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Marks Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9407, "end_char": 9422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 29(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9780, "end_char": 9788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Marks Act, 1958", "statute": "Marks Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "s. 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10311, "end_char": 10318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Marks Act, 1958", "statute": "Marks Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10614, "end_char": 10619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10679, "end_char": 10694, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10728, "end_char": 10743, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10756, "end_char": 10761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10809, "end_char": 10813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11596, "end_char": 11601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_296_302_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "JAIPUR UDYOG LTD.\n\nCEMENT WORK\n\n1KARMACHARI SANGH, SAHU\n\nNAGAR.\n\nJa11uary 28, 1972\n\n[C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, I. D. DUA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]\n\n. Industrial Disputes Act-S. 10(1) (d)-Tribunal cannot go beyond the scope of reference.\n\nThe appellant, a public Limited Company, had a Cement Factory and at '3. distance, :; i. limestone quarry.\n\nIt had two standing orders for the workman employed in the factoiry and in the quarries.\n\nUpto April, 1967, both sets of standing orders provided fo< superannuation of the workmen at the age of 55 with a stipulation for extension upto 60 years if a workman was found fit to work. After a dispute at the Cement Factory, a settlement was arrived at by which it was agreed that the standing order applicable to the Cement Factory be amended by raising the age of superannuation from 55 t..:> 58 without making any provision for further exten~ sion S.nd accordingly, the amendment was made. Nothing was, however, done with regard to the superannuation age of the employees at the quarry.\n\nOn April 3, 1968, the appellant intimated the incline driver at the quarry that he had reached the age of retirement on 3-4-68 and accord ingly he was given notice of retirement in terms of the standing order.\n\nOn April 30, 1968, the said workman wrote to the appellant that altbou&h service records showed him to be SS yean of age, his proper aao accord ing to his borOICOpe, was about SO yean and so his service record• ahould be amended accordingly, but the appellant refuaed.\n\nThe Union took up the cause of the worker and requested the Regional Labour Commilllioner to put the worker back to work .. On a reference under S. 10(1) (d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Triblinal took the view that the Cement Factory and the quarries were two units of the same eotablishment and so, there should be a uniform set of rules for the wo<kmeri of the Company as a whole.\n\nIn the result, the Tribunal held that there could not be a lower age limit of superannuation for workmen at the quarry specially in view of the fact that workmen were admittedly transferred from one unit to the other. As a consequence, the Tribunal quashed lhe order of dismissal and direcied the reinstatement of the workman with full back wages.\n\nIt was contended by the Company before this Court that the TribuD:ll was wrong 'in construing tho order of reference to include a dispute as to whether it was open to the C.Ompany to have two sets of standing G orders providing for different ages of superannuation.\n\nAccording to the appellant, the dispute between the parties w:is whether or not the Company was justified in Coming to the conclusion that the workman con cemed had reached the age of 55 on April 3, 1968, and as such, was to be superannuated in terms of the standing orders.\n\nSetting aside the award,\n\nHELD : Tbe Tribunal had not taken care to examine what was the H dispute between the parties when the government made the order of reference.\n\nNo dispute was ever aised either by the workman or the Union that the age of superannuation governing the _workman was not\n\nJAI~UR UDYOG LTD. V. CEMENT KARMACHARI SANGH 297 (Mitter, J.) 55 years. The finding of the Tribunal that !he Company could not fix. a lower age limit of superannuation for the workman at the qU'lI'ries wentbeyond the scope of reference.\n\nThe Tribunal never addressed itself to the point of view of the workman that his proper age was anly 50 and not 55; nor did it come to a finding that the true age of the workman:· being 50 years in 1968, there was no question of his superannuation in 1hot year. [302 CJ\n\nThe Sindhu Rese1tlement Corporation Lu/. vs. The Industrial Tribunal,.\n\nG11jarat & Ors. [1968] I S.C.R. 515 referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1166 of 1971.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Award dated December 19, 1970 of the CentralGovernment Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur in Case No. CI'l:'-10 of 1968.\n\nM, C. Setalvad, K. K. Jain, C. N. Sharma, C. S. Patel and Bishamber Lal, for the appellant.\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi and J. Ramamurthi, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·\n\nMitter, J, This is an appeal by special leave from an award of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan directing the reinstatement of one Bhisham Verma in the service of t..'ie\n\nappellant with full back wages. ·\n\nThe_ facts are as foliows.\n\nThe appellant is a public limited company with its registered office at Sawaimadhopur in the State of Raiasthan. It has a cement factory at the said place besides a limestone quarry at Phallodi situiite at a distance of 24 kms. from\n\nthe cement fa_ctory.\n\nIt has two separate sets of Standing Order> for the workmen employed in the factory and in the quarries.\n\nBath sets of Standing Orders were certified in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Ac!,\n\n1946. The Standing Orders applicable to the workmen employed in the factory were certified in the year 1954 while those applicable to the workmen of the quarries were certified in the year 1961.\n\nUp to April 1967 both sets of Standing Orders provided for superannuation of the workmen at the age of 55 with a stipulation for extension up to 60 years if a workman was found fit to work.\n\nOn a dispute having been raised for the raising of the age of 8uperannuati0n of the workmen at the cement factory, a settlement was arrived at between the appellant and the respondent (a\n\nreltitered trade union of the employees) on 16th December 1966 whe-reby it was agreed that Standinp; Order No. 21 applicable to the. cement factory be amended by raising the age of superannuation.from 55 to 58 years without making any provisfon for further\n\nextension. A joint application following upon the agreerMnt was moved by the appellant and !he respondent for modifying the\n\nStanding Order No. 21 with respect to the age of superannuation which was accordingly done. Nothing was however done with regard to the age of superannuation of the employees at !he quarry. the relevant clause in 'the Standing Order remaining unaltered.\n\nOn April 3, 1968 the appellant intimated the said Bhishan1 Va/.;; ia, incline driver a!. the quarry, that he \"had exceeded the age of retirement on 3-4-1968\" and as such he was given \"notice of retirement in accordance with clause 21 of the Standing Orders of the quarries With effect from the close of work on 2-5-1968\". On April 30, 1968 the said wortanan wrote to !he appellant that although according to the service file he had completed 1the age of 55 years as indicated, his proper age according to his horoscope was about 50 years and his service record should be amended accordingly.\n\nThe appellants' reply to the above dated July 9, 1968 was !o the effect that his case had been re-examined and that his retirement, as already intimated on 3-4-1968 would stand.\n\nThe Union took up the cause of the worker and addressed a letter on July 18, 1968 to 1he Regional Labour Commissioner requesting that arrangemen!s may .be made to put the worker back to work and take proper legal proceedings. On behalf of the workman it was represented that he had been working in the company sine\" October 11, 1957, that the Personnel Manager of the quarry had given orders dismissing him from service on April 3, 1968 and tha! in spite of objections made by the workman thai there was a mistake in the papers of the company with regard to his age which was 50 as supported bv his horoscope and doctor's certificate, the action of the quarry manager was illegal and contrary to service con!ract. The record does not show what if any other steps were taken by the parties when the Central Government made an order of reference under s. 10 (1 )( d) of the Industrial Disputes Act reading :\n\n\"Whether the action of th;;1 management of !he Jaipur Udyog Limited, P.O. Phallodi Quarry, Sawaimadhopur in terminating the services of Bhisham Varma, incline driver, with effect from 9th July 1968, on l(roUnds of superannuation was legal and justified ? If not to what relief is he entiled ?\n\nBefore the Tribunal, the respondent Union filed a sttitement\n\nof claim wherein after reciting the action taken by the appellant and, the represen!atioh made by the workman it was stated that H the quarry and the cement factory were under one and the same management and there was complete financial integrality between 'the activities of !he company at both the places. It was also'said\n\nJAIPUR UDYOG LTD. V. CEMENT KARMACHAR! SANGH 299 (Mitter,/.) that workmen could be transferred from one place to another and that a& a result of the settlement mentioned, the company could not retire any workman before he al'lained the age of 58 years.\n\nThe settlement was said to apply to the workmen employed at both the places. The Union further submitted that tile company could not ilJliist on two sets of conditions of service covering different sections of the same workmen in tile same establishment, that the age of retirement was no! a subject mentioned in the Schedule to the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Aot and as such no Standing Order could be Cl'.rtified on this topic.\n\nIn its reply to !he above, the company took the stand that the settlement ~!!)ved at in respect of the cement works Karmachari Sangh, Sawai Madhopur was not ipso facto 1 applicable ito the quarry inasmuch as the proper authority under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 in respect of the cement works was the Government of Rajasthan whereas the appropriate Government in respect of the quanies was the Government of India. It was said further that in pursuance of the settlement anived alt in 1966 the Standing Orders were amended by the Certifying Officer of the Government of Rajasthan as a result whereof the age of superannuR'tion in the works at Sawai Madhopur was raised to 58. This however did not alter or modify the position prevailing in the quar1ies which were governed by a separate set of orders certified by , the Certifying Officer of !he Government of India.\n\nThe Tribunal took the view that th~ cement factory and the quarries were two units of the same .establishment and that consequeny there should be a uniform set of rules for the workmen of the company as a whole and it was immaterial that in the case of one unit the Standing Orders had to. be certified by the Certifying Officer of the Government of India and in the other by the Officer\n\nappointed by !he Government of Rajasthan. The Tribunal was further of ihe view that the clause as to superannuation could net\n\nbe provided in the Standing Orders under the relevant Act and certification could not attach enforceability to them even on the ground that t!Je workers did not challenge such provision before the Certifying Officer. In the result the Tribunal held that there\n\noould not be a lower age limit of superannuation for workmen at the Phallodi Quarry specially in view of the fact that workmen were admittedly transferable from one place to the other. As a consequence of the above finding, the Tribunal quashed the order and directed the reinstatement of the workman with foll back wages.\n\nOn behalf of the company the first contention raised by Mr.\n\nSetalvad was .that the Tribunal had gone wron11: in construii; ig the order of reference to include a dispute as to whether it was open to the company to have two sets of Standing Orders providing for\n\n.. different ages of superannuation. Mr. Setalvad argued that in A view of the co;:respondence terminating with ithe representation bv the Union to the Conciliation Officer, it was abundantly clear that the dispute between the parties was whether or not the company was\n\njustified in coming to the conclusion '.hat the workman concerned had reached the aw~ of 55 on April 3, 1968 and as such was to be superannuated in terms of the Standing Orders. The Jetter of the B 9th July 1968 by the Company to the workman reads :5 follows :-\n\n\"Pl, J!~Se re.fer to your applic<ttion dated 30-4-1968\n\nreceiv.~ by us on 8-5-1968 along with a copy of your horoscope in Hindi. The Management has re-examined your case and come to a final conclusion that your re- C tirement from the service of the company as intimated to you vide our memo No. PQIB/186 dated 3-4-68 should stand. You are, therefore, directed to collect your dues, if any, from our Accounts Department on any working day after producing necessary clearance certificate.\"\n\nOf necessity, reference had to be made by the Tribunal to tile D application of the workman dated April 30, 1968 with a copy uf his horoscope.\n\nThe said latler expressly complained of 1i1e alleged inacc11racy in the service record pertaining to him according to which the writer had not completed the age of 55 year< (HI the 3rd April.\n\nThe workman's representation was that his age had been ina.ccurately recorded, •that his proper age was 50 ; rnd E that the records should be correted accordingly.\n\nIn our view, if the Tribunal had taken care •to examir.1\" \"h.it was the dispute between the parties when the Government made the order of reference it would have had no difficulty in realising that no dispute was raised either by the workman or the Union that the age of sup, rannuation governing , the workman was not 55 years. It was certainly open to the workman to contend that hi>\n\nae of superannuation should b~ fixed at 58 and not 55 years anJ it would have been equally open to the Union to raise the point\n\nin their represen•ta1ion to the Conciliation Officer.\n\nTf that had been done, the Government of .Rajasthan could have properly made a reference of a dispute between the parties regarding the G correct age of superannuation and the adjudication of the disputi: regarding the superannuaition of the workman concerned on that basis. Nothing was however shown to us, apart from the d0cuments already referred to, to enable us to find that any qu.estion had been raised before the Government of Rajasthan relating to the age of superannuation of the workmen at the quarries or that there was any basis for apprehensi0n of such a dispute and 'it was therefore not open ito the Tribunal to enlarge the ambit of the dispute between the parties by reference to the difference in the\n\n': : A\n\nJAIPUR UDYOG LTD. V. CEMENT KARMACHARI SANGH 301 (Mitter, J.) age of superannuation under tho two sets of Standing Orders. Mr\n\nSetalvad drew our aVtemion to the judgment of this Court in The Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd. v. The Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat & ()rs. ( 1) for the proposition that unless a dispute was raised by the workman with their employer it could not become an industrial dispute.\n\nRespondent No. 3 before this Court in that case was employed 'by the appellant as an accounts Clerk at Gandhidham in the year 1950. Some years thereafter his services\n\nwere placed at the disposal of the subsidiary company of the appellant.\n\nThe respondent was appointed in the said subsidiary company on a different set of conditions of service. He worked with that CQllUlany up to February 1958 when his services were terminated after payment of retrenchment compenslltion and other dues by the sajd su.bsidiary company. The respondent then went to the appellant and requested that he might be given posting orders. The appellant declined lo do so on the ground that the post which he was occupyin.e; in 1953 had been permanently filled up. Thereupon the respondent demanded retrenchment compensation from the appellant also. As the representations of the respondent were not fruitful, conciliation proceedings were started and ultimately,. on the report of the Conciliation Officer, the State of Gujarat referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal.. The\n\nmatter referr~ for adjudication was, \"whether the said resp0ndent\n\nshould be reinstated in the service of the appellant an<;! be paid back wages from 21st February, 1958.\" The Tribunal directed reinstatement and payment of back wages. In allowing the appeal. this Court observed that the respondent workman had only asked for payment of retrenchment compensation and /did not raise any dispute for reinstatement. According to this Court (si; e p. 522) :-\n\n\" .... the evidence produced clearly showed that no such dispute (i.e. relating to reinstatement) had ever n raj_scd by the respondent with the management of the appellant. If no dispute at all was raised by the respondents with the management, any request sent by them , to the Government would only be a aemand by them and no_t an industrial dispute betwu them and their\n\nemployer.\"\n\nRelying on the above decision Mr. Setalvad argued ithat in order that a reference can be construed to embrace a particular dispute it must be shown that a demand had be>n made by the workman and not accepted by the employers so as to give rise to a dispute which in the view of the Government required adjudication. Mr.\n\nRamamurty on behalf of the respondents drew our attention 'to the provisions of s. 10 (1) of the InduS'trial Dispmes Act and in particular to clauses (c) and (d) thereof. He argued that it was open to !he appropriate Government in an appropriate case to\n\n(l) [l968J 1. s.c.R. s1s.\n\nrefer a dispute alOnl!; with any martter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute and no objection could be taken to the award of a Tribunal where the Tribunal had not transgressed the limits of els. ( c) and ( d) of s. 10 ( 1 ) of the Aot. It was further contended that the proper age of superannuation applica r 1 ,\n\nto the comPal\\Y as a whole was so intimately connected with or relevant to the dispute which actually arose between the parties prior to the order of r.; oference as to lead us to hold that the Tribunal had not gone beyond its jurisdiction in construing the order of reference to embrace an adjudication as -to proper age of superannuation of a workman like Bhisham Verma. In our view, the finding of the Tribunal that the Company could not fix a lower age limit of superannuation for workmen at the quarries went beyond the scope of reference which had to be gathered from the circumstances preceding the Government Order. The Tribunal\n\nne'•r addressed itself to !he paint of view of the workman that his proper age was only 50 and not 55; nor did it come to a findinl!; that the true age of the workman being 50 years in 1968 there was no question of his superannuatio11 in that year.\n\nMr. Setl!lvad raised a further point that so Jong as the quarries had a different set of Standing Orders prescribing a different age of superannuation from ithat fixed under the Standing Orders relating to the ement works, the tribunal could no! have disregarded the Standing Orders as it had purported to do and lay down that the age of superannuation of all workmen should be 58 as found by it. Our attention was drawn to s. 2(g) of the Industrial En1ployment (Standing Orders) Act and to s. 3(2) of the said Act under which provision had to be made in Standing Orders for all m:itters set out in the Schedule to the Ac!. According to Mr.\n\nSetalvad, item 8 of the Schedule reading :\n\n\"Termination of employment, and the notice thereof to~ given by employer and workmen.\" allowed !he framing of Standing Orders with regard to age of superannuation. Mr. Ramamurty on the ather hand contended that this item could not possibly embrace such a matter as the age of superannuation but was limited !o voluntary aots of the employer or tl!_e workmen to put an end to the employment without any question of suir.rannuation.\n\nArguments were advanced at some length by counsel on ei!her side on this point, but in . the view which we have taken on the first point as to the jurisdiction gf the TribUJlal, we find it unnecessary to decide this point.\n\nIn the result we hold tha! the award of the Tribunal was incompetent as the dispute which it sought to adjudicate upon was not the one referred. The award will therefore be set aside, but in the circums!ances of the case, we make no order as to costs.\n\nS.C.\n\nAward set aside.", "total_entities": 52, "entities": [{"text": "JAIPUR UDYOG LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAIPUR UDYOG LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CEMENT WORK\n\n1KARMACHARI SANGH, SAHU\n\nNAGAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CEMENT WORK KARMACHARI SANGH, SAHU NAGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Ja11uary 28, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 82, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ja11uary 28, 1972\n\n[C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, I. D. DUA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "I. D. DUA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 165, "end_char": 173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "April 3, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1025, "end_char": 1038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 3, 1968, the appellant intimated the incline driver at the quarry that he had reached the age of retirement on 3-4-68 and accord ingly he was given notice of retirement in terms of the standing order."}}, {"text": "3-4-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1142, "end_char": 1148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 3, 1968, the appellant intimated the incline driver at the quarry that he had reached the age of retirement on 3-4-68 and accord ingly he was given notice of retirement in terms of the standing order."}}, {"text": "April 30, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1236, "end_char": 1250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 30, 1968, the said workman wrote to the appellant that altbou&h service records showed him to be SS yean of age, his proper aao accord ing to his borOICOpe, was about SO yean and so his service record• ahould be amended accordingly, but the appellant refuaed."}}, {"text": "S. 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1648, "end_char": 1656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1668, "end_char": 1691, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3924, "end_char": 3935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M, C. Setalvad, K. K. Jain, C. N. Sharma, C. S. Patel and Bishamber Lal, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "C. Setalvad"}}, {"text": "K. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3937, "end_char": 3947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M, C. Setalvad, K. K. Jain, C. N. Sharma, C. S. Patel and Bishamber Lal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. N. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3949, "end_char": 3961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M, C. Setalvad, K. K. Jain, C. N. Sharma, C. S. Patel and Bishamber Lal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. S. Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3963, "end_char": 3974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M, C. Setalvad, K. K. Jain, C. N. Sharma, C. S. Patel and Bishamber Lal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Bishamber Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3979, "end_char": 3992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M, C. Setalvad, K. K. Jain, C. N. Sharma, C. S. Patel and Bishamber Lal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4014, "end_char": 4030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi and J. Ramamurthi, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "J. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4035, "end_char": 4048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi and J. Ramamurthi, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4117, "end_char": 4123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·\n\nMitter, J, This is an appeal by special leave from an award of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan directing the reinstatement of one Bhisham Verma in the service of t..'ie\n\nappellant with full back wages. ·"}}, {"text": "Bhisham Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4269, "end_char": 4282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·\n\nMitter, J, This is an appeal by special leave from an award of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan directing the reinstatement of one Bhisham Verma in the service of t..'ie\n\nappellant with full back wages. ·", "canonical_name": "Bhisham Verma"}}, {"text": "Sawaimadhopur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4444, "end_char": 4457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is a public limited company with its registered office at Sawaimadhopur in the State of Raiasthan."}}, {"text": "Raiasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4474, "end_char": 4483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is a public limited company with its registered office at Sawaimadhopur in the State of Raiasthan."}}, {"text": "16th December 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5484, "end_char": 5502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a dispute having been raised for the raising of the age of 8uperannuati0n of the workmen at the cement factory, a settlement was arrived at between the appellant and the respondent (a\n\nreltitered trade union of the employees) on 16th December 1966 whe-reby it was agreed that Standinp; Order No."}}, {"text": "3-4-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6226, "end_char": 6234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the quarry, that he \"had exceeded the age of retirement on 3-4-1968\" and as such he was given \"notice of retirement in accordance with clause 21 of the Standing Orders of the quarries With effect from the close of work on 2-5-1968\"."}}, {"text": "clause 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6302, "end_char": 6311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "2-5-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6389, "end_char": 6397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the quarry, that he \"had exceeded the age of retirement on 3-4-1968\" and as such he was given \"notice of retirement in accordance with clause 21 of the Standing Orders of the quarries With effect from the close of work on 2-5-1968\"."}}, {"text": "9, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6717, "end_char": 6724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants' reply to the above dated July 9, 1968 was !"}}, {"text": "July 18, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6918, "end_char": 6931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union took up the cause of the worker and addressed a letter on July 18, 1968 to 1he Regional Labour Commissioner requesting that arrangemen!s may .be made to put the worker back to work and take proper legal proceedings."}}, {"text": "October 11, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7166, "end_char": 7182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the workman it was represented that he had been working in the company sine\" October 11, 1957, that the Personnel Manager of the quarry had given orders dismissing him from service on April 3, 1968 and tha!"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7648, "end_char": 7666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The record does not show what if any other steps were taken by the parties when the Central Government made an order of reference under s. 10 (1 )( d) of the Industrial Disputes Act reading :\n\n\"Whether the action of th;;1 management of !"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7700, "end_char": 7705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7722, "end_char": 7745, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bhisham Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7893, "end_char": 7906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he Jaipur Udyog Limited, P.O. Phallodi Quarry, Sawaimadhopur in terminating the services of Bhisham Varma, incline driver, with effect from 9th July 1968, on l(roUnds of superannuation was legal and justified ?", "canonical_name": "Bhisham Verma"}}, {"text": "Sawai Madhopur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9271, "end_char": 9285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he above, the company took the stand that the settlement ~!!)ved at in respect of the cement works Karmachari Sangh, Sawai Madhopur was not ipso facto 1 applicable ito the quarry inasmuch as the proper authority under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 in respect of the cement works was the Government of Rajasthan whereas the appropriate Government in respect of the quanies was the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9376, "end_char": 9404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Government of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9444, "end_char": 9467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he above, the company took the stand that the settlement ~!!)ved at in respect of the cement works Karmachari Sangh, Sawai Madhopur was not ipso facto 1 applicable ito the quarry inasmuch as the proper authority under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 in respect of the cement works was the Government of Rajasthan whereas the appropriate Government in respect of the quanies was the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9537, "end_char": 9556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he above, the company took the stand that the settlement ~!!)ved at in respect of the cement works Karmachari Sangh, Sawai Madhopur was not ipso facto 1 applicable ito the quarry inasmuch as the proper authority under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 in respect of the cement works was the Government of Rajasthan whereas the appropriate Government in respect of the quanies was the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11173, "end_char": 11181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the company the first contention raised by Mr.\n\nSetalvad was .that the Tribunal had gone wron11: in construii; ig the order of reference to include a dispute as to whether it was open to the company to have two sets of Standing Orders providing for\n\n.. different ages of superannuation.", "canonical_name": "C. Setalvad"}}, {"text": "Government of .Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13499, "end_char": 13523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tf that had been done, the Government of .Rajasthan could have properly made a reference of a dispute between the parties regarding the G correct age of superannuation and the adjudication of the disputi: regarding the superannuaition of the workman concerned on that basis."}}, {"text": "Gandhidham", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14714, "end_char": 14724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 before this Court in that case was employed 'by the appellant as an accounts Clerk at Gandhidham in the year 1950."}}, {"text": "State of Gujarat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15600, "end_char": 15616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the report of the Conciliation Officer, the State of Gujarat referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal.. The\n\nmatter referr~ for adjudication was, \"whether the said resp0ndent\n\nshould be reinstated in the service of the appellant an<;!"}}, {"text": "21st February, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15822, "end_char": 15841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "be paid back wages from 21st February, 1958.\""}}, {"text": "Ramamurty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16835, "end_char": 16844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.\n\nRamamurty on behalf of the respondents drew our attention 'to the provisions of s. 10 (1) of the InduS'trial Dispmes Act and in particular to clauses (c) and (d) thereof."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16915, "end_char": 16920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17111, "end_char": 17113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17351, "end_char": 17356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhisham Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17811, "end_char": 17824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further contended that the proper age of superannuation applica r 1 ,\n\nto the comPal\\Y as a whole was so intimately connected with or relevant to the dispute which actually arose between the parties prior to the order of r.; oference as to lead us to hold that the Tribunal had not gone beyond its jurisdiction in construing the order of reference to embrace an adjudication as -to proper age of superannuation of a workman like Bhisham Verma.", "canonical_name": "Bhisham Verma"}}, {"text": "Setl!lvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18345, "end_char": 18354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Setl!lvad raised a further point that so Jong as the quarries had a different set of Standing Orders prescribing a different age of superannuation from ithat fixed under the Standing Orders relating to the ement works, the tribunal could no!", "canonical_name": "C. Setalvad"}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18765, "end_char": 18772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18832, "end_char": 18839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18983, "end_char": 18991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mr.\n\nSetalvad, item 8 of the Schedule reading :\n\n\"Termination of employment, and the notice thereof to~ given by employer and workmen.\"", "canonical_name": "C. Setalvad"}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_29_57_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "DELHI CLOTH & GENERAL MILLS CO.\n\nLUDH BUDH SINGH\n\nJanuary 11, 1972\n\n[C. A. VAID!ALINGAM AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.]\n\nJ11dusiriul Disputes Act ( 14 of 1947), ss. 10 antl 33-Donze.5lic en~ quiry by 1na11age111.ent-Jurisdiction of Tribunal to interefere u•ith findings and conider additio11al evjtienc:e.\n\nAn inquiry was held into certain allegations of n1isconduct against the respondent, who was an employee of the appellant, and the Enquiry Officer made a report holding that the allegations had been proved. The appellant accepted the report and decided to dismiss him. Since an industrial dispute bet\\veen the appellant and its workmen was pending beforo the Industrial Tribunal, an application was made under s .. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to the Tribunal for permission to dismiss the respondent.\n\nBefore the Tribunal neither party examined witnesses and tho appellant relied only on the enqiry proceedings.\n\nAfter nrguments, the Tribunal reserved judgment. The appellant, then filed an application praying that if the enquiry proceedings were found to be defective the appellant should be given an opportunity. to adduce evidence to justify the action proposed to be taken.\n\nThe Tribunal did not deal with the application but held that the enquiry proceedings had not been properly conducted and the findings of the Enquiry Officer were not in accordance . with the evidence before him, and refused permission for disn1issing the respondent.\n\nDisn1issing the appeal to this Court.\n\nHELD: (1) The Industrial Tribunal had to consider whether the appcJlant had made out a prilna facie case for the permission asked for, and for that purpose, it was justified in considering the nature of the allegations, the findings, and the evidence before the Enquiry Officer. The jurisdictiol} of the Tribunal in such matters is to consider whether the :findi!lgs are such that no reasonable person wou1d arrive at them on the materials before the Enquiry Officer, or, whether the findings were not su'pported by any legal evidence at all. If the Tribunal held that the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer could not have been arrived at by a reasona\"le person, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to interfere with such a finding, on the ground that it is perverse.\n\n[38 C; 42 E-H; 43 A 1\n\nIn the present case, (a) the finding against the respondent was recol'ded by the Enquiry Officer ignori.ng material admissions, bv witnesses. in favour of the respondent. It is not a question of mere appreciation of evidence but really recording a finding contrary to evidence, [4J DJ\n\n(b) The Enquiry Officer found the respondent guilty of acts of violence from his mere presence in the crowd outside the premises of the appellant. f43 E-FI\n\n(c) The Enquiry Officer contrary to the rule of burden of proof, held that since the respondent had not adduced any evidence in his defence it was not opcll to him to contend that he was not responsible for the acts of <lestri1ction and damage [43 F-G]\n\nTherefore, the Industrial Tribunal was justified In concludina that the appellant had not made out a Prima facle Ctlst. [44 Al\n\nDeihl Cloth & General 'Mills Co. v. Ganesh Dutt and Ors, C.A. No. 982/67 Dt. 17-12-71, Martin Burn Ltd. v. R. N. Banerjee, [19581 S.C.R. 514, Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 204 and Central Bank of India Ltd., New Delhi v .. Shri Prakash Chand lain, [19691\n\n1. S.C.R. 735, followed. ·\n\n( 2) In proceedings before the Tribunal either on a reference under s. 10 or by way of an application under s, 33 of the Act, tb6 jurisdiction of the Ttibunal is as follows : ·\n\n(a) If no domestic inquiry bad been held by the management or if the management makes it clear that it does not rely upon any domestic inquiry that may have been held by it, it is entitled straight away to adduce evidence before the Tribunal and justify its action.The Tribunal is bound to consider that evidence on merits, and, in such a case it is not necessary for the Tribunal to consider the validity of the domestic inquiry, [54 G-Hl\n\n(b) If a domestic inquiry had been held, it is open to the manage ment to rely upon it in the first instance, and alternatively, and without prejudice to its plea that the inquiry was proper, simultaneously adduce additional evidence before the Tribunal justifying its action. In such a case no inference can be drawn, without anything more, that the manage. ment ha& given up the enquiry conducted by it; and it is the duty of the Tribunal, in the first instance, to consider whether the enquiry proceed ings conducted by the management were valid and proper.\n\nIf the Tribunal is satisfied that the enquiry was properly held the question di\n\nconsidering the evidence adduced before it oil merits. does not arise. U the Tribunal holds that the enquiry was not properly held then it has jurisdiction to consider the evidence adduced before it by the management. [SS ADl\n\n(c) When I! domestic inquiry has been held bY the management and the management relies on it, the management 'may request the Tribunal to try the validity of the domestic inquiry as a preliminary issue and also ask for an opportunity to adduce evi&ence before the Tribunal if the finding on the preliminary issue is against the management. In such a case if the finding on the preliminary. iss.ue is against the management, the Tribunal will have to give the employer an opportunity to adduce additional evidence and also give a similar opportunity to the employee to lead evidence contra. But the management should avail itself of the said opportunity by making a suitable request to the Tribunal before the proceedings are closed. If no such opportunity has been availed of before the proceedings were closed, the employer can make no grievance that the Tribunal did not provide for such an opportunity. [55 D-H; 56 ACl\n\n( d) If the employer relies only on the domestic inquiry and does not sin1ultaneously lead additional evidence, or ask for an opportunity during the• pend ency of the proceedings to adduce such evidence, the duty of the Tribunal is only to consider the validity of the domestic inquiry and the finding recor&ed therein and decide the matter; It is not its function to suo moto give an opportunity to the management to adduce evidence before it to justify the action taken. [56 C-El\n\nIn the present case, the record of proceedings shows that the appellant filed the application for adducing further evidence after the proceedin.s before the Tribunal came to an end and judgment as reserved\n\nD.C.M, v. LUDH BUDH SINGH (Jlaltliali\"lllm, /.) 31\n\nA The appellant did not ask for an opportunity when the proceedings were\n\npending and hence, thouah the Tribunal did not deal with the application on merits, it could not be said that the opportunity to which the appellant was entitled had been denied to the appellant. (57 Bi-OJ\n\nManagement of Ritz Theatre (P) Ltd. v. Its Workmen, [19631 3 S.C.R. 461, State Bank of India v. R. K. Jain & Ors., C.A. No. 992/67 di. 17-9-71, M/s. Bharat Sugar Miiis Ltd. v. Shrl Jal Singh & Ors, (1962) B 3 S.C.R. 684 and Workmen of Motipur Sugar Factory (P) Ltd. v. Motipur Sugar Factory, [1965) 3 S.C.R. 588, followed.\n\n€!VIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : c. A. No. 984 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment dated March 22, 1967 of the Delhi Administration Special Industrial Tribunal, C Delhi in Application No. 1 O of 1967 (Dhanbad).\n\nH. L. Anand, D. P. Thadani, S.S. Sharma and M. L. Chhibber, for the appellant.\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi, Vineet Kumar and S. S. Khunduja, for the respondtmt.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J.-This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the order dated March 22, 1967 of the Delhi Administration, Special Industrial Tribunal, dismissing application No. 10 of E 1967 filed by the appellant under s. 33(l)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act).\n\nThe appellant is a public limited company owning textile mills called Delhi Cloth Mills, situated at Bara Hindu Rao, Delhi, and Swatantra Bharat Mills, situated at Najafgarh, New Delhi.\n\nThe workman Ludh Budh Singh was employed, at the material time, in F the Spinning Section 'C' of the fonner mill. A dispute about the payment of bonus for the year 1964-65 arose tween the appellant and their workmen some time in the later part of the year 1965.\n\nIn pursuance of a settlement dated December 13, 1965, arrived at between the management and its workmen, the bonus for the year ending June 30, 1964 was. declared.\n\nTht said settle- G ment also provided that negotiations for settling the rate of bonus for the year ending June 30 1965 were to be held soon after the accounts of the mill had been audited and passed at the Annual General Meeting due to take place on December 14, 1965. The negotiations in that direction were commenced on or about Decem. ber 25, 1965, but no settlement could be arrived at between the n parties and as such the negotiations failed on February 16, 1966.\n\nIn order to pay the bonus within the period prescribied in the Payment of Bonus Act, the appellant declared on February 21.\n\nA 1966, bonus for the year ending June 30, 1965, at the rate of 6% of the annual wages. The workmen being dissatisfied with the quantum of bonus declared by the Company, the Union called upon !he workmen not to receive the bonus.\n\nAs a protest, tl\\e workmen went on strike on the afternoon of February 23, 1966.\n\nAccording to the management, this strike took a violent turn resulting in !he workmen indulging in wanton acts of destruction of the B property of the mill from February 23, 1966 onwards.\n\nThe appelfant, in consequence, declared a lock out. ·\n\nThe disputes regarding the bonus as well as the legality of the strike and lock-out were referred for adjudication by the Delhi Administration by its order datd March 4, 1966, to the Special C.\n\nIndustrial Tribunal, which was numbered as Reierence No. 53 of 1966.\n\nSujan Singh, Security Officer of the mill,' sent a report dated February 23, 1966 to the management regarding the violent activities of the workmen including Ludh Budh Singh, who belonged to the Spinning 5ection 'C'. That report is Ex. M. 15.\n\nThe sub- D stance of the report is as follows : The concerned workman, whose duty hours on February 23, 1966 were from 6.30 A.M. to 2.30 P.M. did not go out of the mill even after his duty was over and continued to remain inside the mill premises.\n\nThe concerned workman Ludh Budh Singh stood in front of the office of the Weaving Superintendent and collected workers.\n\nHe further stopped the E workers of the shiit commencing at 2.30 P.M. from going to their i:lace of work.\n\nHe, along with other workers instigated the employees to strike work.\n\nA large number of workmen collected in front of the office of the Proouction Superintendent with the intention of causing obstruction and creating disorder. Ludh Budh Singh was a member of this unruly mob which forcibly broke open gate No. 4 and entered the open space in the mill's premises with F a view to create disorder.\n\nThe concerned workman along with the mob broke open the door and windows and destroyed the mill's property which included furniture, •air-conditioners, iron-safe and office records.\n\nThese acts of violence were witnessed by Sujan Singh, Security Officer, who made the report as well as by Rampa!, a Sepoy cl the Watch arid Ward and J; U Prakash, a peon in the G Weaving Section.\n\nOn the basis of this report, charge sheet dated March 30, 1966, Ex. M., was issued to Ludh Budh Singh alleging that he was guilty of misconduct under els. (b} (i) and (m) of paragraph 27 of the Certified Standing Orders of the Mill.\n\nThe allegations in the H charge sheet were more or less on the .Jines of the report Ex. M. 15.\n\nIt was specifically alleged that the workman, along with his companions, obstructed the mill workers of the in coming shift from\n\nA proceeding to their place of work and that he and other members of the mob destroyed the property of the mill, enumerated in the charge-sheet.\n\n' The workman sent a reply Ex. M. 2 dated April I, 1966 de, nying the allegations.\n\nHe pleaded that the charges levelled against B him wtre absolutely baseless and that he had no knowledge of the incident stated threin. He denied having been a member of the mob and that he did not take any part in anr violent activities, c i alleged in the charge-sheet.\n\nAccording to htm, after the compk tion of his duty on February 23, 1966, at 2.30 P.M. he left the mill premises and went home.\n\nC l\\ot satisued with the explanation offered by the concernecl\n\nworkman, the appellant issued notiee dated April 27, 1966, stating that Shri S. S. Shanna has been appointed as the Enquiry Officer to hold an enquiry against the workman on May 3, 1966.\n\nThe workman was required to be present, along with any evidence, that he may like to adduce.\n\nOn May 3, 1966, as the notice had not .been served on the respondent, the enquiry was adjourned to May 6, 1966.\n\nAt the request of another workman Sanwal Singh, against whom also there were allegations of misconduct, the Enquiry Officer directetl copies of the complaint and a list of witnesses to ~- furnished to him.\n\nThe Enquiry Officer gave further directions that such E copies will also be given to the respondent. After further adjournment, the enquiry as against Sanwal Singh was separated on May 24, 1966 antl it continued only as against the respondent.\n\nOn behall of the management, a photographer, who had taken the photographs of the crowd outside the mill premises on the day in question, was examined and the respondent IU!mitted that F in the said photograph he was also in the crowd. Two other wit nesses, namely, Suian Singh, Security Officer, who sent the report Ex. M. 15 and Rampal, a Sepoy in the Watch and Ward, were examined and they were also cross-examined by the respondent's representative appearin~ on behalf ot the respondent.\n\nAfter ;, consideration of the evidence, the Enquiry Officer sent his report G dated August 31, 1966 holding that alJ the charges framed under\n\nsub-clauses (b) (I) and (m) of paragraph 27 of the Standing Orders of the MiU have been proved against the workman. Accepting the said report, the management of the Delhi Cloth Mills passeLl an order dated January 5/6, 1967 to the e!Iect that the finding on each of the charges is sufficient to justify the dismissal of the res- H pondent from service. The order further proceeds to state that the management has decided to dismiss the respondent for misconduct proved against him under els. (b) (i) and (m) of the Standing\n\nOrders and that the said order has been n._assed after taking into\n\naccount all relevant circumstances including the past record of A service ot' the respondent. The ordf. winds up~ saying that as\n\nruire4 ur s. 33(1)(b) of the Act, an application is being submitted to the Speci_al Industrial Tribunal, Delhi for permission to pass the order of dismissal against the resndent, and that in the mean time pending the receipt of the permission, the respondent is suspended without wages.\n\nAn industrial dispute being Ref. No. 53 of 1966 was pending before the Special Industrial Tribunal, the appellant filed on January 6, 1967, bef_ore the SQecial Industrial Tribunal application NQ. 10 of 1967 under s. 33(1) (b) of the Act, requesting the Tribunal to grant permission to dismiss µie respondent. In the appli. C cation there is a reference to the allegations made against the respondent, and the enquiry conductt; d against him as well as the findings recorded therein and to the order of dismissal hieing passed on the basis of misconduct proved against the respondent in the said enquiry, findings in which wre accepted by the Manager of the Mill.\n\nThe respondent in his written statement of March 20, 1967 contested the application of the appellant on tlie ground that the enquiry held by the appellant was not in accordance with\n\nthe principles of natural justice and that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were perverse and sufiered from basic errors of facts.\n\nHe attributed ma/a {ides to the management in initiating disciplinary proceedings as well as in proposing to pass the order E of dismissal.\n\nOn March 21, 1967, the apeellant filed an application before the Tribunal that in case the Tnbunal held that the enquiry conducted by it was defective, it should be allowed to adduee evidence before the Tribunal to justify the action proposed to be taken F against the respondent.\n\nBefort; the Trib;.Jnal, it is seen, neither party examined any witnesses: On behalf of the appellant, the enqwry pr~ consis, ting of the charge-shoe!, ilie reply of the respondent and the evidence of witnesses as well as the report ol the Enquiry Olliotr were filed before the Tribunal. Arguments were advanced on G both sides on the basis of enquiry proceedings.\n\n The Tribunal by its order dated March 22, 1967 hold that the enquiry proceedings had not been conducted against the respondent in accordance with the principles of natural justice and that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were not in accordance H with the evidence adduced before him. The Triburuil held that\n\na copy of the report Ex. M .. 15 was not furnished to the ~D dent so as to enable him to effectively cross-examine Sujan Singk,\n\nD.C.M. v. LUDH BUDH SINGH (Vaidiallngam, /,) 35\n\nA who had made the said report.\n\nThe Tribunal is of the view that the Enquiry Officer committed a very serious mistake in casti, ng the urden Of proving his innocen£C on the reBJ?ODdent instea~ of casting the burden on the manageinent of proving the allegations of mis-conduct made against the workman. The Tri!J.unal is also oi the -tiew that though very serious allegations of misconduct, B namely, of inciting other wi>rkmon to strike work unlawfully. and of riotous and disorderly behaviour were made againsf the workman, the Enquiry Officer has found the respondtllllt guilty of those allegations merely on the basis that he was found in a crowd of workmen outside the mill premises and that bis mere presence established the charges levelled against him. The Tribunal is of the C view that the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer does not justify the recording of findings of misconduct against, the respondent.\n\nOn these grounds the Tribunal held that the enquiry proceedings suffered from very serious defects.\n\nRegardip.g the application dated March 21, 1967 seeking permission to adduce evidence before the Tribunal, in case the domes- D tic enquiry was held to be defective, the Tribunal in its order has merely referred to the filing of such a, n application, but has not dealt with it as such and there is no further ret'erence to the said application in the order. Ultimately, the Tribunal has held that the appellant has not made out a prima facie case so as to justify the grant oi permission asked for dismissg the respondent and in E this view the permission asked for was refused and in consequence application No. I 0 of 1967 stood dismissed.\n\nMr. H. L. Anand, learned co11; nsel for the appellant, bas raised two contentions : ( 1) The enquiry proceedings held by the appellant were legal and valid and that the Trib1'181 has exceeded its F jurisdiction under s. 33 ( 1) (1;.) of the Act in holding that the said proceedings were defective; and (ii) Even assuming that the einquiiy proceedings were defective for any reason, the Tribunal has committed an error in law in not dealing with and allowing the application filed by the appellant, which was one for giving the appellant an opportunity, which he has in law, of, adducing evidence before the Tribunal to justify the action taken by' it.\n\nG Mr. Ramamurthy, learned counsel for the respondent, has taken us through the enquiry proceedings cQDducted by the management and pointed out that the View taken by the Tn'bunal that the enquiry proceedings were held in violation of tlie principles of 111atural justice is justified. He urged that the findings recorded by the H Enquiry Officer were perverse as no such findings could be recorded on the evidtllllce adduced by the management. Under these circumstances, he pointed out that it was within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to consider whether the finding! recorded by the Enquiry\n\nA Officer were supported by the evidence on record. It is on such an examination of the evidence that the Tribnnal has come to the conclusion that the findings recorded qy the Enquiry Officer ca.nnot be sustained, as material evidence in favour of the workman has been ignored and there has been a gross-misunderstanding of the evidence by the Enquiry Officer.\n\nThe counsel also pointed out that the application filed by the appellant for permission to adduce B evidence was highly belated inasmuch as it was filed after the proceedings had closed and the Tribunal had reserved judgment.\n\nHe further pointed out that the Tribunal obviously thought that no order need be passed on the said application as the proceedings had come to an end and no request was made by the management during the pendency of the proceedings.\n\nIn support of his first contention Mr. A, nand urged that the appreciation o.f the evidence adduced in a domestic enquiry, as well as the weight to be given to that evidence are all matters failing primarily within the jurisdiction of the Enquiry Officer, over which the Industrial Tribunal has no right to sit in appeal.\n\nThe counsel further urged that the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer D is a possible view, which could be taken on the evidence on record.\n\nThe Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider whether the evidence available before the Enquiry Officer was adequate or sufficient or of a satisfactory character.\n\nMr. Anand pointed out that these are matters that an appellate court may be entitled to consider, but not an Industrial Tribu, nal, whose jurisdiction is very E limited.\n\nHe further pointed out that the fi, ndings recorded by the Enquiry Officer cannot be considered to be perverse, as characterised by the ndustrial Tribunal, in the sense that it is not justified by any legal evidence.\n\nThe counsel further contended that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, as laid down tw this Court in several decisions, was only F to satisfy itself whether a prima facie case has be(ln made out by the employer and that the employer has not acted ma/a fide and that the enq.uiry has been held in accordance with the principles of natural justice and the procedure indicated in the Standing Orders, if any. If once the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the management has not acted ma/a fide aind that there has been a proper enquiry and that the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry G Officer is a possible one on the evidence led before it, the Tribunal <:annot substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the Enquiry Officer, though it may have come to a different conclusion on the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer.\n\nWe do agree, as abstract propositions of Jaw, the contentions of the.learned counsel rgarding the scope of a Tribunal's jurisdic H tion, in such matters, are correct. But the question for considera tion by us is whether the Industrial Tribunal, when it declined to\n\nA. grant the permission asked for by the appellant, has in any manner acted CC\\lltrary to the principles referred to by Mr. Anand and set out above.\n\nBefore we proceed to deal-with the contentions of Mr. Anand, it is necessary to state the law regarding the nature of the jurisdic- B tion exercised by a Tribunal in deaUng with an application under s. 33 of the Act.\n\nWe had occasion to deal with a similar aspect in Delhi GJoth & General Mills Co. v. Ganesh Dutt and others(1) It was observed therein :\n\n\"The nature of the jurisdiction exercised by an Industrial Tribunal in such circumstances is a very limited one and it bas been laid down by several decisions of this Court. The legal position is that where a proper enquiry has been held by the management, the Tribunal has to accept the finding arrived at in that enquiry unless it is perverse or unreaso..11able and should give the permission asked for unless it has reason to lieve that the management is guilty of victimisation or has been guilty of unfair Jabour practice or is acting ma/a fide. (Vide Punjab National Bank, Ltd. v. Its Workme11( 2 ), Bharat Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Jai Singh('), Management of Ritz\n\nTheatre (P) Ltd. v. Its Workmen('), and Mysore Steel Works v. !itender Chandra Kar and others(\")\" In Martin Bum Ltd. v. R. N. Banerjee(•), it has been laid E down that once an Industrial Tribunal is satisfied that the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer, on the evidQnce led before it, is a possible one, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the Enquiry Officer, though the Tribunal may itself have arrived at a different conclusion on\n\nF the same materials.\n\nIt has been further laid down in The Lord Krishna Textile Mills\n\nv. Its Workmen(') as follows:\n\n\"It is well known that the question about the adequacy of evidence or its sufficiency or satisfactory character can be raised i, n a court of tacts and may fall to G be considered biy an appellate court which is entitled to consider facts; but these considerations are irrelevant where the jurisdiction of the court is limited as under s. 33{2){b). It is conceivable that ev~ in holding an enquiry under s. 33{2){b) if the authority is satisfied that the finding recorded at the domestic enquiry is\n\nH (I) C.A. No. 982 of 1967 decided on 17·12-71\n\n(2) (1960] 1 S.<;.R. 806.\n\n(3) [1961] ll L.L.J. 644.\n\n(4) (1963] 3 S.C.R. 461.\n\n(5) (1971] I LL.J. 543,\n\n(6) (1958] S.C.R. 514.\n\n(7) 1)961] 3 S.C.R. 204.\n\nperverse in the sense that it is not justified by any legal evidence whatever, oatly in such a case it may be entitled to consider whether approval should be accorded to the employer or not but it is essential to bear in mind the difference between a finding which is not supported by any legal evidence and a finding which may appear to\n\nbt~ not supported by sufficient or adequate or satisfactory evidence.''\n\nWe may a.Jso refer to the decision in Central Bank of India Ltd., New Delhi v. Shri Prakash Chand Jain(') where after a refere, nce\n\nto the principles laid down in The Lord Krishna Textile Mills v.\n\nIts Workmen( 2 ), it has been pointed out that the test of perversity c of a finding recorded biy a Tribu111al or an Enquiry Officer will be that the said finding is not supported by any legal evidence at all.\n\nIt has been further pointed out that a finding recorded by a domestic Tribu.nal like an Enquiry Officer will also be held to be perverse in those cases where the finding arrived at by the domestic Tribunal is one, which no reasonable person could have arrived at on the 0 material before it.\n\nThe position was summed up by this Court in the said decisioo as follows :\n\n\"Thus, there are two cases. where the findings of a domestic tribunal like the Enquiry Officer dealing with disciplinary proceedings against a workman can be interfered with, a.nd these two are cases in which the findings E are not based on legal evidence or are such as no reasonable person could have arrived 'at on the basis of the material before the Tribunal.\n\nIn each ol these cases, the findings are treated as perverse.\n\nBearii!lg in mind the abQve principles, we will now consider whether the Industrial Tribunal, in the case before us, was' justified F in refusing to grant permission to the appellant to dismiss the respondent on the basis of the evidnce recorded by the Enquiry Officer Shri S. S. Shann11.\n\nWe have already extracted earlier the substance of the report Ex. M. 15, sent by Sujan Singh, Security Officer.\n\nFrom those G\n\nallegation.~ it will be seen that the respondent was alleged to have stopped the woi'kmein from goini to their place of duty and also: along with other workmen, instigating the employees of the mill to strike work. It is also alleged that the respondent a.long with the mob of workmen broke open the door and windows a.nd also destroyed the mill's property, which included iron-safe, office fumi- H ture and record etc.\n\nTherefore, it will be seen that definite individual acts ol violeince in destroyinJ? the mill's property and also of\n\nII) [1969] I S.C.R. 7JS.\n\n(2) [1961) J S.C.R. '04,\n\nA instigating the other workmen to strike work have been alleged against the respondent.\n\nThose individual acts of the respondent of destroying the mill's property d inciting other workmen not to go to work as also of obtructing the employees from going to their place of work are again the subject of the charge sheet Ex. M.\n\nThese allegations of misconduct were the subject of enquiry before B the Enquiry Officer.\n\nNow, we will advert to the enquiry proceedings.\n\nAt this stage it may be mentiQlled that though the Tribunal has held that the respondent was not furnished with a copy of the report Ex. M. 15, and though this aspect has also been stressed before us by Mr.\n\nRamamurthy, on behalf of the workman, we are not inclined to C agree with this finding of the Tribunal.\n\nNo doubt, this is one of. the circumstances pointed out by the Tribunal in suprt of its view that the enquiry proceedings were conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice as the workman hadjllO effective opportunity of cross-examming SuJan Singh, who made the report Ex. M. 15. When the enquiry proceedings cOmmf!llced on May 3, D 1966, the record shows, that the enquiry proceedings were adjourned to May 6, 1966 because the respondent bad not been rved.\n\nBut it is significant to note that on the same date, the :J:!nquiry Officer bad furnished to another workman, Sanwal Singh; -copies of the report Ex. M. 1 S, as well as a list of witnesses proposed to 1*' examined by the management.\n\nWe have already referfed to the E fact that originally the eµquiry was proposed to be held jointly, both against the respondent and Sanwal Singh, and it was only at a later stage that the enquiry as against Sanwal Singh was separated.\n\nAfter furnishing copies to Sanwa.J Singh, the Enquiry Officer had passed an order on the same date that similar copies will be sent to the respondQ!lt along with the date to which the\n\nproceedins were being adjourned.\n\nWhen the enquiry proceedings F were continued later on, there is noth¥1g on record to show that the respondent had not been furnished with the copy of Ex. M. 15, as well as the list of witnesses, as directed by the Enquiry Olllcer on May 3, 1966.\n\nThat shows that the respo, ndent must have .been furnished with those copies.\n\nThis conclusion gains further support from the fact that during the proceedings, the respondent never G made any request for those copies.\n\n' It is also seen that Sujan Singh, after giving evidence in the presence of the respondent before the Enquiry Officer, finally proved the report Ex. M. 15 as having been made by him and this document, when it was so proved, was read over to the respQlldent and H he never took any objection to the same.\n\nOn the other hand, on behall of the respondent, the witness was cross-examined and the nature of the cross-examination also shows that the workman was fully aware of what was stated in Ex. M. 15.\n\nTherefore, it cannot\n\nbe said that the enquiry proceeilings were vitiated, as erroneously A lleld by the Tribunal on the ground that the -respondent was not furnished with a copy of Ex. M. 15.\n\nNo doubt, the witnesses were examined in the pres<mce of the respondent and they were also cross-examined by his representative, but, the question is whether the view of the Tribunal that the find- B ings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are not supported by the evidence or in other words that the findings are perverse, is justified.\n\nSujan Singh, Security Officer, who sent the report Ex. M. 15, both in the report as well as in the evidence before the Enquiry c Officer has referred to the incident as having taken place outside the mill at about 2-15 or 2-30 p.m.\n\nThere is no controversy that the respondent was on duty in the Spinning Section till 2. 30 p.m. on February 23, 1966. It is :not the case of the management that he had surreptitiously left his place of work earlier than 2.30 p.m.\n\nThough Sujan Singh in chief examination has spoken to the part alleged to have been played by the respondent, while being cross- D eK.alllined he has stated that the respondent was amongst the slogan shouters. He has also stated that he cannot say if the respondt had any weapon or tools in his hand.\n\nHe has further admitted that he did not see the respondent destroying any property of the mills or obstructing any workman from going to his place of work.\n\nIn fact, in his cross-examination the entire activity relating to E destruction of mill's property and obstructing the workmen, is attributed !fy him to a crowd of workmen.\n\nThese significant answers given by the witness in cross-examination have not at all been properly adverted to by th~ Enquiry Officer.\n\nOn the other hand, the enquiry report shows that the Enquiry F Officer has thoroughly mis-understood and mis-inreted the nature of the evideirice given by Sujan Singh.\n\nIt is stated in the said report that Sujan Singh has deposed that as the crowd was very large, it was difficult for him to state precisely as to what items of the mill were destroyed by the respondent. We have already referred to the answers given by the said witness in the cross-examination that the respqndent was only a slogan shouter G and that he had not seen any tools or weapons in the hands of the respondent.\n\nBut the more significant admission made by him and which has not at all been adverted to or considered by the Enquiry Officer is his categorical answer that he did not see the respondent personally breaking or destroying any of the articles of the mill.\n\nH Coming to the second witness Rampa!, a sepoy n the Watch :llld Ward, it is seen from the enquiry proceedings that on June 13. 1966, J. C. Bose, the represfltltative of the management mentioned\n\nA to the Enquiry Officer that this witness \"has refµsed to tender evidence because he has no knowledge of this occurrence.\" This has been recorded biy the Epquiry Officer.\n\nBut the said witness gave evidence on June 21, 1966 to the effect at about 2 or 2.30 p.m. on Fejjruary 23, 1966 the Security Officer, Sujan Singh asked him to accompany him to gate No. 4 of the mill.\n\nHe has further B deposed that even before he reached the crowd, which had already collected outside the mills had broken open the gate.\n\nHe has further stated that he saw the respondent in the crowd.\n\nHe WOlltlld' up his chiei examination by saying that he has nothing further td add to what has been stated above.\n\nIt is significant to iil.Ote that this witness even in the chief-examination has not spoken to any' c acts of violeince committed by the respondent, nor has he referred to the respondent behaving in a disorderly manner or of having obstructed any workman from proceeding to his place of work.\n\nWhen this witiness was cross-examined by the respondent on June 22, 1966, he started by saying that he never mentioned earlier to anybody that he had no knowledge about the occurrence in res- D pect of which he had come to give evideince before the' Enquiry Officer.\n\nBut when he was confronted with the record made by the Enquiry Officer on June 13, 1966 on the representation of J. C.\n\nBose that this witness has refused to tender evidence because he has no knowledge of the occurrence, he admitted .that he had so repre sented to J. C. Bose. From this, it is clear that this witness, even E according to his own admission, has oo knowledge about the occurrence about which he had come to give evidence. It is rather strange that nevertheless he appeared before the Enquiry Officer on a later date to give evidence.\n\nBut, as we have alrady pointed out. even in the chief examination he has not attributed any overt act to the respondent.\n\nF To resume the further answers given by this wit.ness in crossexamination, he admitted that before he reached gate No. 4. it had already been broken and that he did not inform anybody about the same.\n\nHe has also admitted that he did not Worm Sujan Singh about having seen the respondent near the gate.\n\nHe has admitted that Sujan Singh also did not mentioin to him about the G presence of the respondent in the crowd.\n\nHe has also admitted that he did not see any arms or weapons iin. the hands of any membe( of the crowd.\n\nThe photoqaph that appears to have been taken of the crowd was shown to this witness and he admitted on seeing the same that nobody in the crowd was carrying any weapons or arms.\n\nH There was, no doubt, the evidence of the photographer MangaI Das, Witness No. 3. He has referred to the fact that he took the photos of the crowd outside the mill, which num\\jered about 3000\n\n4-L864Su~Cl/72\n\nworkers of the mill.\n\nHe has also stated that he took photos at A about 3 P.M. on February 23, 1966.\n\nHe does not refer to any further events relating to the incident of destruction of property or obstruction of workmen.\n\nIt is no doubt true that when the photograph Ex. M.I. was shown to the respondent, the latter admitted that he was in the crowd.\n\nThis admission, at the most, is only to the effect that at about 3 P .M. when a large number of mill workers B were outside the mill premises, the respondent was also in that crowd.\n\nBut the material evidence relating to the incident and relied on by the management is that of Sujan Singh and Rampa! and we have already referred to the nature of their evide, nce.\n\nThe Enquiry; Officer, in the state of the evidence give~ by the two witnesses and C referred to by us earlier, has recorded a finding to the effect that as the respondent was in the crowd, that by itself is einouh for proving the charges levelled against him.\n\nIn fact, the findmg of the Enquiry Officer is :\n\n\"The admission on the part of the workmili!l about his presence in the mob as shown in the photograph Ex.\n\nD M. l is sufficient to hold him guilty of charges.\" Another statement made by the Enquiry Officer is :\n\n\"It does not lie i, n the mouth of the workman once having chosen not to produce evidence in his defence to state that he was not responsible for the acts of destruc- .& tion and damages.\n\nHe is estopped from dQnying his presence fn the mob because of Ex. M. 1.\n\nThe Industrial Tribunal had to consider whether the appellant has made out a prima facie case for permission being granted for\n\nthe action proposed to be taken against the workman.\n\nFor that purpose the Tribunal was jusl'ified in considering the natur~ of the F allegations made against the workman, the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the materials that were available before the Enquiry Officer, on the basis of which such findings had been recorded.\n\nAccepting the contention of Mr. Ana, nd that it was within the jurisdiction of the Enquiry Officer to accept the evidence of Sujan Singh and Rampa! will be over-simplifying the malt4r. c and denying the legitimate jurisdiction of the Tribunal in sl!dla matters to consider whether the findings are such as no reasonab!41i person could have arrived at on the basis of the materials before the Enquiry Officer. Ii the materials biefore the Enquiry Olli.cot are such, from which the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer could not have been arrived at by a reasonable person, then it is needless to state, as laid down by this Court in Celllral Bank B of India Ltd., New Delhi v. Shrl Prakash Chand lain(') that the!\n\n(I) [19691 I S.C.R. 735.\n\nA finding has to be characterised as perverse. If so the Industrial Tr'bunal had ample jurisdiction to interfere with such a finding.\n\nWe have already pointed out that the Tribunal has not taken i:lto account the admissions made by Sujan Singh in his crossexamination where he has not attributed any acts of destruction or B violence to the respondent.\n\nThe Enquiry Officer has proceeded on the basis that though Rampa! declined to participate in the enquiry at an earlier stage, that circumstance does not affect his veracity, when he has later on appeared to give evidence.\n\nJ'his observation of the Enquiry Officer clearly shows that he has not at all cared to give effect to the record made by him 011 June 13, 1966 to the c effect that Rampa! had refused to give evidence because he had no knowledge about the occurrence.\n\nIf a person had no knowledge on June 13, 1966, that is a matter which had to Qe very carefully borne in mind by the Enquiry Officer when he again came to give evidence about the incident.\n\nThis aspect has not been given due consideration by the Enquiry Officer. Therefore, a finding recorded\n\n0 by an Enquiry Officer ignoring the material admissions made by a party in favour of an accused, is not a question of mere appreciation of evidence, but really recording a finding contrary to the evidence adduced before him.\n\nEven otherwise, the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are rather very strange.\n\nHe does not hold the respondent guilty of any act of violence or of destroying the mill's property or of obstructing the workmen from going to their place E of work.\n\nThese were the allegations of misconduct in the charge sheet.\n\nBut curiously, the Enquiry Officer proceeds on the basis that because the workman was in the crowd, that by itself is enough to find him guilty o, f the charges of obstructing the mill workers and destroying mill property. The Enquiry Officer has also committed another.mistake when he proceeded on the basis that as the F workman has not adduced any evidence in his defence, it is not open to him to contend that he was not responsible for the acts of destruction and damages.\n\nThis observation clearly shows that the Enquiry Officer has missed the elementary principle of jurisprudence that when allegations of misconduct are levelled against a person, it is the primary duty of the person making those allegations G to establish the same and not for an accused to adduce negative\n\nevidence to the effect that he is not guilty. ..\n\nThe above aspects, in our opinion, have been rightly taken into account by the Industrial Tribunal when it characterised the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer as being such that no reasonable person will come to, on the material on record. Therefore, the Industrial Tribunal was perfectly justified in coming to the conclusion that the enquiry proceedings are vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice and that the appeilant has not made out\n\na prima facie case for grant of the permission to dismiss the respon- A dent., Therefore the first contention of Mr. Anand will have to be rejected.\n\nThe second contention of Mr. Anand, as noted already, is that the Tribunal has committed an error in law, in ; not permitting the' appellant to add.uce evidep.ce before it to justify the action proposed B to b1e taken agamst the respondent.\n\nWe have already referred to the fact that an application under s. 3 3 ( 1 ) (b) of the Act was filed by the appellant on January 6, 1967. The basis of the application is the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer, the findings recorded therein and the acceptance of those findings by the Manager of the mill.\n\nThe respondqnt filed his written statement on March 20, 1967 contesting the application filed by the appel- C lant.\n\nThe respondent had contended that the qnquiry proceedings had been held in violation of the principles of natural justice and that the din_gs of the Enquiry Officer were perverse and that the report itself suffers from basic errors of facts.\n\nHe had characterised the evidence before the Enquiry Officer as false. The Industrial Tribunal pronounced its order on March 22, 1967 rejecting D the application filed by the appellant under s. 33 (1) (b) of the Act.\n\nJin its order the Tribunal has stated that neither the appe!lant nor the respondent .adduced any oral evidence and that the appellant priduced only the records relating to the enquiry proceedings and the report of the Enquiry Officer.\n\nIt was on the basis of the enquiry report that arguments were advanced in great detail by E li>th parties.\n\nWe have already referred to the fact that there is a reference in the order to the effect that an application was filed oli March 21, 1967 by the appellant that if the Tribunal holds the enquiry proceedings to be defective, for any reason, the management should be allowed to adduce evidence before it to justify the allegations made against the workman. There i' no further consip deration in the order about this application made by the appellant.\n\nThe fifth entry in the order sheet of the Tribunal is dated March 21, 1967 and it is to the effect that the case was taken up for argument and that the enquiry proceedings were filed by the management a.nd that arguments were heard on both sides and that the judgment was reserved.\n\nAfter this entry on the same date, there is an entry as item No. 6 to the effect that the appellant had G filed a petition for fresh evidence if the enquiry is found to be defective with the endorsement \"keep it on record\".\n\nOn March 22, 1967 orders were pronounced by the Tribunal dismissing the main application No. 10 of 1967.\n\nMr. Aaland, learned counsel for the appellant very strenuously H urged that as per the decisions of this Court, the management is entitled t<;> an opportunity to adduce evidence before the Tribunal to justify its action in case the Tn1iRmal holds that the domestic\n\nA enquiry is defective for any reason.\n\nIt was for this opportunity, which the appellant is entitled in law, thll, l the application was filed on March 21, 1967 seeking permission to adduce evidence before the Tribunal.\n\nThe grievance of the appellant, according to the counsel, is that there is absolutely no consideration by the Tribunal of this application and no opportunity was given to the appellant B to adduce evidence before the Tribunal.\n\nThis, the counsel pointed out, constitutes a very serious error in the approach made by the Tribunal and therefore the proceedLngs wll! !rave to be remanded to the Tribunal to enable the appellant to adduce evidence before it.\n\nIn fact, Mr. Anand urged that it is open to fae management to make such a request to adduce evidence in spite of the fact that c a domestic enquiry has been held either a!'ter the Tribunal has' recorded a findiing a1*>ut the defective nature al * domestic' enquiry or at any time before the final judgment is proaounced by the Industrial Tribunal. In this case, the counsel po6ated out, the proceedings must be considered to be pending on the date when the application was filed, mamely, March 21, 1967, as judgment was D pronounced on March 22, 1967.\n\nMr. M. K. Ramamurthy, learned counsel for the respondent, pointed out that the proceedings must be considered to have been\n\nclosed on March 21, 1967, when the Tribunal has made a hote in the order sheet that the judgment has been reserved.\n\nThe application filed by the management seeking permission to adduce evid- E ence was admittedly filed, as the order sheet shows, after the judgment was reserved.\n\nThat may be the reason why the Tribunal did not think it necessary to consider the application on merits, nor did it think it necessary to give an opportunity to the appellant to adduce evidence.\n\nSo far as the right of the management to adduce evidence and F satisfy the Tribunal about its justification for the action taken or proposed to be taken against the workman is concerned, this Court in its recent decision State Bank of India v. R. K. Jain and others ( 1) has after a reference to the earlier decisions 1*laring on the matter held that it is open to a management to rely upon the domestic enquiry conducted by it and satisfy the Tribunal that there G is no infirmity attached to the same. It has also been further held that the management has a right to adduce independent evidence before the Tribunal to justify the action taken or proposed to be takem and that it is for the management to avail itself of the said opportunity.\n\nMr. Anand placed considerable reliance not only on the above B decision but also on the decision in Management of Ritz Theatre\n\n(P) Ltd. v. Its Workme~( 2 ) and urged that it is only after the\n\n(1) C.A. 992 of 1967 decided on 17·9-1971.\n\n\n:_rribunal has found that the domestic enquiry is defective, for any A\n\nreason, that the management's right to adduce independent evidence before the Tnbunal arises for consideration.\n\nBefore we deal with the decision in State Bank of India v. R. K.\n\nJain and others( 1), it is necessary to refer to three earlier decisions of this Court. In Ml s Bharat Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shri Jai Singh B and others(2 ), a domestic enquiry had been held by the management, but the said enquiry was held by the Tribunal to be defective.\n\nThe management, however, adduced evidence before the Tribunal to make out its case that the workmen concerned were in fact guilty of misconduct.\n\nThis evidtlllce was accepted by the Tribunal and it held that the action of the management was valid.\n\nC It was contended by the workmen before this Court that when once the Industrial Tribunal had held that the domestic enquiry was defective, it had no jurisdiction to allow the management to adduce evidtlllce before it to justify the action taken or proposed to be taken.\n\nThis contention was rejected by this Court as follows :\n\n\"When an application for permission for dismissal is made on the allegation that the workman has beein guilty of some misconduct for which the management considers dismissal the appropriate punishment the Tribunal has to satisfy itself that there is a prima facie case for such dismissal.\n\nWhere there has been a proper e.nquiry by the management itself the Trinal, it has been settled by a number of decisions of this Court, has to accept the findings arrived at in that enquiry unless it is perverse and should give the permission asked for unless it has reasQn to believe that the management is guilty of victimisation or has b, een guilty of unfair labour practice or is acting mala fide. But the mere fact that no enquiry has been held or that the enquiry has not been properly cqnducted cannot absolve the Tribunal of its duty to decide whether the case that the workman has been guilty of the alleged misconduct has been made out.\n\nThe proper way for performing this duty where there has not been a proper enquiry by the management is for the\n\nTrinal to take evidQ!lce of both sides in respect of the a!Jeged misconduct.\n\nWhen such evidence is adduced before the Tribunal the management is deprived of the benefit ol having the findings of the domestic tribunal being accepted as prima facie proof of the alleged misconduct unless the finding is perverse and has to prove to the satisfaction of the Tribunal itself that the workman was guilty of the alleged misconduct.\n\nWe do not think it either just to the management or indeed even fair to\n\n(I) C.A. 992 of 1967 dated 17·9-71.\n\n\nA the workman himself that in such a case the Industrial Tribunal should refuse to take evidence and thereby drive the management to make a further application for permission after holding a proper enquiry and deprive the workman of the benefit of the Tribunal itself being satisfied on evidence adduced before it that he was guilty of B the alleged misconduct.\" ·\n\nIt must, however, be pointed out that it is not clear from the facts mentioned in the judgment as to when the finding regarding the defective nature ol the domestic enquiry was recorded by the Tribunal and at what stage the management adduced evidence C bfore the Tribunal.\n\nBut one thing is clear, namely, that the management adduced evideOice before the Tribunal when the proceedings were still pending before the Tribunal.\n\nfa Management of Ritz Theatre (P) Ltd. v. Its Workmen('), disciplinary actin was taken by the management against some of its workmen on the Qasis of the finding recorded in the domestic D enquiry.\n\nThe domestic enquiry was challenged by the workmen before the Tribunal as being defective for several reasons.\n\nWhen the proceedings commenced before the Indu8trial Tribunal and even before the validity of the dimestic enquiry was considered by the Tribunal, the managemant filed an application asking for permission to adduce evidence before the Tribunal to justify the action E taken against the workmen.\n\nThe Tribunal allowed this application and permitted both the management as well as the workmen to adduce evidence before it.\n\nIn addition to the evidence so led belore the Tribunal, the management also produced before it all\n\nthe papers relating to the departmental enquiry as well as the report of the Bnquiry Officer.\n\nF The Tribunal, however, held that as the management had asked for permission to adduce evidence before it, it had jurisdiction to consider on merits the dimissal of the workmen concerned exclusively on the basi~ of the evidence adduced by the parties before it.\n\nThe Tribunal further proceeded on the basis that it was not necessary to c0111Sider the validity or otherwise of the domestic G enquiry proceedings.\n\nIn this view the Tribunal considered in that case the evidence adduced before .it came to the conclusion that the order of dismissal passed tfy the management was not justified.\n\nBefore this Court it was ci>ntended by the management that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction inasmuch as it had considered only the evidence adduced before it without first adju- H dicating upon the validity or otherwise of the domestic enquiry.\n\nThis Court accepted that contention and held that if the Tribunal accepts the enq:iiry proceedings conducted by the management as\n\n(1) [!963] S.C.R. 461.\n\nproper, it has no right to sit in appeal over the findi.ngs recorded A at the domestic enquiry.\n\nIt was further held that the first question which the Tribunal had to consider when an enquiry has beein helq by the management was whether the said enquiry has been held properly and the findings recorded are baSed upon the . materials available before the Enquiry Officer. It was further held that it is only when the Tribunal is satisfied that a proper enquiry has not B been held or that the findings recorded at such 8jll enquiry are perverse that it derives jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute. The legal position, in such circumstances, regarding the duty of the Tribunal to consider the validity of the domestic qnquiry held bi)' the man; igement as well as the right of the management to adduce evidence before the Tribunal to justify the action taken by c it has beqn stated as follows :\n\n\" ...... It is well settled that if an employer serves the relevant charge or charges on his employee and holds a proper and fair enquiry, it would be open to him to act upon the report submitted to him by the Enquiry Officer and to dismiss the employee coocerned.\n\nIf the enquiry has been properly held, the order of .dismissal passed against the employee as a result of such an enquiry can be challenged if it is shown that the conclusions reached atihe departmeintal enquiry were perverse or the impugned dismiss.al is vindictive or mala fide, and amounts to an unfair labour practice. In such an enquiry before the Tribunal, it is not opein to the Tribunal to sit in appeal over the findings recorded at the domestic enquiry.\n\nThis Court has held that when a proper enquiry has been held, it would be open to the Enquiry Officer holding the domestic enquiry to deal with the matter on the merits\n\nbona fide and come to his own conclusion.\n\nIt has also been held that if it appears that the departmental enquiry held by the employer is not fair in the sense that proper charge had not been served on the employee or proper or full opportunity had not been given to the employee to meet the charge, or the enquiry has been affected by other grave irregularities vitiating it, then the position would be that the Tribunal would be entitled to deal with the merits of the dispute as to the dismissal of the employee for itseli.\n\nThe same result fo!Jows if no enquiry has been held at all.\n\nIn other words, where the Tribunal is dealing with a dispute relating to the dismissal of an industrial employee, if it is satisfied that no enqu, iry has been held or the enquiry which has been held is not proper or fair or that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are perverse,\n\nthe whole issue is at large before the Tri1*Jnal. This position also is well-settled.\n\nIn regard to cases falling under this last category ol cases, it is however open to the employer to. adduce additional evidence and satisfy the Tribunal that the dismissal of the employee cqncerncd is justified. And in such a case, the Tribunal would give opponunity to the employer to lead such evidence, would give an opponunity to the employee to meet that evidence, and deal with the dispute between the panics in the light oi the whole of the evidence thus adduced before it. There can be little doubt about this position.\" The contention of tht workmen that by the management straightaway adducing evidence before the Tribunal, in spite of its having held the domestic e_m;1uiry. amounts to the employer giving up its .reliance on the domestic enquiry, was rejected as follows :\n\n\" ...... It is quite conceivable, in fact it happens in many cases, that the employer may rely on the enquiry in the first instance and alternatively l!lld without prejudice to his plea that the enquiry is proper and binding, may seek to lead additional evidence.\n\nIt would, we think, be unfair to hold that merely by adopting such a course, the employer gives up his plea that the enquiry was proper and that the Tribunal should µot go into the merits of the dispute for itself.\n\nIf the view taken by the Tribunal was held to be correct, it would-lead to this anamoly that the employer would be precluded from justifying the dismissal of his employee by leading additional evidence unless he takes the risk of inviting the Tribunal to deal with the merits for itself, because a> soon as he asks for permissian to lead additional evidence, it would follow that he gives up his stadd based on the holding of the domestic enquiry.\n\nOtherwise, it may have to be held that jn a.II such cases no evidence should be led on the merits unless the issue about the enquiry is tried as a preliminary issue. If the finding on that preliminary issue is in favour of the employer, then1 no additional evidqnce need be cited by the emplO, Yer; ir the finding on. the said issue is against him, permission will. have to be given to the employer to cite additional evidence, instead of following such an elaborate and somewhat cumbersome procedure, if the employer seeks to lead evidence in addition to the evidence adduced at the departmental enquiry and the employ:es are also given an opponunity to lead additional' evidence, it would be open to the Tribunal first to consider the preliminary\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 S.C.lt\n\nissue and then to proceed to deal with the merits in case the preliminary issue is . decided against the employer.\n\nThat, in our opion_, fa the true and correct legal position in.this matter.\"\n\nAfter rejecting the contention of the workmen, this Court in the said decision considered the valiity of the doi; nestic f!llquiry held B by the management and held that it was a proper enquiry and that the findings recorded therein were correct. It was further held that the action taken by the management against the workmen on the basis of the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was legal.\n\nJn Workmen of Motipur Sugar Factory (Private) Limited v.\n\nMotipur Sugar Factory(!), this Court had again to consider the C nature of the jurisdiction exercised by a Tribunal. . The management therein had terminated the services of some of its workmen without holdi.ng any enquiry as required by its Standing Orders.\n\nThe legality of termination of the services of the workmen was referred to for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under the Act. The management let in evide111ce before the Tn'bunal justify- D ing its action in terminating the services of the workmen for misconduct. The workmen also let in evidence contra. The Tribunal after consideration of the evidence adduced before it held that the action of the management in terminating the services of the workmen was proper. Before this Court it was urged on behalf of the workmen that as the management had given no charge sheets and E had held no enquiry as required by the Standing Qrders, it was 111ot open to the management to justify before the Tribunal its order discharging the workmen aind that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider the claim of the management on merits.\n\nThe contention cf the workmen was rejected by this Court rui follows :\n\n\"It is l!lOW well-settled by a number of decisions of this Court that where an employer has etiled to make an enquiry before dismissing or discharging .a workman it is open to him to justify the action before the tribunal by leading all relevant evidence before it.\n\nIn such a case the employer would not have the benefit which he had in cases where domestic inquiries have been held.\n\nThe entire matter would be open before the tribunal which will have jurisdiction l!lOt only to go into the limited questions open to a tribunal where domestic enquiry has been properly held (See Indian Iron & Steel Co. v. Their Workmen)('), but also to satisfy itself on the .facts adduced before it by the employer whether the dismissal er discharge was justified.\n\nWe may in this connection refer to Mis Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Limited v.\n\n(I) It %S] 3 S.C.R. 588.\n\nShobrati Khan( 1), Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen(') and the Punjab National Bank Limited v. Its Workmen('). There three cases were further considered by this Court in Bharat Sugar Mills Limited v. Shri lai Singh('), and reference was also made to the decisioo. of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Shri Ram Swarath Sinha v. Belaund Sugar Co.(') It was point~ out that\n\n\"the import effect of commission to hold an enquiry was merely this : that the tribunal would not have to cC111Sider\n\nonly whether there was a prima facie case but would decide for itself on the evidence adduced whether the charges have been made out.\" It is true that , three of these cases, except Phulbari Tea Estate's case('), were on application under s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.\n\nBut in principle we see no difference whether the matter comes before the tribunal for approval under s. 33 or on a reference under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7.\n\nIn either case, if the enquiry is defective or if no enquiry has been held as required by Standing Orders, the entire case would be open before the tribunal and the employer would have to justify on facts as well that its order of dismissal or discharge was proper.\n\nPhulbari Tea Estate's(') was on a refereince under s. 10,\n\n3nd the same principle was applied there also, the only difference being that in that case, there was an enquiry though it was defective. A defective enquiry \\n our opinion stands on the same footing as no enquiry and in either case the tribunal would have juridict1on to go\n\ninto the facts and the employer would have to satisfy the tribunal that on facts the order of dismissal or discharge was proper.\n\nIf it is held that in cases where the employer dismisses , his employee without holding an enquiry, the dismissal must be set aside by the industrial tribunal only on that ground, it would inevitably mean that the e_mployer will immediately proceed to hold the enquiry and pass an order dismissing the employee once again. that case, unother industrial dispute would arise and the employer would hie entitled to rely upon the enquiry which he had held in the mean-time.\n\nTbis course would mean delay 3nd on the second occasion it will entitle the amployer to claim the benefit of the domestic enquiry given.\n\nOn the other ham.d,' if in such cases the employer is given\n\n3n opportunity to justify the impugned dismissal onthe --- -- (]) l19l9l Supp. S.C.R. 836.\n\n(2) (1960] I S.C.R. 32. ()) (19601 l.S.C.R. H06.\n\n(4> (1962] 3 S.C.R. 614. (l! (19l4] L.A.C. 697.\n\nmerits of his case being considered by the tribunal for itself and that clearly would be to the benefit of the employee.\n\nThat is why this Court has consisttly held that if the domestic enquiry is irregular, invalid or improper, the tribunal may give an opportunity to the employer to prove his case and in doing so the tribunal tries the merits itself.\n\nThis view is cQnsistent with the approach which .industrial adjudication generally adopts with a view to do justice between the parties without relying too much on technical considerations and with the object of avoiding delay in the disposal of industrial disputes.\n\nTherefore, we are satisfied that no distinction can be made between cases where the domestic enquiry is ii!lvalid and those where no enquiry has in fact been held.\n\nWe must therefore reject the contention that as there was no enquiry in this case it was not open to the respondent to justify the discharge before the tribunal.\"\n\nThe recent decision of this Court bearing on this matter is the D ()ne rendered in State Bank of India v. R. K. Jain and others(').\n\nThat was a case where the Tribunal held that the domestic enquiry -conducted by the management leading to the termination of the workmen was held in violation of the principles of natural justice and tn consequence the order terminating the services of the workman was set aside.\n\nOn appeal by the management, this Court rejected its contention that the view of the Tribunal about the invalidity Of the en9.uiry proceedings was erron!l<>US.\n\nBut it was contended that the Tnbunal, after having come to the conclusion that the. domestic enquiry was not valid, should have given an opportunity to the F managemeint to adduce evidence before it to justify the order terminating the services of the workmen.\n\nThis Court held that the legal position is that it is open to the management to rely upon the domestic enquiry conducted b\\y it and satisfy the Tribunal that there is no infirmity attached to the same.\n\nIt was further laid down that the management has also got a right to justify on facts G as well that its order of dismissal or discharge was proper by .adducing evidence before the Tribunal.\n\nBut it was emphasised that the dispute that is referred to a Tribunal Is not the validity or otherw.ise of. the domestic enquiry held by the management leading to the order of termination, but the larger issue whether the\n\nordr of termination, dismissal, or imposing or proposing to impose pUlllshment on the workman concerned is justified. It was observed H as follows:\n\n(I) C.A. 992 of 1967 decided on 17-9-71.\n\n\"If the management defends its action solely on the basis that the domestic enquiry held by it is proper and valid and if the Tribunal holds against the management on that point, the management will fail.\n\nOn the other hand, if the\" managemqnt relies not only on the validity of the domestic inquiry, but also adduces evidence before the Tribunal justifying its action, it is open to the Tribu nal to accept the evidence adduced by the management and hold in its favour even if its finding is against the managtllllent regar~ the validity of the domestic enquiry.\n\nIt is essentially a matter for the management to decide about the stand that it proposes to take before the Tribunal. It may be emphasised that it is the right of the management to sustain its order by adducing also independent evidence before the Tribunal. It is a right giv!n to' the management and it is for the management to avail rtself of the said opportunity.\"\n\nIt was further held that it may b, e open to the management to D request the Tribunal to. decide in the first instance as a pr&- liminarv issue the validity of the domestic enquiry that may have been conducted 1'Y it and then to give an opportunity to adduce evidence before the Tribun 1; if the finding was agl$st the management.\n\nIt was held on fac that there was no guestion of opportunity to adduce evidence having been denied by the Tribunal as E the appellant therein had made no such request; and therefore the\n\ncontention that the Tribunal should have given an Qpportunity suo moto to adduce evidence was not accepted, in: the circumstances of that case.\n\nWe have referred to decisions illustrative of various aspects.\n\nM/s Bharat Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shri Jai Singh and others(1) was F an instance where a domestic enquiry was held, but it was not accepted by the Tribunal as a proper enquiry.\n\nThe management let in evidence to justify its action, which was accepted by the Tribunal.\n\nThe contention of the workmen that when Qnce the domestic enquiry has been held to be defective by the Tribunal, there was no right in the management to adduce evidence to justify G its action,. was rejected by this Court.\n\nManagement of Ritz Theatre (P) Ltd. v. Its Workmen(') Wiii an instance where a domestic enquiry had been held by the m31Ilagement.\n\nBut when the dispute regarding the termination of the services of the workmen on the basis of such an enquiry was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, even when the trial started, the H management adduced evidence justifying its action.\n\nThe manage. ment also relied upon the enquiry proceedings conducted by it.\n\n\n(2) [t9631 3 SC.R. 461.\n\nThe Tribunal did not'consider the validity of the domestic enquiry, A but, on the other hand, held against the management on the evid- .ence before it.\n\nThe grievance of the management that the Tribunal shouJd have first considered the validity o{ the domestic enquiry was accepted by th\\s Court.\n\nWorkmen of Motipur Sugar Factory (Private) Ltd. v. Motipur B Sugar Factory ( 1) was an instance where no enquiry at all bad h~\n\nheld by the management as per its Standing Orders before terminating the services of the employees.\n\nBut evidence was adduced before the Tribunal by the management justifying its action and that evidence was accepted by the Tribunal.\n\nThe contention of the workmen that as no enquiry had been held by the management C before passing the order of termination, it was not open to the management to adduce evidence before the Tribunal justifying its action, was rejected by this Court.\n\nState Bank of India v. R. K. Jain and others(') was an instance where an enquiry was conducted by the mamagement, but it was held to be defective by the Tribunal and in consequence the order D terminating the services of the workmqn was set aside. No permission to adduce evidence before the Tribunal justifying its actio~ was asked fur by the management.\n\nThe grievance of the m31!l.agement before this Court, that the Tribunal should have given such an opportunity suo moto was not accepted, in the circumstances of\n\nthat case.\n\nIt may be pointed out that the Delhi and Madhya Pradesh High Courts had held that it is the duty of the Tribu!!al to decide, in the first instance, the propriety of t\\te domestic enquiry held by the management and if it records a finding against the management, it should suo moto provide an opportunity to the management to F adduce additional evidence, even though the management had made no such request.\n\nThis view was held to be erroneous by this Court, in State Bank of India v. R. K. Jain & others(').\n\nFrom the above decisions the following principles broadly ilmerge: ( f) If no domestic enquiry had been held by the management, G or if the management makes. it clear that it does not rely upon any domestic enquiry that may have been held by it, it is entitled to straightaway adduce evidence before the Tribunal justifyil!g its action.\n\nThe Tribunal is bound to consider that evidence so adduced before it, on merits, and give a decisian thereon. In such a case, it is not necessary for the Tribunal to consider .the H validity of the domestic enquiry as the employer himself does not rely on it.\n\n (!) [19651 3 s.c.R. 588.\n\n(2) C.A. 992 of 1967 decided 17·9 71.\n\n( 2) If a domestic enquiry had been held, it is open to the management to rely upon the domestic enquiry held by it, in the first instance, and alternatively and without prejudice to its plea that the enquiry is proper and b\\nding, simultaneously adduce additional evidence before the Tribunal justifying its action.\n\nIn such a case no inference can be drawn, without ything more, B that the management has given up the enquiry conducted by it.\n\n( 3) When the management rdies on the enquiry conducted by it, and also simultaneously adduces evidence before the Tribunal, without prejudice to its plea that the enquiry proceedings are proper, it is the duty of the Tribunal, in the first instance, to con sider wheher the enquiry proceedings conducted by the manage C ment, are valid and proper. If the Tribunal is satisfied that the enquiry proceedings have been held properly and are valid, the question of considering the evidence adduced before it O\\ll merits, no longer survives.\n\nIt is only when the Tribunal holds that the enquiry proceedings have not been properly held, that it derives jurisdiction to deal with the merits ol the dispute and in such a D case it has to consider the evidence adduced before it by the management and decide the matter on the basis of such evidence.\n\n( 4) When a domestic enquiry has been held by the management and the management relies on the same, it is open to the latter to request the Tribunal to try the validity of the domestic E enquiry as a preliminary issue and also ask for an opportuni~ to adduce evidence before the Tribunal, if the finding on the prehminary issue is against the management.\n\nHowever elaborate and cumbersome the procedure may be, 1.111der such circumstances, it i, s open to the Tribunal to deal, in the first instance, as a preliminary issue the validity of the domestic enquiry. If its finding on the preliminary issue is in favour of the managemQnt, then no addi- F tional evidence need be cited by the mnagement. But, if the finding on the peliminary issue is against the management, the Tribunal will have to give the employer an opportunity to cite additiooal evidence and also give a similar opportunity to the employee to lead evidence contra, as the request to adduce evidence had been made by the management to the Tribunal during the course ol' the G proceedings and before the trial has come to an end.\n\nWhen the preliminary issue is decided against the management and the latter leads evidence before the Tribunal, the position, under such circumstances, will be, that the management is deprived of the benefit of having the finding of the domestic Tribunal being accepted as Prima facie proof of the alleged misconduct. On the other hand, the H management will have to prove, by adducing proper evidence, that the workman is guilty of miscooduct 'and that the action ta\\en by it is proper. It will not be just and fair either to the managemeiit or to the workman that the Tribunal should refuse to take evidence\n\nand thereby ask the management to make a further application, A after-holding a proper enq, uiry, and deprive the workm~ of the benefit of the Tribunal itself qeing satisfied, on evidence adduced before it, that he was or was not guilty of the alleged misconduct.\n\n( 5) The management has got a right to attempt to sustain its order by adduckig independent evidence before the Tribunal. But 8 the management should avail itself of the said opportunity by making a suitable request to the Tribunal before the proceedings are closed. If no such opportunity has been available of, or asked for by the management, before the proceedings are closed, the employer can make no grievance that the Tribunal did not provide such an opportunity.\n\nThe Tribunal will have efore it only the enquiry C proceedings and it has to decide whether the proceedings have been held properly and the findings recorded therein are also proper.\n\n( 6) If the employer relies only on the domestic enquiry and does not simultaneously lead additional evidence or ask for an opportunity during the pendency of the proceedings to adduce such evidence, the duty of the Tribunal is only to consider the validity D of the domestic enquiry as well as the finding recorded therein and decide the matter. If the Tribune.I decides that the domestic enquiry has not been held properly, it is not its function to invite su0 moto the employer to adduce evidence before it to justify die\n\naction taken by it.\n\n(7) The above principles apply to the prO\\:eedings , before the E Tribunal, which have come before it either on a referen.ce under s. 10 or by way of an application uµder s. 33 of the Act.\n\nHaving due regard to the above principles, as could be gathered from the decisions, referred to above, in our opinion, the application filed by the management for permission to adduce evidence was highly blated. We have already emphasised that the enquiry F proceeding before the Tribunal is a composite one, though the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to consider the validity of the domestic enquiry and the evidence adduced by the management before it, are to be considered in two stages.\n\nIt is , lib doubt true that the management has got a right to adduce evidence before the Tribunal in case the domestic enquiry is held to be vitiated.\n\nThe Tribu- G nal derives jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute only if it has held that the domestic enquiry has not been held properly.\n\nBut the two stages in which the Tribunal has to conduct the enquiry are in the same proceeding which relates to the consideration of the dispute regarding the validity of the action taken by the m!llllagemflllt.\n\nTherefore, if the management ants to avail itself of the right, at it has in law, of adducing additional evidence, it has 8 either to adduce evidence simultaneously with its reli!llllce on the domestic enquiry or should ask the Tril:iunal to consider the validity\n\nA of the domestic enquiry as a preliminary issue with a reques• to grant permission to adduce evidence, if the decision ol. prelunin& -y issue is agains\\ the ml1ollllgement.\n\nAn enquiry into the prelimina:1 r issue is in the course of the proceedings and the opportunity give1' to the management, after a decision on the preliminary issue, is really a continuation of the same proceedings before the Tribunal.\n\nB In the case before us, it is seen from the order sheet that Item No. 5 relates to the entry of March 21, 1967 regarding the appellant having filed the enquiry proceedings and to the Tribunal having heard the arguments of both sides on the basis of the enquiry proceedings. There is a!SQ the further entry that judgment has been reserved by the Tribunal. That shows that the enquiry pro- C ceedings have closed by then and what was left was only the delivery ol. judgment by the Tribunal. The order sheet further shows that after the judgmein, t was reserved on March 21, 1967, the appel: lailt filed the appiication in question praying that if the enquiry proceedings are found to be defective, it should be given an opportwiity to adduce evidence.\n\nIn the order sheet the try relating o to the receipt of this application is shown as item No. 6, after Item No. 5 which, as pointed above, relates to the reserving of judgment.\n\nNo doubt, it would have been proper for the Tribunal to have dealt\n\nwith this application in its main order and expressed its opinion on the same. It is regrettable that the Tribunal apart from just making a reference to the filing of the application in its main order, E has not dealt with it on merits.\n\nBut, that is of no CQmequence, so far as the present case is concerned.\n\nThe appellant did not ask for an opportunity to adduce evidence when the proceedings were pending; nor did it avail itself of the right given to it in law to adduce evidence before the Tribunal during the pendency of the proceedings. If such an opportunity had been asked for and\n\nF refused or if the Tribunal had declined to receive evidence, when it was sought to be tendered on behalf of. the management, when\n\nthe proceedin~ were still pending, the position would have been entirely differe; nt. In such a case, it can be held that the appellant had been deprived of the opportunity which should have been afforded to it, in law, ol. adducing evidence on merits before the Tribunal if the domestic enquiry was held to be defective. Having G due regard to the fact that the appellant moved the Tnbunal in\n\nthat regard only after the proceedings had come to an end, it cannot be said, in this case, that such an opportunity had been denied to it.\n\nIn the result, the order of the Special Industrial Tribunal is H confirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nApP\"li dismissed. 5-LS64 Sup Cl/72", "total_entities": 106, "entities": [{"text": "DELHI CLOTH & GENERAL MILLS CO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DELHI CLOTH & GENERAL MILLS CO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "LUDH BUDH SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LUDH BUDH SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 11, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 66, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LUDH BUDH SINGH\n\nJanuary 11, 1972\n\n[C. A. VAID!ALINGAM AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "K. K. MATHEW, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152, "end_char": 158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 722, "end_char": 751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "17-12-71", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3195, "end_char": 3203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17-12-71, Martin Burn Ltd. v. R. N. Banerjee, [19581 S.C.R. 514, Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 204 and Central Bank of India Ltd., New Delhi v .. Shri Prakash Chand lain, [19691\n\n1."}}, {"text": "[1961] 3 S.C.R. 204", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3303, "end_char": 3322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3499, "end_char": 3504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "LUDH BUDH SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6543, "end_char": 6558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "56 C-El\n\nIn the present case, the record of proceedings shows that the appellant filed the application for adducing further evidence after the proceedin.s before the Tribunal came to an end and judgment as reserved\n\nD.C.M, v. LUDH BUDH SINGH (Jlaltliali\"lllm, /.) 31\n\nA The appellant did not ask for an opportunity when the proceedings were\n\npending and hence, thouah the Tribunal did not deal with the application on merits, it could not be said that the opportunity to which the appellant was entitled had been denied to the appellant. (", "canonical_name": "LUDH BUDH SINGH"}}, {"text": "[1965) 3 S.C.R. 588", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7158, "end_char": 7177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "VIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7192, "end_char": 7218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : c. A. No."}}, {"text": "H. L. Anand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7416, "end_char": 7427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. L. Anand, D. P. Thadani, S.S. Sharma and M. L. Chhibber, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "H. L. Anand"}}, {"text": "D. P. Thadani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7429, "end_char": 7442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. L. Anand, D. P. Thadani, S.S. Sharma and M. L. Chhibber, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S.S. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7444, "end_char": 7455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. L. Anand, D. P. Thadani, S.S. Sharma and M. L. Chhibber, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. L. Chhibber", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7460, "end_char": 7474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. L. Anand, D. P. Thadani, S.S. Sharma and M. L. Chhibber, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7496, "end_char": 7512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, Vineet Kumar and S. S. Khunduja, for the respondtmt.", "canonical_name": "M. K. Ramamurthi"}}, {"text": "Vineet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7514, "end_char": 7526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, Vineet Kumar and S. S. Khunduja, for the respondtmt."}}, {"text": "S. S. Khunduja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7531, "end_char": 7545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, Vineet Kumar and S. S. Khunduja, for the respondtmt."}}, {"text": "Vaidialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7612, "end_char": 7624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J.-This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the order dated March 22, 1967 of the Delhi Administration, Special Industrial Tribunal, dismissing application No."}}, {"text": "s. 33(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7838, "end_char": 7849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7857, "end_char": 7886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Swatantra Bharat Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8057, "end_char": 8079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is a public limited company owning textile mills called Delhi Cloth Mills, situated at Bara Hindu Rao, Delhi, and Swatantra Bharat Mills, situated at Najafgarh, New Delhi."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8104, "end_char": 8113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is a public limited company owning textile mills called Delhi Cloth Mills, situated at Bara Hindu Rao, Delhi, and Swatantra Bharat Mills, situated at Najafgarh, New Delhi."}}, {"text": "Ludh Budh Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8128, "end_char": 8143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The workman Ludh Budh Singh was employed, at the material time, in F the Spinning Section 'C' of the fonner mill.", "canonical_name": "LUDH BUDH SINGH"}}, {"text": "December 13, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8414, "end_char": 8431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of a settlement dated December 13, 1965, arrived at between the management and its workmen, the bonus for the year ending June 30, 1964 was."}}, {"text": "December 14, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8795, "end_char": 8812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tht said settle- G ment also provided that negotiations for settling the rate of bonus for the year ending June 30 1965 were to be held soon after the accounts of the mill had been audited and passed at the Annual General Meeting due to take place on December 14, 1965."}}, {"text": "Decem. ber 25, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8876, "end_char": 8895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The negotiations in that direction were commenced on or about Decem."}}, {"text": "February 16, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8996, "end_char": 9013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ber 25, 1965, but no settlement could be arrived at between the n parties and as such the negotiations failed on February 16, 1966."}}, {"text": "Payment of Bonus Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9079, "end_char": 9099, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "February 21.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9127, "end_char": 9139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to pay the bonus within the period prescribied in the Payment of Bonus Act, the appellant declared on February 21."}}, {"text": "June 30, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9175, "end_char": 9188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A 1966, bonus for the year ending June 30, 1965, at the rate of 6% of the annual wages."}}, {"text": "February 23, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9434, "end_char": 9451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a protest, tl\\e workmen went on strike on the afternoon of February 23, 1966."}}, {"text": "Delhi Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9820, "end_char": 9840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The disputes regarding the bonus as well as the legality of the strike and lock-out were referred for adjudication by the Delhi Administration by its order datd March 4, 1966, to the Special C.\n\nIndustrial Tribunal, which was numbered as Reierence No."}}, {"text": "March 4, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9859, "end_char": 9872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The disputes regarding the bonus as well as the legality of the strike and lock-out were referred for adjudication by the Delhi Administration by its order datd March 4, 1966, to the Special C.\n\nIndustrial Tribunal, which was numbered as Reierence No."}}, {"text": "Special C.\n\nIndustrial Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9881, "end_char": 9912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The disputes regarding the bonus as well as the legality of the strike and lock-out were referred for adjudication by the Delhi Administration by its order datd March 4, 1966, to the Special C.\n\nIndustrial Tribunal, which was numbered as Reierence No."}}, {"text": "Sujan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9963, "end_char": 9974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sujan Singh, Security Officer of the mill,' sent a report dated February 23, 1966 to the management regarding the violent activities of the workmen including Ludh Budh Singh, who belonged to the Spinning 5ection 'C'.", "canonical_name": "Sujan Singh"}}, {"text": "Rampa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11371, "end_char": 11376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These acts of violence were witnessed by Sujan Singh, Security Officer, who made the report as well as by Rampa!,", "canonical_name": "Rampal"}}, {"text": "U Prakash", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11417, "end_char": 11426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a Sepoy cl the Watch arid Ward and J; U Prakash, a peon in the G Weaving Section."}}, {"text": "S. S. Shanna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12694, "end_char": 12706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C l\\ot satisued with the explanation offered by the concernecl\n\nworkman, the appellant issued notiee dated April 27, 1966, stating that Shri S. S. Shanna has been appointed as the Enquiry Officer to hold an enquiry against the workman on May 3, 1966.", "canonical_name": "S. S. Shann11"}}, {"text": "May 3, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12902, "end_char": 12913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 3, 1966, as the notice had not .been served on the respondent, the enquiry was adjourned to May 6, 1966."}}, {"text": "May 6, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12998, "end_char": 13009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 3, 1966, as the notice had not .been served on the respondent, the enquiry was adjourned to May 6, 1966."}}, {"text": "Sanwal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13046, "end_char": 13058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the request of another workman Sanwal Singh, against whom also there were allegations of misconduct, the Enquiry Officer directetl copies of the complaint and a list of witnesses to ~- furnished to him.", "canonical_name": "Sanwa.J Singh"}}, {"text": "May 24, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13400, "end_char": 13412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After further adjournment, the enquiry as against Sanwal Singh was separated on May 24, 1966 antl it continued only as against the respondent."}}, {"text": "Suian Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13730, "end_char": 13741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two other wit nesses, namely, Suian Singh, Security Officer, who sent the report Ex."}}, {"text": "Rampal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13795, "end_char": 13801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. 15 and Rampal, a Sepoy in the Watch and Ward, were examined and they were also cross-examined by the respondent's representative appearin~ on behalf ot the respondent.", "canonical_name": "Rampal"}}, {"text": "August 31, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14041, "end_char": 14056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After ;, consideration of the evidence, the Enquiry Officer sent his report G dated August 31, 1966 holding that alJ the charges framed under\n\nsub-clauses (b) (I) and (m) of paragraph 27 of the Standing Orders of the MiU have been proved against the workman."}}, {"text": "MiU", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14174, "end_char": 14177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After ;, consideration of the evidence, the Enquiry Officer sent his report G dated August 31, 1966 holding that alJ the charges framed under\n\nsub-clauses (b) (I) and (m) of paragraph 27 of the Standing Orders of the MiU have been proved against the workman."}}, {"text": "Delhi Cloth Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14265, "end_char": 14282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accepting the said report, the management of the Delhi Cloth Mills passeLl an order dated January 5/6, 1967 to the e!Iect that the finding on each of the charges is sufficient to justify the dismissal of the res- H pondent from service."}}, {"text": "January 5/6, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14306, "end_char": 14323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accepting the said report, the management of the Delhi Cloth Mills passeLl an order dated January 5/6, 1967 to the e!Iect that the finding on each of the charges is sufficient to justify the dismissal of the res- H pondent from service."}}, {"text": "s. 33(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14833, "end_char": 14844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Speci_al Industrial Tribunal, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14898, "end_char": 14933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "winds up~ saying that as\n\nruire4 ur s. 33(1)(b) of the Act, an application is being submitted to the Speci_al Industrial Tribunal, Delhi for permission to pass the order of dismissal against the resndent, and that in the mean time pending the receipt of the permission, the respondent is suspended without wages."}}, {"text": "Special Industrial Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15182, "end_char": 15209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "53 of 1966 was pending before the Special Industrial Tribunal, the appellant filed on January 6, 1967, bef_ore the SQecial Industrial Tribunal application NQ."}}, {"text": "January 6, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15234, "end_char": 15249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "53 of 1966 was pending before the Special Industrial Tribunal, the appellant filed on January 6, 1967, bef_ore the SQecial Industrial Tribunal application NQ."}}, {"text": "SQecial Industrial Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15263, "end_char": 15290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "53 of 1966 was pending before the Special Industrial Tribunal, the appellant filed on January 6, 1967, bef_ore the SQecial Industrial Tribunal application NQ."}}, {"text": "s. 33(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15324, "end_char": 15332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 20, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15818, "end_char": 15832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent in his written statement of March 20, 1967 contested the application of the appellant on tlie ground that the enquiry held by the appellant was not in accordance with\n\nthe principles of natural justice and that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were perverse and sufiered from basic errors of facts."}}, {"text": "March 21, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16246, "end_char": 16260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 21, 1967, the apeellant filed an application before the Tribunal that in case the Tnbunal held that the enquiry conducted by it was defective, it should be allowed to adduee evidence before the Tribunal to justify the action proposed to be taken F against the respondent."}}, {"text": "March 22, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16923, "end_char": 16937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal by its order dated March 22, 1967 hold that the enquiry proceedings had not been conducted against the respondent in accordance with the principles of natural justice and that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were not in accordance H with the evidence adduced before him."}}, {"text": "Sujan Singk", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17328, "end_char": 17339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M .. 15 was not furnished to the ~D dent so as to enable him to effectively cross-examine Sujan Singk,\n\nD.C.M. v. LUDH BUDH SINGH (Vaidiallngam, /,) 35\n\nA who had made the said report.", "canonical_name": "Sujan Singh"}}, {"text": "H. L. Anand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19067, "end_char": 19078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. H. L. Anand, learned co11; nsel for the appellant, bas raised two contentions : ( 1) The enquiry proceedings held by the appellant were legal and valid and that the Trib1'181 has exceeded its F jurisdiction under s. 33 ( 1) (1;.)", "canonical_name": "H. L. Anand"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19280, "end_char": 19285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramamurthy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19722, "end_char": 19732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G Mr. Ramamurthy, learned counsel for the respondent, has taken us through the enquiry proceedings cQDducted by the management and pointed out that the View taken by the Tn'bunal that the enquiry proceedings were held in violation of tlie principles of 111atural justice is justified."}}, {"text": "Anand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21786, "end_char": 21791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Anand pointed out that these are matters that an appellate court may be entitled to consider, but not an Industrial Tribu, nal, whose jurisdiction is very E limited.", "canonical_name": "Anand"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23623, "end_char": 23628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25394, "end_char": 25399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25462, "end_char": 25467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "17·12-71", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25596, "end_char": 25604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "982 of 1967 decided on 17·12-71\n\n(2) (1960] 1 S.<;.R. 806."}}, {"text": "(1963] 3 S.C.R. 461", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 25664, "end_char": 25683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. S. Shann11", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27655, "end_char": 27668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bearii!lg in mind the abQve principles, we will now consider whether the Industrial Tribunal, in the case before us, was' justified F in refusing to grant permission to the appellant to dismiss the respondent on the basis of the evidnce recorded by the Enquiry Officer Shri S. S. Shann11.", "canonical_name": "S. S. Shann11"}}, {"text": "SuJan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29419, "end_char": 29430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the circumstances pointed out by the Tribunal in suprt of its view that the enquiry proceedings were conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice as the workman hadjllO effective opportunity of cross-examming SuJan Singh, who made the report Ex.", "canonical_name": "Sujan Singh"}}, {"text": "May 3, D 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29507, "end_char": 29520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the enquiry proceedings cOmmf!llced on May 3, D 1966, the record shows, that the enquiry proceedings were adjourned to May 6, 1966 because the respondent bad not been rved."}}, {"text": "Sanwa.J Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30139, "end_char": 30152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After furnishing copies to Sanwa.", "canonical_name": "Sanwa.J Singh"}}, {"text": "Rampa", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 33938, "end_char": 33943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H Coming to the second witness Rampa!,"}}, {"text": "June 13. 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34026, "end_char": 34039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a sepoy n the Watch :llld Ward, it is seen from the enquiry proceedings that on June 13."}}, {"text": "J. C. Bose", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 34041, "end_char": 34051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1966, J. C. Bose, the represfltltative of the management mentioned\n\nA to the Enquiry Officer that this witness \"has refµsed to tender evidence because he has no knowledge of this occurrence.\""}}, {"text": "June 21, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34314, "end_char": 34327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the said witness gave evidence on June 21, 1966 to the effect at about 2 or 2.30 p.m. on Fejjruary 23, 1966 the Security Officer, Sujan Singh asked him to accompany him to gate No."}}, {"text": "Fejjruary 23, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34369, "end_char": 34387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the said witness gave evidence on June 21, 1966 to the effect at about 2 or 2.30 p.m. on Fejjruary 23, 1966 the Security Officer, Sujan Singh asked him to accompany him to gate No."}}, {"text": "June 22, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35146, "end_char": 35159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When this witiness was cross-examined by the respondent on June 22, 1966, he started by saying that he never mentioned earlier to anybody that he had no knowledge about the occurrence in res- D pect of which he had come to give evideince before the' Enquiry Officer."}}, {"text": "June 13, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35429, "end_char": 35442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But when he was confronted with the record made by the Enquiry Officer on June 13, 1966 on the representation of J. C.\n\nBose that this witness has refused to tender evidence because he has no knowledge of the occurrence, he admitted .that he had so repre sented to J. C. Bose."}}, {"text": "J. C.\n\nBose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35468, "end_char": 35479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But when he was confronted with the record made by the Enquiry Officer on June 13, 1966 on the representation of J. C.\n\nBose that this witness has refused to tender evidence because he has no knowledge of the occurrence, he admitted .that he had so repre sented to J. C. Bose.", "canonical_name": "J. C.\n\nBose"}}, {"text": "J. C. Bose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35620, "end_char": 35630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But when he was confronted with the record made by the Enquiry Officer on June 13, 1966 on the representation of J. C.\n\nBose that this witness has refused to tender evidence because he has no knowledge of the occurrence, he admitted .that he had so repre sented to J. C. Bose.", "canonical_name": "J. C.\n\nBose"}}, {"text": "MangaI Das", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 36790, "end_char": 36800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H There was, no doubt, the evidence of the photographer MangaI Das, Witness No."}}, {"text": "Rampa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37589, "end_char": 37594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the material evidence relating to the incident and relied on by the management is that of Sujan Singh and Rampa!", "canonical_name": "Rampal"}}, {"text": "Ana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38945, "end_char": 38948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accepting the contention of Mr. Ana, nd that it was within the jurisdiction of the Enquiry Officer to accept the evidence of Sujan Singh and Rampa!", "canonical_name": "Anand"}}, {"text": "011 June 13, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40363, "end_char": 40380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J'his observation of the Enquiry Officer clearly shows that he has not at all cared to give effect to the record made by him 011 June 13, 1966 to the c effect that Rampa!"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43081, "end_char": 43085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43881, "end_char": 43886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Aaland", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45321, "end_char": 45327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Aaland, learned counsel for the appellant very strenuously H urged that as per the decisions of this Court, the management is entitled t<;> an opportunity to adduce evidence before the Tribunal to justify its action in case the Tn1iRmal holds that the domestic\n\nA enquiry is defective for any reason."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 46817, "end_char": 46833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. M. K. Ramamurthy, learned counsel for the respondent, pointed out that the proceedings must be considered to have been\n\nclosed on March 21, 1967, when the Tribunal has made a hote in the order sheet that the judgment has been reserved.", "canonical_name": "M. K. Ramamurthi"}}, {"text": "17·9-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48386, "end_char": 48395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Anand placed considerable reliance not only on the above B decision but also on the decision in Management of Ritz Theatre\n\n(P) Ltd. v. Its Workme~( 2 ) and urged that it is only after the\n\n(1) C.A. 992 of 1967 decided on 17·9-1971."}}, {"text": "17·9-71", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51079, "end_char": 51086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not think it either just to the management or indeed even fair to\n\n(I) C.A. 992 of 1967 dated 17·9-71."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 S.C.lt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 59059, "end_char": 59096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "have to be given to the employer to cite additional evidence, instead of following such an elaborate and somewhat cumbersome procedure, if the employer seeks to lead evidence in addition to the evidence adduced at the departmental enquiry and the employ:es are also given an opponunity to lead additional' evidence, it would be open to the Tribunal first to consider the preliminary\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 S.C.lt\n\nissue and then to proceed to deal with the merits in case the preliminary issue is ."}}, {"text": "Shobrati Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61775, "end_char": 61788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shobrati Khan( 1), Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen(') and the Punjab National Bank Limited v. Its Workmen(')."}}, {"text": "Phulbari Tea Estate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 62448, "end_char": 62467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that , three of these cases, except Phulbari Tea Estate's case('), were on application under s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62505, "end_char": 62510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62518, "end_char": 62547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62652, "end_char": 62657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62682, "end_char": 62687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62695, "end_char": 62718, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 10,\n\n3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63046, "end_char": 63055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "(1962] 3 S.C.R. 614", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 64276, "end_char": 64295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "17-9-71", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66910, "end_char": 66917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was observed H as follows:\n\n(I) C.A. 992 of 1967 decided on 17-9-71."}}, {"text": "Delhi and Madhya Pradesh High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 71016, "end_char": 71052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be pointed out that the Delhi and Madhya Pradesh High Courts had held that it is the duty of the Tribu!!al to decide, in the first instance, the propriety of t\\te domestic enquiry held by the management and if it records a finding against the management, it should suo moto provide an opportunity to the management to F adduce additional evidence, even though the management had made no such request."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76755, "end_char": 76760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76795, "end_char": 76800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_303_311_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "BHAGAT RAM\n\nSTATE OF RAJASIBAN\n\nJanuary 31, 1972\n\n[J. M. SHELAT AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.]\n\nCrin1irwl Law-Practice and Procedure-Two accused charged with o11ences for conspiracy and other ofjences_..:..Acquitted by trial coutt-\n\nAppelll heard by two Judges-Acquittal of one accused and the <Hher of ofiences of conspiracy etc. upheld-Difference of opinion with respect to offence under s. 161 I.P.C.-Reference to third Judge-Jurisdiction of ihird !11d.fle to reopen entire matter.\n\nAn Inspector of Police was charged with offences under ss. I 20B, 161, '.!18, 347 and 389 I.P.C. and also under s. 5(1)(a) read withs. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Another accused was charged along wiib him for offences under ss. I20B and J 65A, I.P.C. The trial dmrt acquitted both the accused. Jn appe:il to the High Court a Bench of two judges confirmed the acquittal of tho second accused and the acquittal of the Inspector with respect to offences under ss. 120B, 218, 349 and :\\89, J.P.C., but with respec, t to offences under s. 161, l.P.C. ands. 5(1) (a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the two Judges differed and the matter was referred to a third Judge.\n\nThe third Judge held that the Jnspcctor s guilty of the offences under s. 161 and also under ss. 120B, 218 and 347 J.P.C.\n\nIn appeal to this Court by the Inspector and by the State against the acquittal of the second accused,\n\nHELD : ( J) As regards the second accused there was nothing to justify an interference with his acquitta1. [310 HJ\n\n(2) It was not permissible for the third Judge to reopen the molter and convict the Inspector for offences under ss. 120B, 347 and 389 l.P.C., bec'/iuse it was not a case where the entire matter had been left open for the opinion of the third Judge.\n\nThe difference of opinion between the two Judges was only with l'espec~ to the offences under s. 161 I.P.C. and s. 5(1) (a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the third Judge could only go into that aspect of the matter . .[309 B-D]\n\nThe Division Bench had upheld the ocquittal of the Inspector of Police f0r offences under ss. 120B, 347 and 389 and the State appeal in that respect had been dismissed by the Division Bench.\n\nThat order. unless set aside in appeal to this Court, was binding and conclusive in all suboequent proceedings between the parties. The principle of res judicata is also appltcable to ctiminal proceedings and it is not pennissible in the subsequent stage of the same proceedings or in some other subsequent proceedings to convict a person for an offence in respect of which an crder fo'r his acquittal bas already been reoorded. [309 F-HJ\n\nPritam Singh v. State of Punjab, 1956 S.C. A.l.R. 415, followed.\n\nFurther when the second accused was acquitted of the charge under ' I 20B I.P.C. the bais of the charge against the Inspector for conspimcy\n\n7-L!S7S1p. Cl/72\n\nbetween him and the second accused disappeared.\n\nIt was not the ca.se A of the prosecution that he had conspired with some other person whose identity had not been e•l'ablished. [310 E-F]\n\nIn view of the acquittal of the second accused it is also not pclaiblo to maintain the conviction of the Inspector under s. 161 I.P.C. sinoe it was not the r.rosecution case that he had made any demand directly for payment ot 1llegal gratification.\n\nOn the contrary, the prosecution case was that the Inspector had attempted to obtain such gratification through B iustrumentality of the second accused. (311 B-C)\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. 36 of 1969 and 202 of 1970.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated January 17, 1969 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 376 C of 1965.\n\nA, S. R. Chari and Sobhagmal Jain, for the appellant (in Cr.\n\nA. No. 36 of 1969),\n\nK. B. Mehta, for the respondent (in Cr. A. No. 36 of 1969) (in Cr. A. No. 202 of 1970).\n\nS. C. Gupta, Ramesh Chand, S. Bhandare and P. H. Parekh, for the respondent (in Cr. A. No. 202 of 1970).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J. This judgment would dispose of criminal E appeal No. 36 of 1969 Bhagat Ram v. State of Rajasthan and criminal appeal No. 262 of 1970 State of Rajasthan v. Ram.\n\nSwaroop.\n\nBoth the appeals have been filed on certificate granted by the Rajasthan High Court.\n\nBhagat Ram during the year 1962 was posted as circle ins F pector of police at Ganganagar.\n\nAncestral village of Bhagat Ram is Mehna in Tehsil Moga, District Ferozepur. Ram\n\nSwaroop also belongs to that viii.age.\n\nBoth Bhagat Ram and Ram Swaroop were tried in the court of special judge, Ganga nagar for offences under section 120B IPC for conspiring to extort bribe of Rs. 2,000 from PW 1 Niranjan Dass of Moga.\n\nG Charges were also framed against Bhagat Ram for offences under sections 161, 218, 347 and 389 Indian Penal Code as also section 5 ( 1 )(a) read with section 5 (2) of Prevention of Corrup~ tion Act.\n\nAdditional charge under section 165A Indian Penal Code was framed against Ram Swaroop.\n\nBoth Bhagat Ram and Ram Swaroop were acquitted by the special judge, Ganganagar H in respect of all the charges.\n\nThe State of Rajasthan filed an appeal against the acquittal of the two accused.\n\nThe appeal WilS heard by a Division Bench consisting of Tyagi and Lodha, JJ.\n\nThe Division Bench dismissed the said appeal against the acquittal of Ram Swaroop.\n\nThe appeal of the State against Bhagat Ram in so far as it related to his acquittal for ollcnces under sections 347, 218, 389 and 120B IPC was also dismis9ed.\n\nThere was, however, a difference of opinion between the two learned judges on the point as to whether the acquittal of Bhagat Ram for offences under secti9n 161 IPC and 5(1)(a) of Prevention of Corru_ption Act should be maintained.\n\nAccording to Tyagi,_J., the case against Bhagat Ram for the above mentioned two offences had not been proved and the State appeal in that respect also was liable to be dismissed.\n\nAs against that Lodha, J. took the view that Bhagat Ram was guilty of offences under section 161 Indian Penal Code and section 5 ( 1 )(a) of Prevention of Corruption Act.\n\nHe accordingly p.assed an order for the conviction of Bhagat Ram for the above mentioned two offences.\n\nIn view of the difference between the two judges regarding the acquittal of Bhagat Ram for offences under section 161 IPC and S(l)(a) of Prevention of Corruption Act, the case was placed under section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before Jagat Narayan, J. Jagat Narayan, J. came to the conclusion that the material on record showed that Ram Swaroop and Bha1?; at Ram had entered into an agreement to extort bribe from Niranjan Dass and, as such, were guilty of an offence under section 120A punishable under section 120B of Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe learned judge, however, felt that in view of the decision of the Division Bench, he could not set aside the acquittal of Ram Swaroop.\n\nAs regards Bhagat Ram, the learned judge came to the conclusion that he could set aside the acquittal of Bhagat Ram for. offences under sections 120B, 218 and 34 7 IPC.\n\nBhagat Ram was found 1?; Ui!tv by Jaat Narayan, J. of the offences under sections 120B, 161, 218 and 347 IPC.\n\nFor the offence under section 161 IPC, Bhagat Ram was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/· or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of three months.\n\nFor the offences under sections 218 and 34 7 IPC, Bhagat Ram was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year on each .count.\n\nThese sentences were ordered to run concurrently with the sen tence imposed under section 161 IPC.\n\nNo sentence was award ed for the offence under section 120B IPC. Bhagat Ram has filed criminal appeal No. 36 of 1969 against his conviction and\n\nsentene. while the State of Rajasthan has filed appeal No. 202 of 1970. against the acquittal of Rain Swaroop.\n\nThe prosecution case is that a case under sections 408 and\n\n420. IPC was registered on June 14, 1962 at police station Ganganagar on a report made by the general manager of Ganganagar\n\nSugar Mills against Ramesh, an employee of the sugar mills.\n\nBhagat Ram, who was circle inspector of Ganganagar, took over A\n\nthe investigation of the above case.\n\nBhagat Ram during investigation came to know that Ramesh had sent the misappropriated amount to his brother Puran Chand at Ludhiana. Bhagat Ram also came to know that Puran Chand had entered into a transaction for the purchase of a truck from PW Niranjan Dass of Moga B for a price of Rs. 22,000.\n\nNiranjan Dass received Rs. 7,000 from Puran Chand in that connection.\n\nAs Puran Chand could not pay the balance of the purchase price, the bargain regarding the purchase of the truck was cancelled and the amount received by Niranjan Dass was stated to have been returned to Puran Chand. It seems that Bhagat Ram took the stand that pat of Rs. 7,000 had been kept by Niranjan Dass with himself. Bhagat C Ram, therefore. summoned Niranjan Dass to police station Ganganagar. In obedience to the summons, Niranjan Dass went with his brother Manohar Lal PW to Ganganagar police station on July 27, 1962.\n\nNiranjan Dass and Manohar Lal could not meet Bhagat Ram on that day but met him on the following day.\n\nBhagat Ram then behaved in an unduly rnde and harsh manner D to Ni ran jan Dass and kept him at the police station.\n\nManohar Lal apprehending trouble, returned to Moga and took with him Ram Swaroop accused and some other persons.\n\nManohar Lal and his companions reached Gariganagar on July 29, 1962. In the meanwhile, Bhagat Ram had gone to Hindumalkot. Accompanied by Niranjan Dass, Ram Swaroop and others. Manohar E Lal went to Hindumalkot Dak bungalow where Bhagat Ram was staying. It is stated that Rani Swaroop went inside the room in which Bhagat Ram was present. while others stayed outside.\n\nAfter some time Ram Swaroop came out of the room and told Niranjan Dass and Manohar Lal not to feel worried.\n\nNiranjan Dass was asked to give a statement which was thereafter recorded by Bhagat Ram.\n\nBhagl\\t Ram then produced three documents relating to the agreement for the sale of truck and the receipt which Niranjan Dass had obtained from Puran Chand for the refund of Rs. 7 ,000.\n\nBhaat Ram then told Niranjan Dass to go back to Moga.\n\nIt was also mentioned by Bhagat Ram that if\n\nthe presence of Niranjan Dass was required for further investigation, he would be summoned again.\n\nAbout 10 or 15 days after that, it is stated, Bhagat Rani went\n\nto Moga in a jeep and stayed at the house of Niranjan Dass and Manohar Lal for the night. . While leaving Moga early next morning, Bhagat Ram told Niranjan Dass and Manohar Lal that tbey should have a talk with Ram Swaroop and act according to H Ram Swaroop's instructions.\n\nAfter Bhagat Ram had left Moga.\n\nRam Swaroop met Niranjan Dass and informed him that Bhagat Ram wanted Rs. 2.000 ns bribe for having helped Niranjan Dass\n\nA to get ut of the trobl<l and that otherwise, Niranjan Dass would be agam entangled m the case.\n\nNiranjan Dass then told Ram Swaroop that h~ would consult a lawyer and give a reply.\n\n. Ram Swaro?p, according to the prosecution case, came to N1ranian Dass m the first week of October 1962 and showed letter P. 2 which had been sent by Bhagat Ram to Ram Swaroop from Alwar.\n\nIn the course of that letter it was stated \"Kindly send that thing to Alwar.\n\nThis is very important and please do not be careless and slack in the matter.\" Ram Swaroop told Niranjan Dass that the words \"that thing\" in the letter referred to Rs. 2,000 and demanded that amount from Niranjan Dass, so that it could be passed on to Bhagat Ram. Niranjan Dass expressed his inability to accede to this demand.\n\nThe Jetter was, however, retained by Niranjan Dass.\n\nA few days thereafter Ram Swaroop again came to Niranjan Dass and showed him telegram P.3A dated October 19, 1962.\n\nThe telegram had been addressed by Bhagat Ram to Ram Swaroop and it was stated therein that Ram Swaroop should ask Niranjan Dass to see Bhagat Ram and D that otherwise, warrants of :UTest would be issued against him.\n\nThis telegram too was kept by Niranjan Dass, with himself.\n\nOn December 26, 1962, it is stated, Niranjan Dass came to know that warrants for his arrest had been received by the Moga police in the above mentioned case registered at Ganganagar.\n\nNiranjan Dass then consulted a lawyer aud sent complaint dated E December 26, 1962 to the Inspector General of Police, Special\n\nPolice Establishment. A case was thereafter registered on the basis of the above complaint by DSP Umaid Singh of Anti Corruption Department.\n\nAfter necessary investigation, Bhagat Ram and Ram Swaroop were sent up for trial.\n\nF Jn his statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Ram Swaroop admitted that he knew Bhagat Ram and that he had gone to him on July 29, 1962 with Manohar Lal and Nlranjan Dass at Hindumalkot.\n\nRam Swaroop denied that Bhagat Ram had made any demand through him for illegal gratification.\n\nAccording to Ram Swaroop, Bhagat Ram had asked G him to realise the embezzled amount from Niranjan Dass.\n\nThe other allegations made against him were denied by Ram Swaroop. he. however, admitted having received letter P. 2 and telegram p. 3A from Bhagat Ram and having handed over those documents to Niranjan Dass. Ram Swaroop added that he had asked Niranjan Dass to pay the embezzled amount which was with him.\n\nB Bhagat Ram admitted that he had been entrusted with the investigation of the case against Ramesh and that he had called Niranjan Dass to Ganganagar in that connection. Bhagat Ram\n\nSUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS [1972] 3 s.c.R.\n\ndenied having maltreated Niranjan Dass or having kept him A under unlawful detention. Bhagat Ram admitted that Niranjan Dass and Ram Swaroop had met him on July 29, 1962 at Hindumalkot but he denied having made any demand through Ram Swaroop fqr the payment of Rs. 2,000 as bribe.\n\nIt was admitted by Bhagat Ram that he. had gone to Moga but the demand for any illegal gratification from Niranjan Dass at Moga was denied B by Bhagat Ram.\n\nBhagat Ram admitted having sent letter P. 2 and telegram P. 3A to Ram Swaroop.\n\nAs regards the words \"that thing\", Bhagat Ram stated that they referred to the embezzl ed amount which had been retained by Niranjan Dass.\n\nThe trial court, as stated earlier, acquitted both the accused, C' while the High Court maintained the acquittal of Ram Swaroop.\n\nAs regards Bhagat Ram, there was a difference between the two judges.\n\nOn the matter being referred to the third judge, Bhagat Ram was convicted and sentenced as above.\n\nArguments have been addressed in the two appeals by Mr.\n\nMelita on. behalf of the State of Rajasthan, Mr. Chari on behalf D of Bhagat Ram and Mr. Gupta on behalf of Ram Swaroop. After hearing the learned counsel, we are of the opinion that the appeal filed by the State of Rajasthan merits dismissal, while that filed by Bhagat Ram should be allowed.\n\nIt would appear from theresume of facts given above that both Bhagat Ram and Ram Swaroop were acquitted by the spe E. cial judge.\n\nOn appeal filed by the State of Rajasthan against the acquittal of the two accused, Tyagi and Lodha, JJ. maintained the order relating to the acquittal of Ram Swaroop.\n\nAs regards Bhagat Ram, though there was a difference between the two judges regarding the correctness of his acquittal for offences under section S(l)(a) of Preve.ntion of Corruption Act and section 161 F of Indian Penal Code, they concurred with regard to the acquittal of Bhagat Ram in respect of the charges under sections 120B, 218, 347 and 389 IPC. The State appeal against the acquittal of Bhagat Ram was dismissed to that extent. The order which was made by. the learned judges of the Division Bench reads as under:\n\n\"BY THE COURT\n\nThe result is that the appeal of the State against the order of acquittal of respondent Ram Swaroop Is dis missed.\n\nThe appeal of the State so far as it relates to the acquittal of respondent Bhagat Ram under sections 347 218, 389 and 120B Indian Penal Code is also disniissed. In view of the difference of opinion about the acquittal of Bhagat Ram under section 161 Indian\n\nPenal CQde and section 5 (1 )(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the matter may be laid before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for referring it to the third judge.\"\n\nB In view of the fact that the State appeal against the acquittal of Bhagat Ram for offences under sections 120B, 218, 347 and 389 IPC had been dismissed by the Division Bench, it was, in our opinion, not permissible for the third judge to reopen the matter and convict Bhagat Ram for offence.~ under sections 347, 389 and 1208 IPC. The matter had been referred under section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to J agat Narayan, J.\n\nC because there was a difference of opinion between Tyagi, J. and Lodha, J. regarding the correctness of the acquittai of . Bhagat Ram for offences under section 161 IPC and section S(l)(a) of Prevention of Corruption Act.\n\nJagat Narayan, J. could go only into this aspect of the matter and arrive at his conclusion. The present was not a case wherein the entire matter relating to the D acquittal or conviction of Bhagat Ram had been left open because of a difference of opinion between the two judges. Had that been the position, the whole case relating to Bhagat Ram could legitimately be considered by Jagat Narayan, J. and he could have formed his own view of the matter regarding the correctness of. the order of acquittal made by the trial judge in respect of Bhagat Ram.\n\nOn the contrary, as mentioned earlier, an express E order had been made by the Division Bench upholding the acquittal of Bhagat Ram for offences under sections 120B, 218, 347 and 389 IPC and the State appeal in that respect had been dismissed. The above decision of the Division Bench was binding upon Jagat Narayan, J. and he was in error in convicting\n\nBhaat Ram for offences under sections 120B, 218 and 347 IPC f despite the order of the Division Bench. It was, in our opinion, not within the competence of the learned judge to reopen the matter and pass the above order of conviction in the face of the earlier order of the Division Bench whereby the order of acquittal of Bhagat Ram made by the trial judge in respect of the said three charge1 had been affirmed. The order of the Division Bench c; unless set aside in appeal to this Court, was binding and conclu slve in all subsequent proceedings between the parties. The principle of .res fudlcata is also applicable to criminal proceed 1ngs and it is not permissible in the subsequent stage of the same proceedings or in some other subsequent proceedings to convict\n\na person for an offence in respect of which an order for his H acquittal has already been recorded. The plea of autrefois acquit as a bar to prosecution embodied in section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedme is based upon the above wholesome principle.\n\nIn the case of Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federal of A Malaya('), Lord MacDermott observed :\n\n\"The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent Court on a lawful charge and after a lawful trial is not completely stated by saying that the person acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence.\n\nB To that it must be added that the verdict is binding and conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the adjudication.\n\nThe maxim 'res judicata pro veritate accipitur' is no less applicable to criminal than to civil proceedings.\n\nHere, the appellant having been acquitted at the first C trial on the charge of having ammunition in his possession, the prosecution was bound to accept the correct ness of that verdict and was precluded from taking any steps to challenge it at the second trial.\"\n\nThe above observations were quoted with approval by this Court 0 in the case of Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab('). We are. there fore, of the opinion that the judgment of Jagat Narayan, J. in so far as he has convicted Bhagat Ram for offences under sections\n\n120B, 218 and 347 IPC cannot be sustained.\n\nThe matter can also be looked at from another angle. The charge under section 120B IPC related to conspiracy between E Bhagat Ram and Ram Swaroop for extorting Rs. 2,000 as illegal gratification from Niranjan Dass.\n\nWhen Ram Swaroop was acquitted of the charge under section 120B IPC, the basis of the charge against Bhagat Ram for conspiracy between him and Ram Swaroop disappeared.\n\nIt is not the case of the prosecution that Bhagat Ram had conspired with another person and even though.\n\nF the identity of the other person has not been established, Bhagat Ram would still be guilty for the olfcnce under section 120B\n\nIPC.\n\nOn the contrary, the case of .the prosecution was that Bhagat Ram had conspired with Ram Swaroop to extort Rs. 2,000 as illegal gratification from Niranjan Dass.\n\nOnce Ram Swaroop was acquitted in respect of. the charge relating to conspiracy, the G charge against Bhagat Ram for conspiracy must necessarily fall t9 the ground.\n\nSo far as the State appeal against the acquittal of Ram Swa roop is concerned, we find that there are concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court that the evidence on record had failed to prove that he was guilty of offences under sections 120B ff and 165A IPC.\n\nNothing hai; been brought to our notice at the\n\nrn r10..-oi A C:. 458.\n\n(2) [1956] S.C.R. 41S,\n\nBHAGAT RAM v. RAJASTHAN (Kha11na, J.) 311\n\nA hearing of the appeal as may justify interference with those concurrent findings by a fresh appraisement of that evidence. We are, therefore, of the view that the State appeal against the acquittal of Ram Swaroop is liable to be dismissed.\n\nAs regards the conviction of Bhagat Ram for the offence B under section 161 IPC, we find that it is not the prosecution case that. Bhagat Ram had made any demand directly to Niranjan Dass for payment of illegal gratification.\n\nOn the contrary, the High Court found that Bhagat Ram had not demanded bribe directly from Niranjan Dass. The case set up by the prosecution is that Bhagat Ram attempted to obtain illegal gratification from Niranjan Dass through the instrumentality of Ram Swaroop. In C view of the acquittal of Ram Swaroop, it is not possible to maintain the conviction of Bhagat Ram. The acquittal of Ram Swaroop would necessarily lead to the conclusion that the prosecution allegation about Ram Swaroop having made a demand of illegal gratification from Niranjan Dass for Bhagat Ram has not been proved. 'The case,. in the circumstances, against Bhagat D Ram .for asking for bribe through Ram Swaroop must consequently fail.\n\nIt would indeed be incongruous and inconsistent to acquit Ram Swaroop, for offences under sections 165A and 120B IPC and, at the same time, to convict Bhagat Ram for the offence under section 161 IPC for asking for bribe from Niranjan Dass\n\nthrough the instrumentality of Ram Swaroop.\n\nE We, therefore, accept the appeal of Bhagat :Ram and set aside his conviction and acquit him.\n\nThe appeal of the State of Rajasthan against the acquittal of Ram Swaroop is dismissed.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 166, "entities": [{"text": "RAM\n\nSTATE OF RAJASIBAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF RAJASIBAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 31, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 48, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHAGAT RAM\n\nSTATE OF RAJASIBAN\n\nJanuary 31, 1972\n\n[J. M. SHELAT AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 382, "end_char": 388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 389, "end_char": 394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 568, "end_char": 573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 590, "end_char": 600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 625, "end_char": 653, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 737, "end_char": 742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 120B, 218, 349", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 950, "end_char": 968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1024, "end_char": 1030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1061, "end_char": 1089, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1233, "end_char": 1239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 120B, 218 and 347", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1255, "end_char": 1276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 120B, 347 and 389", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1618, "end_char": 1639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1850, "end_char": 1856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1857, "end_char": 1862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1868, "end_char": 1875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1887, "end_char": 1915, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 120B, 347 and 389", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2085, "end_char": 2106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2767, "end_char": 2772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S7S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2838, "end_char": 2841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3162, "end_char": 3168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3169, "end_char": 3174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3605, "end_char": 3625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 17, 1969 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "S. R. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3673, "end_char": 3684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A, S. R. Chari and Sobhagmal Jain, for the appellant (in Cr."}}, {"text": "Sobhagmal Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3689, "end_char": 3703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A, S. R. Chari and Sobhagmal Jain, for the appellant (in Cr."}}, {"text": "K. B. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3753, "end_char": 3764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "36 of 1969),\n\nK. B. Mehta, for the respondent (in Cr."}}, {"text": "S. C. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3842, "end_char": 3853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Gupta, Ramesh Chand, S. Bhandare and P. H. Parekh, for the respondent (in Cr."}}, {"text": "Ramesh Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3855, "end_char": 3867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Gupta, Ramesh Chand, S. Bhandare and P. H. Parekh, for the respondent (in Cr.", "canonical_name": "Ramesh Chand"}}, {"text": "S. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3869, "end_char": 3880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Gupta, Ramesh Chand, S. Bhandare and P. H. Parekh, for the respondent (in Cr."}}, {"text": "P. H. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3885, "end_char": 3897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Gupta, Ramesh Chand, S. Bhandare and P. H. Parekh, for the respondent (in Cr."}}, {"text": "Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3992, "end_char": 3998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J. This judgment would dispose of criminal E appeal No."}}, {"text": "Bhagat Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4260, "end_char": 4270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagat Ram during the year 1962 was posted as circle ins F pector of police at Ganganagar.", "canonical_name": "Bhagat C Ram"}}, {"text": "Ganganagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4339, "end_char": 4349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagat Ram during the year 1962 was posted as circle ins F pector of police at Ganganagar."}}, {"text": "Ram\n\nSwaroop", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4429, "end_char": 4441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram\n\nSwaroop also belongs to that viii.age.", "canonical_name": "Ram\n\nSwaroop"}}, {"text": "Ram Swaroop", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4494, "end_char": 4505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both Bhagat Ram and Ram Swaroop were tried in the court of special judge, Ganga nagar for offences under section 120B IPC for conspiring to extort bribe of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Ram\n\nSwaroop"}}, {"text": "section 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4579, "end_char": 4591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4592, "end_char": 4595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Niranjan Dass", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4650, "end_char": 4663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,000 from PW 1 Niranjan Dass of Moga."}}, {"text": "Moga", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4667, "end_char": 4671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,000 from PW 1 Niranjan Dass of Moga."}}, {"text": "Bhagat Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4709, "end_char": 4719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G Charges were also framed against Bhagat Ram for offences under sections 161, 218, 347 and 389 Indian Penal Code as also section 5 ( 1 )(a) read with section 5 (2) of Prevention of Corrup~ tion Act.", "canonical_name": "Bhagat C Ram"}}, {"text": "sections 161, 218, 347 and 389", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4739, "end_char": 4769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4770, "end_char": 4787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4796, "end_char": 4805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4825, "end_char": 4834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 165A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4899, "end_char": 4911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4912, "end_char": 4929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5081, "end_char": 5099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Rajasthan filed an appeal against the acquittal of the two accused."}}, {"text": "Tyagi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5215, "end_char": 5220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal WilS heard by a Division Bench consisting of Tyagi and Lodha, JJ."}}, {"text": "Lodha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5225, "end_char": 5230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal WilS heard by a Division Bench consisting of Tyagi and Lodha, JJ."}}, {"text": "sections 347, 218, 389 and 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5424, "end_char": 5455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5456, "end_char": 5459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5642, "end_char": 5645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5979, "end_char": 5990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5991, "end_char": 6008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6013, "end_char": 6022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6035, "end_char": 6063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6276, "end_char": 6287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6288, "end_char": 6291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6307, "end_char": 6335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 429", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6363, "end_char": 6374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6382, "end_char": 6408, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jagat Narayan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6416, "end_char": 6429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the difference between the two judges regarding the acquittal of Bhagat Ram for offences under section 161 IPC and S(l)(a) of Prevention of Corruption Act, the case was placed under section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before Jagat Narayan, J. Jagat Narayan, J. came to the conclusion that the material on record showed that Ram Swaroop and Bha1?;", "canonical_name": "J agat Narayan"}}, {"text": "Niranjan Dass", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6596, "end_char": 6609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at Ram had entered into an agreement to extort bribe from Niranjan Dass and, as such, were guilty of an offence under section 120A punishable under section 120B of Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "Niranjan Dass"}}, {"text": "section 120A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6656, "end_char": 6668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "section 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6686, "end_char": 6698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6702, "end_char": 6719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 120B, 218 and 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6997, "end_char": 7022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7025, "end_char": 7028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jaat Narayan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7065, "end_char": 7077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ui!tv by Jaat Narayan, J. of the offences under sections 120B, 161, 218 and 347 IPC.", "canonical_name": "J agat Narayan"}}, {"text": "sections 120B, 161, 218 and 347", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7104, "end_char": 7135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7136, "end_char": 7139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7164, "end_char": 7175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7176, "end_char": 7179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 218 and 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7404, "end_char": 7423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7426, "end_char": 7429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7613, "end_char": 7624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7625, "end_char": 7628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7678, "end_char": 7690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7691, "end_char": 7694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Rain Swaroop", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7873, "end_char": 7885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "against the acquittal of Rain Swaroop.", "canonical_name": "Ram\n\nSwaroop"}}, {"text": "sections 408 and\n\n420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7930, "end_char": 7951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7953, "end_char": 7956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "June 14, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7975, "end_char": 7988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IPC was registered on June 14, 1962 at police station Ganganagar on a report made by the general manager of Ganganagar\n\nSugar Mills against Ramesh, an employee of the sugar mills."}}, {"text": "Ramesh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8093, "end_char": 8099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IPC was registered on June 14, 1962 at police station Ganganagar on a report made by the general manager of Ganganagar\n\nSugar Mills against Ramesh, an employee of the sugar mills.", "canonical_name": "Ramesh Chand"}}, {"text": "Puran Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8345, "end_char": 8356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagat Ram during investigation came to know that Ramesh had sent the misappropriated amount to his brother Puran Chand at Ludhiana."}}, {"text": "Ludhiana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8360, "end_char": 8368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagat Ram during investigation came to know that Ramesh had sent the misappropriated amount to his brother Puran Chand at Ludhiana."}}, {"text": "Moga B", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8500, "end_char": 8506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagat Ram also came to know that Puran Chand had entered into a transaction for the purchase of a truck from PW Niranjan Dass of Moga B for a price of Rs."}}, {"text": "Bhagat C Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8929, "end_char": 8941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagat C Ram, therefore.", "canonical_name": "Bhagat C Ram"}}, {"text": "Manohar Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9072, "end_char": 9083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In obedience to the summons, Niranjan Dass went with his brother Manohar Lal PW to Ganganagar police station on July 27, 1962.", "canonical_name": "Manohar E Lal"}}, {"text": "Ganganagar police station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9090, "end_char": 9115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In obedience to the summons, Niranjan Dass went with his brother Manohar Lal PW to Ganganagar police station on July 27, 1962."}}, {"text": "July 27, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9119, "end_char": 9132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In obedience to the summons, Niranjan Dass went with his brother Manohar Lal PW to Ganganagar police station on July 27, 1962."}}, {"text": "jan Dass", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9309, "end_char": 9317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagat Ram then behaved in an unduly rnde and harsh manner D to Ni ran jan Dass and kept him at the police station."}}, {"text": "Gariganagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9508, "end_char": 9519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manohar Lal and his companions reached Gariganagar on July 29, 1962."}}, {"text": "July 29, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9523, "end_char": 9536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manohar Lal and his companions reached Gariganagar on July 29, 1962."}}, {"text": "Hindumalkot", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9579, "end_char": 9590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile, Bhagat Ram had gone to Hindumalkot."}}, {"text": "Manohar E Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9646, "end_char": 9659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manohar E Lal went to Hindumalkot Dak bungalow where Bhagat Ram was staying.", "canonical_name": "Manohar E Lal"}}, {"text": "Rani Swaroop", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9741, "end_char": 9753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is stated that Rani Swaroop went inside the room in which Bhagat Ram was present.", "canonical_name": "Ram\n\nSwaroop"}}, {"text": "Bhaat Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10225, "end_char": 10234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhaat Ram then told Niranjan Dass to go back to Moga.", "canonical_name": "Bhagat C Ram"}}, {"text": "Bhagat Rani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10470, "end_char": 10481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About 10 or 15 days after that, it is stated, Bhagat Rani went\n\nto Moga in a jeep and stayed at the house of Niranjan Dass and Manohar Lal for the night. .", "canonical_name": "Bhagat C Ram"}}, {"text": "H Ram Swaroop", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10732, "end_char": 10745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While leaving Moga early next morning, Bhagat Ram told Niranjan Dass and Manohar Lal that tbey should have a talk with Ram Swaroop and act according to H Ram Swaroop's instructions."}}, {"text": "Ram Swaro?p", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11104, "end_char": 11115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Swaro?p, according to the prosecution case, came to N1ranian Dass m the first week of October 1962 and showed letter P. 2 which had been sent by Bhagat Ram to Ram Swaroop from Alwar.", "canonical_name": "Ram\n\nSwaroop"}}, {"text": "N1ranian Dass", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11160, "end_char": 11173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Swaro?p, according to the prosecution case, came to N1ranian Dass m the first week of October 1962 and showed letter P. 2 which had been sent by Bhagat Ram to Ram Swaroop from Alwar.", "canonical_name": "Niranjan Dass"}}, {"text": "Alwar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11284, "end_char": 11289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Swaro?p, according to the prosecution case, came to N1ranian Dass m the first week of October 1962 and showed letter P. 2 which had been sent by Bhagat Ram to Ram Swaroop from Alwar."}}, {"text": "October 19, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11849, "end_char": 11865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A few days thereafter Ram Swaroop again came to Niranjan Dass and showed him telegram P.3A dated October 19, 1962."}}, {"text": "December 26, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12149, "end_char": 12166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 26, 1962, it is stated, Niranjan Dass came to know that warrants for his arrest had been received by the Moga police in the above mentioned case registered at Ganganagar."}}, {"text": "Moga police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12263, "end_char": 12274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 26, 1962, it is stated, Niranjan Dass came to know that warrants for his arrest had been received by the Moga police in the above mentioned case registered at Ganganagar."}}, {"text": "Umaid Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12556, "end_char": 12567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A case was thereafter registered on the basis of the above complaint by DSP Umaid Singh of Anti Corruption Department."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12708, "end_char": 12719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12727, "end_char": 12753, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Nlranjan Dass", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12866, "end_char": 12879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F Jn his statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Ram Swaroop admitted that he knew Bhagat Ram and that he had gone to him on July 29, 1962 with Manohar Lal and Nlranjan Dass at Hindumalkot.", "canonical_name": "Niranjan Dass"}}, {"text": "B Bhagat Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13406, "end_char": 13418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B Bhagat Ram admitted that he had been entrusted with the investigation of the case against Ramesh and that he had called Niranjan Dass to Ganganagar in that connection.", "canonical_name": "B Bhagat Ram"}}, {"text": "SUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS [1972] 3 s.c.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13588, "end_char": 13625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagat Ram\n\nSUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS [1972] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Melita", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14643, "end_char": 14649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arguments have been addressed in the two appeals by Mr.\n\nMelita on."}}, {"text": "Chari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14692, "end_char": 14697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "behalf of the State of Rajasthan, Mr. Chari on behalf D of Bhagat Ram and Mr. Gupta on behalf of Ram Swaroop."}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14732, "end_char": 14737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "behalf of the State of Rajasthan, Mr. Chari on behalf D of Bhagat Ram and Mr. Gupta on behalf of Ram Swaroop."}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15429, "end_char": 15440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15446, "end_char": 15463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 120B, 218, 347 and 389", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15555, "end_char": 15586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15587, "end_char": 15590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bhagat Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15634, "end_char": 15644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State appeal against the acquittal of Bhagat Ram was dismissed to that extent.", "canonical_name": "Bhagat C Ram"}}, {"text": "Ram Swaroop", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15865, "end_char": 15876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the learned judges of the Division Bench reads as under:\n\n\"BY THE COURT\n\nThe result is that the appeal of the State against the order of acquittal of respondent Ram Swaroop Is dis missed.", "canonical_name": "Ram\n\nSwaroop"}}, {"text": "sections 347", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15986, "end_char": 15998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16017, "end_char": 16034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16132, "end_char": 16143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16167, "end_char": 16176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16192, "end_char": 16220, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 120B, 218, 347 and 389", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16416, "end_char": 16447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16448, "end_char": 16451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 347, 389 and 1208", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16618, "end_char": 16644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16645, "end_char": 16648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 429", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16685, "end_char": 16696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16704, "end_char": 16730, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "J agat Narayan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16734, "end_char": 16748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter had been referred under section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to J agat Narayan, J.\n\nC because there was a difference of opinion between Tyagi, J. and Lodha, J. regarding the correctness of the acquittai of .", "canonical_name": "J agat Narayan"}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16908, "end_char": 16919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16920, "end_char": 16923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16947, "end_char": 16975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 120B, 218, 347 and 389", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17685, "end_char": 17716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17717, "end_char": 17720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 120B, 218 and 347", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17918, "end_char": 17944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17945, "end_char": 17948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bhagat Ram", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18212, "end_char": 18222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, in our opinion, not within the competence of the learned judge to reopen the matter and pass the above order of conviction in the face of the earlier order of the Division Bench whereby the order of acquittal of Bhagat Ram made by the trial judge in respect of the said three charge1 had been affirmed.", "canonical_name": "Bhagat C Ram"}}, {"text": "section 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18825, "end_char": 18836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "MacDermott", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18993, "end_char": 19003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federal of A Malaya('), Lord MacDermott observed :\n\n\"The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent Court on a lawful charge and after a lawful trial is not completely stated by saying that the person acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence."}}, {"text": "sections\n\n120B, 218 and 347", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20003, "end_char": 20030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20031, "end_char": 20034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20127, "end_char": 20139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20140, "end_char": 20143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "E Bhagat Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20174, "end_char": 20186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charge under section 120B IPC related to conspiracy between E Bhagat Ram and Ram Swaroop for extorting Rs.", "canonical_name": "B Bhagat Ram"}}, {"text": "section 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20324, "end_char": 20336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20337, "end_char": 20340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20664, "end_char": 20676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20678, "end_char": 20681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ram Swa roop", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21065, "end_char": 21077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the State appeal against the acquittal of Ram Swa roop is concerned, we find that there are concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court that the evidence on record had failed to prove that he was guilty of offences under sections 120B ff and 165A IPC.", "canonical_name": "Ram\n\nSwaroop"}}, {"text": "sections 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21258, "end_char": 21271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21284, "end_char": 21287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21736, "end_char": 21747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21748, "end_char": 21751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bhagat D Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22531, "end_char": 22543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the circumstances, against Bhagat D Ram .for asking for bribe through Ram Swaroop must consequently fail.", "canonical_name": "Bhagat C Ram"}}, {"text": "sections 165A and 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22701, "end_char": 22723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22724, "end_char": 22727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22795, "end_char": 22806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22807, "end_char": 22810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bhagat :Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22935, "end_char": 22946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E We, therefore, accept the appeal of Bhagat :Ram and set aside his conviction and acquit him.", "canonical_name": "Bhagat C Ram"}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_312_319_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "ISHARDAS v.\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB\n\nJal!uary 31, 1972\n\n(J. M. SHELAT AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.)\n\nProbation of Offenders Act, 1958, s. 4( !)-Conviction under Pre., n tion of Food Adulteration Act, 1954-Accused below 20 years-MlnimMm sentence of i1nprisonment and fine prescribed as punishment for oQence-- lf Probation of Offenders Act applicable.\n\nThe appellant, who was less thon 20 years was convicted for llll offence under s. 7(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, c and waa ordered to furnish a bond under s. 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The High Court revised the sentence, because s. 16 of Ille Pl'evention of Food Adulteration Act prescribed a ntinimum sentence of imprisonment for 6 months and a fine of Rs. 1000.\n\nAllowing the appeal to this Court, HELD : Seel ion 4 (I) of the Probation of Offenders Act eontains the non-obstante clause notwithstanding anything contained In any other law [) for the time being in force, and hence the section would have overridlna effect and shall prevail if Its other conditions are fuJJllled; especially when the Probation of Offenders Act waa enacted in 1958 subeequent to the enactment In 1954 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. [317 A-C;\n\n318 D-EJ\n\nAccording to s. 18 of the Probation of Offenders Act, that Act aball not affect a. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption A~ which also pres E cribes '\" minimum sentence of imprisonment. The fact . that only Olle offence for which a minimum sentence of Imprisonment is prescribed, bu been specified shows that in the case of other such offencee, the prov!· sions of the Probation of Offenders Act can be invoked [317H; 3.18 A-CJ\n\n&suming there is some ambiguity, the principle to he applied in construing a penal statute is that such doubt should be resolved in favour of the person who would be liable to the penalty. [318 DJ F\n\nAdulteration of food i~ a 1 mence to public health and th~ Prevention of Food Adulteration Act has been enacted to eradicate the evil. 'Jbero. fore, courts should not li1htly resort to the provisions of the Probation\n\nof Offenders Act in the case of pers00$ abov1 21 years of age; but the Act makes a distinction between offenders below 21 years and tbOM nbove th\"t a1c.\n\nAs re1ards person undrr 21 years, the policy of the law is that such a person, even in the cue of conviction under the Pre\\>eat!on G of Food Adultoratlon Act, ahould not be deprived of the advantap of the Probation of Offenders Act which la a beneJlclent meuure aad reflects and Incorporates the modern approach and latest trend in penoloaY.\n\nf318 GH; 319 A-CJ\n\nAs the object of the Probation of Offenders Act ls to avoid imprisonment of n person covered by its provisions, that object C311110t he set at naught by 1mposihg a sentence of fine which would entail Imprisonment H in case of default. [319 DJ Rattan Lal v. Statt of Punjab [1964J 7 S.C.R. 676 and Ramil Mlssir\n\nv. State of Bihar, [1962J Supp. 2 S.C.R. 745, referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Crigiinal Appeal No 64 of 1969.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 10, 1968 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1200 of 1967.\n\nR. L. Kohli, for the appellant.\n\nV. C. Mahajan and R.· N. Sachthey, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhamm, J. Ishar Das appellant was convicted by the C judicial magistrate 1st class Patiala for an offence under section 7 (I l of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Act N(• 37 of l9'54)read with section 16(l)(a)(i) of that Act and wu; onlered to furnish bond under section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act.\n\nBedi, J. of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. du:ing the course of the inspection of the Court of trial magistrate, D toi:•k the view that an improper order had been made in the above case by the magistrate.\n\nThe High Court thereupon of its own motion directed that a notice be issued to the appellant.\n\nThe case was thereafter posted before Bedi, J.\n\nThe learned judge referred to the fact that a minimum sentence of imprisonment for a period of six months and a fine of Rs. 1,000 had been pres- E cribed by section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.\n\nIt was also observed that offences under the Prevention of Food' Adulteration Act were against the public and called for deterrent punishment.\n\nOrder was consequently made that the appellant instead of being released on his furnishing a bond, should be sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six\n\nF months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000. In default of payment of\n\nfine. the appellant was ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of one and a half month. The appellant thrreafter filed this appeal by special leave to this Court. At the time .the leave was granted. it was ordered that the appeal would be litiilted to the question of sentence only.\n\nG The prosecution case is that on August 1, 1966 the Food lrn.pectbr Patiala took a sample of two cups of ice cream from the appellant from Phu! Cinema canteen on payment of three rupees.\n\nPart of the ice cream was sent for analysis to Public Analyst Chandigarh.\n\nThe Analyst reported that the ice crean1 was adulterated, being deficient in milk fat contents to the extent H of i7 per cent and total solid contents to the extent of 7 per cent.\n\nThe appellant was thereafter prosecuted on the allegation that he had committed an offence under section 7 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act read with section 16(1 )(a){i) of that\n\nAct.\n\nCharge was framed on that count against the appellan[ and he pleaded guilty to the same.\n\nThe trial magistrate took the view that the appellant, who was aged about 20 years, was in a repentant mood.\n\nThe appellant was, in the circumstances, directed to furnish bond under section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act.\n\nThe bond was thereafter furnished by the appel lant.\n\nOn revision, the sentence was altered by the High Court as mentioned above. ln appeal Mr. Kohli on behalf of the appellant has referred to the matriculation certificate which was produced on behalf of 1he appellant and according to which the date of birth of the appellant was May 8, 1947. It is argued that as the age of the appellant on the date of his conviction by the trial magistrate was less than 20 years, the appellant was rightly given the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act.\n\nThe High Court, according to the learned counsel, was in error in awarding\n\nthe sentence of imprisonment and fine to the appellant.\n\nAs against that Mr. Mahajan on behalf of the respondent has con tended that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be invokcJ by an accused convicted of an offence wider section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adullera\n\ntion Act. Mr. Mahajan has not disputed that the age of the accused was less than 20 years on the date of his conviction by the trial magistrate, but, according to the learned counsel, that fact could make no difference.\n\nThere is, in our opinion, considerable force in the stand taken on behalf of the appellant by his learned counsel and we find ourselves unable to accede to the submission made on behalf of the respondent State. The Probation of Offenders Act received the assent of the President on May 16, 1958 and was published in the Gazette of India dated May 19, 1958. According to subsection (3) of section I of that Act, it shall come into force in a State on such date as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint, and different dates may be appointed for different parts of the State.\n\nThe fact that the Act was in force in the State of Punjab before the sample of ice cream was taken from the appellant has not been disputed before us.\n\nSection 3 of the Act gives power to the court to release certain offenders after admonition. According to that section, where any person is found guilty of having committed an offence punisha ble under section 379 or section 380 or section 381 or section 404 or section 420 of the Indian Penal Code or any offence punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years, or with fine, or with both under the Indian Penal Code or any other law, and no previous conviction is proved against him and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, .having regard to the circumstances of the case including the .nature\n\nd the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient '0 to do, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Court may, instead of sentencing him to any punishment or releasing him on probation of good conduct under section 4, release him after due admonition.\n\nThe relevant part of sub-section (I) of section 4 and sub-section\n\ni I ) of section 6 of the Act read as under :\n\n\"4(1) When any person is found guilty of having committed on offence not punishable with death or\n\nimprisonmnt for life and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence\n\n1 when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the Court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.\"\n\n\"6 ( t) When any person under twenty-one years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life). the Court by which the person is found guilty shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it would not be desirable to deal with him under section 3 or section 4, and if the Court passes any sentence of imprisonment on the offender, it shall record its reasons for doing so.\"\n\nThe Probation of Offenders Act, as observed by Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) speaking for the majority in the case of Ra1ta11 Lal v. State of Pun; ab( 1), is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology.\n\nIt is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish him.\n\nBroadly stated, the Act distinguishes offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age, and offenders who are i; uilty of having committed an offence punishable with death. or nnprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offooce. While in the case of offenders who are above the -------------\n\n(!) [1964] 7 S.C'.R. 676.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1972] 3 S.C.ll\n\nage of 21 years absolute discretion is given to the court to release A .them after ~moniti?n or on .Probation of good conduct, subject to th~ conditions laid down m the appropriate provisions of the\n\nct, !n .the case of offenders below the age of 21 years, an injuncr tton 1s .1sued .to the court n?t to sentence them to imprisonment unless 1t 1s satisfied that, havmg regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the B offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under sections 3 and 4 of the Act. .\n\nIt is manifest from plain reading of sub-section ( 1 ) of 1ection 4 of the Act that it makes no distinction between persons of the age of more than 21 years and those of the age of less than 21 years.\n\nOn the contrary, the said sub-section is applicable to persons of all ages subject to certain conditions which have been specified therein.\n\nOnce those conditions are fulfilled and the other formalities which are mentioned in section 4 are complied with, power is given to the court to release the accused on proba tion of good conduct.\n\nSection 6 of the Act deals specifically with persons under twenty-one years of age convicted by a court for an offence punishable with imprisonment other than imprisonment for life.\n\nIn such a case an injunction is issued to the court not to sentence the young offender to imprisonment, unless the court is of the view that having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender (it would not be desirable to release him after admoni tion under section 3 or on probation of good conduct under section 4 of the Act.\n\nSub-section (1) of section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act provides the punishment which may be awarded to a person found guilty of the various offences under that Act.\n\nAccording to the above sub-section, such a person, in addition to a penalty to which he may be liable under section 6, with which we are not concerned, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to six years and with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees.\n\nThere follows a proviso, according to which the court may, in case of some of the offences under the Act, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgmet, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months or of fine of less than one thousand rupees or of both imprisonment for a term of less than six months and fine of less than one thousand rupees.\n\nThe question which arises for determination is whether despite the fact that a minimum sentence of imprisonment for a term of six months and a fine of rupees one thousand has been prescribed by the legislature for a person found guilty of the offence under\n\n!SHAR DAS v. PUNJAB (Khanna, J.) 317\n\nthe Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the court can resort to the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act.\n\nJn this respect we find that sub-section ( 1) of section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act contains the words \"notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force\".\n\nThe above non-obstante clause points to the conclusion that the provisions of section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act would have overriding effect and shall prevail if the other conditions prescribed are fulfilled.\n\nThose conditions are ( 1) the accused is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with deatli or imprisonment for life, (2) the court finding him guilty is of the opinion that having regard to the circumstances of the case. including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, and ( 3) the acc11sed in such an event enters into a bond with or without sureties to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period not exceeding three years as the court may direct and, in the meantime, to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. Sub-section (I) of section 6 of the above mentioned Act, as stated earlier, imposes a duty upon the court when it finds a person under 21 years of age, guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment other than imprisonment for life, not to sentence him to impris<.>nment unless the court is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, includhig the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it would not be desirable to deal with him under sections 3 or 4 of the Act but to award a sentence of imprisonment to him.\n\nThe underlying object of the above provisions obviously is that an accused person should be given a chance of reformation which be would lose in case he is incarcerated in prison and associates with hardened criminals.\n\nSo far as persons who are less than 21 years of age are concerned, special provisions have been enacted to prevent their confinement in jail at young age with a view to obviate the possibility of their being subjected to the pernicious influence of hardened criminals.\n\nIt has accordingly been enacted that in the case of a person who is less than 21 years of age and is convicted for an offence not punishable with imprisonment for life, he shall not be sentenced to imprisonment unless there exist reaons which justify such a course.\n\nSuch reasons have to be recorded in writing.\n\nAccording to section 18 of the Probation of Offenders Act, the aforesaid Act shall not affect the provision of sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act 2 of 1947). The last mentioned provision, namely, sub-section\n\n(2) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, prescribes, in the absence of special reasons, a minimum sentence of imprisonment for a term of not less than one year for those convicted\n\nunder section 5 of that Act. If the object of the legislature was that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act should not apply to all cases where a minimum sentence of imprisonment is prescribed by the statnte, there was no reason io,.specify su1>- section ( 2) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act in section 18 of the Probation of Offenders Act. The fact that out of the various offences for which the minimum sentence is prescribed, only the offence under sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Preventio.n of Corruption Act has bjeen mentioned in section 18 of tbe Probation of Offenders Act and not the other offences for which the minimum sentence is prescribed, shows that in case of snch other offences the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act can be invoked.\n\nThe provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, in our opinion,\n\n point to the conclusion that their operation is not excluded in the case of persons found guilty of offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Assuming that there was reaonable . doubt or ambiguity, the principle to be applied in construing a penal act is that such doubt or ambiguity should be resolved in D favour of the person who would be liable to the penalty (see Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, p. 239, 12th Edition).\n\nIt. has also to be borne in mind that the Probation of Offenders Act was enacted in 1958 subsequent to the enactment in 1954 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.\n\nAs the legislatnre enacted the Probation of Offenders Act despite the existence on the.statute book of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the operation of the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act cannot be whittled down or circumscribed because of the provisions of the earlier enactment, viz. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the non-obstante clause in section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act is a clear manifestation of the intention of the legislature that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act would have effect notwithstanding any other law for the time being in force.\n\nWe may also in .this context refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Ramji Missir v. State of Bihar( 1) wherein this Court while dealing with the Probation of Offenders Act observed that its beneficial provisions should receive wide interpretation and should not be read in a 'restricted sense.\n\nAdulteration of food is 6 menace to public health.\n\nThe Prevention of Food Adulteration Act has been enacted with the aim of eradicating that anti-social evil and for ensuring purity in the articles of food.\n\nIn view of the above object of the Act and the intention of the legislature as revealed by the fact that a H minimum sentence of imprisonment for a period of six months\n\n(1) [1962] Supp. 2 S.CR. 745.\n\nand a fine of rupees one thousand has been prescribed, the courts should not lightly resort to the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act in the case of persons above 21 years of age found guilty of offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.\n\nAs regards persons under 21 years of age, however, the policy of the law appears to be that such a person in spite of his conviction under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, should not be deprived of the advantage of Probation of Offenders Act which is a beneficient measure and reflects and incorporates the modern approach and latest trend in penology.\n\nMr. Mahajan has argued that if the trial magistrate took the view .that the accused-appellant in view of his age, should not be .sentenced to undergo imprisonment, the learned magistrate should still have imposed the sentence of fine as prescribed by subsection ( 1 ) of section 16 of the Act. In this respect w_e are of the opinion that a sentence of fine also carries with if1lie consequence of imprisonment in case the accused fails to pay the fine.\n\nAs the object of Probation of Offenders Aot is to avoid imprisonment of the person covered by the provisions of that Act, the said object cannot be set at naught by imposing a sentence of fine which would necessarily entail imprisonment in case there is a default in payment of fine.\n\nThe High Court in the present case did not consider t; e provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act and its attention does 1iot appear to have been invited to the mandatory provisions of section 6 of that Act. In view of the fact that the accused was Jess than 20 years of age and appeared to be in a repentant mood, the trial court took action under section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. The High-Court, in our view, was in error in interfering with the above order of the trial magistrate.\n\nWe, therefore, accept the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the trial magistrate.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nS--cL887SuPCl/72", "total_entities": 114, "entities": [{"text": "ISHARDAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 8, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ISHARDAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4( !)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "statute": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 163, "end_char": 190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Qence-- lf Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 287, "end_char": 324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 417, "end_char": 424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Qence-- lf Probation of Offenders Act", "statute": "Qence-- lf Probation of Offenders Act"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 432, "end_char": 473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 517, "end_char": 521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "statute": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 529, "end_char": 561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 608, "end_char": 613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "statute": "the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Food Adulteration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 637, "end_char": 658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 808, "end_char": 834, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1080, "end_char": 1106, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1241, "end_char": 1246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Food Adulteration Act", "statute": "Food Adulteration Act"}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1254, "end_char": 1280, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1597, "end_char": 1623, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1916, "end_char": 1951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Food Adultoratlon Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2365, "end_char": 2386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2434, "end_char": 2460, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "As the object of the Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2591, "end_char": 2638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "R. L. Kohli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3182, "end_char": 3193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. L. Kohli, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "V. C. Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3215, "end_char": 3228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. Mahajan and R.· N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R.· N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3233, "end_char": 3248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. Mahajan and R.· N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Khamm", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3315, "end_char": 3320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhamm, J. Ishar Das appellant was convicted by the C judicial magistrate 1st class Patiala for an offence under section 7 (I l of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Act N(• 37 of l9'54)read with section 16(l)(a)(i) of that Act and wu; onlered to furnish bond under section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3427, "end_char": 3436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CJ\n\nAs the object of the Probation of Offenders Act", "statute": "CJ\n\nAs the object of the Probation of Offenders Act"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3449, "end_char": 3490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 16(l)(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3522, "end_char": 3541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "statute": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3592, "end_char": 3601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "statute": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3609, "end_char": 3635, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bedi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3638, "end_char": 3642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bedi, J. of the Punjab and Haryana High Court."}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4148, "end_char": 4158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "statute": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "August 1, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4925, "end_char": 4939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G The prosecution case is that on August 1, 1966 the Food lrn.pectbr Patiala took a sample of two cups of ice cream from the appellant from Phu!"}}, {"text": "Food lrn.pectbr Patiala", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4944, "end_char": 4967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G The prosecution case is that on August 1, 1966 the Food lrn.pectbr Patiala took a sample of two cups of ice cream from the appellant from Phu!"}}, {"text": "Phu! Cinema canteen", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5031, "end_char": 5050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G The prosecution case is that on August 1, 1966 the Food lrn.pectbr Patiala took a sample of two cups of ice cream from the appellant from Phu!"}}, {"text": "Chandigarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5142, "end_char": 5152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Part of the ice cream was sent for analysis to Public Analyst Chandigarh."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5433, "end_char": 5442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16(1 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5500, "end_char": 5517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5808, "end_char": 5817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5825, "end_char": 5851, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kohli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5998, "end_char": 6003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ln appeal Mr. Kohli on behalf of the appellant has referred to the matriculation certificate which was produced on behalf of 1he appellant and according to which the date of birth of the appellant was May 8, 1947."}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6391, "end_char": 6417, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6651, "end_char": 6677, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6740, "end_char": 6749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Mahajan on behalf of the respondent has con tended that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act", "statute": "Mahajan on behalf of the respondent has con tended that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act"}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6760, "end_char": 6770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Mahajan on behalf of the respondent has con tended that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act", "statute": "Mahajan on behalf of the respondent has con tended that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act"}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7243, "end_char": 7269, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "May 16, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7310, "end_char": 7322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Probation of Offenders Act received the assent of the President on May 16, 1958 and was published in the Gazette of India dated May 19, 1958."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7359, "end_char": 7364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Probation of Offenders Act received the assent of the President on May 16, 1958 and was published in the Gazette of India dated May 19, 1958."}}, {"text": "May 19, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7371, "end_char": 7383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Probation of Offenders Act received the assent of the President on May 16, 1958 and was published in the Gazette of India dated May 19, 1958."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7690, "end_char": 7696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that the Act was in force in the State of Punjab before the sample of ice cream was taken from the appellant has not been disputed before us."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7791, "end_char": 7800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 379", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7993, "end_char": 8004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 380", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8008, "end_char": 8019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 381", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8023, "end_char": 8034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 404", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8038, "end_char": 8049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8053, "end_char": 8064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8072, "end_char": 8089, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8200, "end_char": 8217, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8699, "end_char": 8708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8785, "end_char": 8794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8821, "end_char": 8830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10103, "end_char": 10112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10116, "end_char": 10125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10245, "end_char": 10271, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10288, "end_char": 10297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Probation of Offenders Act, as observed by Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) speaking for the majority in the case of Ra1ta11 Lal v. State of Pun; ab( 1), is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1972] 3 S.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10983, "end_char": 11020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1972] 3 S.C.ll\n\nage of 21 years absolute discretion is given to the court to release A .them after ~moniti?n or on .Probation of good conduct, subject to th~ conditions laid down m the appropriate provisions of the\n\nct, !"}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11550, "end_char": 11566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12010, "end_char": 12019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12122, "end_char": 12131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12629, "end_char": 12638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12677, "end_char": 12686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12719, "end_char": 12729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12992, "end_char": 13001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13988, "end_char": 14014, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14066, "end_char": 14075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14083, "end_char": 14109, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14291, "end_char": 14300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14308, "end_char": 14334, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15092, "end_char": 15101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15551, "end_char": 15561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16443, "end_char": 16453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16461, "end_char": 16487, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16560, "end_char": 16569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16577, "end_char": 16611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16687, "end_char": 16696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16704, "end_char": 16732, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16880, "end_char": 16889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16967, "end_char": 16993, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17149, "end_char": 17158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17166, "end_char": 17194, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17198, "end_char": 17208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17216, "end_char": 17242, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17374, "end_char": 17383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17444, "end_char": 17454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17462, "end_char": 17488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17622, "end_char": 17648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17684, "end_char": 17710, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18218, "end_char": 18244, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18377, "end_char": 18403, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18525, "end_char": 18551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18650, "end_char": 18685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18744, "end_char": 18753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act", "statute": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act"}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18761, "end_char": 18787, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18876, "end_char": 18902, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Court while dealing with the Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19109, "end_char": 19164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19815, "end_char": 19841, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20183, "end_char": 20209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20593, "end_char": 20603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "statute": "Probation of Offenders Act"}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21136, "end_char": 21162, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21250, "end_char": 21259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21414, "end_char": 21423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21431, "end_char": 21457, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_320_328_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "VIDYA RAM MISHRA\n\n,,,\n\nMAi\"'iAGING COMMITI'EE, SHRI JAi NARAIN COLLEGE.\n\nJalfWJry 31, 1972\n\n[K. s. llEGDE, P. JAGANMOHAN R, EDDY AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.]\n\nContract of service-Whether Courl,< enforce specific performance of contract of service-;/ not, Its remedy.\n\n'Tue appellant joined as a lecturer in a College in U.P. On the baaia of certain complaints received by the Manaser of the Collese, cbaraeo were framed '1gainst him and his explanation was called for. He submitted an explanation. The explanation was found unsatisfactory and the Managing Committee passed a molution for removal of the appellant from service. The relevant smtutes governing the present case are Statutes 151, 152 and 153 framed under tho provisions of the Lucknow University Act,\n\n1920. The appellant filed a wnt petition before the HIJ!h Court challeng ing the validity of the reoolu.tion and a learned single Judge finding that the Managing Committee acted in violation of the principles of natrftl justice, qusshed the resolution and allowed the writ petition. On appeal, a Division Bench set aside the order of the learned single judge and dis miased the writ petition on the ground that no writ lies in the facts Cll!.d\n\nc!rclll!\\lltances of the case. The remedy of the appellant lay in a suit fol' damages.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant it was contended that the appellant had a statutory status, that his services were terminated in violation of the provisionA Of the statutes pas!ed under the Lucknow University Act, 1920 and therefore, the High Court was wrong in its conclusions that no writ of certiorari would lie against the respondent It was further 111bmitted that the appellGDt was not given a reasonable opportunity of defending hirmelt\n\nagainst the charges. Statute 151 provides that a teacher of an associated College shall be o.ppointed on a written contract and the contract ahall provide the conditions mentioned there in addition to such other condl tions as the associated College may include in the agreement Oause S\n\nof the agreement provides that the Managing Committee may dispense with the services of a lecturer without notice if the Committee is satisfied that it is neoess:iry to remove the said lectu= for misconduct or other wi•e, provided, an opportunity is given to him by the Committee to give his explanation before a decision is arrived at.\n\nDismissing the appeal.\n\nHELD : (I) When there is a purported termination of a contract of service, a declaration that o. contract of service still subsisted would not be made in the absence of special circumstances and courts do not ordi narily enforce specific performance of a contract of service. The remedy of the victim lies in a claim for d'3.ntages, not a claim for a declaration that the contract of service still subsisted. [322 E-F]\n\nExecutive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation Ltd. v.\n\nChandra Kiran Tyagi, [1970] 2 S.C.R. 250; and Indian AMlnes Corp01wtlon v. Sukh Dev Rai, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1828 followed.\n\n(2) On a plain meaning of statute lSl, it is cilear that it only provides that the telrms and conditions mentioned therein must be incorporated in\n\nv. ll. MISHRA v. JAi NARAIN COLLBGB (Mathew, I.) 321\n\nA the contract to be entered into between the College and the teacher con cel'ned. It does not say that the terms and conditions have any legal force,\n\nuntil and unless they are embodied in an '1greement. The terms and con ditions of service. mentioned in Statute I 51 have proprio vigore, no fon:e\n\nof law.\n\nThey becom~ terms of ice only by virtue of their being in• corporated in a contract. Without the cpntract, they have no vitality and can confer no legal right.\n\nTherefore, the 3ppellant cannot find a cause of action of any breach of law, but only on the breach of the contract, B for which a writ in the nature of ceritiorari will not lie [327 H]\n\n(3) A writ will lie when the order is the order of a statutory body <!Cling in brea.Cti of a mandatory obligation imposed by a statute.\n\nThe College or the Managing Committee in question, is not a statutory body and f'O the High Court is right is dismissing the petition. f328 DJ\n\nFurther, since the High Court has no jurisdiction, it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the 3ppellant was given sufficient opportunity to meet the charges against him. [328 G)\n\n\nCIVIL APPBLLATB JURISDICTION : C.A. No. 2 Of 1972.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the judgment and order dated April 13, 1970 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 1074 of 1968.\n\nM. C. Seta/vad, P. N. Tiwari, I. B. Dadachanji and Co. for the appellant.\n\nR. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwal, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMathew, J, The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, challenging the vali- . dity of a resolution passed on 12-11-1967 by the Managing Committee of the Jai Narain College, Lucknow, formerly known as Kanyakubja Degree College, an associated college of the Luck now University, terminating his services, and praying for issue of an appropriate writ or order quashing the resolution. A learned single judge of that Court, finding that in terminating the services, the Managing COlllDlittee acted in violation of principles of natural justice, quashed the resolution and allowed the Writ petition: The Managing Committee appealed against the order. A Division Bench of the High Court found that the relationship between the College and the appellant was that of master and servant and that even if the service of the appellant has been terminated in breach of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice, the remedy of the appellant was to file a suit for damages and not to apply under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ\n\nor order in the nature of certiorari and that in fact no principle A of natural justice was violated by terminating the services of the appellant as the appellant was given an opportunity of submitting his explanation to the charges.\n\nThe Bench, therefore, set aside the order of the learned single judge and dismissed the writ petition. It is from this judgment that the appeal has been preferred by special leave.\n\nThe appellant joined the service of the college as lecturer in\n\n1946. He was promoted to the post of Head of the Department of Z.Oology in 1959 .. on the basis of certain complaints against him received by the Manager of the College, charges were framed against him and his explanation was called for.\n\nHe submitted an explanation. The explanation was found not to be satisfac- C tory and the Managing Committee . passed a resolution on 12-11-1967 for removal of the appellant from service.\n\nAs already stated, this was the resolution challenged by the appellant in the writ petition.\n\nOn behalf of .the appellant, Mr. M. C. .Setalvad, contended D that the appellant had a statutory status, that his services were terminated in violation of the provisions of statutes passed under the Lucknow University Act, 1920 and, therefore the High court was wrong in its conclusions that no application for a writ or order in the nature of certiorari would lie.\n\nHe further submitted that the appellant was not given a reasonable opportunity of defending himself against the charges.\n\nIt is well settled that, when there is a purported termin@on of a contract of service, a declaration that the contract of service still subsisted would not be made in the absence of special circumstances, because. of the principle that Courts do not ordinarily enforce specific performance of. contracts of service [see • Executive. Committee of U.P. State.Warehousing Corporation Ltd.\n\nv. Chandra Kiran Tyagi(')] and Indian Alr/ine, r Corporation v.\n\nSukhdeo Rai('). If the master \"rightfully ends the contract, .there can be no complaint. If the master wrongfully ends the\n\ncontract, then the servant can pursue a claim for ·. damages.\n\nSo even if the master wrongfully dismisses the 11Crvant in breaCh. of the contract, the employment is effectively terminated. In G Ridge v. Baldwin(•), Lord Reid said in his Speech:\n\n''The law regarding master and servant is not in doubt.\n\nThere cannot be specific performance of a contract of service, and the master can terminate the contract with his servant at any time and for any reason or for none.\n\nBut if he does so in a manner not\n\n(I) (1970) 2 S.C.R 250.\n\n(l) A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1828,\n\n(3) (l!l6S) Weekly Law Report!, Vol I, 79.\n\nv. Jt. MISlllA v. JAi NARAIN COLLEGE (Mathew, J.) 323\n\nwarranted by the contract he must pay damages mr brcach of contract.\n\nSo the question in a pure case of master and servant does not at all depend on whether the master has heard the servant in his own defence; it depends on whether the facts emerging at the trial prove breach of contract. But this kind of case can resemble dismissal from an office where the body employing the man is under some statutory or other restriction as to the kind of contract which it can make with its ser~ vants, or the grounds on which it can dismiss them.\"\n\nA teacher appointed by a University constituted under a statute was held n.ot to be holding an office or status in Vidyo- C daya University v. Silva(') In tha: case the services of the respondent was brought to an end by a resolution of the University Council set up under the statute establisliing the University. The resolution was admittedly passed without hearing the teacher.\n\nUnder the statute, the Council was empowered to institute professorships and every a.{lpoinment was to be by an agreement in D writing between the Umversity and the professor and was to be for such period and on such terms as the Council might resolve.\n\nUnder section 18 ( e) of the Act, the Council had the power to disiniss an. officer or a teacher on grounds of incapacity or con• duct which, in the opinion of not less than two-thirds --of the mem\\lers of the Council, rendered him unfit to be an officer or a\n\nE teacher of the University. Such a resolution with the requisite majority was passed. The Act gave no right to the teacher of being heard by the Council. The Privy Council held that the mere circumstances that the University was established by the statute and was regulated by statutory enactments contained in the Act did not mean that the contracts of employment made with teachers, though subject to section 18 ( e), were other than ordi- nary contracts of master and servant and, therefore, the procedure of being hearcl invoked by the respondent was not available to him and no writ could be issued against the University.\n\nThe decision in this case has been criticised by academic writel'S {see Jaffe, English and American Judges as Law Makers, G p. 26; S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, pp. 214-215; G. Ganz, Public Law Principles applicable to Dismissal from Employment, Modern Law Review, Vol. 30 pp. 288- 291). Recently the House 0f Lords considered the question in Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation('). That case concerned a teacher in Scotland who was dismissed by the Education Committee for the reason that he was not registered in tenns of para- H graph 2 of schedule 2 to the Teachers' (Education, Training and Registration) (Scotland) Regulations, 1967, made under section\n\n!I) !1964] 3 All E.R. 865.\n\n(2) (1971) 1 W.L, Q.. IS7S,\n\n2(1) of the Education (Scotland) Act, 1962, and the amending A regulation 4(2) of the Schools (Scotland) Code, 1956. In an action against the education authority, he claimed that the purported dismissal was a nullity in that it was contrary to natural justice since he had not been given a hearing.. It was held (Lord Morris and Lord Guest dissenting) that the teacher had a right to be heard before he was dismissed as according to the U: majority he was holding an office.\n\nIn the course of his speech, Lord Wilberforce made certain observations :\n\n\"A comparative list of situations in which persons have been held entitled or not entitled to a hearing, or to observation of rules of natural justice, according to the master and servant test, looks illogical and even bizarre. A specialist surgeon is denied protection which is given to a hospital doctor; a University professor, as a servant, has been denied the right to be heard, a dock labourer and an undergraduate have been granted it; examples can be multiplied [see Barber v.\n\nManchester Regional Hospital Board (1958) 1 W.L.R. 181, Palmar v. Inverness Hospitals Board of Management, [1963], S.C. 311, Vidyodaya University Council\n\nv. Silva (1965) 1 W.L.R. 77, Vine v. National Dock Labour Board [1957] A.C. 488, Glynn v. Keele University (1971) 1 W.L.R. 487].\n\nOne may accept that if there are relationships in which all requirements of the observance of rules of natural justice are excluded (and I do not wish to assure that this is inevitably so), these must be confined to what have been called \"pure master and servant cases\", which I take to mean cases in which there is no element of public employment or service, no support by statute, nothing in the nature of an office or a status which is capable of protection. If any of these elements exist, then, in my opinion, whatever the terminology used, and even though in some inter partes aspects the relationship may be called that of master and servant, there may be essential procedu-· ral requirements to be observed, and failure to observe: them may result in a dismissal being declared to be void.\"\n\nand then he said as regards the decision in Vidyodaya University Council v. Silva(') : ·\n\n\"It would not be necessary or appropriate to <.m- .. agree with the procedural or even the factual bas~ en H which this decision rests : but I must confess that I\n\n(!) [1964] 3 All E.R. 865.\n\ncould not. follow it in this country in so far as it involves a denial of any remedy of administrative law to anologous employments. Statutocy provisions similar to those on which the employment rested would tend to show, to my mind, in England or in ScOtland, that it was one of a sufficiently public character, or one partaking sufficiently of the nature of an office, to attract appropriate remedies of administrative law.\" Whether the decision in Vidyodaya University Council v.\n\nSilva ( 1) is correct or not, in this case, we think there was no element of public employment, nothing in the nature of an office or status which is capable of protection.\n\nIn S. R. Tewari v. Disll:ict Board, Agra('), this Court formulated the exceptions to the general rule that when there is a termination of a contract of service, a declaration that the conract of service still subsisted would not be made, by saying :\n\n\"But this rule is sub.iect to certain well recognised exceptions. It is open to the Courts, in an appropriate case, to declare that a public servant who is dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 continues to remain in service, even though by so doing the State is in effect forced to continue to employ the servant whom it does not desire to employ. Similarly, under the industrial law, jurisdiction of the labour and. -- industrial tribunals t:O compel the employer to employ a worker, whom he does not desire to employ, is recognised. _ The Courts are also mvested with the power to declare invalid the act of a statutocy body, if by doing the act, the body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by the statute, even if by malcing the declaration the body is compelled to do something which it does not desire to do.\" Mr. Setalvad contended that since the con.e in queetion Is affiliated to a statutocy body, namely, the University of Lucknow, and is governod by the relevant statutes and ordinances framed under the provisions of Lucknow University Act, 1920, &n)' violation of the statute or the ordinance in the matter of termi nating the services of a teacher would attract the jurisdiction ol the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution as. statutes and ordinances have the force of law. In support of this, counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in Prabhakar Ramakrishna Jodh v. A. L. Pande and another('). The , appeJlant before this Court in that case was a teacher in a college affiliated to the University of Saugar and managed by the Governing Body\n\n(I) (19641 3 All E.R. 865,\n\n(2) (19641 3 S.C.R. SS.\n\n(3) (19651 2 S.C.R. 713,\n\nestablished under the provisions of the relevant ordinance made A under the University of Saugar Act. Certain charges were framed against the appellant by the Principal of the Collc:ge and he was asked to submit his explanation. The appellant in his explanation denied all the charges and requested for particulars on which one of the charges was based.\n\nThe particulars were not supplied and the Governing Body ter\\ninated his services a without holding any enquiry. The appellilnt moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ quashing the order of the Governing Body and for his reinstatement.\n\nHe contended that the Governing Body had made the order in violation of the provisions of Ordinance 20, otherwise called the 'College Code', framed under section 32 of the University of Saugar Act read with section 6(6) of that Act.\n\nClause 8(vi) (a) C of the College Code provided that the Governing Body of the college shall not terminate the services of a confirmed teacher without holding an enquiry and without giving him an opportunity of defe9ding himself.\n\nThe High Court held that the conditions of service of the appellant were governed not by the 'College Code' but by the contract made between the Governing Body and D the appellant under clause 7 of the College Code-which stated that all teachers of the college shall be appointed under a written contract in the form prescribed-, that the provision8 of the 'College Code' were merely conditions prescribed for affiliation of colleges and that no legal rights were created by the 'College Code' in favour of the teachers of the affiliated colleges as against E the Governing Body.\n\nThe High Court, therefore, dismissed the petition.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was held that the 'College Code' had the force of law and that it not merely regulated the legal relationship between the affiliated colleges and .the University but also conferred legal rights on the teachers of affiliated colleges.\n\nThe Court further said F \"It is true that Clause 7 of the Ordinance provides that all teachers of affiliated colleges shall be 'appointed on a written contract in the form prescribed in Sch. A but th_at does not mean that teachers have merely a con- tractual remedy against the Governing Body of the College.\n\nOn the other hand, we are of opiniqn that the\n\nG provisions of Clause 8 of the Ordinance relating to security of the tenure of teachers are part and parcel of the teachers' service conditions ...... \"\n\nWhen once this Court came to the conclusion that .the • 'College Code' had the force of law and conferred rights on the teachers H of affiliated colleges, the right to challenge the order terminating the services of the appellant, passed in violation of clause 8(vi)\n\n(a) of the 'College Code' in a proceeding under Articls 226\n\nA followed 'as the night the day' and the fact that the appellant had entered into a \\)Ontract was considered as immaterial.\n\nIn the case in hand, the position is entirely different, The relevant statutes governing this case are statutes 151, 152 and\n\n153, framed under the provisions of the Lucknow University Act,\n\n1920. Statute 151 provides that teachers of an Associated B College including the principal shall be appointed on written contract and that the contract shall inter alia provide the conditions mentioned therein in addition to such other conditions not inconsistent with the Act and the statutes as an Associated College may include in its own form of agreement.\n\nThen the conditions as regards salary, age of retirement, etc., are enume- C rated, The statute then goes on to specify the grounds on which a teacher's services can be terminated.\n\nStatute 152 states that the form of agreement to be adopted by each college shall be approved by the Executive Council before it is put in force.\n\nStatute 153 provides for a form of agreement which shall serve as a model.\n\nIt may be noted that statute 151 does not provide D for any particular procedure for dismissal or removal of a teacher for being incorporated in the contract. Nor does the model fotm of. contract lay down any particular procedure for that purpose.\n\nThe appellant had entered into an agreement when he was employed in the college.\n\nClause 5 of the agreement pr<wlded that:\n\n''the period of probation shall be one year unless .ixtended by the Managing Committee and the College may at any time during the said period of probation put an end to this engagement, or if service shall continue beyond the said term, at any time thereafter, dispense with the services of the said Lecturer without notice, if the Managing Committee oLthe said College is satisfied that it is necessary to remove the said Lecturer for misconduct, insubordination or habitual neglect of duty on the part of the said Lecturer or in case any of the conditions herein specified have been broken by the said Lecturer provided that an opportunity is given to him by the. said Managing Committee to give his explanation before a decision is arrived at.\"\n\nOn a plain reading statute 151, it is clear that it only provides that the terms and conditions mentioned therein must be incorporated in ·the contract to be entered into between the H college and the teacher concerned. It does not say that the terms and conditions have any legal forcie, until and unless they are embodied in an agreement.\n\nTo put it in other words, the terms and conditions of service mentioned in Statute 151 have proprio\n\nvigore no force of law. 'They become terms and conditions of A service only by virtue of their being incorporated in the contract.\n\nWithout the contract, they have no vitality and can confer no legal rights.\n\nWhereas in the case of Prabhakar Ramakrishna J odh v. A.\n\nL. Pande and another('), the terms and conditions of service B embodied in clause 8(vi)(a) of the 'College Code' had the force of Jaw apart from the contract and conferred rights on the appellant there, here the terms and conditions mentioned in Statute 151 have no efficacy, unless they are incorporated in a contract.\n\nTherefor!l, appellant cannot found a cause of action on any breach of the Jaw but only on the breach of the contract.\n\nAB c already indicated, Statute 151 does not lay down any procedure for removal of a teacher to be incorporated in the contract; So, clause 5 of the contract can, in no event, have even a statutory flavour and for its breach, the appellant's remedy lay elsewhei:.\n\nBesides, in order th11t the third exception to the genenil rule D that no writ will lie to quash an order tennlnating a contract of service, albeit illegally, as stated in S. R. Tewari v. District Board,\n\nAgra(') might apply, it is necessary that the order must be the order of a statutory body acting in breach of a mandatory obliga tion imposed by a statute.\n\nThe college, or the Managing Com mittee in question, is not a statutory body and so the argument of Mr. Setalvad that the case in hand will fall under the third excep- I tion cannot be accepted.\n\nThe contention of counsel that this Court has sub silentio sanctioned the issue of a writ under Article 226 to quash an order terminating services of a teacher passed by a college similarly situate in Prabhakar Ramakrishna Jodh v.\n\nA. L. Pande and another( 1), and, therefore, the fact that the college or the managing committee was not a statutory body was r no hindrance to the High Court issuing the writ prayed for by the appellant has no merit as this Court expressly stated in the judgment , that no such contention was raised in the High Court and so it cannot be allowed to be raised in this Court.\n\nIn this view of the matter, it is quite unnecessary to go into the question whether the appellant was . given sufficient opportu G nity to meet the charges agamst him.\n\nWe hold that the High Court was right in its view that the writ petition was incompetent.\n\nWe, therefore, dismiss the appeal but, in the circumstances, we make no order as to cos_ts.\n\nS. N.\n\n(I) [1965] 2 $.C.R.. 7!3,\n\nAppeal dismissed\n\n(2) [1964] 3 S.CR. 6SS.", "total_entities": 52, "entities": [{"text": "VIDYA RAM MISHRA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIDYA RAM MISHRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "iAGING COMMITI'EE, SHRI JAi NARAIN COLLEGE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANAGING COMMITIEE, SHRI JAI NARAIN COLLEGE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. K. MATHEW, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 150, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Lucknow University Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 734, "end_char": 756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lucknow University Act, 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1477, "end_char": 1505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1970] 2 S.C.R. 250", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2889, "end_char": 2908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPBLLATB JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4329, "end_char": 4357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "328 G)\n\nCIVIL APPBLLATB JURISDICTION : C.A. No."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4461, "end_char": 4481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the judgment and order dated April 13, 1970 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Seta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4519, "end_char": 4529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Seta/vad, P. N. Tiwari, I. B. Dadachanji and Co. for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "M. C. .Setalvad"}}, {"text": "P. N. Tiwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4535, "end_char": 4547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Seta/vad, P. N. Tiwari, I. B. Dadachanji and Co. for the appellant."}}, {"text": "I. B. Dadachanji and Co.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4549, "end_char": 4573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Seta/vad, P. N. Tiwari, I. B. Dadachanji and Co. for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4594, "end_char": 4604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwal, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4609, "end_char": 4622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwal, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4690, "end_char": 4696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMathew, J, The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, challenging the vali- ."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4748, "end_char": 4786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMathew, J, The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, challenging the vali- ."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5722, "end_char": 5733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12-11-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6620, "end_char": 6630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "passed a resolution on 12-11-1967 for removal of the appellant from service."}}, {"text": "M. C. .Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6802, "end_char": 6817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of .the appellant, Mr. M. C. .Setalvad, contended D that the appellant had a statutory status, that his services were terminated in violation of the provisions of statutes passed under the Lucknow University Act, 1920 and, therefore the High court was wrong in its conclusions that no application for a writ or order in the nature of certiorari would lie.", "canonical_name": "M. C. .Setalvad"}}, {"text": "Lucknow University Act, 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6968, "end_char": 6996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Reid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8054, "end_char": 8058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In G Ridge v. Baldwin(•), Lord Reid said in his Speech:\n\n''The law regarding master and servant is not in doubt."}}, {"text": "(1970) 2 S.C.R 250", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8343, "end_char": 8361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9674, "end_char": 9684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10333, "end_char": 10343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.A. de Smith", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10690, "end_char": 10703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision in this case has been criticised by academic writel'S {see Jaffe, English and American Judges as Law Makers, G p. 26; S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, pp."}}, {"text": "Judicial Review of Administrative Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10705, "end_char": 10742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "G. Ganz", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10760, "end_char": 10767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "214-215; G. Ganz, Public Law Principles applicable to Dismissal from Employment, Modern Law Review, Vol."}}, {"text": "Scotland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10998, "end_char": 11006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That case concerned a teacher in Scotland who was dismissed by the Education Committee for the reason that he was not registered in tenns of para- H graph 2 of schedule 2 to the Teachers' (Education, Training and Registration) (Scotland) Regulations, 1967, made under section\n\n!"}}, {"text": "Morris", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11617, "end_char": 11623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In an action against the education authority, he claimed that the purported dismissal was a nullity in that it was contrary to natural justice since he had not been given a hearing.. It was held (Lord Morris and Lord Guest dissenting) that the teacher had a right to be heard before he was dismissed as according to the U: majority he was holding an office."}}, {"text": "Wilberforce", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11809, "end_char": 11820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of his speech, Lord Wilberforce made certain observations :\n\n\"A comparative list of situations in which persons have been held entitled or not entitled to a hearing, or to observation of rules of natural justice, according to the master and servant test, looks illogical and even bizarre."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13940, "end_char": 13947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Statutocy provisions similar to those on which the employment rested would tend to show, to my mind, in England or in ScOtland, that it was one of a sufficiently public character, or one partaking sufficiently of the nature of an office, to attract appropriate remedies of administrative law.\""}}, {"text": "ScOtland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13954, "end_char": 13962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Statutocy provisions similar to those on which the employment rested would tend to show, to my mind, in England or in ScOtland, that it was one of a sufficiently public character, or one partaking sufficiently of the nature of an office, to attract appropriate remedies of administrative law.\""}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14811, "end_char": 14822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15468, "end_char": 15476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Setalvad contended that since the con.e in queetion Is affiliated to a statutocy body, namely, the University of Lucknow, and is governod by the relevant statutes and ordinances framed under the provisions of Lucknow University Act, 1920, &n)' violation of the statute or the ordinance in the matter of termi nating the services of a teacher would attract the jurisdiction ol the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution as."}}, {"text": "University of Lucknow", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15567, "end_char": 15588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Setalvad contended that since the con.e in queetion Is affiliated to a statutocy body, namely, the University of Lucknow, and is governod by the relevant statutes and ordinances framed under the provisions of Lucknow University Act, 1920, &n)' violation of the statute or the ordinance in the matter of termi nating the services of a teacher would attract the jurisdiction ol the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution as."}}, {"text": "Lucknow University Act, 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15677, "end_char": 15705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15865, "end_char": 15876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lucknow University Act, 1920", "statute": "Lucknow University Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "University of Saugar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16168, "end_char": 16188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The , appeJlant before this Court in that case was a teacher in a college affiliated to the University of Saugar and managed by the Governing Body\n\n(I) (19641 3 All E.R. 865,\n\n(2) (19641 3 S.C.R. SS."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16813, "end_char": 16824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "contended that the Governing Body had made the order in violation of the provisions of Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16928, "end_char": 17024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17079, "end_char": 17089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He contended that the Governing Body had made the order in violation of the provisions of Ordinance", "statute": "He contended that the Governing Body had made the order in violation of the provisions of Ordinance"}}, {"text": "section 6(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17132, "end_char": 17144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He contended that the Governing Body had made the order in violation of the provisions of Ordinance", "statute": "He contended that the Governing Body had made the order in violation of the provisions of Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Clause 8(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17159, "end_char": 17171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He contended that the Governing Body had made the order in violation of the provisions of Ordinance", "statute": "He contended that the Governing Body had made the order in violation of the provisions of Ordinance"}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17576, "end_char": 17584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He contended that the Governing Body had made the order in violation of the provisions of Ordinance", "statute": "He contended that the Governing Body had made the order in violation of the provisions of Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18327, "end_char": 18335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18658, "end_char": 18666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19051, "end_char": 19063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lucknow University Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19418, "end_char": 19440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20542, "end_char": 20550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8(vi)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22118, "end_char": 22133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22616, "end_char": 22624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23402, "end_char": 23413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1964] 3 S.CR. 6", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 24323, "end_char": 24339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_329_331_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "321>\n\nHARU DAS GUPTA\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL February 1, 1972\n\n[J.M. SHBLAT AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.J\n\nWest Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, (Presidenfs Act 19 of 1970), ss. 12 and 13-Period of three months from the date of detention-Method of computation.\n\nThe petitioner was arrested and detained on February 5, 1971 under C s. 3 of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970.\n\nAfter receipt of the report of the Advisory Board, the St>te Government confirmed the detention order on May 5, 1971.\n\nOn the question whether the c\"'1firmation was made one day after the expiration of the period of 3 months from the date of detention.\n\nHELD : The\n\n0 effect ol defining a period from such a day until such a day within which an '1Ct is to he done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day; and tberefdre, in the present case, the order of confirmation was made before the expiration of the period of three months. from the date of detention. [331 E-FJ\n\nYoung v. Higgon, 6 M & W 50 = 151 E.R. (Ex.) 317, RadcliDe v •.\n\nBartholomew, [1892) 1 Q.B. 161. Williams v.\n\nBurges 10 L.J.O.B. 10, Hardy v. Rlye, 9 B & C 603, English v. CliD, [1914) 2 Ch. 376, Goldsmiths' E Co. v. West Metropolitan Rly. Co. [1904] 1 K.B. 1, S, Cartwright v.\n\nMacCormac, [1963] 1 All E.R. U; 13, Marren v. Dawson Bentley cl CO.:\n\nLtd., [1961) 2 Q.B. 135, Stewart v. Chanman, U951) 2 K.B. 792, In re: .\n\nNorth, Ex parte Hasluck, , H895] 2 Q.B. 264 and Halsbury's Laws of Eng-· land 3rd ed. Vol. 37, pp. 92 and 95) refererd to.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 287 of 1971 ..\n\nUnder article 32 .of the Constitution of India for a writ in the, nature or habeas corpus.\n\nN. N. Goswami, for the petitioner.\n\nD, N. Mukherjee, Sukumar Basu and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Coun was delivered by\n\nShelat, J.\n\nThe petitioner was arrested and detained on February 5, 1971 in pursuance of an order of detention passed on that very day by the Qistrict Magistrate, 24 Parganas under sec. 3(1) and (3) of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities)· Act, President's Act 19 of 1970.\n\nThere is no dispute that, as required by !he Act, his case was: referred to the Advisory Board and on receii>t of its rep<>.\\'t that\n\n330.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthere was sufficient cause for his detention, the State Government under sec. 12 of the ct made an order or decision confirming the said deten1ion order and continuing his detenion thereunder.\n\nThe order of confirmation and continuation was made on May 5, 1971. .\n\nThe only contention raised in this petition was that the order or decision of confirmation of the said detention order was made one day after the explra11ion of the period of three months from the date of detention, that the said period of three months would end on the midnight of May 4, 1971, and that any confirmation .. and continuation of detention made othereaher would not oo valid.\n\nThe question is when can 1ihe period of three months from the date of detention be saic\\ to have expired. . When a period of tiine running from a given day or event to another day or event is prescribed by law or fixed by contract and the qiiestion arises whether the computaticin is to be made inclusively or exclusively of the first-mentiQned Qr of the last-mentioned day, regard must be had to the context and to the purpose for which the computa- . tion has to be made. (Halsbury's Laws of Eng/and, (3rd. ed.) vol 37, p. 92).\n\nThere is, however, a volume of authority in England showing that where a certain thing has to be done within a specified period, the day on which the cause of action arose is to be excluded from computation and the day on which such action is taken is to be included. As early as 1840, Parke, B. laid down this rule in Young v. Higgon('). In Radc(ifje v. Bartholomew(2 ), Wills, J., relying on Williams v. Burgess(') and Hardy v. Ryle('), held that a complaint under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, filed on June 30, in respedt of an act alleged to have been committed on May 30, was \"within one calendar monllh after\n\nthe cause of such complaint shall arise\". He held so on the principle that the day on which the cause for the complaint arose had to F be excluded while computing the period within which under the Act othe complaint had to be filed. In Williams v. Burgess,( 8 ) the staJtute directed warrants of attorney to be filed \"within twentyone days after their execution\", and it was held that a warrant executed on the 9th day of the month would be regarded as having been filed in proper time if filed on the 30th, the day of execution being one which had to be excluded.\n\nOn the other hand, in a case where a settler by a settlement, dated May 13, 1892, conve}OO real estate unto anil to the use of the trustees upon trust !hereinafter declared and it was thereby declared that they should stand possessed of the said premises during the term of twentyone years from 1; he date thereof upon trust to apply the rents and\n\n(1) 6 M & .w 50-151 English Reports (Ex) 317.\n\n(2) [18921\n\nI Q.B. 161.\n\n(3) JO L.J. Q.B. 10. c(4) 9 B . & C 603.\n\nH. D. GUPTA V. WEST BENGAL (She/at, ].) 331\n\nprofits as therein mentioned and it was further declared that the trustees should at the expiration of the said term of twenty-one years sell the said premises and pursuant the said trust for sale the trustees contracted to sell the real estate on June 20, 1913, it was held tllat the term of twenty-one years commenced from\n\nthe midnigh' of May 12, 1892, and therefore, the trust was not void for remoteness on the ground of exceeding a term of twentyone years from its creation. [see English v. Cliff(1)].\n\nThese decisions show that courts have drawn a distinction between a term created within which an act may be done and a time limited for the doing of an act. The rule is well established that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded. [see Goldsmiths' Company v. The West Metropolitan Railway Company(')]. This rule was followed in Cartwright v. Mac- Cormack('), where the expression \"fifteen days from.the date of commencement of the P.olicy\" in a cover note issued by an insur7 ance company was cons.trued .as excluding the first date and the cover note to commence at midnight of that day, and also in Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd.,(4) a case for compensation for injuries received in the course of employment, where for purposes of computing' the period of limitation the date of tho accident, being the date of the cause of action, was excluded. [see also Stewart v: Chanman(') and In re North, Ex parte Hasluck(')]. Thus, as a general rule the effect of defining a period from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. (see Halsbury's Laws of England, (3rd ed.) vol. 37, pp. 92 and 95) There is no reason why the aforesaid mle of construction followed consistently and for so long should not also be applied here.\n\nIn computing the period of three months from the date of detention, which was February 5, 1971, before the expiration of which the order or decision for confirming the detention order and continuation of the detention therennder had to be made, the date of the commencement of detention, namely, February 5, 1971, has to be excluded.\n\nSo done, the order of confirmation was made before the expiration of the period of three months from the date of detention.\n\nThe contention rais¢ on behalf of the petitioner, thus, cannot be sustained. Accordingly the writ petition is dismissed.\n\nV.P.S.\n\n(I) (19141 2 Ch 376.\n\n(3) [1963] I All E.R. II at p. 13.\n\n(5) (1951] 2 K.B. 792.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\n(2) (1904) IK.B. I, at p. 5.\n\n(4) [1961] 2Q.B. 135.\n\n(6) [18951 2 Q.B. 264.", "total_entities": 25, "entities": [{"text": "HARU DAS GUPTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARU DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 1, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "321>\n\nHARU DAS GUPTA\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL February 1, 1972\n\n[J.M. SHBLAT AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.J\n\nWest Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, (Presidenfs Act 19 of 1970), ss."}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 12 and 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 179, "end_char": 192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "statute": "Prevention of Violent Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 336, "end_char": 340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "statute": "Prevention of Violent Act"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 361, "end_char": 386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1600, "end_char": 1610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1619, "end_char": 1640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. N. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1686, "end_char": 1699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. N. Goswami, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "D, N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1722, "end_char": 1737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D, N. Mukherjee, Sukumar Basu and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Sukumar Basu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1739, "end_char": 1751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D, N. Mukherjee, Sukumar Basu and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1756, "end_char": 1772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D, N. Mukherjee, Sukumar Basu and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Shelat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1838, "end_char": 1844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Coun was delivered by\n\nShelat, J.\n\nThe petitioner was arrested and detained on February 5, 1971 in pursuance of an order of detention passed on that very day by the Qistrict Magistrate, 24 Parganas under sec."}}, {"text": "sec. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2019, "end_char": 2028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2057, "end_char": 2082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2379, "end_char": 2386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "statute": "Prevention of Violent Act"}}, {"text": "May 5, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2555, "end_char": 2566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of confirmation and continuation was made on May 5, 1971. ."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3537, "end_char": 3544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is, however, a volume of authority in England showing that where a certain thing has to be done within a specified period, the day on which the cause of action arose is to be excluded from computation and the day on which such action is taken is to be included."}}, {"text": "Parke", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3779, "end_char": 3784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As early as 1840, Parke, B. laid down this rule in Young v. Higgon(')."}}, {"text": "Wills", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3865, "end_char": 3870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Radc(ifje v. Bartholomew(2 ), Wills, J., relying on Williams v. Burgess(') and Hardy v. Ryle('), held that a complaint under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, filed on June 30, in respedt of an act alleged to have been committed on May 30, was \"within one calendar monllh after\n\nthe cause of such complaint shall arise\"."}}, {"text": "Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3964, "end_char": 4000, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "May 13, 1892", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4756, "end_char": 4768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, in a case where a settler by a settlement, dated May 13, 1892, conve}OO real estate unto anil to the use of the trustees upon trust !"}}, {"text": "May 12, 1892", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5538, "end_char": 5550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "331\n\nprofits as therein mentioned and it was further declared that the trustees should at the expiration of the said term of twenty-one years sell the said premises and pursuant the said trust for sale the trustees contracted to sell the real estate on June 20, 1913, it was held tllat the term of twenty-one years commenced from\n\nthe midnigh' of May 12, 1892, and therefore, the trust was not void for remoteness on the ground of exceeding a term of twentyone years from its creation. ["}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_332_341_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "IUMALAYA HOUSE CO. LTD. BOMBAY\n\nCHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY\n\nFebruary 1, .1972 [K. S. Hl!GDB AND P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ;]\n\nIndian Stamp Act (2 of 1899), Sch.I; art. 23-Dtterml\"'1ion of.value of consideration by Revenue-How should be done.\n\n'The lessee of a plot of land from Government sub-leased it and tho sub-lessee built a building on it consisting of flats, shops and officles. 11\" .sub-lessee assigned the rights of occupation of those &ts etc. under various\n\nagreements. 1bereafter, the appellant-company was incorporated and the .sub-lessee pwported to assign all his rights in the building to the appellant- -company. In the pre3111blo to tho deed it was recited that the company bad been formed foi\" the bettor admiJligtration of .the building and for the , protection of the interests of tho persons occupying the flats etc., and that tho su!Hessee had ugroed to assign to tho appellant-company all his interests in the land and the building. The consideration mentioned in 1he document waa nil and the document bore a stamp of 12 amr.is. When it waa presented for registration, the authority impounded the deed, held <hat the appellant<, bmpany was formed of and for the pei\"SOns who b&d\n\npurch3aed the fiats etc., that tho real consideration for the aasigrunent wos made up oartly of what was paid by the occupiera of the flats etc., and\n\ndetermined the stamp duty and penalty under s. 40 of the Stamp Act, 1899. . .\n\nOn a reference to the High Court it was held, that the article in the Schedule to the Sbmp. Act applicable is 23.\n\nOn the question of .consideration, however, while one Judge held that the consideration was 'nil' as mentioruod in the deed, the majority held that the Revenue was not bound to accept the quantum of consideratiOll mentioned in the deed,\n\nthat the deed incl:>rporated into itself the various agreements entered into between !he sub-lessee and the persons to whom rights were assigned in f\n\nthe flats etc., and that the consideration was the total amount payable to <he sub-lessee by those assignees.\n\nAllowing the appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : (I) Before the terms and conditions of an agreement 03D be \"Said to have been incorporated into another document, it must be shown\n\nthat the parties intended to do so. In the present case, the mere reference\n\n. G to the earlier transactions in the deed did not amount to an incorpOration ;; n it of the te'rms and conditions of those transactions, ~338 F-H]\n\n(2) In view of s. 27 of the Stamp Act the parties to a; docwnent are required to set forth in the document fully and. truly, the coilsideratioo\n\n(if any) .ind all other facts and c)ircumstances affecting the chargeability of that document with duty. But a failure to do so is merely pllJ!isl>al!le under s. 64 of the Stamp Act.\n\nThere is no provision empowemjg the H Revenue authorities to make an independent inqwry of the ·.value of the -property conveyed for determining the duty, even usuming that the .charging words in art. 23 do not mean that the Revenue 111118t b&ve regard\n\nonly to what the parties to the instrument have elected to state the consideration to be, but can assess the duty upon the value of the consideration as disclosed upon an examination of the terms of the instrument as a whole. [339 A-DJ\n\n(3) There is a Jong line of decisions of the High Courts holding that the Legislature had not empowered the Revenue to make an independent inquiry M regards the valuation of the right sought to be assigned. Thal\n\nview IS correct and the question must also be held to be settled bY stare decisls. (340 D-FJ\n\nRamen Chetty v. Mohomed Ghouse, I.L.R. 16 Cal. 432, Sakhart:m Shankar v. Ranu:handra Babu Mohire, I.L.R. 27 Bom. 279, Muhammad Muzafjar A.Ii, In re. IL.R. 44 All. 339, Sri Siloart:olfn Ramal/a & Anr. v.\n\nState of Bihar, I.L.R. 39 Pat. 228 and Bharpet Mohammad Hussain Sahib & A.nr. v. District Registrar, Kurnool, I.L.R. [1964] A.P. ) , approved.\n\n( 4) In any event, there was no basis for holding that the consideration for the deed was the '<IIllOllnt eceived by the sub-lessee from tloe persons to whom he assigned rights in the fiats etc, Those penona ccquired an independent right and title.-whether perfect or notn before the impounded deed was executed, and their rights did not 11ow from the impounded deed. (340 F-0]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 660 of 1967 and 58 of 1972. Appeals by certificate/ special leave from the judgment and decree dated August 11112, 1964 of the Bombay High Court in Civil Reference No. 6 of 1959.\n\nS. T. Desai, P. C. Bhartari, J. B. Dadachanj{, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant (in both the appeals).\n\nV. !J. Desai and B. D. Sharma, for respondent No. 1 (in both\n\ne appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of tl1e Court was delivered by Hegde, l. Both these appeals, the former by certificate and the later by special leave arise from the decision of the High Court of Bombay in a reference under section 54 _of the Bombay Stamp Act.\n\nI .\n\nWhen Civil Appeal No. 660 of 1967 came up for hearing on a previous occasion, objection was raised as to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the High Court was not compe- G tent to grant a certificate in the case under Art. 133 of the Consti• tution. At that stage, the appellant sought a.n adjournment of the\n\nappeal so as to enable it to move this Court for special leave against the impugned decision. That prayer was allowed by this Court.\n\nThereafter the appellant sought and obtained special leave of this Court to appeal against the decision in question. Hence Civil H Appeal No. 58 of 1972 came to be filed. In view of this aPJlCI!]., we may now proceed on the basis that Civil Appeal No. 660 of 1967 stands withdrawn and the same is disposed of accordingly.\n\nHereafter we shall only deal with Civil Appeal No. 58 of 1972.\n\nThe facts leading up to this appeal are as follows :- On November 18, 1950, plot No. 79 at Palton Road, Bombay, admeasuring about 1,368 square yards was leased by the Government of Bombay for a period of 999 years from June 26, 1942 to one Lily Investment Corporation Ltd. On December 11, 1950, the said Lily Investment Corporation Ltd, gave a sub-lease of the said plot of land to Uttamchand Tulsi\\las for a term of 999 years (less one day), from June 26, 1942. Thereafter Uttamchand constructed a building called \"Himalaya House\" on that plot consist ing of several flats, shops and offices. Under various agreements, he appears to have assigned the right of occupation in those flats, shops and offices t.o several persons. One such agreement was with one Motiram Shewarama Vallicha.\n\nThat was in respect of one flat.\n\nThat agreement is in the record. As the High Court has placed considerable reliance on that document, it is necessary to quote the relevant clauses therein viz. 2, 5 and 16. Those clauses read thus:\n\n\"2. That the Party hereto of the Second Part hereby agrees to acquire the block bearing No. 12 on the ground floor of the said building for the total sum of Rs. 10,000 (Rµpees ten thousand only).\n\nS. That the possession of the said block shall be delivered to the party hereto of the Second Part provided all the amounts due under this agreement and particularly indicated in condition No. 3 hereof are paid by the party hereto of 1jhe Second Part to the Party hereto of the First Part and upon the delivery of such possession the party hereto of the Second Part shall be entitled to the use and occupation of the said block without hindrance PROVIDED NEVERTHELESS that nothing contained in these presents shall be construed as a demise in law of the said leasehold lands or any part thereof or the buildings thereon, such demise to take place only upon the transfer by a formal conveyance to a Co-operative Society or Incorpora1)ed body to be formed as hereinafter agreed.\n\n16. That the party hereto of the First Part shall form a co-operative society or any other incorporated body recognized in law and the partY hereto of the Second Part shall join such co-operative society or any other incorporated body.\n\nThe party hereto of the First Part agrees to convey transfer or assign to the said society or any other incorporated body as the case may be the aforesaid lands and buildings provided that the costs and expenses in connection with the\n\nrequisition of such society or incorporated body, as well as the costs of preparing, approving, engrossing and stamping the Assignment, Transfer, or Deed of Conveyance required to be executed by the party hereto of the First Part shall be borne by such society, or the incorporated body as the case may be.\"\n\nOn June 28, 1955, the appellant company was incorporated and registered under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act,\n\n1913. On December 30, 1955, Uttamchand purported to assign all his rights in the building to the appellant company under a deed.\n\nIn the preamble to that Deed after tracing Uttamchand's c\n\ntille to the property, it is recited \"AND WHEREAS the Assignee Company has been formed for the better administration of the said building and for the protection of the interes.ts of the persons\n\noccupying flats, offices and shops therein AND WHEREAS the Assignor has agreed to assign to the Assignee all his interests in the said piece of land and building.\" Clause 1 of that Deed provides as under :- \"l. The Assignor (i.e. Respondent No. 2) doth hereby\n\nfor no consideration assign into the Assignee (i.e. the Appellant Company) ALL THAT the piece of land comprised in the before recited Lease together with the buildings a!]d erections now standing and being thereon togeher with all rights easements and appurtenances thereto belonging and together with all the right title and interest whatever of the Assignor in the building known as Himalaya House EX- CEPT AND RESERVED as in the before' recited Lease more particularly mentioned TO HOLD the same unto the Assignee or .all the residue now unexpired of the term of years granted by the before recited Lease SUBJECT to the rent reserved by and to the Agreements convenants and conditions contained in the before recited Lease henceforth on the part of the Assignee to be paid observed and perforn1ed.\" .\n\nThe said document bore a stamp of annas 12 only. When the G same was presented for registration, the Sub-Registrar of Bombay impounded the same and sent it to the Assistanf Superintendent of Stamps, Bombay .. That officer by his letter dated June 26, 1956 mfonned the appellant company that \"as it was formed of and for the erson~ who had purchased the flats in lhe buildi'ng, the real cons1deral!on for the Assignment was made up partlv of H what was paid by the flat holders and the status of the appellant company was tat of the nominee of the flat holders so far as the Assignment was concerned.\" He further stated that in the absence of any mention of consideration in the document, the then value 9-887 Sup; CI/72 . '\n\nof the premises was an index of the consideration. He purporting A to act under section 40 of the Indian Stamp Act, determined the stamp duty at Rs. 95,997 after valuing the building at Rs.\n\n16,00,000. Further he imposed a penalty of Rs. 20,000. He called upon the appellant company to pay the stamp duty as well as the penalty. On reeipt of that communication, the appellant company applied to the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority to B revise othe order of the Assistant Superintendent of Stamps or in the alternative refer the matter to the High Court for its opinion.\n\nThereafter the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority made the reference referred to earlier to the High Court. He submitted two questions for the opinion of the High Court, viz :\n\n\"(!) Whether Himalaya House Co. Ltd. the Assignee in the Assignment dated 30th December 1955 is tlie nominee of the several flat holders who have purchased the flats in the Himalaya House and whether the Assignment in queStion is a Conveyance or a sale for a price whkh has passed from the hand of the flat holders long before t.he date of assignment.\n\n( 2) Whether it was competent to the Assistant Superintendent of Stamps, under section 40 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (now section 39 of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958) to go beyond the terms of the document when i4 is mentioned in E the doc.ument that no. consideration is passed and assess the stamp duty in the manner mentioned by him in his order dated the 26th June 1956.\"\n\nThe matter came up for hearing before a bench of Jihree Judges of the Bombay High Court presided 0ver by the learned Chief Justice.\n\nF At the hearing, the learned Judges opined that the questions submitted by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority were not appropriate and, therefore, they recast those questions as follows:- '\n\n\"l. Under which article in Schedule I to the Stamp Act should the \"Assignment Deed in question be stamped?\n\n2. If Article 23 applies in this case, what is the consideration for the Assignment Deed ?\"\n\nAll the Judges unanimously held that the Article applicable to the case is Article 23 in the FirsU Schedule to the Indian Stamp Act, which will be !lereinafter referred to as \"the Stamp Act\". But H while answering the second question, the learned Chief Justice and Naik. J. opined that \"the consideration for the Assignment Deed is\n\nthe total amount which was payable to the Assignor Tulsidas . under the agreements between him and the persons to whom he had, under those agreements, given the right to occupy the fiats, offices and shops in the building.\" But Mody J. differed from his colleagues and came to the conclusion that \"the consideration is as mentio, ned in the Deed .of Assig11I11ent itself i.e. no consideration.\"\n\nAll the Judges unanimously came to the conclusion that the consideration mentioned in the document is nil. This conclusion is obvious because Cta)I_se 1 of \\he Assig11I11ent Deed says that the Assignor assigns his rights 'for no consideration'. All of them were also unanimous in their conclusion that for finding out the consideration, the concerned authorities (who will be hereinafter referred to as 'Revenue') cannot tra•,'\\ll outside the document;_ it\n\nshould be 'as set forth therein'. But the majority took the view that the Revenue was not bound to accept the quantum of consideration mentioned in the document; it could determine the same by taking into consideration the facts available from the impounded document.\n\nThey fur(her held that the impounded document incorporates into itself the various agreements entered into between Uttamchand and the various persons to whom he had assigned certain rights _in rsQCct of flats, offices and shops referred to earlier. In their view, t; he consideration paid by those persons to\n\nUttamchand formed part of the consideration for the Assignment Deed in question. Naik J. went a little further and held that alternatively the Deed in question can be considered as a \"gifti\" under Art. 33 of Schedule I to the Stamp Act Mody J. opined that there is no basis to ho!d that the agreements entered into between Uttamchand and the various persons to whom the fiats, offices and shops had been assigned were similar to the agreement entered into between him and_ Motirmn Shewarama VaJlicha. He held that on the basis of the mate!ial before the Court, it wasnot possible to cc;>me to the conclJ!SJ'?n that they had entered into agreements witl1 Uttamchand sumlar to the agreement , entered into\n\nbetween Uttamchan4 and Motiram Shewarama Vallicha.\n\nHe further eld that on a P!ain reading of the Assignment Deed, it is\n\not Pc;>SS1ble to come to the conlusion that !he terms and condi\n\nlions Ill !he agreements entered mto by Uttamchand with those to\n\nhorn he hll; d assigned fiats, offices and shops,.were incorporated mto. the Ass1gnl'llent D_eed. . ·\n\nNone of the Judges upheld the conclusi<>n of the Assistant Superintendent of Stamps that the appellant company is a nominee of the persons to whom !he flats, offices and shops had been assigned; nor did they agree with his conclusion that if in a document, the value of the rights assigned is not mentioned, it is permissible for the Revenue to assess their value independently.\n\nSUPREME COURT RE!'OR.TS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nThe contention tha_t the appellant company is a nominee of the various persons to whom flats, offices and shops had been assigned was not pressed before us; nor was it urged before us that the Revenue is competent to make an independent assessment of\n\nthe value of the rights assigned.\n\nThough at one stage, it was feebly suggested that the Deed of Assignment may be considered as a giit but that contention was not elaborated; nor do we see any merit in that contention because in the first place, it does not purport to be a gift; secondly, the valuation of \"gift\" under Article 33 of the First Schedule has to be made on the same basis as the valuation of a \"conveyance\" under Article 23 of that Schedule. Article 3 3 specifically says 1; hat the duty payable on a gift deed will be \"same as a conveyance for a consideration equal to the value of the property as set forth in such instrument.\"\n\nFor the purpose of this case, we shall proceed on the assumption, without deciding, that the charging words in Article 23 of the Stamp Act_ \"where the amount or value of the consideration for such conveance as set forth therein\" do net mean that the Revenue must have regard only to what the parties to the instruments have elected to state the considetation to be, but the duty must be assessed upon the amount or value of the consideration for the transfer as disclosed upon an examination of the terms of the instrument as a whole. We are of the opinion that the learned Chid Justice and Naik J. were not justified in holding tha~ the\n\nD\"u of Assignment incorporates into itself the various. agreements entered into between Uttamchand and the persons to whom he assigned flats, offices and shops.\n\nThe only reference to tlhose pc.rsons in the Deed of Assignment is in the preamble .wherein it is stated ''AND WHEREAS the Assignor having erected a building known as Himalaya House on the said piece of land had granted to certain persons the right to occupy flats. offices and shops in the said building AND W~REAS llhe Assignee Company has been formed for the better administration of the said building and for the protection of the interests of the persons occupying the ilats. ofllces and shops therein.\" These clauses merely refer to the earlier transactions. They do not' incorporate into the Assignment Deed the earlier agreements. with the persons referred to therein.\n\nMere reference_ to some earlier transactions in a document does not amount to an incorporation in that document, of the terms and conditions relating thereto.\n\nFrom the language used in the Assignment Deed, it i~ not possible to come to the conclusion that the tem1s and conditions of the earlier transactions have been made a part of that Deed. Furllher barring one particular agreement, other agreements were not before the Court.\n\nTherefore, it is not possible to know what the terms and conditions p[ those agreements were. Before the terms and conditions of an\n\nagreement can be said to have been incorporatd into another document, the same must clearly show that the parties thereto intended to incorporate them. No such intention in available in this case.\n\nIt was urged that in view of section 27 of the Stamp Act, it was permissible fo~ the Revenue to look into the terms and conditions of the agreements entered into by Uttamchand with the various persons to whom he had assigned fiats, offices and shops •. particularly in view of the fact that the impounded document makes reference to those agreements. We are not able to accept that contention.\n\nSection 27 prescribes that \"The consideration (if any) and all other facts and circumstances affecting the churgeability of any insrument with duty, or the amount of the duty with which it is churgeable shall be '.ully and truly set forth therein.\" It is true that in view of this provision, the-parties to a docu-. ment are requireµ to set forth in the document fully and truly the consideration (if any) and all other facts and circumstances affecting the chargeability of that document with the duty or the amount of the duty with which it is chargeable. But a failure to comply with the requirements of that section is merely punishable under section 64 of the Stamp Act. No provision in the Stamp Acf em powers the Revenue to make an independent inquiry of the value of the property conveyed for determining the duty chargeable.\n\nArticle 23 is the Article that governs the charging of stamp duty on \"conveyance\". That Article' to the extent relevant for our pre sent purpose reads :\n\n\"23. Conveyance (as defined by section 2(10) no~ being a transfer charge or exempted under section 52- Where the amount or value of the consideration for such conveyance as set forth therein .......... \" This Article bas come up for consideration before various High Courts on a number of occasions. In Ramm Chetty v. Mohamed Ghouse( 1) the Calcutta High Court held that in determining whether a document is sufficiently stamped for the purpose of deciding upon its admissibility in evidence, the document itself as it stands, and not any collateral circumstances which may be shown in evidence must be looked at. In Sakharam Shankar and Others v. Ramchandra Babu Mohire, (') it. was held that in determining the question whether a particular docwnent is sufficiently stamped, the Court should look at the instrument as ii stands. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the matter of Muhammad Muzaf]ar Ali(') held that if in a deed of gift the value of the property dealt with is not set forth, the deed does not require any stamp, and it is not within the competence of the Collector to have the said property valued in order to assess the duty\n\n(I) (!LR 16 Cal 432). 2 (!LR 27 Bom 2791.\n\nPl (!LR 44 All. 339).\n\npayable. If, however, the value of the property is intentionally omitted with a view to defraud the Revenue, a prosecution will lie\n\nundr section 64 of the Stamp ct. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Sri Sitaram Rama/ia and Another v. State oj Bihar(') held 1that die Collector had no power under section 40 of the Stamp Act to embark upon an inquiry with regard to the market value of the properties covered by the document! and require the payment of further stamp duty in accordance with his finding as to valuation and, therefore, that the impugned orders of the Collector, Commissioner and the Board were ultra vires and were liable to be set aside under Article 227 of the Constitution.\n\nTherein the Court was c.!Jnsidering the scope of section 5 8 of the Stamp Act which requires that an instlrument of settlement should be stamped with the same <, luty asl a bond \"for a sum equal to the mnount or value of th~. property settled as set forth in such settlement.\"' The Court observed that the words 'as set forth in the settlement\" in the section refer back to the word \"value\" and not to the words \"property settled\". Recently the same view was taken by the A, ndhra Pradesh High Court in Bharpet Mohammad Hussain Sahib and Another v. District Registrar, Kurnool(2). No decision taking a contrary view was brought to our notice. The question arisin_g for decision in this case is settled by stare decisis.\n\nWe are entirely in agreement with the view expressed in those decisions. Even if we had bleen inclined to place a different interpretation on Article 2}, we would have hesitated to do so in view of the long line of decisions to some of which we have already ma!le reference. The Legislature may have had good reasons for not empowering the Revenue to make an independent inquiry as regards the valuation of the right sought to .be assigned.\n\nUnder any circumstance, there was no basis to hold that the consideration for the impounded Deed is the total amount received by Uttamchand under the agreements, entered into between him and the persons (o whom he had assigned certain rights in the fiats, offices and shops in the building. Those persons had an independent right of their own. Their rights did not flow from the impounded Assignment Deed. Whether the title obtained by them was perfect or not, there is no denying of the fact thllt they had acquired valuable rights even before the impounded Deed was executed.\n\nFor the reasons menti, oned above, we allow this appeal and in place of the answers given by ihe High Court, we answer the question formulated by that Court 11hus :\n\n\"I. The Article applicable in this case is Article 23 in H the First Schedule to the Stamp Act, and\n\n<I) (ILR 39 Pat • 228).\n\n(2) !LR. (1964) A.P. I. )\n\n2. the consideration is .as mentioned in the Deed of\n\nAsslgome.nt itself i.e. no consideration.\"\n\nThe first respondent shall pay the costs· of the appellant ip Civil Appeal No. 58 of 1972. There will be no order as to costs in Civil Appeal No. 660 of 1967.\n\nV.P.S.", "total_entities": 81, "entities": [{"text": "IUMALAYA HOUSE CO. LTD. BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HIMALAYA HOUSE CO. LTD. BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 1, .1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 86, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BOMBAY\n\nCHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY\n\nFebruary 1, .1972 [K. S. Hl!GDB AND P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ;]\n\nIndian Stamp Act (2 of 1899), Sch."}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Stamp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "art. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 169, "end_char": 176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Stamp Act", "statute": "Indian Stamp Act"}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1405, "end_char": 1410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Stamp Act, 1899", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1418, "end_char": 1433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2472, "end_char": 2477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2761, "end_char": 2766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2982, "end_char": 2989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Muhammad Muzafjar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3702, "end_char": 3719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "279, Muhammad Muzafjar A.Ii, In re.", "canonical_name": "Muhammad Muzaf]ar Ali"}}, {"text": "olfn Ramal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3764, "end_char": 3774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "339, Sri Siloart:olfn Ramal/a & Anr."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4488, "end_char": 4505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by certificate/ special leave from the judgment and decree dated August 11112, 1964 of the Bombay High Court in Civil Reference No."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4541, "end_char": 4552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, P. C. Bhartari, J. B. Dadachanj{, 0."}}, {"text": "P. C. Bhartari", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4554, "end_char": 4568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, P. C. Bhartari, J. B. Dadachanj{, 0."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4573, "end_char": 4585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, P. C. Bhartari, J. B. Dadachanj{, 0."}}, {"text": ". C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4589, "end_char": 4600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, P. C. Bhartari, J. B. Dadachanj{, 0."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4605, "end_char": 4620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "V. !J. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4664, "end_char": 4676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. !"}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4681, "end_char": 4693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. Desai and B. D. Sharma, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4783, "end_char": 4788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of tl1e Court was delivered by Hegde, l. Both these appeals, the former by certificate and the later by special leave arise from the decision of the High Court of Bombay in a reference under section 54 _of the Bombay Stamp Act."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4901, "end_char": 4921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of tl1e Court was delivered by Hegde, l. Both these appeals, the former by certificate and the later by special leave arise from the decision of the High Court of Bombay in a reference under section 54 _of the Bombay Stamp Act."}}, {"text": "section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4943, "end_char": 4953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5222, "end_char": 5230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 18, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5892, "end_char": 5909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts leading up to this appeal are as follows :- On November 18, 1950, plot No."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5939, "end_char": 5945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "79 at Palton Road, Bombay, admeasuring about 1,368 square yards was leased by the Government of Bombay for a period of 999 years from June 26, 1942 to one Lily Investment Corporation Ltd. On December 11, 1950, the said Lily Investment Corporation Ltd, gave a sub-lease of the said plot of land to Uttamchand Tulsi\\las for a term of 999 years (less one day), from June 26, 1942."}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6002, "end_char": 6022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "79 at Palton Road, Bombay, admeasuring about 1,368 square yards was leased by the Government of Bombay for a period of 999 years from June 26, 1942 to one Lily Investment Corporation Ltd. On December 11, 1950, the said Lily Investment Corporation Ltd, gave a sub-lease of the said plot of land to Uttamchand Tulsi\\las for a term of 999 years (less one day), from June 26, 1942."}}, {"text": "June 26, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6054, "end_char": 6067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "79 at Palton Road, Bombay, admeasuring about 1,368 square yards was leased by the Government of Bombay for a period of 999 years from June 26, 1942 to one Lily Investment Corporation Ltd. On December 11, 1950, the said Lily Investment Corporation Ltd, gave a sub-lease of the said plot of land to Uttamchand Tulsi\\las for a term of 999 years (less one day), from June 26, 1942."}}, {"text": "Lily Investment Corporation Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6075, "end_char": 6107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "79 at Palton Road, Bombay, admeasuring about 1,368 square yards was leased by the Government of Bombay for a period of 999 years from June 26, 1942 to one Lily Investment Corporation Ltd. On December 11, 1950, the said Lily Investment Corporation Ltd, gave a sub-lease of the said plot of land to Uttamchand Tulsi\\las for a term of 999 years (less one day), from June 26, 1942."}}, {"text": "December 11, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6111, "end_char": 6128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "79 at Palton Road, Bombay, admeasuring about 1,368 square yards was leased by the Government of Bombay for a period of 999 years from June 26, 1942 to one Lily Investment Corporation Ltd. On December 11, 1950, the said Lily Investment Corporation Ltd, gave a sub-lease of the said plot of land to Uttamchand Tulsi\\las for a term of 999 years (less one day), from June 26, 1942."}}, {"text": "Lily Investment Corporation Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6139, "end_char": 6170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "79 at Palton Road, Bombay, admeasuring about 1,368 square yards was leased by the Government of Bombay for a period of 999 years from June 26, 1942 to one Lily Investment Corporation Ltd. On December 11, 1950, the said Lily Investment Corporation Ltd, gave a sub-lease of the said plot of land to Uttamchand Tulsi\\las for a term of 999 years (less one day), from June 26, 1942."}}, {"text": "Uttamchand Tulsi\\las", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6217, "end_char": 6237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "79 at Palton Road, Bombay, admeasuring about 1,368 square yards was leased by the Government of Bombay for a period of 999 years from June 26, 1942 to one Lily Investment Corporation Ltd. On December 11, 1950, the said Lily Investment Corporation Ltd, gave a sub-lease of the said plot of land to Uttamchand Tulsi\\las for a term of 999 years (less one day), from June 26, 1942.", "canonical_name": "Uttamchand Tulsi\\las"}}, {"text": "Uttamchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6309, "end_char": 6319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter Uttamchand constructed a building called \"Himalaya House\" on that plot consist ing of several flats, shops and offices.", "canonical_name": "Uttamchand Tulsi\\las"}}, {"text": "Motiram Shewarama Vallicha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6594, "end_char": 6620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One such agreement was with one Motiram Shewarama Vallicha."}}, {"text": "June 28, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8617, "end_char": 8630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 28, 1955, the appellant company was incorporated and registered under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act,\n\n1913."}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8714, "end_char": 8734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "December 30, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8746, "end_char": 8763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 30, 1955, Uttamchand purported to assign all his rights in the building to the appellant company under a deed."}}, {"text": "Clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9285, "end_char": 9293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act,\n\n1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act,\n\n1913"}}, {"text": "June 26, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10429, "end_char": 10442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the G same was presented for registration, the Sub-Registrar of Bombay impounded the same and sent it to the Assistanf Superintendent of Stamps, Bombay .. That officer by his letter dated June 26, 1956 mfonned the appellant company that \"as it was formed of and for the erson~ who had purchased the flats in lhe buildi'ng, the real cons1deral!on for the Assignment was made up partlv of H what was paid by the flat holders and the status of the appellant company was tat of the nominee of the flat holders so far as the Assignment was concerned.\""}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10992, "end_char": 11002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Stamp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11010, "end_char": 11026, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Himalaya House Co. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11678, "end_char": 11701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether Himalaya House Co. Ltd. the Assignee in the Assignment dated 30th December 1955 is tlie nominee of the several flat holders who have purchased the flats in the Himalaya House and whether the Assignment in queStion is a Conveyance or a sale for a price whkh has passed from the hand of the flat holders long before t.he date of assignment."}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12097, "end_char": 12107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Stamp Act, 1899", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12115, "end_char": 12137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12143, "end_char": 12153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Stamp Act, 1899", "statute": "the Indian Stamp Act, 1899"}}, {"text": "Bombay Stamp Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12161, "end_char": 12183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26th June 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12377, "end_char": 12391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "consideration is passed and assess the stamp duty in the manner mentioned by him in his order dated the 26th June 1956.\""}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12752, "end_char": 12762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958", "statute": "the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Article 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12839, "end_char": 12849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958", "statute": "the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Article 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13001, "end_char": 13011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958", "statute": "the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Indian Stamp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13041, "end_char": 13057, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Naik", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13191, "end_char": 13195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But H while answering the second question, the learned Chief Justice and Naik."}}, {"text": "Mody", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13487, "end_char": 13491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Mody J. differed from his colleagues and came to the conclusion that \"the consideration is as mentio, ned in the Deed .of Assig11I11ent itself i.e. no consideration.\""}}, {"text": "Art. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14889, "end_char": 14896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I to the Stamp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14900, "end_char": 14927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Motirmn Shewarama VaJlicha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15165, "end_char": 15191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "33 of Schedule I to the Stamp Act Mody J. opined that there is no basis to ho!d that the agreements entered into between Uttamchand and the various persons to whom the fiats, offices and shops had been assigned were similar to the agreement entered into between him and_ Motirmn Shewarama VaJlicha."}}, {"text": "Uttamchan4", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15405, "end_char": 15415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He held that on the basis of the mate!ial before the Court, it wasnot possible to cc;>me to the conclJ!SJ'?n that they had entered into agreements witl1 Uttamchand sumlar to the agreement , entered into\n\nbetween Uttamchan4 and Motiram Shewarama Vallicha.", "canonical_name": "Uttamchand Tulsi\\las"}}, {"text": "SS1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15526, "end_char": 15529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule I to the Stamp Act", "statute": "Schedule I to the Stamp Act"}}, {"text": "Article 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16748, "end_char": 16758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16766, "end_char": 16780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16855, "end_char": 16865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16884, "end_char": 16893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17184, "end_char": 17194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19346, "end_char": 19356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19712, "end_char": 19722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20359, "end_char": 20369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20547, "end_char": 20557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20732, "end_char": 20745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20792, "end_char": 20802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21042, "end_char": 21061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ramm Chetty v. Mohamed Ghouse( 1) the Calcutta High Court held that in determining whether a document is sufficiently stamped for the purpose of deciding upon its admissibility in evidence, the document itself as it stands, and not any collateral circumstances which may be shown in evidence must be looked at."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21552, "end_char": 21572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the matter of Muhammad Muzaf]ar Ali(') held that if in a deed of gift the value of the property dealt with is not set forth, the deed does not require any stamp, and it is not within the competence of the Collector to have the said property valued in order to assess the duty\n\n(I) (!"}}, {"text": "Muhammad Muzaf]ar Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21590, "end_char": 21611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the matter of Muhammad Muzaf]ar Ali(') held that if in a deed of gift the value of the property dealt with is not set forth, the deed does not require any stamp, and it is not within the competence of the Collector to have the said property valued in order to assess the duty\n\n(I) (!", "canonical_name": "Muhammad Muzaf]ar Ali"}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22057, "end_char": 22067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22109, "end_char": 22125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Sri Sitaram Rama/ia and Another v. State oj Bihar(') held 1that die Collector had no power under section 40 of the Stamp Act to embark upon an inquiry with regard to the market value of the properties covered by the document!"}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22226, "end_char": 22236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22589, "end_char": 22600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22672, "end_char": 22681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23486, "end_char": 23495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24574, "end_char": 24584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24594, "end_char": 24608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_342_347_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "STATE OF U.P.\n\nSAYED ABDUL JALIL February 1, 1972\n\n[S. M .. S!KRI, C.J., A. N. RAY AND M. H: BEG, JJ.]\n\nA1aho1n111edan law-Order of Muslim ruler of Princely State a.Uotting .l1ouse-lf would n1J1ount to a gift of the corpus-Whether operates tu a grnnt of life e:-.tate or a revocable licenct-lndian Evidence Act ( 1 o/ 1872), s. 92 proviso (6)-Admissihilit, v of other el'idtnce.\n\nPursuant to an order by a Muslim ruler of an erstwhile princely-State, th..: respondent \\VUs allotted a house o:ind he \\\\'as Jiving in it.\n\nAfter the merger of th~ princely-State with the appellant-State, rent was demanded from the resondent and he filed a suit for a declaration that he was the o\\vner in possession of the house; and in the 3(tefnative; that he was a licensee entitled to remain in possession for life without payment of any rent.\n\nThe High Court, in sec~:md appeal, held that the use of the Urdu words 'inteqal' and 'atta' showed that the Ruler intended the order to be a valid declaration of gift under Mohammedan Law and that when the respondent took possession of the house, he became its owner. The High Court also held that no other evidence was admissible for deciding on the Ruler's intention. -\n\nAllowing the appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : ( 1) There being no mention in the order either of riahts of ownership or those of a life .. estate holder, the mere use of the two words, did not determine what was meant' to be granted. The word 'inteqal' is used in connection with a transfer of property, but in the context of its use here, it could only indicate that the respondent was to )lave chanae or tramfer his residence in the physical sense.\n\nThe word\n\n1atta' iS: used to denote all kinds of grants including a. mere permission to live in house.\n\nTherefore. assuming tbat the order reduced the terms of a grant to writing, oral and other eYidence was both necessary and. admissible under s. 92, proviso (6), Evidence Ac~, to resolve the latent ambiguity.\n\nThe evidence adduced in the case, however, is more consistent with the view tht the Ruler meant to resolve the immediate financial difficulty of the respondent by giving him free residential accommodation than with a conferment of the ownership of or a life interest in the house. [346 B-H]\n\n( 2) There wos no declaration of any gift either of the corpus or the usufruct and the admissible evidence relating to the nature of the transac- tion, which the High Court should have considered, showed, tht the transaction amounted to nothing more than a grant of '1 licence revocable at the grantor's option. From the mere expenditure by the respondent of money over some necessary repairs, an inference of a larger gfant O'Jnnot be drawn. [347 C-EJ\n\nCML APPELLATE JUP.ISD!CTION : Civil Appeal No. 279 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated September 15, 1966 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 222 of 1960.\n\nG. N. Diks/1it and 0. P. Ran.a, for the appellants.\n\nE. C. Agrawala, for respondents Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeg, J. There are two appeals by Special Leave before us, Leave, against the Judgment a.nd decree of a learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court allowing a plaintiff's se.cond appeal\n\nThe plaintiff's case was that the Governmeur of Rampur had given him a house \"under the orders of His Highness the Nawab of Rampur, passeq on 23rd June, 1945\". It appears that, after the merger of Rampur State in Uttar Pradesh in 1949, when Rampur became a district of Uttar Pradesh, this house was given by the Governme.nt of Uttar Pradesh to the Municipal Board of\n\nR&mpur, Defendant-Appellant, which c!emanded rent from the plaintiff by notice.\n\nOn the plaintiff's refusal to pay, the house was attached on 23rd February, 1955.\n\nThe plaintiff deposited a sum of Rs. 100under protest. He then filed his suit, on 26-10-56, for a declaration that he is the ownr in possession of the house, and, in the alternative, that he is a \"licensee\" entitled to remain in possession of the house for life without payment of rent. -\n\nThe defendants, the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Municipal Board of Rampur, and the Public Works Department at Rampur, ·\n\ndmed the alleged gift of either the ownership or of a life-intere!ll in the house to the plaintiff.\n\nThey also pleaded that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendants.\n\nTheir case was that, if any permission to reside in the house, was given to the plaintiff by the ruler of the State\n\nof Rampur before the merger of Rampur with Uttar Pradesh, it was valid and effective only so long as the plaintiff Was in the service of the former ruler of Rampur.\n\nThey set up a claim to \"damages for use and occupation in the form of rent from the plaintiff at Rs. 10/- per month from 1-4-1953 to 30-1-1954\".\n\nAccording to them, the plaintiff's licence, if any, automatically te•minatec! when the State of Rampur merged with the State of Uttar Pradesh. The defendants had also pleaded that IM alleged gift, which was not governed by Mahomedan law, could not be upheld because no registered deed of gift was executed to transfer a house the value of which was far in excess of Rs. 100/-.\n\nThe Trial court as well as the first Appellate Court had found, after an examination of all the evidence, including the alleJ?ed\n\norder dated 23rd June 1945, of His Highness the Nawab of A Rampur (Exhibit 1), a Jetter dated 30th June l.949 {Exhibit A-10) from a Minister of Rampur State to \"the Secretary (Build in gs), fixing rent for the house and the oral evidence that the\n\nplcintiff had not proved either of the two alternative claims set up by him.\n\nA learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court had, upon the plaintiff's second appeal, reversed the concurrent B findings of fact recorded by the Courts below because the learned Judge thought that \"the order of the Nawab of Rampur dated 23rd June 1945'', constituting a valid declaration of a gift, by the owner of the house, followed by the plaintiff's admitted actual possession of the house conferred ownership of the house upon the plaintiff-respondent according to Mahomedan law.\n\nThe c learned Judire also held that nothing beyond his order of the Nawab could be looked into for deciding what was intended by the Nawab and that the use of the words \"inteqal\" and \"atta\" in the following extract from the order in Urdu determined the in•cnt of the Nawab conclusively. \"Ap ki sakunat ke waste Abdul Karim Sahib wala makan atta farmaya gaya hai.\n\nAp. aj' D hi us me muntaquil ho jayen . . . . . . Ap un se mil kar inteqa makan ki karrawai kariye\".\n\nThe questions arising before us for decision are : firstly, wbether the alleged gift is governed by Mahomedan Law; secondly, whether the requirements of Mahomedan Jaw for establishing a gift of the house or of its usufruct for life to the plaintiff could be E held to have been satisfied in this case; and, thirdly, whether nothing beyond the order of 23-6-1945 could be looked into to determine the Nawab's intention.\n\nOne could legitimately presume that a gift by the Nawab of Rampur, a Muslim, would be governed by the rules of Mahome- F dan Jaw if the Nawab was dealing with his own private property.\n\nIn the case before us, we find that the plaintiff himself has pleaded that he acquired his right and title to the house in dispute from the Government of Rampur State, although the action of the Governmerii was said to be \"under the orders dated June 23, 1945, of His Highness the Nawab of Rampur\". Upon an exami G nation of the alleged order, which has been treated by the learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court as a. valid declaration of a gift of the house by its owner, governed by Mahomedan law, we find that it is only a piece of information sent to the plaintiff who is described as \"Nigran Shikar Mahi\" or \"Supervisor of Fishing.\" The communication, translated in English in the paper book of this Court, reads as follows : H\n\n''His Highness has pssed orders that you should immediately vacate the house in which you reside an.d\n\nA pay up to the landlord all his dues. Abdul Karim wala house has been given to you for your residential purpose. You should shift to that house this very day.\n\nThe Executive Engineer (Buildings) has been intimatto allot the said house to you immediately. Please contact him arid take steps to vacate the house\".\n\nB The plaintiff himself had produced Agha Khan, the Assistant Military Secretary of the Nawab of Rampur, who had signed and sent the communication, set out above, to the plaintiff. His. evidence shows !hat the Nawab of Rampur had probably given some oral order to get the private houe in which the plaintiff was C living vacated, and \"to give\" another house to him for residence.\n\nUnder cross-examination, the witness stated that, by using the -vord \"inteqal\" in the writing, he meant to convey that \"the plaintiff should leave that house and live in the house in dispute.\" This witness, who was not owner of the house, could not gift the house in dispute to the plaintiff.\n\nHe could o.nly \"give\" the house\n\nto the plaintiff in the sense that he could, under the Nawab's orders, obtain its allotment for the plaintiff. He said that its previous occupant, a mechanic, was also occupying it, without payment of any rent, with the Nawab's permission. The implication of such a statement could only be that the plaintiff had a similar permission. He did not depose that the Nawab had asked him to inform the plaintiff that the Nawab was making a gift of the house to the plaintiff. The witness stated that the house belonged to the Government of Rampur.\n\nAll this evidence is consistent with th~ view that the Nawab meant to do nothing more than to resolve the immediate difficulty of the plaintiff, by giving him some free residential accommodation in a house owned by the Government so that the plaintiff could clear up his F dues to his landlord, rather than with the conclusion that the Nawab intended to confer the ownership of the house on the plaintiff.\n\nIt is well established that a document must be read as a whole. In a document meant for a transfer of ownership, the purpose is generally stated clearly to be that the property given will be owned and possessed \\J.enceforth by the donee in such a way that he could use it or deal with it as he liked. The only 'karawai' or proceeding, to which a reference is made in the document. seemed to be \"allotment\" of accommodation or transfer of plaintiff's residence into another house, owned by the State, for which appropriate steps were to be taken. by a Government official. The communication savs, as translated, that the Executive Engineer (Buildings) had been informed that the house in question was to be \"allotted\" to the plaintiff. If the laintiff was to become its owner, that would have been commumcated to the\n\nExecutive Engineer.\n\nA transfer of ownership would, in the ordinary course, be expected to be evidenced by much more clear l!l)d unequivocal language.\n\nTl)e appropriate proceeding after a gift is that of mutation in Municipal records. No evidence was given of any mutation in a Municipal record showing transfer of ownership of the 'corp_us' for which the term 'milkiyat' is used.\n\nIt is true that, as the learned Judge observed, the word 'Inteqal' is used in connection with a transfer of property. This is so when it occurs in juxta-position wifu 'Jaidad'. _In lhe document before us, the following words indicate that transfer which the Nawab had in mind was that of the plaintiff himself to another residence in the physical s\"nse: \"Ap aj _hi us me muntaqil ho jayen.\" This mening is further emphasised by the use of the words \"sakunat ke waste\" (for residential purpose) which was the only stated object of the \"inteqal.\" Again, the word \"atta\" is used to denote all kinds of grants. The grant may be of a license or of ownership of property. The word \"atta\" could be used by a courtier, as a matter of form, to indicate anything granted by the Nawab whether it be mere permission to live in _ a house or something more.\n\nIf the intention of the Nawab was to grant ownership, the language used to communicate it would not have left it in doubt. - It is significant that the plaintiff, who stated in his evidence that the gift was meant to have been made \"in lieu of old services\", had not mentioned this object of the alleged donation in his plaint. It is also evident that he was not sure of his own rights or position because_ he took up an alternative case of a gift -of the right to live in the house for life. We do not find the word 'hibba' or gift used at all in this document. Nor is the word \"amree:' or any other similar word; which could connote a lifeestate, used in the document. There being no mention eit!ier of rights of ownership or those of a life-estate holder, the mere u; e of the words '.'inteqal\" and \"atta\" does not determine, as the learned Judge assumed, what was really meant to be granted or transferred. We think that oral and other evidence, besideS the document under consideration, was both necessary and admissible under ProViso (6) to Sec. 92 of the Indian Evidence Act to resolve a latent ambiguity caused by the two vague words used in it and to show how its language was related to _the existing facts even if one were to assume that the information contained in it was meant to reduce the. terms of a grant to the foi'In of writing.\n\nUpon the view we are taldng of the facts of this Cll$C, it is not necessary for us to embark on any detailed discussion of essentials\n\nU.P. STATE V. ABDUL JAL!L (Beg, !.) 347.\n\nof a gift under the Mahomedan law. It is enough to point out that even if the rules of Mahomedan law were to be applied to the transaction before us the very first of the three conditions of a valid gift, given in Mulla's 'Principles of Mahomedan Law\"\n\n(16th Edn. p. 141) that of \"a declaration of gift by the donor\" -is lacking here. Such a declaration must indicate, with reasonabl1: clarity, what is really gifted. It is also not necessary for us to deal with the distinction between separable gifts of the 'corpus' und the 'usufruct', recognised by Mahomedan law, which references to Amjad Khan v. Ashraf Khan(<) and Nawa- ;, ish Ali Khan v. Ali Raza Khan(') would disclose.\n\nAfter an examination of all the admissible evidence, relating to the nature of the transaction set up by the plaintiff, which should have been ccnsidered, we are satisfied that the plaintiff failed to prove either a grant of the 'corpus' or of the 'usufruct' of the house to him for his life by its owner. The transaction before us would amount to nothing more than the grant of a license, revocable at the Grantor's option to reside in the house so long as the grantor allowed the licensee to do so. Such a grant is known as \"areeat\" in Mahomedan law (See: Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law, Sixteenth Edition, page 166). The tenns of the alleged grant, even if they are to be found only in the communication sent to . the plaintiff, are not, read in the context in which they occur, capable of raising an. inference of a larger grant. The mere expenditure of small sums o.f money over necessary repairs, alleged by the plaintiff, could not convert it into an irrevocable license.\n\nConsequently, we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court. We do not think that this is a fit case in which the appellant should get the costs of this litigation as the plaintiff had some grounds to be misled by the communication received by him.\n\nThe parties will, therefore, bear their own costs throughout.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n(I) A.l.R. 1929 P.C. p. 149. (2) A.l.R. 1948 P.C. r. 134.", "total_entities": 35, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF U", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 10, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAYED ABDUL JALIL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 32, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SAYED ABDUL JALIL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 1, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 49, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF U.P.\n\nSAYED ABDUL JALIL February 1, 1972\n\n[S. M .. S!KRI, C.J., A. N. RAY AND M. H: BEG, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H: BEG, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 325, "end_char": 330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1897, "end_char": 1902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. N. Diks/1it", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2913, "end_char": 2927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Diks/1it and 0."}}, {"text": "P. Ran.a", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2935, "end_char": 2943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Ran.a, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "E. C. Agrawala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2966, "end_char": 2980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E. C. Agrawala, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Beg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3063, "end_char": 3066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeg, J. There are two appeals by Special Leave before us, Leave, against the Judgment a.nd decree of a learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court allowing a plaintiff's se.cond appeal\n\nThe plaintiff's case was that the Governmeur of Rampur had given him a house \"under the orders of His Highness the Nawab of Rampur, passeq on 23rd June, 1945\"."}}, {"text": "Rampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3295, "end_char": 3301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeg, J. There are two appeals by Special Leave before us, Leave, against the Judgment a.nd decree of a learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court allowing a plaintiff's se.cond appeal\n\nThe plaintiff's case was that the Governmeur of Rampur had given him a house \"under the orders of His Highness the Nawab of Rampur, passeq on 23rd June, 1945\"."}}, {"text": "23rd June, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3389, "end_char": 3404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeg, J. There are two appeals by Special Leave before us, Leave, against the Judgment a.nd decree of a learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court allowing a plaintiff's se.cond appeal\n\nThe plaintiff's case was that the Governmeur of Rampur had given him a house \"under the orders of His Highness the Nawab of Rampur, passeq on 23rd June, 1945\"."}}, {"text": "Rampur State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3444, "end_char": 3456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that, after the merger of Rampur State in Uttar Pradesh in 1949, when Rampur became a district of Uttar Pradesh, this house was given by the Governme.nt of Uttar Pradesh to the Municipal Board of\n\nR&mpur, Defendant-Appellant, which c!emanded rent from the plaintiff by notice."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3460, "end_char": 3473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that, after the merger of Rampur State in Uttar Pradesh in 1949, when Rampur became a district of Uttar Pradesh, this house was given by the Governme.nt of Uttar Pradesh to the Municipal Board of\n\nR&mpur, Defendant-Appellant, which c!emanded rent from the plaintiff by notice."}}, {"text": "Municipal Board of\n\nR&mpur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3595, "end_char": 3621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that, after the merger of Rampur State in Uttar Pradesh in 1949, when Rampur became a district of Uttar Pradesh, this house was given by the Governme.nt of Uttar Pradesh to the Municipal Board of\n\nR&mpur, Defendant-Appellant, which c!emanded rent from the plaintiff by notice."}}, {"text": "23rd February, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3757, "end_char": 3776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the plaintiff's refusal to pay, the house was attached on 23rd February, 1955."}}, {"text": "26-10-56", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3861, "end_char": 3869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then filed his suit, on 26-10-56, for a declaration that he is the ownr in possession of the house, and, in the alternative, that he is a \"licensee\" entitled to remain in possession of the house for life without payment of rent. -"}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4089, "end_char": 4111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendants, the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Municipal Board of Rampur, and the Public Works Department at Rampur, ·\n\ndmed the alleged gift of either the ownership or of a life-intere!ll in the house to the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "Municipal Board of Rampur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4117, "end_char": 4142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendants, the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Municipal Board of Rampur, and the Public Works Department at Rampur, ·\n\ndmed the alleged gift of either the ownership or of a life-intere!ll in the house to the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "1-4-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4810, "end_char": 4818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10/- per month from 1-4-1953 to 30-1-1954\"."}}, {"text": "30-1-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4822, "end_char": 4831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10/- per month from 1-4-1953 to 30-1-1954\"."}}, {"text": "State of Rampur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4922, "end_char": 4937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "when the State of Rampur merged with the State of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5692, "end_char": 5712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court had, upon the plaintiff's second appeal, reversed the concurrent B findings of fact recorded by the Courts below because the learned Judge thought that \"the order of the Nawab of Rampur dated 23rd June 1945'', constituting a valid declaration of a gift, by the owner of the house, followed by the plaintiff's admitted actual possession of the house conferred ownership of the house upon the plaintiff-respondent according to Mahomedan law."}}, {"text": "Mahomedan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6138, "end_char": 6147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court had, upon the plaintiff's second appeal, reversed the concurrent B findings of fact recorded by the Courts below because the learned Judge thought that \"the order of the Nawab of Rampur dated 23rd June 1945'', constituting a valid declaration of a gift, by the owner of the house, followed by the plaintiff's admitted actual possession of the house conferred ownership of the house upon the plaintiff-respondent according to Mahomedan law.", "canonical_name": "Mahome- F dan Jaw"}}, {"text": "Mahomedan Jaw", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6773, "end_char": 6786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The questions arising before us for decision are : firstly, wbether the alleged gift is governed by Mahomedan Law; secondly, whether the requirements of Mahomedan Jaw for establishing a gift of the house or of its usufruct for life to the plaintiff could be E held to have been satisfied in this case; and, thirdly, whether nothing beyond the order of 23-6-1945 could be looked into to determine the Nawab's intention.", "canonical_name": "Mahome- F dan Jaw"}}, {"text": "23-6-1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6972, "end_char": 6981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The questions arising before us for decision are : firstly, wbether the alleged gift is governed by Mahomedan Law; secondly, whether the requirements of Mahomedan Jaw for establishing a gift of the house or of its usufruct for life to the plaintiff could be E held to have been satisfied in this case; and, thirdly, whether nothing beyond the order of 23-6-1945 could be looked into to determine the Nawab's intention."}}, {"text": "Mahome- F dan Jaw", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7151, "end_char": 7168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One could legitimately presume that a gift by the Nawab of Rampur, a Muslim, would be governed by the rules of Mahome- F dan Jaw if the Nawab was dealing with his own private property.", "canonical_name": "Mahome- F dan Jaw"}}, {"text": "Government of Rampur State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7366, "end_char": 7392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case before us, we find that the plaintiff himself has pleaded that he acquired his right and title to the house in dispute from the Government of Rampur State, although the action of the Governmerii was said to be \"under the orders dated June 23, 1945, of His Highness the Nawab of Rampur\"."}}, {"text": "June 23, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7472, "end_char": 7485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case before us, we find that the plaintiff himself has pleaded that he acquired his right and title to the house in dispute from the Government of Rampur State, although the action of the Governmerii was said to be \"under the orders dated June 23, 1945, of His Highness the Nawab of Rampur\"."}}, {"text": "Agha Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8418, "end_char": 8427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B The plaintiff himself had produced Agha Khan, the Assistant Military Secretary of the Nawab of Rampur, who had signed and sent the communication, set out above, to the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "Government of Rampur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9609, "end_char": 9629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness stated that the house belonged to the Government of Rampur."}}, {"text": "Sec. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13130, "end_char": 13137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13145, "end_char": 13164, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13824, "end_char": 13829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is enough to point out that even if the rules of Mahomedan law were to be applied to the transaction before us the very first of the three conditions of a valid gift, given in Mulla's 'Principles of Mahomedan Law\"\n\n(16th Edn."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_348_352_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "ANAL CHANDRA BANARJEE\n\nTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL February 2, 1972\n\n[J. M. SHELAT AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.]\n\nPreventive detention-Vagueness of ground--Omission to nzention locality where incident occurred--Or-Specify the group lvith which 1he petitioner came into clash-Petitioner prevented froni effectivel_v making representation-West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970.\n\nThe petitioner was detained under s. 3 (i) and (iii) of the West Beng:il (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970.\n\nThe first and the second ground of detention served on him mentioned two incidents of t\\left and throwing of bombs with intent to kill said to have been dommitted in the yard of Naibati Railway Station. The third and the last ground was that on January 13, 1971 between 12 and 12.20 hrs. the petitioner along with\n\nhis associates \"being armed with bombs, swoh:ls, lathis, etc. entered in a clash with another group with a view to kill them\" and that bis \"violent activities cre.ated a serious panic in the Ststion area ruid disturbed public ordel'.\" The petitioner contended, inter alia that ground No. 3 was vague and uncertain and was couched in such indefinite langll'!lge that it would be itppossible for the petitioner to effectively make a representation and therefore his detention was invalid.\n\nIn his representation the petitioner had merely denied all the three grounds and maintai.ned toot he had no concern with any of the three incidents alleged in the grounds of detention.\n\nIn bis written arguments submitted to this Court the petitioner stated that the allegations in respect of all the grounds were made against him by the Naib:i.ti Railway Police and that they were false. In the reply affidavit. of the state the averment for the first time made was that the alleged incident in ground No. 3 took place not in Naibati Railway Station area but at another railway station.\n\nAllowing the petition,\n\nHELD : (I) Ground No. 3 is vague by reason of its om1Ss1on to mention the locality. It is clear that the petitioner was under the impression, in the absence of the place or the locality where the incident was\n\nsaid to have taken place having been mentioned, tht the said incident had taken place either in Naibati Railway Station or the area under the jurisdiction of Naibati police. Therefore, apart from ground No. 3 beina vague by reason of its omission to mention the locality, there was in the context of the other two grounds a likclthood of the petitloneir being under G a wrong impression that •<!'Ording to the District Magistrate the incident there alleged had taken place in the Naibati Railway Station area. That being so, the omilision to mention the IOC21ity prevented. the petitioner from effectively making a representation. [352 DJ\n\n(2) Tlie omission to specify the group with whom the petitioner and his a5sociates came into clash also renders that ground vague and indefinite, resulting once again in disabling the petitioner from effectively making H a representation. [352 BJ\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 274 of 1971.\n\nA. c. BANERJEE v. WEST BENGAL (She/at, J.) ~49\n\nUnder f\\rticle 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus.\n\nN. N. Goswami, for the petitioner.\n\nD. N. Mukherjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment or the Court was delivered by\n\nShela!, J. The order of detention, dated April 7, 1971, passed a, llainst the petitioner horein and in pursuance of which the petitioner was arrested and detained in jail the next day, recites that it was passed under sec .. ( 1) and (3) of the West Bengal (Prevention -of Violent Acilvitj_es) Act, President's Act 19 of 1970, !he ground for which was' tlfa~ the District Magisll'll'te, 24 Parganas, who Jl\\ISSed it, was satisfied that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to prevent him fromacting in a manner · i:>rejudicial to the maintenance of public order.\n\nThe grounds of detention sel'Vect on him at the time of his arrest narrated three incidents in which he was said to have been involved.\n\nThe first ground was that on November 13, 1970 he, together with some others, committed theft of copper traction wire from a wagon lying in Naihati South Yard, and that when the railway police and the railway protection force on duty rushed at the spot, the petitioner and his associates threw '-bombs at them, with intent to kill them.\n\nThe second ground was that on December 23, 1970, the petitioner and his associates were removing 29 pieces of rail from the same railway yard and when the members of the railway protection force attempted to stop them frogi doing so, the petitioner ljnd his said associates threw bombs at them with intent to kill tllem. The third and the las! grourid was as follows :\n\n''That oil 13-1-71 in . between 12.00 and 12.20 hours, you alon11; with your associaties being armed with bombs, swords, lathis, etc. entered in a clash with another E!OUP with a view to kill them. Your violent aotlvities created a serious panic in the station area and disturbed the public order.\"\n\nFro~ ilie Dym Dum Central 1 ail where the petitioner was det$ed he made a representation, dated April 29, 1971, to the State Government. That representation together with the record of the case was placed before the Advisory Boatd, who it appears,\n\nalso heard the petitioner in person. 'l)o representation, dated April 29, 1971 was in oneral terms .in which the petitioner denied the said grounds alleged against himi and maintained that ho was a law 'abidin11; citir.en who never indulged in activities of the kin~~Red a11; ainst him. The Board, after sldering the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 s.c.R.\n\nsaid represe11tation, the said record of <the case and after hearing him, as aforesaid, reported that there was, in its opinion, sufficient cause for his deten1ion. It seems that thereupon 1the Government confirmed the said detention order and directed continuation of bis detention thereunder. So far there does not appear to be any difficulty as all the steps following the petitioner's arrest appear to have been taken by the detaining authority in compliance with the provisions of the Act.\n\nBut two questions have been raised before us on behalf of the petitioner.\n\nThe first was raised by the petitioner himself in the written arguments submitted by him to this Court from jail and the second was raised by his counsel during the course of the hearing of the petition.\n\nThe point raised by the petitioner was in regard to ground No. 2 in the grounds of detention in which it wa~ alleged that the petitioner participated in the incident said to have iaken place on December 23, 1970.\n\nThe petitioner's allegation was that on January I, 1971 the Naihati G.R.P. police appeared beJore the Magistrate, Sealdah, stating that the petiiioner was arrested in a police case referred to as Naihati G.R.P.\n\nCase No. 11, dated November 23, 1970 under secs. 148, 379 and 307 o( !he Penal Code and sec. 6 ( 3) of the Explosive Substances Act, but that the Magistrate, a(ter considering the facts and circumstances of the case, released him on bail.\n\nThat case, according to the petitioner was still pending. The contention was that the authorities, having elected to institu'te proceedings against him under the Code of Criminal Procedure, could not, while those proceedinl1)S were s!ill pending, also fake parallel p, roceedings under the present Act thereby placing, firstly, the petitioner under a double jeopardy, and secondly, conducting investigation in that case witho\\!.t that investigation being under the courts supervision and control. The argument was that if the petitioner were to kept under preventive detention under the present Act it would not be necessary as it would otherwise ~. for the police to ask for remand orders and produce the petrtioner before the Magistrate whenever such orders were prayed for.\n\nThe detention order and the detention thereunder, it was argued, were on the aforesaid two grounds invalid,\n\nThe second conten1ion concerned the third ground of the grounds of detention and related to the alleged incident, dated January 13, 1971, when the petitioner and his associates who were armed with bombs, swords, Iathis etc. were said to have clashed wrth another group. In the written arguments submitted by the petitioner from jail, the petitioner made a general denial stating that, if such an incident had occurred and he had been involved in it the police were bound to file a case against him but that no such case was filed which indicated that he had nothing to do with -tl)e alleged incident, and had been falsely involved\n\nA. C. BANARJEE V. WEST BENGAL (She/at, /.) ' 351\n\nin it. Counsel appearing for him raised another point, and that was that ground No. 3 was vague and uncertain and was couched in such iµdefipite language that it would be impossible for the\n\npetitioner to eff.ectively make a representation.\n\nWe prl)Ceed to consider •this contention first bc:cause in the view we take concerning it it would not be necessary for us to go into the contention regarding ground No. 2 of the grounds of detention.\n\nGround No. 3, no doubt, specifies the date and the time when the incident alleged therein was said to have taken place.\n\nIt also alleges that the petitioner and his associates were armed during the alleged incident with weapons such as bombs, swords, lathis etc., and that they had a clash \"with another group\", and that incident \"created a serious panic in the sta!ion area\".\n\nThe ground does not state what the authority meant by \"another group\", nor does it s!ate in which \"station area\" the said alleged incident was said to have taken place resulting in panic.\n\nIt will be seen that the first and the second grounds mentioned two incidents of theft said to have been committed in the yard of the Naib, ati railway siation. The question is, ill Jhe absence of any particulars as to the place where the incidenf .alleged in in the !hird ground took place, what would the expression \"station area\" mean to the petitioner, and whether the petitioner would not get the impression that the District Magistrate meant thereby Naihati railway station or Naihati police station area.\n\nIn his representation, the petitioner merely denied all the three grounds and maintained that he had no concern with any of the three incidents alleged in the grounds of detention. In his written arguments submitted to this Court he, firstly, denied having anything to do with the incident of January 13, 1971 a, nd then proceeded to state that all those allegations were made falsely against him by the Naihati railway police, and that they were false because if the said alleged incidents had in fact occurred, the police were bound_ to launch proceedings against him.\n\nHe further asserted that at any rate, !he local police, that is, the Naihati police, were bound to make some record of them in the general diary maintained by the said police station. It is, thus, clear tha!\n\nthe petitioner was under the impression, in the absence of the place or the locality where the said incident was said to have taken place, according to the District Magistrate, either in Naihati railway Station or the area under the jurisdiction of Naiha'.i polk.~\n\nstation.\n\nH Such an impression, it appears, was likely because when read in the context of the first and the second grounds, the reader of the third ground in the absence of any particulars as regards the l0-L887 Sup Cl/72\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1972) 3 S.C.ll.\n\nlocality where the said allel!; ed incident took place, might well infer thait the locality there alleged must be Naihati railway station area.\n\nThat such was !he impression of the petitioner appears from the assertion made by him in para 6 of his writren argilments\n\nthat the allegations in respect of all the grounds were made against him by Naihati Railway police, and !hat those were false because neither they nor the Naihati Police made any reference to them in the l!; eneral diaries maintained by ithem, nor lodged any complaint against him. In para 7 of the affidavit in reply of the State, the avrment for the first time made was tha!I: the alleged incident of January 13, 1971 took place not in Naihati Railway Station area but at Palta Railway Station which resulted in \"panic in the said station area and disturbed public peace and tranquillity\".\n\nApart, thus, from ground No. 3 in the grounds of detention beinl!: vague by reason of its omissjon to mention the locality, there was in the context of the other two grounds a likelihood of the petitioner. beine; under a wro~ impression that according to\n\n!he District Magistrate the incident there alleged had taken place 0 in Naihati Railway Station area. That being so, it is obvious that the petitioner could not make a correct and proper representation which must mean that the omissio.n to mention the locality prevented him from effectively making a representation.\n\nThe omission to specify the group with whom the petitioner and his a_ssociates came into clash also renders fuat ground vague\n\nE . and indefinite, resulting once ag.ain in disabling the petitioner from efi'e!:tively making a representation. Suppose that the petitioner wan!ed to maintain that on January 13, 1971 he was never at or near Palta Railway Station or that the group with whom he was said to have clashed was his own group or was friendly with him, and therefore, there was no possibility of any such clash.\n\nHe could . not obviously have been able o do so in the absence 11 of particµlars about the locality and ithe name or description of the said 1troup.\n\nThe result of those Omissions being to prevent the petitioner from effectively making representation, his detention under the said order must be found to be invalid.\n\nThe petition, for the G reasons aforesaid, succeeds and is allowed.\n\nAccordingly we direct that the petitioner be released from jail and set at liberty\n\nforthwith.\n\nK.B.N.\n\nPetition allowed.", "total_entities": 30, "entities": [{"text": "ANAL CHANDRA BANARJEE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANAL CHANDRA BANARJEE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 2, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ANAL CHANDRA BANARJEE\n\nTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL February 2, 1972\n\n[J. M. SHELAT AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 340, "end_char": 365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 420, "end_char": 424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "statute": "Prevention of Violent Act"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 460, "end_char": 485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 13, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 751, "end_char": 767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third and the last ground was that on January 13, 1971 between 12 and 12.20 hrs."}}, {"text": "Naib:i.ti Railway Police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1646, "end_char": 1670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In bis written arguments submitted to this Court the petitioner stated that the allegations in respect of all the grounds were made against him by the Naib:i.ti Railway Police and that they were false."}}, {"text": "Naibati police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2289, "end_char": 2303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clear that the petitioner was under the impression, in the absence of the place or the locality where the incident was\n\nsaid to have taken place having been mentioned, tht the said incident had taken place either in Naibati Railway Station or the area under the jurisdiction of Naibati police."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3147, "end_char": 3168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. N. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3213, "end_char": 3226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. N. Goswami, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3249, "end_char": 3264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Mukherjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3269, "end_char": 3285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Mukherjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Shela", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3352, "end_char": 3357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment or the Court was delivered by\n\nShela!,"}}, {"text": "November 13, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4099, "end_char": 4116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first ground was that on November 13, 1970 he, together with some others, committed theft of copper traction wire from a wagon lying in Naihati South Yard, and that when the railway police and the railway protection force on duty rushed at the spot, the petitioner and his associates threw '-bombs at them, with intent to kill them."}}, {"text": "December 23, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4438, "end_char": 4455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second ground was that on December 23, 1970, the petitioner and his associates were removing 29 pieces of rail from the same railway yard and when the members of the railway protection force attempted to stop them frogi doing so, the petitioner ljnd his said associates threw bombs at them with intent to kill tllem."}}, {"text": "13-1-71", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4789, "end_char": 4796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "grourid was as follows :\n\n''That oil 13-1-71 in ."}}, {"text": "Naihati G.R.P. police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6734, "end_char": 6755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner's allegation was that on January I, 1971 the Naihati G.R.P. police appeared beJore the Magistrate, Sealdah, stating that the petiiioner was arrested in a police case referred to as Naihati G.R.P.\n\nCase No."}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6959, "end_char": 6969, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6974, "end_char": 6980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Explosive Substances Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6993, "end_char": 7017, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7288, "end_char": 7314, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "A. C. BANARJEE V. WEST BENGAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8645, "end_char": 8674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the written arguments submitted by the petitioner from jail, the petitioner made a general denial stating that, if such an incident had occurred and he had been involved in it the police were bound to file a case against him but that no such case was filed which indicated that he had nothing to do with -tl)e alleged incident, and had been falsely involved\n\nA. C. BANARJEE V. WEST BENGAL (She/at, /.) ' 351\n\nin it."}}, {"text": "Naihati railway police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10623, "end_char": 10645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his written arguments submitted to this Court he, firstly, denied having anything to do with the incident of January 13, 1971 a, nd then proceeded to state that all those allegations were made falsely against him by the Naihati railway police, and that they were false because if the said alleged incidents had in fact occurred, the police were bound_ to launch proceedings against him."}}, {"text": "Naihati police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10860, "end_char": 10874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he local police, that is, the Naihati police, were bound to make some record of them in the general diary maintained by the said police station."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1972) 3 S.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11490, "end_char": 11528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H Such an impression, it appears, was likely because when read in the context of the first and the second grounds, the reader of the third ground in the absence of any particulars as regards the l0-L887 Sup Cl/72\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1972) 3 S.C.ll."}}, {"text": "Naihati Railway police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11875, "end_char": 11897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he impression of the petitioner appears from the assertion made by him in para 6 of his writren argilments\n\nthat the allegations in respect of all the grounds were made against him by Naihati Railway police, and !"}}, {"text": "Naihati Police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11954, "end_char": 11968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hat those were false because neither they nor the Naihati Police made any reference to them in the l!;"}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_353_360_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, BHOPAL, M.P.\n\nMISBABUL HASAN & ORS.\n\nFebruary 12, 1972\n\n[S. M. Sum, C.J., A. N. RAY AND M. H. BEG, JJ.]\n\nMadhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956C-Ss. 432 and 433- Whether the Sti;.te Government can change the service conditions of the Corporation emp/uyees by framing rules without following the procedure laid down under the Act.\n\nThe respondent employee was appointed a Lower Division Clerk and after 5 years of service, the Administrator of the Municipal Corporation, purporting to carry out the orders of tht State Government, passed a general .order dated 21st December 1967, statin~ that the age of compulsory retirement of all servants Of the Corporation (other than Class IV servants) should be 55 years.\n\nThe respondent bad entered into service of the Municipal Board of Bhopal long ago.\n\nIn 1967, the Board became a Corporation under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Coryoration Act, 1956. As a result of the continuance of the service conditions of the employees of the former Municipal Board; the petitioner wss to retire t the age of 60 (by notifica tion dated 11th November, 1947), but in 1955, the Government of Bhopal by a Notification, applying the service regulations of Central Government employees, reduced the retiring age of the respondent to 58.\n\nUnder the Corporation Act of 1956, question relating to service conditions of the employees of the Corporation were to be regulated by bye-laws unde' S. 427 (1-C){b) of the Act and not by rules to be made by Government. The State Government by a Notification in 1967 further reduced the retirement age of all employees (except IV Grade employees) to 55 years.\n\nThe validity of the Order dated 21st December 1967 of .the Administrator was challenged by the respondent on the ground that the\n\nprocedure laid down by the Act for amending a bye-hw was not followed, 1 and the High Court accepting this contention quashed the Government Notification dated 22nd December 1967 as well as the general order reducing the age of retirement. On appeal, it was contended that the procedure laid down in S. 432 of the Corporation Act was not mandatory but was merely meant to give the Corporation concerned an opportunity of putting forward it• views by means of a' representation it may like to make with regard to any proposal to the Government to modify or repeal any bye-law so that the administrator, acting on behalf of the Corporation, could forego the right of, the Corporation to make any representation. The State, in its appeal contended that the rule making powers of the Government under S. 433 are very wide and the Government can make a rule if the Corporation foiled to make a bye-law. The view of the High Court that the matter did not fall under S. 433 of the Act waJ assailed. Dismiss ing the . appeals,\n\n, HELD : (I) The procedure laid down in S. 432 of the Act ls only applicable where there is an existing bye-law which appears to the Government to stand in need of modification or repeal wholly or in part.\n\nTherefore, the impugned notification does not fall under S. 432 of the Act.\n\n!358 GJ\n\n(2) Assuming that the impugned notification purported to publish a rule made under S. 433 of the Act, the condition precedent of previous publication in the Gazette for an amendment of a rule, laid down by S .. 24 of the Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act 1957 had not been followed in the present case. Therefore no valid alteration in the ege of retirement of the employee-respondent was made in accordance with law. The impugned notification is bad and quashed. (359 C, 360 DJ ..\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C.A. Nos. 2004 of 1970 and 319 of 1971.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the judgment and order dated the August 26, 1970 of the Madhya Ptadesh High Court in Miscellaneous Petition No. 302 of 1968.\n\nC. K. Daphtary and Rameshwar Nath, for the Appellant (in C.A. No. 2004 of 1970).\n\n1. N. Shroff, for the Appeliant (in C.A. No. 319 of 1971).\n\nS. K. Gambhir, for Respondent No. 1 (in both the Appeals).\n\nRameshwar Nath, for Respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 319 of 1971).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBe&, J, The.r~ ar!' two appeal.s by gpecial Leave before us, one by the Mumc1pal Corporation, Bhopal, and another by the E State of Madhya Pradesh, against the Judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court allowing a Writ Petition filed by the Respondent employee of the Bhopal Municipal Corporation (hereinafter called the 'Corporation').\n\nThe employee's case was : He was born on 1st July, 1912, appointed a Lower Division Clerk in April, 1962, promoted as a . F Upper Division Clerk in February, 1964. . A general order dated 21 December, 1967, (Annexure 'A') had been passed by the Administrator, Municipal Corporation, purporting to carry out the orders of the Government of Madhya Pradesh which had decided that the age of compulsory retirement of all servants of the Corporation, other than Class IV servants, should be 55 years.\n\nG The employee was informed of it by a communication dated 22nd December, 1967, (Annexure B). The Municipal Corporation of Bhopal, which was formerly only a Municipal Council, became a Corporation when provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (!J.ereinafter referred to as 'the Act') were applied to it from 2Sth August, 1967, by an ordinance the pro- H visions of which were the.n embodied in an Act.\n\nAlthough the Petitioner had entered service of the Municipal Board of Bhopal, as a result of the continuance of the service conditions of the\n\nA employees of the former Municipal Board, which had thus bee come a Corporation, !he petitioning employee was to retire at the age of 60 as laid down in Notification No. 30 of 11* November 1947 (Anµexure C). But, in 1955, when Bhopal was a Part 'C', State, the Government of Bhopal had issued a notification dated 4th February 1955 applying the service regu- B latioiis of Central CJ!>vernment employees in Part 'C' States. In this way, the petitioning employee's correct age of retirement was\n\n58. Under the Act of .1956, questions relating to service conditions of the employees of the Corporation were to be regulated by bye-laws under Seciion 427(1-C)(b) of the Act and not by rules to !le made by the Governmei; it.\n\nThe Government of Madhya Pradesh had, however, issued a Notification in the Gazette of 22nd December, 1967, purporting to reduce the age c\n\nof retirement of firs! and second and third grade employees from 60 years to 55 years by amending the Government Notification No. 30 dated 11th November 1947.\n\nIt was not clear to the petitioning employee whether the orders of 21st December, 1967, were in pursuance of any Gazette Notification or whether they have been passed after a proper amendment of their bye-laws in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 432 of the Act. In any case, the validity of the order of 2 lst December, 1967, was challenged.\n\nThe Judnt under appeal shows that it was argued on behalf of the petitioning employee that the procedure laid down by the Aet for amending a bye-law was not . followed.\n\nThe Madhya Pradesh High Court had accepted this contention and rejected the argument, put forward on tiehalf of the Corporation and its Administrator, that the amendment in question was governed by the provisions of Section 433 of the Act. It had, therefore, quashed the Notification dated 22nd December, 1967, which purported to have been made in exercise of pawers vested in the Government under Section 432 of the Act, as well as an order dated 30th\"December, 1967, (Annexure R-1), the relevant part of which reads as follows :-\n\n\"In pursuance of the Notification No. 10678/ 4251/XVIlI-U-II, dated the 22/12/67, Shri Misbahul Hasan, UDC Account Section, who has attained the age of compulsory retirement, is hereby sanctioned 120 days Earned Leave w.e.f. 1/1/1968 as Jeavo Preparatory to retirement.\n\nHe will stand retired w.e.f. l/5/1968 on expiry of the leave sanctioned to him, stated above\".\n\nMr. Daphtary, appearing on behalf of the Corporation Appellant, has contended tat the procedure laid down In Section 432\n\nof the Act was merely meant to give the Corporation concerned A an opporturiity of putting forward its yiews by means of any representation it may like to make with regard to any proposal of the Government to modify or repeal any bye-law. The learned Counsel submitted that, as the Corporation had no objection whatsoever to the amendment of the age of retirement of Class I and II and III ernPloyees, it was not open to the petitioning em- 8 ployee to raise any objection on the ground that the prescribed procedure had not been followed.\n\nThis argument proceeds on the assumption that there was already a bye-law regulating the age of retirement of employees of Clf!SSes I, II, and III of the Corporation, and that the Government was purporting to follow the procedure laid down by Section 432 of the Act in amending c that bye-law.\n\nWe may here reproduce the provisions of Section 432 of the Act which run as follows :\n\n\"432. Government may modify or repeal byelaws.-\n\n(1)\n\n(2)\n\n(3)\n\nIf it shall at any time appear to die Government\n\nthat any bye-law should be modified or repealed either wholly or in part, it shall cause its reasons for such opinion to be communicated to the Corporation and prescri\\!e a reasonable period within which the Corporation may make any representation with regard thereto which it shall think fit..\n\nAfter receipt and consideration of any such representation or, if in the meantime no such representation is received, after the expiry of the prescribed period, the Government may at any time by notification in the Gazette, modify or repeal such bye-law either wholly or in part.\n\nThe modification or repeal of a bye-law under sub-section (2) shall take effect from such date as the Government shall in !he said notification direct or, if no such date is specified, from the date of the publication of the said notification in the.\n\nGazette, except as to anything done or suffered or omitted to be done before such date\".\n\nIt is admitted by both sides that, at the relevant time, the powers of the Corporation were vested in the Adminisrator under the provisions of Section 43 2 sub-s (1) of the Act.\n\nThe only question, according to the Corporation, is whether the Adminis- 8 trator, acting as the Corporation, should not forego the right of the Corporation to make any representation with regard to a\n\nproposal of the Government to amend a bye-law. In other words, the modification or amendment of a bye-law under Section\n\n432 of the Act was a matter of concern only to the Government and to the Corporation and to nobody else. If, therefore, there was any infringement of its technical procedural requirements, it was only for the Corporation and nobody else, according to this contention, to raise the objection.\n\nThe broad proposition put forward before us is tl_iat the requirements of a procedure intended for the benefit of a party could be dispensed with if that party itself chooses that t~_is should be done.\n\nIt is pointed out that the only object of the procedure provided by Section 432 was that the proposals of the Government may be duly considered by the Corporation so as to enable it to represent its views. There was no obligation upon the Corporation to make a representation. If the Corporation did not choose to make a representatiefn, after the Government had sent its reasons for its opinion to the Corporation and had asked for the representation within a prescribed period, the failure of the Corporation to make any representation would, far from depriving the Government of the power to issue a notification modifying .or repealing a bye-law\n\nwh91ly or in part in accordance with its opinion, enable it to do so. The mere order in which a proposal is made and assent to it is given by the Corporation, it was urged, should not make any difference a8 there was substantial compliance with prescribed procedure.\n\nIn the appeal filed on behalf of. the State of Madhya Pradesh, the main contention is that the rule making powers of the Govermnent under Section 433 of the Act are very wide so that the State could make rule \"for the purpose of carrying into effect the\n\nprovisions of the Act\". It is urged th_at the Act imposed a duty and conferred a power upon the Corporation to frame bye-laws relating to conditions of service of its employees as laid down in Section 427 (1-C) (b) of the Act.\n\nThe Government could make a rule if the Corporation failed to make bye-law on a subject. The correctness of the view of the High Court, that the matter did not fall within the purview of Section 433 of the Act, was assailed. ·\n\nAnother contention put forward on behalf of the State of Madhya· Pradesh was that the petitioning employee had not impleaded either the State or the Government of the Madhya Pradesh, so that a Notification of the State Government could not be .held void without impleading a necessary party.\n\nWe may observe here that this giound is not taken in the Special Leave Petition of the State of Madhya Pradesh by means of which its appeal has come up before us. No such objection was taken on behalf of the Corporation in the Special Leave Petition filed by\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1972] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nit.\n\nNor was any such argument advanced on behalf of tho A Corporation before the High Court.\n\nParagraph 12 of the Special Leave Petition filed on behalf of the Corporation discloses that the High Court had itself considered 1t necessary to hear the State Government. . It had, therefore, given time to the\n\nState Counsel, b:f. an order dated 16th April, 1970, to file a return to the petition of the employ~. But, the State Counsel B had neither filed any return nor put in any appearance. Thus, the State had obtained due opportunity to oppose the petition, but it had not chosen to do so.\n\nTherefore, we are unable to\n\nentain any such objection at this stage.\n\nAnother question attempted to be raised before us, by ihe learned Counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh, was based on C assertions which were neither made in the High Court by any party nor in this Court in the two Special Leave Petitions. the submission rests on materials said to exist on the records of the State Government which, it was stated, show that the proposal\n\nhad actually come from the Administrator himself, that the particular amendment sought be made by the Government. If this p was the correct position, the State Counsel should have appeared before the High Court and placed the whole record before the Court so that the facts which had a material bearing on the question, whether the procedure laid down by Section 432 of the Act had been followed in substance or spirit or not, may be gone into and decided.\n\nE The High Court had proceeded on the assumption that tJi.e procedure laid down in Section 432 of the Act was applicable.\n\nLearned Counsel for the Corporatio, Q also made his submllai.oD primarily on that assumption. If that procedure had been really applicable, we think that the question whether the object of that procedure had been served and whether rthe Corporation could r forego its rit to make a representation or not would have deserved scnous consideration provided it was supPortecl by vice which disclosed that there was substantial compliance with Section 432 of tho Act.\n\nAfter having heard Counsel for both sides, we .are unable to hold that this is a case governed by the procedure lai!i down 0 in Section ii32 of the Act at all. That procedure is only applicable where there is an existing bye.law which appears to the Govern ment to stand in need of modification or repeal wholly or in part.\n\nJt is only then that tho Government had to cause its reasons for entertaining the opinion that the bye-law in question should be modified or repealed, to be communicated to the Corporation. 8 We are not at 8.11 satisfied about tho exact position of the Allan No. 30 of 1947. It has not been shown to us, by references to\n\nthe relevant records and provisions, that this Allan could be\n\nA deemed to be a bye-law as contemplated by the Act. I\\ seems\n\nthat the Corporation was aware of this defect because the main argument on behalf of the Corporation itself before the High Court was that it was a rule made by the Government and noL that Section 432 was applicable and substantially complied with. And, the main argument on behalf of the State Government before us B now also is that the impugned notification is covered by Section 433 of the Act. In view of Section 427 ( 1-C) (b) of the Act,. the High <:; ourt had held that, having regard to the specific provisions on the subject, the general rule making power under Section 433 of the Act was inapplicable to the subject-maller.\n\nC Assuming, however, <that the modification of the age of retirement could be made bya rule made under Seclion 433 cf the Act and not me!,'..ely by a bye-law, as contemplated by the Act, we find thail a condition precedent for an amendment of a rule has not been followed here. Section 433 of the Act enacts : \"The State Government may after previous publication in the \"Gazette make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this D Act''. Section 24 of the Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1957, lays down:\n\n\"24. Provisions applicable to making of. rules or bye-laws, c:tc., after previous publication.- 0Where, by\n\nany Madhya Pradesh Act, a power to make rules or bye-laws is expressed to be given subject to the condition or the rules or bye-laws being made after previous publication, then the following provisio11s shall apply, namely:-\n\n(a) the authority having power to make the rules or bye-laws shall, before making them, publish a draft of the proposed rules or bye-laws for the in• formation of persons likely to be affected thtreby;\n\n(b) The publication shall be made in such manner as\n\n(c)\n\n(d)\n\nthat authority deems to be sufficient, or if the condition with respect to previous publication so requires, in such manner as the Government prescribes;\n\nthere shall be published with the draft a notice\n\nspecifying a date on or after which the draft will be taken \"into consideration;\n\nthe authority having power to make the rules or\n\nbye-laws; and where the rules or bye-laws are to be made with the sanction, approval or concurrence\n\no! another authority, tht authority also &\\1all consider any ob.lectfon or sugge&tion which may be\n\nreived by the authority having power to make the rules or bye-laws from any person with respect !o the draft before the date so specified;\n\n( e) the publication in the Official Gazette of a rule or\n\nbye-law purporting to have been made in exercise of a power to make rules or bye-laws after previous J publication shall be conclusive proof that the rule or bye-law has .been duly made\".\n\nThe legislative procedure envisaged by Section 24, set out above, is in consonance with notions of justice and fair play as it would enable persons likely to be affected to be infom1ed so tliat C they may take such steps as may be open to them to have the wisdom of a proposal duly debated and considered before it becomes law.\n\nThis mandatory procedure was not. sho,1h1 to have been complied with here.\n\nThe result is that we are unable to hold, on the material on record, that a valid alteration in the age of retiremnt of the em- D ployec respondent was made in accordance with law. The }ligh Court had 11ot expressed any opinion on the question wliether the contenlion of the employee-respondent, that his age of retirement was the one laid down as 58 for Central Government employees, was correct. As no contention had been advanced on this question before us and none seems to have been advanced on it before the High Court, we refrain from dealing with it. .E\n\nThe result is that both these appeals must fail and are hereby dismissed with one set of costs.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 74, "entities": [{"text": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, BHOPAL, M", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 32, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, BHOPAL, M.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MISBABUL HASAN & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MISBAHUL HASAN & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 12, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 77, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 12, 1972\n\n[S. M. Sum, C.J., A. N. RAY AND M. H. BEG, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ss. 432 and 433", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 176, "end_char": 191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Municipal Board of Bhopal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 791, "end_char": 816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent bad entered into service of the Municipal Board of Bhopal long ago."}}, {"text": "Board became a Corporation under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Coryoration Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 841, "end_char": 924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "11th November, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1100, "end_char": 1119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of the continuance of the service conditions of the employees of the former Municipal Board; the petitioner wss to retire t the age of 60 (by notifica tion dated 11th November, 1947), but in 1955, the Government of Bhopal by a Notification, applying the service regulations of Central Government employees, reduced the retiring age of the respondent to 58."}}, {"text": "Government of Bhopal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1139, "end_char": 1159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of the continuance of the service conditions of the employees of the former Municipal Board; the petitioner wss to retire t the age of 60 (by notifica tion dated 11th November, 1947), but in 1955, the Government of Bhopal by a Notification, applying the service regulations of Central Government employees, reduced the retiring age of the respondent to 58."}}, {"text": "S. 427", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1446, "end_char": 1452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Board became a Corporation under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Coryoration Act, 1956", "statute": "the Board became a Corporation under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Coryoration Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "21st December 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1689, "end_char": 1707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The validity of the Order dated 21st December 1967 of .the Administrator was challenged by the respondent on the ground that the\n\nprocedure laid down by the Act for amending a bye-hw was not followed, 1 and the High Court accepting this contention quashed the Government Notification dated 22nd December 1967 as well as the general order reducing the age of retirement."}}, {"text": "22nd December 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1947, "end_char": 1965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The validity of the Order dated 21st December 1967 of .the Administrator was challenged by the respondent on the ground that the\n\nprocedure laid down by the Act for amending a bye-hw was not followed, 1 and the High Court accepting this contention quashed the Government Notification dated 22nd December 1967 as well as the general order reducing the age of retirement."}}, {"text": "S. 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2087, "end_char": 2093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 433", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2584, "end_char": 2590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 433", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2747, "end_char": 2753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2847, "end_char": 2853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3071, "end_char": 3077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 433", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3183, "end_char": 3189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3321, "end_char": 3360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Madhya Ptadesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3739, "end_char": 3764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by Special Leave from the judgment and order dated the August 26, 1970 of the Madhya Ptadesh High Court in Miscellaneous Petition No."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3809, "end_char": 3823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary and Rameshwar Nath, for the Appellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3828, "end_char": 3842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary and Rameshwar Nath, for the Appellant (in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "Rameshwar Nath"}}, {"text": "N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3894, "end_char": 3903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Shroff, for the Appeliant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "S. K. Gambhir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3951, "end_char": 3964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Gambhir, for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4011, "end_char": 4025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rameshwar Nath, for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Rameshwar Nath"}}, {"text": "Bhopal Municipal Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4417, "end_char": 4445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "two appeal.s by gpecial Leave before us, one by the Mumc1pal Corporation, Bhopal, and another by the E State of Madhya Pradesh, against the Judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court allowing a Writ Petition filed by the Respondent employee of the Bhopal Municipal Corporation (hereinafter called the 'Corporation')."}}, {"text": "1st July, 1912", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4528, "end_char": 4542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The employee's case was : He was born on 1st July, 1912, appointed a Lower Division Clerk in April, 1962, promoted as a ."}}, {"text": "21 December, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4675, "end_char": 4692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A general order dated 21 December, 1967, (Annexure 'A') had been passed by the Administrator, Municipal Corporation, purporting to carry out the orders of the Government of Madhya Pradesh which had decided that the age of compulsory retirement of all servants of the Corporation, other than Class IV servants, should be 55 years."}}, {"text": "Government of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4812, "end_char": 4840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A general order dated 21 December, 1967, (Annexure 'A') had been passed by the Administrator, Municipal Corporation, purporting to carry out the orders of the Government of Madhya Pradesh which had decided that the age of compulsory retirement of all servants of the Corporation, other than Class IV servants, should be 55 years."}}, {"text": "22nd December, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5043, "end_char": 5062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G The employee was informed of it by a communication dated 22nd December, 1967, (Annexure B)."}}, {"text": "Municipal Corporation of Bhopal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5082, "end_char": 5113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Municipal Corporation of Bhopal, which was formerly only a Municipal Council, became a Corporation when provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (!"}}, {"text": "Corporation when provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5169, "end_char": 5250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "2Sth August, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5316, "end_char": 5333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.ereinafter referred to as 'the Act') were applied to it from 2Sth August, 1967, by an ordinance the pro- H visions of which were the.n embodied in an Act."}}, {"text": "Bhopal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5782, "end_char": 5788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, in 1955, when Bhopal was a Part 'C', State, the Government of Bhopal had issued a notification dated 4th February 1955 applying the service regu- B latioiis of Central CJ!>vernment employees in Part 'C' States."}}, {"text": "4th February 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5869, "end_char": 5886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, in 1955, when Bhopal was a Part 'C', State, the Government of Bhopal had issued a notification dated 4th February 1955 applying the service regu- B latioiis of Central CJ!>vernment employees in Part 'C' States."}}, {"text": "11th November 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6556, "end_char": 6574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "30 dated 11th November 1947."}}, {"text": "21st December, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6644, "end_char": 6663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was not clear to the petitioning employee whether the orders of 21st December, 1967, were in pursuance of any Gazette Notification or whether they have been passed after a proper amendment of their bye-laws in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 432 of the Act."}}, {"text": "Section 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6833, "end_char": 6844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "2 lst December, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6899, "end_char": 6919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In any case, the validity of the order of 2 lst December, 1967, was challenged."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7112, "end_char": 7137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madhya Pradesh High Court had accepted this contention and rejected the argument, put forward on tiehalf of the Corporation and its Administrator, that the amendment in question was governed by the provisions of Section 433 of the Act."}}, {"text": "Section 433", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7324, "end_char": 7335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7506, "end_char": 7517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Misbahul Hasan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7728, "end_char": 7742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10678/ 4251/XVIlI-U-II, dated the 22/12/67, Shri Misbahul Hasan, UDC Account Section, who has attained the age of compulsory retirement, is hereby sanctioned 120 days Earned Leave w.e.f."}}, {"text": "Daphtary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8012, "end_char": 8020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Daphtary, appearing on behalf of the Corporation Appellant, has contended tat the procedure laid down In Section 432\n\nof the Act was merely meant to give the Corporation concerned A an opporturiity of putting forward its yiews by means of any representation it may like to make with regard to any proposal of the Government to modify or repeal any bye-law."}}, {"text": "Section 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8117, "end_char": 8128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8914, "end_char": 8925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9006, "end_char": 9017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10229, "end_char": 10239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10579, "end_char": 10591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11152, "end_char": 11163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12041, "end_char": 12064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the State of Madhya Pradesh, the main contention is that the rule making powers of the Govermnent under Section 433 of the Act are very wide so that the State could make rule \"for the purpose of carrying into effect the\n\nprovisions of the Act\"."}}, {"text": "Section 433", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12141, "end_char": 12152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 427", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12451, "end_char": 12462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 433", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12673, "end_char": 12684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madhya· Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12762, "end_char": 12786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another contention put forward on behalf of the State of Madhya· Pradesh was that the petitioning employee had not impleaded either the State or the Government of the Madhya Pradesh, so that a Notification of the State Government could not be .held void without impleading a necessary party."}}, {"text": "Government of the Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12863, "end_char": 12895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another contention put forward on behalf of the State of Madhya· Pradesh was that the petitioning employee had not impleaded either the State or the Government of the Madhya Pradesh, so that a Notification of the State Government could not be .held void without impleading a necessary party."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1972] 3 S.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13267, "end_char": 13304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No such objection was taken on behalf of the Corporation in the Special Leave Petition filed by\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1972] 3 S.C.ll."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14053, "end_char": 14076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another question attempted to be raised before us, by ihe learned Counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh, was based on C assertions which were neither made in the High Court by any party nor in this Court in the two Special Leave Petitions."}}, {"text": "Section 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14701, "end_char": 14712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14887, "end_char": 14898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15366, "end_char": 15377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "deemed to be a bye-law as contemplated by the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16103, "end_char": 16152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16353, "end_char": 16364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Allan could be\n\nA deemed to be a bye-law as contemplated by the Act", "statute": "Allan could be\n\nA deemed to be a bye-law as contemplated by the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 433", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16539, "end_char": 16550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Allan could be\n\nA deemed to be a bye-law as contemplated by the Act", "statute": "Allan could be\n\nA deemed to be a bye-law as contemplated by the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 427", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16574, "end_char": 16585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Allan could be\n\nA deemed to be a bye-law as contemplated by the Act", "statute": "Allan could be\n\nA deemed to be a bye-law as contemplated by the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 433", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16736, "end_char": 16747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Allan could be\n\nA deemed to be a bye-law as contemplated by the Act", "statute": "Allan could be\n\nA deemed to be a bye-law as contemplated by the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 433", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17078, "end_char": 17089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Allan could be\n\nA deemed to be a bye-law as contemplated by the Act", "statute": "Allan could be\n\nA deemed to be a bye-law as contemplated by the Act"}}, {"text": "Gazette make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this D Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17171, "end_char": 17258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17262, "end_char": 17272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gazette make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this D Act", "statute": "Gazette make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this D Act"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17280, "end_char": 17320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17446, "end_char": 17464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18898, "end_char": 18908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_361_378_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "N. E. HORO\n\nJAllAN ARA JAIPAL SINGH February 2, 1972\n\n[A. N. GROVER AND M. H. BEG, JJ.]\n\nRepresentation of the People Act (43 of 1951), s. 123(2) and (7)- Scope of.\n\nCustomary Law-Mundas-Marriage between Munda male and a non-- Munda-Whether wife becomes a Munda.\n\nThe respondent, who was a Tamil by birth and Christian by religion, had married a member of the Munda Schedule Tribe in the State of Bihar.\n\nOn the death of her husbwd, who was 1l member of the Lok Sabha, she stood for election from a Parliamentary (Schedule Tribe) Constituencr\n\nin the State. Another candidate B filed objections to her nomination that she was not a Munda and her nomination was rejected by the Retumin& Officer, nd the appellant was elected. She filed an Election Petition for\n\nsettin~ aside the election of the appellant.\n\nShe alleged that according to the Munda Customary Law when a Munda male married outside the tribe, if his marriag-c was '3Ccepted by the tribe, he continued to be a member of the tribe and his wife also acquired. its membership,. and so, she became a Munda. In the petition it was also stated that while hearing B's objections the Returning Officer allowed irrelewnt personal aspersiol!S to be cast against her and that the Returning Officer had been influenced by B.\n\nThe High Court allowed the petition.\n\nDismissing the appeal to this Court, on the questions: (1) Whether B was a necessary party to the Election Petition; (2) Whether the marriage of the respondent, who was a divorcee, was a nullity under s. S7 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, in that she married her Munda husband within six months from the date of the decree being' made absoltite; and\n\n(3) Whether the petitioner became member of the Munda Tribe,\n\nHELD: (1) According to s. 82(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, a petitioner must join as a respondent any C3Ddidate against whom . allegations of any corrupt practices are made in the elec· tion petition.\n\nSection 123 deals with corrupt practices.\n\nThe essential ingredient of s. 123(7) on which reliance was placed, is to obtain, procure etc. by a candidate of any assistance (other than the giving of a vote) for the furtherance of .the prospects of that candidate's election from any\n\nperson in the service of the Government and belonging to the classes mentioned in the sub-section. In the present case, there was \"bsolutely no allegation or suggestion that the Returning Officer was influenced by B for the purpose of rendering assistance for the furtherance of the prospects of a candidate's election. The influence, mentioned i~ the elec\n\ntion petition, had reference only to the conduct of the Returnmg Officer is allowing personal aspersions to be cast o:1gaist the l'!; sponden~. , The allegations do not also amount to any suggestion of d!rect or 1direct interference or attempt to interfere on the part of a t'llndidate with the free exercise of .. ny electoral right, aud hence, do not amount to .undue influence under s. 123(2). Therefore, since there was no allegation of any corrupt practice against B he was not a neces; ary party. [366 D-H;\n\n368 A-GI\n\n2 The .respondent had contracted, a marriage with a member of the :Mud~ Tribe acord1ng to Munda ntes and ceremonies and not as one\n\n<:h~1st1an marrym!! another Christian.\n\nIn the absen~ of any pleadings -0r issues or mate.rial o~ record to show that in view of the provision, of s. 57 f the Indian Divorce Act there could not be a valid mahiage '3ccord1ng to Munda customary law, such a contention could not be allowed to be agitated for the fust time in this Court. [369 D-0]\n\n3(i) The information contained in authoritative books dealing with Muda CUstolllary Law and the evidence of witnesses who had made special research m the matter, show that: (a) The Mundas are endogamous and intermarriage with non-Mundas is normally prohibited; (b) A Munda male along with his family, on marrying a non-Munda girl, is often ex-communicated or outcasted; ( c) the rule of endo113my is, however, not so rigid that a Munda cannot marry a non-Munda even after\n\npeforming. special ceremonies; ( d) Such maitiages have been and are being sanctioned by Par ha Panchayat, and ( e) Where a Munda male and his family are outcasted for marrying a non-Munda they are re-admitted to the tribe after certain special ceremonies are performed. I376 C-F]\n\nIn the present case. there is no evidence that the deceased husband of the respondent w.is ex-communidated or outcasted because he had married a non-Munda; on the contrary, the evidence is that the rule of endogamy has not been observed in a rigid or strict form, and that the marriage was accepted as valid and was \"pproved by the Parha Panchayat and the elders of the Tribe. Once the mW\"iage of a Munda male with a non-Munda female is approved or sanctioned by Parha Panchayat they become members Of the community. The contention that a person can be a Munda by birth alone can be sustained only if the custom of endogamy is established without any exception. [377 A-DJ\n\n(ii) Munda is one of the specified tribes or trilnl communities in the Schedule to the Constitution (Schedule Tribes) Order 1952.\n\nThe term \"\"'tribal community' is of wider connotation than the expression 'tribe'. A person who, according to the strict custom of a tribe, cannot be regarded as a member of that tribe may be regarded as a member of that trJbal community.\n\nWhere a non-Munda woman is married to a Munda male and the marriage is approyed and sanctioned by the Pahra Panchayat of that tribe, and the marrige is va1id, she may noj, on the oassumption that the rule of endogamy prevails, become a member of the Munda tribe in 'the strict sense as not having been born in the tribe.\n\nBut a marriage between a Hinduised Munda '!Ind a Munda converted to Christianity is permitted.\n\nThat being so, the wife canngt be excluded from the -larger group, namely, the tribal community.\n\nIn the present case the respondent's marriage with a Munda ma]e having been approved and sanctioned by the Poahra anchayat of the Munda tribe, it can be said that she became a membei\" of the Munda tribal community.\n\nWhen a person, in course of time, has been assimilated into the community that person cannot be denied the rights and privileges which may be conferred on that community, even though tribal, by Constitutional provisions. [377 E, H; 378 A-El\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 909 of 1971.\n\nAppeal under s. 116-A of the Representation of the Peop:e Act 1951 from the judgment and order dated May 21, 1971 of rthe 'Patna High Court in Election Petition No. 2 of 1970.\n\nFrank Anthony, A .. T. M. Sampath and E. C. Agrawala, for the: . appellant.\n\nL. M. Singhvi, Basudeva Prasad, Ravinder Narain and P. c; Bhartari, for the respondent.\n\nThe JudJ<lllent of the Court was delivered by\n\nGrover, J. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Patna High Court holding that the nomination papers of the: respondent Smt. J ahan Ara Jaipal Singh had been illegally rejected by the Returning Officer.\n\nFor that reason the election of the returned candidate Shri N. E. Horo from the 51 Khunti Parliamentary (Scheduled Tribe) Constituency 'in the State of Bihar was set aside.\n\nOn May 1, 1970 the .Election Commission of India issued a, notification calling upon the above-named Parliamentary Consti~ tuency to elect a Member to the Lok Sabha in the vacancy caused by the death of late Shri Jaipal Singh. The last date for filing the nomination papers was May 8, 1970.\n\nThe date for scrutiny was May 9, 1970.\n\nSeveral persons filed nomination papers including Theodore Bodra and others. Two nomination papers. were filed on behalf of the respondent who was a Congress (Ruling) candidate for the aforesaid by-election. According to the .respondent she was the widow of late Shri Jaipal Singh and' was a member of the Munda Scheduled Tribe in the State of Bihar.\n\nShe filed certain certificates to that effect.\n\nBodra filed an objection petition to the noniination papers of the respondent.\n\nThe Returning Officer, after hearing arguments, passed an order rejecting the nomination papers of the respondent.\n\nThe nomination papers of all the other candidates were accepted.\n\nAfter the polling took place the result of the election was announCed on June 3, 1970 and the appellant Shri Horo was declared elected to the Lok Sabha. On July 8, 1970 the respondent filed an election petition.\n\n In the election petition it was stated inter alia that the petitioner (who is now respondent before us) was the widow of Lat>~ Shri J aipal Singh and belonged to the Munda Scheduled Tribe although she was a Christian by religion. It was averred in paragraph 3 of the petition that according to the Munda Customary Law when a Munda male married outside the Munda Tribe if his marriage is accepted by the Tribe he continues to be a member of that Trib>~ and his wife also acquires its membership. It was pleaded that the wife being a member of her husband's family had the right of succession to her husband's property as well. In para 4 of the petition it was stated thM th.e petitioner was a Tamil by birth.\n\nShe married late Shri Jaipal Singh in the year 1954\n\naccording_ to the rights and rituals of Mundas in the presence of Farha Raia, Parha Munda, Parha Pahan, relatives of the deceased\n\nand the members of the Tribe at Morabadi a Mohalla of Ranchi.\n\nIII paragraph 5 the ceremonies which were performed according to Munda custom were mentioned.\n\nThese ceremonies inter alia were the washing of the wife's feet by the elder sister of the husband and the holding of the feast of the male goat meat and drinks of Handia etc. A new name was given by her mother-inlaw to the petitioner, that name being Lankashri.\n\nAll these functions were witnessed by Parha Raja, Parha Munda, Parha Pahan and other members of the Tribe. In paragraph 6 more details were given of the various other ceremonies also which were performed in connection with the marriage. After referring to the . relevant provisions of the Representation of People Act 1951,-hereinafter called the 'Act', it was stated that the Returning Officer had illegally allowed irrelevant personal aspersions to be cast against the petitioner by her opponents.\n\nIt was alleged that the Returning Officer had been influenced by Bodra who was the Chairman of the Bihar Legislative Council. The decision of the Returning Officer that the status of a Munda could be acqnired only by birth and not by marriage and that the petitione.r did not belong to the Munda Scheduled Tribe was challenged principally on the ground that the Returning Officer had not considered the custom by which if a Munda male marries a women not belonging to Munda Tribe and that is accepted by the Tribe the wife acquires the membership thereof.\n\nIn his written statement the returned candidate Shri Horo maintained that even though the election petitioner might be living as wife of late Shri J aipal Singh she was never married in accordance with the custom of the Munda Tribe prevalent in Chhota Nagpur. It was denied that she was ever accepted as a member of the Munda community as no such custom is prevalent in that community. It was denied that the ceremonies and rituals mentioned in the election petition had been performed in respect of the marriage of the election petitioner with the late Shri Jaipal Singh. In paragraph 25 of the written statement it was asserted that a non-Munda merely by virtue of the marriage with a Munda could not ipso facto become a Munda. If a person was not born of a father belonging to a Scheduled Tribe he or she could not legally claim to be a member of the said Tribe.\n\nIt was asserted that since the election petitioner was not the daughter of a member <if the Munda Tribe she could not claim to be a member of that Scheduled Tribe.\n\nThe allegations of mala fides made against the Returning Officer were described as baseless and extraneous.\n\nDuring t)J.e pendency of the election petition. J!ie Lok Sabha was dissolved on December 27, 1970. A petition was filed\n\n\" 4~\n\n~ c\n\nbefore the High Court on behalf of Shri Horo that the election petition should be dismissed as having become infructuous. The court made an order on January 14, 1971 holding that the election petition could not be dismissed on that ground.\n\nOn the pleadings of the parties seven issues were framed.\n\nIssues 1, 2 and 3 which are material need be mentioned. ( 1) Is the election petition maintainable ?\n\n(2) Whether the petitioner was the legally married wife of late Shri Jaipal Singh according to the custom of Munda Tribe prevalent in Chhota Nagpur ?\n\n(3) Whether the petitioner could legally acquire the status of a Munda by virtue of her marriage to late Shri J aipal Singh and whether she had been accepted as a member of the Munda Tribe by the said Tribe ?\n\nIt may be mentioned that so far as issue No. 1 was concerned the objection taken was that the election petition was defective .on account of the non-joinder of necessary parties.\n\nWhen the election petitjon was filed only Sbri Horo the returned candidate was implead, ed but subsequently a petition was filed on behalf of the election petitioner making a prayer that the other contesting candidates were also necessary parties and should be impleaded. The court directed that they be added as parties.\n\nSbri Bodra who was one of the contesting parties was consequently impleaded as a party. Later on it was prayed on behalf of the petitioner that on a further consideration it was found that the persons who bad been subsequently added were not necessary parties and their names might be deleted.\n\nBodra' s name was therefore deleted.\n\nThe argument raised before the High Court was that Bodra being a necessary prty to the petition under\n\ncl. (b) of s. 82 of the Act the petition became defective as soon as his name was struck off at the instance of the election petitioner. The High Court was of the view that although in paragraph 21 of the election petition an allegation had been made that Bodra had influenced the Returning Officer, no evidence was led on that point and the case of the election petitioner was based solely on the ground that the nomination paper had been illegally and improperly rejected.\n\nNo relief had been sought on the ground that undue influence had been exercised on the Returning Officer by Bodra. The High Court was also of the view that the allegation made in the election petition that Bodra had exercised his influence in getting the nomination paper of the election petitioner rejected did not fall within the ambit and scope of sub-s. (7) of s. 123 of the Act. The contention that the petition was not maintainable was consequently rejected.\n\nOn the main issues, namely (2) and (3) i! was expressly stated in the judgment that the factum of the marriage of the election petitioner with the late Shri Jaipal Singh had not been dis-, A puled.\n\nThe real controversy between the parties in the High Court centered round the point whether the marriage was in such form that the wife acquired the membership of the Tribe.\n\nAccording to the arguments on behalf of Shri Horo as the election petitioner was not a Munda she could not belong to the Munda Tribe and that by marriage such a status could never be acquired.\n\nThe High Court examined the evidence relating to the question whether the marriage of the election petitioner with late Shri Jaipal Singh had been performed in accordance with the Munda custom and was in such form that she was accepted and treated as a member of the Munda Tribe. The court also considered the various authoritative books and other works relating to the Mundas and came to the conclusion that on a survey of the entire evidence and the circumstances there was no reason to discredit the evidence which had been led on behalf of the petitioner that she was married according to the Munda custom and that it was with the approval and sanction of the Tribe that she had been accepted as a member of the Munda tribe.\n\nThe first contention raised by Mr. Frank Anthony on behalf of the appellant relates to issue No. 1. It has been maintained by him that Bodra was a necessary party. Apart from the fact that he wa5 the only person who had filed a written objection\n\nto the nomination of the respondent the election petition filed E by the respondent contained serious allegations of corrupt -ptac-. tiee against Bodra. As he had been given up as a party although impleaded at one stage the petition became defective and was not maintainable.\n\nAccording to clause (b) of s. 82 of the Act the petitioner must join as a respondent any candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practices are made in the petition. Section 86 (1) provides that the High Court shall dismiss any elec- F tion petition which does not comply inter alia with the provisions of. s. 81.\n\nThere can be little doubt that if the allegations made in the election petition against Bodra amounted to the commission of a corrupt practice by him it was obligatory on the part of the election petitioner to join him as a respondent to the petition.\n\nIt is equally clear that in that event the petition would have become liable to dismissal.\n\nFor finding out what a corrupt practice is we have to turn to s. 123 of the Act. According to Mr. Anthony the allegations made against Bodra fell within sub-s. (7) of s. 123 which is in the following terms :\n\nS. 123 \"The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act :- ....................\n\n(7) The obtaining or procuring or abetting or attempting to obtain or procure by a candidate or his agent or, by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent, any\n\nassistance other than the giving of vote for the furtherance of the prospects of that candidate's election, from any person in the service of the Government and belonging to any of the following classes, namely :-\n\n(a) gazetted officers;.\n\n(b) stipendary judges and magistrates; c\n\n(c) members of the armed forces of the Union:\n\n(cf) members of the police forces;\n\nle) excise officers;\n\n(f) revenue officers other than village revenue D officers known as lam bardars, malguzar>. patels, dcshmykhs or by any other name. whose duty is to collect land revenue and who are remunerated by a share of, or commission on, the amount of land revenue collected by them but who do not\n\nE discharge any police functions; and\n\n(g) such other class of persons in the service\n\nof the Government as may be prescribed.\n\nExplanation.-(1) In this section the expression \"agent\" includes an election agent, a polling agent and any person who is held to have acted as an agent in connection with the election F with the consent of the candidate.\n\n(2) For the purposes of clause (7) a person shall be deemed to assist in .the furtherance of the prospects of a candidates's election if he acts as an election agent of that candidate\".\n\nThe allegations against Bodra are contained in para 21. the G election petition which may be set out : '\n\n\"That the Returning Officer, while hearing the objections illegally allowed irrelevant personal aspersions to be cast against the petitioner by her opponents and the aforesaid Shree Theodore Bodra even after protests made by and on behalf of the petitioner, Shrill mati Jahanara Jaipal Singh, against the same\".\n\nA plain reading of the above paragraph shows that no such allegation was made that Bodra had influenced the Returning Officer\n\n11-L887 Sup CI/72\n\nf?r te pu~-pose mentioned in s. 123(7) of the Act. The essential mgred1ent of tht provision is to obtain, procure etc. by a candidate of any assistance (other than the giving of a vote) for the furtherance of the prospects of that candidate's election from any person in service of the Government and belonging to the classes mentioned in the sub-section.\n\nThere is absolutely no allegation or suggestion in para 21 that the Returning Officer was rnlluenced by Bodra for the purpose of rendering assistance for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of any candidate.\n\nAll that has been stated in that paragraph is that while hearing the objection the Returning Officer allowed irrelevant personal aspersions to be cast against the election petitioner by her opponents and Bodra. It was further stated that on inquiry the election petitioner came to learn that the Returning Officer had been influenced by Bodra.\n\nThis influence apparently can have reference only to the conduct or act of the Returning Officer in allowing personal aspersions to be cast against the election petitioner.\n\nEven by stretching the language it is not possible to discover any of the ingredients which would constitute a corrupt practice under s. 123(7) of the Act. Faced with this situation Mr. Anthony sought to rely on sub-s. (2) of s. 123 the relevant part of which is as follows :\n\n\"(2) Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or indirect interference or attempt to interfere on the part of the candidate or his agent, or of any other person with the consent of the candidate or his election agenJ\n\nwith the free exercise of any electoral right :\n\nProvided that-\" .......... \"\n\nIt is not possible to comprehend how the allegation contained in para 21 can be understood to amount to a suggestion Of direct or indirect interference or attempt to interfere on the part of the candidate etc. with the free exercise of any electoral right. We are accordingly satisfied that no allegation of any corrupt practice had been made in the election petition against Bodra and therefore he was not a necessary party within s. 82 of the Act.\n\nIn this view of the matter it is not necessary to examine the criticism of Mr. Anthony of that part of the judgmen! of the High Court according to which one of the reasons given for deciding issue No. l in favour of the present respondent. was that no relief had been sought on the ground that undue mfiuence had been exercised on the Returning Officer by Bodra and that no evidence was led on that point.\n\nOn issues 2 and 3 Mr. Anthony has raised three main points.\n\nThe first was that the respondent who was a Christian by birth was a divorcee and according to her own statement the decree\n\nN. E. HORO v. SMT • .TAIPAL SINGH (Grover, J.) 3 b9\n\nnisi in the divorcee proceedings had been made absolute on May 6, 1954. According to her she got married to late Shri Jaipal Singh on May 7, 1954. This marriage was a nullity as under s. 57 of the Indian Divorce Act 1869 she could not enter into a second marriage until after the expiry of six months from the date the decree had been made absolute.\n\nSecondly the High Court ha<.! palpably erred in holding that the respondent had become a member of the Munda tribe by marrying Shri Jaipal Singh and set aside the order of the Returning Officer who had held that she was a Christian by birth and Munda tribe being\n\n~.n ethnic group its membership could not be acquired by marriage but could be acquired only by birth.\n\nThirdly it has been strongly urged that the respondent failed to prove the custom that a non-Munda could be initiated into tribe as its full fledged member eithr by performance of =ertain rituals and ceremonies or by the acceptance as such by the tribe or its panchayat.\n\nAs regards the first point it was never canvassed or argued before the High Court. No plea was taken by Shri Horo in the written statement that there could be no valid marriage between the respondent and late Shri Jaipal Singh owing to the provisions contained in s. 57 of the Indian Divorce Act 1869 until after the lapse of a period of six months from the date the decree of divorce was made absolute. None of the issues which was framed by the High Court involve the question now sought to be agitated based on the provisions of s. 57 of the Indian Divorce Act. It appears that advantage is sought to be taken from the statement of the respondent about the various dates when the decree absolute was granted and the date when the marriage took place between the respondent and the Jate Shri Jaipal Singh.\n\nIn the absence of any pleadings or issues no material has been placed on the record to show that in view of the provisions of s. 57 of the aforesaid Act there could not be a valid marriage acoording to the. Munda customary law.\n\nIt must be remembered that the respondent contracted a marriage with late Shri Jaipal Singh according to Munda rites and ceremonies and not as one Christian marrying another Christian. Nor was the matter pursued in cross-examination of the respondent and she was not asked as to how she could get over the bar of s. 57 in the way of remarriage before the expiry of the prescribed period.\n\nIn these circumstances we do not consider that such a point can be allowe>i 1.o be agitated for the first time before this Court.\n\nOn the second and the third points a great deal of reliance has been placed on the following statement in the well known book of S. C. Roy \"Mundas and their country\", 1912 Edn. :\n\n\"The Munda tribe is divided into a large number of exogamous groups called kilis.\n\nAccording to\n\nMunda tradition, all the members of the same Kill are A descended from one COilllllOn ancestor. But such a tradition ay not be quite correct with regard to the ongmal kills. Though exogamous as regards the kills, the Mundas are endogamous so far as other tribes are concerned. Thus, there can now be no valid marriage, according to Munda custom, between a Munda and the B member of any other 'kolarian' tribe, such as the Santals, the Kharias the Asurs, .or the Bir-hors\".\n\nAccording to Roy !he family came to be evolved from tribes\n\nc and sub-tribes.\n\nCommunal marriage was superseded by the in<li\\idual marriage and Matriarchal Age was superseded by Patriarchal.\n\nKinship came to be. traced not as before, through a common fem.ale ancestor hut through a male ancestor. D. N.\n\nMazumdar in his work 011 the Ho tribe entitled \"Affairs of a Tribe'', 1950 Edn. points out that the rule of endogamy has its base in superstitious belief.\n\nAccording to him villages which are closely allied by ties of marriage are those which share the same God and Spirits and the same Deonwa. The influence of Deomvas, in other words, the knowledge of the Bongas of an area, determines the limit of exogan1y, for there is a risk in man:ying in villages the Uongas of which arc unkown; (pp. 237-238).\n\nFrom the a.:count given by S. C. Roy himself it appears that according. to th•-Murula custom the rule of endogamy is not absolute; for instance, In the case of Munda female E married or unmarried found to have gone astray with a man of a different caste or tribe, it is said, that the latter is summoned before a Panchayat and a heavy fine is imposed on the lover and\n\nthe fine, if realised, is paid as compensation to the parents of the seduced maiden or the husband of the married female and the seducer is compelled to take the girl or woman as a wife or a mistress and in case of refusal (which is rare) to submit to the orders of the Panchayat. 1 The family of the seduced female remains outcaste until a purificatory ceremony is perfomied and thus restored to caste.\n\nThe members of the family then cook rice and pulse and themselves distribute the food to the assem bled relatives; (see pp. S44-54S.)\n\nThe question that has to be enquired into is whether the strict rule of endogamy of the Munda tribe has been deviated from and whther custom has sanctioned such deviation. D. bl.\n\nMazumdar in his work \"Races and Cultures of India\" deals with tribal organisations in Chapter 17. According to him the defi nition that is found in the current literature on the subject is given in the Imperial Gazetteer which is, \"A tribe is a collection of families beanng a common name, speaking a common dialect occupying. or professing to occupy a collllllon territory and is\n\nN. E. HORO v. SMT • .TAIPAL SINGH (Grover, I.) 371\n\nnot usually endogamous though originally it might have been so\". Endogamy is an essential feature of the tribe though inter\n\ntribal marriages are breaking the limits of endogamy. It is further stated by him that \"the importance of the blood bond or the kinship group is forced to the background, the communal eco nomy of the clan is superseded by individual desire for gain and property, money assumes an importance it seldom had before, and the ties of reciprocity and mutuality of obligation are reoriented to suit new conditions.\n\nTribal custom and practices which established social life lose their value and the choice ::if leader and of mate is guided by different considerations\".\n\nThe Munda tribe cannot be said to be immune from the above proc~5'\n\nof chanll, C in their social organisation. Changes in !heir belief.\n\ncustoms, traditions and practices have taken place under the influence of Hinduism, Christianity, and on account of the impact of western cducatiol, l, urbanisation, industrialisation and improved means of communication.\n\nThe sense of individualism and lack of love for, the traditional code of conduct and social taboos\n\n:ire stntcd to be apparent among the emerging urban-industrial , oriented adivasi communities.\n\nD. N. Mazumdnr has made an intensive study of the rule of endogamy among the Ho tribe which is an off-shoot of the Munda :ribe. A reference to the Ho practice may, therefore, help us in understanding the practice among the Mundas.\n\nAccording to D. N. Mazumdar \"A Ho does not marry outside the tribe as a rule but there is today no legal or social prohibition against bis doing so.\n\nThough tribal code has relaxed considerably those who work in the mining and industrial centres in and outside Kolhan cq, ntract such alliances and when they come back to their villages they are not outcasted by the society;\" (pp. 124\n\n12S, \"Races and Cultures of India\").\n\nAt another place he records :-\n\n\"The endogamy of the tribe is not sacred today, with the result that many marriages have taken place between the Hos and other tribes.\n\nLiaison between Diku men and Ho girls is increasing, and cases that have occurred in Chaibassa during the last ten yean or so would fill a volume. Thus, there beln~ no loner any deterrent to mating with strangers, social authonty vested in the Kiili punch has to exercise its prerogative to ensure a compliance with social traditions. l{illl exogamy has not led to an indiscriminate alliance bet\n\nween the different killis and as far as our knowledge\n\n\"oes taboo on marriage outside a particular local area an °be traced to a dread of unfamiliar Bongas, who were conceived as hostile, and therefore dangerous\".\n\nIp. 2~6),\n\nL. P. Vidyarthi in his work mentioned before based on hi> study of the social life of the Oraon and Munda tribes living in the ity of Ranchi points out that a. good number of cases of marnage between tribals and non-tribals have occurred and that in his investigation he came across 53 cases of non-tribal males marrying tribal girls.\n\nHe points out that greater percentage of Jove marriages and marriages by 'Kept' have been socially disapproved while 83.3 % and 100)~ of arranged and legal (civil) marriages have been approved. (See pages 102-103).\n\nWe may how deal with the evidence produced by the partieJ on the above points. P.W. 1 who was working as District We!· fare Officer in May 1970 at Ranchi and who belongs to. the l\\lunda tribe stated that if a Munda male married a non-Munda girl and such marriage was accepted by the society it would be a \\'alid and proper marriage.\n\nThe wife would, therefore, be accepted as a member of the tribe.\n\nHe had himself married an Oraon girl and his wife though a non-Munda has been accepted as a member of the Munda tribe.\n\nHe forther deposed that if the Munda married a non-Mt•nda a feast is given and if the elders of the society accept the marriage and participate in the feast that by itself would show that the tribal society has accepted the marriage and the wife has become a member of the tribe. P.W. 2 who is a nephew of the late Shri Jaipal Singh gave details of the ceremonies which were performed when the marriage between his uncle and the respondent took place. After the performance of those ceremonies the members of the tribe and the family declared that the respondent had been accepted as a member of the tribe. He himself is married to a non-Munda girl though he was married according to Munda marriage rights as welf as accord ing to Hindu law. P.W. 3 who was at the material time working as Assistant Director in Sociology, Bihar Tribal Welfare Insti tute, stated that he had been doing research on the subject of Bihar Tribal Marriage and Family Transformation with special reference to Family law. One of his major duties was to ascertain from the members of different tribes facts relating to the subiect of his research.\n\nAccording to his evidence a Munda male\n\nG c;.n marry a non-Munda girl.\n\nAfter adopting a. special procedure in some cases a non-Munda wife is accepted as a member of the tribe. A certain procedure or formality has to be gone\n\nthrouh. The council of elders of the tribal people has to be consulted and the special reason for the marriage is to be stated.\n\nThen various rituals are gone through and the marriage is. allow ed by the elders.\n\nHe gave instances where a Munda male had married a non-Munda girl and their marriage. had been ac.cepted H by the tribal people. One of these instances given by _him related\n\nto persons belonging to the Santhals and Ho tribes.\n\nHe main, t:iincd that the customs prevalent among these tribes were broad•\n\nly the same as among the Mundas.\n\nIn cross-examination he stated that he had met the members of the Munda elder council and he had remained in touch with that council since 1952. He had made special research of Jojo Hatu which was a Munda vii !age. . He claimed to have submitted a report to the government m which he had collected hundreds of cases where a girl of a particular tribe had married outside her tribe. P.W. 4 was the Superintendent of the Anthropological Survey of India, Ministry of Education.\n\nAs an Anthropologist he had to undertake full study in different parts of India mostly among the tribal community. He had studied Munda tribal custom which assignment had been given to him in 1965-66. In course ol the research he found that a Munda could marry a non-Munda girl even before\n\n1954. He gave three. kinds of unusual marriages one of which was where a Munda male married a non-Munda female.\n\nThe social consequences of that marriage was called Jati Bora.\n\nThat meant that the Munda male had committed an offence against the whole community. Normally he would be ostracised along with his family but there was a process by which he and his wife could be admitted into the community. This process was known 'Niyar' which means \"to bring in or take in\". The offending party invites the members of the Parha gives. them a feast at which a white goat is sacrificed and the blood is smeared on the body of the boy and the girl along with Tiirinolik and then they are allowed to sit along with the members of the community in the same Pankti. After that they. are formally considered as members of the community. He was specifically asbd\n\na question with regard to the manner in which a Munda boy marrying a non-Munda girl would be accepted by the commu nity and his reply was that in his opinion the Parha was the ultimate authority in the matter of acceptance of a non-Munda girl in the community. If a Parha accepted her that was final.\n\nIn cross-examination he stated that if a marriage of1 e nature under discussion is not approved by Parha he did not think it would be accepted by the members of the society. It may be mentioned that the evidence of this witness has been ubjected to a good deal criticism by Mr. Anthony for the reason that he was only expressing an opinion on the last matter and was not G making a definite statemel)t of fact. P.W. 5, who was attached\n\nfo 'the office of the Deputy Comtnissioner, Palamau, gave an account of the ceremonies which were performed of the marriage between the respondent and late Shri J aipal Sin11h. Accordin11 to\n\nhim the elders of the communitv unanimously decided that since permission had been ven bY the elders they would be taken as H members of the tribe. He denied the su22estion that it was on. account of the inlluence of late Shri J alpal Sin2h that Pahans had !liven sanction to the marriage. Accordin2 to him there had been\n\nother cases also where such sanction had been given. ·\n\nP.W. 8 who claimed to be a Parha Raja of three Parhas, viz., Takara Parha, Sada Parha and Sagha Parha comprising 36 vil !ages also gave evidence about the ceremonies which were performed at the marriag~ of late Shri Jaipal Singh with the respon dent. After the performance of the ceremonies the Samaj of the Munda tribe accepted the marriage, according •to him. He deposed to othr instances whre Munda had married non-Mundll'S.\n\nHe had attendeg a marriage of a Munda who had married a Ho girl.\n\nSanction was given by the elders to that marriage. It is unnecessary tc <efer to the evidence of P.W. JO who is also a Pahan and who claimed to have been present at the time of the marriage in question. He made a statement which has been subjected to justi liable criticiLm by Mr. Anlhony about the document Exht-3. His evidence, •therefore, does not deserve consideration.\n\nOut of the witnesses examined on bohalf of the respondent mention may be made of the statement of Shri Horo himself who appeared as R.W. 6. After stating that the late Shri Jaipal Singh who was a leader of the Jharkhand Party and was an Adivasi and a Munda professing the Christian religion, he affirmed that the respondent did not have Jhe right and status of a Munda on the basis of estab lished custom. He admitted that there was a custom that a Munda who had been ex-communicated from the tribe could be taken back but ac£_ording to him that person mus•t be a Munda and no non-Munda could be accepted a1 a member of the tribe.\n\nTh.~ Munda could of couroo marrv a non-Munda but in the manner in which the Munda usuallv married a Munda. The custom among the Mundas is chan2in2 and it is dvnamic and not static. The other witnesses produced bv Shri Horo are not impressive and do not afford much assistance in decidinl!' the points under discussion.\n\nAccordiDI!' to the observations of the High Court Shrl Horo did not examine anv witness on his behalf who could say that he had made a special s!udv and research of the marriage custom of F the Munda tribe and that such a marria2e was not acceptable In the present times in spite of all the chan11:es which have taken place In the life and social structure of the community owing to tho Im pact of the various factors which have been mentioned In the authoritative studies of eminent Anthropologists mentioned before.\n\nOur attllntlon has been drawn by Mr. Anthony to certain decisions for the .proposition that in a tribe which is endogam<!us birth alone can confer the status of membership of the tribal com munity. In V. V. Girl v. D. Suri Dora &: Others( 1) one of the questions raised, was whether respondent No. I in that case had ceased to be a member of the Schedule Tribe at the material time because he .had become a Kshtriya. This court obserwd that it\n\n(ll 21 B. L. R. 188,\n\nwas essential :o bear in mind the broad and recognised foaturcs of the hierarchical social stricture prevalent amongst the Hindus. It\n\nwas considered.enough to stwte 1hat whatever might have been 1he origin of the Hindu, castes and tribes in ancient times, gradua; iy status came to be based on birth alorv:. It was pointed out that a\n\nperson who belonged by bith to a depressed caste or tribe would find it very difficult, if not impossible, to a1tain the status of a higher caste amongst the Hindus by virtue of his volition, education, culture and s'tatus. We are unable to ce how this case can be of any assisWice in deciding 1he ma!ter bdore us, nmnely, whether a non Munda can by marriage be recognised as a member of the Munda tribe in ce,.t~ in circemstances.\n\nThe High Court, after discussing the evidence and referring co other authoritative books like \"Tribes and Castes of Bengal\" by _H. H. Risley and \"Encyclopaedia Mundarica\" by Rev. John Hoffman as also the s1atement in Encyclopaedin Britannica, Vol.\n\n15, and the Encylopaedia of Religion and Ethics by James Hastin.gs, Vol. IX, apart from the work of J. Reid, 1.c.s., on Chhota\n\nNapur Tenancy Act, observed that al'thouµh originally very severe restrictions were imposed amongst the Mundas as far as marriap; e in their own Kili or sect was concerned, the process of Munda assimilation: to th~ lnrgcr Indian society facilitated by improved communications and the introduction of formal system of education was bein~ accelerated under the independent Government of India. In Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 15 in the Chapter relating to Mundas it is also mentioned.. \"The Munda speakinp; people, with the other Indian tribal groups, arc being en coura2ed 'to adopt new customs and to become fully participating members of Indian society\". (page 991). Similarly in' the Encyclopaedia of Rcliion and Ethics by James Hastings, Vol. IX. it has been stated as \\o how Munda customs are bcin2 changed with the impact of the influence of Christianity. Referring to the\n\nChapter in Reid's book it has been noticed by tho High Court that accordin2 to the Munda conce11tion a wife becomes a member of the Kiii of her husband bv legal fiction. The High Court further relied on the decision in Wilson Reads v. C. S. Booth(1) In which it was held that the question whether a person can be rcp; arded as a member of the Khasi tribe was a queS'llon of fact dependln11: upon the evidence produced in the case' It was said that the whole oblect of. reserving a at for a particular tribe was to afford the cOinmunltv, as a whole, a ri2ht of rcpresenta1ion and therefore the que5tlon of the membership of a particular individual of that communitV could not be considered divorced from the very obfect of leaislation. Thus the conduct of the community which had been given 'the riidit of special representation, the manner and how the\n\n(1) A. T. R. 19S8 Assam 128\n\ncommunity r~2arded a particular individual and whether the community as a whole intended to take the individual within its fold were all ma.tiers which would be relevant for consideration of the\n\nquetion whether a particular person could be regarded as a member of the.heduled Tribe. The High Court was alive to the factand this point of distinction has been greatly emphasised by Mr.\n\nAnthony-that in that case the appellant claimed to be a Khasi, his\n\nB · father being a European and his mother a member of the Khasi tribe. Even though the facts were different, the approach in such matters which commended itself to the Assam High Court can hardly be regarded as unsound.\n\nIt appears to us, on a full consideration of the entire material. c that the following matters stand established in the present case :- ( 1) _The Mundas are endogamous and inter-marriage with non-Mundas is normally prohibited.·\n\n(2) That a Munda male along with his family on marrying a non-Munda girl is often ex-communicated or outcasted. D\n\n(3) That the rule of endogamy is not so rigid that . a\n\nMunda cannot marry a non-Munda after performing special ceremonies. ( 4) That such marriages have been and are bei~ sanctioned by the Parha Panchayat.\n\n(5) That where a Munda male and his family are outcasted for marrying a non-Munda they are admitted io the tribe after certain special ceremonies are performed.\n\nEven in the account given by S.C. Roy as well as by P.w. 4 a Munda male is ex-communicated for marrying a non-Munda girl F but such ex-communication is not automatic. It is left to the discretion of the panchayat. If the panchayat approved of a particular marriage with a non-Munda then no question of ex-com munication arises. Thus several inroads appears to have been made on the rigid system of endogamy which might have existed at one time but over the course of years several matters are left to G be decided by the panchayat or ellkrs of the tribe itself. There is no evidenc; c w!i.atsoever that the late Shri J aipal Singh was excommunicated or outcasted because he'llad married .a non-Munda.\n\nOn the contrazy there is abundant evidence that his marriage was accepted as valid. and was appwved by the Parha Panchayat or. t)le elders of the -tribe. · H\n\nR:evertirig to the argument that a: non-Munda women cannot become a member of the Munda tribe by marriage tyen if . the\n\nninrria.c be valid because the Mundas are a patriarchical society and constitute an ethnic ~.roup, \\W have already referred to the evi dence of the witnesses produced by the respondent who had made special research in the matter and even if we exclude 1the opinion of P.W. 4 who was Superintendent of Anthropological Survey of India that th~ Parha was the final authori1y in the matter of acceptance of a non-Munda girl in 1the community but the rest of his evidence cannot be brushed aside. From all this evidence it is proved that once 'the marriage of a Munda male with a non-Munda\n\nfema}~ is approved or sanctioned by the Parha panchayat they become members of the community. They contention of Mr.\n\nAnthony that a person can be l'vlunda by birth alone can be sustained only if the custom of endogamy is established without any exception. We have already held that the rule of endogamy has not been proved to exist in the rigid or strict form canvassed by ::\\fr. Anthony. That rule has not been strictly followed a.nd the\n\nmarriage of .a Munda male with a non-Munda woman has been and is being approved and sanctione(I by the Parha panchaya\\,_ If a non-Munda woman's marriage with a Munda male is valfd it is difficult to say that she will not become a member of the--Mlinda tribe. The concept of a tribe is bound to undergo changes, when numerous social, economic, educational and other like factors in a progressive country start having their impact. It is noteworthy that a Hinduised Munda and a Munda comrted to Christianity can inter-marry and conversion to Christianity has not become an obs.tacle in the way of such marriage among the Mundas. Mr.\n\nHora himself in all fairness affirmed that custom among the Mundas was not static but was dynamic and was changing. We do no! find cogent or weighty reasons for disagreeing with the view of the High Court on the points under discussion.\n\nWe may also refer to Article 330 of the Consti!ution according to which the seats reserved for the Scheduled Tribes are to be reserved in the House of the People, inter alia, for members of these Tribes. Under s. 33 (2) of the Act a candidate for a reservd seat has to file a declaration specifying a particular casie or tribe of which he is a member. Article 342(1) empowers the President to specify th~ tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within tribes or tribal communities which shall, for the purposes of the Constitution, be deemed to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to the State or Union territory as the case may be. In Parts 1 to 12 of the Schedule to the Constitu:ion (Scheduled Tribes) Order 1952 are specified the tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within the tribes or tribal communities who are to be deemed to be Scheduled tribes. Munda is one of such specified tribes or tribal communities. It can well be said that the term \"tribal community\" has a wider connotation than the expression \"tribe\". A person who. according to the strict cuS'tom of a tribe:.\n\ncannot be regarded as a member of that tribe may wll be regarded. as a member of that tribal community. Where a non-Munda woman is married to a Munda male and the marriage is approved and sanctioned by t!ie Parha Panchayat of that tribe and the marriage is valid sh~ may not, on the assumption that the rule of endogamy prevails, become a member of the Munda tribe in the strict sense as not having been born in !he tribe. She cannot. however, be §XC!uded from the larger group, namely, the tribal communitv. The High Court has taken the view that th~ us\" (.'. the term \"tribal commnni!ies\" in addition to the term \"tribes\" in Article 342 shows that a wide import and meaning should be given to these words alld even if the respondent is not a member of 'the Munda tribe by virtue of birth she having been married to a Munda ·\n\nafter due observance of all formalities and after obtaining the approval of the elders of 1he tribes would belong to the tribal community to which her husbnd belongs on !he anology of th.e wife taking the husband's domicile.\n\nEven without invokin, g the doctrine of doinicile the respondent's marriage with late Sh:i Jaipal Singh who was a Munda having been approved and sane 1tioned by the Parha Panchayat of the Munda tribe it can well be said that she became a member of the Munda tribal community.\n\nWe have not been shown any infim1ity in the reasoning of the High Court on this point When a person, in the course of time, has been assimilated in the community it is somewhat difficult to comprehend how that person can be denied the rights and privile.11:es which may be conferred on that community even th9ugh tri- )lal by constitutional provisions.\n\n In the result this appeal fails and it is dismissed but in view of the nature of the points involved we leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.\n\nV, P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 121, "entities": [{"text": "N. E. HORO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 10, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. E. HORO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAllAN ARA JAIPAL SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAHAN ARA JAIPAL SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 2, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 52, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. E. HORO\n\nJAllAN ARA JAIPAL SINGH February 2, 1972\n\n[A. N. GROVER AND M. H. BEG, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 123(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "S7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1518, "end_char": 1520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Divorce Act, 1869", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1528, "end_char": 1552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 82(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1751, "end_char": 1759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Divorce Act, 1869", "statute": "the Indian Divorce Act, 1869"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1767, "end_char": 1805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1950, "end_char": 1961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 123(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2021, "end_char": 2030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 123(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2976, "end_char": 2985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3393, "end_char": 3398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Divorce Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3412, "end_char": 3423, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Parha Panchayat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4810, "end_char": 4825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Once the mW\"iage of a Munda male with a non-Munda female is approved or sanctioned by Parha Panchayat they become members Of the community."}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6440, "end_char": 6446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6604, "end_char": 6617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony, A .. T. M. Sampath and E. C. Agrawala, for the: .", "canonical_name": "Frank Anthony"}}, {"text": "T. M. Sampath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6624, "end_char": 6637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony, A .. T. M. Sampath and E. C. Agrawala, for the: ."}}, {"text": "E. C. Agrawala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6642, "end_char": 6656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony, A .. T. M. Sampath and E. C. Agrawala, for the: ."}}, {"text": "L. M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6681, "end_char": 6694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi, Basudeva Prasad, Ravinder Narain and P. c; Bhartari, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Basudeva Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6696, "end_char": 6711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi, Basudeva Prasad, Ravinder Narain and P. c; Bhartari, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6713, "end_char": 6728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi, Basudeva Prasad, Ravinder Narain and P. c; Bhartari, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Grover", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6817, "end_char": 6823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The JudJ<lllent of the Court was delivered by\n\nGrover, J. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Patna High Court holding that the nomination papers of the: respondent Smt."}}, {"text": "J ahan Ara Jaipal Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6945, "end_char": 6968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J ahan Ara Jaipal Singh had been illegally rejected by the Returning Officer."}}, {"text": "N. E. Horo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7084, "end_char": 7094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For that reason the election of the returned candidate Shri N. E. Horo from the 51 Khunti Parliamentary (Scheduled Tribe) Constituency 'in the State of Bihar was set aside.", "canonical_name": "N. E. HORO"}}, {"text": "May 1, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7201, "end_char": 7212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 1, 1970 the .Election Commission of India issued a, notification calling upon the above-named Parliamentary Consti~ tuency to elect a Member to the Lok Sabha in the vacancy caused by the death of late Shri Jaipal Singh."}}, {"text": ".Election Commission of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7217, "end_char": 7246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 1, 1970 the .Election Commission of India issued a, notification calling upon the above-named Parliamentary Consti~ tuency to elect a Member to the Lok Sabha in the vacancy caused by the death of late Shri Jaipal Singh."}}, {"text": "Jaipal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7411, "end_char": 7423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 1, 1970 the .Election Commission of India issued a, notification calling upon the above-named Parliamentary Consti~ tuency to elect a Member to the Lok Sabha in the vacancy caused by the death of late Shri Jaipal Singh.", "canonical_name": "J aipal Sin11h"}}, {"text": "May 8, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7476, "end_char": 7487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last date for filing the nomination papers was May 8, 1970."}}, {"text": "May 9, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7516, "end_char": 7527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The date for scrutiny was May 9, 1970."}}, {"text": "Theodore Bodra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7580, "end_char": 7594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Several persons filed nomination papers including Theodore Bodra and others.", "canonical_name": "Theodore Bodra"}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7874, "end_char": 7879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the .respondent she was the widow of late Shri Jaipal Singh and' was a member of the Munda Scheduled Tribe in the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "Bodra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7930, "end_char": 7935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bodra filed an objection petition to the noniination papers of the respondent.", "canonical_name": "Bodra"}}, {"text": "June 3, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8265, "end_char": 8277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the polling took place the result of the election was announCed on June 3, 1970 and the appellant Shri Horo was declared elected to the Lok Sabha."}}, {"text": "Horo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8301, "end_char": 8305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the polling took place the result of the election was announCed on June 3, 1970 and the appellant Shri Horo was declared elected to the Lok Sabha.", "canonical_name": "Horo"}}, {"text": "July 8, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8348, "end_char": 8360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 8, 1970 the respondent filed an election petition."}}, {"text": "J aipal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8538, "end_char": 8551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the election petition it was stated inter alia that the petitioner (who is now respondent before us) was the widow of Lat>~ Shri J aipal Singh and belonged to the Munda Scheduled Tribe although she was a Christian by religion.", "canonical_name": "J aipal Sin11h"}}, {"text": "Mundas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9208, "end_char": 9214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She married late Shri Jaipal Singh in the year 1954\n\naccording_ to the rights and rituals of Mundas in the presence of Farha Raia, Parha Munda, Parha Pahan, relatives of the deceased\n\nand the members of the Tribe at Morabadi a Mohalla of Ranchi.", "canonical_name": "Mundas"}}, {"text": "Farha Raia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9234, "end_char": 9244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She married late Shri Jaipal Singh in the year 1954\n\naccording_ to the rights and rituals of Mundas in the presence of Farha Raia, Parha Munda, Parha Pahan, relatives of the deceased\n\nand the members of the Tribe at Morabadi a Mohalla of Ranchi."}}, {"text": "Parha Munda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9246, "end_char": 9257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She married late Shri Jaipal Singh in the year 1954\n\naccording_ to the rights and rituals of Mundas in the presence of Farha Raia, Parha Munda, Parha Pahan, relatives of the deceased\n\nand the members of the Tribe at Morabadi a Mohalla of Ranchi."}}, {"text": "Parha Pahan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9259, "end_char": 9270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She married late Shri Jaipal Singh in the year 1954\n\naccording_ to the rights and rituals of Mundas in the presence of Farha Raia, Parha Munda, Parha Pahan, relatives of the deceased\n\nand the members of the Tribe at Morabadi a Mohalla of Ranchi.", "canonical_name": "Parha Pahan"}}, {"text": "Ranchi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9353, "end_char": 9359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She married late Shri Jaipal Singh in the year 1954\n\naccording_ to the rights and rituals of Mundas in the presence of Farha Raia, Parha Munda, Parha Pahan, relatives of the deceased\n\nand the members of the Tribe at Morabadi a Mohalla of Ranchi."}}, {"text": "Munda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9427, "end_char": 9432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "III paragraph 5 the ceremonies which were performed according to Munda custom were mentioned.", "canonical_name": "Mundas"}}, {"text": "Handia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9621, "end_char": 9627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These ceremonies inter alia were the washing of the wife's feet by the elder sister of the husband and the holding of the feast of the male goat meat and drinks of Handia etc."}}, {"text": "Parha Raja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9759, "end_char": 9769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All these functions were witnessed by Parha Raja, Parha Munda, Parha Pahan and other members of the Tribe.", "canonical_name": "Parha Pahan"}}, {"text": "Representation of People Act 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10010, "end_char": 10043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bodra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10287, "end_char": 10292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged that the Returning Officer had been influenced by Bodra who was the Chairman of the Bihar Legislative Council.", "canonical_name": "Bodra"}}, {"text": "Bihar Legislative Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10321, "end_char": 10346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged that the Returning Officer had been influenced by Bodra who was the Chairman of the Bihar Legislative Council."}}, {"text": "Horo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10832, "end_char": 10836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his written statement the returned candidate Shri Horo maintained that even though the election petitioner might be living as wife of late Shri J aipal Singh she was never married in accordance with the custom of the Munda Tribe prevalent in Chhota Nagpur.", "canonical_name": "Horo"}}, {"text": "Chhota Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11024, "end_char": 11037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his written statement the returned candidate Shri Horo maintained that even though the election petitioner might be living as wife of late Shri J aipal Singh she was never married in accordance with the custom of the Munda Tribe prevalent in Chhota Nagpur."}}, {"text": "December 27, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12000, "end_char": 12017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J!ie Lok Sabha was dissolved on December 27, 1970."}}, {"text": "January 14, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12201, "end_char": 12217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The court made an order on January 14, 1971 holding that the election petition could not be dismissed on that ground."}}, {"text": "s. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13765, "end_char": 13770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14595, "end_char": 14601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16029, "end_char": 16042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first contention raised by Mr. Frank Anthony on behalf of the appellant relates to issue No.", "canonical_name": "Frank Anthony"}}, {"text": "s. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16545, "end_char": 16550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16693, "end_char": 16703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16834, "end_char": 16839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17249, "end_char": 17255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anthony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17285, "end_char": 17292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mr. Anthony the allegations made against Bodra fell within sub-s. (7) of s. 123 which is in the following terms :\n\nS. 123 \"The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act :- ....................\n\n(7) The obtaining or procuring or abetting or attempting to obtain or procure by a candidate or his agent or, by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent, any\n\nassistance other than the giving of vote for the furtherance of the prospects of that candidate's election, from any person in the service of the Government and belonging to any of the following classes, namely :-\n\n(a) gazetted officers;.", "canonical_name": "Anthony"}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17354, "end_char": 17360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17396, "end_char": 17402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Theodore Bodra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19203, "end_char": 19217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the G election petition which may be set out : '\n\n\"That the Returning Officer, while hearing the objections illegally allowed irrelevant personal aspersions to be cast against the petitioner by her opponents and the aforesaid Shree Theodore Bodra even after protests made by and on behalf of the petitioner, Shrill mati Jahanara Jaipal Singh, against the same\".", "canonical_name": "Theodore Bodra"}}, {"text": "Jahanara Jaipal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19291, "end_char": 19312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the G election petition which may be set out : '\n\n\"That the Returning Officer, while hearing the objections illegally allowed irrelevant personal aspersions to be cast against the petitioner by her opponents and the aforesaid Shree Theodore Bodra even after protests made by and on behalf of the petitioner, Shrill mati Jahanara Jaipal Singh, against the same\"."}}, {"text": "s. 123(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19509, "end_char": 19518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20712, "end_char": 20721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20804, "end_char": 20810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21587, "end_char": 21592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22436, "end_char": 22441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Divorce Act 1869", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22449, "end_char": 22472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23507, "end_char": 23512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Divorce Act 1869", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23520, "end_char": 23543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23775, "end_char": 23780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Divorce Act 1869", "statute": "the Indian Divorce Act 1869"}}, {"text": "Divorce Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23795, "end_char": 23806, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24178, "end_char": 24183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Divorce Act 1869", "statute": "the Indian Divorce Act 1869"}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24594, "end_char": 24599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. C. Roy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24930, "end_char": 24939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the second and the third points a great deal of reliance has been placed on the following statement in the well known book of S. C. Roy \"Mundas and their country\", 1912 Edn. :"}}, {"text": "Roy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25565, "end_char": 25568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Roy !"}}, {"text": "D. N.\n\nMazumdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25849, "end_char": 25864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N.\n\nMazumdar in his work 011 the Ho tribe entitled \"Affairs of a Tribe'', 1950 Edn.", "canonical_name": "D. N.\n\nMazumdar"}}, {"text": "Deomvas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26168, "end_char": 26175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The influence of Deomvas, in other words, the knowledge of the Bongas of an area, determines the limit of exogan1y, for there is a risk in man:ying in villages the Uongas of which arc unkown; (pp."}}, {"text": "S44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27257, "end_char": 27260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mazumdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27448, "end_char": 27456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mazumdar in his work \"Races and Cultures of India\" deals with tribal organisations in Chapter 17."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mazumdnr", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29126, "end_char": 29140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Mazumdnr has made an intensive study of the rule of endogamy among the Ho tribe which is an off-shoot of the Munda :ribe.", "canonical_name": "D. N.\n\nMazumdar"}}, {"text": "D. N. Mazumdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29371, "end_char": 29385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to D. N. Mazumdar \"A Ho does not marry outside the tribe as a rule but there is today no legal or social prohibition against bis doing so.", "canonical_name": "D. N.\n\nMazumdar"}}, {"text": "Kolhan cq", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29619, "end_char": 29628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though tribal code has relaxed considerably those who work in the mining and industrial centres in and outside Kolhan cq, ntract such alliances and when they come back to their villages they are not outcasted by the society;\" (pp."}}, {"text": "Chaibassa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30035, "end_char": 30044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Liaison between Diku men and Ho girls is increasing, and cases that have occurred in Chaibassa during the last ten yean or so would fill a volume."}}, {"text": "L. P. Vidyarthi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30573, "end_char": 30588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2~6),\n\nL. P. Vidyarthi in his work mentioned before based on hi> study of the social life of the Oraon and Munda tribes living in the ity of Ranchi points out that a. good number of cases of marnage between tribals and non-tribals have occurred and that in his investigation he came across 53 cases of non-tribal males marrying tribal girls."}}, {"text": "Jojo Hatu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33723, "end_char": 33732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had made special research of Jojo Hatu which was a Munda vii !"}}, {"text": "Anthropological Survey of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33965, "end_char": 33996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 4 was the Superintendent of the Anthropological Survey of India, Ministry of Education."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34096, "end_char": 34101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As an Anthropologist he had to undertake full study in different parts of India mostly among the tribal community."}}, {"text": "Tiirinolik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34966, "end_char": 34976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "them a feast at which a white goat is sacrificed and the blood is smeared on the body of the boy and the girl along with Tiirinolik and then they are allowed to sit along with the members of the community in the same Pankti."}}, {"text": "Parha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35567, "end_char": 35572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In cross-examination he stated that if a marriage of1 e nature under discussion is not approved by Parha he did not think it would be accepted by the members of the society.", "canonical_name": "Parha Pahan"}}, {"text": "Palamau", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35949, "end_char": 35956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 5, who was attached\n\nfo 'the office of the Deputy Comtnissioner, Palamau, gave an account of the ceremonies which were performed of the marriage between the respondent and late Shri J aipal Sin11h."}}, {"text": "J aipal Sin11h", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36066, "end_char": 36080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 5, who was attached\n\nfo 'the office of the Deputy Comtnissioner, Palamau, gave an account of the ceremonies which were performed of the marriage between the respondent and late Shri J aipal Sin11h.", "canonical_name": "J aipal Sin11h"}}, {"text": "J alpal Sin2h", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36324, "end_char": 36337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "account of the inlluence of late Shri J alpal Sin2h that Pahans had !"}}, {"text": "Takara Parha", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 36537, "end_char": 36549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Takara Parha, Sada Parha and Sagha Parha comprising 36 vil !"}}, {"text": "Sada Parha", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 36551, "end_char": 36561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Takara Parha, Sada Parha and Sagha Parha comprising 36 vil !"}}, {"text": "Sagha Parha", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 36566, "end_char": 36577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Takara Parha, Sada Parha and Sagha Parha comprising 36 vil !"}}, {"text": "Anlhony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 37252, "end_char": 37259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He made a statement which has been subjected to justi liable criticiLm by Mr. Anlhony about the document Exht-3.", "canonical_name": "Anthony"}}, {"text": "Jharkhand Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37556, "end_char": 37571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After stating that the late Shri Jaipal Singh who was a leader of the Jharkhand Party and was an Adivasi and a Munda professing the Christian religion, he affirmed that the respondent did not have Jhe right and status of a Munda on the basis of estab lished custom."}}, {"text": "Horo", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 38196, "end_char": 38200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other witnesses produced bv Shri Horo are not impressive and do not afford much assistance in decidinl!'"}}, {"text": "H. H. Risley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40181, "end_char": 40193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, after discussing the evidence and referring co other authoritative books like \"Tribes and Castes of Bengal\" by _H. H. Risley and \"Encyclopaedia Mundarica\" by Rev. John Hoffman as also the s1atement in Encyclopaedin Britannica, Vol."}}, {"text": "John Hoffman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40232, "end_char": 40244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, after discussing the evidence and referring co other authoritative books like \"Tribes and Castes of Bengal\" by _H. H. Risley and \"Encyclopaedia Mundarica\" by Rev. John Hoffman as also the s1atement in Encyclopaedin Britannica, Vol."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40257, "end_char": 40259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "James Hastin.gs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40353, "end_char": 40368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15, and the Encylopaedia of Religion and Ethics by James Hastin.gs, Vol.", "canonical_name": "James Hastin.gs"}}, {"text": "J. Reid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40402, "end_char": 40409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IX, apart from the work of J. Reid, 1.c.s.,"}}, {"text": "Napur Tenancy Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40430, "end_char": 40447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40801, "end_char": 40820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on Chhota\n\nNapur Tenancy Act, observed that al'thouµh originally very severe restrictions were imposed amongst the Mundas as far as marriap; e in their own Kili or sect was concerned, the process of Munda assimilation: to th~ lnrgcr Indian society facilitated by improved communications and the introduction of formal system of education was bein~ accelerated under the independent Government of India."}}, {"text": "James Hastings", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41157, "end_char": 41171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly in' the Encyclopaedia of Rcliion and Ethics by James Hastings, Vol.", "canonical_name": "James Hastin.gs"}}, {"text": "Reid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41322, "end_char": 41326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Referring to the\n\nChapter in Reid's book it has been noticed by tho High Court that accordin2 to the Munda conce11tion a wife becomes a member of the Kiii of her husband bv legal fiction."}}, {"text": "Anthony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 42579, "end_char": 42586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court was alive to the factand this point of distinction has been greatly emphasised by Mr.\n\nAnthony-that in that case the appellant claimed to be a Khasi, his\n\nB · father being a European and his mother a member of the Khasi tribe.", "canonical_name": "Anthony"}}, {"text": "S.C. Roy", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 43612, "end_char": 43620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in the account given by S.C. Roy as well as by P.w."}}, {"text": "Parha", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 44907, "end_char": 44912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the\n\nninrria.c be valid because the Mundas are a patriarchical society and constitute an ethnic ~.roup, \\W have already referred to the evi dence of the witnesses produced by the respondent who had made special research in the matter and even if we exclude 1the opinion of P.W. 4 who was Superintendent of Anthropological Survey of India that th~ Parha was the final authori1y in the matter of acceptance of a non-Munda girl in 1the community but the rest of his evidence cannot be brushed aside."}}, {"text": "Hora", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46224, "end_char": 46228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.\n\nHora himself in all fairness affirmed that custom among the Mundas was not static but was dynamic and was changing."}}, {"text": "Article 330", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46483, "end_char": 46494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46672, "end_char": 46677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 342(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46814, "end_char": 46828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48193, "end_char": 48204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "i Jaipal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48709, "end_char": 48723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even without invokin, g the doctrine of doinicile the respondent's marriage with late Sh:i Jaipal Singh who was a Munda having been approved and sane 1tioned by the Parha Panchayat of the Munda tribe it can well be said that she became a member of the Munda tribal community."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_379_400_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "ANANTA MUKHI, @ ANANTA HARi\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\nFebruary 3, 1972\n\n[J. M. SHELAT, H. R. KHANNA AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.J\n\nWest Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act 1970-Sec. 3 (2) and Sec. 3(3)-Their scope.\n\nPetitioner, through Jail, filed a writ petition under art. 32 for a writ of habeas corpus. He was ordered to be detained u/s. 3 of West Bengai (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State\n\nor the maintenance of public order. The grounds of detention were tbnt the petitioner along with 50/60 other persons armed with lethal weapons\n\nraided the house of a person on October 4, 1969 ot night and looted cash, ornan1ents etc., and on November 81 1969 at bout 10 p.m., the petitioner along with 20/30 associates armed with lethal weapons, raided the house of another citizen and .kflled his two brothers and looted ornaments etc.\n\nIt was contended on behlf of tb.c petitioner that the detaining authority had taken into consideration facts extraneous to Sec. 3 of the Act in making the order of detention and therefore, the said order was illegal\n\nand secondly, that the order of detention showed that the District Magistrate hd not duly applied his mind before making the detention order as the petitioner was detained with a vie\\Y to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the seCutity of the State or the maintenance of public order. According to the petitioner, the detaining authority was not sure as to whether the petitioner \\.Vas detained for a.cling in any manner prejudicial to the security of the Stale or whether he was detained from acting in any manner .prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.\n\nTue District Magistrate could not make n indefinite order by using the word 'or' in the detention order and so the order was bad.\n\nDismissing the petition,\n\nHELD : (i) Tue activities of the petitioner as mentioned in the grounds of detention were not of an extraneous character but fell within the expression acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of State or the mintenance of public order, as defined in Sub-Section (2) of Section 3 of the Act.\n\nAccording to the grounds of detention, the petitioner and his associates committed offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding seven ars or more, and as iuch, the case of the petitioner was covered by Clause (d) of Sub-Section (2) of Section 3 of the Act.\n\nFurther, the activities of the petitioner disturbed public order and the petitioner became a terror\n\nto the residents of the locality nd under the circumstances, the District Magistrate was empowered to exercise his powers under Sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of the Act. (395 F]\n\n(ii) The Special definition given in Sub-Section (2) of Section 3 of 1he Act of the expression1 \"acting in any manner prejudicial to the security Of the State or the maintenance of public order\", ls of comprehensive nature '3nd each one of the activities mentioned in the various clauses of the said sub-section constitutes an act prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order. The presence of the \\vord \"oi\"\" in the definition itself tends to show that the use of that word in the order is not impermissible and there was no element of casualness or absence of due application of the mind in the moking of the impugned order. [397 DJ\n\nShelat J. Dissenting: The c\"nstruction of the definition in S. 3(2) cannot mean that .any one of the activities enumerated in Clauses (a) tO\n\n(e) would fall under both the grounds, namely, the security of the State and the rnainten3nce of public order.\n\nAn act, such as, use of or instigating to use a lethal weopon for the purpose mentioned in Clause (a) (i) or causing insult to the national flag mentioned under Clause ( e) would be a ground of detention, if it either affects, or is likely to fleet adversely either the security of the State or public order depending upon the potentiality and the extent of the act in question.\n\nSuch use or instigation or insult to national flag, might affect only public order and on a state-wide potentiality, it might affect adversely even the security of the State.\n\nBut irrespeCtive of such reach OF poten tiality, the clause cannot n1ean that such an act in itself and without anything more must be deemed to fall under the mischief of both the kinds.\n\nThe result of accepting such a oonstruction would mean that once an 'OCt falls unde'r any one of the clauses (a) to (e), even if it affects or is likely to affect public order only, must also be held to affect or likely to effect the security of the State thus totally wiping off the difference between the two concepts and their respetive are<IS of iolluence and that could not be the intention underlying Sub-Section (2) of Sec. 3. Therefore, it must be held that the use of the disjunctive '<Ir' in the impugned order rendered the order of detention vague and indefinite, indicative of the detaining authority having merely reproduced mechanically the language of S. 3(1) of the Act without applying its mind.properly. [389 D; 390 HJ Jagannath Misra v. State of Orlssa, [1966] 3 S.C.R. 134, discussed and distinguished.\n\n\nShyamal Manda/ v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1971 S.C, 2384, referred to,\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 322 of 1971.\n\nR. K. lain, for the petitioner.\n\nG. L. Mukhoty and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent.\n\nANANTA MUKHI V. WEST BENGAL (She/at, J.) 3 81\n\nJ. M. SHELAT, J. gave a dissenting opinion. The Judgment of H. R. KHANNA and K. K.\n\nMATHEW, JJ. was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J.\n\nShelat, J.,\n\nThe order of detention impugned in this petition is as follows:\n\n\"ORDER\n\n~o. 97iC Dated 24-4-71 Whereas I am satisfied with respect to the person known as s:1ri Anania Mukhi, @ Ananta Bari, son of Gobardhan, @ Gurai o.f Antpara, Chakbazir, P. S. Debra, Dt. Midnaporc that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, I therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (!) read with sub-section (3) of section 3 of the West Bengal (Prevell'tion of Violent Activities) Act, 1970 !President's Act No. 19 of 1970) make this order directing that the said Shri Ananta Mukhi @Anania Hari be detaind.\n\nGiven under my hand and seal of office.\n\nSd./- District Magistrate\n\nMidnapore\"\n\nE The question which falls for determination in this petitlion is whether detention directed by an order which recites that it was made upon satisfaction of the District Magistrate that the person\n\nconcerned was acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order is an order lawfully made. The argument was that the use of the dis- F junctive 'or', instead of the conjunctive 'and', showed either that the detaining authority was not certain under which of the two grounds, namely, the §_ecurity of the State or the maintenance of public order, he had reached his sub.iective satisfaction, impelling him to consider the petitioner's detention necessary, or that the order was passed mechanically, merely reproducing the language\n\nof sec. 3(1) without any application of. mind as to whether the G acts of the petitioner, actual or anticipated, were prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or both.\n\nIf it was the last, obviously, the order should have used the conjunctive 'and', and not the disjunctive 'or'. To appreciate the contention, it would be necessary to understand the object and the scheme of the Act.\n\nH By a Proclamation, dated March 19, 1970, made under Art. 356 of the Constitution, the President of India, being satisfied that a situation had arisen in which government in West Bengal could\n\nnot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, assumed to himself the functions of government of that State and declared that the powers of the State Legislature shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament. In pursuance of the said Proclamation, Parliament enacted, on April\n\n29, 1970, the West Bengal State Legislature \\Delegation of Powers) Act, XVII o[ 1970, under sec. 3 of which the State Legislature's power to m:1kc laws was conferred on the President, who was empowered to enact, whether Parliament was in session or not, as President's Act a bill containing such provisions as he considered necessary.\n\nIn exercise of the powers contained in Act XVII of 1970, the President enacted the President Act XIX of 1970. Since that ... \\ct \\Vas enacted in exercise of and in accordance with the powers of the State Legislature, the Act providing for preventive Jotcntion could lo passed in terms and within 11he scope of entry . 3 of I he Con current List in lhe Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. thM is to say, for reasons connected with (a) the security of that State. \\ b ). he maintenance of public order, or ( c) the maintenance of supplies. and services essential to 1he community.\n\nAct XIX of 1970 was enacted to \"provide for detention with a vie'v to preventing violent activities and for matters connected therewith\". Sec. 3, the construction whereof is called for in this petition, by its Jirst sub-section confars power oo make detention orders against certain persons. That sub-section reads as follows :\n\n\"The State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting irr any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such perso11 be detained.\"\n\nIts second sub-section contain~ a definition of the expression \"acting in any manner prejudicial to the secnrity of the State or the m'aintepance of public order\" employed in sub-section. (1), and enumerates in. clauses (a) to (e) diverse acts as falling within the said expression. That sub-section reads as follows :\n\n\"(2) For the purposes of ob-section (1), the expression \"acting in any manner prejducial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order\" means-\n\n(a) using, or instigating any person by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by\n\nvisible representations or otherwise, to use, any lethal weapon- H\n\n(i) to promote or propagate any cause or ideology, the promotion pr propagation of which\n\nANANTA MUKHI v. WEST BENGAL (Slie/al, J.) 383\n\n(ii)\n\naffects, or is likely to affect, adversely the\n\nsecurity of the State or the maintenance of public order; or\n\nto overthrow or to overawe the Government established by law in India.\n\nExplantaion.-In this clause, ·1cthal weapon\" .includes fire-arms, explosive or corrosive subs!· anccs, svords, spears, daggers, bo\\VS and arrov.•s; or\n\n< b) committing mischief, within the meaning of sec\n\ntion 425 of the Indian Penal Code, by fac or any exploshic suei_ance on nny proprty of CTovernn1ent or any loc:~I auth0:!t'f or any cornnt~0n owned or controlled by Government or any Uni versity or othr educational ins1il!Jtion or on any\n\npu0lic building, where the commiswn of such mi; cbief disturbs, or is likely to disturb, public order; or\n\n(C) causiag inw:t to the Indian Nationµ] Fiag or to any other object of public veneration, wheiher by mutilating, damaging, burning, defiling, destroying or other\\vise, or instigating any person to do so.\n\nExplanation-In 1his clause, \"object of public veneratio\" includes any portrait or statue of an eminent Indian, installed in a public place as a mark or r>spect to him or to his memory; or (<l) con1n1itting, o:· instigating any perc:; on to co1nmit, any offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term extending to seven years or more or any offence under the Arms Act, 1959 or the Explosive Substances /\\cl, 1 908, where the commission of such offence disturbs, or is likely to disturb, public order: or ( e) in the case or a person referred to in clauses (a) to (f) of section 110 of the Code of Crimina I Procedure, 1898, committing any offence punishable with im!)risonment where the commission of such offence disturbs, or is likely to disturb, publi9 order.\"\n\nUnder sub-sec. (1), the satisfaction is regarding the necessity of preventing/the person concerned from acting in any manner prejudicial either to the security of the State or the maintenance\n\nl2~LS87 Sup CI/72\n\n384 SUPllBMll OO'UllT REPORTS [1972] 3 s.c.R.\n\nof public order. As the language of the sub-section stands, such A satisfaction must be in relation to an activity, prejudicial either to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or in certain cases even both.\n\nTherefore, before the power of deten • tion can be invoked the detainlng authority nm&t be satisfied that the activity of the person concerned is such that it is either prejudicial 110 the security of the State or the maintenance of public B order or both.\n\nNeitl1cr the expression \"security of the State\" nor \"the main tcnance of public order\" has been defined either in this Act or in the Preventive Detention Act, IV of 1950, or the Defence of India Act, 1952 and the Rules made thereunder, which earlier made provision for preventive detention.\n\nUnlike the previous C enactments, sub-sec. (2) of s. 3 in the present Act, however, furnishes a dictionary for the expression \"acting in any manner pre judicial to the security of t, he State or the maintenance of public order\", and then enumerates in els. (a) to (e) certain categories of acts which would fall under the aforesaid expression. The defini tion, however, does not provide the meaning of the two concepts D \"security of the State\", or, \"public order\", and leaves the detaining authority to determine whether an act in question disturbs or is likely to disturb or endanger either of them, or both. It becomes necessary, therefore, to ascertain the connotation of these two concepts as lai<! down in certain judicial pronouncements. Although those pronouncements were under tl1e Preventive Detention Act of E 1950, they would, nevertheless, apply to the present Act also, since by not providing any different definition the legislative authority must be presumed to have used the expressions, security of the State and the maintenance of public order, according to their wellestablished meanings. In Dr. R. M. Lohia v. Bihar( 1), the impuned detention order F was passed under r. 30(1) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 which required satisfaction of the detaining authority that tlle per son concerned should be prevented from acting in a marmer prejudicial inter alia, to the public safety anthe maintenance of public order.\n\nThe order impugned the stated 1hat the authority was satisfied that it was necses to detain the petitioner with a view to prevent him from acting in a marmer pre judicial to \"the public safety and maintenance of la\\v and order\" After considering the earlier decisions on the question as to the meaning of the expressions, 'law and order', 'public order' and 'security of I.he State', Hidayatullah, J., (as he then was) summed up as follows :\n\n\"The District Magistrate acted to \"maintain law and order\" and his order could not be read differently even\n\n(I) (196<] I SC R 709.\n\nANANTA MUKHI v. WEST BENGAL (She/at, J.) 335\n\nif there was an affidavit the other way. If he thought in terms of \"public order\" he should have said so in his order, or explained how the error arose. A mere reference-to his earlier note was not sufficient and the two expressions cannot be reconciled by raising an air of simiiitude between them. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect-the community or the public at large.\n\nOne has to imagine three concentric circles, the largest representing \"law and order\"', the next representing \"public order\" and the smallest representing \"security of State\". An act may affect \"law and order\" but not \"public order\", just as an act may affect \"public or<ler\" but not security of the State\".\n\nTherfore, by using the ex• pression \"maintenance of law and order\" the District Magistrate was widening his own field of action and was adding a clause to the Defence of India Rules.\"\n\nD These observations clearly bring out the distinction between the\n\nthree concepts, of law and order, public order and lhe security of the State, and the scope of each of them. The drawing up of imaginary concentric circles helps considerably in delineating the distinction bet.ween one from the other and the area covered by each of them. A similar distinction between the concept of law and order and that of public order was drawn in Pushkar Mukher- E jee v. West Bengal(') by a caution therein that the expression \"public order\" in sec. 3(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 did not take in every infraction of law. In was observed that the contravention of any law always affects 'order', but before it can be said to affect 'public order', it must affect the community or the public at large. Mere disturbance of law and order leading to F disorder is not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preven\n\ntive Detention Act, which can only be invoked where there is apprehended a disruption of public order. The true distinction between the three concepts lies, as pointed out in Arun Ghosh v.\n\nWest Bengal(2 ), in the degree and extent of the reach of the act in question upon society. Acts similar in nature, but committed G in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case, it might affect the problem of law and order, and in another, though similar in quality, of public order. (sec also Nagendra Nath Monda! v. West Bengal('). An act, such as communicating the defence secrets of a country to an enemy country, while not affecting the maintenance of law and order H or public oriier, would affect adversely the security of the State.\n\nOn the other hand, there may be activities which depending upon\n\n\n(2) [1970) 3 S.C.R, 188\n\n(3) Writ Petition 308 of 1971, decided on 13-1-72.\n\nAf the degree of their effect and potentiality might affect all the three at the same time.\n\nThe three concepts have, thus, through a catena of decisions\n\naquired well undertood meanings, and though in some cases tllcy might overlap to a certam extent, the ruotinction between them is tairly clear. When, therefore, statutes, such as the present one, confer power on an authority to deprive a citizen of his\n\nlibrty, and bar at the same time any judicial scrutiny into the sufiiciency of reasons for doing so, it is vital that the action depriving such liberty, without the usual trial, must not only comply with the substantive but also the formal requirements of the statuto conferring such power, for, it is the latter which wouk\n\n'.how whether the form1; r have been complied with. If the power, C tl!erefore, is exercised because a certain result, namely, danger to pubiic order or the security of the State,. is apprehended, the de- 1ainin5 authority ought to set out in clear terms both in the ordet and the grounds for detention upo1i which of the two apprehended results, or both, he is satisfied.\n\nObviously, it would not lie possible, without tht being explicitly set out, for the person D concerned to make a representation, which is the only protection and safeguard given to him under such statutes.\n\nThe detaining Quthority has, therefore, to carefully ascertain, in order to reach his requisite satisfaction, whether the activity in ques\\ion, whether actual or expected, affects or is likely to aikct any one of the two things, namely, public disorder, or dnger to the security E of the State or both, and state so clearly in the order. It may be that the activity in question might be such that it affects or is likely to affect one or the other, or both at the same time, in which case he can state that his satisfaction was as regards both.\n\nAs is clear from the first sub-section of sec. 3, that sub-section confers power to make detention orders against certain persons but its exercise is conditioned by the satisfaction that if not detained, F\n\nthe activity of the person concerned, actual or anticipated, will affect prejudicially either the security of the State or the public order, or both. 1be disjunctive 'or', used there, must mean that the required satisfaction is one or the other ground, or even both. But, unlike the earlier Acts, which providd for preventive G detention, the present Act furnishes in the second sub-section of sec. 3 a definition for the expression used in the first sub-section, namely, \"acting in any manner prejudicial to tl1e security of the State, or the maintenance of public order\", by setting out tertain\n\ncatgories of activities which must be accepted as capable of affecting prejudicially the security of State or the public order. Using or instigating a person, orally or in writing, or by signs or verbal representation, or otherwise; to use any lethal weapon either (i) to promote or propagate a cause or ideology, the promotion or\n\nANANTA MUKHI v. WEST BENGAL (She/at, J.) \",;\n\npropagation of which alfects, as is likely to affet adversciy ti~~\n\nseuruy of the State, or the maintenance of public order, or (11) to overthrow, or overawe the Government established by law would, according to the definition in sub-sec. (2), mean acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order. It would seem from cl. (a) that acts of the kind mentioned in sub-cl. (i) would be regarded as prejudicial to public order or security ol the State, as the case may be, while those mentioned in sub-cl. (ii) would he regarded as capable of prejudicial to the security of the State. The language of cl. ( c;! itself suggests that besides the act being of the kind mentioned in sub-cl. (i) the authority must also be satisfied that the act there set out is one that affects, or is likely to affect adversely public order.\n\nUnder cl.. (b), committin;.': mischief, as defined in sec. 425 of the Penal Code, by fire or explosive substance on the classes of property specified there, provided again that such mischief disturbs or is likely IP disturb public order, would fall under the definition. CI. (b) thus requires two ingredients, (i) that the act in question is mischief and is . committed by fire or explosive substance on property of the kind set out there, and (ii) the satisfaction of the authority that the mischief is such that it affects or is likely to affect public order. Surely, setting fire to an educational institution, or a public building, reprehensible though it is, could not possibly have been intended to mean putting the security of the State in jeopardy. Ordinarily, it might not perhaps have been considered as an ac~ .Pecessarily disturbing or likely to disturb public order, but sec. 3(2) makes it so, in view of the exU-aordinary\n\nsituation then existing in West Bengal, and the background in which the Act was passed. The result is that an activity of the kind set out in cl. (b) would be regarded as a ground for an order under &ub-sec. (1) provided the detaining authority is satisfied that its effect, actual or likely, is disruption of public order. It will be noticed that cl. (b) does not say that the effect of such an activity would prejudicially affect th~ security of the State, and refers only to public order. It is, therefore, manifest that cl. (b) does not intend t11e invoking of the power under sub-sec. 1 on the ground of any apprehension to the security of t11e State.\n\nOn the other hand, acts specified in cl. ( c) might affect public order, and in some cases, even the security of ilie State, depending upon their extent and potentiality. An insult to ithe National Flag or any other object of public veneration might result in disturbance of public order, or even security of the State, depending 'upon the circumstances, the degree of veneration for the object in question and other such factors. In such cases, the detainin_g authority would have to ascertain from the facts and circumstances of each case whether the act under consideration was likely. to affect one or the other, or even both. But, cl. ( c) is not in!ended\n\nto mean that every such at must, without anything more, be A deemed to mean affecting both public order and security of the State. .\n\nActivities set out in both els. (d) and (e) also require satisfaction of tl!e authority that !hey are such that they have either disturbed or tend to disturb public order. It is again noticeable that B both the clauses omit !he expression \"security of the State\". Such an omission must mean that those activities have a bearing on and relate to public order, and not to the security of the Sta!e. Subsec. (2), by furnishing a dictionary to the expression \"acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the Sta!e or the maintenance of public order\" enables the detaining authority to treat the specific categories of activities set out 1therein as activities capable C of affecting the security of the State or the public order, and to invoke the power if it is satisfied that !heir effect, actual or likely, is adYerse to either, or both of them, depending upon their extent or potentiality. Before, therefore, resorting !O sub-sec. (1), the authority has to be satisfied whether the act or acts alleged against the person concerned fall under one or the other ground, viz., the D security of the State or public disorder or under both. If the authority decides to make the order, it must state in i! whether its satisfaction is on one or the other ground, or both. The mere fact that the acts in question are of any of !he kinds mentioned in els. (a) to (e) of sub-sec. (2) does not mean that they autometically and without anything more mean acting in a manner prejudicial to the E security of the State as well as maintenance of public order. It can mean either one or the other, or even both, depending upon the satisfaction of the authority as to its effect on one or the other or both.\n\nBut it wgs said that a construction contrary to the one sugge, led above has been taken in Shyamal Monda/ v. West Bengal(') The impugned order there stated that the District Magistrate was\n\nstisfied that it was necessary that the petitioner should be detained\n\nwith a view to prevent him from aoting in any manner prejudicial LO the securitv of the Sta!e or th~ maintenance of public order.\n\nThe grounds for detention served on the detenu, as set out at page 674 of the rePort, show that !he acts alleged against him and in respect of which the District Magistrate thought it necessary to detain him were (a) an attack on a passenger train by the petitioner and his associates, armed with bombs and explosives, with\n\na view to catcl) their rivals, obviously political rivals, and to kill them, which iniu:ed some innocent passengers, (b) attack and a'sault on !he guard of another train by the petitioner and his associates who were again armed with bombs and daggers, and H\n\n(c) an &tack bv the petitioner and his associate.q, similarly armed.\n\n(I) [19711 2 S.C.C. 672.\n\nANANTA MUKH! v. WEST BENGAL (She/al, J.) 389\n\non a police. partY at a railway station. All the three grounds men tioned the District Magistrate's conclusion that in each case there was disturbance of public order and panic and terror amongst the passengers. There was clearly no reference to any danger or apprehension to the security of the State as the dimensions of the\n\nact~ alleged were confined to the respeC'tive local areas, namely, 1he named railway station. The contention rais-d was that the acts alleged against the detenu had no bearing on the security of the State, and that the order contained, therefore, extraJl\"..ous and irrelevant maters, namely, the apprehension to the security of the State, over which, by the very nature of the acts attributed to the petitioner, and the conclusion stated by the District Magistrate in each of the grounds, he could never have reached his satisfaction.\n\nThe contention was repelled on the ground \"that the act itself furnishes a dictionary meaning for the two expressions and a perusal of clauses (a) to (e) clearly shows tha! any of the matters referred to therein will be both \"prejudicial to the security of the State or ilie maintennce of public order\". With great respect, such a construction of the definition in sec. 3(2) would mean that any one of the activities enumerated in els. (a) to (e) would fall under both the grounds, namely, the security of the State and the maintenance of public order, and therefore, it would not be necessary for 1he detainine: authority to ascertain for his satisfaction whether the\n\n;, ct for which he considers detention necessary is of the type or category which is or tends to be prejudicial to the security of 'lhe State or the maintenance of public order. In other words, any one of the a.cts set out in els. (a) to (e) must be regarded as preiudicial to both fae security of the State and the maintenance of\n\nut-!ic order.\n\nIf that is 'the meaning which is to be attributed to the definition ; n sec. 3(2), the detention order, read in the light of the grounds of detention served on the petitioner there would appear to be not in accord with the realities.\n\nFor instance, an attack on a train with the object of seiring political rivals and to eliminate them would, without doubt, be one that creates public disorder, but such public disorcter affects persons in the area in which i't is disturbed.\n\nSo far as the first ground was concerned, the attack was on a train.\n\nIn the two Qther grounds, the areas affected were two railway stations. Would it, in the light of these confines, be realistic to\n\n390.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nA say that the three alleged acts were such that they placed the security of the State of West Bengal in danger, or had even the tendency to do so ? Further, each of the grounds of detention, a> framed by the District Magistrate himself, contained his conclusio11 that in each case there was disturbance of public order. Ob viously, the satisfaction which he had reached was 1hat the alleged B acts were SJ!Ch that they disturbed or tended to disturb public order. Could such acts, which even according to the District Magistrate himself led to public disorder in a particular area, be said to have led to his satisfaction that they affected or tended to affect adversely the security of the whole State as well as 1he C maintenance of public order ?\n\nIf such !l construction of s. 3(2) were ito be accepted, it must lead to the result 1hat every activity falling under any of the clauses\n\n(a) to (e) !!lUSt be said to be one which actually affects or tends D to affect both the security of the State as well as public order. ln that case des_!ruction of a private school, however, small in size, or an oflioe of a village officer, once it fall within sec. 425 of the Penal Code, or committing or instigating an offence falling und.~~\n\ncl. ( d), qr cl. (e) affecting or tending to affect public order mus'': also be regarded as affecting or tending to affect the security of the I!\n\nState and also as leading to the satisfaotion of the detaining authority that it ds or is likely to do.\n\nWhat sub-sec. (2) of sec. 3 does is that it considors any one of the activi'!.ies there enumerated as adversely affecting or likelv to affect either the security of the State or public order, and bars a challene !hat by its very nature it could not possibly lead anv reasonable person to the satisfaction required by sub-sec. ( 1). U; e of or instigating to use a lethal weapon for the purpose mentionecl in cl. (a) (i) would be a ground for detention if it either affects c:· is likely to affect adversely either the security of the State or public order, depending upon the potentiality and the extent of the act in question. Such use or instigation confined to a small number\n\nof persons or area might affect only public order. On a State-wide potentiality, it might affect advrsely even the security of the Stllle.\n\nIndeed, such a distinction is expressed in sub-els. (i) and (ii) of H\n\ncl. (a) itself, The same can be said of all other activities set out in the other clauses. Under cl. ( c), causing insult to the national\n\nANANTA MUKH! v. WEST BENGAL (Khanna, J.) 391\n\nflag or any other object of public veneration is regarded by that clause as acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State\n\nor the maintenance of public order depending upon the circumstances, the reach or the potentiality of the act in question. Such an insult on a vast scale simultaneousiy commi'lted might have the B effect of creating an upsurge in the whole State and thus affect the security of the State, let alone the public order. Bll't, irrespective of such potentiality, the clause cannot mean that such an act by itself and without anyithing more must be deemed to fall under the mischief of both the kinds: The result of accepting such a con- C struotion would mean that once an act falls under any of the clauses\n\n(a) to ( e), even if it affects or is likely to affect public order only must also be held to affect or likely to affect the security of the State, thus, otally wiping off l!he difference between the two coucepts and their respective areas of influence. That could not be the intention underlying sub-sec. (2) of sec. 3. Taking all these !D circumstances into account 1together with the language of sub-sec. (2), the conclusion must be that the detaining authority must arrive at and express its satisfaction thirt the detenu's activities, actual or likely in future, were such that they would affect either\n\nthe security of the State or the public order or in some cases, by reason of their reach. even both.\n\nIn this view, the construction urged by counsel for the petitioner has to be accepted and it must be held that the use of the disjunctive 'or' in the impugned order rendered ithe order of detention vague and indefinite, indicath•~. of the detaining authority having merely reproduced mechanically the language of sec. 3 (1) of the Act. The detention, therefore, has to be held to be bad.\n\nThe petition consequently must be accepted and the petitioner be held entitled to his liberty forthwith.\n\nOrder accordingly.\n\nKhamlll, J. This is a petition through jail under article 32 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by Anania Mukhi alias Ananta Hari who has been ordered to be detained under section 3 of West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970 (President's Act No. 19 of 1970), hereinafter referred to as the Act.\n\nThe order of detention which was made against the petitioner A reads as under :\n\nORDER No. 97/C Dated 24-4-71 Whereas I. am satisfied with respect to the person known as Shn Ananta Mukhi @ Ananta Hari son of Gobardhan @ Gurai of Antpara, Chakbazir, P. S.\n\nDeba, Dt., Midnapore that with a view to preventing h1!11 from acting in any manner prejudicial to the s.ecnty of the State or the maintenance of public order, 1t 1s necessary so to do, I therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section ( 1) read with sub-section (3) of section 3 of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970 (President's Act No. 19 of 1970) make this order directing that the\n\nsaid Shri Ananta Mukhi @ Ananta Harl be detained.\n\nGiven under my hand and Seal of office.\n\nSd/- District Magistrate Midnapore\n\nSoon after the detention order, the petitioner was found to be •lbsconding.\n\nHe was arrested on May 5, 1971 and was served with the order of detention along with the ground of detention and the vernacular translation thereof on the same day.\n\nOn ,\\pril 26, 1971 the District Magistrate of :\\1idnapore reported to E the. State Government about the making of the detention order\n\nrlgainst the petitioner together with the grounds of detention and other necessary particulars.\n\nThe said report and particulars were considered by the State Government and ori May 4, 1971 the detention order was approved by the State Government. On the same day the State Government submitted a report to the\n\nCentrd Government together with the grounds of detention and 0ther necessary particulars.\n\nThe case of the petitioner was place<l by the State Government before the Advisory Board on June 3, 1971.\n\nIn the meanwhile, on May 20, 1971 the StatE Government received a representation of the petitioner dated \\fay 13, 1971. The s~.'.~ representation was considered by the\n\nState GoY('r; iment and was rejected as per order dated June 2. l 971.\n\nThe representation of the petitioner was then forwarded to th(; Advisory Board.\n\nThe Advisory Board after considering\n\nthe material before it, including the representation of the petitioner and after hearing him in person, sent its report to the State Government on July 8, 1971. Opinion was expressed by the Advisory Board that there was sufficient cause for the deten- H tion of the petitioner.\n\nBy an order dated July 16, 1971 the State Government confinned the order of detention of th\". re-:itioner.\n\nANANTA MUKHI v. WEST BENGAL (Khanna, J.) 393\n\nThe petition has been resisted by the respondents and the affidavit of Shri Manoranjan Dey, Assistant Secretary, Home (Special) Department, Government of West Bengal has been filed in opposition to the petition.\n\nWe have heard Mr. R. K. Jain who has argued the case llmicus curiae on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. G. L. Mu]>hoti\n\non behalf of the State.\n\nOne of the contentions advanced by Mr. Jain is that the detaining authority has taken into consideration facts extraneous to section 3 of the Act in making the order of detention, and therefore the said order is illegal. In this respect we find that in the grounds of detention which were supplied to the petitioner under sub-section ( 1) of section 8 of the Act, the following particulars were mentioned :\n\n\"(1) That on 4-10-69, at about 21-30 hrs., you along with 50/60 Naxalite supporters being am1ed with lethal weapons raided the house of Shri Pulin Bihari Manda! of Bhuiyabasan, P. S. Debra in order to kill him. The house owner somehow managed to save his life. You and your associates then looted cash, ornaments, utensils and other properties worth about Rs. 10, 000 from the house.\n\n(2) That on 8-11-69, at about 20.00 hrs., you along with 20/22 Naxalite workers a1n1ed with lethal weapons raided the house of Shri Bistu Pada Bhuiya of Radhakantapur, P. S. Debra and killed his two brothers named Madan Bhuiya and Kshudiram Bhuiya by sharp cutting weapons. You and your associates also looted ornaments and other articles from the house.\"\n\nlt would appear from the above that according to the grounds of detention, the petitioner along with 50 / 60 other persons armed with lethal weapons raided the house of Pulin Bihari Mandal cm October 4, 1969 at night time and looted cash, ornaments, utensils and other properties worth Rs. 10,000 from the house.\n\nIt is further alleged that on November 8, 1969 at about 10 p.m. 1he petitioner along with 20 /22 associates armed with lethal weapons raided the house of Bistu Pada Bhuiya of Radhakanta, pur and killed his two brothers Madan Bhuiya and Kshu,:iram Bhuiya by sharp cutting weapons and also looted m;!)amentE md other articles from the house. The above facts would sho\\, that the case against the petitioner was covered by clause ( d) of subsection (2) of section 3 of the Act. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 3 of the Act read as under :\n\n\"(!) The State Government may, if satisfied with\n\nespect to any person that with a view to preventing\n\nhim from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintepance of public order, it is necessary so rto do, make an order directing that such person be detained.\n\n(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the expression \"acting in any manner prejudicial to thesecurity of the State or the maintenance of public order\" means-\n\n(a) using, or instigating any person by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, to use, any lethal weapon- ( i) to promote or propagate any cause or ideology, the promotion or propagation of which affects, or is likely to affect, adversely the security of the State or the maintenance of public order; or\n\n(ii) to overthrow or to overawe the Govern- D ment established by law in India.\n\nExplanation.-In this clause, 'lethal weapon\" includes fire-arms, explosive or corrosive substances. swords, spears) daggers, bo\\vs and arrows; or\n\n(b) committing mischief, withm the meaning of section 425 of the Indian Penal Code, by fire or any .explosive substance on any property of Government or any local authority or any corporation owned or -controlled by Government or any University or other educational institution or on any public building. where the commission of such mischief disturbs, or is likely to disturb, public order; or .\n\n(c) causing insult to the Indian National Flag or to any other object of public veneration, whether by mutilating, damaging, burning, defiling, destroying or otherwise, or instigating any person to do so.\n\nExplanation.-In this clause, \"object of public veneration\" includes any portrait or statue of an eminent Indian, installed in a public place as a mark of respect to him or to his memory; or\n\n(d) committing, or instigating any person to commit, any offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term extending to seven years or more or any offence under the Arms Act, 1959 or the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, where\n\nANANTA MUKHI v. WEST BENGAL (Khanna, J.) 39;:\n\nthe commission of such offence disturbs, or is likely to disturb, public order; or\n\n( e) in the case of a person referred to in clauses\n\n(a) to {f) of Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, committing any offence punishable with imprisonment where the commission of such offence disturbs, or is likely to disturb, public order.\"\n\nThe firstallegation discloses that the petitioner and his associate:; were guilty of dacoity, while the second allegation sh9ws that at the time of the. commission of the offence of dacoity, the petitioner and his associates also murdered two persons.\n\nAs such, according to the grounds of detention, the petitioner and his associatc1 committed offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term extending to seven years or more. The aforesaid activities of the petitioner, according to the affidavit of Shri Manoranjan Dey, disturbed public order and the petitioner became a terror to the residents of the locality. We see no cogent ground to take a different view. It is obYious that when such a large number of persons, who were stated to be Naxalite workers, armed with lethal weapons commit the offence of dacoity and dacoity with murder, such offences disturb or are likely to disturb public order. According to sub-\n\nect!on (1) of section 3 of the Act, the State Government may, if so satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the securi!:y of the State or the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.\n\nSub-section ( 3) empowers a District Magistrate to exercise the powers, if so satisfied, conferred by sub-section ( 1).\n\nThe activities of the petitioner as mentioned in the grounds of detention, in our opinion, show that they were not of an extraneous character but fell within the expression \"acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of State or the maintenance of public order\" as defined in sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act.\n\nThe second submission of Mr. Jain is that the order of deten- :ion made by the District Magistrate shows that he has not d?'Y applied his mind before making the detention order, as accordmg to the order the petitioner was detained \"with a view to pr:venting him from actino in any manner prejudicial to the secunty of 1he State or the mintenance of public order\". It is urged that the District Magistrate should have specified in the order. as !O\n\nwhether it was necessary to detain the petitioner from actmg 1!1\n\nany manner prejudicial to the security of the State or whether 1t\n\nwas necessary to detain him from acting in any manner pr.:judicial to the maintenance of public order. The District Magistrate, according to the learned counsel, could have also, if fact; so warranted, passed an order for detention of the petitioner cu both the above grounds but he could not make an indefinite order by using the word \"or\" in the same and stating that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner \"prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order\".\n\nThe. order, it i~ stated, is a mechanical reproduction of the statute and shows that there. was not due application of the mind before the orda was made.\n\nThe above contention has been resisted by Mr. Mukhoti and in our opinion, is not well founded.\n\nWe have reproduced sub lieCtion (2) of section 3 of the Act earlier and it would appear therefrom that a comprehensive definition has been given of the .expression \"acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of\n\nthe State or the maintenance of public order''.\n\nThe definition shows that the whole thing has been clubbed together and no separate definitions have been given, one in respect of \"acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State\" and an other in resptct of \"acting in any manner prejudicial to the main\n\ntenance of public order\".\n\nThe various acts which have been specified in the different clauses of sub-section (2) of section 3 fall within the compendious expression \"acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order\", and it would not, in our opinion, introduce a.a\n\ninfirmity in the detention order if it is stated therein that it iJ; necessary to detain a detenu with a view to prevent him frorr. acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the Stat~ or .the maintenance of public order. .\n\nIt is no doubt true that if a statute mentions different grounds for the detention of a person, the order detention should specify distinctly the ground or grounds for which the detenu has bee:i ordered to be detained and it would not be permissibk to state that the detenu has been ordered to be detained for ground (a) \"or\" ground (b). The use of the word \"or\" woulc .show in cases falling under such a statute, an element of casualness in the making of the order as held by this Court in the case of Jagannath Misra v. State of Orissa.( 1) The detenu in that case had been ordered to be detained under rule 30 ( 1 )( b) o: the Defence of India Rules, 1962 and according to the order of detention, the order had been made with a view to preventing the detenu \"from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India and civil defence, the public safety, the maintenance m\n\n(t) tt966] 3 s.c.R. 134,\n\nANANTA MUKlll v. WEST BENGAL (Khanna,!.) 397\n\nA public order, India's relations with foreign powers, 1he mainten\n\nance of peaceful conditions in any part of India or the efficien conduct of military operations\".\n\nThis Court observed :\n\n\"There is anotner aspect of the order which leads to the same conclusion and unmistakably shows casualness in the making of the order. Where a number of grounds are the basis of a detention order, we would expect the various grounds to be joined by the conjunctive \"and\" and the use of the disjunctive \"or\" in such a case makes no sense. In the present order however we find that the disjunctive \"or\" has been used, showing that the order is more or less a copy of s.3(2)(15) without any application of the mind or the authority concerned to the grounds which apply in the present case.··\n\nD The above principle would, however, not apply in the case of a\n\nperson ordered to be detained under the Act with which we are\n\ndealing because of the special definition given in sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act of the expression \"acting in any nianaer prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order\". According to the definition, each one of the activities mentioned in the various clauses of the said sub-section constitute.; an act \"prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order\". The presence of the word \"or\" in the definition itself tends to show that the use of that word in the order is not impermissible and there was no element of casualness or absence of due application of the mind in the making of\n\nthe impugned order. ·\n\nIn the case of Dr. Ram:Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar.and Ors. (1}, this Court while expounding the words \"maintenanc c:A.\n\npublic order'', observed :\n\nG \"one has to imagine three concentric circles : Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents the security of the State.\"\n\nThe above observations were relied upon by this Court in the H subsequent case of Madhu Limave v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr and Ors. (2) and it was observed : ----· -\n\n0) (1966] I S.C.R. 71YJ.\n\n(2) [1970) J S.C.R. 746.\n\n398 SlTl>llEME COI JHT RE l'OH.1 S fl 9721 3 S.C.R.\n\n''The expression 'public or<lcr' includes absence of all acts which arc a daqgcr to the security of the State Jnd also acts which arc comprchen<le<l by the expression 'order publiquc' explained above but not acts which disturb only the serenity oE others.\"\n\nln 1the case of State of West Bengal v. As/wk Dey & Ors. etc. etc. (Cr. Apptal No. 217 to 223 of 1971 decided on November 19,\n\n1971) while delaling with different claus.es :of section 3, this Court observed :\n\n\"That, disturbance of public order in a State n1ay in turn prejudicially affect its security, is also undeniable.\n\nFairly close and rational nexus between these clauses and the maintenance of public order and security of the State of West Bengal is writ large on the face of these clauses.\"\n\nIt would-follow from the above that though all activities prejudi- : cial to the security of the State and those which are prejudicial\n\nto -the nlaintenance of public order. are not identical, because of close nexus between maintenance of public order and security of State, there is bound to be some overlapping. As the expressions \"acts prejudicial to the maintenance of public order\" and\n\n\"acts prejudicial to the security of the State\" have not been separately defined but have been put together in the same definition with the disjunctive \"or\" in between them, the use of the word \"or\" in the detention order would not, in our opinion, so adversely affect the. said order as may justify the quashing of that order.\n\nWe are fortified in. the above conclusion--by a recent decision of th\\s Court in the case of Shyµmal Monda! v. State of West Bengal(1). In that case too the impugned order of detention\n\nstated that the District Magistrate- was satisfied that it was necess::iry. that the ptitioner should be - detained with a view to prevent hiin fro~ acting n any n1anner prejudkial to the security of the State or the n1aintenance of public order as provided by section 3 (1) of the At. Argument was advanced 'on behalf of t11c: deteri~ that i_hc. order' of etention ,. was illeg::U\n\ninasmuch as the petitioner ha<l not been informed asto how his ...__\n\n(1) .\\.I.It: (1971) s.c. 2384.\n\nANANTA MUKHI v. WEST BENGAL (Khanna, J,) .399\n\nactivity was prejudicial to the security of the State. It was pointed out that as both the matters, namely,. the maintenance Gf public order and the security of the State had been mentioned in the order of detention, it must be taken that the detaining authority had taken into account extraneous and irrelevant matters in passing the order of detention. It was further submitted that it was not clear whether the detaining authority passed the order to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or for maintenance of public order.\n\nThe above contentions were repelled by this C Court and reliance was placed upon the definition given in subsection (2) of section 3 of the expression \"acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order\". It was observed :\n\n\"It will be seen that the Act itself furnishes a dictionary meaning for the two expressions and a perusal of clauses (a) to ( e) clearly shows that any of the matters referred to therein will be both \"prejutlicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order.\n\nWe are not inclined to accept the contention on behalf of the petitioner that it is only sub-clause ( 1) of clause (a) of section 3(2) which deals with the matters, _which adversely affects the security of the State.\n\nIn fact that very sub-clause refers to the matters mentioned therein as affecting the security of the State or the maintenance of public order.\n\nTherefore, in this case the grounds of detention cannot be held to be. vague nor can the order of detention be held to be invalid on the .. g_round .. that.-thepetitioner must have been detairied only to prevent him from acting i!Pally manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and not to the security of the State.\"\n\nAlthough an attempt was made to assail the correctness of the above view, we find, for reasons stated earlier, no cogent\n\n13-Ls87SupCI/72\n\nground to take a different view. The result is that the petition A fails and is dismissed.\n\nORDER\n\nIn view of the opinion of the majority the Writ Petition is dismissed. B . s.c.\n\nPetition dismissed .", "total_entities": 133, "entities": [{"text": "ANANTA MUKHI, @ ANANTA HARi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANANTA MUKHI, @ ANANTA HARi", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 3, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 67, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ANANTA MUKHI, @ ANANTA HARi\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\nFebruary 3, 1972\n\n[J. M. SHELAT, H. R. KHANNA AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.J\n\nWest Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act 1970-Sec."}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. K. MATHEW, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. K. MATHEW, JJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 177, "end_char": 183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "statute": "Prevention of Violent Act"}}, {"text": "Sec. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 192, "end_char": 201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "statute": "Prevention of Violent Act"}}, {"text": "art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 270, "end_char": 277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "statute": "Prevention of Violent Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 339, "end_char": 343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "statute": "Prevention of Violent Act"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 360, "end_char": 385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1064, "end_char": 1070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "statute": "Prevention of Violent Act"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2179, "end_char": 2188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2485, "end_char": 2494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2756, "end_char": 2765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2843, "end_char": 2852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shelat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3453, "end_char": 3459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "397 DJ\n\nShelat J. Dissenting: The c\"nstruction of the definition in S. 3(2) cannot mean that .any one of the activities enumerated in Clauses (a) tO\n\n(e) would fall under both the grounds, namely, the security of the State and the rnainten3nce of public order."}}, {"text": "S. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3513, "end_char": 3520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4877, "end_char": 4883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5118, "end_char": 5125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 S.C.R. 134", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5224, "end_char": 5243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "R. K. lain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5409, "end_char": 5419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. lain, for the petitioner.", "canonical_name": "R. K. lain"}}, {"text": "G. L. Mukhoty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5442, "end_char": 5455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Mukhoty and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "G. L. Mu]>hoti"}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5460, "end_char": 5476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Mukhoty and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "K. K.\n\nMATHEW", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5623, "end_char": 5636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of H. R. KHANNA and K. K.\n\nMATHEW, JJ.", "canonical_name": "K. K. MATHEW, JJ"}}, {"text": "KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5660, "end_char": 5666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by\n\nKHANNA, J.\n\nShelat, J.,\n\nThe order of detention impugned in this petition is as follows:\n\n\"ORDER\n\n~o."}}, {"text": "P. S. Debra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5925, "end_char": 5936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "97iC Dated 24-4-71 Whereas I am satisfied with respect to the person known as s:1ri Anania Mukhi, @ Ananta Bari, son of Gobardhan, @ Gurai o.f Antpara, Chakbazir, P. S. Debra, Dt.", "canonical_name": "P. S. Debra"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6212, "end_char": 6221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ananta Mukhi @Anania Hari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6366, "end_char": 6391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 of 1970) make this order directing that the said Shri Ananta Mukhi @Anania Hari be detaind.", "canonical_name": "ANANTA MUKHI, @ ANANTA HARi"}}, {"text": "sec. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7262, "end_char": 7271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 19, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7707, "end_char": 7721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H By a Proclamation, dated March 19, 1970, made under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7734, "end_char": 7742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7781, "end_char": 7786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "356 of the Constitution, the President of India, being satisfied that a situation had arisen in which government in West Bengal could\n\nnot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, assumed to himself the functions of government of that State and declared that the powers of the State Legislature shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7855, "end_char": 7866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "356 of the Constitution, the President of India, being satisfied that a situation had arisen in which government in West Bengal could\n\nnot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, assumed to himself the functions of government of that State and declared that the powers of the State Legislature shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8112, "end_char": 8122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "356 of the Constitution, the President of India, being satisfied that a situation had arisen in which government in West Bengal could\n\nnot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, assumed to himself the functions of government of that State and declared that the powers of the State Legislature shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament."}}, {"text": "April\n\n29, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8186, "end_char": 8201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of the said Proclamation, Parliament enacted, on April\n\n29, 1970, the West Bengal State Legislature \\Delegation of Powers) Act, XVII o[ 1970, under sec."}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8285, "end_char": 8291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "President Act XIX of 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8612, "end_char": 8637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8881, "end_char": 8897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "President Act XIX of 1970", "statute": "President Act XIX of 1970"}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9249, "end_char": 9255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "President Act XIX of 1970", "statute": "President Act XIX of 1970"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10917, "end_char": 10934, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Arms Act, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11846, "end_char": 11860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12057, "end_char": 12068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Arms Act, 1959", "statute": "the Arms Act, 1959"}}, {"text": "Code of Crimina I Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12076, "end_char": 12109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act or in the Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13120, "end_char": 13158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13179, "end_char": 13205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13343, "end_char": 13347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Act, 1952", "statute": "the Defence of India Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14084, "end_char": 14108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14498, "end_char": 14526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15119, "end_char": 15131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order impugned the stated 1hat the authority was satisfied that it was necses to detain the petitioner with a view to prevent him from acting in a marmer pre judicial to \"the public safety and maintenance of la\\v and order\" After considering the earlier decisions on the question as to the meaning of the expressions, 'law and order', 'public order' and 'security of I.he State', Hidayatullah, J., (as he then was) summed up as follows :\n\n\"The District Magistrate acted to \"maintain law and order\" and his order could not be read differently even\n\n(I) (196<] I SC R 709."}}, {"text": "sec. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16837, "end_char": 16846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16854, "end_char": 16884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "13-1-72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18125, "end_char": 18132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, there may be activities which depending upon\n\n(2) [1970) 3 S.C.R, 188\n\n(3) Writ Petition 308 of 1971, decided on 13-1-72."}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20038, "end_char": 20044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20597, "end_char": 20603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 425", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22098, "end_char": 22106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22114, "end_char": 22124, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sec. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22928, "end_char": 22937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23566, "end_char": 23572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28481, "end_char": 28490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29205, "end_char": 29214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 S.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29817, "end_char": 29854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 S.C.ll."}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29938, "end_char": 29958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A say that the three alleged acts were such that they placed the security of the State of West Bengal in danger, or had even the tendency to do so ?"}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30636, "end_char": 30643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 425", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31009, "end_char": 31017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31025, "end_char": 31035, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31366, "end_char": 31372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "flag", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32421, "end_char": 32425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. WEST BENGAL (Khanna, J.) 391\n\nflag or any other object of public veneration is regarded by that clause as acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State\n\nor the maintenance of public order depending upon the circumstances, the reach or the potentiality of the act in question."}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33476, "end_char": 33482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34187, "end_char": 34193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Khamlll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34389, "end_char": 34396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khamlll, J. This is a petition through jail under article 32 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by Anania Mukhi alias Ananta Hari who has been ordered to be detained under section 3 of West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970 (President's Act No."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34439, "end_char": 34449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34457, "end_char": 34478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Anania Mukhi alias Ananta Hari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34526, "end_char": 34556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khamlll, J. This is a petition through jail under article 32 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by Anania Mukhi alias Ananta Hari who has been ordered to be detained under section 3 of West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970 (President's Act No."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34599, "end_char": 34608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34625, "end_char": 34650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "24-4-71", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34842, "end_char": 34849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "97/C Dated 24-4-71 Whereas I. am satisfied with respect to the person known as Shn Ananta Mukhi @ Ananta Hari son of Gobardhan @ Gurai of Antpara, Chakbazir, P. S.\n\nDeba, Dt.,"}}, {"text": "Ananta Mukhi @ Ananta Hari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34914, "end_char": 34940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "97/C Dated 24-4-71 Whereas I. am satisfied with respect to the person known as Shn Ananta Mukhi @ Ananta Hari son of Gobardhan @ Gurai of Antpara, Chakbazir, P. S.\n\nDeba, Dt.,", "canonical_name": "ANANTA MUKHI, @ ANANTA HARi"}}, {"text": "Gobardhan @ Gurai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34948, "end_char": 34965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "97/C Dated 24-4-71 Whereas I. am satisfied with respect to the person known as Shn Ananta Mukhi @ Ananta Hari son of Gobardhan @ Gurai of Antpara, Chakbazir, P. S.\n\nDeba, Dt.,"}}, {"text": "Antpara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34969, "end_char": 34976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "97/C Dated 24-4-71 Whereas I. am satisfied with respect to the person known as Shn Ananta Mukhi @ Ananta Hari son of Gobardhan @ Gurai of Antpara, Chakbazir, P. S.\n\nDeba, Dt.,"}}, {"text": "Midnapore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35007, "end_char": 35016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Midnapore that with a view to preventing h1!11 from acting in any manner prejudicial to the s.ecnty of the State or the maintenance of public order, 1t 1s necessary so to do, I therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section ( 1) read with sub-section (3) of section 3 of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970 (President's Act No."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35279, "end_char": 35288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "statute": "Prevention of Violent Act"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35309, "end_char": 35334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ananta Mukhi @ Ananta Harl", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35432, "end_char": 35458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 of 1970) make this order directing that the\n\nsaid Shri Ananta Mukhi @ Ananta Harl be detained.", "canonical_name": "ANANTA MUKHI, @ ANANTA HARi"}}, {"text": "District Magistrate of :\\1idnapore reported to E the. State Government", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35816, "end_char": 35886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On ,\\pril 26, 1971 the District Magistrate of :\\1idnapore reported to E the."}}, {"text": "May 4, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36105, "end_char": 36116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said report and particulars were considered by the State Government and ori May 4, 1971 the detention order was approved by the State Government."}}, {"text": "June 3, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36422, "end_char": 36434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the petitioner was place<l by the State Government before the Advisory Board on June 3, 1971."}}, {"text": "May 20, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36458, "end_char": 36470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile, on May 20, 1971 the StatE Government received a representation of the petitioner dated \\fay 13, 1971."}}, {"text": "June 2. l 971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36662, "end_char": 36675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The s~.'.~ representation was considered by the\n\nState GoY('r; iment and was rejected as per order dated June 2."}}, {"text": "8, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36949, "end_char": 36956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Advisory Board after considering\n\nthe material before it, including the representation of the petitioner and after hearing him in person, sent its report to the State Government on July 8, 1971."}}, {"text": "July 16, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37094, "end_char": 37107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated July 16, 1971 the State Government confinned the order of detention of th\"."}}, {"text": "Manoranjan Dey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 37306, "end_char": 37320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ANANTA MUKHI v. WEST BENGAL (Khanna, J.) 393\n\nThe petition has been resisted by the respondents and the affidavit of Shri Manoranjan Dey, Assistant Secretary, Home (Special) Department, Government of West Bengal has been filed in opposition to the petition.", "canonical_name": "Manoranjan Dey"}}, {"text": "R. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 37461, "end_char": 37471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have heard Mr. R. K. Jain who has argued the case llmicus curiae on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. G. L. Mu]>hoti\n\non behalf of the State.", "canonical_name": "R. K. lain"}}, {"text": "G. L. Mu]>hoti", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 37547, "end_char": 37561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have heard Mr. R. K. Jain who has argued the case llmicus curiae on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. G. L. Mu]>hoti\n\non behalf of the State.", "canonical_name": "G. L. Mu]>hoti"}}, {"text": "Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37627, "end_char": 37631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the contentions advanced by Mr. Jain is that the detaining authority has taken into consideration facts extraneous to section 3 of the Act in making the order of detention, and therefore the said order is illegal."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37713, "end_char": 37722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37930, "end_char": 37939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4-10-69", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38009, "end_char": 38016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this respect we find that in the grounds of detention which were supplied to the petitioner under sub-section ( 1) of section 8 of the Act, the following particulars were mentioned :\n\n\"(1) That on 4-10-69, at about 21-30 hrs.,"}}, {"text": "Pulin Bihari Manda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38137, "end_char": 38155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "you along with 50/60 Naxalite supporters being am1ed with lethal weapons raided the house of Shri Pulin Bihari Manda!", "canonical_name": "Pulin Bihari Mandal"}}, {"text": "Bhuiyabasan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38160, "end_char": 38171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Bhuiyabasan, P. S. Debra in order to kill him."}}, {"text": "P. S. Debra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 38173, "end_char": 38184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Bhuiyabasan, P. S. Debra in order to kill him.", "canonical_name": "P. S. Debra"}}, {"text": "8-11-69", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38393, "end_char": 38400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) That on 8-11-69, at about 20.00 hrs.,"}}, {"text": "Bistu Pada Bhuiya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38513, "end_char": 38530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "you along with 20/22 Naxalite workers a1n1ed with lethal weapons raided the house of Shri Bistu Pada Bhuiya of Radhakantapur, P. S. Debra and killed his two brothers named Madan Bhuiya and Kshudiram Bhuiya by sharp cutting weapons."}}, {"text": "Radhakantapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38534, "end_char": 38547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "you along with 20/22 Naxalite workers a1n1ed with lethal weapons raided the house of Shri Bistu Pada Bhuiya of Radhakantapur, P. S. Debra and killed his two brothers named Madan Bhuiya and Kshudiram Bhuiya by sharp cutting weapons."}}, {"text": "Madan Bhuiya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38595, "end_char": 38607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "you along with 20/22 Naxalite workers a1n1ed with lethal weapons raided the house of Shri Bistu Pada Bhuiya of Radhakantapur, P. S. Debra and killed his two brothers named Madan Bhuiya and Kshudiram Bhuiya by sharp cutting weapons."}}, {"text": "Kshudiram Bhuiya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38612, "end_char": 38628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "you along with 20/22 Naxalite workers a1n1ed with lethal weapons raided the house of Shri Bistu Pada Bhuiya of Radhakantapur, P. S. Debra and killed his two brothers named Madan Bhuiya and Kshudiram Bhuiya by sharp cutting weapons."}}, {"text": "Pulin Bihari Mandal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38907, "end_char": 38926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lt would appear from the above that according to the grounds of detention, the petitioner along with 50 / 60 other persons armed with lethal weapons raided the house of Pulin Bihari Mandal cm October 4, 1969 at night time and looted cash, ornaments, utensils and other properties worth Rs.", "canonical_name": "Pulin Bihari Mandal"}}, {"text": "October 4, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38930, "end_char": 38945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lt would appear from the above that according to the grounds of detention, the petitioner along with 50 / 60 other persons armed with lethal weapons raided the house of Pulin Bihari Mandal cm October 4, 1969 at night time and looted cash, ornaments, utensils and other properties worth Rs."}}, {"text": "November 8, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39082, "end_char": 39098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is further alleged that on November 8, 1969 at about 10 p.m. 1he petitioner along with 20 /22 associates armed with lethal weapons raided the house of Bistu Pada Bhuiya of Radhakanta, pur and killed his two brothers Madan Bhuiya and Kshu,:iram Bhuiya by sharp cutting weapons and also looted m;!)amentE md other articles from the house."}}, {"text": "Radhakanta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39227, "end_char": 39237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is further alleged that on November 8, 1969 at about 10 p.m. 1he petitioner along with 20 /22 associates armed with lethal weapons raided the house of Bistu Pada Bhuiya of Radhakanta, pur and killed his two brothers Madan Bhuiya and Kshu,:iram Bhuiya by sharp cutting weapons and also looted m;!)amentE md other articles from the house."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39505, "end_char": 39514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39555, "end_char": 39564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 425", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40676, "end_char": 40687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40695, "end_char": 40712, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Arms Act, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41622, "end_char": 41636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Explosive Substances Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41644, "end_char": 41674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41881, "end_char": 41892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Explosive Substances Act, 1908", "statute": "the Explosive Substances Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41900, "end_char": 41932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Manoranjan Dey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 42615, "end_char": 42629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The aforesaid activities of the petitioner, according to the affidavit of Shri Manoranjan Dey, disturbed public order and the petitioner became a terror to the residents of the locality.", "canonical_name": "Manoranjan Dey"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43044, "end_char": 43053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43777, "end_char": 43786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mukhoti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45130, "end_char": 45137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The above contention has been resisted by Mr. Mukhoti and in our opinion, is not well founded."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45219, "end_char": 45228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45833, "end_char": 45842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46895, "end_char": 46923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.3(2)(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47873, "end_char": 47883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Rules, 1962", "statute": "the Defence of India Rules, 1962"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48197, "end_char": 48206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 19,\n\n1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49821, "end_char": 49839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "217 to 223 of 1971 decided on November 19,\n\n1971) while delaling with different claus.es :of section 3, this Court observed :"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49884, "end_char": 49893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51378, "end_char": 51387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52349, "end_char": 52358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52898, "end_char": 52910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_401_404_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "RAM KRISHNA PAUL\n\nTIIE GOVT. 011 WEST BENGAL & ORS.\n\nFebruary 3, 1972\n\n[J. M. SHELAT, H. R. KHANNA AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.]\n\nWest Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) A.ct, 1970, s. 3- Grounds of detention--One of the grounds extraneous in character.\n\nOrder of detention would be vitiated.\n\nThe petitioner was deiained under section 6 of the West Bengal Pree vention of Violent Activitiea Act, 1970. One of the grounds of detention\n\nwhich was supplied to the petitioner umler sul>-section ( 1) of section 8 was. that .he alongwith his associates werit to a pharmacy po&ng himself\n\nas a purchaser of medicine '311d demanded money from the oWDllt\" of the pharmacy in the name of collection. towards party fund and out of fear the owner delivered Rs. 10/· to him. Quashing the order ot detention,\n\nD HELD : (i) The around doe& not fall under any ot the c:lausea of 1. 3 setting out the cireum1tance1 under which a pehon can be ordered to be detoined and is therefore extraneous in character.\n\n(ii) There is no allegation in. the ground that the.petitioner had put any person in fear of any injury to that person ot to anyi other. Ai such it cannot be said that the petitioner was guilty Of extortion. Intentionally putting \" person in fear of injury to himlelf or any other is a -•ry E ingredient of the offence of extortion. [403 BJ\n\n(iii) There is nothing to show that the District Magistrate wouid lia~ passed the order of detention of the petitionel\" in case he was not indllt!nced by the facts mentioned in the ground. Therefore, the extraneous nature of even one of the grounds of detention would vitiate the order of deten tion. [403 DJ\n\nF OR1GINAL JUltISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 307 or 1971.\n\nUnder articlo 32 of tho Constitution of India for 'II writ in the nature of habtas corpus.\n\nR. K. lain, for the pe.titioaer\n\nG. L. Mukhoty and G. S. Chatter/11, lot th~ re1pondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, l. This is a petition through jail under article '.• 2 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a writ of habtas cor H pus by Ram Krishna Paul who has been ordered to be detained under section 3 of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970 (President's.Act No. 19 of 1970), hereinafter referred to as the Act.\n\nThe order of detention was made against the petitioner under A 111b-section ( 1 ) read with sub-section ( 3) of section 3 of the Aot by the District Magistrate, Murshidabad on January 27, 1971.\n\nAccording to the order of detention, the District Magistrate was satisfied with respect to the petitioner that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it was necessary to make an order directing his\n\nJI. detention. The petitioner in pursuance of the detention order was\n\narrested on January 28, 1971 and was served with the same day with the ground of detention together with vernacular translation thereof. Report about the making of the detention order was sent ' by the District Magistrate to the late Government along with the\n\nounds of detention and other particulars on January 27, 1971.\n\nThe report and the particulars were considered by the State Gov- C ernment and the orr of detention was approved by the said Government on February 5, 1971. The same day the State Government submitted a report to the Central Government together with the grounds of detention and other particulars. On February 18, 1971 the State Government in its Home Department received representation dated February 15, 1971 sent by the petitioner. The D said representation after consideration was rejected by the State Government on March 23, 1971. In the meanwhile, on February 25, 1971 the State Government placed the case relating to the petitioner befpre the Advisory Board. The representation made by the. petitioner was sent by the State Government to the Board on March 23, 1971- The Advisory Board after hearing the petitioner, sen(its report to the State GGvernment on April 5, 1971.\n\nE Opinion was expressed in i!s report by the Advisory Board that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner. The State Gover:mnent confirmed the order of detention of1he petitioner on May 31, 1971. The confirmation order was. communicated to the petitioner as per memorandum dated June. 10, 1971.\n\nThe petition was resisted by the respondents and the affidavit of Shri Manoranian Dev, Assistant Secretary, Home (Special) Department, Government of West Bengal was filed in opposition to the petition.\n\nAfter hearing Mr. R. K. Jain who argued the matter amicus G curiae on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. G. L. Mukhoti on behalf of the IJ<Spondents on January 13, 1972, we directed that, for reasons to recorded later, the petitioner should be set at liberty.\n\nWe now preed to give reasons in support of our decision.\n\nAlthough a number of submissions were made on behalf of the petitioner at the hearing, , it is, in our opinion, not necessary •to deal with all of them as the detention order is liable to. be quashed because one Qf the grounds for the deiention of the petitioner was\n\nR. K. PAUL v. WEST BENGAL (Khanna, I.) 403\n\nA .extraneous and did not in law justify the making of the detention , order.\n\nThe grounds of detention which were supplied to the peti- tioner under sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Act read as under:.\n\n\"(1) That on 8-12-70 at about 20.00 hours you along wi!h your associates went to Jnanada Pharmacy in\n\nBerhllll), P9~ town posing yourself a purchaser of medicine and demanded money from the owner of the Pharmacy in the name of collection towards party fund. Out\n\nof fear, the owner of the pharmacy delivered Rs. 10/ - to vou.\n\n(2) That on 18-12-70 at about 20.00 hours you along with your associates had been to Punjab Dastra- Iaya, Khagra, P. S. Berhampore and demanded Rs. 1001from the shop.keeper at the point of dagger on the plea of collecting donation towards the party fUnd. Putting\n\nthe owner of the shop in fear of .instant death, you induced him to deliver up an amount of Rs. 100/ - then .and there.\n\n(3) That on 22-10-70 at about 19.30 hours you along with your associates had been to Jnanada Pharmacy, Berhampore town and demanded Rs. 2501from the owner of the Pharmacy at the point of dagger putiing him in fear of instant death. The owner of the Pharmacy was spared on payment of Rs. 501forthwith. You and VQ!!r associates went away fixing 26-12-70 for paymem of the remaining amount.\n\n(4) That on 26-12-70 at about 20.00 hours. you along with yout associates came to J nanada Pharmacy, Berhampore and realised Rs. 201from the owner of . the Pharmacy at the point of dagger putting him in fear of instant death.\"\n\nThe various circU)llstances under which a person can be G ordered to be detained have been set out in the different clauses of section 3 of the Act. Ground No. 1 supplied to the petitioner, in our opinion, does not fall under any of those clauses. According \"to Mr. Mukhoti the facts set out in ground No. 1 would show tliat the petitioner received Rs. JO/- from the 'owner of Jnanada Pharmacy as a result of extortion. Extortion has been defined in H section 383 of the Indian Penal Code as under :\n\n\"Whoever intentionally p11ts any person in fear of .any injury to tha1 person, or to any other, and thereby\n\ndishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits \"extortion.\"\n\nIt would appear from the above definition that before a person can be guilty of extortion, he should intentionally put any person in fear of injury, to that person or to any other, and thereby in duce that person so put in fear to deliver to any person some property, valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into valuable securi!y. Intentionally putting a person in fear of injury to himself or any other is, thus, a necessarv ingredient of the offence of extortion. In ground No. 1, however, there is no allegation that the petitioner had put any person in fear of any injury, to that person or to any other. As such, it can.!lot .be s_aid that the petitioner was guilty of extortion.\n\nWe thus find that ground No. 1 was of an extraneous character and did not justify an order of detention. There is also nothing to show that the District Magistrate would have passed an order of detention of the petitioner in case he was not influenced by facts given in groynd No. 1. The extraneous nature of even one of the grounds of de!tention would, in our opinion, vitiate the order of detention.\n\nWe, therefore, quash the order of detention of the petitioner.\n\nK.B.N.", "total_entities": 47, "entities": [{"text": "RAM KRISHNA PAUL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM KRISHNA PAUL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "TIIE GOVT. 011 WEST BENGAL & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TIIE GOVT. OF WEST BENGAL & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 3, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 69, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 3, 1972\n\n[J. M. SHELAT, H. R. KHANNA AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. K. MATHEW, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 182, "end_char": 186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "statute": "Prevention of Violent Act"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 328, "end_char": 337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "statute": "Prevention of Violent Act"}}, {"text": "West Bengal Pree vention of Violent Activitiea Act, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 345, "end_char": 401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 500, "end_char": 509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Pree vention of Violent Activitiea Act, 1970", "statute": "the West Bengal Pree vention of Violent Activitiea Act, 1970"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1728, "end_char": 1749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "R. K. lain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1796, "end_char": 1806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. lain, for the pe.titioaer\n\nG. L. Mukhoty and G. S. Chatter/11, lot th~ re1pondent.", "canonical_name": "R. K. lain"}}, {"text": "G. L. Mukhoty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1829, "end_char": 1842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. lain, for the pe.titioaer\n\nG. L. Mukhoty and G. S. Chatter/11, lot th~ re1pondent.", "canonical_name": "G. L. Mukhoty"}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatter/11", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1847, "end_char": 1863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. lain, for the pe.titioaer\n\nG. L. Mukhoty and G. S. Chatter/11, lot th~ re1pondent."}}, {"text": "Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1930, "end_char": 1936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, l. This is a petition through jail under article '.• 2 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a writ of habtas cor H pus by Ram Krishna Paul who has been ordered to be detained under section 3 of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970 (President's."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2000, "end_char": 2021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2131, "end_char": 2140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2161, "end_char": 2186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2388, "end_char": 2397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "statute": "Prevention of Violent Act"}}, {"text": "January 27, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3111, "end_char": 3127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Report about the making of the detention order was sent ' by the District Magistrate to the late Government along with the\n\nounds of detention and other particulars on January 27, 1971."}}, {"text": "February 5, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3269, "end_char": 3285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report and the particulars were considered by the State Gov- C ernment and the orr of detention was approved by the said Government on February 5, 1971."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3347, "end_char": 3365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same day the State Government submitted a report to the Central Government together with the grounds of detention and other particulars."}}, {"text": "February 18, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3431, "end_char": 3448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 18, 1971 the State Government in its Home Department received representation dated February 15, 1971 sent by the petitioner."}}, {"text": "February 15, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3523, "end_char": 3540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 18, 1971 the State Government in its Home Department received representation dated February 15, 1971 sent by the petitioner."}}, {"text": "March 23, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3651, "end_char": 3665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The D said representation after consideration was rejected by the State Government on March 23, 1971."}}, {"text": "February 25, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3688, "end_char": 3705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile, on February 25, 1971 the State Government placed the case relating to the petitioner befpre the Advisory Board."}}, {"text": "March 23, 1971-", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3889, "end_char": 3904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "petitioner was sent by the State Government to the Board on March 23, 1971- The Advisory Board after hearing the petitioner, sen(its report to the State GGvernment on April 5, 1971."}}, {"text": "April 5, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3996, "end_char": 4009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "petitioner was sent by the State Government to the Board on March 23, 1971- The Advisory Board after hearing the petitioner, sen(its report to the State GGvernment on April 5, 1971."}}, {"text": "Manoranian Dev", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4401, "end_char": 4415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was resisted by the respondents and the affidavit of Shri Manoranian Dev, Assistant Secretary, Home (Special) Department, Government of West Bengal was filed in opposition to the petition."}}, {"text": "R. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4551, "end_char": 4561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After hearing Mr. R. K. Jain who argued the matter amicus G curiae on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. G. L. Mukhoti on behalf of the IJ<Spondents on January 13, 1972, we directed that, for reasons to recorded later, the petitioner should be set at liberty.", "canonical_name": "R. K. lain"}}, {"text": "G. L. Mukhoti", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4636, "end_char": 4649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After hearing Mr. R. K. Jain who argued the matter amicus G curiae on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. G. L. Mukhoti on behalf of the IJ<Spondents on January 13, 1972, we directed that, for reasons to recorded later, the petitioner should be set at liberty.", "canonical_name": "G. L. Mukhoty"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5331, "end_char": 5340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "8-12-70", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5382, "end_char": 5389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"(1) That on 8-12-70 at about 20.00 hours you along wi!h your associates went to Jnanada Pharmacy in\n\nBerhllll), P9~ town posing yourself a purchaser of medicine and demanded money from the owner of the Pharmacy in the name of collection towards party fund."}}, {"text": "18-12-70", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5708, "end_char": 5716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) That on 18-12-70 at about 20.00 hours you along with your associates had been to Punjab Dastra- Iaya, Khagra, P. S. Berhampore and demanded Rs."}}, {"text": "Khagra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5802, "end_char": 5808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) That on 18-12-70 at about 20.00 hours you along with your associates had been to Punjab Dastra- Iaya, Khagra, P. S. Berhampore and demanded Rs."}}, {"text": "P. S. Berhampore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5810, "end_char": 5826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) That on 18-12-70 at about 20.00 hours you along with your associates had been to Punjab Dastra- Iaya, Khagra, P. S. Berhampore and demanded Rs."}}, {"text": "22-10-70", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6093, "end_char": 6101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) That on 22-10-70 at about 19.30 hours you along with your associates had been to Jnanada Pharmacy, Berhampore town and demanded Rs."}}, {"text": "Berhampore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6184, "end_char": 6194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) That on 22-10-70 at about 19.30 hours you along with your associates had been to Jnanada Pharmacy, Berhampore town and demanded Rs."}}, {"text": "26-12-70", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6424, "end_char": 6432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "You and VQ!!r associates went away fixing 26-12-70 for paymem of the remaining amount."}}, {"text": "J nanada Pharmacy, Berhampore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6552, "end_char": 6581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "you along with yout associates came to J nanada Pharmacy, Berhampore and realised Rs."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6825, "end_char": 6834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mukhoti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6964, "end_char": 6971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According \"to Mr. Mukhoti the facts set out in ground No."}}, {"text": "Jnanada Pharmacy", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7075, "end_char": 7091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JO/- from the 'owner of Jnanada Pharmacy as a result of extortion."}}, {"text": "section 383", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7150, "end_char": 7161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7169, "end_char": 7186, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "K.B.N.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8697, "end_char": 8703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.B.N."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_405_410_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "DAUD AHMED\n\nDISTRICT MAGISTRATE, ALLAHABAD & ORS.\n\nFebruary 4, 1972\n\n[S. M. Snw, C.J., A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY, D. G. PALEKAR\n\nAND M. H. BEG, JJ.]\n\nU.P. (TempOl1'ary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, ss. 3, second proviso and 1-Scope of.\n\nNatural Justice-\"-Duty of inquire whether alternative accommodation exists before requisitioning premises,\n\n1be petitionei' owned premises which were in the oqcupe.tion of a tenant. The tenant vacated the premisea and delivered posse8Sion to the petitioner who moved into actu\"1 occupation and informed the. au!lioritiea: Thereafter, the District Magistrate pasied an order of requisition of theae premises, without any enquiry as to whether the petitioner had any othot' alternative accommodation, and the petitioner challenaed the order.\n\nAllowing the petition,\n\nHELD : ( J) The petitioner was in &ctual residenoe of the requisitioned premises and his occupation was not unlawful. Section 7 of the Act does not contain any impediment or bar to the landlord takihg possession Of E the premises after the tenant has vacated. [408 B-G]\n\n(2) The sec.ond proviso to s. 3 of the Act, therefore, applies, and under th&t proviso, the District Magistrate had to form an opinicin that alternative accommodation for the person in occupation existed' Alternative accmnmodation will have to be alternative to the accommodation of which the person was in actual occupation. The existence of !Ill alterna tive accommodation is a mattei' of fact and the opinion is to be formed on certain facts. That is, the District Magistrate had to hold en inquiry to rtain the facts in order 'to arrive at the opinion that there exlated alternative accommodation.\n\nIt will not be correct to say that without holdin.11 such an lnquiiy or aivina an opportunity to the person in occupa. tion the District Ma91strate can ascertain as to whether such alte1119tive accommodation exltts. [409 A.C, GH; 410 A-DJ\n\nA. K. Kralpak v. Union of India, [1970] I S.C.R. 457, followed.\n\nOiuGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 244 of 1971.\n\nUnder article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of the Fundamental Rights.\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, K. L. Hathi and P. C. Kapur, for the petitioner.\n\nG. N. Dikshit and 0. P. Rana, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by- A\n\nRay, J.\n\nThis is a wdt petition challenging the order dated 11 July, 1971 made by the Dist.riot Magistrate, Allahabad under section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Requisition Act) whereby the petitioner's premises 1-A Beli Road, Allahabad was requisitioned B for the residene of Mr. Jul!tice D. S. Mathur for a period of \"three years or earlier if the purpose is exhausted\".\n\nThe order further recited \"I am fur.her satisfied that the said accommodation is not being occupied by any tenant and the owner C who is said to be in possession of the same is living in his own house No. 1011108 Katra Bakhtiari, Allahabad and so no alternative accommodation shall have to be provided to him\".\n\nThe petitioner owns premises 1-A Beli Road, Allahabad here- .· inafter called the Beli Road premises.\n\nPrior to the impeached .0 order the Beli Road premises had been in the occupation of Mr.\n\nJustice Oak Qf the Allahabad High Court since the year 1955 and p.rior thereto from the year 1950 when he was the District Judg.!, Allahabad.\n\nThe petitioner was Jiving at 1011108 Katra Bakhtiari, Al!aha- E. bad. That house is alleged to be situated in a very congested-area\n\nand is unhygenic because of iis situation near a municipal drain.\n\nThe petitioner further alleged that the health of the members of the petitioner's family suffered because of the condition of the house.\n\nAccording to the petitioner, the house also required reconstruction which would cost approximately Rs. 40,000.\n\nMr. Justice Oak retired as Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court in the month of May, 1971. The petitioner in the month of November, 1970 made an application to the District Magistrate under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (herei11after called the Eviotion Act) for release of the Beli G Road premises in his favour after the same would be vacated by Mr. Justice Oak. The application was under Rule 6 of the Rules under the Eviction Act. It was made in view of the fact that the Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court would retire in the month of May, 1971. The petitfoner also gave an undertaking that he H would vacate the other house 101I108 Katra Bakhtiari and the same could be allotted to any other person. By an order dated 3\n\nMay, 1971 the Di&trict Magistrate rejected the application of the petitioner. It may be stated here rthat the Chief Justice of Allahabad had rec; Qmmended the petitioner's application for release of the accommodation.\n\nThe petitioner thereafter filed a representation under seotion 7-F of the Eviction Act against the order of refusal to release the accommodation. The State Government on 6 May, 1971 further stayed all proceedins for allotment in respect of Beli Road premises. After the Chief Justice of Allahabad vacated the premises in the month of May, 1971 ho~ delivered possession to the petitioner who moved into the premises and was then in actual occupation of the Beli Road premises. The petitioner infom1ed the Rent Controller and Eviotion Officer, Allahabad that the Chief Justice of Allahabad had vacated the Boli Road premises and given possession thereof to the petitioner and the petitioner was in occupation ot the same.\n\nOn 8 July, 1971 the DiS'trict Magistrate passed an order of requisition of the Beli Road premises. This order is challenged on these grounqs., First, no notice of enquiry was given to the petitioner nor W!lS any enquiry made whether suitable alternative accommodation eXisted for the needs of 1he petitioner. Secondly, no provision was made for suitable alternative accommodation of the petitioner because the petitioner had stated that the accommodation at 1011108 Katra Bakhtiari was not fit for habitation and that is why the petitioner's whole family was residing at 1-A, Beli Road, A!lahaad. Thirdly, it was said that the petitioner had a fundamental right to hold property and he was deprived of it without being heard and without being given an opportunity of redressing his grievances before the property was requisitioned.\n\nThe entire controversy in this case turns on the second proviso to section 3 of the Requisi1tion Act. The first proviso is not set out because it is not material. The relevant provisions in section 3 are as follows :-\n\n\"Power of requisition :-If in the opinion of the District Magisirate it is necessary to requisition any accommodation. for any public purpose he may' by ordor in writing, requisition such accommodation and may direct that the possession thereof shall be delivered to him within such period as may be specified in the order;\n\nprovided that the period so specified shall not be less A than 15 days from the date of the service of the order;\n\nProvided further that no accommodation which is in the actual occupation of any person shall be requisitioned unless the District Magistrate is further of the B opjnion that suitable alternative accommodation exists for his needs or has been provided to him\".\n\nCounsel on behalf of the State contended that the proviso was not applicable inasmuch as the requisitioned premises was no! in the actual OQcupation of the petitioner. That submission is unacceptable. The affidavit evidence of the petitioner is that the peti- C tioner was in occupation of the Beli Road premises after Chief Justice Oak had vacated the premises. The State did not deny the fact of occupation of the Beli Road premises by the peititioner.\n\nThe impeached order of requisition also recited that the petitioner was said to Qe in possession of the Beli Road premises. The Stale however contended it to be unlawful occupation. It is indisput- D able that the petitioner was in possession of the Beli Road premises~ Chief Justice Oak vacated the premises in the month of May,\n\n1971. The petitioner was the owner. Chief Justice Oak therefore surrendered possession to the owner who accepted it. The petitioner went in!o actual residence at the Beli ltoad premises.\n\nCounsel on behalf of the State relied on section 7 of the Eviction Act in support of the contention that the District Magistrate was to control letting of premises and unless an order was made by the DistJice!. Magistra~~ the petitioner could not get into possession. That is totally misreading section 7 of the Eviction Act.\n\nSection 7 indicates that both the landlord and the tenant shall give\n\nnotice of the vacancy of the premises after accommodation becomes vacant by the' tenant ceasinii; to occupy or the tenant vacatinii; it or when there. is release from requisition.\n\nSection 7 (2) states that 1the District Mastrate may require a landlord to allot or not o allot to any person any occupation which is or has fallen vacant. Section 7 does not contain any impediment and bar to the landlord takinii; possession of the premises after the tenant ha< vacated. The petitioner informed the District Magistrate that the premises had been vacated and that the petitioner moved into the premises particularly because the other house where the petitioner had been staying with his family was unhygenic and in dilapidated condition. It is also noticeable that the petitioner made an application under rule 6 of the Eviction Act to the District Magistrate to permit the petitioner to occupy the premises for his personal occupation inasmuch as it was needed by the petitioner. Therefore the petitioner could not be said to be in unlawful occupation.\n\nI!'\n\nThe petitioner was in actual occupation of the premises. The question therefore is wlwther the second proviso to section 3 of the Requisition Act required that any notice of enquiry was to be given to the petitioner or that any enquiry was to be made by the District Magistrate as to whether suitable alternative accommodation existed for the petitioner or whether alternative accommodation should be provided. On behalf of the State it was submitted that the opinion of the District Magistrate that alternative accommodation existed or had been provided was the subjective opinion of the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate could not form an opinion by imagination. Opinion is to be formed on certain facts. The existence of an alternative accommodation is a matter of fact. The District Magistrate had to form an opinion that alternative accommodation existed. This could not be done without ascertainment of facts and investigation into the question.\n\nThe application of the doctrine of audi altarem partem to the exercise of any statutory power depends primarily on the purpose and provisions of the Act Thi~ Court in A. K. Kraipak & Ors. etc. v. Union of India & Ors., [1970) 1 S.C.R. 457 in dealing with the preparation of a selection list for appointment of officers to the Indian Fore.!_! Service said that one of the purposes of the rule of naturaf justice was ito prevent miscarriage of justice. The principle of natural justice has been applicable to administrative enquiries or quasi judicial enquiries. It is the natiire of the power and the I circumstances and conditions under which it is exercW-.d that will occasion thiinvocation of the principle of natural justice. Deprivation of property.affects rights of a person. If under the Requisiiion Act the. netitioner was to be deprived of the occupation of the premises the District Magistrate had to hold an enquiry in order to arrive at an opinion that there existed alternative accolllmodation '\n\nfor the petiiioner or the District Magistrate was to provide alternative accommodation. The pditioner had made specific request\n\nto remain in occupation of the Beli Road premises on !he 2round that the other house was inadequate and insanitary. The District Magistrate corild decide only after due enquiry and investigation on ma!erials whether any alternative accommodation ex:isted.\n\nAlternative accommodation will have to be alternative to the accommodatio_n of which the petiiion.er is in actual occupation. It is incomprehensible as to how the District Magistrate could in 'the order of requisition state the fact that because the petitioner was living in the other house no alternative accommodation was to beprovided.\n\nThe existence of alternative accommodation is something the having of which can be ascertained. It will not be correct to say that without holding an enquiry and giving an opportunity to the-\n\nPctitiqner in that behalf the District Magistrate will be in a position to ascertain as to whether alternative accommodation for the petitioner exists The existence of an alternative accommodation is a controversy which has to be determined by the District MaRistrait!l. The determination is necessary for correcting or con- . tradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to the view expre.ssed .either by the District Magistrate or the petitioner. That is why the principle of audi a/tarem partem is attracted. The opinion as to alternative accommodation is not an impersonal obligation. It is a determination of a fact. The District Magistrate has to arrive at the opinion on the existence of facts by holding an enquiry and not on turning the idea within himself withou't giving th.e' petitioner any say in the matter.\n\nThe District Magistrate did not hold an enquiry and failed to comply with the principles .of naitural justice by finding out the requisite condition to the exercise of his powers that alternative accommodation existed for :he petitionor.\n\nThe order of reauisition is illegal and unwarranted.\n\nFor these reasons, the petitioner is entitled to succeed. There will be an order quashing the order of requisition of the Beli Road premises. The petitioner is entitled to costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nPetition allowed.", "total_entities": 39, "entities": [{"text": "DAUD AHMED", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 10, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAUD AHMED", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, ALLAHABAD & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, ALLAHABAD & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 4, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 67, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 4, 1972\n\n[S. M. Snw, C.J., A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY, D. G. PALEKAR\n\nAND M. H. BEG, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. G. PALEKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.G. PALEKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 145, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 167, "end_char": 205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 207, "end_char": 212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 929, "end_char": 938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1109, "end_char": 1113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2052, "end_char": 2062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2070, "end_char": 2091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2136, "end_char": 2150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, K. L. Hathi and P. C. Kapur, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "K. L. Hathi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2152, "end_char": 2163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, K. L. Hathi and P. C. Kapur, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "P. C. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2168, "end_char": 2179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, K. L. Hathi and P. C. Kapur, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "G. N. Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2202, "end_char": 2215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Dikshit and 0."}}, {"text": ". P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2221, "end_char": 2230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Dikshit and 0."}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2310, "end_char": 2313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- A\n\nRay, J.\n\nThis is a wdt petition challenging the order dated 11 July, 1971 made by the Dist.riot Magistrate, Allahabad under section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Requisition Act) whereby the petitioner's premises 1-A Beli Road, Allahabad was requisitioned B for the residene of Mr. Jul!tice D. S. Mathur for a period of \"three years or earlier if the purpose is exhausted\"."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2434, "end_char": 2443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2468, "end_char": 2503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2602, "end_char": 2611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- A\n\nRay, J.\n\nThis is a wdt petition challenging the order dated 11 July, 1971 made by the Dist.riot Magistrate, Allahabad under section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Requisition Act) whereby the petitioner's premises 1-A Beli Road, Allahabad was requisitioned B for the residene of Mr. Jul!tice D. S. Mathur for a period of \"three years or earlier if the purpose is exhausted\"."}}, {"text": "Jul!tice D. S. Mathur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2656, "end_char": 2677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- A\n\nRay, J.\n\nThis is a wdt petition challenging the order dated 11 July, 1971 made by the Dist.riot Magistrate, Allahabad under section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Requisition Act) whereby the petitioner's premises 1-A Beli Road, Allahabad was requisitioned B for the residene of Mr. Jul!tice D. S. Mathur for a period of \"three years or earlier if the purpose is exhausted\"."}}, {"text": "Oak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3262, "end_char": 3265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prior to the impeached .0 order the Beli Road premises had been in the occupation of Mr.\n\nJustice Oak Qf the Allahabad High Court since the year 1955 and p.rior thereto from the year 1950 when he was the District Judg.!,"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3273, "end_char": 3293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prior to the impeached .0 order the Beli Road premises had been in the occupation of Mr.\n\nJustice Oak Qf the Allahabad High Court since the year 1955 and p.rior thereto from the year 1950 when he was the District Judg.!,"}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4059, "end_char": 4097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "6 May, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4997, "end_char": 5008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government on 6 May, 1971 further stayed all proceedins for allotment in respect of Beli Road premises."}}, {"text": "8 July, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5551, "end_char": 5563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 8 July, 1971 the DiS'trict Magistrate passed an order of requisition of the Beli Road premises."}}, {"text": "A!lahaad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6135, "end_char": 6143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, no provision was made for suitable alternative accommodation of the petitioner because the petitioner had stated that the accommodation at 1011108 Katra Bakhtiari was not fit for habitation and that is why the petitioner's whole family was residing at 1-A, Beli Road, A!lahaad."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6448, "end_char": 6457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6571, "end_char": 6580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Oak", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8041, "end_char": 8044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is indisput- D able that the petitioner was in possession of the Beli Road premises~ Chief Justice Oak vacated the premises in the month of May,\n\n1971."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8317, "end_char": 8326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8571, "end_char": 8580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8603, "end_char": 8612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8854, "end_char": 8863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9010, "end_char": 9019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9843, "end_char": 9852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1970) 1 S.C.R. 457", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10913, "end_char": 10932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_411_416_EN", "year": 1972, "text": ":}- E\n\nISHWAR DAS MALHOTRA\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS\n\nFebruary 8, 1972\n\n[S. M. $Il(RJ, C.J., A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY, D. G. PALEKAR\n\nAND M. H. BEG, JJ.J\n\nJammu and Kammir (Extension of Laws) Act; 1956, Ss. 1 & 2- Notification by Cen.tral Govern1nent appointing November 1, 1956, as date of coining into force of £.'(tension Act to Jammu and Kashmir-Exten\n\nsion of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946 in the Schedule of\n\n£tension Act to Jan1n1u and Kashmir-Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956-Ef!ect of.\n\nBy ti>! Constitution (Application to J ammu & Kashmir) Order, 1954,. one of the entries on which Parliament could make laws was Entry 8!> of List I -of the Seventh Schedule, dealing With 'Extension of the powers\n\nand jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to 'any State 1 to any area outside that Stte'. The Jammu and Kashmir (Extension of Laws) Act, 1956, (El'tension Act) received the President's assent on September 25, 1956. Section I (2) provides that it shall .come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette appoint.\n\nBy a notification ted October 10, 1956, November 1, 1956 was appointed as the date for the coming into force of the Extension Act in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Tlie effect of the notification and s. 2 of the Act was that the Delhi Speei\"1 Police Establishment Act, 1946, (the impugned Act) which was one of the Act& mentioned in the Sc'.hedule to the Extension Act, came into force in the State from November 1, 1956.\n\nOn the same day the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, came into force and Delhi ceased to be a part C State and became Union Territory,\n\nOn the question whether the impugned Act not validly extended to. the State of Janunu and Kashmir, because, Delhi ceased to be a Part C\n\nState on November 1, 1956,\n\nHELD : (I) When the Extension Act was passed, Parliament had the competence to extend the impugned Act to the State of Jrunmu and Kashmir, because; the Delhi Special Police. establishment was a police force belonging to n Part C State. Assuming Parliament_ qeased to have the power as from November 1, 1956, the Central Government could validly issue the notification under s. I (2) appointing the date from whjch\n\nthe Extension Act would come into force, and as soon as this 'W:l\"S done, by virtue of s. 2, the impugned Act came into force in the State, {414 B-EJ\n\nState of Asam v. Brhvian Kurkalang, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 223, followed.\n\n(2) The general plrinciple that the executive power ccrreSpcinds to the legislative power, in An. 73, of the Constitution is subject to exceptiollJ.\n\nThe executive power to ex-te a valid Jaw does not deae if power fu make that law has ceased to exist. (415 B-DJ .\n\n(3) In so far. as the impugned legislation is a law with respect to Entry 80, even if there was repugnancy it must override any laws repugnant thereto in Jammu and Kashmir. (415 D-EJ\n\n(4) There is nothing in s. 1(2) of the Extension Act which makes it obligatory that the notification should issue simult:Uleously with the date of the coming into force of the Act.\n\nOn the contrary, the notification must ordinarily issue earliei' than the date of the coming into force of the law.\n\nThe notification could have been issued any time after the President had given his assent to t'he Aclt, '3Dd as Soon as the notification was issued, s. 2 came into effect and all the Acts and Ordinances men tioned in the Schedule stood automatically extended and came into force in the State (416 A.CJ\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. '93 of 1971.\n\nL. M. Singhvi, P. N. Tewari, 0. C. Mathur, l .. B. Dadacharji :and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.\n\nNiren De, Attorney-General tor India, lagadish Swarup, 'Solicitor-General of India, R. N. Sachthey and R. L. Mehta, for respondents Nos. 1 & 2. /\n\nAdvocate-General for the State of lammu and Kashmir and .R.. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. 3.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nSikri, C; J. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment of the Janimu & Kashmir High Court holdjng that the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, (25 of\n\n1946) was validly exrended to the State of Janimu and Kashmir by the J animu and Kashmir (Extension of Laws) Act, 1956- :hereinafter referred to as the Extension Act.\n\nThe High Court decided this question on a reference made by the Special Magis~ trate, under s. 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, before whom the challan had been filed under the Ranbir Penal Code on November 29, 1967. The only question involved in this .appeal before us is as to the validity of the aforesaid extension.\n\nIn order to appreciate the contentions of the learned coiinsel in this respect, it is necessary to give an account of the constitutional provisions applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.\n\nOn January 26, 1950 the Constitution of India came into foree.\n\nIn exercise of the powers conferred by cl. (1 ) of art. 3 70 of the Constitution of India, the President, in consultation with the Government of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, made the Constitution (Application to Janimu and Kashmir) Order, 1950. This order was superseded by .another order in 1954. By that order,\n\nne of the entries on which Parliament could make laws was entry\n\n- F\n\n80 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. This entry reads as follows :\n\n\"Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to any State to any area outside that State, but not so as to enable the police of one State to exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area outside that State without the consent of the Government of the. State in which such area is situated; extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to any State to railway areas outside the State.\"\n\nBy the Extension Act, which received the assent of the President on September 25, 1956, the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, was extended to the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the following manner. Section 1 (2) of the Extension Act provided that \"it shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint.\" Section 2 provided as follows :\n\n\"(l) The Acts and Ordinance mentioned in the Schedule and all rules, orders and regulations made thereunder are hereby extended to and shall be in force in, the State of Jammu and Kashmir.\n\n(2) With effect from the commencement of this Act, the Acts and Ordinance mentioned in the Schedule shall be amended as specified rtherein.\"\n\nThe Schedule which contained the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, amended it by omitting the words \"except the State of J ammu and Kashmir\" from section 1.\n\nA notification was issued appointing November 1, 1956, as the date for the coming into force of the Extension Act in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The effect of the notification and Sec. 2 mentioned above was that the Delhi Special Police Esta blishment Act, 1946, came into force in the State of Jammu and Kashmir from November 1, 1956.\n\nThe Constitution (Seventh Ame\"fidment) Act, 1956 also came into force on November 1, 1956. The State of Delhi, which was a part 'C' State immediately before the Seventh Amendment be came a Union Territory.\n\nA new article, art. 372A, was also inserted in the Constitution enabling the President to adapt la\\vs in force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution\n\n(Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956.\n\nThis article has no application to the State of J ammu and Kashmir and, therefore, any adaptations made by the President\n\nin exercise of the powers under art. 3 72A can have no application to the State of J ammu and Kashmir.\n\nIn view of these constitutional changes, it is contended on be half of the appellant, that under entry 80 Parliament could only extend the powers and jurisdiction of members of the Police Force belonging to any State, and as Delhi became a Union Territory and ceased to be a State on November 1, 1956, Parliament had no jurisdiction to extend the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.\n\nIt seems to us that the impugned Act was validly extended and our reasons for coming to this conclusion are as follows.\n\nWhen the Extension Act was passed, Parliament had the compe- C tence to extend the impugned Act to the State of Jammu and Kashmir because the Delhi. Special Police Establishment, was a police force belonging to a Part 'C' State.The contention of the learned counsel that because Parliament could not extend the powers and jurisdiction of members of lhe Delhi Special Police Force nfter November I, 1956, assuming it to be correct; dt>es not 9 invalidate the powers exercised earlier. When the Extension Act was passed there is no doubt that the Parliament had the power. \\ The fact that the Parliament ceased to have power, as from November I, l 956, does not make any difference.\n\nThis Court had occasion to deal with a similar question in State of Assam v. Ka Bchyien. Kurka}ang.(\\) In that case, para 19 (b) of Schedule 6, Constitution of India, authorised the Gover nor to make regulations for ihe peace and good government of a district. This power was vested in the Governor till the settiilg up of a District Council for an autonomous district. It w.as .contended that because a District Council had been set up, the Governor could not exercise the pO\\ver. u_nder the Regulation and apply Jaws.\n\nThe High Court had accepted the contention but this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court, and after referring to J. K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v.\n\nKing Emperor;(') Ram Kirpa/ v. State of Bihar;(8 ) and Cajee v.\n\nU. Jormanik Siem,(') held that although the power of the Governor to legislate ended when the District Council was cons tituted, the power conferred under the regulation on the Governor to bring into force the laws set out in the Schedule continued and would continue so long as the regulation remained on the statute book. The same principle applies here. The Central Governent could validly issue a notification under sub-s. (2) of ... Si; G . .1 appointing the date from which the Act would CQllle into fori; e, and as soon as this notification was made, by virtue of s. 2, the\n\n(1) [19721 S.C.R. 223. (2) [l~47; F, CR. 141. (ll [1970] 1 s.c.R. 2n\n\n(4) ft96tJ 1 s.cn. 1~0.\n\nimpugned Act came into force in the State.\n\nThe Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act did not destroy the efficacy of sub-s.\n\n(2) of s. 1. ·\n\nThe learned counsel contended that this principle conflicts with the general principle that executive power corresponds to legislative power and it could not have been intended that the extended law should operate when there was no corresponding legislative power. In this connection he referred to art. 73. The general principle is subject to exceptions. Article 73 itself opens with the words \"subject to the provisions of this Constitution.\" This is one of the exceptions envisaged by the Constitution.\n\nOther such exceptions are in art. 277 and art. 372. Although legislative power may not xist to legislate on the subject of existing laws executive power would be exercised under the laws saved by art. 277 and art. 372. No authority has been cited in support of the contention that executive power to execute a valid law ceases to exist if power to make that law has been transferred to another authority or ceases to exist.\n\nIt was next contended that the impugned Act was repugnant to and inconsistent with the J anrnm and Kashmir Code of Criminal Procedure and Jamniu and Kashmir Police Act, which were already in existence. before the Delhi Special Police Act, 1946 came into force. But in so far a< the impugned legislation is a bw with respect to entry 80, even if there is repugnancy it mut override any laws repugnant thereto in Jammu and Kashmir.\n\nArt. 246, as applicable to Jammu and Kashmir, reads thus :\n\n\"246( l) Notwithstanding anything in clause (2), Parliament has the exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the\n\nSeventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the \"Union List\");\n\n(2) Parliament, and, subject to clause ( l), the Legislative of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any bf the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the \"Concurrent List\").\n\nWhen the ifnpugned Act was extended Parliament had no power to make laws with respect to any items in the Concurrent List, but the impugned law is fully covered by entry 80 and there is no need to rely on the Concurrent list. Therefore, art. 254 can have no application to the present case.\n\nH was also contended that the impugned Act could not have been validly extended by a notification dated October 10, 1956, 13-L887Sup.CI/n\n\nil!lolOCl under the Extension Act which itself came into force only A from November I, 1956. There is nothing in sub-s.(2) of s. I which makes it obligatory that the notification should issue simultaneously with the date of the coming into force of the Act. On the contrary, notification must ordinarily issue earlier than the date of the coming into force of the Jaw. It seems to us clear that the notification could have been issued any time after the B President had given his assent, and as soon as the notification was issued s. 2 came into effect and all the Acts and Ordinance mentioned in the Schedule, stood automatically extended and came into force.\n\nThe learned counsel did not press the point regarding art. 1-l of the Constitution.\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 83, "entities": [{"text": "E\n\nISHWAR DAS MALHOTRA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ISHWAR DAS MALHOTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. G. PALEKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.G. PALEKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 151, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Ss. 1 & 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 203, "end_char": 212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sion of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 357, "end_char": 408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 676, "end_char": 692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act to Jammu and Kashmir-Exten\n\nsion of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946", "statute": "Act to Jammu and Kashmir-Exten\n\nsion of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946"}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir (Extension of Laws) Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 841, "end_char": 888, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "September 25, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 942, "end_char": 960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Jammu and Kashmir (Extension of Laws) Act, 1956, (El'tension Act) received the President's assent on September 25, 1956."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1036, "end_char": 1054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section I (2) provides that it shall .come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette appoint."}}, {"text": "October 10, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1132, "end_char": 1148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification ted October 10, 1956, November 1, 1956 was appointed as the date for the coming into force of the Extension Act in the State of Jammu and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1311, "end_char": 1315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act to Jammu and Kashmir-Exten\n\nsion of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946", "statute": "Act to Jammu and Kashmir-Exten\n\nsion of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946"}}, {"text": "Police Establishment Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1354, "end_char": 1384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1892, "end_char": 1902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the State of Janunu and Kashmir, because, Delhi ceased to be a Part C\n\nState on November 1, 1956,\n\nHELD : (I) When the Extension Act was passed, Parliament had the competence to extend the impugned Act to the State of Jrunmu and Kashmir, because; the Delhi Special Police."}}, {"text": "Jrunmu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1965, "end_char": 1983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the State of Janunu and Kashmir, because, Delhi ceased to be a Part C\n\nState on November 1, 1956,\n\nHELD : (I) When the Extension Act was passed, Parliament had the competence to extend the impugned Act to the State of Jrunmu and Kashmir, because; the Delhi Special Police."}}, {"text": "Delhi Special Police. establishment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1998, "end_char": 2033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the State of Janunu and Kashmir, because, Delhi ceased to be a Part C\n\nState on November 1, 1956,\n\nHELD : (I) When the Extension Act was passed, Parliament had the competence to extend the impugned Act to the State of Jrunmu and Kashmir, because; the Delhi Special Police."}}, {"text": "November 1, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2136, "end_char": 2152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assuming Parliament_ qeased to have the power as from November 1, 1956, the Central Government could validly issue the notification under s. I (2) appointing the date from whjch\n\nthe Extension Act would come into force, and as soon as this 'W:l\"S done, by virtue of s. 2, the impugned Act came into force in the State, {414 B-EJ\n\nState of Asam v. Brhvian Kurkalang, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 223, followed."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2348, "end_char": 2352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Police Establishment Act, 1946", "statute": "Police Establishment Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2900, "end_char": 2917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as the impugned legislation is a law with respect to Entry 80, even if there was repugnancy it must override any laws repugnant thereto in Jammu and Kashmir. ("}}, {"text": "s. 1(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2954, "end_char": 2961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3378, "end_char": 3382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L. M. Singhvi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3599, "end_char": 3612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi, P. N. Tewari, 0."}}, {"text": "P. N. Tewari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3614, "end_char": 3626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi, P. N. Tewari, 0."}}, {"text": "B. Dadacharji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3647, "end_char": 3660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur, l .. B. Dadacharji :and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3666, "end_char": 3681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur, l .. B. Dadacharji :and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Niren De", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3703, "end_char": 3711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niren De, Attorney-General tor India, lagadish Swarup, 'Solicitor-General of India, R. N. Sachthey and R. L. Mehta, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "lagadish Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3741, "end_char": 3756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niren De, Attorney-General tor India, lagadish Swarup, 'Solicitor-General of India, R. N. Sachthey and R. L. Mehta, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3787, "end_char": 3801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niren De, Attorney-General tor India, lagadish Swarup, 'Solicitor-General of India, R. N. Sachthey and R. L. Mehta, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "R. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3806, "end_char": 3817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niren De, Attorney-General tor India, lagadish Swarup, 'Solicitor-General of India, R. N. Sachthey and R. L. Mehta, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": ".R.. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3906, "end_char": 3922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Advocate-General for the State of lammu and Kashmir and .R.. N. Sachthey, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3992, "end_char": 3997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nSikri, C; J. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment of the Janimu & Kashmir High Court holdjng that the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, (25 of\n\n1946) was validly exrended to the State of Janimu and Kashmir by the J animu and Kashmir (Extension of Laws) Act, 1956- :hereinafter referred to as the Extension Act."}}, {"text": "Kashmir High Court holdjng that the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4085, "end_char": 4165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of Janimu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4209, "end_char": 4236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nSikri, C; J. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment of the Janimu & Kashmir High Court holdjng that the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, (25 of\n\n1946) was validly exrended to the State of Janimu and Kashmir by the J animu and Kashmir (Extension of Laws) Act, 1956- :hereinafter referred to as the Extension Act."}}, {"text": "s. 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4435, "end_char": 4441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kashmir High Court holdjng that the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946", "statute": "Kashmir High Court holdjng that the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4449, "end_char": 4475, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4533, "end_char": 4543, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "November 29, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4547, "end_char": 4564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court decided this question on a reference made by the Special Magis~ trate, under s. 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, before whom the challan had been filed under the Ranbir Penal Code on November 29, 1967."}}, {"text": "State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4836, "end_char": 4862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to appreciate the contentions of the learned coiinsel in this respect, it is necessary to give an account of the constitutional provisions applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4868, "end_char": 4884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 26, 1950 the Constitution of India came into foree."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4889, "end_char": 4910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4980, "end_char": 4986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4997, "end_char": 5018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of the State of Jammu & Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5060, "end_char": 5102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 70 of the Constitution of India, the President, in consultation with the Government of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, made the Constitution (Application to Janimu and Kashmir) Order, 1950."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5334, "end_char": 5350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5951, "end_char": 5995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6069, "end_char": 6078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946", "statute": "the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6239, "end_char": 6248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946", "statute": "the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Schedule which contained the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6608, "end_char": 6681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of J ammu and Kashmir", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6728, "end_char": 6755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Schedule which contained the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, amended it by omitting the words \"except the State of J ammu and Kashmir\" from section 1."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6762, "end_char": 6771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Schedule which contained the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946", "statute": "The Schedule which contained the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6958, "end_char": 6964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Schedule which contained the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946", "statute": "The Schedule which contained the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Delhi Special Police Esta blishment Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6994, "end_char": 7039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7210, "end_char": 7224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Delhi, which was a part 'C' State immediately before the Seventh Amendment be came a Union Territory."}}, {"text": "art. 372A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7337, "end_char": 7346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Special Police Esta blishment Act, 1946", "statute": "the Delhi Special Police Esta blishment Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "State of J ammu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7561, "end_char": 7588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This article has no application to the State of J ammu and Kashmir and, therefore, any adaptations made by the President\n\nin exercise of the powers under art."}}, {"text": "art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7676, "end_char": 7682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Special Police Esta blishment Act, 1946", "statute": "the Delhi Special Police Esta blishment Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7973, "end_char": 7978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of these constitutional changes, it is contended on be half of the appellant, that under entry 80 Parliament could only extend the powers and jurisdiction of members of the Police Force belonging to any State, and as Delhi became a Union Territory and ceased to be a State on November 1, 1956, Parliament had no jurisdiction to extend the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 to the State of Jammu and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "Parliament had no jurisdiction to extend the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8050, "end_char": 8139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Parliament had the compe- C tence to extend the impugned Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8332, "end_char": 8392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi. Special Police Establishment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8439, "end_char": 8474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Extension Act was passed, Parliament had the compe- C tence to extend the impugned Act to the State of Jammu and Kashmir because the Delhi."}}, {"text": "Schedule 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9111, "end_char": 9121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament had the compe- C tence to extend the impugned Act", "statute": "Parliament had the compe- C tence to extend the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9123, "end_char": 9144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10301, "end_char": 10305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10539, "end_char": 10543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10847, "end_char": 10854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10904, "end_char": 10914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11084, "end_char": 11092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11097, "end_char": 11105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11251, "end_char": 11259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11264, "end_char": 11272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11587, "end_char": 11613, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11637, "end_char": 11647, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Delhi Special Police Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11693, "end_char": 11723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11911, "end_char": 11919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Special Police Act, 1946", "statute": "the Delhi Special Police Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12132, "end_char": 12148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Special Police Act, 1946", "statute": "the Delhi Special Police Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12375, "end_char": 12391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Special Police Act, 1946", "statute": "the Delhi Special Police Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "art. 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12691, "end_char": 12699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Special Police Act, 1946", "statute": "the Delhi Special Police Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "OCl under the Extension Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12891, "end_char": 12918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "November I, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12960, "end_char": 12976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CI/n\n\nil!lolOCl under the Extension Act which itself came into force only A from November I, 1956."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13416, "end_char": 13420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "OCl under the Extension Act", "statute": "OCl under the Extension Act"}}, {"text": "art. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13601, "end_char": 13607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "OCl under the Extension Act", "statute": "OCl under the Extension Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_417_421_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "R.L.KAPUR\n\nSTATE OF MADRAS\n\nFebruary 8, 1972\n\n(J. M. SHELAT AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.]\n\n~17\n\nPenal Code-S. 70 read with S. 25 of the General Clauses Act 189i- Whether security deposited in Court in certain contenipt matters can be adjusted against a fine ilnposed upon him in those proceeding$ after the lapse of 6 years.\n\nThe appeal is directed against the order of the High Court of Madras directing a sum of Rs. 500/. deposited in the High Court as security for the appellant's appearance before ii in certain contempt of Court proceedings, to be adjusted against the fine imposed upon him in those proceedings. The contempt of Court proceedings (No. 3 of 1962) were taken against the appellant in the High Court in respect of a letter written and addressed by the appellant to the then Cl!!ef .Justice of the High Court and which contained certain remarks in-: resard to the di•· missal of the appellant'• revision application by a single judge of the High Court. The contempt with which the plaintiff was charged in those proceedings was contempt of the High Court and not tile City Civil Court, in which the appellant had filed the suit 'from which, the said revision application arose. In those proceedings, the High Court by its judgment, held the appellant guilty of contempt of Court and sentenced him to 6 months' simple imprisonment and fine. The appellant served out the sentence of imprisonment but failed to pay the fine.\n\nThe said amount of Rs. 500, deposited in the said contempt proceed ings remained unattached till 1971. when two applications were filed in the High Court-one bl the appellant for refund and the other by the State for adjustment o the said amount towards the fine remaining unpaid and tho High Court allowed the State's application for payment of the said sum towards satisfaction of the said unpaid fine.\n\nCounsel for the appellant relied on S. 70 of the Penal Code and urged that six years having elapsed since the passing of the order imposing fine upon the appellant, the State application was time barred and the High Court could not pus the impugned order. Further, counsel relied on S. 2S ot the General Cla111es Act 1897 which provides that Sections 63 to 70 of the Penal Code and the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code in relation to the issue and execution of warrants for the levy ot fines shall apply to all fines imposed under any Act, Regulation etc., and since a fine which was imposed upon the appellant, was an order passed under the Contempt of Court Act 1952, Section 70 of the Penal Code was applicable. Dismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : (i) Sec. 5 of the Penal Code provides, inttr alia, that its provisions are not to affect the provisions of any special or local law and under Art. 215 of the Constitution, every High Court being a Court of\n\nH Record, have all the powers of such a Court including the power to t punish for contempt of itself. The jurisdiction is a special one. not arising or derived from the Contempt of Courts' Act 1951, and therefore, not within the purview of either the Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Jaw as to contempt of Court, as administered by the\n\nfid: .is High Court.. in the present case, is a special la\\v and therefore,\n\nS. 70 of the Penal CoJe does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case~ Further since such a special law does not prescribe any period of limitation for collecting and satisfying a fine imposed there undc.:· no question of limitation \\vould arise. [420 Al\n\n(ii) The power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself arises not under any Act, such as Contempt of Courts'' Act, but the Constitution itself vests these rights on every High Court, and no Act of a Legislature could take away that jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its 0'1i'n authority and since the sentence of fine\n\n~1nd imprisonment passed against the appellant \\Vas not imposed under :tny act or statute, Section 25 of the General Clauses Act has no applicati0:1 :o the present case. [420 EF]\n\nSukhdev Singh Sondhi v The Chief Justice and Judges of tlte Pepsu\n\nllih Court [1954] S.C.R. 454 referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTIOl'i : Criminal Appeal No. 185 of 1971. ·\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated June 19, 1971 of the Madras High Court in Application Nos, 1171 and 1172 of 1971.\n\nS. l'{. Prasad, for the appellant.\n\nA. V. Rangam. for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShela!, J. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the order of tl!e High Court of Madras, directing a sum of Rs. 500, deposited in the High Court as security for the appellant's appearance before it in certain contempt of court proceed ings, to be adjusted against the fine imposed upon him in those proceedings. It appears that the contempt of court proceedings, being No. 3 of 1962, were taken against the appellant in the High Court in respect of a letter written and addressed by the appellant to the then Chief Justice of the High Court and which contained certain remarks in regard to the dismissal of the appellant's revision application by a single Judge of the High Court.\n\nThus, the contempt with which the plaintiff was charged in those proceedings was contempt of the High Court, and not the City Civil Court, Madras, in which the appellant had filed the sait from out of which the said revision application arose. In those proceedings, the High Court, by its judgment and order, dated February 25, 1964, held the appellant guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to six months' single imprisonment and fine.\n\nThe appellant served out the sentence of imprisonment, but failed <o pay the fine.\n\nR. L. KAPUR v. MADRAS STATE (She/at, J.) 419\n\nA It ppars that. the said amount of Rs. 500, deposited, as a.foresa1d, m the said contempt proceedings, remained unattached till 1971. In 1971, two applications were filed in the High Court, one by the appellant for refund of the said amount and the other on beb, alf of the State for adjustment of the said amount towards the fine remaining unpaid. By an order, dated June 29, 1971, B the High Court dismissed the appellant's application for refund and allowed the State's application for payment of the said mm t'bwards satisfaction of the said unpaid fine.\n\nAs against the said order, counsel for the appellant relied on sec., 70 of the Penal Code and urged that six years having elapsed since the passing of the order imposing fine upon the appellant, the State's application was time barred and the High Court could not pass the impugned order, the diect of which was to collect the said fine from out of the said deposit. If sec. 70 were to apply to tqe said contempt of court proceedings, there is no doubt that the State's application would be time barred as that section in tenns provides that such fine can be levied within six years after the passing of the order of conviction and sentence.\n\nBut sec. 5 of the Penal Code provides, inter alia, that its provisions are not to affect the provisions of any special or local law. Under sec. 41 of the Penal Code, a special law is one applicable to a particular subject. Therefore, if the law as to contempt of court, as administered by the High Court of Madras, a chartered High E Court, were to be regarded as special law, sec. 70 of the Penal Code, obviously, cannot apply, and since such a sp.o-eial law does not prescribe any period of !imitation for collecting and satisfying a fine imposed thereunder, no question of !imitation would arise.\n\nCounsel, however, relied on sec. 25 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which provides that secs. 63 to 70 of the Penal Code F and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the issue and execution of warrants for the levy of fines shall apply to all fines imposed under \"any Act, Regulation, rule or bye-law\" unless such Act, Regulation, rule or bye-law contains an express provision to the contrary. The argument was that the order of sentence which imposed upon the appellant the fine was and must be regarded as an order passed under the Contempt of G Courts Act, XXXII of 1952, and consequently, sec. 70 of the Penal Code was applicable.\n\nThe question is, does the power of the High Court of Madras to punish contempt of itself arise under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, so that under sec. 25 of the General Clauses Act,\n\n1897. secs. 63 to 70 of the Penal Code and the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure would apply? The answer to such a question is furnished by Art. 215 of the Constitution and the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952\n\nthemselves.\n\nArt. 215 declares that every High Court shall be A a court of record and shall have all powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Whether Art.\n\n215. declares the power of the High Court already existing in it by reason of its being a court of record, or whether the Article confers the power as inherent in a court of record, the jurisdiction is a special one, not arising or derived from the Contempt B of Courts Act, 1952, and therefore, not within the purview of either the Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such a position is also clear from the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. Sec. 3 of that Act provides that every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in accordance with the same procedure and practice in respect of contempt of courts subordinate to it as it has and exer- 'C cises in respect of contempts of itself. The only limitation to the power is, as provided by sub-sec. (2), that it shall not take cognizance of a contempt committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Penal Code. As explained in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the Pepsu High Court,(') sec. 3 of the Act D is similar to sec. 2 of the 1926 Act, and \"far from conferring a new jurisdiction, assumes, as did the Old Act, the. existence of a right to punish for contempt in every High Court and further assumes the existence of a special practice and procedure, for it says that every High Court shall exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority \"in accordance with the same procedure E and practice .... \". In any case, so far as contempt of the High Court itself is concerned, as distinguished from that of a court subordinate to it, the Constitution vests these rights in every High Court, and so no Act of a legislature c<iuld take away that jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority.\n\nNo doubt, sec. 5 of the Act states that a High Court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into and try a contempt of itself or of a court F subordinate to j.t whether the alleged contempt is committed within or outside the local limits of its jurisdiction and whether the contenmor is within or outside such limits; Tli!> effect of sec. 5 is only to widen the scope of the existing jurisdiction of a special kind and not conferring a new jurisdiction. It is true that under sec. 4 of the Act the maximum sentence and fine which can be G imposed is respectively simple imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 2,000, or both. But tha't again is a restriction on an existing jurisdiction and not conferment of a new jurisdiction.\n\nThat being the position, sec. 25 in the General Clauses Act, 1897 cannot apply. The result is that sec. 70 of the Penal Code is no impediment by way of limitation in the way of the recovery of H the fine.\n\n(I) [19l4] S.C.R. 454, at 463.\n\nR. L •. KAPUR v. MADRAS STATE (Shelat, J.) 4 21\n\nIt is true that the deposit was made for a particular purpose, that is, to secure the presence of the appellant at the time of the hearing of the said contempt proceedings. But the High Court, as a court of record, being clothed with a special jurisdiction, has also all incidental and necessary powers to effectuate that jurisdiction, <;:onsequently, it had the power to order satisfaction of fine imposed by it from out of an available fund deposited by or on behalf of or for the benefit of the appellant.\n\nIn our view, the C!)ntentions raised on behalf of the appellant cannot, for the reasons aforesaid, be sustained. The appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.\n\ns.c.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 71, "entities": [{"text": "R.L.KAPUR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 9, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. L. KAPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 8, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 44, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.L.KAPUR\n\nSTATE OF MADRAS\n\nFebruary 8, 1972\n\n(J. M. SHELAT AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 99, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 148, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 367, "end_char": 387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal is directed against the order of the High Court of Madras directing a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "S. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1876, "end_char": 1881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1889, "end_char": 1899, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 2S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2123, "end_char": 2128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 63 to 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2182, "end_char": 2199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2207, "end_char": 2217, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Contempt of Court Act 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2491, "end_char": 2517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2519, "end_char": 2529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Contempt of Court Act 1952", "statute": "the Contempt of Court Act 1952"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2537, "end_char": 2547, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2599, "end_char": 2605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Contempt of Court Act 1952", "statute": "the Contempt of Court Act 1952"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2613, "end_char": 2623, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 215", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2737, "end_char": 2745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Contempt of Court Act 1952", "statute": "the Contempt of Court Act 1952"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3053, "end_char": 3063, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3071, "end_char": 3097, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3233, "end_char": 3238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Contempt of Court Act 1952", "statute": "the Contempt of Court Act 1952"}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3935, "end_char": 3945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3953, "end_char": 3972, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sukhdev Singh Sondhi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4024, "end_char": 4044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "420 EF]\n\nSukhdev Singh Sondhi v The Chief Justice and Judges of tlte Pepsu\n\nllih Court [1954] S.C.R. 454 referred to."}}, {"text": "S. l'{. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4347, "end_char": 4361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. l'{."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4383, "end_char": 4395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Rangam."}}, {"text": "Shela", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4462, "end_char": 4467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShela!,"}}, {"text": "City Civil Court, Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5278, "end_char": 5302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, the contempt with which the plaintiff was charged in those proceedings was contempt of the High Court, and not the City Civil Court, Madras, in which the appellant had filed the sait from out of which the said revision application arose."}}, {"text": "February 25, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5472, "end_char": 5489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In those proceedings, the High Court, by its judgment and order, dated February 25, 1964, held the appellant guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to six months' single imprisonment and fine."}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6372, "end_char": 6382, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sec. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6663, "end_char": 6670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6940, "end_char": 6946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6954, "end_char": 6964, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sec. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7075, "end_char": 7082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7090, "end_char": 7100, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sec. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7313, "end_char": 7320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7328, "end_char": 7338, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sec. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7565, "end_char": 7572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7580, "end_char": 7605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7648, "end_char": 7658, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7687, "end_char": 7713, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sec. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8156, "end_char": 8163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8171, "end_char": 8181, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras to punish contempt of itself arise under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8238, "end_char": 8332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sec. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8348, "end_char": 8355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Court of Madras to punish contempt of itself arise under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952", "statute": "the High Court of Madras to punish contempt of itself arise under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8363, "end_char": 8382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8413, "end_char": 8423, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8459, "end_char": 8485, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 215", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8545, "end_char": 8553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act,\n\n1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act,\n\n1897"}}, {"text": "Constitution and the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8561, "end_char": 8628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 215", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8643, "end_char": 8651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution and the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952", "statute": "the Constitution and the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n215", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8816, "end_char": 8825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution and the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952", "statute": "the Constitution and the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Contempt B of Courts Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9071, "end_char": 9101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9155, "end_char": 9165, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9173, "end_char": 9199, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Such a position is also clear from the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9201, "end_char": 9286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9288, "end_char": 9294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Such a position is also clear from the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952", "statute": "Such a position is also clear from the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9791, "end_char": 9801, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Pepsu High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9878, "end_char": 9894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As explained in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the Pepsu High Court,(') sec."}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9899, "end_char": 9905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Such a position is also clear from the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952", "statute": "Such a position is also clear from the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9933, "end_char": 9939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Such a position is also clear from the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952", "statute": "Such a position is also clear from the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10641, "end_char": 10647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10961, "end_char": 10967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11103, "end_char": 11109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11388, "end_char": 11395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11403, "end_char": 11428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sec. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11462, "end_char": 11469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11477, "end_char": 11487, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_422_430_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "SHY AM LAL SHARMA, ETC.\n\nSTATE OF l\\IADHYA PRADESH\n\nFebruary 9, 1972\n\n[P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.J\n\nC, vde of Cri111i11t1l Procedure, ss. 165, 537-Reasons for search not recorded-Alleged illegality of search on this ground does not give to accused right to obstruct s11ibsequent investigation by physical assault and\n\nwrongful confine1nent of p'erson conducting investigation-Conviction of those wh~ do so u11der s. 353 and 342 l.P.C. is justified.\n\nBecause of allegations that the lnspetor of a traffic barrier was de .. nlanding bribe from a lorry d'river u trap was arranged. It was led by a Circle Inspector (P.W. !). The decoy witness handed over Rs. 4-0 in currency notes to constable N inside the harrier office. Thereafter a signal was given to the police party.\n\nWhen N saw P.W. 1 approaching he hid the aforesaid currency nots in an inner apartment of the office under nn overcoat. P .W. 1 made a search of the premises and recOvered the notes from under the -overcoat. When he was preparing the Panchnama appellant U arrived on the scene and took P.W. 1 to task for having entered his office without permission or reference to him.\n\nHe then asked N not to sign the seizure memo.\n\nWhile this altercation \\\\as going on appellant S, the Barrier Inspector, arrived there and he also reprimanded P.W. 1 and questioned his authority. Even though P.W. I asserted that authority was conferred on him to make a search, S asked him to give him in writing that he had entered the barrier office without the permission of the person in-charge otherwise he would not be allowed to go out.\n\nP.W. 1 agreed to give the writing at the Dak Bungalow and moved out of the office but he was brought back by force and a threat to beat him with a danda was held out.\n\nUnder threat from S and U P.W. 1 8'!'V• them a copy of the seizure memo as also a \\\\tiling to the effect that a search was taken. On these facts, S. U and N were charged under ss. 353 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code. The trial 'Court while holding that assault, wrongful restraint and wrongful confinement were proved against the appellants nevertheless acquitted them because the provisions of s. 165 CriminaL Procedure Code relating to search were not complied with. The High Court in appeal by the State held that the non-observance of the provisions of s. 165 Cr.P.C. were a mere irregularity and on this view convicted the appellants under ss. 332. 353 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellants in appeals by special leave contended before this Court that (i) since the search was made without recording reasons as required under s. 165 Cr.P.C. they had a right to' obstruct it and (ii) since P.W. 1 did not give them a copy of the seizure memo as required by s. 103 Cr. P.C. the entire investigation was vitiated and consequently any obstruction caused in the subsequent process of investigation \\vould not constitute ariy offence.\n\nHELD : It may be that an obstruction during the course of a search not conducted in conformity with the provisions of s. 165 Cr. P.C. might be justified but there was no warrant for the further submission that the person in \\VhoSe premises a search is made or from whom articles are selzed is entllled to act in the manner the appellants had acted in preventing P.W. 1 from discharging his official duties. Obstruction to search\n\nis to the act of the person conducting a search.\n\nIt is a defensive act but where search has ended and the persons conducting the search have left the premises, to bring them back and make them do things against their will is not an obstruction to an act but a compulsion to rnak~ them act. [ 426 H; 429 H]\n\nThere was no noncompliance with s. 103 Cr. P.C, by P.W. l. He was preparing a copy of the seizure memo as required by the section but he was prevented from completing it 'by the appellants who asked N not to sign it.\n\nMoreover P.W. 1 had asked the appellants to come to the Dak Bungalow and take the copy. Section 103 does not say that the copy should be given then and there though qrdinarily that will be implied.\n\nIt could be given soon after the search so long as there is no opportunity to raise any suspicion or doubt as to the authenticity of articles seized. [429 D-E]\n\nNot to allow P.W. 1 to go to the Dak Bungalow and take him forcibly from the road into the office and threaten hi!]) with a lathi to write ar.d give a memo that he had searched the office when he was willing to do so at the Dak Bungalow, was to wrongfully confine him durin~ the period he did not comply with that demand. Nor can the illegality of the search continue as contended during the whole process of investigation till the filing of the charge-sheet under s. 173 Cr.P.C. The effect of ace<pting such a proposition would be to thwart public justice. [429 F-0]\n\nOn the facts of the case the conviction of the appellant S under ss. 342 and 353 and of.. appellant U under ss. 353 and 342 read with s. 34 was justified. [430 Al\n\n[In vie\\V of the above finding the conviction of the appellants linde.r s. 332 was set aside without going into the legality of the convit.1ion under that section].\n\nState of Madhya Pradesh v, Mubarak Ali, [1959] Supp, 2 S.C.R. 201, State of Rajasthan v. Raliman, [1960]1 S.C.R. 991, Bai Radha v. Stare of Gujarat, [1969]2 S.C.R. 799 and Public Prosecutor, Andhra Prades/1 v.\n\nUttaravalli Nageshwararao, A.l.R. 1965 A.P. 176.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal N<1S. 80 and 81 of 1969.\n\nAppealsby special leave from the judgment and order dated October 7, 1968 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 519 oi 1966.\n\nV. A. Seyid Muhammad and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant (in Cr. A. No. 80 of 1969).\n\nR. A. Gupta, for the appellant (in Cr. A. No. 81 of 1969).\n\nI. N. Shroff and R. P. Kapur, for the respondent (in bpth the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nP. Jaga11moha11 Reddy, J. The appellants along with another accused, Narayan Singh, were convicted by the High Court under sections 332, 353, 342 of the Indian Penal Code and were sentenced\n\nto one years' rigorous imprisonment on each count, the sentences A to run concurrently. These two appeals are by special leave.\n\nOn 26-5-1965, Sardar Jagat Singh, owner of a lorry made an application to the Vigilance Commissioner, Bhopal Division that the appellant in Cr!. Appeal No. 80/69 Shyam Lal Sharma, Barrier Inspector at Village Multai, District Betul, has seized the B licence of his Driver stating that if he has to pass from 1!he Barrier, he should bring Rs. 5 per trip or Rs. 40 p.m. but the Driver refused to pay him anything and has declined to go there as a result of which he is likely to suffer heavy loss. He, therefore, offered to give currency notes which may be signed and requested that a proper person may be given to him to arrest the Barrier Inspector C Sharma and his staff and sa_ve him from the corruption. On this application, Circle Inspector Rana Ranjit Singh, P.W. 1 was asked to attend to it. Accordingly, he along with Jagat Singh, his Driver and Panchas Hardeet Singh, P.W. 6 and Muana Lal, P.W. 7 proceeded to Multai Barrier by truck to arrange for a trap and catch the culprits red-handed. On arriving at the Barrier Gate, 4 cur- D reucy notes of R.s. 10 each were given by Jagat Singh, P.W. 2, to his Driver who was sent to the Barrier office along with P.W. 6 and P.W. 7 to give the same, if demanded, and after they were accepted an agreed signal was to .be given. Accordingly, the Driver went to the Barrier office along with P.W. 6 Hardeet Singh and P.W. 7 Munna Lal and after the amount was received by accused Narayan E Singh, P.W. 6 Hardee! Singh came out of the offiee and gave the agreed signal. Immediately, P.W. 1 Ranjit Singh proceeded'to the office and when the accused Narayan Singh saw him coming, he felt suspicious, went inside the inner apartment of the office and concealed the notes under the over-coat lying there. As soon as P.W.\n\nI. entered the office, the Driver Jeet Singh informed him that the Constable has concaled the notes under the over-coat in the inner P apartment. P.W. 1 then disclosed his identity and after having his person searched, went inside the inner apartment and recovered the currency notes lying beneath the over-coat. The notes were seized and while he was preparing the Panchnama, accused Udho Prasad-appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 81169-arrived on the scene and started taking P.W.1 to task for having entered his office G without permission or referenee to him. He then asked 'llccused Narayan Singh not to sign the seizure memo. While this altercation was going on, the accused Shyam Lal arrived there and he also reprimanded P.W. 1 and questioned his authority. Even . though P. W. 1 asserted that authority was conferred upon him to make a search, accused Shyam Lal asked him to give him in writing that he had entered the Barrier office without the permission of the H person incharge otherwise he would not be allowed to go out.\n\nShyam Lal also picked up the notes from the table but they were\n\nA given back on the potest of P.W. 1. P.W. ~.then assured him that he would give the seizure memo and the wntmg to say that he searched at the Dak Bungalow opposite and that accused should accompany him. He was accordingly. allowed and he then lef~ the otlice without getting the signature of the accused Narayan Smgh on the seizure Memo. But no sooner had P.W. 1 come out of the\n\noffice on to the road, Udho Prasad again insisted on the writing being given whereupon Shyam Lal caught P.W. 1 by his wait and forcibly lifted him, took him to the Barrier office and threw hin; i on a chair. The accused Udho Prasad asked accused Narayan Smgh 10 take out a Danda so that these Police officials raiding the office may be taught a lesson. Accused Shyam Lal insisted that unless P.W. 1 gives him then and there a copy of the seizure memo as also a writing to the effect that search was taken, the latter would not be allowed to leave the office.\n\nP.W. 1 faced with this situation could not but comply with the demand made by Udho Prasad and Shyam Lal. It is only after he had given in writing that he had made a search, he was allowed to return to the Dak Bungalow and that too when Misra, Station Officer, P.W. 8 who had come there D went to telephone. Thereafter P.W. 1 gave a written information, Ex. P-4 on 2-6-65, as follows :-\n\n\"It is submitted that today-at 7 .25 a.m. I had arranged the trap at the traffic barrier Multai. After taking the search of the Barrier currency notes ofRs. 40 were found beneath the over-coa(. While I was recording the seizure-memo of these notes, Shri Sharma, Station Officer Traffic abused me and uttered bad words. Thereafter, he said to me, \"You have no powers of trap\". I repeatedly told him that recently the State Government have authorized the Circle Inspectors for trapping. But he did not agree and he created obstruction while I was discharging my duties. He grappled with me. This act of the Sub-In!pector traffic barrier falls under section 353 Indian Penal Code.\n\nAt that time many persons were present on the spot. Kindly offence be registered and a challan be put up in the Court according to Jaw\".\n\nWe may here state, and it is not denied,· that P.W. 1 did not G record in writing the grounds of his belief that anything necessary for. t.he purpos~ of ivestigation into any offence cannot in his op1mon be obtamed without undue delay which is a condition precedent to effect a search under section 165, Cr. P.C. The trial Court wh!le accepting tlie evidence and holding that as8au!t, wrong• ful restramt and wrongful confinement are proved against the\n\napllants, none-the-less acquitted them because the provisions of sectmn 165, Cr. P.C. relating to search had not been complied with.\n\nOn. an appeal by the State, the High Court also accepted the prosecul!on case and agreed with the findings of the trial Court but rejected the contention of the appellants that the search was illegal A and entitled the appeliants to obstruct and man-handle P.W. 1. fa this view the non-observance of the provisions of sec. 165, Cr. P.C. were held to be a mere irregularity as P. W. 1 was throughout conducting himself in an honest and bonafide manner in the discharge of his duties and the appellants were not justified in claiming the right of private defence. In this view, it reversed the order of ace quittal and convicted the accused of the offences as aforesaid.\n\nOn behalf of the appellants it is contended that notwithstanding the findings of both .the Courts that the appellants had wrongfully restrained and obstructed P.W. 1 and also assaulted and used criminal force against him, the several acts alleged against them do not constitute any offence as they had a right to obstruct a search made C in contravention of the provisions of sec. 165, Cr. P.C. which.made the search illegal. It is accordingly submilted that when reasons are not recorded as required by sec. 165, Cr. P.C. for making a search during investigation and as P.W. 1 did not, as required under section 103, Cr. P.C., give a copy of the list of the currency notes seized from Narayan Singh to the appellants, the entire in- D vestigation is vitia\\ed and consequently any obstruction caused in the subsequent process of investigation will not constitute any offence inasmuch as an investigation continus upto the date of filing a charge-she.et under sec. 173.\n\nThere is, in our view, a fallacy in these submissions. That the investigation commenced when the information of a cognizable E offence was given and a trap was laid and P.W. 1 proceeded to the barrier for laying a trap and entered the office to make a search, does not admit of doubt. This Court also held it to be so in the State of Madhya Pradesh.v. Mubarak Ali('), in which the requirements of section 165 to be complied with have been set out and analysed. Even so, to further contend that the appellants were en- F titled to act in the manner they did merely because 11he search was illegal, would be to confer a licence and afford them an unwarranted excuse to commit each and every criminal act. The provisions of section 165 deal with 5earch and seizure.\n\nThe non-conformity with any of the requirements of that provision must be confined to that part of the investigation which relates to the actual search and G seizure but once the search and seizure is complete that provision ceases to have any application to the subsequent steps in the investigation. All cases citd deal with the situation arising out of the actual search and seizure alone. Jt may be that an ob&truction during the course of a search not conducted in conformity with the provisions of sec. 165, Cr. P.C. might be justified but there is no warrant for the further submission that the person in whose premises a search is made or from whom articles are seized is entitled H\n\n(I) [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 201.\n\nA to act in the manner the appellants have acted in preventing P.W. 1 from discharging his official duties.\n\nThe decisions of this Court to which a reference will be made, do not support the submissions made on behalf of the appellants that since the search is illegal, even for the moment accepting that to be so, the entire invtigation till the laying of the c]large-sheet 8 under sec. 173, Cr. P.C. is to be treated as illegal and would afford a justification for the acts of the appellants as held proved in this case. In The Stare of Rajasthan v. Rahman( 1) a Deputy Superintendent of Central Excise, who accompanied by an Inspector of\n\nCentral Excise, a Sepoy, a chowkidar and two motbirs, without complying with the provisions of ec. 165, Cr. P.C. had gone to the C house of the respondent with a view to search the house for finding out whether he had stored tobacco there. When they declared their intention to do so, the respondent and one Dhaman, it is alleged, obstructed the making of the search with the result that the Deputy\n\nSupdt. fell down and received some injuries. The respondent and Dhaman were prosecuted for an offence under sec. 353, I.P.C.\n\nD No doubt, this Court (Gajendragadkar and Subba Rao n~, as, they\n\nthen were), had held that the search made by the Qy. Superintendent in contravention of the provisions of sec. 165 of the Code was illegal but even so, it did not go into the question whether the omission to record the reasons was only an irregularity and that tlie respondents had no. right to prevent the officer from making the search because as that contention had not been raised till then it felt that there was no justification to allow it to be raised before it for the first time.\n\nThis ca9~ considered in Bai Radha v. State of Gujarat(') by Shah J. (ash then was), Ramaswami & Grover JJ.\n\nThere a search was made under sec. 15 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women & Girls Act, 1956, the proviions of which\n\nwere in pari materia with sec. 165, Cr.P.C. in that (1) if the special police officer empowered to search the premises has reasonable grounds for believing that an offence punishable under that Act has been or is being committed in respect of a woman or a girl living in any premises and that such search of the premises with warrant cannot be made without undue delay, such officer may, after recording the grounds of his belief, enter and search such premises without a warrant; (2) before making a search the special police officer was required to call upon two or more respectable inhabitants (at least one of whom shall be a woman) of the locality in which the place to be searched is situa'te, to attend and witness the search. It was contended that since, these provisions have not been complied with, the conviction of the appellant was illegal. The High Court in that case was of the view that the power to conduct the search was derived from the statute and not from the recording of the reasons and, therefore, the search was not rendered illegal on\n\n(1) [1960] l S.CR. 991. f2, !1969] 2 S.C.R. 799.\n\naccount of the contravention of sec. 15(1) of the Act, nor was there A any provision in law which rendered 1jhe evidence of the Pancha witnesses inadmissible even though sec. 15(2) had been contravened. In this view; it did not agree with the decision of the Andhra Pradesh-High Court in Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh v.\n\nU ttaravalli N ageshwararao ('), which held that the directions contained in sub-sec. 2 were of a mandatory nare. After referring B to the State of Rajasthan v. Rahman's(2 ) case, Grover, J. pointed out that that case could not be of much assistance to the appellant because no question was involved in the case before them of any public servantbeing obst:ructed in the course of a search conducted under sec. 165, Cr. P.C. The trial of the appellants was for contravention of certain provisions of the Act and the search was made in respect of this offence. In these circumstances, the non-obser- C vance of the provisions of section 15(2) was held to be not an illegality but a mere irregularity having regard to the provisions of sec. 53 7 of the Criminal Procedl!re Code, and unless it is shown that such irregularity has caused a failure of justice, t:he conviction cannot be set aside. It would, therefore, appear that this Court has not finally decided whether a sear.h already made in contravention D of the provisions of sec. 165, Cr. P.C. makes it illegal or void or merely provides a justification for an obstructtion to the search when it is in.tended or in the process of it being conducted.\n\nOn the findings in this case, i( is unnecessary to resolve. this doubt because even if the search is illegal, it does not justify any E obstruction or other criminal acilS committed against the persons who had conducted the search. The facts undisputably disclose that even after P. W. 1 was allowed to go away on the assurance that he would give a copy of the seizure memo and writing to say that a search was made, at the Dale Bunglow had asked the appel• !ants to accompany hini there, and had gone out of the office and was on the road he was forcibly seized, lifted, taken into the office F and thrown on a chair. Thereafter he was confined, there and threatened with a lathi, till1he\"had complied with the demand of the appellants to give in writing that he had taken a search of the. barrier. The evidence of P.W. 1, P.W. 6, P.W. 7 and of the Station\n\nOfficer'P. N. Misra. P.W. 8, clearly supports the findings of both the courts.\n\nG It may be observed that sec. 342, Cr. P.C. is not confined to offences against public servants but is a general section and makes a person who wrongfully restrains another, guilty of the offence under that section. A wrongful coi$lement is a wrongful restraint in such a manner as to prevent that person .from proceeding beyond a certain circwtmcribed limits. This offence has nothing to do H with the inyestigation or search and, therefore, the argument that\n\n{l) A.LR. 1965, A.P. 176.\n\n(2) [1960J I S.C.Jl. 991.\n\ns. L. SHARMA v. M.P. STATE (Jaganmohan Red~, J,) 429\n\nA the accused were entitled to obstruct P, W. 1 because he did not conform to the provisions of secion 165, Cr. P.C. is an argument of desparation. It is again contended that all that the appellants did was to request P.W. 1 to give.them in writing that a search was , made which they were entitled to ask. To put it thus is to make the act an innocuous one but considered in the light of the inexor- B able facts as established in this case, clearly make the acts of the appellants culpable. Iiy no stretch of logic or reason can the justification for obstruction during the course of a search in contravention of the provisions of sec. 165 entitle a person to force a public servant or any other person to do acts contrary to their volition. It may be mentioned that section 103 which is applicable to searches C under section 165, Gr. P.C. by virtue of clause 4 thereof, requires the person conducting the search to prepare a list of the things taken into possession .and give the person searched a copy of that list. It was exactly that which was, being done by P.W. 1 when he prepared a seizure-memo in which the details of the currency notes were written but he was prevented from completing it by the appellants asking Narayan .Smgh in whose presence in the office they D were seized by not to sign it. In these circumstances when it\n\nappeared that the appeJ)ants had become abusive and agi:ressive, P. W. 1 told them to c2me to the Dak Bungalow wherll he would give them a copy. This in our view cannot be said to amount to non-compliance with the provisions of sec. 103 Cr. P.C. as P.W. 1 was prevented from complying therewith. Section 103 does not E say that the copy should be given then and there thouglu>rdinarily that would be implied. It could be given soon after the search so long as there is no opportunity to raise any suspicion or doubt as to the authenticity of articles seized. Not to allow P. W. 1. to go to the Dak Bungalow and take him forcibly from the road into the office and threaten him with a lathi to write and give a memo that F he had searched the office when he was willing to do so at the Dak Bungalow, is to wrongfully confine him during the period he does not comply with that demand nor can in our view the illegality of the search, if it was an illegality, continue as contended during the whole process of investigation till the filing of a charge-sheet under sec. 173, Cr. P.C. H this proposition is accepted, namely, that if the investigation at any stage is illegal, that illegality continues to G effect the subsequent investigation and justifies a person considering hlmself to be aggrieved to impede, obstruct and unlawfully prevent its further progress, then the logical implication would be to encourage people to take the law into their hands, frustrate the investigation of crimes and thwart public justice. That apart, obstruction to search is to the act of the person conducting a search. It is a H defensive act but where search has ended and the persons condut ina the search have left the premises, to bring them back and to make them do things against their will is not an obstruction to an act but a compulsion to make them act. In this view, the conviction\n\nand sentence of. l; he appellant Shyam Lal Sharma under sec. 342 and 353 and of appellant Udho Prasad under section 353 and 342 read with sec. 34 are justified. In so far as their conviction under se.:tion 332 is concerned, the contention of the learned Advocate\n\nis that the appellants were not charged with this offence and, therefore, they are en.t!tled to an acquittal as they are prejudiced thereby. The learned advocate for the respondent does not insist on this conviction being upheld In any case as we are confirming the conviction and sentence under the other two sections, it is not really necessary to go into the legalify of the conviction under sec.\n\n332. Accordingly, we set aside the conviction, and sentence under\n\nsec 332 and confirm the convictfons and sentence of the appellants under sections 342 and 353, Cr. P.C. The appeal except to the C extent indicated is dismissed.\n\nG.C.\n\nOrdered accordingly.", "total_entities": 113, "entities": [{"text": "SHY AM LAL SHARMA, ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHYAM LAL SHARMA, ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF l\\IADHYA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 9, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 68, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF l\\IADHYA PRADESH\n\nFebruary 9, 1972\n\n[P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.J\n\nC, vde of Cri111i11t1l Procedure, ss."}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. Jaga11moha11 Reddy", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 165, 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 281, "end_char": 284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 353 and 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 428, "end_char": 442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 353 and 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1947, "end_char": 1962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1970, "end_char": 1987, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2167, "end_char": 2173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CriminaL Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2174, "end_char": 2197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2329, "end_char": 2335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CriminaL Procedure Code", "statute": "CriminaL Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2336, "end_char": 2342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 332", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2417, "end_char": 2424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2445, "end_char": 2462, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2614, "end_char": 2620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2621, "end_char": 2627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2744, "end_char": 2750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3036, "end_char": 3042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3688, "end_char": 3694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3962, "end_char": 3973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4699, "end_char": 4705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4706, "end_char": 4712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 342 and 353", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4868, "end_char": 4883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "ss. 353 and 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4911, "end_char": 4926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4937, "end_char": 4942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 332", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5039, "end_char": 5045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "V. A. Seyid Muhammad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5614, "end_char": 5634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. A. Seyid Muhammad and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant (in Cr."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5639, "end_char": 5656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. A. Seyid Muhammad and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant (in Cr."}}, {"text": "R. A. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5705, "end_char": 5716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. A. Gupta, for the appellant (in Cr."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5765, "end_char": 5777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. N. Shroff and R. P. Kapur, for the respondent (in bpth the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. P. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5782, "end_char": 5793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. N. Shroff and R. P. Kapur, for the respondent (in bpth the appeals)."}}, {"text": "P. Jaga11moha11 Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5882, "end_char": 5903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nP. Jaga11moha11 Reddy, J. The appellants along with another accused, Narayan Singh, were convicted by the High Court under sections 332, 353, 342 of the Indian Penal Code and were sentenced\n\nto one years' rigorous imprisonment on each count, the sentences A to run concurrently.", "canonical_name": "P. Jaga11moha11 Reddy"}}, {"text": "Narayan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5951, "end_char": 5964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nP. Jaga11moha11 Reddy, J. The appellants along with another accused, Narayan Singh, were convicted by the High Court under sections 332, 353, 342 of the Indian Penal Code and were sentenced\n\nto one years' rigorous imprisonment on each count, the sentences A to run concurrently.", "canonical_name": "Narayan Singh"}}, {"text": "sections 332, 353, 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6005, "end_char": 6027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6035, "end_char": 6052, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "26-5-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6205, "end_char": 6214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 26-5-1965, Sardar Jagat Singh, owner of a lorry made an application to the Vigilance Commissioner, Bhopal Division that the appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Sardar Jagat Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6216, "end_char": 6234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 26-5-1965, Sardar Jagat Singh, owner of a lorry made an application to the Vigilance Commissioner, Bhopal Division that the appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Multai", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6411, "end_char": 6417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "80/69 Shyam Lal Sharma, Barrier Inspector at Village Multai, District Betul, has seized the B licence of his Driver stating that if he has to pass from 1!he Barrier, he should bring Rs."}}, {"text": "Betul", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6428, "end_char": 6433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "80/69 Shyam Lal Sharma, Barrier Inspector at Village Multai, District Betul, has seized the B licence of his Driver stating that if he has to pass from 1!he Barrier, he should bring Rs."}}, {"text": "C Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6851, "end_char": 6859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He, therefore, offered to give currency notes which may be signed and requested that a proper person may be given to him to arrest the Barrier Inspector C Sharma and his staff and sa_ve him from the corruption.", "canonical_name": "C Sharma"}}, {"text": "Rana Ranjit Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6947, "end_char": 6964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this application, Circle Inspector Rana Ranjit Singh, P.W. 1 was asked to attend to it."}}, {"text": "Jagat Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7027, "end_char": 7038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, he along with Jagat Singh, his Driver and Panchas Hardeet Singh, P.W. 6 and Muana Lal, P.W. 7 proceeded to Multai Barrier by truck to arrange for a trap and catch the culprits red-handed."}}, {"text": "Panchas Hardeet", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7055, "end_char": 7070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, he along with Jagat Singh, his Driver and Panchas Hardeet Singh, P.W. 6 and Muana Lal, P.W. 7 proceeded to Multai Barrier by truck to arrange for a trap and catch the culprits red-handed."}}, {"text": "Muana Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7089, "end_char": 7098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, he along with Jagat Singh, his Driver and Panchas Hardeet Singh, P.W. 6 and Muana Lal, P.W. 7 proceeded to Multai Barrier by truck to arrange for a trap and catch the culprits red-handed."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7260, "end_char": 7265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagat Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7285, "end_char": 7296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10 each were given by Jagat Singh, P.W. 2, to his Driver who was sent to the Barrier office along with P.W. 6 and P.W. 7 to give the same, if demanded, and after they were accepted an agreed signal was to .be given."}}, {"text": "Hardeet Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7548, "end_char": 7561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, the Driver went to the Barrier office along with P.W. 6 Hardeet Singh and P.W. 7 Munna Lal and after the amount was received by accused Narayan E Singh, P.W. 6 Hardee!"}}, {"text": "Munna Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7573, "end_char": 7582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, the Driver went to the Barrier office along with P.W. 6 Hardeet Singh and P.W. 7 Munna Lal and after the amount was received by accused Narayan E Singh, P.W. 6 Hardee!"}}, {"text": "Narayan E Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7628, "end_char": 7643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, the Driver went to the Barrier office along with P.W. 6 Hardeet Singh and P.W. 7 Munna Lal and after the amount was received by accused Narayan E Singh, P.W. 6 Hardee!"}}, {"text": "Hardee! Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7652, "end_char": 7665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, the Driver went to the Barrier office along with P.W. 6 Hardeet Singh and P.W. 7 Munna Lal and after the amount was received by accused Narayan E Singh, P.W. 6 Hardee!"}}, {"text": "Ranjit Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7737, "end_char": 7749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Immediately, P.W. 1 Ranjit Singh proceeded'to the office and when the accused Narayan Singh saw him coming, he felt suspicious, went inside the inner apartment of the office and concealed the notes under the over-coat lying there."}}, {"text": "Jeet Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7999, "end_char": 8009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As soon as P.W.\n\nI. entered the office, the Driver Jeet Singh informed him that the Constable has concaled the notes under the over-coat in the inner P apartment."}}, {"text": "Udho Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8350, "end_char": 8361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notes were seized and while he was preparing the Panchnama, accused Udho Prasad-appellant in Crl.", "canonical_name": "Udho Prasad"}}, {"text": "Shyam Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8640, "end_char": 8649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While this altercation was going on, the accused Shyam Lal arrived there and he also reprimanded P.W. 1 and questioned his authority.", "canonical_name": "Shyam Lal Sharma"}}, {"text": "Narayan Smgh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9366, "end_char": 9378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "allowed and he then lef~ the otlice without getting the signature of the accused Narayan Smgh on the seizure Memo.", "canonical_name": "Narayan Singh"}}, {"text": "Udho Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9465, "end_char": 9476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But no sooner had P.W. 1 come out of the\n\noffice on to the road, Udho Prasad again insisted on the writing being given whereupon Shyam Lal caught P.W. 1 by his wait and forcibly lifted him, took him to the Barrier office and threw hin; i on a chair.", "canonical_name": "Udho Prasad"}}, {"text": "Shyam Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9529, "end_char": 9538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But no sooner had P.W. 1 come out of the\n\noffice on to the road, Udho Prasad again insisted on the writing being given whereupon Shyam Lal caught P.W. 1 by his wait and forcibly lifted him, took him to the Barrier office and threw hin; i on a chair."}}, {"text": "Narayan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9688, "end_char": 9695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused Udho Prasad asked accused Narayan Smgh 10 take out a Danda so that these Police officials raiding the office may be taught a lesson.", "canonical_name": "Narayan Singh"}}, {"text": "Misra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10238, "end_char": 10243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is only after he had given in writing that he had made a search, he was allowed to return to the Dak Bungalow and that too when Misra, Station Officer, P.W. 8 who had come there D went to telephone."}}, {"text": "Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10643, "end_char": 10649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While I was recording the seizure-memo of these notes, Shri Sharma, Station Officer Traffic abused me and uttered bad words.", "canonical_name": "C Sharma"}}, {"text": "section 353", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11036, "end_char": 11047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11048, "end_char": 11065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11497, "end_char": 11508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "sec. 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12112, "end_char": 12120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12840, "end_char": 12848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12968, "end_char": 12976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13069, "end_char": 13080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13423, "end_char": 13431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13831, "end_char": 13842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14155, "end_char": 14166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14702, "end_char": 14710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15305, "end_char": 15313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dhaman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15872, "end_char": 15878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When they declared their intention to do so, the respondent and one Dhaman, it is alleged, obstructed the making of the search with the result that the Deputy\n\nSupdt."}}, {"text": "sec. 353", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16072, "end_char": 16080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16082, "end_char": 16087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16114, "end_char": 16128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "353, I.P.C.\n\nD No doubt, this Court (Gajendragadkar and Subba Rao n~, as, they\n\nthen were), had held that the search made by the Qy."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16133, "end_char": 16142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "353, I.P.C.\n\nD No doubt, this Court (Gajendragadkar and Subba Rao n~, as, they\n\nthen were), had held that the search made by the Qy."}}, {"text": "sec. 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16263, "end_char": 16271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16708, "end_char": 16712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This ca9~ considered in Bai Radha v. State of Gujarat(') by Shah J. (ash then was), Ramaswami & Grover JJ."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16732, "end_char": 16741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This ca9~ considered in Bai Radha v. State of Gujarat(') by Shah J. (ash then was), Ramaswami & Grover JJ."}}, {"text": "Grover", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16744, "end_char": 16750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This ca9~ considered in Bai Radha v. State of Gujarat(') by Shah J. (ash then was), Ramaswami & Grover JJ."}}, {"text": "sec. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16786, "end_char": 16793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Girls Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16843, "end_char": 16858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16910, "end_char": 16918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Girls Act, 1956", "statute": "Girls Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16920, "end_char": 16926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "1969] 2 S.C.R. 799", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17975, "end_char": 17993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18028, "end_char": 18038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 15(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18166, "end_char": 18176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh-High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18255, "end_char": 18280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this view; it did not agree with the decision of the Andhra Pradesh-High Court in Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh v.\n\nU ttaravalli N ageshwararao ('), which held that the directions contained in sub-sec."}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18403, "end_char": 18409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18727, "end_char": 18735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18949, "end_char": 18962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19055, "end_char": 19062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19352, "end_char": 19360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. Misra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20398, "end_char": 20406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of P.W. 1, P.W. 6, P.W. 7 and of the Station\n\nOfficer'P. N. Misra."}}, {"text": "sec. 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20493, "end_char": 20501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21671, "end_char": 21679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21807, "end_char": 21818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21859, "end_char": 21870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21894, "end_char": 21902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Narayan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22264, "end_char": 22271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was exactly that which was, being done by P.W. 1 when he prepared a seizure-memo in which the details of the currency notes were written but he was prevented from completing it by the appellants asking Narayan .Smgh in whose presence in the office they D were seized by not to sign it."}}, {"text": "sec. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22608, "end_char": 22616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22676, "end_char": 22687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23440, "end_char": 23448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shyam Lal Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24289, "end_char": 24305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l; he appellant Shyam Lal Sharma under sec.", "canonical_name": "Shyam Lal Sharma"}}, {"text": "sec. 342 and 353", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24312, "end_char": 24328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 353 and 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24364, "end_char": 24383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24394, "end_char": 24401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec.\n\n332", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24915, "end_char": 24924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec 332", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24988, "end_char": 24995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 342 and 353", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25061, "end_char": 25081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_431_436_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "GANGA DEVI & ORS. ETC.\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nFebruary 11, 1972\n\n[A. N. RAY ANP M. H. BEG, JJ.]\n\nU.P. Zamindari Abolition.and La11<I Reforms Act, 1950, s. 39(l)(e)\n\n(i) and (ii)-A.verage annual income how deterniined-Fortst inco1ne. ij includes income dtrived by processing wood.\n\nThe forests of the appellants vested in the respondent-State as a result <>f the notification µnder the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, and the Compensation Officer determined the basis of compensation.\n\nJn appeal by the respondent the High Court held that the Compen sation Officer in determining the compensation was wrong in arriving at the average annual income by adding the annual income, under s. 39( I) ( e )( i) on the basis of a period of 25 years and the appraioemtnt of the annual yield, under s. 39(1)(e)(ii), on the date of vesting.\n\nJn appeals to this Court,\n\nHELD : ( 1) The High C.ourt was correct in holding that the average annual income from forest under s. 39(1)(e) of the Act cm.Id not be computed by arithmetical addition of the figures arrived at on the basis of cl. ( i) and on the ba, is of cl. (ii). The section ,,,,,.xi of computa ti0n of average annual income from forest, (i) on t1'c basis of ioc<; ime for a period of 20 to 40 agricultural years immedialely ,-ding the date of vesting as the Compensation Officer may consider rca!OflabJe.\n\nand (ii) on the appraisement of the annual yield of the forest on the date of vesting.\n\nUnder the first clause. the actual income derived from the forest for a number of years before the date of vesting as the Compensation Officer may consider reasonable is to be taken and the average calculated.\n\nUnder the second clause the annual yield as on the date of vesting is to be appraised. This should be done, Inter alia. by taking ihto considetation the num'Oer and age of trees, the area pf cultivation and the produce. Therefore. the compensation officer has to compute the 'average annual income' by taking recourse to both the iPethods but not by adding the figures on the basis of cl. (i) and on tlic., h!ll of ct (ii l [435 DH; 436 A-BJ '\n\n(2) The High Court rightly held that forest income was reftnhlc lo price of the standing timber. Hence any income which the appenants derived by processing wood, was income in the nature of trade and would not be forest income. [436 E-GJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 41 to 46 of 1967.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated September 1. 1965 of the Allahabad Hig, h Court in First Appeals Nos. 513 of '1955 etc. 15-L8R7S, pCJ/72\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nM. C. Chagla, S. R. Agarwala, A. T. M. Sampath and E. C.\n\nAgarwala, for the appellants (in all the appeals).\n\nL. M. Singhvi and 0. P. Rana, for the respondent (in all the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by B Ray, J. These six appeals are by certificate from the judgment dated 1 September, 1965 of the High Court at Allahabad, Lala Triloki Nath and Lala Digambar Prasad filed four appeals and the State two in the High Court agaiust the order dated 6 September,\n\n1955 of the Compensation Officer. During the pendency of the appeals the Lalas died and the appellants were brought on record.\n\nThe High Court allowed the appeals filed by the State and allowed in part the appeals filed by the appellants. The appellants have come up by certificate in these six appeals.\n\nEach of the Lalas held equal one half share in each of the forests in the villages of Chharba and Prithipur in Dehra Dun District.\n\nBy a notification dated 1 July, 1952 under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter called the Act) the entire furest vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh.\n\nOn 2 May, 1953 the Lalas received the Draft Compensation Assessment Rolls under section 46 (1 )(b) of the Act which showed annual compensation to be paid to the Lalas as nil.\n\nThe Lalas thereafter on 20 May, 1953 filed their objections against the draft compensation roll and claimed compensation under the provisions of the Act.\n\nWith regard to village Chharba the Lalas claimed that it was a valuable sal forest comprising 225 acres.\n\nThe Lalas assessed .the worth of the forest at Rs. 3,40,000. Tkey claimed that sayar F income during the 10 agricultural years immediately preceding the date of vesting should be computed separately and added to the gross income from the forests.\n\nThey further claimed that income by selling poola grass was to be within sayar income.\n\nThe next head of claim was that they did not have accounts of the income of the forest for the previous 20 years but they were able to pro- G duce accounts for four years from 1944 up to 194 7 and the share of each of the Lalas on the basis of the income derived for the said four years came to Rs. 1274-12-0 and on the basis of the appraisement of the annual yield on the date of vesting it came to Rs. 5457 /-.\n\nOn, this basis each of the Lalas claimed Rs. 46740/- as compensation in respect of village Chharba, H\n\nWith regard to the Prithipur forest the Lalas claimed that they had worked the forest during the years 1945 to 1952 and that the\n\nA average annual income of each of their share from the Pri!hipur forest on the basis of 20 agricultural years immediately preceding the date of vesting came to Rs. 5106/-. The Lalas stated that on the basis of appraisement of the annual yield on the date of vesting of the forest Prithipur the share oi each came to Rs. 7955/-. On this basis each of the Lalas claimed a sum of Rs. 101114 and odd B as compensation for the forest Prithipur.\n\nThe Compensation Officer decided that the income from the poola grass was not sayar income but forest income and disallowed income from poola grass in entirety. The Compensation Officer however allowed some sayar income in each forest and decided that the average annual income of the forest under section C 39(1) (e) of the Act should be calculated on the basis of the period of 25 years immediately preceding ; he date of vesting an<j. not 20 years as the Lalas had claimed.\n\nWith regard to the forest in village Chharba the Compensation Officer arrived at the figure of Rs. 55292/- consisting , of Rs. 4300/- as sayar income and Rs. 50992/- as the forest income for computation of average D annual income on the bas.is of the period oi 25 years and thus arrived at the annual income of Rs. 2211-8-0 under; section 39(l)(e)(i) of the Act. With regard to the computation of average annual income on the appraisement of the annual yield of the forest on the date of vesting as contemplated in section 39(1) (e)(ii) of the Act the Compensation Officer held that the ]1 representative area was not specified by the Lalas with enumeration or location and the enumeration figures of the Lalas were bas ed on estimated and presumed calculations.\n\nThe Lalas appraised Rs. 11000/- as the annual yield on the date of vesting. The Compensation Officer found that the forest F had been felled about 6 to 8 years before vesting and the age of the crop for that reason could not be more than 8 Jears for coppice. The Compensation Officer thus appraised Rs. 800/- as the annual yield and determined Rs. 2211-8-0 and Rs. 800/· aggregating Rs. 3011-8-0 as the average annual income to be added to the gross asets for assessment of compensation.\n\nG With regard to the forest in village Prithipur the Lalas cl-aimed Rs. 5106/- as the annual income for a period of 20 agricultural years immediately preceding the date vesting and appraised the annual yield on the date oi vesting at Rs. 7955/-. The Lalas claimed one tenth of the sayar income for 10 agricultural yea's at Rs .. 2007-8-0. The Compensation Officer disallowed income from H poola grass but allowed sayar income of Rs. 23550/. and added the same to the forest income of Rs. 113914/- aggregating .\n\nRs. l 37464/- on the basis of a period of 25 years and thus amved at the average annual income of the forest under section\n\n39(1) (e) of the Act at Rs. 5496-8-0. The Compensation Offi- A cer appraised the annual yield , at Rs. 1650/- and thus arrived at the total sum of Rs. 7146-8-0 to be added as gross assets of forest income.\n\n. In the High ourt th~ State. contended that the Compensation Officer was m error m adding the annual income on the B basis of a period of 25 years and the appraisement of the annual yield in order to arrive at the average annual income under section 39 ( 1 )( e) of the Act. The contentions of the Lalas in the High Court were these : First. the income from poola grass was sayar income and should have been allowed and added separately to the average annual income.\n\nWith regard to Prithipur c forest it was said that the Compensation Officer wrongly rejected the 5ayar income for the Fasli years 1352 and 1353 amounting to Rs. 4600/- and Rs. 4500/' respectively.\n\nSecondly, the average annual income from forest should have been detennined on the basis of income for a period of 20 and ncit 25 years.\n\nThirdly, the Compensation Officer was in error in not accepting 0 the whole income of the Prithipur forest for the Fasli years\n\n135~. 1356, 1357 and 1358 by holdin.11: that the income durin.11: those four years had been derived by processing wood and therefore the income was made by activities in the nature of trade and was not forest income.\n\nFourthly, the Compensation Officer should have accepted the appraisement of the annual yield of the forest on the date of vesting as claimed by the Lalas.\n\nThe High Court came to the conclusion that the Lalas were entitled to income from poola grass as sayar income and thus allowed the appeals of the Lalas in part.\n\nThe sayar income is not to be c1ubbed with the average annual income but is to be dealt with separately.\n\nSayar income is dealt with in section 39(1)(c) of the Act.\n\nSayar is not defined in the Act but in section 3 (26) of the Act the word 'sayar' is to have the meaning assigned to it in the United Provinces Te!lancy Act, 1939. In the 1939 Tenancy\n\nAct sayar includes whatever is to .. be paid or elivered by a leasee or Iicencee on account of nght of gathenng produce.\n\nG forest rights, fisheries and the use of water for irrigation from artificial sources. Therefore the income derived by 'the landlord from persons who have been given licences to cut and remove poola grass from forest has been held by the High Court to be sayar. We agree with the reasoning of the High Court.\n\nThe High Court was correct in holding that the sayar income H during 1 O agricultural years immiatel)'. preeding th~ ate of vesting should be taken into cons1deratton m determmmg the gross assets under section 39 of the Act.\n\nCounsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court did .not deal with the finding of thte Compensation Officer with regard to income from poola grass for the Fasli years 1352 and 1353 in respect of Prithipur forest.\n\nThe Lalas claimed for the Fasli year 1352 a sum of Rs. 4600/- and for the Fasli year 1353 a sum of Rs. 4500/ • as income from poola grass. The Compensation Officer gave the additional reason for rejecting the income from poola grass for these two years that in the extract of khatauni it was not mentioned as to what the source of income was.\n\nExhibit P-3 being the extract from khatauni for the Fasli year 1352 would show that Rs. 4600/- was the rent for clause 13 sawai items.\n\nAgain, Exhi!>it P-10 for the Fasli year 1353 in respect of Prithipur forest would show the sum of Rs. 4500/- on account of rent for sayar.· Therefore when the Compensation Officer will deal with sayar income he will take into consideration Exhibits P-3 aM P-10 for the Fasli years 1352 and 1353.\n\nIn the High Court it was contended that the Compensation Officer was wrong in taking 25 years to be the period on the basis of whicb annual average income of the forest was to be computed under section 39 (l) ( e) of the Act. The High Court did not accept that contention.\n\nThis contention was not repeated in this Court.\n\nThe High Court held that the Compensation Officer was wrong in arriving at the average annual income by adding the annual income on the basis of a period of 25 years and the aopraisement of the annual yield on the date of vesting.\n\nThe High Court said that the two clauses in section 39(1) (e) of the Act were independent methods of finding out the average annual income from forest and it was not intended that the average annual income should be arrived at by adding the two methods.\n\nSection 39 ( 1 )( e) of the Act speaks of computation of average annual income from forest (i) on the basis of income for a period of 20 to 40 agricultural years immediately preceding the date of vesting as the Compensation Officer may consider reasonable and (ii) on the appraisement of the annual yield of the forest on the date of vesting.\n\nThe two are separate matters. It cannot be said that the Compensation Officer will adopt either of the clauses.\n\nThe Compensation Officer. has to refer to both the clauses in order to compute the average annual income from forest.\n\nThe High Court is correct in holding that the average annual income from forest under section 39 (I )( e) of the Act cannot be computed by arithmetical addition of the figures arrived at on the basis of clause (i) and on the basis of clause (ii). It is the average annual income from forest which is to be computed.\n\nThe words of importance are 'average annual income'.\n\nUnder the first clause the actual income derived from the forest for a number of years before the date of A vesting as the Compensation Officer may consider reasonable is to be taken and the average calculated.\n\nUnder the second clause the annual yield as on the date of vesting is to be appraised.\n\nThe Compensation Officer is to compute the average in- . come by taking recourse to both the methods. The sec9nd clause which speaks of appraisement of the annual yield will be done g inter alia by taking into consideration the number and age of trees, the . area of cultivation and the produce.\n\nIn the present appeals the High Court found on the 'mte rials that the forest had been felled almost completely during the last 9 or 10 years preceding the date of vesting.\n\nThe evidence further established that there were no mature trees for c felling and that the bulk of the crop that had existed had grown within a period of 8 years.\n\nIt was therefore clear that the whole of the forest's income derived during those 9 or 10 years for which accounts of the Lalas were available represented the whole grnwth of the forest during the last 40 years and even if the forest had been gradually cut during the last 40 years the income derived would not have been substantially more than what have been derived during the last 9 or 10 years preceding the date of vesting.\n\nThe High Court assessed the evidence. We do not find that there is any error in regard to the appreciation or assessment of evidence by the High Court and the conclusion that under section 39(1 )(e) of the Act the annual average income of Prithi- E pur forest came to Rs. 4396.56 and of village Chharba at Rs. 2039.68.\n\nCounsel for the appellants contended that the Compensation Officer did not consider the entire forest income for the Fasli years 1352, 1356, 1357 and 1358 for the Prithipur forest on the ground that the entire income was not the sale price of F forest but that the Lalas worked the forest and a portion of the income was from the sale of the timber of that forest.\n\nThe High Court rightly held that the forest income was referable to the price of the standing timber and income which the Lalas derived by processing wood would not be within forest income.\n\nFor these reasons we uphold the judgment and order of the G High Court with this modification that when the Compensation Officer will deal with the income from poola grass as . sayar in• come as derived by the High Court the Compensation Officer will also take into consideration the income from poola grass for the Prithipur forest for the years 1352 and 1353 Fasli.\n\nIn the facts and circumstances of the case the appeals are H dismissed.\n\nThe parties will pay and bear their own costs.\n\nV.P .S.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 42, "entities": [{"text": "GANGA DEVI & ORS. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GANGA DEVI & ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 11, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 56, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF U.P.\n\nFebruary 11, 1972\n\n[A. N. RAY ANP M. H. BEG, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY ANP M. H. BEG, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 39(l)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 383, "end_char": 429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 39( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 696, "end_char": 705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 39(1)(e)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 801, "end_char": 816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 39(1)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 970, "end_char": 981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "M. C. Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2605, "end_char": 2617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, S. R. Agarwala, A. T. M. Sampath and E. C.\n\nAgarwala, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. R. Agarwala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2619, "end_char": 2633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, S. R. Agarwala, A. T. M. Sampath and E. C.\n\nAgarwala, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "A. T. M. Sampath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2635, "end_char": 2651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, S. R. Agarwala, A. T. M. Sampath and E. C.\n\nAgarwala, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "E. C.\n\nAgarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2656, "end_char": 2671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, S. R. Agarwala, A. T. M. Sampath and E. C.\n\nAgarwala, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "L. M. Singhvi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2715, "end_char": 2728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi and 0."}}, {"text": ". P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2734, "end_char": 2743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi and 0."}}, {"text": "B Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2830, "end_char": 2835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B Ray, J. These six appeals are by certificate from the judgment dated 1 September, 1965 of the High Court at Allahabad, Lala Triloki Nath and Lala Digambar Prasad filed four appeals and the State two in the High Court agaiust the order dated 6 September,\n\n1955 of the Compensation Officer."}}, {"text": "Lala Triloki Nath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2951, "end_char": 2968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B Ray, J. These six appeals are by certificate from the judgment dated 1 September, 1965 of the High Court at Allahabad, Lala Triloki Nath and Lala Digambar Prasad filed four appeals and the State two in the High Court agaiust the order dated 6 September,\n\n1955 of the Compensation Officer."}}, {"text": "Lala Digambar Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2973, "end_char": 2993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B Ray, J. These six appeals are by certificate from the judgment dated 1 September, 1965 of the High Court at Allahabad, Lala Triloki Nath and Lala Digambar Prasad filed four appeals and the State two in the High Court agaiust the order dated 6 September,\n\n1955 of the Compensation Officer."}}, {"text": "Chharba", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3478, "end_char": 3485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Each of the Lalas held equal one half share in each of the forests in the villages of Chharba and Prithipur in Dehra Dun District."}}, {"text": "Prithipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3490, "end_char": 3499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Each of the Lalas held equal one half share in each of the forests in the villages of Chharba and Prithipur in Dehra Dun District."}}, {"text": "Dehra Dun District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3503, "end_char": 3521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Each of the Lalas held equal one half share in each of the forests in the villages of Chharba and Prithipur in Dehra Dun District."}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3576, "end_char": 3622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3684, "end_char": 3706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification dated 1 July, 1952 under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter called the Act) the entire furest vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "2 May, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3712, "end_char": 3723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2 May, 1953 the Lalas received the Draft Compensation Assessment Rolls under section 46 (1 )(b) of the Act which showed annual compensation to be paid to the Lalas as nil."}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3789, "end_char": 3799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Lalas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3870, "end_char": 3875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2 May, 1953 the Lalas received the Draft Compensation Assessment Rolls under section 46 (1 )(b) of the Act which showed annual compensation to be paid to the Lalas as nil."}}, {"text": "20 May, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3909, "end_char": 3921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Lalas thereafter on 20 May, 1953 filed their objections against the draft compensation roll and claimed compensation under the provisions of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 39(l)(e)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6380, "end_char": 6399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6564, "end_char": 6577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n39(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7929, "end_char": 7943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8388, "end_char": 8398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9750, "end_char": 9766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9819, "end_char": 9828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10600, "end_char": 10610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11303, "end_char": 11312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11818, "end_char": 11828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12223, "end_char": 12236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12434, "end_char": 12444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13096, "end_char": 13106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13787, "end_char": 13791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39(1 )(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14928, "end_char": 14945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_437_438_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS\n\nN. K. PRIVATE LIMITED & ANOTHER\n\nFebruary 11, .1972\n\n[K. S. HEGDE, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.)\n\nConstitution of Jndi'a, Art. 299-Whether the Secretc..ry to the Railwa, v Board can enter into a conu<ct on behalf of the Prellident of India\n\nreprtstntd by the Ministr1v of Rilways.\n\nA global tender to sell surplus serviceable and scrap rails was issued to established (myers by the Government Of India and pursuant to this tender notice, the respondents by their letter dated 21-5-68 offered to bu¥ the rails at a particular price and Shri P. C. Oak, Deputy Director, Railway Stores, Railway Board, on behalf of the Secretary. Railway Board, accepted t.he respondents' offer with the terms and conditions mentioned in the letters sent by the respondent on 15-7-68. Negotiations for the final contract, however, took place between the parties and on 15-7-68, the respondents complained that some of the Railways who were holding stocks are selling the steel rails which they have no right to sell in view of the concluded contract; i>ut Shri P. C. Oak for Secretary, Railway Board, replied that subsequent to 15-7-68, there were negotiations for the vital terms and conditions of the contract and so the question of the existence of a concluded Contract did not arise. At this, the respondents filed a petition in Court under s. 20 of the Arbitration Act, after setting out the relevant correspondence leading upto the letter of acceptance of !5th July 1968 and it was stated that, theJetter was a definite acceptance of the offer and constitute a valid and binding contract between the parties.\n\nIn the written statement, . the appellants raised a preliminary objection that the petition was misconceived as there was no arbitration agreement' between the parties and so the question of enforcing the afoitration c:lause in the alleged contract did not arise: Further, it was contended by the appellants that the letter of acceptance and the subsequent letters were not by the Director of Railway Stores, but by the Secretary to the R.ailway Board, who was not a person authorised to enter into the agreement between the President Of India represented by the Ministry of Railwa}'1 and the respondents as required undr Art. 299 of the Constitution.\n\nAllowing the appeal.\n\nHELD : The Secretary to the Railway Board, on whose behalf the offer of the respondents waa accepted, waa not the person nuthorised to enter into a contract on behalf of the President of India, as required under Art. 299, and therefore, the contract, if nny, was not binding on the appellants. Further, it was not correct to say that Clause 43 of Part XVIII and Part XLI empowered the Secretary, Railway Board to enter into such contracts; because Oau'e- 9 specifically provided for the\n\ncontracts connected with the sale of sc'rap: ashes coal, du•t, empty containers and stores; and relayable rails, bein~ part of the stores, it was covered by Oause 9 and the Secretary, Railway Board, was not empowered by the President to enter into a contract on his behalf. (445 Bl\n\nSeth Bikhra/ Jaipur/a vs, Villon of India, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 880, referred to,\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C.A. No. 1067 of 1971.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 30, 1970 of the Delhi High Court in F.A.0. (O.S.) No. 40 of 1970.\n\nN. A. Palkhivala, D. Mukherjee, R.H. Dhebar andA. !. Rane, for the appellants.\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, G. L. Sanghi, B. R. Agarwala and Jane11dra Lal, for respondent No. 1.\n\nA. K. Sen, G. L. Sanghi and B. R. Agarwala, for respondent No. 2.\n\n The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJaganmohan Reddy, J.\n\nThis appeal is by special leave. The question for consideration is whether there is a binding, valid and concluded contract between the appellants and the respondents.\n\nOn an application ll!ed by the respondents under section 20 of the Arbitration Act a single Judge of the Delhi Higlr Court directed the appellan!S to file the arbitration agreement to refer the disputes between lh~ partil)S arising under the .contract to arbitrators. An appeal ag<.1nst that order to a Division Bench was dismissed.\n\nIn order to understand the scope of the controversy, a few facts may be stated. On the 21st March 1968, a notice of , Global Tender No. 1 of 1968 was issued by the President of India, therein referred to as the Government of India, Ministry of Railways (Railway Board), proposing to sell 80,000 tonnes of surplusreleased serviceable and scrap rails, as per details given in the schedule thereto, to established buyers abroad or their accredited F agents.\n\nIt invited offers in respect thereof to be addressed to the President of India and sent to Shri R. No. Mubayi, Director, Railway Stores, Railway Board. With this notice were enclosed the general conditions of tender, special conditions of tender, instruc.• ions to tenderers, including proforma for performance guaralltee. and deed bonds as in clauses 4A and 4B, shipping G term; and schedule of stocks available as on 1st March 1968.\n\nIn the general conditions the seller was defined to mean the President of India acting through the Director, Railway Stores, Railway Board, unless the context otherwise provided.\n\nThe delivery F.O.B. (Free on Board)/F.A.S. (Free Alongside Ship) invoices and freight were dealt with in clause 9.\n\nThe default clause in H clause 11 provided that where a buyer fails to execute the contract the seller was to have power under the hand of the Director.\n\nRailway Stores, Railway Board, to declare the contract at an end\n\nat the risk and cost of the buyer.\n\nThe special conditions of tender dealt with prices, quotations, payments, terms of shipment, weighment, basis of sales and handling at ports force majeuie arbitration, legal jurisdiction, acceptance of o!Ies and title and risk. In the instructions to tenderers, the tenderers were requested to quote their highest offer indicating the price per metric tonne inclusive of export incentive of 5% of F.O.B. value currently applicable as guarantee by the Government of India which will always be to the sellers benefit for handing over of the rails F.O.B. docks/F.A.S./F.O.B. Indian Port or C.l.F. destination port. The tenderer was required to offer comments clause by claUSe on the ::; 'general conditions of tender' and the 'special conditions of tender' either confirming acceptance of the clauses or indicating deviation therefrom, if any. It was further provided that the contract will come into force from the date the buyers' letter of credit is accepted by the sellers' nominee. In 4A of these instructions the proforma deed bond was given which was to be signed by the tenderer and the acceptance was to be signed for and on behalf of the President of India by the person designated for that purpose.\n\nSimilarly, para 4B gave the proforma per.ormance guarantee bond to be addressed to the President of India executed by the tenderer and accepted for and on behalf of the President of India by the person so designated. The terms and conditions also set out the shipping terms in detail, though a few of them were also mentioned in the special conditions under the headings Shipment, Terms of Shipping and Receiving Notice. It appears that the terms and conditions enclosed with the tender notice annexed to the petition filed in court were not full and complete. Consequently the appellant has anne11.ed a true copy of the enclosures with the special leave petition and prayed that this may be admitted in evidence. As there was no dispute in respect of the contents thereof, we have allowed this prayer because without them it is not possible to arrive at a just conclusion.\n\nPursuaut to this tender notice, the respondents, by their letter, Ex. 'B', dated 21-5-1968, offered to buy 80,000 tonnes of rails at $45.1 per tonne F.O.B. Indian Ports on the term and conditions set out therein. In reply thereto, by a letter dated 25-5-1968, the Dy. Director, Railway Stores, Railway Board, P.C. Oak in.para 1(6) categorically stated by reference to para 14 of the conditions of the letter of the respondents that as shipping terms have financial implications they were requested to indicate with reference to the tender which yarticular clauses they desire to re-negotiate and settle. In para 2 it was stated that the offer of the respondents was not addressed to the President of India as required under clause 1 ( 3) of the Instructions to the Tenderers and, therefore, the Respondents were required to confirm that their offer .was deemed to have been addressed to the President of India and is\n\nA open for acceptance on behalf of the President. It was further stated in para 4 that they should send the reply addressed to the President of India through the Director of Railway Stores, Railway Board covering all the points indicated therein, to reach them not later than 28-5-1968. No reply was, however, received by the time indicated in the letter of the appellants and while so stating another letter was addressed to the Respondents on 3-6-68 B by C. Parasuraman for Secretary, Railway Board, seeking further clarification in respect of items Nos. 26 and 27 of the offer contained in the aforesaid letter of the Respondents dated 21-5-1968.\n\nThere were also two other clarifications in respect of the weight of the tonne for which $45.1 was quoted and the option to transfer the contract in the name of the foreign principles which it was 'tated, could not be agreed to straightaway unless and until they knew the names of the foreign principles and their willingness c\n\nto enter into a legal binding guarantee of all the terms and conditions of the contract. The Respondents wrote subsequently t6 the Director; Railway Stores on the 15th June, 29th June, 8th July and the three letters on 10th July and one on the 15th July D 1968, some of which were written after a discussion with the Director of Railway Stores in the presence of the Director of Finance, Mr. Datta. On the same day as the letter of 15th July was sent by the Respondents, P. C. Oak signing for the Secretary of the Railway Board, addressed the following letter of acceptance, No. 68/RS(G)/709/10 to the Respondents :-\n\n\"Subject:-Tender No. 1 of 1968 for Export sale of used re-rollable and relayable steel rails.\n\nReference:-Your letter Nos. Nil dated 21-5-68, 15-6-68, 29-6-68, 8-7-68, 10-7-68 and 15-7-68.\n\nKindly be advised that your offer (at $39 per long F ton F.O.B. Indian Port for export and Rs. 458/- per long ton for indigenous consumption) with terms and conditions referred to in your above letters is hereby accepted. Formal contract will be issued shortly.\n\n2. Kindly acknowledge receipt.\n\nYours faithfully, Sd./- P. C. Oak.\n\nfor Secretary, Railway Board\".\n\nThereafter, it is alleed that several draft agreements were exchanged regarding which there is a dispute but ultimately before us it is not contested that a draft agreement, which the appellants say is the Sth draft, but according to the Respondents is\n\nA the final draft, was handed-over to the Respondents by P. C. Oak on 27-8-68 but this, however, was not signed. Clause 2 of this draft agreement states that the contract has been concluded by the issue of seller's 11; tter No. 68/RS(G)/709/10 dated 15-7-68 to the buyers; that the term of the contract shall be three years from 1-11-1968 to 31-10-1971; that the buyers reserve the right B to act upon the contract any time before 1-11-68 and start inspection and take delive1y of the goods but this will not in any manner effect the terms of the contract. Even thereafter there was further correspondence between the parties. By letter dated 18-9-68 the Respondents wrote to the Director, Railway Stores, agreeing to several other matters to be included in the final draft and request- C ed him to issue the 'final contract' without delay. On the 21st September 1968 the Respondents again wrote to the Director.\n\nRailway Stores, complaining that the info1mation provided by the various Railways was not complete and requested him to contact the various Railways and obtain the required information as soon as possible. After the receipt of this Jetter the Joint Director, Railway Stores (G), wrote to the general Manager (S), All Indian D Railways with a copy to the respondents calling for the required information. In that letter the Joint Director stated thus :-\n\n\" .. the Board have finalised an export-cum-internal sale contract with M/s. N. K. (P) Ltd., New Delhi for a period of 3 years, entitling them to export stock of such surplus rails available with the Railways. The detailed terms and conditions of the contract will be ap prised to you when finalised\"\n\nOn the 23rd October 1968, C. Parasuraman, for Secretary, Railway Board, replied to the letter of the Respondents of the 21st September 1968, stating that it was not correct that their office has assured them that it would arrange to get the missing details\n\nfrom -the concerned C.O.Ss. After this letter two other letters were written by the Respondents to the Director, Railway Stores, dated 7th and 23rd November 1968. In the first letter it was. stated thus :-\n\n\"In pursuance of your invitation we submitted our tender for purchase of used relayable and re-rollable steel rails on 21-5-68. After some negotiations the terms of the contract were finalised and the Secretary, Railway Board by his letter No. 68/RS(G)70910 dated 15-7-68, accepted our offer and concluded the contract.· We were informed that the formal contract will be issued shortly. A draft of the formal contract was handed over to us on 27-8-68. In our letter of 18-9-68, some agreed terms were set out which had to be incorporated\" in the formal contract. Since the acceptance of our\n\noffer we have made all arrangement for the sale of the material.\n\nWe beg to inform you that out of the total quantity of 88,936 tonnes of Rails already offered to us for our approval we approve and shall take delivery of 53,807 Tonnes as per list enclosed herewith. The ab9ve quantity may kindly be reserved for us and arrangement be made for their delivery in terms of the contract . ... \"\n\nIn the second letter, the respondents complained that though the contract for sale of used rerollable and relayable steel rails was. concluded on 15-7-68 they regretted that they had not received the formal contract so far and requested that it should be sent without any further delay. In the last paragraph of that letter, C the Respondents complained that they came to know that some <:J. the Railways who were holding stocks are selling the steel rails which they have no right to do and requested them to stop such sales. To this, P. C. Oak for Secretary, Railway Board, replied :\n\n\"Kindly refer to correspondence resting with your letters dated July 26, 1968, 18th September 1968 and No. RB/Rails/68/1/114, dated 2nd December 1968.\n\nYour contention contained in your letter No. RB/Rails/ 68/1 dated 23-11-68 that the Railway Board is not authorised to sell rails to other parties because of their having concluded a contract with you is factually incorrect.\n\nNo doubt, letter Nq. 68/RS(G)/709/10 dated 15-7-68 iodicatan intention to enter into a contract with you, but subsequent to this, discussions had been held with you over a number of sittings on 20-7-68,\n\n12-8-68, 26-8-68, 27-8-67 cuhninating in your letter dated 18-9-68. '.\\his would amply indicate that no agreement had 'been reached on vital terms and conditions, and the question of the existence of a concluded contract does not arise .... \"\n\nThe Respondents replied to this letter by their letter dated 25-1-1969 expressing surprise and contesting the stand taken by\n\nthe Railway Board. In the petition of the Respondents filed in Court after setting out the relevant correspondence leading upto G the letter of acceptance of P. C. Oak dated 15th July 1968, t\n\nwas stated that that letter was a definite acceptance of the offer and constitutes a binding and valid contract between the parties.\n\nWith respect to the draft agreement of the 27th August 1968 handed over to the Respondents embodying the agreement between the parties, the averment was that the then Acting Director of Railway Stores desired certain additional terms to be embodied H in the terms that were agreed to. The additional terms were agreed to by the plaintiffs (Respondents) by their letter to the\n\nUNION v. N. K PVT. LTD. (iaganmohan Reddy, J.) 443\n\nA Director, Railway Stores, dated 18-9-1968.\n\nIn para 16 it wa' further alleged that after the letter of acceptance by the appellants the then Acting Director of Railway Stores and the Director of Finance proposed to the plaintiffs that the price offered by them should be increased or in the alternative certain alterations be made in the agreed terms, but the plaintiffs having justly refused B to do so, the 2nd defendant (C: Parasuraman). falsely wi; ote to the plaintiffs on 15-1-1969 that no concluded contract had taken place and that the Railway Board was; therefore, not precluded from selling rails to other parties.\n\nThe appellants in their written statement, raised a preliminary objection, namely, that the petition was mis-conceived as there was no arbitration agreement between. the parties and so the question of enforcing the arbitration clause in the alleged contract did not arise. It also reiterated its stand earlier taken that the letter dated 15-7-68 written by Oak on behalf of the Secretary, Railway Board, was not a letter of acceptance of the offer of the Respondents so as to amount to a concluded contract binding on D the Union of India , nor could it, be construed as such in view of the mandatory provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution of India. The contention was that unless and until a formal instrument of contract wa~ executed in the manner required by Article 299 of the Constitution and by the relevant notifications, there\n\nwould not be a contract binding on the Union of India and at any rate no such agreement was entered into as it was alleged that though interviews had taken place at various times between the plaintiffs and the several officers of the Railway Board, no agreement had been reached on vital terms and conditions.\n\nTwo submissions were urged on behalf of the appellants, namely :\n\n(I)\n\n(2)\n\nthat apart from the contention relating to Ar.t. 299 of the Constitution, there was no concluded contract between the parties, because\n\n(a) the essential terms were not agreed to between them on the date when the acceptance letter was issued by P. C. Oak on 15-7-68. and (b) even if there was an acceptance as alleged, that acceptance was conditional upon a formal contract being executed by the appellants;\n\nthat the three mandatory requirements of Art. 299 of the Constitution for a valid and binding contract made in exercise of the executive power of the Union have not been complied with. namely, (a) that the contract. was not expressed to be in the name of the President, nor (b) was\n\nit executed on behalf of the President, or ( c) A by a person authorised to execute it on his behalf.\n\nThe crucial question which arises for detennination is whether there was a concluded contract, and if there was one whether the mandatory requirements of Article 299 of the <;:nstitution for entering into a valid and binding contract have been satisfied?\n\nIt is now settled by this Court that though the words 'expressed' and 'executed' in Article 299 (1) might sugg.,'St that it should be by a deed or by a fonnal written contract, a l:iinding contract by tender and acceptanc., can also come info existence if the acceptance is by a person duly authorised on this behalf by the President of India. A c; ontract whether by a fonnal deed or otherwise by persons not authorised by the President cannot be binding and is absolutely void.\n\nWe do not for the present consider it necessary to go into the question whether and to what extent the requirements of Art. 299 have been complied with in this case. What we have to first ascertain is whether apart from the contention relating to Article 299, a concluded contract has come into existence as alleged by the Respondents.\n\nBefore us detailed arguments were addressed on behalf of the appellants to show that notwithstanding the letter of acceptance of 15th July 1968, no concluded contract had in fact come into existence and though that letter accepted certain tenns, there were other essential terms of• the contract which had to be agreed to and were the subject matter of further negotiations between the parties; that it was the intention of the parties that all those terms were to be embodied in a formal contract to be executed which contract alone was to be binding between the parties; and that in any case the letter of acceptance and the subsequent letters were not by the Director of Railway Stores but by the Secretary to the Railway Board who was not a person authorised to enter into the agreement between the President of India represented by the Ministry of Railways and the Respondents. On the other hand, the stand taken by the Respondents was that all the essential terms of the contract were agreed to and the contract was concluded on 15th July 1968, though at the instance of the Director, Railway Stores further terms with respect to the execution of the contract were the subject-matter of negotiations between the parties and in any case these did not pertain to the essential terms and could not on that account detract from the binding nature of a concluded contract. It was also contended that the letter of aceptance by P. C. Oak though signed on behalf of the Secretary, Railway Board was in fact on behalf of the said Board which was authorised to enter into such a contract.\n\nIt is in our view unnecessary to consider the several contentions as to whether all the essential terms of the contract had been agreed to or that the contract was ooncluded by the acceptance\n\n.<•\n\nUNIONV. N. K. PVT. LTD. (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.) 445\n\nletter of 15th July 1968 or whether the parties intended it to re a tenn of the contract that a fonnal contract should be entered into between .them in order to bind the parties. In this case, we are of the view that the Secretary to the Railway Board, on whose behalf the offer of the Respondents was accepted, was not the person authorised to enter into a contract on behalf of the President B of India. As can be seen from the various documents already extracted that the tender notice invited offers to be addressed to the President of India through the Director of Railway Stores, Railway Board. Under the general conditions the seller was defined to mean the President of India acting through the Director, Railway Stores and in the default clause it was provided that where the buyer fails to execute the contract, the seller shall have power under the hand of the Director, Railway Stores, Railway Board, to declare the contract at an end. In the letter written by Oak on 25-5-68, as earlier noticed, it was pointed out to the' Respondents that their offer was not addressed to the President of India as required under clause 1 ( 3) of the Instructions to the Tenderers and, therefore, the Respondents were required to confinn\n\nD that their offer can be deemed to have been addressed to the President and is open for acceptance on behalf uf the President and their reply should be addressed to the President of India, through the Director of Railway Stores, Railway Board.\n\nEven the draft contract dated 27-8-68 in terms of which the Respondents were insisting on a final contract to be issued to them by the E appellants was to be executed by the' Respondents as buyers on the one part and the President of India acting through the Director, Railway Stores, Ministry of Railways (Rail}Vay Board) as the sellers, on the other. There is little doubt that the only person authorised to enter into the contract on behalf of the President is the Director, Railway Stores. It is true that the noti- F fication of the Ministry of Law issued in exercise. of the powers under clause 1 of Article 299 of the Constitution shows that the President directed the authorities named therein to execute on his behalf the contracts and assurances of property specified therein.\n\nBut notwithstanding this, the President is fully empowered to direct the execution of any specified contract or class of C0!1 tracts on ad hoc basis bv authorities other than those specified m the said notification. This Court had in . Seth Bikhrai Jaipuria\n\nv. Union of India, (1) earlier held that the authority to execute G\n\ncontracts may be conferred on a person not only by mies expressly framed and bv formal notifications issued in this behalf but may also be SPeclficallv conferred. In this case the letter of acceptance dated 15-7-1968 was on behalf of the Secretary, Railway H Board. who is not authorised to enter into a contract on behalf of the President.\n\n(!) [1962] (2) S.C.R. 880.\n\nIt is contended that clause 43 of part XVIII and Part XII empower the Secretary, Railway Board to enter into such contracts.\n\nClause 43 of Part XVIII provides that all deeds and instruments other than those specified in that part may be executed by the Secretary or the Joint Secretary or the Deputy Secretary or the Under Secretary in the Railway Board or a Director, Joint I>irector, Deputy Director or Assistant Director in the Railway Board. It is submitted that as nothing has been specified in Part XVIII relating to the contract of the type we are considering, the Secretary, Railway Board is authorised to enter into a contract on behalf of the President. This submission is untenable because clause 9 specifically provides for the contracts connected with the sale of scrap, ashes, coal, dust, empty containers and stores. The tender, it will be observed, is for rails which are scrap as well as rerollable and relayable but it is urged that relayable rails 1l1'e not stores nor can they be considered as scrap and as these are not covered by clause 9, the Secretary, Railway Board is fully empowered by the President to enter into a contract on his behalf.\n\nWe cannot accept this argument because in our view relayable rails are part of the stores. It may be that some of these rails which are part.of the stores may be considered to be in a c6ndition which the authorities concerned think should be disposed of.\n\nThe contracts relating to the goods of the nature specified in the tender notice are, therefore, dealt with by clause 9, as such clause 43 will have no application. Part XLI empowers the Secretaries to the Central Government in the appropriate Ministries or Departments to execute any contl¥lct or assurances of property relating to any matter whatsoever and i~ in these terms :-\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything heieinbefore contained any contract or assurance of property relating to any matter whatsoever may be executed by the Secretary or the Special Secretary or the Additional Secretary or a Joint Secretary or a Director or where there is no Additional Secretary or a Joint Secretary or a Director, a Deputy Secretary to the Central Government in the appropriate Ministry or Department and in the case of .. \"\n\nThe con ten ti on on behalf of the Respondents is that since Railway Board is a Department of the Government, the Secretary to the Department is authorised to enter into a contract under the above provision.\n\nThis submission in our view, is equally misconceived because reading the above requirement carefully it will appear that the persons there mentioned should be Secretary, Special Secretary etc., to the Central Government in the appropriate Ministry or Department and not that the Secretary to any Department or office of the Government of India is empowered thereunder.\n\nIt is however contended that the Secretary to the\n\nRailway Board is a Joint Secretary to the Government of India and as such under the above provision the acceptance letter should be considered to have been executed on behalf of the President\n\nEven tb.is submission lacks. validity because as pointed out on behalf of the appellant, at the relevant time. the Secretary to the Railway Board did not have any status as Secretary to the Central Government. The status of a Joint Secretary was only conferred on him by a notification by the Government of Jndia in the Ministry of Railways for the first time on 15-9-1969 with effect from that date.\n\nAn affidavit of the Deputy Secretary to the Railway Board (Ministry of Railways) has been filed before us setting out the above fact and enclosing the said notification. Then again it was urged that the members of the Railway Board were Secretaries to the Central Government and hence the Board on whose behalf the Secretary communicated the acceptance could enter into a binding contract.\n\nThis submission also is without force because there is no material before us to conclude that the Board was so authorised.\n\nIn these circumstances, even if the correspon&nce shows that the formalities necessary for a . concluded contract have been satisfied and the parties were ad idem by the time the. letter of acceptance •of the 15th July 1968 was written, about which we do not wish to express any opinion, there is no valid or binding contact because the letter of acceptance, on the evidence before us, is not by a person authorised to execute the contracts for and on behalf of the President of India.\n\nE On the evening before the day the judgment in the case was due to be delivered, an application dated 7-2-72 was filed enclosing an affidavit of R. N. Mubayi who was Director, Railw11.y- Stores, between 18-12-1965 to 30-9-1969 as also an affidavit of R. B. Lal, Managing Director of the Respondent No. 1 to take them in evidence and consider the facts stated therein before judgment is delivered, and if necessary, to call for the file and F give a re-hearing. The affidavit of Mubayi states that only after he recorded on the relevant file and issued instructions to his Deputy Director, Shri P. C. Oak to convey the acceptance of the offer of M/s. N. K. Private Limited, that the acceptance was conveyed by Shri P. C. Oak to the said company. The affidavit of R. B. Lal says that though the affidavit filed by P. Lal, Deputy G Secretary, Railway Board stating that the Secretary, Railway Board, did not have the status of Secretary, Special Secretary, Additional Secretary, Joint Secretary or Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Railway, he has not denied that the Secretary did not have the status of a Director.\n\nIt is further submitted in that affidavit that the Secretary of the H Board had the status of a Director at the relevant time and as mentioned in Part XLI of the Notification of the Ministry of Law, 'a Director' is authorised to accept offers.\n\nL887Suli.Clj72\n\nApart from the question whether we should admit additional A cvid.ence at stage in this case and though we had rejected an earlier sublll1Ss1on to call for the files, having regard to the facts stated by R. N. Mubayi, Director of Railway Stores during the relevant period that it was he who had asked P.C. Oak to accept the offer and had so endorsed it on the file, as also the affidavit of R. B. Lal that the Secretary to the Board was the Director of Railway Storefi, we withheld the judgment and called for the file to satisfy ourselves.\n\nThe file has been submitted to us by the appellants along with an affidavit of R. Srinivasan, Joint Director, Railway Board in which it is categorically averred that at the relevant time, namely, 15-7-6&, the Secretary Railway Board did not have the status of the Director under Para XLI of the Notification of the Ministry of Law or at all. A perusal of the relevant\n\n- file relating to the letter of acceptance would show that on 15-7-68, Shri Oak made the following endorsement: \"Reference to Board's orders at page 38/N, draft letter accepting M/s. N.K.\n\n(P) Ltd., offer is being issued today. D.R.S. may kindly see before issue\", and this endorsement was merely signed by R.N.\n\nMubayi. We are not here referring to the other proceedings on the file as to whether the execution of a formal contract was a condition precedent and as one of the terms of the contract but even the above endorsement does not show that the Jetter of acceptance of 15-7-68 was issued on the orders and directions of Mubayi as alleged by him in the affidavit. What it in fact shows is that it is the Board that issued the orders of acceptance and that the acceptance Jetter was only to be seen by him. Even the draft letter issued does not contain his initials or his signature in token of his having seen or apProved it. The letter of acceptance not having been issued on the orders of the Director, Railway Stores, there was no concluded contract as on that date, by a person authorised to enter into a contract. There is also nothing to show that the Secretary to the Board was the Director, Railway Board as further alleged in the affidavit of R. B. Lal.\n\nIn this view the appeal is allowed and the application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs of the appellants. On the other hand, we direct the appellants to pay the costs of the Respondents because special G leave was granted on . condition that the petitioner will pay the costs of the Respondents in this appeal in any event. s.c.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 110, "entities": [{"text": "UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. K. PRIVATE LIMITED & ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. K. PRIVATE LIMITED & ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 11, .1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 76, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS\n\nN. K. PRIVATE LIMITED & ANOTHER\n\nFebruary 11, .1972\n\n[K. S. HEGDE, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. K. MATHEW, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160, "end_char": 168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "21-5-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 514, "end_char": 521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A global tender to sell surplus serviceable and scrap rails was issued to established (myers by the Government Of India and pursuant to this tender notice, the respondents by their letter dated 21-5-68 offered to bu¥ the rails at a particular price and Shri P. C. Oak, Deputy Director, Railway Stores, Railway Board, on behalf of the Secretary."}}, {"text": "C. Oak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 581, "end_char": 587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A global tender to sell surplus serviceable and scrap rails was issued to established (myers by the Government Of India and pursuant to this tender notice, the respondents by their letter dated 21-5-68 offered to bu¥ the rails at a particular price and Shri P. C. Oak, Deputy Director, Railway Stores, Railway Board, on behalf of the Secretary."}}, {"text": "15-7-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 794, "end_char": 801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Railway Board, accepted t.he respondents' offer with the terms and conditions mentioned in the letters sent by the respondent on 15-7-68."}}, {"text": "P. C. Oak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1079, "end_char": 1088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Negotiations for the final contract, however, took place between the parties and on 15-7-68, the respondents complained that some of the Railways who were holding stocks are selling the steel rails which they have no right to sell in view of the concluded contract; i>ut Shri P. C. Oak for Secretary, Railway Board, replied that subsequent to 15-7-68, there were negotiations for the vital terms and conditions of the contract and so the question of the existence of a concluded Contract did not arise."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1363, "end_char": 1368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2256, "end_char": 2264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2521, "end_char": 2529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Clause 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2643, "end_char": 2652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 S.C.R. 880", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3123, "end_char": 3142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. A. Palkhivala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3345, "end_char": 3361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala, D. Mukherjee, R.H. Dhebar andA. !."}}, {"text": "D. Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3363, "end_char": 3375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala, D. Mukherjee, R.H. Dhebar andA. !."}}, {"text": "R.H. Dhebar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3377, "end_char": 3388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala, D. Mukherjee, R.H. Dhebar andA. !."}}, {"text": "andA. !. Rane", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3389, "end_char": 3402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala, D. Mukherjee, R.H. Dhebar andA. !."}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3425, "end_char": 3439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, G. L. Sanghi, B. R. Agarwala and Jane11dra Lal, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3441, "end_char": 3453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, G. L. Sanghi, B. R. Agarwala and Jane11dra Lal, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. R. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3455, "end_char": 3469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, G. L. Sanghi, B. R. Agarwala and Jane11dra Lal, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Jane11dra Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3474, "end_char": 3487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, G. L. Sanghi, B. R. Agarwala and Jane11dra Lal, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3512, "end_char": 3521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, G. L. Sanghi and B. R. Agarwala, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Jaganmohan Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3624, "end_char": 3640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJaganmohan Reddy, J.\n\nThis appeal is by special leave.", "canonical_name": "Jaganmohan Reddy"}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3864, "end_char": 3874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Higlr Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3920, "end_char": 3937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On an application ll!ed by the respondents under section 20 of the Arbitration Act a single Judge of the Delhi Higlr Court directed the appellan!S to file the arbitration agreement to refer the disputes between lh~ partil)S arising under the .contract to arbitrators."}}, {"text": "21st March 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4236, "end_char": 4251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 21st March 1968, a notice of , Global Tender No."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4678, "end_char": 4683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It invited offers in respect thereof to be addressed to the President of India and sent to Shri R. No."}}, {"text": "R. No. Mubayi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4701, "end_char": 4714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It invited offers in respect thereof to be addressed to the President of India and sent to Shri R. No.", "canonical_name": "R. No. Mubayi"}}, {"text": "1st March 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5024, "end_char": 5038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and deed bonds as in clauses 4A and 4B, shipping G term; and schedule of stocks available as on 1st March 1968."}}, {"text": "clause 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5326, "end_char": 5334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5361, "end_char": 5370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6044, "end_char": 6063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instructions to tenderers, the tenderers were requested to quote their highest offer indicating the price per metric tonne inclusive of export incentive of 5% of F.O.B. value currently applicable as guarantee by the Government of India which will always be to the sellers benefit for handing over of the rails F.O.B. docks/F.A.S./F.O.B. Indian Port or C.l."}}, {"text": "21-5-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7757, "end_char": 7766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B', dated 21-5-1968, offered to buy 80,000 tonnes of rails at $45.1 per tonne F.O.B. Indian Ports on the term and conditions set out therein."}}, {"text": "25-5-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7925, "end_char": 7934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply thereto, by a letter dated 25-5-1968, the Dy."}}, {"text": "clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8400, "end_char": 8408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "28-5-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8870, "end_char": 8879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further stated in para 4 that they should send the reply addressed to the President of India through the Director of Railway Stores, Railway Board covering all the points indicated therein, to reach them not later than 28-5-1968."}}, {"text": "3-6-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9039, "end_char": 9045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No reply was, however, received by the time indicated in the letter of the appellants and while so stating another letter was addressed to the Respondents on 3-6-68 B by C. Parasuraman for Secretary, Railway Board, seeking further clarification in respect of items Nos."}}, {"text": "C. Parasuraman", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9051, "end_char": 9065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No reply was, however, received by the time indicated in the letter of the appellants and while so stating another letter was addressed to the Respondents on 3-6-68 B by C. Parasuraman for Secretary, Railway Board, seeking further clarification in respect of items Nos.", "canonical_name": "C. Parasuraman"}}, {"text": "15th June, 29th June, 8th July", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9737, "end_char": 9767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Respondents wrote subsequently t6 the Director; Railway Stores on the 15th June, 29th June, 8th July and the three letters on 10th July and one on the 15th July D 1968, some of which were written after a discussion with the Director of Railway Stores in the presence of the Director of Finance, Mr. Datta."}}, {"text": "15th July D 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9818, "end_char": 9834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Respondents wrote subsequently t6 the Director; Railway Stores on the 15th June, 29th June, 8th July and the three letters on 10th July and one on the 15th July D 1968, some of which were written after a discussion with the Director of Railway Stores in the presence of the Director of Finance, Mr. Datta."}}, {"text": "Datta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9966, "end_char": 9971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Respondents wrote subsequently t6 the Director; Railway Stores on the 15th June, 29th June, 8th July and the three letters on 10th July and one on the 15th July D 1968, some of which were written after a discussion with the Director of Railway Stores in the presence of the Director of Finance, Mr. Datta."}}, {"text": "15-6-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10334, "end_char": 10341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nil dated 21-5-68, 15-6-68, 29-6-68, 8-7-68, 10-7-68 and 15-7-68."}}, {"text": "29-6-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10343, "end_char": 10350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nil dated 21-5-68, 15-6-68, 29-6-68, 8-7-68, 10-7-68 and 15-7-68."}}, {"text": "8-7-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10352, "end_char": 10358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nil dated 21-5-68, 15-6-68, 29-6-68, 8-7-68, 10-7-68 and 15-7-68."}}, {"text": "10-7-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10360, "end_char": 10367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nil dated 21-5-68, 15-6-68, 29-6-68, 8-7-68, 10-7-68 and 15-7-68."}}, {"text": "27-8-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11069, "end_char": 11076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, it is alleed that several draft agreements were exchanged regarding which there is a dispute but ultimately before us it is not contested that a draft agreement, which the appellants say is the Sth draft, but according to the Respondents is\n\nA the final draft, was handed-over to the Respondents by P. C. Oak on 27-8-68 but this, however, was not signed."}}, {"text": "Clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11112, "end_char": 11120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11212, "end_char": 11216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1-11-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11328, "end_char": 11337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68/RS(G)/709/10 dated 15-7-68 to the buyers; that the term of the contract shall be three years from 1-11-1968 to 31-10-1971; that the buyers reserve the right B to act upon the contract any time before 1-11-68 and start inspection and take delive1y of the goods but this will not in any manner effect the terms of the contract."}}, {"text": "31-10-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11341, "end_char": 11351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68/RS(G)/709/10 dated 15-7-68 to the buyers; that the term of the contract shall be three years from 1-11-1968 to 31-10-1971; that the buyers reserve the right B to act upon the contract any time before 1-11-68 and start inspection and take delive1y of the goods but this will not in any manner effect the terms of the contract."}}, {"text": "1-11-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11430, "end_char": 11437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68/RS(G)/709/10 dated 15-7-68 to the buyers; that the term of the contract shall be three years from 1-11-1968 to 31-10-1971; that the buyers reserve the right B to act upon the contract any time before 1-11-68 and start inspection and take delive1y of the goods but this will not in any manner effect the terms of the contract."}}, {"text": "18-9-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11642, "end_char": 11649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By letter dated 18-9-68 the Respondents wrote to the Director, Railway Stores, agreeing to several other matters to be included in the final draft and request- C ed him to issue the 'final contract' without delay."}}, {"text": "21st September 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11847, "end_char": 11866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 21st September 1968 the Respondents again wrote to the Director."}}, {"text": "All Indian D Railways", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12226, "end_char": 12247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the receipt of this Jetter the Joint Director, Railway Stores (G), wrote to the general Manager (S), All Indian D Railways with a copy to the respondents calling for the required information."}}, {"text": "M/s. N. K. (P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12439, "end_char": 12458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that letter the Joint Director stated thus :-\n\n\" .. the Board have finalised an export-cum-internal sale contract with M/s. N. K. (P) Ltd., New Delhi for a period of 3 years, entitling them to export stock of such surplus rails available with the Railways."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12460, "end_char": 12469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that letter the Joint Director stated thus :-\n\n\" .. the Board have finalised an export-cum-internal sale contract with M/s. N. K. (P) Ltd., New Delhi for a period of 3 years, entitling them to export stock of such surplus rails available with the Railways."}}, {"text": "23rd October 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12676, "end_char": 12693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detailed terms and conditions of the contract will be ap prised to you when finalised\"\n\nOn the 23rd October 1968, C. Parasuraman, for Secretary, Railway Board, replied to the letter of the Respondents of the 21st September 1968, stating that it was not correct that their office has assured them that it would arrange to get the missing details\n\nfrom -the concerned C.O.Ss."}}, {"text": "7th and 23rd November 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13062, "end_char": 13088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After this letter two other letters were written by the Respondents to the Director, Railway Stores, dated 7th and 23rd November 1968."}}, {"text": "23-11-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14923, "end_char": 14931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RB/Rails/ 68/1 dated 23-11-68 that the Railway Board is not authorised to sell rails to other parties because of their having concluded a contract with you is factually incorrect."}}, {"text": "20-7-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15277, "end_char": 15284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68/RS(G)/709/10 dated 15-7-68 iodicatan intention to enter into a contract with you, but subsequent to this, discussions had been held with you over a number of sittings on 20-7-68,\n\n12-8-68, 26-8-68, 27-8-67 cuhninating in your letter dated 18-9-68. '"}}, {"text": "12-8-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15287, "end_char": 15294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68/RS(G)/709/10 dated 15-7-68 iodicatan intention to enter into a contract with you, but subsequent to this, discussions had been held with you over a number of sittings on 20-7-68,\n\n12-8-68, 26-8-68, 27-8-67 cuhninating in your letter dated 18-9-68. '"}}, {"text": "26-8-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15296, "end_char": 15303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68/RS(G)/709/10 dated 15-7-68 iodicatan intention to enter into a contract with you, but subsequent to this, discussions had been held with you over a number of sittings on 20-7-68,\n\n12-8-68, 26-8-68, 27-8-67 cuhninating in your letter dated 18-9-68. '"}}, {"text": "27-8-67", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15305, "end_char": 15312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68/RS(G)/709/10 dated 15-7-68 iodicatan intention to enter into a contract with you, but subsequent to this, discussions had been held with you over a number of sittings on 20-7-68,\n\n12-8-68, 26-8-68, 27-8-67 cuhninating in your letter dated 18-9-68. '"}}, {"text": "iaganmohan Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16386, "end_char": 16402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "iaganmohan Reddy, J.) 443\n\nA Director, Railway Stores, dated 18-9-1968.", "canonical_name": "Jaganmohan Reddy"}}, {"text": "18-9-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16447, "end_char": 16456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "iaganmohan Reddy, J.) 443\n\nA Director, Railway Stores, dated 18-9-1968."}}, {"text": "Parasuraman", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16842, "end_char": 16853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In para 16 it wa' further alleged that after the letter of acceptance by the appellants the then Acting Director of Railway Stores and the Director of Finance proposed to the plaintiffs that the price offered by them should be increased or in the alternative certain alterations be made in the agreed terms, but the plaintiffs having justly refused B to do so, the 2nd defendant (C: Parasuraman).", "canonical_name": "C. Parasuraman"}}, {"text": "15-1-1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16893, "end_char": 16902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "falsely wi; ote to the plaintiffs on 15-1-1969 that no concluded contract had taken place and that the Railway Board was; therefore, not precluded from selling rails to other parties."}}, {"text": "Oak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17398, "end_char": 17401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also reiterated its stand earlier taken that the letter dated 15-7-68 written by Oak on behalf of the Secretary, Railway Board, was not a letter of acceptance of the offer of the Respondents so as to amount to a concluded contract binding on D the Union of India , nor could it, be construed as such in view of the mandatory provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution of India."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17565, "end_char": 17579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also reiterated its stand earlier taken that the letter dated 15-7-68 written by Oak on behalf of the Secretary, Railway Board, was not a letter of acceptance of the offer of the Respondents so as to amount to a concluded contract binding on D the Union of India , nor could it, be construed as such in view of the mandatory provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution of India."}}, {"text": "Article 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17656, "end_char": 17667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17675, "end_char": 17696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17810, "end_char": 17821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18721, "end_char": 18729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19220, "end_char": 19231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19406, "end_char": 19417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19922, "end_char": 19930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20050, "end_char": 20061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "15th July 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20269, "end_char": 20283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before us detailed arguments were addressed on behalf of the appellants to show that notwithstanding the letter of acceptance of 15th July 1968, no concluded contract had in fact come into existence and though that letter accepted certain tenns, there were other essential terms of• the contract which had to be agreed to and were the subject matter of further negotiations between the parties; that it was the intention of the parties that all those terms were to be embodied in a formal contract to be executed which contract alone was to be binding between the parties; and that in any case the letter of acceptance and the subsequent letters were not by the Director of Railway Stores but by the Secretary to the Railway Board who was not a person authorised to enter into the agreement between the President of India represented by the Ministry of Railways and the Respondents."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Railways", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20981, "end_char": 21001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before us detailed arguments were addressed on behalf of the appellants to show that notwithstanding the letter of acceptance of 15th July 1968, no concluded contract had in fact come into existence and though that letter accepted certain tenns, there were other essential terms of• the contract which had to be agreed to and were the subject matter of further negotiations between the parties; that it was the intention of the parties that all those terms were to be embodied in a formal contract to be executed which contract alone was to be binding between the parties; and that in any case the letter of acceptance and the subsequent letters were not by the Director of Railway Stores but by the Secretary to the Railway Board who was not a person authorised to enter into the agreement between the President of India represented by the Ministry of Railways and the Respondents."}}, {"text": "UNIONV. N. K. PVT. LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21925, "end_char": 21947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is in our view unnecessary to consider the several contentions as to whether all the essential terms of the contract had been agreed to or that the contract was ooncluded by the acceptance\n\n.<•\n\nUNIONV."}}, {"text": "25-5-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22957, "end_char": 22964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the letter written by Oak on 25-5-68, as earlier noticed, it was pointed out to the' Respondents that their offer was not addressed to the President of India as required under clause 1 ( 3) of the Instructions to the Tenderers and, therefore, the Respondents were required to confinn\n\nD that their offer can be deemed to have been addressed to the President and is open for acceptance on behalf uf the President and their reply should be addressed to the President of India, through the Director of Railway Stores, Railway Board."}}, {"text": "clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23104, "end_char": 23112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24053, "end_char": 24061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24065, "end_char": 24076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "15-7-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24782, "end_char": 24791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case the letter of acceptance dated 15-7-1968 was on behalf of the Secretary, Railway H Board."}}, {"text": "clause 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24966, "end_char": 24975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25071, "end_char": 25080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25646, "end_char": 25654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25997, "end_char": 26005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26480, "end_char": 26488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26498, "end_char": 26507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26575, "end_char": 26593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Part XLI empowers the Secretaries to the Central Government in the appropriate Ministries or Departments to execute any contl¥lct or assurances of property relating to any matter whatsoever and i~ in these terms :-\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything heieinbefore contained any contract or assurance of property relating to any matter whatsoever may be executed by the Secretary or the Special Secretary or the Additional Secretary or a Joint Secretary or a Director or where there is no Additional Secretary or a Joint Secretary or a Director, a Deputy Secretary to the Central Government in the appropriate Ministry or Department and in the case of .. \"\n\nThe con ten ti on on behalf of the Respondents is that since Railway Board is a Department of the Government, the Secretary to the Department is authorised to enter into a contract under the above provision."}}, {"text": "Government of Jndia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28298, "end_char": 28317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The status of a Joint Secretary was only conferred on him by a notification by the Government of Jndia in the Ministry of Railways for the first time on 15-9-1969 with effect from that date."}}, {"text": "15-9-1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28368, "end_char": 28377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The status of a Joint Secretary was only conferred on him by a notification by the Government of Jndia in the Ministry of Railways for the first time on 15-9-1969 with effect from that date."}}, {"text": "7-2-72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29512, "end_char": 29518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E On the evening before the day the judgment in the case was due to be delivered, an application dated 7-2-72 was filed enclosing an affidavit of R. N. Mubayi who was Director, Railw11.y- Stores, between 18-12-1965 to 30-9-1969 as also an affidavit of R. B. Lal, Managing Director of the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. N. Mubayi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29555, "end_char": 29567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E On the evening before the day the judgment in the case was due to be delivered, an application dated 7-2-72 was filed enclosing an affidavit of R. N. Mubayi who was Director, Railw11.y- Stores, between 18-12-1965 to 30-9-1969 as also an affidavit of R. B. Lal, Managing Director of the Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "R. No. Mubayi"}}, {"text": "18-12-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29613, "end_char": 29623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E On the evening before the day the judgment in the case was due to be delivered, an application dated 7-2-72 was filed enclosing an affidavit of R. N. Mubayi who was Director, Railw11.y- Stores, between 18-12-1965 to 30-9-1969 as also an affidavit of R. B. Lal, Managing Director of the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "30-9-1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29627, "end_char": 29636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E On the evening before the day the judgment in the case was due to be delivered, an application dated 7-2-72 was filed enclosing an affidavit of R. N. Mubayi who was Director, Railw11.y- Stores, between 18-12-1965 to 30-9-1969 as also an affidavit of R. B. Lal, Managing Director of the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. B. Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29661, "end_char": 29670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E On the evening before the day the judgment in the case was due to be delivered, an application dated 7-2-72 was filed enclosing an affidavit of R. N. Mubayi who was Director, Railw11.y- Stores, between 18-12-1965 to 30-9-1969 as also an affidavit of R. B. Lal, Managing Director of the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Mubayi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29888, "end_char": 29894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The affidavit of Mubayi states that only after he recorded on the relevant file and issued instructions to his Deputy Director, Shri P. C. Oak to convey the acceptance of the offer of M/s. N. K. Private Limited, that the acceptance was conveyed by Shri P. C. Oak to the said company."}}, {"text": "N. K. Private Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30060, "end_char": 30081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The affidavit of Mubayi states that only after he recorded on the relevant file and issued instructions to his Deputy Director, Shri P. C. Oak to convey the acceptance of the offer of M/s. N. K. Private Limited, that the acceptance was conveyed by Shri P. C. Oak to the said company."}}, {"text": "P. Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30222, "end_char": 30228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The affidavit of R. B. Lal says that though the affidavit filed by P. Lal, Deputy G Secretary, Railway Board stating that the Secretary, Railway Board, did not have the status of Secretary, Special Secretary, Additional Secretary, Joint Secretary or Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Railway, he has not denied that the Secretary did not have the status of a Director."}}, {"text": "R. Srinivasan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31436, "end_char": 31449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The file has been submitted to us by the appellants along with an affidavit of R. Srinivasan, Joint Director, Railway Board in which it is categorically averred that at the relevant time, namely, 15-7-6&, the Secretary Railway Board did not have the status of the Director under Para XLI of the Notification of the Ministry of Law or at all."}}, {"text": "Secretary Railway Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31566, "end_char": 31589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The file has been submitted to us by the appellants along with an affidavit of R. Srinivasan, Joint Director, Railway Board in which it is categorically averred that at the relevant time, namely, 15-7-6&, the Secretary Railway Board did not have the status of the Director under Para XLI of the Notification of the Ministry of Law or at all."}}, {"text": "N.K.\n\n(P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31910, "end_char": 31924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A perusal of the relevant\nfile relating to the letter of acceptance would show that on 15-7-68, Shri Oak made the following endorsement: \"Reference to Board's orders at page 38/N, draft letter accepting M/s. N.K.\n\n(P) Ltd., offer is being issued today."}}, {"text": "R.N.\n\nMubayi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32034, "end_char": 32046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.R.S. may kindly see before issue\", and this endorsement was merely signed by R.N.\n\nMubayi.", "canonical_name": "R. No. Mubayi"}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33059, "end_char": 33069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_449_461_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "P. B. ROY\n\nUNION OF INDIA\n\nFbruary 11, 1972\n\n[S. M. S1KRI, C.J., A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY, D. G. PALEKAR\n\nAND M. H. BEG, JJ.]\n\n. Civil Servantllolding temporary post-Constitution of New service -'Departmental candidate' holding temporary post appointed to pernza. nent post but of a lower grade-If violative of Art, 311.\n\nThe appo:llant was holding a temporary post of Editor in the Publi cations DiVIsion of the Department of Information and Broadcasting. The\n\nteml\"!rary post was sanctioned upto 28-2-1957.\n\nOn 16-2-1959, tho PreS1dent of India, in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution, promulgated the Central Information Service Rules, 1959. These Rules were meant for the creation of a Cen tral Information Service with prescribed grades and strengths. and entry into the service was open to departmental candidates according to r. S for the initial constitution of the service. The appellant was chosen by the Selection Col)lmittee and was posted as an Assistant Editor. He challenged the order,\n\nA single Judge of the High Court allowed the petition.\n\nOn uppeal, in the course of arguments, the question arose whether the post of Editor was abolished or had ceased to exist and the respondent was allowed to file an affidavit stating that the post of Editor had ceased to exist.\n\nThe Division Bench then held that there was no question of demotion or reduction in rank and hence that Art. 311 was not appli .. cable.\n\nIn appeal to this . Court, it was held :\n\n(I) The additional affidavit filed by the respondent did not introduce anything new but only clarified the po; ition. [455 E]\n\n(a) There was nothing to show that the temporary post of Editor in which the appellant was initially appointed had been continued beyond 28-2-1957 for any period. [455 CJ\n\n(b) The question whether the constitution of the Central Information Service involved fresh appointments to new posts or its effect was merely to transfer existing employees to corresponding posts with new desig11ations was already before the court. [455 D-E] . ( c) The appellant himself never sked for any opportunity to meet any allegation in the additional affidavit. [454 F-G]\n\n(2) There is nothing to indicate that on the face of the impued . order, that the appellant had been demoted as a measure of purushment. [455 F-GJ\n\n(3) It could not be held that the order, which had the effect of terminating an officiating appointmet in which the. appellant. had i:io right to continue-and which gave him a fresh appomtment wit~ a different designation, -Out 11trmanent tenure and prospects, constituted a\n\nviolation of either Art. 14 or 16, simply because the process which resulted in such an order did not have a similar effect upon the position or rights of any other person in the Department; especially when, after taking into account the appellant's individual case, the Selection Com mittee recommended the maximum pay in the class and grade of the post given to him. [456 ACJ\n\n(4) (a) The new rules had the effect of constituting a 11ew service with a fair and reasonable procedure for entry into it.\n\nSuch a procedure could not be characterised as a device to defeat the provisions of Art. 311 or a fraud upon the Constitution simply because the result of. subjection to the proeess of appraisement of the merits of each candidate may not meet the expectations of some candidates. [457 F-G]\n\n(b) Article 311 affords a reasonable opportunity to defend against threatened punishment to those already in GQvernment service.\n\nRule 5 of tho Central Information Service Rules provides a method of recruit\n\nront or entry into a new service of persons who, even , though they may have been serving the Government had no right to enter the newly constituted se\\'Vice before going through tho procedure prescribed by the rule. The fields of operation of Art. 311 and r. 5 are quite different and '°istinct. [457 GH; 458 A-Bl\n\n(c) The definition of 'departmental candidates' in r. 2(b) was meant only as an aid in interpreting r. 5 and was not intended to operate as a fetter on the functions and powers of the Selection Committee. It does not require that all persons falling within the definition of 'departmental candidate' should be placed in a single class. Under r. 5 the Selection Committee could assign different grades to the departmental candidates.\n\nThe post actually held by the appellant before his selection for appointment to the newly constituted service did not automatically or wholly determine the position of a departmental candidate . who offered himself to the proeess of appraisement of his merits by the Selection Committee to be made on the totality of relevant facts.\n\nThat Committee was presid ed over by the Chairman or a Member of the Union Public Service Com . mission and had officials Of the Department on it who were in a position to correctly evaluate the appellant's merit's and the weight to be attached to his confidential records. [459 BHl\n\n(S) The appellant's allegations of mala {ides and tliat he was the victim of the prejudice and machinations of an (unnamed) officer in the Transport Ministry, could not properly be tried in writ proceedings and \"ithoot impleading that official. [460 F-G]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2172 of 1968.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated August 10, 1967 of the Delhi High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 97-D of 1965.\n\nFrank Anthony, K. B. Rohatgi and P. Parameswara Rao, for the appellant.\n\nJagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General df India and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeg, J, 'Dtls is an appeal by grant of a Certificate of the Delhi High Court under Article 132 read with Article 133(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution.\n\n8 The Appellant had filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing an order dated 10-3-1960 and had prayed for a consequential order also in the nature of a mandamus. Information of tl)e impugned order (Annexure 'C' to the petition), given to the petitioner, reads as follows :\n\n\"The Union Public Service Commission have in pur suance of Rule 5 of the Central Information Ser\\'.ice Rules, 1959, recommended Shri P. B. Roy, at present officiating as Editor in the Pul.ri.:ations Division, for appointment, in a substantive capacity, to Grade III of the service at its initial constitution. Shri Roy is informed that the President has been pleased to post him as an Assistant Editor in the Publications Division with immediate effect\".\n\nThose relevant facts, preceding and following the impuJ!ned order, which are admitted by both sides. may now be mentioned.\n\nIn 1955, the post of Editor, Publicatiions Division, in the E _ Department of.Information and Broadcasting of the_Government of\n\n- India (hereinafter referred to as 'the Department'), was advertised.\n\nThe appellant, who had applied for the post, was selected by the Union Public Service Commission, and, on its recommendation, wl!S offered a temporary post of Editor in the Publications Division of the Department on an initial salary .of Rs. 720 per month in the F scale of Rs. 720-40-1000 together with the usual allowances. The material terms and conditions of this employment were :\n\n(i) The post is to be gazetted Class I;\n\n(ii) The temporary post was sanctioned upto 28-2-1957 but was likely to continue;\n\n(iii) Shri Roy (the Appellant) will be governed by the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service Rules) and other Rules applicable to temporary Govt. servants of his category; ·\n\n(iv) He was to be on probation for 6 months which may\n\nbe extended at the discretion of the appointing autho- H rity.\n\nThe Appellan~ had reported for duty on 1st August, 1956, as directed. On 27-3-1957, the Appellant's probation was extended\n\nby three months. Immediately thereafter, on 28-3-57, the Appel- A lant's services were terminated under Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules 1949, (Annexure 'D' to the Rejoinder Affidavit of 20th February, 1964). On 5-3-1957, the Appellant made a representation against this termination of his service (Annexure 'B' to the Rejoinder Affidavit). On 27-4-1957, in response to this representation., the above-mentioned termination B tio the Appellant's service was rescinded (Annexure 'F to the Re• joinder Affidavit).\n\nOn 28-4-1958, the President was pleased to terminate the probationary period of the. Appellant and permitted him to continue in his post in a temporary capacity (Annexure 'B' to the Affidavit supporting the Petition)\n\nOn 16-2-1959, the Presidentoflndia, in exercise of powers con- C ferred by the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, promulgated the Central Information Service Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), whicl) came into force on 21-2-1959.\n\nThese rules were mean~ for the creation of a Central Information Service with prescribed grades and their strengths. Entry into this service was open to \"departmental candidates\" by a procedure laid D down in Rule 5 for the initial constitution of the service. In accordance with this procedure, 1ihe Appellant was required to appear before a Selection Committee on a given date, and, after selection, he was posted by the impugned order as indicated above. On 11-3\n\n1960, the Appellant assumed charge of the. post thus assigned to him on the recommendation of the Union Pnblic Service Commis- E sion. The Appellant then made a representation, dated 11-3-1960 (Annexure 'E' to the Rejoinder Affidavit), against his appointment in Class II grade III post. He made other similar representations after that. His last representation was made. on 25-8-1962. The/ Appellant received a communication dated 10-12-1962 forwarding extract of an order dated 26-11-1962 which said :\n\n\"The representation from Shri P. B. Roy has been carefully considered in the Ministry. All relevant facts were fully en into account, by the Departmental Promotion Committee, before drawipg up the recent panel of Grade III officers considered suitable for promotion to\n\nGrade II. Shri Roy may be informed accordingly\".\n\nThe Appellant, treating this as the rejection of his last representation, filed his petition on 11-1-1963 which was allowed by a learned Judge of the Punjab High Court, sitting on the Circuit Bench at Delhi. A Letters' Patent Appeal against this decision had been allowed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court which then granted a ccate on 12-8-1968 for leave to Appeal pri- , H marily because it held that the required test relating to valuation of . the subject matter had been satisfied.\n\nA The learned Judge who had initially heard the petition had pointed out that the representation of the Appellant was first rejected on 29-7-1960 and that it did not matter that the petitioner had\n\ncontinued making subsequent representations. The learned Judge had noticed the explana(, ion that the petitioner could not approach the Court as he was admitted to a Tuberclulosis Clinic in June, B\n\n1961. The learned Judge, having found that this was not sufficient to explain the dell!)' between 29-7-1960 and June 1961 was disposed to reject the petition on the ground of !aches. But, in view of the decision of the majority of the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in S. Gurmej Singh v. Election Tribunal, Gurdaspur('), the delay in filing the petition was overlooked on the ground that, after c the admission of a Writ Petition and hearing of arguments, the rule that delay may defeat the rights of a party is relaxed and need not be applied if his case is \"positively good\".\n\nThe learned Single Judge had come 1io the conclusion, on the facts stated above, that the petitioner's case would b~ governed by the decision of this Court in Moti Ram Deka & Ors. v. Generlil D Manager, North East Frontier Railway('), as the petitioner's prospects and emoluments were adversely affected by the impugned order. The learned Judge thought that the mere fact that the Department was reorganised and that the petitioner was to be fitted into an appropriate category by the procedure laid down in Rule 5 did not take away the effect, that is 1!0 say, the loss of his emolu- E ments, of the procedure to which the petitioner had been subjected.\n\nThis view implied that Art. 311 of the Constitution was attracted by the case despite the above mentioned creation of the Central Information. Service by the rules.\n\nThe Division Bench which heard the Appeal of the Union of F India was not inclined to interfere with the discretion of the learned Single Judge in rejecting the objection to the petition on the ground of delay. We too will not enter into this question which was not argued before us.\n\nThe Division Bench, after reviewing facts leading to the absorption of the Appellant into a newly constituted Central In- G forniation Service, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Rule 5 mentioned above, held that the \"News and Information Cadre\" of the Department, in which the Appellant was initially appointed, had been superseded by the cadres and grades constituted by the rules of the ne.w service. It overruled the contention of the Petitioner that the effect of the rules was merely to transfer employees in existing posts to corresponding posts with new designa- H tions. It held that the Rules did create an altogeer new service.\n\nIt pointed out that the process of entry into the new service was of\n\n(I) [1964] P.L.R. p. 589.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1964 S.C, p. 600.\n\nselection of each individual candidate after an examination of his A individual record and qualifications by a Selection Committee before which he appeared so !halt there could be no automatic fitting into some corresQ011ding appropriate post of a pre-determined class and grade. The rules and process for the constitution of the new service did not guarantee the class or grade or emoluments enjoyed by any candidate in a cadre in which he served prior to the setting B up of the new service. It, therefore, held that no question of demotion or reduction in rank, without observing the procedure laid down in Art. 311 of the Constitutio11.. arose at all in the instant case.\n\nMr Anthony, appearing on behalf of the Appellant, has assailed the correctness of the decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi C High Court on five grol!nds. We will take up and consider each of these seriatim.\n\nFirstly, it is contended that !he Division Bench had erred in allowing an affidavit to be filed on 26-6-1967 before it, without affording an opportunity to the Appellant to repel its contents by filing a counter-affidavit. It was urged that the result was that an D altogether new case, neither argued before nor referred to by the learned Single Judge, had been allowed to be raised. This ground is no doubt mentioned among the grounds on which a certificate of the fitness for an appeal to this Court was sought. The Judgment of the Division Bench mentions that, in the course of arguments, the question arose whet.her the post of Editor in the Publications E Division was abolished or had ceased to exist. It appears that an affidavit was then allowed to be filed before the Division Bench on behalf of the Union of India in which it was stated that two 'posts of Editors in the scale of Rs. 720-40-1000 in the Publications Division had ceased to exist as a consequence of the inclusion of two posts in the revised grade of Rs. 700-40-1100-50/2-1250 with- F effect from 1-7-1959 in the Central Information Service constituted from 1-3-1960. There is nothing in the Judgment or anywhere else\n\nto show that the petitioner had asked for any opportunity to controvert any statement made in the affidavit dated 26-7-1967 and had been denied that.\n\nThe case and the contention on behalf of the Appellant have G been that the new posts in the services are really old posts in a new garb. This raised what was primarily a question of law, depending for decision upon an interpretation of the relevant rules of which the Court takes iudlcial notice. The rules certainly did not provide for the continuance of any ex-cadre posts outsitk the new service introduced by the rules. Facts stated in the Aft!- H davit of 26-7-1967 could have some bearing on the question wh\"her there were two posts in the revised scale which could be considered as corresponding posts. They could, if they had\n\nany ellect on the respective stands, perhaps help the Appellant's case that there was nothing more than a re-designation of J>Osts with same dll'lies and corresponding scales.\n\nAnd, this seems to explain why there is nothing to show that the Petitioner-Appellant asked for an opportunity to meet any allegation made in the affidavit of 26-7-1967 filed on behalf of the Union.\n\nMoreover, what the fresh affidavit contained about the disappearance of the remporary post given to the Petitioner in 1956 before the Rules came into force flowed logically from the order of Petitioner's initial appointment in a temporary post which was to continue only upto 28-2-1957, unless its life was shown to have been extended for some definite or indefinite period.\n\nThe Petitioner had not averred anywhere that the post was continued beyond 28-2-1957 for any period by any order or rule.. Indeed, the very argument advanced on behalf of the Appel.Ian!, that bis i, nitial post merged in another corresponding post, implied that the post to which he was initially appointed at least rost its identity or could not be deemed tO continue without a transmutation. The question whether the constitution of the Central lnformation Service did or did not involve fresh appointments to new posts but was simply an automatic process of transmutation It' the pooling together of existing incumbents of certain posts to form a new service, as the appellants allejled, was already the subject matter of assertion made in the Rejoinder Affidavit of the PetitiQner and counter-assertions in. a reply filed to the Rejoinder on 2-4-1964.\n\nThe affidavit of 24-6-1967 did not introduce anything new but only clarified the position still more.\n\nWe find no force in the first objection.\n\nSecondly, it is contended thalt the impugned order constitutes. on the face of it, a reducon in rank of the petitioner.\n\nLookin~ at the unication dated 10-3-1960; set out above, we find nothing there to indicate that the petitioner bad been demoted as\n\na measure of punishment. To hold, as it was sugp; ested/that we should, that the procedure laid down by Rule 5 was adopted as a cloak to cover up an intended reduction in rank and emoluments of an o:fficiting Editor, by appointing him in a permanent substantive capacity of a grade carrying lesser emoluments in the new service, would necessitate JP; Oing behind the order bf 10-3-1960. At any rate, on the face of it, the order discloses no such devious action against the Appellant.\n\nThirdly, it was contended that the impugned order violates ff Art. 14 and 16 of the Constitution inasmuch as it places an employee who was serving as an Editor in a post of lower ade with less emolumen'ls whereas no such result bad followed in tbe case of any other employee in the Information and Broadcasting\n\nDepartnwnt.\n\nWe are unable to see how an order which has the effect of terminating an officiating appointment,. in which the petitioner had no right to continue, and which gives him a fresh appointment,' with a different designation but permanent tenure and prospects, constitutes a violation of either Art. 14 or 16 of the Constitution simply because the process which resulted in such an order did not have a similar effect upon the position or rights of any other servant in the Department.\n\nIncle¢, the Selection Committee had, apparently after taking into account the special features of the petitioner's individual case, recommended the malt.imum pay, in the class and grade of the post given to him, and the petitioner _got this exceptional pay.\n\nEven his prospects improved to the extent that from the precarious position of a temporary servant he had moved into a permanent service.\n\nIt could not be definitely stated that his position had worsened on the whole.\n\nHe was at least no longer subject to the hazards of temporary employment which could be terniinated by a month's notice at any time.\n\nThe results of applying Rule 5 to the faots of individual cases could not be expected to be identically similar in all cases.\n\nAll candidates were subjected to the same process or procedure conmplated by Rule 5. It is not the Appellant's case that the Selection Committee did not function honestly or that its proceedin>,~ were vitiated by any defect in its constitution or\n\nof any bias on its part or any unifairness or inequality of the test E applied in judging the merits of the Appellant as against other candidates The a:llel!,~ defect with the material said to have been used by the Committee is another matter which we will consider last.\n\nFourthly, it was ur_ged that Rule 5 mentioned above is itself void for conflict with the provisions of Article 311 and 14 and 16 F of the Constitution.\n\nIt was urged that Rule 5 permits violation of Art. 311 of the Constitution inasmuch as it enables that to be done indirectly Which could not be done directly.\n\nThe Rule reads as follows :-\n\n5. INITIAL CONSTITUTION OF THE SERVICE:- G\n\n(1) The Commission shall constitute a Selection Committee with the Chairman or a Member of the Commission as President and not more itban three representatives of the Ministry of Informa;\n\ntion and Broadcasting as members, to determine the suitability of departmental candidates for H appointment to the different grades and to prepare an order of preference for the initial constitution of the service;\n\nA (2)\n\n(3)\n\nOn receipt of the Committee's report the Commission shall forward its recommendations to the\n\nGovernment and such recommendations may in-· cludct a recommendation that a person considered silitable for appointment to a grade may, if a sufficient number of vacancies are not available in that grade, be appointed to a lower. grade;\n\nVacancies in any grade which remain unfilled after the appointment of departmell'lal candid11tes selected under sub-rules\n\n(1) and (2) above shall be filled by direct recruitment. through the Commission.\n\nRule 3 indicates that appointmen1s to the newly created ser-· vice could take place either by selection under Rule 5 or by direct recruitment with which we are not concerned here.\n\nThe grades and the fixation of an authorised sirength of each grade D '!l\"e provided for by Rule 4.\n\nOnly posts in the first 3 grades are classified as Class I (Gazetted) posts.\n\nRule 5(2) enables the Selection C9mmittee to recommend :hat a \"departmental candidate\" consideI'd suitable for appointment to a post of a particular grade be actually appointed in even a lower grade if sufficient number of vacancies are not available in the grade for which he may be found fit In other words, even between candidates found fit for E a particular grade, the recommendation may be for an appointment to a lower grade.\n\nAs between those found fit for a particular grade, the preferences had to be and were, presumably, determined by fair and honest appraisements of their merit. Such preferences due 1o honest assessments, which are not above possi- . bilities of error, have never been held to cast any reflection which F could be equated with punishment If the view of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court is correct, as we think it is, that the rules had the effect of constituting a new service, with a fair and reasonable procedure for entry into it, the procedure could not be characterised as a device to defeat the provisions of Art. 311 or a fraud upon the Constitution simply because the results .G of subiwtion to the process of appraisement of the merits of each candidate may not meet the expectation of some candidates.\n\nArticle 311 affords reasonable opportunity to defend against threatened PJ111ishment to those already in a Government service.\n\nRule 5 provides a !Mthod of recruitment o~ entry into a new service of persons who, even thoull:h they may have been servinir H the Government, had no right to enter the newly constituted serviee before going through the procedure prescribed by the Rule. If the petitioner had already been appointed a permanent Government servant; there may have been some justification for\n\n.contendin11: that Rule 5 could not be so applied as to deprive him of a permanent post without complying with Article 311 . as such deprivation would have been per se a punishment. The mere possibility of misuse of Rule 5 could not involve either its\n\nconfilct with or attract the application of Art. 311.\n\nThe fields of operation of Rule 5 and Art. 311 of the Constitution are quite different and distinct so_ that the two do not collide with each . other.\n\nThe learned Counsel for the Appellant then contended that each person placed in the category of Departmental candidat.es\n\nby Rule 2 had to be treated alike, but Rule 5 enables the Selection Committee to treat them differently by assigning different grades to them. In other words, the contention was that Rule 5 gives too wide a power of selection to the Selection Committee.\n\nIt was also submitted, though not quite so clearly, that Rule 5 must itself be so interpreted as to operate automatically and place all persons falling within the definition of Departmental candidate\" in a single class if Rule 5 is to be upheld as valid.\n\nIt was urged that the interpretation placed on Rule 5 by the Division Bench involved not merely its conflict with the definition -of a \"departmental candidate\" in Rule 2 (b) but also with Articles\n\n14 and 16 of the Constitution, as it meant that those treated equally by Rule 2 (b) could be treated unequally by the Selection Com mittee. This argument rests on a misconstruction of Rule 2(b).\n\nThe definition of a Departmental candidate given by Rule 8 (b) is : ·\n\n2(b) \"departmental candidate\" means-- ( i) a person in the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting or any of its attached and subordinate offices who was holding or would have held, but for his absence on deputation, a duty post, on the 1st November, 1957, and who is holding, or has a lien on a duty post in a substantive capacity at the commenc:em.ent of these rules; or who has been declared quasi-pennarient in a duty\n\npost, on, or prior to, the 1st July 1957; or who was eligible to be declared quasi-permanent fu\n\na duty post, on, or on any date prior to, the 1st July 1957; or who was appointed to a duty post on the basis of selection by the Commission or whose 11PPOintment thereto was approved by the Camitission, before the commencem.mt of these rules;\n\nE • '\n\n(ii) any other person in the Ministry of Infomation\n\nand Broadcasting or any of its attached and subordinate offices whom the Government may _d119lare as such on the basis of his qualification and experience\"; .\n\nIt is clear that this definition of a \"departmental candidate\" is meant only as an aid in interpreting Rule 5 and was not intended to operate as a fetter on the functions and powers of the Selection Committee.\n\nWe may add that the validity of Rule 5 does not appear to us to have been assailed in arguments before the High Court. And, in any case, the attack on it must fail on merits.\n\nFifthly and lastly, it was urged that the action against the Petitioner was visited by mala (ides. We find no such ground taken either in the Writ Petition or argued at any stage in the High Court or mentioned in the grounds of appeal taken in the application for certifying the case as fit for appeal to this Court.\n\nIt was, however, a ground taken by the Petitioner Appellant in his Rejoinder affidavit in attempting to reply to the affidavit filed in opposition to the Writ Petition.\n\nIt had been stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India that the Appellant's work was not found to be up to the mark even during the period of his probation which had to be extended thrice by two months on each occasion before the probationary period was at last teminated. It had also been pointed out that the Appellant had been given a warning that he should improve his work. Furthemore, it was stated that all the facts of the Appellant's case were C¥efully examined, from the point of view of his merit, by the selection Committee. The case of the Union of India was that the post actually held by the Appellant before his selection for appointment to the newly constituted service did not automatically or wholly determine the position of a departmental candidate who offered himself to the process of appraisement of his merits by the Selection Committee to be made on the totality of relevant facts.\n\nThat Committee had to be presided over either by the Chairman or a Member of the Union Public Service Commission and had officials of the Department on it who must have been in a position to correctly evaluate the petitioner's merit and to know the weight to be attached to such entries as the Appellant's confidential records contained.\n\nIn reply to the case of the Union of India, that the Appel lant's merits were duly considered by the Selection Committee, the Appellant had characterised what had happened as an 'attempt to create prejudice against the Petitioner and to justify its\n\nmala fide reduction of rank of the Petitioner\".\n\nHe also said that this amounted to \"raking up the past\" which had no relevance to \"the admitted case of the Appellant\" that he was holding the temporary substantive rr.nk of Editor when he was reduced to the rank of an Assistant Editor.\n\nTh.is assertion was incorrect if it implied, as it seemed to, that it was admitted that the petitioner was being punished.\n\nThe Appellant had also referred to assertions made by him, in his representation dated 5-4-57 (Annexure 'B' to the Rejoinder) to the Minister of Information and Broadcasting against the termination of his service by notice dated 23-3-57, and also to those contained in another representation dated 11-3-1960 (Annexure 'E' to the Rejoinder Affidavit) against the impugned order. In these representations, the petitioner had complained that he was a victim of the prejudice and machinations of an Officer in the Transport Ministry (not named by him) whose mistakes, in the publications of the Transport Ministry, had been pointed out by the Appellant. He had also referred to a number of his own publications. Thus, the Appellant's case on ma/a fides rests on allegations which had been examined by the Department and may also have been considered by the Selection Committee.\n\nThe petitioner had assumed that there were some malicious reports \"against him which, according to him, he had no chance to meet. and on which he thinks that the recommendations of the Selection Committee about him were based. The reply of the Union of India to this case of ma/a /ides was that it was an after thought and that the assessment of the Selection Committee was based on the results of the interview given to the Appellant and a total assessment of all the facts concerning the Appellant which were before the Selection Committee. ' Even if we were to assume that the Appellant had thus taken up a case of action vitiated by ma/a fi(ies at its foundations and had supported it with necessary particulars and averments, it is evident that such a case could not be properly tried upon the materials on the record before us, without even impleading the official who was alleged to be the architect of his misfortunes. 1t could not, as it has been, argued seriously for the first time before us.\n\nThe fatal weakness in the Appellant's case arises from the fact that he was holding only a temporary post so that he could have no right to continue in it after it had ceased to exist.\n\nWe think that the necessary effect of setting up of the Central In- . formation Service, together with the determination of its classes and grades and their strengths was that the temporary posts in the Department which were not shown to have been continued, automatically came to an end. The Appelant was offered a new\n\nPost altogether after going through the process of selection i11 ai:cordance with Rule 5 to which he subjected himself.\n\nIndeed. the Appellant had no option, if he wanted to continue in the service of the Department, except to go through the procedure provided by the rules. We are unable to hold that the procedure contemplated by Rule 5 either automatically fixed the Appellant in any particular grade or post or could be held to be void for any reason wha'!soever. Therefore, if the Appellant was selected fot a particular post, by a process which, for the purpos::s of lhc case before us, must be assumed to have been fair, honest, and\n\nlegal, he cannot complain that he was entitled to a better one.\n\nWe, therefore, dismiss this appeal.\n\nBut, in the circumstances of the case, ,;, e leave the parties to bear <their own costs throughout.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "ROY\n\nUNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S1K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 55, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. G. PALEKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.G. PALEKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 601, "end_char": 609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Information Service Rules, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 647, "end_char": 686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1433, "end_char": 1441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Information Service Rules, 1959", "statute": "the Central Information Service Rules, 1959"}}, {"text": "28-2-1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1773, "end_char": 1782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "455 E]\n\n(a) There was nothing to show that the temporary post of Editor in which the appellant was initially appointed had been continued beyond 28-2-1957 for any period. ["}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2635, "end_char": 2642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3203, "end_char": 3211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3414, "end_char": 3425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Information Service Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3554, "end_char": 3587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3862, "end_char": 3870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Information Service Rules", "statute": "Central Information Service Rules"}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Com", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4771, "end_char": 4795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That Committee was presid ed over by the Chairman or a Member of the Union Public Service Com ."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5242, "end_char": 5270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "460 F-G]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5429, "end_char": 5442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony, K. B. Rohatgi and P. Parameswara Rao, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. B. Rohatgi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5444, "end_char": 5457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony, K. B. Rohatgi and P. Parameswara Rao, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Parameswara Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5462, "end_char": 5480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony, K. B. Rohatgi and P. Parameswara Rao, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Jagadish Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5502, "end_char": 5517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General df India and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5550, "end_char": 5561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General df India and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Beg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5628, "end_char": 5631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeg, J, 'Dtls is an appeal by grant of a Certificate of the Delhi High Court under Article 132 read with Article 133(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5711, "end_char": 5722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 133(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5733, "end_char": 5750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5824, "end_char": 5835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "10-3-1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5884, "end_char": 5893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 The Appellant had filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing an order dated 10-3-1960 and had prayed for a consequential order also in the nature of a mandamus."}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6086, "end_char": 6117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Information of tl)e impugned order (Annexure 'C' to the petition), given to the petitioner, reads as follows :\n\n\"The Union Public Service Commission have in pur suance of Rule 5 of the Central Information Ser\\'.ice Rules, 1959, recommended Shri P. B. Roy, at present officiating as Editor in the Pul.ri.:ations Division, for appointment, in a substantive capacity, to Grade III of the service at its initial constitution."}}, {"text": "P. B. Roy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6214, "end_char": 6223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Information of tl)e impugned order (Annexure 'C' to the petition), given to the petitioner, reads as follows :\n\n\"The Union Public Service Commission have in pur suance of Rule 5 of the Central Information Ser\\'.ice Rules, 1959, recommended Shri P. B. Roy, at present officiating as Editor in the Pul.ri.:ations Division, for appointment, in a substantive capacity, to Grade III of the service at its initial constitution.", "canonical_name": "P. B. ROY"}}, {"text": "Roy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6396, "end_char": 6399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Roy is informed that the President has been pleased to post him as an Assistant Editor in the Publications Division with immediate effect\".", "canonical_name": "Roy"}}, {"text": "Roy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7384, "end_char": 7387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material terms and conditions of this employment were :\n\n(i) The post is to be gazetted Class I;\n\n(ii) The temporary post was sanctioned upto 28-2-1957 but was likely to continue;\n\n(iii) Shri Roy (the Appellant) will be governed by the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service Rules) and other Rules applicable to temporary Govt.", "canonical_name": "Roy"}}, {"text": "Temporary Service Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7452, "end_char": 7475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "5-3-1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8037, "end_char": 8045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5-3-1957, the Appellant made a representation against this termination of his service (Annexure 'B' to the Rejoinder Affidavit)."}}, {"text": "27-4-1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8169, "end_char": 8178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 27-4-1957, in response to this representation.,"}}, {"text": "28-4-1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8341, "end_char": 8350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 28-4-1958, the President was pleased to terminate the probationary period of the."}}, {"text": "16-2-1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8559, "end_char": 8568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appellant and permitted him to continue in his post in a temporary capacity (Annexure 'B' to the Affidavit supporting the Petition)\n\nOn 16-2-1959, the Presidentoflndia, in exercise of powers con- C ferred by the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, promulgated the Central Information Service Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), whicl) came into force on 21-2-1959."}}, {"text": "Presidentoflndia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8574, "end_char": 8590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appellant and permitted him to continue in his post in a temporary capacity (Annexure 'B' to the Affidavit supporting the Petition)\n\nOn 16-2-1959, the Presidentoflndia, in exercise of powers con- C ferred by the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, promulgated the Central Information Service Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), whicl) came into force on 21-2-1959."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8646, "end_char": 8657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8665, "end_char": 8686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Information Service Rules, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8704, "end_char": 8743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "21-2-1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8810, "end_char": 8819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appellant and permitted him to continue in his post in a temporary capacity (Annexure 'B' to the Affidavit supporting the Petition)\n\nOn 16-2-1959, the Presidentoflndia, in exercise of powers con- C ferred by the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, promulgated the Central Information Service Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), whicl) came into force on 21-2-1959."}}, {"text": "11-3\n\n1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9283, "end_char": 9293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11-3\n\n1960, the Appellant assumed charge of the."}}, {"text": "11-3-1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9472, "end_char": 9481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellant then made a representation, dated 11-3-1960 (Annexure 'E' to the Rejoinder Affidavit), against his appointment in Class II grade III post."}}, {"text": "25-8-1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9664, "end_char": 9673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on 25-8-1962."}}, {"text": "10-12-1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9721, "end_char": 9731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The/ Appellant received a communication dated 10-12-1962 forwarding extract of an order dated 26-11-1962 which said :\n\n\"The representation from Shri P. B. Roy has been carefully considered in the Ministry."}}, {"text": "26-11-1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9769, "end_char": 9779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The/ Appellant received a communication dated 10-12-1962 forwarding extract of an order dated 26-11-1962 which said :\n\n\"The representation from Shri P. B. Roy has been carefully considered in the Ministry."}}, {"text": "11-1-1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10210, "end_char": 10219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellant, treating this as the rejection of his last representation, filed his petition on 11-1-1963 which was allowed by a learned Judge of the Punjab High Court, sitting on the Circuit Bench at Delhi."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10264, "end_char": 10281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellant, treating this as the rejection of his last representation, filed his petition on 11-1-1963 which was allowed by a learned Judge of the Punjab High Court, sitting on the Circuit Bench at Delhi."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10315, "end_char": 10320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellant, treating this as the rejection of his last representation, filed his petition on 11-1-1963 which was allowed by a learned Judge of the Punjab High Court, sitting on the Circuit Bench at Delhi."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10413, "end_char": 10429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Letters' Patent Appeal against this decision had been allowed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court which then granted a ccate on 12-8-1968 for leave to Appeal pri- , H marily because it held that the required test relating to valuation of ."}}, {"text": "12-8-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10460, "end_char": 10469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Letters' Patent Appeal against this decision had been allowed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court which then granted a ccate on 12-8-1968 for leave to Appeal pri- , H marily because it held that the required test relating to valuation of ."}}, {"text": "29-7-1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10748, "end_char": 10757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A The learned Judge who had initially heard the petition had pointed out that the representation of the Appellant was first rejected on 29-7-1960 and that it did not matter that the petitioner had\n\ncontinued making subsequent representations."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12272, "end_char": 12280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union of F India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12464, "end_char": 12480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Division Bench which heard the Appeal of the Union of F India was not inclined to interfere with the discretion of the learned Single Judge in rejecting the objection to the petition on the ground of delay."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14088, "end_char": 14096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Anthony", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14158, "end_char": 14165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr Anthony, appearing on behalf of the Appellant, has assailed the correctness of the decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi C High Court on five grol!nds."}}, {"text": "26-6-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14469, "end_char": 14478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he Division Bench had erred in allowing an affidavit to be filed on 26-6-1967 before it, without affording an opportunity to the Appellant to repel its contents by filing a counter-affidavit."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15180, "end_char": 15194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that an affidavit was then allowed to be filed before the Division Bench on behalf of the Union of India in which it was stated that two 'posts of Editors in the scale of Rs."}}, {"text": "1-7-1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15443, "end_char": 15451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "700-40-1100-50/2-1250 with- F effect from 1-7-1959 in the Central Information Service constituted from 1-3-1960."}}, {"text": "1-3-1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15504, "end_char": 15512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "700-40-1100-50/2-1250 with- F effect from 1-7-1959 in the Central Information Service constituted from 1-3-1960."}}, {"text": "26-7-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15679, "end_char": 15688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is nothing in the Judgment or anywhere else\n\nto show that the petitioner had asked for any opportunity to controvert any statement made in the affidavit dated 26-7-1967 and had been denied that."}}, {"text": "2-4-1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17951, "end_char": 17959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a reply filed to the Rejoinder on 2-4-1964."}}, {"text": "24-6-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17979, "end_char": 17988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The affidavit of 24-6-1967 did not introduce anything new but only clarified the position still more."}}, {"text": "Art. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18908, "end_char": 18922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19461, "end_char": 19468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311 and 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21016, "end_char": 21041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21112, "end_char": 21120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "INITIAL CONSTITUTION OF THE SERVICE:-", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21259, "end_char": 21296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "INITIAL CONSTITUTION OF THE SERVICE:- G\n\n(1) The Commission shall constitute a Selection Committee with the Chairman or a Member of the Commission as President and not more itban three representatives of the Ministry of Informa;\n\ntion and Broadcasting as members, to determine the suitability of departmental candidates for H appointment to the different grades and to prepare an order of preference for the initial constitution of the service;\n\nA (2)\n\n(3)\n\nOn receipt of the Committee's report the Commission shall forward its recommendations to the\n\nGovernment and such recommendations may in-· cludct a recommendation that a person considered silitable for appointment to a grade may, if a sufficient number of vacancies are not available in that grade, be appointed to a lower."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Informa;\n\ntion and Broadcasting", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21467, "end_char": 21510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "INITIAL CONSTITUTION OF THE SERVICE:- G\n\n(1) The Commission shall constitute a Selection Committee with the Chairman or a Member of the Commission as President and not more itban three representatives of the Ministry of Informa;\n\ntion and Broadcasting as members, to determine the suitability of departmental candidates for H appointment to the different grades and to prepare an order of preference for the initial constitution of the service;\n\nA (2)\n\n(3)\n\nOn receipt of the Committee's report the Commission shall forward its recommendations to the\n\nGovernment and such recommendations may in-· cludct a recommendation that a person considered silitable for appointment to a grade may, if a sufficient number of vacancies are not available in that grade, be appointed to a lower."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23671, "end_char": 23679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23869, "end_char": 23880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24484, "end_char": 24495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24670, "end_char": 24678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24719, "end_char": 24727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles\n\n14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25654, "end_char": 25673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ministry of Information & Broadcasting", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25990, "end_char": 26028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The definition of a Departmental candidate given by Rule 8 (b) is : ·\n\n2(b) \"departmental candidate\" means-- ( i) a person in the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting or any of its attached and subordinate offices who was holding or would have held, but for his absence on deputation, a duty post, on the 1st November, 1957, and who is holding, or has a lien on a duty post in a substantive capacity at the commenc:em.ent of these rules; or who has been declared quasi-pennarient in a duty\n\npost, on, or prior to, the 1st July 1957; or who was eligible to be declared quasi-permanent fu\n\na duty post, on, or on any date prior to, the 1st July 1957; or who was appointed to a duty post on the basis of selection by the Commission or whose 11PPOintment thereto was approved by the Camitission, before the commencem.mt of these rules;\n\nE • '\n\n(ii) any other person in the Ministry of Infomation\n\nand Broadcasting or any of its attached and subordinate offices whom the Government may _d119lare as such on the basis of his qualification and experience\"; ."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Infomation\n\nand Broadcasting", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26731, "end_char": 26771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The definition of a Departmental candidate given by Rule 8 (b) is : ·\n\n2(b) \"departmental candidate\" means-- ( i) a person in the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting or any of its attached and subordinate offices who was holding or would have held, but for his absence on deputation, a duty post, on the 1st November, 1957, and who is holding, or has a lien on a duty post in a substantive capacity at the commenc:em.ent of these rules; or who has been declared quasi-pennarient in a duty\n\npost, on, or prior to, the 1st July 1957; or who was eligible to be declared quasi-permanent fu\n\na duty post, on, or on any date prior to, the 1st July 1957; or who was appointed to a duty post on the basis of selection by the Commission or whose 11PPOintment thereto was approved by the Camitission, before the commencem.mt of these rules;\n\nE • '\n\n(ii) any other person in the Ministry of Infomation\n\nand Broadcasting or any of its attached and subordinate offices whom the Government may _d119lare as such on the basis of his qualification and experience\"; ."}}, {"text": "5-4-57", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29805, "end_char": 29811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellant had also referred to assertions made by him, in his representation dated 5-4-57 (Annexure 'B' to the Rejoinder) to the Minister of Information and Broadcasting against the termination of his service by notice dated 23-3-57, and also to those contained in another representation dated 11-3-1960 (Annexure 'E' to the Rejoinder Affidavit) against the impugned order."}}, {"text": "23-3-57", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29947, "end_char": 29954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellant had also referred to assertions made by him, in his representation dated 5-4-57 (Annexure 'B' to the Rejoinder) to the Minister of Information and Broadcasting against the termination of his service by notice dated 23-3-57, and also to those contained in another representation dated 11-3-1960 (Annexure 'E' to the Rejoinder Affidavit) against the impugned order."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_462_484_EN", "year": 1972, "text": ")INNYLTD.\n\nTHEIR WORKMl!:N\n\nFebruary 15, 1972 [C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, I. D. DuA AND G. K. MITTER, 1J.]\n\nThe Payment of Bonus Act, 1965. $1'. 17 and l~Direcll'o# to' pay half yearly bonus-If justified-Payment of additional bonus-Metliod of calculation.\n\nThe appellant company was making two payments of bonus every year one for too half year ending 30th June and the other for the half year c ending 3 !st Dece111ber, The payment wao on the basi• of profits earned by it and the payment was not a condition of service and had nothing to do with any custom or festival.\n\nWhen the Payment of Bonus Act, 1%5 came into force, the appellant issued a circular that as bonus was payable under Jaw only within a period.of 8 months from the endof the accounting year (the appellant's accounting year was the calendar year), no bonus was payable for the accounting year 1965 until the accoun!S for the year are closed, and the announced payment of one month's basic D wages as advance against wages for the half year endig. 30th June 1965.\n\nThe questions, (l) whether the appellant was justified in.announcing the payment as advance against wages iiistead of as advance bonus, and\n\n(2) whether the respondents were justified in claiming bonus for the years 1962 and 1963, in addition to what had already been paid by the appellant were referred to the Industrial Tribunal.\n\nOn the first question the Tribunal held that the appellant was not justified ln anncunc1ng the payment towards advance wages and directed\n\nthe appellant to pay profit bonus in .two instalments-one as advmce against the final declaration of bonus, and the balance; if any, as the second instalment.\n\nOn the second question the Tribunal held that the question of bonus payable was to be calculated in accordance with the Labour' Appellate Tribunal Full Bench Formula approved in AS30Ciated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Workmen, [19591 S.C.R.25; that in calculating the re~ on Reserves the claim of the appellant to iJtclude in the working C84>ltal the amounts sunk in \\a) fixed assets and (b) capital work in progress should be disallowed; and that the claim of the appellant for a provision for rehabilitation should be rejected:\n\nIn apeal to this Court. ·\n\nHELD; (I) (a) Under the Act, bonus for a particular accoiJnting'year will have to be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act (Ill the basis of the gross profits determined at the close af the accounting year. . The Act makes prvision as to how the gross profits, available and allocable surplus are to be calculated, and s, 19 prescribes 8 montha from ll>c close of the accounting year as the period within which the , bonus was to be normally paid., The scheme of the Act shows that a claim for llonus can be made only after the close of the accounting year, because, groa profits and the vailable and allocable surplus can be worked out only at the end of the accounting year and not earlier, whereas the direction'\n\ngiven by the Tribunal requires the employer to make two computati~ at the end of each half yar. /469 E-H; 470 A-Bl\n\nBINNY LTD. 1'. WORKMEN 463\n\n(b) The direction given by the Tribunal making it obligatory on the ntanagement to make half yearly payments of bonus apart from being .. ipposed to the scheme of the Act. runs counter to s. 19. Under the section, whether it is the minimum bonus of 4% under s. 19 or the maximum bonus of 20% under s. 11, they have to be paid only within a period 'bf 8 months from the closing of the accounting year. [470 C-E]\n\n( c) Section 17 (b) is an enabling section in favour of the employer in that it visualises a situation when he may have paid during the accounting year a part of the bonus payable under the Act, before the date on which such bonus becomes payable. lf the payment was by way of profit bonu8,\n\nhe is entitled to deduct it from the final amount that may be payable under the Act.\n\nBut that provi:; ion does not give a right to an emplo)'ee to claim payment of bonus by way of part payment during the currency of the accounting year. Therefore, the mere fact that the appellant has heen making payments on previous occasions half yearly, does not confer a right on the employee to 'have such payments by way of bonus in the same manner after the Act has come into force.\n\nHence, the Tribunal had r:io jurisdiction to give a direction to he appellant to pay bonus at the end of each half year. [471 A-CJ\n\n(2) (a) In coa.idering the claim for return on workins capital two questions have to be kept in viev.·: (i) whether Reserve,, were available, and (ii) \\Yhether they were used as working capital, and if $0, what was 1heatnount used. 1477 GJ\n\nIn the present case, the Tribunal has correctly kept the two principles in view in arriving at the amount of Reserves used as working 'capital and on which a return is to be allowed. The balance sheets of the appellant do not have any figures from which the Tribunal would be able to draw a conclusion. The Tribunal, therefore, while acceptin1 the sents of account filed by the appellant for the two years, for showing how it had calculated the amQunt , of Reserves utiliz.ed as working a.pita], held~ that t_he two items should be deducted; because, working capitil represents the funds required for day-to-.day work of the company and carinot include~\n\nfixed assets, and the capital works in progress. r477 G-H; 478 A'Cl\n\n. Workmen of M/s. Hindustan Motors Ltd. v. M/s. Hindustan Moiors Lid. & Anr. [1968] 2 S.C.R. 311 and M/s.'A/uminium Corpn. of India v.\n\n\nTherefore, the contention that the Tribunal had committed a mistake Jn calculating the amount of Reserves used as working capita.I cannot be accpted. [478 D-EJ\n\n(b) A company should build up rehabilitation reserve takinr into consideration the increase in price in plant and machinery which bu to be repJaced at a future date.\n\nBut since it is a substantial item which goes bl: reduce the available surplus and as a resul~ affects the right of the employees to bonus, the employer will have to place all .relevant material, before the Tribunal for its scrutiny.\n\nThe burden of proof is on the employer to prove the price of the plant and machinery, its age, the period during which it requires replacements, the cost df replacemen~\n\n\\he amount standing in the Debunture and' Reserve Funds and to what extent t.he funds at its disposal would meet the cost of replacement. If the employer fails to lead satisfactory evidence on these points his claim for rehabilitation will be rejected. Also. if a company has no scheme for rehabilitation then its claim on that head must he rejected. r 479 A, E'\n\n481 B-C]'\n\n\nIn the present case, the averment in the written statement of the respondents,· that the appellant's machinery was among the most modern and .. no provision for rehabilitation was necessary, was not controverted by the appellant.\n\nThe balance sheets for the two years showed that some amounts were spent on machinery. But when the respondents were contesting the claim of the appellant on the ground that it had no scheme of rehabilitation and that it had not spent any amount by way of replaooment, it was the duty of the appellant to have made a proper claim and to adduce evidence regarding that aspect.\n\nMere production of balance sheets , and profit and Joss accounts and adding a note in the statements -0[ account filed that the figure is 'subject to claim for rehabilitation' will not entitle the appellant to sustain its claim for rehabilitation. More<>Yer, lhe appellant had large Reserves to meet rehabilitation expenses. It had also floated a debenture for buying new machinery. r481 G-H; 482A- C, Dl Further, in determining the claim of an employer far rehabilitation, two factors are essential to be ascertained, namely, (i) the multiplier, which\n\nhas to be done by reference to the purchase price of the machin!\"Y and the price \"hich has to be paici for replacement; and (ii) the divl'IOr, which has to be done by deciding the probable life of the machinery. [479 E~FJ\n\nHo110rary Secretary, South India Mil/owners' Assn. v. Secretary Coimbato,.. District Textile Workers' Union, [1962] SUpp. 2 S.CR. 926 and M /s. Gan110n Dunkerley &. Co .. v. Their' Workmen, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2567, re!erred to.\n\nIn the present case no material was placed before the Tribunal by the appellant from which the multiplier and divisor can be properlyworked <mt. [481 E-P) \"\n\nlberefore, the Tribunal was justifiOd in bplding that the appellant had not made out its claim for making provision for rehabilitation. [411'2 C-Dl\n\n( c) The equitable method of aDocating the available surplus between the company and its workmen is to distribute (,()% as bonus to the w<>rlan\"1 leaving the remaining 40% to the company. In the pr.sent case, the method of calculation adopted for 1962, by the Tribunal, shows that the amount of 'bonus awarded by the Tribunal together with the amount already paid by the appellanr exceeded (,()% and the award of the excess was not justified. [484 A-CJ Ml s. Ganncn Dunkerley &. Co. v. Their Workmtn, A.I.R. 1.9'11 S.C.\n\n2567. referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1291\n\nand 1292 of 1967 ,, G Appeals by special leave from the awatd dated June 30, 1967 of the Addi1ional Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore m A.I.D. Nos. 6 and 8 of 1966.\n\n0. P. Malhotra and D. N. Gupta, for the appe11ant.\n\nl. N. Keshava and K. Rajendra Chowdhary, for respondents H Nos. 2 and 3.\n\nVineet Kumar, for respon'dents No5. 4 to 10.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nV aidialiDgam. 1. These two appeals, by specal leave, are directed against the common Award, dated June 30, 1970 of the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore, in two References, A.I.Ds. 6 and 8 of 1966.\n\nOn December 8, 1965, the Government of Mysore referred to the Industrial 'tribunal for adjudication the following question :\n\n . \"Is 1the Management of the Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills C!)mpany Limited, Bangalore,\n\njustified in announcing payment of one month's basic wages as advance against wages for the half-year ending June 1965 instead of declaring this' payment as an advance against payment of bo1Vi~ as was being done all these years ?\n\nIf not, what other relief the workers are entitled to?\"\n\nThis was numbered as Reference No. A.I.D. 6 of 1966.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 129'1 of 1967 is directed against that part of the order of the Tribunal regarding ithis Reference. · .\n\nOn March 5, 1966, the Government of Mysore referred to E the same Tribunal for adjudication the following question :\n\n\"Whether. the demand. of the workers of Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co., Ltd., Bangalore, for additional bonus for the year 1962 and 1963 at the rate of 2 months additional bonus and 4 months additional bonus on total wages respectively is justified.\n\nF If not, to what other relief or reliefs a:re the workmen c; ll'titled ?\"\n\nThis Reference was numbered as A.J.D. 8 of 1966. Civil Appeal No. 1292 of 1967 is directed against that part of the order of the Tribunal regardinjl this Reference. Both the appeala are G by the Company.\n\nWe will first take up Civil Appeal No. 1291 of 1967. The appellant was making two 1>8ymetl'!S of bonu8 every year, one.for the half-year ending 30th June and half-year ending 30th De. cember. The accounting year is the Calendar year. The balf H yearly payments were unilaterally declared by the appellant and not on the basis of any aJU\"eemell'I: between the pal'lies. The quantum of bonus that was paid for each half-year was also not cbostant.\n\nHalf-yearly payments were made at the end of the half-year when\n\nthe working result of 'the said year was known and if there was sufficient profit to pay bonus. The payment of bonus for the halfyears also depended upon the approximate estimate that the Directors used to make about their prospective future earnings for the net half-year. According to the appellant the bonus amounts were paid out of profits. As the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act) had come into force on August 28, 1965, the appellant issued a circular to 1he efP>..ct that for the half-year ending June 30, 1965, payments will be made a' advance of wages equivalent to I/ 6th of the basic earnings of the. employees. In this circular there is a reference to the Payment of Bonus Ordinance 1965, promulga~.!d on May 29, 1965 and that under the terms of the Ordinance, bonus is payable only within a period of 8 months from the end of the accounting year. The circular futher states that no bonus is payable for the accounting year 1965 unti) the accounts for the year are closed. It was further mentioned that the amounts are paid as advance wages in view of the representations made by the employees. The circular further mentioned that the amounts paid as advance wages will be set off against the bonus that may be found payable for the accounting year 1965 and that if no bonus is payable, the amount paid will be adjusted against the wages due for any month after March, 1966.\n\nThe issue of the above circular led to the Unions concerned raising a dispute with the Management that the payment of bonus\n\nirt the end of each half-year has become a condition of service of the workmen as the same was being paid for several decades without any relation to profits.\n\nThe appellant was charged by the Unions of having changed the conditions of service by offering to make payments as advance against wages instead of payment by way of bonus.\n\nAs conciliation proceedings failed, the workmen resorted to a strike in December 1965, which led to the Reference being made by the State Government on December 8, 1965, No. A.I.D. 6 of 1966.\n\nThe short stand taken by the appellant before the Tribunal\n\nwas that the payments were being made as bonus 11'1 the end of each half-year on the basis of the profits earned by the Company.\n\nG Such payment was a voluntary act of the appellan!t and related to profit and it had not become a condition of service of the employees. The further case of the appellant is that as the Act had CO!lJe into force, bonus is governed by the provisions of the Act and that bonus is to be paid only within eight months after the close of the year of account, i.e., December 31, 1965.\n\nThe Unions pleaded that the payment of bonus at the end of each half-year, which was being done for a long number of years,\n\nA has become .ll. condition of serviee and too amounts paiq were not related to the profits earned by the Company. The Unions furtller contended that the Act has not in any manner afiected the right of the employees getting bonus in the manner paid by the appellant namely, at the end of every half-year.\n\nThe Tribunal has recorded the following findings : The pay ment of bonus was not a settled condition of service, but is de pendent upon the profits earned during the halfyGar. Payments made by the appellant at the close of the half-year cannot be con sidered as customary or festival bonus and that the appellant has made no change in the conditions of service of rthe workmen by altering the quantum of bonus. Though bonus was paid at the close of each half-year, the quantum of such bonus varied depending upon the profits earned by the Company. The Company has no doubt been paying for a long time profit bonus in two instalments, namely, in the month of August for the half year end\n\ning 30th June and in the month of March or April of the succeed ing year for the half-year ending 31st December. The coming D into force of the Act has not created any right in the appellant to withhold the payment for each half-year as it used to do.\n\nThe appellant will be entitled to deduct the amount of bonus paid for the first half year from the amount of bonus payable to its em\n\np!oyees under the Act in respect of the accounting year and the employees will be entitled to receive only the balance for th\" £ second half-year. On these findings the Tribunal held that the appellant was not justified in announcing the payment of the amount. towards advance wages under the circular dated August 28,\n\n1965. In the end <the Tribunal gave a direction to the effect that the ai>Pellant is liable to pay profit bonus in two insta!ments--Olle\n\nas advance against the final declaration of bonus to oo paid dur-\n\nF ing the last week of August or first week of September and the balance, if any, was to be paid in the month of March or first week of April of the succeeding year. It further gave a direction that the first payment that is to be paid is to be as advance against payment of bonus and not as against wages.\n\nMr. Malhotra, learned counsel for the appellant, has cha!· G Ienaed . t, be above directions given by the Tribunal. The counsel pointed out that after the OOllling into force of t'he Aot, the rights and liabllitiOBof the parties, reg bonus, are governed by its provisiODI. Under the Act, the compurtalions of the available and allocable rplus have to be made on the basis of the gross-profits .asceitained e.t the end of the relevant accounting year and the.pay H ment of bqnus has to be made within eight months of the close of the 11ccou, ntin11; year. As the Act envisages payment of only one. bonus, at the end of tho aci:ountiug year, .after computation qf the amount as per llhe Act, the on given by the Tribunal\n\nregarding paymell\"t of half-yearly bonus is illegal and contrary to A the provisions of the Act. This direction, the counsel pointed out. given by the Tribunal, will apply not only to the year 1965, but also to all succeeding years.\n\nOn .the other hand, Mr. H. K. Puri, learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 and 3, whose contentions have been.accepted B by the counsel for the other respondents, urged '!hat the Act does not prohibit an employer from paying bonus at the end of each half-year.\n\nThe appellant has been paying bonus in two instal ments, nan1ely, at the end of each half-year. It is always open !O the appellant, both by virtue of the provisions of the Act and the direction given by the Tribunal to deduct when paying final bonus c at the end of the accounting year. any amounts that may have been paid for the first half-year.\n\nTherefore, accordinit to Mr. Puri. the directions Jtiven by '!he Tribunal are neither illegal nor con trary to the provisions of the Act.\n\nWe are not inclined to accept the conntion of Mr. Puri. We D have already referred to the findings of '!he Tribunal to the effect that the amount that was paid by the appellant as bonus at the end of each half-year was on the basis of the profits earned by i't.\n\nThe Tribunal has re.iected the claim of the Unions that the pay mcnt of bonus, in the manner claimed by them, was not a condition of service and th:it the payment had nothing to do with any custom or festival. These findings have not been and in fact could E not be challenged by the respondents. There is also no controversy that payment of bonus for the accounting year 1965 is governed by the provisions of the Act. If so, the question is whether the directions given by the Tribunal and referred to above. can be supported by the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe Act has come into force with effect from August 28.\n\n1965. As provided under sub-section ( 4) of seotion 1, it applies to all accounting years commencing on any day in the year 1964 and in respect of every subsequent accountinl!: year. Section 2 defines amongiit others the expressions, \"accounting year\", \"al!o cable surplus\", \"available surplus\" and \"ross profits\" Section 4 deals with •the computation of gross-profits. So far as the appellant is concc; ned, under s. 4, cl. (b) the gross-profits are to be calculated in the manner specified in the Second Schedule. Section 5 provides for computation of available surplus. It is to be ascertained after deducting from the gross-profits the various\n\nitems, referred to in s. 6.\n\nSection 6 deals with the items to be deducted as prior charges from the gross-profits.\n\nSection l O H makes it obligatory on an employer to pay minimum bonus to the employees in an accounting year of 4% of his salary or wages or Rs. 40/- whichever is higher. This payment is irrespective of the\n\nfact whether a Company has or has not earned profits in an ac countinl!; year. But this provision is subject to ithe provisions of ss. 8 and 13. Section 11 provides for payment of bonus subject to a maximum of 20% of the salary or wages, if the conditions mentioned. therein are satisfied. Section 17 enables an employer, who has paid .during any accounting year Puja Bonus or other customary bonus or a part of the bonus payable under the Act before the due date, to deduct the amount so paid from the amount of bonus payable by him to an employee under the Aot in respect of that accounting year. It further provides th!!t under such cir cumstances the employee will .be entitled to receive only the balance. Seotion 19 fixed the tinie limit for payment of bonus.\n\nIf there is a dispute regarding payment of bonus pending before any authority, the .bonus will have to be paid within a month from the date, on which the Award becomes enforceable or ithe settlement comes into operation. In any other case the bonus will have to be paid within a period of eight months from the close of the accounting year. Under ithe proviso to s. 19, power is given to the appropriate Government to extend the period of eight months in accordance with the provisions contained therein. Section 34 provides that the Act exoopt as otherwise provided in the section, shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in the terms of any Award, agreement, settlement or contract of service made before May 29, 1965.\n\nWe. have referred to some of the relevant provisions of the Aot. From a perusal of the scheme of the Act, it is clear that the bonus for a particular accounting year will have to be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act on the basis of the gross-profits which are determined at the close of the accounting year. The Act itself provides as to how the gross-profits are to be calculated and the available and allocable surplus arrived at.\n\nThe Act also provides the outer limit, the period within which bonus has to oo paid. It further gives the employer a right to deduct any amount that any have been paid during the accountil).g\n\nyear as part of .the bonus payable under the Act.\n\nG It will be seen from the scheme of the Act that the claim f6r bonus can be made only after the close of the accouttting year and in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The gross-profits can be calculated only at the end of the accountirig year' and the available and allocable surplus can also be worked out only at the end of the. accounting year. There is no question of an employer H computing the gross-profits, available and allocable surplus in the middle of an accoilnting year or at any time before the close of the relevant accountinl!; year. The direction l!; iven by the Tribti nal really amounts to the employer having to make two .2-1031 Sip CI/72\n\n470 SUPREME COUl!.T REPORTS\n\n\ncomputations at the end of each half-year. No doubt, the Tribunal A ha.s given a direction to the effeet that any amount paid for the first\n\nhalfyear can be deducted when the final bonus is paid at the end of t]je accounting year. Even without any such comideration be in!f shown by the Tribunal allowing an employer to so deduct, section 17 iiself clearly gives such a right to an employer. We are not impressd with the contention of Mr. Puri that as there is no B prohibition .in the Act against an employer making the paymel1t by way of bonus at the end of a half year, the direction given by the Tribunal can be sustained.\n\nMr. Puri referred us particularly to the provisions contained in s. 17 of the Act. He pointed out that though a time limit is fixed bys. 19, the Act itself as is evident from s. 17, clearly en C visages payment of bonus at the end of each half year. We are not inclined to accept this contention of Mr. Puri. The direction given by the Tribunal making !t obligatory on the Manage- D!ettt to make half yearly payment of bonus, apart from being opposed to the scheme of the Act, also runs counter to the provisions of s. 19. Whether it is the minimum bonus of 4% under D s •. 10 or t}te maximum bonus of 20% under s. 11, they have to be paid, as is made clear by s. 19, only within the period mentioned therein. It may be that an employer voluntarily pays amount during the accouating year by way ofpart bonus which he is en\n\ntitled to take into account and adjust when making final payment at the close of the accounting year. It is one thing to say that an E 1'11lployer can make voluntary paY1Dent, but it is a different thing for the Tribunal to give a direction to that effect.\n\nSection 17 on which reliance is placed by Mr. Puri is as follows :\n\n\"Where in any acC®nting year-\n\n(a) an employer haS paid any puja bonus or other\n\ncu&to.mary' bonus to an employee; or\n\n(b) an emploJ'Cl' has d a part of !lie . qonus pay\n\nable under this Act to an employee before the date on which such bonus becomes PllYl!ble, then, the cnployer shall be entitled to deduct the lllllOUllt ofbo11119 so Paid froni .the\"'3101Jnt of bonua pay-· able by bbil to'the eniplilyee undu tbl1 'Act in resiieot of\n\nthat aee<>i.illlim vear 'lilld 1he em,, loyee atrall be' entitled to 1'ecei\\re aniy'llbe balance.\"\n\nClallse (.&) Ids po \"1Jlllica~ as 1hlJ :Tribunal has catejClriff ·~ ~~ that~ u :!10 qu.esaoo of .Hr paymeat by way.ill pWJa bonus Or• otller cuatlllilarr Even thein, if uy SllCll bon'os\n\nA has been pd, the employey is entitled to deduct the same om the amount of bonus payable under the. Act. Clause (b) JS an enabling section in favour of the emplo}'er in that it visualises a\n\nsituation or contingency where he may have paid during the accountin11: year a part of bonus payable under the Act \"before tbz date on which such bonus becomes payable\". If an employer has B paid any amount during an accounting year by way of part of the bonus he is entitled to deduct the same from the final amounts that n:ay be payable under the Act. That provision does not give a riJ?ht to an employee to claim payment of bonus even by way of part payment during the currency of tlie accounting year. If so, the Tribunal has also no jurisdiction to give a direction to an c employer to pay bonus at the end of each half-year.\n\nIn tl!is case, it is no doubt, seen tha't the appellant has been paying bonus at the end of each half-year. But the Tribuna1 has found that such payment has not become a condition of service.\n\nTherefore by the mere fact that the appellant has been making payments on previous occasions every half-yearly, does not confer D a right on the employee to have such payments by way of bonus in the ame manner even after the Act came into force,.\n\nFrom the above discussion it follows that the directions given by the Tribunal in A.I.D. No. 6 of 1966 have to be set aside. __\n\nNow coming to Civil Appeal No. 1292 of 1967, as mentioned E earlier, it is a2ainst that part of the Award of the Tribunal in\n\nA.J.D, No., 8 of 1966. The question 1that was referred to !he Tribunal has also been extracted in the earlier part of the judgment. That relates to a claim for additional bonus for the years 1962 and 1963. There is no controversy that 'the appellant has already paid for the year 1962, three months basic wages as bonus.\n\nF Similarly for the year 1963 also four months basic wages as bonus has already been paid. The claim was for two months total wap, cs as additional bonus for 'the year 1962 and four months' total wages as additional bonus for the year 1963. The findings\n\nrecorded by the Tribunal in A.I.D. No. 6 of 1966 regarding the nature of bonus paid to the employees have been adopted for thi~ reference also. The respondents-Unions do not challenge those G findings. Therefore, even in respect of .!Pe years 1962 and 1963, what is P., ayable is only profit bonus .. JJ:'here is also no controversy 'Iha~ for thele two years the quantum of bonus payable has to be calculated in accordance with what is known as the Labour Appellate Tribunal Full Bench :Formula, which has been approved by this Court in The Associated Cement Companies Ltd., H Dwarka Cement Works, Dwarka v. Its Workmen and Another(!).\n\nBOth the parties have filed statements of calculations according to\n\n(I) [19'9J S.C.R. 92S.\n\nthe said Fonnula. The statements Bxs. M.1 and M.2 filed by the A Management represent the c0mputation of available surplus for the years ended December 31, 1962 and 1963 respectively. Ex.\n\nM.l is as follows: ·\n\n\"THE BANGALORE WOOLLEN, COTTON & SILK MILLS CO. LTD.\n\nStatement showing the computation of available surplus for the B year ended 31st December,' 1962 (Under L.A. 'T, Formula/\n\nProfit as per profit and loss Ac.count '.\n\n68017S6 Add:\n\nProvision for Bonus 1614000 Depreciation on Fixed As°sets 1696481 c Donations 107362 .Additional Bous fo; l 96i 146000 3563843\n\nLiss:\n\nProfit on sale of asaets 1745426\n\n8620173 D Leis:\n\nNormal Depreciation and Shift Allowance • '1465812-\n\n715,4361\n\nLess:\n\nTax Liability :\n\n7154361 E Profit as aobove ..\n\nLiu Devolopment Rebate 586415\n\nInc<im .. tax Liability at 6553408 .3276704 . '°\" oo Rs.\n\nJnco111&-Taxat\n\n1•538 3635 15\" on Rs:\n\n:Supor Proftt1 Tu on Rs. • rsf,= mYW\n\n3689497.\n\n-G '.Return on Capital employed :\n\nPt.rorenoe Share Capital\n\n46800 . 7 •8 Y, on RI. 600000 Oidlnary hare Capital 729000 . '\" oa lbd2150000. • . . • llolerV11 J:lploye~ in business durlns the\n\nr en 31·12·1962\n\n178733 . 2554533. 62M030 4\" 011 b. #46831' • • . • H Availalilo $urp).us.\n\nRs.\n\n'91°'3J\n\n•3ubjoct to claim for rehabilitation.\n\nWe have preparod the above statement from the audited accounts of the Company and is in accordance therewith. The return on Capital and Re!cJvt>S is as claimed by the Company.\n\nSd/- lllegible Chartered Accountants.\" Similarly Ex. M2 regarding the year 1963 is as follo\\\\'S :\n\n\"THE BANGALORE WOOLLEN, COTTON & SILK MILLS CO. LTD.\n\nStatement showing the computation of available surpJus for the year ended 31st December 1963\n\n(Under L A. T. Formula) Profit as per Profit and Loss Accont 5239220\n\nADD:\n\nProvision for Labour Bonus Depreciation on Fixed Assets Donations ' Provi'iion for Taxation\n\nLESS:\n\nProfit on Sale of Assets . • • Excess Provision of Electricity charges\n\nwritten back , . . • •\n\nLESS:\n\n1°nd interest ....\n\n2245000 1733719\n\n8804 8110000 12097523\n\nNormal depreciation and Shift Allowance .\n\n16'78466\n\n. 1647555\n\nLESS: Tax Liability Profit as above\n\nUSS Development Rebate\n\nIncome-tax Liability at\n\nSO\"On Rs. 2!1 /0 tOD Rs.\n\nDividend-tax . . • Companies (Profit) Surtu\n\nLiability on Rs. 14455825\n\nReturn on Capital Empioyed':\n\nPreference Share eapitat\n\n7 8 % on Rs. 600000 Ordinary Share Capital\n\n6% on Rs.12150000 Reoerves employed in the busiMss\n\n4 % on Rs. 46937947 •\n\nAvailable srpl¥•·\n\nSubject to claim for rehabilitation.\n\n7290oo\n\n14455825 7227912\n\n14538 3635\n\n1786212 -.--.-. 9111784'\n\n1877518 2653318 11835102\n\nWe have prepared the above statement from tht; audited accounts of .the co1npany and c'rtify that it is in accordance therewith. The return n capital and reserves is, as claimed by the company.\n\nSd. Illegbile Chartered Accountants.\n\nB The Tribunal has accepted as correct the gross-profits as given by the appellant in these two exhibits for the two years in question. Even though the Unions contested the return on Preference Share Capital at 7 .8 % , the Tribunal has rejected their objections. It has held that under the Preference Share Regulations Act, the Company is bound to pay 7.8% on Preference Share C Capital. The Workmen did not raise any coll'lroversy regardi11g the return on Ordinary Share Capital at 6%. The Tribunal, therefore, accepted the figures given in both Exs. M. 1 and M. 2 and to the return of Ordinary Share Capital. But the controversy arose about the claim made by the appellant regarding return on Reserves employed during the two years. It will be noted that D neither in Ex. M. 1 nor in Ex. M. 2 the appellant has made any claim for rehabilitation excepting adding a note to the statement\n\nthat they &re subject to a claim for rehabilitation.\n\nThe two points in controversy between the parties regarding these two :years were : ( 1) The claim for Return on Reserves E and (2) Provision for. Rehabilitation.\n\nWe will first take up the question regarding the claim of the appellant for return on Reserves. In Ex. M. 1, the appellant has claimed a sum of Rs. 178733.00 as 4% return on Rs. 44468315.00\n\nbeing the amount employed in business.\n\nSimilarly in Ex. M.2, F for the year 1963, it had claimed Rs. 1877518.00, being 4% return on Reserves on Rs. 46937947.00, employed in the business.\n\nThe Unions contested the claim of the appellant on the ground that they are not entitled to any return on Reserves. The appellant had filed two statements Exs. Ml(a) and M.2(a) for the years 1962 and 1963 respectively, showing how the amounts claimed as Reserves employed in business have been arrived at.\n\nG Ex. M.1 (a) for the year 1962 is as follows :\n\n,, THE BANGALORE WOOLLEN, COTTON & SILK MILLS CO. LID.\n\nYear ended 31st December 1962.\n\nReconciliation of c.apital employed in the business during the year ended 31st December. 1962.\n\nA \"As at 31-12-1961:\n\nFixed Assets and Capital Works 43139570 in Progress Investments ' ' ' 595216 Interest accrued on Investments 17477 Stores and spare parts 6179042 Raw Materials 6886058 B Process Stocks 5053558 Finished Stocks 1381082 Sundry Debtors 2473722 Advances . 2768233 Balance with Railav and Excise Authorities • 292529\n\nDposits 18993 6880fi470 ---- c\n\nLESS:\n\nSundry Creditors 7077709 Due to Directors 63744 Unclaimed Dividends 18257 Provision for Taxation 1057850 Proposed Dividends 1481400 Provision for Gratuity 1860431 D Officers• Retiring Fund 26764 (Fund loss investments) 11588155\n\nLESS.-\n\nE Share Capita] 12750000 ---- Rs. 44468315\" ---\n\nExhibit M.2(a) for the year 1963 is as follows :-\n\n\"THE BANGALORE WOOLLEN, COITON & SILK MILLS CO. LTD.\n\nYear ended 31st December, 1963.\n\nReconciliation of Capital employed during the year ended 31-12-1963.\n\nAs at 31-12-1962 Investments . . . .\n\nInterest accrued on Investments Stores and Spare Parts Raw Materials Process Stocks Finished Stocks Sundry 'Debtors Advances . . . . • .\n\nBalances with Rai'lway a11d Excis.e Authorities Deposits . • . . . .\n\n45229453 548575\n\n8703 6553343 4701434 7285534 1688931\n\n3429299 3165324\n\nLESS:\n\nSundry Creditors Due to Directors .\n\nUnclaimed Dividends Provision for Taxation Proposed Dividends Provision for Gratuity Officers Retiring Fund (Fund less investments)\n\nLess Share Capital\n\n\n7686123 65278 22837 2305645 1481400 1706251\n\n25799\n\n13293333 ---- 59687947\n\n12750000 ---- Rs. 46937947'\" ---\n\nIt will be seen that the last figures: shown in both the state• ments have been clalined by the appellant as Reserves employed in business for each of these two years.\n\nThe Tribunal after a reference to the evidence of the Char~ tered Accou..!ltant, M.W.l, has held that the amounts which. should have been used as Working Capital are those mentioned in Exs.\n\nD M.l(a) and M.2(a), less the fixed assets and capital works in progress. The Tribunal has further held that the working capital cannot .include fixed assets nor the capiial works in progress,. as they represent the funds required for day to day work of the Company. According to the Tribunal these fixed assets have been accumtilated over years and they cannot form part of the E working capital.\n\nHowever, the Tribunal accepted the claim of the appellant that the other items in Exs. M.l(a) and M.2(a), namely, investments, interest accrued on investments, stores and spare parts, raw materials, process stocks, finished stocks, sundry debtors, advances etc. are the amounts available to be used as working cataj. On this reasoning the Tribunal held. that in cal- F culating the return on working capital, the amounts mentioned in Ex.M.1(1!) and M.2(a) less the amount sunk in fixed assets and working capital in progress1 have to be deducted. On this basis it deducted from Rs. 44468315, a sum of Rs. 43139570,'and fixed a sum of R~. 1328745, as Reserves employed in business during the year ended December 31, 1962. On this amount it allowed a sum of Rs. 53150/- as return on Reserves at 4 % for the year G 1962.\n\nSimilarly, for the year 1963, it deducted from Rs. 46937947, a sum of Rs. 45229423, and fixed a sum of Rs. 1708524/- as Reserves employed in business during that year. On this amount it a'llowed ~· 68340/- as return on Reserves at 4 % .\n\nMr. Malhatra, learned counsel for the appellant, while accepting that the principle adopted by the Tribunal in this regard is.\n\nA correct, contended that it had made a mistake in calculation.\n\nAccording to the learned counsel, the claim must have been allowed in the manner calculated by the appellant. In this connection, the learned counsel pointed out that e\\-en in cases where the evidence regarding the utilisation of Reserves as Working Capital as cla.imed by the Company, is not very satisfactory, this B Court, on the bas\\s of the balance sheets, which indicated that\n\nsome amount must have been used as working capital has allowed such a claim. In this connection, he relied on Workmen.of Mis: Hi1u/11s1an Motors Ltd. v. Mis Hindustan Motors Ltd., and Another(') and Messrs. Aluminium Corporation of India v. Their Workmen('). c We may straightway say that these decisions do not assist the appellant.\n\nIn the case before us it is not necessary to do any guess work as the appellants wants us to do. The appellant has filed g1atements showing how it has calculated the amount of Reserws utilised as working capital and we have to find out whether the calculations made by it are. correct. In fact, Mr. Malhotra has D not been ab]!l to point out from he balance sheets, as to what amount, according to the appellant, can be considerd to have been used as working capital. In the two decisions, relied on by him, the company concerned was llble to refer to ithe figures in the balance sheets from which this Court was able to draw a conclusion regarding the approximate amount that would have been utilised as working capital. The position before us is el}tircly E different.\n\nOn the other hand, Mr. Puri, learned counsel for the respondents, referred us to the balance sheets for the years in question regarding tb_e share capital of 1the company being shown as Rs. 12750000/-. The counsel further pointed out that the said share capHal must have been sunk in acquiring the fixed assets F and for capital works in progress and, therefore, the Tribunal was justified in deducting the amount of fixed assets and capital works in progress shown in Exs. M.l(a) and M.2(a) from the totaI shown by the appellant in those statements. The counsel further urged that in considering the claim for return on working capital two questions have to be kept in view: ( 1) Whether the Reserves G were available, and if they were (2) whether they were used as working capital and if so what is that amount.\n\nThe Tribunal in our opinion, bas c9rrectlv kept these two principles in view in arriving at the amount of Reserves used as working capital and on which a retui; n is to be allowed. We see no error committed by the Tribunal in the calculation made for arriving at the Reserves. which must have been used as working capital, especially as the H evidence on the side of the appellant was very unsatisfactory. Even the appellant has deducted the amount of share capital before\n\n\n(2) [1969] 3 s.c.c. 832:\n\narriving at the final figures mentioned in Exs. M.l (a) and M.2 (a). But the appellant was claiming Ute whole of the. final amount shown..in these two statements as Reserves. used as working capital, which it was not certainly entitled to in law.\n\nWe have :Jready pninted out that the Tribunal has held that the working capital cannot include fixed assets nor tlr~ capital works in progress as i'I represents •the funds required for day to day running of the Company. The Tribunal has further held that the appellant is entitled to deduct investments, interest accrued on investments etc. which have been shown in Bxs. M.1 (a) and M.2(a) on the ground that they must be considered to be the amounts available to be used as working capital. These findings have .not been challenged by the learned counsel for the appellant. The appellant has also filed d•!tails of Reserves employed in the busin.ess during the years ended 31st December, 1962 and 1963 as shown in Exs. M.l(b) and M.2(b) respeotively. Even there the appellant has deducted the share capital before giving final figures.\"'\n\nTherefore, the contention of Mr. Malhotra that the Tribunal has committed a mistake in calculating the amount of Reserves\n\nused as working capital for these two years, cannot be accepted.\n\nIf so, i'I follows that the amount fixed. by the Tribunal as return at 4% an Reserves used as working capital for these two years, is correct\n\nThe second question that arises for consideration is the claim made by the appellant for provision for rehabilitation for the two years and which claim has been re.iected by the Trib~. The claim made by ¢he appellant for provision for rehabilitation for 1he year 1962 was Rs. 18030871.00 and for the year 1963 Rs. 18062336.00. 'Thus the appellant was claiming for each year provision being made of more than a crore of rupe.-..s for rehabilitation. . The ; ippellant has filed a chart Ex. M.8 giving the calculations for the year 1962, its claim for rehabilitation for Rs. 18030871.00. If the claim for rehabilitation is accepted, then the result will .be that there will be no profits at all from and out of which any bonus can be paid for the years in question.\n\n'The claim of the appellant has been opposed by Mr. I. N.\n\nKeshava, learned counsel for the first respondent and His conten tions have been adopted by the counsel appearing for the other respondeIYts--Uriions. The claim of the appellant is opposed mainly on two grounds, namely, (1 ) that the appellant has no scheme for .rJ:habilitation for the relevant years and (2) in any event there were huge Reserves available from which the claim for rehabilitation can be easily met. The Tribunal has rejected\n\nChe claim for rehabilitation both oh the grounds that the appeTiant\n\nhas no scheme for rehabilitation and that the rehabilitation claim can be adequately met .with from the hul\\e Reserves of nearly four crores of rupees that the appellant had.\n\nIt must be noted that Rehabilitation Reserve is a substantial item which goes to reduce <the available surplus and as a result affects the right of the employees to receive the bonus. Hence the\n\nemplor will have 'IO place all relevant materials and the Tribunal will have to scrutinize them carefully and to be satisfied that the claim is justified. It is no doubt true that it is but proper in the larger interest of the industry as well as the employees that proper rehabilitation Reserve should be built up taking into consideration the increase in price in plant and machinery which has to be replared at a future date and by determination of multiplier and its divis~. It is also clear from the decisions of this Court that if a Company has no scheme for rehabilitation, then of course, its claim on that head must be rejected. tvide Azam Jahi Mills, Ltd. v. Their Workmen(')].\n\nFurther, since it is the employer who seeks replacement costs, it is for him to satisfy the Tribunal as to what wii(be the overall cost of replacement and in doing so, it is he who has to discharge this burden by adducing proper evidence and giving other paty an opportunity to test the correctness of that evidence by cross-examination. [vi de National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. Its Workmen(')].\n\nIt is also' now well-settled that in determining the claim of the employer for rehabilitation, two factors are essential to be ascertained, namely, ( 1) the multiplier, and that has to be done by reference to the purchase price of the machinery and the price which has to be paid for rehabilitation or replacement; and (2) the determination of the diviser and thait has to be done by deciding the probable life of the machinery. [vide The Honorary Secretary, South India Millowners' Association and others v The Secretary Coimbatore District Textile Workers' Union(') and Mis Gannon Dunkerley and Co. Ltd. and another v. Their Workmen(')].\n\nMr. Malhotra, learned counsel for the appellant, very strongly relied on the statement Ex. M.S. as well as the evidence of M.W. 2, ithe Mill Manager and M.W. 3, the Assistant Officer,\n\nEfficiency Section of the Mill, in support of his contention that the appellant has a scheme for rehabilitation and that the claim made by the appellant for making provision for rehabilitation is proper. The counsel also pointed out that the evidence of these two witnesses clearly establishes that most of the items of machinery have long out lived, their normal age of 25 years. and\n\n(I) [1967p L.L.1' 18.\n\n(3) (1962] SuPJi. 2 l .c.~\n\n2) [1969J 1 s.c.R. 779.\n\n(4) A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2567.\n\ntherefore they require replacemeait in order to ensure proper production. The counsel further pointed out that the rejection by the Tribunal .of the claim made by the appellant, on 'the basis that the life of the textile machinery is only 25 years, is .not correct and that the view of the Tribunal that the normal age is more than 25 years is opposed to the decisions of this Court.\n\nSo far as the age of the machinery is concerned, it is no doubt true 1that in The Honorary Secretary, South India Mil/owners' Association and others v.\n\nThe Secretary Coimbatore District .'f.exti/e Workers' Union( 1), this Court, after a reference to the evidence adduced confirmed the findings of the Tribunal 'i:hat the estimated life of the textile machinery in question should be taken to be 25 years, but in the said decision itself it is observed as follows :\n\n\"We are not prepared 'to accept either argument because, in our opinion, the life of the machinery in every case has to be determined in the light of evidence adduced by the parties.\"\n\nBut it is unnecessary for us to pursue this aspect further as we are\n\ndisallowing he entire claim for rehabilitation.\n\nMr. Malhotra, also criticised the view of the Tribunal that in this case the evidence of the witnesses on the side of the appellant clearly shows that the. machines are working very efficiently though they have been running for over 50 years. On the other hand, the counsel ur, ged that the principle to be borne in mind, when considering the claim for rehabilitation, is that 'the life of the machinery is the period during which it is estimated to work with reasonable efficiency and not the period during which it has actually been operated, that is, till it becomes too deteriorated for use.\n\nNo doubt the last proposition enunciated by the counsel in the abstrtact is correct; but the question is whether 1the appellant has discharged its burden of satisfying the Tribunal that it had a scheme for rehabilitaition and whether it had placed the necessary materials for the purpose of working out the multiplier and the diviser.\n\nMr. Keshava, learned counsel for the first respondent, referred us to the written statement filed by one of the Unions, Binny Mills Labour Association, wherein it has specifically stated that the plant and machinery owned by the Mills are amongt the most modern machineries and that no provision for rehabilitation is necessary.\n\nThe appellant, it is pointed out, in its reply statement did not controvert these averments.\n\nEven in the statements Exs. M. 1 and M. 2, filed by the appellant, no claim for rehabilitation has been made.\n\nHe also referred to ithe evidence of\n\n(1) [1962] Supp. 2. S.C. R. 926.\n\nA M.Ws. 2 and ~. and pointed out that their evidence does not show that the Company had any scheme for rehabilitation.\n\nOn thei; e grounds, the counsel pointed out that the appellant has not placed sufficient materials before the Tribunal to. sustain its claim for rehabilitation.\n\n8 It must be emphasised that in _dealing with the claim of an employer for rehabilitation, as pointed out earlier, the onus of proof is on the employer.\n\nHe has to prove the price of the plant and the machinery, its age, the period during which it requires replacement, the cost of replacement, the amount standing in the\n\nDebentures and Reserve Funds and to what extent the funds at its disposal would meet the cost of replacement.\n\nIf the employer C fails to lead satisfactory evidence on these ppints, the result will be that the claim for rehabilitation will have to b! itotally rejected.\n\nIt is no doubt true that a chart Ex.M. 8 has been filed by the appellant and N:.W. 3, the Assistant Officer, Efficiency Section, has spoken regarding the same.\n\nBut he has admitted hat the D original quotations received from the do.lalers regarding the price of new machinery for the purpose of replacement have nat been produced before the Tribunal.\n\nHe has further admitted that the appellant has not produced the lel!ters written by it calling for quotations regarding the price of the machinery.\n\nHe has further admitted that no charts have been produced to show the value of the machineries in 1962 .. The multipliers, according to this witness, E have been adopted as advised by the appellant's Legal Adviser.\n\nIt is clear from the above answers of the witness that there is no material placed before the Tribunal by \"the appellant from which the multiplier and diviser can be properly worked out for the purpose of considering the claim for rehabilitation.\n\nIn fact F the Mill Manager, M. W. 2 has stated that the company has floated a debenture for 1 i crore for buying new machinery.\n\nThis clearly shows that the appellant had no scheme for rehabilitation and that explains the rson why it had not made any provision for rehabilitation.\n\nMr. Malhotra, then urged that at any rate the Tribunal itself G has proceeded on the basis that some amount for rehabilitation is necessary to be provided for each year.\n\nBased on this observation of ihe Ttibunal, 100 counsel pointed out that the appellant\n\nhould be allowed at least the amount that it has actually spent for\n\nreplacement of machineries in the years 1962 and 1963.\n\nAccor ding to himJ!. sum of Rs. 2619608 and Rs. 2124102 have been H spent in the years 1962 and 1963 rcspcctiwly for machinery and plant installed in those years. In this conneotion m referred us to the balance sheet and profit and. loss accounts for these two years and stres9':d that the Tribunal has committed an error in not\n\nallowing at least these amounts by way of provision for rebabiU- A rtation.\n\nIt is no doubt true that these amounts are shown in the schedules to the balance sheets for the years concerned.\n\nAdmittedly, there is_ no such claim made in 1the written statement filed by. the appellant before the Tribunal.\n\nWhen the Unions were constesting the claim of the awellant on the ground that it bas no scheme B for rehabiliitation and that it has not spent any amount by way of replacement of old machinery, it was the duty of the appellant to have ma4e a proper claim and it should have adduced evidence regarding that aspect before the Tribunal.\n\nMere production of balance sheet and profit and Joss accounts by themselves will not entitle the appellant to sustain its claim for rehabilitation. c For all the reasons given above, it is clear that 1the Tribunal was justified in holding that the appellant has not been able to make out its claim for making provision for rehabilitation.\n\nIn this view the Tribunal was justified in rejecting this claim of the appellant.\n\nWe may also state that the Tribunal is also of lhe view that D the appellant has large Reserves with which it can meet rehabilitation expenses of the machinery.\n\nIn this connection the Tribunal has also referred to the evidence on the side of the appellant, that even according to the appellant rehabilita1tion will have to be completed only within eight years from 1962 and that only a sum of rui>ees eighty Jakhs will be required •for each year.\n\nOn •this E reasoning the tribunal has held that this amount of rupees eighty lakhs can be ea5ily met with from the large Reserves available with the appellant.\n\nIt is not necessary for us to consider this aspect further because we have already agreed with. the findings of the Tribunal that the appe!lant has no scheme for rehabilitation and that it has not placed any satisfactory evidence before the Tribunal in support of its claim.\n\nF The last point that arises for consideration is regarding the available surplus for the years 1962 and 1963 as calculated by the Tribunal and the award by it of 1 /3rd of the amount as additional bonus for the two years after deducting the bonus already paid by .the appellant. The Tribunal, after re.jecting the appellant's claim for rehabilitation and also allowing return on Reserves used as G working capital in 'the manner, already referred to, had arrived at the. available surplus for the year 1962 in the sum of'Rs. 2635914 and for the year 1963 at Rs. 4904987. The appellant filed a statement Ex. M. 4 showing the amount of bonus already paid for the year~ 1962 and 1963 to all employees drawing a total of Rs. 500/- and less per mensem: From that statement it is seen H that for the year 1962 it had paid a sum of Rs. 1441455 and for the year 1963 a sum of Rs. 1960795. On the basis of the available surplus worked out for the years 1962 and 1963, the balance\n\navailable surplus after deducting bonus already paid will be as follows :\n\n1%2\n\nA vailabie surplus as worked out by the Tribunal\n\nAmount already paid as bonus by the apPellant .\n\nBalance: •\n\nAvailable surplus as worked out bY. the Tribunal\n\nAmount already paid as bonus by the appellant\n\nBalance,\n\nRs. 2635914\n\n490498'\n\nWhat the Tribunal has done is to distribute 1/3rd of the amouat shown as balance above, for each of the years as additi.onal bonus. That results in the workmen getting Rs. 398153 D representing 25 days basic wages as additional bonus for the year\n\n1962. Similarly, the workmen get Rs. 981397 representini two months basic wages as additional bonus for the year 1963.\n\nTherefore, i<t will be seen that the total bonus that the workmen wi!I get for each of the years will be as follows :\n\n1'62\n\n1. Amount already paid by the appellant\n\n2. Additional amount awarded by the Tribunal\n\nTOTAL\n\nRs.\n\n1839608\"\n\n. From the available surplus of Rs. 2635914 in 1962, the .workmen will get a total sum of Rs. 1839608 as bonus for that year which works out to more than 60% of the available aurplus.\n\nSimilarly for the year 1963 th~ figures are as follows : . 1963\n\nI. Amount already paid by the appellant\n\n2. Additional amount awarded by the Tribunal\n\nTOTAL\n\nRs. 19l5079s\n\n981397\"\n\n.2942192\n\nH From the available surplus of Rs. 4904987 in.· 1963, thcworkmen will get a sum of Rs. 2942192 for that year which works\" out more or less about 60% of the available surplus, falling short by a sum of Rs. 800/-. ,\n\nMr. Malhotra, learned counsel for the appellant attacked the A method of calculation adopted by the Tribunal. According to him the Tribun11l should not have fixed more than 60% of the available surplus as bonus payable for a year. On the other hand, th: amounts of bonus now awarded by the Tribunal and already paid by the appellant exceed 60%. Jn our opinion, there is considerable force in the contention of the Learned counsel. The avail- U able surplus, as found by lb~ Tribunal for the year 1962 is Rs. 2635914. Working out roughly 60% of this surplus to be distributed as bonus to the workmen, the amount of bonus will be aboui Rs. 1581600. The appellant has admittedly paid a sum of Rs. 1441455. The balance that tthe workmen will be entitled to will be Rs. 14.9145.00, whereas the Tribunal has directed the c apJ\"llant to pay for this year by its Award a sum of Rs. 3~153.\n\nThe award of this amount is not justified.\n\nSo far as 1963 is concerned, the available surplus as found by the Tribunal is Rs. 4904987. 60% of this available surplus, to which the workmen will be entitled to will be Rs. 2942992. On the other hand, the total amount that the workmen will get as per o the award includi111t the amount already paid by the appellant as bonus is Rs. 2942192. The appellant will have to pay only an additional sum of Rs. 800/. to make up 60%.\n\nThere is no appeal by the Unions and therefore the bonus awarded for the year 1963 does not require any interfereno:.\n\nIn allocting the available surplus between the company and E the workmen, it has been held by this Court that it will be eguitable if roughly 60% of the surplus is distributed as bonus to the workmen and the Company is left with the remaining 40%. The Company will get in addition to this 40%, the benefrt of the Income-tax rebate on the 60% bonus payable to the workmen. !vide Mis. Gannon Dunkerley and Co. Ltd. and anotlrer v. Their F workmen( 1)]. We have adopted the same principle jn thease\n\non hand.\n\nTo conclude the Award of the Industrial Tribunal in A:J.D.\n\nNo. 6 of 1966 is set aside and Civil Appeal No. 1291 of 1967 is allowed. Ture will be no order as to costs.\n\nThe Award of the Industrial Tribunal in A.I.D. No. 8 of G 1966 is modified to the following extent: For tthe year 1962 the appellant will be liable to pay as additional bonus only a sum of Rs. 140145 inste1d of a sum of Rs. 398153 as directed by the Tribunal in the Award. To this extent Civil Appeal No. 1292 of 1967 is allowed in part. In other respects, it is dismissed. There will be no or.der as to costs.\n\n'V.P.S.\n\n(I) A.l.R.1971, S.C. 2S67", "total_entities": 61, "entities": [{"text": "February 15, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 45, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THEIR WORKMl!:N\n\nFebruary 15, 1972 [C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, I. D. DuA AND G. K. MITTER, 1J.]\n\nThe Payment of Bonus Act, 1965."}}, {"text": "I. D. DuA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Payment of Bonus Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Payment of Bonus Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 575, "end_char": 595, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "30th June 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1010, "end_char": 1024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "30th June 1965."}}, {"text": "BINNY LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3062, "end_char": 3071, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BINNY LTD", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3278, "end_char": 3283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3348, "end_char": 3353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3388, "end_char": 3393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3507, "end_char": 3517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1968] 2 S.C.R. 311", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5444, "end_char": 5463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9073, "end_char": 9101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "P. Malhotra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9294, "end_char": 9305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Malhotra and D. N. Gupta, for the appe11ant.", "canonical_name": "P. Malhotra"}}, {"text": "D. N. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9310, "end_char": 9321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Malhotra and D. N. Gupta, for the appe11ant."}}, {"text": "N. Keshava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9346, "end_char": 9356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l. N. Keshava and K. Rajendra Chowdhary, for respondents H Nos.", "canonical_name": "N. Keshava"}}, {"text": "K. Rajendra Chowdhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9361, "end_char": 9382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l. N. Keshava and K. Rajendra Chowdhary, for respondents H Nos."}}, {"text": "Vineet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9417, "end_char": 9429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vineet Kumar, for respon'dents No5."}}, {"text": "December 8, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9718, "end_char": 9734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 8, 1965, the Government of Mysore referred to the Industrial 'tribunal for adjudication the following question :\n\n . \""}}, {"text": "Government of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9740, "end_char": 9760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 8, 1965, the Government of Mysore referred to the Industrial 'tribunal for adjudication the following question :\n\n . \""}}, {"text": "March 5, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10409, "end_char": 10422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 5, 1966, the Government of Mysore referred to E the same Tribunal for adjudication the following question :\n\n\"Whether."}}, {"text": "Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10564, "end_char": 10614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the workers of Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co., Ltd., Bangalore, for additional bonus for the year 1962 and 1963 at the rate of 2 months additional bonus and 4 months additional bonus on total wages respectively is justified."}}, {"text": "As the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11927, "end_char": 11960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "August 28, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12024, "end_char": 12039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act) had come into force on August 28, 1965, the appellant issued a circular to 1he efP>..ct that for the half-year ending June 30, 1965, payments will be made a' advance of wages equivalent to I/ 6th of the basic earnings of the."}}, {"text": "June 30, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12119, "end_char": 12132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act) had come into force on August 28, 1965, the appellant issued a circular to 1he efP>..ct that for the half-year ending June 30, 1965, payments will be made a' advance of wages equivalent to I/ 6th of the basic earnings of the."}}, {"text": "this circular there is a reference to the Payment of Bonus Ordinance 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12241, "end_char": 12314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "May 29, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12332, "end_char": 12344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this circular there is a reference to the Payment of Bonus Ordinance 1965, promulga~.!d on May 29, 1965 and that under the terms of the Ordinance, bonus is payable only within a period of 8 months from the end of the accounting year."}}, {"text": "December 31, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14207, "end_char": 14224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The further case of the appellant is that as the Act had CO!lJe into force, bonus is governed by the provisions of the Act and that bonus is to be paid only within eight months after the close of the year of account, i.e., December 31, 1965."}}, {"text": "August 28,\n\n1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16041, "end_char": 16057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "towards advance wages under the circular dated August 28,\n\n1965."}}, {"text": "Malhotra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16570, "end_char": 16578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Malhotra, learned counsel for the appellant, has cha!·", "canonical_name": "P. Malhotra"}}, {"text": "H. K. Puri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17544, "end_char": 17554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On .the other hand, Mr. H. K. Puri, learned counsel for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Puri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18164, "end_char": 18168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, accordinit to Mr. Puri."}}, {"text": "August 28.\n\n1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19140, "end_char": 19156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act has come into force with effect from August 28."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19335, "end_char": 19344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19466, "end_char": 19475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19567, "end_char": 19571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19651, "end_char": 19666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19668, "end_char": 19677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19823, "end_char": 19827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19830, "end_char": 19839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 8 and 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20257, "end_char": 20269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20271, "end_char": 20281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20416, "end_char": 20426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Puja Bonus or other customary bonus or a part of the bonus payable under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20489, "end_char": 20569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21256, "end_char": 21261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Puja Bonus or other customary bonus or a part of the bonus payable under the Act", "statute": "Puja Bonus or other customary bonus or a part of the bonus payable under the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21398, "end_char": 21408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Puja Bonus or other customary bonus or a part of the bonus payable under the Act", "statute": "Puja Bonus or other customary bonus or a part of the bonus payable under the Act"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23429, "end_char": 23439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23791, "end_char": 23796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23901, "end_char": 23906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24242, "end_char": 24247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24338, "end_char": 24343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24387, "end_char": 24392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24808, "end_char": 24818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BANGALORE WOOLLEN, COTTON & SILK MILLS CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29971, "end_char": 30017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M2 regarding the year 1963 is as follo\\\\'S :\n\n\"THE BANGALORE WOOLLEN, COTTON & SILK MILLS CO.", "canonical_name": "BANGALORE WOOLLEN, COTTON & SILK MILLS CO. LTD"}}, {"text": "Fixed Assets and Capital Works", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33306, "end_char": 33336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A \"As at 31-12-1961:\n\nFixed Assets and Capital Works 43139570 in Progress Investments ' ' ' 595216 Interest accrued on Investments 17477 Stores and spare parts 6179042 Raw Materials 6886058 B Process Stocks 5053558 Finished Stocks 1381082 Sundry Debtors 2473722 Advances ."}}, {"text": "BANGALORE WOOLLEN, COITON & SILK MILLS CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33999, "end_char": 34045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "44468315\" ---\n\nExhibit M.2(a) for the year 1963 is as follows :-\n\n\"THE BANGALORE WOOLLEN, COITON & SILK MILLS CO.", "canonical_name": "BANGALORE WOOLLEN, COTTON & SILK MILLS CO. LTD"}}, {"text": "Malhatra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 36597, "end_char": 36605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Malhatra, learned counsel for the appellant, while accepting that the principle adopted by the Tribunal in this regard is.", "canonical_name": "P. Malhotra"}}, {"text": "Their Workmen", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37411, "end_char": 37424, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THEIR WORKMEN", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "I. N.\n\nKeshava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41830, "end_char": 41844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'The claim of the appellant has been opposed by Mr. I. N.\n\nKeshava, learned counsel for the first respondent and His conten tions have been adopted by the counsel appearing for the other respondeIYts--Uriions."}}, {"text": "Keshava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 47222, "end_char": 47229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Keshava, learned counsel for the first respondent, referred us to the written statement filed by one of the Unions, Binny Mills Labour Association, wherein it has specifically stated that the plant and machinery owned by the Mills are amongt the most modern machineries and that no provision for rehabilitation is necessary.", "canonical_name": "N. Keshava"}}, {"text": "Binny Mills Labour Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47338, "end_char": 47368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Keshava, learned counsel for the first respondent, referred us to the written statement filed by one of the Unions, Binny Mills Labour Association, wherein it has specifically stated that the plant and machinery owned by the Mills are amongt the most modern machineries and that no provision for rehabilitation is necessary."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_485_496_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "C. l:,, SUBRAMANIAM .\n\nCOLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, COCHIN\n\nFebruary 15, 1972\n\n(K. S. HEGDE AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.]\n\nArt. 311 of the Constitution read with Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955-Rule 12(1)'-Preventive ojJicer, Customs, purchased taxis in the name of his wife after informing higher authorities-Whether\n\nvilation of rule 12(1) Central Civil Services .(Conduct) Rules 1955- Whether denial of the assistance of a lawyer i• violation' of the Rule of th• Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1951.\n\nThe appellant, a preventive officer, applied for permission to allow his wife to run a taxi service. He was informed that no permission was necessary. Thereafter, appellant acting on behalf of his wife, purchased a few cars which wero used 'as tax.is. Later several complaints were made against him to the effect that he was canva.Ssing business for his wife. Enquiry was made and the appellant was served with a memorandum stating that while functioning as Preventive Officer he had contravened the prov:isions Of Rule .\n\n12(1) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1955. The factual allegation made against. him was that, he canvassed business for his wife . . An Enquiry Officer was appointed.\n\nOn enquiry the appellant was found guilty of contravening rule 12(1) of the Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules 1955, and. his removal from service was recommended.\n\nOn the basis of that: recommendation, the Disciplinary Authority served on the appellanj: a notice to show cause why he should not be removed from service.\n\nThe appellant submitted his explanation; but the Disciplinary Authority was not satisfied and consequently, the appellant was removed from service.\n\nThe appellant challenged the order by a writ petition which was dis missed both by a single judge as well as by a Division Bench of the High Court.\n\nOn appeal to this Court, it was contended by' the appellant that he was not given .a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charge levelled against him and there was a violation of rule 15 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules 1957 and Art. 311 df the Constitution. 'Hence the order of ,..emoval was bad in law One trained police prosecutor. was appointed as the officer tn present the case before the Enquiry Officer in support of the allegations made against the appellant. Therefore, the appellant wrote to the Dis ciplinary Authority for permission to engage a counsel to defend his case, but even after a number of written requests, he was not given the permission to engage a legal practitioner to defend himself.\n\nFurther, the appellant was denied . the assistance of a government servant.- Allowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : ( i) In the facts and circumstances of the case, it was clear that the appellant bad not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself, 1be grievance of the appellant that he was pitted against a trained prosecutor w .. not considered by the Disciplinary authority.\n\nThe fact that the case against the appellant was being bandied by a trained prosecutor w.. a good ground for allowing the appellant to engage a legal practitioner to defend him lest the scales should be weighted against 3-L!031SupCJl72\n\nhim.\n\nThe disqiplinary authority completely ipored that circumstance.\n\nA Therefore, that authority clearly failed to exercise the power con'ferred on it _under the rule. [490 GJ\n\n(ii) There had been a clear violation of rule 15(5) of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rul01 1<)57 which provides for the engi, igement of a legal practitioner in certain circumstances.\n\nThe present case -required that the appellant be given a chance to defend B himself by a legal practitioner. Since he was denied such an opportunity, the order was bad and therefore, it should be struct down. J,4<)5 HJ\n\nPet, v. Greyhound Racing Assn. Ltd., [1%8] 2 All E.R. 545; Kalindi & Ors. v. Tata Locomotive &, Engineering Co. Ltd, [1%0] 3 S.C.R. 407; Brooke Bond India Private Ltd. v. S11bba Ramman (S) & another, [1961] 2 L.L.J. 417, discussed and distinguished. c CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 11 of 1971.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the judgment and order dated March 26, 1970 of the Kerala High Court in Writ Appeal No. 197 of 1968.\n\nAppe/larlti appeared in person.\n\nGobind Dass and S. P. Nayar, for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judg1llent of the Court 'was delivered by\n\nHedge, J, This is an appeal by special leave. The appellant E was a Preventive Officer, Grade II, Customs Office, Cochin from June 16, 1962 lo January 31, 1963. In April 1962, he applied to the Assistant Collector of Customs, seeking permission to allow his wifo to run a taxi service. ' He was informed that no permission was necessary for his wife to operate a taxi service but he should no.I canvass any business for his wife.\n\nThereafter, it is said that the appellant acting on behalf of his wife purchased some\n\n'I! cars which were used as taxis. It appears that there were several complaints against the appellant to the effect that he was canvassing business for his wife. 1 Those complaints were enquired into.\n\nThereafter on March 25, 1963 the appellant was seri'ed with'. a memorandum stating that while functioning as Preventive Officer, Grade II, Cochin Customs House, during the period June 1962 to G January 31, 1963 he had contravened the provisions of rule 12(1) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955. The factual allegation made against the appellant was that he canvassed business for his wife. He was to!<! that an enquiry will be held against him on the basis of that charge.\n\nSri H. T. Soares, Assistant Collector, Customs House, Cochin 8\n\nwas appointed as the Enquiry Officer.\n\nDuring the pendency of the enquiry an additional grou11d in support of the charge was\n\nserved on the appellant to the effect that he himself was running the taxi service. After enquiry the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion that the allegations made against the appellant were established and consequently he was guilty of contravening rule 12{1) of the Central Civil Service (Conduot) Rules, 1955. The Enquiry Officer recommended appellant's removal from service.\n\nB On the basis of that recommendaiion the Disciplinary Authority served on the appellant a notice to show cause why he should not\n\nbe removed from service. The appellant submitted his explanation. But the same was not accepted by the Disciplinary Authori'ty. In the .result the appellant was ordered to be removed from service.\n\nThe appellant challenged that order by !lleans of a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Kerala.\n\nHis writ pettion was first heard by a single judge who dismissed the same and. the order. of the single judge was affirmed by a Division Bench 6f that High Court. Hence this appeal.\n\nThe appellant personally argued his appeal.\n\nHe challenged the validity of the order J.>emoving him from service on various\n\ngrounds. As _we are of the opinion ll:hat the appellant had not been afforded reasonable opportunity to present his case and con\n\nsequeptly the impugned order has to be struck down, we do nat think it necessary to examine other contentions advanced by the E appellant.\n\nThe appellant who was a member of the civil service of the Union of India was holding his office during the pleasure of the President; but in view of Art. 311 of the Constitution, he could not have been removed from service except after enquiry in which he had been i:iven a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charge levelled against him.\n\nThis procedural guarantee is undoubtedly a valuable one.\n\nBreach of that guarantee vitiates the enquiry.\n\nRemoval from service is a major penalty.\n\nProcedure for imposing major penalties is prescribed in rule 15 of the Central . Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, G a rule framed under Art. 309 of the Constitution. Sub-rule (5) of that rule provides :\n\n\"The Disciplinary Authority may nominate any person to present the case in support of the charges before tll'~ authority inquiring into the charges (hereinafter referred to as the Inquiring Authority). The Government servant may present his case with the assistance of any Government servant approved by the Disciplinary Authority, but may not engage a legal practitioner for othe purpose unless the person nominated by\n\nthe Disciplinary Authority as aforesaid is a legal praotitioner or unless the Disciplinary. Authority, having re gard to the circumstances of the case, so permits.\"\n\nThis rule bears upon the reasonable opportunity contemplated by Art. 311. The validity of this rule was not challenged. Hence all that we have to see is whether the rule had been complied with.\n\nFor deciding this quesiioit rt is necessary to refer, to the relevant facts.\n\nIn September 1963, one A. M. Shivaraman was appointed as the officer to present the c•se before the Enquiry Officer in sup ' port of the allega'tions made aainst the appellant. The said Shivaraman was a trained police prosecutor.\n\nAfter he was ap pointed to present the case in support of the allegations made against the appellant, the appellant wrote to the Collecor of Customs, Cochin, the Disciplinary Authority on October 4, 1963 as follows :\n\nSir,\n\n\"From : C. L. Subramaniam, Preventive Officer,· Customs House, Cochin-3.\n\nThe Collector of Customs, Customs House, Cochin-3.\n\nSub : Sec. 1/63 Estt-Cus d!l'ted 30th September 1963.\n\nIn the above memorandum it is stated in paragraph 4, that Shri A. M. Sivaraman as the officer to present the case in support of, tho~ allegll'tions against me before the Enquiry Officer.\n\nI understand that Shri A. M. Sivaraman is legally trained to conduct such prosecutions. Under such circumstances I will be prejudiced in my defenoe unless I am permitted to engage a counsel to appear and defend\n\nme during the enquiry. Hence I request that permission G be accorded to engage a lawyer of my choice to represent and defend the charges before the Enquiry Officer.\n\nCochin-3, 4-10-1963\n\nYours faithfully,\n\nSd/· C. L. Subramaniam\".\n\nHe aitain reiterat>ed his request for permission to engage a Counsel to liefend him in his Jetter to the Assistant Collector on\n\nOctober 9, 1963. Thereafter he again wrote to the Collector of Customs on October 14, 1963 as follows ;\n\n\" .... It may' help me very much too, if you can grant the permission I have sought for engaging a Counsel of my choice at an early date so ithat I could get the Counsel's assistance for the inspection of documents too.\"\n\nOn October 17, 1963, Sri Soares, Assistant Collector of Customs wrote to foe appellant thus ;\n\n\"Secret 1/1/63 Est. Cus\n\nCustom House, Cochin-3 17th September 1963\n\nFrom:\n\nThe Assistant Collector of Customs, Appraising Department, Cu&toms House, Cochin-3\n\nShri C. L. Subramaniam, Preventive Officer, CuS'tol)l House, Cochin-3.\n\nSub ; Establishment-Inquiry into the work and conduct of Shri C. L. Subramaniam, Preventive Officer, Custom House, Cochin.\n\nWith reference to your letter Sc. 1/63/Estt Cus dated 14th October 1963, requesting permission for engaging a counsel to appear and defend you, during the enquiry, I am directed by the F Collector to inform you that although Shri A. M. Siyaraman is legally trained, he is not a legal practitioner and hence there is no necessity for engaging a lawyer to defend you at the enquiry.\n\nSd/- H. T. Soares, Assistant Collector of Customs\".\n\nG It is clear from that letter that the Disciplinary Authority had overlooked the fact that the appellant sought permission to engage :a counsel not because Sivaraman was a legal practitioner but because he was trained prosecutor.\n\nOn January 6, 1964, the appellant again wrote to the Collector of Customs explaining his difficulties in def.ending himself. In H paragraph 4 of that letter, the appellant stated :\n\n\"In the nature of accusations made against me and the naoture of their widespread source the nnportance •\n\nof the informants and their intentions, the varying •types of witnesses supporting the charge, the complicated nature of the evidence, the inexperience I have in assessing the impact of such evidence and in sifting the evidence for preparing an effective cross-examination and above all the lurking conspiracy of a series of persons whom I have to deal with firmly in discharging my duties as a Preventive Officer, all these when considered can lead you to the only conclusion that if I am denied the assistance of an experienced counsel at the enquiry it would be tantamount to denial of an opportunity to defend myself and prove my innocence. This\n\nwoul!I be particularly so in the context of •the present enquiry where evidence have sought to be brought in by different stages and alleged incidents subsequent to the charges are sought to be proved in support of the allegations made before such incidents.\"\n\nDespite these communications, the appellant was not given permission to engage a legal practitioner to defend .himself.\n\nD Therefore the question arises whether the appellant was given reasonable opportunity to defend himself in accordance with subrule ( 5) of rule 15 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. The portion of that rule that is relevant for out present purpose is the last clause which says that the Government servant may nat engage a legal practitioner for the purpose mentioned in that clause \"unlss the Dis- E ciplinary Authority having regard to the circumstances of the case so permits\".\n\nThe grievance of the appellant was that he was pitted against a trained prosecutor and not that Sivaraman was a legal practitioner.\n\nThe Disciplinary Authority did not consider that grievance. It brushed aside the request of the appellant on the l!fOund that Sivaraman was not a legal practitioner, a consideration which was not relied on by the appellant.\n\nThe grounds urged by the appellant in support of his request for permission to engage a legal practitioner were by no means irrelevant.\n\nThe\n\nfact that th!! case against the appellant was being handled by a trained prosecutor was a good ground for allowing •the appellant G to engage a legal practitioner to defend him lest the scales should be weighted against him. The Disciplinary Authority completely ignored that circumstance. Therefore that authority clearly failed to exercise the power conferred on it under the rule. It is not unlikely that the Disciplinary Authority's refusal to permit the appellant to engage a legal practitioner in the circumstances mentioned H earlier had caused serious prejudice to the appellant and had amounted to a denial of reasonable opportunity to defend himself.\n\n' ''.ii.\n\nc. L. SUBRAMAN!AM v. COLLECTOR CUSTOMS (Hegde, /.) 491\n\nThe appellant contended that he had a right to engage a legal practitioner to defend him. He sought to spell out that right on the basis that \"'.hat he could himself do, he could get it done by an agent of his and a legal practitioner acting for him would only have been his agent. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the decision in Pet v. Greyhound Racing Association B Ltd. (1). The facts of that case were as follows :\n\nTrack stewards of a greyhound racing stadium owned by the defendants proposed to hold an inquiry into he withdrawal of a\n\ntriner's dog from a race at a stadium licensed by the National Greyhound Racing Club. The inquiry involved the question whether drugs had been administered to the dog.\n\nThe trainer held a licence from the National Greyhound Racing Club entitling him to race dogs on tracks lirensed by the club, and thus the result of the inquiry might involve the trainer's reputation and livelihood. The rules of the club, to which the trainer had agreed when he obtained his licence, did not prescribe the procedure to be followed by track stewards at their inquiries, and did not exclµde legal representation.\n\nThe procedure in fact followed at such an inquiry allowed the trainer to be present, to hear the evidence and 10 have an opportilnity to question witnesses. The trainer sought o be represented by counsel and solicitor at the enquiry hut the track stewards decided ultimately not to allow legal representation. On appeal from the grant of an interlocutory injunction restraining the inquiry from being held unless the trainer were allowed to be represenred, the Court of Appeal held that prima facie the trainer was entitled to an oral hearing and, the inquiry being one of serious importance to him, to be represented as it by counsel and solicitor, for he was entitled not only to appear himself but also to appoint an agent on his behalf, and so was entitled to appoint lawyers to represent him.\n\nLord Denning, M. R. who delivered the main judgment of the court in the course of his judgment dealing with the decision of stewards that they will not hear lawyers observed :\n\n\"I cannot accept this contention. The plaintiff is here facing a serious charge. He is charged either with\n\ngiving the dog drugs or with not exercising proper control over the dog so that someone else drugged it. If \"he is found guilty, he may be suspended or his licence may nQ! be renewed. The charge concerns his reputation_ and his livelihood.\n\nOn such an inquiry I think that he i$ entitled not only to appear by himself but also to appoint an agent to act for him. Even a prisoner can have bis friend.\" ·\n\n(l) [1968] 2 All E.R, S4S.\n\nProceeding further the Master of Rolls observed :\n\n\"I should have thought, therefore, that when a man's reputation 'or livelihood is at stake, he not only has a right to spak by his own mouth. He has also a right to speak by counsel or solidtor.\"\n\nB This decision, in our opinion, does not bear on the point under consideration. Herein we are dealing with a statutory rule, which prohibits the appointment of a legal pra<ltitioner excepting under certain circumstances. Hence the agency theory has no relevance no]'_ ar>! we required to consider the principles of natural justice as those principles are only relevall't when the concerned procedure is not regulated by any statute or statutory rule. The C rule laid down in Pet's case('') has not commended itself 'to this Court. In Kalindi and ors. v. Tata Locomotive and Engineering Co. Ltd. (2), a question arose whether in an enquiry by management into misconduct of a workman, the workman was entitled to be represented by a representative of the Union.\n\nAnswering this question this Court observed that a workman against whom an enquizy is being held by the management has no right to be represented at such an enquiry by. a representative of the Union though the employer in his discretion can and may allow him to oo so represened. In such enquiries fairly simple questions of fact as to whether certain acts of misconduct were committed by a workman or, not fall to be considered and the workman is best suited to conduct the case. Ordinarily, in enquiries before domestic tribunals a person accused of any misconduct conducts his own case and so it cannot be said that in any enquiry against a workman natqral justice demands that he should be repre9!nted by a representative of his Union. The same view was taken by this Court in Brooke Bond India (Private) Ltd. v. Subba Raman\n\n(S) and anr.( 8 ). That view was reiterated again in Dunlop Rubber Co; v. Workmen('). ·\n\nThe learned counsel for the State relied on the decisions mentioned above in support of his contention that the appellant was\n\nnot entitled to have the assistano! of a legal practitioner. . This con, tention is without force.\n\nIn those cases this Court considered G whether a person proceeded against in an enquiry before a domestic tribunal had a right to be represenled by someone else on the basis of the principles of natural justice. 1bereln this Court was not called upon to consider either the limits of the reasonable opportunity to defend oneself, guaranteed under Art. 311 or the scope of a statutory rule. The question th, at falls for decision in this case did not arise for decision in those cases.\n\n(1) [1968] 2 All E.R. 545.\n\n(2) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 407,\n\n(3) [1961] 2 L.L.J. 417.\n\n(4) ]1965] 2 S.C.R.139.\n\nA The appellant supported his complaint of breach of rule 1 S ( S) on yet another ground. After the appellant's request for engaging a counsel was rejected, he requested the Disciplinary Authority to let him have the assistance of Abraham Kurian, clerk, Cochin Head Post Office, Cochin-1. This request be appears to have made long before the date of enquiry i.e. December 5, 1963. 8 He bad also requested the Disciplinary Authority 1to move the superiors of Abraham Kurian to grant permission to Abraham Kurian to assist him. But it appears the Disciplinary Authority wrote to the Superintendent of Post Offices who is stationed at Tricbur only on the 28th of November, 1963 requesting him to permit Abraham Kurian to assist the appellant. . That communica- C tion wa~ not received by the Superintendent of Post Offices in time. Hence Abraham Kurian did not get the permission sought l?efore the date of enquiry.\n\nAfter learning that fact from Abraham Kurian, the appellant wrote the following letter to the Collector of Customs on December 4, 1963.\n\nD \"Sec. 1/1/63 IEstt-Cus.\n\n; ii: From:\n\nTo:\n\nC. L. Subramaniam,\n\nNo. 16 Customs Quarters Willingdon Island, .P.O.\n\nCochin-3. 4th December, 1963.\n\n:e_reventive Officer Gr. II, Customs House, Cochin-3. ·\n\nF The Collector of Customs & Central EJ!:cise, Custom House, Cochin-3.\n\nSir,\n\nSub-Enquiry into the work and conduct of Shri C. L.\n\nG Subramaniam, Prevemive Offioor, Custom House, Cochin-3.\n\nWith reference to your letter dated 3rd December, 1963 I wi$h to submit as follows :\n\nH Shri Abraham Kurian, Cbrk, Cochin Head Post Office who js to assist me in the enquiry from 5-12-1963 in connection with certain allegations pending against me has urgently applied to bis . superior :v.esterday i(Self and is awaiting permission.\n\nAs I cannot appear for the enquiry without assistance I request you Sir, to adjourn the hearing by 10 days.\n\nThanking you,\n\nI remain Sir,\n\nYours faithfully, Sd/·, C. L. Subramaniam.\"\n\nOn the qa1e of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer adjourned 'the case sine die after obtaining an undertaking from the appellant that on the next da:te of the enquiry he would go on with the case even if he was unable to get the assistance of Abraham Kurian on that date.\n\nO:n Deceml>r 9, 1963, the appellant wrate to the Enquiry Officer as follows :\n\n\"Sec. No. 1/1/63 Estt. Cus.\n\n9th December 1963\n\nFrom\n\nTo:\n\nSir,\n\nC. L. Subramaniam.\n\nPreventive Officer, Custom House, Cochin-3.\n\nThe Asst!. Collector of Cutoms (Apprg.), Enquiry Officer, Custom House, Cochin-3.\n\nSub : Enquiry into the work and conduct of Shri C. L. Subramaniam, Preventive Officer, Custom House, Cochin.\n\nI understand from a communication from the Senior Super intendent of Post Offices, Trichur addressed to the Assistant Col lector of Customs ( Apprg.), Custom House, Cochin with copy endorsed to Shri Abraham Kurian, that your communication in forming that the enquiry was to have been held from 5-12-1963 was received by the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices only on 5th December, 1963, and therefore the relief arrangement could not be made by him.\n\nNow that the enquiry is adjourned it is requested that you may be good enough to inform ithe Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Trichur (Superior Officer of the Government who. assists\n\nme) sufficiently arly as to the date of the enquiry, so that he may relieve the Government servant in time.\n\nIt is humbly pointed out that unless your goodself take necessary action in iime in this regard it may not be possible •to get me the assistance I have requested for.\n\nYours faithfully, Sd/- 9-12-63 (C. L. Subramaniam)\"\n\nEven after getting this letter, the Enquiry Officer did not fix the date of the enquiry. It appears that on December 30, 1963 the Enquiry Officer fixed January 8, 1964 as the date of enquiry.\n\nIt is only thereafter he wrote to the Superintendent of Post Offices requesting him to permit Abraham Kurian to assist the appel!ant.\n\nIt is not known when tha!t letter was received by the Superintendnt of Post Offices but Abraham Kurian did not get the permission sought, before 'the date of enquiry. Therefore he was unable to assist the appellant in the enquiry. Hence the enquiry went on without t]]e appellant having anybody's assistance.\n\nFrom •th!' facts set out above, it is clear that the Enquiry Officer di.ct not afford the appellant necessary facility to have the assistance of another Government servant in defending him which assistance he was entitled 'to under the rule.\n\nHe W!U deprived of that assistance solely because of the indifferent aititude adopted by the Enquiry Officer. Therefore we have no hesi'tation in comin.g to the conclusion that the Enquiry Officer bad clearly breached rule 15(5).\n\nIt is needless to say that rule 15 is a mandatory rule. That rule regulates the guarantee given to Government servant$ under Art. 311. Government servants by and large have no legal training. At any rate, it is nobody's case that the appellant had legal training, Moreover when a man is charged with the breach of a rule entailing serious consequences, he is not likely to be in a position to present his case as best as it should be. The accusation against the ppellant •threatened his vry livelihood. Any adverse verdict against him was. bound to be disastrous to him; as it has proved to ~- In such ; a situation he cannot be expected to act calmly and with deliberation.\n\nThat is why rule 15(5) has provided for representation of a Government servant charged with dereliction of duty or with contravention of the rule by iinother\n\novernment servant or in appropriate cases by a legal practitioner.\n\nFor the reasons mentioned above, we think that there had been a contravention of rule 15(5). We are also of the opinion\n\n1hat the appellant had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity A to defend himself.\n\nHence the impugned order is liable to be struck down and it is hereby struck down. The facts of 1his case are not such as to justify any fresh enquiry against the appellant.\n\nHence we direct that no fresh enquiry shall be held against the\n\nappellant and he be restored to the position to which he would have been entitled to but for 1he impugned order. The appeal is B accordingly allowed. The appellant is entitled to his costs from the respondents both in this Court as well as in the High Court. s.c.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 51, "entities": [{"text": "l:,, SUBRAMANIAM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "C. L. SUBRAMANIAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, COCHIN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, COCHIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. K. MATHEW, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2154, "end_char": 2162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4046, "end_char": 4049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4127, "end_char": 4155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Gobind Dass", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4352, "end_char": 4363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gobind Dass and S. P. Nayar, for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4368, "end_char": 4379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gobind Dass and S. P. Nayar, for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4563, "end_char": 4569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant E was a Preventive Officer, Grade II, Customs Office, Cochin from June 16, 1962 lo January 31, 1963."}}, {"text": "March 25, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5184, "end_char": 5198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter on March 25, 1963 the appellant was seri'ed with'."}}, {"text": "January 31, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5364, "end_char": 5380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a memorandum stating that while functioning as Preventive Officer, Grade II, Cochin Customs House, during the period June 1962 to G January 31, 1963 he had contravened the provisions of rule 12(1) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955."}}, {"text": "H. T. Soares", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5665, "end_char": 5677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri H. T. Soares, Assistant Collector, Customs House, Cochin 8\n\nwas appointed as the Enquiry Officer."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6630, "end_char": 6638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Kerala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6670, "end_char": 6690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Kerala."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7421, "end_char": 7429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7948, "end_char": 7956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8667, "end_char": 8675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. M. Shivaraman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8899, "end_char": 8915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In September 1963, one A. M. Shivaraman was appointed as the officer to present the c•se before the Enquiry Officer in sup ' port of the allega'tions made aainst the appellant.", "canonical_name": "A. M. Shivaraman"}}, {"text": "Shivaraman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9062, "end_char": 9072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Shivaraman was a trained police prosecutor.", "canonical_name": "Shivaraman"}}, {"text": "Collecor of Customs, Cochin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9236, "end_char": 9263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After he was ap pointed to present the case in support of the allegations made against the appellant, the appellant wrote to the Collecor of Customs, Cochin, the Disciplinary Authority on October 4, 1963 as follows :\n\nSir,\n\n\"From : C. L. Subramaniam, Preventive Officer,· Customs House, Cochin-3.", "canonical_name": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, COCHIN"}}, {"text": "October 4, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9295, "end_char": 9310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After he was ap pointed to present the case in support of the allegations made against the appellant, the appellant wrote to the Collecor of Customs, Cochin, the Disciplinary Authority on October 4, 1963 as follows :\n\nSir,\n\n\"From : C. L. Subramaniam, Preventive Officer,· Customs House, Cochin-3."}}, {"text": "C. L. Subramaniam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9339, "end_char": 9356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After he was ap pointed to present the case in support of the allegations made against the appellant, the appellant wrote to the Collecor of Customs, Cochin, the Disciplinary Authority on October 4, 1963 as follows :\n\nSir,\n\n\"From : C. L. Subramaniam, Preventive Officer,· Customs House, Cochin-3.", "canonical_name": "C. L.\n\nG Subramaniam"}}, {"text": "Sec. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9463, "end_char": 9469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. M. Sivaraman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9575, "end_char": 9590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the above memorandum it is stated in paragraph 4, that Shri A. M. Sivaraman as the officer to present the case in support of, tho~ allegll'tions against me before the Enquiry Officer.", "canonical_name": "A. M. Shivaraman"}}, {"text": "A. M. Sivaraman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9723, "end_char": 9738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I understand that Shri A. M. Sivaraman is legally trained to conduct such prosecutions.", "canonical_name": "A. M. Shivaraman"}}, {"text": "Soares", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10625, "end_char": 10631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 17, 1963, Sri Soares, Assistant Collector of Customs wrote to foe appellant thus ;\n\n\"Secret 1/1/63 Est."}}, {"text": "Assistant Collector of Customs, Appraising Department, Cu&toms House, Cochin-3", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10775, "end_char": 10853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cus\n\nCustom House, Cochin-3 17th September 1963\n\nFrom:\n\nThe Assistant Collector of Customs, Appraising Department, Cu&toms House, Cochin-3\n\nShri C. L. Subramaniam, Preventive Officer, CuS'tol)l House, Cochin-3."}}, {"text": "C. L. Subramaniam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10860, "end_char": 10877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cus\n\nCustom House, Cochin-3 17th September 1963\n\nFrom:\n\nThe Assistant Collector of Customs, Appraising Department, Cu&toms House, Cochin-3\n\nShri C. L. Subramaniam, Preventive Officer, CuS'tol)l House, Cochin-3.", "canonical_name": "C. L.\n\nG Subramaniam"}}, {"text": "A. M. Siyaraman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11281, "end_char": 11296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1/63/Estt Cus dated 14th October 1963, requesting permission for engaging a counsel to appear and defend you, during the enquiry, I am directed by the F Collector to inform you that although Shri A. M. Siyaraman is legally trained, he is not a legal practitioner and hence there is no necessity for engaging a lawyer to defend you at the enquiry.", "canonical_name": "A. M. Shivaraman"}}, {"text": "Sivaraman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11643, "end_char": 11652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G It is clear from that letter that the Disciplinary Authority had overlooked the fact that the appellant sought permission to engage :a counsel not because Sivaraman was a legal practitioner but because he was trained prosecutor.", "canonical_name": "Shivaraman"}}, {"text": "January 6, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11721, "end_char": 11736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 6, 1964, the appellant again wrote to the Collector of Customs explaining his difficulties in def.ending himself."}}, {"text": "National Greyhound Racing Club", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15411, "end_char": 15441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of that case were as follows :\n\nTrack stewards of a greyhound racing stadium owned by the defendants proposed to hold an inquiry into he withdrawal of a\n\ntriner's dog from a race at a stadium licensed by the National Greyhound Racing Club."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16759, "end_char": 16766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Denning, M. R. who delivered the main judgment of the court in the course of his judgment dealing with the decision of stewards that they will not hear lawyers observed :\n\n\"I cannot accept this contention."}}, {"text": "S4S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17465, "end_char": 17468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19974, "end_char": 19982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1960] 3 S.C.R. 407", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20145, "end_char": 20164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Abraham Kurian", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20449, "end_char": 20463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the appellant's request for engaging a counsel was rejected, he requested the Disciplinary Authority to let him have the assistance of Abraham Kurian, clerk, Cochin Head Post Office, Cochin-1.", "canonical_name": "Abraham Kurian"}}, {"text": "Tricbur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20850, "end_char": 20857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it appears the Disciplinary Authority wrote to the Superintendent of Post Offices who is stationed at Tricbur only on the 28th of November, 1963 requesting him to permit Abraham Kurian to assist the appellant. ."}}, {"text": "Sec. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21272, "end_char": 21278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C. L.\n\nG Subramaniam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21596, "end_char": 21616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir,\n\nSub-Enquiry into the work and conduct of Shri C. L.\n\nG Subramaniam, Prevemive Offioor, Custom House, Cochin-3.", "canonical_name": "C. L.\n\nG Subramaniam"}}, {"text": "Abraham Kurian", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21755, "end_char": 21769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With reference to your letter dated 3rd December, 1963 I wi$h to submit as follows :\n\nH Shri Abraham Kurian, Cbrk, Cochin Head Post Office who js to assist me in the enquiry from 5-12-1963 in connection with certain allegations pending against me has urgently applied to bis .", "canonical_name": "Abraham Kurian"}}, {"text": "C. L. Subramaniam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22595, "end_char": 22612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9th December 1963\n\nFrom\n\nTo:\n\nSir,\n\nC. L. Subramaniam.", "canonical_name": "C. L.\n\nG Subramaniam"}}, {"text": "Asst!. Collector of Cutoms (Apprg.), Enquiry Officer, Custom House, Cochin-3.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22664, "end_char": 22741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Asst!."}}, {"text": "5-12-1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23147, "end_char": 23156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Custom House, Cochin with copy endorsed to Shri Abraham Kurian, that your communication in forming that the enquiry was to have been held from 5-12-1963 was received by the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices only on 5th December, 1963, and therefore the relief arrangement could not be made by him."}}, {"text": "5th December, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23223, "end_char": 23241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Custom House, Cochin with copy endorsed to Shri Abraham Kurian, that your communication in forming that the enquiry was to have been held from 5-12-1963 was received by the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices only on 5th December, 1963, and therefore the relief arrangement could not be made by him."}}, {"text": "Trichur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23439, "end_char": 23446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now that the enquiry is adjourned it is requested that you may be good enough to inform ithe Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Trichur (Superior Officer of the Government who."}}, {"text": "December 30, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23935, "end_char": 23952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on December 30, 1963 the Enquiry Officer fixed January 8, 1964 as the date of enquiry."}}, {"text": "January 8, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23979, "end_char": 23994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on December 30, 1963 the Enquiry Officer fixed January 8, 1964 as the date of enquiry."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25064, "end_char": 25072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_497_504_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "SOM NARIB PURI\n\nl'.\n\nTHE STATE OF RAJASTHAN\n\nFebruary 15, 1972\n\n[J.M. SHELAT, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.J\n\nPenal Code, Indian (45 of 1860)-Section 405, 409-Criminal Breach of Trust-'Entrusted,' ffleaning.\n\nThe appellant who was an employee of the Indian Airlines Corporation was convicted under s. 409, Penal Code, and section 5(2) read with section 5(1) (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,\n\n1947. The e.ppzllanfs duty was to make reservations for the passengers. The pJ:actice was that whenever the quota was full intending travellers were required to pay trunk telephone charges for enabling the Corp<iration to obtain relc::r.se of seats from quotas 'lllotted to other centres. The appellant \\vllc was incharge of this arrangem-ent, it was allt!ged, collected Rs. 184.90 towards trunk telephones charges but actually deposited with/ the corporation 9nJy a sum of Rs. 44.90 and misappropriated the balance.\n\nThe 1nod11s operandi, it was alleged, was that he would demand a higher amoutli for Trunk Call charges than was Jik.ely to .be in<1Urred and be \\vould isslJe a correct receipt for this amount on behalf of the corporation bnt aitor making the trunk call, he would alter the counterfoil with the octual amount of trunk call charges. In the appeal , to this Court it was urge.ct that since the prosecution case as disclosed by: the evidence was that .the appellant had collected excess charges representing them to be actual charges for trunk calls and not that any excess over the actual charges would be returned to the appellant be could not be convicted either under s. 5(2) read with S(l)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act or uudr s. 409 penal code, because, the important ingredient, viz., enlhli; tment cf the amount was abs, ent.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : (i) The expression 'entrusted' in section 409 is used in a W.<le sense and inc\\udes all cases in whic; b property is voluntarj!yJ1anded O'fr ior a specific purpose and is dishonestly disposed ·<>f contrary to the terms on which possession !)as been handed over. As long as tlr: accused is gh en possession of property for. a specific purpose or to deal with it in <: particular manner, the ownership being in some person other than the accmed, he can be said to be entrusted with that property to be applied' in accordance with the terms of entrustment and for the benefit of the owner. It may be -that a person to whom the property is handed over may tc an agent of the person to whom it .is entrusted or to whom it ma1• belong in which <)lse, if the ag:nt who comes into possession of it on behuif of his principal, fraudulently misaPPl'OPriates the property, he is nonetheless guilty of criminal, breach of trust, because, as an uent be ls enlruted with it. A person authorised to collect moneys on behalf of •nother II entrusted with the money when the ..mounts are paid to him, and though the person paying may no longer have any 'Proprietary in terest, nonetheless, the person on whose behalf it was collected become the owner as soon as the amount is handed ovrlr to the person so authorised to collect on his behalf. (502 DJ\n\nThe State v. Dahyalal Da/patram, A.LR. 1960 Born. 53; Ir. re: Ram A Soonder Poddar & Ors. 1878 (2) Cal. LR. 515; In re: Ramappa, (1911) 22 M.LJ. 112; In re: Venkata Raghunatha Sastri, (1923) 45 M.L.J. 133 and the, Crown Prosecutor v. J. Mclyer and K. S. Narasimhachari, 69 M.L.J. 681, referred to.\n\n(ii) In the present case the amounts for trunk call cjiarges were demanded on behalf of the Corporation and we\"> paid to the Corporation.\n\nB .The receipts in respect of the sums were given on behalf of the Corpe\n\nration and it would be the Corporation tht would b<> liable directly to the p<>rson who had paid this amoun4 if no trunk calls were made, or any excess over the actual amoun.t of the trunk calI charges was charged by it.\n\nThe amount was not paid by passengers to the accused as f>uch but to\n\nthr~ corporation and as soon a~ the receipt for the amount actually received from the passengers was given by the ac'Cused on behalf of the corpoartion, he was .entrusted with that an1ount.\n\nHis subsequent conc duct in falsifying the counterfoils '3Dd fraudulently misappropriating tho.!\n\nJLmount would make him guilty of criminal breach of trust under s. 409 I.P.C., as also under section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(c) of the Act.\n\n[604 EH]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 101 of 1969.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 16, 1969 of the Rajasthan High Court in S. B. Criminal Appeal No. 558 of 1966.\n\nA. S. R. Chari and S. B. Wad, for the appellant.\n\nK. !3 Mehta, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Jaganmohan Reddy, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court. The accused was initially charged on three counts, firstly, under section 5(2) read with section S(l)(c) of t!ie Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), secondly, under section 409, I.P.C., and .thirdly, under section 477A, I.P.C. Thereafter on 15-1-1964 another Special Judge charged him on two counts, namely, under section 5(2) read with section 5 (1)( c) and section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(w) of the Act. After the trial, the appellant was, however, convicted under section 409, I.P.C. and section 5(2) read with section 5(1 )(c) and (d) of the Act and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of 18 months and a fine of Rs. 250/- under_ section 409, I.P.C. and 18 months' rigorous i!flprisonment and a fine of Rs. 250/- under section 5(2) read with sections 5(1)(c) and 5(l)(d) of the Act. The sentences on both these counts were directed to run concurrently. The I; iigh Court, however, thought that the Special Judge had not recorded any conviction under section 5(l)(d) of the Act and in that view confirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellant of 18 months' rigorous imprisonment on each of the coun~. namely, under\n\ns. N. PUR\\ v. STATE (Jagamnohan Reddy, J.) 499\n\nA. section 409, I.P.C. and section 5(2) read with ;1ection 5(1)(c) of the Act, but reduced the fine for each of the offences from Rs. 250/· to Rs. 150/-.\n\nThe appellant was employed as a Traffic Assistant in the Indain Airlines Corporation's office at Jaipur and his duty was B to make reservations of the pasre.ngers intending to go by air and issue tickets. As it happens, when the quota of seats allotted to Jaipur is full, intending travellers who request for uccommodation would be required _to pay trunk telephone charges for enabl ing the Airlines Corporation to obtain release of seats from quotas allotted to other centres.\n\nThe practice of the Airlines was to\n\nC collect the approximate charges and issue a receipt therefor and if a seat was available, the reservation would be confirmed and accommodation given to the passengers if seats could be released from other centres for Jaipur. Tin appellant who was incharge of these an:angements between 16-2-62 and 30-8-62, collected Rs. 184.90 towards trunk telephone charges but actually deposited witli the Airlines Corporation a sup1 of Rs. 44.91 and misappro- D priated the balance of Rs. 139.99. The modus operendi followed by him, it is alleged, 'Yl\\S tha.t he would demand a higher amount for Trunk Call charges than were likely to be incurred and he would issue a correct receipt for those amounts on behalf of. the Airlines Corporation but after making the trunk call, he would alter the counter-foil with the actual amount of trunk call charges.\n\nE On the same day he WO!!ld make a daily return showing the actual amounts and deposit them with the Cashier.\n\nA typical sample of the receipts given by him on behalf of the Airlines Corporation is Exhibit 40 which i.s as follows :-\n\n\"INDIAN AIRLINES CORPORATION NEW DELHI.\n\nNo. 354577 Station : Jaipur.\n\nDate : 30-8-62.\n\nReceived with thanks from M/s. M/Travels, Jaipur sum., of Rupees Twentythree and forty nP, being the amount T /Call charges to Udaipur and AMD for release of seat.\n\n'for INDIAN AIRLINES °CORPORATION.\n\nRs. 23.40\n\nSd/- Cashier\".\n\nOn 31-8-62, one M.D. Singh qf_the Mercury Travel Agency, Jaipur complained to D.S. Gupta, Incharge of the Office of the Indian Airlines Corporation a~ Jaipur that the appellant had\n\ncollected Rs. 23.40 for proposed trunk call charges from the 1i.\n\nAgency but made no call and no seat was allotted to the passenger of the Mercury Travel Agency, even though one was available and that eat was given by B. S. Gupta to someone else. B. S. Gupta quesljioned the appell!!_nt who then made. a confession of his having collected the amount but not having made a call. After making this confession he immediately resigned his job.\n\nA preliminary B inquiry was conducted by the Area Manager who thereafter lodged the First Informaticm Report.\n\nThe accused denied having collected the amounts or of having issued the receipts and further stated that whatever amounts were collected by him were paid in the office of the Airlines everyday.\n\nBoth the Courts foµnd on the evidence that the appellant used to make trunk calls whenever he was on duty from the Indian Airlines Corporation office at Jaipur for the relea5e of seats and that he would call for and receive trunk call charges from intend ing passengers. It was further held proved that the appellant gave receipts Exhibited in the case which were in his own hand-writing and signed by him; and that it was he who realised the total sum of Rs. 185 /- which was entrusted to him and over which he had a ®minion in his capacity as a public servant We have already pointed out that the !Iigh Court did not confirm the conviction of the appellant under section. 5(2) red with section 5(1 )(d) on the assumption that the said Special Judge had not convicted the accused for that offence, and since there is no appeal by the State against this part of the judgment, the contention on behalf of the State that he was convicted under section 5(1)(d) has no merits and cannot be sustainCcl.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant it was urged before the High Court that as the appellant had to face a trial extending over more than\n\n3 years incurring enormous expenses for coming tq and from Chandigarh where he was practising law and was also in Jail for II some time, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should\n\nbe given to him. This contention was rejected because the provisions of that Act were inapplicable in view of his conviction under section 409, I.P.t:;.\n\nAs the offence cif criminal breach of trust under section 409, .J:.P.C. is punishable with imprisonment for life, the High Court, in our view, was right because the provisions of section 4 are only applicable to a case of aperson found guilty of having committed an offence no~ punishble wi~ death or imprisonment for life.\n\nA part from this rea9omn_g, section 18 of the Probation of Offenders Act makes the pl'OVISions of that Act inapplicable to an Offence under sub-section (2) of section S of the Prevention of Corruption Act.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant it is submitted by the learned Advocate that the prosecution case as dlosed by the evidence was tlrat 'the appellant had collected exc, ess charges from the p11S9engers\n\ns. N. PURI v. STATE (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.) . 501\n\nrepresenting them to be the actual charges for trunk calls and not that any excess over the actual charges would be returned to them. In view of this evidence, the appellant could not be convicted either under secl; ion 5(2) read with section 5(l)(c) of the Act or under section 409, I.P.C. because the important ingredient which is entrustment of the amounts is absent.\n\nIn order that B any amount can be said to be entrusted it should be lawfully made over, but in this case the appell.aD.t obtained the amount by cheating and by the commission of an offence. If there was no entrustment of the moneys to the appellan~. he could not be con, victed either under section 409 or under section 5(2) read with 5(1)(c) of the Act and is accordingly entitled to an acquittal on C both these charges. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on Surendra Pal Singh v. The State('), where a Bench\n\nof the Allahabad High Court held that the amounts collected from cultivators by the Canal Amin in excess of the amount actually due from them and misappropriated by him, did not amount to an entrustment as he could not be a trustee of that money on behalf of the cultivators from whom he realised it because when they D handed over the money to the accused, they purported to surrender all their rights in that money, nor could it be said that this money had become the property of the Government at any stage for him to be considered a trustee on }ts behalf. This decision was, however, disapproved in The Stal&. v. Dahyalal Dalpatram('), by a Bench of the Bombay High Court, a view with which the High E Court agreed. In that case the accused who was employed as a Talati in the Revenue Department, was invested with the authority to collect land revenue and fines. He was ordered to recover from the land-holders who had defaulted in paying the moneys but having collected the, m, he did not pay them into 11he Government Treasury as required by the rules made under the Land Revenue Code. The accused was convicted under section 409, I.P.C. On F the question that when the accused collected the amount as tax alleged to be due by the land-holder thouj!h the liability whereof could not beenforced according to Jaw, coµJd it be said that he was then entrusted with the money, the High Court after noticing that the Atlahabad High Court appears to have taken the view that a public servant collecting the money claiming that it was G due to the State but which in fact was no~ due to th~ State, could not be regarded as entr\\isted with the money collected. by him. held that that was not a necessary ingredient of section 405. The\n\nlearned Advocate sought to distinguish this case on the round that in the Bombay case there was a definite direction f.o collect a specific amount and when that amount was collected there was ll' entrustment of that money which was lawfully collected, as such\n\n~- !he accused was riitbtlv convicted. It was further contended that if looked at from thr !l('lint of view of the passen2ers from whom\n\n(I) A.1.R. 1957 All. 122.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1960 Bom. 53, 4-L1031 SuJ)CJ/72\n\ntrunk call charges were collected, they had not entrusted the ll; lOney to the accused because they had parted with the proprietary rights thereon and if viewed from the point of view of the Airlines Corporation, the money collected did not become the property of the Corporation and consequently there was no entrustment of i!.\n\nThere can be no doubt that before a public servant can be convicted of an offence under section. 5 ( 1 He) or under section 409, I.P.C. the property which is said to have been misappropriated must be entrusted to him.\n\nSection 405 merely provides, whoever being in any manner entrusqed with property or with any dominion over the property, as the first ingredient of the criminal breach of trust. The words 'in any manner' in the context are significant.\n\nThe section does not provide that the entrustment of property should be by someone or the amount recieved must be the property of the person on whose behalf it is received.\n\nAs long as the ac9.use.d is given possession of property for a specific purpose Qr to deal with it in a particular manner, the ownership being in some person other than the accused, he can be said to be entrusted with that property to be applied in accordance with the terms of entrustment and for the benefit of the owner. The expression 'entrusted' in section 409 is used in a wide sense and includes all C¥!:, S in w. hich property is voluntarily handed over for a specific purpc!\"se and is dishonestly disposed of contrary to the terms on which possession has been handed over. It .may be that a person to whom the property is handed over may be an agent of the person to whom it is entrusted or 10 whom it may belong, in which case if the agent who comes into possession of it on behalf of his principal, fraudulently misappropriates the property, he is nonetheless guilty of criminal breach of trust because as an agent he is entrusted with it.\n\nA person authorised to collect moneys on behalf of another is entrusted with the money when the amounts are paid to him, and though the person paying may no longer have any properietary interest nonetheless the person on whose behalf it was collected becomes the owner as soon as the amount is handed over to the person so authorised to oollect on his behalf.\n\nThis view of ours is well supported by decisions of different High Courts in this country for neruly a century, a few of which alone need be exrunined.\n\nIn the matter of Ram Soonder Poddar & Ors.('), a Deputy Magistrate convicted the accused under seetion 406, I.P.C., an offence over which he had jurisdiction, instead of under section 409, I.P.C. which was coizable only by the Court of Session.\n\nOn revision the High Court held that the proceedings were contrary io law and the Deputy Magistrate was directed to commit the accused for trial by the Court of Session. It' appears that the accused who were charged were Treasury employees. One of the accused\n\n(I) 1878 (2) Cal. L.R. SIS.\n\ns. N. PURI v. STATE (Jagamnohan Reddy, J.) 503\n\nwas allowed to write the Treasury Cash Book which was the duty of the Treasurer.\n\nTalcing advantage of it, he misappropriated Rs. 16/- by scoring off the entry in the account book. In this misappropriation he was assisted by the other accused who was employed to do stamp work. While holding the trial to be without jurisdiction, it was observed that seer.ion 409 does 'not as supposed by the Deputy Magistrate, require the property in respect of which criminal breach of trust is committed, to be the property of Government, but only requires that it should be entrusted to a public servant in his capacity.as such public servant. In re: Ramappa( 1), the accused who was the Superintendent of some Coffee Curing Works was convicted 9f criminal breach of trust by misappropriating a large sum of money made up of amounts which he had received from the Manager on the false pretence that they were required for paying .coolies who garbled coffee. One of the arguments urged against the conviction was that the receipt of the money by false representation amounted to an offence of cheating and that the subsequent appropriation of it by the accused to his own use was not a criminal breach of trust as the criminal intent was present at.the time of the receipt of the moneys from the Manager. Benson and Sundara Aiyar, JJ., while rejecting that argument, observed :\n\n\"When the accused received the money he did so as a servant of the Company for the express purpose of using it for his master's benefit in a particular way. He was, therefore, entrusted with the money and his apP!'o:. priating it to himself clearly amounts to criminal breach of trust\".\n\nIn Venkata Raghunatha Sastri('), , Spencer, J., held that where a person who had pledged promissory notes with another as security for a loan dishonestly induced the latter to hand over the same to him by pretending that he required the same for collecting money from his creditors with .the aid of which he would pay cash to the complainant, his act constituted an offence of cheating punishable under section 420, l.P.C. and tha~ when he dishonestly disposed of the notes in violation• of his contract with e pledgee to use the money collected in paying off his debt, there was both entrustment and dishonest misappropriation and that the conviclion for the offence of criminal breach of trust under section 406, l.P.C. was legal.\n\nBoth these cases were referred to in The Crown Prosecutor v.\n\nJ. Mclver and K. S. Narasimhachari(').\n\nTlie facts in thi~ case also were somewhat similar to those in Venkataraghunatha Sastri's case('). Madhavan Nair, J (as he then was) examined the mean- 'ing of the word 'entrusted' in section 406 and rejected a similar\n\nH contention as was urged in this case on behalf of the appellant that\n\nwhen fhe accused by deceiving the complainant fraudulently and\n\n(I) (1911) 22 M, L, J. 112.\n\n(3) 69 M.L.J. 681.\n\n(2) (1923) 4l M.L.J. 133\n\n(4) 4l M.L.J. 133.\n\ndishonestly indced hint to part with the property in questioa, the offence of cheatmg was complete and that there is no room for further holding that the acused have committed criminal breach of trust also by their subsequent misappropriation of the property.\n\nIn the case before us, the practice which was being followed by the Jaipur office of the Indian Airlines Corporation is spoken to by M. U. Menon, P.W. 6, who was a Personal Assistant to the General Manager of the National Engineering Industries Ltd., Jrupur.\n\nHe says that on 16-2-1962 his General Manager had ected t\". issue instirctions to t)le accounts branch for arrangmg for flight !Ickets by rur for Delhi. He first rang up the Indian Airlines Corporation 'ab.out the air passage for eight persons and received a reply from that office that 8 tickets were not available at Jaipur and they would iiy from Udaipur and Ahmedabad by trunk calls.\n\nAfter some time the Indian\"-Ai!Iines_ Corporation people rang up telling him that tickets can be arranged and he should send the money runounting to Rs. 410.50 which included trunk call charges of Rs. 26.50. He therettpon . sent a slip, Exhibit P-6 to the accounts department for further necessary action. There was no cross-exrunination on behalf of the accused. Similarly Ganesh Singh, P. W. 3 who is working for the National Engineering Industries Ltd., Jaipur said that when his people contacted Indian Airlines Corporation on telephone and enquired about the fare etc., they would ask for trunk call charges along with the amount for tickets.\n\nThis would be paid and in fact he pointed out to the accused and said that he might be one of the persons whom he' met at the office and after he paid the amounts for the tickets and irunk call charges, he would obtain a receipt and give it to the company. This evidence read with other evidence Which has been accepted by both the Courts would show that whatever may have been the criminal intention of the accused, the amounts for trunk call charges , were demanded on behalf of the Indian Airlines Corporation and '\\YCfe paid to the Corporation. The receipts in respect of the sums were given on behalf of the Corporation and it would be the Corporation that would be liable directly to the person who had paid this amount, if no trunk calls were made, br any excess ever the actlial .amount of the trunk call charges was charged by it. The amount was not paid by passengers to the accused as such but to the Indian Airlines Corporation and as soon as the rpt for the amount actually received from the P}.1ssengers was given by the accused on behalf of the Corporation, he was entrusted with that amount. H\"IS subsequent conduct in falsifying the counter-foils and fradulently misappropriating the amounts would make hint guilty of critninal breach of trust punishable under section 409, I.P.C. as also under section S(2) read with section S(l)(c) of the Act.\n\nThere is, therefore, no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed.\n\nK.B.N.\n\nApptal dismissed.", "total_entities": 116, "entities": [{"text": "SOM NARIB PURI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SOM NARIB PURI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 15, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 62, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN\n\nFebruary 15, 1972\n\n[J.M. SHELAT, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.J\n\nPenal Code, Indian (45 of 1860)-Section 405, 409-Criminal Breach of Trust-'Entrusted,' ffleaning."}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 132, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 405, 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154, "end_char": 170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 310, "end_char": 316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 318, "end_char": 328, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 334, "end_char": 346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 357, "end_char": 369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 381, "end_char": 409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1598, "end_char": 1605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1631, "end_char": 1659, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1668, "end_char": 1674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1836, "end_char": 1847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramappa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3256, "end_char": 3263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "515; In re: Ramappa, (1911) 22 M.LJ."}}, {"text": "K. S. Narasimhachari", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3384, "end_char": 3404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "112; In re: Venkata Raghunatha Sastri, (1923) 45 M.L.J. 133 and the, Crown Prosecutor v. J. Mclyer and K. S. Narasimhachari, 69 M.L.J. 681, referred to."}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4293, "end_char": 4299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4300, "end_char": 4305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4322, "end_char": 4334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4345, "end_char": 4360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4532, "end_char": 4552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 16, 1969 of the Rajasthan High Court in S. B. Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "A. S. R. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4596, "end_char": 4610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari and S. B. Wad, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. B. Wad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4615, "end_char": 4624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari and S. B. Wad, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. !3 Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4646, "end_char": 4657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. !"}}, {"text": "Jaganmohan Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4723, "end_char": 4739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Jaganmohan Reddy, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court.", "canonical_name": "Jaganmohan Reddy"}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4896, "end_char": 4908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4943, "end_char": 4976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5033, "end_char": 5044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act 1947", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act 1947"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5046, "end_char": 5051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 477A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5074, "end_char": 5086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5088, "end_char": 5093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "15-1-1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5109, "end_char": 5118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused was initially charged on three counts, firstly, under section 5(2) read with section S(l)(c) of t!ie Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), secondly, under section 409, I.P.C., and .thirdly, under section 477A, I.P.C. Thereafter on 15-1-1964 another Special Judge charged him on two counts, namely, under section 5(2) read with section 5 (1)( c) and section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(w) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5182, "end_char": 5194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5205, "end_char": 5214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5227, "end_char": 5239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)(w)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5250, "end_char": 5265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5339, "end_char": 5350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5352, "end_char": 5357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5363, "end_char": 5375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 5(1 )(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5386, "end_char": 5402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5505, "end_char": 5516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5518, "end_char": 5523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5594, "end_char": 5606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "sections 5(1)(c) and 5(l)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5617, "end_char": 5645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 5(l)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5825, "end_char": 5840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6048, "end_char": 6059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6061, "end_char": 6066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6072, "end_char": 6084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indain Airlines Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6257, "end_char": 6284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was employed as a Traffic Assistant in the Indain Airlines Corporation's office at Jaipur and his duty was B to make reservations of the pasre.ngers intending to go by air and issue tickets."}}, {"text": "Jaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6297, "end_char": 6303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was employed as a Traffic Assistant in the Indain Airlines Corporation's office at Jaipur and his duty was B to make reservations of the pasre.ngers intending to go by air and issue tickets."}}, {"text": "16-2-62", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7004, "end_char": 7011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tin appellant who was incharge of these an:angements between 16-2-62 and 30-8-62, collected Rs."}}, {"text": "30-8-62", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7016, "end_char": 7023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tin appellant who was incharge of these an:angements between 16-2-62 and 30-8-62, collected Rs."}}, {"text": "INDIAN AIRLINES CORPORATION NEW DELHI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7794, "end_char": 7831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A typical sample of the receipts given by him on behalf of the Airlines Corporation is Exhibit 40 which i.s as follows :-\n\n\"INDIAN AIRLINES CORPORATION NEW DELHI."}}, {"text": "31-8-62", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8112, "end_char": 8119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 31-8-62, one M.D. Singh qf_the Mercury Travel Agency, Jaipur complained to D.S. Gupta, Incharge of the Office of the Indian Airlines Corporation a~ Jaipur that the appellant had\n\ncollected Rs."}}, {"text": "M.D. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8125, "end_char": 8135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 31-8-62, one M.D. Singh qf_the Mercury Travel Agency, Jaipur complained to D.S. Gupta, Incharge of the Office of the Indian Airlines Corporation a~ Jaipur that the appellant had\n\ncollected Rs."}}, {"text": "Mercury Travel Agency, Jaipur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8143, "end_char": 8172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 31-8-62, one M.D. Singh qf_the Mercury Travel Agency, Jaipur complained to D.S. Gupta, Incharge of the Office of the Indian Airlines Corporation a~ Jaipur that the appellant had\n\ncollected Rs."}}, {"text": "D.S. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8187, "end_char": 8197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 31-8-62, one M.D. Singh qf_the Mercury Travel Agency, Jaipur complained to D.S. Gupta, Incharge of the Office of the Indian Airlines Corporation a~ Jaipur that the appellant had\n\ncollected Rs."}}, {"text": "Airlines Corporation a~ Jaipur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8236, "end_char": 8266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 31-8-62, one M.D. Singh qf_the Mercury Travel Agency, Jaipur complained to D.S. Gupta, Incharge of the Office of the Indian Airlines Corporation a~ Jaipur that the appellant had\n\ncollected Rs."}}, {"text": "Mercury Travel Agency", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8430, "end_char": 8451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agency but made no call and no seat was allotted to the passenger of the Mercury Travel Agency, even though one was available and that eat was given by B. S. Gupta to someone else."}}, {"text": "B. S. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8509, "end_char": 8520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agency but made no call and no seat was allotted to the passenger of the Mercury Travel Agency, even though one was available and that eat was given by B. S. Gupta to someone else."}}, {"text": "Indian Airlines Corporation office", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9153, "end_char": 9187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the Courts foµnd on the evidence that the appellant used to make trunk calls whenever he was on duty from the Indian Airlines Corporation office at Jaipur for the relea5e of seats and that he would call for and receive trunk call charges from intend ing passengers."}}, {"text": "section 5(1 )(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9726, "end_char": 9742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9980, "end_char": 9995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandigarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10226, "end_char": 10236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant it was urged before the High Court that as the appellant had to face a trial extending over more than\n\n3 years incurring enormous expenses for coming tq and from Chandigarh where he was practising law and was also in Jail for II some time, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should\n\nbe given to him."}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10323, "end_char": 10349, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10489, "end_char": 10500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10562, "end_char": 10573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10691, "end_char": 10700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10865, "end_char": 10875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10883, "end_char": 10909, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11013, "end_char": 11041, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11526, "end_char": 11541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11562, "end_char": 11573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11575, "end_char": 11580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11954, "end_char": 11965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 5(2) read with 5(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11975, "end_char": 12005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12202, "end_char": 12222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of this contention reliance has been placed on Surendra Pal Singh v. The State('), where a Bench\n\nof the Allahabad High Court held that the amounts collected from cultivators by the Canal Amin in excess of the amount actually due from them and misappropriated by him, did not amount to an entrustment as he could not be a trustee of that money on behalf of the cultivators from whom he realised it because when they D handed over the money to the accused, they purported to surrender all their rights in that money, nor could it be said that this money had become the property of the Government at any stage for him to be considered a trustee on }ts behalf."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12853, "end_char": 12870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Dahyalal Dalpatram('), by a Bench of the Bombay High Court, a view with which the High E Court agreed."}}, {"text": "Government Treasury as required by the rules made under the Land Revenue Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13209, "end_char": 13286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13320, "end_char": 13331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government Treasury as required by the rules made under the Land Revenue Code", "statute": "Government Treasury as required by the rules made under the Land Revenue Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13333, "end_char": 13338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Atlahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13613, "end_char": 13633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused was convicted under section 409, I.P.C. On F the question that when the accused collected the amount as tax alleged to be due by the land-holder thouj!h the liability whereof could not beenforced according to Jaw, coµJd it be said that he was then entrusted with the money, the High Court after noticing that the Atlahabad High Court appears to have taken the view that a public servant collecting the money claiming that it was G due to the State but which in fact was no~ due to th~ State, could not be regarded as entr\\isted with the money collected."}}, {"text": "section 405", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13911, "end_char": 13922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14003, "end_char": 14009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nlearned Advocate sought to distinguish this case on the round that in the Bombay case there was a definite direction f.o collect a specific amount and when that amount was collected there was ll' entrustment of that money which was lawfully collected, as such\n\n~- !"}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14844, "end_char": 14855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14857, "end_char": 14862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 405", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14947, "end_char": 14958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15712, "end_char": 15723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Ram Soonder Poddar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16841, "end_char": 16859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the matter of Ram Soonder Poddar & Ors.('),"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16932, "end_char": 16937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17000, "end_char": 17011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17013, "end_char": 17018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jagamnohan Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17381, "end_char": 17397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. N. PURI v. STATE (Jagamnohan Reddy, J.) 503\n\nwas allowed to write the Treasury Cash Book which was the duty of the Treasurer.", "canonical_name": "Jaganmohan Reddy"}}, {"text": "Benson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18700, "end_char": 18706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Benson and Sundara Aiyar, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Sundara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18711, "end_char": 18724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Benson and Sundara Aiyar, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Venkata Raghunatha Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19065, "end_char": 19090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Venkata Raghunatha Sastri('), , Spencer, J., held that where a person who had pledged promissory notes with another as security for a loan dishonestly induced the latter to hand over the same to him by pretending that he required the same for collecting money from his creditors with .the aid of which he would pay cash to the complainant, his act constituted an offence of cheating punishable under section 420, l.P.C. and tha~ when he dishonestly disposed of the notes in violation• of his contract with e pledgee to use the money collected in paying off his debt, there was both entrustment and dishonest misappropriation and that the conviclion for the offence of criminal breach of trust under section 406, l.P.C. was legal.", "canonical_name": "Venkata Raghunatha Sastri"}}, {"text": "Spencer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19097, "end_char": 19104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Venkata Raghunatha Sastri('), , Spencer, J., held that where a person who had pledged promissory notes with another as security for a loan dishonestly induced the latter to hand over the same to him by pretending that he required the same for collecting money from his creditors with .the aid of which he would pay cash to the complainant, his act constituted an offence of cheating punishable under section 420, l.P.C. and tha~ when he dishonestly disposed of the notes in violation• of his contract with e pledgee to use the money collected in paying off his debt, there was both entrustment and dishonest misappropriation and that the conviclion for the offence of criminal breach of trust under section 406, l.P.C. was legal."}}, {"text": "section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19465, "end_char": 19476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19764, "end_char": 19775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkataraghunatha Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19961, "end_char": 19985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tlie facts in thi~ case also were somewhat similar to those in Venkataraghunatha Sastri's case(').", "canonical_name": "Venkata Raghunatha Sastri"}}, {"text": "Madhavan Nair", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19997, "end_char": 20010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhavan Nair, J (as he then was) examined the mean- 'ing of the word 'entrusted' in section 406 and rejected a similar\n\nH contention as was urged in this case on behalf of the appellant that\n\nwhen fhe accused by deceiving the complainant fraudulently and\n\n(I) (1911) 22 M, L, J. 112."}}, {"text": "section 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20082, "end_char": 20093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Airlines Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20699, "end_char": 20726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case before us, the practice which was being followed by the Jaipur office of the Indian Airlines Corporation is spoken to by M. U. Menon, P.W. 6, who was a Personal Assistant to the General Manager of the National Engineering Industries Ltd., Jrupur."}}, {"text": "M. U. Menon", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20743, "end_char": 20754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case before us, the practice which was being followed by the Jaipur office of the Indian Airlines Corporation is spoken to by M. U. Menon, P.W. 6, who was a Personal Assistant to the General Manager of the National Engineering Industries Ltd., Jrupur."}}, {"text": "16-2-1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20886, "end_char": 20895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He says that on 16-2-1962 his General Manager had ected t\"."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21016, "end_char": 21021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ickets by rur for Delhi."}}, {"text": "Udaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21220, "end_char": 21227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He first rang up the Indian Airlines Corporation 'ab.out the air passage for eight persons and received a reply from that office that 8 tickets were not available at Jaipur and they would iiy from Udaipur and Ahmedabad by trunk calls."}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21232, "end_char": 21241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He first rang up the Indian Airlines Corporation 'ab.out the air passage for eight persons and received a reply from that office that 8 tickets were not available at Jaipur and they would iiy from Udaipur and Ahmedabad by trunk calls."}}, {"text": "Ganesh Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21633, "end_char": 21645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly Ganesh Singh, P. W. 3 who is working for the National Engineering Industries Ltd., Jaipur said that when his people contacted Indian Airlines Corporation on telephone and enquired about the fare etc.,"}}, {"text": "National Engineering Industries Ltd., Jaipur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21678, "end_char": 21722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly Ganesh Singh, P. W. 3 who is working for the National Engineering Industries Ltd., Jaipur said that when his people contacted Indian Airlines Corporation on telephone and enquired about the fare etc.,"}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23186, "end_char": 23197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23199, "end_char": 23204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "K.B.N.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23351, "end_char": 23357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.B.N.\n\nApptal dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_505_509_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "GUDAR DUSADff\n\nSTATE OF BmAR February 15, 1972\n\n[J.M. SHELAT, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.]\n\n111aian Penal Code (Act 45 of, 1860), s. 300, cl. thirdly-Singk blow with lath1 on head of deceased given deliberately-Nature of Offence.\n\nS.ction 300, clause tbirdli, of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, consists of two parts. . Under the first part it has to be shown that there was an intention on the pan of the acpused to infiict the particular injury whicr\n\nwas found on the body Of the deceased.\n\nThe second part requires that the bodily injury intended to be infiicted was sufficient in the ordinary couhe of nature to cause death. So far as the first part is concerned, the COUJt has to see whether the injury which was found on the de0\"\"8ed was the one intended 1>y the accused or whether it was accidental without his having intended to cause that bodily injury. it is found that the injury was not_ accidental and that the accused inten~ to cause the irijury which W35 ac1ually_ infilcted and found on the body of the deceased. the first part is satisfied.\n\nThe oourt should then go into the second part and find, in the liaht of the medical evidence, whether the bodily _injurv in8icted was sufficient in the ordinary cour>e of nature to cause death.\n\nIf the court finds that the requirements of both the parts have been satisfied, the case is covered by the clause unless it falls within one of the exceptiolli!. [508 CFl\n\nIn tliepresent c; ise, the c~ of the case ahowed tilat the assault by the accused on the deceased was premeditated and that the blow given by the accused to the deceased was not accidental. . The fact that the accused the blow . on the he:id of the deceased with a lathi •howed that it was his intention to cause the precise injurY which wa.• found on the. head of the deceased. N the injury was deliberate and not accidental, and as according to the medical evidence the injury was suffi cient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, and as it actually resulted in the death of the deceased, the case would fall squarely within the ambit of clasue 'thirdly' of s. 300, I.P.C., and the appellant would be guilty of Jhe offence Of murder. The fact that the accused gave only one blow would not mitigate the offence and make l:iim guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder 1508. F-H; 509 D-EJ\n\nObservations in Cbamru Budhwa v. State of M.P., AJ.R. 1954 S. C. 652, explained and distinguished,\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 94 of 1969.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 30, 1968 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No.\n\nH 539 of 1966.\n\nNur-ud-din ..thmed and U. P. Singh, for the appellant.\n\nR. C. Prasad, for the respondent.\n\n.The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J.\n\nGudar Dusadb appellant was tried along with 23 others in the court of Additional Sessions Judge Saran.\n\nEighteen of the accused were acquitted by the trial court.\n\nThe appellant was convicted under sections 302 and 147 Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life on the former count.\n\nNo separate sentence was awarded to the appellant for the offence under section 147 Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe remaining five accused were convicted under section 323 read with section 149 Indian Penal Code as well as for other minor offences with which we are not concerned.\n\nOn appeal ' the Patna High Court maintained the conviction and senfence of the appellant, while some modification was made as regards the sentence awarded to the other five convicted accused.\n\nThe appellant thereupon came up in appeal to this Court by special Ieave.\n\nThe leave was, however, confined only to the queson whether the offence committed by the appellant was murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder.\n\nThe case relates to an occurrence which took place in village Khahla in district Saran at about 11 a.m. on August 14, 1965.\n\nRamlal Bhagat, who was aged about 65 years, died as a result of the assault during the course of the occurrence while his son Ramashish Prasad (PW 10) received injuries.\n\nThe case of the prosecution is that a day before the occurrence Prasadi' Dusadh and Ganesh Dusadh killed a goat belonging to Bahatah Bhagat\n\n(PW 8). On the advice of Ramlal Bhagat deceased, Baharan Bhagat lodged a report with the police at 3 p.m. on that day.\n\nOn the morning of August 14, 1965 Ramlal and his son Ramashish went to their paddy field.\n\nWhile they were returning from the field at about 11 a.m. they were assaulted by the six convicted persons who had been hiding on the route.\n\nThe appellant gave a lathi blow on the head of Ramlal as a result of which fae latter fell down and died at the spot.\n\nOne of the companions of the appellant then shouted that the assault was made because of Ramlal being responsible for the commencement of criminal proceedings by Baharan. Some injuries were also caused to Ramashish.\n\nThe accused then set fire to one of their huts with a view to prepare some kind of defence.\n\nAfter that the accused fled away.\n\nSHO Sarju Prasad Singh of police station Barauli on receipt of information that a large number of persons belonging to the :>arty of the accused had collected to attack the other party in spite of the promulgation of an order under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, came to the place of occurrence but before that Ramlal had already been killed.\n\nSarju Prasad Singh recorded the statement of Ramashish and on the basis of that\n\nGUDAR DUSADH v. BIHAR (Khanna, J.) 507\n\nstatement, a formal information report was prepared at the police station.\n\nPost mortem examination on the body of Ramlal~ deceased was performed by Dr. R. S. Singh on August 15, 1965.\n\nAt the trial the plea of the appellant was that he had been falsely involved in the case at the instance of the Mukhia of the village who was inimical to the appellant.\n\nThe two courts below accepted the prosecution case that it was the appellant who had given a lathi blow on the head of Ram- 'lal deceased as a result of which the latter died. It was held that\n\nthe case against the appellant fell under clause \"3r!lly\" of section 300 of Indian Penal Code.\n\nAs such, the appellant was convicted under section 302 Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe only question with which we were concerned in appeal is whether the offence committed by the appellant is murder or whether it is culpable homicide not amounting 'to murder. In\n\nthis respect we find that according to Dr. R. S. Singh who performed the post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased, the doctor found a lacerated wound 7!' X t\" bone deep on the left side of the head of the deceased.\n\nThe injury was ante-mortem and had been caused by a weapon like lathi.\n\nOn dissection the doctor found 3\" long fracture of , the left parietal bone about 2t\" frrAT, the middle line of tl\\e top of th1' head.\n\nOn removing the skull the doctor noticed large amount of blood and blood clots on the left side of the brain. Death, in the.opinion of the doctor, was due to compression on the left side of the brain.\n\nThe doctor further state!<! that the above injury was sufficient in the ordinary oourse of nature to cause death.\n\nThe appellant who caused the above in jury to Ramlal deceased, in our opinion, was guilty of the offence of murder and he has been rightly convicted under section 302 Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe appellant along with his companions was lying in wait to attack Ramlal and, according_to the evidence on record which has been accepted by the High Court, he gave a blow on the head of Ramlal as a result of which Ramlal fell down and died instantaneously.\n\nIt has also been found by the High Court that there was no altercation or exchange of abuses between Ramlal and the accused party. The circumstances of the case thus show that the assault was premeditated and the blow on the head of Ramlal was not accidental. The fact that the appellant gave only one blow on the head would not mitigate the offence of the appellant and make him guilty of the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.\n\nThe blow on the head of Ramlal with Jathi was plainly given with some force and resulted In a 3\" long fracture, ot the left parietal bone.\n\nRamlal deceased died instantaneously and as such, there arose no occasion for\n\ngiving a second blow to him.\n\nAs the injury on the head was deliberate and not acctdental and as the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the case against the appellant would fall squarely within the ambit of clause \"3rdly\" of section 300 Indian Penal Code.\n\nAccording to that clause, culpable homicide is murder if it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the. bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Section 300 also provides for some exceptions but we are not concerned with them in this case.\n\nClause \"3rdly\" consists of two parts.\n\nUnder the first part, it has to be shown that there was an intention on the part of the accused to inflict the particular injury which was found on the body of the deceased.\n\nThe second part requires that the bodily injury intended to be inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.\n\nSo far as the first part is concerned, the court has'to see whether the injury which was fcillnd :m the deceased was the one intended by the accused or whether it was accidental without his having intended to cause that bodily injury.\n\nOnce it is found that the injury was not accidental and that the accused intended to cause the injury which was actually inflicted and found on .the body of the; deceased, the first part shall be satisfied. The court would then go into the second part of the clause and find in the light of medical evidence as to whether the bodily injury inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. If the court finds that the requirements of both the parts have been satisfied, the case shall be held to be covered by clause \"3rdly\" unless it falls within one of the exceptions.\n\nIn the present case, both parts of the clause \"3rdly\" have been satisfied.\n\nAs observed earlier, the in jury which was inflicted by the accused on the head of Ramlal was not accidental. It is not the case of any one that ilie appellant aimed a blow on some other part of the body and because of some supervening cause like sudden intervention or movement of the deceased the lathi struck the head of the deceased.\n\nThe fact that the appellant aimed a blow on the head of Ramlal with the lathi would go to show that it was the intention of the appellant to cause the precise injury which was found on the head of the deceased.\n\nThe evidence of Dr. R. S. Singh who performed post mortem examination shows that the above injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and actually resulted in the death of the deceased.\n\nThe case of the appellant would thus be covered by clause \"3rdly\" of section 300 and he would l)e guilty of the offence of murder.\n\nGUDAR DJJSADH v. Bll!AR (Khanna, !.) 509\n\nReference on behalf of the appellant hrui bCen made to the case ot Chamru Budhwa v. Stat\" of Madhya Pradesh(1). Tl)ere was in thalt case a severe exchange of abuses betw, een .. the parties preceding the incident.\n\nWhile the abuses were being eXchanged, the tempers rose high and both the parties came 0ut of their resc .... pective houses in anger. In the course of tlie quarrel the appel- lant dealt a fatal blow on the head of tlie deceased with his lathi. · It was held that the crime was conunitted. •by 'the appellant Without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of pa5slon and without the appellant having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.\n\nThe case of the appellant was thus held to be covered by exception 4 to section 300 of Indian Penal Cooe and he was found guilty of. the .offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. It was also observed that the fatal injury inflicted by the appellant on the head of the deceased by one blow was not caused with the intention of causing death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause death.\n\nThe last observation upon which reliance has been placed by Mr. Nuruddin on behalf of the appellant should be taken to have been made in the context of the fadts of that case.\n\nThe above case docs not war- .rant the proposition. that if the accused gives a deliberate blow on the head of the deceased with a lathi and thereby causes an injuzy as is sufficient in tl!e ordinary course of nature to cause death and actually results in death, the case against him would not fall under clause \"3rdly\" of section 300 of Indian Penal Code.\n\nWe are, therefore, of the view that the appellant was guilty of <the offence of murder and not culpable homicide not amounting to murder and that he has been rightly convicted under section 302 Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe appeal consequently fails and is dismissed.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(I) A.1.R. 1954 S.C. 652.", "total_entities": 62, "entities": [{"text": "DUSADff\n\nSTATE OF BmAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 15, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 46, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GUDAR DUSADff\n\nSTATE OF BmAR February 15, 1972\n\n[J.M. SHELAT, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 124, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144, "end_char": 150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 281, "end_char": 304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2109, "end_char": 2115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2117, "end_char": 2122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Nur-ud-din", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2655, "end_char": 2665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nur-ud-din ..thmed and U. P. Singh, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Nur-ud-din"}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2678, "end_char": 2689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nur-ud-din ..thmed and U. P. Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2711, "end_char": 2723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. C. Prasad, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2791, "end_char": 2797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J.\n\nGudar Dusadb appellant was tried along with 23 others in the court of Additional Sessions Judge Saran."}}, {"text": "Gudar Dusadb", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2803, "end_char": 2815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J.\n\nGudar Dusadb appellant was tried along with 23 others in the court of Additional Sessions Judge Saran.", "canonical_name": "GUDAR DUSADff"}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge Saran.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2873, "end_char": 2905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J.\n\nGudar Dusadb appellant was tried along with 23 others in the court of Additional Sessions Judge Saran."}}, {"text": "sections 302 and 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3001, "end_char": 3021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3022, "end_char": 3039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3185, "end_char": 3196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3197, "end_char": 3214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3265, "end_char": 3276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3287, "end_char": 3298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3299, "end_char": 3316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3403, "end_char": 3419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal ' the Patna High Court maintained the conviction and senfence of the appellant, while some modification was made as regards the sentence awarded to the other five convicted accused."}}, {"text": "Khahla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3874, "end_char": 3880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case relates to an occurrence which took place in village Khahla in district Saran at about 11 a.m. on August 14, 1965."}}, {"text": "Saran", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3893, "end_char": 3898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case relates to an occurrence which took place in village Khahla in district Saran at about 11 a.m. on August 14, 1965."}}, {"text": "August 14, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3919, "end_char": 3934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case relates to an occurrence which took place in village Khahla in district Saran at about 11 a.m. on August 14, 1965."}}, {"text": "Ramlal Bhagat", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3937, "end_char": 3950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramlal Bhagat, who was aged about 65 years, died as a result of the assault during the course of the occurrence while his son Ramashish Prasad (PW 10) received injuries."}}, {"text": "Ramashish Prasad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4063, "end_char": 4079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramlal Bhagat, who was aged about 65 years, died as a result of the assault during the course of the occurrence while his son Ramashish Prasad (PW 10) received injuries."}}, {"text": "Prasadi' Dusadh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4172, "end_char": 4187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution is that a day before the occurrence Prasadi' Dusadh and Ganesh Dusadh killed a goat belonging to Bahatah Bhagat\n\n(PW 8)."}}, {"text": "Ganesh Dusadh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4192, "end_char": 4205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution is that a day before the occurrence Prasadi' Dusadh and Ganesh Dusadh killed a goat belonging to Bahatah Bhagat\n\n(PW 8)."}}, {"text": "Bahatah Bhagat", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4233, "end_char": 4247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution is that a day before the occurrence Prasadi' Dusadh and Ganesh Dusadh killed a goat belonging to Bahatah Bhagat\n\n(PW 8)."}}, {"text": "Ramlal Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4274, "end_char": 4287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the advice of Ramlal Bhagat deceased, Baharan Bhagat lodged a report with the police at 3 p.m. on that day."}}, {"text": "Baharan Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4298, "end_char": 4312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the advice of Ramlal Bhagat deceased, Baharan Bhagat lodged a report with the police at 3 p.m. on that day.", "canonical_name": "Baharan Bhagat"}}, {"text": "Ramlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4403, "end_char": 4409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the morning of August 14, 1965 Ramlal and his son Ramashish went to their paddy field.", "canonical_name": "Ram- 'lal"}}, {"text": "Ramashish", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4422, "end_char": 4431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the morning of August 14, 1965 Ramlal and his son Ramashish went to their paddy field."}}, {"text": "Baharan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4883, "end_char": 4890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the companions of the appellant then shouted that the assault was made because of Ramlal being responsible for the commencement of criminal proceedings by Baharan.", "canonical_name": "Baharan Bhagat"}}, {"text": "Sarju Prasad Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5070, "end_char": 5088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHO Sarju Prasad Singh of police station Barauli on receipt of information that a large number of persons belonging to the :>arty of the accused had collected to attack the other party in spite of the promulgation of an order under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, came to the place of occurrence but before that Ramlal had already been killed."}}, {"text": "section 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5298, "end_char": 5309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5317, "end_char": 5343, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ramlal~", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5662, "end_char": 5669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Post mortem examination on the body of Ramlal~ deceased was performed by Dr. R. S. Singh on August 15, 1965.", "canonical_name": "Ram- 'lal"}}, {"text": "R. S. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5700, "end_char": 5711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Post mortem examination on the body of Ramlal~ deceased was performed by Dr. R. S. Singh on August 15, 1965."}}, {"text": "August 15, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5715, "end_char": 5730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Post mortem examination on the body of Ramlal~ deceased was performed by Dr. R. S. Singh on August 15, 1965."}}, {"text": "Ram- 'lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6022, "end_char": 6031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two courts below accepted the prosecution case that it was the appellant who had given a lathi blow on the head of Ram- 'lal deceased as a result of which the latter died.", "canonical_name": "Ram- 'lal"}}, {"text": "section 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6158, "end_char": 6169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6173, "end_char": 6190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6236, "end_char": 6247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6248, "end_char": 6265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7362, "end_char": 7373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7374, "end_char": 7391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8140, "end_char": 8145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The blow on the head of Ramlal with Jathi was plainly given with some force and resulted In a 3\" long fracture, ot the left parietal bone."}}, {"text": "section 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8584, "end_char": 8595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8596, "end_char": 8613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8853, "end_char": 8864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "R. S. Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10780, "end_char": 10791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of Dr. R. S. Singh who performed post mortem examination shows that the above injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and actually resulted in the death of the deceased."}}, {"text": "section 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11043, "end_char": 11054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11902, "end_char": 11913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nuruddin", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12300, "end_char": 12308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last observation upon which reliance has been placed by Mr. Nuruddin on behalf of the appellant should be taken to have been made in the context of the fadts of that case.", "canonical_name": "Nur-ud-din"}}, {"text": "section 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12736, "end_char": 12747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12751, "end_char": 12768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12953, "end_char": 12964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12965, "end_char": 12982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_510_517_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "KHANDU SONU DHOBI AND ANR.\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA February 1,5, 1972\n\n[J, M. SHELAT, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.J\n\nPenal Code 1860 (45 of 1860)-S. 4-03-Dishonesr misappropriation for a .time only is misappropriation.\n\nPrevention of Corruption Ac~ (2 of 1947)-S. SA-Inve1ttigation conducted n breach of section-Illegality must result in miscarriage of justice.\n\nBo1nbay Land_ Improvement Schemes Act, 1942-Sub-section (1) and\n\n(2) of s. 23-Bar of prosecution applies on(v to any thing done in good faith or ·•under\" the Act.\n\nThe appellants entrusted with the duties of carrying out improvement schemes under the Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942, were charged with the offence of preparing false documents and committing D crimi.nal breach of trust in :respect of certain amount.\n\nIt was alleged that even thougl) no work had been done and no amount had been disbursed they prepared documents showing the doing of the work and payment oJ.. the '3mount.\n\nThey were convicted under s. 218 read with section 34. section 477A read with section 34 and ection 409 read with :section 34 of the Indian Penal Code as well as section 5(2) read with section 5(i)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The High Court affim1ed the conviction.\n\nIn the appeal to this Court it was contended E that after the matter had been reported to the higher authorities the rectification wdrk W3.S done and the money was disbUrsed for the purpose for which it had been entrusted; that the conviction was bad beC)ause of non-compliance with section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act; and that the prosecution was barred by time unde• •· 23 of .the Bombay Land Improvement Schemes Act, 1942.\n\nDismissing t_he appeal, F\n\nHELD : (i) There is no cogent ground to disagree with the trial court and the High Court that the accused had prepared false documents, bad nlso committed criminal breaC'h of trust '3Dd were in the discharge of their duties guilty of criminal misconduct as defined in s. 5 of the Pre- , ventic.il of Corruption Act.\n\n(ii) It is no answer to a charge of criminal misappropriation that after G the 111atre:r had been reported to the higher authorities the accused got the rectification work dcne or the money was subsequently disbursed fer the purpose for \\1/hich it had been entrusted. According to explanation 1 to section 403 Indian Penal Code a dishonest misappropriation for a time only is \"misappropriation\" within the meaning of that section.\n\n[515 DJ\n\n(iii) It is well established that cognizance of a case has, in fact, been H tuken by the court on a police report following inve11tigation conducted in bt..,;, ach of provisions of section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the result of the trial cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the\n\ninvestigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarrjage of justice.\n\nThe reason for the above dictum is that an illegality cOmmitted during the course of investigation does not effect the competence and juf'isdiction\n\nof the Court to try .the ae¢used. Where, tmrefore, the trial of the case has proceeded to terfnination, the invalidity of the preceding investigation would not vitiate the conviction of the accused as a !T.lsult of the trial Ullles's the illegality in the investiption has caused prejudic, e to the accused.\n\nSince there has been no miscafriage of justice in the pnt case because of the alleged non-compliance with section SA the conviction of the appellants cannot be set aside on that score. [SIS HJ\n\nH .. N. R.; shbu!f and Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi, {1955] I S.C.R. li50, referred to.\n\n(1v) Sub-section (i) of the Bombay Land Improvement Schemes Act 1942 has plainly no application as it relates to 3nything done in the good faith. It cannot also be said that the acts of the appellants in preparing false documents and committing criminal bre3ch of trust as also the act of criminal misconduct were done \"under\" the Bombay Land Improve~\n\nment Schen\"s Act within the meanini of sub-section (2). The subsection has rio. application wher.e something is done not under the Act even though it has been done by a public servant who has been •!Dtrusted with the duties of carrying improvement sches under this Act.\n\nThe iritpugned acts of tDe appellants W'..lS not in discharge of their duties under the Act but in obvious breach and flagrant dis!regard: of their duties.\n\n!516 G-517 D 1 ·\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 105 of 1969.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated E March 27, 1969 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeals\n\nNos. 53 aind 4S of 1968. -\n\nV. S. Kotwal, A. G. Ratnaparkhi and Rajiv Shah, for the appellani.\n\nR. M. Mehta aw B. D. Sharma, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J. This is an appeal by special leave by Khandu Sonu Dhobi and Bhikanrao Rambhau Khaimar against the judgment of the Bombay High Court affinning on appeal the conviction of the appellants under section 218 read with sei; tion 34, section 4 77 A read with . section 34 and section 409 read' with section 34 of Indian Penal Code as well as under section. S(2) read . with section 5 ( 1 )( d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. . &inte'nee of rigorous imprisonment for a period of on~ year and a fine of Rs. 200 or in default fu!1!her rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months has been awarded on 'each count to the appellants. ·· The substantive sentences have ben ordered to run concurrently.\n\nDhobi appellant No. 1 was an agricultural assistant '.111d was ' \\Working under Khaimar appellant No. 2 who was agncqlitUJ\"al\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 S.C.lt.\n\nsupervisor in the soil conservation section of the Government of A Maharashtra.\n\nDhobi was incharge of the work relating to a Bundh in block No. 13 of village Asane in Taluka Mandurbar.\n\nThe above block comprisei; agricultural lands bearing survey Nos. 8, 17, 18, 19 and 32 measuring 90 acres.\n\nThe Bundhs were being constructed since the year 1962.\n\nRectification work in respect o( thos.e Bundhs at a cost of Rs. ~~9 .07 had to be got B done by Dhob1 appellant under the superv1s10n of Khairnar appellant.\n\nThe Government sanctioned an amount of Rs. 4 779 in connection with the construction of the Bundhs.\n\nAn advance amount of Rs. 5000 was received by Khairnar accused on March 2, 1966 in that connection.\n\nWork of lhe value of Rs. 4400 was done but that relating to rectification work was not done. According to the rules of the soil conservation section, lhe Government C spent the money in the first instance and after the report of the completion of work was received, the expenses were recovered from the landowners for whose benefit the work was done. On March 11, 1966 Khairnar made entries in measurement book Ex. 27 showing that he had checked. 28 payments and certified the same.\n\nKhaim.ar accused also stated in the entry that he. had D passed the measuremenis and paid Rs. 369 .07.\n\nPaysheets Ex. 64 were prepared by Dhobi acc)ISed and he obtained the thumb impressions and signatures of the labourers on the paysheets.\n\nKhairnar made his initials below the thumb impressions in the paysheets.\n\nOn the last page of the paysheets, Khairnar signed a certificate according to which he had paid Rs. 3~9 .O? ito P_W 10 E Jagan Trimbak who used to do the labour work.\n\nFinal bill Ex. 28 was also prepared on that day by the accused and the signa ture of Jagan Trimbak was obtained on the sa, me.\n\nThe bill was got signed from PW 7 Ziparu Tukaram and another person as attesting witnesses.\n\nThe bill was signed thereafter by Khairnar.\n\nDebit entry Ex. 32 of Rs. 369.07 was made by Khairnar accused .. in the cash book.\n\nHe also prepared work abstract Ex. 29 on r April 16, 1966 and sent it to the sub-divisional soil conservation officer Nandurbar showing an expenditure of Rs. 369.07.\n\nThe case of the prosecution was that the measurement book Ex. 27, paysheets Ex. 64, final bill Ex. 28 and cash book entry Ex. 32 were false documents and were fabricated by the accused G without dooig any recification work on the Bundh. The accused thds committed criminal breach of trust in respect of the amount of Rs. 369.07 in furtherance of their common intention to misappropriate government property.\n\nAccordiJig further to the prosecution case, the landowners in block No. 13 came to know of J:he above acts of the. accused and they complained about it to H Sarpanch Tanku Bhagwan (PW 12). Tanku sent a telegram on April 12, 1966 to the superintending agricultural officer, Bombay division, N asik in this connection. A. 00py of the telegram was\n\nA thereafter sent by the superintending agricultural officer to divi- , sional soil conservation officer D.S.D. Ghate (PW 1) for neces- :\n\nsary action as Wajl as for enquiry and report.\n\nChate PW went to village Asane on May 2, 1966 and inspected block No. 13.\n\nHe found th:i, t entries had lieen made about the payment of Rs. 369 .07 in the measurement book and cash book even though no rtictifica- B tion w6rk had been done.\n\nChate srubmitted his rep0rt on , May , 6, 1966 for proceeding departmentally against the accused.\n\nOn rece, ipt of the above report, the superintending agricultural officer directed P. R. Inamdar (PW 11 ) , deputy director of agricultural engineering, to go to Asane village and submit his report after perSonally verifying the facts.\n\nInamdar went with Ghate to c block No. 13 in Asane village on May 11, 1966. Both Inamdar\n\nand Ghate found that no rectification work had been done. They did not find even a single pit in the l2nds in that block although, according to measurement book, 83 pits had been recently dug.\n\nInamdar and Ghate also met the Sarpanch and other landowners of Asane village. Report dated May 18, 1966 was thereafter D submitted by Inamdar affirming those facts.\n\nSarpanch Tanku sent complaint Ex. 84, in the meanwhile, on April 30, 1!166 to the director of anti-corruption branch Maharashtra State stating that the accused had prepared false bill for Rs. 369.07 without doing any work and that they had mis- E appropriated that amount.\n\nIt was also stated that attempts were being made to shield the accused.\n\nThe director of anti-corruption sent a copy of that application to Sub Inspector K. G. Patil (PW 13) who was then attached to Dhulia office of the anticorruption branch.\n\nSub Inspector Patil made local enquiry and took into possession the measurement book, paysheets and cash book.\n\nThe director of anti-corruption branch directed Patil to F register a case and investigate ino the matter. Patil went to Nasik and recorded statement Ex. 79 of Inamdar PW on November 7, 1966.\n\nThe statement was .then sent to Nandurbar Taluka police station.\n\nA case was registered on the basis of that statement at the police .station on November 8, 1966.\n\nOn November 12, 1966 sub Inspector Patil applied for permission under G section SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act of judicial\n\nmagistrate I st class to investigate the offence.\n\nThe permission was granted by the judicial magistrate 1st class Nandurbar on the same day.\n\nPatil thereafter recorded statements of a number or persons.\n\nPatil was subsequently transferred and the case was investigated by his successors Mahamuni and Kulkarru who also H obtained the requisite permission.\n\nSanction Ex. 97 for the prosecution of the two accused was granted under section. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act by the superintending agricultural officer Bombay division, Nasik on May 18, 1967.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\n'The two accused in their statements admitted that the work A of the value of Rs. 369.07 was .not done till March 11, 1966 although it was so stated in the various documents by them. The accused also admitted that no amounts were paid to any of the labourers mentioned in the paysheelSI although signatures and thumb imprei; sions of the labourers had been obtained on the paysheets on March 11, 1966. According to the 11ccµsed, they B had prepared the various documents in accordance with the instructions of Ghate PW who was insisting in March 1966, and even.earlier, that a completion report relating to block No. 13 be sent as the entire amount spent on that !;>lock since 1962 could not be recovered for want of a completion report.\n\nKhairnar accused added that rectification work Jiad been done between May 13, 1966 and May 16, 1966 and the amount of Rs. 369.07 C was thereafter disbursed on May 16, 1966.\n\nThe learned special judge held that the amount of Rs. 369.07 had not been paid by the two accused to the labourers.\n\nNo work, it was found, had been done and the different douments prepared by the accused in this connection were false even on D their own admissions.\n\nThe explanation furnished by the accused that they prepared false documents t the instance of Ghate and got work dQne thereafter was not accepted.\n\nObjection was raised on behalf of the accusecl that the inves\\igation of the case was illegal and that prosecution was barred by time under the provisions of section 23 of the Land Improvement Schemes Act, E 1942.\n\nThese objections were repelled.\n\nTi).e accused were accordingly convicted and sentenced as above.\n\nOn appeal the High Court affirmed the findings of the learned special judge.\n\nWe have heard Mr. Kotwal on behalf of the appellants and are of the opinion that there is no merit in the appeal. It has F not been disrupted before us that the ' accused made various entries and prepared documents on March 11, 1966 about their having got .the rectification work done as well as about the payment of Rs. 369.07 on that account. It has also not been dis puted before us that the amount of Rs. 369.07 was not paid to any one by the accused in March or April 1966.\n\nAccording to G Ghate (PW 1 ) and Inamdar (PW 11 ) , no work relating to the rectification of the Bundh was found to have been done till May 11, 1966 when they visited the site in question .• Inamdar's evidence also shows that according to the measurement book prepared by the accused, 83 pits ha~ been recently dug though the witness could not find a smgle pit on the spot. In view of the H above, we find no cogent ground to disagree with the trial court and the High Court that the accused had prepared false documents and had also committed criminal breach of trust In respect\n\nof the amount of Rs. 369.07.\n\nWe also agree with the trial court and the High c_ourt that the accused were in the discharge of their duties guilty of criminal misconduct as defined in section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.\n\nfr. Kotwal has argued that the accused completed the recti- B fical!on work after May 11, 1966. There is, however, no direct evidence as may show that the rectification work was completed after May 11, 1966. Even if it may be assumed that the accused completed the rectification work in May 1966, that fact, in our opinion, would not absolve the accused of their criminal liability.\n\nThe charge against the accused relates to preparation of false documents because even though no work had been done till March 11, 1966 and no amount had been dl:sbursed, they prepared docuc\n\nments showing the doing of that w'}rk and the payment of that amount.\n\nIt is no answer to that charge that after the matter had been reported to the higher auhorities, the accused in the month of May 1966 got the rectification work done.\n\nIt is also no answer to a charge of criminal misappropriation that the money was D subsequently, after the matter had been reported to the high authorities, disbursed for the purpose for which it had been entrusted.\n\nAccording to explanation 1 .to section 403 Indian Penal Code, a dishonest misappropriation for a time only is \"misappropriation\" within the meaning of that section.\n\nE Mr. Kotwal has also submitted .that the accused expressed willingness to complete the work after the matter had been reported to the higher authorities. This submission, even if accepted, would not exonerate the accused because the willingness after the matter had been reported to the higher authorities could not efface or undo the offence earlier committed by the accused. .\n\nI F Argument has .then been advanced on behalf of the appellants that Sub Inspector Patil did not make investigation in the case in .\n\naccordance with law. It is urged that permission to make investigation was granted to Sub Inspector Patil on November 12, 1966 and, as such, he was not authorised to make before that date the enquiry which led to the registration of the case as that G enquiry partook of the character of investigation. Nothing has been brought to our notice as to how an enquiry before the registration of a case can be held to be investigation. The matter, however, need not be dilated upon and it is not necessary to express any final opinion in the matter because we find that there is no material on the record as may show that the accused were prejudiced because of the alleged non-compliance with the pro- H visions of section SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is well established that where cognizance of a case has, in fact, been taken by the court on a police report following investigation\n\nSPPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\nc(Jnducted !nbreaclf of prpvisions of .section 5A of the Prevention A\n\nQf Corruption Act;. the result of the trial cannot be set aside un- the illega).ity in the .investigati6n can be shown to h.ave brought about a iniscarriag!l of justice.\n\nThe underlying reason for the above dictum is that an illegality committed in the course ' of investigation does not• afiect the competence and jurisdiction of the court th try the accuSed.\n\nWhere, therefore, the trial of B the case' has proceeded to 'tennination, .. the. invalidity of the proceeding investiglitiO)i: wo\\Jld not vitiate the conviction. of the accus- . ed as a result of' ihe trial unless the illegalityin the investigation has caused prejtii!iCtHo the accused (see H. N. Rishbud and lnder Singh'v. The State Of 1Jelhi(1)]; Sincethere has been no miscarriage of jiistie In the present case because of the alleged c non-cotnplianee with section 5A, the convicti6n of the accusedappellants caruiot be set aside on that score.\n\nFor the same reason, we ru:e unable to accede to the contention of Mr. Kotwal that the conviction of the accused sho\\Jld be set aside because permission under section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act !O SI Patil for investigation of the offence was granted in a\n\ncasual manner and without the existence of sufficient reasons.\n\nLastly, it has been argued by Mr. Kotwal that th.e prosecution of the accused was barred by time under section 23 of the Bombay Land Improvement Schemes Act, 1942.\n\nThe section reads as under:\n\n\" ( 1) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall be .instituted against any public servant or person duly authorised under this Act in respect of anything in good faith Cione or intended to be done under this Act or the rules made thereunder. ( 2) No suit or orosecution shall be instituted against any pul:>lic servant or person duly authorised under this. Act in respect of anything done or intended to be done, unde~ this , Act, unless the suit or prosecution has .been instituted. within six months from the date of the act complained of.\"\n\nSub-seetion ( 1) of the section has plainly no application as it G rel!ltes to l!!lytlritlg done. in. g\\)Od faith.\n\nAccording to Bomby General Clalllies Act, .a thing shall. be deemed .to be done m g~ faith \\Vhere itis in fact done , honesy, whether it is d?Ile negligently or not.\n\nThe appellants admittedly were not actmg honestly when they prepared the false documents in question and . showed disbursement of Rs. 369.07 on March 11, 1966. Mr.\n\nH J{otwal, however, relies on sub-section ( 2) of section 23 and\n\n(I) [1955] I s.c.R. 1150. '\n\nsubmits that the prosecution could be instituted against the appellants only within six months from March 11,\n\n1966. As the charge sheet was submitted. long after the expiry of six months, the case against t!; te accused-appellants, according to the counsel, was barred by time.\n\nThis contention, in our opinion, is devoid of force.\n\nSub-section ( 2) refers to suit or prosecution against a public servant or person duly authorised under the Act in respect of anything done or intended to be done under the Bombay Land Improvement Schemes Act. It cannot be said that the acts of the accused-appellants in preparing false documents and in committ. ing criminal breach of truSt in respect of the amount of Rs. 369.07\n\nas also their act of criminal misconduct were done under the Bombay Land Improvement Schemes Act.\n\nSub-section (2) of section 23 deals with anything done or intended to be done under the above mentioned Act by a public servant or a person duly authorised under the Act. It has no application where something is done not under the Act even though it has been done by a public servant who th.as been entrusted with duties of carrying out improvement schemes under the above mentioned Act.\n\nThe impugned acts of the appellants in the present case were not in discharge of thefr duties under the above mentioned Act but in obvious breach and flagrant disregard of their duties.\n\nNot only they did no rectification work for the Bundh which was a part of the improvement scheme, they also misappropriated the amount which had been entrusted to them for the purpose of rectification.\n\nPrayer has also been made for the reduction of the sentence, but we see no cogent ground. to interfere with . the same.\n\nThe appeal consequently fails and is dismissed.\n\nK.B.N.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nS-L!03! Sup.Cl/72", "total_entities": 113, "entities": [{"text": "KHANDU SONU DHOBI AND ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KHANDU SONU DHOBI AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 1,5, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 67, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA February 1,5, 1972\n\n[J, M. SHELAT, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.J\n\nPenal Code 1860 (45 of 1860)-S. 4-03-Dishonesr misappropriation for a .time only is misappropriation."}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Penal Code 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 157, "end_char": 161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Penal Code 1860", "statute": "Penal Code 1860"}}, {"text": "Improvement Schemes Act, 1942", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 388, "end_char": 417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 446, "end_char": 451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Improvement Schemes Act, 1942", "statute": "Improvement Schemes Act, 1942"}}, {"text": "s. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1000, "end_char": 1006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellants entrusted with the duties of carrying out improvement schemes under the Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942", "statute": "The appellants entrusted with the duties of carrying out improvement schemes under the Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1017, "end_char": 1027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellants entrusted with the duties of carrying out improvement schemes under the Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942", "statute": "The appellants entrusted with the duties of carrying out improvement schemes under the Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942"}}, {"text": "section 477A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1029, "end_char": 1041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellants entrusted with the duties of carrying out improvement schemes under the Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942", "statute": "The appellants entrusted with the duties of carrying out improvement schemes under the Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1052, "end_char": 1062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellants entrusted with the duties of carrying out improvement schemes under the Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942", "statute": "The appellants entrusted with the duties of carrying out improvement schemes under the Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1089, "end_char": 1099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellants entrusted with the duties of carrying out improvement schemes under the Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942", "statute": "The appellants entrusted with the duties of carrying out improvement schemes under the Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1107, "end_char": 1124, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1136, "end_char": 1148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellants entrusted with the duties of carrying out improvement schemes under the Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942", "statute": "The appellants entrusted with the duties of carrying out improvement schemes under the Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942"}}, {"text": "section 5(i)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1159, "end_char": 1174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellants entrusted with the duties of carrying out improvement schemes under the Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942", "statute": "The appellants entrusted with the duties of carrying out improvement schemes under the Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1182, "end_char": 1210, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1536, "end_char": 1546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellants entrusted with the duties of carrying out improvement schemes under the Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942", "statute": "The appellants entrusted with the duties of carrying out improvement schemes under the Bombay Land Improvement Scheme Act, 1942"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1554, "end_char": 1582, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Improvement Schemes Act, 1942", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1648, "end_char": 1689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1987, "end_char": 1991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Land Improvement Schemes Act, 1942", "statute": "the Bombay Land Improvement Schemes Act, 1942"}}, {"text": "section 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2334, "end_char": 2345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Land Improvement Schemes Act, 1942", "statute": "the Bombay Land Improvement Schemes Act, 1942"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2346, "end_char": 2363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2658, "end_char": 2668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2676, "end_char": 2704, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ullles", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3230, "end_char": 3236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T.lsult of the trial Ullles's the illegality in the investiption has caused prejudic, e to the accused."}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Improvement Schemes Act 1942", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3630, "end_char": 3670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V. S. Kotwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4617, "end_char": 4629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Kotwal, A. G. Ratnaparkhi and Rajiv Shah, for the appellani."}}, {"text": "A. G. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4631, "end_char": 4648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Kotwal, A. G. Ratnaparkhi and Rajiv Shah, for the appellani."}}, {"text": "Rajiv Shah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4653, "end_char": 4663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Kotwal, A. G. Ratnaparkhi and Rajiv Shah, for the appellani."}}, {"text": "R. M. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4685, "end_char": 4696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. M. Mehta aw B. D. Sharma, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4700, "end_char": 4712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. M. Mehta aw B. D. Sharma, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4779, "end_char": 4785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J. This is an appeal by special leave by Khandu Sonu Dhobi and Bhikanrao Rambhau Khaimar against the judgment of the Bombay High Court affinning on appeal the conviction of the appellants under section 218 read with sei; tion 34, section 4 77 A read with ."}}, {"text": "Khandu Sonu Dhobi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4828, "end_char": 4845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J. This is an appeal by special leave by Khandu Sonu Dhobi and Bhikanrao Rambhau Khaimar against the judgment of the Bombay High Court affinning on appeal the conviction of the appellants under section 218 read with sei; tion 34, section 4 77 A read with .", "canonical_name": "KHANDU SONU DHOBI AND ANR"}}, {"text": "Bhikanrao Rambhau Khaimar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4850, "end_char": 4875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J. This is an appeal by special leave by Khandu Sonu Dhobi and Bhikanrao Rambhau Khaimar against the judgment of the Bombay High Court affinning on appeal the conviction of the appellants under section 218 read with sei; tion 34, section 4 77 A read with ."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4904, "end_char": 4921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J. This is an appeal by special leave by Khandu Sonu Dhobi and Bhikanrao Rambhau Khaimar against the judgment of the Bombay High Court affinning on appeal the conviction of the appellants under section 218 read with sei; tion 34, section 4 77 A read with ."}}, {"text": "section 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4981, "end_char": 4992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5017, "end_char": 5026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5044, "end_char": 5054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5059, "end_char": 5070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5082, "end_char": 5092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5096, "end_char": 5113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5157, "end_char": 5166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5184, "end_char": 5212, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Dhobi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5489, "end_char": 5494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dhobi appellant No.", "canonical_name": "Dhobi"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 S.C.lt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5616, "end_char": 5653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 who was agncqlitUJ\"al\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 S.C.lt."}}, {"text": "Dhobi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5737, "end_char": 5742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dhobi was incharge of the work relating to a Bundh in block No.", "canonical_name": "Dhobi"}}, {"text": "Asane", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5815, "end_char": 5820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 of village Asane in Taluka Mandurbar."}}, {"text": "Khairnar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6312, "end_char": 6320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5000 was received by Khairnar accused on March 2, 1966 in that connection."}}, {"text": "March 2, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6332, "end_char": 6345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5000 was received by Khairnar accused on March 2, 1966 in that connection."}}, {"text": "March 11, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6721, "end_char": 6735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 11, 1966 Khairnar made entries in measurement book Ex."}}, {"text": "Khaim.ar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6851, "end_char": 6859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khaim.ar accused also stated in the entry that he."}}, {"text": "Jagan Trimbak", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7288, "end_char": 7301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ito P_W 10 E Jagan Trimbak who used to do the labour work."}}, {"text": "Jagan Trimbak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7420, "end_char": 7433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "28 was also prepared on that day by the accused and the signa ture of Jagan Trimbak was obtained on the sa, me."}}, {"text": "Ziparu Tukaram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7497, "end_char": 7511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The bill was got signed from PW 7 Ziparu Tukaram and another person as attesting witnesses."}}, {"text": "April 16, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7728, "end_char": 7742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "29 on r April 16, 1966 and sent it to the sub-divisional soil conservation officer Nandurbar showing an expenditure of Rs."}}, {"text": "Nandurbar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7803, "end_char": 7812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "29 on r April 16, 1966 and sent it to the sub-divisional soil conservation officer Nandurbar showing an expenditure of Rs."}}, {"text": "H Sarpanch Tanku Bhagwan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8416, "end_char": 8440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "accused and they complained about it to H Sarpanch Tanku Bhagwan (PW 12)."}}, {"text": "Tanku", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8450, "end_char": 8455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tanku sent a telegram on April 12, 1966 to the superintending agricultural officer, Bombay division, N asik in this connection."}}, {"text": "April 12, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8475, "end_char": 8489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tanku sent a telegram on April 12, 1966 to the superintending agricultural officer, Bombay division, N asik in this connection."}}, {"text": "N asik", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8551, "end_char": 8557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tanku sent a telegram on April 12, 1966 to the superintending agricultural officer, Bombay division, N asik in this connection."}}, {"text": "D.S.D. Ghate", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8712, "end_char": 8724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. 00py of the telegram was\n\nA thereafter sent by the superintending agricultural officer to divi- , sional soil conservation officer D.S.D. Ghate (PW 1) for neces- :\n\nsary action as Wajl as for enquiry and report."}}, {"text": "May 2, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8828, "end_char": 8839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chate PW went to village Asane on May 2, 1966 and inspected block No."}}, {"text": "Chate", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9035, "end_char": 9040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chate srubmitted his rep0rt on , May , 6, 1966 for proceeding departmentally against the accused."}}, {"text": "P. R. Inamdar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9217, "end_char": 9230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On rece, ipt of the above report, the superintending agricultural officer directed P. R. Inamdar (PW 11 ) , deputy director of agricultural engineering, to go to Asane village and submit his report after perSonally verifying the facts."}}, {"text": "Inamdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9371, "end_char": 9378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Inamdar went with Ghate to c block No."}}, {"text": "Ghate", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9465, "end_char": 9470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both Inamdar\n\nand Ghate found that no rectification work had been done."}}, {"text": "Asane village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9719, "end_char": 9732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Inamdar and Ghate also met the Sarpanch and other landowners of Asane village."}}, {"text": "Sarpanch Tanku", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9822, "end_char": 9836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarpanch Tanku sent complaint Ex."}}, {"text": "April 30, 1!166", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9881, "end_char": 9896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "84, in the meanwhile, on April 30, 1!166 to the director of anti-corruption branch Maharashtra State stating that the accused had prepared false bill for Rs."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9939, "end_char": 9956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "84, in the meanwhile, on April 30, 1!166 to the director of anti-corruption branch Maharashtra State stating that the accused had prepared false bill for Rs."}}, {"text": "K. G. Patil", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10250, "end_char": 10261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The director of anti-corruption sent a copy of that application to Sub Inspector K. G. Patil (PW 13) who was then attached to Dhulia office of the anticorruption branch."}}, {"text": "Dhulia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10295, "end_char": 10301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The director of anti-corruption sent a copy of that application to Sub Inspector K. G. Patil (PW 13) who was then attached to Dhulia office of the anticorruption branch."}}, {"text": "Patil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10354, "end_char": 10359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub Inspector Patil made local enquiry and took into possession the measurement book, paysheets and cash book."}}, {"text": "Nasik", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10573, "end_char": 10578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patil went to Nasik and recorded statement Ex."}}, {"text": "November 7, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10626, "end_char": 10642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "79 of Inamdar PW on November 7, 1966."}}, {"text": "Nandurbar Taluka police station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10677, "end_char": 10708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statement was .then sent to Nandurbar Taluka police station."}}, {"text": "November 8, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10790, "end_char": 10806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A case was registered on the basis of that statement at the police .station on November 8, 1966."}}, {"text": "November 12, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10812, "end_char": 10829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 12, 1966 sub Inspector Patil applied for permission under G section SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act of judicial\n\nmagistrate I st class to investigate the offence."}}, {"text": "Inspector Patil applied for permission under G section SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10834, "end_char": 10927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mahamuni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11229, "end_char": 11237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patil was subsequently transferred and the case was investigated by his successors Mahamuni and Kulkarru who also H obtained the requisite permission."}}, {"text": "Kulkarru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11242, "end_char": 11250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patil was subsequently transferred and the case was investigated by his successors Mahamuni and Kulkarru who also H obtained the requisite permission."}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11389, "end_char": 11417, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "May 18, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11487, "end_char": 11499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act by the superintending agricultural officer Bombay division, Nasik on May 18, 1967."}}, {"text": "Ghate", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12052, "end_char": 12057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the 11ccµsed, they B had prepared the various documents in accordance with the instructions of Ghate PW who was insisting in March 1966, and even.earlier, that a completion report relating to block No."}}, {"text": "May 13, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12351, "end_char": 12363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khairnar accused added that rectification work Jiad been done between May 13, 1966 and May 16, 1966 and the amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "May 16, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12368, "end_char": 12380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khairnar accused added that rectification work Jiad been done between May 13, 1966 and May 16, 1966 and the amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13029, "end_char": 13039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kotwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13281, "end_char": 13287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have heard Mr. Kotwal on behalf of the appellants and are of the opinion that there is no merit in the appeal."}}, {"text": "G Ghate", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13756, "end_char": 13763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to G Ghate (PW 1 ) and Inamdar (PW 11 ) , no work relating to the rectification of the Bundh was found to have been done till May 11, 1966 when they visited the site in question .• Inamdar's evidence also shows that according to the measurement book prepared by the accused, 83 pits ha~ been recently dug though the witness could not find a smgle pit on the spot."}}, {"text": "Inamdar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13776, "end_char": 13783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to G Ghate (PW 1 ) and Inamdar (PW 11 ) , no work relating to the rectification of the Bundh was found to have been done till May 11, 1966 when they visited the site in question .• Inamdar's evidence also shows that according to the measurement book prepared by the accused, 83 pits ha~ been recently dug though the witness could not find a smgle pit on the spot."}}, {"text": "May 11, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13879, "end_char": 13891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to G Ghate (PW 1 ) and Inamdar (PW 11 ) , no work relating to the rectification of the Bundh was found to have been done till May 11, 1966 when they visited the site in question .• Inamdar's evidence also shows that according to the measurement book prepared by the accused, 83 pits ha~ been recently dug though the witness could not find a smgle pit on the spot."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14508, "end_char": 14517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14525, "end_char": 14553, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15618, "end_char": 15629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15630, "end_char": 15647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16986, "end_char": 17024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17226, "end_char": 17236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act", "statute": "SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "H. N. Rishbud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17912, "end_char": 17925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ed as a result of' ihe trial unless the illegalityin the investigation has caused prejtii!iCtHo the accused (see H. N. Rishbud and lnder Singh'v."}}, {"text": "section 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18082, "end_char": 18092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18330, "end_char": 18340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18348, "end_char": 18376, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18607, "end_char": 18617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Improvement Schemes Act, 1942", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18625, "end_char": 18666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act in respect of anything in good faith Cione or intended to be done under this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18837, "end_char": 18921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "According to Bomby General Clalllies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19370, "end_char": 19410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "H J{otwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19702, "end_char": 19711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.\n\nH J{otwal, however, relies on sub-section ( 2) of section 23 and\n\n(I) [1955] I s.c."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19752, "end_char": 19762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "According to Bomby General Clalllies Act", "statute": "According to Bomby General Clalllies Act"}}, {"text": "March 11,\n\n1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19897, "end_char": 19912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "submits that the prosecution could be instituted against the appellants only within six months from March 11,\n\n1966."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20631, "end_char": 20641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bundh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21236, "end_char": 21241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Not only they did no rectification work for the Bundh which was a part of the improvement scheme, they also misappropriated the amount which had been entrusted to them for the purpose of rectification."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_518_529_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "BINNY LID.\n\n'IllEIR WORKMEN AND ANR.\n\nFebruary 17, 1972\n\n(C. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND G. K. MITTER, Ji.]\n\nIndustrial Dwputes Act (14 of 1947), s. 10(1)-Dlsmlssal of. employee-Natural Justice--Opportµnit:y to cross examine witness lJ.Ot given- Reference by Government, after refusal to do so earlier-Competence lndustnal dispute-Jurisdiction to proceed after Union withdraws support of workman-Re-instatement, when may be ordered.\n\nThe r .. pondent was alleged to have behaved insolently towards .a superior and the matter was enquired into by the Manager of the appellant-company. After the ex=ination of the witnesses, one of the appellant's witnesses was recalled by the Manager to give any relevant information regarding the respondent. The witness stated that the reson dent had been absenting himself without leave on . a number of occasions and that a month back also he had behaved in an insolent manner thou, ih no disciplinary act.ion was then , taken. At that stage, the respondent intervened and said that it was a case of misunderstanding due to his habit Of talking in a loud voice. :rhe Manager did not ask the respondent if he wanted to cross examine the witness on his further testimony (though with respect to each witness earlier, he asked the respondent if he wanted to cross examine), or whether. he had any explanation to Offer, but passed an order finding the respondent guilty of the charge. In' the order he expressly recorded that the respondent Ind beien guilty of abl!Onting himself without leave and that 'muc)l more than this he behaved\n\nin an . insolent manner earlier' and that in those circumstances he was not a person fit to be retained in service, The Manall'J:r dismisoecl the respondent. The dispute whether the appellant was justified in tehninating tlr: &ervices Gf five workmen including the spondent, was referred\n\nto the Labour Court. During the pendency of the pfoceedings there was a settlement of the disputes between the workers' Union and the manaae- . ment with regard to all the employees. exc.ept the spondent, and the Union withdrew .its support of the respondent.\n\nThe Labour Court, while accepting the finding of the domestic tribu- .nal that the respondent was guilty of misconduct, set aside the order of termination and ordered re'instatement on the ground that the respon- deht Wa!i not given an opportunity' to cross.ex.amine the witness or .. explain his testimony 'regarding the respondent';, past conduct.\n\nJn appeal to this Court, it was contended that (I) the respondent never asked for the . opportunity and did not make a grievance of the denial of the opportunity, (2) the Governm, ent, having refused to refer the dispute on two previous occasions the reference. was in\"t-alid as there was no material to show why the Government did Ygo ultimately, (3) tpe Labour Court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter after the Union ceased to sponsor the respondent's case, and ( 4) it was not a fit case for re-instatement in view of the long lapse of time between the date• , of dismissal and reference and that, if at Ill, . compensation 8hould have been awarded in lieu orre-instatement'. ·\n\nDismissing the appea~\n\nHELD : ( 1) (a) The record of the domestic tribunal demonstrates that the respondent was not given a chance either to cross-examine the witness or to explain the evidence, regarding his past conduct. The intervention of the respondent could not be construed as his explanation or that it amounted to an admission of the truth of the evidence. f,524 A-El\n\n(b)Although the enquiry Officer found that the resp0ndent had behaved insolently_ towards his supelrior, he did not come to the conclusion that h1& solitary act of indiscipline was sufficient to warrant dismissal. fhe language of the order shows that it was the cumulative effect of the hpses in the past that resulted in the order. It was not a case where two separate charges had been framed against a delinquent and that they were of such a serious nature that the finding of guilt on any one would warrant dismissal. [526 B-E] '\n\nRailway Board v. Niranjan Singh, [1969] 3 S.C.R • .548, India Marine Service v. Their Workmen, [1963] 1 L.L.J. 122, Tata Oil Mills Co. v.\n\nIts Workmen, [1963] 2 L.L.J. 78, referred to.\n\n(2) (a) Under s. 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Ac~ 1947, a refe• rence may be made at any time when the appropriare Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. From the mere fact that on the previous occasions Government had taken the view that no reference was called for, it did not follow that tho Government could not thereafter change its mind. [527 A-El\n\n(bJ Further, the point could only be decided either in a proceeding to which the Governnt was a party or when the cour1; was in possession of all available material relating to the dispute. [527 E-F]\n\n(c) It is not necessary that the order of reference must, on the face of it, show what impelled the Govmment to depart from its earlier decision.\n\nNo., inference can be drawn against the Government from the absence ofsuch marerial in the order. [~27 F-GJ\n\n(3 i A dispute which hd already b, een referred by Government does not ceast to be one in respect of a portion of it, merely because the Union did not choose to repre,., nt the case of a particular dismissed employee.\n\nIf there was an industrial dispure at the time of reference it would not cease to be one merely because the claims of some of the dismissed employees were settled by mutual agreement. (528 B-D]\n\n( 4 )(a) Mere lapse of time is not enough to IO':ld the Labour Court to hold that there should be no re-instarement.\n\nThe management must show that any re-instatement will callse dislocation Of work. The Labour Court would t!Jon have taken the circumstances into consideration before passing its order.\n\nBut, in thC present c.ase, theTe were no uch ci.rcum stances. !529 A-CJ\n\nShalimar Works Ltd. v. Workmen, ,[1960] I S.C.R. ISO, 159, referred to.\n\n(b) It is a settled principle that re-instatement should not bie ordered when \\he management justifiably alleges that they have ceaaed to have confidence in the dismissed employee but there is no such allegation in the present caae.\n\nWhere there is no such allegation the Labour\n\nCourt must consider all the circumstances and decide whether justice and A fair play require that re-instatement should be ordered. [529 D-Fl\n\nHindustan Steels v. A. K. Roy, [1970] 1 L.L.J. 228, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1851 of 1967. .\n\nAppeal by special leave from the award dated October 9, 1967 of the Labour Court, Bangalore in Reference No. 86 of 1966.\n\n0. f. Malhotra and D. N. Gupta, for the appellant.\n\nM. Kuppuswamy, in person, for resJ?O!!dent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J. Thjs is an appeal by special Ieiive from an award of the Labour CoUrt, Bangalore dated October 9, 1967 where\n\nthe dispute referred, for adjudication was, \"whether the Management oi the Bangalm; e Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. (hereinafter referred to aS the 'Company') was justified in terminating D the services of five workmen including one Kuppuswamy ?\".\n\nDuring the course of the proceedings the Binny Mills Labour Association, Bengal, a registered trade union, sponsoring the cause of the dismissed workmen entered into a settlement with the management whereby the management agreed to reinstate one Rama- E. nadha and gave up its demand for reinstatement of three others excluding Kuppuswamy. The Union however withdrew its support to Kuppuswamy from the date of the settlement and the latter stated before the Labour Court that he would conduct his own case.\n\nThe facts relating to the dismissal of Kuppuswamy are as follows. He is alleged to have behaved in an insolent manner towards F the Warehouse Master, his superior officer, on 3rd November, 1963 in respect whereof he was given a charge sheet on 6th November, 1963 the complaint against him being that he was guilty of misconduct falling under Standing Order No. 13 ( 11) i.e; act subversive to discipline.\n\nHe submitted a written explanation on 8th November. An enquiry was held by the Mill Manager on 10th G November and on the same day the. Mill Manager came to the conclusion that the charge against Kuppuswamy had been proved and taking into account the gravit; Y of the misconduct and his past conduct the Mill Mabager found him not a fit person to . remain in the employment of the company and terminated his services.\n\nBefore the Labour Court Kuppuswamy filed his statement of claim, H the management its statement of objections followed by a rejoinder of Kuppuswamy. Kuppuswamy examined himself and one Shadgopalan was eiramined on behalf of the management. The'\n\n' '\n\nA records_of the domestic enquiry were marked illl evidence by common consent. The Lal; iour Court while accepting the finding of\n\nthe domestic tribunal that Kuppuswamy was guilty of the misconduct alleged against him was not inclined to retain the order of termination of his service mainly on the ground that he was not given an opportunity to challenge the statement of one Veerarag- B havan regarding his past repord of service nor wa:s .he given any\n\nopportunity to say whether Veeraraghavan's state!llent was true or false or reasonably explainable. According to the Tribunal the enquiry officer :\n\n\"might have thought fit to pass. this very order of termination, even without going into the past record of Kuppuswamy.\n\nBut the possibility of his awarding a lesser punishment also cannot be ruled out, altogether.\"\n\nWe have therefore to examine what happened at the enquiry stage to ascertain whether the labour court was right in acting in D e manner it did. The charge against Kuppuswamy formula!¢ by the manager was that :\n\n\"on the 3rd of this month at about 9.15 a.m. Kuppuswamy had behaved in an insolent manner towards the Ware.house Master, Mr. Veeraraghavan by shouting at him and creating a disorderly scene in the Warehouse E office.\"\n\nThe Manager reminded Kuppuswamy of his written explanation and asked him whether he had anything to add. Kuppuswamy stated that he had stocked a number of pieces which had mounted so high that he apprehended that the same might fall over and F he therefore started stocking the pieces in between the pieces already mounted before_ the examiners.\n\nThe Manager reminded him that the charge against him was not about stacking pieces but of behaving in an insolent manner towards the Warehouse Manager. Kuppuswamy was asked whether he wanted to call anyone as witness and Kuppuswamy answered in the negative. Veerarag- G havan was then examined by the Manager. According to Veeraraghavan's statement, Kuppuswamy had disregarded the instructions given to him by one Allam, Assistant Manager by stacking the pieces between the examiners in a manner which would obstruct the free passage for the examiners and that he did deliberately.\n\nKµppuswamy when produced before the Warehouse Master by H Allam is alleged to have flared up and shouted at him saying :\n\n\"You do not find out our difficulty.\n\nYou do not listen to our grievances.\"\n\nHe is further alleged to have shouted ai the top of his voice :\n\n\"You think we are all slaves ? You do not know how to treat us.\n\nAre we not human beings ?\"\n\nIt was also said that not only was Kuppuswamy was shouting but he was also gesticulating with his hands towards the Warehouse master who found it impossible to.control Kuppuswamy and immediately reported the matter to tlie Mill Manager.\n\nAsked whether he had any questions to put to V eeraraghavan, Kuppuswamy answered in the negative and explained that it was his habit to speak in a loud voice. According to him Veeraraghavan did not bear him any enmity. To the next witr1ess for the Management, Allam, Kuppuswamy put only one question, namely, whether he (Kuppuswamy) was not presenting his view of the case to the warehouse master. He had no further questions to put to Allam and stated that Allam did not bear him any enmity.\n\nThe third witness was one Murty who supported the version given by Veeraraghavan. To Murty also Kuppuswamy put only one question and denied that Murty bore him any enmity.\n\nAftler these three witnesses were examined, the Manager called upon Veeraraghavan to give his remark.s about Kuppuswamy's conduct and ability and any other relevant information in respect of the respondent whereupon Veeraraghavan stated that Kuppuswamy had been absent without leave or permission on a number of occasions and that about a month back he had behaved in a manner similar to the one with which he was charged but no disciplinary action had been taken against him on the intercession of one Ra.iagopal. When Veeraraghavan was making this statement, Kuppuswamy intervened and said :\n\n\"That was beca.use of a misunderstanding as it .is my habit to speak in a loud voice.\"\n\nThe record of the proceedipgs shows that Veeraraghavan thereafter went out. The Manager did not ask Kuppuswamy on this occasion as to whether he wanted to put any question to Veeraraghavan on the further testimony given by him or whether he had any explanation to offer.\n\nOn the spot the Manager passed his order wherein after reciting the facts of the case he recorded that he found Kuppuswamy guilty of misconduct with which he was charged on the testimony of three witnesses. A note was also made that the misconduct was aggravated in view of the fact that the insolent behaviour was unprovoked and there were no extenuating circumstances in the case. The last two paragraphs of the order read:\n\n\"The only question which remains for me is to decide what punishment should be given to you. While looking into your service records, I find that you are\n\nBll'!NY LTD. v. WORKMEN (Mitter, I.)\n\neducated up to S.S.L.C.\n\nBeing an educated person a better behaviour is expected of you. Further you herd the Departmental Officer inform me during the course of this enquiry that y0u had been warned b'y him for absence for 3 days without leave or permission and that you had availed within a span of irbout 6 months, 25 days sick leave No. 9. Much more than all of these, he had let you off only a month earlier for behaving insolently towards him purely because of reque&t of the departmental workers' representative.\n\nUnder the circumstances, I do not consider that you are a fit person to remain in the employ of the Company and I therefore terminate your services with immediate effect on payment of one month's wages and dearness allowance in lieu of notice.\"\n\nThe question before us is, whether on the facts and circum~ stances of the case, the Labour Court was justified in exercising its discretion in ordering reinstatement specially when he himself had recorded in the course of his award that he accepted the finding tliat Kuppuswamy was guilty of the misconduct alleged against him in the charge sheet\n\nThe points urged before us were as follows :-\n\n(1) The Labour Court had gone wrong in setting aside the order of dismissal on the ground which was not put forward by the workman himself, specially because he never asked for an. oppartunity to cross-examine V eeraraghavan on his last statement and had never taken the point that he had been denied an opportunity to explain what was put forward against him by Veeraraghavan in his last statement before the enquiry officer. (2) The order of reference was invalid inasmuch as , Government had on previous occasions refused to refer the disputie for adjudication and there were no material on record to show that persuaded the Government ultimately to do so. (3) The Labour Court should not have proceeded with the reference after the Union had ceased to sponsor the case of Kuppuswamy and lefti him to.his fate.\n\n(4) Reinstatement should not have been ordered in view of the long lapse between the date of dismissal alild the order of reference; and ·(5) The order of reinstatement was also not justified in this case inasmuch as the breach of discipline of which Kuppuswamy was found guilty was of a serious character and the justice of the case required at the most that compensation should be .awarded tp him in place of reinstatement.\n\nIn our view none of the contentions have any merit. As re-· gards the first point, the record made by the enquiry officer amply\n\ndemonstrates that Kuppuswamy was not given a chance to crossexamine V eeraraghavan on his further.statement nor was he asked to state'anything by•way of exp!anation. To our mind the record. of the enquiry officer seems to suggest that he was under the impre, sion that he could look into the past record of the delinquent without affording him an opportunity of explanation or testing by cross-examination what was alleged against him. On each occasion when a person was examined on behalf of the management, the Manager was at pains to ask the delinquent whether he wanted to put any questions. But when the evidence was given about his absenting himself without leave or permission and specially when he was accused of a similar insolent conduct in the past, the least he could have done was. to have asked Kuppuswamy whether he had any question to put on the further evidence given and whether he had anything to say for himself in respect of what was alleged.\n\nWe were asked to record Kuppuswamy's intervention \"tha~ it was his habit to speak in the loud voi~\" as and by way of his explanation and also an10unting to an admission of the truth of the statement of Veeraraghavan. We find ourselves unable to accept his view. It appears clear to us that the enquiry officer was alive to the fact that the delinquent had to be given an opportunity of cross-examining a witness on his statement and that it was necessary also for him to find out whether the delinquent was accusing the witness of any bias or pre-conceived notion.\n\nSeveral decisions were cited to us in support of the proposition put forward by 0unsel that it was for the delinquent to raise an objection when he found a point being made .against him without an opportunity to him to give evidence by way of explanation. In our view each case must depend on its own facts\n\nand the circumstances of a par!icular case may show that no prejudice had been caused to the delinquent by any irregularity sought to be availed of by him.\n\nIn The Management of Delhi Cloth & F General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Kalu Ram(I) this Court took the view that the Tribunal whose order was appealed against had gone wrong in taking the view that the enquiry officer had conducted the enquiry unfairly in that the respondent was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the expert of the appellant with the help of an expert of his own.\n\nIn that case the respondent had been charged with using abusive, defamatory and threatening language in a letter to the officer in charge of his department without putting his name or signature thereto.\n\nIn the domestic enquiry the expert produced by the respondent was allowed to be cross-examined by the expert previously examined on behalf of the management but the expert produced on behalf of the appellant was only cross-examined b:i: the respondent himself.\n\nThis\n\nCour~ noted tha\\ the Tribunal had not found that the respondent\n\n(I) Civil Appeal No. 195of1964decided on 9th April, 1965.\n\never demanded that he should be permitted to cross-examine the expert produced on behalf of the appellant with the help of an expert of his own and there had been no refusal of any such request.\n\nAccording to this Court :\n\n\"If the respondent did not ask for an opportunity to cross-examine the appellant's expert with the help of an expert because he-had no legdl advice, that default on his part cann.ot mean that the enquiry officer violated the principles of natural .justice.\n\nNor the fact that crossexamination by the respondent could not be of the same quality as the cross-examination with the aid of an expert meari that the enquiry officer was guilty of breach of any of the principles of natural justice.\"\n\nWe fail to see how this case helps the appellant before us at all.\n\nIt was argued _gn behalf of the appellant that once the Labour Court accepts the finding of the domestic tribunal that the delinquent is guilty of the misconduct alleged against him the fact that D the order of termination of service mentions a similar conduct in the past on which no charge had been raised' should not make any difference to the result. Our attention was drawn to the decision of this Court in Railway Board v. Nlranjan Singh(') where the enquiry committee after investigating the charges had come to the conclusion that although the first charge was not E proved yond all reasonable doubt the respondent was guilty of the second charge. The Disciplinary authority, the General Manager, accepted not only the findings of the second charge, but differing from the conclusion on the first charge tentatively took the view that the respondent was guilty of that charge as well and after the issue of a show cause notice and the rejection of his explana- F tion directed that the respondent be removed from service. The High Court set aside. the order of dismissal on a writ petition under Art. 226 taking the view that.\n\n\"where an order such as an order of detention or removal from service is based on a number of grounds, and one or more of these grounds disappear it becomes G difficult to uphold the order when it is not. clear to what extent it was based on the ground found to be bad.\"\n\nIt was urged that the Court should not have assumed that the Genera! Manager would have inflicted the punishment of dismissal solely on the basis of the second charge and consequently the punishment should not be sustained if it was held that one of the H two charges on the bllSiS of which it was imposed was unsustainable. This was rejected following the decision in State of Orissa\n\n-(!) [1969] 3 S.C.R. 548.\n\nv. Bidyabhan Mahapatra(') where it was said that if an order A in an enquiry under Art. 311 can be supported on any finding as substantial misdemeanour for which punishment imposed can lawfully be given, it is not for the Court to oonsider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in imposing the punishment in question. In our view that principle can have no application to the facts of this case.\n\nAlthough the enquiry B officer found in fact that the respondent had behaved insolently towards the Warehouse Master, he did not come to the conclusion that this act of indiscipline on a solitary occasion W3S sufficient to warrant an order of dismissal.\n\nHe expressly recorded that the delinquent had been guilty of absenting himself without leave, that he had taken 25 days'sick leave in a span of six months C and that \"much more than all this, he (the warehouse master) had let Kuppuswamy off only a month earlier for behaviour insolently towards him purely because of request of the departmental workers' representative\" and it is in these circumstances that the Manager did not consider the delinquent to be a person fit to be retained in service. 'J]:le language of the order leaves no dou)>t in our mind that it was the cumulative effect of the lapses on the D part of the respondent_ that had resulted in the order of termination of service.\n\nIt was not a case where two separate chargoes had been framed against the delinquent and they were of such a. serious nature that the finding of guilt on any one would warrant the dismissal of the delinquent.from service.\n\nIn our view the decision in India Marine Service v. Their E Workmen(') does not help the appellant.\n\nThere the order of enquiry officer extracted at page 124 right hand column clearly shows that the order of dismissal was based on one of the charges and it was only after recording this decision that the enquiiy officer went on to note \"in taking the action against you e have also taken into consideration your past record which is very much F against you.\"\n\nThe case of Tata Oil Mills Co. v. Its Workmen(') is equally unhelpful to the appellant. There this Court found itself unab!e to sustah1 the finding of the Industrial Tribunal that the domestic enquiry was unfair because. tl1e concerned workman had not been given sufficient time to submit his explanation.\n\nR'l:amining the facts of the case this Court concluded that \"the position appears to be that on the two points on which Gupta could have crossexamined Mr. Banerjee if the report had been given to him have been tested in cross.examination, and so we feel no hesitation in holding that the failure to supply Mr. Banerjee's report to Gupta has not caused any prejudice to Gupta in ihe present case.\"\n\n(I) [1962] Supp, I. S.C.R. 648.\n\n(2) [196311L.L.1.122.\n\n(3) [1963]2 L.L.1. 78\n\nThe submission that the order of reference js invalid as the Government had no grounds or ma11erial to form the opinion about the existence of a dispute in order to enable it to make an order under s. 10(1) is one which does no~ merit any consideration. In the absence of the Government from the array of the parties it is not; possibfo to come to any finding as to whether there were any such material or not. But the mere facU that on two previous occasions Government had taken the view that no reference was called for does not entitle us to conclude that there could be no cause for reference in 1966. The enquiry was held on 10th November 1963 and the order. of termination of service was made the very same day. The letter of the Under Secretary to Government._ I.:abqur Department dated August 17, 1964 shows that out of the five workmen in question Government considered the cases of dismissal of three as quite old as having taken place at different times in 1961, 1962 and 1963 and as such did not deserve consideration. With regard to the other two, namely, Ramanatha and Kuppuswamy Government was of the view that they had been employed in the year 1963 ivself and had put in very short periods of service and as they had been dismissed -after proper enquiry no reference was called for.\n\nThe second loiter is dated August 21, 1965 where the Under Secretary merely stated that in view of the decision already taken, the dispu11e in question did not merit reference for adjudication. From the above it does not follow that Govenµnent could not thereafter either change its mind or make an order of reference on (resh material before it.\n\nUnder s. 10(1) of the Industrial Dispu11es Act a reference may be made at any time whenever the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. At any rate the point could only be canvassed either ; n a proceeding to ':Vhich the Government was a party or in one where tlhe Court v'\"- in possession of all the available material relating to the dispute. In the absence of such material the point must be decide4 against the appellant.\n\nIn our view 1lhe further submission that the order of reference must on the face of it show what impelled the Government to depart from its earlier decision and that in the absence thereof the Court must hold that there were no reasons for such a change of opinion is without any force.\n\nThe next submission was that the dispute with regard to the dismissal of Kuppuswamy ceased to be an industrial dispute after the Union ceased to sponsor his case.\n\nAs already mentioned, during the pendency of the proceedings before the Labour Court, there was a settlement of the disputes between the Union and the\n\nManagement with ree; ard. _to all !he employees other than Ku1>- puswamy.\n\nThe memorandum of settlement under section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act whkh was put in on the 24th June 1967 shows that the Union had proposed that in consideration of their withdrawal of the cases of Madaiah, Ekambaram and\n\nDevaiah, Ramanatha and Kuppuswamy may be taken back into A service but the Management did not accept the proposal but offered to take back Ramanatha only, which was accepted by the Union.\n\nThe Union further unqertook no~ to represe, tit Kuppuswamy's case or prosecute it before the Labour Court in view of this overall settlement with the Management. It is not necessary for us to consider whether s. 2A of the Act which was introduced in B the statute in 1965 has any application to the facts before us.\n\nWe do not however see any reason to hold that the dispute which had already been referred by Government should cease to be one in respect of a portion of it merely because the Union did not choose to represent the case of a particular dismissed employee. If there was an industrial dispute at the time of re- C ferences it would not ce'!CSe to be one merely because the claim of some of the dismissed employees was settled by mutual agreement.\n\nThe las~ point urged before us was that on the facts of the case the Labour Court should not have directed reinstatement but should have allowed compensation to Kuppuswamy in view D of the following factors.-(!) Kuppuswamy had been dismissed because of gross indiscipline and it was not proper to order re,_ instatement of a person who 1night indulge in similar acts in the future. ( 2) Reinstatement should not have been ordered four years after the dismissal as the Management had already made other arrangements for the work which was formerly being done E by Kuppuswamy executed through some other workman.\n\nOn the first of the above points our attention was drawn to the decision in Shalimar Works Limited v. Their Workmen(').\n\nThere the facts were that the company had discharged a large number of workmen in April 1948 and the first order of reference was made in October J 952. The case of no less than 250 workmen was involved in the dispute and this Court observed that : F\n\n\" .... if for any reason there had been a wholesale discharge of workmen and closure of the industry followed by its reopening and fresh recruitment of labour, it is necessary that a dispute regarding reinstatement of a large number of workmen should be referred for adjudication within a reasonable time. . . .\n\nG In these circumstances, we are of opinion that the tribunal would be justified in refusing the relief of reinstatement to avoid dislocation of the industry. . \"\n\nOn this view the Court felt that the Appellate Tribunal should not have ordered the reinstatement of even the 15 workmen as H their case was exactly the same as that of a large number of\n\n, (I) [1960] I S.C.R. ISO, 159.\n\nothers.\n\nIn our view what was said in the Shalimar W arks' case cannot be repeated in the case before us.\n\nThe appellant pursues an industry with_ a large number of workmen and we cannot imagine any serious dislocation of work by the order of reinstatement of one workman. Normally it will be months before ari order of reference is made by .Government and one or two years elapse in almost all C3$f'S before the adjudication by an Industrial Tribunal is complete. If mere lapse of time be enough to lead the Industrial Tribunal to hold that there should be no reinstatement of service the power of reinstatement will become obsolete.\n\nIn any case the Management must try to show thae reinstatement will cause dislocation of work and the Tribunal must take that into consideratiion. In this case we find no such compelling circumstances.\n\nOn the question as to whether compensation should have been awarded in lieu of reinstatement, we were referred to the case of Hindustan Steels v. A. K. Roy(') where it was said that it was in the discretion of the tribunal to make an order of reinstatement D or to award compensation in lieu thereof and it is only when the tribunal exercises its jurisdiction in disregard of the circum~ stances or the relevant principles laid down iin regard thereto that this Court would interfere with their discretion.\n\nIt has become almost a sett; ted principJe that reinstatement should be awarded where the management justifiably alleges that tJiey have ceased to E\n\nhave confidence in the dismissed employee.\n\nIn other cases the Tribunal must consider carefully the circumstances of the case to come to a finding that justice and fairplay require that reinstatement should be awarded.\n\nIn this case, there is no allegation that the Management )!ad lost confidence in Kuppuswamy. It is\n\nextremely doubtfu] whether the Manager would have ordered dismissal if Veeraraghavan had not drawn his attention to the past lapses of the respondent about which he was not allowed to have a say.\n\nWe do not therefore feel that we must interfere with the award of reinstatement of the respondent.\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(I) [1970] I L.L.J. 228.", "total_entities": 51, "entities": [{"text": "BINNY LID", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 9, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BINNY LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "WORKMEN AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WORKMEN AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 17, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 55, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 17, 1972\n\n(C. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND G. K. MITTER, Ji.]"}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Industrial Dwputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Dwputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Dwputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4270, "end_char": 4278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6465, "end_char": 6493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "f. Malhotra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6654, "end_char": 6665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f. Malhotra and D. N. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. N. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6670, "end_char": 6681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f. Malhotra and D. N. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. Kuppuswamy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6703, "end_char": 6716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Kuppuswamy, in person, for resJ?O!!dent No.", "canonical_name": "M. Kuppuswamy"}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6798, "end_char": 6804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J. Thjs is an appeal by special Ieiive from an award of the Labour CoUrt, Bangalore dated October 9, 1967 where\n\nthe dispute referred, for adjudication was, \"whether the Management oi the Bangalm; e Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. (hereinafter referred to aS the 'Company') was justified in terminating D the services of five workmen including one Kuppuswamy ?\"."}}, {"text": "Kuppuswamy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7158, "end_char": 7168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J. Thjs is an appeal by special Ieiive from an award of the Labour CoUrt, Bangalore dated October 9, 1967 where\n\nthe dispute referred, for adjudication was, \"whether the Management oi the Bangalm; e Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. (hereinafter referred to aS the 'Company') was justified in terminating D the services of five workmen including one Kuppuswamy ?\".", "canonical_name": "M. Kuppuswamy"}}, {"text": "Binny Mills Labour Association, Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7215, "end_char": 7253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the course of the proceedings the Binny Mills Labour Association, Bengal, a registered trade union, sponsoring the cause of the dismissed workmen entered into a settlement with the management whereby the management agreed to reinstate one Rama- E. nadha and gave up its demand for reinstatement of three others excluding Kuppuswamy."}}, {"text": "Rama- E. nadha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7420, "end_char": 7434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the course of the proceedings the Binny Mills Labour Association, Bengal, a registered trade union, sponsoring the cause of the dismissed workmen entered into a settlement with the management whereby the management agreed to reinstate one Rama- E. nadha and gave up its demand for reinstatement of three others excluding Kuppuswamy."}}, {"text": "10th G November", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8183, "end_char": 8198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An enquiry was held by the Mill Manager on 10th G November and on the same day the."}}, {"text": "Shadgopalan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8692, "end_char": 8703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kuppuswamy examined himself and one Shadgopalan was eiramined on behalf of the management."}}, {"text": "Veerarag- B havan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9135, "end_char": 9152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Lal; iour Court while accepting the finding of\n\nthe domestic tribunal that Kuppuswamy was guilty of the misconduct alleged against him was not inclined to retain the order of termination of his service mainly on the ground that he was not given an opportunity to challenge the statement of one Veerarag- B havan regarding his past repord of service nor wa:s .he given any\n\nopportunity to say whether Veeraraghavan's state!llent was true or false or reasonably explainable.", "canonical_name": "Veerarag- B havan"}}, {"text": "Veeraraghavan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9241, "end_char": 9254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Lal; iour Court while accepting the finding of\n\nthe domestic tribunal that Kuppuswamy was guilty of the misconduct alleged against him was not inclined to retain the order of termination of his service mainly on the ground that he was not given an opportunity to challenge the statement of one Veerarag- B havan regarding his past repord of service nor wa:s .he given any\n\nopportunity to say whether Veeraraghavan's state!llent was true or false or reasonably explainable.", "canonical_name": "Veerarag- B havan"}}, {"text": "Veerarag- G havan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10615, "end_char": 10632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veerarag- G havan was then examined by the Manager.", "canonical_name": "Veerarag- B havan"}}, {"text": "Allam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10771, "end_char": 10776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Veeraraghavan's statement, Kuppuswamy had disregarded the instructions given to him by one Allam, Assistant Manager by stacking the pieces between the examiners in a manner which would obstruct the free passage for the examiners and that he did deliberately.", "canonical_name": "H Allam"}}, {"text": "Kµppuswamy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10940, "end_char": 10950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kµppuswamy when produced before the Warehouse Master by H Allam is alleged to have flared up and shouted at him saying :\n\n\"You do not find out our difficulty.", "canonical_name": "M. Kuppuswamy"}}, {"text": "H Allam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10996, "end_char": 11003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kµppuswamy when produced before the Warehouse Master by H Allam is alleged to have flared up and shouted at him saying :\n\n\"You do not find out our difficulty.", "canonical_name": "H Allam"}}, {"text": "V eeraraghavan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11580, "end_char": 11594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Asked whether he had any questions to put to V eeraraghavan, Kuppuswamy answered in the negative and explained that it was his habit to speak in a loud voice.", "canonical_name": "Veerarag- B havan"}}, {"text": "Murty", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12055, "end_char": 12060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third witness was one Murty who supported the version given by Veeraraghavan."}}, {"text": "Murty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12114, "end_char": 12119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To Murty also Kuppuswamy put only one question and denied that Murty bore him any enmity."}}, {"text": "Ra.iagopal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12705, "end_char": 12715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aftler these three witnesses were examined, the Manager called upon Veeraraghavan to give his remark.s about Kuppuswamy's conduct and ability and any other relevant information in respect of the respondent whereupon Veeraraghavan stated that Kuppuswamy had been absent without leave or permission on a number of occasions and that about a month back he had behaved in a manner similar to the one with which he was charged but no disciplinary action had been taken against him on the intercession of one Ra.iagopal."}}, {"text": "crossexamine V eeraraghavan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16366, "end_char": 16393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As re-· gards the first point, the record made by the enquiry officer amply\n\ndemonstrates that Kuppuswamy was not given a chance to crossexamine V eeraraghavan on his further.statement nor was he asked to state'anything by•way of exp!anation."}}, {"text": "0unsel", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17922, "end_char": 17928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Several decisions were cited to us in support of the proposition put forward by 0unsel that it was for the delinquent to raise an objection when he found a point being made .against him without an opportunity to him to give evidence by way of explanation."}}, {"text": "9th April, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19267, "end_char": 19282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195of1964decided on 9th April, 1965."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21174, "end_char": 21182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1969] 3 S.C.R. 548", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 21869, "end_char": 21888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bidyabhan Mahapatra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21894, "end_char": 21913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Bidyabhan Mahapatra(') where it was said that if an order A in an enquiry under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21974, "end_char": 21982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24376, "end_char": 24381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R'l:amining the facts of the case this Court concluded that \"the position appears to be that on the two points on which Gupta could have crossexamined Mr. Banerjee if the report had been given to him have been tested in cross.examination, and so we feel no hesitation in holding that the failure to supply Mr. Banerjee's report to Gupta has not caused any prejudice to Gupta in ihe present case.\""}}, {"text": "Banerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24411, "end_char": 24419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R'l:amining the facts of the case this Court concluded that \"the position appears to be that on the two points on which Gupta could have crossexamined Mr. Banerjee if the report had been given to him have been tested in cross.examination, and so we feel no hesitation in holding that the failure to supply Mr. Banerjee's report to Gupta has not caused any prejudice to Gupta in ihe present case.\""}}, {"text": "s. 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24931, "end_char": 24939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "10th November 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25364, "end_char": 25382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The enquiry was held on 10th November 1963 and the order."}}, {"text": "August 17, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25528, "end_char": 25543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.:abqur Department dated August 17, 1964 shows that out of the five workmen in question Government considered the cases of dismissal of three as quite old as having taken place at different times in 1961, 1962 and 1963 and as such did not deserve consideration."}}, {"text": "Ramanatha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25803, "end_char": 25812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With regard to the other two, namely, Ramanatha and Kuppuswamy Government was of the view that they had been employed in the year 1963 ivself and had put in very short periods of service and as they had been dismissed -after proper enquiry no reference was called for."}}, {"text": "Kuppuswamy Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25817, "end_char": 25838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With regard to the other two, namely, Ramanatha and Kuppuswamy Government was of the view that they had been employed in the year 1963 ivself and had put in very short periods of service and as they had been dismissed -after proper enquiry no reference was called for."}}, {"text": "August 21, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26062, "end_char": 26077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second loiter is dated August 21, 1965 where the Under Secretary merely stated that in view of the decision already taken, the dispu11e in question did not merit reference for adjudication."}}, {"text": "s. 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26389, "end_char": 26397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "puswamy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27530, "end_char": 27537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he employees other than Ku1>- puswamy.", "canonical_name": "M. Kuppuswamy"}}, {"text": "section 12(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27575, "end_char": 27588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27596, "end_char": 27619, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "24th June 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27643, "end_char": 27657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The memorandum of settlement under section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act whkh was put in on the 24th June 1967 shows that the Union had proposed that in consideration of their withdrawal of the cases of Madaiah, Ekambaram and\n\nDevaiah, Ramanatha and Kuppuswamy may be taken back into A service but the Management did not accept the proposal but offered to take back Ramanatha only, which was accepted by the Union."}}, {"text": "Madaiah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27750, "end_char": 27757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The memorandum of settlement under section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act whkh was put in on the 24th June 1967 shows that the Union had proposed that in consideration of their withdrawal of the cases of Madaiah, Ekambaram and\n\nDevaiah, Ramanatha and Kuppuswamy may be taken back into A service but the Management did not accept the proposal but offered to take back Ramanatha only, which was accepted by the Union."}}, {"text": "Ekambaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27759, "end_char": 27768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The memorandum of settlement under section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act whkh was put in on the 24th June 1967 shows that the Union had proposed that in consideration of their withdrawal of the cases of Madaiah, Ekambaram and\n\nDevaiah, Ramanatha and Kuppuswamy may be taken back into A service but the Management did not accept the proposal but offered to take back Ramanatha only, which was accepted by the Union."}}, {"text": "Devaiah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27774, "end_char": 27781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The memorandum of settlement under section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act whkh was put in on the 24th June 1967 shows that the Union had proposed that in consideration of their withdrawal of the cases of Madaiah, Ekambaram and\n\nDevaiah, Ramanatha and Kuppuswamy may be taken back into A service but the Management did not accept the proposal but offered to take back Ramanatha only, which was accepted by the Union."}}, {"text": "s. 2A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28172, "end_char": 28177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_530_535_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "~30\n\ni, ENIOR SUPERINTENDENT, R.M.S. COCHIN & ANR.\n\nv ..\n\nK. V. GOPINATH, SORTER\n\n'February 18, 1972\n\n[C. A. VA!DIALINGAM AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.] B\n\nCivil Servant-Central Services (Temporary Sere) Rules 1965, , r. 5(1) (b) proviso-Scope of.\n\nThe strvices of tOO respondent, a temporary government servant, were lerminated on a particular day, but his sla<Y, and allowane<ls due tiH then were not paid on that date.\n\nThe High Court held that the termmallon , was not in accordance with the provisions of r. S of the Central Service C {Temporary Service) Rules, 1965.\n\nDismissing the appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD: (1) Rule 5(!)(a) gives the Government swell as the employ~ a right to put an end to the service by a notice in writing.\n\nUnder r. l(b) the period prescribed for such notice is one month. The proviso to the uh-rule however gives the Government an option not to retain the D employee in service till the expiry of the period of the notice; but to be effective, the termination of seryice has to be simultaneous with the payment to the employee of whatever is due to him. The operative words of the proviso are 'the services of any such government servant may be terminated forthwith by payment', showing that .the payment is a condition of the termination of service forthwith. [532 D-FJ\n\n(2) Since the words used are plain and unambious they must be .~· construed in their ordiOary sense without any considerations of policr,..--E\n\n[532 F-GJ -\n\n(3) There will always b> some time during whic.h the authority deliberates over the matter and makes up his mind, and within tb:.i.t time, directions can be given that the pay and allowances of the govemment ocrvant should be calculated so that they could 1:e offered to the emp1oye_e at the time when the order of termination is served on him. 'There 1s no difficulty in the calculation because the payment is to be made 'at F the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of his services.' Therefore, there is no merit in the contention that it would be impossible for the authorities to give effect to th~ provisv 1f payment was to be µiade simultaneously with the servioo on the employee of the order of termination. [532 H; 533 A-DJ\n\n( 4) The words of the rule construed in the State of U.P. v. Dinanath Rni, C.A. No. 1734/68 dt. 11-10-1968, though some what similar to the G words of r. 5 only entitled the employee to pay fcir the period of the notice but did not lay down any condition as tO when tfu payment was to be made. [534 F-GJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Aopea] No. 1706 of 1971. .\n\n Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated H January 5, 1971 of the Kerala High Court in Civil Writ Appeal No. 534 of 1969. ·\n\n!!.. M. S, v, K. V. GOPINAT!I (Mitter, J.) 531\n\nR. H. Dhebar, for the appellants.\n\nA. S. R. Chari, A. K. Gupta, S. C~ Agarwal and V. J. Francis, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J, The only question involved in this appeal is, whether the order dated Septembet' 25, 1968 terminating the services Of the respondent, a temporary Government servant, was in accordance with the provisions of Rule 5 of the Central Service (Temporary Service) Rules 1965, hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules'.\n\nThe services of the respondent ap)'(!ar to have been terminated on the basis of the directive containe:I in a circular dated 12th September 1968 that action should be taken against every employee who absented himself from duty on 19th September,\n\n1968. No contention was raised at any stage that no action could . be taken under Rule 5. This said rule reads :-\n\n\"5. Termination of temporary service . ..c::\n\n(I) (a) The services of a temporary Government servant who is. no' in quasi-permanent service shall be liable to termination at any time by a notice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the Government servant;\n\n(b) the period of such notice shall be one month;\n\nP.rovided that the services of any such Government servant may be terminated forthwith by payment to him of a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of the notice at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of his services, or, as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of one month.\n\nxx xx xx xx.\"\n\nIt. is admitted that payment of the salary and allowances was not 'made to the respondent on 25th September, 1968.\n\nAccording to the respondent the disbursing officer was intimated about the 1 order of termination only on the 28th September when he was supplied with the necessary funds. As against this it was alleged in the counter affidavit to the writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court that one month's pay and allowances had been sent by money order to the respondent. The question is,\n\nwhether the order of termination of service can be sustained because of absence of payment on the 25th September. The order was quashed by a learned single Judge of the High Court and this was upheld by a Division Bench in appeal.\n\nApart from the authorities which were cited at the Bar, it appears to us that the rule is capable of the only interpretation that the order of termination can be upheld if the requisite mount in terms of the rule was paid into the hands of the employee or made available to him at the same time as he was served with the order.\n\nRule S(l)(a) gives the Government as well as the employee a right to put an end to the service by a notice in writing.\n\nUnder .JUie 1 (b) the period prescribed for such notice is one month.\n\nThe proviso to sub-r. (b) however gives the Government an additional right in that it gives an option to the Government not to retain the services of the employee till the expiry of the period of _the illOtice : if it so chooses to terminate the service at any time it can do so forthwith \"by payment to him of a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of the notice at the same rate at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of his services, or, as the . case may be, for the .!leriod by which such notice falls short of. one month.\" At the _risk of repetition, y; e may note that the operative words of the proviso are \"the services of any such Government servant may be terminated forthwith by payment\". To put the matter in a nutshell, to be effective the termination of service has to be simultaneous with the payment to the employee of whatever is due to him. We need not pause to consider the question as to what would be the effect if there was a bonafide mistake as to the amount which is to be paid.\n\nThe rule does not lend itself to the interpretation that the termination of service becon'ies effective as soon as the order is served on the Government Servant irrespective of the question as to when the payment due to him is to be made. If that was the intention of the framers of the rule, the proviso would have been differently worded. As has often been said that if \"the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, we are bjound to construe them in their ordinary\n\nsense,\" \"and not to limit plain words in an Act of Parliament by considerations of policy, if it be policy, as to which minds may differ and as to which decisions may vary\" .-see Craies on Statute Law, Sixth Edition, pages 86 and 92.\n\nIt is not for us to enter into a discussion as to why the proviso was framed as we find it. It was argued that it would, in the ordinary course of things, be a!rnpst impossible for the authorities to give effect to _the proviso if payment has to be made at the time the order of termination is served on the employee. It was submitted that before any payment can be made by Government,\n\nsanction has to be ta.ken and some time must elapse, before_ the necessary procedure is complied with and money obtained either from the tn<asury or a cheque made out to cover the amount due to the employee. It was also argued that if the construction given by the High Court to the rule is to lie maintained, the appointing authority could never ask. the employee to go at once even when it found that it was necessary in the interest of Government to require him to do so. It is difficult to contemplate a case in which an appointing authority has to make up his mind on the spur of the moment that a particular employee should be asked to go immediately. Normally a Government employee is not asked to go unless some complaint is made against him for some irregula- rities detected in his work.\n\nThis is alwa~ followed by some enquiry into his conduct, however brief, as it is only as a result of an enquiry that the authority makes up its mind that it would not be ill .public interest to retain the service of the employee any fonger.\n\nWithin. the time which is ta.ken for such deliberation i.e., the preliminary enquiry, direction can certainly be given that the pay and allowances 'of the government servant concerned should be calculated so that it could be offered to the employee at the time when the order Of termination is served on1rim. There can be no difficulty in the calculation because the payment is to be made \"at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the, termination of his services.\"\n\nIt was suggested on behalf of the respondent that the. construction of the rule should be such as would mitigate the rigour of an order of terniination inasmuch as where riptice of a full month is given the Government servant knows that he will have to find some other employment without delay and he can make. his . arrangements accordingly; but if he is to be asked to leave at once and to depend on the mercy of the Government as to when it will pay )tltn for the period of the notice, it would be very hard on employee. We do not think it necc:ssary to express . any view as to whether the rule was so framed on account of . any such reason and we must give effect to the plain meaning of the words of the rule.\n\n. Our attention was drawn to a decision of this Court which had been cited on behalf of the appellant in the High Court-The\n\nState of Uttar Pradesh v. Dinanath Rai(1) There the rule was differently worded. The rule in that case ran as follows :-\n\n''In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the (lovernor\n\nof U.P. is pleased to make the following general rule\n\n(I) Civil Appeal No. 1734of1968 dated 11th October, 1968. 6-Ll031 Sup Cl/72\n\nregulating the tennination of services of temporary Government servants :\n\n( l) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any existing rules and orders on the subject, the services of a Government servant in temporary service shall be\n\nble t? tennination at any time by notice in writing given either by the Government servnt to the appointing authority, or by the appointing authority to the Government servant.\n\n( 2) The period of such notice shall be one month given either by the avpointing authority to the Government servant, or by the Government servant to the arpointing authority, provided that in the case of notice o the appointing authority the latter may substitute for the whole or part of this period of notice pay in lieu thereof; provided further that it shall be open to the appointing authority to relieve a Government servant without any notice or accept notice for a shorter period, without requiring the Govemmenf servant to pay any penalty in lieu of notice.\"\n\nIn that case this Court had observed : ''The rule does not say that. the pay should be given in cash or by cheque at the time the notice is issued.\n\nKnowing the way the Governments are run, it would E. )le difficu!t to ascribe this intention to the rule-making authority. There is no doubt that the Government servant would be entitled to the pay in lieu of qotice but dtis would be in the ordinary course.\"\n\nNo doubt the language of that rule is somewhat similar to the F words of rule 5 but there is an essenti!ll difference.\n\nThe rule only means that the pay for 30 days or less may be substituted . for service for the period of the notice. In other words, the rule only entitles the employee to pay for the period of the notice without laying . down any condition as to when the payment is to be given.\n\nG In this case, as we have already noted, \"tennination forthwith\" is. to be \"by payment to the Government servant\" of the sum mentioned.· Payment is a condition of the termination of service forthwith.\n\nThe. facts of this case show that the circular which formed the basis of the order of tennination was issued on the H 12th September; the employee, it would appear, had absented himself from 'ducy on the 19th September. The appointing authority had at. least six days within whicb time the amount due to the resoonden~ could have been calculated.\n\nIn our view, the decisions in Seshavataram v. State af Hyderabad(') and Venkataswami v. Director of Commerce & Industries(') do not help the appellant.\n\nThe appeal is therefore dismissedand in terms of the order granling special leave, the appellant must pay the costs of the respondent.\n\nV.P.S.\n\n(1) [1959)-2 L.L.J. 227.\n\n(2) [1959)-2 L.L.J. 702.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 15, "entities": [{"text": "ENIOR SUPERINTENDENT, R.M.S. COCHIN & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT, R.M.S. COCHIN & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. V. GOPINATH, SORTER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. V. GOPINATH, SORTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 143, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "dt. 11-10-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2318, "end_char": 2332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1734/68 dt."}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2680, "end_char": 2697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated H January 5, 1971 of the Kerala High Court in Civil Writ Appeal No."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2787, "end_char": 2799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S, v, K. V. GOPINAT!I (Mitter, J.) 531\n\nR. H. Dhebar, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "A. S. R. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2822, "end_char": 2836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, A. K. Gupta, S. C~ Agarwal and V. J. Francis, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "A. K. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2838, "end_char": 2849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, A. K. Gupta, S. C~ Agarwal and V. J. Francis, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. C~ Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2851, "end_char": 2864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, A. K. Gupta, S. C~ Agarwal and V. J. Francis, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "V. J. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2869, "end_char": 2882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, A. K. Gupta, S. C~ Agarwal and V. J. Francis, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2949, "end_char": 2955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J, The only question involved in this appeal is, whether the order dated Septembet' 25, 1968 terminating the services Of the respondent, a temporary Government servant, was in accordance with the provisions of Rule 5 of the Central Service (Temporary Service) Rules 1965, hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules'."}}, {"text": "25th September, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4504, "end_char": 4524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is admitted that payment of the salary and allowances was not 'made to the respondent on 25th September, 1968."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7260, "end_char": 7270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As has often been said that if \"the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, we are bjound to construe them in their ordinary\n\nsense,\" \"and not to limit plain words in an Act of Parliament by considerations of policy, if it be policy, as to which minds may differ and as to which decisions may vary\" .-see Craies on Statute Law, Sixth Edition, pages 86 and 92."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10384, "end_char": 10395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10403, "end_char": 10424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_536_547_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "GOBINDRAM v.\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nf:ebruary 21, 1972\n\n[S. M. S!KRI, C.J., A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY, D. G, PALEKAR B\n\nAND M. H. BEG, JJ.]\n\nContempt of Court Acf, •1952-S. 3(2).,-Scandalizing the Cour.t- Principles for determining when it amounts to con_tmpt-Transfer application-Alfegadons against judicial official-Allegations -that the Magistrate below is on friendly relaiions with complainants-[/ amounts to contempt.\n\nAn advocate, in a transfer application in respect of a crimill'31 com .. plaint, filed before Ille Sessions Judge made certain allegations against two judicial officers before whom the criminal complaint and a civil suit were pending. While dismissing the transfer application, the Additional Se&.ions Judge, who heard the application, recorded an nrder that a report be submitted to the High Court for considering the conduct -of~ the applicant as to the course adopted by him in making imputations or aspersions in the transfer petition against the judicial officers and to take action for contempt of court under s. 3(3) of the Contempt of Court's Act, 1952. ·\n\nParagraph 1 of the transfer application stated that \"the Magistrate below is on friendly relations with the mplaino:mt, the respondent No.\n\nI in the present petition and he e\\'On enjoys ihe hospitality of the Respondent No. I sometimes alone and sometimes in company of the Civil Judg<>-J. D. Kalyan (Shri M. B. Boadkar) who is also on friendly relations with the respondent No. 1 and who also enjoys the hospitality of the respondent No. I\". There were other allegations In the transfer petition. The show cause notice issued by the High Court containing the charge of contempt was confined only to paragraph I of the transfer application.\n\nThe High Court held that the appellant was guilty of contempt of court and he was sentenced accordingly,\n\nAllowing the appeal.\n\nHELD : (I) The show cause notice on the l'oce of it disclosed no such allegation which oould be regarded as falling within the rule laid down by this Court In which the head of contempt, i.e. scandalising the Court, had come up for examination. In Perspective Publications (P) LYd. v. State of Maharashtra, [1969) 2 S.C.R. 779 this Court baa laid down certain principles as to the law of contempt. They are : ·\n\n(i) It will no/ be right to say that Committals for contempt for scandalizmg the Court have become obsolete.\n\n(ii) 1be summary jurisdiction by way of contempt should be exercised with great care -and caution and only when its exercise is necessary for the proper administ!ration of law and justioo.\n\n(iii) Any one may express fair, reasonable and legitimate critidism of any act or conduct <if a jqdge in his judicial capacity or make a proper or fair comment on any decision given by him.\n\n(iv) A distinction must be made between a mere libel or defamation of a judge and what amounts to contempt of court. The test in each\n\ncase would be whether the impugned publication is a mere defamatory attack on the judge or whether it is calculated to interfere with due course of justice or the proper administration of law by the court it is only in the latter case that it will lie punishablO as contempt. [542 HJ\n\n(v) Alternatively, the test will be whetiher the wrong is done to the judge personally or it is . done to the pubilc.\n\nThe publication of a disparaging statement will be an injury to the public if it tends to create. an apprehensin in the minds of the people ; regarding the integrity, a bi.; lily of fairness of the judges or to deter actual and prospective litigants\n\nfrom placing complete reliance upon the courts administration of justice or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties\". [,543 E]\n\n(2) Allegations made even in a transfelr application casting aspersions on a judicial officer an CQ.n.st_itute contempt of his court within s. 3 of the Act. However, cases in which applications for transfer are made. stand on a slightly dllfernt footing from those where a party makes an\n\nallegation, either inside cir outside the court of a scandalising nature imputing improper motives of the judge trying the case: but even in the case of a transfer application, a person cannot be allowed to commit contempt of court by making allegations of a srious nature scandalising the court and imputing improper motives to the judge trying the case.\n\n[544-B, 546 DJ .\n\nIn the present case, the mere statement thaf'.a Magistrate is friendly with a party who happens to be an advocate and enjoys his hospitality or has fl'iendly relations with him will not nstitute contempt unless there is an imputation of some \"imprOpe!r motives as would amount to scandalizing the court itself and as would have a tendency to create distrust in the popular mind and impair the confidence of ·!be people in the courts. 1;544 CJ State of Madhya Pradesh v. Revaslumkar, p959] S.C.R. 1367, State\n\nv. The Editor.9 and Publishers of Eastern Times and Prajantra, A.1.R. 1952 Orissa 318 and Swaranamavi Panigrahi v. B. Nayak & Ors., A.I.R. 1959 Orissa 89, referred to and discussed.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 51 of 1968.\n\nAppeal by sJ>ecial leave from the judgment and order dated Febi:uary 2, 1968 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Application No. 393 of 1967.\n\nAppellant appeared in person.\n\nM. C. Bhandare, S. B. Wad and B: D. Sharma, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgement of the Court was delivered by\n\nGrover, 1. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the Bombay High Court finding the appellant who is an Advocate, guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to simple imprisonment for a term of four weeks and a fine of\n\nRs. 1,000/-. It was directed that in default of payment of the A fine he would have to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of four wcceks.\n\nHe was also ordered to pay the costs of the Assistant Government Pleader in the High Court and the Government Pleader before the Sessions Judge.\n\n_The material facts may be stated : In March 1966 a suit was B filed ai; ainst the appellant by D. N. Santani who is also an Advocate for recovery of Rs. 640/- in the court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Kalyan. The plaintiff in that suit had engaged H. I. Jagiasi as his Advocate. In the written statement filed b)' the appellant he made certain allegations against J agiasi and alleged inter al_la, that the latter was responsible for the suit.\n\nC Jagiasi filed a criminal complaint for deation in August 1966 against the appellant in the court of Shri P. D. Sayyid, Judicial Magistrate at Kalyan.\n\nThe appellant has set out a number of incidents and matters in his petition for special leave to aQPCal which it is not necessary for our purpose to mention. It would suffice to say that on. October 15, 1966 the appellant filed an D application before the Jdicial Magistrate saying that he intenc; led to apply for transfer of the case to some other court. On October 28, 1966 he presented a transfer application in the court of the Sessions Judge. Thana. __ The transfer application was ultimately dismissed by the Assistant Judge and Additional Sessions Judge on March 8, 1%7 before whom it came up for disposal. Meanwhile it appears that the appellant applied for transfer of the E civil suit which had been filed by D. N. Santani to the court of the District Judge. The suit was stayed and we have been informed that ultimately it was transferred sometime in the year 1967 from the court of Shri M. B. Baadkar from whose court transfer was sought. _ It has further been stated at the Bar and that statement has not been challenged that the civil suit was ulti-\n\nF . mately dismissed in August 1969.\n\nWhile dismissing the transfer application of the appellant in th.c criminal complaint filed by Jagiasi in the court of Shri P. D.\n\nSayyid the Additional Sessions Judge recorded an order that a report be submitted to the High Court for \"considering the con- G duct of the appellant and the course adopted by him in making the transfer application and in making imputations or aspersions against the Judicial Officers and , to take action for contempt .of court under s. 3(2) of the Contempt of Court's Act, 1952, hereinafter called the 'Act'.\n\nThis was done after reproducing three paragraphs from the transfer apPiication and expressing an opinion that the appellant had attempted to attack the integrity and honesty of the courts 6f the Judicial Magistrate and the Civil Ju'dge and to scandalize and to malign the same. The High Court made an\n\norder on December 1, 1967. The following part of that oder may be reproduced-\n\n\"He 'mad11 an application to. the Sessions Judge for transfer of the proceedings to another Court and the ground objected to by the learned Sessions Judge is as follows :-\n\n\"The Magistrate below is on friendly relations with the complainant the respondent No. 1 in the present petition and he even enjoys the hospitality of the respondent No. 1 some times alone and some times in company qf the Civil Judge J. D. Kalyari (Shri M. B.\n\nBaadkiir) who is also on friendly relations with the respondent No. 1 and who also enjoys the hospitality of the respondent No. l \".\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge had called for report from the Magistrate Mr. P. D. Sayyed and was apparently satisfied after consideration of all the affidavits produced before him that the allegations was baseless. He, therefore, referred the matter to this court for suitable action being taken against the respondent-:-Advocate for his making such allegations and interfering with the course of justice and scandalising or maligning the Courts. - below\".\n\nIt was further stated in that order that the appellant had asked for an opportunity to establish the truth of the allegation made above which had been made both \"because of his personal knowledge and also because of information obtained from others''. A list of witnesses was furnished by the appellant whom he proposed to examine.\n\nThe High Court directed the District Judge to regard the evidence and to submit his report along with the evidence and the reports of the two judges. It was expressly stated that the inqu.iry w.as to be confined to the allegations which had been quoted above. The show cause notice which . was issued to the appellant by the High Court (omitting unnecessary portions) was as follows :-\n\n\"Whereas\" upon reading letter No. 2434, dated 5th April, 1967 forwarded by the 2nd Addi. Sessions Judge, Thana along with the Record and proceedings of Cri. Transfer Application No. 108/66 on his file and the Record and Proceedings in Cri. Case No. 2949 of 1966 of. the Court of the Judicial Magi.<; trate, F. C.\n\nKalyan, requting to take action under the Contempt of Court's Act against the Advocate Mr. G. L. Bhatia, wlio has made serious allegations against the Judicial\n\nOfficers Shri Baadkar and Shri Sayyad in Transfer Cri.\n\nA Application No. 108/66 in para one in the Court of the 2nd Add!. Sessions Judge, Thana, etc.,\n\nAnd whereas this Court has on 15.th June 1967, passed the following order :-\n\n\"Notice to Mr. Bhatia Advocate to show cause why action for contempt of Court should not be taken against him.\n\nNotice to G. P. also. A copy of D. J.'s Jetter to be sent to Mr. Bhatia along with the notice.''\n\nThe District Judge in accordance with the orders of the High Court submitted a re_port giving his own findings on the evince\n\nrecorded by him and also after taking into consideration the reports of Sarvshri Baadkar and Sayyid which had been ailed for from them apparently after the witnesses produced by the apPCllant had given their evidence and copies pf their depositions had been ~µt to the two judges. The appellant raised two preliminary objections before the High Court.\n\nThe first was tlfaf the District Judg, e . could only submit a record of evidence and could not give l!is findings and, secondly, he could not take into consideration the reports of the two judges which had not been shown to the appellant.\n\nAnother objection raised was that the repOrts of tlie Judicial Officers could not have been relied upon becall$e the apPellant had no opportunity to cross-examine them.\n\nThe High Court repelled all these objections. From the statement of preliminary facts it is clear that\" the High Court. relied only~ on the allegations contained in para I of the application of transfer which have already been set out before and contents of which were that Shri Sayyid was on friendly relations with Iagiasi and that he had even enjoyed his hospitality sometimes alone and s<imetimes in the company of Shri Baadkar.\n\nWe have laid a certain amount of stress on the aforesaid allegation made in para I of the transfer application because that application consisted in substance of three paragraphs. It will. be desirable, owing to the nature of this case, to set put all the allegations made in the transfer application :\n\n i. '\"The Magistrate below is on friendly relations with the complainant the Respondent No. 1 ln the pre- . sent petition and he even enjoys the hospitality of the Respondent No. 1 some times alone and some times in company of the Civil Judge J: D. Kalyan (Shri M. B.\n\nBaadkar) who is alilo on friendly relations with the Respondent No. 1 and who also enjoys the h0spitality of the Respondent Ni>. 1.\n\nGOB!ND RAM v. MAHARASHTRA (Grover, l.) 541\n\n2. The Magistrate below is prejudiced against the present application.\n\n3. The M11gistrate below has not taken and does not appear to take impartial disinterested view of the case in question. ·\n\n(a) Evidently the complainant was not actuated by mere or bonafide professional interest. He was the author of false litigation for a false and fabricated claim.\n\nThat matter Suit No. 213 of 1966 was still penditig hearing and adjudication. The complaint in question could not as such be filed in all fairness and it ought not to have been entertained at least without the preliminary enquiries or at any rate it ought to have been stayed.\n\n\\ b) That was not done and the process was ordained to be urgently issued and served and the socalled summons was served on the applicant a day or two before the date of hearing .to harass and handicap him in his professional commitments.\n\n( c) Even the said summons was not accompanied by copy of the complaint as niendatorily required by s. 204(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the aJ>plicant was left guessing as to what the said summons related to.\n\n(d) On 15th October 1966 when the case in question was Sr. No. 10-12 on the Board and it. was preceded by even part heard cases the trial Magistrate did not permit this application even leave for a while to enable him to go to Civil Court at a distance of furlong or so to obiain leave of the Court from his professional engagements and the trial Magistrate observed that he wotild \"take up the case there and then and just now\" and in the next moment the complainant was in the Box ready for\n\n\"finishing\" the case as though by previous understanding.\n\n4. The applicant respectfully refrains from entering into further details in this regard and he would do the same if called upon.\n\nFor the present suffice to say that in view of what is stated above there is well-founded apprehension in the mind of the applicant he would not get justice unless the case is transferred to some other Court of the competent jurisdiction\".\n\nThe question which immediately arises is whether an allegation of the nature made in para ( 1 ) in the circumstances of the present case in a transfer application would amount to contempt of the two judges Sarvshri Sayyid and Baadkar.\n\nThe High Court made a detailed examination of the evidence adduced before the District Judge and also reli~ on the reports of Sarvshri Sayyid and Baadkar. It came to the conclusion that the allegations made by the appellant had not been proved.\n\nIt was observed that these allegations \"in the above quoted paragraph\" which means paragraph I were quite serious. The High Court was also. influenced by the fact that the appellant had \"pitched the case higher and tried to prove that the two judges concerned were continuously receiving from Mr. Jagiasi presents of large value in the shape of sarees and other articles and thus receiving bribes so as to indiscreetly favour Mr. Jagiasi and the litigants whom he represented in their Court\". The appellant was not even willing to tender an api>logy and his position as an Advocate was naturally regarded as making the contempt all the more seri0us.\n\nThe appellant, who has argued the case himself, has raised the following main con17ntions :-\n\n1. The Act is unconstitutional and invalid.\n\nIt violates Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution.\n\n2. No procedure has been provided in the Act and therefore it is bad.\n\n3. Even the normal procedure which should be followed in such cases has not been followed.\n\n4. The High Court was not entitled to call for a report from the District Judge or to delegate its functions including the examination of witnesses to the District Judge.\n\n5. The show cause. notice issued by the High Court containing the harge of contempt was confined only to paragraph l of the transfer application.\n\nThe statements made in that paragraph could not by themselves constitute contempt.\n\nIn our opinion it is wholly unnecessary to decide points 1 to 4 because the appellant must succeed on the 5th point. This court has, after a review of all the relevant decisions, laid down hi- Perspective Pub/icatiims (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra('), inter alia, the following principles:-.\n\n1. It will not be right to say that the committals for contempt fof scandalizing the court have become obsolete.\n\n(I) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 779.\n\n2. The summary jurisdiction by way of contempt must be exercised with great care caution and only when its exercise is necessary for the proper administration of law and justice.\n\n3. It is open to any one to express fair, reasonable and legitimate criticism of any act or conduct of a judge in his judicial capacity or even to make a proper and fair comment on any decision given by him.\n\n4. A distinction must be made between a mere libel or defamation of a judge and what amounts to a contempt of the court.\n\nThe t1'.5t in each case would be whether the impugned publication is a mere defamatory attack on the judge or whether it is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or the proper administration of law by his court.\n\nIt is only in the. latter case that it will be punishable as contempt.\n\n5. \"Alternatively the test will be whether the wrong is done to the judge personally or it is done to the public.\n\nTo borrow from the language of.Mukherjea J., (as he then was) Brahma Prakash Sharma's case (1953 SCR 1169) the publication of a disparaging statement will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the court's administration of justice or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties\".\n\nIn that case it was held that the imputation in an cle of impropriety, Jack of integrity and oblique motives to a judge of the High Court in the matter of deciding a suit constituted contempt of court.\n\nThe question whether an action can be taken under s. 3 of th.e Act if in a :transfer application allegations are made against a judge which are of such nature: as to constitute contempt of his court does not appear to be res integra.\n\nIn State of Madhya Pradesh v. Revashankar(I) aspersions of a serious nature had been made against a Magistrate in a transfer petition. One of such aspersions was that. the Magistrate in whose court the proceedings were pending was a party to a conspiracy with certain others the object of which was to implicate the complainant in a false case of theft and that a lawyer appearing for the accused persons in whose favour the Magistrate was inclined, h.ad declared\n\n(!) [1959] S.C.R. !367.\n\n that he had paid a sum of Rs. 500/- to the Magistrate.\n\nIt was also asserted that the applicant was sure that he would not get impartial and legal justice from the Magistrate. It was held that the aspersions taken at their face value amounted to what is called 'scandalizing the court' itself and the attack on the Magistrate tended to create distrust in the popular mind and impair the confidence 'Of the people in the courts.\n\nThis decisions is quite apposite for the purposes of the present case. It decides that allegations made even in a transfer application casting aspersions on a judicial officer can constitute contempt of his court within s. 3 of the Act. It is difficult to comprehend that the mere statement that a Magistrate is friendly with a party who happens to be an advocate and enjoys his hospitality or has friendly relations with him will constitute contempt unless there is an imputation of some improper motives as would amount to scandalizing the court itself and as would have a tendency to create distrust in the popular mind and impair the confidence of the people in the courts.\n\nThe allegations contained in para 1 of the transfer application may or may not amount to defamation of the two judges, namely, Sarvashri Sayyid and Baadkar but to constitute contempt the other tests which have been discussed above must be fulfilled.\n\nAs noticed before the High Court confined the action, which was to be taken, only to the matter stated in paragraph 1 and did not choose or decide to include or consider paragraphs 2 or 3 either in the show cause notice or in the judgment the following part of which may be reproduced :-\n\n\"We have considered the whole of the evidence on record that can be relied upon on behalf of the contemner on the one side and by the State in support of the case for action against the contemner.\n\nWe have with some anxiety considered the arguments advanced by the contemner in support of his case that the evidence is sufficient to prove the allegations made by the contemner in the above quoted paragraph.\n\nWe find it impossible to hold in his favour that he has proved that Mr.\n\nSayYid had friendly relations with Mr. Jagiasi and was enioying the hospitality of Mr. Jagiasi either alone or in company with Mr. Baadkar, He has failed to prove that Mr. Baadkar had friendly relations with Mr. Jagiasi and enjoyed the hospitality of Mr. Jagiasi\".\n\nIt is true that a party cannot make such allegations even in a transfer application which may fa!J within the rule laid down in\n\nRevashankar's(1') case or in the Perspective Publication's case(') and which may amount to scandalizing the court in the sense H pointed out in these decisions. In the State v. The Editors &\n\n(1) [1959] S.C.R. 1367.\n\n\nPublishers of Eastern Times and Prajatantra('), Jagannadhadas C.J. (as he then was) delivering the judgement of the Division Bench, after an exhaustive examination of the decided cases where the jurisdiction of the court for this class of contempt had in fact been exercised, observed :-\n\n\"A review of the cases in which a contempt committed by way of scandalising the court has been taken notice of, for punishment, shows clearly that the exercise of the punitive jurisdiction is confined to cases of very grave and scurrilous attack on the court or on the Judges in their judicial capacity, the ignoring of which would only result in encouraging a repetition of the same with a sense of impunity and which would thereby result in lowering the prestige and authority of the court\".\n\nThere are not many decisions in which punishment has been\n\ninflicted for committing contempt of conrt by making scurrilous allegations in an application for transfer of a case from one court to another.\n\nMention may, however, be made of one of such cases: Swarnamayi Panigrahi v. B. Nayak & Ors.(').\n\nThere, during the pendency of certain rent suits filed before the Rent Suit Collector by the landlord, who was the wife of the Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, the tenant filed certain transfer applications before the Additional District Collector making statements like these :\n\n\"l. The lower court openly identified himself with the plaintiff Shrimati Swarnmayi Panigrahi and is so partial to her that no justice or impartial decision can be expected from him;\n\n2. He has gone out of the course prescribed by law and has taken over the function of witness and court in himself in such a way that there is no parallel to it in the history of litigation in India; and\n\n3. That opposite party wields extraordinary influence i)l the State as si'ie is the wife of Shri Lingarai\n\nPanigrahi Chief Justice of Orissa High Court. It is being openly talked about that the conclusions are foregone\".\n\nIt was observed that though some latitude has to be given in a transfer application but the question was whether or not the applicant in that case had exceeded the limits permissible under the law. As a rule applications for transfer were not made merely\n\n(I) A.l.R. 19S2 Orissa 318.\n\n(2) A.I.R 1959 Orissa 89.\n\nbecause the trying judge was alleged to be incompetent but there A may be circumstances beyond the judge's control such as the acquaintance with one of the parties .(If personal interest in the sub1ect matter of the proceedings whicli in law would be considered as preventing him from giving an unbiased decision.\n\nIt was held that the applicant had exceeded the limits and had gone out of his way not only to malign the personal integrity and judi- B cial honesty of the lower court but had also directly attacked the whole administration of justice headed by the Chief Justice of the State.\n\nIt is noteworthy that on an allegation made in a transfer application the judge against whom the allegation is made is often afforded an opportunity of giving explanation by the higher court and he can dispel any cloud that might have been cast on his fairness and integrity.\n\nThe higher court takes action for trans- C fer after full consideration of all the circumstances of the case including the report of the judge against whom the allegations are made.\n\nIn this way it can well be said that cases in which _ applications for transfer are made stand on a slightly different footing from those where a party makes an allegation, either inside or outside the court of a scandalising nature imputing improper D motives to the judge trying the case.\n\nThe Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Murli Dhar & Another('') was of the view that where an accused person in an application for transfer of a case made an assertion that the persons who had caused the proceedings to be instituted were on terms of intimacy with the offi.. cer trying the case and, therefore, he did not expect a fair and E impartial trial was not guilty of offence under s. 228, Indian Penal Code, there being no intention on the part of the applicant to insult the court, his object being merely .to procure. a transfer of his case. It is true that in the garb of a transfer applicatioc. a person cannot be allowed to commit contempt of court by making allegations of a serious and scurrilous natur.e scandalising the court and I' imputing improper motives 1!0 the judge trying the case. But then -the nature of the allegations will have to be closely examined and_ so long as they do not satisfy the requirements of wht may be regarded as contempt of court no punishment can possibly be inflicted.\n\nThe appellant, in the present case, is an advocate and it is most wifortunate that though at the stage of the transfer G application be made certain allegations in para I about the social intimacy between Jagiasi and Sarvashri Sayyid and Baadkar, the two judicial officers, with the apparent object of securing a l:rans fer of the case he proceeded to take the highly ill-advised step of attempting to substantiate the allegation so made.\n\nWe are, however, not concerned with any charge relating to the matters B subsequent to the notice which was iued by the High Court with regard to the. allegations for which purushment )las been\n\n(I) l.L.R. 38 All, 284\n\nimposed on the appellant. That notice on the face of it discloses no such allegation which could be regarded as falling within the rule laid down by this Court aud by a series of decisions of the\n\nPrivy Council iu which this head of contempt i.e. scaudalisiug court has come up for examination. Most of those decisions have been referred to in the case of Perspective Publications (P) B .Ltd.('). In addition we may mention Debi Prasad Sharma &\n\nOthers v. Emperor(') in which in a newspaper report the Chief Justice of a High Couit was untruly alleged to have committed an i!J-advised act in writing to. his subordiuate judges asking them to collect subscriptions for the War Fund. Accordiug to their lordships there was no criticism of auy judicial act of the Chief c\n\nJustice nor auy imputation was made for auything done or omitted to be done by him in the administration of justice nor was there auy criticism of him iu his administrative capacity.\n\nIn the opinion of their lordships the proceedings in contempt were misconceived.\n\nIn our judgment the allegations contaiued iu para I of the transfer application were not such as would amount to contempt of court. We cannot help observing that the appellant did not show the sense of responsibility iu making the allegations iu question which is expected from au advocate aud in further attempting to substautiate them which he failed to do.\n\nThe appeal is allowed aud the order passed by the High Court is hereby set aside. Parties will bear their own costs iri this Court. s.c.\n\n--:-m (t969) 2 S.C.R. 779.\n\n(2) A.l.R. (1943) P, C. 202.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "GOBINDRAM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 9, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GOBIND RAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PALEKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.G. PALEKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1039, "end_char": 1046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. B. Boadkar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1394, "end_char": 1407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I sometimes alone and sometimes in company of the Civil Judg<>-J. D. Kalyan (Shri M. B. Boadkar) who is also on friendly relations with the respondent No.", "canonical_name": "M. B.\n\nBaadkiir"}}, {"text": "[1969) 2 S.C.R. 779", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2165, "end_char": 2184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3891, "end_char": 3895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. C. Bhandare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5349, "end_char": 5363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, S. B. Wad and B: D. Sharma, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. B. Wad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5365, "end_char": 5374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, S. B. Wad and B: D. Sharma, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5382, "end_char": 5391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, S. B. Wad and B: D. Sharma, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5528, "end_char": 5545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the Bombay High Court finding the appellant who is an Advocate, guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to simple imprisonment for a term of four weeks and a fine of\n\nRs."}}, {"text": "D. N. Santani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6093, "end_char": 6106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material facts may be stated : In March 1966 a suit was B filed ai; ainst the appellant by D. N. Santani who is also an Advocate for recovery of Rs.", "canonical_name": "D. N. Santani"}}, {"text": "H. I. Jagiasi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6254, "end_char": 6267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff in that suit had engaged H. I. Jagiasi as his Advocate."}}, {"text": "Jagiasi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6453, "end_char": 6460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C Jagiasi filed a criminal complaint for deation in August 1966 against the appellant in the court of Shri P. D. Sayyid, Judicial Magistrate at Kalyan.", "canonical_name": "Jagiasi"}}, {"text": "P. D. Sayyid", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6558, "end_char": 6570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C Jagiasi filed a criminal complaint for deation in August 1966 against the appellant in the court of Shri P. D. Sayyid, Judicial Magistrate at Kalyan.", "canonical_name": "P. D.\n\nSayyid"}}, {"text": "Kalyan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6595, "end_char": 6601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C Jagiasi filed a criminal complaint for deation in August 1966 against the appellant in the court of Shri P. D. Sayyid, Judicial Magistrate at Kalyan."}}, {"text": "October 15, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6795, "end_char": 6811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "October 15, 1966 the appellant filed an D application before the Jdicial Magistrate saying that he intenc; led to apply for transfer of the case to some other court."}}, {"text": "October 28, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6964, "end_char": 6980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 28, 1966 he presented a transfer application in the court of the Sessions Judge."}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge. Thana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7037, "end_char": 7058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 28, 1966 he presented a transfer application in the court of the Sessions Judge."}}, {"text": "March 8, 1%7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7169, "end_char": 7181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The transfer application was ultimately dismissed by the Assistant Judge and Additional Sessions Judge on March 8, 1%7 before whom it came up for disposal."}}, {"text": "D. N. Santani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7324, "end_char": 7337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile it appears that the appellant applied for transfer of the E civil suit which had been filed by D. N. Santani to the court of the District Judge.", "canonical_name": "D. N. Santani"}}, {"text": "M. B. Baadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7504, "end_char": 7517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was stayed and we have been informed that ultimately it was transferred sometime in the year 1967 from the court of Shri M. B. Baadkar from whose court transfer was sought.", "canonical_name": "M. B.\n\nBaadkiir"}}, {"text": "Jagiasi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7803, "end_char": 7810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While dismissing the transfer application of the appellant in th.c criminal complaint filed by Jagiasi in the court of Shri P. D.\n\nSayyid the Additional Sessions Judge recorded an order that a report be submitted to the High Court for \"considering the con- G duct of the appellant and the course adopted by him in making the transfer application and in making imputations or aspersions against the Judicial Officers and , to take action for contempt .of court under s. 3(2) of the Contempt of Court's Act, 1952, hereinafter called the 'Act'.", "canonical_name": "Jagiasi"}}, {"text": "P. D.\n\nSayyid", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7832, "end_char": 7845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While dismissing the transfer application of the appellant in th.c criminal complaint filed by Jagiasi in the court of Shri P. D.\n\nSayyid the Additional Sessions Judge recorded an order that a report be submitted to the High Court for \"considering the con- G duct of the appellant and the course adopted by him in making the transfer application and in making imputations or aspersions against the Judicial Officers and , to take action for contempt .of court under s. 3(2) of the Contempt of Court's Act, 1952, hereinafter called the 'Act'.", "canonical_name": "P. D.\n\nSayyid"}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8174, "end_char": 8181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 1, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8562, "end_char": 8578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court made an\n\norder on December 1, 1967."}}, {"text": "J. D. Kalyari", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9039, "end_char": 9052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 some times alone and some times in company qf the Civil Judge J. D. Kalyari (Shri M. B.\n\nBaadkiir) who is also on friendly relations with the respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. B.\n\nBaadkiir", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9059, "end_char": 9074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 some times alone and some times in company qf the Civil Judge J. D. Kalyari (Shri M. B.\n\nBaadkiir) who is also on friendly relations with the respondent No.", "canonical_name": "M. B.\n\nBaadkiir"}}, {"text": "P. D. Sayyed", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9273, "end_char": 9285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Sessions Judge had called for report from the Magistrate Mr. P. D. Sayyed and was apparently satisfied after consideration of all the affidavits produced before him that the allegations was baseless.", "canonical_name": "P. D.\n\nSayyid"}}, {"text": "5th April, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10421, "end_char": 10436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2434, dated 5th April, 1967 forwarded by the 2nd Addi."}}, {"text": "G. L. Bhatia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10780, "end_char": 10792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<; trate, F. C.\n\nKalyan, requting to take action under the Contempt of Court's Act against the Advocate Mr. G. L. Bhatia, wlio has made serious allegations against the Judicial\n\nOfficers Shri Baadkar and Shri Sayyad in Transfer Cri."}}, {"text": "Baadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10864, "end_char": 10871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<; trate, F. C.\n\nKalyan, requting to take action under the Contempt of Court's Act against the Advocate Mr. G. L. Bhatia, wlio has made serious allegations against the Judicial\n\nOfficers Shri Baadkar and Shri Sayyad in Transfer Cri.", "canonical_name": "Baadkar"}}, {"text": "Sayyad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10881, "end_char": 10887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<; trate, F. C.\n\nKalyan, requting to take action under the Contempt of Court's Act against the Advocate Mr. G. L. Bhatia, wlio has made serious allegations against the Judicial\n\nOfficers Shri Baadkar and Shri Sayyad in Transfer Cri.", "canonical_name": "Sayyad"}}, {"text": "Bhatia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11096, "end_char": 11102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And whereas this Court has on 15.th June 1967, passed the following order :-\n\n\"Notice to Mr. Bhatia Advocate to show cause why action for contempt of Court should not be taken against him.", "canonical_name": "Bhatia"}}, {"text": "D. J.'s Jetter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11225, "end_char": 11239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of D. J.'s Jetter to be sent to Mr. Bhatia along with the notice.''"}}, {"text": "Bhatia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11258, "end_char": 11264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of D. J.'s Jetter to be sent to Mr. Bhatia along with the notice.''", "canonical_name": "Bhatia"}}, {"text": "Sarvshri Baadkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11489, "end_char": 11505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Judge in accordance with the orders of the High Court submitted a re_port giving his own findings on the evince\n\nrecorded by him and also after taking into consideration the reports of Sarvshri Baadkar and Sayyid which had been ailed for from them apparently after the witnesses produced by the apPCllant had given their evidence and copies pf their depositions had been ~µt to the two judges."}}, {"text": "Sayyid", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11510, "end_char": 11516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Judge in accordance with the orders of the High Court submitted a re_port giving his own findings on the evince\n\nrecorded by him and also after taking into consideration the reports of Sarvshri Baadkar and Sayyid which had been ailed for from them apparently after the witnesses produced by the apPCllant had given their evidence and copies pf their depositions had been ~µt to the two judges.", "canonical_name": "Sayyad"}}, {"text": "Iagiasi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12498, "end_char": 12505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "relied only~ on the allegations contained in para I of the application of transfer which have already been set out before and contents of which were that Shri Sayyid was on friendly relations with Iagiasi and that he had even enjoyed his hospitality sometimes alone and s<imetimes in the company of Shri Baadkar.", "canonical_name": "Jagiasi"}}, {"text": "D. Kalyan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13165, "end_char": 13174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 some times alone and some times in company of the Civil Judge J: D. Kalyan (Shri M. B.\n\nBaadkar) who is alilo on friendly relations with the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. B.\n\nBaadkar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13181, "end_char": 13195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 some times alone and some times in company of the Civil Judge J: D. Kalyan (Shri M. B.\n\nBaadkar) who is alilo on friendly relations with the Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "M. B.\n\nBaadkiir"}}, {"text": "s. 204(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14342, "end_char": 14351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14359, "end_char": 14385, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "15th October 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14472, "end_char": 14489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(d) On 15th October 1966 when the case in question was Sr."}}, {"text": "Sayyid", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15605, "end_char": 15611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question which immediately arises is whether an allegation of the nature made in para ( 1 ) in the circumstances of the present case in a transfer application would amount to contempt of the two judges Sarvshri Sayyid and Baadkar.", "canonical_name": "Sayyad"}}, {"text": "Articles 20 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16674, "end_char": 16692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1969] 2 S.C.R. 779", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17702, "end_char": 17721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18683, "end_char": 18692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J., (as he then was) Brahma Prakash Sharma's case (1953 SCR 1169) the publication of a disparaging statement will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the court's administration of justice or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties\"."}}, {"text": "Brahma Prakash Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18714, "end_char": 18735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J., (as he then was) Brahma Prakash Sharma's case (1953 SCR 1169) the publication of a disparaging statement will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the court's administration of justice or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties\"."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19447, "end_char": 19451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20772, "end_char": 20776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sarvashri Sayyid", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21358, "end_char": 21374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allegations contained in para 1 of the transfer application may or may not amount to defamation of the two judges, namely, Sarvashri Sayyid and Baadkar but to constitute contempt the other tests which have been discussed above must be fulfilled.", "canonical_name": "Sarvashri Sayyid"}}, {"text": "Baadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21379, "end_char": 21386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allegations contained in para 1 of the transfer application may or may not amount to defamation of the two judges, namely, Sarvashri Sayyid and Baadkar but to constitute contempt the other tests which have been discussed above must be fulfilled.", "canonical_name": "Baadkar"}}, {"text": "SayYid", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22253, "end_char": 22259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We find it impossible to hold in his favour that he has proved that Mr.\n\nSayYid had friendly relations with Mr. Jagiasi and was enioying the hospitality of Mr. Jagiasi either alone or in company with Mr. Baadkar, He has failed to prove that Mr. Baadkar had friendly relations with Mr. Jagiasi and enjoyed the hospitality of Mr. Jagiasi\".", "canonical_name": "Sayyad"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22914, "end_char": 22927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Publishers of Eastern Times and Prajatantra('), Jagannadhadas C.J. (as he then was) delivering the judgement of the Division Bench, after an exhaustive examination of the decided cases where the jurisdiction of the court for this class of contempt had in fact been exercised, observed :-\n\n\"A review of the cases in which a contempt committed by way of scandalising the court has been taken notice of, for punishment, shows clearly that the exercise of the punitive jurisdiction is confined to cases of very grave and scurrilous attack on the court or on the Judges in their judicial capacity, the ignoring of which would only result in encouraging a repetition of the same with a sense of impunity and which would thereby result in lowering the prestige and authority of the court\"."}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24099, "end_char": 24116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, during the pendency of certain rent suits filed before the Rent Suit Collector by the landlord, who was the wife of the Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, the tenant filed certain transfer applications before the Additional District Collector making statements like these :\n\n\"l. The lower court openly identified himself with the plaintiff Shrimati Swarnmayi Panigrahi and is so partial to her that no justice or impartial decision can be expected from him;\n\n2."}}, {"text": "Shrimati Swarnmayi Panigrahi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24303, "end_char": 24331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, during the pendency of certain rent suits filed before the Rent Suit Collector by the landlord, who was the wife of the Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, the tenant filed certain transfer applications before the Additional District Collector making statements like these :\n\n\"l. The lower court openly identified himself with the plaintiff Shrimati Swarnmayi Panigrahi and is so partial to her that no justice or impartial decision can be expected from him;\n\n2."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24615, "end_char": 24620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has gone out of the course prescribed by law and has taken over the function of witness and court in himself in such a way that there is no parallel to it in the history of litigation in India; and\n\n3."}}, {"text": "Lingarai\n\nPanigrahi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24724, "end_char": 24743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That opposite party wields extraordinary influence i)l the State as si'ie is the wife of Shri Lingarai\n\nPanigrahi Chief Justice of Orissa High Court."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26511, "end_char": 26531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Murli Dhar & Another('') was of the view that where an accused person in an application for transfer of a case made an assertion that the persons who had caused the proceedings to be instituted were on terms of intimacy with the offi.. cer trying the case and, therefore, he did not expect a fair and E impartial trial was not guilty of offence under s. 228, Indian Penal Code, there being no intention on the part of the applicant to insult the court, his object being merely .to procure."}}, {"text": "s. 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26897, "end_char": 26903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26905, "end_char": 26922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sarvashri Sayyid", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27744, "end_char": 27760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, in the present case, is an advocate and it is most wifortunate that though at the stage of the transfer G application be made certain allegations in para I about the social intimacy between Jagiasi and Sarvashri Sayyid and Baadkar, the two judicial officers, with the apparent object of securing a l:rans fer of the case he proceeded to take the highly ill-advised step of attempting to substantiate the allegation so made.", "canonical_name": "Sarvashri Sayyid"}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_548_560_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "R. P. KHANNA & ORS.\n\nS.A.F. ABBAS & ORS. ETC.\n\nFebruary 22, 1972\n\n[S. M. S!KRI, C.J., A. N. RAY AND M. H. BEG, JJ.]\n\nltidian Administrative Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules 1954, Rule 3(3) (b)-Year of allotment of promotee--Officiation in senior post prior to inclusion of promotee's name in Select List can be taken into consjderation only after approval by Central Government and Union Public Service Commission-Post held by promotee may be declared equivc.:lent to senior post rettrospectively.\n\nRule 3(3){b) of the Indian Administrative Service (Regulation of Senicnty) Rules 1954 laid down in its main part that tlr. year of allotment of an officer who was appointed to the service by promotion shall ™' the year of allotment of the junior-most among the officers who entered th: service by direct recruitment who officited continuously in a senior post from a date earlier than the date of commencement of such officiation by the former. The second proviso to the rule laid dwn that a promotee shall he deemed to have officiated dpntinuously in a senior post prior to the date of inclusion of his name in the Select List prepared in accordance with the requirements of the lndi':ln Adniinistrative Service {Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, if the period of such officiation prior to that date was approved by the Central Government in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission. The appellants became members of the Indian Administrative Service in the years 1949 and\n\n1950 by direct recruitm_ent.\n\nThe respondents were initially recruited to the executive branch of the Bihar State Civil Service and were subsequently in the years 1955 and 1956 promoted to the Indian Administrative Service. The Government of India on 3 September 1958 allotted to the respondents the year 1948 and placed them below the junior most amongst the direct recruits of the 1948 allotment in purported compliance with Rule 3 ( 3 )(b) aforesaid.\n\nThe appellants thereupon made a repre- Sentation to the Union Government as a result Of which the Union Government by order dated 20 September 1967 revised the seniority of the promotees and allotted to some of the promotees the year 1950 and to others the year 1952. In making this order the Government of India agreed with the Ministry of Law in its view that rule 2{g) of the Seniority Rules did not perm.it retrospective declaration of a post as equivalent to a senior post within the meaning of Rule 3(3){b) as had been done by the State Government in the cae, of the respondents. The respondents challenged the Union Government's order dated 20 September 1967 in the High Court.\n\nThat Court quashed the said order and directed that the promotees would continue to hold the year of allotment assigned to them in the year 1958. Jn appeal to this Court by the direct recruits the questions that fell for consideration were {i) whether the period of officiation in a senior post by a promotees prior to the inclusion of his name in the Select List could be taken into consi!leration without the appoval of the Central Government and the Union Public Service Commission as required by Rule 3(3){b); (ii) whether the State Government was authorised to retrospectively declare a post as equivalent to a 'senior post'; (iii)\n\nwhether in the circumstances of the case the order of the High Court restoring the year 1948 as the year df allotment for the respondents was right. ·\n\nHELD : (i) The Select List for the promotion of the respondents was fiually approved by the Uiiion Public Service Cornmm..ion on 26 Decem ber 1955. Rule 3(3)(b) of the Regulation of Seniority Rules, 1954 speaks of approval by the Central Government in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission of the period of the officiation prior to the date of the inclusion of the names of the promotees in the select list.\n\nThis approval '.lS contemplated in rule 3(3) (b) is a specific.approval and is directed to the particular matter mentioned therein as to whetber there is approval of the period of officiation prior to the inclusion of tne names in the selec~ list.\n\nOn the materials in the pre,., nt appeals it could not be held that the Central Government gave any approval in consultation with lhe Union Public Service Commission within the meaning of rule 3(3)(b) so as to enable the promotees to have the benefit of the period of officiation prior to the date of the inclusion of lheir names in the select list. [556H-557CJ\n\nD. R. Nim, /.P.S. v. Union of India, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 325 and State of Oris.a & Anr. v. B. K, MohapMra, L1970] l S.C.R. 266, opplied.\n\n(ii) The contention on behalf of the direct recruits that it is not open to the State to make a retrospective declaration with regard to posts be ing 1nade equivalent to senior posts was, however, unacceptable. (Reaw sons discussed.) The State Government has power to make such a retros pective declaration. The order of the Union Government dated 20 Sep tember 196 7 which directed the years of allotment on the basis that there could not be any rctr_pspcctive declaration Of equivalent i; ost could not be sustained. [557C-559HJ\n\n(iii) The High Court directed that the promotees must continue to hold ranks as assigned to them in the year 1958. This order of the High Court must be set aside for the reason that the year of allotment must now be determined by the approval of the Central Government in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission. [560AJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 565 and 1470 to 1474 ol 1970. Appeals trom the judgment and order dated November 7, 1969 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Cases Nos. 853, 854 and 877 to 880 of 1968.\n\nBasudeo Prasad, R. B. Datar and S. N. Prasad, for the appellan!S (in all the appeals).\n\nLal Narain Sinha, Advocate-General for the .State of B!har, C. K. Daphtary and U. P. Singh, for responderii No. 4 (in C.A.\n\nNo. 565 of 1970), respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 1473 of 1970) and respondent No. 3 (in C.As. Nos. 1470 to 1472 and 1474 of 1970).\n\nM. C. Chagla, Gobind Das and S. P. Naypr, for.respondent No. 3 (iin: C.As. NoS. 565 and 1473 of 1970) and respondent.No. 2 (in C.As. Nos. 1470 to 1472 and 1474 oi 1970). 7-L1031 Sup.Cl/72\n\nSUPREME COIJRT REPORTS\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA C. K. Daphtary, S. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg and V. I. Francis, for respondent No. 1 (in C.A. No. 14 70 of 1970).\n\nS. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg and V. I. Francis, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in C.A. No. 565 of 1970) aind respondent No. 1 (in C.As. Nos. 1471to1474 of 1970).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRay, J.-These six appeals are by certiificate from the judgment dated 7 November, 1969 of the High Court at Patria quashlng the order of the Government of India dated 20 September, 1967, and directing that the respondents must continue to hold rank as assigned to them in 1958.\n\nThe appellants and the respondents are now members of the lndian Administrative Service. For the sake of brevity the appellants can be described as direct recruits and the respondents as promotees.\n\nThe direct recruits were appointed to the Indian Administrative Service in the years 1949 and 1950 as a result of competitive examination held for nicruitment of candidates to that D Service.\n\nThe promotees were initially recruited to the executive branch of the Bihar Stiate Civil Service and were subsequently in the years 1955 and 1956 promoted to the Indian Administrative Service.\n\nThe controversy i!I the present appeals is as to the seniority E between the direct recruits and the promotees und.er the Indian Administrative Service (Regulation 9f Seniority) Rules, 1954.\n\nThe Government of India on 3 September, 1958 allotted to the promotees the year 1948 and placed them below the junior most amongst the direct recruits of the 1948 allotment.\n\nI The direct recruits thereafter made representation against the decision of the Government of India. Eventually, on 13 January, 1965 the State of Bihar forwarded the representation of the direct recruits to the Government of India against the decision made by the Government of India in the year 1958. On 4 January, 1966 ·\n\nthe Government of India took a tentative decision to allow the repreSentation of the direct recruits on !lie ground that the previous G decision was on wrong facts and on wrong interpretation.\n\nOn 14 April, 1967 the State of Bihar represented to the Government of India to reject the representation of the direct recruits on the ground that the facts alleged by the direct recruits were wrong.\n\nOn 20 September, 1967 the Government of India H however allowed the representation of the direct recruits and revised the seniority of the promotees and allotted to some of the promotees the year 1950 and to some of the promotees the year\n\n1952 as mentioned in the letter of the Government of lndia dated 20 September, 1967 set out hereunder:-\n\n\"The matter was further examined in consultation with the Ministry of Law, who have reiterated their earlier advice and said that rule 2(g) of the Indian Administrative Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954 does not permit retro-!'ctive declaration of a post equivalent to a senior post of the I.As.- The declaration made by the State Government in the presen~ case cannot have retrospective operation. It will have prospective operation.\n\nThe Government of India have therefore decided to revise the seniority of the officers concerned. It will appear from the attached statement that the relevant dates for the purpQ.Ses of fixation of seniority will be 26 December, 1955 in the case of S/Shri S. C. Mishra, S. A. F. Abbas, R. S. Manda!, S. K. Sinha and S. K.\n\nChakravarty; 1 February, 1956 in the case of Shri S.\n\nSahay and 17 October, 1956 in the case of S/Shri Ramanand Sinha, Anwar Karim, R. C. Sinha, S. K.\n\nGhosh and M. Alam. As Shri M. K. Mukherjee the seniormost regular recruit of 1950 batch started officiating continuously in senior posts with effect from 2 May, 1955 , a date earlier than the relevant dates of S/Shri S. C. Mishra, S. A. F. Abbas, R. S. Manda!, S. K. Sinha, S. K. Chakravarty, N. P. Sinha and S. Sahay, these officers may be re-!tllotted to the year 1950 and may be placed before Shri S. D. Prasad (RR-1950) and above Shri P. S. Appu (RR-1951).\n\nShri N. Nagamani, the seniormost regular recruit of 1952 batch started officiating continuously in senior posts earlier than the relevant dates of S / Shri Raman and Sinha, A'.nwar Karim, R. C.\n\nSinha, S. K. Ghosh and M. Alam. These officers may be allotted to the year 1952 and may be placed below Shri K. K. Srivastava (RR-1952) and above Shri R. B.\n\nLal (SCS, SR-1952)\".\n\nThe promotees impe<1ched the Government of India Memoran- G dum dated 20 September, 1967 principally on the ground that the Government of India. was wrong in holding th!'t it was not competent to the St:ate of Bihar to make a retrospective declaration of a post as equivalent to a cadre iiost. The promotees succeeded in the High Court.\n\nThe High Court quashed the order dated 20 September 1967 and directed that the promotees would continue to hold th~ year of allotment assigned to them in the year 1958.\n\nThe Indian , Administrative Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954 formed the bone of contention between the direct\n\nrruits and the promotees. In order to appreciate the rival content1on.s refere!1ce may be made to the origin of the Indian Adminis-! trative Service and the relevant rules and regulations in that behalf.\n\nThe origin of the Indian Administrative Service is to be found in .the Memorandum of Agreement dated 21 October 1946 between the Government of India and the Government of the then Provinces. 1The Indian Administrative Service came to be consti\n\ntuted under the Agreement with effect from 21 Ociober, 1946.\n\nRecruitment to the Indian Administrative Service was to be by direct recruitment or by promotion of members of a Provincial Civil Service. The Indian Civil Administrative Cadre Rules, 1950 specified in the Schedule thereto for each Province the strength of the cadre and the number and character of the posts. In 1951 the All-India Services Act came into existence. Tne All-India Service was defined t9 mean the Indian Administrative Service or the Service known as the Indian Police Service. Later on section 2(a) was introduced into the 1951 Act to include certain other specified Services as All India Services.\n\nSection 3 of the All-India Services Act, 1951 conferred power on the Cent; ral Government after consultation with the Governments of the States conerned to make rules for the regulation of recruitment and the conditions of service of persons appointed to All-India Service. That is how the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, d 954 came into exisnce repealing the Indian Civil\n\nAdministrativ~ Cadre Rules, 1950. So did the Indian Administrative Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954 and the Indian Administrative Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954.\n\nTwo other Regulations which are material for the purposes of the present appeals are the Indian fl.dministrative Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955 and the Indian Administrative Service (Fixation of Ca.dre Strength) Regulations, 1955.\n\nThe Promotion Regulations, 1955 were in exercise of the rule making power under rule 8 of the Indian Administrative Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954. The Fixation of Cadre Strength Regulations, 1955 were made in exercise of the rule making power conferred on the Central Government by rule 4 of the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules.\n\nThe 1954 Cadre Rules defined cadre post to mean any of the posts specified in item 1 of the Schedule to the Indian Administrative Service (Fixation of Cadre Strength) Regulations. The Cadre Strength Regulations, 1955 set out the strength and the composition of the cadre in relation to the different States including Bihar. For the State of Bihar there. are 8 items.\n\nThe first item relates to senior posts under the State Government which are 103 in number and item 2 relates to senior posts under the Central Government which are 41 in number. Of these 144 posts 36 are to be filled by promotion and sclecon in accordance with\n\nA rule 8 of the Recruitment Rules, 1954. The other 108 posts are to be filled by direct recruitment. Items 5, 6, 7 and 8 in the Bihar Cadre Strength relate to .other posts with which the present appeals are not concerned. Of the total authorised strength of 211 cadre posts in the State of Bihar 175 are direct recruitment posts and 36 are promotion posts.\n\nThe Regulation of Seniority Rules, 1954 .B defines senior post meaning a post included and specified under item 1 of the cadre of each State in the Schedule to the Fixation of Cadre Strength Regulations •. 1955. The 1954 Recruitment Rules speak of recruitment to the Service inter alia (a) by a competitive examinallion, and (b) by promotion. The other two modes of recruitment by selection fmm emergency commissioned officers and c from persons who hold any substantive capacity gazetted post and who are not members of the State Civil Service are not relevant for the purpose of the present appeals.\n\nRule 7 of the Recruitment Rules, 1954 relates to recruitment by competitive examination and rule 8 relates to recruitment by promotion or selection. The Promotion Regulations, 1955 prescribed the conditions of eligibility D for promot, ion.\n\nIn the background of these Rules and Regulations it follows that members of a State Civil Service are promoted to the Indian Administrative Service. The present appeals relate to promotees after the abovementioned Rules and Regulations came into existence.\n\nThe question of ireniority of promotees vis>-a-vis direct recruits is covered by rule 3(3)(b) of the Indian Administrative Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954 which is set out hereunder :-\n\n\"The year of allotment of an officer appointed to the Service after the commencement of these rules, shall be:-\n\n(b) where the officer is appointed to the Service by promotion in accordarice with sub-rule ( 1) of rule 8 of the Recruitment Rules, the year of allotment of the junior-most among the officers recruited to the Service in accordance with rule 7 of these rules who officiated continuously in a senior post from a date earlier than the date of commencement of such officiating by the former :\n\nProvided that the year of allotment of an officer appointed to the Service in accordance with sub-rule (I) of rule 8 of the Recruitment Rules who started officiating continuously in a senior post from a dae earlier than he date on which any of t!he officers recrmted l'O the service in accordance with rule 7 of those rules so started officiating, shall be determined ad hoc by the Central\n\n554 SUPREME COURT llEPORTS\n\nL 1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nGovernment i:n consultation with the State Governmen,\n\nconcerned.\n\nProvided further that an officer appointed to the Service after the commencement of these rules in accordance with sub-rule (1) of rule 8 of the Recruitment Rules shall be deemed to hav• officiated continuously in a senior post prior to the date of the inclusion of his name in 'the Seleco List prepared in acdordance wit'h the requirements of the Indian Administrative Service (Appointment bY. Promotion) Regtilations framed under sub-rule (1) of rule 8 of the Recruitment Rules, if the period of such officiation prior to that date is approved by the Central Government in consultation with the Com.mission\".\n\nThere are two explanations which need not be set out because ·\n\nthey are not relevant for the purposes of the present appeals.\n\nThe scheme of the Indian Administrative Service (Regulation ·\n\nof Seniority) Rules, 1954 is that every officer shall be assigned a Ii) year of al!Ollment in accordance with the provisions contained therein.\n\nThe present appeals raise the question of the year of allotment of the promotees who were promoted to the Service, after the commencement of the Rules, in the years 1955 and 1956.\n\nTherefore, rule 3(3 ){b) applies to the case of 1ib.e promotees vis-avis the direct recruits.\n\nThe Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954 is the counter-part of the Indian Administrative Service (Regulation ()f Seniority) Rules, 1954. Rule 3(3)(b) of the Indian Police Service (RegulatiOn of Seniority) Rules is in identical language with rule 3(3)(b) of the Indian Administrative Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules.\n\nRule 3(3 )(b) of the Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules came up for consideration before this Court in two cases.\n\nThese are the decisions in D. R. Nim, l.P.S. v. Union of India(') and State of Orissa & Anr. v. B. K.\n\nMahapatra(').\n\nRule 3(3)(b) which is in common language in the Rules of both the Services and the two provisos lay down the mode of regulation of seniority of the promotees vis-a-vis the direct recruits.\n\nPromotees will be given the year of allotment of\n\nG the junior-most among direct recruits who officiated in a senior post from a date earlier than the date of commencement of such officiation by a promotee. The first proviso regulates the seniority between direct recruits and promotees who started officiating continuously in a senior post from a date er!ier than the . te on which the direct recruits so started officia#ing by ~~1bmbg tthhe JI mode of regulation of seniority by ad hoc determmatton Y e Central Government iµ consultation with the State Government.\n\n\nThe effect of the second proviso was stated by this Court in Nim's(') case to be this : \"The second proviso limits the operation of the first proviso by diyiding the officiating period into two classes; first, a period before the date of inclusion of an officer in the Select List and, secondly, the period after that date.\n\nThe first period can. on!)' be counted if such period is approved by the Central Government in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission\".\n\nThe rulings of this ourt hold that a promotee can obtain the advantage of officiation continuously in a senior post prior to the inclusion of the name in the Select List if the period of such officiation is approved by the Central Government in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission. The officiation in a senior post is one of the indispensable ingredients in the application of rule 3(3)(b). A senior post as defined -in the Regulation of Seniority Rules means a post included and specified under item 1 of the cadre of the State or any post declared equivalent thereto by the State Government concerned. It may be stated here that the\n\ndefinition of senior post underwent change in the year 1967 by notification No. 27/47/64-AIS(IIl)-A dated 17 April, 1967 and the new definition of senior post came into effect on 22. April, 1967.\n\nThe present appeals are governed by the definition of senior post prior to the year 1967. The important words in the relevant deli• nition of the senior post are 'any post declared equivalent thereto by the State Government'.\n\nThe memorandum dafud 20 September, 1967 Was impeached by the promotees on the ground that the State Government could not make a retrospective declaration with regard to malting posts equivalent to senior pQSts.\n\nCounsel on behalf of direct recruits contended that the letter dated 9 April, 1958 from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bihar to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs could not amount to a declaration of posts as equivalent to senior posts and further '1Jiat there could not be any retrospective declaration of making posts equivalent to senior posts.\n\nCounsel on behalf of the Union contended that the declaration contemplated with regard to senior posts must be a formal order G and it was not open to the State to make a retro-active declaration because the rule contemplated approval of such officiation in consultation with the Commission. In other words, it was said that the State would first have to make a declaration with regard to making posts equivalent to senior posts and thereaft!er approval of such officiation would be given by the State Government in consul-\n\nH tation with the Public Service Commission.\n\nCriticism was made by counsel for the direct recruits that there was no proper Select List and Rao's letter dated 9 July, 1958 and\n\n(I) [1970] 2 S.C.R 325.\n\nthe reply thereto dated 3 September, 1958 by the Deputy Secretary to t; he Government of India wer!l contended not to amount to approval by the Central Government in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission of the period of officiation prior to the date of inclusion of the names of promotees in the Select List.\n\nThere was an ad hoc list in the year 1954 and the ad hoc list is referred to in the Chief Secretary's letter with the letter 'A'. The select list was prepared in the year 1955 and is referred to in the Chief Secretary's letter with the letter ''B'. In the Chief Secretary's letter the date of officiation of the promotees was proposed by the State Government to be 28 December, 1954. The date of officiation in the senior scale by the promotees as agreed to by the Government of India was shown in that letter as some time in the month of October, 1955 with regard to three promotees and in the month of December, 1955 with regard to 1ihe fourth promotee.\n\nWith regard to the other three promotees no date was shown as having been agreed to l:>Y the Government of India. The State Government proposed with regard to some of the promotees that they should be allowed the benefit of officiation from the time of the inclusion of their names in the ad hoc list in the year 1954.\n\nThe Deputy. Secretary tci the GovernmenQ of India by letter dated 3 September, 1958 accepted the recommendation of the State Government with re2:ard to the promotees and allotted to them the year 1948 and placed the promotees below Shri B. S. Srivastava who was the junior most among direct recruits who had started officiating continuously in a senior p0st earlier than 28 December,\n\n1954. The impeached ircular dated 20 September, 1967 did not allow retrospective declaration of equivalent posts and therefore the year of allotment was no longer 1948. The High Court held that there could be retrospective declaration and thus in effect restored 1948 as the year of allotment.\n\nThe Government of India by the letter dated 20 September, 1967 which is impeached by the promotees changed the. year of allotment of the promotees from 1948 to 1950 with regard to the first three promotee9 and to the year 1951 with regard to the fourth promotee and the year 1952 with regard to the other two promotees and placed these promofees below the direct recruits of those batches who started officiating continuously in a senior post earlier than the date of such officiation bv the promotees.\n\nOn these materials it appears that the ad hoc list was prepared with the approval of the Union Public Service Commission on 28 December, 1954 and the Select List was finally approved by the Union Public Service Commission on 26 December, 1955.\n\nThe select list was the list prepared for appointment of the promotees by promotion to the Indian Administrative Ser.ice. Rule 3(3)(b)\n\n1f the Regulation of Seniority Rules, 1954 speaks of approval by\n\n.A the Central Governm_ent in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission of the period of officiation pr(or to the date of e inclusion of the names of the promotees in the select list.\n\nThis .app:oval as contemplated in rule 3(3)(b.) is-a specific approval and 1s drrected to the par!Jcular matter mentioned therein as to whether there is approval of the period of officiation prior to the B inclusion of the names in the select list. On the materials in the present appeals we are unable to hold that the Central Government gave any approval in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission within the meaning of rule 3(3) (b) so as to enable the promotees the benefit of the period of officiation prior to the date of the inclusion of their names in the select list.\n\nThe contention on behalf of the direct recruits that it is not open to the State -to make a retrospective declaration with regard to posts being made equivalent to senior posts is unacceptable. From the point of view of workability of the rule as well as the circumstances and the COl)ditions of service it may not always be practicable to make such prospective declaration.\n\nIt is only when the Government has found that it is necessary or desirable to declare such posts equivalent to senior posts that the Government will do so. That will be usually possible after the Government will have considered several factors, namely, finance, structure of the service, the personnel fit' for undertaking the post. Normally, the promotees obtain promotion from the State Civil Service after long E service.\n\nThat is why rule 3(3)(b) of the Regulation of Seniority Rules is designed to arrive at a fair adjustment of the competing claims of the direct recruits and the promotees. To hold that a promotee could not get the benefit of officiation unless the post was declared as equivalent to a senior cadre post before the promotee was appointed to officiate might defeat the policy of the Govern-\n\nF ment. A promot_ee may be officiating continuously for a long period and his name may be included in the select list after some time.\n\nAgain a person who officiates continuously for long time may thereafter be not included in the select list. Such a person\n\nrnlht deprive a person who would otherwise be found suitable for appointment by w:omotion after similar officiation in a sil)lilar post. 'It is only when the State Government finds that it is desirable to G declare the post equivalent to a senior post inter alia by reason of the efficiency of the person which has entitled him to promotion that the consequential necessity arises for giving him that senior post by requisite declaration of a senior _ post.\n\nA retrospective declaration therefore is in the scheme of things practical as well as\n\nreasonable. ·\n\nThe basic idea of declaration of post as equivalent to a senior post is that it is treated as a post of equal rank and responsibility. 'Ruic 3(3)(b) is designed to strike a balance between conflicting\n\nclaims. When a promotee with the background of a long conti- \"' nuous officiation gets promotion it is in the fitness of things that the peod of .such officiation is not lost to him.\n\nThe necessary check 1s supplied by approval by the Central Government in consultation with the Commission.\n\nThere will be two sources charged with the ft'.sponsibility of approval of the period of officiation prior to the inclusion of the name in the select list. \"B\n\nA retrospective declaration that a post is equivalent to a senior post really amounts to declaration of an existing fact. . It is that tho person who has officiated continuously for a long time i~ allowed the benefit of a senior post prior to the appointment by promotion of such officer to the Cadre of the Indian Administrative Service. Ordinarily, under Cadre Rules a non-cadre officer cannot hold a cadre post excepting for short time of three months and if it is for a longer period not without approval by the Central Government. Therefore, there is no occasion for declaration by\n\nthe State Government of a non-cadre post as equivalent to a cadre post. The question of declaration arises only for the purpose of giving the promotee the benefit of the period of officiation prior )) to promotion. The use of the word 'deemed' in rule 3(3)(b) of the Regulation of Seniority Rules indicates that the Government has the power to make a retrospective declaration because it Js only after promotion that there is any occasion to consider whether the period of offication prior to promotion will be counted for purposes of seniority.\n\nThe harmonious construction of the definition of 'senior post' occurring in the 1954 Cadre Rules along with rule 3(3)(b) of\n\nthe Regulation of Seniority Rules is that promotee will by a legal fiction obtain advantage of the period of officiation first by the declaration and second bv the approval of the Central Government in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission.\n\nF It is not the declaration but the approval which introduces the legal fiction.\n\nThere is an apprehension that retrospective declaration might cause mischief in the sense that it would enable a promotee to obtain seniority as against a direct recruit. The apprehension is unmerited because promotees obtain promotion after long service G and that is why the year of allotment of promotee is below the junior most among direct recruits who continuously officiated in a senior post from a date earlier than the date of commencement of such officiation by the promotee. Again, there may .be a salutary reason to defend a retrospective declaration because a prospective declaration by the State Government may not be acceptable H to the Central Government by not giving approval of the period of officiation prior to the date of inclusion of the names in the select list. There is no time limit fixed with regard to approval by the\n\nCentral Government.\n\nTherefore, . a retrospective declaration will be under the check of approval by the Central Government and such approval will always act as a. safecty valve against any abuse or mischief of retospective declaration.\n\nIt is important to notice that' the defuutlon of 'Senior post' has undergone change in the year 1967. The amendment of the definition has brushed way the necessity of any declaration by the Government of a post being made equivalent to senior cadre post. also deleted the second nroviso to rule 3(3)(b) of the Regulation of Seniority Rules. In place of the second proviso a new explanation has been added. The explanation states , that in respect of a promotee the period of continuous officiation in a senior post shall, for the purposes of determination of his seniority, count only from the date of the inclusion of l)is name in the Select List, or from the date of his officiating appointment to such senior post whichever is later; The declaration of a .P<>St to be equivalent to a senior post and the approval of the Government of India in consultation with the Commiss!on fur alk>\\vjng a promotee the benefit of the period of continuous officiation prior to the inclusion of his nam11 in the Select List are all obsolete now. One of the reasons for the changes may be that a prospective declaration might give rise to show of preference or favour to some chosen persons who might not turn out to be suitable person to fill that post.\n\nAgain, the disadvan-. tage of prospective declaration may be that the Government might be saddled with the problem of a declaration in anticipation and later finding out the absence of necessity of such a post or even of not finding a suitable person for occupying such a post. The soundness of a retrospective declaration rests on the consideration that not only will the promotee by that time have been tried and tested in that post but also his promotion would indicate the benefit of the period of continuous officiation which earned promotion for him. To deny a retrospective declaration would in the case of promotion of persons from State Civil Service deprive them of the opportunity of enjoyment of the period. of officiation.'\n\nFor these reasons, we uphold the judgment of the High Court that the memorandum dated 20 September, 1967 which stated that the State Government could not retrospectively declare a post to be equivalent to a senior post was bad.\n\nThe State Government has power to make such a retrospective declaration. The order\n\ndated 20 September, 1967 which also directed the years of allotment on the basis that there could not be any retrospective declaration of equivalent post cannot be sustained.\n\nThe High Court however further directed that the promotees must continue to hold ranks as assigned to them in the year 1958\".\n\nThis order of the High Court is to be set aside, for the reason that A the year of allotment will now have to be determined by the approval of the Central Government in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission.\n\nThe appeals are therefore dismissed in so far as they relate to quashing of the order of the Central Government dated 20 Septem- B ber, 1967. The appeals are allowed setting aside the order of the High Court that the promotees would continue to hold ranks as assigned to them in the year 1958. In .the facts and circumstances of the case parties will pay and bear their own costs.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 96, "entities": [{"text": "R. P. KHANNA & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. P. KHANNA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.F. ABBAS & ORS. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.A.F. ABBAS & ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 22, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 22, 1972\n\n[S. M. S!KRI, C.J., A. N. RAY AND M. H. BEG, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1332, "end_char": 1350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second proviso to the rule laid dwn that a promotee shall he deemed to have officiated dpntinuously in a senior post prior to the date of inclusion of his name in the Select List prepared in accordance with the requirements of the lndi':ln Adniinistrative Service {Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, if the period of such officiation prior to that date was approved by the Central Government in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1376, "end_char": 1407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second proviso to the rule laid dwn that a promotee shall he deemed to have officiated dpntinuously in a senior post prior to the date of inclusion of his name in the Select List prepared in accordance with the requirements of the lndi':ln Adniinistrative Service {Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, if the period of such officiation prior to that date was approved by the Central Government in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1727, "end_char": 1746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India on 3 September 1958 allotted to the respondents the year 1948 and placed them below the junior most amongst the direct recruits of the 1948 allotment in purported compliance with Rule 3 ( 3 )(b) aforesaid."}}, {"text": "3 September 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1750, "end_char": 1766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India on 3 September 1958 allotted to the respondents the year 1948 and placed them below the junior most amongst the direct recruits of the 1948 allotment in purported compliance with Rule 3 ( 3 )(b) aforesaid."}}, {"text": "Union Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2052, "end_char": 2068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants thereupon made a repre- Sentation to the Union Government as a result Of which the Union Government by order dated 20 September 1967 revised the seniority of the promotees and allotted to some of the promotees the year 1950 and to others the year 1952."}}, {"text": "Regulation of Seniority Rules, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3598, "end_char": 3633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "D. R. Nim", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4467, "end_char": 4476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "556H-557CJ\n\nD. R. Nim, /.P.S. v. Union of India, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 325 and State of Oris.a & Anr."}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 S.C.R. 325", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4504, "end_char": 4523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "20 Sep tember 196 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4949, "end_char": 4968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of the Union Government dated 20 Sep tember 196 7 which directed the years of allotment on the basis that there could not be any rctr_pspcctive declaration Of equivalent i; ost could not be sustained. ["}}, {"text": "November 7, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5590, "end_char": 5606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals trom the judgment and order dated November 7, 1969 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Cases Nos."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5614, "end_char": 5630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals trom the judgment and order dated November 7, 1969 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Cases Nos."}}, {"text": "Basudeo Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5703, "end_char": 5717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basudeo Prasad, R. B. Datar and S. N. Prasad, for the appellan!S (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. B. Datar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5719, "end_char": 5730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basudeo Prasad, R. B. Datar and S. N. Prasad, for the appellan!S (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. N. Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5735, "end_char": 5747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basudeo Prasad, R. B. Datar and S. N. Prasad, for the appellan!S (in all the appeals).", "canonical_name": "S. N. Prasad"}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5791, "end_char": 5807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Advocate-General for the .State of B!har, C. K. Daphtary and U. P. Singh, for responderii No."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5851, "end_char": 5865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Advocate-General for the .State of B!har, C. K. Daphtary and U. P. Singh, for responderii No."}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5870, "end_char": 5881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Advocate-General for the .State of B!har, C. K. Daphtary and U. P. Singh, for responderii No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6046, "end_char": 6058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, Gobind Das and S. P. Naypr, for.respondent No."}}, {"text": "Gobind Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6060, "end_char": 6070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, Gobind Das and S. P. Naypr, for.respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. P. Naypr", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6075, "end_char": 6086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, Gobind Das and S. P. Naypr, for.respondent No."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COIJRT REPORTS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6235, "end_char": 6257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cl/72\n\nSUPREME COIJRT REPORTS\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA C. K. Daphtary, S. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg and V. I. Francis, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "A C. K. Daphtary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6276, "end_char": 6292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cl/72\n\nSUPREME COIJRT REPORTS\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA C. K. Daphtary, S. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg and V. I. Francis, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6294, "end_char": 6307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cl/72\n\nSUPREME COIJRT REPORTS\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA C. K. Daphtary, S. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg and V. I. Francis, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6309, "end_char": 6319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cl/72\n\nSUPREME COIJRT REPORTS\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA C. K. Daphtary, S. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg and V. I. Francis, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "V. I. Francis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6324, "end_char": 6337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cl/72\n\nSUPREME COIJRT REPORTS\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA C. K. Daphtary, S. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg and V. I. Francis, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6593, "end_char": 6596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRay, J.-These six appeals are by certiificate from the judgment dated 7 November, 1969 of the High Court at Patria quashlng the order of the Government of India dated 20 September, 1967, and directing that the respondents must continue to hold rank as assigned to them in 1958."}}, {"text": "20 September, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6760, "end_char": 6778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRay, J.-These six appeals are by certiificate from the judgment dated 7 November, 1969 of the High Court at Patria quashlng the order of the Government of India dated 20 September, 1967, and directing that the respondents must continue to hold rank as assigned to them in 1958."}}, {"text": "Bihar Stiate Civil Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7334, "end_char": 7360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The promotees were initially recruited to the executive branch of the Bihar Stiate Civil Service and were subsequently in the years 1955 and 1956 promoted to the Indian Administrative Service."}}, {"text": "3 September, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7677, "end_char": 7694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India on 3 September, 1958 allotted to the promotees the year 1948 and placed them below the junior most amongst the direct recruits of the 1948 allotment."}}, {"text": "13 January, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7942, "end_char": 7958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eventually, on 13 January, 1965 the State of Bihar forwarded the representation of the direct recruits to the Government of India against the decision made by the Government of India in the year 1958."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7963, "end_char": 7977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eventually, on 13 January, 1965 the State of Bihar forwarded the representation of the direct recruits to the Government of India against the decision made by the Government of India in the year 1958."}}, {"text": "4 January, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8131, "end_char": 8146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 4 January, 1966 ·\n\nthe Government of India took a tentative decision to allow the repreSentation of the direct recruits on !"}}, {"text": "14 April, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8347, "end_char": 8361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 14 April, 1967 the State of Bihar represented to the Government of India to reject the representation of the direct recruits on the ground that the facts alleged by the direct recruits were wrong."}}, {"text": "Government of lndia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8824, "end_char": 8843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 20 September, 1967 the Government of India H however allowed the representation of the direct recruits and revised the seniority of the promotees and allotted to some of the promotees the year 1950 and to some of the promotees the year\n\n1952 as mentioned in the letter of the Government of lndia dated 20 September, 1967 set out hereunder:-\n\n\"The matter was further examined in consultation with the Ministry of Law, who have reiterated their earlier advice and said that rule 2(g) of the Indian Administrative Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954 does not permit retro-!'ctive declaration of a post equivalent to a senior post of the I.As.- The declaration made by the State Government in the presen~ case cannot have retrospective operation."}}, {"text": "S. C. Mishra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9594, "end_char": 9606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will appear from the attached statement that the relevant dates for the purpQ.Ses of fixation of seniority will be 26 December, 1955 in the case of S/Shri S. C. Mishra, S. A. F. Abbas, R. S. Manda!,", "canonical_name": "S. C. Mishra"}}, {"text": "S. A. F. Abbas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9608, "end_char": 9622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will appear from the attached statement that the relevant dates for the purpQ.Ses of fixation of seniority will be 26 December, 1955 in the case of S/Shri S. C. Mishra, S. A. F. Abbas, R. S. Manda!,", "canonical_name": "S. A. F. Abbas"}}, {"text": "R. S. Manda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9624, "end_char": 9635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will appear from the attached statement that the relevant dates for the purpQ.Ses of fixation of seniority will be 26 December, 1955 in the case of S/Shri S. C. Mishra, S. A. F. Abbas, R. S. Manda!,"}}, {"text": "S. K. Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9638, "end_char": 9649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Sinha and S. K.\n\nChakravarty; 1 February, 1956 in the case of Shri S.\n\nSahay and 17 October, 1956 in the case of S/Shri Ramanand Sinha, Anwar Karim, R. C. Sinha, S. K.\n\nGhosh and M. Alam."}}, {"text": "S. K.\n\nChakravarty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9654, "end_char": 9672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Sinha and S. K.\n\nChakravarty; 1 February, 1956 in the case of Shri S.\n\nSahay and 17 October, 1956 in the case of S/Shri Ramanand Sinha, Anwar Karim, R. C. Sinha, S. K.\n\nGhosh and M. Alam.", "canonical_name": "S. K.\n\nChakravarty"}}, {"text": "S.\n\nSahay", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9711, "end_char": 9720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Sinha and S. K.\n\nChakravarty; 1 February, 1956 in the case of Shri S.\n\nSahay and 17 October, 1956 in the case of S/Shri Ramanand Sinha, Anwar Karim, R. C. Sinha, S. K.\n\nGhosh and M. Alam.", "canonical_name": "S.\n\nSahay"}}, {"text": "Ramanand Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9764, "end_char": 9778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Sinha and S. K.\n\nChakravarty; 1 February, 1956 in the case of Shri S.\n\nSahay and 17 October, 1956 in the case of S/Shri Ramanand Sinha, Anwar Karim, R. C. Sinha, S. K.\n\nGhosh and M. Alam."}}, {"text": "Anwar Karim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9780, "end_char": 9791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Sinha and S. K.\n\nChakravarty; 1 February, 1956 in the case of Shri S.\n\nSahay and 17 October, 1956 in the case of S/Shri Ramanand Sinha, Anwar Karim, R. C. Sinha, S. K.\n\nGhosh and M. Alam.", "canonical_name": "A'.nwar Karim"}}, {"text": "R. C. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9793, "end_char": 9804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Sinha and S. K.\n\nChakravarty; 1 February, 1956 in the case of Shri S.\n\nSahay and 17 October, 1956 in the case of S/Shri Ramanand Sinha, Anwar Karim, R. C. Sinha, S. K.\n\nGhosh and M. Alam.", "canonical_name": "R. C.\n\nSinha"}}, {"text": "S. K.\n\nGhosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9806, "end_char": 9818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Sinha and S. K.\n\nChakravarty; 1 February, 1956 in the case of Shri S.\n\nSahay and 17 October, 1956 in the case of S/Shri Ramanand Sinha, Anwar Karim, R. C. Sinha, S. K.\n\nGhosh and M. Alam.", "canonical_name": "S. K.\n\nGhosh"}}, {"text": "M. Alam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9823, "end_char": 9830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Sinha and S. K.\n\nChakravarty; 1 February, 1956 in the case of Shri S.\n\nSahay and 17 October, 1956 in the case of S/Shri Ramanand Sinha, Anwar Karim, R. C. Sinha, S. K.\n\nGhosh and M. Alam."}}, {"text": "M. K. Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9840, "end_char": 9855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Shri M. K. Mukherjee the seniormost regular recruit of 1950 batch started officiating continuously in senior posts with effect from 2 May, 1955 , a date earlier than the relevant dates of S/Shri S. C. Mishra, S. A. F. Abbas, R. S. Manda!,"}}, {"text": "S. C. Mishra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10030, "end_char": 10042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Shri M. K. Mukherjee the seniormost regular recruit of 1950 batch started officiating continuously in senior posts with effect from 2 May, 1955 , a date earlier than the relevant dates of S/Shri S. C. Mishra, S. A. F. Abbas, R. S. Manda!,", "canonical_name": "S. C. Mishra"}}, {"text": "S. A. F. Abbas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10044, "end_char": 10058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Shri M. K. Mukherjee the seniormost regular recruit of 1950 batch started officiating continuously in senior posts with effect from 2 May, 1955 , a date earlier than the relevant dates of S/Shri S. C. Mishra, S. A. F. Abbas, R. S. Manda!,", "canonical_name": "S. A. F. Abbas"}}, {"text": "S. K. Chakravarty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10087, "end_char": 10104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Sinha, S. K. Chakravarty, N. P. Sinha and S. Sahay, these officers may be re-!tllotted to the year 1950 and may be placed before Shri S. D. Prasad (RR-1950) and above Shri P. S. Appu (RR-1951).", "canonical_name": "S. K.\n\nChakravarty"}}, {"text": "N. P. Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10106, "end_char": 10117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Sinha, S. K. Chakravarty, N. P. Sinha and S. Sahay, these officers may be re-!tllotted to the year 1950 and may be placed before Shri S. D. Prasad (RR-1950) and above Shri P. S. Appu (RR-1951)."}}, {"text": "S. Sahay", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10122, "end_char": 10130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Sinha, S. K. Chakravarty, N. P. Sinha and S. Sahay, these officers may be re-!tllotted to the year 1950 and may be placed before Shri S. D. Prasad (RR-1950) and above Shri P. S. Appu (RR-1951).", "canonical_name": "S.\n\nSahay"}}, {"text": "S. D. Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10214, "end_char": 10226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Sinha, S. K. Chakravarty, N. P. Sinha and S. Sahay, these officers may be re-!tllotted to the year 1950 and may be placed before Shri S. D. Prasad (RR-1950) and above Shri P. S. Appu (RR-1951).", "canonical_name": "S. N. Prasad"}}, {"text": "P. S. Appu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10252, "end_char": 10262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Sinha, S. K. Chakravarty, N. P. Sinha and S. Sahay, these officers may be re-!tllotted to the year 1950 and may be placed before Shri S. D. Prasad (RR-1950) and above Shri P. S. Appu (RR-1951)."}}, {"text": "N. Nagamani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10280, "end_char": 10291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri N. Nagamani, the seniormost regular recruit of 1952 batch started officiating continuously in senior posts earlier than the relevant dates of S / Shri Raman and Sinha, A'.nwar Karim, R. C.\n\nSinha, S. K. Ghosh and M. Alam."}}, {"text": "Raman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10431, "end_char": 10436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri N. Nagamani, the seniormost regular recruit of 1952 batch started officiating continuously in senior posts earlier than the relevant dates of S / Shri Raman and Sinha, A'.nwar Karim, R. C.\n\nSinha, S. K. Ghosh and M. Alam."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10441, "end_char": 10446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri N. Nagamani, the seniormost regular recruit of 1952 batch started officiating continuously in senior posts earlier than the relevant dates of S / Shri Raman and Sinha, A'.nwar Karim, R. C.\n\nSinha, S. K. Ghosh and M. Alam."}}, {"text": "A'.nwar Karim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10448, "end_char": 10461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri N. Nagamani, the seniormost regular recruit of 1952 batch started officiating continuously in senior posts earlier than the relevant dates of S / Shri Raman and Sinha, A'.nwar Karim, R. C.\n\nSinha, S. K. Ghosh and M. Alam.", "canonical_name": "A'.nwar Karim"}}, {"text": "R. C.\n\nSinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10463, "end_char": 10475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri N. Nagamani, the seniormost regular recruit of 1952 batch started officiating continuously in senior posts earlier than the relevant dates of S / Shri Raman and Sinha, A'.nwar Karim, R. C.\n\nSinha, S. K. Ghosh and M. Alam.", "canonical_name": "R. C.\n\nSinha"}}, {"text": "S. K. Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10477, "end_char": 10488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri N. Nagamani, the seniormost regular recruit of 1952 batch started officiating continuously in senior posts earlier than the relevant dates of S / Shri Raman and Sinha, A'.nwar Karim, R. C.\n\nSinha, S. K. Ghosh and M. Alam.", "canonical_name": "S. K.\n\nGhosh"}}, {"text": "K. K. Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10579, "end_char": 10595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These officers may be allotted to the year 1952 and may be placed below Shri K. K. Srivastava (RR-1952) and above Shri R. B.\n\nLal (SCS, SR-1952)\"."}}, {"text": "R. B.\n\nLal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10621, "end_char": 10631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These officers may be allotted to the year 1952 and may be placed below Shri K. K. Srivastava (RR-1952) and above Shri R. B.\n\nLal (SCS, SR-1952)\"."}}, {"text": "21 Ociober, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11775, "end_char": 11791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1The Indian Administrative Service came to be consti\n\ntuted under the Agreement with effect from 21 Ociober, 1946."}}, {"text": "Indian Administrative Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11813, "end_char": 11842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Recruitment to the Indian Administrative Service was to be by direct recruitment or by promotion of members of a Provincial Civil Service."}}, {"text": "Indian Civil Administrative Cadre Rules, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11937, "end_char": 11982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "All-India Services Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12116, "end_char": 12138, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12296, "end_char": 12308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Civil Administrative Cadre Rules, 1950", "statute": "The Indian Civil Administrative Cadre Rules, 1950"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12410, "end_char": 12419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Civil Administrative Cadre Rules, 1950", "statute": "The Indian Civil Administrative Cadre Rules, 1950"}}, {"text": "All-India Services Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12427, "end_char": 12455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Cadre Rules, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12812, "end_char": 12829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Promotion Regulations, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13234, "end_char": 13261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Fixation of Cadre Strength Regulations, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13385, "end_char": 13429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cadre Strength Regulations, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13760, "end_char": 13792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13893, "end_char": 13898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Cadre Strength Regulations, 1955 set out the strength and the composition of the cadre in relation to the different States including Bihar."}}, {"text": "Recruitment Rules, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14222, "end_char": 14245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Regulation of Seniority Rules, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14568, "end_char": 14603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State in the Schedule to the Fixation of Cadre Strength Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14699, "end_char": 14766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Recruitment Rules, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15181, "end_char": 15204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Promotion Regulations, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15320, "end_char": 15347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19520, "end_char": 19523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The effect of the second proviso was stated by this Court in Nim's(') case to be this : \"The second proviso limits the operation of the first proviso by diyiding the officiating period into two classes; first, a period before the date of inclusion of an officer in the Select List and, secondly, the period after that date."}}, {"text": "22. April, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20769, "end_char": 20784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27/47/64-AIS(IIl)-A dated 17 April, 1967 and the new definition of senior post came into effect on 22."}}, {"text": "9 April, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21295, "end_char": 21308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel on behalf of direct recruits contended that the letter dated 9 April, 1958 from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bihar to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs could not amount to a declaration of posts as equivalent to senior posts and further '1Jiat there could not be any retrospective declaration of making posts equivalent to senior posts."}}, {"text": "Government of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21341, "end_char": 21360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel on behalf of direct recruits contended that the letter dated 9 April, 1958 from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bihar to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs could not amount to a declaration of posts as equivalent to senior posts and further '1Jiat there could not be any retrospective declaration of making posts equivalent to senior posts."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affairs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21406, "end_char": 21430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel on behalf of direct recruits contended that the letter dated 9 April, 1958 from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bihar to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs could not amount to a declaration of posts as equivalent to senior posts and further '1Jiat there could not be any retrospective declaration of making posts equivalent to senior posts."}}, {"text": "Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22160, "end_char": 22185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, it was said that the State would first have to make a declaration with regard to making posts equivalent to senior posts and thereaft!er approval of such officiation would be given by the State Government in consul-\n\nH tation with the Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22283, "end_char": 22286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Criticism was made by counsel for the direct recruits that there was no proper Select List and Rao's letter dated 9 July, 1958 and\n\n(I) [1970] 2 S.C.R 325."}}, {"text": "[1970] 2 S.C.R 325", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22324, "end_char": 22342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "B. S. Srivastava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23886, "end_char": 23902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secretary tci the GovernmenQ of India by letter dated 3 September, 1958 accepted the recommendation of the State Government with re2:ard to the promotees and allotted to them the year 1948 and placed the promotees below Shri B. S. Srivastava who was the junior most among direct recruits who had started officiating continuously in a senior p0st earlier than 28 December,\n\n1954."}}, {"text": "28 December,\n\n1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24020, "end_char": 24038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secretary tci the GovernmenQ of India by letter dated 3 September, 1958 accepted the recommendation of the State Government with re2:ard to the promotees and allotted to them the year 1948 and placed the promotees below Shri B. S. Srivastava who was the junior most among direct recruits who had started officiating continuously in a senior p0st earlier than 28 December,\n\n1954."}}, {"text": "26 December, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25058, "end_char": 25075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On these materials it appears that the ad hoc list was prepared with the approval of the Union Public Service Commission on 28 December, 1954 and the Select List was finally approved by the Union Public Service Commission on 26 December, 1955."}}, {"text": "Regulation of Seniority Rules, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25221, "end_char": 25256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "20 Septem- B ber, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34359, "end_char": 34381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeals are therefore dismissed in so far as they relate to quashing of the order of the Central Government dated 20 Septem- B ber, 1967."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_561_566_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "R. C. JAL & ANR.\n\nUNION OF INDIA\n\nFebruary 23, 1972\n\n[S. M. SIICRI, C.J., A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY, D. G. PALEKAR\n\nAND M. H. BEG, JI.]\n\nCoal Production Fund Ordinance (39 of 1944)-Coal despatched from colliery in British India to consignee in Princely State-L1'ability of ct>n-- signee to P'i.'Y the cess.\n\nCoal was despatched from collreries within British India in December 1946 and fanu:uy and February 1947, to the appellant in Indore. The respondent filed a suit in 1953 tor recovery of coal production cess levied under the Coal Production Fund Ordinance, 1944, and r. 3(1) of the Coal Production Fund Rules, 1944.\n\nOn the question whether the Ordinance had no territorial operation to reach the appellant, because, he was a resident of a Princely State at tho time of despatch of the coal.\n\nHELD : In R. C. Jal! v. Union of India, U962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 436, it was held that the cess was an excise duty Qn the manufacture or production of coal and that the method of collection did not affect the e.,., nce of the duty. The coal production cess was n the production of coal and was levied on coal des1>3tched from collieries in the then British India, - that is, the taxable eYent happened within the theD British India. Under the Rules, the duty was to be collected by the railway administcatfon as a surcharge on freight and was to. be recovered from the consignee if the freight charges were to be collected at the destination. The appellant was the tonsignec and the freight charges were to be collected from him at the destination, namely, Indore. llie cess_ thus became a part of the freight for purposes of collection but in 'essence remained a tax on goods.\n\nOnce the duty attaches to the goods they became impressed with the liability and the consignee was liable to pay. The 'tiit was filed in 1953 when Indore was within India and the right of the Union to claim, as well the liability of the appellant to pay, the cess, was valid and subsisting.\n\nIt was not a case of the Union sueing or enforcing any revenue law in a foreign court.\n\nTherefore, the Union was entitled to a decree against the appellant. [5650-H; 566B-DJ\n\nGovt. of India, Ministry of Finance v. Taylor, :[1955] A.C. 491; 27 J.T.R. 356, distinguished .\n\n. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1920 of 1968.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated April 15, 1968 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 21 H of 1962.\n\nM. C. Chag/a, A. K. Verma, B. Datta, J. B. Dadachan; i, O. C. Md/Jiur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants.\n\nJagdish Swarup, Solicitor-General of India, S. N. Prasad and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRay, J. This is an appeal by certificate from the judgment dated 15 April, 1968 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh upholding the judgment and decree passed by Nevaskar, J. of that High Court.\n\nThe Union filed a suit against the appellant in the Court of Small Causes J]ldge at Indore in the year 1953 and claimed a decree for Rs. 83-12-0.\n\nThe claim in the suit represented coal production cess levied under Ordinance No. XXXIX of 1944 on coal and coke despatched from collieries in the then British India to the appellant.\n\nThe. only question which falls for consideration in this appeal is whether the Union could make a valid claim for the amount.\n\nCounsel on behalf of the appellant contended that the appellant was at the material time a resident at Indore in the then Holkar\n\nState and the Ordinance passed in the then British India would have no territorial operation to reach him.\n\nThe Ordinance was called the Coal Production Fund Ordinance of 1944. It extended to the whole of the then British India.\n\nSection 2 of the Ordinance provided inter alia as E follows:-\n\n(1 ) With effect from such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint in this behalf, there shall be levied and collected as a cess. for the purposes of this Ordinan~. on all coal and coke despatched from collieries in British India a duty of excise at such rate not . exceeding one rupee and four annas for ton, as may from time to time be fixed by the Central Government by notification in the official gazette;\n\nProvided that the Central Government may, by noti- G fication in the official Gaiette, exempt from liability to the duty of excise any specified class or classes of coal or coke.\n\n(2) • • • •\n\n( 3) A duty levied under this section shall be in\n\nH addition to any other duty of excise or customs for the time being leviable under any other law.\n\n( 4) The duties imposed by this section shall, subjec: to and in accordanee with the rules made under this Ordinance in this behalf, be collected on behalf of the Central. Government by such agencies and in such manner as may be prescribed by the rules.\"\n\nSection 5 of the Ordinance conferred power on the Central Government to make rules and to provide for inter alia the manner in which the duties imposed by this Ordinance shall be collected, the pets9ns who shall be liable to make the payments, the making of refunds, remissions and recoveries, the deduction of collections agencies of a percentage of the realisations to cover the cost of collection, and the procedure to be followed in remitting the proceeds to the credit of the Central Government.\n\nThe Coal Production Fund Rules, 1944 were made by the Central Government in exercise of powers conferred by section 5 of the Coal Production Fund Ordinance 1944. Rule 3 related to recovery of excise duty.\n\nRule 3 (I) was as follows :-\n\n\"Recovery of excise duty : ( l) The duty of excise imposed under sub-section ( 1) of section 2 of the Ordinance on coal and coke shall, when such coal or coke is despatched by rail from collieries or coke plants, be collected by the Ralway Administrations by means of a surcharge on freight, and such duty of excise shall be recovered:-\n\n(a) from the consigner if the freight charges are being prepaid at the destination of the consignment;\n\n(b) from the consignee if the freight charges are collected at the destination of the consignment;\n\n( c) from the party paying freight if the consignment ·\n\nis booked on the \"Weight Only\" system\".\n\nThe Coal Production Fund Ordinance , f 944 was repealed tiy the Coal Production Fund (Repealing) Ordinance, 1947. The Repealing Ordinance of 194 7 for the. avoidance of doubts declared that the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1887 applied in respect of such repeal.\n\nTherefore the repeal of the 1944 Ordinance did not affect the right of the railway to recover the surcharge on freight or the liability of the appellant to pay and the remedy in respect of the right and liability.\n\nThe claim of the Union related to coal production cess on three several consignments of coal despatched in the months of\n\ncember, 194?, January 1947 and February, 1947 from three A\n\n~1fferent collies at !vf ohuda, Umaria and Burhar respectively m the then Bntish India to the appellant the consignee at Indore.\n\nEac~ cons1g:tlfilent was under a railway invoice and a railway rece1.pt.\n\nFreight was payable on each consignment.\n\nCoal productton cess was under the 1944 Rules to be collected by means of a surcharge on freight.\n\nFreight and the coal production cess as a surcharge thereon were payable at the destination at Indore by the consignee.\n\nThe appellant paid freight but did not pay the coal production cess by way of surcharge. The Union therefore sued the appellant for the sums of Rs. 27-8-0, Rs. 27-8-0 and Rs. 28-12-0 aggregating Rs. 83-12-0 in respect of the aforesaid surcharge on the three several consignments.\n\nThe validity of the Ordinance came up for consideration by this Court in R. C. Jail v. Union of India(').\n\nIn that case suit was filed in the year 19 5 3 at Chhindwara for recovery of coal ce.ss on 3 consignments of coal despatched from collieries in the then British India in the months of January/February, 1947 to the consigb.ee at Indore.\n\nThis Court held that coal cess was levied and collected with the authority of laiiz.\n\nThis Court however did not decide two contentions sought to be raised. in that case.\n\nThese ', Vere first, that coal cess is a fee and not a tax or duty and secondly, that the consignee was a non-resident and therefore the Ordinance not having extra-territorial operation could not reach him.\n\nCounsel bn behalf of the appellant contended that the appellant was at the material time a resident\" of Indore and was therefore not bound by the revenue law of the then British India and\n\nno suit could be filed for enforcing recovery of revenuei dues against the appellant.\n\nReliance was placed. in support of the contention on the decision of the House of Lords in Government y of India, Ministry of Finance v. Taylor and Anr.(2 ). In Tay- , /or's(') case the Government of India sought to prove in the voluntary liquidation of a company registered in the United Kingdom but trading in India for a sum due in Ie$pect of Indian income-tax including capital gains tax, whicli arose on the sa:\\e Qf the company's undertaking in India.\n\nIt was held by. the majority G opinion that although under section 302 of the English Companies Act, 1948 a liquidator was require.cf to provide in the liquidation of the company for liabilities of the company the tax claims would not be a liability within the meaning of section 302 of the English Companies Act The un; urimo~ opini?D was that e revenue claims would not be enforceable m relation to assets m England.\n\nThe ratio of the decision in Taylor's(') c~ that H India being a foreign Gove!rnment could not ue the liquidator\n\n(I) [ 1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 436.\n\n(2) [195.5] !A, C, 491; 27 l.T.R. 356.\n\nTaylor in England for income tax levied and declared to be payable under the Indian law.\n\nA foreign State cannot enforce . a claim for revenues against a foreigner in his home country. The reason is that a foreign court will not be an agency for tax gathering.\n\nThe decision in Taylor's('') case is of no aid to the appellant in the present case.\n\nThe Union in the present case did not either sue or enforce any revenue law in a foreign court.\n\nThe Coal Production Cess was levied on coal despatched from collieries in the then British India.\n\nUnder the Rules the excise duty was to be collected by the railway administration as a surcharge on freight and was to be recovered from the consignee if the freight charges were to be collected at the destination. The fact found in the present case was that the coa~ was despatched from the collieries within the then British India. The appellant was the consign'ee.\n\nFreight charges were to be collected at the station of destination, namely, Indore.\n\nThe appellant also paid the freight charges on the consignments.\n\nThe levy of cess which is the taxable event happened within the then British India. The duty of excise is determined by reference to goods despatched from collieries.\n\nThe tax is on the production of coal.\n\nThe liability to pay cess. is on the goods.\n\nThe cess is a tax on goods and not on the sale of goods.\n\nThis Court examined the true character of the cess in Jail's(') case and Subba Rao, J. speaking for the Court said at page 451 of the 1 Report : \"Excise duty is primarily a duty on the production or manufacture of goods produced or manufactured within the country.\n\nIt is an indirect duty which the manufacturer or producer passes on to the ultimate consumer, that is, its ultimate incidence will always be on the consumer.\n\nTherefore, subject always to the legislative competence of the taxing authoriy, the said tax can be levied at a convenient stage so long as the character of the impost, that is, it is a duty on the manufacture or prwuction, is not lost.\n\nThe method of collection does not affect the essence of the duty, but only relates to the machinery of collection for administrative convenience. . ........... A perusal of the provisions of the Ordinance 'clearly demonstrates that the duty impOsed is in essence excise duty and there is a rational connection between the said\n\ntlllC and the person on whom it is imposed\".\n\nThe ruling in Jail's(') case establishes two propositi0il1S. First, that the cess is a tluty on the manufacture or production of coal and secondly, the method of collection does not affect the essence of the excise duty.\n\n(1) [1955] A.C 491 8-L103 l Sup.CI/72\n\n(2) [1962] Snpp. 3 s.r.R.436.\n\nThe transaction of sale is a composite transaction consisting of agreement of sale, passing of title, delivery of goods and payment _of. price and costs charges of transportation.\n\nThe cess fonned surcharge on the freight.\n\nThe appellant being the consignee was liable. for the same.\n\nThe cess became a part of the freight for purposes of collection but in essence the cess remained a tax on goods.\n\nThe machinery for collection of the duty is not to be confused with the duty itself.\n\nOnce the duty attaches to the goods these bame impressed with the liability and the purchaser, namely, the consignee in the present case was affixed with the liability to pay.\n\nThe liability arose at the colliery.\n\nTho collection was to be at Indore.\n\nThe appellant became liable to pay the cess along with the payment of the freight charges.\n\nThe suit was filed in the year 1953 when Indore was within India and the right of the Union to claim as well as -the liability of the appellant to pay the cess was valid and subsisting.\n\nThe Un!_on was therefore entitled to a decree against the appellant.\n\nCounsel on behalf of the appellant &QUght to raise an additional ground that there was no cause of action against appellant No. 2.\n\nNotice of the application for urging additional ground was given on 22 January, 1972.\n\nWe did not allow this additional ground to be raised at this late stage. If the appellant had raised this question at the trial of the suit the respondent would have dealt with the same.\n\nWe therefore thought that it would not be fair and proper to allow this ground to be raised.\n\nFor these reasons the judgment of the High Court is affinned.\n\nThe appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 48, "entities": [{"text": "R. C. JAL & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. C. JAL & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 32, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 23, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 51, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION OF INDIA\n\nFebruary 23, 1972\n\n[S. M. SIICRI, C.J., A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY, D. G. PALEKAR\n\nAND M. H. BEG, JI.]"}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. G. PALEKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 112, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.G. PALEKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Coal Production Fund Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 431, "end_char": 437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coal was despatched from collreries within British India in December 1946 and fanu:uy and February 1947, to the appellant in Indore."}}, {"text": "Coal Production Fund Ordinance, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 529, "end_char": 565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Coal Production Fund Rules, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 586, "end_char": 618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1150, "end_char": 1155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The coal production cess was n the production of coal and was levied on coal des1>3tched from collieries in the then British India, - that is, the taxable eYent happened within the theD British India."}}, {"text": "Govt. of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2139, "end_char": 2153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5650-H; 566B-DJ\n\nGovt."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2238, "end_char": 2266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Chag", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2435, "end_char": 2445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag/a, A. K. Verma, B. Datta, J. B. Dadachan; i, O. C. Md/Jiur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "A. K. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2449, "end_char": 2460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag/a, A. K. Verma, B. Datta, J. B. Dadachan; i, O. C. Md/Jiur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "B. Datta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2462, "end_char": 2470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag/a, A. K. Verma, B. Datta, J. B. Dadachan; i, O. C. Md/Jiur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2472, "end_char": 2486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag/a, A. K. Verma, B. Datta, J. B. Dadachan; i, O. C. Md/Jiur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "O. C. Md", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2491, "end_char": 2499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag/a, A. K. Verma, B. Datta, J. B. Dadachan; i, O. C. Md/Jiur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2509, "end_char": 2524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag/a, A. K. Verma, B. Datta, J. B. Dadachan; i, O. C. Md/Jiur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Jagdish Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2547, "end_char": 2561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdish Swarup, Solicitor-General of India, S. N. Prasad and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. N. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2591, "end_char": 2603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdish Swarup, Solicitor-General of India, S. N. Prasad and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2608, "end_char": 2620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdish Swarup, Solicitor-General of India, S. N. Prasad and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2687, "end_char": 2690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRay, J. This is an appeal by certificate from the judgment dated 15 April, 1968 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh upholding the judgment and decree passed by Nevaskar, J. of that High Court."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2774, "end_char": 2802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRay, J. This is an appeal by certificate from the judgment dated 15 April, 1968 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh upholding the judgment and decree passed by Nevaskar, J. of that High Court."}}, {"text": "Nevaskar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2847, "end_char": 2855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRay, J. This is an appeal by certificate from the judgment dated 15 April, 1968 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh upholding the judgment and decree passed by Nevaskar, J. of that High Court."}}, {"text": "Court of Small Causes J]ldge at Indore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2933, "end_char": 2971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union filed a suit against the appellant in the Court of Small Causes J]ldge at Indore in the year 1953 and claimed a decree for Rs."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3700, "end_char": 3709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3802, "end_char": 3820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 2 of the Ordinance provided inter alia as E follows:-\n\n(1 ) With effect from such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint in this behalf, there shall be levied and collected as a cess."}}, {"text": "Central.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4727, "end_char": 4735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( 4) The duties imposed by this section shall, subjec: to and in accordanee with the rules made under this Ordinance in this behalf, be collected on behalf of the Central."}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4820, "end_char": 4829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Coal Production Fund Rules, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5326, "end_char": 5358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5430, "end_char": 5439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Coal Production Fund Rules, 1944", "statute": "The Coal Production Fund Rules, 1944"}}, {"text": "Coal Production Fund Ordinance 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5447, "end_char": 5482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5643, "end_char": 5652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Coal Production Fund Ordinance 1944", "statute": "the Coal Production Fund Ordinance 1944"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6406, "end_char": 6415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Coal Production Fund Ordinance 1944", "statute": "the Coal Production Fund Ordinance 1944"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6423, "end_char": 6448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Chhindwara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7786, "end_char": 7796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case suit was filed in the year 19 5 3 at Chhindwara for recovery of coal ce.ss on 3 consignments of coal despatched from collieries in the then British India in the months of January/February, 1947 to the consigb.ee at Indore."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8815, "end_char": 8834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Tay- , /or's(') case the Government of India sought to prove in the voluntary liquidation of a company registered in the United Kingdom but trading in India for a sum due in Ie$pect of Indian income-tax including capital gains tax, whicli arose on the sa:\\e Qf the company's undertaking in India."}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8911, "end_char": 8925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Tay- , /or's(') case the Government of India sought to prove in the voluntary liquidation of a company registered in the United Kingdom but trading in India for a sum due in Ie$pect of Indian income-tax including capital gains tax, whicli arose on the sa:\\e Qf the company's undertaking in India."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9147, "end_char": 9158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "English Companies Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9166, "end_char": 9193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9360, "end_char": 9371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the English Companies Act, 1948", "statute": "the English Companies Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9387, "end_char": 9400, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9498, "end_char": 9505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the majority G opinion that although under section 302 of the English Companies Act, 1948 a liquidator was require.cf to provide in the liquidation of the company for liabilities of the company the tax claims would not be a liability within the meaning of section 302 of the English Companies Act The un; urimo~ opini?D was that e revenue claims would not be enforceable m relation to assets m England."}}, {"text": "Taylor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9537, "end_char": 9543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ratio of the decision in Taylor's(') c~ that H India being a foreign Gove!rnment could not ue the liquidator\n\n(I) [ 1962] Supp."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11142, "end_char": 11151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court examined the true character of the cess in Jail's(') case and Subba Rao, J. speaking for the Court said at page 451 of the 1 Report : \"Excise duty is primarily a duty on the production or manufacture of goods produced or manufactured within the country."}}, {"text": "22 January, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13685, "end_char": 13701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Notice of the application for urging additional ground was given on 22 January, 1972."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_567_605_EN", "year": 1972, "text": ".. I\n\nUNICHEM LABORATORIES LTD.\n\nTHE WORKMEN February 24, 1972\n\nJC. A. VAIDIALINGAM, I. D. DUA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Dearness All.owance-Deprrciation reserve~ whether to be deducted from profits--Concern.r with foreign collaboration wh~\n\nther can be compared with purely Jndia.n Companies-Slab system- Classification of grade~ and fixation of wages-Gratuity-Incentive Bonu's Sche1ne.\n\nThe appellant carried on the business of manufacturing and selling pharmaceutical products in Greater Bombay.\n\nIn disputes arising OOtween the ppellant and the respondents the Industrial Tribunal had to deal with questions relating to dearness allowance, classification of grades and fixation of wag.es .and the incentive bonus scheme as modified by the company. In appeal against the aw-..rd of the Tribunal,\n\nHELD: (i) The decisions of this Court in Gramophone Company Ltd.\n\nv. its Workmen and The !11dian Link Chain Manufacturers Ltd. v. Their Workmen show that the Tribunal .was justified in computing gross profits without deducting taxation, deprectation and development rebate~ The latter decision is directly jn point to the effect that 'provision or depreciation cannot be deducted.\n\n[582E., 585BCJ\n\nGramophone Company Ltd. v. Jts'Workmen, [191i4] II L.L.J. 131 and The Indian Link Chain Manufacturers Ltd. \"f. Their WOrkmen, l1971] 2 S.C.R. 759, applied.\n\nAhniedabad Mil/owners' Association Etc~ v. The Textile Labour A.rsociat'ion, [1966] I S.C.R. 382, referred to. ·\n\n(ii) so long and to the extent that concerns having foreign c§ll_aboration are doing business in India and in a pafticular concerood region there is no reason why they should not be taken into account for purposes of being teated as comparable unfts, provided th-.lt the tests for. such purp06es as laid down by this Court are satisfied.\n\nTOO object of industrial. adjudication is to secure as far as possible unifdrmity of iervice conditions among industrial units in the same regiOn. If a concern having foreign collaboration properly satisfies the tests of comparability it would be improper to regard such unit as uncomparable merely on the ground' that it is a concern with foreign collaboration or interest and t the unit with which it is 'ought to be compared. is entirely of Indian origin and resources.\n\n!591ACI\n\nCh•mical IndustrieS\"and Pharmaceutical Laboratories Limit<d (Cipla) Bombay v. Their W<!rkmen, [1957] !.C.R.\n\nBombay 1206 and Alembic Chemical Works Ltd. Baroda v. Its Workmen [1967] I S.C.R. 652,\n\nHindust, in Antibiotics Ltd. v. The Workmen and Ors.,. [1967] I S.C.R. 652, relied on.\n\n(iii) On the materials before it the Tribunal was justified in treating M/S. Burroughs Wellcome & Co. as a unit comparable with the appellut.\n\nThe fact that Burroughs Wellcome .employed a le.,.r labour force did not deserve much impOrtance beoause the business performance of the two companies was equal.\n\nOnce Burroughs Wellcome Co. was timted as a comparable unit the wage scales awarded by the Tribunal oj(mld not be considered to be unjustified. [598G-599A-D]\n\nWorkmen of New Egerton Woollen Mills v. New Egerton Woollen Mills and Ors., [1969) II L.L.J. 782, applied.\n\n(iv) On the facts of the case it was not possible t<? disagree with the view of the Tribunal that the impact of the Drugs (Price Con.trol) Order will not be such as to affect materially the business pfpects of the appellant company. If the Order materially aff<•cts the prosperity of the appiilant's trade it would be open to it to raise '3. dispute for the reduction in the wage structure and in case they are able to show that in view of the Dlrugs (Price Control) Order their financial position has weakened to such an extent that they c:annot he'll' the burden of the wage structure .fixed by the present award, the matter may have to be examined on its merits. [598B.CJ\n\n Wi/liamsons (India) Private, Ltd. v. It• Workmen, [1962] 1 L.L.J.\n\n302. referred to.\n\n(v) The Tribunal hod acted within its jurisdiction in classifying the workmen and fixing the sc:iles of pay after fitting them in particular categories. The objection based on s. 10(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 must be rejected. [599E-600B]\n\n(vi) When the Tribunal raised in the gratuity scheme the ceiling limit from 15 months to 17t months according to the pattern obtaining in Burroughs Wellcome Company there was no question of principle involved justifying an objection by the appellant company. [600C-DJ\n\n(vii) There were different systems of dearness llowanc!io for the operators and the clerical and subordinate staff in the appellant company.\n\nThat such a different system of dearness auowance for employees working unde'r the same employer is not warranted is clear from the decisions of this Court in the cases of Greaves Cotton & Co. and Bengal CheinicaJ & Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. Therefore the Tribunal was justified in devising a unifonn scale of dearness allowance '3pp1icable to all the empolyees of the appellant. r600E-F]\n\nGreaves Cotton and Co. and Ors. v. Their Workmen, [1964) 5 S.C.R. 362 and Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical Works Lrd. v. /Ar Workmen [1969] 2 S.C.R. 113, relied on. '\n\n(viii) From the date of the settlement in 1966 the cost of living index hd very rapidly gone up by 220 points. At the time when the demand for revision of wages sqtles and dearness allowance was made G by the Unions and when the reference order was made by the Government. the cost of living index had gone up very high. That clearly showed that the workmen had m'3de out a case for revision of wage scaJes and dearness a11owance.\n\nThe contention of the appeUant that because a system of dearness aHowance aireadv existed there should be no revision Of the same, could not be accepted. r602C; 601A 1\n\n\nWIICHEM LTD. v. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, J.) 569\n\n(ix) When the slab system of dearness .. allowance was prevailing in the industry in the region the Tribunal committed no error in introducing a similar pattern in the case of the appellant. [603C-DJ .\n\nKamani Metals & ill/oys Ltd. v. TIU!ir Workmen, [19671 2 S.C.R. 463, referred to.\n\n(x) In regard to the Incentive Bonus Scheme the Tribunal had stated that th:! nec.essary material for that purpose had not been made available\n\nnd as such it had not been possible to devise a scheme calculated to afford. protection to .the incentive earning of a workman at the raised base performanre index. This Court could do nothing further in this 'regard and the result would be that observations made by the Tribunal will have full effect. [6040-Hl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1091 to 1093 oi 1971.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the award dated April 15, 1971 of the Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra, Bombay in References (IT) Nos. 20 of 1969, 70 of 1970 and 105 of 1969.\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, R. A. lahagirdar and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant (in all the appeals).\n\nK. T. Sule, lanardaro Sharma and Indira Jaisingh, for respondent No. 1 {in all the appeals).\n\nE Urmila Kapoor and Kamlesh Bansal, for respondent No; 2 (in\n\nall the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J.-These three appeals, by special leave, arise out of the Award, dated April 15, 1971 of the Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra, Bombay iri Reference (l.T. Nos. 20 and\n\n105 of 1969 and 70 of 1970).\n\nThe main questions that arise for consideration in these . appeals relate to the award of Dearness Allowance, Classification of Grades and Fixation of Wages and a direction given by the Industrial Tribunal regarding the Incentive Bonus Scheme, as modified by the Company.\n\nThere is also a minor point regarding a particular clause in the Gratuity Scheme as framed by the Tribunal in Reference (l.T. No. 20 of 196.9). Though there are certain other matters dealt with in the Award in Referi:nce (l.T.\n\nH No. 20 of 1969) they are not the subject of controversy in these appeals.\n\nWe will now state the circumstances under which the References came to be made 10 the Tribunal.\n\nThe appellant was started as a .proprietary concern in the J. year 1944 and w_as later transfonned to a public limited Company and registered as such under the Indian Companies Act, 1962.\n\nFrom its inception, tile Company has been dealing in the business of manufacturing and selling phannaceutical products. It had its factory in Jogeshwari in , Greater Bombay.\n\nAt the time of the Reference, the Company was employing about 714 workmen, of B whom 558' were operatives and 156 were me.mbers of the clerical and subordinate staff.\n\nAll these employees were covered by the demands comprised in all the References.\n\nThe wage scales of the workmen had been determined originally in Reference (I.T.\n\nNo. 23 of 1959). The wage scales of 1the operatives were as follows : c\n\n\"Uns'dlled A Unskilled B Se:niski!led A\n\nSe:niskiUed B Skilled\n\n. Rs. t 52-0 •09-2 23-0·12-2 93\n\n1 25.-0 J6-1 85-0 09-2 JO\n\n2 00 _Q 12--2 72-0 18-3 80\n\nt 76-0t1-2 64-0 15-3 39 2 59--0 13-2 85-0 22-3 •95-0 l0-\n\n4 25\".\n\nD The wage-scales of ihe clerical and subordinate staff were as follows :\n\n\"Junior Chemist . .\n\nManufacturing Assistant Store-keeoers J Store-Assistants }-\n\nStenographers j\n\nJunior Clerk .\n\nIntermediate Clerks ·\n\nSeiQr Clerks\n\n. Rs. 120-10-200-12-260\n\n14().._(Q-220-15-310\n\n180-10-260-i 5_350\n\n60-8-90~10-140-E.B.-15-215. 7l-8-115-12-175-E.B.-15-250.\n\n115-10-255-15-315-E.B.-20-395.\"\n\nIn addition to the basic wages, referred to above, the em• ployees were getting dearness allowance, which in the case of operatives was equal to 80% of the revised textile scale of dearness F allowance arid in tile case of clerical and subordinate staff 100% of the revised textile scale of dearness allowance.\n\nThe nomenclature of the grades of the operatives was changed by a consent award in Reference (I.T. No. 170 of 1961). The grades and wages as per this award were as foilows :\n\n\"Unskilled .\n\nSemi-skilled A Semi-skilled B Skilled .\n\nHighly Skilled\n\n. Rs. 1 25-0 06-1 85-0 -09-2 30\n\n1 52-0·02-2·33--0·12-2·93 1 •76-0 11-2 64-0 15-3 39 2-00-0 12-2 72-0 18-l 39 2 59-0 13-2 85---0 22 .. 3 95 .. 0 30-\n\n4 25.\" '\n\nThe dearness allowance of the operatives and clerical and H subordinate staff underwent a change by the award in Refere.nce\n\n(l.T. No. 402.of 1963). Underothat award the dearness allowance\n\nUNICHEM LTD. v. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, J.) 571\n\nof the oper3Jives was increased to 90% of the revised, textile scale of dearness allowance from January 1, 1964 and to 95% of the revised textile scale of dearness allowano~ from July 1, 1964.\n\nThe dearness allowance of the clerical and subordinate staff was supplemented at different slabs with effect from January 1, 1964 as follows :\n\n\"Basic salary' upto Rs. 100 .\n\nBasic salary of Rs. 101 to 200\n\nBasic salary of Rs. 201 to 300\n\nBasic salary of over Rs. 300 .\n\nOperatives' dearness allowance plus Rs. 7 50.\n\nQperativco;' -dearness allowance plus Rs. 15.\n\nOperatives' dearness allowance plus Rs. 22 50.\n\nOperatives' dearness allowance plus Rs. 25.\"\n\nThough the award prescribed to the clerical and subordinate staff the same rate of dearness allowance of the operatives plus a fixed amount, as referred to above, the Company continued to give them derness allowance equal to 100% of the revised textile scale of dearness allowance. This was also supplemented with the fixed amount .depending upon the slab of the salary.\n\nThere was a settlement on :June 24, 1966 between the Com pany and its employees, in and by which. the wages of the operatives and the clerical and subordinate staff underwent a final re vision. The wages of the operatives were fixed as follow~\n\n\"Unskilled .\n\nSemi-skilled B Semiskilled A Skilled .\n\nHighly skilled\n\nRs. 1 25-0·10-2·75\n\nI 6<).:_0 12-2 32-0 15-3 67 I 80-0ll-2·85-0·20-4·45 2·10-0 20-3 10-0 25-5 10\n\n2 75-0·20-3 75-0·25-5 00-0 30- 6·50.\"\n\nSimilarly, the wages of the clerical and subordinate staff were as follows :\n\n''Junior Clerk\n\nIntermediate Clerk\n\nSenior Clerk\n\nSten~ and Storelceeper .\n\nRs. 75-6-105-10-155-15-260-E. B.-- 17-311.\n\n90-8-130-12-190-15-295-E. B.- 18- 349.\n\n125-10-195-15-270-20-390-E. B-\n\n- 25-440.\n\n180-10-260-15-380-E. B .... :0-4-\n\n'460.\"\n\nThe above basic scales in respect of all die categories were again supplemented by dearness allowance as provided for in the award passed in Reference (LT. No. 402 of 1963). The Com pany had also an Incentive Bonus Scheme, by virtue of which a large number of operatives were getting on an average an addi tional sum of Rs. 28/ per month. The Company further revised\n\nfrom about November 1, 1969 the wage scales of Drivers and Watchmen as follows\n\n\"Drivers\n\nWatchmen\n\n. Rs. 70-6-100-9-145-12-205-E. B.-\n\n15-250.\n\n45-4-65-6-95-E. B.-8.-135\".\n\nThe above was the pattern of the wage structure and dearness B allowa.nce for the operatives and the clerical and subordinate staff.\n\nThe Unions conorned made a demand for introducing the following scheme of dearness allowance in respect of all the workmen with immediate effect :\n\n'Wage slab.\n\nUpto 100 . .\n\nFrcm Rs. 101 to 200 prom Rs. 201 and above\n\nWhen the working class cost of living indcix figure is in the group of 401- 410. 100 percent 50 per cent 25 per cent\n\nVariatirn in the dearness allowance for every 10 points rise or fall. 5 percent 2t per cent\n\nIi Percent\n\nMinimum dearness al](; Wance Rs. 100. Minimum variation Rs. 5.\"\n\nThey also demanded that the above scheme of dearness allowance was to have retrospective effect from August 1, 1967. In the same demand the Unions required that the workmen should be granted one month's wages for every year of service s gratuity in case of resignation, dismissal, discharge, death or termination of service for any reason. By this demand the Unions required modification of e then existing pattern of payment of dearness allowance at 95 '° of revised textile scale of dearness allowance to operatives and 100% of revised textile scale of dearness allowance plus Rs. 7.50 to Rs. 25/- paid to the cleri.cal and other staff.\n\nThe Company did .not agree to the demand and in consequence by order dated January 14, 1969 the Government of Maharashtra referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal the demands.\n\nThis Reference was registeted as Reference (l.T. No. 20 _of 1969).\n\nThe Unions again made a demand for revision of scales of pay as well as the classification of employees, their grades and their fitment in the revised scales of pay.\n\nAs against the then existing six categories of workmen and their wage scales of the operatives the Unions demanded new classification and gradatioi1 into eight grades with new wage scales. Similarly, as against the then existing five grades of the clerical and subordinate staff, the Unions demanded the creation of six categories with enhanced wage scales.\n\nThese demands again were not accepted by the Company which led to the State Government making a reference on Jainuary 9, 1970, which reference was registered as Reference (I.T. No. 70 of 1970). ·\n\n• A\n\nUNICHEM LTD. v. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, J.) 573\n\nThe Company some tilll'! in the year 1959 had introduced au Incentive Bonus Scheme.\n\nThis was introduced, according to the appellant, because of the fact that the workmen were not giving a substantial production.\n\nThe basis of the scheme; introduced by the appellant, was that if the workm!n gave only 30% of the 100% production expected of them, their performance would be considered zero.\n\nOn the other hand, if they gave production above 30% and upto 100%, they would be eligibL~ for payment of Incentive Bonus which would ho! from 31 to 100 points.\n\nIn other words, for the 70 points above the first 30 points, the workmen would get Rs. 50/- .as Incentive Bonus which would worl.: out approximately to about Rs. 71.43 per point. The appellant desired that the then existing floor limit of 30% ought to be raised to 75% without varying the quantum of Rs. 50/- that was originally payable on achievement of 100% production.\n\nWhat was intended was that the 25 points between 7 5 and 100 points were io be made eligible for payment of Incentive Bonus of Rs. 2/- for each point.\n\nThe Company served a notice of change on the workmen under s. 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. As the workmen protestec; I against this change, this led the Government to make a Reference to the Industrial Tribnual for adjudication.\n\nThis was numbered as Reference, (I.T. No. 105 of 1969).\n\nThe appellant resisted the claims made for revision of dearness allowance and wage scales as well as the modification sought for in the gratuity sche1m. The appellant also wanted the Tribunal to uphold the notice of change given by it under s. 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act in respect of the Incentive Bonus Scheme: In particular the appellant contended that it was.not a comparable concern with the units reforred to by the Unions and that any modification in •the scale of dearness allowance and wages would be beyond its financial capacity.\n\nThe appellant also relied on the comiµg into force of the Drugs (Price Control) Order 1970\n\nwith effct from May 16, 1970. According to the appellant the wages and dearness allowance paid by it to the workmen were far higher than what were paid by other units in the region. The Company also referred to the various awards wherein it had been held that it could not be compar!d with an International Company having branches in Bombay or with foreign concrn though incorporated in India. The wage scales had been fixed by Settlement dated June, 24, 1966 and tht nothing has happened since the date of S•!ttlement to justify a revision of wage scales and dearness allowance. The appellant further urged before the Tribunal that the double linl<ing of dearness allowance, as required by the Unions had never been adopted for the Pharmaceutical units in tlie Bombay region.\n\nAccording to the appellant, the rvision '\n\neffected regarding the Incentive Bonus Scheme was justified and A the amount of 2/- offered per point was much more than the prevailing rate of Rs. 71.43p. per point. It also opposed the revision of the then existing gratuity scheme as demanded by the Unions.\n\nAccording to the appellant the grntuity scheme which was in force had been introduced by a consent award in 1963.\n\nThe appellant filed copies of balance sheets and profit and loss accounts from 1962-63 to 1969-70 and various other charts in support of i'ls plea •that it will not be able to bear the additional financial burden that would result if the wage scales and dearness allowance are revised as p.r the demands made by the Unions.\n\nIt will be seen from the facts mentioned above that tho~ main controversy between the parties related to the revision of wage structure and dearness allowance.\n\nAs the demands of the workmen related to regrouping in different grades, the operatives and the clerical and subordinate staff and as tllis involved a very radical change in the existing pattern of grades, the Trinal\n\nfelt that the Qpinion of an expert should be obtained on the advisibility of the reclassification. In this regard both the Unions and the appeJlant filed a joint application on December 22, 1970 requestin!( the Tribunal to appoint Sri N. L. Gadkari, retired Chief Inspector of Factories, Maharashtra State as an assessor.\n\nThey also p.rayed ihat the points mell'tioned in the application be referred for the opinion of the assessor.\n\nThe Assessor submitted his report on. February 22, 1971, in which he recommended the continuance of the then existing grades.\n\nThe Unions, while demurring •to the report of the Assessor, requested th~ Tribunal, by their application dated March 25, 1971 to fix for the then existing five grades the following wage scales :\n\n\"Un, kitlo1 Rs. 85-8-t25-10-225 s,:ni-•killed B 100-t0-t50-t2-210-15-285.\n\nSemi-•killcd A 120-12-t80-15-255-18-345.\n\nSkille1 . t.W-15-215-18-305-20--405.\n\nHighly skilled 225-25-350--30-500-35-675.\"\n\nThe appellant, when the Reference came up for hearing, raised an objection to the selection of wage scale by the Unions for\n\nthe existing grades of the operatives on the ground that such a selection was not permissible, tdng contrary to the provisions of s. I 0( 4) of •the Industrial Disputes Act.\n\nThe Unions, ultimately, made it clear to the Tribunal that their demand for revision of wage scales of the existing five grades of operatives is to be as follows :\n\n''Unskilled\n\nSemi-skilled B Semi-skilled A Ski tied .\n\nHighly skilled\n\nRs. 60-5-85-7--155.\n\n70-6-100-8-180.\n\n85-8-125-10-225. :00-10-150-12-210-15-285. 120 .. 12-180-15 .. -255.-18-345.\"\n\nUNICHEM LTD. v. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, J.) 57 5:\n\nIt is on the basis of this claim that the question of revision has been dealt with by the Tribunal.\n\nRegarding the financial incapacity pleaded by the appellant, the Tribunal after an analysis of the balance sheets and profit and loss accounts, held that the average net profit of the Company during the years 1965-66 to 1969-70 works out to about Rs. 1384691/·. It is also of the view that the apprehensions of the appellant regarding the possible impact of the Drugs (Price Cofl'!rol) Order, 1970 are µot justified. It is 1he view of the Tribunal that in spite of the price freeze effected in. 1963, the appellant has been doing very good 'business from 1962-63 to 1969-70.\n\nUltimately, the Tribunal found that the financial condition of the appellant is quite sound.\n\nRegarding the comparable concerns in the region, the Unions referred to as many as twenty units.\n\nOne of the units relied on as comparable with the appellant was M/s. Burroughs Wellcome & Co. (lndig) Private Ltd., Bombay.\n\nThe appellant opposed its being compared with the concerns relied on by the Unions on the ground that those units were either foreign conorns doing business in India or Indian units working in c0Jlaboration with foreign concerns. The appellant in turn relied on seyr_al other concerns as being comparable with it. The appellant very strongly relied on certain previous awards in support of ils contention that it has been held in those awards that the appellant-cannot be compared with foreign concerns or with the con9erns working in collaboration with foreign concerns.\n\nThe Tribunal, after a consideration of the materials placed before it, in this regard, ultimately, held that Mis. Burroughs Wellcome & 'co. (India) Private Ltd., was a unit w'1ich could be considered as a comparable concern with the aopellant. 1be Tribunal having regard to the grades and scales of pay obtaining in M/s. Burroughs Wellcome & Co. (India) Private Ltd., held that !he wage scales for the five grades for the operatives of the appellant should be as follows :\n\n\"Unkilled .\n\nSemi-skilled B Semi-skilled A Skilled .\n\nHigh skilled\n\n. Rs. 42-3-11-4-112\n\n47-3-50-82~4-122 50-4-90-5·50-134 55-5·50-110-6·50-155·50\n\n72-7-142-8-182-9 5f-2<0.\"\n\nThe Tribunal fixed the following grades and scales of pay for the clerical and subordinate staff :\n\n\"Junior Clerks and Laboratory Assistants . Rs. 85-7 50-145-l0-l95-l2-25g._ F .. 323 Intermediate Clerks 120-10-200-12-260-15-335- 11.\n\n353 Senior Clerk• 185-15-305-20-365- 25- 465\"\n\nThe Tribunal did not accept the large demand made by the Unions for a general adjustment in increments of the employees.\n\nNevertheless, in view of the revision of the scales of wages, it gave certain direQtions so that rthe employees may be fitted in the appropriate revised wage scales.\n\nThe parties very hotly contested the. question of dearness al· lowance , as well as the pattern ito be adopted. As there were different systems of dearness allowance for the operativi; s and the clerical and subordinate staff, the Unions desired that a common scheme of dearness allowance on a slab system should be adopted.\n\nThe Tribunal having regard to the decisions of this Court in Greaves Cotton and Co. and others v. Their Workmen(') and\n\nBe~ Chemic~ & Pharmaceutical Works Ltd, v. Its Workmen(') held that there was no justification for having two systems of dearness allowance--<>ne for the operatives and 1he other for the members gf the clerical and subordinate staff.\n\nAccordingly, the Tribunal held that all 1the employees should get the same dearness allowance irrespective, of the fact whether they were operati\\'s or members of the clerical and subordinate staff.\n\nAs the , dearness 3llowance has to be fixed on industry-cumregion basis, the Tribunal examined the system of dearness al- 1owance followed in the region by the industries belonging 1o the pharmaceutical units.\n\nThe Unions had submitted statements Exs. DU-1 and MU.-1 containing a list of pharmaceutical unit;, in support of their contention that such units were adopting a slab system of deam, ss allowance. The Company, on the other hand. referred to certain awards of the Industrial Tribunals in support of its stand that slab systemof dearness allowance is not considered as an appropriirte mode of providing neutralisation. The Uni.:ms also relied on certain awards wher, in the slab system of dearness allowance had been introduced by the Industrial Tribunals. Though the Tribunal had held that most of the units referred to in Exs.\n\nDU-1 and MU-1, cannot be considered for 1he purpose of being treated as units comparabl•, with the appellant, nevertheless lt held that the Pr.!!c([ce adopted by !hose units regarding 1the grant of dearness allowance can be taken into account as providing a guide regarding the system of d.earness allowance adopted in the region.\n\nOn 1this basis the Tribunal -accep!ed the statements in Exs. DU-1 and MU-1 and held that the slab system of dearness allowance was prevalent in a large number of units belonging to pharmaceutical industry. In this view, the Tribunal further held that slab system of deamm allowance can be adopted, if the financial burden consequent on the adoption of the said system, can be safely 'borne by the Company.\n\n(I) [19641 5 S.C.R. 352. c2> [I969J 3 s.c.R. m.\n\nUNJCHEM LTD. v. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, !.) 577\n\nThe Tribunal then proceeded to consider the system obtaining in Burrough Wellconie Company regarding the payment of dearness allowance.\n\nThe system in the said Company, which was common for operatives as well as the clerical and subordinate staff, was as follows\n\nBasic Salary\n\nRs. 1-100 .\n\nRs. IOl-200\n\nRs. 201-300\n\nDerness allowance per month at the Boin bay working cJ.\"lSS cost of livig index 491-500.\n\n1.50 per cent\n\n150 per cent on the 1st\n\nRs. 100. 7! p,:r cent on the\n\nbalanr_.e. 150 per 1,;.~.11 on the 1st Rs. IOO. 72! per cent on the 2nd\n\n!ls. 100, and 36-i per cent on the balance.\n\nVariation for points.\n\n5 per cent 2t per cent\n\nlt per cent.\n\nD Minimum Dearness allowance Rs. 4\n\nRs. 101.\n\nIn the said Company the above scale of dearness allowance was howev<U limited only to employees drawing a basic salary upto Rs. 300/- per month. The appellant accepted before tho Tribunal that the scheme of dearness allowance obtaining 'in Burroul(hs \\Yell come Company would cast a lesser financial burden than the scale of dearness allowance as demanded by the Unions. In fact, the Company had filed two charts Exs. C 12 and C-13, showinl( the burden which it will have to bear i( the scheme of dearness allowance as demanded by the Unions was introduced. . The Company had worked out the demands . in different ways and that is why it filed two statements. According to the appellam the additional financial burden will be about Rs. 87812~.00 as per Ex. C-12 and Rs. 1252693.00 as per Ex.\n\nC-13.\n\nThe Tribunal is of the view that under Ex. C-13, the Company had taken into account a sum of Rs. 186293.00 payabk to some members of the staff drawing a salary of over Rs. 200/- per month and amongst whom Were also included 52 chemists.\n\nAccordinl( to the Tribunal the 52 chemists are not covered by the Reference and therefore the burden will have to be calculated only in respect of the workmen covered by the Reference and to whom dearness allowance is being fixed. On calculation the Tribunal found that about a lakh of rupees payable to 52 chemists and included in Ex. C-13 by the appellant will have to be deducted from Rs. 1252693.00 Accordingly, it held that as per the calculation ()f the appellant under Ex. C-13, leaving out the 52 chemists, the total burden will only be Rs. 1152693.00. Taking\n\ninto account the 'tax relief that the Company will get, the Tribunal A ultimately held that the additional financial burden that te appellant will have to bear will only be Rs. 555000.,00. As rt had already held that the average annual gross-profits of the Company\n\nare over Rs. A0,00,000.00, the Tribunal held that the Company can easily bear this additional burden. The Tribunal is further of the view 'that though the financial impact of the Drugs (Price D Control) Order, on the business activities of the Company has had to be seen the impact will not be such as to make the appellant's finanr-iai' position difficutt.\n\nFor all thes•: reasons, the Tribunal fixed for the operatives and the clerical and subordinate staff of the appellant dearness allowance on a system prevalent in Burroughs Wellcome Company.\n\nThe sys•tem of dearness allowc .ance fixed bythe Tribunal is as follows :\n\nBasic salary\n\nRs. 1-100\n\nRs. 101-200\n\nDearness allowance per Variation month at the Bombay working class cost of living index 521-530.\n\n150 per cent 5 per cent\n\nl 50 per cent on the 2t per nt\n\n1st Rs. 100. 72! per cent on the\n\nbalance.\n\nRs. 201-300\n\nMinimum dearness allowance Rs. 101 .\n\n150 per ce:it on the lt Per cent. !st 100 Rs. 72J,. percent on the\n\nind Rs. 100. 36t per ce:it. ()O the balance.\n\nRs. 4.\n\nThe Tribunal has further directed that dearness allowance in F .accordance with the above scheme will be paya5te only to em- .ployees drawing a basic salary upto Rs. 300(- per month.\n\nIt will be seen that the Tribunal while adopting the scale of dearness allowance obtaining in Burroughs Wel\\come Company, has made a departure in fixing the scale of <foarness allowance on the basis of the Bombay Working Class Cost of Living Jndel< G 521 to 530. The dearness allowance scheme obtaining in Burroughs Wellcome Company was on the Bombay Working Class Cost of Living Index 491 to 500.\n\nThe dilfurent cost of living index was adopted by the Tribunal in vie.w of the fact that the ap: pellant was paying incentive wages to its operatives and with a view to lessen the financial burden on the Company.\n\nAnother feature of tthe scheme adopted by the Tribunal is that it puts a ceiling on the employees drawing basic waes upto\n\nUNJCHEM LTD. v. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, J.) 579\n\nRs. 300/, per month alone being eligible for dearness allowance, whereas under the practice originally obtaining in the Company there was no such limit. The Tribunal held. tha:t the revised wage scales and dearness allowance would be effective from October 1 1969 and directed the Company to pay the arrears within three onths from the dat~ of the Award becoming enforceable.\n\nAt this stage it may be mentioned that the appellant is not chal~nging\n\nthis direction regarding the date from which the wage scales and dearness allowance are to take effect, though it \\ery vehemently attacks the fixation of the scale of revised wage scales and dearness allowance by ithe Tribunal.\n\nRtlgarding _gratuity, tile Company had already a scheme which had been introduced under the Settlement Award in Reference (IT) No. 141 of 1962. It is not n.:cessary to set out the scheme that was prevalent in the Company because the only objection of the apllant to the revised scheme evolved by the Tribunal is in respec!_ of raising the ceiling from 15 months to 17! months.\n\nThe demand in this regard by the Unions was that the ceiling should be raised from 15 months basic wages to 20 months basic wages.\n\nHowever, the Tribunal did not accept the claim of the Unions in toto.\n\nOn the other hand, it adopted the practice obtaining in the Burroughs Wellcome Company and accordingly fixed the ceiling at 1 7t months basic wages.\n\nRegarding the notice of change issued to the workmen by the appellant under s.9A of the Industrial Disputes Act proposing to alter the existing floor limit of 30% to 75% in the Incentive Bonus Scheme, the Tribunal on the joint application of the parties dated April JO, 1970 appointed on April 28, 1970 Sri B. Tulpule, as Assessor to examine the question of revising the existing scheme of Incentive Bonus. The Assessor submitted his report on August F 27, 1970 making the following recommendations :\n\n\"(1) The base performance index for all sections/ in\n\nlhe Company's factory should be revised and raised to 60 per cent.\n\n(2) Consequent upon the revision of the base index as above, an amount of Rs. 1.00 per day should be added to the basic wages of the workers, this addition being independent of any other revision of the Wal!, C structure that the Tribunal may decide upon.\n\n(3) The revised rates of incentive should continue H beyond 100 per cent performance.\"\n\nThoul(h the Unions generally accepted the recommendations, the appellant was opposed, particularly to the second and third\n\nrecommendations.\n\nThe Tribunal, after a consideration of the objection, is of the view that recommendations Nos. 2 and 3 were beyond the scope of ihe terms of reference made to him. ere fore, those two recommendati<ms were negatived.\n\nRegarding\n\nthe first recommendation, it is stated by the Tribunal that the Unioris accepted the same and that 1he Company also was not opposed to that suggestion made by the Assessor rgarding the B raising of the base perfonnance index to 60%. In dealing with this aspect the Assessor in bis report had stated as follows :\n\n\"If the base index of any incentive scheme is raised from X to Y, the workers will stop getting the incen1tive earnings which they used to get for the performance range from X to Y.\n\nThis is also the main anxiety ex' pressed by both the Unions in the present case. At the outset I asked the management whe'ther the implication of th.cir proposed change was such a reduction in the 'Norkers' total pay packet, at any given level of performance. The management caterically assured me that that is not their intention. Their purpose in proposing the change is stated by. them .to induce workers to raise their performance above '!he prevaili11g level.\"\n\nThe Triburial in its Award had stated that the matters mentioned in the above paragraph inCluding the assurance st~1'd to . E .·\n\nhave been given by the appellant were not denied.\n\nTherefore, the Tribunal, in view of the common measure of agreement between both the parties regarding !he first recomme'.ldation is of the view thatif the pay packet of the workman is to be protected at the wage raise base index performance of 60%, some scheme may have to be worked out But as the necessary materials for the purpose of evolving a scheme were not available, the Tribunal Fhas thrown out a suggestion that the said question should be dealt with by the appellant in consultation with the Unions and frame a scheme by common consent, if possible. Accordingly, the Tribunal left the matter to the parties to deal with the matter with .the observation that if i'l is found that no scheme could be framed by consent, the Uiuons will be free to raise any dispute that nrny be available to them in that regard. .G\n\nWe have exhaustively referred to the questions referred to the Tribunal as well as the decision of the Tribunal on those points.\n\nIn these appeals, as mentioned earlier, the controversy relate to :\n\n(I) Scale of Dearness Allowance; (2) Fixation of Wage Scales, Classification and Grades; (3) Raising of the ceiling to 17! months basic wages in the. gratuity scheme; and ( 4) th~ direction given by the Tribunal regarding the Incentive Bonus Scheme. ·\n\nUN!CHEM LTD. v. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, /.) 581\n\nAs the main points in great controversy between the parties before us relate to the patitem of dearness allowance and the classification and grads of employees and the fixation of the revised wage scales, we will take up for consideration those matters.\n\nThe very_ JirS't objection of Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the appellant is regarding the manner of ascertaining 'grossprofits when revising the wage scales and' awarding dearn...\"Ss allowance.\n\nWe have already poinlP..d out that the Tribunal has proceeded on the basis thaJt the average annual gross-profits cf the Company are over Rs. 40,00,00Q, OO.\n\nThe appellant had submitted balance sheets and profit and loss acounts for the year\n\nl 962-63 to 1969-70. It is enough to refer. to the particulars that could be gathered for the five preceding years, namely, 1965-uo to 1969-70.\n\nFor those years the figures are as follows : ----\n\nParticulars 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70\n\nPaid-up capital 4500000 4500000 4500000 5400000 5400000 Reserves.and Surplus 2152186 2925376 4421515 4785697 5714988 Sales . . 21997640 23866647 30359380 32994456 37152031 Depreciation . .544919 555035 784824 1111775 916719 Development rebate 97242 . 68266 105840 110858 144511 Provision for taxation 1915000 1590300 1850500 1698500 1639000 NetIDock 4601566 4905509 5458212 5745997 7375386 Net Profit 954591 1443489 1597094 1604501 1323779\n\nFrom the above statement i't will be seen that the average net profits work out to Rs. 1384691.00 The net profits have bc•!n arrived at, by the Company after dedutjtinj! taxation, depreciation and development rebate. It is on the basis of the net prOfits so arrived at that 1he appellant appears to have urged b.fore the Tribtmal that th~ wage scales and dearness allowance are to b~ fixed. The Tribunal rejected this contention. On the other hand. the Tribunal has held that when considering a revision of wage struc.ture wl)at is to be taken. intq account is not the. net profit; but gross profits without l!llY deductions having been made for taxation, depreciation an~ development rebate.\n\nIt is on .that basis tha\\ the Tribunal held that th~ average gross-profits of the Company exceed Rs. 40,00,000.QO.\n\nThe gross-profits without deducting taxation, depreciation and development rebate for the years 1965-66 to 1969-70 will\"b.:\n\napproximately as follows :\n\nvear Gross-profits\n\n~-· Rs. \"1965-66 35,11.752 . 1961;-67 36,57,090 1967-68 43,37,69~ .)968-69 45.15,134 • 1969-70 40.24,009\"\"\n\n9'-L1031 Sun.Cl/72\n\nFrom the above it will be seen that the figure of Rs. 40,00,000.00 arrived at by the Tribunal as average annual grossprofits appears to be prima facie correct.\n\nMr. Tatj<:unde, learned counsel for tlie appellant found considerable difficulty in challenging the view of the Tribunal tht gross-profits are to be arrived at without decucting truration and development rebate.\n\nHe rather strenuously urged tha!t there b absolutely no warrant for arriving at gross-profits without deducting depreciation.\n\nOn the other hand, Mr. K. T. Sule, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, whose contentions have been adopted by Mrs.\n\nUnnila Kapoor, learned counsel for the second respondent, pointed out that the approach made by the Tribunal is correct and is also supported by the decisions of this Court.\n\nMr. Tar](unde referred us to sections 205 and 211 of th~ Companies Act, 1956, as well as Part I, Schedule VI therein.\n\nWe do not think it necessary to refer to those provisions as, in oor\n\nopinion, they have no relevance or bearing when considering a revision of wages and award of dearness allowance under industrial adjudication.\n\nThose provisions are intended for a totally different purpose.\n\n We will presently show, by reference to the decisions of this Court that the Tribunal was justified in computing gross-protits without deducting taxation, depreciation and development rebate.\n\nIn view of the decisions, to which we will immediately refer to.\n\nMr. Tarkunde was prepared to accept the position that, at any rate, taxation and development rabate cannot be deducted, but he still maintained that depreciation has to be deducted.\n\nIn Gramophone Company Ltd, v. Its lforkme11('), this Court, in dealing with a gratuity scheme, had to consider the pril)ciples F applicable for ascertaining the financial capacity of an employer.\n\nIn that decision the employer contended that before the real profit for each year can bie arrived at, the provisions made for taxation and for development reserves should be deducted.\n\nOn this basis, it was further contended that if these deductions are made, there G will 111ot be any profit left which wil! enable the Company concerned to frame a gratuity scheme. This claim for deducting taxation and development rebate reserves was negatived by this Court as follows :\n\n\"When an industrial tribunal is considering the question of wage structure and gratuity which in our opinion H stands more or less on the same footing as wage-struc-\n\n11 l [1964] 2 L.L.J. 13!.\n\nI )\n\nUNJCHEM LTD. v. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, J.) 583\n\niure, it has to look at the profits made without considering provision for taxation in the shape of income-tax and for reserves.\n\nThe provision for income-tax and for reserves must in our opinion take second place as compared to provision for wage structure and gratuity, which stands on ihe same footing as provident fund which is also a retiral benefit.\"\n\nIt was further observed that if an industry is in a stable condition and the burden of provident fund and gratuiiy does not resul1 in loss to the employer, that bJurden will have to be borne by the employer, like the burden of wage-structure in the interest of social c justice.\n\nIt was finally held that the contention on behalf of the Company therein that provision for taxation and provision for reserves should take precedence over provision for gratuity cannot be accepted.\n\nFrom the above decision it is clear that : ( l) Fixation of wagcstructure stands more or less on the same footing as framing of a D gratuity scheme a:nd the principles applicable for ascertaining the profits are the same : ( 2) Provision for taxation and provision for reserves cannot take precedence over for gratuity and fixation of wages; and (3) The provision for income-tax and for reserves must take second place as compared to provision for wage-structure and gratuity.\n\nThe above decision categorically rules out any deduction of taxation. It also excludes from deduction all provision for reserves which will take in depreciation reserve also.\n\nBut, Mr. Tarkunde contended that the above decision is an F auihority for the proposition that the only two items that could be deducted are provision for taxation and provision for development rebate reserve.\n\nIf so, the counsel urges that the deduction .of depreciation reserve as claimed by the appellant is justified and that the Tribunal erred in declining that item to be deducted .\n\n. We are not inclined to accept this contention of Mr. Tarkunde.\n\nG The above decision is, in our opinion, an authority for the proposition that the provision for taxation and provision for reserves, which expression wiil take in depreciation reserve also, cannot be deducted for the purpose of computing the profits.\n\nAt any rate the said decision had no occasion to consider whether depreciation reserve can lie deducted or no( We have already pointed out that the H only claim made by the appellant therein was for deducting provision for taxation and for development rebate reserve and that claim was rejected.\n\nTherefore, looked at from any point of view. the above dedsion is certainly not in favour of the contention of Mr.\n\nTarkunde that depreciation reserve has to be deducted before arriving at profits.\n\n1n The Indian Link Clwin Manufacturers Ltd. v. Their Workmen('), this Court had occasion to consider the principles applicable to ascertain the financial capacity of a company in fixing wage scales and dearness allowance and framing of a gratuity scheme.\n\nThe nrinciple applicable was stated as follows :\n\n\"It is pertinent to notice that gratuity and wages in industrial adjudication are placed on the same footing and have priority over Income-tax and other reserves, as such in considering the financial soundness of an undertaking for the purposes of introduction of a gratuity scheme the profits that must be taken inio account are those computed prior to the deduction of depreciation and other reserves.\"\n\nThe decision in Gramophone Company v. bs Workme11(') wa<. quoted with approval in this decision.\n\nThe Company in that case had calculated profits after deducting depreciation.\n\nThis method was deprecated by this Court as follows :\n\n\"All these profits it may be mentioned are computeu after deducting depreciation and this should be taken into account in considerinl! the desirability cf formulating a gratuity scheme for the Appellant.\"\n\nIn. the end the provision made for depreciation and which had been deducted by the Company for calculation of profits was added tmk.\n\nFrom the above decision it is clear that profits are to be computed prior to the deduction of depreciation and other reserves.\n\nF The. said decision direc!ly holds that provi$ion for depreciation and other reserves cannot be deducted in computing profits to be ascertained for framing a gratuity scheme. This decision again reiterates the legal position that graiuity and wages in industrial adjudication and placed on the same footing and have priority over Income-tax and other reserves.\n\nIn fact, as pointed out by us earlier, provision G made for depreciation and which had been deducted by the Company for arriving at profits was added back by this Court.\n\nMr. Tarkunde urged that this Court in The !lldian Link Chain Ma1111fact11rers Ltd. v. Their Workmen(') has misunderstood and\n\n1niinierpreted the earlier decision in Gramophone Company Ltd.\n\nv. lr.1 Workmen(').\n\nAccording to the.counsel the error committed by 1his Court was on proceeding on the basis that the decision in\n\nfl) [1971] 2 s.c.c. 759.\n\n(2) [1964] 2 LLJ. JJI.\n\nLNICHEM LTD. 1'. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, J.) 585\n\nA Gramophone Company Ltd. v. Its Workmen(!) has laid down that depreciation reserve should not be deducted in computing the profits available for framing a gratuity scheme or when fixing a ', wage\n\nca.le.\n\nWe have no hesitation in rejecting this contention of Mr. Tarkunde.\n\nWe have already expressed our views regarding the scope of the decision in Gramophone Company Ltd. v. Its Workmen( 1 ) and no error has been committed by this Court in The Indian Link\n\nChain Manufacturers Ltd. v. Their Workmen(').\n\nOn the other hand, the latter deelsion is directly in point to the effect that provi- 'ion for depreciation cannot be deducted.\n\nWe may also refer to the observation of this Court in Al1medabad Millowners' Association Ere. v. The Textile Labour A.l'Ociarion(\") that\" ........ it is the figure of gross-profit which is more important, b•cause it is not disputed that wages payable to the employees are a lirst charge. and all other liabilities take their place after the wages:·\n\nMr. Tarkunde referred us to the statements contained in certain leading text books on principles of Accounting, Book Keeping and Accounts and Accountancy regarding the nature ol depreciation reserve.\n\nIn \"Principles of Al'diting by F. R .. M. De Paula, 8th Edition,\" it is stated that the main ob.iect of providing for depreciation of wasting assets is to keep the original capital intact.\n\nIn \"'Balance Sheets, how to read and understand them, by Phillip Tovey,3rd Edition\" the distinction between a \"Reserve\" and ·Depreciation\" has been stated. The author says that depreciation should !:le written of before arriving at the year's profit and that reserve is built up by setting aside portions of the profits itself. The author proceeds to state that depreciation represents the estimated wear and tear which will ultimately reduce the property and plant to scrap value.\n\nIn \"'Book-Keeping and Accounts\" by Cropper, Morrs and Fison, 19th Edition. when dealing with the Trial Balance. Trading and Profit and Loss Accounts, it is mentioned that depreciation is the term employed bY. the Accountants to indicate the gradual deterioration both in the value and the usefulness of those assets which, by reason of their nature and uses. steadily decline in value.\n\nAgain in \"Accountancy\" by William Pickles, 3rd Edition the author has defined \"Depreciation\" as the permanent and continuing\n\ndimnution in the quality, quantity or value of an asset.\n\nIt is further stated that the provision for depreciation does not depend\n\nupon what the business can afford. as the debit therefor i.' an\n\n,(I) '1964] 2 L.L.J.Jll.\n\n(2) [1971] 2 S.C.C. 759.\n\n(l) [t966) I S.C'.R. J82.\n\nesse.ntial one, constit\\lting not an appropria.tion of, but a charge A• agamst, profits for the period in question.\n\nBased upon the above statements contained in the text books. referred to above, Mr. Tarkunde urged that the principle in Accountancy is that depreciation must be deducted before ascertaining the profits.\n\nIn our opinion, the above statements may have considerable bearing in the preparation of profit .and loss accounts having due regard to the provisions of the Companies Act and Mercantile usage; but they have no bearing on the question of fixation of wage structure and dea1111ess allowance in an industrial adjudication.\n\nFrom what is stated above, it follows that the Tribunal was justified in arriving at gross-profits without deducting the provision for Depreciation.\n\nAs already mentioned by us, Mr. Tarkunde has\n\nacepted that the Tribunal was justified in not_ deducting the proviion made for taxation and develop]Ilent rebate.\n\nThe result 1s that the average gross-profits of the appellant being about n, Rs, 40,00,000.00, as held by the Tribunal, is correct.\n\ni:n the fixation of wages and dearness allowance the legal position is well-established that it has to be done on an industry-cumregion basis having due regard to the financial capacity of the unit under consideration-,-vil:le Express Newspaper~ (Private) Ltd..\n\nE and Another v. The Union cf India and others('), Greaves Cotton and Co. and others v. Their Workmen('), and Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Its Workmen(').\n\nIt has been further stated in Greai'es Corron arid Co. and others\n\nv. Their Workmen(') as follows:\n\n\"The principle Jherefore which emerges from thei.1: two decisions is that in applying the industry-cum-region formula for fixing wage scales the Tribunal should lay stress on the industry part of the tonnula if there are a large number of concerns in the same region carrying on the same industry; in such a case in order that production cost may not be unequal and there may be equal competition, wages should generally be fixed on the b(asis of the comparable industries, namely, industries of the same kind.\n\nBut where the number of industries of the same kind in a particular region is small it is the region part of the industry-cum-region formula which ssumes importance . ....... ''\n\n(I) [1959] S.C.R . .12.\n\n(21 [19(;41 5 S.C.R . .162\n\n\nUNICHEM LTD. v. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, /.) 587\n\nIt has been further emphasised in Ahmedabad Millowners' Association etc. v. The Textile Labour Association(') that industrial adjudication should always take into account, when revising the wage structure and granting dearness allowance, the problem of the additional burden to be imposed on the employer and ascert:1in whether the employer can reasonably be called upon to bear such burden.\n\nThe principles to be bprne in mind have been stated in the said decision as follows :\n\n\"It is a long-range 'plan; and so, in dealing with this problem, the financial position of the employer must be carefully amined. What has been the progress o{ the industry in question; what are the prospects of the indusiry in future; has the industry been making profits; and if yes. what is the extent of profits; what is the nature of demand which the industry expects to secure; what would be the extent of the burden and its gradual increa5e which the employer may have to face ? These and similar other considerations have to be carefully weighed before a proper wage structure can be reasonably constructed by industrial adjudication ........ \"\n\nAs pointed out In Greaves Cotto11 a11d Co. and others v. Their JV orkmen (' )., one of the principles to be adopted in fixing wages and dearness allowance is that the Tribunal should take into account the wage scale and dearness allowance prevailing in comparable ''oru:erns carrying on the same industry in the region.\n\nThe factorsc which have to be taken into account for ascertaining comparable concerns have also been laid down by this Court.\n\nIn Workmen of Balmer Lawrie and Co. v. Bil/mer Lawrie and Co.(\") those principles have been stated as follows:\n\n\"Besides, it is necessary to emphasise that in dealing with the comparable character of industrial undertaking5, industrial adjudication does not usually rely on oral evidence alone. This question is c01l5idered in the light of material fact aoo circumstances which are generally proved by documentary evidence.\n\nWhat is the total capital invested by the concern, what is the extent of its business. what is the order of the profits made by the concern, what are the dividends paid. how many employees are employed by the concern, what is its standing in the industry to which it belongs, these and other matters have to be examined by industrial adjudication in determining the question as to whether one concern is comparable with another in the matter affixing wages.\n\nNow,\n\n(I) [1966] I S.C.R. 382.\n\n(2) j1964] S S.C.R. 36:!.\n\n(3) [1%4] S S.C.R. 344.\n\nit is obvious that these questions cannot be decided merely on the interested .testimony either of the workmen, or of the employer and his witnesses.\"\n\nJ:n Workmen of New Egerton Woollen Mills v. NewEger1011 Woollen Mills and others('), the above principles have again been reiterated.\n\nFrom the decisions,. referred to above, it follows that two principal factors which must weigh while fixing or revising wage scales and grades are : ( 1) How the wages prevailing in the establishment\n\nin question compare with those given to the workmen of similar grade and scale by similar establishments in the same industry or in their absence in similar establishments in other industries in the region; and ( 2) What wage scales the establishment in question can pay without any undue strain on its financial resources.\n\nThe same principles substantially apply when fixing or revising the dearness allowance.\n\nThe question is whether the Trilµlal has adopted the above principles when revising the wage scales and dearness a!lowance in the case of the appellant.\n\nThe Unions had relied on as many as twentyone ccmcerns located in the region of Greater Bombay and belonging to the same pharmaceutical units of industry as units comparable with the appellant.\n\nThe appellant opposed its. being compared with those concerns on the groqnd that the units relied on by .the Unions were companies having foreign collaborations or connections, and as such possessing several advantages.\n\nThe appe)Jant in tum relied on several concerns in the region as comparable units;\n\nBefore we refer to .the concerns relied oo by the Unions and the appellant as comparable concerns, it is necessary to deal with an objection raised by Mr. Tarkunde that no foreign unit doing business in India or no unit in India doing business in collaboration\n\nwith a foreign concern, can ever considered for purposes of comparison.\n\nAccording .to the appellant such concerns have dis- G tinct advantages of international research facilities, reputation in business which enables such concerns to market their products more easily and thus enable them to pay higher Wliges to their employees, In view of the special technical facilities,' that may be available to them, their output will be far higher though the number of. emplo- yees wi!J be much Jess, •and as such they will be able to pay to their lesser number of employs higher wages.\n\nIn this connection H Mr.· Tarkunde relied on certain awards of the Industrial Tribunal\n\n(I) [1%9] 2 LL. J. 782.\n\n. ..;,\n\nUNICHEM LTD. \\\". WORKMEN ( Vaidialingam. J.) 5~,,\n\nwherein it is held that the companies having foreign collaboration though in the same region and in the same industry, cannot he considered for the purposes of comparison with purely local units.\n\nOn the other hand Mr. Sule, has opposed the ah!ove position and urged that the question as to who is the employer, is absolutd: inunaterial so long as the tests for the purposes ol' comparability. as laid down by this Court, are satisfied and the capacity to he; i: the financial burden is established, We will deal with aspect; in the first instance.\n\nlt must be stated at the outset that the Unions placed re!ianc: on certain information contained in the prospectus of the Compa111 and certain statements contained in the book \"'Indian Pharma. ceutical Industry\" published in 1963 and 1969, to show that th,· appellant concern is also one which has foreign collaboration and as such it is to be ranked as a concern with foreign attachmnt. has recorded a finding in favour of the appellant that it is not '' unit having foreign collaboration.\n\nTherefore. this finding i' i\" favour of the appellant.\n\nThe question that now arises for consideration is whether in 13,, there is any objection or prohibition in an industrial tribunal, whon dealing with comparable units in a region from taking into account concerns having foreign collaboration.\n\nIt is no doubt true that some of the concerns relied on by the Unions are concerns working\n\nin collaboration with foreign firms.\n\nIn Chemical Industries and Pharmaceu4ica/ Laboratori<'., Limited (Cipla) Bombay v. Their Workmen('), it was held by the Industrial Tribunal that the Cipla cannot be compared to GlJ.~'' Laboratories, Raptakos Brett and other plrarmaceutical concernwhich are either subsidiaries of foreign concerns or are c!osel) linked with them.\n\nIt was further held that if any comparison could be made, it can only bie with concerns like Kemp & Compan~.\n\nSandu Pharmaceutical, Fair Deal Corporation, Edison Continenta: Laboratories, Bengal Chemicals aci1d such other indigenot<- concerns.\n\nAgain in Alembic Chemical Works Ltd. Baroda v. Its Workmen('), the Tribunal held that Alembic cannot be compared tn concerns like the Gloom Laboratories and others who have associatidns in different degrees and forms with certain foreign concern' of international repute.\n\nOn this reasoning the Tribunal relied more on the scales L'f wages prevailing in concerns like the Jhandu Pharmaceutical, Cipla.\n\nKemp & Co., and 'such similar concerns.although it held that\n\n(ll [1957] !.C.R. Bombay, t206.\n\n12) 11958] l.C.R. B:imbay, 1305.\n\nAlembic is a much bigger concern than .the said units.\n\nIt must A be stated that in both theSe awards, concerns with foreign collaboration have been eliminated from consideration oo the.ground that they cannot~ regarded as comparable concerns1aiid to that extent they support Mr. Tarkund<s contention.\n\nIn Reference (IT) No. 223 of W59, which related to the appellant Company, the workmen pla~ reliance on Indian units of foreign cancems for being treated \\as comparable units.\n\nThe :ippellant, however, pointed out that\\ those units which have international fame and repute in world market were in a position to sell their products more easily and profitably and hence they cannot be treated as comparable units.\n\nThe Tribunal, no doubt, accepted C the contention of the appellant that the Unions had selected some of the bigger concerns for comparison. and held•that it would be more appropriate if the appellant is placed somewhere in between the bigger and smaller concerns. In this view the Tribunal took a fair cross-section of the industry and fixed the wages having regard to the financial capacity of the appellant.\n\nD Again in Reference (IT) No. 402 of 1963, relating to the appellant, wherein. the dearness allowance was revised, the appellant had contended that it should not be compared with the units like Ciba, Dumex, Glaxo, Sandoz and the like.\n\nThe Tril:!unal held that the appellant cannot be compared with international pharmaceutical units having branches in Bombay or with foreign concerns like Glaxo, Ciba, Sandoz etc., which though incorporated in India E. are subsidiaries of forei!lll companies having all the advantages of connection with respect of home companies in Europe and America.\n\nThe Tdbunal referred to the award in Reference (IT) No. 223 of\n\nI 959 and hela that a fair cross-section of the industry has to be taken into account for fixing a scale of dearness allowance, which\n\nF'. will be within the financial capacity of the appellant. But, however,, the Tribunal held that the appellant is a firm of good repute and standing and that it has very fair prospects.\n\nThough in Refe. rence (IT) No. 223 of 1959, the Tribooal did not specifically eliminate from consideration units having foreign collabora•ion as such, nevertheless, in Reference (IT) No.\" 402 of 1963, the Tribunal has held that the appellant cannot be c'Olllpared with inter- G national pharmaceutical companies having branches in Bombay or with concerns, though incorporated in India, are subsidiaries of foreign companies.\n\nFrom what is stated above, it is no doubt true that in tjie three awards, one of which specifically relates to the appellant, concerns H having foreign collaboration have been eliminated for P!1rpdses of comparison.\n\nBut no legal principle on , the basis of which such a decision has been arrive4 at has been stated in any of these award<.\n\nUNICHEM LTD. v. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, l.) 5911\n\nIn our.opinion, so.long and to the extent that concerns having foreign collaboration are doing business in India and-in a particular concerned region, we do not see any reason why they should not be taken into account for purposes of being treated as comparab e units, provided the tests for such, purposes as laid down by this Court are satisfied.\n\nNo doubt s<hne of thOSe concerns may be having an , advantage in various matters.\n\nBut merely because that they possess such advaniage in the field of business is not a circurn\" stance for eliminating such c0ncerns for purposes of comparability.\n\nThe object of industrial adjudication is, as far as possible, to secure uniformity of service conditions amongst the industrial units in the same region.\n\nIf a concern having foreign c01Iaboration properly satisfies the tests of comparability, it would be improper to regard such unit as uncomparable merely on the ground that it is a concern with foreign co!Jaboration or interest and that the unit with which it is sought fo be compared is entirely of Indian origin and resources. ·\n\nThe object .of Industrial Law is to improve the service c0ndi- 1ions of industrial labour so as to provide for them the ordinary\n\namenitis ()f life with a view to bring ahPut industrial peace which would in \"turn accelerate productivity of the country resulting in its prosperity.\n\nThe prosperity of the country, in its turn will help 10 improve the conditiQll of Jabour.\n\nThe principles regarding fiiration of wage scales and dearness allowance have been laid down in several decisions by this Court and they apply equally to all industries irrespective of the character of the.employer. The worker is interested in his pay packet a:nd given reasonable wages, he can be expected to be a satisfied worker.\n\nThere is no juStification from the stand point of View of the emproyees for fixing different wage scales merely because of the fact that some workmen are in the employ of pu~Jy local concerns. while some others are in the employ of units though in the same region, working in collaboration with foreign concerns.\n\nAs the paramoun:t consideration is the inu:rest of the worker, the character of the emp1oyer is irrelevant, provided 1he latter's financial capacity to bear the burden is establish~. . In the ultimate analysis the character of the employer or the destmatmn of profits has no. relevance in the fixation of wages and dearness allowance. ·\n\nWe are fortified in the above view by the decision of the Con1 stitution Bench of this Court in Hindustan Antibiotics Lhl. v. The Workmen and others('). In that case on behalf of hehappellt\n\nit was urged that as t was a government eompany m t e J?Ubhc sector, the principles governing the fixation of wag~ applicable to companies in the private sectr do not haw \\\\nytt:levooce.. On\n\n(1) [1%7] I S.C.R. 652.\n\n1he other hand, on behalf of the workmen it was contended that in fixing the wage structure including dearness allowance, 'the quest ion, who is the employer, is irrelevant and that only the needs ol I he employee are of paramount importance.\n\nThe contention on behalf oi the workmen was accepted by this Court and it was held that the same principles that have been laid down by the industrial adjudication and the courts regarding the fixation of wage scale' 11nd dearness allowance in respeci of companies in the priva:te sector apply with equal force to companies in the public sector also.\n\nIt \\\\'as further held that in the application ot the industry-cum-region principle to be adopted to distinction can be made between on~ unit anCI another in the same industry in the fixation of wage scale' provided the test of financial capacity is satisfied.\n\nIt was furthr held that by and large the acceptance or the principle of indu>try- , um-region will be more conducive to industrial relations and that the same principles evolved by the indusirial adjudication in regard 10 private sector undertakings will govern those in the public sect.'r undertakings having a distinci corporate existence.\n\nThough the decision cited above had to deal with a claim for differentiation being made on behalf of a company in the public\n\n<ector and which claim was rejected, in our opinion, the ba,,, ic principle underlying the said decision will apply even with respe<:t to the question whether the units, having collaboration with foreign\n\nconcerns can be taken into account for purposes of compari .. , on.\n\nIn our opinion, the above decision warrants the conclusion that such units ha:ving foreign collaboration or foreign companies doin~\n\nhlLiness in India can be taken into account for purposes of being considered whether they are comparable units.\n\nOf course, the test laid down by this Court for treating one unit as a comparable one, will have to be satisfied, and once that test is fulfi.lled, there can be no distinction made between such units a:nd purely local units.\n\nTherefore, in our view, the Tribunal, in the case before us, was perfectly justified Jn taking into account for purposes of comparison units having collaboration with foreign concerns and foreign units doing business in India in the same region and bein~ in the same industry.\n\nIt follows. therefore, that the principles laid down to the contrary in the awards relied on by Mr. Tarkunde, are erroneous.\n\nComing to the units relied o.u by the parties as comparable units. as mentioned earlier, the Unions relied on as many as 21 concern., as comparable with the appellant.\n\nNo doubt some of the unib relied on by them were units having coUab(oration with foreign concerns.\n\nThe aooellant also in turn filed statement Ex. C-26. referring to six companies which could be treated as comparable concerns.\n\nUN!CHEM LTD. v. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, J.) 593\n\nThe Tribunal rejected most of the units relied on by the Unions on the ground that the information furnished regarding such units were not adequate and complete regarding various factors necessary\n\nto constitute a comparable unit.\n\nWe have also gone through the statements filed by the Unions. In Ex. DU-2, one of the Unions furnished information regarding.the business performance of about nine concerns till 1he year 1964-65.\n\nSimilarly, in Ex. DU-3, another Union had giveri the average performance of nearly ten units for the years 1962-63 to 1964-65. As it would be more desirable to consider the financial capacity of the appellant in the\n\nliglit of the trading results disclosed in the balance sheets and profit and loss accounts from the years 1965-66 to 1969-70, it must be c considered that the information furnished in Exs. DU-2 and DU-3\n\ncannot be considered to be upto date and helpful. The Unions also did not make any further attempc to supplement the information contained in these two exhibits by fur.nishing information regarding the years subsequent to 1964-65. No doubt, the Union, haYe furnished particulars regarding: one unit, Burrouhs Wel!cornc\n\n1 lndia) Private Ltd., which will be dealt with later.\n\nTherefor~.\n\nU the rejection by the Tribunal of most of the units relied on by the\n\nL:nions was justified.\n\nThe uppellant Company relied on six units mentioned in E~.\n\nC-26.\n\nThose units are Cipla, Chemo-Phama, Zandu, Opil, Sigm\" and Bengal Chemicals. But the Compa, ny did not furnish informu- E ti<Jn regarding the business performa:nce of these concerns for u\n\npriod of years in the immediate past.\n\nBut it will be noted that the four units referred to in E~. C-26, namely. Zandu. Cipla. Opil\n\n•ind Sigma, had been considered by the Industrial Tribunal in its previous uward Reference. (IT) No. 402 of 1963,, when the scale of dearness allowance obtaining in the appellant Company was r reised. On that occasion the Tribunal had held that it was only Cipla which came nearest to the apPCllant Company and even there the dearness allowance obtainmg in Cipla cannot be taken for comparison. !hat means that these four units were left out of 11ccount and were not treated as units comparable with the appelltmt.\n\nNo fresh materials. were placed by the appellant regarding G these four units after the decision of llie Tribunal in Reference\n\n1 IT) No. 402 of 1963. Therefore, the Tribunal in the present case, was justified in rejecting the claim of the .. appellant that those four units are comparable concerns. The elimination of the four units, thus left for consideration only two concerns, namely, Chemo-Phaina andBengal Chemic; als.\n\nEven here the Unions had furnished statements Bxs. DU-8 and DU-9, regarding these two H uni!S.\n\nIn Ex. DU:8; the business ce of Chemo-Phama from 1965 to 1969 was given and m Ex. DU-9, the business perfonnance of Bengal Chemicals from 1965 to 1970 was given. The\n\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\nA comparison of the statements contained in Exs. DU-8 and DU-9 with. the material relatin.,. to the appellant in Ex. DU-44, regarding the paid up capital, ':-eserves and surplus sales. net block, net profits and gross-profits it is quite clear that the business performance of Chemo-Phama ; nd Bengal Chemicals do not come anywhere nor that of the appe!lant. The\n\nB appellant in al! respects stands on a much higher footing.\n\nThe average gross-profits of the appellant work out to Rs. 40,11,176. while. the average gross-profits of Chemo-Phama works 9ut to Rs. 5,31,511 and that of the_ Bengal Chemicals to Rs. ll,'.l9,553.\n\nTherefore, it is clear that these two units also cannot be treated as concerns comparable with the appellant and hence the wage strucc ture prevailing in those concerns cannot provide any useful guidance.\n\nWe have already mentioned that the Tribunal has ultimately held that M/s Burroughs Wellcome (India) Private Limiied is a concern comparable with that of the appellant.\n\nIt is no doubt a foreign company in the sense that its entire capital is held by I> foreign company as shown in the statement Ex. C-11. filed by the appeJlant.\n\nBut we have already rejected the contention that such a concern cannot be ruled out of consideration for purpose of comparability.\n\nA very severe attack has been levelled by Mr. Tarkunde in the E Tribunal's treating M/ s Burroughs Wellcome Company as a comparable unit.\n\nAccording. to the learned counsel if the various factors relevant for the purpose of comparison are considered, it will be clear that the appellant cannot stand any comparison with this unit.\n\nMr. Tarkunde further pointed out that instead of taking only one unit for purposes of comparison, theTribunal should ha.ve taken fair cross-section of the industry in order to find out where F exactly the appellant can be fitted in. It is no dout true that a fair cross-section of the industry should be taken into account.\n\nBut in this case when all the other units have been held to be not comparable with the appellant, this criticism leveJled against the approach made by the Tnbllllal cannot be accepted. ·\n\nRegarding Burroughs Wellcome Company, the Unions had submitted a statement Ex. DU-2A under a seal of confidential as it was a private limited company. A comparison of the information -contained in the said statement Ex. DU-2A regarding the paid up\n\n-capital, reserves and surplus ' sales, depreciation,, development rebate, provision for taxatipn, net-profit's, gross-lll'Ofits, net block H and dividend declared for the,.ears 1967 to 1970 with tho corresponding items in Ex. DU-4A with respect to the appellant shows 1hat both the units are substantially on a par; Normally, the\n\nUNICHEM LTD. v. WORKMEN (Vaid{a/ingam, /.) 595\n\nstatements in Ex. DU-2A could have been extracted in this judgment b, ut for the fact that .Burroughs Wellcome Cpany being a private limited company and the Statements havirig been furnished in a sealed cover, they could not be made public.\n\nThe paid up capital is identical in both the conce.rns. The average sales of Burroughs Wellcome Company and those of the appellant are substantially the same.\n\nThe difference between the net-profits of the two is significantly smrul.\n\nThe gro'ss-proJitS of the two units are also close to each other. No doubt there are sO!\\le small differences between the two in these items, but they are of no significance. The various factors which have to be taken into account for he purpose of a unit being treated as a comparable one as laid down by this Court have already been reierre4 to. If so, all thoe factors taken into account clearly show that Burroughs We!Jcome Company is a unit comparable with the appellant.\n\nNo doubt the appellant has .relied on the ratio of employees to sales, as well as to debt equity ration and the percentage of profit to sales in respect of the appellant and the Burroughs Wellcome Company. Ex. C-22 co, ntains the ratio of employees to sales in 1968-69. Though there are certain other units referred to therein. we will only advert to the particulars regardini:i: the appellant and the Burroughs Wellcome Company, which are as follows :\n\nRation of Employee to Salef\n\nNo.of Per Name of the Company Year Sales Employees employee\n\nsale\n\nRs.\n\nRs.\n\nUruchem 68-69 32994456 752 43875 Burrouahs. 69 25000000 425 58823\n\nA reference to Ex. C-22 will show that the sales of the appellant is higher than that of Burroughs Wellcome Co.\n\nNo doubt the ratio per employee is slightly less in the case of the appellant.\n\nIt is also seen that the appellant employs nearly 752 workmen wheica5 Burroughs Wellcome Co. employs only 425 workmen.\n\nIn Ex. Cc 18, particulars regarding Debt Equity Ratio have been given.\n\nThat statement contains particulars regarding the various firms including the appellant. In 1969 the capital of the appellant was Rs. 101.86 Jakhs.\n\nIt had borrowed Rs. 95.89 lakhs and the percentage on borrowed funds to capital works out to 94.1 % . It is no doubt ti:ue that there is no borrowed capital in Burroughs Wellcome Co. In Ex. C-18 particulars regarding nine !!!rlis have l>een given and it is Seen that except two units al] the\n\note~ seven }Jlllits, including e appellant, .have borrowed. ' Jn fact It IS mteresting to note that Glaxo, which has a capital of Rs. 1196.81 laths had also borrowed Rs. 26.80 lalchs. S!milarJy,\n\nChemo-Phama which had a capital of only Rs. 32.05 lakhs had A borrowed Rs. 37.08 lakhs and the percentage works out to Rs. 115.7%. We are referring fo these aspects because it was\n\nmesed by M.r. Tarkunde that the Debt Equity Ratio in the appellant 1s very fogh and that it has to pay a large amount by way of inlt!rest on borrowed funds which is not the case with Burroughs Wellcome Company. But the statements contained in Ex. C-18 s themselves clearly show that borrowing for the purpose of business\n\n>eems to be a usual pattern followed by the companies in the region.\n\nEx. C-15 is a statement relating to percentage of profit to s'ales for the years 1965-66 to 1969-70. No doubt the figures given C therein show that the percentage of profits has been fluctuating: but. in our opinion, the particulars contained in the above exhibits. relied on by the appel!ant, do not affect the findings of the Tribunal that Burroughs Wel!come Company is .a unit comparable with the Cippellant.\n\nAnother criticism that has been levelled by Mr. Tarkunde is that the Tribunal has not taken into account the prospects of the t\\1ture business of the appellant. ln .this connection the appellant :elied on the coming into force with effect from January l, 1971 of the Drugs (Price Control) Order. 1970 .. According to Mr. Tarkunde wh11tever may have been the financial position of the appellant in the past, its future business is bound to suffer in view of thh price control order. He referred us to 'the decision in Wil/iamsons\n\n1 Tndia) Privae. Ltd. v. Its Workmen(') of this Court wherein it hus been held, amongst the various factors which have to be taken into account for the purpose of fixation of wage scales and dearness uJlowance, the prospect of future business is a very relevant circum- 'tance. This factor, according to the appellant, has not been taken into account by the Tribunal. ·\n\nWe have earlier referred to the decisions of this Court regardinp. the principles governing the fixation \\lf wages nd dearness allowance.\n\nIt is no doubt a long range plan and the prospects o[ future\n\nbuiness amongst other factors bave also to be taken.into account.\n\nTile case of the appellant is that in 1963, there has 'Ileen a 1'r.ice\n\nfreeze and that has affected its busiliess and therefore the Druir.;\n\ni'Price Control) Order, 1970 Will affect its future business.\n\nWe have. already extracted in the e8!11ier part of the jud2ment the .trd ing res).l!ts of the appellant from 1965-66to 1969-70. If the price freeze which came Into force in 1963 had any affect, then it mu5t\n\nhve been feflected in the. trading results of the al)pellant. 'The\n\nUN!CHEM LTD. v. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, J.) 597\n\ntrading results of the appellant during the years 1962-63 to 1964-65 are as follows :\n\nParticulars 1962-63 1963-64 .1964-65\n\nPaid-up capital . 4491000 4499250 4499500 Reserves and Surplus . 476569 1010753 1505353 Sales • 10241405 15665883 17388705 Net Block 3907400 4371113 4345467 Provision for Taxation 934000 1065000 1515000 Depreciation . 297243 379256 390878 . Development rebate 33686 100617 22329 Net Profits . , • 442881 703567 877271 ·-------\n\nA glance of the above statement clearly' shows that though the paid-up capital remains the same, there has been a steady rise in\n\ntile reserve and surplus sales and net profits. Similarly, the net block has also an increase: There has been no set back in the sales.\n\nOn the other-hand there has been a steady rise in the sales.\n\nNo doubt for the year 1969-70 the profits did go down; but the drop is comparably small and the appeliant has not been able to satisfy us that it is due to the price freeze. ·\n\nThen the question is regarding the impact of the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1970, which has come into effect from January 1,\n\n1971. In this connection it is necessary to refer to the speech E made hr; the Chainnan of the Board of Directors of the appellant Company at the Annual General Meeting held on January 9, 1971.\n\nAt this stage it may be mentioned that the Accounting year of the appellant Company is from October 1, to September 30, of the succeeding year. On January 9, 1971, the Chairman was giving a review of the working of the Company for the year ending September 30, 1970. He had clearly stated that the impact of the F Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1'970, which had come into force only recently will be felt by the Company only after the year\n\n1970-71. The appeal wrui heard by us from January. 3, 1972 and concluded only on January 10, 1972. As the Company, in the previous years had been having its Annual' ral Meetings in early January, of each year, we suggested to the counsel for the G appellant that as the approximate trading results for the year commencing from October 1, 1970 to September 30, 1971 would have been •available by then, they may be furnished so that it may be possible to find out the impact of the Drugs (Price Control) Order\n\non the trading results of the appellant, But it was represented that the figures are ilot available. It is not necessary for us to com- H ment except to state that going by the fact that on 'former occasions the figure had b!een ready by the first week of Janurv to euRhle the Annual General Meetin~ of the Company to be held, it would . not have been ditlioult for the appellant to have furnished at least IO-LI031 Sup.CJ/72\n\nthe pproximate figures, if really the trading results had shown a A <l7chne. . The appeant has missed an opportunity 'that was provided to it to establish that the Drugs (Price Control) Order has .adversely affected its business. Under those circumstances, it is not\n\npossie for us to disagree with the view of the Tribunal that the impact of the Drugs (Price Control) Order will not tie such as to affect materially the business prospects of the appeHant Company.\n\nWe may stale that if the Drugs (Price Control) Order materially affects the prosperity of the appellant's trade, it wuld be opell: to it to raise a dispute for the reduction in the wage structure and m case they are able to show that in view of the Drugs (Price Control) Order, their financial position has been weakened to such C an extent that they cannot bear the burden of wage structure fixed by the present award, the ma'tter may have to be examined on its merits.\n\nThe questio:n of fixation o( wage scales need not detain us very . long. We have already extracted the wage scales prevailing in the appellant company as wel! as the categories of workmen when the D reference was made.\n\nWe have also referred to the fixation of wage scales by the Tribunal on a comparison with the wage scale.obtaining in Burroughs Wellcome Company .. The wag~ structure as well as the grades that were prevalent in Burroughs Wellcome Co. in pursuance of the settlement dated June 13, 1966 regarding the operatives and clerical and subordinate staff have peen incorporated E by the Tribunal in its Award.\n\nWe do not think it necessary to reproduce the same. A comparison of the wage scales in Burrough Wellcome Company and the wage scales fixed by the Tribunal in 'the Award for the Company will show that the Tribunal has only :made some slight variation in view of the fact that lt accepted the report of the assessor for the continuance of the exigting grades in F the Company. Assome of those grades were not existing in Burroughs Wellcome Company, the Tribunal had to :make some .slight changes. Wherever it was possible the wage structure in Burroughs Wellcome Co. has been retained but the maximum has been raised a 1ittle and some slight changes have also been made in the incre- mental stage.\n\nOnce Burrough Wellcome Company is treated as a comparable unit we are satisfied that the wage scales awarded by the Tribunal canot be considered to be unjustified.\n\nThe Triunal's finding regarding the financial capacity of the appellant has already been referred to and we accept the same.\n\nIt wa8, however, J?Ointed out by Mr. Tarkunde that in cqnsidering w comp.arabihty of a unit; strength of the labour forcehas :lilso to be given due importance. Mr. Tarlcuncle l'Ointed out that\n\nUNICHEM LTD. v. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, !.) 599\n\nA while 'the appellant employs 752 workmen, there are only 436 i:n\n\nBurroughs Wellcome Co. as is seen from the State)lle!It Ex. C-22.\n\nNo doubt to this extent, the two units differ, but when one be'ars in mind the business performance of both , the units, there is not much of a substanfral difference. It may be that because of the fact that Burroughs Wellcome Co. adopts more modem methods tl of production, it was employing a smaller complement of worker5.\n\nHaving due regard to all the other tests that have been satisfied, this difference in \"the strength of labour force alone, in our opinion, cannot.l>e given undue importance. It is pertinent io note that this Court in Workmen of New Egertorli Woollen Mills v. New Egerton Woollen MU/sand others(1) did not disagree with the vie~ c of the Industrial Tribunal which had treated the respondent therein and another unii as a comparabi1e unit, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent was employing at the material time about 3000 workmen whereas the unit which was treated as a comparable unit was havin_g the labour force of only about 1000 men, in view of the fact that all other requirements for comparability were satisfied.\n\nIn fact, in the case before us, the Tribunal has adverted to this D difference o{ Jabour force of the appellant and Burroughs Wellcome Company, but nevertheless it held that, that by itself is not sufficient to eliminate Burroughs Wellcome Company as a comparable unit.\n\nWe agree with this approach made by the Tribunal.\n\nAn objection was taken on the asis of s. 10(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 that ihe Tribunal has permitted the Unions to revise their demand regarding classification and grades of workmen and that the Tribunal has further committed an error i, n upholding the grades of Stenographers, Assistants and Store-keepers and merging them with that of the Senior Clerks.\n\nWe are not inclined to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant.\n\nWe have already referred to the fact that as the question of classification and fixing grades were matters cf a technical nature, at the joint request of both the parties, the Tribunal appointed Sri Gadkari, as an assessor.\n\nIt was really in view of the stand taken by both the parties before the assessor and the Tribunal, after the report was submitted by the assessor that the Tribunal has G accepted the report that the existing grades should continue.\n\nBut as the '\"'.orkmen had to be fitted in the appropriate grades, the Tribunal was justified in fitting in the categories the workmen and their grades as well as their scales of wages.\n\nThe above contention based upon s. 10( 4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, at the most can relate, if at all. only to the operatives.\n\nThe report of .Sri Gadkari has already been referred to.\n\nHe . had suggested the .H retention of the existing categories.\n\nThe workmen have necessarily to be classified for the puri>ose pf being put in particular categories\n\n(I) [1969] 2 L.L.J. 782.\n\nand the wages also have to be suitably fixed depending upon the category in which they are so fitted.\n\nHaving due regard to the nature of the reference, olassificatio, n though jobwise and the fixing of wages of pay and fitting the workmen in suitable categories were all matters incidental and as such the Tribunal has acted within its jurisdiction in classifying the workmen and fixing the scales of pay after fitting them in particular categories. In the view above expressed, we do not think it necessary to refer to the decisions referred either by Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the appellant or by Mrs. Urmi!a Kapoor, o, n behalf of the respondent No. 2 as to when exactly the matter can ble considered to be incidental to the question referred for adjudication.\n\nBefore we 'take up the question of dearness allowance, one other point that requires to be adverted to is the objection taken on behalf of the appellant regarding. the raising in the gratuity scheme the ceiling limit from 15 months to l 7t months' basic wages.\n\nThe Tribunal has adopted the pattern obtaining in Burroughs Wel!come Company. We do not see any question of principle involved in this matter and therefore we find no merit in the objection raised by the Company.\n\nThe pattern of dearness allowance that was in force in the appellant Company at the time of the reference has been indicated already.\n\nWe have also referred to the scale of deaess allowance fixed by the Tribunal.\n\nThere were different systems of dearness allowance for the operatives and the clerical and subordinate staff.\n\nThat such a different system of dearness allowance for the employees working under the same employer is not warranted, is clear from the decisions of this Court in Greaves Cotton & Co. and others\n\nv. Their Workmen(') and Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Its Workmen('). Therefore, the Tribunal was justified in devising a uniform scale of dearness allowance applicable to all the employees of the appellant. The Unions required a common scheme of dearness allowance of slab! system to be introduced for all employees.\n\nThe appellant resisted the claim on the ground that there was already a scheme of dearness allowance existing in the Company and that there is no justification for revising the same. But, nevertheless, the Tribunal has adopted, by and large, the scheme of dearness allowance which was in vogue in Burroughs Wellcome Co. Normally, once Burroughs We!lcome Co. is treated as a unit comparable with the appellant, the Tribunal must be considered prlma facle to be j, usfified in introducing the pattem obtaining in that unit. However, it is pointed out on behalf of the appellant that the slab system of dearness allowance does not obtain in any of the pharmaceutical industries in the region.\n\n(1) [19641 S S.C.R. 362.\n\n(2) {19691 2 S.C.R. 113.\n\nUN!CHEM LTD. v .. woRKMEN (Vaidialingam, J.) 60 l\n\nThe contention that because there was a system of dearness allowance in existence in the Company and therefore there was no justification for revising the same, cannot be accepted.\n\nA similar contention raised in Remington Rand of India v. Its Workmen(') was rejected by this Court. In that case there was a system of dearness allowance providing for payment of not only a rate of B percentage on the basic salary biut also a variation in the percentage on the rise or fall of the cost of living index.\n\nThe workmen demanded revision of the scale of dearness allowance on the ground that the cost of living }ndex had increased.\n\nThe clainr was resisted by the Company on the ground that the scheme of dearness allowance then existing in the Company itself provided for an increase c\n\nin the cost of living index and therefore no revision is required.\n\nThis contention was not accepted by this Court. It was held that a clainr made by the workmen, if otherwise justified, cannot be rejected on the sole ground that a provision is already made in an existing scheme of dearness allowance for adjustmt1llt depending upon an increase in the cost cf living index.\n\nThis Coun further held that if it is established that the cost of living shows a tendency to rise very high, the workmen would be entitled to claim and there may be a change .in the rate of dearness allowance originally fixed, so as to provide for more neutralisation. It was further held that a claim made by the workmen will have to be properly considered and adjudicated upon by the Tribunat.\n\nJ:n fact, in that case, it is seen that there was only a 50 point rise in the cost of living index and nevertheless the revision of the scale of dearness aMowe by the Tribunal was upheld.\n\nWe may also refer to the decision of this Court in Workmen of Balmer Lawrie and Co. v. Balmer Lawrie and Co. (2 ) wherein it has been held as follows :\n\n\"If the paying capacity of the employer increases or the cost of Jiving shows an upward trend, or there are other anomalies, mistakes or errors, in the award fixing wage structure, or there has been a rise in the wage siructure in comoarable industries in the region, industrial employees would be justified in making a claim for the\n\ne-examination of the wage structure and if such clainr is referred for adjudication, the Adjudicator would not normally be , iustified in rejecting it solely on the ground that enough time has not passed after the making of the award, or that material change in relevant circumstances b.ad not been proved. . It .is of course, not possible to lay down any hard and fast rule in the matter. The question as to revision must be examined on the merits in each\n\n(I} [19621 I L.L.J, 287.\n\n(2) [1964]5 s.c.R. 344,\n\nindividual case that is brought before an adjudicator for his adj.udication.\"\n\nOn the date when the settlement was entered into be'tween the\n\nppell'ant and its workmen on April 20, 1966, the cost of iiving mdex was 630.\n\nFrom Ex. C-1 it is seen that in August 1969, the cost of living index had gone up to 790 and from Ex. DU-10 dated B December 8, 1970, it is seen that when the second settlement was entered into between Bmroughs Wellcpme Co. and its workmen, the cost of living index had gone upto 800.1.\n\nIt is also seen that at the time of the Award.it had gon.e up farther to about 850 points.\n\nTherefore, from the date of the setllement in 1966 the cost of living index had very rapidly gone up by 220 points.\n\nAt the time when the demand for revision of wage-scales and dearness allowance wss made bly the Unfons and when the reference order was made by the Government, the cost of living index had gone up very high.\n\nThat clearly shows that the workmen had made out a case for revision of wage-scales and dearness allowance.\n\nWe have earlier referred to the scheme of dearness allowance D fixed by the Tribunal in ihe Award.\n\nThe scheme provides for payment of a particular percentage on the basic salary and it also provides for variation on 10 points.\n\nBut the dearness allowance has been fixed on the Bombay Working Class Cost of Living lndex of 521-530.\n\nThough more or less the same pattern of dearness allowance was obtaining in Burroughs Wellcome Co., the dearness allowance in the latter was fixed at the Bombay Worki; ng Class Cost of Living Index of 491-500.\n\nThe scale of dearness allowance, as demanded by the Unions, was on the basi's of the cost of living index 401-410.\n\nIt was accepted by the appellant that the scheme obtaj.ning in Burroughs Weilcome Company is more advantageous from the financial point of view than the_ scheme of dearness allowance demanded by the Unions.\n\nIn fact, the Tribunal itself has made a further concession in favour of the appellant by adoptin~\n\nthe cost of living index of 521-530 instead of 491-500 as was obtaining in Burroughs Wellcome Co.\n\nThe Tribunal had made this change in the cost of living index n view of the fact that in the appellant Company, there was an Incentive Wages Scheme in and by which operatives were gettinii on an average about Rs. 28/- per G month.\n\nTherefore the financial burden cast on the appellant by the dearness allowance scheme fixed by the Tribunal is such that the appeilant can bear the burden.\n\nIn order to show that in the Bombay region the pharrnaceµtical units were adopting the slab system of. dearness allowance, the\n\nUnions had filed a chart Ex. DU-1.\n\nIt is evident from Ex. DU-!, that out of 19 pharmaceutical units, referred to therein, at least 11 of them adopt the slab sys'tem of dearness allowance which has been\n\nUNICHEM LTD. v. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, 1.) 603\n\nintroduced in the case of the appellant in the Award.\n\nNo doubt,. it is pointed out by Mr. Tarkunde that in the statement filed biy the appellant, Ex. C-25, it will be seen that none of the Indian owned units have adopted the slab system. But whether those units have adopted or not, we have already indicated, that no distinction can be made between a purely local unit and a foreign unit doing B busi:ness in India.or an Indian unit doing business in collaboration with foreign concern.\n\nWhen oince such units can be taken into account as comparable units, the pattern of dearness allowance ob'taining therein can very well be cqnsidered to ascertain the system adopted by the industry as that will show the trend in the\n\nregion.\n\nAs pointed out above, ai leas't 11 units, referred to in Ex. DU-I have adopted the system now introduced in the case of the appeHant tjy the Tribunal. Under those circumstances, when such sysiem is prevailing in the industry in the same region, it cannot t\\e held that the Tribunal has committed any error, in introducing a similar pattern in the case cf the appellant.\n\nThe slab sysiem has been approved by this Coun as will be seen by the decisions in Greaves Cotton and Co. and others v. Their Wo.rkmen(1) and Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works-Ltd. v.\n\nIts Workmen(').\n\nEven in Bombay that such a pattern of dearness allowance, as the one introduced in ihe case of the appellant, is existing is see111 by the decisions of this Court in Greaves Cotton and Co. and others v. Their Workmen(') and Kamani Metals & Alloys Ltd. v. Their Workmen(').\n\nNo doubt the industries therein E were not pharmaceutical units. But that such a system exists in Bombay region is clear from the above decisiQDS.\n\nMr. Tarkunde referred us to the Award of the Industrial Tribunal in Reference (IT) No. 411 of 1966 in Voltas Limited, Bombay v. The Workmen Employed under them dated September\n\n30, 1969 wherein the adoption of slab system has not been approved. Orr the other hand, Mrs. Urmila K'apoor, learned counsel for respondeni No. 2 has drawn our attention to a number of awards of the Industrial Tribunal rendered during the years 1965 to 1968 wherein the slab system ol dearness allow11nce has been\n\nadopte? in Bombay region.\n\nIt is only necessary to refer to the award m the case of May and Baker Limited, Bombay v. Its Work- G '!1en, because that is a pharmaceutical unit. The award was given m or about June 1967 3flld it is seen that the dearness allowance on the patiern now given by the Tribunal in respect of the appellant has been adopted.\n\nWe have already referred to the fact that in Ex. DU-I, it is seen H that as many as 11 pharmaceutical u.uiis in Bomijay region have adopted the pattern of granting dearness allowance on the slab\n\n(I) [1964] S S.C.R. 362, .\n\n(2) [19691 2 S.C.R, 113.\n\n\nsystem._now incorporated !fl the present award.\n\nThough most of A the umts referred to therein could not be treated as units comparable ith the appellant because of lack of fu!J information regarding material factors, yet those concerns can be taken into account inasmuch as the system obtaiining in those concerns will show that the slab system is not something new to the pharmaceutical units.\n\nWe have already referred to the award in May an.d Baker Limited, B Bombay v. Its Workmen. These facts clearly show that the scheme of dearness allowance provided in the award before us in respect of. the appellant is ,; not anything new.\n\nOn the other hand, the Tribunal has only adopted the system prevailing in the region in respect of pharmaceutical units.\n\nSo far as the financial burden is concerned, we have already referred to the filndings recorded by the Tribunal.\n\nEven on the basis that the Tribiunal was not justified in proceeding on the assumption that 52 chemists are not covered by the reference, in -0ur opinion, the additional burden that will be cast qri the appellant\n\ncan be easily borne by ii.\n\nTherefore, we see no error in the scheme of dearness allowance introduced, in the case of the appellant, by the Tribupal. ·\n\nThe only other point that requires to be considered is in respect -Of. the direction given by the Tribunal regarding the Incentive Bonus Scheme in respect of which the appellamt had given notice of change under s. 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. We have already referred to the natiure of the scheme that originally existed and the modification sought to be made by the appellant.\n\nWe have also pointed out that the Triblunal has not accepted most of the recommeindations made by Sri Tulpule, who was appointed as an assessor on the joint application of both the parties.\n\nThe Tribunal has s'tated that it is desirable that a scheme is worked out, if possible, by consent of parties for the purpose of pr<itecting the interest of the workmen at the increased base performance index.\n\nAccordiJng to Mr. Tarkunde the Tribunal itself should have gone into the matter and evolved a scheme.\n\nNo dpubt, it would have been desirable if. the Tribunal had actually evolved a scheme.\n\nBut the Tribunal has stated ihat the necessary material for that purpose has not been made avm1ae and as such it has not been possible to devise a scheme calculated to afford protection to the incentive earning of a workman at the raised base performance index.\n\nIn fact, we also suggested to the counsel that the parties may consider the matter and submit a scheme for that puroose.\n\nBut it was represented to us on February 9, 1972 by Mrs. U'lllila Kapoor, learned counsel for respondent No. 2, that it bas not en possible for the parties to arrive at 3111 agreement in respect of that matter, at present.\n\nTherefore; there is nothing fµrther that could\n\nUN!CHEM LTD. v. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, J.) 605\n\nbe done by this Court in this regard; and the resul't is that the observations made by the Tribunal in this regard will have full effect.\n\nIn the result, all the contentions of the appellaint are rejected and the A ward ot the Industrial Tribunal in respect of the matters in controversy in the appeaJs are confirmed.\n\nAll the appeals are dismissed. In Civil Appeal No. 1091 of 1971, the appellant will pay the costs of respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\n\nIn the other appeals, parties will l:iear their. own costs.\n\nThe appellant will have three months' time from today for f)ayment of the amounts due under the award.\n\nG.C.", "total_entities": 119, "entities": [{"text": "I\n\nUNICHEM LABORATORIES LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNICHEM LABORATORIES LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE WORKMEN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE WORKMEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DUA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Link Chain Manufacturers Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1285, "end_char": 1321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[582E., 585BCJ\n\nGramophone Company Ltd. v. Jts'Workmen, [191i4] II L.L.J. 131 and The Indian Link Chain Manufacturers Ltd. \"f. Their WOrkmen, l1971] 2 S.C.R. 759, applied."}}, {"text": "1971] 2 S.C.R. 759", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1342, "end_char": 1360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1583, "end_char": 1588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) so long and to the extent that concerns having foreign c§ll_aboration are doing business in India and in a pafticular concerood region there is no reason why they should not be taken into account for purposes of being teated as comparable unfts, provided th-.lt the tests for."}}, {"text": "Burroughs Wellcome & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2670, "end_char": 2694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iii) On the materials before it the Tribunal was justified in treating M/S. Burroughs Wellcome & Co. as a unit comparable with the appellut."}}, {"text": "Burroughs Wellcome", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2750, "end_char": 2768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that Burroughs Wellcome .employed a le."}}, {"text": "Burroughs Wellcome Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2904, "end_char": 2926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Once Burroughs Wellcome Co. was timted as a comparable unit the wage scales awarded by the Tribunal oj(mld not be considered to be unjustified. ["}}, {"text": "s. 10(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4105, "end_char": 4113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4121, "end_char": 4144, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Burroughs Wellcome Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4320, "end_char": 4346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "599E-600B]\n\n(vi) When the Tribunal raised in the gratuity scheme the ceiling limit from 15 months to 17t months according to the pattern obtaining in Burroughs Wellcome Company there was no question of principle involved justifying an objection by the appellant company. ["}}, {"text": "Greaves Cotton & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4765, "end_char": 4785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That such a different system of dearness auowance for employees working unde'r the same employer is not warranted is clear from the decisions of this Court in the cases of Greaves Cotton & Co. and Bengal CheinicaJ & Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. Therefore the Tribunal was justified in devising a unifonn scale of dearness allowance '3pp1icable to all the empolyees of the appellant."}}, {"text": "Bengal CheinicaJ & Pharmaceutical Works Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4790, "end_char": 4834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That such a different system of dearness auowance for employees working unde'r the same employer is not warranted is clear from the decisions of this Court in the cases of Greaves Cotton & Co. and Bengal CheinicaJ & Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. Therefore the Tribunal was justified in devising a unifonn scale of dearness allowance '3pp1icable to all the empolyees of the appellant."}}, {"text": "[1964) 5 S.C.R. 362", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5033, "end_char": 5052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1969] 2 S.C.R. 113", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5116, "end_char": 5135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6544, "end_char": 6572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6040-Hl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6684, "end_char": 6724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by special leave from the award dated April 15, 1971 of the Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra, Bombay in References (IT) Nos."}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6790, "end_char": 6804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, R. A. lahagirdar and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. A. lahagirdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6806, "end_char": 6822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, R. A. lahagirdar and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6827, "end_char": 6839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, R. A. lahagirdar and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "K. T. Sule", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6882, "end_char": 6892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. T. Sule, lanardaro Sharma and Indira Jaisingh, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "lanardaro Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6894, "end_char": 6910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. T. Sule, lanardaro Sharma and Indira Jaisingh, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Indira Jaisingh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6915, "end_char": 6930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. T. Sule, lanardaro Sharma and Indira Jaisingh, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "E Urmila Kapoor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6976, "end_char": 6991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E Urmila Kapoor and Kamlesh Bansal, for respondent No; 2 (in\n\nall the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Kamlesh Bansal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6996, "end_char": 7010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E Urmila Kapoor and Kamlesh Bansal, for respondent No; 2 (in\n\nall the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Vaidialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7101, "end_char": 7113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J.-These three appeals, by special leave, arise out of the Award, dated April 15, 1971 of the Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra, Bombay iri Reference (l.T. Nos."}}, {"text": "Company and registered as such under the Indian Companies Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8107, "end_char": 8174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jogeshwari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8319, "end_char": 8329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It had its factory in Jogeshwari in , Greater Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8343, "end_char": 8349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It had its factory in Jogeshwari in , Greater Bombay."}}, {"text": "June 24, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11368, "end_char": 11381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a settlement on :June 24, 1966 between the Com pany and its employees, in and by which."}}, {"text": "November 1, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12496, "end_char": 12512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company further revised\n\nfrom about November 1, 1969 the wage scales of Drivers and Watchmen as follows\n\n\"Drivers\n\nWatchmen\n\n."}}, {"text": "Jainuary 9, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14832, "end_char": 14848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These demands again were not accepted by the Company which led to the State Government making a reference on Jainuary 9, 1970, which reference was registered as Reference (I.T. No."}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16111, "end_char": 16116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16124, "end_char": 16153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16592, "end_char": 16597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16605, "end_char": 16628, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "May 16, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17008, "end_char": 17020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant also relied on the comiµg into force of the Drugs (Price Control) Order 1970\n\nwith effct from May 16, 1970."}}, {"text": ", 24, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17441, "end_char": 17451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The wage scales had been fixed by Settlement dated June, 24, 1966 and tht nothing has happened since the date of S•!ttlement to justify a revision of wage scales and dearness allowance."}}, {"text": "N. L. Gadkari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19128, "end_char": 19141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Tribunal to appoint Sri N. L. Gadkari, retired Chief Inspector of Factories, Maharashtra State as an assessor."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19181, "end_char": 19198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Tribunal to appoint Sri N. L. Gadkari, retired Chief Inspector of Factories, Maharashtra State as an assessor."}}, {"text": "February 22, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19365, "end_char": 19382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 22, 1971, in which he recommended the continuance of the then existing grades."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20123, "end_char": 20146, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Burroughs Wellcome & Co. (lndig) Private Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21490, "end_char": 21535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the units relied on as comparable with the appellant was M/s. Burroughs Wellcome & Co. (lndig) Private Ltd., Bombay."}}, {"text": "Burroughs Wellcome & 'co. (India) Private Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22233, "end_char": 22279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Burroughs Wellcome & 'co. (India) Private Ltd., was a unit w'1ich could be considered as a comparable concern with the aopellant."}}, {"text": "s.9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31958, "end_char": 31962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31970, "end_char": 31993, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "April 28, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32170, "end_char": 32184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Regarding the notice of change issued to the workmen by the appellant under s.9A of the Industrial Disputes Act proposing to alter the existing floor limit of 30% to 75% in the Incentive Bonus Scheme, the Tribunal on the joint application of the parties dated April JO, 1970 appointed on April 28, 1970 Sri B. Tulpule, as Assessor to examine the question of revising the existing scheme of Incentive Bonus."}}, {"text": "B. Tulpule", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32189, "end_char": 32199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Regarding the notice of change issued to the workmen by the appellant under s.9A of the Industrial Disputes Act proposing to alter the existing floor limit of 30% to 75% in the Incentive Bonus Scheme, the Tribunal on the joint application of the parties dated April JO, 1970 appointed on April 28, 1970 Sri B. Tulpule, as Assessor to examine the question of revising the existing scheme of Incentive Bonus.", "canonical_name": "B. Tulpule"}}, {"text": "August F 27, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32326, "end_char": 32343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Assessor submitted his report on August F 27, 1970 making the following recommendations :\n\n\"(1) The base performance index for all sections/ in\n\nlhe Company's factory should be revised and raised to 60 per cent."}}, {"text": "Tarkunde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35980, "end_char": 35988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The very_ JirS't objection of Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the appellant is regarding the manner of ascertaining 'grossprofits when revising the wage scales and' awarding dearn...\"Ss allowance.", "canonical_name": "Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "Unnila Kapoor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 38813, "end_char": 38826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, whose contentions have been adopted by Mrs.\n\nUnnila Kapoor, learned counsel for the second respondent, pointed out that the approach made by the Tribunal is correct and is also supported by the decisions of this Court."}}, {"text": "sections 205 and 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39017, "end_char": 39037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39045, "end_char": 39064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Schedule VI", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39085, "end_char": 39096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Phillip Tovey,3rd", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47245, "end_char": 47262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In \"'Balance Sheets, how to read and understand them, by Phillip Tovey,3rd Edition\" the distinction between a \"Reserve\" and ·Depreciation\" has been stated."}}, {"text": "William Pickles", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48084, "end_char": 48099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again in \"Accountancy\" by William Pickles, 3rd Edition the author has defined \"Depreciation\" as the permanent and continuing\n\ndimnution in the quality, quantity or value of an asset."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48940, "end_char": 48953, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "UNICHEM LTD", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 55949, "end_char": 55960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNICHEM LTD. \\\"."}}, {"text": "Sule", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56219, "end_char": 56223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand Mr. Sule, has opposed the ah!ove position and urged that the question as to who is the employer, is absolutd: inunaterial so long as the tests for the purposes ol' comparability."}}, {"text": "Cipla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 57537, "end_char": 57542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Limited (Cipla) Bombay v. Their Workmen('), it was held by the Industrial Tribunal that the Cipla cannot be compared to GlJ.~'' Laboratories, Raptakos Brett and other plrarmaceutical concernwhich are either subsidiaries of foreign concerns or are c!osel) linked with them."}}, {"text": "GlJ.~'' Laboratories", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57648, "end_char": 57668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Limited (Cipla) Bombay v. Their Workmen('), it was held by the Industrial Tribunal that the Cipla cannot be compared to GlJ.~'' Laboratories, Raptakos Brett and other plrarmaceutical concernwhich are either subsidiaries of foreign concerns or are c!osel) linked with them."}}, {"text": "Raptakos Brett", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 57670, "end_char": 57684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Limited (Cipla) Bombay v. Their Workmen('), it was held by the Industrial Tribunal that the Cipla cannot be compared to GlJ.~'' Laboratories, Raptakos Brett and other plrarmaceutical concernwhich are either subsidiaries of foreign concerns or are c!osel) linked with them."}}, {"text": "Sandu Pharmaceutical", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57912, "end_char": 57932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further held that if any comparison could be made, it can only bie with concerns like Kemp & Compan~.\n\nSandu Pharmaceutical, Fair Deal Corporation, Edison Continenta: Laboratories, Bengal Chemicals aci1d such other indigenot<- concerns."}}, {"text": "Fair Deal Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57934, "end_char": 57955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further held that if any comparison could be made, it can only bie with concerns like Kemp & Compan~.\n\nSandu Pharmaceutical, Fair Deal Corporation, Edison Continenta: Laboratories, Bengal Chemicals aci1d such other indigenot<- concerns."}}, {"text": "Edison Continenta", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57957, "end_char": 57974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further held that if any comparison could be made, it can only bie with concerns like Kemp & Compan~.\n\nSandu Pharmaceutical, Fair Deal Corporation, Edison Continenta: Laboratories, Bengal Chemicals aci1d such other indigenot<- concerns."}}, {"text": "Bengal Chemicals", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57990, "end_char": 58006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further held that if any comparison could be made, it can only bie with concerns like Kemp & Compan~.\n\nSandu Pharmaceutical, Fair Deal Corporation, Edison Continenta: Laboratories, Bengal Chemicals aci1d such other indigenot<- concerns."}}, {"text": "Alembic", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 58056, "end_char": 58063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again in Alembic Chemical Works Ltd. Baroda v. Its Workmen('), the Tribunal held that Alembic cannot be compared tn concerns like the Gloom Laboratories and others who have associatidns in different degrees and forms with certain foreign concern' of international repute."}}, {"text": "Gloom Laboratories", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58181, "end_char": 58199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again in Alembic Chemical Works Ltd. Baroda v. Its Workmen('), the Tribunal held that Alembic cannot be compared tn concerns like the Gloom Laboratories and others who have associatidns in different degrees and forms with certain foreign concern' of international repute."}}, {"text": "Jhandu Pharmaceutical", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58419, "end_char": 58440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this reasoning the Tribunal relied more on the scales L'f wages prevailing in concerns like the Jhandu Pharmaceutical, Cipla."}}, {"text": "Cipla.\n\nKemp & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58442, "end_char": 58460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this reasoning the Tribunal relied more on the scales L'f wages prevailing in concerns like the Jhandu Pharmaceutical, Cipla."}}, {"text": "Tarkund", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58859, "end_char": 58866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must A be stated that in both theSe awards, concerns with foreign collaboration have been eliminated from consideration oo the.ground that they cannot~ regarded as comparable concerns1aiid to that extent they support Mr. Tarkund<s contention.", "canonical_name": "Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "Ciba", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 59899, "end_char": 59903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the dearness allowance was revised, the appellant had contended that it should not be compared with the units like Ciba, Dumex, Glaxo, Sandoz and the like."}}, {"text": "Dumex", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 59905, "end_char": 59910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the dearness allowance was revised, the appellant had contended that it should not be compared with the units like Ciba, Dumex, Glaxo, Sandoz and the like."}}, {"text": "Glaxo", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 59912, "end_char": 59917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the dearness allowance was revised, the appellant had contended that it should not be compared with the units like Ciba, Dumex, Glaxo, Sandoz and the like."}}, {"text": "Sandoz", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 59919, "end_char": 59925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the dearness allowance was revised, the appellant had contended that it should not be compared with the units like Ciba, Dumex, Glaxo, Sandoz and the like."}}, {"text": "Glaxo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 60095, "end_char": 60100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tril:!unal held that the appellant cannot be compared with international pharmaceutical units having branches in Bombay or with foreign concerns like Glaxo, Ciba, Sandoz etc.,", "canonical_name": "Glaxo"}}, {"text": "Ciba", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 60102, "end_char": 60106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tril:!unal held that the appellant cannot be compared with international pharmaceutical units having branches in Bombay or with foreign concerns like Glaxo, Ciba, Sandoz etc.,"}}, {"text": "Sandoz", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 60108, "end_char": 60114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tril:!unal held that the appellant cannot be compared with international pharmaceutical units having branches in Bombay or with foreign concerns like Glaxo, Ciba, Sandoz etc.,"}}, {"text": "Europe", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 60273, "end_char": 60279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which though incorporated in India E. are subsidiaries of forei!lll companies having all the advantages of connection with respect of home companies in Europe and America."}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 60284, "end_char": 60291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which though incorporated in India E. are subsidiaries of forei!lll companies having all the advantages of connection with respect of home companies in Europe and America."}}, {"text": "Jabour", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 62944, "end_char": 62950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosperity of the country, in its turn will help 10 improve the conditiQll of Jabour."}}, {"text": "Zandu. Cipla. Opil", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 68970, "end_char": 68988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Zandu."}}, {"text": "Cipla", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 69247, "end_char": 69252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On that occasion the Tribunal had held that it was only Cipla which came nearest to the apPCllant Company and even there the dearness allowance obtainmg in Cipla cannot be taken for comparison. !"}}, {"text": "Burroughs Wellcome (India) Private Limiied", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 71125, "end_char": 71167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already mentioned that the Tribunal has ultimately held that M/s Burroughs Wellcome (India) Private Limiied is a concern comparable with that of the appellant."}}, {"text": "Tnbllllal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72326, "end_char": 72335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in this case when all the other units have been held to be not comparable with the appellant, this criticism leveJled against the approach made by the Tnbllllal cannot be accepted. ·"}}, {"text": ".Burroughs Wellcome Cpany", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 73079, "end_char": 73104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DU-2A could have been extracted in this judgment b, ut for the fact that .Burroughs Wellcome Cpany being a private limited company and the Statements havirig been furnished in a sealed cover, they could not be made public."}}, {"text": "Burroughs We!Jcome Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 73874, "end_char": 73900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If so, all thoe factors taken into account clearly show that Burroughs We!Jcome Company is a unit comparable with the appellant."}}, {"text": "Glaxo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 75497, "end_char": 75502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn fact It IS mteresting to note that Glaxo, which has a capital of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Glaxo"}}, {"text": "S!milarJy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75581, "end_char": 75590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S!milarJy,\n\nChemo-Phama which had a capital of only Rs."}}, {"text": "M.r. Tarkunde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 75783, "end_char": 75796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are referring fo these aspects because it was\n\nmesed by M.r."}}, {"text": "Burroughs Wel!come Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 76508, "end_char": 76534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "relied on by the appel!ant, do not affect the findings of the Tribunal that Burroughs Wel!come Company is .a unit comparable with the Cippellant."}}, {"text": "January 1,\n\n1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79352, "end_char": 79368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then the question is regarding the impact of the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1970, which has come into effect from January 1,\n\n1971."}}, {"text": "January 9, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79541, "end_char": 79556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection it is necessary to refer to the speech E made hr; the Chainnan of the Board of Directors of the appellant Company at the Annual General Meeting held on January 9, 1971."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79806, "end_char": 79824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 9, 1971, the Chairman was giving a review of the working of the Company for the year ending September 30, 1970."}}, {"text": "January. 3, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80040, "end_char": 80056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal wrui heard by us from January."}}, {"text": "January 10, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80079, "end_char": 80095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, 1972 and concluded only on January 10, 1972."}}, {"text": "October 1, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80325, "end_char": 80340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the Company, in the previous years had been having its Annual' ral Meetings in early January, of each year, we suggested to the counsel for the G appellant that as the approximate trading results for the year commencing from October 1, 1970 to September 30, 1971 would have been •available by then, they may be furnished so that it may be possible to find out the impact of the Drugs (Price Control) Order\n\non the trading results of the appellant, But it was represented that the figures are ilot available."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80344, "end_char": 80362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the Company, in the previous years had been having its Annual' ral Meetings in early January, of each year, we suggested to the counsel for the G appellant that as the approximate trading results for the year commencing from October 1, 1970 to September 30, 1971 would have been •available by then, they may be furnished so that it may be possible to find out the impact of the Drugs (Price Control) Order\n\non the trading results of the appellant, But it was represented that the figures are ilot available."}}, {"text": "Burrough Wellcome Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 82581, "end_char": 82606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A comparison of the wage scales in Burrough Wellcome Company and the wage scales fixed by the Tribunal in 'the Award for the Company will show that the Tribunal has only :made some slight variation in view of the fact that lt accepted the report of the assessor for the continuance of the exigting grades in F the Company."}}, {"text": "Tarlcuncle", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 83646, "end_char": 83656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Tarlcuncle l'Ointed out that\n\nUNICHEM LTD."}}, {"text": "s. 10(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85274, "end_char": 85282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85290, "end_char": 85319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Gadkari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 85892, "end_char": 85899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already referred to the fact that as the question of classification and fixing grades were matters cf a technical nature, at the joint request of both the parties, the Tribunal appointed Sri Gadkari, as an assessor."}}, {"text": "s. 10( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86369, "end_char": 86378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 86386, "end_char": 86409, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Urmi!a Kapoor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 87335, "end_char": 87348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the view above expressed, we do not think it necessary to refer to the decisions referred either by Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the appellant or by Mrs. Urmi!a Kapoor, o, n behalf of the respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Urmila K'apoor"}}, {"text": "Burroughs We!lcome Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 89165, "end_char": 89187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, nevertheless, the Tribunal has adopted, by and large, the scheme of dearness allowance which was in vogue in Burroughs Wellcome Co. Normally, once Burroughs We!lcome Co. is treated as a unit comparable with the appellant, the Tribunal must be considered prlma facle to be j, usfified in introducing the pattem obtaining in that unit."}}, {"text": "December 8, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 92704, "end_char": 92720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DU-10 dated B December 8, 1970, it is seen that when the second settlement was entered into between Bmroughs Wellcpme Co. and its workmen, the cost of living index had gone upto 800.1."}}, {"text": "Bmroughs Wellcpme Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 92790, "end_char": 92811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DU-10 dated B December 8, 1970, it is seen that when the second settlement was entered into between Bmroughs Wellcpme Co. and its workmen, the cost of living index had gone upto 800.1."}}, {"text": "Burroughs Weilcome Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 94126, "end_char": 94152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was accepted by the appellant that the scheme obtaj.ning in Burroughs Weilcome Company is more advantageous from the financial point of view than the_ scheme of dearness allowance demanded by the Unions."}}, {"text": "Urmila K'apoor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 97243, "end_char": 97257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Orr the other hand, Mrs. Urmila K'apoor, learned counsel for respondeni No.", "canonical_name": "Urmila K'apoor"}}, {"text": "Bomijay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 97926, "end_char": 97933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DU-I, it is seen H that as many as 11 pharmaceutical u.uiis in Bomijay region have adopted the pattern of granting dearness allowance on the slab\n\n(I) [1964] S S.C.R. 362, ."}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99515, "end_char": 99520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99528, "end_char": 99557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Tulpule", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 99797, "end_char": 99804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have also pointed out that the Triblunal has not accepted most of the recommeindations made by Sri Tulpule, who was appointed as an assessor on the joint application of both the parties.", "canonical_name": "B. Tulpule"}}, {"text": "February 9, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 100705, "end_char": 100721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it was represented to us on February 9, 1972 by Mrs. U'lllila Kapoor, learned counsel for respondent No."}}, {"text": "U'lllila Kapoor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 100730, "end_char": 100745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it was represented to us on February 9, 1972 by Mrs. U'lllila Kapoor, learned counsel for respondent No."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_58_70_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nSAMMAN DASS January 11, 1972\n\n[J. M. SHELAT AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.J\n\nCriminal Trial-Murder-Trial Court convictin11 and ••nt•\"\"\"'8 to death-Acquittal by High Court-Ground of Interference with OSI,.._\n\nment of,, evidence by Hi11h Court in appeal und.,. Art. 136-lnttrl•rence justi, fied ii High Court reverses the iudgment of the trial court on lf'OUnd8 which are manifestly fallacious and untenable-Constitution of India, ht. 136.\n\nThe fact that the High Court, in a reference under S; 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, bas to appraise the evidence for itself and h .... to arrive at its own independent conclusion would not prevent this Court from interfering with the order of the. High Court if the High Court reverses the judgment of the trial court on ground.t which are manifestly fallacious and untenable.\n\nThis Court in an appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution does not normally reappraise the evidence and interfere with the aaseosment of that evidence by the High Court. Where, however, this Court find.t that\n\ngrave injustice bas been done by the High Court in interfering with the decision of the trial court on grounds which are plainly untenable. and the view taken bv the High Court is cle; trly unreasonable on the evidence on record this Court would not stay its band, There are, bow\"'\"'• certain\n\ncardinal rules which have always to be kept in view in appeals against acqu)ttal. Firstly, there is a presumption or innocence in favour of the accused which has to be kept in mini! especially when the accused bu been acquitted by the Court below: Secondly, if two views of the .matter are possible a view faourable to the accused should be taken; thirdly, in case of acquittal by the trial judge the appellate court •hould take into account the fact that the trial judge bad the advan'age of looking at the demeanour of witnesses: and fourthly,. the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. The doubt should, however, be reasonable and should be such as a rational thinking man will reasMably, honestly .and c:On.cientiously entertain and not the doubt of a timid mind which .fighta shy thougb unwittingly it mav be or is afraid of the logical consequences, if that benefit was not given. To put it difl'erently, it is \"not the dou~ of a vacillating mind that. has not the moral courage to decide but obeiten itself in a vain and Idle scepticism'\", [69H-70Bl ·\n\nHimachal Pradesh Admin!.rrration v. Shrl Om Prakash, Cr. Appeal No. 61 of 1969 decided on December 1, 1911, referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal A~ 1'119. 17 of 1971.\n\nAppeal bv special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the June I, 1970 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal AJ)peal No. 1931of1969 and Referred No. 182 of 1969.\n\nH D. P; Uniyal and 0. P. Rana, for the Appellant.\n\nU.P. STATB v. SAMMAN DASS (Khanna, I.) 59\n\nA. S. R. Chari, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J, Samman Dass alias Samman Lal, aged 19 years, was convicted by Sessions Judge, Faizabad under section 8 302 l.P .C. for causing the death of his wife Putlibai by throttling her and was sentenced to death.\n\nOn appeal as well as in the reference made to it for the confirmation of the death sentence, the Allahabad High Court set aside the conviction of the accused and acquitted him.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh has filed this appeal by special leave against the above judgment of the High C Court.\n\nThe accused was married to Putlibai, who was neatabout of the same age as the accused, on May 14, 1968. Putlibai was the daughter of Gurmukh Das (PW 8) of Azamgarh, while the accused is the son of Shobhamal of Faizabad. The accused lived with his parents in quarter No. 1831 in Ram Nagar Colony of Faiza- D bad.\n\nMore than 300 familities of .Sindhis live in this locality.\n\nThe non-Sindhis occupy only a couple of houses.\n\nThere are a number of blocks of buildings in the colony. Each of those blocks\n\nconsi&ts of ten quarters. Apart from the accused and his parents, his uncle Parumal and the wife of Parumal, who is sister of the mother of the accused, also lives in his quarter.\n\nThe accused had been engaged to Putlibai about a year before the marriage.\n\nAccording to the prosecution case, about 5 or 6 months after the engagement the accused went to the house of Gurmukh Das in Azamgarh to see Putlibai. After having a look at Putlibai the accused came to Faizabad and stated that he would F not marry Putlibai as she was not of fair complexion. When Gurmukh Das (PW) 8 learnt that the accused had refused to marry his daughter, he convened a panchayat.\n\nThe father of the accused then became agreeable to marry the accused with Putlibai. The marriage accordingly took place on May 14, 1968.\n\nAfter the marriage Putlibai came to Faizabad and lived with the accused in his parents' quarter for about two and a half months.\n\nG Gurmukh Das, father of Putlibai, it is stated, then came and took her to his house.\n\nPutlibai after that came to the house of her husband on October 15, 1968.\n\nThe Cleath anniversary of Sain Kanwar Ram, a Sindhi saint, was celebrated by the Sindhis in Ram Nagar Colony of Fai?.abad H on the night between 17th and 18th October, 1968. The singing of the devotional songs continued up to 10 a.m. on October 1 8 in an open maidan in the Ram N agar Colony. The said maidan is at about a distance of 90 paces from the quarter of the accused.\n\nMost of the Sindhis of Ram Nagar Colony attended the celebra- A tions. The Prasad was distributed at about 10 a.m. on the close of the celebrations.\n\nThe case of the prosecution is that Bhagwan Das (PW' 1), who is brother of maternal grandfather of Putlibai, after talcing Prasad took a riksha and started going to his grocery shop in B Mohalla Chowk, Faizabad. When Bhagwan Das passed in front of the quarter of the accused, he heard shrieks.\n\nBhagwan Das then shouted as to what the shrieks were about. Bhagwan Das also went to the front door of the quarter of the accused and knocked there. On hearing the shouts of Bhagwan Das, Choith Ram (PW 2), Ayal Das alias Ailmal (PW 6), Shobhraj (PW 7) c and one Kirpal Das also joined Bhagwan Das.\n\nBhagwan Das, Choi th Ram, Ayal Das and Shobhraj all live in that locality.\n\nChoith Ram and Shobhraj were passing through the lane at that time after 1aking Prasad. Ayal Das, who too had taken Pi'asad, was taking water at a place about 40150 paces away from the quarter of the accused when Ayal Das heard shouts. The front door of the quarter of the accused was found bolted from inside D and there was no response to the knocking at the door. Bhagwan Das and others who had joined him then went to the back door of the quarter of the accused and knocked at the back door. The back door which opens in a very narrow lane was also found bolted from inside. There was no response even to the knocking at the back door. Bhagwan Das and his companions then thoqght E of going again to the front door of the quarter. When Bhagwan Das and his companions reached near a well at a distance of 10 paces from the back door of the house of the accused, they heard the noise of someone jumping. They then looked back and saw the accused who jumped over the back wall of his quarter. The accused wanted to run away but Bhagwan Das and his four com- F panions caught hold of the accused and did not allow him to escape in spite of his entreaties. The accused appeared worried at that time and there was redness in his eyes.\n\nAt the asking of Bhagwan Das, it is alleged, Choith Ram PW went inside the quarter of the accused by scaling over the wall which is about 7 feet high. Choith Ram then opened the G back door. Bhagwan Das along with the companions went inside the quarter of the accused and found Putlibai lying dead on a cot in one of the rooms of the quarter. The door of this room was slightly open. No one else was present in the quarter at that time.\n\nJust then there was a knock at the front door of the quarter.\n\nIt was opened by Choith Ram. The mother of the accused who H had also gone to take Prasad then came inside the quarter.\n\nOn seeing the dead body of the deceased, the mother of the accused started crying. Shobhamal, the father of the accused, whose shop\n\nis situated in Sabzi Mandi, came after about one and a half hour.\n\nOn the arrival of Shobhamal, Bhagwan Das told him everything.\n\nShobhamal then wanted to lift the dead body of Putlibai for con signing it in the river. but he was told by Choith Ram and others that they would not allow the dead body to be removed till the arrival of the parents of Putlibai. Bhagwan Das, in the mean while, directed one Oovardhan Das, brother of Choith Ram, to go in a taxi to Azamgarh and bring the parents of PutlibaL\n\nAt about 3 p.m. it is stated, Shobhamal, father of the accused, stated that there was no idea in keeping the dead body for a long time and that if Bhagwan Das and others had any suspicion, a doctor could be sent for. Bhagwan Das and his companions then told Shobhamal to call the doctor. Shobhamal thereupon deputed one Bhagumal to call a doctor. Bhagumal then went and con !acted Dr. Hansraj Singhal (PW 4) at the latter's residence at about 4 p.m.\n\nDr. Singhal, it is alleged, then went to his clinic and from D there took his diagonistic bag and thereafter came to the CJ.Uarter of the accused. The doctor found the dead body of Putlibai lying on a cot. The colour of her face was blue. The face was swollen and the eyes were slightly open. Pupils were dilated and non reacting to light. The mouth was slightly open and there were finger marks on the left and right side of her neck. There were E also marks of some abrasions on both the elbows besides a con , tusion on the right palm.\n\nAs Dr. Singhal was concerned only with the question as to whether the death of the deceased was normal or was. the result of some foul play, he did not make a more detailed examination of the dead body. Dr. Singhal came to the conclusion that the death of Putlibai was not natural but was due to throttling. The doctor told this thing to Bhagumal.\n\nF The doctor added that the police should be informed and that otherwise he would himself inform the police on reaching his ell\n\nnic. After saying this the doctor left the quarter. After the doctor gone for a distance of about two furlongs he thought of enquiring the name of the deceased, her husband and the particulars of the address. He consequently returned to the quarter of the accused G and after getting the necessary information, went to his clinic.\n\nBefore reaching the clinic, the doctor also telephoned to the police station about the death of Putlibai from a shop near his clinic.\n\nIn the meanwhile, immediately after Dr. Singhal had left the quarter of the accused, Bhagwan Das PW got a report written by Dayal Das (PW 10). The report was then signed by Bhagwan Das and was taken to police station kotwali at a distance of about two miles from the place of occurrence. The report was handed over at the police station at 5 p.m. Mohd. Amin (PW 9),\n\nhead clerk in the police station, then prepared a fonnal F.l.R. on the basis of the report of Bhagwan Das. A copy of the first informatioo report was sent to Sub Inspector Ram Gulam Chaudhari who was present in station :Fatehganj.\n\nThe Sub Inspector then went to the quarter of the accused and reached there at about 6 p.m.\n\nThe Sub Inspector took the accused, who had been secured at the spot, in his custody.\n\nThe dead body of the deceased was found by the Sub Inspector lyi.i1g on a cot.\n\nAfter preparing the necessary docwnents, the Sub Inspector sent the dead body to the mortuary.\n\nPost mortem examination on the dead body of Putlfbai was perfonned by Dr. Vijay Pal (PW 3) at 11.45 a.m. on October 19,\n\n1968. In the opinion of Dr. Vijay Pal the death of Putlibai deceased was due to asphyxia caused by throttlmg.\n\nAfter necessary investigations, a challan was put in against the accused.\n\nIn his statement under section 342 Code of Criminal Procedure before the committing magistrate the accused denied the prosecution allegations and stated that on t11e day of occurrence, he had gone to his father's shop at 9 a.m. He was caHed from that shop at 9-30 a.m. after being told that the condition cf his wife was serious. The accused ithen wanted to call a doctor but the doctor was not available. According to the accused he was falsely involved in this case at the instance of Bhagwan Das and Peruml who did not want that he should marry Putlibai.\n\nIn his statement under sectioo 342 of the Code of Criniinal .Procedure in the court of Sessions, the accused admitted that he\n\nhad been married to Putlibai deceased on May 14, 1968 and that they had been living together in the quarter of the accused along with the parents of the accused as well as his uncle and aunt. The accused further admitted that he had been engaged to Putlibai before his marriage but denied that he h.ad refused to marry her.\n\nThe allegation about the gathering of a panchayat too was denied !ti the accused.\n\nThe accused admitted that Putlibai came to the quarter of the accused on October 15, 1968 .. The fact that there was a celebration by the Sindhis living in t11e locality of the death anniversary of Sain Kanwar Ram on the night between 17th and 18th October 1968 was also admitted by the accused, but according to him, the Prasad was distributed at 6 or 7 a.m. The prosecution allegations about the hearing of shircks from his quarter as well as abouf his jumping over the back wall was denied by the accused.\n\nThe accused likewise denied the allegation that he was secured by Bhagwan Das and others. The accused added that Bhagwan Das, Choith Ram and father of Cloith Ram, were inimical to him b!ecause they did not want Putlibai to marry the accused.\n\nt '\n\n. B\n\nAccording to the accused, on the day Of occurrence he had gone to his lather's shop at about 9 a.m. Thereafter he came to the place of occurrce at about 11 or 11.30 a.m. on being told that the condition of his wife was serious.\n\nIn defence five witnesses were examined on behalf of the accused .\n\nThe purport of the defence evidence was that on the day of occurrence at 10.30 or 11 a.m. the aunt of the accused called Tikam Das (DW 2), who is the cousin of the mother of the accused 8illd lives in the neighbourhood, and told him to go to the shop of the father of the accused and inform him about the serious condition of Putlibai deceased.\n\nTikam Das then went to the shop of the father of the accused and met the accused and his father there and conveyed the message to them.\n\nEvid.ence was also Jed to show that the accused called two doctors and sent a telegram abput the death of the deceased to his sister's husband.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge on consideration of the evidence found that the following facts had proved by the prosecution :\n\n\"I. The accused was the only person in the quarter and, therefore, with, the deceased immediately before, at the time c4' and immediately after her murder. '\n\n2. Instead of getting out of the quarter in the usual way, he scaled the rear wall and jumped into the back lane immediately after the murder of the deceased.\n\n3. WhQll he was caught as soon as he jumped, he was non-plussed, his eyes were red-shot and he begged to be let off which exhibited his guilty conscience.\"\n\nReference was further made to the fact that the accused had failed to explain as to why he had jumped from the back wall of his quarter and had tried to run away.\n\nIt was also pointed out that tho accused had made false denials and put forth false plea of alibi.\n\nThe above circumstances, m the opinion of the Sessions Judge, were consistent only with the guilt of the accused. The defence evidence produced by the accused was found to be not worthy of credence and was rejected. In the result the accused was convicted for the murder of Putlibai and was sentenced to death.\n\nWhen the matter came up before the High Court, the learned Judges l>.eld that the prorecution had successfully established thlllt\n\nthe accused had a motive for the murder of Putlibai. lo the opinion of the learned Judges, the circumstances in which the death of Putlibai had occurred must have created a str<llllg suspicion against the accused.\n\nHe was consequently involved in this case.\n\nSUPREME COURT RBPO.RTS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C . .R.\n\nThe learned Judges seem to have taken the view that the first information report was not lodged at the time when it purports to have been made.\n\nIt was also observed that the only witiness who appeared to be independent was PW Shobharaj.\n\nHis statement was found to be not true because the witness had given the distance of his quarter from that of the accused as 50 'paces, while, according to another witmess, the distance was 150 paces. In the result, the conviction of the accused was set aside and he was acquitted.\n\nWe have heard Mr. Unyal on behalf of the appellant and Mr.\n\nChari on behalf of the accused-respondent, and are of the opiinion\n\nthat the High Court set aside the conviction of the accused on grounds which are wholiy untenable. There can be no ma!llller of doubt that Putlibai deceased was throttled to death.\n\nThe evidence Of Dr. Vijay Pal (PW 7), who performed post mortem ex&mination on the dead body of Putlibai deceased shows that he found the following ante mortem njuries on the dead qody of the deceased Putlibai :\n\n\"Finger marks were present in front of the neck.\n\nThese marks looked like brownish and dry.\n\nOn the left side of the neck, in front, upper aind outer part, thumb mark was present which measured 1\" x t\" and the upper pan of which was t\" below the mandible.\n\nOn the right side of the neck, in front upper and outer part of 4 finger marks were present iin oblique directions downwards and outwards one below the other measuring 1\" x t\",; t•xt\", t• x t• and !' x !'; the upper most mark was t\"\n\nbelow the mandible.\"\n\nBesides the above injuries, there was a contusion on the right thinner eminence and two abrasions on the elbows.\n\nExtravascular blood was present in the sub-cute.neons tissues of the neckunder the finger marks in the adjacent muscles of the neck. There was fracture of the corner of the hyoid bone. The larynx, the trachea, the lungs, the liver, the gall bladder, the spleen and the kidneys were congested. Dr. Vifay Pal accordingly came to the conclusion that the death was due to asphyxia caused by throttling. The doctor added that the time of the death of the deceased could be about 10.30 a.m. on October 18, 1968.\n\nAccording to the prosecution case, the death of Putlibai deceased was caused by the accused, while the accused has denied this allegation.\n\nThe Sessions Judge accepted the prosecution evidence in this respect, but the same was found by the High Court to be not such as could warrant a conviction of the accused.\n\nIn order to prove the case against the accused, the prosecution examined Bhagwan Das (PW 1), Choith Ram (PW 2),\n\nA Ayal Das (PW 6) and Shobhraj (PW 7). According to Bbag- :wan Das PW, he heard shrieks when he passed in front of the quarter of the accused at about 10.30 a.m. on the day of occurrence. The witness then shouted as to what the matter was about and was immediately joined by the other three witnesses and Kirpal Das. The witness then knocked at the front door as B well as at the back door of the quarter of the accused but got no response. Just then, the witness and his companions saw the accused jumping over the rear wall of his quarter in the back lane. The accused was then secured and was not allowed to escape in spite of his entreaties. Choith Ram PW then entered\n\nc the quarter by sealing over the back wall and opened the door.\n\nWhen Bhaan Das and his companions went inside, they found Putlibai lying dead on the cot.\n\nBhagwan Das also deposed about the report lodged by him with the police after Dr. Singhal had declared that Putlibai had been throttled to death.\n\nThe above evidence of Bhagwan Das is corroborated by the\n\nD evidence of Choith Ram (PW 2), Ayal Das (PW 6) and Sbobh\n\nraj (PW 7). The evidence of the above mentioned four wit nesses was found by the learned Sessions Judge to be convincing and reliable. After having been taken through that evidence, we sec no cogent ground to take a view different from that of the Sessions Judge. It is no doubt true \\bat Bhagwan Das PW is the brother of Bangamal, maternal grandfather of Putlibai, E deceased and that sister of Cboith Ram PW is married to Banga ma!. It is also true that Ayal Dass PW is a cousin of Gurumukh Das, father of Putlibai.\n\nThe relationship of the above mentioned three witnCSSC6 to Putlibai deceased would, in our opinion, be not a sufficient ground for discrediting their testimony. It is well known that the close relatives of a murdered person are most F reluctant to spare the real assailant and falsely involve another person in place of the assailant.\n\nHad Putlibai been killed by some other person, the natural conduct of the above mentioned three witnesses, who were related to Putlibai on her parents' side, would have been to offer sympathy to Samman Dau accused and help him In the apprehension of the real culprit, rather than to faliely involve him In the murder of his wife. There Is no cogent G evidence on the record to show that any of the above mentlOned tJlree witne&1e1 bad any animus against the accused. The accus ed, no doubt, took the plea that the above mentioned wltneues were against his marriage with Putlibal, but that suggestion has been denied by these witnesses.\n\nH Apart from the evidence of the aforesaid three witnesses, we have the evidence of Shobhraj PW. Shobhraj is a wholly dis interested witness, and we see no cogent ground whatsoever u to why his evidence he not accepted. The fact that accordlna to\n\nShobhraj his quarter was at a distance of about 50 paces from the A quarter of the accused, while according to Bhagwan Das PW the quarter of Shobhraj is at a distance of 150 paces from that of the accused, would not go to show that Shobhraj is not, as held by the High Court, a truthful witness.\n\nThe difference in the estimate of the distance of the quarter of the accused from that of Shobhraj is not of great significance because nothing hinges on B that distance. According to Shobhraj, he arrived at the scene of occurrence not from his quarter but from the place where the celebrations of Sain Kanwar Ram were being held.\n\nThe afore said place is at a distance of less than 100 paces from the quarter of the accused.\n\nThe view of the High Court thaf the first information report C was not lodged at the police station at the time, viz;., 5 p.m., at\n\nwhich it purports to have been l<><Jged is based upon mere con iecture.\n\nAccording to Bhagwan Das PW, immediately after Dr Singhal had declared at about 4.30 p.m. that Putlibai had been throttled to death, he (Bhagwan Das) got written report from Dayal Das (PW I 0) and signed it. The report was then sent to D the police station. The evidence of Bhagwan Das in this respect is corroborated by Dayal Das PW.\n\nWe have then the evidence of Mohd. Amin (PW 9). Mohd. Amin was head clerk in police station Kotwali in those days.\n\nAccording to Mohd. Amin. the report was handed over to him .at the police station at 5 p.m. on October 18, 1968. The witness then prepared the formal first I! information report.\n\nAn entry was also made in the general diary of police station . at that time.\n\nThe witness further sent special report regarding this case at 5.20 p.m. on that very day. Nothing was brought out in cross-examination to shake the evidence of Mohd.\n\nAmin.\n\nApart from the fact that no reason has been shown as. to why the evidence of Bhagwan Das and Mohd .. Amin be not accepted regarding the time lit which the first information r report was lodged at the l)CRice station, we find that there was rtot even a remote suestion in the cross examination of Mohd.\n\nAmin that the formal firSt information report was not prepared at the police station at the time, viz, p.m., at which it purports to have been prepared. In the absence of any material pointing to the inference that the formal first information report was not G prepared at 5 p.m., the High Court, in our view acted erroneously in holding, on the basis of a pure surmise, that the first inform&. tion report had not been lodged at the police 918.tion at 5 p.tn.\n\nWe are al.so not impressed by the argument that the police acted on the telephonic intimation received ftom Dr. Singhal.\n\nAccording to Dr. Singhal, he sent the telephonic intimation after H 5 p.m., while the report of Bhagwan Das had been lodged at 1be police station at 5 p.m. Dr. Singhal's evidence shows that after\n\nexamining the dead body of Putlibai at about 4.30 p 0m., he proceCded in a riksha to _his clinic. After he had gone for a distance of two furlon~. he thought of getting details about ihe name of the deceased, her husband's name and address.\n\nHe accordingly returned to the quarter of the accused and got the necessary particulars.\n\nAfter that, he again proceeded towards his clinic, but his riksha was held UJI at the railway level crossing because the gate at the crossing remained closed for 10 minutes.\n\nIn the circumS'tances, we find no reason to reject the prosecution evidence that the police acted upon the report lodged by Bhagwan Das PW.\n\nComing to the question as to whether there was a delay in lodging the report, we find that the evidence on record shows that after Putlibai had been found dead, the father. of the accused showed inclination to consign her dead body to the river. Bhagwan Das then insisted that the dead body of PuUibai should not be disposed of till the arrival of her parents. The father of the accused thereupon agreed to send for a doctor. Dr. Singhal was\n\naccordingly called and he &tated, after examining the dead body, that the deceased had been throttled to death.\n\nImmediately thereafter, Bhagwan Das got the report written from Dayal Das and lodged it at the police station. In our opinion, there was no inordinate delay in lodging the report. It is obvious that Bhagwan Das did not lodge the report rtill such tlme as he was certain that the deaih of Putlibai deceased was not natural but was due to violence.\n\nThe present was not a case wherein the deceased had been killed by some sharp-edged weapon or a fire arm, or wherein the deceased had been killed sharp-edged weapon or a fire arm, or wherein the body of the deceased had been found lying in a pool of blood. In such a case, there can be no doubt about the death being not natural. In cases, however, of death caused by poisoning or throttling, a layman cannot be very sure of the cause of death, and we find nothing improbable in the conduct of\n\nBhagwan Das PW in not lodging the report 'till he learnt from Dr. Singhal that death of the deceased was due to throttling.\n\nBhagwan Das, Choith Ram, Ayal Das and Shobhraj PWs reside in the locality wherein the occurrenee took place. The fact that no one from the quarters adjoining that of the accused has been examined by the prosecution would not, in our opinion, introduce an infirmity in the prosecution case.\n\nThe evidence Bhagwan Das shows that the adjoininJ!. quarters were closed at the time of the occurrence, as most of the people in the locality had 11:one to attend •the celebrations of Sain Kanwar Ram.\n\nArgument was advanced by Mr. Chari that it would not be a natural act of the accused to have made the murderous assault on his wife at about 10.30 a.m. when 'lhe people were moving in the Jane in front of his quarter. In this respect we\n\nfind that the accused chose the moment when no one else was A\n\npresent in the house.\n\nThe fact that no one was present there to witness the actual murder of the deceased might well have been considered by the accused to be an opportune time. Different individuals act differently in a given situation, and we find nothing improbable in the act of the accused in committing the murder -0£ his wife at abQut 10.30 a.m. on the day of occurrence.\n\nIt has also been submitted by Mr. Chari that there was no sufficient motive for the accused to murder his wife.\n\nIn this respect we find that the evidence of Choith Ram (PW 2) sh<lws that the accused has told him that he did not like Putlibai.\n\nWe have then the evidence of Bhagwan Das PW as well as that of Gurmukh Das PW, father of Putlibai, that when it was learnt that the ac- C cused was reluctant to marry Putlibai, Gurmukh Das convened\n\na panchyat. The accused was thereafter married to Putlibai.\n\nThe evidence on record • thus, reveals that the accused was forced to rnary Putlibai in spite of his dislike, because of the convening of the panchayat. It cannot, in the circumstances,\n\nbe said that the accused bad no motive to cause the death of bis D wife. The learned iudges of ithe High Court too took the view that the accused had a motive to cause the death of the deceased., In any case, motive is not very material when the other evidence clearly points to the guilt of the accused.\n\nReference bas also been made by Mr. Chari to the fact that I cbere is no evidence about the existence of any injury on the person of the accused. It is urged that the deceased, while being throttled, must have offered resistance, and thus, there would have been an i!liury on the person of the accused because of that resistance. We are not impressed by this argument because resis tance by the deceased resultinJ! in iniuries to the assailant is not a necessary feature of every act of throttling.\n\nDiffere11t victim~ r can act differently and it would depend upon a variety of circumstances as to whether they were or not in a position to offer resistance.\n\nThe absence of Injuries on the person of the accused would not RO to show that he was not the person who had throttled\n\nthe deceased to death.\n\nSo far as the defence evidence is concerned, the same was disbelieved by the Sessions Judge. The defence evidence was also not relied upon by the High Court-ostensibly because no effort was made to relv upen that evidence.\n\nLikewise, no effort has been made in this Court to rely upon the defence evidence.\n\nThere is no evewitness of the actual occurrence, but on the H material on record, we tlnd that the following circumstances have been proved aalnst the accuaed.\n\nA ( 1 ) The accused was alone with the deceased in his quarter at about 10.30 a.m. on the day of occurrence.\n\n(2) Shrieks were heard at that time from inside the quarter of the accused.\n\n(3) Both the froDt and the back doors of the quarter of the B accused were found to be bolted from inside. Those doors were not opened in spite of shouting and knocking.\n\n( 4) The accused soon thereafter jumped over the rear wall into the back lane.\n\nHe wanted to run away but was secured by BhaR, Wan Das and otlw witnesses. This accused appeared to be C upset at that time and, in sipte of his entreaties, he was not allowed\n\nto~ awav.\n\n(S) Immediately thereafter, Bhagw11111 Das and other witnesses went inside the quarter and found Putlibai, wife of the accused, lvina dead on a cot.\n\n( 6) According to medical evidence, the deceased had been D throttled to death at about 10.30 a.m. on that day.\n\n(7) The! accused had an animus against Putlibai because he was forced to marry her in spite of the fact that he did not like her.\n\nAll the above circumstances, in our opinion, cleadv point to the conclusion that the accused was the murderer of Putlibai.\n\nE The above cju:umstances are inconsistent wid! his innocence.\n\nMr. Chari has referred to the case of-Ote State of Madr!IS v.\n\nA. Yaidyanatha Iyer (1) wherein this Court held that the words used In article 136 of the Constitution shciw that, in criminal\n\nmatter&, no distinction can be made as a matter of construction F between a judgment of conviction and one of acquittal. This Court, It! was further observed, would not readily interfere with the flndinlll of fact ven by the High Court, but if the HiRh Court llCts pervenely or otherwise improperly, Interference will lie called for.\n\nIn our oPlnlon, the accused-respondent can derive not much aulstance from the above authority because the HlRh Court In the present cue reversed the flndlna of conviction on arounds G which were wholly untenable. The view taken by the Hlah Court\n\nIs clearly unreasonable and Is not warranted by the material on\n\nrecord. The fact that the Him Court, In a reference under sec tion 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has to appraise the evidence for itself and has to arrive at its own Independent con clusion would not prevent this Court from interfering with the H order of the High Court if the High Court reverses the judgment of the trial court on grounds which are manifestly fallacious and untenable.\n\n(1) tiflil $.C.R. 516.\n\nThis Court in an appeal under article 136 of the Constitution A does not normally re-appraise the evidence and interfere with the assessment of that evidence by the High Court.\n\nWhere, how ever, this Court finds that ve injustice has been done .by the High Court in interfering with the decision of the trial court on grounds which are plainly untenable and the view taken by the High Court in interfering with the decision of the trial court on B this Court would not stay its hand. There are, however, certain cardinal rules which have always to be kept in view in appeals against acquittal. Firstly, there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused which has to be kept in mind, especially when. the accused has been acquitted by the court below; secondly, if two views of the matter are p05sible, a view favourable to the accused should be .taken; thirdly, in case of acquittal by C the trial judge, rthe appellate court should take into account the fact. that the trial judge had the advantage of looking at the domeanour of witnesses; and fourthly, the accused is entitled.tO the benefit of doubt.\n\nThe .doubt should, however, be reasonable and as observed recently by this Court, the doubt should be sueh which rational thinking men will reasonably, honestly and con- D scientiouslv .11ntertain and not the doubt of a timid mind which fights shy-though unwittingly it may be-or is afraid Qf the logical consequences, if that benefit was nC11 given.\n\nTo put it differently, it is \"not the doubt of a vacillating mind that bas not 'the moral courage to decide but shelts itself in a vain ar.d idle scepticism\" (see Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Shri Om E Parkash, Cr. Appeal 67 of 1969 decided on December 7, 1971).\n\nWe, therefore, accept the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and convict the accused-respondent under section\n\n302 I.P.C.\n\nAs regards the sentence, we find that the occurrence took place more than three veal\"$ ago.\n\nThe accused was aged about 'fl 19 years at the time of the trial. ·. Lookin~ to all '.he circumstances, we are of the opinion that we meed not award the extreme penalty in this case. We accordingly sentence the accused to undergo imprisofunent for life.\n\nK.B.N.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 101, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAMMAN DASS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SAMMAN DASS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 11, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 52, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nSAMMAN DASS January 11, 1972\n\n[J. M. SHELAT AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.J\n\nCriminal Trial-Murder-Trial Court convictin11 and ••nt•\"\"\"'8 to death-Acquittal by High Court-Ground of Interference with OSI,.._\n\nment of,, evidence by Hi11h Court in appeal und.,."}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 274, "end_char": 282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 421, "end_char": 442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 519, "end_char": 545, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 871, "end_char": 879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "H D. P; Uniyal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2770, "end_char": 2784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H D. P; Uniyal and 0."}}, {"text": "0. P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2789, "end_char": 2799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H D. P; Uniyal and 0."}}, {"text": "A. S. R. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2864, "end_char": 2878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.P. STATB v. SAMMAN DASS (Khanna, I.) 59\n\nA. S. R. Chari, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2880, "end_char": 2891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.P. STATB v. SAMMAN DASS (Khanna, I.) 59\n\nA. S. R. Chari, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2893, "end_char": 2904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.P. STATB v. SAMMAN DASS (Khanna, I.) 59\n\nA. S. R. Chari, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "K. R. Nagaraja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2909, "end_char": 2923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.P. STATB v. SAMMAN DASS (Khanna, I.) 59\n\nA. S. R. Chari, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2990, "end_char": 2996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J, Samman Dass alias Samman Lal, aged 19 years, was convicted by Sessions Judge, Faizabad under section 8 302 l.P .C. for causing the death of his wife Putlibai by throttling her and was sentenced to death."}}, {"text": "Samman Dass alias Samman Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3001, "end_char": 3029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J, Samman Dass alias Samman Lal, aged 19 years, was convicted by Sessions Judge, Faizabad under section 8 302 l.P .C. for causing the death of his wife Putlibai by throttling her and was sentenced to death."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3094, "end_char": 3103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Putlibai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3150, "end_char": 3158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J, Samman Dass alias Samman Lal, aged 19 years, was convicted by Sessions Judge, Faizabad under section 8 302 l.P .C. for causing the death of his wife Putlibai by throttling her and was sentenced to death.", "canonical_name": "Putlibai"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3303, "end_char": 3323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal as well as in the reference made to it for the confirmation of the death sentence, the Allahabad High Court set aside the conviction of the accused and acquitted him."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3388, "end_char": 3410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Uttar Pradesh has filed this appeal by special leave against the above judgment of the High C Court."}}, {"text": "High C Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3484, "end_char": 3496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Uttar Pradesh has filed this appeal by special leave against the above judgment of the High C Court."}}, {"text": "May 14, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3589, "end_char": 3601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused was married to Putlibai, who was neatabout of the same age as the accused, on May 14, 1968."}}, {"text": "Gurmukh Das", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3632, "end_char": 3643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Putlibai was the daughter of Gurmukh Das (PW 8) of Azamgarh, while the accused is the son of Shobhamal of Faizabad."}}, {"text": "Azamgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3654, "end_char": 3662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Putlibai was the daughter of Gurmukh Das (PW 8) of Azamgarh, while the accused is the son of Shobhamal of Faizabad."}}, {"text": "Shobhamal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3696, "end_char": 3705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Putlibai was the daughter of Gurmukh Das (PW 8) of Azamgarh, while the accused is the son of Shobhamal of Faizabad."}}, {"text": "Faizabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3709, "end_char": 3717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Putlibai was the daughter of Gurmukh Das (PW 8) of Azamgarh, while the accused is the son of Shobhamal of Faizabad."}}, {"text": "Parumal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4077, "end_char": 4084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the accused and his parents, his uncle Parumal and the wife of Parumal, who is sister of the mother of the accused, also lives in his quarter."}}, {"text": "Gurmukh Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4367, "end_char": 4378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the prosecution case, about 5 or 6 months after the engagement the accused went to the house of Gurmukh Das in Azamgarh to see Putlibai.", "canonical_name": "G Gurmukh Das"}}, {"text": "G Gurmukh Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4927, "end_char": 4940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G Gurmukh Das, father of Putlibai, it is stated, then came and took her to his house.", "canonical_name": "G Gurmukh Das"}}, {"text": "October 15, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5070, "end_char": 5086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Putlibai after that came to the house of her husband on October 15, 1968."}}, {"text": "Sain Kanwar Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5115, "end_char": 5130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Cleath anniversary of Sain Kanwar Ram, a Sindhi saint, was celebrated by the Sindhis in Ram Nagar Colony of Fai?.abad H on the night between 17th and 18th October, 1968."}}, {"text": "18th October, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5243, "end_char": 5261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Cleath anniversary of Sain Kanwar Ram, a Sindhi saint, was celebrated by the Sindhis in Ram Nagar Colony of Fai?.abad H on the night between 17th and 18th October, 1968."}}, {"text": "October 1 8", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5326, "end_char": 5337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The singing of the devotional songs continued up to 10 a.m. on October 1 8 in an open maidan in the Ram N agar Colony."}}, {"text": "Ram N agar Colony", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5363, "end_char": 5380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The singing of the devotional songs continued up to 10 a.m. on October 1 8 in an open maidan in the Ram N agar Colony."}}, {"text": "Bhagwan Das", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5653, "end_char": 5664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution is that Bhagwan Das (PW' 1), who is brother of maternal grandfather of Putlibai, after talcing Prasad took a riksha and started going to his grocery shop in B Mohalla Chowk, Faizabad."}}, {"text": "Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5740, "end_char": 5746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution is that Bhagwan Das (PW' 1), who is brother of maternal grandfather of Putlibai, after talcing Prasad took a riksha and started going to his grocery shop in B Mohalla Chowk, Faizabad."}}, {"text": "Bhagwan Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5834, "end_char": 5845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Bhagwan Das passed in front of the quarter of the accused, he heard shrieks.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwan Das"}}, {"text": "Choith Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6099, "end_char": 6109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On hearing the shouts of Bhagwan Das, Choith Ram (PW 2), Ayal Das alias Ailmal (PW 6), Shobhraj (PW 7) c and one Kirpal Das also joined Bhagwan Das."}}, {"text": "Ayal Das alias Ailmal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6118, "end_char": 6139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On hearing the shouts of Bhagwan Das, Choith Ram (PW 2), Ayal Das alias Ailmal (PW 6), Shobhraj (PW 7) c and one Kirpal Das also joined Bhagwan Das."}}, {"text": "Shobhraj", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6148, "end_char": 6156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On hearing the shouts of Bhagwan Das, Choith Ram (PW 2), Ayal Das alias Ailmal (PW 6), Shobhraj (PW 7) c and one Kirpal Das also joined Bhagwan Das."}}, {"text": "Kirpal Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6174, "end_char": 6184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On hearing the shouts of Bhagwan Das, Choith Ram (PW 2), Ayal Das alias Ailmal (PW 6), Shobhraj (PW 7) c and one Kirpal Das also joined Bhagwan Das."}}, {"text": "Choi th Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6224, "end_char": 6235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwan Das, Choi th Ram, Ayal Das and Shobhraj all live in that locality.", "canonical_name": "Choi th Ram"}}, {"text": "Ayal Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6237, "end_char": 6245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwan Das, Choi th Ram, Ayal Das and Shobhraj all live in that locality.", "canonical_name": "Dayal Das"}}, {"text": "Shobhraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6250, "end_char": 6258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwan Das, Choi th Ram, Ayal Das and Shobhraj all live in that locality."}}, {"text": "Choith Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6287, "end_char": 6297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Choith Ram and Shobhraj were passing through the lane at that time after 1aking Prasad.", "canonical_name": "Choi th Ram"}}, {"text": "Pi'asad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6403, "end_char": 6410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ayal Das, who too had taken Pi'asad, was taking water at a place about 40150 paces away from the quarter of the accused when Ayal Das heard shouts."}}, {"text": "Oovardhan Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8680, "end_char": 8693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwan Das, in the mean while, directed one Oovardhan Das, brother of Choith Ram, to go in a taxi to Azamgarh and bring the parents of PutlibaL\n\nAt about 3 p.m. it is stated, Shobhamal, father of the accused, stated that there was no idea in keeping the dead body for a long time and that if Bhagwan Das and others had any suspicion, a doctor could be sent for."}}, {"text": "PutlibaL", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8771, "end_char": 8779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwan Das, in the mean while, directed one Oovardhan Das, brother of Choith Ram, to go in a taxi to Azamgarh and bring the parents of PutlibaL\n\nAt about 3 p.m. it is stated, Shobhamal, father of the accused, stated that there was no idea in keeping the dead body for a long time and that if Bhagwan Das and others had any suspicion, a doctor could be sent for.", "canonical_name": "Putlibai"}}, {"text": "Bhagumal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9101, "end_char": 9109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shobhamal thereupon deputed one Bhagumal to call a doctor."}}, {"text": "Hansraj Singhal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9166, "end_char": 9181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "acted Dr. Hansraj Singhal (PW 4) at the latter's residence at about 4 p.m.\n\nDr. Singhal, it is alleged, then went to his clinic and from D there took his diagonistic bag and thereafter came to the CJ.Uarter of the accused."}}, {"text": "Singhal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9236, "end_char": 9243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "acted Dr. Hansraj Singhal (PW 4) at the latter's residence at about 4 p.m.\n\nDr. Singhal, it is alleged, then went to his clinic and from D there took his diagonistic bag and thereafter came to the CJ.Uarter of the accused."}}, {"text": "Dayal Das", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10841, "end_char": 10850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile, immediately after Dr. Singhal had left the quarter of the accused, Bhagwan Das PW got a report written by Dayal Das (PW 10)."}}, {"text": "police station kotwali", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10919, "end_char": 10941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report was then signed by Bhagwan Das and was taken to police station kotwali at a distance of about two miles from the place of occurrence."}}, {"text": "Mohd. Amin", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11064, "end_char": 11074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report was handed over at the police station at 5 p.m. Mohd."}}, {"text": "Ram Gulam Chaudhari", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11256, "end_char": 11275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of the first informatioo report was sent to Sub Inspector Ram Gulam Chaudhari who was present in station :Fatehganj."}}, {"text": "Fatehganj", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11304, "end_char": 11313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of the first informatioo report was sent to Sub Inspector Ram Gulam Chaudhari who was present in station :Fatehganj."}}, {"text": "Putlfbai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11716, "end_char": 11724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Post mortem examination on the dead body of Putlfbai was perfonned by Dr. Vijay Pal (PW 3) at 11.45 a.m. on October 19,\n\n1968.", "canonical_name": "Putlibai"}}, {"text": "Vijay Pal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11746, "end_char": 11755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Post mortem examination on the dead body of Putlfbai was perfonned by Dr. Vijay Pal (PW 3) at 11.45 a.m. on October 19,\n\n1968."}}, {"text": "October 19,\n\n1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11780, "end_char": 11797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Post mortem examination on the dead body of Putlfbai was perfonned by Dr. Vijay Pal (PW 3) at 11.45 a.m. on October 19,\n\n1968."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12002, "end_char": 12013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12014, "end_char": 12040, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Peruml", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12482, "end_char": 12488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the accused he was falsely involved in this case at the instance of Bhagwan Das and Peruml who did not want that he should marry Putlibai."}}, {"text": "17th and 18th October 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13308, "end_char": 13334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused admitted that Putlibai came to the quarter of the accused on October 15, 1968 .. The fact that there was a celebration by the Sindhis living in t11e locality of the death anniversary of Sain Kanwar Ram on the night between 17th and 18th October 1968 was also admitted by the accused, but according to him, the Prasad was distributed at 6 or 7 a.m. The prosecution allegations about the hearing of shircks from his quarter as well as abouf his jumping over the back wall was denied by the accused."}}, {"text": "Cloith Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13734, "end_char": 13744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused added that Bhagwan Das, Choith Ram and father of Cloith Ram, were inimical to him b!ecause they did not want Putlibai to marry the accused.", "canonical_name": "Cloith Ram"}}, {"text": "Tikam Das", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14254, "end_char": 14263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The purport of the defence evidence was that on the day of occurrence at 10.30 or 11 a.m. the aunt of the accused called Tikam Das (DW 2), who is the cousin of the mother of the accused 8illd lives in the neighbourhood, and told him to go to the shop of the father of the accused and inform him about the serious condition of Putlibai deceased."}}, {"text": "Tikam Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14479, "end_char": 14488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tikam Das then went to the shop of the father of the accused and met the accused and his father there and conveyed the message to them."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT RBPO.RTS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C . .R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16327, "end_char": 16369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT RBPO.RTS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C ."}}, {"text": "Shobharaj", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16598, "end_char": 16607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also observed that the only witiness who appeared to be independent was PW Shobharaj."}}, {"text": "Unyal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16911, "end_char": 16916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have heard Mr. Unyal on behalf of the appellant and Mr.\n\nChari on behalf of the accused-respondent, and are of the opiinion\n\nthat the High Court set aside the conviction of the accused on grounds which are wholiy untenable."}}, {"text": "Chari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16953, "end_char": 16958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have heard Mr. Unyal on behalf of the appellant and Mr.\n\nChari on behalf of the accused-respondent, and are of the opiinion\n\nthat the High Court set aside the conviction of the accused on grounds which are wholiy untenable."}}, {"text": "Vifay Pal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18340, "end_char": 18349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Vifay Pal accordingly came to the conclusion that the death was due to asphyxia caused by throttling."}}, {"text": "October 18, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18531, "end_char": 18547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The doctor added that the time of the death of the deceased could be about 10.30 a.m. on October 18, 1968."}}, {"text": "Ayal Das", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18978, "end_char": 18986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to prove the case against the accused, the prosecution examined Bhagwan Das (PW 1), Choith Ram (PW 2),\n\nA Ayal Das (PW 6) and Shobhraj (PW 7)."}}, {"text": "Bbag- :wan Das", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19028, "end_char": 19042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Bbag- :wan Das PW, he heard shrieks when he passed in front of the quarter of the accused at about 10.30 a.m. on the day of occurrence."}}, {"text": "Kirpal Das", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19281, "end_char": 19291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness then shouted as to what the matter was about and was immediately joined by the other three witnesses and Kirpal Das."}}, {"text": "Bhaan Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19721, "end_char": 19730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Bhaan Das and his companions went inside, they found Putlibai lying dead on the cot.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwan Das"}}, {"text": "Sbobh\n\nraj", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20065, "end_char": 20075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The above evidence of Bhagwan Das is corroborated by the\n\nD evidence of Choith Ram (PW 2), Ayal Das (PW 6) and Sbobh\n\nraj (PW 7)."}}, {"text": "\\bat Bhagwan Das", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20356, "end_char": 20372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is no doubt true \\bat Bhagwan Das PW is the brother of Bangamal, maternal grandfather of Putlibai, E deceased and that sister of Cboith Ram PW is married to Banga ma!."}}, {"text": "Bangamal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20394, "end_char": 20402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is no doubt true \\bat Bhagwan Das PW is the brother of Bangamal, maternal grandfather of Putlibai, E deceased and that sister of Cboith Ram PW is married to Banga ma!.", "canonical_name": "Bangamal"}}, {"text": "Cboith Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20468, "end_char": 20478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is no doubt true \\bat Bhagwan Das PW is the brother of Bangamal, maternal grandfather of Putlibai, E deceased and that sister of Cboith Ram PW is married to Banga ma!.", "canonical_name": "Cloith Ram"}}, {"text": "Banga ma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20496, "end_char": 20504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is no doubt true \\bat Bhagwan Das PW is the brother of Bangamal, maternal grandfather of Putlibai, E deceased and that sister of Cboith Ram PW is married to Banga ma!.", "canonical_name": "Bangamal"}}, {"text": "Ayal Dass", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20528, "end_char": 20537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also true that Ayal Dass PW is a cousin of Gurumukh Das, father of Putlibai."}}, {"text": "Gurumukh Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20556, "end_char": 20568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also true that Ayal Dass PW is a cousin of Gurumukh Das, father of Putlibai.", "canonical_name": "G Gurmukh Das"}}, {"text": "Samman Dau", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21122, "end_char": 21132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Had Putlibai been killed by some other person, the natural conduct of the above mentioned three witnesses, who were related to Putlibai on her parents' side, would have been to offer sympathy to Samman Dau accused and help him In the apprehension of the real culprit, rather than to faliely involve him In the murder of his wife.", "canonical_name": "SAMMAN DASS"}}, {"text": "Putlibal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21497, "end_char": 21505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accus ed, no doubt, took the plea that the above mentioned wltneues were against his marriage with Putlibal, but that suggestion has been denied by these witnesses.", "canonical_name": "Putlibai"}}, {"text": "Kotwali", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23169, "end_char": 23176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amin was head clerk in police station Kotwali in those days."}}, {"text": "Mohd. Amin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23206, "end_char": 23216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Mohd .. Amin"}}, {"text": "Mohd.\n\nAmin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23613, "end_char": 23624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nothing was brought out in cross-examination to shake the evidence of Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Mohd .. Amin"}}, {"text": "Mohd .. Amin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23720, "end_char": 23732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to why the evidence of Bhagwan Das and Mohd .. Amin be not accepted regarding the time lit which the first information r report was lodged at the l)CRice station, we find that there was rtot even a remote suestion in the cross examination of Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Mohd .. Amin"}}, {"text": "PuUibai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25653, "end_char": 25660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwan Das then insisted that the dead body of PuUibai should not be disposed of till the arrival of her parents."}}, {"text": "Dayal Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25979, "end_char": 25988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Immediately thereafter, Bhagwan Das got the report written from Dayal Das and lodged it at the police station.", "canonical_name": "Dayal Das"}}, {"text": "BhaR", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 30808, "end_char": 30812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He wanted to run away but was secured by BhaR, Wan Das and otlw witnesses."}}, {"text": "Wan Das", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 30814, "end_char": 30821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He wanted to run away but was secured by BhaR, Wan Das and otlw witnesses."}}, {"text": "Bhagw11111 Das", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 30983, "end_char": 30997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(S) Immediately thereafter, Bhagw11111 Das and other witnesses went inside the quarter and found Putlibai, wife of the accused, lvina dead on a cot."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31671, "end_char": 31682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32453, "end_char": 32479, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32827, "end_char": 32838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "December 7, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34516, "end_char": 34532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal 67 of 1969 decided on December 7, 1971)."}}, {"text": "section\n\n302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34652, "end_char": 34664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34665, "end_char": 34670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_606_621_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "• ·• 606\n\nAIR INDIA CORPORATION, BOMBAY\n\nV. A. REBELLOW & ANR.\n\nFebruarv 24. 1972\n\n(C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, I. D. DUA\n\n0AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act (14 Of 1947), ~'- '33(1 )(b), 33(2)(b) and 33A-Tenninntion of servic~~ 0/ en1p/oye-NOt for 111is-:onduct-Approval of Tribunal not obtained~Legalil•y.\n\nThe respondent htid be.en employed by the appellant as an Assistant Station Superintendent. An order was passed terminating his services with\n\nimmrdiate effect with P'1Yment of one month's salary in lieu of notice.\n\nHe filed a complaint under s. 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Labour Court before which. 1.1n industrial dispute was pending. <J, lleging that the tcrn1ination of hf.s service was illegal for tl'r! reason inter a/ia tlY.tt the approval of the Labour Court for such termination was not obtained.\n\nTh~ uppellunt contended thut the respondent was not a •.vorkman and thal hr.! was not conC:e'rned in the industrial dispute pending in the Labour Court.\n\nPursuant to the directions of the Latour Court, the appellant filed v. written statement in which it was pleaded that without prejudice to the contention that this .case should be decided on the aforesaid\n\npreliminary points raised by the appellant the order of termination of the respondents' services was valid because his services were terminated under Regulation 48 of the Air India Employees' Service Regulations framed with previous app'roV':ll of the Central Govenunent, and under that regu .. lation the services of a permanent employee may be terminated without assigning any reason. It was added that without prejudice to the plea that the appellant W'\"JS not bound to discle any reason for terminating the services of the respondent, the latrer•s services weTe terminated because of the appellant's total Jo-s of confiden~.e in the respondent on account of gtave suspicioJns regarding his private cpnduct and behaviour with the Air Hostess';?s of the appelJ-:in.t-Corporation.\n\nThe Labour Court held on the preliminary question that the respondent was a workman concerned in the industrial_ dispute pending before it and that his dicharge was in breach of s. 33 of the Act.\n\nOn the question whether t11c action taken by .tltc_?· appellant. W'3S hit by s. 33 of the Act,\n\nHELD: (1) Section 33(1)(b) bans the dischargi:: or punishment. whether by dismissal or otherwise. of a workman for misconduct connected with a pending dispute \\Vithout the express permiso::ion in writing G of the authority dealing with the pending proceeding.\n\nSection 33(2) (b) places a similar ban in reg:ird to matters not connected with the pendin~ dispute; but the employe:r is free, to discharge or dismiss a workman by paying wages for one month provided he applies to the authority dealing with the pending proceeding for approval of the action taken.\n\nWhether lhe ction is taken under' 33(l)(b) ors. 33(2)(b), the ban is imposed bnly in regard to c.ction tokerr for misconduct whether corinected or un-·\n\nconnected with the dispute. Unlike under s. 33(3) which gives a blanket R protection to 'protected workmen•, an employer is free to take. action against other workmen if it is not based orl any misconduct on their part. f617B-D, C-Gl\n\nl2) ln the present case, on the fac, e of it, the language of the order\n\nJos not show th3t the respondent's services were terminated because of any misconduct.\n\nPrima facie, therefore, the impugned order was not an order discharging Or punishing the respondent for any misconduct. r618A-·\n\nBJ ( 3) Action under Reg. 48 can be validly tak•!n by an employer at his Sweet-will without assigning any reason, and he is not bound to disclose why he does not want to continue in service a particular employee. r620D-E1\n\n( 4) It is however open to the restbondent to urge that reliance on.\n\nReg. 48 V.'as not bona fide and 'that it was a colourabl~ exercise of the right confe:rred by the Regu!ation, because, the form of .the order is not decisive and attending circumstances are open to consideration though th~ motive ftJr the order, if not n1alafi(le, is not open to question. f619H;\n\n6208-C]\n\nfVorknien o/ .St1dder Office, Cinnamara v. Afanagcment, [19711 II L.L.J. 610, Chartered Bank, Bonibav v. Chartered Bank Emploxees' Union. [1960] l[ L.L.J.- 222 and Tcta Oil Mills Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nWori:rner, [1964] ][ L.L.J. 1!3, referred to.\n\n(5) But the reason of the employer for the terminating the services o'f his employee need not be his misconduct but may, inter-alia, be want of full satisfaction with the employee's' overall suitability in the job assigned to the employee. Such want of satisfaction does not imply misconduct of the employee. r620E-Fl\n\n(6) 'fhe loss of confidence in the pres.ent case canno.t be considered to be mc; lafide.\n\nAssuming that the re'3.SOn stated in the appellant's written statement could be taken into account, the bona fides of .the appellant in making the impugned order could not be challe.nged. The respondent had to deal with Air hostesses in the performanc~ of his duties and if the\n\nappllant was not fuUy s'3.tisfied beyond -\"SUSP.icion about his general conduct and behaviour while dealing with them it could not be said that the loss cf confidence was not bona fide.\n\nOnce bona fide loss of cofidencc is affirmed the impugned order must be considred to be immune from challenge.\n\nThe opinion formed by the employer about the suitability of his crnpl_oyee for the job assigned to him, even though erroneous, if hona {idi:' is final '3.nd not subject to review by industrial adjudication.\n\nSuch an opinion may legitimately induce the employer to tetminate the .employee's ervices, but, s_uch termination can, on no rational glrounds .. be considered to 'be for misconduct, and lnust therefore be held to bepermissible and immune from challenge. [620F-H; 62\\A-BJ\n\nManage111en~ of U. B. Dlltt & Co. v. Workmen of U. B. Dutt & Co. [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 822, distinguished. ·\n\n[The question whether the reason stated in the appell-:lnt's written stat-:ment. filed without Prejudice and pursuant to the direction of the Labour Court could be takc11 into account, left open.1 [621E-FJ\n\nC1v1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1339 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Award dated April 28, 1967 of the Central Govemmnt Labour Court, Bombay in Application No. LCB-39 ol 1965. .\n\nS. D. Vimdalal, S. K. Wadia, D. N. Mishra 8iild 0. C. Mathur, A '.for the appellant.\n\nK. P. V. Menon, S. R. Iyer and M. S. Narasimhan, for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDua, J. This is an appeal by special leave and the appellant, the Air-India Corporation, Bombay assails Part I of the Award with corrigendum, date<! April 28, 1967, given by the Central Government Labour Court, Bombay, on the complaint dated October 16, 1965 made by Shri V. A. Rebellow, respondent no. 1 in this Court (hereinafter referred to as the complainant) under s. 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act). The complaint was originally filed by the complainant before the National Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, (Mr. Justice G. D . . Khosla, retired Chief Justice of the Punjab High Court) in the .Industrial Dispute Reference No. l of 1964 but was later trans-\n\n[erred to the Central Government Labour Court and numbered as .application no. LCB 39 of 1965.\n\nThe impugned award merely dealt with the preliminary points raised by the appellant that the complainant was not a workman cc, ncemed in the aforesaid industrial dispute and that there was .no breach of s. 33 of the Act with the result that the complaint under s. 33-A of the Act was incompetenll.\n\nThe Labour Court held the complainant to be a workman concerned in the atoresaid -indJJstrial dispute pending before the National Industrial Tribunal -0n the date of his dismissal and that the dismissal was not a discharge simpliciter but in breach of the provisions of s. 33.\n\nOn this finding his complaint was held to be maintainable. The two questions canvassed in the present appeal are ( 1) whether the complainant was a workman and was as such concerned in the aforesaid dispute (Industrial Dispute Reference No. 1 of 1964) and (2) whether the termination of his service was a dismissal as alleged by him or was a mere termination of service not amounting to dismissal: Broad facts necessary for understanding the controversy may now be stated : The order which was challenged as amounting to the complainant's dismissal reads :\n\nCONFIDENTIAL Dated June 19, 1965 (Thru: The Co111mercial Manager, Cargo) Dear sir, It has been deci!ofed to terminate your services, which We hereby do with immediate effect. You will be paid one month's salary in lieu of n<>tice, ·\n\n2. Please arrange IQ return, as early as possible, all items of Corporation's property in your possession to enable us to settle your accounts.\n\n3. Your accounts will be settled after checking your commitments. ·\n\nYours faithfully,\n\nAIR INDIA\n\nSd/- S. K. KOOKA Commercial Director\"\n\nOn July, 1 §, 1965 the complainant acknowledged the above letter terminating his services with inunediate effect and requested for reinstatement because according to him there was nothing to warrant such summary termination of his services. This is what he wrote:\n\n\" .... In this connection I have to state that I have served the Corporation for a period of over nine years and to the date of terminating my services, there is nothing on record which warrants that my services.should be terminated summarily. Hence it is requested that I be reinstated and thereafter if the Management is of the opinion that I have done something against the interest and the fair name of the Corporation, I be charged accordingly, given an opportunity to explain my conduct and after everything else if I am found guilty, acion taken gainst me as the management deems fit.\n\nWith the experience I have with the management's policy towards its employees, I am confident that I will never be deprived of the opportunity I have asked for and more so in the light of the faithful service I have rendered. . ..... \"\n\nThe following reply was sent to the complainant on September I 1965;\n\n2. I have to inform you that your services were terminated on payment of 30 days' salary in lieu of notice, in accordance with Rule 48 of the Air-India Employees Service Regulations.\"\n\nRegulation 48 of the Air-India Employees' Ser'Vice Regulations which was described as Rule 48 in the letter of September 8, 1965 reads as under :\n\nCHAPTER VIII Cessation of service\n\n• • •\n\n48. Termination: The service of an employee may be terminated without assigning any reason, as under :\n\n(a) of a permanent employee by giving him 30 days' notice in writing or pay in lieu of notice;\n\n(b) of an empl_oyee on probation by giving him 7 days' notice in writing or any in lieu of notice;\n\n(c) of a temporary employee by giving him 24 hours' notice in writing or pay in lieu of notice.\n\nExplanation: For the purposes of this Regulation, the word \"pay\" shall include all emoluments which would be admissible if he were on privilege leave.\"\n\nIn the complaint under s. 33-A of the Act it was alleged by the complainant that the order dated June 19, 1965 smacked of vindictiveness or unfair labou_r practice and that his alleged termination was a cloak for punishing him.\n\nNo facts were, however, stated in support of this averment. According to the averments in this complaint, Regulation 48 postulates the existence of some relISOn for the termination of service and since the Corporation had not disclosed any reason for the termination of the complainant's service it was requested'that the Corporation be directed to disclose the reason, if any, for the termination of his service.\n\nThe real grievance of the complainant, it appears, was founded on the construction of Regulation 48 as is clear from the following avermcnts in para 7 of the complaint :\n\n\"The complainant submits that on a reasonable construction of the said Rule, the Opposite Party is bound to disclose the reason if any for the said termination in the present proceedings. The complainant submits that any other construction would be unreasonable and make the said rule itself unreasonable, illegal, void as also in contravention of Articles 14, 16, 19 and 311 of the Consti~ tution of India and is therefore void and inoperative.\"\n\nIn regard to the question of the complainant bei11g a workman .concerned in a pending indust; riaf dispute it was a, verred that the\n\ncomplainant had been employed by the Opposite Party as an Assistant Station Superintendent (Crew Scheduling) in the grade of Rs. 300-25-500-50-650 and was confirmed in that post with effect from 1st December, 1963, In po.ra 8 of the complaint it was pleaded !hat :\n\n\"the proceedings in reference no, NIT No, 1 of 1964 were and are pending before this Hou'ble Tribunal and the Complainant is a workman concerned in the said dispute. The Complainant says that U!H.kr the circumstances aforaid the Opposite Parry ought to have made an application for approval before this Hon'ble Tribunal under Section 33 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but the Opposite party has made no such application nor has the Opposite Party intima•t>.d that it proposed to make such an application for approval while terminating the services of the Complainant.\n\nThe Complainant says; that the Opposite Party has not obtained the approval of this Hon'ble Tribunal in writing of the action taken by it ggalnst the Complainant.\"\n\nOn these averments reinstatement was cbimed by the complainant with full b1tck wages and allowances from the date of the alleged termination of his ser\\(ic, es,\n\nE It appears that pursuant to directions from t})e Labour Court the appellant filed a further written statement dated June 30, 1966 and it was submiHed :\n\n\"Without prejudice to the contention of the Opposite Party that this case should be decided on the preliminary points above. as raised by the Opposite Party, as the Complainant has repeatedly made a grievance that a written statement on merits has not even been filed and as this Honourable Tribunal also indicated at the preliminary hearing that a written statement on merits should in any event be kept ready and that no further time would be given to, the Opposite Party for preparing and filing\n\nthe same, the Op1Josite Party herewith begs to submit this further written Statement.\"\n\nWith these preliminary submissions it was stated as follows in paragraph 7 :\n\n\"With reference to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint, Regulation 48 of the Air-India Employees' Service Regulations provides inter alia, that the services of a pennanent employee may be terminated, without assigning any rlll!son, by giving him thirty days' notice in writing or pay in lieu of notice. The construction\n\nsought to be put upon the said Regulation by the Com plainant is not correct, The opposite Party denies that .\n\nRegulation 48 is unreasonable, illegal or void or in contraven, tion of Articl, es 14, 16, 19 and 311 of the Consti~ tution of India. The said Regulations have been framed with the previous approval of the Central Government under section 45 (2)(b) of the Air Corporation Act,\n\n1953. The Opposite Party submits tha~ it was and is not bound to gi\"'._e or disclose any reason for tenninating the service of tlie Complainant. Any contrary view would, it is submitted, render the said Regulation No. 48 completely nugaUQry.\n\nHowever, without prejudioo to this, the OppoSite Party says that the Complainant's service was terminated because of Ike total loss of con fidence on account of grave suspicions regarding his private conduct and behaviour with Air Hostesses of the Corporation. The reports and statements from the Air Hostesses concerned cannot be disclosed as they involve the reputation and future of young and unmarried girls.\n\nHaving regard to this, the Opposite Party could not continue the Complainant in its service and it was constrained to terminate his service in accordance with Regulation 48.\" The complainant's averment that he was a workman concerned in the proceedings in the industirial dispute was denied by the appellant in the first written statement dated March 15, 1966 in j>ara 1 which reads :\n\n\"(a) Tli.e Complainant was at no relevant time a 'worlanan' within the meaning of that term as defined in Section 2 ( s) of the said Act. At the time of the tttmination of his service, the Complainant was an Assistant Station Superintendent and was employed in an administrative/ Supervisory . capacity, drawing a total salary amounting to Rs. 690 per month.\n\nMoreover, it may also be pointed out that in its Staff Notice No. 130 dated 31st March,.1956, the'Opposite Party has given a classification of its nnel, whereili . the category of Assistant Station Superintendents has been classified as an \"Officer\" category (vide Entry no. 1/28). A copy of. the said Staff Notice is hereto annexed and marked Ex.\n\nNo. 1. Further, the said category of Assistant Superintendents has not been included among the categories of workmen in the dispute in Ref. No. NIT/1. of 1964 pending bel'ore the National Industrial TribiJnal composed of Shri G. D. Khosla. Besides, the C1aB11 of 9ffi\" ccrs designated as Assistant Station Superindents •has always been,. and. is, represented by the Air-India OjliCen\n\nAIR I.NDJA v. v. A. REBELLOW (.Qua, /.) 613\n\nAssociation which is not an association reprsenting any 'workmen' and which.is not a party to the dispute in the abovementioned reference.\n\nFurther, the said class of Officers has not at any time presented itself before the National Industrial Tribunal nor has it been represented at the hearing of the said dispute by any of the Uniort& representing parties nos. 2 to 7 to the said dispute.\n\n(b) Even assung, without admitting, that the Complainant is held to be a workman (which is denied)\n\nsubsections 1 and 2 of section 33, and consequently section 33A,. have, and can have, no application having regard to the circumstances of tlhe present case. The sub~ .iect matter of the Complaint is not a matter connected\n\nwith the dispute in the Reference before the Natipnal Industrial Tribunal nor is the, Complainant concerned in the said dispute. Further, sut>isection (1) (b) and subsection 2(b) of Section 33 have application only in the case of dismissal or discharge for misconduct in the cir cumstances set out therein, and not to a case of termiila tion of service simpliciter. In the prent case, the\n\nOpposite Party has bona fide terminated 'the service of the Complainant under. the provisions of Regulation 48-' of Air India Employees' Service Regulations which are applicable to the Complainant. There has, therefore, been no breach of the provisions of sub-section (l)(b) or sub-section 2(b) of section 33 and unless there is such a breach there can be no invocation of Section 33A. Oti\n\nthe contrary, the Opposite Party repeats that the said sub-sections are inapplicable.\"\n\nThe complainant and the appellant both filed lists of the com\n\nplainant' s duties in proof . of their respective contentions, Ex. E-1 . being the appellant's list and 9x. W-13, the complairuµit's.\n\nThe Labour Court eld in the impugned award that the complainant as Assistant Station Superintendent was a Junior Officer and as such, as determined in the Khosla Tribunal Award, was' a workman concerned in the industrial dispute before that Tribunal and that his discharge was not discharge simpliciter-but .in breach of s. 3 3 of the At. On this view the complaint was directed to be considered on themerits. · ' :\n\nJn this _Couit Shri Yunadlal argued that keepin~ in view the\n\ncompla~nt's duties it is not possible to hold that he is a workman.\n\nAccdrding to the submission the. complainant was an officer whose duties 'Yete primarily supervisory and, therefore, lie could\n\nnot be described as a workman. lbe complainant, it was furths\n\nargued, was t least not a workman_ oonrned. in th~ industrial\n\nJ 1-Lt03 tS11p. Cl./72 . -\n\ndispute pel)ding before the Khosla Tribunal.\n\nIn any event, the action taken by the appellant, not being for misconduct on th; part of the appellant but under Regulation 48 was not hit bys. 3.J of the Act.\n\nWe should like first to deal with t:he applicability of ss. 33 and 33A of the Act on the assumption that the complainant was a workman and also as such interested in a pending industrial dispute. These sections read :\n\n\"33. Conditions of servh'e etc., to remain unchanged under certain circ\\lmstances during pendency of proceedings : ( 1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a concHation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before an arbitrator or a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall,-\n\n( a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or\n\n(b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workmen concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending.\n\n(2) During the pendency of any such proceng in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a work- . man concerned in such dispute, or, where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman,-\n\n( a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or\n\n(b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman :\n\nProvided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for onQ\n\nmonth and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceerung is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer.\n\n( 3) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection ( 2) no employer shall, during the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, take any action against any protected workman concerned in such dispute-\n\n( a) by altering, to the prejudice of such protected workman, the conrutions of service applicable to him immediately before the commencement of such proceedings; or\n\n(b) by discharging or punishing, whether by dismissal or otherwise, such protected workman,\n\nsave with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending.\n\nExplanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, a 'protected workman', in relation to an establishment, means a workman who, being an officer of a registered trllde union connected with the establishment, is recognised as such in accordance with rules made in this behalf.\n\n( 4) In every establishment, the .number of workmen to be recognised as protected workmen for the purposes of sub-section ( 3) shall be one per cent. of the total number of workmen employed therein subject to a minimum number of five protected workmen and a maximum number of one hundred protected workmen and for the aforesaid purpose, the appropriate Government may make rules providing for the distnbution of such protected workmen among various trade unions, if any, connected with the establishment and the manner in which the workmen may be chosen and recognised as protected workmen.\n\n{ 5) Where an employer makes an application to a conciliation officer, Board, an arbitrator, a Labour C:ourt, Tribunal or National Tribunal under the proviso to. sub-section ( 2) for approval of the action taken by !}im, the authority concerned shall, without delay, hear\n\nsuch application and pass, as expeditiously as possible such order in relationthereto as it deemed fit. . •\n\n33A Special provision for adjudication as to whether conditions of service, etc., changed during pendency or proceedings :\n\nWhere an employer contravenes the provisions of section 3 3 during the pendency of proceec; lings before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, any emplciyee aggrieved by such contravention, may make a complaint in writing, in the prescribed manner to such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal and on receipt of such complaint that Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it, in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly.\"\n\nD The basic object of these two sections broadly . speaking appears to be to protect the workmen concerned in the dispulei! which form the subject matter of pending conciliation proceed~ ings or proceedings by way of reference under s. 10 of the Act, against victimisation by the employer on account of raising or continµing such pending disputes and to ensure that those. pending proceedings are brought to expeditious termination in a peaceful atmosphere, undisturbed by any subseq\\lent cause tending to further exacerbate the already strained relations between the It employer and the workm, en.\n\nTo achieve this objective a ban, subject to certain conditions, has been imposed by s. 33 on the ordinary right of .the employer to alter the terms of his employees' services to their prejudice or to terminate their services under the general law governing contract of employment and s. 33A provides for relief against contravention of s. 33, by way of adjudication of the. complaints by aved workmen comidering them to be disputes referred or pending in aqcordance with the provi sions of the Act.\n\nThis ban, however, is designed to restrict interference with the general rights and liabilities 'bf the parties under the ordinary la'!\" within the limits truly necessary for accomplishing the above object. , The employer is accordingly ti left free to deal with the employees when the action concerned is\n\nnot punitive or mala fide or does not :!mount to victimisation or . unfair labour practice.\n\nThe anxiety of the legislature to ellectively ll'chieve. the object of duly protecting . the. workmen against victimisation or unfair labc;>ur practices consistently with the preservation of the employer's bona fide right to maintain discipline and efficiency in the industry for securing the maximum production in a peaceful harmonious atmosphere is obvious from the overall scheme of these sections.\n\nTurning first to s. 33, sub:s.\n\n( 1 ) of this section deals with the case of a workman concerned in a pending dispute who has been prejudicially ilffected by an action in regard to a matter connected with such pending dispute and sub-s. ( 2) similarly deals with workmen concerned in regard to matters unconnected with such pending disputes.\n\nSub-section ( 1 ) bans alteration to the prejudice of the workman concerned in the conditions of service applicable to him immediately before the commencement of the proceedings and discharge or punishment whether by disntlssal or otherwise of the workman concerned for misconduct connected with the dispute without the express permission in writing of the authority dealing with the pending proceeding.\n\nSub-section ( 2) places a similar ban in regard to c matters not connected with the pending dispute but the employer is free to discharge or dismiss the workman by paying wages for one month provided he applies to the authority dealing with the pending proceeding for approval of the action .taken. In the case before u& we are concerned only with the ban imposed against orders of discharge or punishment as contemplated by cl. (b) of 0 the two sub-sections.\n\nThere are no allegations of alteration of the complainant's terms of service. It is not necessary for us to decide whether the present case is governed by sub-s. ( 1) or sub-s. ( 2) because the relevant clause in both the sub-sections is couched in similar language and V(e do not find any difference in the essential scope and purpose of these two &uh-sections as far as\n\nthe controversy before us is concerned. It is noteworthy that the ban is imposed only in regard to action taken for misconduct whether connected or unconnected with the dispute.\n\nThe employer is, therefore, free to take action against his workmen if it is not basea on any misconduct on their part. In this connection reference by way of contrast may be madeto sub-s. (3) of s. 33 which imposes an unqualified ban on the employer in regard to action by discharging or punishing the workman whether by dismissal or otherwise. In this sub-section we do not find any restriction such as is contained in cl. (b) of sub-ss. (1) and (2).\n\nSub-section ( 3) protecls \"protected _workman\" and the reason is obvious for_ the blanket protection of such' a workman.\n\nThe legislature in his case appears to be anxious for the interest of healthy growth and development of trade union movement to ensure for him complete protection against every kind or order of discharge or punishment because of his special position as an officer of a registered trade union recognised as such in accordance with the rules made in that behalf.\n\nThis explains the restricted protection in sub-ss. (1) and (2).\n\nIt is in, the background of the. purpose and scope of s. 33(1) and (2 l that we have to consider whether the action taken against the complainant is hit bv eitll.er of these two sub-sections. We have seen the form and the language of the impugiied order. On\n\nits face the language does not show that the complainant's services were terminated because of any misconduct.\n\nPrima facie, therefore, the impugned order is not an order discharging or punishing the complainant for any misconduct.\n\nBut then the complainant's learned counsel Shri Menon argued that the face or the fom1 of the order is not conclusive and that the Court is entitled to and indeed should go behind the form and by looking at the real substance of the matter try to find the real cause and then come to its conclusion whether or not the order is a mere camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct.\n\nThe true legal position has been stated by this Court more than once and is by now beyond controversy.\n\nIn one of the most recent decisions in The Wo1kmen of Sudda Office, Cinnamara v.\n\nThe Management(!) this.Court approvingly referred'to two of its earlier decisions actually reproducing a passage from one of them.\n\nThis is what was said in Sudder Office case :\n\n\"It is needless to point out that it has been held by this Court in The Chartered Bank, Bombay v.\n\nThe Chartered Bank Employees' Union(') thafif the termination of service is a colourable exercise of the power vested in the management or as a result of victimisation or unfair labour practice, the Industrial Tribunal would have jurisdiction to intervene and set aside such a termination.\n\nIn order to find out whether the order of termination is one of the termination simpliciter under the provisions of contract or of standing orders, the Tribunal has ample jurisdiction to go into all the -circumstances which led to the termination simpliciter.\n\nThe form of the order of termination, is not conclusive of the true nature of the order, for it is possible that the fo1m may be merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct. It is, therefore, open to the Tribunal to go behind the form of the order and look at the substance. If the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that though in form the order amounts to termination simp/iciter but in reality cloaks a dismissal for misconduct, it will be open to it to set aside the order as a colourable exercise of power by the management.\n\nPrinciples to the same effect have also been reiterated in the later decision of this Court in Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Workmen & anr. (') where the Court observed as follows :\n\n\"The true legal position about the Industrial Court's justification and authority in dealing with\n\n(I) [1971]-II L.L.J. 620.\n\n(2) [1960]-II L.L. J. 222.\n\n(3) [1964]-II L.L.J. 113.\n\ncases of this kind is no longer in doubt. lt is true that in several cases, contract of employment or provi sions in standing orders authorise an industrial employer to terminate the service of his employe.:s after giving notice for one month or paying salary for one month in lieu of notice, and normally, an employer may, in a proper case, be entitled to exercise the said power.\n\nBut where an order of discharge passed by an employer gives rise to an industrial dispute, the form of the order by which the employee's services are terminated would not be decisive; industrial adjudication would be entitled to examine the substance of the matter and decide whether the termination is in face discharge simpliciter or it amounts to dismissal which has put on the cloak of discharge simpliciter.\n\nIf the Industrial Court is satisfied that the order of discharge is punitive, that it is ma/a fide, or that it amounts to victimisation or unfair labour practice, it is competent to the Industrial Court to set aside the order and, in a proper case, direct the reinstatement of the employee.\"\n\nShri Menon on behalf of the complainant, however, contended that ignoring the form and language of the impugned order and looking at the real substance of the matter it is clear as disclosed by the appellant in the further written statement that the complainant's services were terminated because of a suspicion about his private conduct and behaviour with Air Hostesses whose names were considered not proper to be disclosed.\n\nThis, said the counsel, makes out an allegation of misconduct which induced the appellant to terminate the complainant's services and the case, therefore, clearly falls within the mischief of s. 33.\n\nThe impugned order, he added, is a colourable exercise of the power under Regulation 48, the real object of the appellant being essential!}' to punish the complainant for misconduct.\n\nNo doubt, the position of the industrial workman is different from that of a Government servant because an industrial employer cannot \"hire and fire\" his workmen on the basis of an unfettered right unde\" the -contract of employment, that right now being subject to inC:strial adjudication : and there is also on the other hand no provision of the Constitution like Arts. 310 and 311 requiring consideration in the case of industrial workmen.\n\nWe are here only concerned with the question whether the. impugned action of termin_ation of the complainant's services is for misconduct as contemplated bys. 33(11) (b) ors. 33(2)(b). While considering this question it is open to the complainant to urge that reliance on Regulation 48 is not bona fide, it being a colourable exercise of the right conferred by that regulation.\n\nHe has in fact raised\n\nthis argument and it is this aspect which concerns us in this case.\n\nA Let us now scrutinise the present record for examining the position from this aspect.\n\nNow, the true position, as it appears to be clear from the record of this case, is that the complainant's services were terminated under Regulation 48 by paying his salary for 30 days in B lieu of notice.\n\nThe order does not suggest any misconduct on the part of the complainant and indeed it is not possible to hold this order to be based on any conceivable misconduct.\n\nThe form of this order is no doubt not deciive and attending circumstances are open for consideration, though motive for the order, if not mala fide, is not open to question.\n\nThe further written statement C which the appellant was directed to file and which was filed without prejudice discloses the fact that the appellant had lost confidence in the complainant and this los~ of confidence was due to a grave suspicion regarding the complainant's private conduct and behaviour with Air-Hostesses employed by the appellant.\n\nRegulation 48 which has been set out earlier as its plain language shows does not lay down or conJemplate any defined essential pre-requisite for invoking its operation.\n\nAction under this Regulation can be validly taken by the employer at his sweet will without assigning any reason.\n\nHe is not bound to disclose why he does not want to continue in service the employee concerned.\n\nIt may be conceded that an employer must always have some reason for terminating the services of his employee.\n\nSuch reasons apart fiom misconduct may, inter\\ alia, be want of full satisfaction with his overall suitability in the job assigned to the employee concerned.\n\nThe fact that the employer is not fully satisfied with the overall result of the performance of his duties by\n\nF his employee does not necessarily imply misconduct on his part.\n\nThe only thing that remains to be seen is if in this case the impugned order is mala fide.\n\nThe record merely discloses that theappellan~ had suspicion abQtit the compl11inant's suitability for the job in which he was enl.ployed and this led to loss of confidence in him with the result that his services were terminated under Regulation 48: In our view, loss of confidence in such circumstances cannot be considered to be mala fide.\n\nWe are G unable to concve of any rational challenge to the bona (ides of the employer in making the impugned order in the above background.\n\nThe complainant, it may be remembered had to deal with Air-Hostesses in the performance of his duties and if the appellant was not fuily satisfied beyond suspicion about his general conduct and behav; iour while dealing with them it cannot be H said that loss of confidence was not bona fade.\n\nOnce bona fide loss of confidence in affirmed the impugned order must be considered to be immune from challenge.\n\nThe opin, ion formed by\n\nthe employer about the suitability of his employee for the job assigned to him even thou.$ erroneous, if bona fide, 1s m our opinion final and not subject to review by the industrial adjudication.\n\nSuch opinion may legitimately induce the employer to terminate the employee's services; but such termination can on no ratiopal grounds be considered to be for misconduct and must, therefore be held to be permissible and immune from challenge.\n\nThe decision in the case of Management of U. B. Dutt & Co.\n\nv. Workmen of.U. B. Dutt & Co.(1) relied upon by the complainant's learned counsel is of no assistance to him. There one S employed by the managemel)t as a cross cutter in the saw mill was asked to show cause why his services should not be terminated on account of grave indiscipline and misconduct and he denied the allegations of fact.\n\nHe was thereafter informed about a departmental enquiry to be held against him and was suspended pending enquiry. Purporting to act under r. 18(a) CJf the Standing Orders, the appellant terminated the services of S without holding any departmental enquiry.\n\nOn reference of the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal this action was held not to be bona fide but a colourable exercise of the power conferred under r. 13 (a) of the Standing Order and since no attempt was made before it to defend such. action by proving the alleged misconduct, it passed an order for reinstatement of S. Quite clearly the facts there are not parallel to the facts before us.\n\nThe facts there are materially different.\n\nWe have proceeded on the assumption that the reason stated in the further written statement filed without prejudice pursuant to the direction of the Labour Court could be taken into account.\n\nWe, however, must not be understood to express any opinion on its propriety either way.\n\n•In our opinion the Central Gox_ernment Labour Court, Bombay, was, for the reasons foregoing, not right in holding that the complainant was guilty of misconduct .and that his. services were terminated for that reason.\n\nWe, therefore, allow this appeal and setting aside the oroer of . the C.entral Government Labout Court Bombay, dismiss the complainant's petition under s. 33-A of th~ Act.\n\nIn the peculiar circumstances of the case there would be no order as to costs. ·\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n'1) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 822.", "total_entities": 76, "entities": [{"text": "606\n\nAIR INDIA CORPORATION, BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AIR INDIA CORPORATION, BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. A. REBELLOW & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. A. REBELLOW & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DUA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0AND G. K. MITTER, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 558, "end_char": 564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 572, "end_char": 601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2168, "end_char": 2173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2264, "end_char": 2269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2293, "end_char": 2309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2544, "end_char": 2557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3038, "end_char": 3046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "fVorknien", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4122, "end_char": 4131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f619H;\n\n6208-C]\n\nfVorknien o/ .St1dder Office, Cinnamara v. Afanagcment, [19711 II L.L.J. 610, Chartered Bank, Bonibav v. Chartered Bank Emploxees' Union. ["}}, {"text": "S. D. Vimdalal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6352, "end_char": 6366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. D. Vimdalal, S. K. Wadia, D. N. Mishra 8iild 0."}}, {"text": "S. K. Wadia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6368, "end_char": 6379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. D. Vimdalal, S. K. Wadia, D. N. Mishra 8iild 0."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mishra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6381, "end_char": 6393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. D. Vimdalal, S. K. Wadia, D. N. Mishra 8iild 0."}}, {"text": ". C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6401, "end_char": 6412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. D. Vimdalal, S. K. Wadia, D. N. Mishra 8iild 0."}}, {"text": "K. P. V. Menon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6438, "end_char": 6452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. P. V. Menon, S. R. Iyer and M. S. Narasimhan, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. R. Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6454, "end_char": 6464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. P. V. Menon, S. R. Iyer and M. S. Narasimhan, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. S. Narasimhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6469, "end_char": 6485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. P. V. Menon, S. R. Iyer and M. S. Narasimhan, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Dua", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6554, "end_char": 6557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDua, J. This is an appeal by special leave and the appellant, the Air-India Corporation, Bombay assails Part I of the Award with corrigendum, date<!"}}, {"text": "Central Government Labour Court, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6732, "end_char": 6771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 28, 1967, given by the Central Government Labour Court, Bombay, on the complaint dated October 16, 1965 made by Shri V. A. Rebellow, respondent no."}}, {"text": "V. A. Rebellow", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6826, "end_char": 6840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 28, 1967, given by the Central Government Labour Court, Bombay, on the complaint dated October 16, 1965 made by Shri V. A. Rebellow, respondent no.", "canonical_name": "V. A. REBELLOW & ANR"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6924, "end_char": 6929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6939, "end_char": 6968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "National Industrial Tribunal, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7064, "end_char": 7099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complaint was originally filed by the complainant before the National Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, (Mr. Justice G. D . ."}}, {"text": "G. D . . Khosla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7114, "end_char": 7129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complaint was originally filed by the complainant before the National Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, (Mr. Justice G. D . .", "canonical_name": "G. D . . Khosla"}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7160, "end_char": 7177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khosla, retired Chief Justice of the Punjab High Court) in the .Industrial Dispute Reference No."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7551, "end_char": 7556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7609, "end_char": 7614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7917, "end_char": 7922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "S. K. KOOKA", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8966, "end_char": 8977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yours faithfully,\n\nAIR INDIA\n\nSd/- S. K. KOOKA Commercial Director\"\n\nOn July, 1 §, 1965 the complainant acknowledged the above letter terminating his services with inunediate effect and requested for reinstatement because according to him there was nothing to warrant such summary termination of his services."}}, {"text": "July, 1 §, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9003, "end_char": 9018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yours faithfully,\n\nAIR INDIA\n\nSd/- S. K. KOOKA Commercial Director\"\n\nOn July, 1 §, 1965 the complainant acknowledged the above letter terminating his services with inunediate effect and requested for reinstatement because according to him there was nothing to warrant such summary termination of his services."}}, {"text": "Vice Regulations which was described as Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10396, "end_char": 10440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11112, "end_char": 11117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vice Regulations which was described as Rule", "statute": "Vice Regulations which was described as Rule"}}, {"text": "June 19, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11186, "end_char": 11199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the complaint under s. 33-A of the Act it was alleged by the complainant that the order dated June 19, 1965 smacked of vindictiveness or unfair labou_r practice and that his alleged termination was a cloak for punishing him."}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 16, 19 and 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12252, "end_char": 12279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13078, "end_char": 13088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13100, "end_char": 13129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "June 30, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13776, "end_char": 13789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On these averments reinstatement was cbimed by the complainant with full b1tck wages and allowances from the date of the alleged termination of his ser\\(ic, es,\n\nE It appears that pursuant to directions from t})e Labour Court the appellant filed a further written statement dated June 30, 1966 and it was submiHed :\n\n\"Without prejudice to the contention of the Opposite Party that this case should be decided on the preliminary points above."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15118, "end_char": 15136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Regulations have been framed with the previous approval of the Central Government under section 45 (2)(b) of the Air Corporation Act,\n\n1953."}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15143, "end_char": 15153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Air Corporation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15168, "end_char": 15187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 15, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16192, "end_char": 16206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complainant's averment that he was a workman concerned in the proceedings in the industirial dispute was denied by the appellant in the first written statement dated March 15, 1966 in j>ara 1 which reads :\n\n\"(a) Tli.e Complainant was at no relevant time a 'worlanan' within the meaning of that term as defined in Section 2 ( s) of the said Act."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16339, "end_char": 16348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st March,.1956,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16669, "end_char": 16686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "130 dated 31st March,.1956, the'Opposite Party has given a classification of its nnel, whereili ."}}, {"text": "G. D. Khosla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17168, "end_char": 17180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of 1964 pending bel'ore the National Industrial TribiJnal composed of Shri G. D. Khosla.", "canonical_name": "G. D . . Khosla"}}, {"text": "National Industrial Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17596, "end_char": 17624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, the said class of Officers has not at any time presented itself before the National Industrial Tribunal nor has it been represented at the hearing of the said dispute by any of the Uniort& representing parties nos."}}, {"text": "sections 1 and 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17868, "end_char": 17884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17888, "end_char": 17898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17917, "end_char": 17928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Natipnal Industrial Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18134, "end_char": 18162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sub~ .iect matter of the Complaint is not a matter connected\n\nwith the dispute in the Reference before the Natipnal Industrial Tribunal nor is the, Complainant concerned in the said dispute."}}, {"text": "section 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18255, "end_char": 18267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18271, "end_char": 18281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18761, "end_char": 18773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18777, "end_char": 18787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18852, "end_char": 18863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19477, "end_char": 19481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Yunadlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19593, "end_char": 19601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn this _Couit Shri Yunadlal argued that keepin~ in view the\n\ncompla~nt's duties it is not possible to hold that he is a workman."}}, {"text": "Khosla Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20014, "end_char": 20029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dispute pel)ding before the Khosla Tribunal."}}, {"text": "ss. 33 and 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20249, "end_char": 20263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24182, "end_char": 24191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24661, "end_char": 24752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25013, "end_char": 25018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act", "statute": "Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25464, "end_char": 25469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act", "statute": "Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act"}}, {"text": "s. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25664, "end_char": 25670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act", "statute": "Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25716, "end_char": 25721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act", "statute": "Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26700, "end_char": 26705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28640, "end_char": 28645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29501, "end_char": 29509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Menon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29987, "end_char": 29992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But then the complainant's learned counsel Shri Menon argued that the face or the fom1 of the order is not conclusive and that the Court is entitled to and indeed should go behind the form and by looking at the real substance of the matter try to find the real cause and then come to its conclusion whether or not the order is a mere camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33960, "end_char": 33965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 310 and 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34517, "end_char": 34534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Gox_ernment Labour Court, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 39734, "end_char": 39774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "•In our opinion the Central Gox_ernment Labour Court, Bombay, was, for the reasons foregoing, not right in holding that the complainant was guilty of misconduct .and that his."}}, {"text": "C.entral Government Labout Court Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 40003, "end_char": 40042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the C.entral Government Labout Court Bombay, dismiss the complainant's petition under s. 33-A of th~ Act."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40085, "end_char": 40090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_622_628_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "THUL1A KALI v.\n\nTHE STATE OF TAMIL NADU\n\nFebruary 25, 1972\n\n[H. R. KHANNA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]\n\nCrimi1t11l Trial-First Information Report-Unexplained delay in the lodging of First f/nformation Report_.lnference.\n\nConstitution of India, 1950--Article 136-lnterfercnce---if evidence afflicted 'tl'ith ex-facie infirmity.\n\nThis Court does not normally reappraise cVict!nce in an appeal under article 136 of th~ Constituion; but that fact would not prevent fnterfelrenc~ with -:in order of conviction, if, on consideration of the vital prose .. cution evidence in the case the Court finds it to be afflicted with ex-facie infirmity. The appellant was sentenced to death under s. 302 Indian Penal-Code.\n\nThe trial Court and the High Court 'based the conviction of the appellant .primarily \\ll>On the testimony of two witnesses one of whom according to the prosecu_J.ion Case ws present when the accused made JllUrderous assault on the deceased and the other arrived soon after. Neither of them nor anyone e1se who was told' about the occurrence by the two witnesses made any report at the police station for mdre than 20 hours after the •occurrence even though the police station was only t\\.\\'O miJes from the place of occurrence.\n\nSetting a5ide the conviction,\n\nHELD : That tbe delay in lodging the report would raise considerable doubt regarding the varacity of the evidence of two witnesses ad point to an infirmity in -that evidence and would render it unsafe to base the conviction of the a9peltant.\n\nThe fitst information rep<irt in a criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of corroborating the \"ra1 \":evidenee dduced irl,'ll!e trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodgitl& qf the report td, the police in respect of commission of an offence to _obtain ear'Jy information regarding the circumstances in which the crime W'll c:ommitttd, the name, of tbe actual culprits and the part playd\n\nby them as well a<> the names of eye witnesses present at tlY! scene of occlurttnce. Delay in lodging the first information report __ quite often results in t!mbellishment which is a creature of after thought.\n\nIt is therefore essential that th:~ delay in lodging the report should be satisfactorily explained. [626 HT\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 165 of 1971.\n\nAppeal biY special leave from the judgment and order dated November 24, 1970 of the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 7 61 of 1970 and Referred Trial No. 50 of 1970.\n\nS. Lakshminarasu, for the appellant.\n\nA, V. Rangam, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J.\n\nThulia Kali (26) was convicted by Sessions Judge Salem under section 302 Indian Penal Code for causing the death of Madhandi Pidariammal ( 40) and under section 379 Indian Penal Code for committing theft of the ornaments of Madhandi deceased.\n\nThe accused was sentenced to death on the former count.\n\nNo separate sentence was awarded for the offence under section 379 Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe High Court of Madras affirmed the conviction and sentence of the accused.\n\nThe accused has now come up in appeal to this Court by special 'leave.\n\nThe pros-cution case was that Madhandi deceased purchased land measuring 1 acre 62 cents from Thooliya Thiruman (PW 5), elder brother of the accused for rupees one thousand.\n\nThe land of the accused adjoined the land sold to Madhandi deceased.\n\nThe accused wanted Madhandi deceased to sell that land to him but the deceased declined to do so.\n\nMadhandi constructed a D fence around the land purchased by her, as a result of which the passage to the land of the accused was obstructed.\n\nAbout a week before the present occurrence, the accused removed some jack fruits from the land purchased by the deceased.\n\nComplaint about that was made by the deceased to the Panchayatdars. The Panchayatdars considered the matter, but the accused dec)ined to\n\nabide by the decision of the Panchyatdars.\n\nOn March 12, 1970 at about 12 noon, it is stated, Madhandi deceased left her house situated in village Sakkarapatti along with her daughter-in-law Kopia Chinthamani (PW 2), aged 10, for Valaparathi_at a distance of about two miles from the village for grazing cattle.\n\nShortly thereafter, Valanjiaraju (PW 1), stepson of Madhandi deceased, alo went to Valaparathi and started cutting plants at a distance of about 250 feet from the place where the deceased was grazing the cattle.\n\nAt about 2 p.m. the accused came to the place where Madhandi deceased was present and asked her whether she would give him the right of passage or not.\n\nThe deceased replied in the negative.\n\nThe accused then took out knife Ex. 1 and gave a number of knife blows to the deceased in spite of her entreaties to the accused not to stab her and that she would give him what he wanted.\n\nKopia PW raised alarm and ran from th~ place of occurrence.\n\nShe met Valanjiaraju PW and told him that the accused was giving _knife blows to Madhandi.\n\nAccompanied by Kopia, Valanjiaraju then went towards the accused but he threatened them with knife.\n\nValanjiaraju and Kopia thereupon went to the village and informed the husband of the deceased as well as a number of other villagers including Aneeba (PW 3) and Selvaraj (PW 4). Valanjiaraju and a large\n\nnumber of other villagers then went to the place of occurrence A and found the dead body of Madhandi deceased lying there with injuries on her throat, face and other parts of the body.\n\nBoth her <:ars were found to have been chopped off.\n\nHer jewels had been removed.\n\n According further to the prosecution, Valanjiaraju went to B the house of village munsif Muthuswami (PW 8) to inform him about the occurrence.\n\nMuthuswami, however, was away from the house to another village in connection with some collection work.\n\nMuthuswami returned at about 10.30 p.m. and was told by Valanjiaraju about the occurrence.\n\nMuthuswami did not record the statement of Valanjiaraju at that time and told hin1 that he would not go to the spot where the dead body was lying on C that night as wild animals would be roaming there and that he would go there on the following morning.\n\nMuthuswami went to the spot where the dead body of the deceased was lying at about 8.30 a.m. on the following day, that is, March 13, 1970 and had a look at the dead body of the deceased.\n\nStatement P: 1 of Valanjiaraju was recorded by Muthuswami at 9. a.m. at the spot. o The statement was then sent by Muthuswami to police station Valavanthi at a distance of about two miles from the place of occurrence.\n\nFormal first information report P. 15 on the _basis of statement P. 1 was prepared at the police station at 11.45 a.m.\n\nHead Constable Rajamanickam, after recording first informa- E tion report, went to the place of occurrence and reached there at\n\n2.3Q p.m.\n\nInspector Rajagopal (PW 13), on hearing about the occurrence at the bus stand, also went to the place of occurrence.\n\nInquest report relating to the dead body of the deceased was then prep_ared.\n\nDr. Sajid Pasha (PW 7) was thereafter sent for from Sendamangalam.\n\nDr. Pasha arrived at the place of occurrence at 12.30 p.m. on March 14, 1970 and performed post mortem exa- F ruination on the dead body of Madhandi dceased.\n\nInspector Rajagopal arrested the accused, according to the prosacution, at 5 a.m. on March 15, 1970 in a reserve forest about one mile from Seppangulam.\n\nThe accused then stated that he had kept ornaments and knife in the house of Chakravarthi G\n\nIPW 9) and would get the same recovered.\n\nThe Inspector then went with accused to the house of Chakravarthi PW and from iliere recovered knife Ex. 1 and ornaments Bxs. 2 to 8.\n\nThe said ornaments belonged to Madhandi deceasd. The knife was taken into possession and put into a sealed parcel.\n\nThe c!othes which the accused was wearing were got removed and put mto a H sealed parcel.\n\nThe parcels were sent to Chemical Examiner, whose report showed that neither the knife nor the clothes of the accused were stained with blood.\n\nAt the trial the plea of the accused was denial simpliciler.\n\nAccording to the accuse, d, the villagers came to know on the evening of March 12, 1970 that the deceased had been murdered.\n\nThe accused along with the villagers went to the spot where, the dead body of the deceased was lying and stayed with them there during the night.\n\nOn the following day, the accused was suspected by the villagers.\n\nThey gave him beating and tied him to a tree.\n\nLater on that day, that is, March 13, 1970, the accused was taken to the police station and kept there for two days.\n\nThe accused denied having committed the murder of the deceased or having got recovered the ornaments and the knife.\n\nNo evidence was produced in defence.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge in convicting the accused relied upon the evidence of Kopia (PW <.), who had given eye witness account of the occurrence, as well as the statement of Valanjiaraju (PW i), who had been t)\\reatened by the ac9used with knife near the place of occurrence. Reliance was also placed upon the recovery of knife and ornaments in 11uisua:ice of the statement of the accused.\n\nThe High Court agreed with the Sessions Judge and affirmed the conviction of the accused.\n\nThere can be no doubt that Madhandi deceased was the victim of a .brutal attack.\n\nDr. Sajid Pasha, who performed. post mortem examination on the dead body of Madhandi, found as many as 29 injuries on the body.\n\nOut of them, 24 were incised wounds and five were multiple abrasions.\n\nThere were a number of incised wounds on the face, neck, chest and abdomen.\n\nThe pinnas of the right and Jeff ears had been completely severed.\n\nTnjuries were also found in the eyes and laryngeal region.\n\nDeath was the result of different injuries, some of which were individually-Sufficient to cause death.\n\nThe case of the prosecution was that it was the accused-appellant who had caused the injuries to Madhandi .deceased. The accused has, however, denied this all~\n\ngation andhas claimed that he has been falsely involved in this case on suspicion.\n\nThe trial court and the High Court have based the conviction- G of the accused-appellant, as stated earlier, primarily . upon the testimony of Kopia (PW 2) and Valanjiaraju (PW 1). This Court does not normally reappraise evidence in an appeal under cle 136 of. the Constitution, but that fact would not prevent mterference with an order of coriviction if on consideration of the vital prosecution evidence in the case, this Court finds it to be\n\naffiic!ed with ex facie infirmity.\n\nThere are in the present case ff . c~¢1in broad features ?f the prosecution story which create considerable doubt regarding the yeracity of the aforesaid evidence and. in our opinion, it would not be safe to maintain the conviction\n\n.on the basis of that evidence. According to Kopia (PW 2), the accused stabbed the deceased at about 2 p.m.\n\nKopia raised alarm and immediately informed Valanjiaraju, who was cutting plapts at a distance of about 250 feet from the place of occurrence.\n\nValanjiaraju and Kopia then came tow.an:!\" the place where the accused had assaulted the deceased, but the accused threatened them with knife.\n\nV alanjiaraju and Kopia thereupon went to the village abadi and informed the other villagers.\n\nValanjiaraju accompanied by other villagers then went to the place of occurrence and found the dead body of Madhandi lying there with a number of injuries.\n\nAccording to document P, 1 Valanjiaraju made statement C about the occurrence to village munsif Muthuswami (PW 8) at about 9 a.m. on March 13, 1970.\n\nFormal first information report on the basis of the above statement was prepared at the police station at 11.45 a.m.\n\nThe delay in lodging the repon, according to the prosecution, was due to the fact that Muthuswami PW was away to another village in connection with some collection work and he returned to his house at 10.30 p.m.\n\nMuthusY,1ami told Valanjiaraju when the latter met him at niglit that he would record the satement only after having a look at the dead body on the following morning.\n\nIt is in the evidence of V alanjiaraju that the house of Muthuswami is at a distance of three furlongs from the village of V alan- E jiaraju.\n\nPolice station Valavanthi is also at a distance of three furlongs from the house of Muthuswami.\n\nAssuming that Muthuswami PW was not found at his house till 10.30 p.m. on March 12, 1970 by V alanjiaraju, it is not clear as to why no report was lodged by Valanjiaraju at the police station. It is, in our opinion, most difficult to believe that even though the accused had been seen at 2 p.m. committing the murder of Madhandi F deceased and a large. number of villagers had been .told about it soon thereafter, no report about the occurrence could be lodged till the followin!\\ day.\n\nThe police station was less than two miles from the village of Valanjiaraju and Kopia and their failure to make a report to the police till the following day would tend to show that none of them had_ witnessed the occurrence.\n\nIt G seems likely, as has been stated on alf of the acused, that the villagers came to know of the death of Madhandi deceased on the evening of March 12, 1970. , They did not then know about the actual assailant of the deceased, and on the following day, their suspicion feJl. on the accused and accordingly they involved 'hin; i in this case.\n\nFirst injonitation report in a criminal case is 11 an extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose :-of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the trial .. The im-\n\n'.portance of the above report can hardly be overestimated from the\n\n'tHULIA KALI v. STATE (Khanna, J.) 627\n\nstandpoint of the accused.\n\nThe object of insisting upon prompt., lodging of the report to the police in respect of colllllllssion of an offence is to obtain early infonnation regarding the circumstances in which the crime,, was committed, the names of the actual cul- prits and the pa_rt played by them as well as names of eye witnesses present at the scene of occurrence.\n\nDelay in lodging the first infonnation report quite often results in embellishment which is a creature of afterthought On account of delay, the report not only gets eft _of the advantage of spontaneity, danger creeps in of the introduction of coloured. version, exaggerated account or\n\nconcocted story as a result of deliberation and consultation. It is, therefore, essential that the delay in the lodging of the first infonnation report should . be satisfactorily explained.\n\nIn the present case, Kopia, daughter-in-law of Madhandi deceased, according to the prosecution case, was present when the accused made murderous assault on the deceased.\n\nValanjiaraju, stepson of the deceased, is also alleged to have arrived near the sce11e of occurrence on being told by\"Kopia.\n\nNeither of them, nor any other villager, who is stated to have been told about the occurrence by Valanjiaraju and Kopia, made any report at the police station for more than 20 hours after the occurrence, even though\n\nthe police station is only two miles from the place of occurrence.\n\nThe said circumstance, in our opinion, would raise considerable doubt regarding the veracity of the evidence of those two witnesses and point to an infinnity in_ that evidence as would render it unsafe to base the conviction of the accused-appellant upon it.\n\nAs regards the alleged recovery of knife and ornam~_nts at the\n\ninstane of tlie accused, we find that the evidence consists of statements of Inspector Rajagopal (PW 13), Kali Goundar (PW 6) and Chakravarthi (PW 9). According to Chakravarthi (PW 9), the accused handed over the ornaments in question to the witness when the accused came to the house of the witness on the evening of March 12, 1970 and passed the night at the house.\n\nThe witness also found knife in the bed of the accused after he had left on the following day.\n\nAccording, however, to Kali Goundar (PW 6) ,-the accused, on interrogation by the Inspector of Police, stated that he had entrusted the ornaments to Thangam, wife of Chakravarthi (PW 9). Apart from the discrepancy on the point as to whom was the person with whom the accused had kept .the ornaments, we find that Thangam, with whom the accused, according to Kali Gouridai PW had kept the ornaments, has not been examined as a witness.\n\nIn view of the above state- H ment of Kali Goundar, it was, in our opinion, essential for the prosecution to examine Thangam as a witness and its failure to do so would make the Court draw an inference against the prosecution.\n\nIt .is also not clear as to why the accused should leave knife A Ex. 1 in his bed in the house of Chakravarthi (PW 9) when he • had ample opportunity to throw away the knife in some lonely place before arriving at the house of Chakravarthi.\n\nThe knife in question was found by Chemical Examiner to be not stained with blood and according to the prosecution case, the accused had washed it before leaving it in the bed in the house of Chakra- B vanhi. If the accused realised the importance of doing away with the blood stains on the knife, it does not seem likely that he would bring that knife to the house of Chakravarthi and leave it in the bed.\n\nLooking to all the circumstances, we are of the view that it is not possible to sustain the conviction of the accused on the evidence adduced.\n\nWe accordingly accept the appeal, set aside the conviction of the accused-appellant and acquit him.\n\nK.B.N. 'Appeal allowed.", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "THUL1A KALI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THUL1A KALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 25, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 58, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THUL1A KALI v.\n\nTHE STATE OF TAMIL NADU\n\nFebruary 25, 1972\n\n[H. R. KHANNA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 215, "end_char": 236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 244, "end_char": 255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 391, "end_char": 402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 674, "end_char": 680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2414, "end_char": 2431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal biY special leave from the judgment and order dated November 24, 1970 of the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "S. Lakshminarasu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2504, "end_char": 2520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Lakshminarasu, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2545, "end_char": 2554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A, V. Rangam, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2621, "end_char": 2627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J.\n\nThulia Kali (26) was convicted by Sessions Judge Salem under section 302 Indian Penal Code for causing the death of Madhandi Pidariammal ( 40) and under section 379 Indian Penal Code for committing theft of the ornaments of Madhandi deceased."}}, {"text": "Thulia Kali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2633, "end_char": 2644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J.\n\nThulia Kali (26) was convicted by Sessions Judge Salem under section 302 Indian Penal Code for causing the death of Madhandi Pidariammal ( 40) and under section 379 Indian Penal Code for committing theft of the ornaments of Madhandi deceased.", "canonical_name": "THUL1A KALI"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2694, "end_char": 2705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2706, "end_char": 2723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 379", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2786, "end_char": 2797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2798, "end_char": 2815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 379", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2989, "end_char": 3000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3001, "end_char": 3018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3025, "end_char": 3045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Madras affirmed the conviction and sentence of the accused."}}, {"text": "Madhandi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3202, "end_char": 3210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pros-cution case was that Madhandi deceased purchased land measuring 1 acre 62 cents from Thooliya Thiruman (PW 5), elder brother of the accused for rupees one thousand."}}, {"text": "Thooliya Thiruman", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3266, "end_char": 3283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pros-cution case was that Madhandi deceased purchased land measuring 1 acre 62 cents from Thooliya Thiruman (PW 5), elder brother of the accused for rupees one thousand."}}, {"text": "March 12, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3966, "end_char": 3980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 12, 1970 at about 12 noon, it is stated, Madhandi deceased left her house situated in village Sakkarapatti along with her daughter-in-law Kopia Chinthamani (PW 2), aged 10, for Valaparathi_at a distance of about two miles from the village for grazing cattle."}}, {"text": "Sakkarapatti", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4066, "end_char": 4078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 12, 1970 at about 12 noon, it is stated, Madhandi deceased left her house situated in village Sakkarapatti along with her daughter-in-law Kopia Chinthamani (PW 2), aged 10, for Valaparathi_at a distance of about two miles from the village for grazing cattle."}}, {"text": "Kopia Chinthamani", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4110, "end_char": 4127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 12, 1970 at about 12 noon, it is stated, Madhandi deceased left her house situated in village Sakkarapatti along with her daughter-in-law Kopia Chinthamani (PW 2), aged 10, for Valaparathi_at a distance of about two miles from the village for grazing cattle."}}, {"text": "Valanjiaraju", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4252, "end_char": 4264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shortly thereafter, Valanjiaraju (PW 1), stepson of Madhandi deceased, alo went to Valaparathi and started cutting plants at a distance of about 250 feet from the place where the deceased was grazing the cattle."}}, {"text": "Valaparathi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4315, "end_char": 4326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shortly thereafter, Valanjiaraju (PW 1), stepson of Madhandi deceased, alo went to Valaparathi and started cutting plants at a distance of about 250 feet from the place where the deceased was grazing the cattle."}}, {"text": "Kopia", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4827, "end_char": 4832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kopia PW raised alarm and ran from th~ place of occurrence."}}, {"text": "Kopia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4995, "end_char": 5000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accompanied by Kopia, Valanjiaraju then went towards the accused but he threatened them with knife.", "canonical_name": "Kopia"}}, {"text": "Valanjiaraju", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5002, "end_char": 5014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accompanied by Kopia, Valanjiaraju then went towards the accused but he threatened them with knife.", "canonical_name": "V alanjiaraju"}}, {"text": "Aneeba", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5224, "end_char": 5230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Valanjiaraju and Kopia thereupon went to the village and informed the husband of the deceased as well as a number of other villagers including Aneeba (PW 3) and Selvaraj (PW 4)."}}, {"text": "Selvaraj", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5242, "end_char": 5250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Valanjiaraju and Kopia thereupon went to the village and informed the husband of the deceased as well as a number of other villagers including Aneeba (PW 3) and Selvaraj (PW 4)."}}, {"text": "munsif Muthuswami", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5637, "end_char": 5654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According further to the prosecution, Valanjiaraju went to B the house of village munsif Muthuswami (PW 8) to inform him about the occurrence."}}, {"text": "Muthuswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5699, "end_char": 5709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muthuswami, however, was away from the house to another village in connection with some collection work.", "canonical_name": "MuthusY,1ami"}}, {"text": "March 13, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6276, "end_char": 6290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muthuswami went to the spot where the dead body of the deceased was lying at about 8.30 a.m. on the following day, that is, March 13, 1970 and had a look at the dead body of the deceased."}}, {"text": "police station Valavanthi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6470, "end_char": 6495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "o The statement was then sent by Muthuswami to police station Valavanthi at a distance of about two miles from the place of occurrence."}}, {"text": "Rajamanickam", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6695, "end_char": 6707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Formal first information report P. 15 on the _basis of statement P. 1 was prepared at the police station at 11.45 a.m.\n\nHead Constable Rajamanickam, after recording first informa- E tion report, went to the place of occurrence and reached there at\n\n2.3Q p.m.\n\nInspector Rajagopal (PW 13), on hearing about the occurrence at the bus stand, also went to the place of occurrence."}}, {"text": "Rajagopal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6830, "end_char": 6839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Formal first information report P. 15 on the _basis of statement P. 1 was prepared at the police station at 11.45 a.m.\n\nHead Constable Rajamanickam, after recording first informa- E tion report, went to the place of occurrence and reached there at\n\n2.3Q p.m.\n\nInspector Rajagopal (PW 13), on hearing about the occurrence at the bus stand, also went to the place of occurrence."}}, {"text": "Sajid Pasha", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7020, "end_char": 7031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Sajid Pasha (PW 7) was thereafter sent for from Sendamangalam."}}, {"text": "Sendamangalam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7068, "end_char": 7081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Sajid Pasha (PW 7) was thereafter sent for from Sendamangalam."}}, {"text": "Pasha", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7088, "end_char": 7093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Pasha arrived at the place of occurrence at 12.30 p.m. on March 14, 1970 and performed post mortem exa- F ruination on the dead body of Madhandi dceased."}}, {"text": "Rajagopal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7253, "end_char": 7262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Inspector Rajagopal arrested the accused, according to the prosacution, at 5 a.m. on March 15, 1970 in a reserve forest about one mile from Seppangulam."}}, {"text": "March 15, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7328, "end_char": 7342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Inspector Rajagopal arrested the accused, according to the prosacution, at 5 a.m. on March 15, 1970 in a reserve forest about one mile from Seppangulam."}}, {"text": "Seppangulam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7383, "end_char": 7394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Inspector Rajagopal arrested the accused, according to the prosacution, at 5 a.m. on March 15, 1970 in a reserve forest about one mile from Seppangulam."}}, {"text": "Chakravarthi G", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7474, "end_char": 7488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused then stated that he had kept ornaments and knife in the house of Chakravarthi G\n\nIPW 9) and would get the same recovered."}}, {"text": "Chakravarthi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7585, "end_char": 7597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Inspector then went with accused to the house of Chakravarthi PW and from iliere recovered knife Ex."}}, {"text": "Sajid Pasha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9311, "end_char": 9322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Sajid Pasha, who performed."}}, {"text": "V alanjiaraju", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11173, "end_char": 11186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V alanjiaraju and Kopia thereupon went to the village abadi and informed the other villagers.", "canonical_name": "V alanjiaraju"}}, {"text": "Muthuswami", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11780, "end_char": 11790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Formal first information report on the basis of the above statement was prepared at the police station at 11.45 a.m.\n\nThe delay in lodging the repon, according to the prosecution, was due to the fact that Muthuswami PW was away to another village in connection with some collection work and he returned to his house at 10.30 p.m.\n\nMuthusY,1ami told Valanjiaraju when the latter met him at niglit that he would record the satement only after having a look at the dead body on the following morning."}}, {"text": "MuthusY,1ami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11906, "end_char": 11918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Formal first information report on the basis of the above statement was prepared at the police station at 11.45 a.m.\n\nThe delay in lodging the repon, according to the prosecution, was due to the fact that Muthuswami PW was away to another village in connection with some collection work and he returned to his house at 10.30 p.m.\n\nMuthusY,1ami told Valanjiaraju when the latter met him at niglit that he would record the satement only after having a look at the dead body on the following morning.", "canonical_name": "MuthusY,1ami"}}, {"text": "V alan- E jiaraju", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12197, "end_char": 12214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is in the evidence of V alanjiaraju that the house of Muthuswami is at a distance of three furlongs from the village of V alan- E jiaraju."}}, {"text": "Kopia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14542, "end_char": 14547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, Kopia, daughter-in-law of Madhandi deceased, according to the prosecution case, was present when the accused made murderous assault on the deceased.", "canonical_name": "Kopia"}}, {"text": "Kali Goundar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15533, "end_char": 15545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the alleged recovery of knife and ornam~_nts at the\n\ninstane of tlie accused, we find that the evidence consists of statements of Inspector Rajagopal (PW 13), Kali Goundar (PW 6) and Chakravarthi (PW 9)."}}, {"text": "Thangam", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16041, "end_char": 16048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According, however, to Kali Goundar (PW 6) ,-the accused, on interrogation by the Inspector of Police, stated that he had entrusted the ornaments to Thangam, wife of Chakravarthi (PW 9)."}}, {"text": "Kali Gouridai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16250, "end_char": 16263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the discrepancy on the point as to whom was the person with whom the accused had kept .the ornaments, we find that Thangam, with whom the accused, according to Kali Gouridai PW had kept the ornaments, has not been examined as a witness."}}, {"text": "Kali Goundar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16366, "end_char": 16378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the above state- H ment of Kali Goundar, it was, in our opinion, essential for the prosecution to examine Thangam as a witness and its failure to do so would make the Court draw an inference against the prosecution."}}, {"text": "Chakravarthi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16654, "end_char": 16666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 in his bed in the house of Chakravarthi (PW 9) when he • had ample opportunity to throw away the knife in some lonely place before arriving at the house of Chakravarthi.", "canonical_name": "Chakra- B vanhi"}}, {"text": "Chakra- B vanhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16990, "end_char": 17005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The knife in question was found by Chemical Examiner to be not stained with blood and according to the prosecution case, the accused had washed it before leaving it in the bed in the house of Chakra- B vanhi.", "canonical_name": "Chakra- B vanhi"}}, {"text": "K.B.N.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17451, "end_char": 17457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.B.N. 'Appeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_629_638_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "HARIDWAR SINGH\n\nv .\n\nBA GUN SUMBRUI AND ORS.\n\nFebruary 25, 1972\n\n[K. S. HEGDE AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.]\n\nCqntracts-Acceptance of auction bi~ b, y Divisional Forest Officer r; ubject to confirmation by Government does nof result in concluded contracts in the abnce of confirmation by Governm.eint7\"\"\"\"Rules of Executive Busines9 of Bihar Government 1nade under Art. 166(3) of Constitution-Rule-10(1) as relaxe(i does not prohibit grallt of /eare by vrivnte Neaty-Rule 10 (1) in so far llS it requires prior con.fultation with\n\nFinance Depar'1nent is mnndatory.\n\nThe right to exploit a bamboo coup in the Hazaribagh district of Bibar was auctioned in August .1970.\n\nThe reserve price was Rs. 95,000/· but the appellant's bid of Rs. 92,001/· being the highest was accepted by the Divisional Forest Officer. Too petitioner deposited the security required and executed an agreement. The Divisional Forest Officer reported\n\nobout the aucion sale to the Conservator of Forests, Hazaribagli Circkl.\n\nAs the price for which the coup was provisionally settled exceeded Rs. 50,000 / • the Conservator of Forests forwarded ili> papers reprding the auction sale to the Deputy Sl:cfetary to the Government of Bihar, Forest Department for confirmation of the acceptan<\" by the Govctnment.\n\nSince provisional . 'Settlement was made for an amount less than the reserve prioe the matter was also referred to the Finance Department. When the\n\nmatter was pending the appellant expmserl his willingness to take the settlement at the res:rve price of Rs. 95,000/- by his communication dated October 26, 1970. The appellant thereafter filed an application.. on Sovembe< 3, 1970 praying for settlement of the <ioup on 111> b3sis of the highest bid. The Minister of Forest by his proceedings dated NOYemfier 27, 1970 directed that 111> coup may be. settled with the highest bidder\n\nviz .. ' the appellant at the reserve price. A telegram was sent by the Government. to the Consorvator of F<W.sts, Hazaribagh Circle on November\n\n28, 1970 with copy of the same to the Conservator of Forest, Bihar <:<>'nliniling the auction sale '3t 'the reserve price of Rs. 95,000/·. As no intimati911 was receiwd by the Divisional Forest Officel\" he did not communicate the proceedings of the Minister to the appellant.\n\nOn JJecmber 24; respondent No. 6 filed a petition to the Government offering to take the settlement of the coup in question for Rs. 101125/·. The\n\n~1inister, by his proceedings dated December 13, 1970 canrelled the •ettlement of the coup with the appellant and settled the same with res. pondcnt No. 6 fol: Rs, 101125 / -.\n\nThe appellant filed '3 writ petition in the lfigb Court contending that there was a concluded contract when the bid. of the appellant was accepted by the Divisional _Fo.:est Olllcer though that was subject to the confirmation by the Government and when the Government confirmed acceptance by its proceedings dii&if Decanber\n\n2 7, I 970. it was no longer within the power of the Gove'rnment to malre the settlement of th~ coup upon the 6th respondent. It was abo contended that the settlement of the coup in favour of the 6th respoodent\n\nwas invalid because (a) rule IO(l) of the Rules of :£xecutive Business made under Art. 166( 3) of the Constitution as relaxed by the letter of the Deputy Secretary to the Government dated November 27, 1'67 P*\n\nhibited the grant of r.ase by. private treaty and (b) the requirement of 12-Ll031SupCT/12\n\nprior consull':ltion in r. 10( I) with the Finance Department was mandatory and had not been complied with.\n\nThe High Court rejected the appellant's contentions. In appeal to this Court by special leave.\n\nHELD : ( 1) The actptance of the appellant's offer was subject to confirmation by the Government and in the absence of such confirmation there could be no concluded contract.\n\nThe appellant's bid was for Rs. 92001/ -.\n\nThe acceptance of the bid by the Divisional Forest Officer was therefore, subject to confirmatioo by the Government. The pro=ding of the Minister dated November 27, I 970 would show that he did not confirm acceptance of the offer by the Divisional Forest Officer. What the Minister did was not to confirm the acceptance made by tho Divisioll\".li Forest Officer bui to accept the offer made by the appellant in his communication dated October 26, 1970 that he would take the coup for the reserved price of Rs. 95,000/. lberc was. thorefolre, no confirmation of the acceptance of the bid to take the coup in the settlement for the amount of Rs. 92,001/-. ·~634-G-635B]\n\nIf the offer that was accepted was the offelcontained in the communication of the appellant dated October 26, 1970 it could not be said that there was any communicati(ln of the acceptance of that offer to the appellant.\n\nThe telegram sent to the Conservator of Forest, Hazaribagh by the Government on November 28, 1970 could not be considered as a communication of the acceptance of that offer to the appellant.\n\nThe acceptance of the offer was nor hen put in counie of transmission to the appellant; and so even as5uminl!\" that acceptance need not <!<>me to theknowledge of the offl'!'or, the appellant could not contend that there was a concluded contract on the basis of his offer cont, Uned in his communication dated October 26, 1970, as . the acceptance of that offer was not put in the course of transmission.\n\nApari from that the appellant himself revoked the offer ma<h by him on OctOber 26, 1970 by his letter dated November 3, 1970 in which he stated that the coup may be settled upon him at the highest bid made by him in . the auction. There was, thm no conclud,¢ contract between the appellant and the overnment. f,6358-DJ ·\n\nThe Raianagoram Village C<10perative Socit, v v, Veeraswami Mudaly, ,[1950] II M.L.J. 486, distinguished.\n\nSomasundaram Pillai v. Provincial Governmen( of Madras,· A.J.R.\n\nF 1947 Madras, 366, appl~.\n\n(ii) Rule 10(1) in so far as it was relevant to the pre5ent case cn!y says that\" no department shall without prior consultation with the F'mance\n\nDepartD>.lnt 'Outhorise by any order the lease cir license of mineral. of forests.\n\nThe rule read in the context of its relaxation as mentionod in the letter of the Deputy Secretary wotild only show that consultation with the Finance Department is not necessary fdr a lease if leaoe is of land of G the .value of more tllan Rs. 50,000/- .and is granted in pursuance of public auction held in conformity with the conditions mentioned in the letter of the Deputy Secretary, The rule wmther before or after ,.,_ laxation did\" not prohibit the grant of leave by private treaty. [637C]\n\n(iii) It was clear from records relating to the proceedings for the grant of the lease in favour of the 6th respondent thst the Finance Department was not consulted befo0> the Minister passed the order on j)ecember 13, H 1970 to grant lease.\" It could not be oaid that rule 10(1 ). in so .far as it requires prior consultation with the Finance Department i• only drirOC' tory and therefore even if there was no prior consultation the settlement\n\nHARIDWAR SINGH v. BAGUN SUMBRUI (Mal/Jew, J.) 631\n\nwas valid. The neg:itive or prohibitive language of rule 10(1) is a strong indication of the intent to make the rule mandatory.\n\nFurthei: rule 10(2) mak\"s it clear that where prior consultation with the Finance Department is,.required for a propOflal and the department on consultation, does not agree to the propOS\".ll, the department originating the proposal can take no further action on the propo; al. The Cabinet alone would be compent to take a decision.\n\nPridr consultation is therefore an essnial prerequisite to the <!xcrci!I! of power. The orde/ passed b~ the Mmtster of Forest, Government of Bihar on December 13 1970 settling the coup in favour of 100 6th ['espondent was, therefore d anJ the order must be quashed. [637EF; 6380-FJ\n\nDattatreya Moreshwar Pangerkar v. The State of Bombay and Others, [.1952] 2 S.C.R. 612 applied.\n\nC CIVIL APl'ELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1807 of 1971. .\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 6, 1971 ol the PatnaHigh Court in C.W.J.C. No. 41of1971.\n\nL. M. Singhvi, S. C. Dingra and U. P. Singh, fortlie appellant.\n\nO S. V. Gupte and B. P. Singh, for r11spondents Nos. 1 to 5.\n\nS. N. Prasad and D. N. Mishra, for respondent No. 6 ..\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMathew, J. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Patna praying for quashing an order passed by the Minister or-Forest, Government of Bihar, on December 13, 1970, and for issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the . respondents 1 to 5 to give effect to the previous order of the Minister of Forest dated November 27, 1970. The writ petition was heard by a Division Bench of the Court and the petition was dismissed.\n\nThis appeal, by special leave, is from that judgment.\n\nThere is a bamboo coup know as \"Bantha Bamboo coup\" in Chatra North Division of Hazaribagh district.\n\nOn July 22, 1970, the Forest Department of the Government of B, ihar adv~ tised for settlement of the right to exploit the coup by. blic auction.\n\nThe auction was held in the. office of '!te D!vmouai F0rest Officer Oil August 7, 1970.. Five persons mcluding . e appellant participated in the auction.\n\nThough the resee pnce fixei! in. the tender notice was Rs. 95,000/ ·, the appellant.s .b.1d of Rs. 92,001/-, being the highest, was accepted b)'. the Div1s1oa\\\n\nForest Officer.\n\nThe petitioner thereafter deposited the secll?t.Y amount of Rs. 23,800/~ and execu~ an aent. The ; DlVI~ sional Forest Officer reporteii about the auon sale to. the Conservator of Forests, Hazaribagh Circle, by his letter dated ugust 25, 1970.\n\nAs the price for which the coup was pro'vis1onally\n\nsettled exceeded Rs. 50,000/-, the Conservator of Forests forwarcd the papers regarding the auction sale to the Deputy Secretary Id Government of Bihar, Foest Department, for confirmation of the acceptance by the Govermnent.\n\nSince the provisional settlement was made for an amount less than the reserve price the matter was also referred to the Finance Department. 'The Finance Department invited comments from the Divisional Forest Officer as .tO why the settlement was made for a lesser amount.\n\nThe Divisional Forest Officer, by his letter dated . October 30,\n\n1970, submitted his explanation for the provisional settlement at\n\nn amount below the reserve price.\n\nW]]en the matter was pend- . mg before the -Government, the appellant expressed his willingness to take the settlement at the reserve price of Rs. 95,000/-, by his communication dated October 26, 1970.\n\nThe appellant thereafter filed an application on November 3, 1970, praying for settlement of the coup on the basis of the highest bid.\n\nThe Minister of Forest, by his proceedings dated November 27, 1970, directed that the coup may be settled with the highest bidder, namely the appellant, at the reserve price.\n\nA telegram was sent by the Government to the Conservator of Forests, Hazaribagh Circle on November 28, 1970, with a copy of the same to the Conservator of Forest, Bihar, confinning the auction sale to the appellant at the reserve price of Rs. 95,000/-.\n\nAs no intimation was received by the Divisional Forest Officer, he did not communicate the proceedings of the .Minister to the appell!jllt. . One Md. Y akub, Respondent No. 6, filed a petition on December 4,\n\n1970, before the Government of Bihar, Respondent No. 1, offering to take the settlement of the coup in question for Rs. 1,01,125/-. A telegram was sent by the Government on December 5, 1970; to the Divisional Forest Officer, directing him not to take any action on the basis of the telegram dated November 28, 1970, sent to him in pursuance of the proceedings of the Government dated November 27, 1970. That telegram was received by the Divisional Forest Officer on December 10, 1970, and the Divisional Forest Officer, by his letter dated December 10,\n\n1970, informed the Government that the previous telelgram dated Nove!J1ber 28, 1970, was not received by him and so it content was\n\nnot communicated to the appellant.\n\nThe whole matter was there-. after placed before the Minister Of Forest and the Minister, by his G proceedings dated December 13, 1970, cancelled the settlement of the ooup with appellant a\\ld settled the same with Respondent No. 6 for Rs. 1,01,125/-. The Government thereafter sent.telegrams on December 21, 1970, to the Conservator of Forests aitd the Diviional Forest Officer, informing them that the coup had been settled with Respondent No. 6. . The Di_vit>:ional Forest Officer, by Iii$ letter dated December 23, 1970, directed }lesdent N'o, 6 to deposit the security amount and to pay the rust instalment.\n\nRe5poildent No. 6 depositedthe same and executed an agreement.\n\nHARIDWAR SINGH v. BAGUN SUMBRUI (Mathew, J.) 633\n\nThe contention of the appellant in the writ petition was that there was a concluded contract when the bid of the appellant was accepted by the Divisional Forest Officer though that was subject to confirmation by the Government and that, when the Government confirmed the acceptance by its proceedings dated November 27, 1970, it was no longer within the power of Government to make the settlement of the coup upon the 6th Respondent by its proceedings dated December 13, 1970.\n\nIt was also contended in the alternative that the settlement of the coup in favour of the 6th Repondent was in violation of statutory rules and, therefore, in any event, that settlement was invalid.\n\nAs already indicated, the High Court negatived these contentions and upheld the validity of the settlement in favour of the 6th Respondent.\n\nThe special conditions in the tender notice makes it clear that the Divisional Forest Officer has the right to accept a bid of less than Rs. 5,000/-, that acceptance of a biid of more than Rs. 5.000/- by him is subject to confirmation by the Chief Con-\n\n'ervator of Forests and the Forest Department of the Bihar Government, that an auction sale for an amount of more than Rs. 5,000/- would n0t be recognised until it is confirmed by the competent authority, and that a bid made in auction and which has been provisionally accepted by the Divisional F:orest Officer shall be binding on the bidder for two months from the date of auction or till the date of rejection by the competept authority, whichever is earlier.\n\nCounsel for the appellant contended that there was a conditional acceptance of the offer of the appellant by the Divisional Forest Officer, that on confirmation by the Government, that acceptance became unconditional and, therefore, there was a concluded contract when the Government confirmed the acceptance, even though the confirmation was not commllnicated to the appellant.\n\nIn suppon of this, he relied on The Rajanagaram Village Cooperative Society v. Veerasami Mudaly( 1). There it was held that in the case of a 'conditional acceptance in the presence of a l>idder, the condition being that it is subject to approval or confirmation by some other peyso.n, the acceptance, though conditional, has to be communicated and when that is communicated, there is no further need to communicate the approval or confinna- . tion which is the fulfilment of the condition. It was further _held\n\nthat a conditional acceptance has' the effect of binding the highest bidder to the contract if there is subsequent approval or confumation by the person indicated, that he cannot resile from the contract or withdraw the offer, and if there is approval or confirma-\n\n(1) [19501 11 M.L.J. 486.\n\ntion, the contract becomes concluded and enforceable.\n\nThis decision was considered in Somasudaram Pillai v.\n\nProvincial Government of Madras(') where Chief Justice Leach, speaking for the Court said that, to have an enforceable contract, there must be an offer and an unconditional acceptance and that a person who makes an offer has the right to withdraw it before acceptance, in the absence of a condition to the contrary supported by consideration. He further said the fact that there has. been a provisional or conditional acceptance would not make any difference as a provisional or conditional acceptance cannot in Itself make a binding contract. ·\n\nThe question whether by an acceptance which is conditional upon the occurrence of a future event a contract .will become concluded was considered by Williston and this is what he says:(')\n\n\"A nice distinction may be taken here between ( 1 )' a so-called acceptance by which the acceptor agrees to become immediately bound on a condition not named in the offer, and (2) an acceptance which adopts unequivocally the terms of the offer but states that it will not be effective until a certain contingency happens or fails to happen. In the first case there is a counter offer and rejection of the original offer; in the second case there is no counter-officer, since there is no assent to entei; into an immediate bargain.\n\nThere i~. so to speak, an acceptance in escrow, which is not to take effect until the future.\n\nIn the meantime, of course, .neither party is bound and either may withdraw.\n\nMore over, if the time at which the acceptance was to become effectual is unreasonably remote, the offer may lapse before the acceptance becomes effective.\n\nBut if neither party withdraws and the delay is not unreasonable a contract will arise when the contingency happens or stipulated i; vent occurs\"\n\nIn this case, it is not the want of communication of the confirmation by the Government to the appellant that really stands in the way of there being a concluded contract, but .. rather the want of confirmation by the Government of the eond1tional acceptance by the Divisional Forest Officer.\n\nThe appellant's bid was for Rs. 92,001/-. The acceptance of the bid by the Divisional Forest Officer was, therefore, subject to confirmation by Government.\n\nThe proceedings of the Minister dated November 27 .• 1970, would show that he did not confirm the acceptance of the\n\n(!) A.LR. 1947, 34 M•dras, 366.\n\n(2) Williston On Contracts, Vol. I, 3rd Ed. Section 77A.\n\n..,. . .... . ,\n\n.. ~\n\nHARIDWAII. SINGH V, BAGUN SUMBRUI (Mathew, J.) 635\n\nofferby the Divisional 'Forest Officer.\n\nWhat the Minister did was not to confirm the acceptance made by the Divisional Forest Officer, but to accept the offer made by the appellant in his com- ·\n\nmunication dated October 26, 1970, that he would take the coup for the resed price of Rs. 95,000/-. T)lere was, therefore, no confirmation of the acceptance of ihe bid to take tlle COUP' in settlement for the amount of Rs. 92,001/-. If the offer that was accepted was the offer contained in the communication of the appellant dated October 26, 1970, we do not think that there was any communication of the acceptance of that offer to the appellant. The telegram sent to the Conservator of Forest, Ha-zeribagh,\n\nby the Government on November 28, 1970, cannot be considered as a communication of the acceptance of tl)at offer to the appellant.\n\nThe acceptance of the-offer was not even put in the course of transmission to the appellant; and so even assuming that an acceptance need not come to the knowledge of the offeror, the appellant cannot contend that there wa8 a concluded contract on the basis of his offer contained in his communication dated October 26, 1970, as the acceptance of that offer wa& no, t put in the D course of transmission.\n\nQuite apart from that, the appellant himself revokd the offer made by him on October 26, 1970, by his letter dated November 3, 1970; in which he stated that the coup may be settled upon him at the highest bid made by him in the auction.\n\nWe are, therefore, of the opinion that there was no concluded contract between the appellant and the Government.\n\nThis t.akes us to the question whether the settlement in favour of the 61h Respondent was in violation of any statutory rule. The appellllillt's contention was that the settlement in favour of the 6th Respondent by a private treaty was in violation of the rules of executive business made under Article 166(3). Rule 10 of the Rules provides :\n\n\"10(1) No department shall, without previous consultation with the Finance Department, authorise aily orders (other than orders pursuant to any general or special delegation made by the Finance Department) which:\n\n(a) either immediately or by their repercussion. will affect the finances of the State, or which,. in particular.\n\n( i) involve any grant of land or assignment of revenue or concession, grant, lease or licence of mineral or forests, rights or a right to water power of any easement or privilege in respect of such concession.\n\n•• •• • •\n\n(2) Where on a proposal under this rule, prior consultation with the Finance Department is required, but on which the Finance Department might not have\n\nagreed, no further action shall be taken on any such proposal until the cabinet takes a decision to this effect.\"\n\nA copy of the letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of the Accountant General, Bihar, dated November 22, 1967 would show that some relaxation of Rule JO ( l) of the rules of executive business was made by the Finance Department relating to lease of forest Coups or forest produce of the value of more than'Rs. 50,000/-.\n\nThat letter read~ as under:\n\n\"Suhjecr : Revision of procedure in issuing any order C involving any grant of lease, sale or licence of minerals of forest rights if such order is issued by the Administrative Department at the Secretariat level.\n\n\"Sir; D\n\nl am directed to say that in relaxation of rule 10 ( 1) of the Rules of Executive Business, Government have been pleased to decide that the Forest Department shall authorise orders sanctioning leases of Forest coups or produce of the value of more than Rs. 50,000/- (ru~ fifty thousand) each, subject to the following conditions E that:-\n\n( I ) Reserve price of the coup has been fixed before auction.\n\n( 2) Highest bid should be accepted.\n\n( 3) Highest bid should not be less than the reserve price.\n\n( 4) Any relaxation to the above conditions may not ordinarily be allowed except with the prior concurrence of the Finance Department.\"\n\nBefore the High Court the contentions of the 6th Respondent were, firstly, that the rule 10(1) is not a statutory rule and. secondly, that it did not concern lease of forest land.\n\nThe High Court, without deciding the question whether the rule is a statutory rule, held that the rule has nothing to. do with the lease of forest coups and said that there was nothing which prevented th<!\n\nGovernment from giving the coup on lease by private treaty. The High Court, therefore, held that there was no bar, statutory or otherwise, to the settlement of the coup in favour of Respondent\n\nHARIDWAR SINGH V, DAGUN SUMBRUI (Mathew, J.) 637\n\nNo. 6 by private negotiation and as such the settlement in his favour was valid.\n\nCounsel for the appellant argued that the High Court went wrong in its conclusion that rule 10{1) as.relaxed, did not apply to the grant of the lease of the coup in question and that it really prohibited a lease of forest land except by public auction.. We are not satisfied that the construction contended for is correct.\n\nNeither rule 10(1) nor the rule as relaxed says that forest land can be leased only by public auction.\n\nRule 10( 1) in so far as il is relevant to the present case only says that no department shall, without prior consultation with the Finance Department, authOrise by any order, the lease or licence of mineral or forests.\n\nThe relaxation made to rule 10 (I) as evidenced by the letter from the . Deputy Secretary to the Government is to the effect that in .the case of lease of forest land of the value of more than Rs. 50,000/-. if made by public auction, it can only be made subject to the conditions mentioned there.\n\nJn other words, rule 10( 1) as relaxed does not prohibit the grant of a lease by private treaty.\n\nThe rule read in the' context of its relaxation as mentioned in the letter of the Deputy Secretary would only show that con@ta, fion with the Finance Department is not necessary for a lease, if the lease is of lan.d of the value of more than Rs. 50,000/- and is granted in pursuance of a _public auction held in conformity 'with the conditions mentioned in the letter of the Deputy Secretary.\n\nNow the question is whether the coup in question was settled in favour of the 6th Respondent in accordance with Rule 10( 1) . ft is clear from the records relating to the proceedings forthe grant of the lease in favour of the 6th Resp0ndent ihat the Finance Dep.artment was not consulted before the Minister passed tl1e order on December 13, 1970, to grant the lease.\n\nBut counsel for the Government of Bihar and 6th Respondent contended that rule 10( 1), in so far as it requires prior consultation with the\n\nFinance Department, is only directory in character and, therefore. even if there was no prior consultation, the settlement was valid.\n\nSo, the question arises whether rule 10 ( 1) which requires prior consultation with the Finance Department is mandatory or not.\n\nSeveral tests have been propounded in decided cases for determining the question whether a provision in a statute, or a rule ;, mandatory or directory.\n\nNo universal rule can be laid down on this matter.\n\nJn each case one must look to the subject matter and consider the importance of the provision disregarqed and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured.\n\nProhibitive or negative words can rarely be directory and are indicative of the intent that the provision is to be mandatory (see Earl T. Crawford.\n\nThe Comtructian of Statues, pp. 523-4 ).\n\n. Where a prescription relates to performance of a public duty A und to invalidate acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, such prescription is generally understoOd as mere instruction for the guidance of those upon whom the duty is imposed [see Dattatreya Moreshwar. Pangerkar\n\nv. The State of Bombay and others( 1) ].\n\nWhere, however, a power or authority is conferred with a direction !hat certain regulation or formality shall be complied with, it seems neither unjust nor incorrect to exact a rigorous observance of it as essential to acquisition of the riJ!ht or authority\n\n(see Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 6th ediuon, pp. 649-\n\nMO).\n\nIn this case, we think that a power has been given to the Minister in charge of the Forest Department to do an act which concerns the revenue of the State and also the rights of individuals.\n\nThe negative or prohibitive language of rule 10(1) is a strong indication of the intent to make the rule mandatory. Further, rule 10~2) makes it clear that where prior consultation with the Finance Department is required for a proposal, . and the department on consultation, does not agree tQ the proposal, the department originating the proposal can take no further action on the proposal.\n\nThe cabinet alone would, be competent to take a docision.\n\nWhen we see that the disagreement of the Finance Department with a proposal on consultation, deprives the department originating the proposal of the power to take further action on it, the only conclusion possible is that prior consultation is an '\"sential pre-requisite to the exercise of the power.\n\nWe, therefore, think that the order passed by the Minister of Forest, Gov- <?rnment of Bihar on December 13, 1970. settling the coup in favour of the 6th Respondent was bad and we quash the order.\n\nWe allow the appeal to the extent indicated but make no order :1, to costs.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 52, "entities": [{"text": "HARIDWAR SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARIDWAR SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BA GUN SUMBRUI AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAGUN SUMBRUI AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 25, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 63, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 25, 1972\n\n[K. S. HEGDE AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. K. MATHEW, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 166(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 357, "end_char": 368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bibar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 623, "end_char": 628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The right to exploit a bamboo coup in the Hazaribagh district of Bibar was auctioned in August .1970."}}, {"text": "Government of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1178, "end_char": 1197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50,000 / • the Conservator of Forests forwarded ili> papers reprding the auction sale to the Deputy Sl:cfetary to the Government of Bihar, Forest Department for confirmation of the acceptan<\" by the Govctnment."}}, {"text": "October 26, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1566, "end_char": 1582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "95,000/- by his communication dated October 26, 1970."}}, {"text": "Sovembe< 3, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1635, "end_char": 1651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant thereafter filed an application.. on Sovembe< 3, 1970 praying for settlement of the <ioup on 111> b3sis of the highest bid."}}, {"text": "November\n\n28, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1990, "end_char": 2008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the Consorvator of F<W.sts, Hazaribagh Circle on November\n\n28, 1970 with copy of the same to the Conservator of Forest, Bihar <:<>'nliniling the auction sale '3t 'the reserve price of Rs."}}, {"text": "Art. 166( 3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3220, "end_char": 3232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 27, I 970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4015, "end_char": 4033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pro=ding of the Minister dated November 27, I 970 would show that he did not confirm acceptance of the offer by the Divisional Forest Officer."}}, {"text": "November 28, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4832, "end_char": 4849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The telegram sent to the Conservator of Forest, Hazaribagh by the Government on November 28, 1970 could not be considered as a communication of the acceptance of that offer to the appellant."}}, {"text": "26, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5428, "end_char": 5436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apari from that the appellant himself revoked the offer ma<h by him on OctOber 26, 1970 by his letter dated November 3, 1970 in which he stated that the coup may be settled upon him at the highest bid made by him in ."}}, {"text": "November 3, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5457, "end_char": 5473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apari from that the appellant himself revoked the offer ma<h by him on OctOber 26, 1970 by his letter dated November 3, 1970 in which he stated that the coup may be settled upon him at the highest bid made by him in ."}}, {"text": "j)ecember 13, H 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6804, "end_char": 6824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "637C]\n\n(iii) It was clear from records relating to the proceedings for the grant of the lease in favour of the 6th respondent thst the Finance Department was not consulted befo0> the Minister passed the order on j)ecember 13, H 1970 to grant lease.\""}}, {"text": "1952] 2 S.C.R. 612", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7909, "end_char": 7927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L. M. Singhvi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8125, "end_char": 8138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi, S. C. Dingra and U. P. Singh, fortlie appellant."}}, {"text": "S. C. Dingra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8140, "end_char": 8152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi, S. C. Dingra and U. P. Singh, fortlie appellant."}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8157, "end_char": 8168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi, S. C. Dingra and U. P. Singh, fortlie appellant.", "canonical_name": "U. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8192, "end_char": 8203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O S. V. Gupte and B. P. Singh, for r11spondents Nos."}}, {"text": "B. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8208, "end_char": 8219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O S. V. Gupte and B. P. Singh, for r11spondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "U. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "S. N. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8252, "end_char": 8264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Prasad and D. N. Mishra, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mishra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8269, "end_char": 8281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Prasad and D. N. Mishra, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8352, "end_char": 8358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 ..\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMathew, J. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Patna praying for quashing an order passed by the Minister or-Forest, Government of Bihar, on December 13, 1970, and for issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the ."}}, {"text": "November 27, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8691, "end_char": 8708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "respondents 1 to 5 to give effect to the previous order of the Minister of Forest dated November 27, 1970."}}, {"text": "Chatra North Division", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8914, "end_char": 8935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a bamboo coup know as \"Bantha Bamboo coup\" in Chatra North Division of Hazaribagh district."}}, {"text": "Hazaribagh district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8939, "end_char": 8958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a bamboo coup know as \"Bantha Bamboo coup\" in Chatra North Division of Hazaribagh district."}}, {"text": "July 22, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8964, "end_char": 8977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 22, 1970, the Forest Department of the Government of B, ihar adv~ tised for settlement of the right to exploit the coup by."}}, {"text": "Forest Department of the Government of B", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8983, "end_char": 9023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 22, 1970, the Forest Department of the Government of B, ihar adv~ tised for settlement of the right to exploit the coup by."}}, {"text": "October 30,\n\n1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10290, "end_char": 10307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "October 30,\n\n1970, submitted his explanation for the provisional settlement at\n\nn amount below the reserve price."}}, {"text": "Md. Y akub", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11320, "end_char": 11330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Md. Y akub, Respondent No."}}, {"text": "December 4,\n\n1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11370, "end_char": 11387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6, filed a petition on December 4,\n\n1970, before the Government of Bihar, Respondent No."}}, {"text": "December 5, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11556, "end_char": 11572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A telegram was sent by the Government on December 5, 1970; to the Divisional Forest Officer, directing him not to take any action on the basis of the telegram dated November 28, 1970, sent to him in pursuance of the proceedings of the Government dated November 27, 1970."}}, {"text": "December 10, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11849, "end_char": 11866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That telegram was received by the Divisional Forest Officer on December 10, 1970, and the Divisional Forest Officer, by his letter dated December 10,\n\n1970, informed the Government that the previous telelgram dated Nove!J1ber 28, 1970, was not received by him and so it content was\n\nnot communicated to the appellant."}}, {"text": "December 10,\n\n1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11923, "end_char": 11941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That telegram was received by the Divisional Forest Officer on December 10, 1970, and the Divisional Forest Officer, by his letter dated December 10,\n\n1970, informed the Government that the previous telelgram dated Nove!J1ber 28, 1970, was not received by him and so it content was\n\nnot communicated to the appellant."}}, {"text": "Nove!J1ber 28, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12001, "end_char": 12020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That telegram was received by the Divisional Forest Officer on December 10, 1970, and the Divisional Forest Officer, by his letter dated December 10,\n\n1970, informed the Government that the previous telelgram dated Nove!J1ber 28, 1970, was not received by him and so it content was\n\nnot communicated to the appellant."}}, {"text": "December 21, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12401, "end_char": 12418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government thereafter sent.telegrams on December 21, 1970, to the Conservator of Forests aitd the Diviional Forest Officer, informing them that the coup had been settled with Respondent No."}}, {"text": "December 13, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13291, "end_char": 13308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HARIDWAR SINGH v. BAGUN SUMBRUI (Mathew, J.) 633\n\nThe contention of the appellant in the writ petition was that there was a concluded contract when the bid of the appellant was accepted by the Divisional Forest Officer though that was subject to confirmation by the Government and that, when the Government confirmed the acceptance by its proceedings dated November 27, 1970, it was no longer within the power of Government to make the settlement of the coup upon the 6th Respondent by its proceedings dated December 13, 1970."}}, {"text": "Leach", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15720, "end_char": 15725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision was considered in Somasudaram Pillai v.\n\nProvincial Government of Madras(') where Chief Justice Leach, speaking for the Court said that, to have an enforceable contract, there must be an offer and an unconditional acceptance and that a person who makes an offer has the right to withdraw it before acceptance, in the absence of a condition to the contrary supported by consideration."}}, {"text": "Williston", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16361, "end_char": 16370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question whether by an acceptance which is conditional upon the occurrence of a future event a contract .will become concluded was considered by Williston and this is what he says:(')\n\n\"A nice distinction may be taken here between ( 1 )' a so-called acceptance by which the acceptor agrees to become immediately bound on a condition not named in the offer, and (2) an acceptance which adopts unequivocally the terms of the offer but states that it will not be effective until a certain contingency happens or fails to happen."}}, {"text": "November 27 .• 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17899, "end_char": 17918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proceedings of the Minister dated November 27 .• 1970, would show that he did not confirm the acceptance of the\n\n(!)"}}, {"text": "Section 77A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18055, "end_char": 18066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "HARIDWAII. SINGH V, BAGUN SUMBRUI (Mathew, J.) 635", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18092, "end_char": 18142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. ~\n\nHARIDWAII."}}, {"text": "Article 166(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20037, "end_char": 20051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of the Accountant General, Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20960, "end_char": 21003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of the letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of the Accountant General, Bihar, dated November 22, 1967 would show that some relaxation of Rule JO ( l) of the rules of executive business was made by the Finance Department relating to lease of forest Coups or forest produce of the value of more than'Rs."}}, {"text": "November 22, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21011, "end_char": 21028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of the letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of the Accountant General, Bihar, dated November 22, 1967 would show that some relaxation of Rule JO ( l) of the rules of executive business was made by the Finance Department relating to lease of forest Coups or forest produce of the value of more than'Rs."}}, {"text": "HARIDWAR SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22714, "end_char": 22728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, therefore, held that there was no bar, statutory or otherwise, to the settlement of the coup in favour of Respondent\n\nHARIDWAR SINGH V, DAGUN SUMBRUI (Mathew, J.) 637\n\nNo.", "canonical_name": "HARIDWAR SINGH"}}, {"text": "DAGUN SUMBRUI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22732, "end_char": 22745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, therefore, held that there was no bar, statutory or otherwise, to the settlement of the coup in favour of Respondent\n\nHARIDWAR SINGH V, DAGUN SUMBRUI (Mathew, J.) 637\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "Earl T. Crawford", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25582, "end_char": 25598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prohibitive or negative words can rarely be directory and are indicative of the intent that the provision is to be mandatory (see Earl T. Crawford."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27435, "end_char": 27440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rnment of Bihar on December 13, 1970."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_639_659_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "MAHABIR MANDAL AND OTHERS\n\nSTATE.OF BIHAR\n\nMarch 1, 1972\n\n[J.M. SHELAT, H. R. KHANNA AND G. K. MITTER', JJ.]\n\nPenni Code-Murder-Death hy poisoning-Tests.\n\nThe fi'i:H apoellant c1nd another were conviced under s. 302 read 11ith ss. 34. 1208 and 201 of the Penal aide and two other accused who\n\nwcte tried along with them were convicted under ss. 120B and 201. On 1hc materials on record, the trial. Court and the High Coun found that the first appellant was responsible for the death of the deceased by poisoning. ·\n\nThe doctor who performed thr~ post mortem examination on the dead body gave videnc.e that the death of the deceased might have been a normal death. He ruled out an asphyxia! death by morphine poisoning, hccause, according to hin1. there was no indication of any of the followinl? characteristics which are to be found in C\"Jses of such a death: \"(a)\n\nRight lung is full of blood and left is empty (b) Lividity of faces nd fingers and nails (c) Congestion of the brain (d) Froth or blood froth in the trachea (c) Puncti form ecchymosis in the Jungs with congestion\n\nl 1f lungs,..\n\nHe v.•as declafcd hostile and anotmr doctor examined by the rrosecution also stated that he c:ould not form any opiniOn about the cause of death except tha~ death had resulted due to respiratory failure.\n\nConfirming the conviction of the R'rst appellant for murder arid allowing the appeals in part,\n\nHELD : (_i) The circumstances of the case and the evidence on record clt!arly point out that the first appellant was responsible for the death o'i\n\n1 he deC•!ascd and the death was caused by poisoning. When there is no eye witness of the occurrence, the court should not insist upJn evidence\n\nr1:garding the exact manner i!l which the death was caused.\n\nPoison can he. administered not only orally b.ut also hypoderm'ically or intervacula1rlv\n\n'' ith the h<lp of a syringe.\n\nIn the present case, the conduct of the first ,1µpellan1 in 1•omoving the <ld body immediately after the death of tho deceased and the same remaining submerged in water for more than 2.4 hours pr.:!vented promt post mortem examination on the dead body. On tbc n1aterial, it can be said that there v.1erc some features Jikc the congestion ,, f both the lungs, the kidney. the liver and the spleen of the victim,\n\n\\hich. according to the doctor. Y.'Crc indicative of death by respiratdry\n\nfa.ilur-~ <ind the same cbul<l Ix! caused hy poisoning. The fact that the hi.fart of the deceased nt the time of post mortem cx:lminaticn \\\\'as founJ •o be empty \\\\IOuld not rule out asphyxia! death as ':l. result of poisoning.\n\nJn many casc!i of -asphyxia! death both the sides of the heart are found \\(l be full if examined soon after death but after rigor mortis has set in .. 1hc bean is found contracted and mpty. The fact that no poison could he detected in the viscera of the deceased would not n1ilitatc against the conclusion that the death of the deceased was due to poisoning.\n\nThere .:ire several poisons •Nhich do not leave any characteristic signs as can\n\nh~ seen on post mortem cxan1ination, r653A~Dl~\n\nTaylor's Principles and Pracfice of Mt!dical jun'sprudenc:e, T., J.'e/frh A Edit; on, p. 199; Moc/i's Medical Jurisprudence ancl .Toxicology Seenteeflth Edition pp, 125, 447; Legal Medit:i11e, Pathology and To.<icoloRy, l>.1• Gonzales, referred to.\n\n(ii) If circumstantial cvjdencc in the absence of direct proof is so decisive that the Court can unhesitatingly hold that the death was as a result of administration of posion (though not detected) and that the posion must II have been administered by the accused person, then conviction can lY.:: rested on it. Therett.Jre there are no cogent grounds to interfere with the findings of the two courts that the death. of the deceased was not natural but homicidal.\n\n(ill) No case has been proved against two of the appellants and th<ir .conviction has to be set aside.\n\nThe rule in section 162 of the Code o[ c Criminal Procedur~ is not applicable to statements falling within the provisions of clause ( i) of section 3:! of the Evidence Act or to affect the provisions of section 27 of that Act.\n\nBut there is nothing in the present cai; e to show that statements made by the two appellants to the police, on whicJi the p.roscution tilicd, resulted in the discovery of any incriminating material as may make them admissible under section 27 of the Evidence Act.\n\nAs such the aforesaid st':ltements must be excluded from consiOOration.\n\nAnant Chintaman Lagu v. The Srate of BomQay, fl960l 2 S.C:R, 460 and State of M.P. v. Rc.mkrishna Ganapaiia Limsey 4' Ors., A.LR. 1954 S.C. 2, referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Cr. A. No. 97 of 1969.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 31st January, 1969 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 254 of 1966. ,\n\nA. S. R. Chari and D. Goburdhun, for the appellants.\n\nR. C. Prasad, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J. Mahabir .Mandal (58), Dasrath Mandal (241.\n\nKasim Ansari (30), Mahadeo Sah (60) and Kedar Nath Upadhya\n\n(28) were tried in the court of Additional Sessions Judge Monghyr.\n\nThe learned Additional Sessions Judge acquitted Kedar Nath Upadhya. Mahabir and Dasrath were .convicted under section 302 read with section 34, I 20B and 201 Indian Penal .Code. For the offence under section 302 read with section 34 Indian Penal Code. each of those two accused was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. while for the offence under section 201 Indian Penal Code. each of them was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of four years. No separute sentence was awarded for the olTencc under section 1208 Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe sentences\n\na warded to each of the two accused were ordered to run concur rently. Mahadeo and Kasim were convicted under sections 120B and 201 Indian Penal Code. For the offence under section 201 Indian Penal Code, each of these . two accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years. No separate sentence was awarded for tlie offence under section 120R Indian Penal Code to Mahadeo and Kasini. The appeal filed by Mallabir, Dasrath, Kasim and Mahadeo was dismissed by the Patna High Court.\n\nThe four convicted accused have now come up in appeal to this Court by special leave.\n\nMahabir accused, who was practising as a homeopathic doctor at Jamalpur in district Monghyr, is the father of Dasrath accused.\n\nDasraih was_studying in the final year in Medical College, Dharbhanga at the time of occurrence an<i was having house surgeon's training in that college at the time of the trial. .Kasim is stated to be the compounder of Mahabir accused, while Mahadeo accused was employed by Mahabir as a servant to look after Mahabir's field.\n\nIndim Devi deceased (18) was the wife of Dasrath accused and daughter of Baijnath Manda! (PW 2) of Surajgarh ai a distance of\n\n30 miles from Jamalpur. Indira was aged about 13 years at the time of. her marriage and continued to stay after the marriage at her father's ho.use forabout five years. The reasoris for the delay in the performance , of Muragawan (second marriagp) ceremony. after which a girl goes to her husband's house, acoording to the prosecution_ case, was that Mahabir accused demanded about Rs. 2;500 as Dan Dahej from Bai_inath PW.\n\nThe amount was. however, not paid by Baijnath. Letter dated March 29, 1962 wus then received by Baijnath from Dasrath accused wherein Dasrath reminded Bai_inath of his promise to pay Rs. 2,500 to Dasrath so that Dasrath might obtain admission in Calcutta National Medical College for the purpose of his further education.\n\nMuragawan cremony of Indira was performed in April 1962 and Indira went to the house of her hu_sband and his father in Jamalpur. A few months after that, in the month of Bhadon: 1962, Baijnath tooJ..\n\nIndira to his ho11se after reoeipt of a letter for that puriiose from Dasrath accused. . A few weeks thereafter Indira was taken bv Mahabir accused to his house.\n\nAfter Indira had stayed at the house of her father-in-law for some time, Mahabir accused levelled allegations against Indira that she was having illicit intimacy with His second son Rajendra. , Mahabir also sent a letter to Baijnath to take Indira to his house in Surajgarh. Indira was accordinglV taken in the month of December 1962 to Baijnath's house. Mahabfr after that expressed his reluctance to take back Indira to his house.\n\nIn May 1963 the Tilak ceremony of.Mahabir's d<iughter as well as the marriage of Mahabir's youngest son Mahendra were to be performed.\n\nIndira was not invited for these occasions from her father's house. Baijnath then took Indira and left her at the house\n\noQf Mahabir. Mahabir and Dasrath accused did not like this act of \".Baijnalh. in bringing Indira and leavin!I her at their house. q.i June?, '1963 Mahabir wrote a letter to Baijnath wherein e\n\ncomplained that some people had set fire to t:he house of Mahabir qn the occasion of the marriage at the instance of Baijnath.\n\nThe case of the prosecution further is that in August 1963 Mahabir accused went to Calcutta and met Bhai Lal Manda! (PW 18), who is a cousin and partner in hotel business of Baijnath PW . . and asked Bhai Lal to request Baijnath to take his daughter Indira from Mahabir's house, becau~ Indira was having illicit intimacy with her.husband's you!lger brother who was an engineering student.\n\nMahabir also told Bhai Lal that if Baijnath would not take Indira, he (Mahabir) would give some fatal in.iection to Indira. Blfai Lal thereupon sent letter dated August 8, 1963 to Baijnath in an in- sured cover. Referring to the talk with Mahabir, Bhalla! stated in that letter : ' ''In the end, Doctor Babu told us that now he would take his action vry soon.\n\nShe was the cobra of his house. He has such an injection in his possession that nothing will be known and she will remain sleeping. At present I give her one injection at an interval of a day or two for the pain in her abdomen and the girl a!SQ says \"Babuji please give me injection in at an interval of a day or two. The pain of my abdomen remains subsided with the injection.\" On the same pretext he will give her that injection also that she will not even know abouti it and will depart from my house for ever. He was saying that he would take that action within a month.\"\n\n Indira died in the house of Mahabir accused in Mohalla Naya- 11; aon in Jamalimr on the night of September 17, 1963. Mahadco accused earlier on that evening had been fold by Mahabir accused to sleep at the latter's house for the night. At about 1.30 a.m. or 2 a.m: on that night, . Mahabir accused, who is known as Doctor Sahib, awakened Mahadeo as well as Kasirn and Gobind, another servant of Mahabir.\n\nMahadeo then brought a taxi driven by Kedar Nath Upadhya accused. Mahadeo went with Mahabir accused inside the house and saw the dead body of Indira lying on a cot. No one else was present in the house. The mouth of Indira was . open and there were no apparent injuries on her person.\n\nMahabir and Mahadeo accused then picked up the dead body and brought it outside the house.\n\nGobind was also asked to assist in the carrying of the dead body. The dea4 body was then placed in the taxi: on the back seat. Gobind and Mahadeo sat below the seat by the side of the dead body, while Mahabir' and KasiJn accused sat oli the front seat along with the driver. A cement bag with bricks was placed in the boot of the taxi. The dead body was\n\nA then taken to Kamarganj, Ghat on the bank of Ganges at a distance of 21 miles from J amalpur. A'.t the Ghat the bag filled with bricks was tied round the waist of Indira's dead body. Mahadeo and Gobind took the dead body into the water of the Ganges and\n\nthrew it there in chest-deep water. Mahabir and others then went\n\nB back to J amalpur and reached there at 5 a.m.\n\nMahabir and Dasrath accused, according to the prosecution case, were seen by Shiban Mandal'(PW 8) and Mushahru (PW 15) at or about their house in Nayagaon on the morning of September 18, 1963.\n\nHead Constable. Suleman Khan (PW 6) was during tlhe days C of the occurrence posted at police post Nayagaon. On the morning\n\nofSeptember 18, 1963 when he wen~ to the tea stall for taking tea.\n\nlie heard from some rsons about the death of Indira and the removal of her dead body at night. The Head Constable gave this information at 11 am. to Sul>, lnspector Kishori Lal (PW 21) at Jamalpur police station. The Sub Inspector made an entry abo•Jt D the information in the station diary.\n\nSub Inspector Kishori Lal then went to the house of Mahabir and found the door closed. There was no response to the knocking at the door. .Kasim and Mahadeo accused were, then sent for and were interrogated.\n\nIn the meanwhile, on the morning of Septembjll\" 18, 1963, it is stated, Baijn!lth PW sent his younger brother Jagdish (PW 9 l to Monghyr to make some purchases. Baijnath also asked Jagdish to go to Nayagaon and meet Indira. fagdish reached Nayagaon at about 8 .a.m. In Nayagaon Jagdish came to know from his relative Sita Devi that Indira. had died during the previous night and her F dead body had been removed. Jagdish then hired a taxi, went to Surajgarh and informed Baijnath about the death of Indira and the removal of her dead body. Baijnath and Jagdish then came in that taxi to Jamalpur. Baijnath on arrival at Jamalpur lodged report Ex. 18 at police station Jamalpur at 2 p.m.\n\nSub Inspector Kishori Lal, it is further alleged, went again to.\n\nG the house of Mahabir accused at about 3.30 p.m. on September 18, 1963. Mahabir and Dasrath accused were not found Ui spite of search. Outside the dispensary of Mahabir, the Sub Inspector found lying on a table two empty ampules of coramine, one empty phial of homeooathic medicine on which words \"Mere sd.\" were written and two empty ampules with words \"distilled water fo1 H injection\"' written on them.\n\nThose articles were seized by the Sub Inspector. Mahadeo and Kasim accused were put under arrest.\n\nAfter the interrogation of Mahadeo accused, on September 18, 1963 ASI Birbhadra Singh went with Mahadeo accused to a place\n\ncalled Chandi As than on the bank of river Ganges and spread a net in the river, but the dead body of Indira was not found there.\n\nThe police party then returned tp the police station. There was further interrogation of Mahadeo and asim accused. Early 011 the morning of September 19, 1963 at about 5 a.m. ASI Birbhadra Singh accompanied by Mahadeo and Kasim accused went to Kamar- !!anj Ghat. A place was then pointed by Mahadeo accused. From ihai place Mahadeo acused brought out of tihe water the dead body of Indira. A bag full of bricks was found tied to the waist of the dead body. ASI Birbhadra Singh then prepared the inquest report and took into possession , thebagfilled with bricks.\n\nPost mortem exan1_ination on the dead body of Indira was performed by Dr. Hari hanker Prasad (PW 21) on September 19.\n\nJ 963 at 4.30 a.m. at. Sadar Hosp.ital Monghyr. The doctor found greenish discolouration over fuce and abdomen and an abrasion 2! x l\" on left cheek.\n\nAccording to the doctor, Indira had died within 36 to 48 hours before the post mortem examination. There\n\nwrt~ no mark of ligature or wound on !he neck.\n\nThe. skull. and \\t'rtebrae were found t<l be normal. Right lung and left lung were found congested.\n\nHeart wa> nonnal and empty.\n\nLiver,' spleen :md kidney were \"normally congested'\".\n\nHladder was normal and\n\nmpty. Viscera were preserved and sent to the Chemical Examiner.\n\nAccording to the report of the Chemical Examiner. nei poison :ould be detected in the viscera of Indira.\n\nConfessional statement of Mahadeo accused was got recorded from Shri B. M. Rastogi magistrate on September 21, 1963. Ac- ; ording to that statement, Mahadeo along with Mahabir and Kasim accused as well as Gobind had taken the dead body of Indira from\n\nYlahabir's house to thebank of Ganges and thrown it in the river water after tying the bag full of bricks to the dead body.\n\nMahabir, Dasrath and Kedar Nath accused absconded after this occurrence.\n\nMahabir and Dasrath accused surrendered in .:oun on September 30, 1969. Kedar accused too was arrested .\n\n.\\ttempt was also made to arrest: Gobind but he was found to be \"hsconding.\n\nIt is also aUeged by the prosecution that Dasrath accused who was in the Darbhanga Medical College h.!istel was found absent from the hostel during, the days fronJ Septmber 14 to September i9, 1963.\n\nMahabir accused at the trial gave the following version of tlte oc-:urrence :\n\n\"On 17-9-63 at 8 p.m,. she (Indira) died. About H months before it, she was seriously suffering from stomach trouble and. there was no hope for her life.\n\nBaijnath lived at _my house for four days and attended her. Letter (Ex\\. B/1) is proof thereof. Four days before her death, she suffered from ordinary Influenza and she was under my treatment. On 17-9-63 in the morning there was remission of her fever.\n\nOn that date at about 7.45 p.m. I came back to my house, and asked Indira's conditon. My wife told me that she was quite well for the whole day and that she was not feeling well for the last 5 to 7 minutes. Thereafter I went inside. On enquiry Indira to!<! that she was not feeling well. Then I began to feel her pulse. All of a suddn she had convulsion and she died within 4 seconds. I could not understand as to what was the cause of her death. I am myself a doctor; There was no necessity of beating drums (spreading news) as to her illness.\"\n\nAccording further to the statement of Mahabir, he informed the relatives about the death of Indira. They took the dead body of Indira at 10 o'clock in the night and after disposing of the dead body returned to the house at 12 mid-night or I a.m. Jitan Manda!, Thakur Manda! and Mahadeo went with Mahabir when the dead body was p11t in .the riyer. Mahabir further stated :\n\n;•I do not .know Gobind. . After disposal of the dead body, we came back to our house between 12 O'clock\n\nand 1 O'clock in the night, Mahadeo put the bag full of bricks on the taxi. It is our custom either to burn or drown the dead body, but specially younz girls are cent per cent drowned _because while burning, tlie clothes are burnt and the dead body ecomes naked. Hence after putting fire in the mouth of the dead body of a young girl the same ii erally drowned. For drowning the dead body some heavy burden is tied, so that the dead body might not float, and nobody might see it and dog or jackal might not eat.\" ·\n\nMahabir denied having met Bhai Lal ln Calcutta and having told him that he (Mahabir) would give a fatal injection to Indira. The other allegations of the prosecution were a!so denied by Mahabir.\n\nG He, however, admitted having written the letters produced by the prosecution.\n\nDasrath accused in his statement under section 342 of the Code of Crimina! Procedure stated that he was at Darbhanga during the. days of the present occurrence and was staying at the house of a close relative, Shri Ra!ll Lakhan Bhagat Advocate, because the eldest son of Shri Bhagat was suffering from typhoid and there was no other male member to attend upon him. The plea of Kasim accused was denial simpliciter. l 3-L1031 Sup.CTI''\n\nMahadeo accused in the course or his statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stated that Indira died at about 8 p.m. and later on that night, Mahadeo was awakened by Mahabir accused. Mahadeo added :\n\n. '\"At 8 O'clock in the night after the death of Indira, Dr. Saheb told that Thakur should prepare CHACHRI and that he was going to bring KAFAN. Ladies were weeping inside the house.\n\nOobind was not there. It was rainy season. At the instance of Dr. Saheb, Thakur and myself kept bricks in a gunny bag. Dr. Saheb wen~ .to ask 10 or 15 persons to go with. the dead body.\n\nWhen he came after saying to them, it began to rain.\n\nAt the instance of other persons, Dr. Saheb went to bring two taxis but only one taxi could be available.\n\nFor want of accommodation in the taxi, I, Dr. Saheb, Thakur and Jitan took the dead body on the taxi and remaining persons could not go.\"\n\nMahadeo admitted having thrown the dead body in the river.\n\nWritten statement was also filed on behalf of Mahabir.\n\nThe trial Cour\\ came to the conclusion that the possibility of the death of Indira due. to morphine injection could not be ruled out.\n\nIt was held that Mahabir and Dasrat'h accused had con spired to kill Indira by administering poison, or at any rate, Dasrath accused had connived at the' murder of Indira byMahabir accused.\n\nBoth of them were further held to have conspired to dispose of the dead body secretly with a view to screen themselves from legal punishment. Mahabir and Dasrath accused were ac. cordingly convicted and sentenced as above. Kedar accused was given the benefit of doubt and was acquitted. As regards Mahadeo and Kasim accused, it was held that though they had .joined in the disposal of the dead body, they were not partie5 to the conspiracy to murder Indira.\n\nThese two accused were, however, found to have conspired to dispose of Indira's dead body with a view to screen .Mahabir and Da.srath accused from legal punishment of murder. Mahadeo and asim accused were accordingly convicted for offences under sections 120B and 201 Indian Penal Code.\n\nOn appeal the High Court found that the following facts had been proved :\n\n\"(I) Appellant Dasrath was not keen to have the DURAGAMAN ceremony performed even after more than four years of his marriage and was putting pressure on Indira's father to pay the promised sum of Rs. 2500/- to him although in fact there was no such promise from his father-in-law.\n\n.(2) Dasrath had in the meantime come in some sort df close intimacy with a girl medical student of Kanpur, named, Madhl!ri Chourasia and was on correspon.dence with her. ·\n\n(3) Deceased Indira was suspected by Dasrath and by his father and step-mother of illicit intimacy with Rajendra when she came in Aswin in 1962 to stay at Mahabir's place and they decided to abandon. her at her father'$-!place neV'er to be called back again.\n\n(4) On the asking of Dasr.ath and Mahabir the father of Indira brought her back to his place in December, 1962.\n\n(5) Indira was not asked to join her husband's family on the occasion of the il'ILAK of Mahabir's daughter and third son Mahendra \\in May, 1963.\n\n(6) Baijnath went uninvited with Indira to Nayagaon on that occasion :, md he was insulted by Mahalfir and Dasrath; but still Baijnath left Indira there and returned alone to Surajgarh.\n\n(7) Mahabir immediately wrote a post card (Ext. l /3) expressing his acute bitterness, disgust and hatred for Baijnath .al!d his daughter.\n\n( 8) On 7th August, 1963 Mahabir in Calcutta had talks with Bhailal an uncle of Indira and Mahabir conyeyed to him his idea of injecting Indira to deal\\! within a month if she was not removed by her father from his place.\n\n(9) Dirty allegations were rnade against he.r character and she was described by Mahabir before Bhailal as cobra.\n\n( 10) Bhailal immediately conveyed to Bai.inath the gist of the conversation he had with Mahabir by letter Ext. 1/4 by dated 8-8-1963.\n\n( 11) Mahabir on his own admission before Bhailal was already giving injections to Indira to relieve her of some stomach pain.\n\n(12) Su, dden]y Indira died on the night of 17-9-1963.\n\n(13) No relation or neighbour at Nayagaon came to know of her death on that evening.\n\n(14) The father of the deceased p:irl was not informed about the death although Sura.jgarh was not very far\n\nand there was undqe hot haste in disposing of the body on the very night of her death.\n\n(15) The dead body was stealthily carried away by Mahabir and his three servants including Qasim Ansari on a taxi at dead of night and was sunk unceremoniously in Kamarganj Ghat 21 miles away although the nearer burning ghat or bank of the Ganges was at Lal Darwaza or Chandi As than at Monghyr, only fiveto six miles away from Jamalpur. ( 16) The body was not cremated according to custom.\n\n(17) Rumour about surreptitious disposal of the dead body was reported at Jamalpur Police Station and enquity was at once started by the thana officer on the morning of 18-9-1963 and Mahadeo' and Quasim Ansari made discrepant statements about the death and disposal of the dead body on interrogation. ( 18) Mahabir and also Dasrath (who was seen at .T amalpur on the morning of 18-9-1963) absconded and remained traceless till 30-9-1963.\n\n(19) Mahadeo misled the police in searching out the dead body in the evening at Chandi Asthan on 18-9-1963 and later on a su_bsequent .clue furnished by him the police party came to Kamarganj Ghat and recovered the dead body from the river bed.\n\n(20) Upon post mortem examination heart was found empty and norma_l and it excluded the possibility of natural death due to syncope or vagal inhibition.\n\n(21) Dasrath was absent from his hostel at Darbhanga from 14-9-1963 and again from 23-9-1963 till 30-9-1963 when he and his father Mahabir surrendered in court.\n\n(22) The plea of alibi of Dasrath remained unsubstantiated.\"\n\nIn the result, the conviction of the accused-appellants was upheld G and their appeal was dismissed.\n\nJn appeal in this Court Mr. Chari on behalf of the appellants has argued that the material on record does not establish that Mahabir accused caused the death of Indira deceased.\n\nIn any case, according to the learned counsel, it has not been proved that H the death of Indira was homicidal and not natural.\n\nSo far as Dasrath accused is concerned, the submi., sion made is that there is no cogent evidence on the record to show that he was present at\n\nhis house in J amalpur on the night of occurrence.\n\nAs regards Kasim accused, the counsel contends that he is not proved fo have taken part in the removal of the dead body of Indira from the house of Mahabir. In respect of Mahadeo, the argument is that he did not know that Indira had been murdered. The above contentions have been controverted. by Mr. Prasad on behalf of the respondent State.\n\nWe have heard the arguments at length and shall now proceed to examine as to whether the prosecution has been able to establish the charge against the accused and if so,\n\nagainst which of them.\n\nWe may first take the case of Mahabir accused. It is the case of the prosecution that Mahabir had an aversion for Indira deceased and suspected her of illicit intimacy with his second son Rajendra.\n\nIndira was consequently sent to her father's house.\n\nThe above facts are proved by the evidence of Baijnath (P\\Y 2) . and are corroboral'cd by letter dated July 6, 1962 sent by Dasrath accused to Baijnath PW. The evidence of Baijnath PW further shows that after Indira had been brought to his house in December 1962, Baijnath made m; my efforts to send Indira to the house of Mahabir, but Mahabir declined t'o keep her in his house. , In May 1963 the1marriage of Mahandra and 'rilak ceremony Qf Mahabir's eldest daughter were to be performed. Mahabir did not send for Indira on the occasion of the above Tilak ceremony. Baijnath on coming to know of the Tilak ceremony personally took Indira with him to Mahabir's house.\n\nMahabir resented the act of--Baijnath in bringing Indira to hifo house on the above occasion and made no secret of his resentment.\n\nBaijnath all the same left Indira at Mahabir's house under the belief that the anger of Mahabir would subside. The fact that Mahabir became angry because of Indira having been brought to his house by l:lajjnath on the occasion of the above Tilak ceremony is admitted by Mahabir also in his statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nAfter the Tilak ceremony of Mahabir's daughter, Indira continued to stay at the house of Mahabir. Mahabir, however, did not feel happy over this. Mahabir also suspected that some people had set fire t.o his house on the occasion of the marriage of his daughter at the instigation of Baijnath. On June 7, 1963 Mahabir - wrote a letter to Baij1Jath in the course of which Mahabir stated:\n\n\"So for your daughter is living peacefully but you, who have kept your daughter (here) sccrcfly have don~ a great harm. You who have done this act in collusion with my enemies and you have thought that it would be for your good. Those whom you think that they will help you against Mahabir Manda! are like the TAT! of the stalks of maize. You should know that there is man of brain on this side also to burn the action which you take.\n\nHence you1should come as soon as you receive the letter A and have a face to face talk~ Your daughter can live or go only after settlemept made in the talk.\n\nYou should not hesitlate in coming (here) I shall not quarrel. Whatever action will have to be taken, will be taken with brain. If you do not come, its result will be bad.\"\n\na The writing of the abo.ve letter has been admitted by Mahabir in his statement under sect.ion 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThe letter shows that Mahabir was not prepared to keep Indira at his house unless some amends were made by her father.\n\nThe evidence of Bhai Lal (PW 18), who is a cousiri of Baijnath C PW and runs hotel business, shows I.hat on August 7, 1963 Maha bir went to the witness in Calcutta and told the witness to request Baijnath to take his daughter from the house of Mahabir as Mahabir did not like to keep her in his house. Mahabir also added at that time that Baijnath's daughter was having iJlicit intimacy with the other son of Mahabir and this would create complication in the family when the sons of Mahabir came during vacation to the D house. Mahabir even went to the extent of describing the daughter of Baijnat; h as a cobra in the house. According further to Bhai Lal, Mahabir held out a threat while leaving that if Baijnath did not agree to take back his daughter, he would give some fatal in\n\njection to Indira. On the following day Bhai Lal sent a letter nanating the above facts ro Baijnath. As some money was also being sent along with tha't letter by Bhai Lal to Baijnath, the letter E and the inoney were sent in an insured cover. The evidence of Bhai Lal in this respect is corroborated by that of Baijnath PW to whom the letter was sent.\n\nBaijath also referred to the above threat of Mahabir conveyed through Bhaila\\ in the first information report.\n\nBoth the trial court and the High Court accepted the prosecution evidence in this respect and nothing has been urged F in !his Court as may justify interference with the above appraisement of evidence ..\n\nIt is a oommori case of the prosecution and the defence that Indira died suddenly in Mahabir's house in his presence on the night between 5eptember 17 and September 18, 1963. The evi- G dence of Baijnath shows that no intimation about the death of Indira was sent to him. Mahabir accused Jailer on that night arranged a taxi and with the help of Mahadeo and others placed the dead body in the taxi. The dead body was thereafter taken in that taxi by Mahabir to Kamarganj Ghat at a distance of 21 miles from the house of Mahabir in Jamalpur. A bag full of bricks was also carried in the taxi. The dead body of Indira was then thrown H into chest-deep water Qf. the Gagges after the bag full of bricks had been tied to the waist. The above facts are also not disputed\n\nby Mahabir. According to him, they took the dead body at about 1 O p.m. and after the body was thrown into the Ganges they re turned at about mid-night or 1 a.m.\n\nAfter report had been lodged by Baijnath with the police on the following day, that: is, September 18, 1963 Mahabir accused was found to be absconding , and was not traed till he surrendered himself in court in September 30, 1963.\n\nThe dead body of Indira could not be recovered on Septe111ber 18, i 963 and was recovered only on the morning of September 19, 1963 after the particular spot at Kamarganj Ghat had been pointed by Mahadeo accused.\n\nPost mortem examination pn the dead body of Indira .deceased was performed by Dr. Bari Shanker Prasad. There was greenish discolouration over the face and abdomen and an ante morte11 abrasion 11 as found on the left cheek.\n\nEyes were protruding anci corneas were hazy. Decomposition had started, and according to the doctor, the time between the death and pos( mortem examination was 36 to 48 hours .. Both the lungs were found congested.\n\nHeart, according to the doctor, was normal and empty, while liver, spleen and kidney were \"normal congested ...\n\nThe above circumstances, in our opinion. clearly point to the conclusion that Mahabir accused was responsiblefor the death of Indira. lt is no. doubt true that there is no ocular evidence in this case regarding the commission of the crime but the chain of different circumstances are consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of Mahabir. Mahabir was no~ only inimically disposed to• wards Indira, he had also held out a threat that if she was not taken from his house he would administer an injection to her as a rcs:.:lt cf v.'~_\\C'h she v10:11d d:·:.\n\nTh::: ccr:dut o~ ~luhcbir ~[l.:r the death of Indira at a time when according him, he was feeling her pulse speaks volumes of his guilty conscience. Had Indira's death been natural and not the result of foul-play, there was no reason as to why Mahabir should not have immediately informed her father of her death.\n\nAccording to Mahabir, he sent a post card to lndiras father on the following day. No question on that score, however, was put to Indira's father Baijnath when he came into witness box.\n\nThe act of Mahabir in arranging for a taxi and taking the dead body of Indira at the dead hour of the night to Kamarganj Ghqt at a distance of 21 miles clearly indicates his de; i:c to surreptitiously remove the dead body and throw it at a place from which it would not be recovered. It is significant in this connection to observe that Monghyr is at a distance of only five or\n\nsix miles from Jamalpur while Lal Darwaza burning ghat is at a distance of nine miles from Jamalpur. Both Lal Darwaza burning ghat and Monghyr are on river bank. The fact that the dead body\n\nw~ ta!'en to .a much more distant place like Kamarganj Ghat\n\nA . which is 21 mtles away tends to show that Mahabir wanted that the place where th7 dead body was. t1!rown should not get known to others.\n\nThe ty1!1g of bag contammg bricks to the dead body\n\nbetays further anxiety to prevnt the floating and consequent detect10n of the dead body.\n\nAccording to the defence version, Dasrath accused. who is husband of Indira, was not present in Nayagaon and was away to Darbhanga at the time of the death of Indira. Dasrath even was itot sent for before the dead body was disposed of. The stealthy removal of the dead body of Indira at a late hour of the night and\n\nthe undue haste with which the body of Indira was thrown in the c river at a distance of 21 miles from Nayagaon is a gravely incriminating circumstance and no plausible explanation has been furnished by Mahaoir for this abnormal conduct.\n\nAs regards the contention that the death of Indira was natural and not homicidal, we have already mentioned above that both D her lungs were found to be congested.\n\nHeart was normal and empty.\n\nDr. Prasad (PW 21), who performed the post mortem examination on the dead body, was declared hostile on the request of the public prosecutor.. In answer to a further question, Dr.\n\nPrasad stated that the death of Indira might have been a normal death. Dr. Prasad ruled out an aphyxial death or death by morphine poisoning because, according to him, there was no indication E of any of the following characteristics which are to be fonnd in the case of such a death :\n\n\"(a) Right lung is full of blood and left is empty.\n\n(b) Lividity of faces, fingers and nails.\n\n(c) Congestion of the brain.\n\n(d) Froth or blood froth in the trachea.\n\n(e) Punctiform ecchymosis in the lungs with congestion of lungs.\"\n\nG The prosecution also examined Dr. Kamleshwar Singh. police surgeon (PW 24). According to this witness, he perused the post mortem report and the Chemical Examiner's report. The witness added : \"In my view I cannot form any opinion for the cause of death except that death had resulted due to respiratory failure.\n\nAsphyxia is the technical term for respiratory failure.. Poisoning may be one of the causes of respiratory failure\". Dr. Kamleshwar H Singh expressed his agreement with Dr. Prasad regarding the characteristics of asphyxia) death.\n\nThe trial court and the High Court in the light of the evidence on record, were of the opinion that the death of Indira by morphine poisoning could not be 1uled out. According to Taylor's Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, Vol. II, Twelfth Edition, page 199, poison can be administered not only orally but also hypodermical!y or intravascularly with the help of a syringe. As there was no eye witness of the occurrence, the court should not, in our opinion, insist upon evidence regarding the exact manner in which the death of Indira was caused. It has to be borne in mind in this context that Mahabir accused was responsible for the removal of the dead body immediately after the death of Indira' and the same remaind submerged in water for more than 24 hours. The above conduct of Mahabir accused prevented prompt' post mortem examination on the dead body of Indira. On the material it can be said that there were some features like the congestion of both the lungs, the kidney, the liver and the spleen of Indira whi9h, according to Dr. Kameshwar Singh, were inflicative of death by respiratory failure and the same could be caused by poisoning. The fact that the heart of the deceased at the time of post mortem\\examination was found to be empty would n.ot rule out asphyxia!:, death. as a result of poisoning.\n\nAccording to observations on page 125 of Modi's Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, Seventeenth Edition, in many cases of asphyxia! deaths both the sides of the heart! are found to be full if examined soon after death but after rigor mortis has set in. the heart is found contracted and empty. Reference has been made by Mr. Chari to reportj dated December 23, 1963 of the Chemical Examiner, according to whom no poison could be detected in the viscera of Indira deceased. This circumstance would not, in our opinion, militate against the conclusion that the death of the deceased was due ro poisoning. There are several poisons, particularly of the synthetic hypnotics and \\egetable alkaloids groups, which do not leave any characteristic signs as can be noticed on post mortem examination.\n\nWe may in this context refer to the following observations on page 4 77 of the above mentioned book by Modi :\n\n\"It is quite possible that a person may die from the effects of a poison, and yet none may be found in the body after death, if the whole of the poison has disappeared from the lungs by evaporation, or has been removed from the stomach and intestines by vomiting and purging, and after absorption has been detoxified, conjugated and eliminated from the system by the kidneys and other channels. Certain vegetable poisons may not be detected in the viscera, as they have no reliable tests, while some organic poisons, esQeeially the alkaloids and glucosides, may, by oxidation during life or by putrefaction aft.er death, be split up into other substances which have no\n\ncharacteristic reactions sufficient for their identification.\"\n\nSimilar view has been expressed by Lambert in his book \"The Medico-Legal Post-Mortem in India\". We may also in this context refer to the book \"Legal Medicine Pathology and Toxicology\" by . Conzales and others, Second Edition, wherein it is stated on\n\npage 847:\n\n\"The postmortem appearances in cases of morphine .poisoning are not particularly characteristic. There is a congestion of the viscera, cyanosis and abundant dark fluid blood. When crude opium is taken by mouth the stomach may contain fragments of poppy,. but nothing characteristic is found if morphine is ingested.\"\n\nThe circumstances of the present case taken in their entirety clearly point to the conclusion that the death of Indira was not natural but was due to foul-play. In a number of cases where the deceased\n\ndies as a result of poisoning, it is difficult to successfully isolate the poison and recognize it. Lack of positive evidence in this respect D would-not result in throwing out the entire prosecution case.if the other circumstances clearly point to the guilt of the accused. Reference in this context n:iay be made to the following obsei; vations of Hidayatullah J. (as he then was) who spoke for the majority in the case of Anant Chintaman Lagu v. The State'<Jf Bombay(') :\n\n\"A case of murder by adminisl'ration of poison is almost always one of secrecy. the poisoner seldom takes another into his confidence, and his preparations to the commission of the offence are also secret. He watches his opportunity and administers the poison in a manner calculated to avoid i!s detection. The greater his knowledge of poil; ons, the greater the secrecy, and consequently the greater the difficulty of proving the case against him.\n\nWhat assis~<; e a man of science can give he gives, but it is too much to say that the guilt of the accused must, in all cases, be demonstrated by the isolation of the poison, though in a case where there is nothing else such a course would be incumbent upon the prosecution. There are various factors which militate against a successful isolation of the poison and its recognition. The discovery of the poison can only take place either through a pmt .mortem examination of the internal organs or by chemical analysis.\n\nOftien enough, the diagnosis of a poison is aided by the information which may be furnished by relatives and friends as to the symptoms found on the victim, if the course of poison has taken long and others co 11960! 2 s.c.R.\n\nA have had an op_po, rtunity of watching its effect. Where, however, the poison is adminised in secrecy and the victim i~ rendered unconscious effectively, .there is nothing to show how1he deterioration in the condition of the victim took place and if'not poison but disease is suspected,\n\nB the diagnosis of poisoning may be rendered difficult.\"\n\nReliance in the above context was placed in the cited case on the books on , iuedjcal jurisprudence by different authors wherein it has been stated'that the pathologist's part in the diagnosis of poisoning is secondary and that several poisons particularly of the synthetics hypnotics and vegetable alkalodis groups do not leave any C characteristic signs which cart be noticed on post mortem examina~ tion.\n\nThe following dictum was laid down in the case :\n\n\"The cases of this Court which were decided, pr<>· ceeded upon their O'Yn facts, and though the three propositions must be J<ept in 111ind always, the sufficiency of the evidence, direct or circumstantial, to establish murder by poisoning will depend on the facts of each case.\n\nIf the evidenee in a particular case does not justify the inference that death is the result of poisoning because of. the failure of the prosecution to prove the fact satlifactorily, either directly or by circumtantial evidence,. then the benefit of the doubt will have to be given to the accused person. But if circumstantia.1 evidence, in the ab sence of direct proof of the three elements, is so decisive that th.e. Court can unhesitatingly hold that death was-a result of administration of poison (though not detected) ancf that the poison must have been administered by the accused person, then the conviction can be rested on it.\"\n\nF The case against Mahabir accused, in our opinion, is covered by the latter oart of the above observation.\n\nWe, therefore, find no cogent ground to interfere with the findings of the two courts that the death of the , deceased was not natural but homicidal!\n\nReference has been made by Mr. Chari to the case of State Government, Madhy, a Pradesh v. Ramkrishna Ganpatrao Limsey G and Ors. (1) wherein this Court dealt with an appeal against acquittal and 'observed that the exercise of extra-'Ordinary jurisdiction under Article 13 6 of the Constitution is not justifiable in criminal cases unless exceptional and special circumstances are shown to exist or that substantial and grave injustice has bee!\\ done. . The above observations are hardly of any assistance to the appellant H The other observation in that case relating to speculation in the absence of any material were made in the light of the facts of that\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 20.\n\ncase and as there is. no parallel between the facts of the two cases not much help can be derived from the cited case. '\n\nThe suggestion put (orth on behalf of the accused that Indira deceased might have died due . to vagal inhibiion as a result of menstural trouble or diarrhoea cannot be accepted .. Had the death of Indira been natural 'because of some sudden disease and not homicidal, Mahabir acc.used. would not have acted in the manner he did for the stealthy disposal of the dead body at night by throwing it in the river at a far off place without informing her father or even his own son about the death. The entire conduct Qf Mahabir is inexplicable on any rational ground and is consis• t,.nt only with his guilt.\n\nWe may now deal with the case of Dasrath accµsed. According to the prosecution case, Dasrath was present in his house in\n\nJamalpur . on the night of occurrence. pasrath, however, has denied this .allegation andhas stated that 'he W<IS away to Dath hanga during those days. There is no liable evidence t.o show tllat Dasrath was present in the house on the night in question.\n\nReliance has been pli!ced by the prosecution on the testimony of Shih.an Manda! (PW 8) and Mushahru Manda! (PW 15) who have deposed that they saw Dasrath reading a book near the -dispensary room of h_is house on the morning of September 18,\n\n1963. Both these witnesses are. related to each other.\n\nShiban did not make any statement to the police till September 22, 1963.\n\nThe fact that Shiban kept quiet for four days and made statement to the police after fou_r days would show that not much reliance can be placed upon hi~ testimony. Mushahru on his own testimony has been involved in litigation with Mahabir, father of Dasrath.\n\nMahabir also got the house of Mushahru attached in a suit iiled against him. As such, it is not safe to rely upon the testimony of Mushahru also.\n\nIt may be mentioned that, according to the -confessional statement of Mahadeo, which was recorded by Shri Rastogi magistrate on September 21, 1963 and upon which reliance was placed by the prosecution, no one was present in the house when Mahabir took Mahadeo inside the house to bring out the dead body of Indira for being placed in the taxi on the night of occurrence.\n\nThe confessional statement of Mahadeo thus rules out the presence of Oasrath accused at his house on tile fateful night.\n\nfhe fact that Dasrath was not marked present in his hostel from September 14 till September 19, 1963 would not necessarily show that he was prent in his house in J amalpur on the night of September 17, 1963. According to Dasrath, he was in those days staying with a relative Shri Ram Lakhan Bhagat Advocate as Shri Bhagat's son was having typhoid. The fact that Dasrath did not\n\n~ A adduce evidence in SU.Pport of his version would not lead to the conclusion that he was present at his house in J amalpur on the night of occurrence.\n\n, G\n\nReference has also been made to some letters between Dasrath and a girl named Madhuri in order to show their intimacy.\n\nThis_ circumstance would not warrant an inference of the guilt of Dasrath when the other evidence is not sµfficient to connect him with the crime.\n\nThe same remarks would apply to letter dated March 29, 1962 which Dasrath wrote to Baijnath in order to re mind him of his promise to pay Rs. 2,500 for futther education to Dasrath. It may be mentioned that a subseqm!nt letter dated July 6, 1962 of Dasrath _to Baijnath shows his attachnient towards his wife Indira deceased.\n\nComing to the case of Kasim, w•: find that there is no reliable evidence as may, show that Kasim was present at the house of Mahabir on the night of occurrence and took part in the disposal of the dead body of Indira. Reliance was placed by the prcu\n\ntion upon the statements alleged to have been made by Kilsim and Mahadeo accus_ed at the police station in the presence of Baijnath PW after Baijnath had lodged .report at the police station.\n\nSuch statements are le>!la!ly not admissible In evidence and cannot be used as substantive evidence. According to section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation shall be signd by the person making it or used for any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made: The only exception to the above rule is mentioned in the proviso to that section. According to the proviso, when any witness is called for the prosecution in the enquiry or trial, any part of his statement, if duly proved, may be 11sed by the accused and with the permission of the court by the prosi, cution,\n\nto contradict such witness in the manner provided by section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act and when any part of such :'.atement is so used, any part 'thereof may also be used in the re-examincion of such witness for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred. to in his cross-examination. The above rule is, however, not applicable to statements falling within the provisions of clause 1 of section 32 of theIndian Evidence Act or to affect the provisiens of section 27 of that Act. It is also well established that the bar of inadmissibility orates not ollly on statements of witnesses but also on those of the accused 1$ee Narayan Swami v. Emperor\n\n(')]. Lord Atkin, in that case, while dealiing with .section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure observed :\n\n\"Then follows .the Section in question wh)ch iS &awn in the same general way relating to \"any person.\" That\n\n(I) [1939] P.C. 47.\n\nthe words in their ordinary meaning would inclr.de any person though he may thereafter be accused seems plain.\n\nInvestigation into crime often includes the examination of a number of persons none of whom or all of whom may be suspectep at 'the time.\n\nThe first words of the Section prohibit; ing the stateme.nt if recorded from being signed must apply to all the statements made at the time and must therefore apply to a statement made by a person possibly not then even suspected but eventually accused.\"\n\nReference may also be made to section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, according to which no confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved against such person.\n\nThere is nothing in the present case to show that the statements which were made by Kasim and Mahadeo accused on September 18, 1963 at the police station in the presence of Baijnath resulted in the discovery of any incriminating material as may make them admissible under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. . As such, 'the aforesaid statements . must be excluded from consideration.\n\nWe, therefore, are of the opinion that no case has been proved .against Dasrath and 1Kasim accused.\n\nAs regards Mahadeo accused, we find that it is the case of .the prosecution and ihis fact is also admitted by Mahadeo accused\n\nin his statement under section 342 of , the Code of Criminal Procedure that he was one of those who carried the dead body of Indira from the house of Mahabir to the taxi and thereafter went with the dead body in the taxi to K amarganj Ghat.\n\nThe dead body also thrown in the Ganges by Mahadeo. Mahadeo further admits that he pointed out the dead body to the police aRd brought it , out of the Ganges.\n\nThe circumstances in which the death of Indira took P.lace and the surreptitious manner in which \"her dead body was removed at dead of night from Mahabir's house to Kamarganj Ghat go to show that Mal!adeo was not Unaware of ihe fact thit Indira's death was not naaural and had 'been brought abOut by M•bir. Mahadeo, in the circurostan-,\n\nwas rightly . convicfed for olfence llllder tion 201 Indian Penal . -Code for causing the ·~ of the dead body with a view to screen the murdiirer from legal ., punlshinent. ·\n\nAs both Dasrath, aQd.. Kiisiln .are being acquitted, the charge 1Jnder section 1208 ladilll PC11al Code against Mahabir for coli\n\nspir111Cy with Diisrath to murder and against Mahadeo tor conspiracy with Kasim for causing disappeannce of dead body .of Indira must fail.\n\nA The result is that appeal ot-Dasrath and Kasltu is allowed.\n\nTheir conviction is set aside and they are acquitted. The conviction of Mahabir and Mahadeo for offences under section l 20B Indian Penal Code is set aside.\n\nThe conviction of Mahabir for offences under sections 302 and 201 Indian Penal Code as well as the sentence on that score is maintained. Likewise, lhe convic- e ti on and sentence of Mahadeo for offence under section 201 Indian Penal Cod.p is maintained.\n\nThe appeal of Mahabir and Mahadeo to this extent is dismissed. s.c.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 221, "entities": [{"text": "MAHABIR MANDAL AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHABIR MANDAL AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE.OF BIHAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 1, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 56, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHABIR MANDAL AND OTHERS\n\nSTATE.OF BIHAR\n\nMarch 1, 1972\n\n[J.M. SHELAT, H. R. KHANNA AND G. K. MITTER', JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 209, "end_char": 215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 227, "end_char": 233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 120B and 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 341, "end_char": 357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Taylor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3077, "end_char": 3083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There .:ire several poisons •Nhich do not leave any characteristic signs as can\n\nh~ seen on post mortem cxan1ination, r653A~Dl~\n\nTaylor's Principles and Pracfice of Mt!dical jun'sprudenc:e, T., J.'e/frh A Edit; on, p. 199; Moc/i's Medical Jurisprudence ancl .Toxicology Seenteeflth Edition pp, 125, 447; Legal Medit:i11e, Pathology and To.<icoloRy, l>.1• Gonzales, referred to."}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3908, "end_char": 3919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4036, "end_char": 4045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4099, "end_char": 4109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4357, "end_char": 4367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. S. R. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4821, "end_char": 4835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari and D. Goburdhun, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "D. Goburdhun", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4840, "end_char": 4852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari and D. Goburdhun, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4875, "end_char": 4887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. C. Prasad, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4954, "end_char": 4960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J. Mahabir .Mandal (58), Dasrath Mandal (241."}}, {"text": "Dasrath Mandal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4987, "end_char": 5001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhanna, J. Mahabir .Mandal (58), Dasrath Mandal (241.", "canonical_name": "Dasrath Mandal"}}, {"text": "Kasim Ansari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5009, "end_char": 5021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kasim Ansari (30), Mahadeo Sah (60) and Kedar Nath Upadhya\n\n(28) were tried in the court of Additional Sessions Judge Monghyr.", "canonical_name": "Quasim Ansari"}}, {"text": "Mahadeo Sah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5028, "end_char": 5039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kasim Ansari (30), Mahadeo Sah (60) and Kedar Nath Upadhya\n\n(28) were tried in the court of Additional Sessions Judge Monghyr.", "canonical_name": "Mahadeo Sah"}}, {"text": "Kedar Nath Upadhya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5049, "end_char": 5067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kasim Ansari (30), Mahadeo Sah (60) and Kedar Nath Upadhya\n\n(28) were tried in the court of Additional Sessions Judge Monghyr.", "canonical_name": "Kedar Nath Upadhya"}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge Monghyr", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5101, "end_char": 5134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kasim Ansari (30), Mahadeo Sah (60) and Kedar Nath Upadhya\n\n(28) were tried in the court of Additional Sessions Judge Monghyr."}}, {"text": "Kedar Nath Upadhya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5185, "end_char": 5203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Additional Sessions Judge acquitted Kedar Nath Upadhya.", "canonical_name": "Kedar Nath Upadhya"}}, {"text": "Mahabir", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5205, "end_char": 5212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir and Dasrath were .convicted under section 302 read with section 34, I 20B and 201 Indian Penal .Code.", "canonical_name": "MAHABIR MANDAL AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Dasrath", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5217, "end_char": 5224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir and Dasrath were .convicted under section 302 read with section 34, I 20B and 201 Indian Penal .Code.", "canonical_name": "Dasrath Mandal"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5247, "end_char": 5258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5269, "end_char": 5279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5337, "end_char": 5348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5359, "end_char": 5369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5370, "end_char": 5387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5491, "end_char": 5502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5503, "end_char": 5520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 1208", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5665, "end_char": 5677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5678, "end_char": 5695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mahadeo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5784, "end_char": 5791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahadeo and Kasim were convicted under sections 120B and 201 Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "Mahadeo Sah"}}, {"text": "Kasim", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5796, "end_char": 5801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahadeo and Kasim were convicted under sections 120B and 201 Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": ".Kasim"}}, {"text": "sections 120B and 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5823, "end_char": 5844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5845, "end_char": 5862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5886, "end_char": 5897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5898, "end_char": 5915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 120R", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6077, "end_char": 6089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6090, "end_char": 6107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Kasini", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6123, "end_char": 6129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No separate sentence was awarded for tlie offence under section 120R Indian Penal Code to Mahadeo and Kasini.", "canonical_name": "Kasini"}}, {"text": "Mallabir", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6151, "end_char": 6159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal filed by Mallabir, Dasrath, Kasim and Mahadeo was dismissed by the Patna High Court."}}, {"text": "Kasim", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6170, "end_char": 6175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal filed by Mallabir, Dasrath, Kasim and Mahadeo was dismissed by the Patna High Court.", "canonical_name": ".Kasim"}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6209, "end_char": 6225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal filed by Mallabir, Dasrath, Kasim and Mahadeo was dismissed by the Patna High Court."}}, {"text": "Jamalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6378, "end_char": 6386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir accused, who was practising as a homeopathic doctor at Jamalpur in district Monghyr, is the father of Dasrath accused."}}, {"text": "Monghyr", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6399, "end_char": 6406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir accused, who was practising as a homeopathic doctor at Jamalpur in district Monghyr, is the father of Dasrath accused."}}, {"text": "Dasraih", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6443, "end_char": 6450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dasraih was_studying in the final year in Medical College, Dharbhanga at the time of occurrence an<i was having house surgeon's training in that college at the time of the trial.", "canonical_name": "Dasrath Mandal"}}, {"text": ".Kasim", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6622, "end_char": 6628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Kasim is stated to be the compounder of Mahabir accused, while Mahadeo accused was employed by Mahabir as a servant to look after Mahabir's field.", "canonical_name": ".Kasim"}}, {"text": "Mahabir", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6663, "end_char": 6670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Kasim is stated to be the compounder of Mahabir accused, while Mahadeo accused was employed by Mahabir as a servant to look after Mahabir's field.", "canonical_name": "MAHABIR MANDAL AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Indim Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6771, "end_char": 6781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indim Devi deceased (18) was the wife of Dasrath accused and daughter of Baijnath Manda! ("}}, {"text": "Baijnath Manda", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6844, "end_char": 6858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indim Devi deceased (18) was the wife of Dasrath accused and daughter of Baijnath Manda! ("}}, {"text": "Surajgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6870, "end_char": 6879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW 2) of Surajgarh ai a distance of\n\n30 miles from Jamalpur."}}, {"text": "Indira", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6922, "end_char": 6928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indira was aged about 13 years at the time of."}}, {"text": "Muragawan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7118, "end_char": 7127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reasoris for the delay in the performance , of Muragawan (second marriagp) ceremony."}}, {"text": "Dan Dahej", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7293, "end_char": 7302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2;500 as Dan Dahej from Baiinath PW."}}, {"text": "Baijnath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7360, "end_char": 7368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "however, not paid by Baijnath.", "canonical_name": "Bai_inath"}}, {"text": "March 29, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7383, "end_char": 7397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Letter dated March 29, 1962 wus then received by Baijnath from Dasrath accused wherein Dasrath reminded Bai_inath of his promise to pay Rs."}}, {"text": "Bai_inath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7474, "end_char": 7483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Letter dated March 29, 1962 wus then received by Baijnath from Dasrath accused wherein Dasrath reminded Bai_inath of his promise to pay Rs.", "canonical_name": "Bai_inath"}}, {"text": "Calcutta National Medical College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7569, "end_char": 7602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,500 to Dasrath so that Dasrath might obtain admission in Calcutta National Medical College for the purpose of his further education."}}, {"text": "Rajendra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8192, "end_char": 8200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After Indira had stayed at the house of her father-in-law for some time, Mahabir accused levelled allegations against Indira that she was having illicit intimacy with His second son Rajendra. ,"}}, {"text": "Mahabfr", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8365, "end_char": 8372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabfr after that expressed his reluctance to take back Indira to his house.", "canonical_name": "MAHABIR MANDAL AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Mahendra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8548, "end_char": 8556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir's d<iughter as well as the marriage of Mahabir's youngest son Mahendra were to be performed.", "canonical_name": "Mahendra"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9105, "end_char": 9113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution further is that in August 1963 Mahabir accused went to Calcutta and met Bhai Lal Manda! ("}}, {"text": "Bhai Lal Manda", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9122, "end_char": 9136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution further is that in August 1963 Mahabir accused went to Calcutta and met Bhai Lal Manda! ("}}, {"text": "Bhai Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9222, "end_char": 9230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and asked Bhai Lal to request Baijnath to take his daughter Indira from Mahabir's house, becau~ Indira was having illicit intimacy with her.husband's you!lger brother who was an engineering student.", "canonical_name": "Bhai Lal"}}, {"text": "Blfai Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9536, "end_char": 9545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Blfai Lal thereupon sent letter dated August 8, 1963 to Baijnath in an in- sured cover."}}, {"text": "August 8, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9574, "end_char": 9588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Blfai Lal thereupon sent letter dated August 8, 1963 to Baijnath in an in- sured cover."}}, {"text": "Bhalla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9660, "end_char": 9666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Referring to the talk with Mahabir, Bhalla!", "canonical_name": "Bhai Lal"}}, {"text": "Babu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9715, "end_char": 9719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "stated in that letter : ' ''In the end, Doctor Babu told us that now he would take his action vry soon.", "canonical_name": "Babuji"}}, {"text": "Babuji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10024, "end_char": 10030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At present I give her one injection at an interval of a day or two for the pain in her abdomen and the girl a!SQ says \"Babuji please give me injection in at an interval of a day or two.", "canonical_name": "Babuji"}}, {"text": "Mohalla Naya-", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10398, "end_char": 10411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indira died in the house of Mahabir accused in Mohalla Naya- 11; aon in Jamalimr on the night of September 17, 1963."}}, {"text": "Jamalimr", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10423, "end_char": 10431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indira died in the house of Mahabir accused in Mohalla Naya- 11; aon in Jamalimr on the night of September 17, 1963."}}, {"text": "September 17, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10448, "end_char": 10466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indira died in the house of Mahabir accused in Mohalla Naya- 11; aon in Jamalimr on the night of September 17, 1963."}}, {"text": "Mahadco", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10468, "end_char": 10475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahadco accused earlier on that evening had been fold by Mahabir accused to sleep at the latter's house for the night.", "canonical_name": "Mahadeo Sah"}}, {"text": "Sahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10673, "end_char": 10678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir accused, who is known as Doctor Sahib, awakened Mahadeo as well as Kasirn and Gobind, another servant of Mahabir.", "canonical_name": "Sahib"}}, {"text": "Kasirn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10708, "end_char": 10714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir accused, who is known as Doctor Sahib, awakened Mahadeo as well as Kasirn and Gobind, another servant of Mahabir.", "canonical_name": "Kasini"}}, {"text": "Gobind", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10719, "end_char": 10725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir accused, who is known as Doctor Sahib, awakened Mahadeo as well as Kasirn and Gobind, another servant of Mahabir."}}, {"text": "KasiJn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11348, "end_char": 11354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gobind and Mahadeo sat below the seat by the side of the dead body, while Mahabir' and KasiJn accused sat oli the front seat along with the driver.", "canonical_name": "Kasini"}}, {"text": "Kamarganj, Ghat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11505, "end_char": 11520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dead body was\n\nA then taken to Kamarganj, Ghat on the bank of Ganges at a distance of 21 miles from J amalpur."}}, {"text": "J amalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11574, "end_char": 11583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dead body was\n\nA then taken to Kamarganj, Ghat on the bank of Ganges at a distance of 21 miles from J amalpur."}}, {"text": "Shiban Mandal'(PW", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11938, "end_char": 11955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir and others then went\n\nB back to J amalpur and reached there at 5 a.m.\n\nMahabir and Dasrath accused, according to the prosecution case, were seen by Shiban Mandal'(PW 8) and Mushahru (PW 15) at or about their house in Nayagaon on the morning of September 18, 1963."}}, {"text": "Mushahru", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11963, "end_char": 11971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir and others then went\n\nB back to J amalpur and reached there at 5 a.m.\n\nMahabir and Dasrath accused, according to the prosecution case, were seen by Shiban Mandal'(PW 8) and Mushahru (PW 15) at or about their house in Nayagaon on the morning of September 18, 1963."}}, {"text": "Nayagaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12007, "end_char": 12015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir and others then went\n\nB back to J amalpur and reached there at 5 a.m.\n\nMahabir and Dasrath accused, according to the prosecution case, were seen by Shiban Mandal'(PW 8) and Mushahru (PW 15) at or about their house in Nayagaon on the morning of September 18, 1963."}}, {"text": "Suleman Khan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12071, "end_char": 12083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suleman Khan (PW 6) was during tlhe days C of the occurrence posted at police post Nayagaon."}}, {"text": "Kishori Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12413, "end_char": 12424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to Sul>, lnspector Kishori Lal (PW 21) at Jamalpur police station."}}, {"text": "Jamalpur police station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12436, "end_char": 12459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to Sul>, lnspector Kishori Lal (PW 21) at Jamalpur police station."}}, {"text": "Kishori Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12555, "end_char": 12566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub Inspector Kishori Lal then went to the house of Mahabir and found the door closed."}}, {"text": "Septembjll\" 18, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12786, "end_char": 12806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile, on the morning of Septembjll\" 18, 1963, it is stated, Baijn!lth PW sent his younger brother Jagdish (PW 9 l to Monghyr to make some purchases."}}, {"text": "Jagdish", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12860, "end_char": 12867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile, on the morning of Septembjll\" 18, 1963, it is stated, Baijn!lth PW sent his younger brother Jagdish (PW 9 l to Monghyr to make some purchases."}}, {"text": "Jagdish", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12931, "end_char": 12938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baijnath also asked Jagdish to go to Nayagaon and meet Indira."}}, {"text": "Sita Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13067, "end_char": 13076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Nayagaon Jagdish came to know from his relative Sita Devi that Indira."}}, {"text": "September 18, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13557, "end_char": 13575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G the house of Mahabir accused at about 3.30 p.m. on September 18, 1963."}}, {"text": "Birbhadra Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14081, "end_char": 14096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the interrogation of Mahadeo accused, on September 18, 1963 ASI Birbhadra Singh went with Mahadeo accused to a place\n\ncalled Chandi As than on the bank of river Ganges and spread a net in the river, but the dead body of Indira was not found there."}}, {"text": "asim", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14367, "end_char": 14371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was further interrogation of Mahadeo and asim accused.", "canonical_name": ".Kasim"}}, {"text": "September 19, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14406, "end_char": 14424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Early 011 the morning of September 19, 1963 at about 5 a.m. ASI Birbhadra Singh accompanied by Mahadeo and Kasim accused went to Kamar- !!"}}, {"text": "Birbhadra Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14727, "end_char": 14742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ASI Birbhadra Singh then prepared the inquest report and took into possession , thebagfilled with bricks."}}, {"text": "Hari hanker Prasad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14904, "end_char": 14922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Post mortem exan1_ination on the dead body of Indira was performed by Dr. Hari hanker Prasad (PW 21) on September 19."}}, {"text": "September 19.\n\nJ 963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14934, "end_char": 14954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Post mortem exan1_ination on the dead body of Indira was performed by Dr. Hari hanker Prasad (PW 21) on September 19."}}, {"text": "Sadar Hosp.ital Monghyr", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14972, "end_char": 14995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sadar Hosp.ital Monghyr."}}, {"text": "B. M. Rastogi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15703, "end_char": 15716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Confessional statement of Mahadeo accused was got recorded from Shri B. M. Rastogi magistrate on September 21, 1963."}}, {"text": "Ylahabir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15886, "end_char": 15894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ac- ; ording to that statement, Mahadeo along with Mahabir and Kasim accused as well as Gobind had taken the dead body of Indira from\n\nYlahabir's house to thebank of Ganges and thrown it in the river water after tying the bag full of bricks to the dead body."}}, {"text": "Kedar Nath", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16032, "end_char": 16042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir, Dasrath and Kedar Nath accused absconded after this occurrence.", "canonical_name": "Kedar Nath Upadhya"}}, {"text": "September 30, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16137, "end_char": 16155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir and Dasrath accused surrendered in .:oun on September 30, 1969."}}, {"text": "Kedar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16157, "end_char": 16162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kedar accused too was arrested .", "canonical_name": "Kedar Nath Upadhya"}}, {"text": "Darbhanga Medical College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16341, "end_char": 16366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also aUeged by the prosecution that Dasrath accused who was in the Darbhanga Medical College h.!istel was found absent from the hostel during, the days fronJ Septmber 14 to September i9, 1963."}}, {"text": "17-9-63", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16551, "end_char": 16558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir accused at the trial gave the following version of tlte oc-:urrence :\n\n\"On 17-9-63 at 8 p.m,."}}, {"text": "Jitan Manda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17749, "end_char": 17760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They took the dead body of Indira at 10 o'clock in the night and after disposing of the dead body returned to the house at 12 mid-night or I a.m. Jitan Manda!,"}}, {"text": "Thakur Manda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17763, "end_char": 17775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thakur Manda!", "canonical_name": "Thakur Manda"}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18814, "end_char": 18825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Darbhanga", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18882, "end_char": 18891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Procedure stated that he was at Darbhanga during the."}}, {"text": "Ra!ll Lakhan Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18990, "end_char": 19009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "days of the present occurrence and was staying at the house of a close relative, Shri Ra!ll Lakhan Bhagat Advocate, because the eldest son of Shri Bhagat was suffering from typhoid and there was no other male member to attend upon him.", "canonical_name": "Ra!ll Lakhan Bhagat"}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19264, "end_char": 19275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19283, "end_char": 19309, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Saheb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19494, "end_char": 19499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At 8 O'clock in the night after the death of Indira, Dr. Saheb told that Thakur should prepare CHACHRI and that he was going to bring KAFAN.", "canonical_name": "Sahib"}}, {"text": "Thakur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19510, "end_char": 19516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At 8 O'clock in the night after the death of Indira, Dr. Saheb told that Thakur should prepare CHACHRI and that he was going to bring KAFAN.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Manda"}}, {"text": "Oobind", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19617, "end_char": 19623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Oobind was not there."}}, {"text": "Jitan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20029, "end_char": 20034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For want of accommodation in the taxi, I, Dr. Saheb, Thakur and Jitan took the dead body on the taxi and remaining persons could not go.\""}}, {"text": "Dasrat'h", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20384, "end_char": 20392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held that Mahabir and Dasrat'h accused had con spired to kill Indira by administering poison, or at any rate, Dasrath accused had connived at the' murder of Indira byMahabir accused.", "canonical_name": "Dasrath Mandal"}}, {"text": "byMahabir", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20526, "end_char": 20535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held that Mahabir and Dasrat'h accused had con spired to kill Indira by administering poison, or at any rate, Dasrath accused had connived at the' murder of Indira byMahabir accused.", "canonical_name": "MAHABIR MANDAL AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": ".Mahabir", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21117, "end_char": 21125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These two accused were, however, found to have conspired to dispose of Indira's dead body with a view to screen .Mahabir and Da.srath accused from legal punishment of murder.", "canonical_name": "MAHABIR MANDAL AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Da.srath", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21130, "end_char": 21138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These two accused were, however, found to have conspired to dispose of Indira's dead body with a view to screen .Mahabir and Da.srath accused from legal punishment of murder.", "canonical_name": "Dasrath Mandal"}}, {"text": "sections 120B and 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21251, "end_char": 21272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21273, "end_char": 21290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Dasrath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21383, "end_char": 21390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal the High Court found that the following facts had been proved :\n\n\"(I) Appellant Dasrath was not keen to have the DURAGAMAN ceremony performed even after more than four years of his marriage and was putting pressure on Indira's father to pay the promised sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Dasrath Mandal"}}, {"text": "Kanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21750, "end_char": 21756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".(2) Dasrath had in the meantime come in some sort df close intimacy with a girl medical student of Kanpur, named, Madhl!ri Chourasia and was on correspon.dence with her. ·"}}, {"text": "Madhl!ri Chourasia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21765, "end_char": 21783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".(2) Dasrath had in the meantime come in some sort df close intimacy with a girl medical student of Kanpur, named, Madhl!ri Chourasia and was on correspon.dence with her. ·"}}, {"text": "Aswin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21954, "end_char": 21959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Deceased Indira was suspected by Dasrath and by his father and step-mother of illicit intimacy with Rajendra when she came in Aswin in 1962 to stay at Mahabir's place and they decided to abandon."}}, {"text": "Dasr.ath", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22105, "end_char": 22113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) On the asking of Dasr.ath and Mahabir the father of Indira brought her back to his place in December, 1962.", "canonical_name": "Dasrath Mandal"}}, {"text": "Nayagaon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22386, "end_char": 22394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(6) Baijnath went uninvited with Indira to Nayagaon on that occasion :, md he was insulted by Mahalfir and Dasrath; but still Baijnath left Indira there and returned alone to Surajgarh."}}, {"text": "Mahalfir", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22437, "end_char": 22445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(6) Baijnath went uninvited with Indira to Nayagaon on that occasion :, md he was insulted by Mahalfir and Dasrath; but still Baijnath left Indira there and returned alone to Surajgarh.", "canonical_name": "MAHABIR MANDAL AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "7th August, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22678, "end_char": 22694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( 8) On 7th August, 1963 Mahabir in Calcutta had talks with Bhailal an uncle of Indira and Mahabir conyeyed to him his idea of injecting Indira to deal\\!"}}, {"text": "Bhailal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22730, "end_char": 22737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( 8) On 7th August, 1963 Mahabir in Calcutta had talks with Bhailal an uncle of Indira and Mahabir conyeyed to him his idea of injecting Indira to deal\\!", "canonical_name": "Bhai Lal"}}, {"text": "Bai.inath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23046, "end_char": 23055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( 10) Bhailal immediately conveyed to Bai.inath the gist of the conversation he had with Mahabir by letter Ext.", "canonical_name": "Bai_inath"}}, {"text": "8-8-1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23133, "end_char": 23141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1/4 by dated 8-8-1963."}}, {"text": "Su", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23277, "end_char": 23279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(12) Su, dden]y Indira died on the night of 17-9-1963."}}, {"text": "Qasim Ansari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23702, "end_char": 23714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(15) The dead body was stealthily carried away by Mahabir and his three servants including Qasim Ansari on a taxi at dead of night and was sunk unceremoniously in Kamarganj Ghat 21 miles away although the nearer burning ghat or bank of the Ganges was at Lal Darwaza or Chandi As than at Monghyr, only fiveto six miles away from Jamalpur. (", "canonical_name": "Quasim Ansari"}}, {"text": "Lal Darwaza", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23865, "end_char": 23876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(15) The dead body was stealthily carried away by Mahabir and his three servants including Qasim Ansari on a taxi at dead of night and was sunk unceremoniously in Kamarganj Ghat 21 miles away although the nearer burning ghat or bank of the Ganges was at Lal Darwaza or Chandi As than at Monghyr, only fiveto six miles away from Jamalpur. ("}}, {"text": "Jamalpur Police Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24077, "end_char": 24100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(17) Rumour about surreptitious disposal of the dead body was reported at Jamalpur Police Station and enquity was at once started by the thana officer on the morning of 18-9-1963 and Mahadeo' and Quasim Ansari made discrepant statements about the death and disposal of the dead body on interrogation. ("}}, {"text": "18-9-1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24172, "end_char": 24181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(17) Rumour about surreptitious disposal of the dead body was reported at Jamalpur Police Station and enquity was at once started by the thana officer on the morning of 18-9-1963 and Mahadeo' and Quasim Ansari made discrepant statements about the death and disposal of the dead body on interrogation. ("}}, {"text": "Quasim Ansari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24199, "end_char": 24212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(17) Rumour about surreptitious disposal of the dead body was reported at Jamalpur Police Station and enquity was at once started by the thana officer on the morning of 18-9-1963 and Mahadeo' and Quasim Ansari made discrepant statements about the death and disposal of the dead body on interrogation. (", "canonical_name": "Quasim Ansari"}}, {"text": "30-9-1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24430, "end_char": 24439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "18) Mahabir and also Dasrath (who was seen at .T amalpur on the morning of 18-9-1963) absconded and remained traceless till 30-9-1963."}}, {"text": "14-9-1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24900, "end_char": 24909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(21) Dasrath was absent from his hostel at Darbhanga from 14-9-1963 and again from 23-9-1963 till 30-9-1963 when he and his father Mahabir surrendered in court."}}, {"text": "23-9-1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24925, "end_char": 24934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(21) Dasrath was absent from his hostel at Darbhanga from 14-9-1963 and again from 23-9-1963 till 30-9-1963 when he and his father Mahabir surrendered in court."}}, {"text": "Chari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25196, "end_char": 25201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn appeal in this Court Mr. Chari on behalf of the appellants has argued that the material on record does not establish that Mahabir accused caused the death of Indira deceased."}}, {"text": "Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25973, "end_char": 25979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Mr. Prasad on behalf of the respondent State."}}, {"text": "Baijnath", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 26509, "end_char": 26517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The above facts are proved by the evidence of Baijnath (P\\Y 2) ."}}, {"text": "Mahandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26873, "end_char": 26881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In May 1963 the1marriage of Mahandra and 'rilak ceremony Qf Mahabir's eldest daughter were to be performed.", "canonical_name": "Mahendra"}}, {"text": "lajjnath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27466, "end_char": 27474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that Mahabir became angry because of Indira having been brought to his house by l:lajjnath on the occasion of the above Tilak ceremony is admitted by Mahabir also in his statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27570, "end_char": 27581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27589, "end_char": 27615, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "June 7, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27914, "end_char": 27926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 7, 1963 Mahabir - wrote a letter to Baij1Jath in the course of which Mahabir stated:\n\n\"So for your daughter is living peacefully but you, who have kept your daughter (here) sccrcfly have don~ a great harm."}}, {"text": "Baij1Jath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27955, "end_char": 27964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 7, 1963 Mahabir - wrote a letter to Baij1Jath in the course of which Mahabir stated:\n\n\"So for your daughter is living peacefully but you, who have kept your daughter (here) sccrcfly have don~ a great harm.", "canonical_name": "Bai_inath"}}, {"text": "Mahabir Manda", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28287, "end_char": 28300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those whom you think that they will help you against Mahabir Manda!", "canonical_name": "MAHABIR MANDAL AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28880, "end_char": 28906, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bhai Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 29045, "end_char": 29053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of Bhai Lal (PW 18), who is a cousiri of Baijnath C PW and runs hotel business, shows I.hat on August 7, 1963 Maha bir went to the witness in Calcutta and told the witness to request Baijnath to take his daughter from the house of Mahabir as Mahabir did not like to keep her in his house."}}, {"text": "August 7, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29137, "end_char": 29151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of Bhai Lal (PW 18), who is a cousiri of Baijnath C PW and runs hotel business, shows I.hat on August 7, 1963 Maha bir went to the witness in Calcutta and told the witness to request Baijnath to take his daughter from the house of Mahabir as Mahabir did not like to keep her in his house."}}, {"text": "Maha bir", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29152, "end_char": 29160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of Bhai Lal (PW 18), who is a cousiri of Baijnath C PW and runs hotel business, shows I.hat on August 7, 1963 Maha bir went to the witness in Calcutta and told the witness to request Baijnath to take his daughter from the house of Mahabir as Mahabir did not like to keep her in his house.", "canonical_name": "MAHABIR MANDAL AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Baijnat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29619, "end_char": 29626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir even went to the extent of describing the daughter of Baijnat; h as a cobra in the house.", "canonical_name": "Bai_inath"}}, {"text": "Baijath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30166, "end_char": 30173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baijath also referred to the above threat of Mahabir conveyed through Bhaila\\ in the first information report.", "canonical_name": "Bai_inath"}}, {"text": "Bhaila\\", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30236, "end_char": 30243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baijath also referred to the above threat of Mahabir conveyed through Bhaila\\ in the first information report.", "canonical_name": "Bhai Lal"}}, {"text": "5eptember 17 and September 18, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30621, "end_char": 30656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "his Court as may justify interference with the above appraisement of evidence ..\n\nIt is a oommori case of the prosecution and the defence that Indira died suddenly in Mahabir's house in his presence on the night between 5eptember 17 and September 18, 1963."}}, {"text": "Kamarganj Ghat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30944, "end_char": 30958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dead body was thereafter taken in that taxi by Mahabir to Kamarganj Ghat at a distance of 21 miles from the house of Mahabir in Jamalpur.", "canonical_name": "K amarganj Ghat"}}, {"text": "30, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31634, "end_char": 31642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to him, they took the dead body at about 1 O p.m. and after the body was thrown into the Ganges they re turned at about mid-night or 1 a.m.\n\nAfter report had been lodged by Baijnath with the police on the following day, that: is, September 18, 1963 Mahabir accused was found to be absconding , and was not traed till he surrendered himself in court in September 30, 1963."}}, {"text": "Septe111ber 18, i 963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31695, "end_char": 31716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dead body of Indira could not be recovered on Septe111ber 18, i 963 and was recovered only on the morning of September 19, 1963 after the particular spot at Kamarganj Ghat had been pointed by Mahadeo accused."}}, {"text": "Bari Shanker Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31941, "end_char": 31960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Post mortem examination pn the dead body of Indira .deceased was performed by Dr. Bari Shanker Prasad."}}, {"text": "Kamarganj Ghqt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33585, "end_char": 33599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The act of Mahabir in arranging for a taxi and taking the dead body of Indira at the dead hour of the night to Kamarganj Ghqt at a distance of 21 miles clearly indicates his de; i:c to surreptitiously remove the dead body and throw it at a place from which it would not be recovered.", "canonical_name": "K amarganj Ghat"}}, {"text": "Monghyr", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33811, "end_char": 33818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is significant in this connection to observe that Monghyr is at a distance of only five or\n\nsix miles from Jamalpur while Lal Darwaza burning ghat is at a distance of nine miles from Jamalpur."}}, {"text": "Mahaoir", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34909, "end_char": 34916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The stealthy removal of the dead body of Indira at a late hour of the night and\n\nthe undue haste with which the body of Indira was thrown in the c river at a distance of 21 miles from Nayagaon is a gravely incriminating circumstance and no plausible explanation has been furnished by Mahaoir for this abnormal conduct.", "canonical_name": "MAHABIR MANDAL AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Prasad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 35143, "end_char": 35149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Prasad (PW 21), who performed the post mortem examination on the dead body, was declared hostile on the request of the public prosecutor.. In answer to a further question, Dr.\n\nPrasad stated that the death of Indira might have been a normal death."}}, {"text": "Kamleshwar Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 35878, "end_char": 35894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G The prosecution also examined Dr. Kamleshwar Singh."}}, {"text": "Kamleshwar H Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36279, "end_char": 36297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Kamleshwar H Singh expressed his agreement with Dr. Prasad regarding the characteristics of asphyxia) death.", "canonical_name": "Kamleshwar H Singh"}}, {"text": "Kameshwar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37445, "end_char": 37460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the material it can be said that there were some features like the congestion of both the lungs, the kidney, the liver and the spleen of Indira whi9h, according to Dr. Kameshwar Singh, were inflicative of death by respiratory failure and the same could be caused by poisoning.", "canonical_name": "Kamleshwar H Singh"}}, {"text": "Modi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37762, "end_char": 37766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to observations on page 125 of Modi's Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, Seventeenth Edition, in many cases of asphyxia!"}}, {"text": "December 23, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38071, "end_char": 38088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference has been made by Mr. Chari to reportj dated December 23, 1963 of the Chemical Examiner, according to whom no poison could be detected in the viscera of Indira deceased."}}, {"text": "Lambert", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39396, "end_char": 39403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar view has been expressed by Lambert in his book \"The Medico-Legal Post-Mortem in India\"."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39449, "end_char": 39454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar view has been expressed by Lambert in his book \"The Medico-Legal Post-Mortem in India\"."}}, {"text": "Conzales", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39550, "end_char": 39558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Conzales and others, Second Edition, wherein it is stated on\n\npage 847:\n\n\"The postmortem appearances in cases of morphine .poisoning are not particularly characteristic."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40493, "end_char": 40505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference in this context n:iay be made to the following obsei; vations of Hidayatullah J. (as he then was) who spoke for the majority in the case of Anant Chintaman Lagu v. The State'<Jf Bombay(') :\n\n\"A case of murder by adminisl'ration of poison is almost always one of secrecy."}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44062, "end_char": 44072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "pasrath", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45374, "end_char": 45381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "pasrath, however, has denied this .allegation andhas stated that 'he W<IS away to Dath hanga during those days.", "canonical_name": "Dasrath Mandal"}}, {"text": "Shih.an Manda", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 45654, "end_char": 45667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance has been pli!ced by the prosecution on the testimony of Shih.an Manda! ("}}, {"text": "Mushahru Manda", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 45680, "end_char": 45694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW 8) and Mushahru Manda! ("}}, {"text": "Shiban", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45887, "end_char": 45893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiban did not make any statement to the police till September 22, 1963."}}, {"text": "September 22, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45940, "end_char": 45958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiban did not make any statement to the police till September 22, 1963."}}, {"text": "Mushahru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46251, "end_char": 46259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir also got the house of Mushahru attached in a suit iiled against him."}}, {"text": "Rastogi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46474, "end_char": 46481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that, according to the -confessional statement of Mahadeo, which was recorded by Shri Rastogi magistrate on September 21, 1963 and upon which reliance was placed by the prosecution, no one was present in the house when Mahabir took Mahadeo inside the house to bring out the dead body of Indira for being placed in the taxi on the night of occurrence."}}, {"text": "September 21, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46496, "end_char": 46514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that, according to the -confessional statement of Mahadeo, which was recorded by Shri Rastogi magistrate on September 21, 1963 and upon which reliance was placed by the prosecution, no one was present in the house when Mahabir took Mahadeo inside the house to bring out the dead body of Indira for being placed in the taxi on the night of occurrence."}}, {"text": "Oasrath", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46809, "end_char": 46816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The confessional statement of Mahadeo thus rules out the presence of Oasrath accused at his house on tile fateful night.", "canonical_name": "Dasrath Mandal"}}, {"text": "Ram Lakhan Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47142, "end_char": 47159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Dasrath, he was in those days staying with a relative Shri Ram Lakhan Bhagat Advocate as Shri Bhagat's son was having typhoid.", "canonical_name": "Ra!ll Lakhan Bhagat"}}, {"text": "Madhuri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47479, "end_char": 47486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", G\n\nReference has also been made to some letters between Dasrath and a girl named Madhuri in order to show their intimacy."}}, {"text": "Kilsim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48301, "end_char": 48307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed by the prcu\n\ntion upon the statements alleged to have been made by Kilsim and Mahadeo accus_ed at the police station in the presence of Baijnath PW after Baijnath had lodged .report at the police station."}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48554, "end_char": 48565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48573, "end_char": 48599, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49226, "end_char": 49237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49245, "end_char": 49264, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49561, "end_char": 49569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49573, "end_char": 49583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49590, "end_char": 49609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49641, "end_char": 49651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49844, "end_char": 49849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Atkin, in that case, while dealiing with .section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure observed :"}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49886, "end_char": 49897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49905, "end_char": 49931, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50611, "end_char": 50621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50629, "end_char": 50648, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51122, "end_char": 51132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51140, "end_char": 51159, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "1Kasim", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 51322, "end_char": 51328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, therefore, are of the opinion that no case has been proved .against Dasrath and 1Kasim accused.", "canonical_name": ".Kasim"}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51489, "end_char": 51500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51510, "end_char": 51536, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "K amarganj Ghat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51690, "end_char": 51705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards Mahadeo accused, we find that it is the case of .the prosecution and ihis fact is also admitted by Mahadeo accused\n\nin his statement under section 342 of , the Code of Criminal Procedure that he was one of those who carried the dead body of Indira from the house of Mahabir to the taxi and thereafter went with the dead body in the taxi to K amarganj Ghat.", "canonical_name": "K amarganj Ghat"}}, {"text": "Mal!adeo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52064, "end_char": 52072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The circumstances in which the death of Indira took P.lace and the surreptitious manner in which \"her dead body was removed at dead of night from Mahabir's house to Kamarganj Ghat go to show that Mal!adeo was not Unaware of ihe fact thit Indira's death was not naaural and had 'been brought abOut by M•bir."}}, {"text": "M•bir. Mahadeo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52168, "end_char": 52182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The circumstances in which the death of Indira took P.lace and the surreptitious manner in which \"her dead body was removed at dead of night from Mahabir's house to Kamarganj Ghat go to show that Mal!adeo was not Unaware of ihe fact thit Indira's death was not naaural and had 'been brought abOut by M•bir."}}, {"text": "section 1208", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52453, "end_char": 52465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kasltu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52696, "end_char": 52702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A The result is that appeal ot-Dasrath and Kasltu is allowed."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52841, "end_char": 52858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 302 and 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52919, "end_char": 52939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52940, "end_char": 52957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53083, "end_char": 53094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_660_664_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "UMON OF INDIA AND ANOTHER\n\nGAJENDRA SINGH, ETC., ETC.\n\nMarch 1, 1972\n\n[K. S. HEGDE AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.]\n\n('onstitution oJ India-Arts. 14, 16 and 311(2)-whether version amounted to reduction in rank to attract Art. 311(2)-J/ retention of\n\njunior in officiating capacity was violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the ('onstitution of India.\n\nThe facts of the apP'.als are similar -and the facts of C.A. No. 314 al c as follows : ·\n\nThe respondent was a permanent Kanungo who was promoted to offi. ciate as Naib Tehsildar under paragraph 37(ii) of the S!:lnding Order No. 12, passed by the second appellant. He was reverted from the officiating post for the ra:on that he did not pass the departmental examin'J. .. lion o! Naib Tehsildar within the period prescribed by the Standing Order.\n\nThe respondent contended in the writ petition that he was entitled to continue in the post of Naib Tehsildar until a qualified person became\n\nav-ailable, that since he was promoted under para 37(ii) of the Standing Order, passing of departmental examination was not necessary to officiite in the post of Naib Tehsildar. that junior Kanungos were retained in the posts of Naib Tehsildar by which respondent had lost his seniority ih the subst'3ntive rank of Kanunt, v and hence the reversion amounted to a reduction in rank within the meaning of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution and retention of juniors h the post of Naib Tehsildaf' was violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nThe Judicial COmmhsioner, decided the case ln favour of the 1espondent and held that the reversion of the respondent was attended with penal consequences and since he was not given a reasonable opPortunity of making representation agaist the order, the order W1lS bad and the order was accordingly quashed.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : (i) Appointment t., a post on an officiating basis, is, ftom the nature of employment, its.elf of a transitory character and in the absence of any contract or spe6ific rule regarding the cc>ndition of service to the contrary, the implied term of such an appointment is that it is terminable at any time. 'fhe Government servant so appointed acquires no right to the post. But if the order entails or provides folr forfeiture of his pay or allowance etc. or stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circumstance would indicate that in form the Government had purported to exercise its undoubted right to terminate 'the employment, but in , truth and reaUty, the termination was by way of penalty. f,863Dl\n\nParshotam fol Dhingra v. Union of India, [1958] S.C.R. 828, referred to.\n\nFurther, by the mere fact that some Of the juniors w.ire allowed to continue in the post. of N aib Tehsildar on an officiating basis, it could\n\nUNION v. GAJENDRA SINGH (Mathew, ].) 661\n\nA ' not be said that the respondent lost his seniority in his substantive l'3.D.t of Kanungo. [863 HJ\n\n(ii) Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are also not violated in the present case because the junior persons were retained in their ciating capacities either because they had passed the departmental. ex~· nation or because they had been exempted from passing that exanunatlon.\n\nB In any case, the respondent was not similarly situated with his juniors and therefore, there was no discrimination to attract the Articles. t864-C]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : C.A. No. 314 to 320 of 1967.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated c July 23, 1966 of the Judicial Commissioner's Court at Simla in Writ-Petitions Nos. 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24 and 25 oi 1965.\n\nR. N. Sachthey, for the appellants (in all the appeals).\n\nRameshwar Nath, for the respondents (in C.As. Nos. 314, 315 and 318 of 1967).\n\nThe Judgment of the court was delivered by\n\nMathew, J. These appeals, by special leave, by the Union of India and the Financial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh, are from a judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, E allowing Civil Writ petitions Nos. 18, 19,-20, 21, 23, 44 and 25 of 1965, filed by the respondents and quashing the orders passed by the financial Commissioner 2nd appellant reverting the respo.n.d'ents to the posts of Kanungos. As the facts in all the appeals are similar, we will deal with Civil Appeal No. 314.\n\nThe respondent was a permanent Kanungo in the Revenue F Department. He was promoted on March 26, 1962; to offici11_te as Naib Tehsildar und.er para 37(ii) of Standing Order No. 12, passed by the 2nd appellant. He was reverted from the officiating post to his substantive post on June 1, 1965, for the reason that he did not pass the departmental examination of Naib Tehsildar within the period prescribed in para 34 of the Standing Order.· 9 The respondent contended in the writ petition that he was en titled to continue in the post of Naib Tehsildar until a qualified person became available, that no qualified person was available when he was reverted, that since he was promoted! under para 37(ii) of the Standing Order, he could not have reverted for the reason that he did not pass the departmental examination as the H passing of the departmental examination was not necessary in the case. of Kanungos promoted under para 3 ?(ii) 11f the Standing Order to officiate in the post of Naib Tehsildar. He further con tended that Kanungos junior to him who were promoted to offi. 14-LIOJ!Sup.CI/72 -\n\n662 SUPllBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nciate in the post of N aib Tehsildar were retained in the posts of A\n\nNaib Tehsildar and that has resulted in the loss of his seniority in the substantive rank of Kanungo and hence the reversion amounted to a reduction in rank within the meaning of Article 311 ( 2) of the Constitution.\n\nSo, according to the respondent, he should have been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the reversion and since such an opportunity was not given, B the order of reversion was bad. The respondent also contended that the retention of his .iuniors in the post of Naib Tehsildar was violative of his fundamental right under Articles 1.4 and 16 of the Constitution. ·\n\nThe learned Judicial Commissioner, by his order held that para 37(ii) of the Standing Order did not confer any rjght on the C respondent to continue to officiate in the post of Naib- Tehsildar until a qualified person became. available as that para only con~ mrred a power on the appropriate authority to. allow him to continue to officiate in thepost till a qualified'hahd Jiecame available.\n\nThe learned Judicial Comrtlissioner •then held that since the re&. pondent was promoted under i)ara 37 (ii) of the Standing Order, D he could not have been reverted on the score that he did_not pass the departmental examination, that since the juniors of the-respondent who were also prooted on an officiating basis, were allowed to continue in the post o.f Naib Tehsildar, the reversion had result;; eel in the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank. He, therefore, came to the conclusion that the order of reversion wu attended 1 with penal consequen~ and that the respondent should hi!ve been given a reasonable oppgrtunity of making representation against the order, and quashed it.\n\nParagraphs 34 and 37 of the Standing Order passed by the Financial Commissioner read as under :..,-\n\n\"34(i) Ordinari_ly an A class candidate should pl!Ss F the Naib Tehsildar.'s examination within two years after. completing his revenue training as prescribed in paragraphs 25 and 27 and a B Class candidate should pass the Naib Tehsildar's examination within two y~ 'of his first selection. The Commissioner may extend this period for an.other year for special reason to be recorded in G writing .\n\n. (ii) The Financial Commissioners may further ex tend the period in which a candidate must pass the - examination or exempt any candidate from passing the examination. in exceptional cases on the recommenda- . , tion of the Commissioner.\" H \"37(i) Officiating appoiritments of Naib Tehsil~' are made by Commissioners in Divisions.\n\nPreference .\n\nUNION v. GAJBNDRA SINGH (Mathew, 1.) 66 3\n\nshould be given to direct tehsildar candidates who have .undergone revenue training for one year under paragraph 4(j) but not completed the requisite period of service as Nl!, ib Tehsildar under paragraph 4(i)(b).\n\n(ii) If no such Tehsildar candidate and no qualified Naib Tehsildar candidate of his list is available for a vacant post of Naib Tehsildar, the Commissioner may appoint a Tehsildar candidate who has completed his two years service \\f unemployed or an unqualified Naib Tehsildar candidate or a Kanungo to fill the vacancy until a qualified person becomes available.\"\n\nWe do not think that the Judicial Commissioner was justified in quashing the order of. reversion for the reason that in passing the order the 2nd appellant contravened the provisions of Article 311,(2).\n\nAppointment to .a post on an officiating basis is, from the nature of employment,' itself of a transitory character and in the absence of any eontrai)t. or specific rule regulating the conditiQns of service to the contrary, the implied term of such an appointmeilt is that it is terminable at any time. The Government servant so appointed acquires no right to the post. But if the order entliila or provides for forfeiture of his pay or allowance or the loss of his seniority in the substantjve rank or the stoppage or potponement of hl!i future chances of promotion, then that circumstance .may jndicate that thoujh, . in form, the Government had purport¢ to exercise its undoubted right to terminate the employment, in truth and reality, the termination was by way of penalty (see Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India(').\n\nWe do not understand how the respondent lost his-Seniority in his substantive rank of Kanungo by the mere fact that some of his juniors were allowed to continue in the post of Naib Tehsifdar on an officiating basis. His juniors were not promoted on a regular basis. Like the respondent th.ey were also promoted to officiate in the post of Naib Tehsildar under para 37(ii). We do not see how .. their retention in the posts on an officiating basis would entail loss of seniority of the respodent in his substantive rank. No provision in the Standing Order or any other rule has been brought to our\n\nnolice to show that by allowing the juniors of the respondent to continue to officiate in the posts of :N aib Tehsildar the respondent lost his seniority in his substantive. rank. We do not, therefore, think that the order of .r1<version w~ .attended with any penal consequences so as to attract the prov1s1ons of Article 311 (2).\n\n(I) [1958] S.C.R. 828.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 s.c.tt.\n\nThe respondent, no doubt, was appointed to officiate in the A post of Naib Tehsildar in pursuance of para 37(ii) of the Standing Order and that did not provide that he could be reverted for his not passing the departmental examination within any specified time but that would notin any way vitiate the order of reversion as the respondent had no right to hold the post and the 2nd appellant had the undoubted power to revert him.\n\nThe fact that the 8 2nd .appellant give a _wrong reason for reverting the respondent would not in any way affect the power which he undoubtedly possessed to revert him.\n\nThe contention of the respondent that the retention of his juniors to officiate in the post of Naib Tehsildar violated his fundamental right under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution has no C substance for his juniors were retained either because they had passed the deparl!mental examination or because they had been exempted from passing that examination. The respondent was not, therefore, similarly situate with his juniors and, therefore, there was no discrimination to attract the Articles.\n\nWe, therefore, set aside the order of the Judicial Commissioner and allow the appeal b11t, in the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. s.c.\n\nI Appeals allowed.", "total_entities": 25, "entities": [{"text": "UMON OF INDIA AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GAJENDRA SINGH, ETC., ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GAJENDRA SINGH, ETC., ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 1, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 68, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 1, 1972\n\n[K. S. HEGDE AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. K. MATHEW, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 16 and 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 211, "end_char": 222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 288, "end_char": 303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1329, "end_char": 1340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1433, "end_char": 1448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2911, "end_char": 2929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3584, "end_char": 3598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Sachthey, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3642, "end_char": 3656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rameshwar Nath, for the respondents (in C.As."}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3765, "end_char": 3771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the court was delivered by\n\nMathew, J. These appeals, by special leave, by the Union of India and the Financial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh, are from a judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, E allowing Civil Writ petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3816, "end_char": 3830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the court was delivered by\n\nMathew, J. These appeals, by special leave, by the Union of India and the Financial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh, are from a judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, E allowing Civil Writ petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "June 1, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4547, "end_char": 4559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was reverted from the officiating post to his substantive post on June 1, 1965, for the reason that he did not pass the departmental examination of Naib Tehsildar within the period prescribed in para 34 of the Standing Order.·"}}, {"text": "Kanungos", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5168, "end_char": 5176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Kanungos promoted under para 3 ?(", "canonical_name": "Kanungos"}}, {"text": "N aib Tehsildar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5436, "end_char": 5451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CI/72 -\n\n662 SUPllBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nciate in the post of N aib Tehsildar were retained in the posts of A\n\nNaib Tehsildar and that has resulted in the loss of his seniority in the substantive rank of Kanungo and hence the reversion amounted to a reduction in rank within the meaning of Article 311 ( 2) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Kanungo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5578, "end_char": 5585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CI/72 -\n\n662 SUPllBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nciate in the post of N aib Tehsildar were retained in the posts of A\n\nNaib Tehsildar and that has resulted in the loss of his seniority in the substantive rank of Kanungo and hence the reversion amounted to a reduction in rank within the meaning of Article 311 ( 2) of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Kanungos"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5664, "end_char": 5675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6055, "end_char": 6065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8846, "end_char": 8857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Naib Tehsifdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9868, "end_char": 9882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not understand how the respondent lost his-Seniority in his substantive rank of Kanungo by the mere fact that some of his juniors were allowed to continue in the post of Naib Tehsifdar on an officiating basis."}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10604, "end_char": 10615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11434, "end_char": 11452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_665_673_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "C. BUCIDVENKATA RAO\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\nMarch 8, 1972\n\nIA. N. GROVER AND M. H. BEG, JJ.]\n\nMineral Concession Rules, 1949, rr. 27 and 32r-Application not accomp•nied by map and containing defects re : area-If should be rejected.\n\nPractice-If legal representative can continue application for mining lease-Eauities.\n\nThe application of one B for a mining lease was rejected on the , ground\n\ntht another applicant V had a prior claim. B's writ application was dismiss¢ by the High Court and while bis appeal in this Court was pending he died and his sons were allowed to be impleaded as legal rreoen tatives subject to any objection that may be taken tb th, eir nght to continoo the appeal.\n\nPn the question whether V's application was defective because it was not in accordance with r. 27 of the Mineral Concession Rules and because of want of a map and some details regarding .r,,., and therefore, whether B's application should ha\"\" been granted,\n\nHELD : ( 1) The details mentioned in r. 27 are intended for the correct identification of the individual to whom the lease is to be granted, the minerals which are to be mined the area in respect of which the lease was to be granted and the qualifitions of till' applicant Rules 32(2), introduced in 1955, before the grant of V's application, shows that individual qualifications of the applicants including their special kriowledge, their capacity to engage technically efficient staff, their financial soundness and stability, had to be taken into account in determining the question of priority. There is no prohibition against the grant of an application on the ground that the application is oofioctive or not ccornpanied by a map. There is also no provision in the Act showing that defects in an application could not be .subsequently removed. The form of the application is subordinate to the essential facts to be taken into account before grnnting a lease. The information given in the application is intended for the satisfaction of the authorities granting the lease, so that, after coosidering the merits and making a grant, proper details are em bodied in the le\"\"\" a<', tually granted. The supply of neces931Y details is directory and not mandatory. It was not the case here that as a result of the defects in V's application the lease itself could nDI be executed.\n\nTherefore, the mere want of a map or of details describing the area for which the lease was applied for, would not Illllke the application itself void or of no effect If it did not produce a defect which afiected the validity of the leue, and the details supplied in the application colT~ ponded with the contents of the lease af!U the Glle&ed lacuna had bQoll removed the grant of the lease to V was valid. t669F-H; 670BFJ\n\n( 2) In order to ble a le pl repreae.ntative fu conliauo a legal proceejing, the right to sue or pursue a remedy must survive the death of his predecessor, Under the rules, right of an applicant on the st=ath of a superior claim cannot be separated !from his personal quali&atiOltl. r6110-HJ\n\nMoreover, there is no provision in the Rules for impie:lding an heir A to continue the application for a mining lease. The scb<lme under the Rules is that if an applicant dies, a fresh application has to be presented by the heirs or legal representatives if they desire to apply for the grant of a lease. It may be that they may obtain priority owr an earlier appli cant if they are continuing the busmess or industry of the d.ecj:ased, but It would be on a fresh application setting out their qualifications. Therefore, the heifs had no right to continue the appeal in this Court, [672A-Cl B\n\nDhani Devi v. Sant Bihari & Ors., [1969] 2 S.C.R. 507, distinguished.\n\n( 3) The acceptance of V's claim by the Government on the strength of which he had made his investment, clothes his claim with an equity which could not be defuat, ed without clear proof of some overriding legal right or interest of another claimant, and, there is no such right in the heirs , of B. [672GHl C\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2580 of 1969.\n\nAppeal from the judgment a:nd order dated August 6, 1969 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 3124 of 1967.\n\nA. Subba Rao, for the appellants.\n\nS. P. Nayar, for respondent No. I.\n\nP. Ram Reddy and A. V. V. Nair, for respondents Nos.-Z1Uld,3;\n\nP. P. Rao and T. V. S. Narasimhachari, for respondent No. 4.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeg, J. This appeal, from a Judgment and order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dj_smissing the appeallant's Writ Petition, comes up before us by a Certificate under Article I 33(1)(a) of the Constitution, in the following circumstances : F\n\nOne Buchivenkata Rao had fild application on 1-9-1959 and 1-8-1960 under Mineral Concession Rules, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') before-the Collector of. Nellore, for the giant of a mining lease to him of an area mentioned in his applications.\n\nHe alleged that his applications complied with the rules framed\n\nG . under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act of 1957. The State Government rejected the application of 1-8-1960 on 7-12-1960, but granted the application made on 4th October, 1950, by the Respondent Kumara Rajah of Venkatagiri (hereinafter referred to as Venkatagiri). The ground on which the application of the appellant Rao. was rejected was that Venkatagiri H had a prior claim. The appellant Rao had then preferred a Revision application to the Central Government under the Mineral Concession Rules which came into force on 11th November, 1960.\n\nC. B. RAO V. UNION (Beg, J.) 667 ' A The Central Government had rtjected the revision application on the ground that it was not filed within the prescribed time. Upon a Writ Petition filed in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, the order vf rejection of the revision application by the Central Government was quashed. The Central Government was directed to consider Rao's application on merits. The Central Government had, after B giving due opportunity to be d to the appellant Rao, dismissed his application on 18th October, 1967, holding that Venkatagiri had priority over his cfaim. Rao then filed a second Writ Petition which was dismissed on 26th September, 1969.\n\nThe judgment and, order of dismissal are now under appeal before us.\n\nc The judgment of the High Court shows that the appellant Rao had relied on the following three grounds only at the time of agruments on his Writ Pe_tition :-firstly, that the application of Venkatagiri was not maqe in accordance with Rule 27 and 32 of the said Rules of 1949; secondly, that the application of Venkata-\n\n,,:; D\n\ngiri was not for a fresh lease but for the continuation of a previous lease so that it did not fall within the purview of the rules; and, thirdly: that the Central Government had not considered in detail the various comments offered by the State Govt. with regard to each ground of revision. •\n\nA contention noticed by the High Court, as a separate ground of attack, was that the _Central Govt. had relied upon a ruling of\n\nE a Single Judge of the Punjab High Court.in J. A. Trivadi Brothers\n\nV. Union of lndia( 1), holding that Rules 27 to 29 did not make defective applications void, biut this view had been reversed by a Division Bench of that Court.\n\nThis was not/ really a separate ground but a contention relating to the effect of failure to comply strictly with Rules 27 to 29 of the Rules of 1949.\n\nThe main\n\nF contention of Rao was that the application of Venkatagiri had to be disregarded as it failed to comply with the rules, and, therefore, was not an application in the eye of law, so that, out of several competing applications, Rao's application ought to have been granted. The High Court, made it clear that other grounds were taken in Rao's petition, but were not argued there. In this Court, a freSh ground, neither taken nor argued before the High Court, G is sought to be urged in addition to the ol!her grounds before the High .Court which were repeated before us. We will take up the grounds advanced in the High Court and again in this Court before considering the entertainability of l!he fresh ground.\n\nAt this stage, before dealing with the first ground, we may set out the , elevant rules 27 and 32 of 1949 which run as follows :- H \"27.\n\nApplication for mining; lease-An application for . a iQining lease shall, in case of land in which the mine-\n\n(I) .A.I.R. 1959 Purtjab 589.\n\nrals belong to Govjlrnment, be made to the State Government concerned through such officer or authority as it may appoint in this behalf and shall contain the following particulars :-\n\n(a)(i) If the_ applicant is an individual; his name, nationality, profession, and residence, and\n\n(ii) if the applicant is a partnership firm, a company or an association or body of individuals, whether ini:orporated or not; its name, nature and place of business, place of registratio11 of incorporation and except in the case of a company which is not a private company as defined in the Indian Companies Act, 1913 (VU of\n\n1913) the names and addresses of the individuals constituting such partnership firm, company, association or body.\n\n(b) The number and date of the notification of the grant or renewal of certificate of approval of the applicant;\n\n(c) A descript!on, illustrated by a map or plan, showing as accurately as possible the situaoll, boundaries and area of the land in respect of which the lease is required; · ·\n\n( d) The mineral or minerals which the applicant intends to mine;\n\n(e) The areas and minerals within the jurisdiction of the State Qovernment for which the applicant or any person .ioint in interesLwith him already holds a .mining lease;\n\n(f) If the applicant holds a prospecting !icellse for the area applied for, the number and date of such license;\n\n(g) The period for which the lease is required; and\n\n( h) The industry, if any, which the applicant proposes to develop and the location of such industry.\n\nExplanation :-The map or plan referred to in item ( c) should give sufficient information to enable identification of the area in respect of which the lease is required\".\n\n\"3 2. Prioritiy-{ 1) If more than one application' fe$8i'ding.\n\nthe same land is received,· pmerence shiill be given t.o the application received first, unless the State Govern~\n\nment, for any special reason, and with the prior approval of the Central Government decides to the contrary.\n\nProvided that where more than one application in respect of the same land is received on the same day, the State GovernmentJ afier taking into. consideration the matters specified in sub-rule (2) an<I after obtaining the prior approval of the Central Government, may grant the mining lease to such one of the applicants whom it considers to be t:he most suitable.\n\nProvided further that no application shall be deemed to be incomplete for the purposes of this rule on account ,1f the omission or misdescription of the number and date of the prospecting licence and of the profession or residence or nationality in the case of an individual or of the place of business in the aase of a partnership firm, a company pr an association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, if such omission or misdescription is corrected within a period specified by the State Government or an officer appointed by thl!-t Goverument in' this behalf.\n\n(2) The matters referred to in the proviso to subrule (1) shall be the following namely:-\n\n(i) experience of the applicants in mining;\n\n(ii) financial soundness and stability of the applicants;\n\n(iii) special knowledge of geology or mining and the technical staff already employed or to be employed for the work.\n\nIt is clear to us that the details mentioned in Rule 27 are intended for the correct identification of the individual to whom the lease is to be granted, the minerals which are to be mined, the area in respect of which the lease was to be granted, and e qualifications of the. applicant. Considerable emphasis was placed on the word 'shall' in Rule 32 with regard to the priority to be given G between different applicants. This rule dbes illo't directly affect the question whether an application for a lease could be considered a proper application or not by the authorities concerned.\n\nThe se<iond .proviso to this rule, however, pro'llides for the manner in which :ertain defects may be cured. Rule 32, sub-rule (2), introduced Ill 1955 )'ef?r_e !lie gra!!t of .the application of Venkatagiri, H sho_l\"s tha! the md1v1dual qu:ilificatio!1s .of the applicants including their special knowledge, their capacrty to engage technically efficient staff, their financial SOWl.dness and stability, had to be taken into account in determining the question of priority. Again Rule\n\n610 SUPll.BMB COURT 11.BPOll.TS [1972] 3 S.C.ll.\n\n26, imposing certain restrictions, prohibits the grant of the lease -' to any person who doe~ !IOI hold a certificate of approval from the State Government or who has not produced an Income tax clear ance certificate, It does not prohibit anY grant on the ground that t:he application for it is defective or not accompanied by a map.\n\nThe form of the application seems to be subordinate to the essen tial facts to be taken into account before granting a lease.\n\nThere is no provision in the Act showing. that the defects in an application which is accompanied by the fee prescribed in Rule 28 cannot be subsequently removed. The information given in the application is intended for the satisfaction of the authorities grant ing the lease so that, after considering merits' and making a grant, proper details are embodied in the lease actually granted. It was not urged anywhere that, as a result of any defects in the applica ti on. of V enkatagiri, the lease itself could not be uted. This indicates that the omission to file a1 proper map in?tially was cured.\n\nThe High Court had relied on a decision of this Court in Banarsi Das v. Cane Commissioner, U.P.( 1), where .conditions similar to those laid down by Rule 27 were held to be directory.\n\nIt had also held that, even assuniing that some of the requirements in the. rules may be mandatory, it could not be held that the mere want of a map or of details, describing the area for which the lease was applied for, would make the application itself void or of no effect.\n\nWe are, therefore, unable to find any error in the view adopted by the High Court that the supply of necessary details was directory and not mandatory. If_ it did not produce a defect which affected the validity of the lease, and the details supplied in the application corresponded with the contents of the lease after the alleged lacuna had been filed up, the grant of the lease to Venkatagiri: was valid.\n\nAs regards •the second ground that the application of Venkatagiri had to be interpreted_ as an application for the continuation of an already existing lease and not for the grant of a fresh lease, we find that the High Court had rejected this contention by pointing out that the application was on a form which complied with Rule\n\n27 so that. it could be treated as a fresh application. We find G nothing wrong with the 'High Court's interpretation of the application made by Venkatagiri.\n\nThe High Court had' also found; as a fact, that the order of the Central Government disclOsed that it was based on relevant considerations and could not be said to have omitted consideration of an:Ything material sil!lplv because the details of matters consi- II dered 'were not fully s.et out. We concur with this view and are\n\n.(1)-A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1947 ..\n\nA unable to hold that the order of the Central Government was vitiated on the third ground urged on behalf of Rao.\n\nWe may now refer to the fresh question which was sought to be raised on behalf of the appellant by means of an application before us.\n\nThis was, that this Court had pointed out in Nookala B Satharamaiah v. Kotaiah Naidu & Ors. (I), that, on 15th Sep tember, 1956, the Mineral Concession Rules were amended and a new sub-rule 28(1-A) was introduced which provided that every applicationunder.Rule.27, shall be disposed of within nine months from tihe date of its receipt, and had held that the effect of the amended Rule 57, which was further amended on 14-9-1956, was that an application r!lffiaining undisposed of within the period C prescribed will be deemed to be rejected. It was urged that we should allow this point to be ar£ued for the first time in this Court although it was neither raised nor argued in the High Court. It was submitted that this was a pure question of law on which no investigation of facts afresh was required.\n\nD On the other hand, it has been contended, on behalf of the contesting respondent, that a new point should not be allowed to be urged at this stage for which reliance was placed on Bhagwati Saran & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh('), S. L. Aggarwal v.\n\nGeneral Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd.('), Chitra Ghosh & Anr.\n\nv. Union of India d: Ors.('). , E Even if we had been disposed to consider this new ground on the plea that exceptional circumstances justified our going into it, we must here point out a.nother fact which affects the very maintainability of the appeal before us now.\n\nThe appellant B. Rao died on 18-2-1970. His sons filed an application in this Court on 20 7·1970 for impll)llding them as the heirs and legal repre- F sentatives of the deceased. This application was tentatively allowed, on 3-11-1970, under the orders of the Registrar of this Court, subject to such objections to the rights of the substituted appellants to be heard and to continue this appeal on behalf of the decea<ed as may be taken before us at the hearing of the appeal.\n\nIt .has to be remembered that, in order to enable a legal repre- G sentative to continue a legal proceeding, the right to sue or to purue a remedy must survive the death of his predecessor. In the ms!31Jt case, e have set out provisions showing that the rights which an appltcant may have had for the grant of a mining lease, on the .strength of ah alleged superior claim, cannot be separated from his personal qualifications.\n\nNo provision 4as been pointed H out to us_ in the rules for impleading an heir who could continue the application for a mining lease. The scheme under the rules\n\n(I) [1971] (I) S.C.R. 153.\n\n(2) [1961] (3) S.C.R. 563 at 568.\n\n(3) [1970] (3) S.C.R. 363 at 365.\n\n(4) [1970] (1) S.C.R. 413 at 420.\n\n672 SUPREMi COURT lll!fOllTI . [1972] 3 s.c.~.\n\nseems to be that, .if an applicant dies, a fresh application bas to be A presented by his heirs or legal representatives if they themselves desire to apply for the grant of a lease. It may be that the heirs and 1egal representat!_ves, if lj!J.ey are continuing the business or industry of the dee~ and have the required qualifications, obtain priority over an earlier applicant on account of speciltl. reasons for this preference. But, in each case, they have to apply afresh and JS set out their own qualifical!ions. Ithas not been shown to us that any of the legal reprentatives have applied afresh. . The legal representatives only claim to be entitled to sucCeed the deceased Buchivenkata Rao under a will. The assumption 1111derlying the application is that, whatever right the deceased may have had to -0btain a lease survived and vested in the heirs after his death. We are unable to accept the correclness of this assumption.\n\nIn support of. the contention on behalf of the heirs of Buchivenkata Rao, our attention was drawn to the case of Dhani Devi\n\nv. Sant Bihari & Ors.( 1), which related to a right to obtain transfer of a permit for a Motor vehicle under Section 61, sub. s.\n\n(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act It was.held there that, iµ the case -0f 1he death of an applicant, for the grant of a permit in respect of his motor vehicle, the Regional Transport Authority had the power to substitute the person suc, ceeding: to the possession of the vehicle in place of the deceased applicant: It was pointed out there that the right to the permit was relate4 to tile possession of the vehicle. Moreover, there was a rule enabling the Transport E Authorities to substitute the heir or Jegiil representatives of the deceased. No such rule applicable to the case of .the heirs of the\n\ndece.!ised Buchivenkata Rao bas been pointed out. tp vs. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the heirs, who have been heard, had any right to continue !he appeal before us. This feature of. the case is decisive not only on die right 'to be heard on the fresh l1 ground but also on the right to advance any l\\l'gumellt in support of the appeal of the deceased .\n\n. We may mention that it was also urged that the matter was so old that any reversal ?f the grant of the mining lease to Venkata G girl, as Jong ago as 1960, would involve considerable dislocation and injury to respondent Venkatagiri without any fault on his part.\n\nThe respondent V enkatagiri must have invested considerable amount of money in mining operations. The acceptance of the claim of Venkatagiri by the Government on the strength of whicli Venkatagiri made his investment clothes Venkatagiri's claim with an equity which could not be defeated without clear proof of. liOlllC II 'Over-riding legal right or interest of another claimant. We are\n\n(I) [1969] (2) S, C.R. SfTI.\n\nA unable to see any such right in the heirs of the deceased\n\nBuchivenkata Rao.\n\nConsequently this appeal is dismissed but we make no orders as to costs in this Court.\n\nB V.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed ..", "total_entities": 40, "entities": [{"text": "RAO\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 8, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 57, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 8, 1972\n\nIA."}}, {"text": "IA. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Mineral Concession Rules, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1969] 2 S.C.R. 507", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3679, "end_char": 3698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4154, "end_char": 4179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment a:nd order dated August 6, 1969 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "A. Subba Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4216, "end_char": 4228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Subba Rao, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4251, "end_char": 4262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Nayar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. Ram Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4287, "end_char": 4299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nP. Ram Reddy and A. V. V. Nair, for respondents Nos.-Z1Uld,3;\n\nP. P. Rao and T. V. S. Narasimhachari, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. V. V. Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4304, "end_char": 4317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nP. Ram Reddy and A. V. V. Nair, for respondents Nos.-Z1Uld,3;\n\nP. P. Rao and T. V. S. Narasimhachari, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. P. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4350, "end_char": 4359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nP. Ram Reddy and A. V. V. Nair, for respondents Nos.-Z1Uld,3;\n\nP. P. Rao and T. V. S. Narasimhachari, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "T. V. S. Narasimhachari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4364, "end_char": 4387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nP. Ram Reddy and A. V. V. Nair, for respondents Nos.-Z1Uld,3;\n\nP. P. Rao and T. V. S. Narasimhachari, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Beg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4456, "end_char": 4459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeg, J. This appeal, from a Judgment and order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dj_smissing the appeallant's Writ Petition, comes up before us by a Certificate under Article I 33(1)(a) of the Constitution, in the following circumstances : F\n\nOne Buchivenkata Rao had fild application on 1-9-1959 and 1-8-1960 under Mineral Concession Rules, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') before-the Collector of."}}, {"text": "Buchivenkata Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4702, "end_char": 4718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeg, J. This appeal, from a Judgment and order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dj_smissing the appeallant's Writ Petition, comes up before us by a Certificate under Article I 33(1)(a) of the Constitution, in the following circumstances : F\n\nOne Buchivenkata Rao had fild application on 1-9-1959 and 1-8-1960 under Mineral Concession Rules, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') before-the Collector of."}}, {"text": "Mineral Concession Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4771, "end_char": 4795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "7-12-1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5155, "end_char": 5164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government rejected the application of 1-8-1960 on 7-12-1960, but granted the application made on 4th October, 1950, by the Respondent Kumara Rajah of Venkatagiri (hereinafter referred to as Venkatagiri)."}}, {"text": "Kumara Rajah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5239, "end_char": 5251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government rejected the application of 1-8-1960 on 7-12-1960, but granted the application made on 4th October, 1950, by the Respondent Kumara Rajah of Venkatagiri (hereinafter referred to as Venkatagiri)."}}, {"text": "Venkatagiri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5255, "end_char": 5266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government rejected the application of 1-8-1960 on 7-12-1960, but granted the application made on 4th October, 1950, by the Respondent Kumara Rajah of Venkatagiri (hereinafter referred to as Venkatagiri)."}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5362, "end_char": 5365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ground on which the application of the appellant Rao.", "canonical_name": "Rao"}}, {"text": "Venkatagiri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5389, "end_char": 5400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was rejected was that Venkatagiri H had a prior claim.", "canonical_name": "V enkatagiri"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5489, "end_char": 5507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Rao had then preferred a Revision application to the Central Government under the Mineral Concession Rules which came into force on 11th November, 1960."}}, {"text": "11th November, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5568, "end_char": 5587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Rao had then preferred a Revision application to the Central Government under the Mineral Concession Rules which came into force on 11th November, 1960."}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5786, "end_char": 5814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upon a Writ Petition filed in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, the order vf rejection of the revision application by the Central Government was quashed."}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5954, "end_char": 5957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government was directed to consider Rao's application on merits.", "canonical_name": "Rao"}}, {"text": "18th October, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6101, "end_char": 6119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government had, after B giving due opportunity to be d to the appellant Rao, dismissed his application on 18th October, 1967, holding that Venkatagiri had priority over his cfaim."}}, {"text": "September, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6241, "end_char": 6256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rao then filed a second Writ Petition which was dismissed on 26th September, 1969."}}, {"text": "Venkata-", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6640, "end_char": 6648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c The judgment of the High Court shows that the appellant Rao had relied on the following three grounds only at the time of agruments on his Writ Pe_tition :-firstly, that the application of Venkatagiri was not maqe in accordance with Rule 27 and 32 of the said Rules of 1949; secondly, that the application of Venkata-\n\n,,:; D\n\ngiri was not for a fresh lease but for the continuation of a previous lease so that it did not fall within the purview of the rules; and, thirdly: that the Central Government had not considered in detail the various comments offered by the State Govt.", "canonical_name": "V enkatagiri"}}, {"text": "giri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6658, "end_char": 6662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c The judgment of the High Court shows that the appellant Rao had relied on the following three grounds only at the time of agruments on his Writ Pe_tition :-firstly, that the application of Venkatagiri was not maqe in accordance with Rule 27 and 32 of the said Rules of 1949; secondly, that the application of Venkata-\n\n,,:; D\n\ngiri was not for a fresh lease but for the continuation of a previous lease so that it did not fall within the purview of the rules; and, thirdly: that the Central Government had not considered in detail the various comments offered by the State Govt."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court.in", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7106, "end_char": 7126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "had relied upon a ruling of\n\nE a Single Judge of the Punjab High Court.in J. A. Trivadi Brothers\n\nV. Union of lndia( 1), holding that Rules 27 to 29 did not make defective applications void, biut this view had been reversed by a Division Bench of that Court."}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9041, "end_char": 9067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "15th Sep tember, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15980, "end_char": 16001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I), that, on 15th Sep tember, 1956, the Mineral Concession Rules were amended and a new sub-rule 28(1-A) was introduced which provided that every applicationunder."}}, {"text": "14-9-1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16292, "end_char": 16301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule.27, shall be disposed of within nine months from tihe date of its receipt, and had held that the effect of the amended Rule 57, which was further amended on 14-9-1956, was that an application r!lffiaining undisposed of within the period C prescribed will be deemed to be rejected."}}, {"text": "B. Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17278, "end_char": 17284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant B. Rao died on 18-2-1970."}}, {"text": "3-11-1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17488, "end_char": 17497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was tentatively allowed, on 3-11-1970, under the orders of the Registrar of this Court, subject to such objections to the rights of the substituted appellants to be heard and to continue this appeal on behalf of the decea<ed as may be taken before us at the hearing of the appeal."}}, {"text": "SUPREMi COURT lll!fOllTI . [1972] 3 s.c.~.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18469, "end_char": 18511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "672 SUPREMi COURT lll!fOllTI . ["}}, {"text": "Section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19682, "end_char": 19692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkata G", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20787, "end_char": 20796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f the grant of the mining lease to Venkata G girl, as Jong ago as 1960, would involve considerable dislocation and injury to respondent Venkatagiri without any fault on his part.", "canonical_name": "V enkatagiri"}}, {"text": "Venkatagiri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20888, "end_char": 20899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f the grant of the mining lease to Venkata G girl, as Jong ago as 1960, would involve considerable dislocation and injury to respondent Venkatagiri without any fault on his part.", "canonical_name": "V enkatagiri"}}, {"text": "V enkatagiri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20947, "end_char": 20959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent V enkatagiri must have invested considerable amount of money in mining operations.", "canonical_name": "V enkatagiri"}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_674_689_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "SONE VALLEY PORTLAND CEMENT CO.\n\nTHE WORKMEN\n\nMarch 8, 1972\n\n[C. A. VAJDJALJNGAM, I. D. DUA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]\n\nCement\"Control Order 1961-Higher price paid in respect of cm1ent produced in excess of specified form-Whether workers entitkd to share .in such extra payment.\n\nUnder the Cement Control Order, 1961 passed by the Government of India in exercise of powers under s. 18(g) of the Industries (DeveloP- C ment and Regulation) Act of 1951, producers of cement wete obliged to sell all the cement produced by them to the State Trading Corporation 111 the prices laid down in th.e order. Sub&equently in order to provide an incentive to the producers to incresse their output it was Jl<Ovided :in the order that if a producer's output was in excess of a certain speci- .fied quantity, then the payment for such excess would be made at a\n\nhigher rate. The workers of the appellant companies asked for a share . in the incentive payment on the contention that they had contributed to D the excess in production. The IndllStrial Tribunal in its award held that the companies and th, eir workmen were entitled to share the incentive payment on a fifty-fifty bssis. In appeal by special leave,\n\nHELD: There it nothing in law which prevents a buyer and seller ; from agreeln1 that whatever the aeller can offer upto a tjirtain quantity will he paid for at a particular rate and any quantity over E and allove that figure will be for at a higher rate.\n\nThe total amount which the seller would receive can only . be -called price even if the contract of sale. was so worded as to show that the excesa amount was to be treated as an incentive payment.\n\nTherefore the argument that the workers wore entitled to a share of the extra payment de hors the question of any profit could not be accepted.\n\nUnder the Industriol Law as prop<>Ullded by this Court the. worken can lay no such claim. [685F, 6860] F\n\nNew Maneck Chowk Spg •. & Wvg. Co. Lid. v. Textile Labour Association, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 1, Th. Mill owner&' Association Bombay v. The Rashtriya Mill Mar.door Sangh, Bombay, U960] 1 .S.C.R. 101; M/s Tltaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. ,-, Its Workmen, [19591 Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 1012; Bum & Co. Ltd., v. Their Empfoivees, ;~1960] 3 S.C.R. 423 and National Iron and Steel Co. Ltd.' v. Their Workmen, :H963] 3 S.C.R. 660, referred • G Cement Control Order even if it offered some inducement' -. ihe producers to step up their production, the rms thereof did not entitle the Tribunal to treat it as and by way of intive bonus. In which the workmen could share. It was certainly up to the producer to intlriiate the workmen that under the 1'0rm• of the Control Order an extra amount of money would comb to the till of the COIDJl'!DY if production wat In• sed and the producers could have sett.led what incentive '&hould be H olfered to the workmen, but merely because an extra amount of money which was as and by way of price would llnd its way into the till df the -company because the production target waa exceeded, the workmen did\n\nA not become entitied ipso faclO to lay a claim .to too excess amount and the Industrial Tribunal was not entitled to take the view that because an increase in production can only come about with the cooperation of the workmen they automatically became entitled to a share thereof. An industrial court C'ln only award what the law allows. In the absence of legislation on the subject and in the absence of a scheme for incentive l'. payment introduced by the manag, ment, in the particular facts and B circumstances of the case, the claim on the part of the workmen had to be negatived. f689D-H]\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 635 of . 1967.\n\nC Appeal by special leave from the award dated January 11, 1967 of the National Industrial Tribunal, Bombay in Referenee (NT)-1 of 1965.\n\nS, D. Vimdalal, K. D. Mehta, D. N. Mishra and 0. C. Mathur D for the appellants.\n\nK. L. Hathi, for re8pondent No. 1.\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi and Vineet Kumar, for respondents Nos. 2 and 3.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J.-This is an ap~ by special leave from an award of a National Tribunal under an order of reference reading :\n\n\"Whether the demand of the workmen for a share in the incentive payment allowed by Government to cement producers is justified? If so, what should be the baJ1is and the quantum payable for the year 1963 and subsequent years ?\"\n\nThe cement producers involved were 14, in number set out in Schedule I to the said Order. Out of the total, the Tribunal was not called upon to go into the cases of five cement producers as they had not received any incentive payment and the demand in respect of these five companies was dismissed. Even out of the nine left, three of the producers entered into settlements with their workers as a result whereof the cases of six only are left for consideration. The names of the companies and the incentive\n\npayments involved in this appeal are as under :-\n\nName of the Company\n\nPayment for 1963 Rs.\n\nI. India Cements Ltd. 56,713-50\n\n2. Sone Valley Portland Cement Co.\n\nNil\n\n3. Dalmia Dadry Cement Ltd. 1,19,7qo........oo\n\n4. Jaipur. Udyog Ltd. 5,16,661-00\n\nKalyanpur Lime & Cement Works Ltd. 17,923-00\n\n6. Mysore Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. 20,86,759-00\n\nThe background of the dispute is as follows.\n\n\nPayment for 1964 Rs.\n\n22,265-00\n\n22,000-00\n\n1,22,496-00\n\nNil\n\n20,305-00\n\nNil\n\n\"Cement and gypsum products\" became a scheduled industry under s. 3 (1) of the indutries (Development and Regulation)\n\nAct of 1951 being an Act to provide for development and regulation of _certajn industries. Under s. 2 of the Act the Union of India was empowered to take control of 1the said industry. S.\n\nE 18 (g) ( 1) of Chapter III-B of the Act with the heading \"Control of Supply, Distribution, Price etc. of certain articles\" enabled •the Central Government to provide for regulating the supply and distribution of any article or class of articles relatable to any Scheduled iJ1S!ustry and trade and commerce therein by notified order.\n\nSub-s. (2) of s. 18(g) illustrates the powers compre- F bended by sub-s. (1). These include, inter alia, powers for controlling the prices', at which any such articles or class thereof may be bought or sold, regulation of the distribution of such articles etc. On October 31, 1961 Government of India made an order under s. 18/(g.) known as the Cement Control Order of 1961 superseding an earlier Order of 1958. The relevant por- G lion's of the Order are set out below :-\n\n\"Cl. 3. Producers to sell cement to Corporation.-(!) Every producer shall sell- ( 1) the entire quantity of cement held in stock by him on the date of commencement of this Order; and\n\n(b) the entire quantity of cement which may be produoed by H him before the date of commencement of this Order up to the 31st March, 1966 (inclusive) except such quantity as may be mutually\n\nagreed upon from time to time between him and the Central Government, to the Corporation, and dliver the same to such person or persons as may be .specified by the Corporation in this . behalf from time to time.\n\n(2) No!Withstanding any contraot to the contrary, no pro- B ducer shall dispose of cement held in stock or produced by him except in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (1).\n\nCl. 6. Controlled price of cement.-( 1) The price at which a producer may sell cement other than- ·\n\n(i) water-proof (hydrophobic) cement;\n\n(ii) rapid hardening cement; and\n\n(iii) low beat cement;\n\nshall be as specified in the Schedule :\n\n( 2) (a) The price at which the Corporation may sell' cement other than-\n\n(i) water-proof (hydrophobic) cement;\n\n(ii) rapid hardening cement; and\n\n(iii) low bea~ cement;\n\nto any person shall be Rs. 94.00 per metric tonne free or rail destination railway st.11tion plus the excise duty paid thereon :\n\nProvided that the Corporation may, with the prior approval• of the Central Government, allow a rebate, discount or commission F in the price of cement sold to the Government for the Directorate\n\nGeneral of SupPlies and Disposals : .\n\nThere was only one Schedule to the Order which l!l\\n: :\n\nThe Schedule\n\n[See clause 6 ( !) J.\n\n1'1ie price at which each produci:r may sell cement fiee on rail ex-w0rks is the price which has been determined by the Central Government in respect of that producer baviilg: regard. to the recinllmt!!!dations of tt:be Tariff Commission on the revision of H prices 'Of cement, and to all other relevant circumstances, that i' to say,-\n\n(Ohly th.e. relevant portion is set out below) IS-L1031Sup.CIJ72\n\nPrice Name of Producer per Metric tonne Rs.\n\n4. M/s. K.C.P. Ltd., Mac her la . . . 69 50\n\n6. M/s. Mysore Iron & Steel Works Bhadravati 69 50\n\n8. U.P. Government Cement Works Churku (U.P.) . 69 50\n\n9. M/s. Dalmia Dadri Cement Co .. Ltd., Dalmia Dadri 69 50\n\n12. M/s. Jaipur Udyog Ltd., Sawai Madhopur . 69 50 [13. M/s. India Cements Ltd., Talaiyuthu . . . 72 50\n\nJ 16. M/s. Kalyanpur Lime and Cement Works Ltd., BaDJari 72 50\n\n117. M/s. Sone Valley Portland Cement Co., Ltd. Japla 72 50\n\n21. M/s Travancore Cements Ltd., Kotteyam , .\n\n9S 00 By the amendment of 1963 the paragraph before the Schedule was marked as (A) prefixed by the words \"subject to the provisions of paragraphs (B) and (C).\" After the Schedule paragraph (B) was added to read :- (B) In addition to the price specified in paragraph (;\\) the producer mentioned in column 1 of the Table below may charge an extra amount specified in column 2 of the said Table in res pect of cement produced and sold by them in excess of the quan\n\ntity specified in the corresponding entry in column 3 thereof.\n\n\"TABLE\" (only the relevant portion is set out)\n\nName of the Producer\n\n(I)\n\nI. The U. P. Government Cement\n\nWorks, churk (Ilttar Pradesh)\n\nM/s. K. C. P Ltd., Macherla .\n\n7. M/s. Mysore Iron & Steel Ltd., . Bhadravati\n\nM/s. Dalmia Dadri Cement Ltd., Dalmia Dadri .\n\n12. M/s. Jaipur Udyog Ltd. Sawai\n\nMadhopur\n\n13. M/s. India Cements Ltd., Ta-\n\n.~ laiyuthu .\n\n16.\n\nM/s. Kalyanpur Lime & Cement Works Ltd., Baqjari • ,\n\n17. M/s, Sone Valley Portland Cement Co. Ltd., Japla . .\n\nExtra amount\n\nper tonne Rs. (2)\n\nLimit of quantity (in tonnes)\n\n(3)\n\n5 '50 2,20,000 in any year ending\n\n31st, October.\n\n5 SO 1,15,000\n\n5·50 81,000\n\n5 50\n\n1,76,00CJ\n\n5·50\n\n1, SS, OOQ\n\n2·50 4,52,000\n\n2•50 1,42,000\n\n2,35,000\n\nin any year ending 31st October.\n\nin the year ending 31st December, 1963.\n\nin the year ending 31st December, 1963\n\nin the year endina\n\n31st December, 1963.\n\nin the year enclina\n\n31st December, 1963.\n\nin the year enclina\n\n31st December 1963.\n\nin the year enclina\n\n31st Docen\\hli' 1963.\n\nSONli VALLEY CEMENT v. WORKMEN (Mitter, J.) 679\n\n.A It .is to be noted that three different prices were fixed in respect of the 21 companies mentioned in the Schedule. The price applicable to twelve was Rs. 69•50, to eight others Rs. 72-50\n\nand to one alone Rs. 95/-. Paragraph (B) inserted in 1963 however pro.vided for a charge by the producer of an extra amount of Rs. 5-50 in respect of twelve companies and u Rs. 2-50 in respect of five others. The cui; i.ous feature of this table is thaL the limit of quantity in column 3 varies from producer to producer and the period specified is not the same in all cas.es. For _th~ first two producers the U.P. Government Cement Wor~ and the K.C.P. Ltd., Macherla, the Order provided for payment of an additional amount for all subsequent years ending on rthe 31st October. In the case of Mysore Iron and Steel Co., <:: Ltd. the increase was provided for only one year, namely, year ending 31st December 1963 the target above which the extra amount was to be paid being 81,000 metric tonnes.\n\nSimilarly, in the case of .Dalnila Dadri Cement lJlli. the exira amount was to be payable over the target figure of Rs. 1,76,000 metric tonnes only in the year ending 31st December 1963 : so is. the\n\n D case of Jaipur Udyog Ltd. the target being 7,55,000 tonnes; in the case of I!!d.ia Cements it was for the year ending 31st Decem\n\nber 1963 as also in the case of Kalyanpur Lime and Cement Works and Sone Valley Portland Cement Company.\n\nIt appears that Cement Control Order of 1961 was further amended from time to time. By an order dated 31st May 1963 E which was to come into force on June 1, 1963 and the Schedule below paragraph A of the Schedule was amended increasing the price in cases where cement producers could charge the Corporation Rs. 6~50 per ton to Rs. 72-25 per ton while India Cements Ltd., Kalyanpur Lime & Cement Ltd. and Sone Valley Portland Cement Co., Ltd., were allowed to charge the Corpora- F tion Rs. 75-25. In other words, all the above six producers besides K.C.P, Ltd. (appellant in C.A. No. 2156 of 1970) were allowed to increase their price by Rs. 2-7 5 per tonne chargeable to the said Corporation. There was also an increase in the price which the State Tradinit Corporation could charge under sub-cl. 2 (a) of cl. 6. Prices were further increased by Amendment Orders G dated 30th June 1964 and 31st May, 1965. These however do\n\nnot concern us in these appeals.\n\nWorkmen of fourteen companies claimed, that the extra amount under pragraph (B) of the Schedule could only be earned by .the producers as a result of extra effort on their part and as such they were entitled to a share thereof. Different state.\n\nJI ments of cla4n were put in before the Tribunal in respect of different producers. The workmen of faipur Udyog Ltd. claimed that they should be paid 60% of the extra amount paid for the year 1963 and to the full amounts to be paid in the subsequent\n\nyear.\n\nAccording to them the Government of India had intro- A duced a scheme whereby the cement industry was allowed payments in the nature of inctllltive. at the rate of Rs. 5-50 per tonne oi. cement produced in 1963 and subsequent years in excess of the specified quantities of cement. The figures adopted for Udyog Ltd. was 7,55,000 and the extra payment at Rs. 5-50 per ton related to the production over and above that figure.\n\nThe President of the Indian National Cement Workers' B Federation submitted that :\n\n\"In the cement industry tlJ.e workers played a very important part in increasing the cement production and without their co-operation and efforts the quantity fixed in each factory could never have been exceeded ..... .\n\nThe quantity fixed by the Government in respect of each factory was the highest figure reached in the preceding three years and labour had substantially contributed to exoeed , tl; te said figure and reducing the cost of production in _respect of. various cement works and all workmen should be entitled 1to the full payment in the incentive payment allowed by the Government to the various cement producers in proportion to the earnings for the years 1963 and for subsequent years.\" In some of the statements of claim rthe additional amounts received were described as incentive bonus for additional production.\n\nThe producers in their written statement, on the other hand, submitted that the extra or incentive payment had formed part of their sale proceeds and included in the profit and loss account for\n\nthe purpose of payment of annual profit bonus. The Mysore Iron and Steel Co., l.Jtd. stated that their workers were paid production iricentive bonus ranging from 12% to 40% of the basic wages in F accordance with certain scales of incentive fixed for the targets of production. India Cements Ltd. submitted that the production of cement being a continuous process and not a repetitive one the same could not be related or linked with individual effort or increased by any individual effort and that any increased produc- , tion in an individual cement factory was due to efficient supervi- G sion and good management of the factory rather than increased effort on the part of the workers. It was also said that being a capital intensive industry increased production was due to increased capital investments and improved techniques and the final product was a seauence of linked pro.:ess in that any drawback could reduce or slow down the amount of finished product.\n\nAccording to. this Company the sole object of the incentive H scheme as rt was popularly known, was to encourage cement producers to maximiSe their. production: with a view to meeting, as\n\nfar as possible, the growing demand for cement in the country.\n\nThe company also referred to various capital expenditure incurred for rehabilitating its machinery. According to the written statement of Sone Valley Portland Cement Company it had incurred an expenditure of more than Rs. 17,50,000/- for new equipment for the quarry and the factory and rehabilitation of kilns and bicable ropeway.\n\nOut of the six producers involved in this appeal reliance was placed by four on certain special features. So far as ladia Cements Ltd. ; vere concerned, reliance was placed on a settlement regarding the payment of bonus for the year 1964-65 in that the amount !!greed to be paid for the year 1-4-1964 to 31-3-1965 to the extent of 7 /24th of the total basic wages for the above year was to be taken as including the consideration of -the incentive bonus earned by the company during the calendar year 1964. As regards Jllipur Udyog, reference was made to a settlement of February 4, 1962 which originated in a demand for bonus amounting to 10 months' wages for the year 1960-61. This was\n\n:'I however a long-term settlement as is apparent from the terms recorded which were to the effect that the workers\n\n\"would be given bonus for the years 1959-60 to 1963-64 according to the table set out\" According to clause 9 of the terms :\n\n\"It is agreed and clearly understood that the workers of the Union shall not claim or be entitled to any bonus in any form whatsoever and by whatever name. called except the bonus agreed to hereby in respect of the years\n\ncoverecj_ by this agreement.\" Clause 13 of the terms shows that the Union assured the Mana.gement that no effort would be spared 'ln their part to raise and maintain production to its full installed capacity.\n\nDalmia Dadri Cement entered into an agreement with its . workmen to pay bonus equivalent 'to 14 months' basic wages for the years 195~ to 1963. This was to include. both profit and production bonus. The workers also agreed to co-operate with the management in ensuring that there was an increase in the productivity of the plants.\n\nAs regards Mysore Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., the Management stated that there was already in existence a scheme for incell'tiw bonus ranging from 12 % to 40% of the basic wages in accordance with the scales of incentive fixed for the targets of production as per appendix annexed to the written statement. It was said that this was over and above the annual profit bonus which H the employees were bein~ paid at the rate of 1/6th of their earn-.\n\nings exclusive of dearness allowance and other allowances during the accounting years 1962-63 and 1963-64.\n\n5UPR.BMB COURT R.BPOR.TS\n\n\nOnly one witness was examined on either side before the Tri A. bunal. One R. Natarajan, Under Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Industry, gave evidence about the circumstances under which Government took the decision to grant an incentive bonus to producers of cement. According to him during the years 1962 and 1963 Government being exercised by the critical supply positio~ of cement in the country and being keen to take all B possible steps to increase the production of cement and to consider ways and means to increase the production of cement, set up a panel of wading producers and technical expem. A number of cement factories were allowed to import balancing equipment to ensure a proper synchronisation of the working of various departments and to remove production bottlenecks caused mainly C by d@culties of coal and rail transport. Steps were taken to remove these difficulties by concerted action of several agencies of Government.. There still remained however a considerable field .of effort in which the producer had to apply his mind and resources to the task of overcoming his specific difficulties and to create a clima!le in the cement industry by using his ingenuity of taking all possible further measures to overcome his specific difli- () cul ties in u_!ili$ing his full capacity.\n\nGovernment therefore de cided to allow an extra price to the cement producers in respect . of the quantity of cement produced in each factory over and above the highest level of actual production reached during the last three years ending 1962. The extra price was to be the differential between Rs. 75/- and the then ex-factory price per tonne E applicable to the unit This extra price was paid on such production during 1963 and 1964. In his cross-examination he made it clear that the decision of Government was taken and notified in January 1963 but this had not been reached at a joint meeting of the Government and the producers. According. to witness Government did not have any idea whher labour should F or should nQt hare in this extra payment.\n\nThe witness exa, mined on behalf of the workmen was the Assistant Labour Commissioner who was really called to produce certain documents.\n\nBefore the Tribunal various contentions were pUt forward on behalf o(the producers to show that the production above tarQet figures fixed by Government had little to do with any extra effort put in by the workmen.\n\nOne of the submission was that some of the units had incurred considerablexpenditure for the puroose of increasinK production.\n\nBut as the Tribunal rightly pointed out:\n\n\"No evidence either documentary or oral was led by the company to show how the expenditure had contributed to increased production and in what proportionc\"\n\nSONE VALLEY CEMENT v. WC)RKMEN (Mitter, J,) 683\n\nA. The Tribunal recognised that capital expenditure on equipment would certainly make a contribution towards increased produc .. tion but in the absence of evidence it was not in a positioin to detennine the extent of such contribution. The Tribunal exai¢11ed the special circumstances relied on by four out of the six companies but notwithstanding the same took the view that the demand B of the workmen for a share in the incentive payment allowed by Government was justified.\n\nThe Tribunal appears to have been influenced very largely by a.n award in the case of Kymore Cement Works containing the following remark: .\n\n\"As by their notification, the Government held out allurement to <the industry for greater production the claim of the workmen, in our opinion, must be considered on the basis on which claim for \"incentive bonus\"\n\nmust be considered. We are not unmindful ofthe fact that the claims before us, strictly speaking, are not in all respects at par with the claims of incentive bonus for in the case of the incentive bonus, the nonn of production and the rate for the extra production over the norm are fixed in advance, but we have held that the claims before us are more akin to \"incentive bonus\" than anything else. As this is additional bonus which partakes of the nature of incentive bonus, its amounts cannot have any relation to profits made and must be related to the wages and measured by the amount of work.\" In our view being impressed by the above reasoning the Tribunal concluded that <the basis of payment for each of the two years should be on a fifty fifty basis.\n\nBefore us elaborate arguments were put up on either side, counsel on behalf of the employers contending that so far as at least the four out of six producers were concerned, in view of the special features workmen could not claim anything over and above the usual bonus allowable under the Labour Appellate Tribunal formula or the Bonus Act.\n\nAs against this, it was contended on behalf of the workmen that there could be no doubt that workers had played some part in raising the figure of production above the maximum of the G last three vars ending in 1962 and if the pr<lducers were given something by way of incentive there was no reason why the workers should be deprived of a share thereof. Mr. Ramamurty frankly conceded that if it was established that substantial capital expenditure had been incurred in the case of any particular producer, that was a factor to be taken into consideration in making H allocation out of .t)le extra payment earned; but even that would not justify the total negation of the claim of the workers to some Pa, Yment. e also conceded that .. if the pr~ucei: was free Jo raise the pnce by reason of conditions prevwlmg m the market\n\nlabour could not claim any share in the increa>cd price on the A ground that it \\Y_as based on the extra efforts put forward by them.\n\nHe however argued that the extra amount chargeable was not due to any such conditions in the market and was allowed to be charged by the Government so that the producers in conjunction with their labour could raise the level of production lior the benefit of the commun.ity as a whole. It was also argued by B Mr. Ramamurty that the case required a special consideration of the circumstances by the Tribunal and by this Court in appeal and the view to be adopted should be the one which is consonant with social justiee.\n\nAs against this counsel for the producers submitted that social justice was a vague concept and except in circumstances recognised by courts of law as justifying the adoption of a particular course should not be allowed to influence the decision of a Tribunal administering industrial law. It is only too well known that in most of the industries in our country the objective of a living wage will remain a distant dream for a long time to come and soelal justice certainly requires that efforts schould be made to·\n\nreduce the disparity between a living wage and the actual wage but industrial tribunals are not to consider themselves free to depart from settled principles of industrial law by chalking out a path of their own whenever opportunity occurs.\n\nE In our view, however, it is not necessary to examine the aspect of social justice in the matter or even the special features with regard to the working of four out of six of the abov~ producers.\n\nWe must first consider the nature of the extra payment which was received by the producers from the State Trading Corporation i.e., was it by way of or towards the price payable, or was it unconnected with the question of price e.g.~ a payment by way of a tip ? Mr. Ramamurty submitted that it could not be the F former in which case one would expect the extra payment to be\n\nIink!!d with the entire quantity produced and not limited to te production over and above the target fixed by Government. While it cannot be denied that the underlying object of paragraph (B) and the Schedule to the Cement Control Order of 1963 was that the producer should adopt ways and means to increase the pro- G ductlon either with the help of Government reducing bottle-necks or the producer itself finding out and adopting devices to step up production with the help of the workmen concerned! the extra amount paid can onl_y be treated. as an~ by. way of pnce offered because of the scarcity of the commodity m the country.\n\nTh~ Cement Control Order which has beeri set' out in some de:rul ff clearly shows that producers were not entitled to charge teir own price. If they had been we have no doubt that takmg advantage of the scarcity they would have charged much more\n\nJI·.\n\nthan Rs. 69-50 per ton to start with. Whatever their production each unit could only sell to the State Trading Corporation and at the price fixed.\n\nAs a result of the Order, the Corporation was not free to offer an inducement to the producer for producing cement in excess of the target fixed as in its turn it Was not entitled to charge the actual consumers or the dealers in the market any amount in excess of the priee fixed under the Control Order. The transaction between a cement producer and the State Trading Corporation can only be described as a sale and whatever was paid to the producer by the Corporation can only be described as the price.\n\nMr. Ramamurty conceded that normally a workman could only share in the. general prosperity of the undertaking and ask for a rvision of his wage, dearness allowances etc. when the prod.uct10n of he employer shdots up thereby enhancing its profitmaking capacity.\n\nHe also agreed that in normal circumstances greater production leading to a greater amount ot profit would ensure to the benefit of t)le labour by way of production bonus under the Labour Appellate Tribunal formula or under the Bonus Act.\n\nHe however contended that the facts in this case must be treated as justifying the claim of workmen to something like an incentive bonus though it was not to be treated in the way such bonus is usually claimed or awarded. In other words, his submission was that but for the inducement of extra payment the target figure would not have been exceeded and that as the efforts of workmen must to some extent be held to have contributed the increase in production they must have a share of such payment de hors the question of any profit.\n\nWe find ourselves unable to accept this proposition. There is nothing in law which prevents a buyer and seller from agreeing that whatever the seller can offer up to a certain quantity will be paid for at a particular rate and any quantity over and above that figure will be paid for at a higher rate.\n\nThe total amount which the seller would receive can only be called price even if the contract of sale was so worded as to show that the excess amount was to be treated as an incentive payment. Between the buyer and the seller the amount which changes hands i.e., the consideration for the thing sold, can only be described in legal terminology as price.\n\nIn some cases in ordinary commercial transactions, the seller allowes the buyer a certain amount of commission in case the buyer takes delivery of a quantity over and above a parti.cular figure. fixe~.\n\nThis will only mean that the buyer was a!lowmg a reduction m price in the particular circumstances of that case.\n\nWhat has taken place under the Cement Control Order is that the terms of sale are fixed by Government under the Order, the parties i.e., the\n\nproducers and the Corporation not being allowed to discuss and A settle. the tenns themselves.\n\nGovernment recognised that unless it held out an inducement to the producers by allowing them to sharge a price over and above that fixed under the Schedule to paragraph (A) there was little chance of the shortage of the commodity in the market B being reduc¢. It however realised at the same time that a gene-· ral increase of price on the whole outtum of the produce would make it difficult for the State Trading Corporation. to function properly unless it aliowed the Corporation to charge a higher price to the consumer. It was only because Government did not want the consumer to have to pay more that it adopted the device of the extra amount being chargeable only in respect of this addition_al quantity over the figure of production up to 1962. c\n\nThere is howeve.r another aspect of the matter.\n\nAssuming that the extra payment was to be treated and described as an incentive payment, it is difficult to see how the employees can under the Industrial Law which this Court has so far expounded D have any claim to any share of such payment. In New Maneck Chowk Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd, v. Textile Labour Assoclation(1 ) this Court examined the concept of bonus as involved in industrial law of this country by Industrial Tribunals and by the decisions of this Court. It took the view that there are four types of bonus which had been evolved under the industrial law, namely, E ( 1 ) production bonus or incentive wage, ( 2) bonus as an implied term of Contract between the parties, (3) customary bonus in connection with some festival and ( 4) profit bonus evolved by the LabolJr Appellate Tribunal in The Mill-owners' Association Bombay v. The Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh, Bombay.(') An incentive bonus for increased production partakes of the nature f of a production bonus. In M/s. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. lts Workmen(•) this Court had to examine the nature of production bonus. According to this Court (see at p. 1019) :\n\n\". . . it is an incentive to higher production and is in the nature of an incentive wage.\"\n\nReferring to Labour Law by Smith, Second Edition, p. 723, where various plans prevalent in other countries known as Incentive Wage Plans have been worked out on various bases, the Court said :\n\n''The simplest of such plans is the straight piecerate plan where payment is made according to each piece\n\n(1) [1961] I S.C.R. I at p. 9\n\n(2) [1960] I S.C.R. 107.\n\n(3) [1959] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 1012.\n\n. produced, subject in some cases to a guaranteed minimum wage for so many hours' work. But the straight piece-rate system cannot work where the finished product is the result of the co-operative effort of a large number of workers ch holding a small part which contributes to the esult.\n\nIn such cases, production bonus by tonnage produced, as in this case, is given.\n\nThere is a ]>ase or standard above which extra payment is made for extra production in addition to the basic wage. . . . But whatever may be the nature of the plan the payment in effect is an extra emolument for extra effort put in by workmen over the standard that may be fixed. . . . . . . .\n\nThe extra payment depends not on extra profits but on extra production. . . . Therefore, generally speaking, payment of production bonus is nothing more or Jess than a payment of further emoluments depending. upon production as an incentive to the workmen to put in more than the standard performances. Production bonus in this case also is of tiiis nature and nothing more than additional emolument paid as an incentive for higher production.\"\n\nAs to the initiation of such a scheme \\]le argument before the Court was:\n\n\"Whether there should be increased production in a particular concern is a matter to be determined entirely by the employer and depends upon a consideration of so many complex factors, namely, the state of the market, the demand for the product, the range of prices, and so on. It is, therefore, entirely for the employer to introduce a production bonus scheme or not.\" .\n\nI On the question as to whether the Industrial Tribunal could have jurisdiction to introduce a production bonus scheme at all, the Court left the question open but took the view that where as in the case before the Court there was a scheme of production bonus in existence, the Tribunal had jurisdiction under the Industrial Disputes Act to deal with it and make suitable amendments to it.\n\nA similar view was expressed in Burn & Co. ltd. v. Their Employees(') and National Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen.(2).\n\nIt would of course always be open to the Legislature to introduce any kind of bonus not so far recognised' by industrial Jaw evolved either by tribunals or by this Court. But that must rest on a solid foundation and express words must be used to that\n\n\n(2) [1963r 3 SC.R. 660.\n\neffect.\n\nAlthough it is not necessary to express any final view on the subject we are inclined to think that apart from legislation an incentive bonus for increase of production, irrespective of the question as to whether the industry was making profit or not is one that must be introduced by the particular unit of industry.\n\nIt would be for the management to fix what incentives should be given to different departments to step up production.\n\nAn Industrial Tribunal would not be justified in holding that merely because there had 6een augmentation in the production labour would be entitled to make a claim to bonus because of such increase.\n\nLabour would undoubtedly be entitled to revision of wage scales, dearness allowance and other terms and conditions of service as also profit bonus; but in the absence of legislation or a scheme of incentive production, industrial. tribunals would not be justified in laying down a scheme themselves.\n\nIn. our view the Cement Co.ntrol Order even if it offered some rnducement tc:> the prucers to sep up their production, the terms thereof did not entitle the Tnbunal to treat it as and by way of incentiv_e bonus in which the workmen could share.\n\nIt was certainly up to the producer to intimate the workmen that under the terms of the Control Order an extra amount of money would come to the till of the company if production was increased and the producer could have settled what incentives should' be\n\n- offered to the workmen but merely because an extra amount of money which as we have already described, was as and by way of price would find its way into_ the till of the company bec; ause the production target was exceeded, the workmen did not become entitled ipso facto to lay a claim to the excess amount and the Industrial Tribunal was not entitled to tak.e the view that because an increase in production can 011ly come about with the cooperation of the workmen they automatically become entitled to a share thereof.\n\nIt may be that they all had the benefit' of the extra payment by way of profit bonus under the Labour. Appellate Tribunal formula and it would appear that the claims to incen• tive bonus rested rather on a frail foundation in era! of the companies earlier mentioned. This will hardly be a case where we should lay down a principle of such far-reaching importance viz., that workmen are entitled to an extra payment by way of incentive bonus as soon as they can establish that production in a particular year exceeded the highest figure of the three preceding years.\n\nNor can we look at the terms of the award in Kymore's case as showing the course industrial adjudication should take.\n\nAn industrial court can only award that which the law allows.\n\nIn the absence of legislation on the subject and in the absence of a scheme for incentive payment introduced by the management\n\nin the particular facts and circumstances of the case, we would' negative such a claim on !Jie pan of the workmen. \\ In tpe ult thetefore we. allow the appeal but would make no order as to costs. ·\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal allowed: .", "total_entities": 90, "entities": [{"text": "SONE VALLEY PORTLAND CEMENT CO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SONE VALLEY PORTLAND CEMENT CO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE WORKMEN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE WORKMEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 8, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE WORKMEN\n\nMarch 8, 1972\n\n[C. A. VAJDJALJNGAM, I. D. DUA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "I. D. DUA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 327, "end_char": 346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the Cement Control Order, 1961 passed by the Government of India in exercise of powers under s. 18(g) of the Industries (DeveloP- C ment and Regulation) Act of 1951, producers of cement wete obliged to sell all the cement produced by them to the State Trading Corporation 111 the prices laid down in th.e order."}}, {"text": "s. 18(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 375, "end_char": 383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "DeveloP- C ment and Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 403, "end_char": 433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1961] 1 S.C.R. 1", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1972, "end_char": 1989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tltaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2098, "end_char": 2127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mill owner&' Association Bombay v. The Rashtriya Mill Mar.door Sangh, Bombay, U960] 1 .S.C.R. 101; M/s Tltaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. ,-, Its Workmen, [19591 Suppl."}}, {"text": "1960] 3 S.C.R. 423", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2213, "end_char": 2231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3618, "end_char": 3644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f689D-H]\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "National Industrial Tribunal, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3751, "end_char": 3787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C Appeal by special leave from the award dated January 11, 1967 of the National Industrial Tribunal, Bombay in Referenee (NT)-1 of 1965."}}, {"text": "D. Vimdalal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3821, "end_char": 3832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S, D. Vimdalal, K. D. Mehta, D. N. Mishra and 0."}}, {"text": "K. D. Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3834, "end_char": 3845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S, D. Vimdalal, K. D. Mehta, D. N. Mishra and 0."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mishra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3847, "end_char": 3859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S, D. Vimdalal, K. D. Mehta, D. N. Mishra and 0."}}, {"text": "0. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3864, "end_char": 3876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S, D. Vimdalal, K. D. Mehta, D. N. Mishra and 0."}}, {"text": "K. L. Hathi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3900, "end_char": 3911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Hathi, for re8pondent No."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3936, "end_char": 3952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi and Vineet Kumar, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Vineet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3957, "end_char": 3969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi and Vineet Kumar, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4046, "end_char": 4052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J.-This is an ap~ by special leave from an award of a National Tribunal under an order of reference reading :\n\n\"Whether the demand of the workmen for a share in the incentive payment allowed by Government to cement producers is justified?"}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4453, "end_char": 4463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sone Valley Portland Cement Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5031, "end_char": 5062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sone Valley Portland Cement Co.\n\nNil\n\n3."}}, {"text": "Dalmia Dadry Cement Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5072, "end_char": 5096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dalmia Dadry Cement Ltd. 1,19,7qo........oo\n\n4.", "canonical_name": "Dalmia Dadri Cement Co .. Ltd."}}, {"text": "Jaipur. Udyog Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5120, "end_char": 5138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jaipur.", "canonical_name": "Jaipur Udyog Ltd. Sawai\n\nMadhopur"}}, {"text": "Mysore Iron and Steel Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5201, "end_char": 5231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mysore Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. 20,86,759-00\n\nThe background of the dispute is as follows."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5434, "end_char": 5438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5587, "end_char": 5591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5607, "end_char": 5621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under s. 2 of the Act the Union of India was empowered to take control of 1the said industry."}}, {"text": "Chapter III-B of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5696, "end_char": 5720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5817, "end_char": 5835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of certain articles\" enabled •the Central Government to provide for regulating the supply and distribution of any article or class of articles relatable to any Scheduled iJ1S!ustry and trade and commerce therein by notified order."}}, {"text": "s. 18(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6029, "end_char": 6037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III-B of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III-B of the Act"}}, {"text": "October 31, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6279, "end_char": 6295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 31, 1961 Government of India made an order under s. 18/(g.)"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6336, "end_char": 6341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III-B of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III-B of the Act"}}, {"text": "Cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6490, "end_char": 6495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III-B of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III-B of the Act"}}, {"text": "31st March, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6794, "end_char": 6810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Every producer shall sell- ( 1) the entire quantity of cement held in stock by him on the date of commencement of this Order; and\n\n(b) the entire quantity of cement which may be produoed by H him before the date of commencement of this Order up to the 31st March, 1966 (inclusive) except such quantity as may be mutually\n\nagreed upon from time to time between him and the Central Government, to the Corporation, and dliver the same to such person or persons as may be .specified by the Corporation in this ."}}, {"text": "Cl. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7261, "end_char": 7266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8111, "end_char": 8119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K.C.P. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8585, "end_char": 8596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. K.C.P. Ltd., Mac her la . . ."}}, {"text": "Mysore Iron & Steel Works Bhadravati", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8630, "end_char": 8666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Mysore Iron & Steel Works Bhadravati 69 50\n\n8."}}, {"text": "U.P. Government Cement Works Churku", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8677, "end_char": 8712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.P. Government Cement Works Churku (U.P.) ."}}, {"text": "Dalmia Dadri Cement Co .. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8737, "end_char": 8767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Dalmia Dadri Cement Co .. Ltd., Dalmia Dadri 69 50\n\n12.", "canonical_name": "Dalmia Dadri Cement Co .. Ltd."}}, {"text": "Jaipur Udyog Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8798, "end_char": 8815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Jaipur Udyog Ltd., Sawai Madhopur .", "canonical_name": "Jaipur Udyog Ltd. Sawai\n\nMadhopur"}}, {"text": "India Cements Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8850, "end_char": 8868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. India Cements Ltd., Talaiyuthu . . ."}}, {"text": "Kalyanpur Lime and Cement Works Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8905, "end_char": 8941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Kalyanpur Lime and Cement Works Ltd., BaDJari 72 50\n\n117."}}, {"text": "Sone Valley Portland Cement Co., Ltd. Japla 72 50", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8968, "end_char": 9017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Sone Valley Portland Cement Co., Ltd. Japla 72 50\n\n21."}}, {"text": "Travancore Cements Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9027, "end_char": 9050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s Travancore Cements Ltd., Kotteyam , ."}}, {"text": "U. P. Government Cement\n\nWorks, churk (Ilttar Pradesh)", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9675, "end_char": 9729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"TABLE\" (only the relevant portion is set out)\n\nName of the Producer\n\n(I)\n\nI. The U. P. Government Cement\n\nWorks, churk (Ilttar Pradesh)\n\nM/s. K. C. P Ltd., Macherla ."}}, {"text": "K. C. P Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9736, "end_char": 9748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"TABLE\" (only the relevant portion is set out)\n\nName of the Producer\n\n(I)\n\nI. The U. P. Government Cement\n\nWorks, churk (Ilttar Pradesh)\n\nM/s. K. C. P Ltd., Macherla ."}}, {"text": "Mysore Iron & Steel Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9770, "end_char": 9794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Mysore Iron & Steel Ltd., ."}}, {"text": "Jaipur Udyog Ltd. Sawai\n\nMadhopur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9866, "end_char": 9899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Jaipur Udyog Ltd. Sawai\n\nMadhopur\n\n13.", "canonical_name": "Jaipur Udyog Ltd. Sawai\n\nMadhopur"}}, {"text": "Kalyanpur Lime & Cement Works Ltd., Baqjari", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9960, "end_char": 10003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Kalyanpur Lime & Cement Works Ltd., Baqjari • ,\n\n17."}}, {"text": "U.P. Government Cement Wor~", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11227, "end_char": 11254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For _th~ first two producers the U.P. Government Cement Wor~ and the K.C.P. Ltd., Macherla, the Order provided for payment of an additional amount for all subsequent years ending on rthe 31st October."}}, {"text": "Mysore Iron and Steel Co., <:: Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11410, "end_char": 11445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Mysore Iron and Steel Co., <:: Ltd. the increase was provided for only one year, namely, year ending 31st December 1963 the target above which the extra amount was to be paid being 81,000 metric tonnes."}}, {"text": ".Dalnila Dadri Cement lJlli", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11640, "end_char": 11667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, in the case of .Dalnila Dadri Cement lJlli."}}, {"text": "Jaipur Udyog Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11825, "end_char": 11842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the\n\n D case of Jaipur Udyog Ltd. the target being 7,55,000 tonnes; in the case of I!!d.ia Cements it was for the year ending 31st Decem\n\nber 1963 as also in the case of Kalyanpur Lime and Cement Works and Sone Valley Portland Cement Company."}}, {"text": "I!!d.ia Cements", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11892, "end_char": 11907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the\n\n D case of Jaipur Udyog Ltd. the target being 7,55,000 tonnes; in the case of I!!d.ia Cements it was for the year ending 31st Decem\n\nber 1963 as also in the case of Kalyanpur Lime and Cement Works and Sone Valley Portland Cement Company."}}, {"text": "Kalyanpur Lime and Cement Works", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11979, "end_char": 12010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the\n\n D case of Jaipur Udyog Ltd. the target being 7,55,000 tonnes; in the case of I!!d.ia Cements it was for the year ending 31st Decem\n\nber 1963 as also in the case of Kalyanpur Lime and Cement Works and Sone Valley Portland Cement Company."}}, {"text": "Sone Valley Portland Cement Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12015, "end_char": 12050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the\n\n D case of Jaipur Udyog Ltd. the target being 7,55,000 tonnes; in the case of I!!d.ia Cements it was for the year ending 31st Decem\n\nber 1963 as also in the case of Kalyanpur Lime and Cement Works and Sone Valley Portland Cement Company."}}, {"text": "31st May 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12155, "end_char": 12168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated 31st May 1963 E which was to come into force on June 1, 1963 and the Schedule below paragraph A of the Schedule was amended increasing the price in cases where cement producers could charge the Corporation Rs."}}, {"text": "June 1, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12203, "end_char": 12215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated 31st May 1963 E which was to come into force on June 1, 1963 and the Schedule below paragraph A of the Schedule was amended increasing the price in cases where cement producers could charge the Corporation Rs."}}, {"text": "India Cements Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12405, "end_char": 12423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "72-25 per ton while India Cements Ltd., Kalyanpur Lime & Cement Ltd. and Sone Valley Portland Cement Co., Ltd., were allowed to charge the Corpora- F tion Rs."}}, {"text": "Kalyanpur Lime & Cement Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12425, "end_char": 12453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "72-25 per ton while India Cements Ltd., Kalyanpur Lime & Cement Ltd. and Sone Valley Portland Cement Co., Ltd., were allowed to charge the Corpora- F tion Rs."}}, {"text": "Sone Valley Portland Cement Co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12458, "end_char": 12495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "72-25 per ton while India Cements Ltd., Kalyanpur Lime & Cement Ltd. and Sone Valley Portland Cement Co., Ltd., were allowed to charge the Corpora- F tion Rs."}}, {"text": "K.C.P, Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12603, "end_char": 12614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, all the above six producers besides K.C.P, Ltd. (appellant in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "State Tradinit Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12798, "end_char": 12824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was also an increase in the price which the State Tradinit Corporation could charge under sub-cl."}}, {"text": "cl. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12848, "end_char": 12853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12861, "end_char": 12866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30th June 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12926, "end_char": 12940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prices were further increased by Amendment Orders G dated 30th June 1964 and 31st May, 1965."}}, {"text": "31st May, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12945, "end_char": 12959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prices were further increased by Amendment Orders G dated 30th June 1964 and 31st May, 1965."}}, {"text": "faipur Udyog Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13359, "end_char": 13376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The workmen of faipur Udyog Ltd. claimed that they should be paid 60% of the extra amount paid for the year 1963 and to the full amounts to be paid in the subsequent\n\nyear."}}, {"text": "Udyog Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13823, "end_char": 13833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The figures adopted for Udyog Ltd. was 7,55,000 and the extra payment at Rs."}}, {"text": "Indian National Cement Workers' B Federation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13965, "end_char": 14009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The President of the Indian National Cement Workers' B Federation submitted that :\n\n\"In the cement industry tlJ.e workers played a very important part in increasing the cement production and without their co-operation and efforts the quantity fixed in each factory could never have been exceeded ..... ."}}, {"text": "Mysore Iron and Steel Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15109, "end_char": 15134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Mysore Iron and Steel Co., l.Jtd."}}, {"text": "ladia Cements Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16728, "end_char": 16746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as ladia Cements Ltd. ; vere concerned, reliance was placed on a settlement regarding the payment of bonus for the year 1964-65 in that the amount !!"}}, {"text": "1-4-1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16904, "end_char": 16912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "greed to be paid for the year 1-4-1964 to 31-3-1965 to the extent of 7 /24th of the total basic wages for the above year was to be taken as including the consideration of -the incentive bonus earned by the company during the calendar year 1964."}}, {"text": "31-3-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16916, "end_char": 16925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "greed to be paid for the year 1-4-1964 to 31-3-1965 to the extent of 7 /24th of the total basic wages for the above year was to be taken as including the consideration of -the incentive bonus earned by the company during the calendar year 1964."}}, {"text": "Jllipur Udyog", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17130, "end_char": 17143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards Jllipur Udyog, reference was made to a settlement of February 4, 1962 which originated in a demand for bonus amounting to 10 months' wages for the year 1960-61."}}, {"text": "February 4, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17183, "end_char": 17199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards Jllipur Udyog, reference was made to a settlement of February 4, 1962 which originated in a demand for bonus amounting to 10 months' wages for the year 1960-61."}}, {"text": "clause 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17518, "end_char": 17526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17795, "end_char": 17804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dalmia Dadri Cement", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17975, "end_char": 17994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dalmia Dadri Cement entered into an agreement with its ."}}, {"text": "5UPR.BMB COURT R.BPOR.TS", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18860, "end_char": 18884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5UPR.BMB COURT R.BPOR.TS\n\nOnly one witness was examined on either side before the Tri A. bunal."}}, {"text": "R. Natarajan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18961, "end_char": 18973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One R. Natarajan, Under Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Industry, gave evidence about the circumstances under which Government took the decision to grant an incentive bonus to producers of cement."}}, {"text": "Kymore Cement Works", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22257, "end_char": 22276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal appears to have been influenced very largely by a.n award in the case of Kymore Cement Works containing the following remark: ."}}, {"text": "Ramamurty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23989, "end_char": 23998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ramamurty frankly conceded that if it was established that substantial capital expenditure had been incurred in the case of any particular producer, that was a factor to be taken into consideration in making H allocation out of .t)le extra payment earned; but even that would not justify the total negation of the claim of the workers to some Pa, Yment."}}, {"text": "LabolJr Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31815, "end_char": 31841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It took the view that there are four types of bonus which had been evolved under the industrial law, namely, E ( 1 ) production bonus or incentive wage, ( 2) bonus as an implied term of Contract between the parties, (3) customary bonus in connection with some festival and ( 4) profit bonus evolved by the LabolJr Appellate Tribunal in The Mill-owners' Association Bombay v. The Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh, Bombay.(')"}}, {"text": "Smith", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32298, "end_char": 32303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Referring to Labour Law by Smith, Second Edition, p. 723, where various plans prevalent in other countries known as Incentive Wage Plans have been worked out on various bases, the Court said :\n\n''The simplest of such plans is the straight piecerate plan where payment is made according to each piece\n\n(1) [1961] I S.C.R. I at p. 9\n\n(2) [1960] I S.C.R. 107."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34536, "end_char": 34559, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kymore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37609, "end_char": 37615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor can we look at the terms of the award in Kymore's case as showing the course industrial adjudication should take."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_690_710_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "HUNGERFORD\n\nINVESTMENT\n\nTRUST\n\nLIMITED (IN\n\nVOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION)\n\n'V.\n\nHARIDAS MUNDHRA & OTHERS\n\nMarch 9, 1972\n\n[K. S. HEGDE AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.]\n\nSpecific Relief Act (1 of 1877) repealed by Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963)-.A.pplication jor rescission of convact and decree in 1967 .wuier s. 35 of 1877 Act-When dight to rescission can be said to have\n\nuccrued under s. 6 of General Clauses Act, 1897.\n\nSpecific Relief Act (4~ of 1963) s. 28-Scope of.\n\nPower of Court tip order rescission under the law relating to specific relief-No time fixed in decree for specific performance -Effect of- ·Order of ,-escision by Court-Nature of.\n\nDecree for specific performance-If could be executed. by defendant as mone, v decree.\n\nThe appellant was the owner of 100% shares in Company 'A' By an agreement iiated October 30, 1956, between the appellant and the respondent, the respondent purchased 49% of the shares with an option to purchase the balance of 51 % shares. The respon- . dent exercised his option but as the shares welre not transferred to him he filed a suit. The suit was decreed and the decree for specific performance provided that the 51 % shares should be delivered to the respondent against payJrent by him o the appellant of their value; and an injunction was '!llso granted restraining the appellant from voting except in acicordance with the instructions of the respondent.\n\nExcept as regards the injunction, the trail court, however, stayed execution of the . decree and\n\nthe stay was continued by the appellate court till the appeal was dismis sed in 1965.\n\nThe appellant filed an appfioation in 1965 praying that the respon- dent may be directed to pay the consideration amount. within such time as the Court may direct, but the application was, dismissed.\n\nMeanwhile, there were certain orders of atta<; bment of the decree, who3e effeclt was that the respondent was prohibited and restrained from alienating, transferring or charging his right, title and interest in the decree or from obtaining satisfactio~ thereof. Further, in February 1965, a ·pany 'B' .which had Obtained a decree against a holding company of the appellant, '3pplied for execution and got the 51 % shares of the . appellant attached. The executing court ordered that those shares should\n\noo produced for delivery to the respondent against payment of the nsi deration mentioned in the specific perfonnance dectete.\n\nThe 'A' Company also instituted a ,.suit against the '3ppellant in respect .of payment made by 'A' -to the Income-tax authorities on behalf of the ; appellant and prayed for possession and sale of the 51% shares in the\n\nHUNGERFORD INVESTMENT v. H. MUNDHRA (Mathtw, J.) 691\n\nexercise of their lien on those shares.\n\nA rec.eiwr woas appointed in res pect of those shares oand the Court directed that the Receiver wOuld be at liberty deliver the 51% shares to the respondent on payment of the consideration. This orO::r was communicated by the appellant to the respondent on January, 11, 1967, and even before that date the appel~ lant wrote two letters.·to the respondent ':lsking him to be ready with the amount to be paid by him and to take delivery of the shares. Those letters were refused by the respondent and inrcply to the letter 'dated, January 11, 1967, the respondent raised the o~'j, ection that the appellant was not in a position to give de.livery of the shares and tt the order of tm Court as not binding on him because he was not a party to the suit in which, tha~ order was pa~Sted. By a letter dated February 11, 1967, addressed tO the respondent, the appellant sbted that the respondent had forfeired his right to purc:hase the 51 % shares umier the specific perfonnance decree as he had failed to fulfil his obligation in pursuance of the notice of the appellant dated January 11, 1967. Thereafter, in\n\nM&eh 1967, the appellant filed an application for rescission of the agreement of sale of 1956 as also the decree for specific performance of the agreement.\n\n- The trial court held that the respondent was not keen on paying the purchase money and get the transfer of 51 % shares for the reason that the injunction granted by the Court restraining the appelhnt from voting except under the instructions of the respondent made the rpondent virtually the owner of tic 100% shares in 'A' company, with full control, that therefolre, the respondent had committed breach of the contract which be was directed spedfically to perform, that he creared a situation which\n\nbad made it impossible f<* him to perform hi'S part of the obligation, and hence the decree for specific rformance must_ be rescinded. The trail court appointed the Receivet in the suit by the 'A' company against\n\nthe appellant as Receiver of tic 51% shar~ and directed the respondent to pay the consideration money to the Receiver within a fortnight from the date of the order and directed the River to hand over the shares\n\nto the respondent; and that, in default of such payment within the time specified the. contract and the decree would stand rescinO::d, and that the appellant would be absolved from all obligations thereunder.\n\nThe appellate court however held that the application filed by the appellant for the rescission of the contract and dec~:ee was not maintain- Gble under the Specific Relief Act of 1877 dr of 1963. '\n\nAllowing the apal to this Court,\n\nHELD : ( 1) The Specific Relief Act, 1877 was repealed .bY the Specific Relief Act of 1963 and the appellant had no accrued ngbt on the .date of the repeal to file the application under s. 35 of the 1877- Act read with s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. [7000-HI\n\nThe right to rescind the decree under s. 35 can arise only if the purchaser makes default in paying the purchase money ordered to be paid under the decree. Buf before the lapse of reasonable time from the date of the decree the appellanJ could have no right to . have the decree rescinded on the ground of default. Such a default had not occurred when the Specifi~ Relief Act, 1877, was repealed as a reasonable time for the performance of the obligation undei' the decree had not elapsed from the date of the decree. Tb, ere was no default till 1965 in the present . cue. all the execution of the decree was stayed by orders of the trial court and the appellate court. [7001).0].\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1972) 3 S.C.R..\n\n2 Since. s. 28 of the SP'cific Relief Act, 196~. provides only for ( ) Jication fc:ir rescission of a decree fr specific peronnance for A !:le \".lf lease of immovable property no apphcauon to rescmd decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell movables would lie under that sec1ion. f70lABl ·\n\n(3) But the Specific Relief A~, 196~, is not an exaustive enactment, and under the Jaw rebting to spec1fic rehef a Court wh11:lh Pll3o.s a deere-: for specific performance retains control ever the dccrre even after the a decree had been passed. Ther.efoc:, th! Court, in th~ present case, re tained control over the matter desp1te the decree and 1.t was open to the Court, wheiT it was alleged that. the party oved ag:u':lst .had positively refused to complc~ the contract, to entertam the npphcat10n and order rescission of the decree if the allegation was p'roved. f701B-C; 703~-cj\n\nRamdas Khatau & Co. v. Atlas Mills Co. Ltd., A.l.R. 1931 Bombay lSI; Rahmath Unnissa Begum v. Shimoga Co-operative Bank Ltd., A.l.R.\n\nC 19S1 Mysore 59; Firm Kishore Cl1and shivo Charan Lal v. Bruk.un Ekctric Supply Co., A.I.R •. 1944 All. 66, 77; Moho=daii Sahibv, Abdul Klu:dir Saheb, (1930) 59 M.L.J. 351; Pearisundari Dasset v.\n\nHari Charan Mazumdar Chowdhry, I.L.R. 15 Cal. 211; Some, rhwar Dyal\n\nv. Widow of !Alman shah, A.I.R. 1958 All. 488, Anandi/al poddar v . . Gunndra, A.I.R. 196() Cal. 107 ana Tribeni Tewary v. Naina, A.I.R. 1959 Pntna 460, referred to, D\n\n( 4) lbe responckmt had, by his conduct and Jetter evinced an intention a01 10 perform his part of i_hc contract.\n\nTherefo~. the fact that no time had been fixed in the decree would not preclude the Court from adjudgi_ng the contract as rescinded.\n\nP05E..Jil ·\n\n(a) If a contract does oot specify time for performan<le hw will llllJ>IY !JDder s. 46 of the Contract Act that th.e parties intended that the ligataon under the coorract should be performed within a reasonable tlllle dc:Jiendmg on the circumstances of t~ case. The trect between\n\nthe part~:s was not extinguished by the P'JSSing o! the speciilc perf~ :ance dree and u the cOOiract au.isted despito the ree, and as the\n\ncree did DO! abrogate or modify any of the e-xpress or Jmp/Jd terms of\n\ncontract !1 must oo presumed tha~ tho parties tO tho contract were under the obhvuoo to complete it within a. l'elL\\OW\\ble time. po3B-Hl ,\n\nsb:sr~~) respondent. by exercising his option to purcha.5e the 519f; appellant C:::e. entllled 10 obtuin a conveyance of the sha.res from c in the agree~ment of the pun:llrue money. There wa.s no provi.stOD shares • . TI!e!\"efore ••.tto when thcreu.ftr the appcUant ahoult.l con~Y t!J~ br lntimatina the' 'he wu open 1() e1ther party to make time -~tt expreuing Ita or hl: r larty, after -a rea&Onliblo riod, about lt. aft\" &ation Under the ~~\n\n1~ and willingnesa. to perform its or his ot>U• _. had n Pllid for 1 l i liberty wa.s not tllteo away bcca~ a doe~ '1:10 the tune tor 'Ita \"\"\"f~ pee ftc .Ret rformance ot the contract without ft.'ttOi r• v.mance. ?03H; 704A-c] ObJrrvatioru in p Hai.sburyt Lawr of E7t 'f:::zaSpeci[ic .P_rrforrtUUIC• edn, p. 546 , t.rui\n\n(• g 3rd ed1t1on vol. 36, JS 1 to 3S2,. expljU!~ J) AJ the lrxejy ,_. &II order of the ·~ t_!tc .n,.~ io h~ ssion and U • l:llll!nl of the Putc~::~;:~ him. ~<? del.i~ a of tbt that the~~~ to the rc.pon.Jey, .~~uon regardioa-whK:h wu_. ~\n\npe &Jlt was not in 'l . \"'\"'\"a 11 no 11Ub6ta, n~ i.Q- obi~® ' posiiiGn to dc.livet. tlte sh.acee •.. f11>56-G 1\n\nHUNGERFORD INVESTMENT v. H. MUNDimA (Mathew, ],) 693\n\n. . ( 6) WOOn the Co~ adjudges rescission of a . contraQt or a decree •t 1s . onl.Y con <; em~ With the question whether the person rescinding it was JUStified 1!! dmg so .. In . the present case when the awellant came t? !Jle Court With 1ts applloahOn for rescission there was already a res.\n\nCISS!On of the contract and the decree by its letter dated February 11 ~967. .It ?nlY ante~ a declaration by adjudgment by the Court that 1t was )stifi~ tn domg so. The, Court did not create any right which the parttes d1d not p<>ssess when 1t made a declaration that the oontract had been validly rescinded. Merely because it is necessary for the Court to pass such an order it does not follow that it is the Court that rescinds the oontract. It is only deciding upon too validity of the rescission al ready made by the party. f706AEl\n\nThereore, the respondent could not compbin that, because the appelv lant obtam a stay of the order passed by the trial court giving the respondent fortnight's _time to pay the purchase money the appellant prevented htm from paying the purchase money, and resist the pmyer for rescission. f706A-B]\n\nAbram Steamship company Ltd. v. Westville Shipping Company Ltd.\n\nL.R. L1923] A.C. 781, referred to.\n\n(7) There is no substance in the clonntion of the respondent that the appellant was not in a position to give a good title to the shares be-- cause 'A' company claimed a lien in respect of the shares. f707C-Dl\n\n(8) It could not be contended that the remedy of the 'appellant was to execute the decree. for specific performance as a decree for money.\n\nf709B-C)\n\nA decree for specific performance is a in. favour of both the plaintiff and defendant in the suit, but it could be executed only in the manner prescribed by 0.31, r. 3.2, C.P.C. The appellant could not have iCXecuted the decree against the respondent as a money decree '!llld realised\n\nthe purdtase money from him. Therefore, if the respondent refused to pay the purchase money there was nothing which prevented the appel lant from applying for rescisSionof the de. f707FrH; 708G-H; 709CT\n\nHeramba Chandra Maitra v. J; votish Chrmdra SinhtJ, A.I.R. _1932 CaL 579 and Bai Karimabibi v.\n\nA.bderahman Sayad Banu,\n\nA.I.R. 1923 Bom. 26, 1eferred to.\n\n(9) The only question with which. the Court was cocernc:d was. whether the respondent had disabled himself from perfonmng his part o' the obligation under the decree. The fact that attachments of ~\n\ndecree by creditors prevented him from performing his part of the obli .. gation under the decree or obtain satisfaction thereof W?uld not makd him any the less a defaulte~ so far as performance of his part of thet obligation under the decree ts concerned. f709E.Gl\n\n(10) There is no substance in the contention that the attachment by B.company of the S 1% shares made it impossible for the appellant to deliver the shares to the repondent as the atacbment ord\" dl.l'~ that the 51% shares should be produced for delivery to th7 respondent\n\nagainst payment of the consideration mentioned in the specific perform~ ance decree. f7090Hl CML APPELLATE JUR.ISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 488 of 1971. 16-JOJ 1 Sup.CI/72\n\nSUPR'EME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.I..\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated September 14, A 1970 of the Calcutta High Court-in Appeal No. 148 of 1969.\n\nS. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N. Sinha, Lina Seth, M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the appellant.\n\nR. C. Dev, Somnath Chatterjee, M. Bose, S. Swarup and 8\n\nP. C. Bhartari, for respondent No. 1.\n\nA. K. Sen, Shanker Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, .N. Khait(ln, Krishna Sen and B. P. Singh, for respondent No. 4.\n\nS. S. Khanduja, Promod Swarup and La/{~ Kohli, for responc dents Nos. 7 and 8. ·\n\nGobind Das and B. D. Sharma, for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nw, J. This is an appeal with certificate from a judgment D of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, setting aside the order of a single judge of the Court allowing an application filed by the appellant for rescission of an agreement for sale dated October 30, 1956, as also the decree dated February 25, 1964, for specific perfonnance of the agreement and for other alternative reliefs s~ified in the application.\n\nHungerford Investment Trust Limited, (in voluntary liquidation) hereinafter called 'Hungerford' was the owner of 100 pet cent shares in Turner Morrison & Co., hereinafter called 'Turner\n\nMorrison'.\n\nJohn Geoffrey Turner and Nigel Frederic Turner, both since deceased, were the owners of the 100 per ce.Qt shares of Hunerford .\n\nThe entire share capital of Turner Morrison F consis!OO of 4,500 fully paid' up ordinary shares of Rs. 1,000/- each.\n\nBy exchange of letters it was agreed that Haridas Mundhra, bereinafter called 'Mundhra' would purchase from Hungerford, 49 per cem: shares of Turner Morrison. The agreement also provided for an option to Mundhra to purchase from Hungerford, G the balance of 51 per cent shares of Turner Morrison within 5 years. A fo.I'.Qlal agreement dated October 30, 1956, was xe cutcd between Hungerford, John Geoffrey Turner- - and Nigel Frederic Turner on the one hand, and British India Corporation\n\nand Haridas Mundhra on the other, embodying the terms of the agreement. .Pursuant to this agreement, 49 per cent of the shares H in Turner Morrison was sold and transferred to Mundhra and his nominee British India Corporation. Thereafter, Mundhra , exercised his option to purchase the 51 per cent shares. But the\n\nHUNGERFORD INVESTMENT v. 1L MUNDHRA (Mathew, /.) 695\n\nA shares were not sold or transferred to him. So, on April 19,\n\n1961. Mundhra filed a suit againSt Hungerford, 'tun)er Mow.son .and others for specific perforinance of. the agreement to sell the 51 per cent shares (Suit No. 600 of 1961). As Mundhra did not want to proceed aainst Turner Morrison, the suiot was dismissed as ainst that company and a decree was passed on Feb- B ruary 25, 1964. The decree provided that the agreement relatinst to the sale of 51 per cent ordinary shares of Turner Morrison\n\nout to be soecifically performed and directed HWlgerford to deliver to undhra, the 51 per cent shares against payment of the considerati6n of Rs. 86,60,000/-. An injunction was also\n\nanted restraining Hungerford and the other deJendants in the C suit from voting except in accordance with theinstruction of Mundhra and restraining Hungerford from selling the shares to any person other than Mundhra. The decree, except as regards 1he iniunction, was stayed by the trial iudge, on the application of the appellant, for 3 weeks.\n\nHungerford, along with some ather defendants, filed an D appeal from the decree on March 18, 1964 (Appeal No. 69 of\n\n1964) and obtained stay of execution of the decree except in so far as it related to' the , injunction, until the disposal of , fue appeal. The appeal was dismissed on August 26, 1964, for the reason that it was withdrawn. by the appellcmt, leaving Mundhra\n\nfr~ to perform his part of the obligation under the decree.\n\n:E By a Master's summons dated August 30, 1965, Hungerford made an application praying that Mundhra may be directed to implement the decree by paying Rs. 86,60,000/, tbe un-paid purchase money, within such time as the Court may direct, that Hungerford b~ directed to execute proper transfer deeds in respect of llhe 51 per cent shares within such time as the Court may F direct; and- :that in default of payment of Rs. 86,60,000/- by Mundhra within the period to be fixed, the Court may order the rescission of the agreement and the decree.\n\nThe application was dismissed on September 28, 19.65, by Justice R, ay, holding that the application was one for execution of the decree in Suit No. 600 of 1961 and must be in a tabular form and \"that any imposition of time limit would be to engraft something on the G decree which does not exist in the decree'.\n\nHunrford preferred an appeal against the said order (Appeal No. 286 of 1965).\n\nThe appe.al as dismissed on August 8, 1966. The application of Hungerford for leave to appeal to this Court was also dismissed on November 25, 1968. ·\n\nH Before the dismissal of appeal No~ 69 of.1964 filed against the decree for specific perform~~ ih suit No. 600. of 1961, the Certificate Officer, 24 Parganas had attached that decree; as Mundhra failed to satisfy six certificates then pending against him.\n\n' SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972] 3 .S.C.R:.\n\nIn pursuance o a Memorandum issued by the Certificate Officer.\n\nRay, J. made an order dated March 2, 1964, staying the execution of the decree until cancellation of the notice by the Certificate Officer or until the Certificate Officer or the debtor applied for execution of the decree. The decree in suit No. 600 of 1961 was also attached in execution of three other decrees, namely the decree obtained by Champaran Sugar Co. Ltd. and B British India Corporation Ltd. in sllirt No. 179 of 1960 of tho Court of. Civil Judge, Kanpur and those obtained by Kanpur Sugar Work! lAd. and Britisp India Corporation Ltd. in suit No. 178 of 1960 in the Court of Second Civil Judge, Kanpur and the Life Insurance Corporation of India in special appeal No. 299 of 1961 of the High Court of Allahabad. The effect of c these orders of attachment was that the decree-holder Mundhra was prohibited and restrained from alienating, transferring or charging his right, title and interest in the decree in suit No. 600 of 1961 or from obtaining satisfaction thereof.\n\nIn February, 1965, Bank Hoffman A.G. obtained a decree D from Queen's Bench Division, London, for £657,345-17-9d. with interest at 4! per cent per annum from the date of decree\n\nagainst Romanigo Holdings S.A.H., a holding company of Hungerford and also against Hungerford. Bank Hoffman executed the decree in the Court of Distri~ Judge, Delhi, and got the 51 per cent shares of Hungerford atached. The District Judge ordered the attachment and directed .. that the 51 per ctnt B shares be produced in the High Court of Calcll'tta for delivery to Mundhra against payment of consideration mentioned in the sj, eCific Perf9!manee decree. ·\n\nHungerford was in control of Turner Morrison upto February 25, 1964, when the injunction in regard to voting rights was .J granted. 'It had kept scripts of. 707 shares out of 2;295 shares_m the office of Turner Morrison. When Mundhra got. control of Turner Morrison, these scripts went under his control and power.\n\nThe Liquidators of Hungerford wrote on December 12, 1964, to Turner Morrison to deliver the scripts of 707 shares to M/s Sanderson and Margo~!, solicitors of Hungerford.· Tho request G fo, r delivery of 707 shares was repeatt:4 by Sanderson an~ Margo a on December 22, 1964. Turner Mornson rote a letter on January 11. 1965 to K. N. Srivllstava,. Income Tax Officer, if the 707 shares' seripts could be delivered to Hungerford and if Income Tax Officer had any objection to such delivery. On January 13,\n\n1965, Turner Morrison's solicitors wrote to Mls . . Sanderson -and Morgan that 707 shares had become 1the .property of Mundhra H. and, for the first time, also claimed that thetit was a lietl on the shares. On January 18, 1965, K. N. Srivastava, the Income TU.\n\nHUNGERFORD INVESTMENT v. H. MUNDHRA (Mathew,/,) 691\n\n()fficer, wrote a letter raising objection to the delivery of 707 shares to Hungerford although the Income Tax Department had no claim on lthese shares.\n\nTutiiler Morrison instituted a suit against Hungerford (Suit No. 2005 of 1965) in' the Calcutta High Comt claiming' Rs. 79,70,802 as principal and Rs. 47,96,250.16 as interest, in respect of payment made by Turner Morrison tto Income Tax authorities on behalf of Hungerford under section 23 (a) of the Indian Inoome Tax Act, 1922. A claim was also made in the suit for possession and sale of 1he 2,295 shares in the exercise of their lien on those shares under Article 22 of rthe Articles of Association of the Company. Mundhra was not a party to the suit. Turner Morrison made an ex-parte application in the suit on July 8, 1966, for appointment of a receiver in respect of the 2,295 shares. Mr. K. B. Bose was appointed receiver and he took possession of 1,588 shares froq1 the First National City Bank and 707 shares from llhe Police. On July 13, 1966, Sen J.\n\npassed an order confirming the order of appointment of the receiver and directing that the receiver will be at liberty to deliver the 51 per cent of shares to Mundhra on payment of Rs. 86,60,000/- in performance of his part of the obligation\n\nl, lDder the decree, if so required by the Court hearing appeal No. 286 of 1965. The order also provided that if Mundhr~ takes the shares on payment of tthe price directed to be paid by the decree, or in direction of the Coun of appeal, the lien if any, as claimed by Turner Morrison will shift on to the money which the receiver would £et from Mundhra.\n\nTurner Morrison preferred an appeal against the order and applied for stay of the order. The stay was refused but the appeal was partly allowed on September 2, 1968, by setting aside the direction given to the receiver to tender the shares to Mundhra as also the direction that the lien of Turner Morrison would shift to.the purchase money to be paid by Mundhra.\n\nOn Mat:ch 21, 1967, the application from which the present appeal arises, was made by Hungerford (the appellant here) before the High Court. The prayers in the application were illartistically worded. It was prayed that the agreement dated October 30,\n\n1956, and the deee dated February 25, 1964, passed in suit No. 600 of 1961 be rescinded, that the injunction granted by the decree in the suit be vacated unless Mundhra (the 1st respondent here) deposits Rs. 86,6.0,000/- in the Court or with the receiver\n\nin suit No. 2005 of 1965, that the receiver appointed in suit No. 2005 of 1965 be appoimed as receiver in the suit for speCific performance in respect of the said 2,295 shares, -tharthe receiver be directed to tender, on a day certain. the ilaid ShareS .to\n\n898 SUPREME cOURT REPC)ltTS '\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.·\n\nMundhra, and Mund.hra be direcred to pay the sum of A Rs. 86,60,000/- to the receiver on that day and to declare that if Mundhra failed to pay llhe amount to the receiver on or befor.e the day, the agreement dated October 30, 1956 and the decree dated February 25, 1964, would stand rescinded. This application was allowed by Masood J. ·\n\nThe learn¢ judge overruled <the objection of Mundhra that the application was not maintainable and held that it was maintainable under section 35 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, notwithstandinp; the repeal of that Act by the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as the appellant had an accrued right under the section to make the application even before the repeal.\n\nThe learned judge then found that Mundhra was not keen in paying the purchase money and getting transfer of the 51 per cent shares for. the reason that t:e injunction granted by the Court in the decree in suit No. 600 of 1961 restraining the appellent from voting except in accordance with the instruction of Mundhra made him virtually lthe owner of 100 per cent shares D in Turner Morrison, and if without paying any amount for the\n\n51 per cent shares of Turner Morrison, he got control of Turner Morrison, it was to his interest not to pay anything to the appellant.\n\nAs regards the objection by Mundhra that since Turner Morrison claimed a lien on the 51 per cent shares and, therefore, the E llant was not in a position to deliver the shares free from encumbrance, he held that there was no bona-fides in the claim of Turner Morrison : firstly because !the lien was not set up by Turner Morrison in its written statement in the suit filed by Mundhra for specific 'Performance, secondly because in the suit filed by l'urner Morrison claiming the lien, Mundhra, who was F interested in rthe shares upon which the lien was claimed, was not made a party and thirdly for the reason that by his letter dated November 29, 1955. Mundhra had agreed that Turner Morrison would pay the income tax liabilities of Hungerford to the extent of Rs. 46 lakhs. The learned 'Judge found it impossible to be lieve that Mundhra had no knowledge about the suit filed by Turner Morrison claiming the lie11 a& he was m complete control G of Turner Morrison at the time the Suit was ana s8id that TurDer MorrisOn and.Mun.dhra were colluding with each other to defeat the apPellant in its attcmi't to get ilhe purchase money from Mundhra and that suit No . .2005 of 1965 was inStituted with the connivan~ of Mundhra. The .carDed 'udge a15o. fourid that even if Turner Morrison l, u\\d a lien on th~ share$, sin, ce there was no H covenant. for title,\" Mundhra wa8. not iustified in declining to tUe dtli:VetY of the . $hares on the score that TUrner. Morrisonliaa a lien u'POri the shares. · ·\n\nHUNGERFORD INVESTMENT v. H. MUNDHRA (Mathew, J.) 699\n\nA The learned judget after evaluating all the circumstances ukimartely came to the conclusion that Mundhra committed breach of the contract which he was directed specifically to perform, that\n\nbe created a situation which made it practically impossible for hlm to perform his part of !the obligation under the decree and that the agegtent dated October 30, 1956 and the decree <Wed 8 February 25, 1964, for specific performance must be rescinded.\n\nThe learned judge, therefore, appointed the receiver in suit No. 2005 of 1965 as receiver of the 51 per cent shares and directed Mundhra to pay Rs. 86,60,000/- to the receiver within a fortnight from the date of the order and the receiver to hand over the 51 per cent of the shares to Mundhra's solicitors if the amount c was paid as directed. The receiver was also directed to pay the amount to tbe solicitors of Hungerford. The stay order passed by Ray J. on March 2, 1964, was vacated and liberty was given to the Certificate Officer or lthe Tax Recovery Officer, 24 Parganas to take such steps against Mundhra as he thought fit.\n\nIn default of -payment of Rs. . 86,60,000/- by Mundhra to the receiver within the time specified, the Court directed that the con- D tract arid th_~ decree would stand rescinded and Hungerford absolved from all obligations under the said contract and the decree. ' Against the decision, the appellant filed appeal No. 148 of 1969 before a Division Bench of the Court and Mundhra .filed a E cross-obiection.\n\nThe appellalte Court found that if Mundhra was really interested in getting transfer of the shares by paying the money, he would not have allowed th~ opportunity to acquire the shares under the order dated July 13, 1966, to slip by, that Mundhra knew of the order of July 13, 1966, and also of the opportunity F given to him by the order to get delivery of the shares on payment of the purchase money, but that he did not avail of the opportunity for the reason that, if without ' paying money, he could virtually enjoy the .same advanta~. it would be foolish\n\nfrom a businessman's point of 'view to invest any amount in purchasing the shares. The Court observed :\n\n\"A busines.sman who files a suit for specific performance of a contract to buy shares and prosecutes that suit to a successful termination in his favour, will not fritter away the benefit under the decree except for a higher or superior advantage and that advantage Mundbra got under the decree in suit No. 600 of 1961.\"\n\nThe Court then held that application filed by the appellant for rescission ofthe contract and the decreo was not main .. tainable. The reasoning of the Court was two-fold. The Court\n\n700 SUPR.EMB COUllT ltBPOR.1S\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nsaid that the appellant had no accrued right to apply for rescission A under section 35 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, which would survive the.repeal of that Act by the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and so, no application for rescission would lie under section 35\n\nof the old Act read with section 6 of the General Oauses Act.\n\n1897. Jt then held that since section 28 of the Specific Relief Act,. 1963, only provided for rescission of a dec~· for specific B performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property, the application was illlcompetent under the section and allowed the appeal and cross-objection in part.\n\nWe do not think .that the appellant had an accrued right for c rescission of the contract or the decree for specific performance under section 35 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, when the Act was repealed by the Specific Relief Act, 1963, on March 1, 1964.\n\nIt may be recalled that .the decree in suit No. 600 of 1961 was passed on February 25, 1964 ind that the application for resci!~ sion of the decree was filed on March 21, 1967. Section 35 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, so far as it is material for the pur- D pose of this case, provided that where a decree .for specific performance of a contract of sale or of a contract to take a lease ha~\n\nbeen made and the purchaser or lessee makes default in payment of the purchase money, which the Court has ordered him to pay, the decree may be rescinded as regards the party in default either by a suit or by an application. The right to rescind the decree E under the section can arise only if the purchaser makes default in paying the purchase money ordered to be paid under the decree.\n\nBefore the lapse of a reasonable time from the date of the decree, the appellant could have no right to have the decree rescinded on the ground of default of the purchaser. To put it in other words, the right of the appellant to have the decree rescinded was dependant upon the default of the purchaser in paying the purchase money. Such a default had not occurred when the F Specific Relief Act, 1877, was repealed, as a reasonable time for the performance of the obligation under the dec.ree had not elapsed from the date of the decree.\n\nThe more important reason VJhy there was no default in this ca.~ was that the execution of the decree in suit No. 600 of 1961 was stayed by orders of the trial G and appellate Court till August 26, 1964. We, therefore, agree with the finding of the Div; ision Bench that the appellant had no accrued right on the date of the repeal to file an. application under section 35 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, which was saved under section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The mere right to take advantage of the provisions of an Act is not an H rued right [see Abbott v. The Minister for plans(1)].\n\n(l) [l89S] A.C. 42S.\n\nHUNGERFOIU> INVESTMENT v. H. MUNDHRA (Mathew, J.) 701\n\nWe also agree with the finding of the Division Bench that since section 28 of. the Specific Relief Act, 1963, provides only for an application fox: rescission of a decree for specific performance for the sale or lease of immovable property, no application to rescind\n\na decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell movables, would lie under that section.\n\nThe-question then is whether the application as mamtainable under -any other provision of the law. The Specific Relief, Act, 1963, is not an exhaustive enactment. It does not .consolidate the whole law on the subject. As the preamble would indicate, it--is an Act \".to define and amend the law relating to certain C ' kinds ,.of specific relier•. It does not purport to lay down the law relating -to specific relief in all ts ramifications. -In Ramda.s Khatau & Co. v. Atlas Mills Co. Ltd.(l) it was held that the Specific Relief Act, 18 77, was not exhaustive. 1 In Rahmath Unnissa Begam v. Shimoga Co-operative Bank Ltd. another(2 ) the Court said that the Specific Relief Act, 1877, is foun.ded on English equity jliri.sprudence and that it is permissible to refer to English Law on the subject wherever -the Act did not deal specifically with any topic [see also Firm Kishore Chand Shiva Charan\n\nLal and another v. Budaun Electric Supply Co. Ltd.(')]. Although a matter on which the Act defines the law it might gneral ly be exhaustive, the Act as a whole cannot be considered as exhaustive of -the whole -branch of the law of specific perfoi'Iijance.\n\nIt is settled by 'a long course of decisions of the Indian High Courts that the Court which passes a decree for specific performance retains control over the decree even after the decree has been passed.\n\nIn Mahommadalli Sahib v.\n\nAbdul Khadir Saheb(') it was held at the Court which passes a decree for\n\nspecific performance has .the power to extend the time fixed in the decree for the reason that Court retains control over the decree, that the contract between the parties is not extinguished by the passing of a decree for specific performance and that the contract subsists notwithstanding the passing of the dectee. In Pearisun• dari Dassee v. Hari Charan Mozumdar Chowdhry( 5 ) the Calcutta High Court said that the Court retains control over the proceed- G _ ings even afte~ a decree for specific performance has been passed, that the decree pas~ iJ, l a suit fo.r specific performance is not a final decree and that the st1it .mt be dme4 to be pending even after the. decree. 'n~ same view was taken in Someshwar Dayal. and othrtrs_ v. Widow ofl,-aln:tan Shah and others(8). In A.nandil Pddar v .. Gunendra , Kr. Roy (11fll _ another~~) Raj J.! speaking JI {1) A.I.R.I931 Bombay lSl. - . (2) AJ.R. l9Sl Mysore 59.\n\n(3) /..I.R. (31) 1944 Anahabad 66 at p. 77. (4) (1930) M.LJ. Vol. S9, p. 351.\n\n(5) I.L.R. Calcutta Series. Vol. XV, p. 211. (6) A.I.R. 1958 Allahabad -488.\n\n(7) A.I.R. 1966 Calcutta 107.\n\n702 SUP1lEME COUllT REPORTS\n\n[1972.] 3 S.C.R.\n\nfor , the CoUrt,. said that. the cOOit rewns .control over the matter A even afr passing a deeree for speeific performance and that vir~ tually, theo decree is in the nature of a preliminary one. In Trilieni Tewary and others v. Ramratan Nonia and others(1) it\n\nwas held that the Court retains seisin of the case notwithstanding\n\nthe fact that a decree for specific perfonnance has been passed and that the decree is really in the nature of a preliminary decree.\n\nB Fry in his book(2 ) on Specific Performancestates the law. in\n\nEngland as follows :-\n\n. --\n\n\"It may and not unfrequently does hapPen that after judgment has been given for the specific: performance of a contract, some further relief becomes necessary, in consequence of one or other of the parties making default in the perfonnance of some!}ling which ought under the judgment to be perform~ by him or on his.part; as for instance, where a vendor refuses or is unable to. execute . a proper conveyance of the property, or a purchaser to pay the purchas~ money •..•.•\n\n\"There are two kinds of relief after. judgment for specific performance of which either party. to the contract may, in a proper case, avail himself : ·\n\n\"(i) He may obtain (on motion in the action) on\n\norder appointing a definite time and place for\n\nthe completion Of the . contract by payment of the un-paid purchase-money and delivery Over of the executed conveyance and title deeds, or a period within which the judgment, is to be obeyed, and, if theother party fails to obey tho order, .may thereupon at once issue a writ of sequtration against the dclaulting party's' estate arid effects . . . .. . .• ·~ ·\n\n\"(ii) He may wly t:O the. Gourt _(by ,1notion in tho\n\n G action) for; an rd¢!. rescind~ ~t. 9n. an applice~.tion ~ kind, if 1~ .a~ .that the • party JAOVed agamst. has positively. fused. to cop1plete .. the. tract, , its inun.e4i, ate ... rescissiop\n\n~Y ~; otherwise,. the. on:fF will .. bo for rescission .in default of eompletion within a H t!;...:.!ted.. . ?• . ww . .time~ •..••. •• ~\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1959 Patna 460. (2) Fiy on SpecifiC Performance. 6th Od. p, $46.\n\niluNGDPORD INVESTMENT V. H. MUNDIDt.A. (Mathew, J.) 703\n\nA In Halsbury's laws of EDgland(l) the law is stated as under :-\n\n\"Ancillary relief may be obtained after judgment in an action for specific performance where such further relief becomes necessary ....... .\n\nEither party may also obtain an order rescinding B the contract in default of completion within a fiXed time.\"\n\nAs the Court retained control over the matter despite th~ decree, it was open to the Court, when it was alleged that the\n\nparty moved againsti has positively refused to complete the con~\n\ntract to entertain -the application and order rescission of the. decree c if the allegation was proved. We, therefore, think that the application of the appellant was competent.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of Mundhra that he was always ready and willing to pay the purchase money, but since the ctecree .. did not specify any time for payment of the money, there was no default' on. his part. In other words, the contention was that since D the decree did not specify a time within which the purchase money should. be paid and, since an application for fixing the time was made by the appellant and dismissed by the Gourt, Mundhra cum.ot be.saidto have been in default in not paying , tbb:purehasemoney so that the appellant might apply for rescisiion of the decree. H a contract does not specify the time for performance, E the law will imply that the parties intended that the obligation under the contract should be performed within a reasonable tiine.\n\nSection ~6 Of the Contract Act provides that where, by a contract. a promisor is to perform his promise without a9.plication by the promisee, and no time for perfonnance is specified, the engagement must be perfonned within a reasonable time d the .question F \"what is reasonable time\" is, in each particular case, a question of fict.\n\nWe have already indicated that the contract between the parties was not etinguished by the passing of the decree, that it subsisted notwithstanding the decree. It was an plied term of the contract and, therefore, of the decree passed thereon tUt the\n\nparties w<>uld perform the contract within a reasOilable time. Toput it ia oth¢rwords,- as the contract subsisted desPite the decree- G aDd -.s the decree did not abrogate or modify any f the express .or implied teqns of the contract, it must be presumed .that the pt~\n\nto tho decree had the obligation to complete the contract wtthin a reasonable time.\n\nThe. matter. call Qe !()()ked at. from another angle. Mundhra H by exercising the opti9n to pu, rchase the 31 per cent shares, be--\n\ncame entitled to obtain a conveyance of. the ares trom the appellant on payment of'tb, e purchase money. There was no pro-\n\n(1} Halsbury's Laws of Eng/and 3rd Ed, Vol., 36. 3SJ.S2.\n\n'104\n\nSUPREM:B COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 s.C.R.\n\nvision. in the agreement at what time or withiQ. what period after\n\nthe exercise of the option the appellant should convey the shares\n\nagainst the payment of the purchase nioney. But it was open\n\nto either party to make time essential by intimating the other party after a reasonable period about it after expressing its or his readiness and willingi:less to perform its or his obligation un!kr the contract. That liberty was not taken away because a decree B has been passed for specific performance of the contract without fixing the time for the performance. The appellant could, there~ .fore, have called upon Mundhra to pay the purchase money and\n\ntake delivery of the shares within .a ·ble time. The fact that the decree did not fiX a time for1completing the contract did . not prevent either party from demancling performance from other c party within a reasonable time aild thus make time essential, as the parties had that liberty before the decree was passed and the .decree did not abrogate that liberty in any way, and if the party \\from whom performance was demanded evinced by his conduct that he was unWilling to perform his part, then it was open to the party dainiing performance to rescind the contract and obtain an order from die Court adjudging rescission ol the contract and the D decree thereon. We do not think, in case the Court comes to the conclusion that the party moved against has by conduct evinced an intention not to pedorm his part of the contract, the fact that no time has been fixed in the decree would preclude it from adjudg. ing the contract as rescinded. The observation of Fry already quoted does, not mean .that unless a time is specified in the decree there can be no default. It only means that if the conduct of the\n\nparty moved against is equivocal, an order for rescission will 1:le made only in default of completion within a specified time. Nor can tho observation quoted above f.rom Halsbury's Law$ of England bear any other construction. We have already indicated that section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, deals only with rescission of a decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell or lease itnmovable property and so the terms of the section are hardly relevant in deciding the question whether there can be default without fixing the time for performance in: a decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell movables. We think it unnecessary to decide the question whether, under an_y Circumstances,\n\nthere can be default of performance where a decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell or lease immovable property &>es not speeify the time of perfonnance for the purpose of an application for rescission of the decree.\n\nIt is no doubt true that after the decree in suit No. 600 of 1961,\n\n11 stay was -<>btained by the appeUat)t preventing the execution of H the decree : an appeal was a.J.so l)referred .against that decree and a stay ebtained for the same purpose, from the appeJJate court and\n\nHUNGBRF0RD INVESTMENT V. H. MUNDHllA (Mathew, J.) 705'\n\nA that th~. order continued in force till tbe disposal of the appeal oru August 26, 1965. Till thCll, there can be no question of Mundhra being in default because he was not required by the orders of Coun to. perform his part of the obligation under the' decree. But question is, was he in default after August 26, 1965, in performing\n\nhis part of the obligation under the decree ? Counsel for Mundhra B relied upon the observations in the order of Ray J. passed' on the . application on the Master's sUJllll).ons as well as in tbe.order passed\n\nmthe appeal (No. 2a6 of 1965) th.erefrom on August 18, 1966, to show that there was no offer by the appellant to deliver the sha!e6. and, therefore, Mundhra was not in default in paying the purchase money. It will be recalled that on July 13, 1966, Sen 1: passed c the order in suit No. 2005 of 1965 direc\\ing Mun.dhra to pay the- ·\n\n. purchase price and ~e deliv'etj of the shares from. the l;'eceiver. . The learned judge further directed t the' lien, if any, of Tuiner Morrison would shift to the purchase money to be paid to the receiver. This order, though passed in suit No. 2005 of 1965 in which Mundhra was' not a party, was communicated to him by the 0 letter of the appellant dated January 11, 1967. Even before that, two letters had been sent on July 28 and July 29, 1966, bly the appellant's solicitors to Mundhra asking him to be ready with the. sum to take delivery of the $hares before the Court hearing appeal No. 286 of 1965. This was refused by Mundhra by his letter dated August 2,.1966. In the reply Q(Mdhra.dated Januacy 25, 1967, E to the letter dated January, 11, 19()7, from the appellant, he ised. the objection that the appellant was not in a position to give delivery of the shares aru:t that the order dated July 13, 1966, was not binding on him, as he was .-ot a party. to the suit in which theorder was passed. As the ivcr had the share! in his possession, there was no pOint in the objection raiAed by .Mundhra that the appellant was not in a position to deliver the shares. In other P words, the receiver had the shares in his .-possession, and as therewas an order by the Court directing the n!<:eiver to deliver possession of the shares on payment of the purchase money bject to the order of. the Coun bearing appeal No. 286 of 1965, there was no substance i~ the objection that the appellant was nQt in a opposition to deliver the shares. Mundhra did not ril.ise any objection on the G score that the appell'ate court has not made an'V direction asking\n\nhim to pay the purchase money es against the delivery of the shares by the receiver or that the receiver was not directed by that Court\n\nto deliver the shares. The only Ie2itiniate inference from his conduct is that Mundhra was deliberately putting frd the plea that the appellant was not in a position to deliver the shares and that it was not readv and will~ to nerform its part of the contract only H to avoid oo'ymenf of the _purchase money. Nor is there any substance m the contention of COUDSel for Mund&ra that beCause the\n\nappeiant obtained a stay of the order passed by Masud J •. giving:-\n\n- 1()6 SUPilEME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.I.\n\nMundln:a -a fght's e to pay the purchase money for tlkilag A delivery of e shes. the appel1ant was precludecUi'om c:Ontendilig that MUn.dhra C()mlnit~ delault in the. payment of the amount.\n\nIn other words, there is no. pOmt in the contention of coiiUel that\n\nsince 'the appellant itself obtained a stay of.the order palled bY Masud .J. giving liberty to Mundhra to pay the purchue mo~ within a fortnight from the date of the order, the appellant 1 vented Mundhra from performing his part of the obligation uDder the decree in suit No. 600 of 1961. When the appellant came to the Court with its application for rescission, there was already a rescission of the contract and the decree by.its letter dated Feb ruary '11, 1967, stating that Mundhra had forfeited his right to purchase the 51 per cent shares in pursuance of the decree in suit c No. 600 of' 1961, as he failed to fulfil his obligation in pursuance to the noti6e of the appellant on J anuiu-y 11, '1967. It only wanted a declaration by adjudgment by the (;:ourt that it was justified in doing so.\n\nA court generally adjudicates upon the antecedent rights of the parties. When a Court adjudges rescission of a contract or a decree, it is only concerned with the question whether the person rescinding it was justified in doing so. The Coun does not create D any right which parties did not possess when it makes a declaration that a contract has been validly rescinded.\n\nMerely \"because .. it is necessary for the Court to pass an order of rescission, when a controversy arises, it does not follow that it is the Court t'hat rescinds . the contract.\n\nThe Court is only passing upon the validity of the rescission already made by the party. InAbram Steamship Com- E pany Ltd. and another v. Westville Sipping Company Ltd.(1), their Lordships of the House of Lords said :\n\n\"Where' one party to a contract expresses by word or act in an Ujllequivocai manner that by reason of fraud or essential error of a material kind inducing him to enter int'o the contract he has resolved to rescind it~ an4 refuses to be bound by it, the expression of his electioJl, if justified by the facts, terminates the contract, puts the parties in status quo' ante and restores things, u between them, to the position in which they stood befo~ the contract was entered mto. It may be that the facts impO&e upon the partr desiring to reseid the duty of making\n\nrestitution in mtegrum. If so, he must discharge that duty before the rescissjon iq, in effect accomplished. But if the other party to the contract questions the right of the first to resci; nd, thus obliging the latter to bring. an action at law to enforce the right he has secured for him self by his election, and he later gets a verdi~ it. is an entire mistake to suppose that it is this verdict which by itself terminates· the contract and Testores the anteced.lllt\n\n(1) Law Report$. A))peal Cases, 1923, p. 773 at p. 781.\n\n~GBllFOIID INVBSTMB.NT V. H. ~UNI>Hlt.A (Aftllhew, J.) 707\n\nstatus. Tho verdict, is merely the ju4icial determination of the .fact tht the expreSsiqn by the p!aintift of his eleC-:\n\ntion to rescind was justlfied, was eective, and put an end to the contra\"t . . . . .. \" The rights of the parties became crystallized whon the appel- B lant, by its letter dated February 11, :1967, re&cinded.the contraet\n\nand the decree based thereon and when Masud J. adjudged that the contract and the decree be rescinded. Mundhra cannot,\n\nthrefore, complain that he was prevented by appellant from paying the purchase money in pursuance of the order of Masud J. and resist the prayer for rescission. · c There is no substance in the contention of counsel for Mu_ndhra that the appeUant was not in a position to give a good title to the sl¢'es because Tumer Morrison ha~ .a lion upon the shares. The\n\nquestjn whether Tumet. Morrison has a lien upon the shares has been finally decided by this Court in Appeal No. 1223 (N) of 1970 filed by Turner Morrison, holding 'that they have tno lien in respect D ol these shares. . - It was contended that if Mundhra committed default in payment of the purchase money, the remedy of the appellant was to execute the decree for specific performance as the decree was a decree iD favour Of both the appellant amd Mundhra and that the - d~ ia fivour of the appellant was a decree for JllOney. 1 A decree for specific -perlormanct is a decree. i11 favour of both the plahitiff and tho defendant in the suit In Heramba Chandra Maitra v./YfJiish Chandra Sinha an4 others(1) Rankin CJ., speaking for. e Court, said that a decree fOr specific performance operates ill favour of both plainti1r and defendant and tlra~ the decree . is capable of being executed by either [see .. also Bai Karimtlblbi T\n\nv. A.btkrehman Sayad Banu(2)]. Counsel for Mundhra, therefore,\n\nthat 'it was open to the appc.Uant to have executed e decree\n\nana realiled the purchase money from Mundhra inatead of resort iog to the romedy of rcacisaioo.. Order 21, rule 30 provides for execution of a deCree for.moncy •. That rule can posslb1y have no · application tO the executi~ a dec~ for specific performance, G firstly for tho' reuon that a c mode for execution of a decree for specific pedorma.nce is provided by Order 21, Rule 32 and ..\n\nsecondly, because no decree tor ni*Y ia puaed in a suit tor specific - performance. Order 21, Rule 32 providea as follows:-\n\n. •• ( 1) :WJtere party apwt wh~ a decree for the\n\nH .specific performance of a contract,· or fr reatftution of\n\nconjugal rights,\" for an-injunction, has boon puaed,\n\n~ has had an opportunity of obeying the decree and has .\n\n(J) A.I.R. J~32 Calcutta .579. A.l.R. 1923 ~~ 26.\n\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.'R..\n\nwilfully failed to obey it, the decree may be enforced in the case of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights by the attachment of his property or, in the case of a decree for the specific . performance of a contract or for an injunction by his detentiQl) in the civil prison, or by the attachment of hk property or by both.\n\n( 2) Where the party against whom a. decree for specific pedormance or for an injlinction has been passed is a corporation, the decree may be enforced by the attachment of the property of the corporation or, with the leave of the Court, by the detention in the civil prison of the directors or other principal officers thereof, or by both attachment and dettntion.\n\n( 3) Where any attachment under sub-rule ( 1) or sub-rule (2) has remained in force for one year, if the judgment-debtor has not obeyed the decree and the decree-holder has applied to have the attached property sold, such property may be sol<; i; and out of the proceeds the court may award to the decree-holder such compensation as it thinks fit, and shall pay the balance (if a, iY) to the judgment-debtor on hi~ application. ( 4) Where the judgment-debtor has obeyed the . decree and paid an costs of executing the same which he.· is bound to pay, or where, at the end o[one year frOm the date of the attachmQnt, no application to have the property sold has been made, or if made has been tefused, the attachment shall cease.\n\n( 5) Where a decree for the specific performance of a contract or for an injunction has not been obeyed, the Court may, in lieu of or in addition to all or any of the processes aforesaid, direCt that the act required to be done tnay be done so far as practicable by the decree-holder or some other person appointed b!y the Court, at the oost of the judgmont-debtor. and upon tpe act being done the expenses incui'red may be ascertaillled in such manner as. the Court may direct and may be recovered as if they were included in .the decree.''\n\nThe execution of a decree for specific performance can only\n\nbe in the manner prescn\"'bbO by this rule sub-rule ( 1) of the rule says that if a decree for specific performance is . :not obeyed, the decree isto be enforced by the detention of the party in default in H the civil prison or by attachment of his property or by both. The . detention in the' civil prison of the party who failed to obey the decree and the attacbmetnt of his property are simp1y the means\n\n, HUNGERFORD INVESTMENT v. H. MUNDHRA (Mathew, J.) 70'9\n\nto compel , to obey tpe decree. That is made clear by subrule (3) which says that if the judgment-debtor has failed to obey the decree when the attachment has remained in force for one year the property attached may be sold and out of the proceeds the decree-holder may be awarded such compensation as the Court tb4J.ks fit. Sub--rule ( 5) which provides that the Court may direct tho act required to J>e done may be dQne by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by the court can only refer to an act other than an act of payment of money.\n\nWe de not think that t)le appellant could have executed the decree agat Mundhra as a money decree and realised the purchase money from him. Therefore, if Mundhra refused to pay the purchase money, there was no•hing which. prevented the appellant from applying for rescission of the decree.\n\nIt was then rontended that the attachments of the decree in suit No. 600 of 1961 by the creditors of Mundhra prevented hiri1 from tendering the purchase money to the appellant and take delivery 0f the shares as the attachments prevented him from obtaining satisfaction of the decree by paying the purchase money and obtaining delivery of the shares. In .other words, the contention was that because of the attachments Mundbra cowd not have paiti the.: purchase money to the appellant as that would have Deell in coo.travention of the orders of the. Court attaching the decree. We do not think that there is any substance in this conttion~ If the creditors of Mundhra attached the decree and he was prevtnted from tendering the money because of the attachment, he .has oply to blame himself. The only question with which the Court is eon~ cerned is whether Mundhra has disabled bimsel! from perfOI'IJ$g his part of the obligation under the decree. The inability to pay off the creditors was the proximate cause of the attacbm.Qilts and the responsibility for the same was that of Mundhra. 'The fact that the attachments prevented him from performing his part of the obligation under , the decree or obtaining satisfaction therem -'WOUld not make him any the less a defaulter, so far as the performance of his part of the obligati<¥1. un~ the decree is concerned. Nor is there any substance in the contention of counsel for Mundhra that the attacbmeiJ.t by Bank Hoffman of the 51 per cent shares under the order of the District Judge of Delhi made it im.possil:ie for the appellsm.t tp deliver the shares to Mundhra. as the attachment order directed that the 51 per cent shares should be proclg.ced before the Calcutta High Cpurt for delivery to Mundhra against -paent of the consideration mentioned in the decree _in suit No. 600 of 1961.\n\nWe, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the judgment H under appeal and order the rescission of the decree for specific perfonttance passed in suit No. 600 o_f 1961. We direct hri K.\n\nB. Bose, Barrister, Member, Bar Ltbrary (]ub, Calcutta High 17-L1031Supcl/72 .\n\n.SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1972)3 ~.C.R.\n\n' Court; the receiver apointed in suit No. 2005 of 1965-.:, and who\n\nwaS appointed as receiver of the shares by the proceedings dated July 14, 1969, of Masud J. in suit No. 600 of 1961, .tO pr00uce the 2,295 shares .before this Court and give. custody of the same to the Registrar of this Court. The Registrar will hand them over to the appellant, ·\n\nThe Receiver has informed. this Court that the remuneration the shares in this Court in pursuance of this judgment, .\n\nWe allow the appeal with costs.\n\nORDER\n\nIn modification of our earlier order dated March 9, 1972 we ndw direct the Receiver to deliver the shares to the Registrar of the •Calcutta High Court on the original side within 10 days rrom this date. The Registrar .will handover the shares to Mr. B. M. Bagaria, a Solicitor of the Calcutta High Court; on behalf of Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. ·\n\n(The Receiver has informed this Court that the remuneration due to him has not yet been paid. The Receiver may move the\n\n, alcutta Hi'gh Court for nec.essary orders in this connection.\n\niln. modification of our earlier order dated March 9, 19\"72 \"rtgllrdillg costs we direct that ill Civil Appeal No. 488 of 1971 the costs will be paid by the cootin~ defendants.\n\nV.P.S~ ·\n\nF ,", "total_entities": 175, "entities": [{"text": "HUNGERFORD\n\nINVESTMENT\n\nTRUST\n\nLIMITED (IN\n\nVOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HUNGERFORD INVESTMENT TRUST LIMITED (IN VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION)", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HARIDAS MUNDHRA & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARIDAS MUNDHRA & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. K. MATHEW, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 148, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 151, "end_char": 170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 195, "end_char": 214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 294, "end_char": 299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act", "statute": "Specific Relief Act"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 372, "end_char": 376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act", "statute": "Specific Relief Act"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 380, "end_char": 405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 408, "end_char": 427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 441, "end_char": 446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act", "statute": "Specific Relief Act"}}, {"text": "January, 11, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2982, "end_char": 2999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This orO::r was communicated by the appellant to the respondent on January, 11, 1967, and even before that date the appel~ lant wrote two letters.·to the respondent ':lsking him to be ready with the amount to be paid by him and to take delivery of the shares."}}, {"text": "Gble under the Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5270, "end_char": 5304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5378, "end_char": 5403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5425, "end_char": 5444, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5548, "end_char": 5553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Specific Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "The Specific Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5581, "end_char": 5585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Specific Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "The Specific Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5593, "end_char": 5618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5668, "end_char": 5673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Relief Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5995, "end_char": 6011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6362, "end_char": 6367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "sec1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6638, "end_char": 6642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "Cl1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7408, "end_char": 7411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8156, "end_char": 8161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11640, "end_char": 11645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Chrmdra SinhtJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11995, "end_char": 12009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f707FrH; 708G-H; 709CT\n\nHeramba Chandra Maitra v. J; votish Chrmdra SinhtJ, A.I.R. _1932 CaL 579 and Bai Karimabibi v.\n\nA.bderahman Sayad Banu,\n\nA.I.R. 1923 Bom."}}, {"text": "S 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12666, "end_char": 12669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13138, "end_char": 13157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CI/72\n\nSUPR'EME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.I..\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated September 14, A 1970 of the Calcutta High Court-in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13186, "end_char": 13197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N. Sinha, Lina Seth, M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. B. Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13199, "end_char": 13214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N. Sinha, Lina Seth, M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. N. Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13216, "end_char": 13226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N. Sinha, Lina Seth, M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. K. Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13228, "end_char": 13238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N. Sinha, Lina Seth, M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13240, "end_char": 13251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N. Sinha, Lina Seth, M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Lina Seth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13253, "end_char": 13262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N. Sinha, Lina Seth, M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. M. N. Pombra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13264, "end_char": 13279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N. Sinha, Lina Seth, M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H. K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13284, "end_char": 13294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N. Sinha, Lina Seth, M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. C. Dev", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13316, "end_char": 13325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. C. Dev, Somnath Chatterjee, M. Bose, S. Swarup and 8\n\nP. C. Bhartari, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Somnath Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13327, "end_char": 13345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. C. Dev, Somnath Chatterjee, M. Bose, S. Swarup and 8\n\nP. C. Bhartari, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13347, "end_char": 13354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. C. Dev, Somnath Chatterjee, M. Bose, S. Swarup and 8\n\nP. C. Bhartari, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13356, "end_char": 13365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. C. Dev, Somnath Chatterjee, M. Bose, S. Swarup and 8\n\nP. C. Bhartari, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. C. Bhartari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13373, "end_char": 13387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. C. Dev, Somnath Chatterjee, M. Bose, S. Swarup and 8\n\nP. C. Bhartari, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13412, "end_char": 13421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shanker Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, .N. Khait(ln, Krishna Sen and B. P. Singh, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Shanker Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13423, "end_char": 13436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shanker Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, .N. Khait(ln, Krishna Sen and B. P. Singh, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "D. N. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13438, "end_char": 13449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shanker Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, .N. Khait(ln, Krishna Sen and B. P. Singh, for respondent No."}}, {"text": ".N. Khait(ln", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13451, "end_char": 13463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shanker Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, .N. Khait(ln, Krishna Sen and B. P. Singh, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Krishna Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13465, "end_char": 13476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shanker Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, .N. Khait(ln, Krishna Sen and B. P. Singh, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13481, "end_char": 13492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shanker Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, .N. Khait(ln, Krishna Sen and B. P. Singh, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. S. Khanduja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13517, "end_char": 13531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. Khanduja, Promod Swarup and La/{~ Kohli, for responc dents Nos."}}, {"text": "Promod Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13533, "end_char": 13546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. Khanduja, Promod Swarup and La/{~ Kohli, for responc dents Nos."}}, {"text": "Gobind Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13599, "end_char": 13609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gobind Das and B. D. Sharma, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13614, "end_char": 13626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gobind Das and B. D. Sharma, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "February 25, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13993, "end_char": 14010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nw, J. This is an appeal with certificate from a judgment D of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, setting aside the order of a single judge of the Court allowing an application filed by the appellant for rescission of an agreement for sale dated October 30, 1956, as also the decree dated February 25, 1964, for specific perfonnance of the agreement and for other alternative reliefs s~ified in the application."}}, {"text": "Hungerford Investment Trust Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14117, "end_char": 14152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hungerford Investment Trust Limited, (in voluntary liquidation) hereinafter called 'Hungerford' was the owner of 100 pet cent shares in Turner Morrison & Co., hereinafter called 'Turner\n\nMorrison'."}}, {"text": "Turner Morrison & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14253, "end_char": 14274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hungerford Investment Trust Limited, (in voluntary liquidation) hereinafter called 'Hungerford' was the owner of 100 pet cent shares in Turner Morrison & Co., hereinafter called 'Turner\n\nMorrison'."}}, {"text": "John Geoffrey Turner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14316, "end_char": 14336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "John Geoffrey Turner and Nigel Frederic Turner, both since deceased, were the owners of the 100 per ce.", "canonical_name": "John Geoffrey Turner-"}}, {"text": "Nigel Frederic Turner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14341, "end_char": 14362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "John Geoffrey Turner and Nigel Frederic Turner, both since deceased, were the owners of the 100 per ce."}}, {"text": "Hunerford", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14432, "end_char": 14441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Qt shares of Hunerford ."}}, {"text": "Turner Morrison", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14473, "end_char": 14488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The entire share capital of Turner Morrison F consis!OO of 4,500 fully paid' up ordinary shares of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Turner Morrison"}}, {"text": "Haridas Mundhra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14605, "end_char": 14620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By exchange of letters it was agreed that Haridas Mundhra, bereinafter called 'Mundhra' would purchase from Hungerford, 49 per cem: shares of Turner Morrison.", "canonical_name": "HARIDAS MUNDHRA & OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Hungerford", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14671, "end_char": 14681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By exchange of letters it was agreed that Haridas Mundhra, bereinafter called 'Mundhra' would purchase from Hungerford, 49 per cem: shares of Turner Morrison.", "canonical_name": "Hungerford"}}, {"text": "Mundhra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14767, "end_char": 14774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The agreement also provided for an option to Mundhra to purchase from Hungerford, G the balance of 51 per cent shares of Turner Morrison within 5 years.", "canonical_name": ".Mundhra"}}, {"text": "October 30, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14904, "end_char": 14920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Qlal agreement dated October 30, 1956, was xe cutcd between Hungerford, John Geoffrey Turner- - and Nigel Frederic Turner on the one hand, and British India Corporation\n\nand Haridas Mundhra on the other, embodying the terms of the agreement."}}, {"text": "John Geoffrey Turner-", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14955, "end_char": 14976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Qlal agreement dated October 30, 1956, was xe cutcd between Hungerford, John Geoffrey Turner- - and Nigel Frederic Turner on the one hand, and British India Corporation\n\nand Haridas Mundhra on the other, embodying the terms of the agreement.", "canonical_name": "John Geoffrey Turner-"}}, {"text": "British India Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15026, "end_char": 15051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Qlal agreement dated October 30, 1956, was xe cutcd between Hungerford, John Geoffrey Turner- - and Nigel Frederic Turner on the one hand, and British India Corporation\n\nand Haridas Mundhra on the other, embodying the terms of the agreement."}}, {"text": "April 19,\n\n1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15475, "end_char": 15490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So, on April 19,\n\n1961."}}, {"text": "Feb- B ruary 25, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15792, "end_char": 15813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Mundhra did not want to proceed aainst Turner Morrison, the suiot was dismissed as ainst that company and a decree was passed on Feb- B ruary 25, 1964."}}, {"text": "HWlgerford", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15973, "end_char": 15983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree provided that the agreement relatinst to the sale of 51 per cent ordinary shares of Turner Morrison\n\nout to be soecifically performed and directed HWlgerford to deliver to undhra, the 51 per cent shares against payment of the considerati6n of Rs."}}, {"text": "Hungerford", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16455, "end_char": 16465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hungerford, along with some ather defendants, filed an D appeal from the decree on March 18, 1964 (Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Hungerford"}}, {"text": "March 18, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16538, "end_char": 16552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hungerford, along with some ather defendants, filed an D appeal from the decree on March 18, 1964 (Appeal No."}}, {"text": "August 26, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16740, "end_char": 16755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal was dismissed on August 26, 1964, for the reason that it was withdrawn."}}, {"text": "August 30, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16922, "end_char": 16937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ":E By a Master's summons dated August 30, 1965, Hungerford made an application praying that Mundhra may be directed to implement the decree by paying Rs."}}, {"text": "September 28, 19.65", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17466, "end_char": 17485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application was dismissed on September 28, 19.65, by Justice R, ay, holding that the application was one for execution of the decree in Suit No."}}, {"text": "R, ay,", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17498, "end_char": 17504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application was dismissed on September 28, 19.65, by Justice R, ay, holding that the application was one for execution of the decree in Suit No."}}, {"text": "Hunrford", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17747, "end_char": 17755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hunrford preferred an appeal against the said order (Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Hungerford"}}, {"text": "August 8, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17854, "end_char": 17868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appe.al as dismissed on August 8, 1966."}}, {"text": "November 25, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17956, "end_char": 17973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application of Hungerford for leave to appeal to this Court was also dismissed on November 25, 1968. ·"}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18344, "end_char": 18347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ray, J. made an order dated March 2, 1964, staying the execution of the decree until cancellation of the notice by the Certificate Officer or until the Certificate Officer or the debtor applied for execution of the decree."}}, {"text": "Champaran Sugar Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18687, "end_char": 18711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "600 of 1961 was also attached in execution of three other decrees, namely the decree obtained by Champaran Sugar Co. Ltd. and B British India Corporation Ltd. in sllirt No."}}, {"text": "B British India Corporation Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18716, "end_char": 18748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "600 of 1961 was also attached in execution of three other decrees, namely the decree obtained by Champaran Sugar Co. Ltd. and B British India Corporation Ltd. in sllirt No."}}, {"text": "Kanpur Sugar Work! lAd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18834, "end_char": 18856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Civil Judge, Kanpur and those obtained by Kanpur Sugar Work!"}}, {"text": "Britisp India Corporation Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18862, "end_char": 18892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Britisp India Corporation Ltd. in suit No."}}, {"text": "Court of Second Civil Judge, Kanpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18924, "end_char": 18959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "178 of 1960 in the Court of Second Civil Judge, Kanpur and the Life Insurance Corporation of India in special appeal No."}}, {"text": "Life Insurance Corporation of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18968, "end_char": 19003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "178 of 1960 in the Court of Second Civil Judge, Kanpur and the Life Insurance Corporation of India in special appeal No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19045, "end_char": 19068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "299 of 1961 of the High Court of Allahabad."}}, {"text": "Bank Hoffman A.G.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19348, "end_char": 19365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In February, 1965, Bank Hoffman A.G. obtained a decree D from Queen's Bench Division, London, for £657,345-17-9d.", "canonical_name": "Bank Hoffman A.G."}}, {"text": "Romanigo Holdings", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19515, "end_char": 19532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "per cent per annum from the date of decree\n\nagainst Romanigo Holdings S.A.H., a holding company of Hungerford and also against Hungerford."}}, {"text": "Bank Hoffman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19602, "end_char": 19614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bank Hoffman executed the decree in the Court of Distri~ Judge, Delhi, and got the 51 per cent shares of Hungerford atached.", "canonical_name": "Bank Hoffman A.G."}}, {"text": "Court of Distri~ Judge, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19642, "end_char": 19671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bank Hoffman executed the decree in the Court of Distri~ Judge, Delhi, and got the 51 per cent shares of Hungerford atached."}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcll'tta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19834, "end_char": 19858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Judge ordered the attachment and directed .. that the 51 per ctnt B shares be produced in the High Court of Calcll'tta for delivery to Mundhra against payment of consideration mentioned in the sj, eCific Perf9!manee decree. ·"}}, {"text": "December 12, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20322, "end_char": 20339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Liquidators of Hungerford wrote on December 12, 1964, to Turner Morrison to deliver the scripts of 707 shares to M/s Sanderson and Margo~!,"}}, {"text": "Sanderson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20404, "end_char": 20413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Liquidators of Hungerford wrote on December 12, 1964, to Turner Morrison to deliver the scripts of 707 shares to M/s Sanderson and Margo~!,"}}, {"text": "Margo~", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20418, "end_char": 20424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Liquidators of Hungerford wrote on December 12, 1964, to Turner Morrison to deliver the scripts of 707 shares to M/s Sanderson and Margo~!,", "canonical_name": "Margo~"}}, {"text": "Margo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20528, "end_char": 20533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tho request G fo, r delivery of 707 shares was repeatt:4 by Sanderson an~ Margo a on December 22, 1964.", "canonical_name": "Margo~"}}, {"text": "December 22, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20539, "end_char": 20556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tho request G fo, r delivery of 707 shares was repeatt:4 by Sanderson an~ Margo a on December 22, 1964."}}, {"text": "Turner Mornson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20558, "end_char": 20572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Turner Mornson rote a letter on January 11.", "canonical_name": "Turner Morrison"}}, {"text": "January 11. 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20590, "end_char": 20606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Turner Mornson rote a letter on January 11."}}, {"text": "K. N. Srivllstava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20610, "end_char": 20627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1965 to K. N. Srivllstava,.", "canonical_name": "K. N. Srivllstava"}}, {"text": "January 13,\n\n1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20775, "end_char": 20792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 13,\n\n1965, Turner Morrison's solicitors wrote to Mls . ."}}, {"text": "Sanderson -and Morgan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20840, "end_char": 20861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sanderson -and Morgan that 707 shares had become 1the .property of Mundhra H. and, for the first time, also claimed that thetit was a lietl on the shares."}}, {"text": "January 18, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20998, "end_char": 21014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 18, 1965, K. N. Srivastava, the Income TU."}}, {"text": "K. N. Srivastava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21016, "end_char": 21032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 18, 1965, K. N. Srivastava, the Income TU.", "canonical_name": "K. N. Srivllstava"}}, {"text": "Tutiiler Morrison", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21257, "end_char": 21274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tutiiler Morrison instituted a suit against Hungerford (Suit No."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Comt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21344, "end_char": 21362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2005 of 1965) in' the Calcutta High Comt claiming' Rs."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21537, "end_char": 21547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Inoome Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21559, "end_char": 21586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21718, "end_char": 21728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Inoome Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Inoome Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "July 8, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21874, "end_char": 21886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Turner Morrison made an ex-parte application in the suit on July 8, 1966, for appointment of a receiver in respect of the 2,295 shares."}}, {"text": "K. B. Bose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21954, "end_char": 21964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. K. B. Bose was appointed receiver and he took possession of 1,588 shares froq1 the First National City Bank and 707 shares from llhe Police."}}, {"text": "First National City Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22037, "end_char": 22061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. K. B. Bose was appointed receiver and he took possession of 1,588 shares froq1 the First National City Bank and 707 shares from llhe Police."}}, {"text": "July 13, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22098, "end_char": 22111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 13, 1966, Sen J.\n\npassed an order confirming the order of appointment of the receiver and directing that the receiver will be at liberty to deliver the 51 per cent of shares to Mundhra on payment of Rs."}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22113, "end_char": 22116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 13, 1966, Sen J.\n\npassed an order confirming the order of appointment of the receiver and directing that the receiver will be at liberty to deliver the 51 per cent of shares to Mundhra on payment of Rs."}}, {"text": "Mundhr~", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22477, "end_char": 22484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order also provided that if Mundhr~ takes the shares on payment of tthe price directed to be paid by the decree, or in direction of the Coun of appeal, the lien if any, as claimed by Turner Morrison will shift on to the money which the receiver would £et from Mundhra.", "canonical_name": ".Mundhra"}}, {"text": "September 2, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22866, "end_char": 22883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The stay was refused but the appeal was partly allowed on September 2, 1968, by setting aside the direction given to the receiver to tender the shares to Mundhra as also the direction that the lien of Turner Morrison would shift to.the purchase money to be paid by Mundhra."}}, {"text": "Mat:ch 21, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23086, "end_char": 23101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Mat:ch 21, 1967, the application from which the present appeal arises, was made by Hungerford (the appellant here) before the High Court."}}, {"text": "October 30,\n\n1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23323, "end_char": 23340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was prayed that the agreement dated October 30,\n\n1956, and the deee dated February 25, 1964, passed in suit No."}}, {"text": "Mundhra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23497, "end_char": 23504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "600 of 1961 be rescinded, that the injunction granted by the decree in the suit be vacated unless Mundhra (the 1st respondent here) deposits Rs.", "canonical_name": ".Mundhra"}}, {"text": "Masood", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24225, "end_char": 24231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was allowed by Masood J. ·\n\nThe learn¢ judge overruled <the objection of Mundhra that the application was not maintainable and held that it was maintainable under section 35 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, notwithstandinp; the repeal of that Act by the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as the appellant had an accrued right under the section to make the application even before the repeal."}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24373, "end_char": 24383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24391, "end_char": 24416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Act by the Specific Relief Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24454, "end_char": 24490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "November 29, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25803, "end_char": 25820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the lien was not set up by Turner Morrison in its written statement in the suit filed by Mundhra for specific 'Performance, secondly because in the suit filed by l'urner Morrison claiming the lien, Mundhra, who was F interested in rthe shares upon which the lien was claimed, was not made a party and thirdly for the reason that by his letter dated November 29, 1955."}}, {"text": "s8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26163, "end_char": 26165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "8 February 25, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27105, "end_char": 27124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the obligation under the decree and that the agegtent dated October 30, 1956 and the decree <Wed 8 February 25, 1964, for specific performance must be rescinded."}}, {"text": "March 2, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27632, "end_char": 27645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The stay order passed by Ray J. on March 2, 1964, was vacated and liberty was given to the Certificate Officer or lthe Tax Recovery Officer, 24 Parganas to take such steps against Mundhra as he thought fit."}}, {"text": "Mundbra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29145, "end_char": 29152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court observed :\n\n\"A busines.sman who files a suit for specific performance of a contract to buy shares and prosecutes that suit to a successful termination in his favour, will not fritter away the benefit under the decree except for a higher or superior advantage and that advantage Mundbra got under the decree in suit No.", "canonical_name": ".Mundhra"}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29509, "end_char": 29519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29527, "end_char": 29552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Act by the Specific Relief Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29593, "end_char": 29629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29685, "end_char": 29695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act by the Specific Relief Act, 1963", "statute": "Act by the Specific Relief Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29722, "end_char": 29731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act by the Specific Relief Act, 1963", "statute": "Act by the Specific Relief Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29790, "end_char": 29800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act by the Specific Relief Act, 1963", "statute": "Act by the Specific Relief Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29808, "end_char": 29827, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30202, "end_char": 30212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act by the Specific Relief Act, 1963", "statute": "Act by the Specific Relief Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30220, "end_char": 30245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Act was repealed by the Specific Relief Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30256, "end_char": 30305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "March 1, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30310, "end_char": 30323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not think .that the appellant had an accrued right for c rescission of the contract or the decree for specific performance under section 35 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, when the Act was repealed by the Specific Relief Act, 1963, on March 1, 1964."}}, {"text": "March 21, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30487, "end_char": 30501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "600 of 1961 was passed on February 25, 1964 ind that the application for resci!~ sion of the decree was filed on March 21, 1967."}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30503, "end_char": 30513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act was repealed by the Specific Relief Act, 1963", "statute": "the Act was repealed by the Specific Relief Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30521, "end_char": 30546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Such a default had not occurred when the F Specific Relief Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31445, "end_char": 31513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32014, "end_char": 32024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Such a default had not occurred when the F Specific Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "Such a default had not occurred when the F Specific Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32032, "end_char": 32057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32081, "end_char": 32090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Specific Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "the Specific Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32098, "end_char": 32123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32394, "end_char": 32404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32413, "end_char": 32438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33211, "end_char": 33230, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Court said that the Specific Relief Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33336, "end_char": 33381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "English Law on the subject wherever -the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33468, "end_char": 33512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Raj J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35001, "end_char": 35007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Roy (11fll _ another~~) Raj J.!"}}, {"text": "S9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35145, "end_char": 35147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.I.R. 1958 Allahabad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35207, "end_char": 35228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6) A.I.R. 1958 Allahabad -488."}}, {"text": "B Fry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35778, "end_char": 35783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B Fry in his book(2 ) on Specific Performancestates the law."}}, {"text": "S2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40202, "end_char": 40204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 42206, "end_char": 42213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor can tho observation quoted above f.rom Halsbury's Law$ of England bear any other construction."}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42274, "end_char": 42284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42292, "end_char": 42317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Tuiner Morrison", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44314, "end_char": 44329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned judge further directed t the' lien, if any, of Tuiner Morrison would shift to the purchase money to be paid to the receiver.", "canonical_name": "Turner Morrison"}}, {"text": "July 28 and July 29, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44606, "end_char": 44631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even before that, two letters had been sent on July 28 and July 29, 1966, bly the appellant's solicitors to Mundhra asking him to be ready with the."}}, {"text": "January, 11, 19()7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44923, "end_char": 44941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the reply Q(Mdhra.dated Januacy 25, 1967, E to the letter dated January, 11, 19()7, from the appellant, he ised."}}, {"text": ".Mundhra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45282, "end_char": 45290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in his possession, there was no pOint in the objection raiAed by .Mundhra that the appellant was not in a position to deliver the shares.", "canonical_name": ".Mundhra"}}, {"text": "Masud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46417, "end_char": 46422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor is there any substance m the contention of COUDSel for Mund&ra that beCause the\n\nappeiant obtained a stay of the order passed by Masud J •. giving:-\n1()6 SUPilEME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.I.\n\nMundln:a -a fght's e to pay the purchase money for tlkilag A delivery of e shes. the appel1ant was precludecUi'om c:Ontendilig that MUn.dhra C()mlnit~ delault in the.", "canonical_name": "Masud J."}}, {"text": "~GBllFOIID INVBSTMB.NT V. H.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49414, "end_char": 49442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~GBllFOIID INVBSTMB.NT V. H. ~UNI>Hlt."}}, {"text": "Aftllhew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49455, "end_char": 49463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A (Aftllhew, J.) 707\n\nstatus."}}, {"text": "Tumer Morrison", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50250, "end_char": 50264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c There is no substance in the contention of counsel for Mu_ndhra that the appeUant was not in a position to give a good title to the sl¢'es because Tumer Morrison ha~ .a lion upon the shares.", "canonical_name": "Turner Morrison"}}, {"text": "Tumet. Morrison", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50315, "end_char": 50330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nquestjn whether Tumet.", "canonical_name": "Turner Morrison"}}, {"text": "Rankin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51005, "end_char": 51011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i11 favour of both the plahitiff and tho defendant in the suit In Heramba Chandra Maitra v./YfJiish Chandra Sinha an4 others(1) Rankin CJ.,"}}, {"text": "Order 21, rule 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51453, "end_char": 51470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 21, Rule 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51718, "end_char": 51735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 21, Rule 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51828, "end_char": 51845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Deell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56005, "end_char": 56010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "purchase money to the appellant as that would have Deell in coo.travention of the orders of the."}}, {"text": "District Judge of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 57019, "end_char": 57042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor is there any substance in the contention of counsel for Mundhra that the attacbmeiJ.t by Bank Hoffman of the 51 per cent shares under the order of the District Judge of Delhi made it im.possil:ie for the appellsm.t tp deliver the shares to Mundhra."}}, {"text": "K.\n\nB. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 57527, "end_char": 57538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We direct hri K.\n\nB. Bose, Barrister, Member, Bar Ltbrary (]ub, Calcutta High 17-L1031Supcl/72 ."}}, {"text": "Masud J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57803, "end_char": 57811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and who\n\nwaS appointed as receiver of the shares by the proceedings dated July 14, 1969, of Masud J. in suit No.", "canonical_name": "Masud J."}}, {"text": "B. M. Bagaria", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 58411, "end_char": 58424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Registrar .will handover the shares to Mr. B. M. Bagaria, a Solicitor of the Calcutta High Court; on behalf of Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. ·\n\n(The Receiver has informed this Court that the remuneration due to him has not yet been paid."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_711_730_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "TURNER MORRISON AND CO., LTD.\n\nHUNGERFORQ INVESTMENT TRUST LTD.\n\nMarch 9. 1972 B . [K. S. HEODE AND K. K. :!VIATH.Ew, 11.]\n\nEstoppti-P!omissory estoppelcope of-App/lcab/ll:y of doctrlru.\n\nI Company Law--lncorp, orated CompanieJ-R'esidmu of-Ultra CompfJIJ authorised by resolution ID dixhmge rax /iob/1/(y of JwldJiw company to which dividends due not distribuud-lf ultra vires tht com- C p<Jny's powers.\n\n Limitation Ac(. 1963--S'ection 1S(S)~Applicability to lnC07pOrtllu companies--Company-When can be said to be re:ridinll In In.di4 tl1ld constqurntly noJ \"absent\" from the country.\n\nThe rule of estopple has gained new dimensions ln re~:ent years and a new c)as5 of estoppel, vir. .• promis:sory estoppel hu come to be recoc- D ni!l!d by Courts.\n\nWhere parties ent.:r into 111 greemeot which il intenlk!d to cte<~!e legal relations between them and in punuaooe of ax:h arrangement om party make; a promise to the other which he kiiOII'S wiU be acted on and which i5 in fact acted on by the pi'001isce, 1be Court will treat the promise at finding on the promisor to the extent that it will not allow him to act inconsi&ttntly with it ven allhoug!i m, mise may not be supported by consideration in the strict .~. n21o, I 723Cl .\n\nHungerford Investment Co. owo:d hundred per c.ent shares.~~~ Morrison & Co. During the assessment yean 1939-~~ to v~. the lat!er did not disrribute dividends and t~ undtstnbuted. dividc:Dds were utilised by it as working apital. Jn all thoec yean tbe\n\n111~ utboriti~ took proceedings under s. 23-A f tho Income Tf ~!'gertord.\n\nand the deemed dividenc4 were assessed 10. the handl 0 Turner Mor f But, yur after yo:ar trom 1939 to 19S4, the Dtnecto!'.l ot 'ubi to JSk rison PUled a resoltion to the effect that it would be incqUitsel~ sboU!d ~UD&erford to pay the talt levied and that Tume~ Morruon ' b 'I\\II1Ief\n\nd~.tharge that liability. The rcaolutions were U[P~~re vidalda , MomSOQ by PlYinll aU the. taxes due from Hunger 0 than two and a n declared Hungerford would have got m~ were not debt~ ,,.... tunea the talt paid on ita behalf.\n\nTho paymcn as debll dUtJ ftcm 0 the accoont of Hungerford; nor were they sh~oer MorriJoD tude\n\nUO.terford in the btlanoe 1hects. At no tune • 'd. 1o. 195~ tho any dt:inand on Hungerford to rimbune tho rn':J::!e.r by ·~ trol of T~I\"'ICT Morrison chang.ed hand•th4u liability' of HUoam_ .. ,1 ... oer Morr110n under-toolc to dt.chuge e n died • - 10 the extent of Ri. 46 lakhs. 14 1965 Turner r.ult wu d!slllt.od r~\" Hunpford for recovery of thJ 'd' Pf~ the plea ot It\n\nClio e 1•PilO:II ro thia Court Hunaeth Of It ra rcsoiU4ioP• w~!\" of d'l. pPe • Turner Morrbon ur~ at 1 rcprcJCJtat.iOIII lbeY 1~\" to do aomcthlng In future; they ere not anY C()QiidentlOO. r tb8 nd. at those promise• were nor .upportcd 'jr gerford arsued ·~ •t!ord no ltaal bula to reslat the c:lalm. pOl'~ by eoliSid rom,'\" malt: under ~~ rc.solut1ons wcro au .\n\nSUPREM'E COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nin as mu~~ as Hungelrford, in response to those promises, refrained .. from\n\nenforc!ing the right to hav~ the profits distributed as dividends.\n\nHeld, that by acting on the basis of. the representation made by Turner Morrisott Hungerford placed itself in a disadvantageous position,\n\nand therefore, the pleas of promissory estoppel had to be sustained. [122B-CJ\n\nUnion of India v . .Indo Afghan Agencies Ltd., {1968] 2 S.C.R. 366, Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd., ~19471 1 K.B. 130, Combe v. Combe, [1951] 2 K.B. 215, Tool Metal Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Electric Co. Ltd., [1955] 2 All B.R. 657 and Robuton v. Minister of Pensions [1949] 1 K.B. 227, referred to.\n\nIt was urged on beh:ili of Turner Morrison that the authority given to it to discharge the tax liabilities of Hungerford were ultra vires its powers and, therefore, provided no legal basis to resist the plain, claim,\n\nHeld, that Turner Morrison had not acted ultra vires its powers. The nondistribution df the dividents had augmented the working capital of the company thus affording it facility to earn more profits. Any step takn\n\nto augment the working capital of the company was undoubtedly incidental to the business of the company and, further, tm same was not for the attainment of e objects mentioru:d in the memorandum. When Turner Morrison paid the tax due from Hungerford, in substance, though not in form, it was distributing a portion of its o:1ssets to the 100 . per cent share holder of the company, but without reducing its capital. P26Hl\n\nEvn on the assumption that the suit claim was otherwise good, Hungerford urged, it was barred by limitation. It was contended o.tf\n\nbehalf of Turner Morrison that in view of s. 15(5) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the claim made, leaving aside the claim made in re8pecf of the assessment for the assessment years 1955-1956, was not. barred, because, Hungerford was a non resident company never present in India, and therefore, under the section the time durini which \"~ defendant has been absent from India\" had to be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of .limitation., Held, that the suit was barred by limitation: (a) Turner Morrison had waived the lien it might have had CNer t~ shares held by Hungerford. Hence the only claim that lilmer Morrison could have made against Hunford was a money claim. (b) The sl, lit was governed by. the l.imition Act 1963, which fixed a period of three years for money payable, The !llllOUnts aimed, except those in teSpect of the asseS&ment fui\" the oassessment year 1955-1956, were all paid before November, 15, 1%2.\n\nThefore; they were barred by limitation. So far as the payment made m respect of the asses!lmcnt yesr\n\n1955-56 was concerned, Turner Morrison h~ no claim against . Hungerford, because, under the amended s. 23A of the Income Tax Act, 1922, that liability was .of the Turner Morrison itself. (c) Section. IS(5) of the share holders of Turner Morrison.\n\nUnder these circumstances, it that the provision does not apply to incorporated companies at all or, alt:tnatively, that the incorporated compllllies must be held to reside .in places where they carry on thetadtivities and thus be present in all tboee plac:, es.\n\nFctually a company cannot either be present in India or abient from India. But it may have a domicile or residence jn India. 1be Board of Directo!l of Hungerford . used to meet in India now and then. It was, through its representatives, atoonding the general mectin~~; of the share holders of Turnet Morrison. Under .these circumstances, it . must be held to have been Ie$iding in this country and con5equently\n\nn<)t a*nt from, this country. Hence, s. 15(5) cannot afford any as&is tance to Hurner Morrison to.Silve the bar of limitation. f727H-728C..730CT\n\nTURNER MORRISON V. HUNGERFORD (Hegde, /.) 113\n\nDicey's Conflict of Laws, New York Life Insurance Company v.\n\nPublic Trustee, f1924] 2 Ch. 201, Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren, 5 HL.C. 416 and Sayaji Rao Gaikwar of Baroda v. Madhavrao Raghunathrao, A . I. R. 1929 Bom. 14, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : C, A. No. 1223 of 1970. \"\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated June 23rd/24th, 1969 of the Calcutta High Court jR Appeal from Original Decree No. 203 of 1968. A. K. Sen, Shankar Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, N. Khaitan, Krishna Sen and .B. P. Singh, for the appellant\n\nS. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N.\n\nSinha, Lina Seth; M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHEDGE J. This appeal by certificate is by the plaintiffappellant, Turner, Morrison Co. Ltd. (to be hereinafter referred to as Turner Morrison) from. the decision of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. The Division Bench affirmed the decion of the trial cou\"rt dismissing the plaintiff's . suit.\n\nIn the sult Turner Morrison claimed a decree for a sum of Rs. 1,27,67,052/16 P. The claim was made on the ground that the plaintiff had paid either as an agent or on behalf of the defen-. dant Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. (in voluntary liquidation) (to be hereinafter refeqed to as the HungerfOrd) a sum of Rs. 79,70,802/- as super-tax which it was entitled t~ be reimbursed. To that sum a sum of Rs. 47,96,250/16 P. was added as interest in the shape of \"damages. In respect of that claim the appellant claimed a paramount lien on the 2295 shares owned by Hungerford in the.plaintiff-company. The defendant resisted the ' swt on variops grounds. It denied that the plaintiff had paid the amounts shown in the plaint-schedule or it was liable to be reimbursed the payments made, if any. It also de.nied its liability . to pay 'interest on the amounts that might have been paid. Further\n\nit pleaded that the suit was barred by estoppel, waiver and acquiescence. It also pleaded the bar of limitation. In addition it pleaded that the !ien claimed had been waived and that the suit was not properly instituted. According to the defendant, the suit was not a bona fide one. It was one of the manipulations of Haridas Mundhra to get at the defendants' 2295. shares the plaintiff-company without paying for them.\n\nThe trial. court dismissed the plaintiff's suit holding that the claim in question was barred by \"estoppel, waiver or acquie- .scence\". It held that it was also barred by.limitation. It opmeid\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT£ [l972J 3 S.C,:~R.\n\nthat the liability to pay tl; le tax in question was the joint liability A of Turner Morrison as well as Hungerford and the same having 1:.1een discharged by the fonner, it had no claim on Hungerford.\n\nIt opined that the suit was a dishonest attempt on the part of Haridas Mundhra to absolve his liability: for paying for the 2295 shares in respect of which he had obtained a decree for specific perfonnance.\n\nThe appellate court affinned some of the findings D of the trial court.\n\nIn order to appreciate the various contentions advanced before this Court, it is necessary briefly to refer to the history of the case.\n\nHungerford was the owner of 100 per cent shares of Turner.\n\nMorrison.\n\nJohn Geoffrey Turner and Nigel Frederic Turner C (both since deceased) were the owners of the 100 per cent shares of Hungerford. As can be seen from the records, Turner Morrison was a prosperous company. Though that company was making enormous profits every year, it did not distribute any portion of those profits as dividends during the assessment years 1939·1940 to 1955-56.\n\nThe profits that should have been aaib. o able for distributing as dividends were kept back by the .company\n\nand used as working capital. In all those years the income-tax authorities took proceedings under s. 23-A of the Indian Incometax- Act, 1922. Thereafter the \"deemed dividends\" were assessed in the hands of Hungerford.\n\nBut year after year the Directors of Turner Morrison passed a resolution to the effect that it would be inequitable to ask Hungerford to pay the tax levied. and .that E Turner Morrison itself should discharge that liability.\n\nThose resolutions were duly implemented by Turner Morrison by paying aH-the taxes due from Hunerford. In about the middle cf 1955. Haridas Mundhra entered mto negotition with Nigel Tur.ner for purchasing all the shares of Turner Morrison.\n\nBy exchange . of letters in November and December of 1955, Hungerford agreed F to sell and Mundhra agreed to purchase 49 pe; r cent shares of Turner Morrison.\n\nThe agreement also prQvided for an option to Mundhra to purchase from Hungerford the balance of 51 per cent shares of Turner Morrison within five years for the price agreed upon.\n\nA formal agreement in that regard was entered between Hungerford, John Geoffrey Turner, Nigel Turner, British G India Corporation (a nominee of Mundhra) and Mundhra on October 30, 1_956.\n\nIn pursuance of that agreement Mu!ldhra purchased 49 per cent shares of Hungerford. Thereafter as con\n\ntemplated in that agreement Hungerford went into voluntary liquidation.\n\nOn October 3 L 1957 two documents came to be executed.\n\nOne is a deed of guarantee and indemnity.\n\nThat was a 'tripartite agreement.\n\nThe first party to that deed was Turner 8 : Morrison.\n\nThe second party was John Geoffrey Turner and Nigel Frederick Turner and the third party was Hungerford.\n\n. !\n\n------~\n\n••• l. ;,]' =f\n\nTURNER MORRISON V. HUNGERFORD (Hegde; J.) 715\n\nthat deed after setting uut thl! agreement between Hungerford and Mundhra, it was stated:\n\n\"~OW TijlS DEED WITNESSETH that in consideration of the liquidators having at the request of the Company (Turner Morrison).; the said John Geoffrey Turner and Nigel Frederick Turner agreed (as is testified by their being parties to and executing these presents) to distribute the assets of Hungerford in specie\n\namongt the contributories of Hungerford (such contributories being the said John Geoffrey Turner and Nigel Frederick Turner) and in consideration of the premises.\n\n1. The Company and the said John Geoffrey Tur-· ner and Nigel Frederick Turner hereby jointly and severally undertake to pay and/or satisfy all claims for or in respect of Income-tax and Super-tax which is or are not payable or recoverable or may at any time be payable 0r recoverable under the Indian Income-tax. Act by or from Hungerford and which payments are in fact'legally\n\nenforced and made.\n\n2. The Company and the said John Geoffrey Turner and. Nigel Frederick Turner hereby jointly and .. severally -covenant with the Liquidators and each of.\n\nthem that the company and the said John :Geofftey Turner and e said Nigel Frederick Turner will iointly and severally at all times hereinafter keep indemnified _. the Liquidators and each of them .from all actions, proceedings, claims or demands in respect of or in connec-· tion with any liability of Hungerford to Income-tax or Super-tax under the Indian Income-tax. Act and also against all costs, damage or. expenses which the Liquadators or any of them may pay, incur or sustain in con nection therewith or arisirig therefrom or otherwise in relation to the premises.\"\n\nThe second document was a deed of indemnity between the Turner brothers and Turner Morrison. That deed provided that in the event of Turner Morrison \"paying in tenns of the deed of\n\nguarantees and indemnity any suin in excess of 46 lakhs in satisfaction of the income-tax and super-tax. which. may at any . time be payable or recoverable,· payment of which are in fact legally enforced and made under the Indian Income-tax. Act by or from II Hungerford the Guarantors and each of them in consideration of the premises undertake to pay to the company (Turner Morrison) the amount of such excess as af6resaid\" .· ·\n\nSUP:RBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n\nAtthis stage, it may be mentioned that in accordance with the .agreement entered into between Mundhra and Hungerford Turner\n\nMofrlson was to discharge the tax liability of Hungerford to the extent of Rupees 46 lakhs. After the sale of the 49 per cent shares referred to earlier, some dispute appears to have arisen between Mundhra. and Hungerford in regard to his option to pur- .chase the remaining 51 per cent shares of thelater.\n\nConsequently Mundhra filed a suit in the Calcutta High CoUrt on its original side for the specific pe, rformance of the agreement entered into between him and the Hungerford. Tlie suit was resisted by Hungerford.. But; it was decreed., It. appears· that when the leame.d trial judge was about to conclude his judgment, in that case the Coun.Sel for Mundhra requested the court to issue\n\n.an injunction requiring Hungedord to exercise its voting rights in\n\nrespect'of the 51 per cent shares which was the subject matter of 1he suit in accordance with the directions of 'Mund.hra until the\n\nimplemetation of the .decree for specific performance. . The learned trial judge accepted tht prayer and issued the injunction asked for. This led to serious consequences, some of which we have dealt with in our judgment in Civil Appeal No. 488 of 1971 which we have just now pronounced.\n\nThis case appears to be an off-shoot of that unfortunate injunction. In the suit for :specific performance, though Turner Morrison was a party, it did not plead that it any lien over the shares with whiCh We are .concerned ill this case. By agreement between Mundhra and Turner Morrison, the latr was removed frOm. the array of defen- <iants aid the suit proceeded against the remaining defendants.\n\nAfter obtaining the decree for specific performance and the injunction mentioned above, Mundhra appears to have not been\n\ninterested in purchasing the 51 per cent shares by paying for the same evidently use he was in a position to have an absolute , F control 6\\rer Turner Morrison as a result of the injunction issued.\n\nThough Hungerford.filed an appeal.against.the dec~ in that suit, that appeal as withdrawn for which are not clear .. After 1he withdrawal'of the appeal, by a Master's sons dated August 30, 1965 Hungerford moved the trial court for :fixing a time within which Mundhra shpu1d purchase the 51 per cent -shareS by paying for the same. That application was rejected G -on September 1965 on the ground .that the application being on~ for execution; it must be in a tabular form and \"that anyimpositiO!D of time limit would be to engraft something on the decree which. does. not .exist in the decree\".. The appeal against . that crder was-also unsuccessful.\n\nAfter the sUit for :st*ific performan6e was decreed, Mundhra by himself or through Turner· MOrrison appears to have made ·\n\nTURNER MORRISON \\', HUNGERFORD (Hegde, J.) 717\n\nvarious attempts to see that Hungerford is placed in such a position as not to be able to implement its part of the agreement.\n\nWe have had to deal with some of those aspects in Civil Appeal 488 of 1971.\n\nSuffice it to say that according to Hungerford, the suit from which this appeal arises is one of the attempts of Mundhra in that direction.\n\nOne other circumstance that is necessary to be mentioned before proceeding to conside~ the points in controversy is that despite the various resolutions passed by the Board of Directors of Turner Morrison as well as by the shareholders of that company at the general meeting, ihe present suit was filed by the Secretary of Turner Morrison even without obtaining the sanction of the Board of Directors.\n\nThe Board of Directors' sanction was sought only after the defendants' objected to the maintainability of the suit.\n\nFrom the proceedings of the Board of Directors,\n\n~ it is clear that they were not even aware of the company against whom the suit was filed.\n\nFrom the two resolutions passed by the Board of Directors ratifying the action taken by the Secretary, it is obvious that either they were callous or they were mere tools in the hands of Mundhra.\n\nIt is not de.nied on behalf .of Hungerford that the tax due from that company for the assessment years 1939-40 to 1955-56 had been discharged by Turner Morrison.\n\nHungerford's liability to pay tax arose because of the dividends it was deemed to have received from Turner .Morrison as a result of s. 23-A proceedings.\n\nBut there is dispute between the parties as to the exact amount paid by Turner Morrison.\n\nWe have not thought it necessary to go into that controversy as we have, agreeing with the High Court, come to the conclusion that the suit is not maintainable for the reasons to be presently stated.\n\nA great deal of controversy centres round the question whether when an assessment is made on the shareholders of a company as a result of an order under s. 23-A, lhe company's liability to pay that tax is primary or secondary. It was contended on behalf of Hungerford that that liability is a joint liability of both\n\nthe company's as well as that of the shareholders.\n\nBut according to the appellant that liability is primarily that of the shareholders and if the company is compelled to discharge that liability, it is entitled to be reimbursed by its shareholrs. Both the trial judge as well as the appellate bench have upheld the contention of Hungerford and have come to the conclusion that when Turner Morrison paid the tax due from Hungerford, it was discharging its own liability under law and that being so, it was not entitled to seek reimbursement from Hungerford.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR1'S [ 1972] 3 S.C.lt.\n\nSection 23-A empowers the Income-tax Officer to order iir A writing if the conditions prescribed in that section are satisfied that the undistrubuted portion of the assessable income of a com-· pany earned ip. the previous year as computed for income-tax purposes and reduced by the amount of income-tax and super-tax payable by the company in respect thereof, shall be deemed to have been distributed as dividends amongst the shareholders as on B the date of the concerned general meeting.\n\nThat deemed income has to be assessed in the hands of the shareholders either under s. 23 or under s. 34 -of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.\n\nThe two provisos to s. 23-A that are important for our present punx>se are.found in cls. (ii) and (lii) of sub-s. (2) of s. 23-A.\n\nC Clause (ii) says:\n\n\"Where the proportionate share of any member of a company in the undistributed profits and .gains of the company has been included in his total income under the provisions of sub-section ( 1 ) the tax payable in respect thereof shall be recoverable from the company, if it cannot be recovered from such member.''\n\nClause (iii) reads :\n\n\"Where tax is recoverable from a company under this sub-section, a notice of demand shall be served\n\nupon it in the prescribed form showing the sum so pay- E able, and such compa~ shall be deemed to be the assessee in respect of such sum, for the purposes of Chapter VI.\"\n\nIt was urged on behalf of Hungerford that the income that can be brought to tax as a result of an order under s. 23-A is not a real income; it is only a deemed income; that income came to· F be taxed because of the failure of the company to declare dividends. It is only for the purpose of convenience that income is taxed1 in the hands of the shareholders; hence the liability to pay that tax in equity must be that of the company and it is for that reason s. 23-A has provided for the realisation of the tax due from the shareholders from the company.\n\nThe fact that before G passing an order under s. 23-A the shareholders are. not even required to be heard was emphasised.\n\nIn this connection our attention was invited to the amendment of s. 23-A in 1955 as a result of whicp. now the tax liable to be paid as a result of an order under s. 23-A is payable exclusively by the company.\n\nIn this connection reliance was also placed on the language of s. 42 1-t which empowers the Revenue to assess the income of a nonresident assessee in the hands of his agent, but at the same time\n\nthat section empowers that agent to retain in his hands a sum\n\nTURNER MORRISON V, HUNGERFORD (Hegde, J.) 719\n\nA equal to his estimated liability under that section from out of the.: non-resident's monies in his hands. It was lastly urged that if dividends were deemed to have -been declared, those deemed dividends remained in .. the handS of the company and when the company paid tax in respect of the same, it must be held to have paid the same out of the dividends of the shareholders that remained in B its hands. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of Turner\n\nMorrison that any assessment made in pursuance of an order\n\nunder s. 23-A is an assessment on the shareholders and not on the company. ~Thedividends deemed to have been distributed under\n\n~- 23-A is considered to be the income of the shareholders and\n\nnof that of the company.\n\nIt is added on to the other income of the shareholder for the purpose of assessment.\n\nIt is recoverable from the shareholder.· It is recoveable from the company only if it cannot be recovered from the shareholders and the company is deemed to be an assessee in espect of such' sum for the purposes of Chapter VI only and not for all purposes. . Further the\n\ndeemed distribution of dividends as a result of an order under s. 23-A is in no sense a real distribution of dividends which can. be Jone only by the shareholders at the general meeting of the company. We, do not propose to pronounce on this controversy firstly because this appeal can be decided on other grounds and secondly for the reason that that controversy has now become more or less academic in view of the amendment of's. 23-A in 1955. . . - For the assessment years 1940-41 to 1952-53, Trime~Moni-· son was assessed as the agent of Hungerford as could be seen from the assessment orders.\n\nFor that reason it was contended on beha1f of Turner Morrison that it is entitled to be reimbursed in respect of the tax paid by it.\n\nHungerford denies that Turner Morrison was its agent.\n\nAccording to Hungerford, the. payments in F question were made by Turner Morrison voluntarily and therefore\n\nit is not entitled to claim any reimbursement.\n\nSection 43 of the- Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 prescribes as to who could be assessed as an <1gent under s. 42.\n\nThat section says :-\n\n\"Any person employed by or on behalf of a person residing out of the taxable territories or having any business connection with such person, .or through whom such person is in the receipt of any income, profits or !!ains uoon whom the Income-tax Officer has caused a notice: to b~ ::-erved of hi'\\ intention of tteating hinl as the agent of the non-resident person shall for all the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be such agent.\"\n\nIt was contended on behalf of Hungerford that it was not residing out of the taxable territories; it is a private limited company: hence it must be held to be residing in all places where it.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nearns or deemed to earn any income.\n\nIt was further urged thal A Turner Morrison was not a person employed by or on behalf of\n\nHungeord nor did Hungerford have any business connections with Turner Morrison.\n\nIt was also the contention of Hungerford that it did not rive any income, profits or gains through Turner Morrison.\n\nLastly it was urged that the lnoome-tax Officer had not caused any notice to be served upon Turner B Morrison intending to treat that company as the agent of Hungerford.\n\nOn the other hand it was Turner Morrison which had volunteered to be assessed on behalf of Hungerford.\n\nFor all tqese reasons it was said that Turner Morrison cannot be held to have been taxed as the agent of Hungerford.\n\nAll these contentions were taken for the first time in this Court.\n\nThey do not c appear to have been taken either bef<;>re the trial court or before the appellate court.\n\nThe ontentio, PS raised involve determination of questions of fact.\n\nIn the'plaint, it was specifically averred that the payments in question were made by .Turner Morrison as the agent of H.JJ.ngerford.\n\nThat averment has not been specifically denied.\n\nIn that view, we are notcaUed upon to go into the various submissions noted above.\n\nD ,\n\nBefor~ going into the other contentions, we may briefi.y deal with the cotention that the suit was not properly instituted. There\n\nappears to be basis for Hungerford's contention that this suit was inspired by Mundhra and Ardeshir Jivanji Honnasji, the Secretary of Turner Morrison, who signed the plaint on behalf of E Turner Morrison was a mere tool in his hands.\n\nThere is also reason to believe that when the Directors of Turner-Morrison ratified the action taken by Hormasji, they behaved in an irresponsible manner as seen earlier.\n\nBut all the same it cannot be said, the suit is not maintainable. It is true that under the. Article~ of Association of Turner Morrison, a suit o~ behalf of that company has to be filed with the c.onsent of the Directors. But F the Secretary of the company held a general power of attorney from the Directors and the action taken by him was approved by the Directors.\n\nHence there can be. no valid objection to the maintainability of the suit.\n\nThree important questions remain to be coru; idered.\n\nThey G are:\n\n1. Whether the claim made bv Turner Morrison is barred by the rule of estoppel. or waiver or abandonment?\n\n2. Whether the decision of Turner Morrison to take over the liability of Hungerford either \\\\'ith or withot any guarantee from Turner brotbyrs was ultra vires its powers and\n\nTURNER MORRISON v. HUNGERPOllD (Hegde, /~) 721\n\n3. Whether the claim made in the , suit or any portion thereof is barred by limitation ?\n\n1)e judgments of the trial cciurt and the appellate court havenot made any distinction between estoppel, waiver and abandonment. The distinction between those three concepts is fine but B real. In this case, there was no plea of any release under s. 63 of\n\n$e Contract Act. Hence the argument of Mr. A. K. Sen, learned Counsel for Turner Morrison on the scope of that section is irrelevant and we shall not go into the same. The essential qties~.\n\ntion to be considered is whether the facts established in this case\n\nsupport the plea of estoppel put forward by Hungerford. If the C oosw~ to lutt question is in the affirmative then. there is no need to examiae whether there was. any waiver or abandonment as pleaded by Hungerford.\n\n'Estoppel' is a rule of equity.. That rule has gained new dimensions in recent years. A new class of estoppel i.e. prO-· missory estoppel has come to be recognised by the courts in thiS' o country as well as in England. The full implication of 'promissory estoppel', is yet to be speHed out. . We shall presently refer to decisions bearing on that topic but before dOing so, let us whether Turner Morrison made any representation to Hungerford, if so, what is that representation.\n\nFurther, whether: Hun3Prfonl' acted on the basis of that representation to its disadvantage. It E is not denied tba:t year after year from 1941 to 1954 Turner\n\nMorrison paSsed resolutions undertaking to discharge the tax lia-. bility of Hungerford. In pursuance of those resolutions taxa due from Hungerford were p&Jd.\n\nThere can be no doubt that tht step$ taken by Turner Morrison were within the knowledge ' or Hungerford as it held 100 per cent of Turner Morrison.\n\nTile Directors 'l'Ui'ner: Morrison must have been its' nominees.\n\nF The profit and loss accoun.b of Turner Morrison must have b!=en approved by Hungerf~ )'eat after. year. at the ge, neral meetihg of that company.. In reality the Turner brothers were the own~\n\nof Hungerford as well 'as 'J; utner MorriSon thoqgli each of those companies was a separate legal entity. It may be that Turner Monison did not declare dividends so t:Jiat Hungerford may avoid G paying tax at a high rate. But at the same tiine Hungerford W®ld not have agrud for not distn\"butfug dividendS unless 'Turner.\n\nMoirison took over the responsibi, lity 'of paying th6 tax . on the\n\ndividends deemed to have been distributed. It is blished that 1f dividends had been declared .. HWlgerford would .hve got more than two and ba1f times the tax paid on its behalf~ The un~- B tributed diyidends Mre available to Turner MorriSon. to lle utilis G4·11 workin& capil and-th~ earn more proiits. . The arrangement regarding the 00114istrl.bUtion. ¢ dividendi as well. as, the\n\npayment for the t&X due from HuniJil{~ bf mer Momson\n\n, .SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972] 3 S, C.R\n\nmust have been with the consent of Hungerford as well as Turner A , brothers.\n\nThose arrangements had clearly benefited all the parties.\n\nTill Mundhra entered the scene, there could not have been any conflict of interest between Hungerford and Turner Morrison.\n\nWhen Turner Morrison paid the tax due from Hungerford, legal fiction apart, it was really paying from the monies belonging to Hungerford. If for any reason, Turner Morrison had not undern taken the responsibility to discharge the tax liability of Hungerford, the latter could have taken steps to compel the former to declare dividends or even compel it to go into voluntary liquidation. Hence there can be no doubt that by acting on'.the basis of the representation made by Turner Morrison, Hungerford had placed itself in a disadvantageous position. But it was urged c on behalf of Turner Morrison that the resolutions in question were mere promises to do something in the future : They were not representations of any fact and as those promises were not supported by any consideration, they afford no legal basis to resist the claim made in the plaint. Hungerford's answers to these contentio.ns are, that firstly those resolutions -~!lord a good basis for raising a plea of promissory estoppel; secondly those D representations became representation of fact as soon as the . tax liability of Hungerford was discharged by Turner Morrison in pursuance of its resolutions and lastly the promises made under those resolutions were supported by consideration inasmuch as Hungerford in response to those promises refrained from enforcingits right to have the profits distributed as dividends. Now com- E ing to the payme:!U:s made after 1955, it is seen that a9cording to the agreement between Turner Morrison, Hungenord and Mundhra, Turner Morrison was required to set apart a sum of Rupees 46 lakhs to discharge the tax. liability of HuQgerford.\n\nAccordingly Turner Morrison transferred Rupees 46 lakhs from its general reserve to a special reserve.\n\nFurther by the agree- F ments dated October 31, 1957 set out earlier Turner Morrison took over the entire tax liability of Hungerford and the Turner brothers agreed to reimburse Turner Morrison any payment . made on behalf of Hungerford in excess of Rupees 46-lakhs. All these arrangements clearly enured to the benefit of Turner Morrison inasmuch as it allowed that company to refrain from declaring dividends and utilise that money for business purposes. - There G can be no doubt that it was done in UJ.e best ipterst of that company and with a view to further its business interests.\n\nIt is necessary to note that despite Turner Morrison paying the tax due from Hungerford from 1941 uptill 1953, those pay~ ments were not debited to the account of Hungerford; nor were H they shown as debts due from Hungerford in the balance sheets placed before the general meeting. Those balance sheets were approved by the general meeting. It was plainly admitted by te\n\nTURNER MORRISON \\1, HUNGERFORD (Hegde, }.) 723\n\nwitns examined on behalf of Turner Morrison that the amounts paid on bt:half of Hungerford were not considered as debts due from that l:Ompany till about the time of filing the suit.\n\nJn the general meeting of Turner Morrison held on March 29, 1956, tne recornmenoation of the Board of Directors to transfer Rupees 46 lakhs from t)le genera! reserve to a special reserve for the purpose mentioned earlier was approved.\n\nThereafter Turner Morrison paid .the tax due from Hungerford for the assessment\n\nyear 1952-53_ and. debited the sarue to that special reserve. While Turner Morrison was keeping HungerfQrd infonned of the ments made Qn it and the refunds ordered, at no time it made any demand' on Hungerford to reimburse the moneys paid.\n\nOn several occasions Turner Morrison entered into agreements with the •\n\nPresident of India undertaking to discharge the tax liabilities of Hungerford upto an agreed maximuru. Turner Morrison was representing Hungerford in all the assessment proceedings. It aised to file appeals on behalf of Hungerford against the orders of the Income-t~ Officers. :It had received all the amounts ordered to be .refunded. lt was keeping Hungerford infonned of the various orders passed by the Income-tax authoritieS: but yet_ without making any demand for the payment of tax paid by it The docii.ments produced in the case and the admissions made by the witnesses examined on'behalf of Turner Morrison make it abundantly clear that the idea of claiming back the tax paid on -behal~ ()f Hungerford caine to be entertained by Turner Morrison only after Mundhra came to control that ompany. With this background let us now. consider whether Turner Morrison is estopped from making the claim in question. ·\n\nIn suppart of its case Hungerford relies primarily on the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel. This doctrine ha:s assumed importance in recent years though it was dimly noticed in some of the earlier cases. The leading case on'the subject is Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. (1). The facts of that cse are as follows : ·\n\n, Central London Prqperty Trust Ltd. let .to the High Trees House Ltd.~ a subsidiary of the former a block of flats for a term of 99 years from September 29, 1937 at a ground rent of £ 2500 a year.\n\nIn the early part of 1940, owing to war conditions then prevailing only a few of the flats in the block were let to tenants and it became apparent that the High Ts House Ltd. would be unable to pay the rent reserved by the lease out of the rent of the. flats.\n\nDiscussions took 'place between the Directors of the two companies and as a result on January 3, 1940r a letter was sent by the lessor to the lessee confinning that the ground rent. of the . \\\n\n(1) [1947] 1 K.B. 130.\n\n\n[ 1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nprmises would be reduced from £ 2500 to £ 1250 from the A beginning of the tenn. The lessee thereafter paid the reduced rent By the beginning of 1945, all fiats were let but the lessee continued to pay only the reduced rent. In September 1945, the lessor wrote to the lessee demanding rent at the rate of ·£ 2500 per year. It also claimed at that rate for the quarters ending September 29 and December 25, 1945. The lessee repudiated B that claim. The question for decision was whether tho lessor was bound by the concession that it had agreed to show as the same\n\nas not Sl; lPPorted by any consideration.\n\nAnswering that ques. tlon Denmng J. (as he then was) held that where parties enter into an agreement which is intended to create legal relations between tll.em apd .in pursuance of such arrangement one party c makes a promise to the other which he kt.1ows will be acted on and which is in fact acted on by the promise, the court will treat the\n\npromise as binding on the promisor to the extent that it will not atlow him to act inconsistently with it even allhough the promise may :aot be supported y consideratiol'l in the strict sense.\n\nTherein the court divided the claim made in the suit into two categories one for the period prior to the end of 1945 and the other for the D period thereafter. It disallowed the claim of the lessor in respect of the former and allowed the claim relating to the later period.\n\n-- The rule laid down in_High Trees case(!) again came up for consideration before the King's Ben.ch in Combe v. Combe(2). E- Therein the court ruled that the principle stated in High Trees' case( 1) is that, where one party has,, by his words or con ·\n\nduct, made to the other a promise or assurance which was intended to affect tho legal relations between them and to be acted on\n\naccordingly, then, once-the other party has taken him at his word and acted on it, the party who gave the prom.ise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to the previous legal relation F! ship as if no seuch:promise or assurance had been made by.him. but he must accept their legal relations sub; ec( to the qualification which he himself has so introduced, even though it is not sup\n\nported in point of law by any consideration, but only by his word . .\n\nBut that principle does not creat~ any ~~ of action. ch did not exis~ before; so that, where a pronnse IS made which IS not -G supported by any consideration, the promises cannot bring an action on the basis of that promise. The principle enunciated in the High Trees' case( 1) was also recognised by the House. of Lords in Tool Metal Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Tungsten Electric co. Ltd.(1). That principle was adopted br this Court in\n\nUniQn of India v. Indo Afghtm Agencies Ltd( ) . 'The facts of B that case, in brief, are as follows : . .\n\n(1) [1947)1 K.B: 130.\n\n(2) [19~1] 2!K.B. 215.\n\n(3) [195512 All B.R.. 657;\n\n(4) [1968]2. S.C.R. 366.\n\n. f\n\nTURNER MORRISON V, HUNGERFORD (Hegde, }.) 725\n\nIn exercise of its powers under s. 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, Central Government issued the. Imports (Control) Order, 1955 and other orders setting out the policy governing the grant of import and export licences. The Central Government also evolved an Import Trade Policy, to faeilitate the mechism of the Act and the orciers issued thereunder, and it was modified from time to time by issuing fresh Schemes in respect of new commodities. In 1962, the Central Govemm.ent promulgated the Export Promotion Scheme providing incentives to exporters of woollen textiles and goods.\n\nIt provided for the grant to an exporter certificates to import raw materials of a total amount equal to 100% of the F.O.B. value of his exports.\n\nClause 10 of the scheme provided that the Textile Commissioner could grant an import certificate for a lesser amount if he is satisfied, after holding an enquiry, that the declared value of the goods exported is higher than' the real value of the goods. The Scheme was extended to exports of woollen textiles and goods to Afghanistan. M/s. Indo-Afghan Agencies Ltd. exported woollen goods to Afghanistan and were issued an Export Entitlement Certificate by the Textile Commissioner not for the full F.O.B. value of the goods exported but for a reduced amount on the basis of some private enquiry supposed to have been held by him hllt not after holding an enquiry as contemplated by the Schenio._~· _The representation made by the Indo-Afghan Agencies in that ·· connection to the Central Goverent was rejected. Thereafter M/s. Indo~Afghan Agencies Ltd. moved-the High Court to set aside the order of the Textile Commissioner and the government and to issue a direction to them to grant licences f<;>r an amount equal to 100% of the F.O.B. value of their exports. That prayer was resisted by the government on various rounds, inter alia, f1tat the Export Promotion Scheme was admimstr'!tive in .. character, that it contained mere executive instructions issued by the government to the Textile Commissioner, and created no. enfrce able rights in the exporters who exported their goods in pursuance · of the scheme and it imposed no obligation on the government to issue import certificates.\n\nThe High Court and later this Court in appeal rejectd that contention. This Court held that the government is not exempt from liability to carry out . the represent_ation made by it as to its future conduct. In arriving at that conclusion this Court -placed reliance on the decision of Denning J. in .Robertson v. Minister of Pensions(1). Therein (Denning J.) was dealing with a case of serving army oftieer who wrote to the War Office regarding a disability and received a reply that his disability had been accepted as attributable to \"military service\".\n\nRelying on that assurance he forebore to obtain .an independent medical opinion. The Minister of Pension~ later decided that his\n\n. (1) t1949)1 K.B. 227.\n\n~ SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\ndisability could not be attributed to Wax Service.\n\nTherein the court held that as between the subjects such an assurance would be enforceable because it was intended to be binding, intended to be acted upon and was in fact acted upon, and the aSsurance was also binding on the ground because no tenn could be implied that the Crown was at liberty to revoke.\n\nThe rule laid down in these decisions undoubtedly advance the cause of justice . and hence we have no hesitation in accepting it.\n\nIt was urged on behalf of Turner Morrison that the authority given to it to discharge the tax liabilities of Hungerford as well as the agreements entered into by it with Hungerford and the Turner brothel'S were ultra vires its powers, and .. consequently they provide no legal basis to resist the plaint claim.\n\nIt is true that a Private Ltd. company cannot exceed the powers conferred on it under its Memorandum of Association.\n\nTherefore, for considering whether Turner Morrison was competent to undertake the liability it did, we have to look to the provisions in the Memorandum.\n\nClause 3(b) of the Memorandum empowers the Turner Morrison to carry on business in India and elsewhere as merchants, general merchants, agents and traders etc. Sub-clause\n\n( q) of tbat clause gives power to the company \"to receive money on dep6sit at interest or otherwise and lend money to such persons, with or without security and on such terms as ay seem expedient and in particular to customers of and ·.other persons having dealing. with the company and to give any guarantee or indemnity as may seem expedient.\"\n\nSub-cl. (x) authorises the cC>mP, any:\n\n\"to distribute among the members of the company in specie any property of the Company, but no distribution amounting to a reduction of capital shall be made F without the sanction, if any, for the time being required by law.\"\n\nSub-cl. ( z) authorises the company to do all such other things as are incidental ()r conducive to the attainment of objects mentioned in Memorandum.\n\nAs seen earlier the non-distribution of the. dividends had augmented the working capital. of the company thus affording it facility to earn more profits. Any step taken to augment the working capital of the company is undoubtedly incidental to the business of the company and further the same was e9nducive to H the .attainment of the objects mentioned in the Memorandum.\n\nWhen Turner Morrison paid the tax due from H\\mgerford in substance, though not in fonn, it was distributing a portiou of its\n\n::I'UltNER'MORRISON V, HUNGERFORD (Htgde, J.) 727\n\n. assets to the 100 per cent shareholder of the company but withc.ut reducing its capital.\n\nHence we are unable to see how it can be said that Turner Morriso11 had acted ultra vires its powers.\n\nMr. A. K. Sen, learned Counsel for Turner Morrison invited our attention to several decisions wherein the courts had taken the view that the actions taken by the companies concemed were ultra vires their powers.\n\nThose decisions were rendered on the facts of those cases. Whether a transaction entered into by a\n\ncompan~ can be said to be within its powers or not has 'to be decided on the basis of the tacts established and the provi5ions 'in its Memorandum a:nd not on the basis of any a}:>stract rule.\n\nThe only other question that remains to be considered is whether the suit claim is barred by limitation even on the assumption that claim is otherWise in order. For pronouncing on this question, it is first necessary to decide whether Tumer Morrison had waived its lien over the shares held by Hungerford. There can be no dotlbt that Turner Morrison has the power to waive the paramount lien it has upon all the shares registered in the name of each member, for his debts or liabilities to the company.\n\nThat much is clear fm art. 22 of the Articles of Association.\n\nThat article provides that :\n\n\"Unless otherwise agreed the registration of transfer of shares sMll operate as a waiver of the Company's lien (if any.) upon such shares.\"\n\n. In Buckley on Companies A,.cts (13th Edn. at p. 797) dealing with the question of lien, it IS observed :\n\n\" ... For such a Drovisio.n is for the Drotection of the company, and is capable of being waived by the\n\ncomp.any.\"\n\nWe have to see whether the company in fact had waived the lien it had in respect of the suit cl~, assuming that the said claim is otherwise good. As seen earlier .at all stages Turner Morrison took over the responsibility of paying the tax due on behalf of\n\nHungerford.\n\nThere was no idea of recovering the amount paid as tax, from Hungerford. When Hungerford sold 49 per cent of its shares to Mundhra, the same was registered without any objection.\n\nIt :was clearly admitted by the Secretary of Turner Morrison and other witnesses examined on behalf of that company that the idea of suing Hungord for recovering the tax paid was conceived for the first time after Mundhra obtained the decree for specific pedonnance.\n\nUnder these circumstances, it is clear that Turner Morrison had waived the lien that it might have bad over the shares held,.. by Hungerford .. Hnce the only claim that Turner Morrison could have made against Hungerford was a mobey\n\n7..28\n\n'SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\nclaim. The present suit was tiled on November 15, .1965. Hence it is governed by the provisions of the Liriritation Act, 1963 which came into force on April 1, 1964. Article 23 of that Act fixes a period of three years for instituting a suit \"for . money payable to the plaintiff for money paid for the defendant\" and the cause of' action for the same commences when the money is paid.\n\nTo the same effect was Art 63 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The\n\namounts claimed in the present suit except thpse in respect of the assessment f()( the assessment year 1955-56 were all admittedly paid before November 15, 1962. Hence they are prima facie barred , by limitation. So far as the payments made in respect of the assessment for the assessment year 195$-56 is conce1J1ed, Turner Morrison can have no caim a_gainst Hungerford because under the amended s. 23-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922, that liabi).ity was that of Turner Morrison itself. But it was urged on behalf of Turner Morrison that iil view of s. 15(5) of the Limitation Act, 1963, th~ claim made, leavittg aside the claimmade in\n\ni'espect of the assessmen.t:for the assessment year 1~55-56, is not barred. Section 1 S ( 5) prescribes :\n\n. \"In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the defendant has . been absent from India and from the territories outside India under tbe administration of the Central Government shall be\n\nexcluded ...\n\nIt was urged on behalf of Tumtr Morrison that Hungerford is a lion-resident company. Therefore it caJ)lldt be said that at , any time it was present in India. Hencel the suit is not bamd.\n\nIf this argument IS correct then there can oe no. period of limitation for filing a suit against a non-resident company-a proposition which is prima facie startling. Can we hold that s.\n\n15 (S) app)i~ to a suit of th~ type with which 'We are conceined ? That provision contompJates the ca8e of a defendant who . has been absent from India: That article presupposes that defendant was at one time present in: India and later he has been absent from India. A rson: who was never in India cannot l>e considered as having 'l:i\"e!n absent. from India.\n\nFctually a company cannot either be present in India or absent from India.\n\nBut it may have: a , domicile or residence in lndia. . Sometime . questions have 'G a.rlSen as to what is the place Of residenc'e of an incorporated oomp&.!ty~ Dicey hi hiS Conftict of Laws (4th Edn; p. 152 rule 19) pointmR out the cMereilte between the domicil of a natural per- .son.attd that of a OOrpOiatiOn. says : · ''The domicil. of a human beiJl& is a fact wch on pOtilts, . ubj~.ts h~ to. e. aw .O..f a plrticulai .frY; '~'¥domicil of a COf'P.'Ol'::ttion 1S a fictiC?Jl.&bgpsted\\y the tact that a corporation is, on cert~ points.\n\nTURNER MORRISON v. HUNGERFORD (Hegde, J.) 729\n\ne.g., the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to the law of\n\nparticular country.\n\nA man, that is to say, is in some respects subject to the law of England because he has in fact an English domicil; a corporation is by a fiction supposed to have an English rellidence or domicil because it is in cet1ain respects subject to the law of England.\n\nHence a corporation may very well be considered domiciled or resident, in a country for one purpose and not fo.r another, and hence, too, the great uncertainty as to the facts which determine the domicil, or residence of a corporation.\n\nIn each case the particular question is not, at bottom, whether_ a corporation has in reality a permanent residence in a particular country, but whether, for certain purposes (e.g. submission to the JUrisdiction of the Courts or liability to taxation), a corporation is to be considered as resident in England or in some other country.\"\n\nThe question of residence of an insurance company registered and having its registered office in a foreign country came up for consideration before the Chancery Division in New York Life Insurance Company v. Public Trustee(l).\n\nTherein Pollock M.R. quoted with .approval the following passage from the judgment of Lord S_t. Leonards in Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren( ).\n\n''I think that this company may properly be deemed both Scotch and English. It may, for the purposes of jurisdiction, be deemed to have two domiciles.\n\nIts pusiness is necessarily carried on by agents, and I do not know why its domicile should be considered to be con fined to the place where the goods are manufactured ...\n\nTiiere may be two domiciles and two jurisdictions; and in this case there are, as I conceive, two domiciles and a double sort of jurisdiction, one in Scotland and one in England; and for the purpose of carrying on their busi ness, one is just as much a domicile of the corporation\n\nas the other.\"\n\nThe same view was expressed in that case by Warrington L.J. and Atkin L.J.\n\nA division bench of the Bombay High Court in Sayaji Rao Gaikwar of Baroda v. Madhavraa Raghunathrao(3) dealing with\n\n1hc scope of s. 13 of the Limitation Act 1908 which is identical with the present s. 15 ( 5) held that s. 13 must be read so as. to\n\navoid t11e obvious absurdity that arises ii such corporate bodies\n\n(1) [1924] 2. Ch. 201.\n\n(2) 5, H.L.C. 416.\n\n(3) A.T.R. 1929 Born. p, 14.\n\n730 SUP:UME COUR'l' REPORTS\n\n[1972]' 3 S.C.R.\n\nare deemed to reside out of British India so that suits against them can never be barred at all.\n\nAnd this can be done by treating thein as defendants, who by reason of their special character, are not absent from British India within the meaning of the section, because they have not got the same liberty as private individuals to reside personally in British India and attend to their affairs and they must do so through agents or representatives. Under those circumstances, they can be held to reside in British India in so_ far as they actually carry on business through their representatives\n\nin B.titish India.\n\nSection 15(5) of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be viewed in cne of the two ways i.e. that that' provision does not apply to incorporated companies al all or alternatively that the incorporated compailies must be held to reside in places where they carry on their activities and thus being present in all. those places.\n\nHungerford is an Investment company. It had invested large sums of monies in Turner Morrison.\n\nIts Board of Directors used . to J!lOOt in India now and then. It was, (through its representa~ tives) attending the general meeting of the shareholders of Turner Morrison.\n\nUnder these circumstances, it must be held to have been residing in this country and consequently was . not absent from this country. .. Hence s. 15 ( 5) cannot afford any assistance to Turner Morrison to save the bar of limitation.\n\nFor the reasons mentioned above, this appeal fails and it is dismissed.\n\nTurning to the question of costs, from what we have said earlier, it is clear that there was no justification for bringing the suit.\n\nThe suit was clearly engineered by Mundhra to attain certain ulterior purposes of his.\n\nBut unfortunately neither he nor his likely collaborators the Directors of Turner Morrison, are before us.\n\nThe only accessory _of Mundhra who is before us is the Secretary of Turner Morrison, Hormasji.\n\nThere is no jstifi cation to make Turner Morrison in which Mundhra has only 49 per cent shares to bear the costs. In the circumstances, we think it proper to direct Hormasji to be~ the costs of both the parties in this Court.\n\nThe order made by the High Coilrt as regards costs will stand. ·\n\nK.B.N.\n\nAppeal' dismissea~", "total_entities": 153, "entities": [{"text": "TURNER MORRISON AND CO.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TURNER MORRISON V. HUNGERFORD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HUNGERFORQ INVESTMENT TRUST LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HUNGERFORD INVESTMENT TRUST LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 9. 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 78, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 9."}}, {"text": "K. K.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. HEODE AND K. K. :!", "canonical_name": "K. K. Jain"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1522, "end_char": 1527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1968] 2 S.C.R. 366", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3356, "end_char": 3374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Turner Morrison", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3665, "end_char": 3680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged on beh:ili of Turner Morrison that the authority given to it to discharge the tax liabilities of Hungerford were ultra vires its powers and, therefore, provided no legal basis to resist the plain, claim,\n\nHeld, that Turner Morrison had not acted ultra vires its powers.", "canonical_name": "TURNER MORRISON V. HUNGERFORD"}}, {"text": "Hungerford", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3748, "end_char": 3758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged on beh:ili of Turner Morrison that the authority given to it to discharge the tax liabilities of Hungerford were ultra vires its powers and, therefore, provided no legal basis to resist the plain, claim,\n\nHeld, that Turner Morrison had not acted ultra vires its powers.", "canonical_name": "Hungerford"}}, {"text": "s. 15(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4668, "end_char": 4676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4684, "end_char": 4704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4897, "end_char": 4902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "barred, because, Hungerford was a non resident company never present in India, and therefore, under the section the time durini which \"~ defendant has been absent from India\" had to be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of .limitation.,"}}, {"text": "Hunford", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5281, "end_char": 5288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence the only claim that lilmer Morrison could have made against Hunford was a money claim. (", "canonical_name": "Hungerford"}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5765, "end_char": 5771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5779, "end_char": 5799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Turnet Morrison", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6470, "end_char": 6485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, through its representatives, atoonding the general mectin~~; of the share holders of Turnet Morrison.", "canonical_name": "TURNER MORRISON V. HUNGERFORD"}}, {"text": "s. 15(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6626, "end_char": 6634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Hurner Morrison", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6668, "end_char": 6683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence, s. 15(5) cannot afford any as&is tance to Hurner Morrison to.", "canonical_name": "TURNER MORRISON V. HUNGERFORD"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7017, "end_char": 7045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : C, A. No."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7213, "end_char": 7222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shankar Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, N. Khaitan, Krishna Sen and .B. P. Singh, for the appellant\n\nS. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N.\n\nSinha, Lina Seth; M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "Shankar Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7224, "end_char": 7237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shankar Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, N. Khaitan, Krishna Sen and .B. P. Singh, for the appellant\n\nS. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N.\n\nSinha, Lina Seth; M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "D. N. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7239, "end_char": 7250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shankar Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, N. Khaitan, Krishna Sen and .B. P. Singh, for the appellant\n\nS. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N.\n\nSinha, Lina Seth; M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "N. Khaitan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7252, "end_char": 7262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shankar Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, N. Khaitan, Krishna Sen and .B. P. Singh, for the appellant\n\nS. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N.\n\nSinha, Lina Seth; M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Krishna Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7264, "end_char": 7275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shankar Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, N. Khaitan, Krishna Sen and .B. P. Singh, for the appellant\n\nS. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N.\n\nSinha, Lina Seth; M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the respondent."}}, {"text": ".B. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7280, "end_char": 7292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shankar Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, N. Khaitan, Krishna Sen and .B. P. Singh, for the appellant\n\nS. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N.\n\nSinha, Lina Seth; M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7313, "end_char": 7324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shankar Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, N. Khaitan, Krishna Sen and .B. P. Singh, for the appellant\n\nS. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N.\n\nSinha, Lina Seth; M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. B. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7326, "end_char": 7341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shankar Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, N. Khaitan, Krishna Sen and .B. P. Singh, for the appellant\n\nS. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N.\n\nSinha, Lina Seth; M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. N. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7343, "end_char": 7353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shankar Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, N. Khaitan, Krishna Sen and .B. P. Singh, for the appellant\n\nS. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N.\n\nSinha, Lina Seth; M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "K. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7355, "end_char": 7365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shankar Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, N. Khaitan, Krishna Sen and .B. P. Singh, for the appellant\n\nS. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N.\n\nSinha, Lina Seth; M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "K. K. Jain"}}, {"text": "D. N.\n\nSinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7367, "end_char": 7379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shankar Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, N. Khaitan, Krishna Sen and .B. P. Singh, for the appellant\n\nS. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N.\n\nSinha, Lina Seth; M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Lina Seth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7381, "end_char": 7390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shankar Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, N. Khaitan, Krishna Sen and .B. P. Singh, for the appellant\n\nS. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N.\n\nSinha, Lina Seth; M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "M. M. N. Pombra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7392, "end_char": 7407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shankar Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, N. Khaitan, Krishna Sen and .B. P. Singh, for the appellant\n\nS. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N.\n\nSinha, Lina Seth; M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "H. K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7412, "end_char": 7422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Shankar Ghosh, D. N. Gupta, N. Khaitan, Krishna Sen and .B. P. Singh, for the appellant\n\nS. V. Gupte, S. B. Mukherjee, B. N. Garg, K. K. Jain, D. N.\n\nSinha, Lina Seth; M. M. N. Pombra and H. K. Puri, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Turner, Morrison Co. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7555, "end_char": 7580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHEDGE J. This appeal by certificate is by the plaintiffappellant, Turner, Morrison Co. Ltd. (to be hereinafter referred to as Turner Morrison) from.", "canonical_name": "TURNER MORRISON V. HUNGERFORD"}}, {"text": "Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7987, "end_char": 8019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dant Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. (in voluntary liquidation) (to be hereinafter refeqed to as the HungerfOrd) a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Haridas Mundhra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9003, "end_char": 9018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was one of the manipulations of Haridas Mundhra to get at the defendants' 2295."}}, {"text": "Turner.\n\nMorrison", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10012, "end_char": 10029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hungerford was the owner of 100 per cent shares of Turner.", "canonical_name": "TURNER MORRISON V. HUNGERFORD"}}, {"text": "John Geoffrey Turner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10032, "end_char": 10052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "John Geoffrey Turner and Nigel Frederic Turner C (both since deceased) were the owners of the 100 per cent shares of Hungerford.", "canonical_name": "John Geoffrey Tur-· ner"}}, {"text": "Nigel Frederic Turner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10057, "end_char": 10078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "John Geoffrey Turner and Nigel Frederic Turner C (both since deceased) were the owners of the 100 per cent shares of Hungerford.", "canonical_name": "Nigel Frederick Turner"}}, {"text": "Turner Morrison", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10194, "end_char": 10209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As can be seen from the records, Turner Morrison was a prosperous company."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10618, "end_char": 10623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hunerford", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11056, "end_char": 11065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those resolutions were duly implemented by Turner Morrison by paying aH-the taxes due from Hunerford."}}, {"text": "Nigel Tur.ner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11140, "end_char": 11153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Haridas Mundhra entered mto negotition with Nigel Tur.ner for purchasing all the shares of Turner Morrison.", "canonical_name": "Nigel Tur.ner"}}, {"text": "Mundhra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11296, "end_char": 11303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of letters in November and December of 1955, Hungerford agreed F to sell and Mundhra agreed to purchase 49 pe; r cent shares of Turner Morrison."}}, {"text": "Nigel Turner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11633, "end_char": 11645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A formal agreement in that regard was entered between Hungerford, John Geoffrey Turner, Nigel Turner, British G India Corporation (a nominee of Mundhra) and Mundhra on October 30, 1_956.", "canonical_name": "Nigel Tur.ner"}}, {"text": "British G India Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11647, "end_char": 11674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A formal agreement in that regard was entered between Hungerford, John Geoffrey Turner, Nigel Turner, British G India Corporation (a nominee of Mundhra) and Mundhra on October 30, 1_956."}}, {"text": "October 30, 1_956.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11713, "end_char": 11731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A formal agreement in that regard was entered between Hungerford, John Geoffrey Turner, Nigel Turner, British G India Corporation (a nominee of Mundhra) and Mundhra on October 30, 1_956."}}, {"text": "Mu!ldhra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11764, "end_char": 11772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of that agreement Mu!ldhra purchased 49 per cent shares of Hungerford."}}, {"text": "October 3 L 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11912, "end_char": 11928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 3 L 1957 two documents came to be executed."}}, {"text": "Morrison", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12087, "end_char": 12095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first party to that deed was Turner 8 : Morrison."}}, {"text": "Nigel Frederick Turner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12144, "end_char": 12166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second party was John Geoffrey Turner and Nigel Frederick Turner and the third party was Hungerford.", "canonical_name": "Nigel Frederick Turner"}}, {"text": "TURNER MORRISON V. HUNGERFORD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12234, "end_char": 12263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\n••• l. ;,]' =f\n\nTURNER MORRISON V. HUNGERFORD (Hegde; J.) 715\n\nthat deed after setting uut thl!", "canonical_name": "TURNER MORRISON V. HUNGERFORD"}}, {"text": "John Geoffrey Tur-· ner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12876, "end_char": 12899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company and the said John Geoffrey Tur-· ner and Nigel Frederick Turner hereby jointly and severally undertake to pay and/or satisfy all claims for or in respect of Income-tax and Super-tax which is or are not payable or recoverable or may at any time be payable 0r recoverable under the Indian Income-tax.", "canonical_name": "John Geoffrey Tur-· ner"}}, {"text": "Mofrlson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14741, "end_char": 14749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUP:RBMB COURT REPORTS\n\nAtthis stage, it may be mentioned that in accordance with the .agreement entered into between Mundhra and Hungerford Turner\n\nMofrlson was to discharge the tax liability of Hungerford to the extent of Rupees 46 lakhs."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High CoUrt", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15090, "end_char": 15109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequently Mundhra filed a suit in the Calcutta High CoUrt on its original side for the specific pe, rformance of the agreement entered into between him and the Hungerford."}}, {"text": "Hungedord", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15461, "end_char": 15470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sel for Mundhra requested the court to issue\n\n.an injunction requiring Hungedord to exercise its voting rights in\n\nrespect'of the 51 per cent shares which was the subject matter of 1he suit in accordance with the directions of 'Mund.hra until the\n\nimplemetation of the .decree for specific performance. ."}}, {"text": "Hungerford", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18840, "end_char": 18850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hungerford's liability to pay tax arose because of the dividends it was deemed to have received from Turner .Morrison as a result of s. 23-A proceedings.", "canonical_name": "Hungerford"}}, {"text": "Turner .Morrison", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18941, "end_char": 18957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hungerford's liability to pay tax arose because of the dividends it was deemed to have received from Turner .Morrison as a result of s. 23-A proceedings.", "canonical_name": "TURNER MORRISON V. HUNGERFORD"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18973, "end_char": 18978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19439, "end_char": 19444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPOR1'S [ 1972] 3 S.C.lt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20163, "end_char": 20202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPOR1'S [ 1972] 3 S.C.lt."}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20205, "end_char": 20215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20781, "end_char": 20786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20796, "end_char": 20801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20810, "end_char": 20837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20860, "end_char": 20865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20961, "end_char": 20966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21711, "end_char": 21716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22059, "end_char": 22064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22202, "end_char": 22207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22344, "end_char": 22349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22442, "end_char": 22447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22553, "end_char": 22558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Turner\n\nMorrison", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23253, "end_char": 23269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of Turner\n\nMorrison that any assessment made in pursuance of an order\n\nunder s. 23-A is an assessment on the shareholders and not on the company.", "canonical_name": "TURNER MORRISON V. HUNGERFORD"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23327, "end_char": 23332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23960, "end_char": 23965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24326, "end_char": 24331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24843, "end_char": 24853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24862, "end_char": 24889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24948, "end_char": 24953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "A Turner Morrison", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25709, "end_char": 25726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further urged thal A Turner Morrison was not a person employed by or on behalf of\n\nHungeord nor did Hungerford have any business connections with Turner Morrison."}}, {"text": "Hungeord", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25773, "end_char": 25781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further urged thal A Turner Morrison was not a person employed by or on behalf of\n\nHungeord nor did Hungerford have any business connections with Turner Morrison.", "canonical_name": "Hungerford"}}, {"text": "Turner B Morrison", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26063, "end_char": 26080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lastly it was urged that the lnoome-tax Officer had not caused any notice to be served upon Turner B Morrison intending to treat that company as the agent of Hungerford.", "canonical_name": "TURNER MORRISON V. HUNGERFORD"}}, {"text": ".Turner Morrison", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26691, "end_char": 26707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the'plaint, it was specifically averred that the payments in question were made by .Turner Morrison as the agent of H.JJ.ngerford.", "canonical_name": "TURNER MORRISON V. HUNGERFORD"}}, {"text": "H.JJ.ngerford", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26724, "end_char": 26737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the'plaint, it was specifically averred that the payments in question were made by .Turner Morrison as the agent of H.JJ.ngerford."}}, {"text": "Ardeshir Jivanji Honnasji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27100, "end_char": 27125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There\n\nappears to be basis for Hungerford's contention that this suit was inspired by Mundhra and Ardeshir Jivanji Honnasji, the Secretary of Turner Morrison, who signed the plaint on behalf of E Turner Morrison was a mere tool in his hands."}}, {"text": "E Turner Morrison", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27196, "end_char": 27213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There\n\nappears to be basis for Hungerford's contention that this suit was inspired by Mundhra and Ardeshir Jivanji Honnasji, the Secretary of Turner Morrison, who signed the plaint on behalf of E Turner Morrison was a mere tool in his hands."}}, {"text": "Hormasji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27349, "end_char": 27357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also reason to believe that when the Directors of Turner-Morrison ratified the action taken by Hormasji, they behaved in an irresponsible manner as seen earlier."}}, {"text": "s. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28596, "end_char": 28601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28649, "end_char": 28658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence the argument of Mr. A. K. Sen, learned Counsel for Turner Morrison on the scope of that section is irrelevant and we shall not go into the same.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29293, "end_char": 29300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A new class of estoppel i.e. prO-· missory estoppel has come to be recognised by the courts in thiS' o country as well as in England."}}, {"text": "Turner Monison", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30415, "end_char": 30429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be that Turner Monison did not declare dividends so t:Jiat Hungerford may avoid G paying tax at a high rate.", "canonical_name": "TURNER MORRISON V. HUNGERFORD"}}, {"text": "Moirison", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30617, "end_char": 30625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moirison took over the responsibi, lity 'of paying th6 tax ."}}, {"text": "Turner MorriSon", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30912, "end_char": 30927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is blished that 1f dividends had been declared .. HWlgerford would .hve got more than two and ba1f times the tax paid on its behalf~ The un~- B tributed diyidends Mre available to Turner MorriSon.", "canonical_name": "TURNER MORRISON V. HUNGERFORD"}}, {"text": "Turner A", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31225, "end_char": 31233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as, the\n\npayment for the t&X due from HuniJil{~ bf mer Momson\n\n, .SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972] 3 S, C.R\n\nmust have been with the consent of Hungerford as well as Turner A , brothers."}}, {"text": "Till Mundhra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31306, "end_char": 31318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Till Mundhra entered the scene, there could not have been any conflict of interest between Hungerford and Turner Morrison."}}, {"text": "Hungerford", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31921, "end_char": 31931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence there can be no doubt that by acting on'.the basis of the representation made by Turner Morrison, Hungerford had placed itself in a disadvantageous position."}}, {"text": "Hungenord", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32938, "end_char": 32947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now com- E ing to the payme:!U:s made after 1955, it is seen that a9cording to the agreement between Turner Morrison, Hungenord and Mundhra, Turner Morrison was required to set apart a sum of Rupees 46 lakhs to discharge the tax.", "canonical_name": "Hungerford"}}, {"text": "HuQgerford", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33063, "end_char": 33073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "liability of HuQgerford.", "canonical_name": "Hungerford"}}, {"text": "October 31, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33216, "end_char": 33232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further by the agree- F ments dated October 31, 1957 set out earlier Turner Morrison took over the entire tax liability of Hungerford and the Turner brothers agreed to reimburse Turner Morrison any payment ."}}, {"text": "March 29, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34424, "end_char": 34438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the general meeting of Turner Morrison held on March 29, 1956, tne recornmenoation of the Board of Directors to transfer Rupees 46 lakhs from t)le genera!"}}, {"text": "Central London Prqperty Trust Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36269, "end_char": 36303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of that cse are as follows : ·\n\n, Central London Prqperty Trust Ltd. let .to the High Trees House Ltd.~ a subsidiary of the former a block of flats for a term of 99 years from September 29, 1937 at a ground rent of £ 2500 a year."}}, {"text": "High Trees House Ltd.~", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36316, "end_char": 36338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of that cse are as follows : ·\n\n, Central London Prqperty Trust Ltd. let .to the High Trees House Ltd.~ a subsidiary of the former a block of flats for a term of 99 years from September 29, 1937 at a ground rent of £ 2500 a year."}}, {"text": "September 29, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36411, "end_char": 36429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of that cse are as follows : ·\n\n, Central London Prqperty Trust Ltd. let .to the High Trees House Ltd.~ a subsidiary of the former a block of flats for a term of 99 years from September 29, 1937 at a ground rent of £ 2500 a year."}}, {"text": "High Ts House Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36622, "end_char": 36640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the early part of 1940, owing to war conditions then prevailing only a few of the flats in the block were let to tenants and it became apparent that the High Ts House Ltd. would be unable to pay the rent reserved by the lease out of the rent of the."}}, {"text": "January 3, 1940r", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36813, "end_char": 36829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Discussions took 'place between the Directors of the two companies and as a result on January 3, 1940r a letter was sent by the lessor to the lessee confinning that the ground rent."}}, {"text": "September 29 and December 25, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37340, "end_char": 37374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also claimed at that rate for the quarters ending September 29 and December 25, 1945."}}, {"text": "Denmng", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37598, "end_char": 37604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tlon Denmng J. (as he then was) held that where parties enter into an agreement which is intended to create legal relations between tll.em apd .in pursuance of such arrangement one party c makes a promise to the other which he kt.1ows will be acted on and which is in fact acted on by the promise, the court will treat the\n\npromise as binding on the promisor to the extent that it will not atlow him to act inconsistently with it even allhough the promise may :aot be supported y consideratiol'l in the strict sense."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39968, "end_char": 39972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40021, "end_char": 40039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "725\n\nIn exercise of its powers under s. 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, Central Government issued the."}}, {"text": "Central Govemm.ent", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40412, "end_char": 40430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1962, the Central Govemm.ent promulgated the Export Promotion Scheme providing incentives to exporters of woollen textiles and goods."}}, {"text": "Clause 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40684, "end_char": 40693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Afghanistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 41006, "end_char": 41017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Scheme was extended to exports of woollen textiles and goods to Afghanistan."}}, {"text": "Indo-Afghan Agencies Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41024, "end_char": 41049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Indo-Afghan Agencies Ltd. exported woollen goods to Afghanistan and were issued an Export Entitlement Certificate by the Textile Commissioner not for the full F.O.B. value of the goods exported but for a reduced amount on the basis of some private enquiry supposed to have been held by him hllt not after holding an enquiry as contemplated by the Schenio.~· The representation made by the Indo-Afghan Agencies in that ·· connection to the Central Goverent was rejected."}}, {"text": "Indo~Afghan Agencies Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41512, "end_char": 41537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter M/s. Indo~Afghan Agencies Ltd. moved-the High Court to set aside the order of the Textile Commissioner and the government and to issue a direction to them to grant licences f<;>r an amount equal to 100% of the F.O.B. value of their exports."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42462, "end_char": 42469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In arriving at that conclusion this Court -placed reliance on the decision of Denning J. in .Robertson v. Minister of Pensions(1)."}}, {"text": "Clause 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43990, "end_char": 44001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I'UltNER'MORRISON V, HUNGERFORD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45429, "end_char": 45460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Turner Morrison paid the tax due from H\\mgerford in substance, though not in fonn, it was distributing a portiou of its\n\n::I'UltNER'MORRISON V, HUNGERFORD (Htgde, J.) 727\n\n."}}, {"text": "Htgde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45462, "end_char": 45467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Turner Morrison paid the tax due from H\\mgerford in substance, though not in fonn, it was distributing a portiou of its\n\n::I'UltNER'MORRISON V, HUNGERFORD (Htgde, J.) 727\n\n."}}, {"text": "Turner Morriso11", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 45621, "end_char": 45637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence we are unable to see how it can be said that Turner Morriso11 had acted ultra vires its powers.", "canonical_name": "TURNER MORRISON V. HUNGERFORD"}}, {"text": "Tumer Morrison", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46414, "end_char": 46428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For pronouncing on this question, it is first necessary to decide whether Tumer Morrison had waived its lien over the shares held by Hungerford."}}, {"text": "art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46705, "end_char": 46712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Buckley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46922, "end_char": 46929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Buckley on Companies A,.cts (13th Edn."}}, {"text": "Hungord", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47732, "end_char": 47739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It :was clearly admitted by the Secretary of Turner Morrison and other witnesses examined on behalf of that company that the idea of suing Hungord for recovering the tax paid was conceived for the first time after Mundhra obtained the decree for specific pedonnance.", "canonical_name": "Hungerford"}}, {"text": "November 15, .1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48163, "end_char": 48181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present suit was tiled on November 15, .1965."}}, {"text": "Hence it is governed by the provisions of the Liriritation Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48183, "end_char": 48251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 1, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48277, "end_char": 48290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence it is governed by the provisions of the Liriritation Act, 1963 which came into force on April 1, 1964."}}, {"text": "Article 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48292, "end_char": 48302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hence it is governed by the provisions of the Liriritation Act, 1963", "statute": "Hence it is governed by the provisions of the Liriritation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Art 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48536, "end_char": 48542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hence it is governed by the provisions of the Liriritation Act, 1963", "statute": "Hence it is governed by the provisions of the Liriritation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48550, "end_char": 48570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "November 15, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48720, "end_char": 48737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\namounts claimed in the present suit except thpse in respect of the assessment f()( the assessment year 1955-56 were all admittedly paid before November 15, 1962."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48973, "end_char": 48978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48988, "end_char": 49008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 15(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49125, "end_char": 49133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49141, "end_char": 49161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49288, "end_char": 49297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1963", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Tumtr Morrison", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 49578, "end_char": 49592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "been absent from India and from the territories outside India under tbe administration of the Central Government shall be\n\nexcluded ...\n\nIt was urged on behalf of Tumtr Morrison that Hungerford is a lion-resident company.", "canonical_name": "TURNER MORRISON V. HUNGERFORD"}}, {"text": "s.\n\n15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49924, "end_char": 49930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1963", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Therein Pollock", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52099, "end_char": 52114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therein Pollock M.R. quoted with .approval the following passage from the judgment of Lord S_t."}}, {"text": "S_t. Leonards in", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52190, "end_char": 52206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therein Pollock M.R. quoted with .approval the following passage from the judgment of Lord S_t."}}, {"text": "Scotland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 52715, "end_char": 52723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its pusiness is necessarily carried on by agents, and I do not know why its domicile should be considered to be con fined to the place where the goods are manufactured ...\n\nTiiere may be two domiciles and two jurisdictions; and in this case there are, as I conceive, two domiciles and a double sort of jurisdiction, one in Scotland and one in England; and for the purpose of carrying on their busi ness, one is just as much a domicile of the corporation\n\nas the other.\""}}, {"text": "Warrington L.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52907, "end_char": 52922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same view was expressed in that case by Warrington L.J. and Atkin L.J.\n\nA division bench of the Bombay High Court in Sayaji Rao Gaikwar of Baroda v. Madhavraa Raghunathrao(3) dealing with\n\n1hc scope of s. 13 of the Limitation Act 1908 which is identical with the present s. 15 ( 5) held that s. 13 must be read so as."}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52927, "end_char": 52932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same view was expressed in that case by Warrington L.J. and Atkin L.J.\n\nA division bench of the Bombay High Court in Sayaji Rao Gaikwar of Baroda v. Madhavraa Raghunathrao(3) dealing with\n\n1hc scope of s. 13 of the Limitation Act 1908 which is identical with the present s. 15 ( 5) held that s. 13 must be read so as."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 52963, "end_char": 52980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same view was expressed in that case by Warrington L.J. and Atkin L.J.\n\nA division bench of the Bombay High Court in Sayaji Rao Gaikwar of Baroda v. Madhavraa Raghunathrao(3) dealing with\n\n1hc scope of s. 13 of the Limitation Act 1908 which is identical with the present s. 15 ( 5) held that s. 13 must be read so as."}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53069, "end_char": 53074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53082, "end_char": 53101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53138, "end_char": 53143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act 1908", "statute": "the Limitation Act 1908"}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53159, "end_char": 53164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act 1908", "statute": "the Limitation Act 1908"}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 53591, "end_char": 53604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And this can be done by treating thein as defendants, who by reason of their special character, are not absent from British India within the meaning of the section, because they have not got the same liberty as private individuals to reside personally in British India and attend to their affairs and they must do so through agents or representatives."}}, {"text": "B.titish India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 53978, "end_char": 53992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under those circumstances, they can be held to reside in British India in so_ far as they actually carry on business through their representatives\n\nin B.titish India."}}, {"text": "Section 15(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53995, "end_char": 54008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act 1908", "statute": "the Limitation Act 1908"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54016, "end_char": 54036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54726, "end_char": 54731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1963", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "K.B.N.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 55609, "end_char": 55615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.B.N.\n\nAppeal' dismissea~"}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_71_74_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "TALKESHWARI DEVI\n\n-'AM RAN BI.KAT PRASAD SINGH & ANR.\n\nJanuary 12, 1972 [K. S. Hl!GDE, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY. AND D. G. PALEKAll, JJ.]\n\nIndian Succession Act 1925-Ss. 124, 131-Scope-Will, construction of.\n\nBy clause 4 of a will the testator bequeathed to his grand daughters T and S an absolute right in the properties that were to devolve on them after the death of his wife. Clause 5 further provided that if one of the two grand daughters were to die issueless the other living grand daughter was to enter into possession of the entire pro- C perty as absolute owner. After the death of the testator's wife T and S\n\ndivided the properties which devolved on them in equal shares. On S dying issueless T instituted a 1uit for poasession of the properties that fell to the share of S basin& her claim on clause 5 of the will. The suit was dismi!!led. Dismissing the appeal, HELD : Clause 5 of the will relaes to devolution, it does not provide for any divestment of an estate which had vested. The estate that vested D in S under clause 4 of the will was not a conditional estate, it was an absolute one. The will does not provide for the divestment of that estate.\n\nClause 5 would have come into operation if the contingency mentioned therein had happened before the properties absolutely devol\\-ed on T and S. What the testator intended was that if any of his grand daughters died issueless before the devolution took place then the entire property should go to another grand daughter. The intention of the testator is plain E from the language of the will. [73 BJ Section 124 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 applies to the facts of the case and not s. 131. The legacy claimed by the apllant is unavailable as the contemplated con'ingency did not occur before the fund bequeathed was payable or distributable. Section 131 provides for the divestment of an estate which had already vested; it speaks l}f an estate going over to another peraon. 174 Bl F Norendra Nath Sircar and anr. v. Kamal Basini Dasi, I.L.R. 23, Cal. 563, referred to.\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 213 of 1967.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and order dated February, 17th 1965 of the Patna High Court in First Appeal No. 113 of 1960.\n\nG M. C. Chagla, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwal, V. I. Francis, R. Gqburdhun and D. Goburdhun, lor the appellant.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Sarjoo Prasad, A. G. Ratnaparkhi and Rajiv Shah, for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judent of the Court was decided by II Hegde, J, In this appeal by certificate we are to consider the effect of the will executed by one Ral!hunath Prasad Singh, on August 31, 1938. The said testator died very soon after the execution of the will leaving behind him his widow 1ageshwar Kuer,\n\nhis dau, ghter Satrupa Kuer and his two grand daughters Talkeshwari Devi (the appellant herein) and Sheorani. The appellant and Sheorani are the dau, ghters of Sukhdeo Prasad Sin, gh, the son\n\nof the testator who had pre-deceased the testator.\n\nJageshwar Kuer died in November 1948 and Sheorani Devi on November 1, 1949 without Jeavinl!: any issue. The dispute in thiS case is as to who is entitled to the properties devolved on Sheorani under B the provisions of the will left by the testator. For deciding that question we have to refer to the relevant provisions of the will, the l(eni, tineness or validity of which is not in dispute.\n\nThe will in ques'.ion provides that after the death of the testator a portion of his properties (detailed in the will) was to C devolve on Jaj!; CShwar Kuer absolutoly and tho remaining pro. perties are also to devolve on her but therein she was to have only a life interest. The will fur.her provides that after her death\n\n\"the entire property will be l!reated as 16 annas property out of which S annas 4 pies (five annas four pies) share constituting proprietary interest will pass to Shrimati Satrupa Kuer alias Nan\n\ndau, ghter of me, the executant and her heirs as absolute owners and the remaining 10 annas 8 pies ( annas ten and eight pies) share will pass to both the minor grand daughters, (1) Shrimati Talkeshwari Kuer alias Babu and (2) Sbrimati Sheorani Kuer alias Bachan in equal shares as absolute proprietary interest\"\n\n(cl. 4 of the will) . Clause 5 of the will says :\n\n\"That if one of the tw0 grand dau, ghters named E abow dies issueless, then under such circumstances the other livinl!; grand dau, ghter will enter into possession and occupation of the entire 10 annas 8 pies and bte come the absolute owner thereof.\" At the time of the death of the testator, the appellant as . .well as Sheoranl Kuer were minors. After the death of Jageshwar F Kuer, the appellant and her sister Sheorani Kuer divided the ten annas eiht pies share of the properties which devolved on them In equal sharea and each one came into possession of her share of the properties.\n\nImmediately after the death of Sheoranl Kuer, the appellant G instituted a suit for possession of the properties that fell to the share of Sheoranl Kuer purporting to base her claim on cla'JSO\n\nS of the will to which we have earlier made reference. That suit was resisted bv the first defendant, the husband of Sheorani, He claimed that he was entitled to those properties as the heir of hi& .wife. The trial ~.ourt dismissed the plaintiff's suit and the decision of the al court was upheld by the HI~ Court, H It was contended on behalf of the appellant that In ''iew of claUIO S of the will, the appellant Is entitled to the suit properties\n\nTALKESHWARI DEVI v. RAM RAN BIKAT (Hegde, J.) 71\n\nas Sheorani Kuer had died issueless.\n\nThis contention, as mentioned earlier, did not find favour either with the trial court or with the appellate court.\n\nThey have held that on a proper ieading of the will as a whole, it is clear tha~ clause 5 ceased to be operative on the death of' Jageshwar Kuer, thereafter caluse 4 of \\he will was the only operative clause so far as the rights of the appellant and Sheorani were concerned.\n\nIt is undisputed 11at the duty of the court is to !ind out the intention of the testator but that intention has t0 be gathered from the langmfge Qf the will read as a whole.\n\nI'. is clear from clause 4 of the will that the testator wanted to give to his grant-daughters an absolute right in the properties that were to devolve on them after 'the death of his wife, J ageshwar Kuer.\n\nThe estate bequeathed undcl'r clause 4 Of the will is not a condi1ional estate.\n\nClause 5 of the will relates to devolu'.ion and it does not provide for anv divestment of an estate which had vested.\n\nThe estate that vested on Sheorani was an absolute one. The will does not provide for the divestment of '.hat estate. It is plain from the language of clause 5 of the will that it refers to the devolution, which means when the properties devolved on the two si, ters on the death of\n\nJaeshwar Kuer..\n\nWe are unable '.o accept the contention of Mr. M. C. Chagla, learned Cooosel for the appellant that there is any conflict between clause 4 and clause 5 of the will.\n\nClause 5 in our judgment would have come into force if the contingency mentioned therein had happened before the properties absolutely devoved on the two sisters.\n\nClause 5 cannot be considered as a defeasance clause. If the testator wanted that the bequest made to any of his grand-daughters should stand divested on the happening of any contingency, then he would have said so in the will, assuming that he could have made such a provision.\n\nBut the will nowhere says that the properties bequeathed to the appellant and her sister should cease to be their properties on their dying issueless.\n\nObviously what the testator intended was that if any of his grand-daughters dies issueless before the devolution took place then the entire property should go to the other granddaughter.\n\nTo. our mind the intention of the testator is plain from the language of the will.\n\nTo find out the effect of the will before us we have to look to ss. 124 and 131 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.\n\nSection 124 says :\n\n\"Where a legacy is given if a specified uncertain event shall happen and no time is mentioned in the will for the. occurrence of that event, the legacy cannot take effect; unless such event happens before the period when the fund bequeathed is payable or distributable.\" 6-L864 Su PC I /72\n\nIllustration (ii) to .that section says :\n\n\"A legacy is bequeathed to A, and in the case of.his death without Children, to B. If A survives the testator or dies in his lifetime leaving a child, the legacy to B does not take effect.\" If s. 124 applies to the facts of' the case, as we think it does, B then it is clear that the legacy claimed by the appellant is unavailable as the contemplaied eontingency did not occur before the fund bequeathed was payable or distributable. Section 124 deals with devolution.\n\nBut as we shall presently secs. 131 deals with divestment of an estate that had vested.\n\nMr. Chagla contends that the governing provision is s. 131. That section says: c\n\n\"A bequest may be made to any person with the condition superadded that, in case a specified uncertain event shall happen, the thing bequeathed shall go to another person, or that in case a specified uncertain event shall not happen, .the thing bequeathed shall go over (o another person.\" D\n\nThe section provides for the divestment of an estate which had already vested. It speaks of an estate going over to another person. As seen earlier clause 5 of .the will is not a defeasance clause.\n\nA case somewhat similar to the one before us came up for B consideration before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Norendra Nath Sircar and anr. v. Kamal Basini Dasi(').\n\nTherein a Hindu at his death left three sons, the eldest of full age and the other two minors. In his will were the directions \"My three sons shall be entitled to enjoy all the moveable and inunoveable properties left by me equally. Any one of the sons dying JI sonless, the surviving son shall be entitled to all th~ properties equally\". Interpreting this clause the Judicial Committee held that those words gave a. legacy to the survivors contingently on the. happening of a specified uncertain event, which had not happened before the Jltlriod when the property bequeathed was distributable, that period of distribution being the time of the testator's death.\n\nIn arriving at this conclusion, the Judicial Com- G mittee relied on s. 111 of the Indian Succession Act, 1865. That provision is similar to s. 124 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.\n\nFor the reasons mentioned above we are in a8!\"eetllent with the courts below that the suit brout by the appdlant is unsustainable.\n\nThis appeal is accordmgly dismissed with costs.\n\nK.B.N.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(I) 1.L.R. 23. Cal. ,63.", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "TALKESHWARI DEVI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TALKESHWARI DEVI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AM RAN BI.KAT PRASAD SINGH & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM RAN BIKAT PRASAD SINGH & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 12, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 71, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 12, 1972 [K. S. Hl!GDE, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY."}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ss. 124, 131", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Succession Act 1925", "statute": "Indian Succession Act 1925"}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 207, "end_char": 215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Succession Act 1925", "statute": "Indian Succession Act 1925"}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 375, "end_char": 383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Succession Act 1925", "statute": "Indian Succession Act 1925"}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 802, "end_char": 810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Succession Act 1925", "statute": "Indian Succession Act 1925"}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 879, "end_char": 887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Succession Act 1925", "statute": "Indian Succession Act 1925"}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1028, "end_char": 1036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Succession Act 1925", "statute": "Indian Succession Act 1925"}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1165, "end_char": 1173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1565, "end_char": 1576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1584, "end_char": 1611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 131", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1653, "end_char": 1659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Succession Act, 1925", "statute": "the Indian Succession Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Section 131", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1813, "end_char": 1824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Succession Act, 1925", "statute": "the Indian Succession Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "G M. C. Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2221, "end_char": 2235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G M. C. Chagla, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwal, V. I. Francis, R. Gqburdhun and D. Goburdhun, lor the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2237, "end_char": 2248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G M. C. Chagla, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwal, V. I. Francis, R. Gqburdhun and D. Goburdhun, lor the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2250, "end_char": 2263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G M. C. Chagla, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwal, V. I. Francis, R. Gqburdhun and D. Goburdhun, lor the appellant."}}, {"text": "V. I. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2265, "end_char": 2278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G M. C. Chagla, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwal, V. I. Francis, R. Gqburdhun and D. Goburdhun, lor the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Gqburdhun", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2280, "end_char": 2292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G M. C. Chagla, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwal, V. I. Francis, R. Gqburdhun and D. Goburdhun, lor the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. Goburdhun", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2297, "end_char": 2309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G M. C. Chagla, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwal, V. I. Francis, R. Gqburdhun and D. Goburdhun, lor the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2331, "end_char": 2345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Sarjoo Prasad, A. G. Ratnaparkhi and Rajiv Shah, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2347, "end_char": 2360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Sarjoo Prasad, A. G. Ratnaparkhi and Rajiv Shah, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. G. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2362, "end_char": 2379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Sarjoo Prasad, A. G. Ratnaparkhi and Rajiv Shah, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Rajiv Shah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2384, "end_char": 2394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Sarjoo Prasad, A. G. Ratnaparkhi and Rajiv Shah, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "II Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2458, "end_char": 2466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judent of the Court was decided by II Hegde, J, In this appeal by certificate we are to consider the effect of the will executed by one Ral!hunath Prasad Singh, on August 31, 1938."}}, {"text": "Ral!hunath Prasad Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2559, "end_char": 2582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judent of the Court was decided by II Hegde, J, In this appeal by certificate we are to consider the effect of the will executed by one Ral!hunath Prasad Singh, on August 31, 1938."}}, {"text": "Talkeshwari Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2771, "end_char": 2787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said testator died very soon after the execution of the will leaving behind him his widow 1ageshwar Kuer,\n\nhis dau, ghter Satrupa Kuer and his two grand daughters Talkeshwari Devi (the appellant herein) and Sheorani.", "canonical_name": "TALKESHWARI DEVI"}}, {"text": "Sheorani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2815, "end_char": 2823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said testator died very soon after the execution of the will leaving behind him his widow 1ageshwar Kuer,\n\nhis dau, ghter Satrupa Kuer and his two grand daughters Talkeshwari Devi (the appellant herein) and Sheorani.", "canonical_name": "Sheorani Devi"}}, {"text": "Jageshwar Kuer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2960, "end_char": 2974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jageshwar Kuer died in November 1948 and Sheorani Devi on November 1, 1949 without Jeavinl!:", "canonical_name": "Jageshwar F Kuer"}}, {"text": "Sheorani Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3001, "end_char": 3014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jageshwar Kuer died in November 1948 and Sheorani Devi on November 1, 1949 without Jeavinl!:", "canonical_name": "Sheorani Devi"}}, {"text": "November 1, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3018, "end_char": 3034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jageshwar Kuer died in November 1948 and Sheorani Devi on November 1, 1949 without Jeavinl!:"}}, {"text": "CShwar Kuer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3500, "end_char": 3511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CShwar Kuer absolutoly and tho remaining pro."}}, {"text": "Shrimati Satrupa Kuer alias Nan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3842, "end_char": 3873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The will fur.her provides that after her death\n\n\"the entire property will be l!reated as 16 annas property out of which S annas 4 pies (five annas four pies) share constituting proprietary interest will pass to Shrimati Satrupa Kuer alias Nan\n\ndau, ghter of me, the executant and her heirs as absolute owners and the remaining 10 annas 8 pies ( annas ten and eight pies) share will pass to both the minor grand daughters, (1) Shrimati Talkeshwari Kuer alias Babu and (2) Sbrimati Sheorani Kuer alias Bachan in equal shares as absolute proprietary interest\"\n\n(cl."}}, {"text": "Shrimati Talkeshwari Kuer alias Babu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4057, "end_char": 4093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The will fur.her provides that after her death\n\n\"the entire property will be l!reated as 16 annas property out of which S annas 4 pies (five annas four pies) share constituting proprietary interest will pass to Shrimati Satrupa Kuer alias Nan\n\ndau, ghter of me, the executant and her heirs as absolute owners and the remaining 10 annas 8 pies ( annas ten and eight pies) share will pass to both the minor grand daughters, (1) Shrimati Talkeshwari Kuer alias Babu and (2) Sbrimati Sheorani Kuer alias Bachan in equal shares as absolute proprietary interest\"\n\n(cl."}}, {"text": "Sbrimati Sheorani Kuer alias Bachan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4102, "end_char": 4137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The will fur.her provides that after her death\n\n\"the entire property will be l!reated as 16 annas property out of which S annas 4 pies (five annas four pies) share constituting proprietary interest will pass to Shrimati Satrupa Kuer alias Nan\n\ndau, ghter of me, the executant and her heirs as absolute owners and the remaining 10 annas 8 pies ( annas ten and eight pies) share will pass to both the minor grand daughters, (1) Shrimati Talkeshwari Kuer alias Babu and (2) Sbrimati Sheorani Kuer alias Bachan in equal shares as absolute proprietary interest\"\n\n(cl."}}, {"text": "cl. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4190, "end_char": 4195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4211, "end_char": 4219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sheoranl Kuer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4561, "end_char": 4574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".well as Sheoranl Kuer were minors.", "canonical_name": "Sheorani Devi"}}, {"text": "Jageshwar F Kuer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4607, "end_char": 4623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the death of Jageshwar F Kuer, the appellant and her sister Sheorani Kuer divided the ten annas eiht pies share of the properties which devolved on them In equal sharea and each one came into possession of her share of the properties.", "canonical_name": "Jageshwar F Kuer"}}, {"text": "Sheorani Kuer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4654, "end_char": 4667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the death of Jageshwar F Kuer, the appellant and her sister Sheorani Kuer divided the ten annas eiht pies share of the properties which devolved on them In equal sharea and each one came into possession of her share of the properties.", "canonical_name": "Sheorani Devi"}}, {"text": "Sheorani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5141, "end_char": 5149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That suit was resisted bv the first defendant, the husband of Sheorani, He claimed that he was entitled to those properties as the heir of hi& .wife.", "canonical_name": "Sheorani Devi"}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5760, "end_char": 5768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6148, "end_char": 6156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J ageshwar Kuer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6320, "end_char": 6335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is clear from clause 4 of the will that the testator wanted to give to his grant-daughters an absolute right in the properties that were to devolve on them after 'the death of his wife, J ageshwar Kuer.", "canonical_name": "Jageshwar F Kuer"}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6368, "end_char": 6376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6419, "end_char": 6427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6689, "end_char": 6697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jaeshwar Kuer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6822, "end_char": 6835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is plain from the language of clause 5 of the will that it refers to the devolution, which means when the properties devolved on the two si, ters on the death of\n\nJaeshwar Kuer..\n\nWe are unable '.o accept the contention of Mr. M. C. Chagla, learned Cooosel for the appellant that there is any conflict between clause 4 and clause 5 of the will.", "canonical_name": "Jageshwar F Kuer"}}, {"text": "M. C. Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6886, "end_char": 6898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is plain from the language of clause 5 of the will that it refers to the devolution, which means when the properties devolved on the two si, ters on the death of\n\nJaeshwar Kuer..\n\nWe are unable '.o accept the contention of Mr. M. C. Chagla, learned Cooosel for the appellant that there is any conflict between clause 4 and clause 5 of the will."}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6969, "end_char": 6977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6982, "end_char": 6990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7005, "end_char": 7013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7169, "end_char": 7177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 124 and 131", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7937, "end_char": 7952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7960, "end_char": 7987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7990, "end_char": 8001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Succession Act, 1925", "statute": "the Indian Succession Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8537, "end_char": 8543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Succession Act, 1925", "statute": "the Indian Succession Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Section 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8778, "end_char": 8789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Succession Act, 1925", "statute": "the Indian Succession Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8907, "end_char": 8913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chagla contends that the governing provision is s. 131."}}, {"text": "s. 131", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8955, "end_char": 8961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Succession Act, 1925", "statute": "the Indian Succession Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9426, "end_char": 9434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10393, "end_char": 10399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act, 1865", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10407, "end_char": 10434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10465, "end_char": 10471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Succession Act, 1865", "statute": "the Indian Succession Act, 1865"}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10479, "end_char": 10506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_731_740_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "CllHOTOBRAI JETHABRAI PATEL &: CO.\n\nTHE INDUSTRIAL COURT, MAHARASHTRA NAGPUR\n\nBENCH, NAGPUR &: OTHERS.\n\nMarch 9, 1972\n\n[C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, J. D. DUA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J\n\nBomba>' Industrial Re/r.1ionr Ac/, 194&-ss. 78(1) D, 42{4)- Compliance wit!h s. 42(4) i/ condition precedent for invoking jurisdic tion of Labour Court under s. 78(1) D.\n\nAgainst the order of the appellant company dismissing him, an employer filed an application before the Labour Court under secltion 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. The Labour Court set aside the order. The Industrial Court ®d the High Court confirm ed the order Of the Labour Court rejecting the appellant's contention that the order of the Labour Court was liable to be set aside on the ground that the employee did not make an application under s. 42( 4) in Ch:lpttl' VIII of the Act which was a condition precedent to apo proaching the Labour Court. On the question whether the Labour Court could exerc.'ise jurisdiction under s. 78(1) D of the Act in a cue where the employee of an industry governed by the Act had not com• plied with the provisions of .sub-oection ( 4) of s. 42 of the Act cad with the provisc to the sub-oection,\n\nHELD : Allowing the appeal.\n\n(i) The scheme of Chapter VIII of the Act is that in regard to any \"Change\" in an industrial m'ltter there must be compliance with the provisions of that chltpter. There is nothing in the Act: which warrants .the conclusion that the legislattire bv inserting paragraph D in s. 78 ( i) intended to chalk out a wholly different course of acion to that prescribed in Ch1pter VIII dealing with changes.\n\nThe 'cheme of s. 78(1) is that Labour Court is to have power to decide all 'the disputes covered by paragraph A. In other words, efforts must first be made. by the employer intending to effect any change in respect of matten cove\"'d by s. 42 (I), or an employee desiring a change in respect of any order p:is.ed by the employer under standing order which would of necessity include an order 9f dismissal, to see whether it was possible to come to any agreement and an applicjation , to the Labour Court could only be resorted to after efforts had been made to settle the dispute and no agreement had been arrived at. P39C-Gl ·\n\n(ii) A person who is di, missed would be an employee within the meaning of s. 3(13) of the Act and there is no valid reason for differentiating the case of a dismimd employee from one who complains of some other change. P39Hl · ·\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1968.\n\nAppeal from th~ judgment and order dated April 12, 1967 of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench in Special Civil Application No. 812 of 1966.\n\nM. N. Phadke and M ohinder Narain, for the appellant.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, 1.\n\nIn this appeal by certificate the question involved is, whetner the Labour Court at Nagpur could exercise jurisdiction under s. 7 8 (1) D of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act in a case where the employee of an industry governed by the Act had not complied with the provisions of s. 42( 4) of the said statute read with the proviso to the said sub-section.\n\nThe Bombay High Court has held that it was not necessary for an empl<>- yee first to approach the employer or to follow the procedure laid down in s. 42 ( 4) including the proviso before he could apply to the Labour Court for relief under s. 78 (I) D.\n\nThe facts are as follows.\n\nOne Nathu, respondent No. 3 herein, was employed as a munshi in the appellant's Bidi factory at Bhandara. The appellant had framed a charge sheet against him in respect of certain acts of misconduct, gross negligence of duty, insubordination etc. on May 13, 1965. Aµ enquiry in respect thereof was held on May 15th after receipt of written statement from Nathu.\n\nHolding that the charges levelled against him were proved, the employer dismissed the third respondent with effect from August I, 1965. The said respondent filed an application challenging the order of dismissal before the Labour Court under s. 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, here inafter referred to as the 'Act', on the 5th August.\n\nHis complaint was that the charge sheet was not proper, that the Head Office of the appellant had no authority to deal with his case under the Standing Orders, that no evidence was allowed or filed on behalf of the employer and that \\he finding was based only on his statement and in particular his cross-examination.\n\nHe had been forced to append hi~ signature to a certain paper without the same having been read over to him.\n\nThe Labour Court after holding an enquiry took the view that the findings of the enquiry officer 'vere perverse, that the order of dismissal was\n\npased by a person not authorised to exercise the power and consequently the Labour Court directed the reinstatement of the third respondent with all back wages.\n\nThe appellant preferred an appeal to the State Industrial Court contending, inter alia, that the third respondent had failed to comply with the provisions of law in that he did not make an application under s. 42 ( 4) of the Act which was a condition precedent to approaching the Labour Court and prayed that the order of the Labour Court should be sot aside on that ground alone.\n\nThe Industrial Court confirn!.ed the order of the Labour Court. The appellant then filed a peti\n\nI j\n\nD I\n\nC. J. PATEL & CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COUR.T (Mitte~, J.) 7331\n\nlion under Art. 227 of the Constitution before the Bombay High • Court. The High Court held against the appellant.\n\nUiifortu nately, there is no appearance for the resp011dent. before us.\n\nIn order to appreciate the scope of the Labour Court's juris- diction under the Act and in particular the attractability of. s. 78 ( 1) D it is necessary to exaniine the scheme of the Act as a whole including the provisions relevant for this appeal.\n\nThe Act when first passed in 1946 known as the Bombay Industrial Relations A~ was applicable to a limited area within -the State. In the Vidarbha region of the State, there was anothet similar Act in operation.\n\nThe Act suffered numyous amendments from time to time until 1965 when MaharaShtra Act 22 of 1965 was passed.\n\nThe new Act was described as an Act .. \"to extend the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 throughout the State of Maharashtra and for that and for certain other pi\\tposes further to amend that Act, and to repeal correspQPding laws in force in any part of the State\".\n\nUnder s. 2 of that Act the Bombay Industrial Relations Act of 1946 as in force immediately . before the commencement of the 1965 Act in the Bombay area of the State of Maharashtra was extended to the rest of the State.\n\nThe C.P. and Berar Act was repealed. As a n:Sult, the Act now extends to the whole of the State.\n\nChapter I contains only .three sections : s. 2 deals with the extent, commencement. and application of the Act and s. 3 is the definition section.\n\nChapter II sets out tbe authorities . to , be , co, nstituted or appointed under. the ;\\ct.\n\nS. 9 provides for the constitution of Labour Courts and s.J!O of Industrial Courts.\n\nChapter Ill containing ss. 11 to 22 deals with registration of Unions and Chapter IV with approved .:Unions.\n\nChapter V deals with representatives of employers arid employees. and appearance in ptoceedings on their behalf.\n\nChapter VI deals with powers and duties of labour officer and Chapter VIII deals with Standing Orders.\n\nChapter VIII containing ss. 42 to 4 7 deals with \"changes\".\n\nChapter IX deals with Joint Committees, Chapter X with Conciliation Proceedings, Chapter XI with Arbitration and Chapter XII with Labour Courts, their territorial jurisdiction, their powers,· commencement of proceedings before the Labour.\n\nCourt etc. It is not .necessary to take note of . other Chapters excepting s. 123 in Chapter XIII which deals with the rulemaking power.\n\nThe relevant definitive clauses in s. 3 are :- , . . \" ( 8) \"change\" means an alteration in an industrial matter;\n\n(13) \"employee\" means any person employed to do any skilled or unskilled work for hire or reward in any 'industry, and includes- ( a) a person employed by a contractor to do al)y -work for him in the execution1 of a contract with an\n\nemployer within the meaning of sub-clause ( e) of clause (14);\n\n(b) a person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched or whose services have been terminated from employment on account of any dispute relating to change in respect of which a notice is given or an application made under section 42 whether before or after bis dismissal. discharge, retrenchment or, as the case may be, termination from employment;\n\nbut does not include--\n\n(i) a person employed primarily in a managerial administrative, supervisory or technical capacity drawing basic pay (excluding allowances) exceeding five hUll dred and fifty rupees per month;\n\n(ii) any other person or class. of persons employed in the same capacity as those specified in clause (i) above irrespective of the amount of the pay drawn by such person which the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf.\n\n( 17) \"Industrial dispute\" means any dispute or difference between an employer and employee or between employers and employees or between employees and employe.es and which is connected with any _industrial matter;\n\n(18) \"industrial matter\" means any matter relating to employment, work, wages, hours of work, privileges, rights or duties of employers or employees. or the mode, terms and conditions of employment, and includes--\n\n(a) all matters pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees, or to the dismissal or non-employment of any person;\n\n(b) all .matters pertaining to the demarcation of functions of any employees or class of employees; . .\n\n( c) all matters pertaining to any right or claim under or in respect of or concerning a registered agree ment or a submission, settlement or award made under this Act;\n\n( d) all questions of what is fair and right in rela- H tion to any industrial matter having regard to the person immediately concerned and of the community as a whole;\"\n\nUnder s. 31 (1) every employer must submit for approval ta the Commissioner of Labour in the prescribed manner standing Orders regulating the relations between him and his employees with regard to the industrial matters mentioned in Schedule I within six weeks from the date of the application of the Act to the industrr- Under sub-s. (5) of the section:\n\n\"Until standing orders in respect of an undertaking come into operation u.nder the provisions of sub-section ( 4), model standing orders, if any, notified in the Official Gazette .by the State Government in respect of the industry shall apply to such undertaking.\"\n\nSchedule I to the Act contains among other matters items IO and 11 relating to termination of employment including notice to be given by the employer and employee and punishment including warning, censure, fine, suspension or dismissal for, misconduct, suspension pending enquiry into alleged misconduct and the acts or omissions .which constitute misconduct.\n\nNormally, therefore, standing orders must deal with misconduct which can lead to dismissal or other punishment.\n\nUnder s. 41 the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 are not to apply to any industry to w]jich the provisions of Chapter VII of the Act apply.\n\nAs 'industrial matter' as defined in s. 3(18} includes all matters pertaining to the dismissal or non-employment of any person, an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 3(17) must\n\nnecssarily arise when there is any difference between an -employer and an employee about such dismissal.\n\nThe solution to the question before us turns on. the interpretation of the relevant provisions in Chapter Vlli headed \"changes\". - 'Change' as already noticed means any alteration iii an industrial matter.\n\nUnder s. 42(1) any employer.intending fo effect any change in respect of an industrial matter specified in Schedule II of which item 3 reads\n\n. \"Dismissal of any employee except as provided lat in the standing orders applicable under this Act'\\\n\nmust,.give notice of such intention in the prescribed fonn to the representative of the employees.\n\nHe must also send a copy of such notice to the Chief Conciliator, the Conciliator for the industry co11cerned for the local area, the Registrar, the Laboiir Officer and such other person as may be prescribed. He has also to affix a copy of such notice at a conspicuous place of the premises where the employees affected by the change are e111ployed. Under sub-s.\n\n(2) of s. 42 an employee desiring a change inrespect of an indus-\n\n736 SUPREMf!, CQURT REPORTS [1972] 3 S.C.ll.\n\ntrial matter not specified in Schedule I or Schedule III has to give notice in th~ prescribed form to the employer with similar intimation to others. Under sub-s. ( 4) any employee desiring a change in resj>\"t iTJter alia, of any industrial matter specified in Schedule m of which item reads : .\n\n\"EmplQyment including-\n\n(i) reinstatement and , recruitnient\" must ma)ce au application to the Labour Court. 1bis sub-section has a proviso which runs : .·\n\n\"Provided that no such application shall lie unless c the employee or a tepresentative union has in t, be prescribed manner approached the employer with a request for the change and no agreement has been arrived at in respect of the change within the prescribed period.\"\n\nS. 44 envisages an agreement between the parties regarding \"change\" at)d registration of the memorandum thereof by the D Registrar. Under s. 44-A a memorandum of agreement arrived lit is to be forwarded by either party to the Registrar' by re.gistered post and an agreement which is registered under s: 44 is to come into operatioµ as laid down in s. 45.\n\nThe territQrial jurisdiction of Labour Courts extends to lcical E areas for which they are constitutr.d under s. 77 in Part XII. S. ~8 runs as follows:- ·\n\n\"78. ( 1) A Labour Court shall have power to- 1'1.. decide-\n\n(a) displlctes regarding~ ( i) the propriety or legality of an. order passed by an employer ·acting or purporting to act under the standing orders;\n\n(ii) the application and intertiretation of standing orders; ·\n\n(iii) any change made by an employer or desired by an employee in respect of .an industrial matter specified in Schedule III [except item ( 5) thereof] and matters arising out of such change;\n\n(b) industrial disputes-- ( i) referred to it under section 71 or 72; tii) in respect of which It is appointed as an arbitrator by a submission;\n\n(c) whether a strike; lock-out, closure, stoppage or any change is illegal under this Act; B. try offences punishable under this Act where the , payment of compensation on conviction for an offence\n\nis provided for, determine the compensation and order its payment;\n\nB C. require any employer to-\n\n(a) withdraw any change which is held by it to be illegal, O!\\ withdraw temporarily any change the legality of which is a matter of issue in any proceeding pend\n\nng final decision, or c\n\n(b) carry out any change J•rovided such .change is a matter in issue in any proceeding before it under this Act.\n\nD. require an employer, where it finds that the order of dismissal, discharge, removal, retrenchment, ter-\n\nD mination of service or suspension of an empl(l}'ee made by the employer,- ( i) was for fault or misconduct committed by the employee which came to the notice of the employer more than six months prior to the date of such order; or I\n\n(ii) was in contravention of any of the provisions of any law, or of any standing order in force applicable to such employee, or\n\n(iii) was otherwise improper or illegal,\n\n(a) reinstate the employee forthwith or by a date F , specified by it in this behalf and y.-him wages for the period beginning on the date of such , order of dismissal, discharge, removal, retrenchment, termination of\n\nbervice or suspension, as the case may be, and ending on the date on which the Labour Court orders his re- , instatement or on the date cif his reinstatement, which-\n\n'G ever is later, or\n\n(b) to pay to the .employee in addition to wages (being wages for the period commencing on the date of his dismissal, discharge, removal, retrenchment or termination1 of service and ending on the date on which the, Labour Court orders such payment), such sum not ff exceeding four thousand rupees by way of , compensa'. tion, regard being had to loss of employment and possibility of getting suitable employment therea~.\n\n( 2) Every offence punishable under this Act shall be tried by the Labour Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed.\n\nExplanation-A dispute falllilg under clause (a) of paragraph A of sub-section ( 1) shall be deemed to have arisen if within the period prescribed under the proviso to sub-section ( 4) of section 42, no agreement is arrived at in respect of an order, matter or change referred to in the said proviso.\"\n\nClause D of s. 78(1) was introduced in the Act of Maharashtra Act 22 of 1965.\n\nS. 31 of the Act of 1965 not only introduced Cl. D but also made changes in paragraphs A and C thereof. The c forerunner of Act 22 of 1965 i.e. Bill No. LXVI of 1964, the object of which was to make numerous changes in the Act shows in its Statement of Objects and Reasons that clause 31 of the Bill was meant to \"enlarge the power8 of the Labour Court under s. 78\".\n\nAccording to th!s clause ·\n\n\"The Labour .Court is empowered (by paragraph D) tq direct temporary withdrawal of any change the legality of which is a matter of issue in i1ny proceedings before it, pending, its finaLdecision.\"\n\nThe LabOur Court was also thereby• fui:ther empowered \"to\n\nrequire an employer to reinstate an employee with full back wages or pay him wages and compensation not exceeding Rs. 2,500/- E .... if the employee was dismissed, discharged\" etc.\n\nThe Statement of Objects and Reasons amply demonstrate&· that by introducing paragraph D in s. 78 (1) the legislature was on1y seeking to arm the Labour Court with further and more\n\neffective powers to grant relief.\n\nUnder s. 79(1) proceediiigs before a Labour Court in respect of disputes fiilling under clause (a) of paragraph A of sub-s. ( 1) of s. 78 must be commenced on an application made by any of\n\nthe parties to the dispute etc. and under sub-s. (2) every application under sub-s, ( 1 ) has to be made in the prescribed form and manner.\n\nUnder s. 84 an appCal Iies to the Industrial Court G against the decision of. a LaliOur Court .in respect of a matter falling under clause (a) or cl. ( c) of paragraph A of sub-s~ ( 1 ) of s. 78 except in the case of lock-out eto. or a decision of such court under paragraph C of sui;, s. ( 1) of the said section.\n\nReading s. 78 as a whole, there is no doubt left in our minds that the legislature wanted the provision to be a comprehensive H one. It contains all the powers of the Labour Court in the matter f all disputes mentioned and gives it jurisdiction to punish\n\ncertain offences under the Act. It does not lay down the procedure for the attraction of such jurisdiction. So far as disputes are concerned, the procedure is as laid down in s. 79.\n\n. It will be noteyd that no mention is made in s. 84 of paragraph D of s. 78 ( 1) but inasmuch as orders of dismissal, discharge, removal, retrenchment, termination of service or suspension of an employee. would c(ll!le under s. 78 ( 1) paragraph A, the legislature felt it unnecessary to make ai; iy mention of an order under , paragraph .D in s. 84.\n\nParagraph D, so far as we can see, is not referred to anywhere else in the Act.\n\nThe question therefore narrows down to this i.e. whether the legislature by inserting paragraph D in s. 78 ( 1) intended to chalk oulf'a wholly different course of :iction to that prescribed in Chapter VIII dealing with changes.\n\nIn our view, there is nothing in the Act which warrants such a conclusion.\n\nThe' scheme of Chapter VIII seems to be that in regard to any \"change\" in an industrial matter there must be compliance with the provisions of that Chapter.\n\nIn other words, effort must first be made by the employer intending to effect any change in respect _oL matters covered bys. 42(1) or an employee desiring a change in respect of any order passed by the employe~ under standing orders which would of necessity include an order of dismissal, to see whether it was possible to; come to any agreement and .an application to the labour court could only be resorted to after efforts had been made\n\n E to settle the dispute and no agreement had been arrived at.\n\n'the scheme of s. 78 (1) seems to be that a Labour Court is to hav1rpower to decide all the disputes covered by paragraph A.\n\nPph B thereof gives the Labour Court the power to try\n\nolfe\\).s punishable under the Act and cognizance of such offences can <lilly be take.n under s. 82.\n\nParagraphs C and D set out what ll' relief .the Labour Courts are empowered to give including directions .a$ may be found necessary, Jn that behalf.\n\nAs already noted. the Statement pf Objects and ons of clause 31 of the J:lill .which later resulted in Act 22 of 1965, shows that the underlymg ldea was to enlarge the powers .of the Labour Court. The Legislaturec nowhere intended to make a complete departure from the G procedure to be adopted when powers under s. 78 ( 1) D were to be exercised.\n\nRule 55 of the Bombay Industrial Rclatians Rles, 1_9~7 . shows how an application is to be made and the penod w1thm which .it is to be made. ·\n\nltmust be held that a person who is dismissed would be an emp!Oyee within the meaning of s. 3 ( 13) of the Act and we can\n\n7 40\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1'972] 3 S.C.R. , see no villid reason for differentiating the case of a dismissed employee from one who complains of some other hange. As the A scheme of the Act is that disputes should be settled as ell Ill! possible and primarily through conciliation and agreement, it does not stand to reason that an employee should be able to side-step all this by a direct reference to the Labour Court. A Labour Court is a creature of the statute and it can only exercise Sl!Ch jurisdiction as the statute confers on it : if !here are certain pre B\n\ncondition~ to the exereise of its jurisdiction, it must refuse to entertain any sµch application unless such pre-conditions are first complied with.\n\nIn the result we set aside the order of the High Court, allow the appeal and qul!Sh the orders of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court but do not make any order for CO!!SC<!Uential .C relief, in view of the solemn assurance give!} to this Co&t i?Y Mr.\n\nPhadke, learned counsel for the appellant that his client does not desire to give effect to the order of termination of service passed on the third respondi:nt.\n\nIn the ircumstances .of the c::ase, we make no order as to costs. .D\n\nK.B.N.\n\nAppeal al/owed.", "total_entities": 88, "entities": [{"text": "CllHOTOBRAI JETHABRAI PATEL &: CO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 33, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHHOTOBHAI JETHABHAI PATEL & CO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE INDUSTRIAL COURT, MAHARASHTRA NAGPUR\n\nBENCH, NAGPUR &: OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE INDUSTRIAL COURT, MAHARASHTRA NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. DUA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 149, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 154, "end_char": 170, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 78(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 214, "end_char": 223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 251, "end_char": 259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 78(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 332, "end_char": 340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 486, "end_char": 523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 42( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 808, "end_char": 817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "statute": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "s. 78(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 991, "end_char": 999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "statute": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1139, "end_char": 1144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "statute": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1501, "end_char": 1506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "statute": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "s. 78(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1641, "end_char": 1649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1863, "end_char": 1868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(13)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2330, "end_char": 2338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2608, "end_char": 2639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from th~ judgment and order dated April 12, 1967 of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench in Special Civil Application No."}}, {"text": "M ohinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2704, "end_char": 2720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Phadke and M ohinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2785, "end_char": 2791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, 1."}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2881, "end_char": 2887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this appeal by certificate the question involved is, whetner the Labour Court at Nagpur could exercise jurisdiction under s. 7 8 (1) D of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act in a case where the employee of an industry governed by the Act had not complied with the provisions of s. 42( 4) of the said statute read with the proviso to the said sub-section."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2922, "end_char": 2926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3078, "end_char": 3087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3160, "end_char": 3177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bombay High Court has held that it was not necessary for an empl<>- yee first to approach the employer or to follow the procedure laid down in s. 42 ( 4) including the proviso before he could apply to the Labour Court for relief under s. 78 (I) D.\n\nThe facts are as follows."}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3303, "end_char": 3308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3395, "end_char": 3400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nathu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3440, "end_char": 3445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Nathu, respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Nathu"}}, {"text": "Bhandara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3532, "end_char": 3540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 herein, was employed as a munshi in the appellant's Bidi factory at Bhandara."}}, {"text": "May 13, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3686, "end_char": 3698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on May 13, 1965."}}, {"text": "Nathu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3791, "end_char": 3796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aµ enquiry in respect thereof was held on May 15th after receipt of written statement from Nathu.", "canonical_name": "Nathu"}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4041, "end_char": 4046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4054, "end_char": 4091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5096, "end_char": 5101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5447, "end_char": 5455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High • Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5487, "end_char": 5506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "227 of the Constitution before the Bombay High • Court."}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5750, "end_char": 5755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vidarbha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6013, "end_char": 6021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Vidarbha region of the State, there was anothet similar Act in operation."}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6252, "end_char": 6289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6474, "end_char": 6478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "statute": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Act the Bombay Industrial Relations Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6487, "end_char": 6526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6608, "end_char": 6614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "before the commencement of the 1965 Act in the Bombay area of the State of Maharashtra was extended to the rest of the State."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6636, "end_char": 6647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "before the commencement of the 1965 Act in the Bombay area of the State of Maharashtra was extended to the rest of the State."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6828, "end_char": 6832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act the Bombay Industrial Relations Act", "statute": "Act the Bombay Industrial Relations Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6901, "end_char": 6905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act the Bombay Industrial Relations Act", "statute": "Act the Bombay Industrial Relations Act"}}, {"text": "S. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7027, "end_char": 7031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act the Bombay Industrial Relations Act", "statute": "Act the Bombay Industrial Relations Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 11 to 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7135, "end_char": 7147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act the Bombay Industrial Relations Act", "statute": "Act the Bombay Industrial Relations Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 42 to 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7464, "end_char": 7475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act the Bombay Industrial Relations Act", "statute": "Act the Bombay Industrial Relations Act"}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7816, "end_char": 7822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7914, "end_char": 7918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8521, "end_char": 8531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10152, "end_char": 10157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10379, "end_char": 10389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10768, "end_char": 10789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11248, "end_char": 11253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule I to the Act", "statute": "Schedule I to the Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11276, "end_char": 11325, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chapter VII of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11387, "end_char": 11409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 42(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11924, "end_char": 11932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12025, "end_char": 12036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter VII of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12635, "end_char": 12640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12771, "end_char": 12781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule III", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12785, "end_char": 12797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13467, "end_char": 13472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13605, "end_char": 13610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13815, "end_char": 13820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13933, "end_char": 13938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule III", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14365, "end_char": 14377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14498, "end_char": 14508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16869, "end_char": 16879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 78(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16996, "end_char": 17004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17063, "end_char": 17068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17341, "end_char": 17350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17422, "end_char": 17427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17990, "end_char": 17995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 79(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18121, "end_char": 18129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18247, "end_char": 18252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18452, "end_char": 18457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18635, "end_char": 18640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18770, "end_char": 18775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19193, "end_char": 19198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19248, "end_char": 19253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19272, "end_char": 19277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19427, "end_char": 19432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19546, "end_char": 19551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19736, "end_char": 19741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20619, "end_char": 20624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20878, "end_char": 20883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21090, "end_char": 21099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21349, "end_char": 21354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21618, "end_char": 21622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Phadke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22631, "end_char": 22637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to this Co&t i?Y Mr.\n\nPhadke, learned counsel for the appellant that his client does not desire to give effect to the order of termination of service passed on the third respondi:nt."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_741_753_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "A DUNLOP L.\"miA LINI'IED\n\n'OIEIR WORKMEN\n\nMarch 10, 1972\n\n1-41\n\nu- , [C. A. V AlDIALlNOAM AND G. K. Mrrna, J1.]\n\nIndustrial Dlsput~Retlre!\"ent age-flfllwstriaJ Tribunal-Jurisdlai to (iz retlrenunf age-Worlcmi111 II bound by agreent b7 Unlo { h'0 1r\" hf is M, l a member. n o w IC\n\nIn. 1955 the appelant Company framed and brought into fon:o Staodil!a Orders unde.t wh1ch a sta.l! efD:P!e was to mire at the ap of ss.\n\nC 1be Compaoy tn 1.956, entered mto an a~Veemett with its workmen represented by the union, of wbic; b all the workmen of the company re\n\nmembers. The ament, among other thing,, fixed the retirement agca.t\" 55. Notwithstanding this agreement the Compiny iswed a Circular in 1960 to the effect that the manaa:ement will not ~Uuirc any employeeto retire before attaining the age of 58 years. In 1961, tho Oompany entered into an nt wiltt one of the three uniOilS of the workmen dina the (:Ofldllions of Mpioyment. Tbo aereement provided that D an employee shall' relire at the of 58. Otl the expiry of this a~ mtAt a. fClllh aaeeme11t waseGioeled into. with tho.same unioo In 1966. 0t1 one of~ WOI'kmenauaining.SS.years the Coy passed an order retirina the workman. An iAdu&uilll dispute \"'r.U raised and it wu referred to Tribunal for adjlldieatioo.\n\nTho Tribunal recorded. tho tlndi.oga tlw wb£n the kman joillrJ! the\n\nE lf!n'ice of' the Coolpany in 1944 tbc:re were no SbndiD& Orders, ,__or . ard' th r etirement chat tbou&h the wot .. n•ll reauJauons rea tng e age 0 rtbe Co.., did not sjvt. dl'ej; l to - bound by tho 19S6 agreement ·!kJd . the agrtemaJt; that thedie 11111 of• retirement of. 55. yean as :;:;:; . tolll with a Union of wbich 1961 and. 1966. aa:rcaneota were en be was not bound by the workmaa was not a rru::f!lbtr and. ision of this ():)urt in Guut the a~U\"tement: and that in Vt~ o!- the doc S.CIL 348 the workman Keen, William.r Ltd• v, P •. 1: 5_ttrltt !19.~1 1 tho age of 60. yean. 011 F waa entitled &o bQ in eerwoe till hla attanuna 0 tho workman ill~ these fiadini!O' the Tribun&l bcld tho ._ord~ ;::: :nd contin\\10 in stSVttC' and dcdara<l thllt bo. was enlltled t& \"\" re:tDS till he attained the ae (If 60 years. .L. (') the trlbunaf 't was contended ...,.t I 6 bould In the appeal by speclill lellve I d by the agreement of l9S s\n\nbavin.t hekl.that tho workmao was =d to redre at the age of S~~\n\nlv.ye held th&l. the. workman was tbe StandiPI ()nlers .\n\nG as provided tbetein or. at.· any. rJ.Ie. '-$ the ()lCnpanfs order redrln~ in !9S5 and In this vi~ it.shoulth d ~al should have held tbebad7o~ the workman at S8 le2al: (il) e . especiall.Y as be e th of 1961 and 1966. bind.ina M !me~~ and (iii) in aoe=u: the various OlheT bcneflts c:oo directioo to tho companY tribunal had no Jurisdic:tioo. ave a f 60 rut' . the \\l(orkman till be attained tho aao 0 \"b •• b-~ 10 ~.CQIII!rmed \"al Ttl \\IOU au ' B HELD • That the Award oC the InduStn and the apPul diJmi~ . f the companY In l{:j\n\n(l) ThoU&h the workman entered the rr::; rb; tho coD'IPIDY In ' he Is bound by the StaJ!dina ~\n\n: /\n\nI I .\n\n: I\n\n. I\n\n. I\n\nI i I!\n\n\"742\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nin as much as he was a workman and employed at the time when the Standing Orders were certified. [748 Hl\n\nAgra Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. Sri Alladin and others, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 808; Guest Keen Williams Private Ltd. v. P. I. Sterling and others, ''[19601 1 S.C.R. 348; Workmen of Kettlewell Bullen &: Co. v. Ketrlewell\n\nBullen &: Co, Ltd., [i964] 2 L.L.J. 146 and Salent Erode Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. v. Salem Erode Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. Employed Union,. [19661 2 S.C.R. 498, referred to.\n\nThe 1956 agreement was a valid agreement and as rightly held by the Tribunal it was bindin~ on the concerned workman. ·\n\nBut, the Tribunal's finding that the agreement of 1956 had not been\n\niven effect to is justified.\n\nFrom the 1960 circular and other circum- . stances it is clear that the management decided not to retire any employee before attaining the age of 58 years though the age of retirment was 55 years under the Standing Orlers framed in 1955 and under the agreement of 1956. [749 EJ\n\n\n(ii) The agreements of 1961 and 1966 will bind only such of the staff employees as were members of the Union which was party to the\n\nagreement. Tile concerned workman was not a member of. the Union . wnich was a party to the agreement. 1berefore, the Tribunal was justified in holding that he was not bound by the agreements of 1961 and 1966.\n\nAnd, the mere fact that an employee gets the benefit of higher wages\n\nfixed under the agreement cannot be considered tD operate as a bar to his disputing the right of the manat to retire hilt! at the age _9f 58 years; it is only when the clause relating to the a~ of retirement is sought to be enforced that he can raise a controversy, [7S 1 H1\n\n(iii) The Tribunai is justifted in considering the question of the proper retirement age of the workman. The decisions of this Court prima facie support the view of the Tribunal that the workman was entitled to cootinue till he attained the age of 60 years. [752 E]\n\n\nThis Court had emphasised that industrial adJudication in India beina based on industryi-Cum-region basis, industrial tribunals have jurisdiction to make nece~Sary chanaea in a Uniform Scheme so that it might accord wih the prevailin1 conditions in the repon where the employees were G working, as the changes found necessary by the tribunal were to ensure fair conditions of service. 1752 H]\n\nFurther the trend in West Bengal region is to fix the aae of retirement at 60 years for the clerical and subordinate staff. [753 D] ·\n\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JUIUSDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1490 of 1968 ..\n\nDUNLOP INDIA V. WORKMEN (Valdialingam, J.) 743\n\nAppeal by special Leave from the Award dated the 29th Feb ruary, 1968 of the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, Calcutta in Case No. 334 of 1967.\n\nG. B. Pai and D. N. Gupta, for the appellant.\n\nB D. L. Sen Gupta, Janardan Sharma a.nd S. K. Nandy, for the . respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the award dated February 29, 1968 of the Fifth Industrial\n\nTribmal, West Bengal, in Case No. 334 of 1967, settin~ aside the order dated August 2, 1966 passed by the appellant directing the retirement of the concerned workma, n on his attaining the age of 58 years.\n\nThe appellant is a Joint Stock Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. It carries on business throughout India as manufacturers a)tld dealers of tyres, tubes for motors, trucks and tractors etc~ The workman concerned, Hari Nath Bhattacharjee, was appointed in 1944. At that time there were no rules regarding the age of superannuation. On April 26, 1955, the Company framed and brought into force under s. 7 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, standing ordersrelating to its staff employees. Under clause 28 of the Standing Orders a staff employee as to retire on the first January next. following -e year\n\nwhich he attains 55 years of age. But it was also provided that if a staff employee desires to remain in service of the Company after the date when he should have been oormally retired, the Managing Director had the power to extend the employee's service year by year provided the work was found to be satisfactory and the employee was certified by the Chief Medical Officer as of good health. ·\n\nIn 19 56 an agreement. was entered into between the appellant and its workmen represented by the Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour G Union. Clause 14 of the agreement fixed the age of retirement of a staff employee as the 1st of January next following the year in which he has attained 55 years of age.\n\nNotwithnding this agreement under which the age of retirement. of a staff ployee was 55 years, the appellant issued a Circular on April 20, 1960\n\nto the effect that the management will ; not ask any employee to.\n\netire before attaining the age of 58 years .. In this CircU:I~~ after B terring to the uniform age of retirent in .\\Yes~ Bengal of e:t; t.·\n\noyees in Government and Commercial Establishments. as .the age\n\nSS years, it is stated that the Industrial Tribunals throUghout the\n\n744 .\n\nSVPREM£ COUI.T llEPOit.TS\n\n{1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\ncountry have fix.ed the age of retirement varying from 55 years to A ,, 60 year&.\n\nOn June 29, 1961, an agreement was entered into between the appellant and the Dunlop R.ubbec Factory Labour Union regarding the terms of engagement a, n.d conditions of employment of staff employees.\n\nThe aemen.t deals with various matters. a Clause 14 of this agreement provided that the staff employees shall retire at the end of the month in which they attai~ the age of 58 years. This clause also provides for a staff employee retiring when he is declared unfit on medical groUiDd. Clause 27 provided that the agree~ was to take effect from 1st Jnuary, 1961 and was to remain in force for five years from that date.\n\nIn view ot the C expiry ol the above agreement, the appellant and the same Union entered into a fresh agreemen( on December 6, 1966. regarding the terms of engagement and conditions of employment for staff employees. This agreement also deals with various matters. Clause 6; dealing with retirement, provided that the staff employees shall retire at the end of the month in which they attai!l the age of 58 years.\n\nClause 32 provided that the agreemetn't was to have effect D from 1st January, 1966 and was to remain in force for five years from that date.\n\nOn August 2, 1966 the Company informed the concerned workman that as per the Company's Regulations, he was due to retire on February 28, 1967 as he will be attai; tiing the age of 58 years E on February 15, 1967. The workman replied on September 7, 1966 stating that he was not bound to retire on completion ot 58 years as he had entered the service.of the Company long before the Standing Orders fixing the age of retirement at the age of 55 years were framed.\n\nAccording to the workman, he was entitled to continue in service till he completed 60 yeais of age. In this reply p he had also referred to the minutes of the meetings of the Works Committee held on February 29, March 30 and May 4, 1956, wherein fixtig of age of retirement at 55 years was disputed.\n\nHe . had also referred to certain other matters in his reply.\n\nThe appellant sent a further communication on Novemr 4, 9 1966 reiterating its stand that the workman was to retire as mentioned ian the letter dated August 2, 1966. The appellant further stated thai thO\\lgh the age of retirement was fixed as 55 years in tbe Standing Orders dated April 26, 1955, the age was raised to ~8 years in the agreements with the recognised Union and that the.\n\nsi4 tc; n:n$ had been accepted by the employees of the appellant K inchi.ctW.a th~. worn concmed. The appellant sent a fur\n\nCo.ro.WcatlQl\\. dated. ; f'bnw.y 25~. 1967 .~ the .woran Sting that he was bound by the age of retirementfixed m theagH, ements\n\nDUNLOP INDIA V, WORKMEN (Vaidia/'ingam, J.) 745\n\nA da.tecl Joo.e 2g, 1%1 aDd December 6, 1966. It was further ment.Wnea in this letter that an the employees were umiformly retired from servke. on attailing the age of 5 s: yt1sin: acc0rdance with the sa, id agJieements.\n\nThe appellant further stated that the workman had enje~ all the benefits conferred. qn him underthe two\n\nagreemellt3 and 'hence he was bound by the retirement age fixed .B therein.\n\nAs cOnciliation proceedings faile~ the GovellJlment of West Bengal referred to the Industrial Tribunal concerned for adjudication the (iJuestion :\n\n\"whether the retirement of Shri H. N. Bhattacharyya c is justified: ?\n\nT@ what relief, if any, is he entitled?\"\n\n~ appellt relied on the agreements dated June 29, 1961 and December 6, 1966 in support of its stand that the order. regard~\n\ning the retirement of the workman was justified. In fact the Company raised a plea that 1he concerned workman was bound by the agreeme, nt of 1956 entered into between the appellant and the Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour Union fixing the age of retirement of its employees at 55 years on, the ground that the workman was a member of the said Uniqn. On thiS basis it was\n\npleaded by the appellant that the concerned workman has really got a higher age of superannuation by virtue of the later two agreements.\n\nThe Union qii the other hand pleaded that as there were no Standing Orders regarding the age of retirement when the workman joined service in 1944, he was entitled to connue in service till he attained the age of 60 years in view of the decision of this Court in Guest, Keen, Williams Private Ltd. v. P.J. Sterling and others(!).\n\nThe Union further pleaded that the agreement of 1956 had not been given effect to by the appellant as will.be seen from its Circular dated April 20, 1966. The Union also contended that the workman was not. bound by the agreemqnts either of June 29, 1961 or of December 6, 1966 as the Union, which wa's a party to those agreements did not represent all the employees of the apllant including the concei)Ded workman. The Union fet. raised a point that at. the time of the appointment of e wQrkinan~ an assurance had been given by Mr. Edward, Employment Officer ortJie Company, that the. workman can continue in service so long as be was found to be phySically fit\n\n. . . ne~ Tribunal has recorded the following findingS : ·t the f:iine . . :!::!c:e~7~~.j=~:R:!r~;:;:=:~ (I) u960) 1 s.c.l. 348. · . .\n\n.746\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[19721 3 S.C.R.\n\nage of retirement.\n\nThe plea of the Union regarding the assurance stated to have n given by Mr. Edward was rejected.\n\nAt the time when the agreements of 196t and 1966 were entered 4nto, there were three Unions, namely, Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour Union, Dunlop Workmen's Ujn.ion and Dunlop Workers' Association; but the agreements were entered into only with one union, namely, Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour Union. The concerned . a workman as well as several other employees were' not the members of this union.\n\nOn the other hand, the workman was an active member of the Dunlop Workers' Union, which was not a party to either of the agreemelnts, and therefore, the workman was . not bound by those agreements. In 1966 there was only one Union, namely, Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour Union, representing alj the employees of the Company, and therefore the workman was l), ound by the agreement of 1956.\n\nBut the Company did not give effect to the age of retiremnt of 55 years as provided in cl. 14 of\n\nthe agreement of 1956.\n\nIn view of the decision of this Court in Guest, Keen, Williams Private Ltd. v. P. J. Sterling and others(!), the concerned workman was entitled to be in service till his attaining the age of 60 years.\n\nThe Company's plea that as th~ workman had enjoyed the benefits conferred on all employees utnder the agreements of 1961 and 1966, he was also bound by the age of retirement provided therein, was rejected on the ground that the workman c<tn raise a dispute or a controversy about the age of retirement only when the provision regarding the age of superannuation was sought to be enforced.\n\nOn these findings the Tribunal held that the order dated August 2, 1966 pa, ssed by the appellant is illegal and it also declared the right of the concerned workman to be reinstated with all benefits 8!tid that he is entiled to continue in service till he attains the age of 60 years.\n\nMr. G. B. Pai, learned counsel for the appellant, raised three contentions : ( 1 ) The Tribunal, having held that the concenned workman. was bound by the agreement of 1956, should have held that the workman was bound to retire at the age of 55 years as provided by cl. 14 therein or at any rate as per clause 28 of the Standing Orders framed in 1955. In this view, it should have further held that the Company's asking the workman to retire. on completion ol. 58 years was legal; (2) The Tribunal committed an error in holding that the agreements dated June 29, 1961 and December 6, 1966 fixing the age of retiremc:mt at 58 years were not binding on the concerned workman.\n\nOn th~ other hand. it should have held that those agreements were binding Qn the . concerned workman especially as he had enjoyed the various other benefits conferred by them; and ( 3) In any event the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to give a direciion to the Company to continue.the\n\nconcemed:workman in.service till he attained the age of 6Q .. years. ·\n\n(1) [1960]1 S.C.R. 348.\n\nDUNLOP INDIA v. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, J.) 74.7\n\nMr. D. L: Sen Gupta, learned counsel for the Union, pointed out that the findings of the Tribunal that the agrement of 1956 was. binding on the concerned workman was itself erroneous.\n\nHe referred us to certain materials on record, which, according to him, will establish that protests had been regardijlg the binding nature of the agreement.\n\nIn the alternative he contended that the age. of B retirement of 55 years asprovided in cl. 28 of the Standing Orders framed in 1955 or in cl. 14 of the agreement of 1956, has ;'fever\n\ntn given effect to by the appellant as the circular dated April 20, 1960 will show as also the various dates on which the workmen were retired.\n\nThe agreements of 1961 and 1966 were rightly held to be not binding <¥1 the concerned workman, as the concerned c workman was not a member of the union which was a party to those agreements. Mr. Sen Gupta further pointed out that when once the action of the appellnt in retiring the concerned workman on his attaining 58 years was being challenged, the Tribunal had to consider till what date the, workman was entitled to continue in service.\n\nUnless a finding is recorded by the Tribunal on the latter D aspect, it will not be possible to consider otherwise the validity of the order that was being challenged.\n\nTherefore,. he pointed out that the Tribunal was justified n holding that the workman was entitled to continue in service till 60 years and it is on that basis that it held that the termination of the services of the workman on ·.his attaining 58 years was illegal.\n\nE We have already referred to the fact that the Tritjqnal hs disbelieved the case set up by the workman regarding the assurance stated to have been given at the time of his appointment by the Employment Officer, Mr. Edward.\n\nAt the time when the wC?rkman entered the service of the appellant in 1944, admittedly there were no rules regulatiMs or agreements regarding the age of F superannuation. In the absence of any such rules, regulations or agreements regarding the age of superannuation, it was the case of the workman, that he was .entitled to continue in service so long as he was physically and mentally fit.\n\nThe Tribunal relying on the decision of this Court in Guest, Keen Williams, Private Lta.\n\nv. P. J. Sterling and others(l) and Workmen of Kettlewell Bullen & Co., Ltd. v. Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd.(2) has held that the G Standing Orders which are rules fixing the age of retirement, framed by a Company, would have no application to its prior employees unless it is shown that such employees accepted the new rules as part of their conditions of service.\n\nThese decisions have further laid down that in the absence of any such indication that the enrployees have accepted the new rules as part of their condi- H .-tions of serVice, thy are entitled to be in sece till they attain th~ age_ . of 60 years.\n\nIn . support of h~ 1st conten-·\n\n(I) [1960]1 S.C.R. 348.\n\n(2) [1964)2 L.LJ. 146.\n\n748 SUPREME COURT REPoRTS\n\n\ntion Mr. Pai pointed out that the above two decisions relied A on by the Tribunal have been explained by this Court in a recent decision in Agra Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. Sri Alladin and others(l).\n\nOil. the basis of the said decision, he contended that the Standing Orders framed in 1955 providing •n cl, 28 the . age of retirement of an employee as 55 years, is binding on the appellant, though the Standing Orders were framd long after he 8 had tmtered service.\n\nThe counsel further re-enforCed this argu- .ment relying on the agreement of 19S6 and the finding of the Tribunal that the said agreement was binding on the concelJled workman.\n\nMt. Pai urged that the agreement of 1956, which is .binding on the concerned workm~, clearly establishes that the employees represented by the Union including the concerned work- C . man have accepted the uule regarding the age of retirement as part\n\nof. their conditions of service. In short, according to Mr. Pai when the concerned workman is entitled to continue in service only till the age of 55 years, he has really been given a benefit by being allowed to continue till he attained the a~ of SS years.\n\nNonnally the ab\\Ove contention of _Mr. Pai will have considern ; able force.\n\nThe decision _in Guest, Keen, Williams Privaie Ltd. v.P. I. Sterling and others(2) as to why the age of retiiemeni of 60 years was fixed to employees who have been in s-emce be'oie the Standing Orders :fixitig the age of retirement were tranied, has :been explained in Salem Erode Electricity Diibutibn Company .Ltd. v. Salem Erode Electricity l)istribution Co. Ltd, Emp(pyees' -Union(a). In fact, both the decisionS in Giitst, Keen, Wiiliams, E Private Lttf. v. 'P: /. Sferli11g arad pthers(~) and' Workmen of Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. v. Kttlewell BaUtli & Co~ Ltd.(\") have\n\nbeen explained in Agra El~Ctri'cit)'J Supply Co. Lid. v. St'f .4)/itdin -and others('). In the latest' deciSion, after a review of the provi~\n\nsions of the Indfrial Empl9yment' ( Sdipg Otdel'S) Act, 1946, it has been held that' when: the standlng <!JrdtJ:s art' certified and F , oome into operation, they become binding on the employer and all the workmen presently employed as also those emoyed thereafter in the establishment conducted by that employer~ It liasbeen'turther -htsld that. it canno~ possibly be that such Standing Ottiel'S would bindonly those who are. employed after they coin~· into force and not. those who ate employed previously, btit are still in employment ,. when they come into force. .u ApPlying the: principles laid down.in A.g¥a .Elecf.ridiy SupplJ Co . . Ltd; v. Sri Alladin andothers-(1)., it is clear that though .. tqe oonC4fltlCdworkmaii, in tho case befpre u&, eritered-rt, iiee _ot the\n\nat-in. 1944; be will be-bollBd-by .the:Stiuidiiig.Orders framed by. t}w::appd}am-11·1955 after following.-the provisio~ of e rete- . 11 vaM' statute io:asnmcb-as--ho was &:workmeri pte8<$tly employed\n\nt tho time when-~ Standing Orders were certifiec1\n\n<t> [l970J 1 s.c.R. aos. <2> [1960] 1 s.c.a. 348.\n\n(3) 11~1 2 S.C.R. 498.\n\n(4) [19641 2 L.L.J. 146.\n\nDUNLOP INDIA v. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, J.) 749\n\nThough Mr. Sen Gupta haS been able to draw our attention tO certain protests made by the workm~ regarding the agreement of 1956, .in our opinion,· the finding of the Tribunal that the concerned workman was bpund by the said agreement has to be accepted~\n\nThere is no cQntroversy that in 1956 there was only one union,. namely, Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour Union. There is further no controversy that the said union repr-..sented all the employeeS of the Company. The agreement was entered •nto by the appellant with the said Union. If so, it follows_ that was a valid agreement and as rightly held by the Tribunal it was binding on the\n\nconce11Iled workman.\n\nClause 14 of the said agreement clearly specifies that a staff enrployee shou4J retire on the 1st of January, next following the year in which he has/attained 55 years of age.\n\nBy this agreement it must be held that the employees have accepted the retiring age already provided in the Standing Ordrs framed in 1955 as part of their ronditions of service. It the 1956 agreement holds the field, there is no scape from the conclusion that the concerned workman was entitled to be in service only till he attained the age of 55 years, and Mr. Pai is well founded .in his ctention that the retirement of the workman long after he attained the age of 55 years is justified.\n\nIt must be noted that the Tribunal has found that the ament of 1956 has not been givtm effect to by the appellant. niis finding is attacked by Mr. Pai. Even here, in our opinion, the finding-of\n\nthe Tribrunal is justified. That the retirement age provided under\n\ncl. 14 of the agreement of 1956 was not acted UPQn by the appellant Company is clear from the allowing circumstances : The appellant issued a circular on April 20, 1960 to the effect .that the management will not ask any employee to retire before atta.inmg the age of 58 years. In the said circul~ it is stated that the question of fixing the retiring age of employees, both in public and private sectors, has received considerable attentiQQ .and publicity and that in West Bengal thOugh the retiring age is almost unifO!lnly ' 55 years, in Government service, the Industrial Tribunals throgh out the country have awarded ages of retirement varying from . ss\n\nto 60. From this circular it is clear that the management have decided not to retire any employee before attaining the age of 58 G years, .though the age of retirement was 55 years as per clause. 28 of the Standing Orders framed in 1955 and clause 14 of the agreement of 1956.\n\n It is also pertinent to note that in Bomooyarea,:disputes:were raised by the employees of the appellant regardmg !f1e_ age of B retirement for clerical and guboi'dmate .staff to ]:)e ratSed .m.. ~5 to 60 years. The Industrial. T{ibunaL raised th~ age of rewent ·\n\nto 60 years; ?The appellant. had-challen~ .· .d~i9rl--~ me Industrial Tribunal oofore this Court. This CQ~~ ltl. lts 'd~ISlO~\n\n2-L106 SupCI/72 '\n\nSUPREME COURT. REPORTS [1972] 3 s.c.R.\n\nin The Dunlop Rubber Co. (India) Ltd. v. Workmen andothers(l),\n\nrendered on October 16, 1959, upheld the order of the Tribunal and dismissed the Company's appeal. Following this judgment the appellant had issued the circular, referred to above, on April 20,\n\n1960. The appellant entered into an agreement with the Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour Union Qn June 29, 1961 fixing the age of retirement at 58 years.\n\nThe same has been reiterated in the second agreement between the same parties on December 6, 1966. ..,\n\nEven on December 6, 1962 there is an inter office letter issued by the appellam.t stating that those staff employees who are over 52 or will attain the age of 52 on 1st January, 1963, will continue\n\nto work until the age of 60 years and all others will retire at 58. c Admittedly, as on January 1, 1963, the concerned workman was over 52 years and as such bly , virtue of this letter he was titled to continue in service till the age of 60 years.\n\nAll these circum~ stances clearly indicate that the appellant has departed from the original age of retirement fixed at 55 by the 1956 agreement.\n\nThe 'appellant had very strongly relied on Ex. I, as co, ntaining D the list of employees (Staff, Operatives & Special Appointments) superannuated from 1956 to August 1, 1967. According to the appellant the particulars furnished in this list will establish that the age of retirement of 55 years fixed by the 1956 agreement has bn given effect to and the staff has been retired on their attaining the age of 55 years as per clause 14.\n\nWe have already referred to the fact that cl. 14 of the 1956 agreement provides that staff employees are to retire on the 1st of January, next following the year n which they have attained 55 years of age.\n\nWe have gne through the particulars .mentioned therein. A perusal of the details mentioned in columns 5 and 6 relating to date of birth a!Od date of retirement relating to the years 1956 to 1959 clearly shows that except a few officers, all the others have retired long after having completed 55 years of service.\n\nTo take an instance: serial No. 8, Gopi Nath Seal, who was born on April 8, 1894 retired on Al}ril 1, 1956, i.e., at about the age of 62 years.\n\nSimilarly, serial No. 1'2, Dasurathi Bose, who was born on May 22, 1.891 retired only on April1, 1956, i.e., wh~ he was about 65 years. We do not want to multiply instances because there are persons who have retired at the. age of 59 and long after attainingthe age of 58. the list furnished by the appella.nt itself to establish that the 1956 agreement was given effect to re2arding the age of superannuation does not support the appellant.\n\nMr. Pai pointed out that the asPeCt referred to. by us in Ex. I has not bleen put to the Comoany's witness in which case an exPla~ nation would have been offered.\n\nWhen the facts and particulars\n\n\nDUNLOP INDIA V, WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, J.) 751 .\n\nA in Ex. I are quite clear and when the appellant itself relied on 1 that document to establish that the members of the staff were It superannuated at the age of 55 years, it was its duty to offer satis- ·.: factory expla111ation, ii one such was avaitable, to show why very many officers mentioned therein were continued in service loner after attainingthe age of 55 years. o\n\nFrom what is stated above, the contettion of Mr. Pai that the Tribooal's finding that the agreement of 1956 has not been acted upon, is erroneous, cannot be accepted. H so, it follows that the first contention of Mr. Pai will have to be re.iected.\n\nComing to the second contention of Mr. Pai, the agreement of 1966, it cMl be safely left out ot acco\\mt as it came into effect only\n\nm December 6, 1966 long after the notice dated August 2, 1966 • tssued by the appellant to the concerned workman. Coming to the agreement of June 29, 1961 that was one entered into between the appellant and the Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour Union. At the time when this agreement was entered into, there is no controversy, D that there were three labour unions, namely, Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour Qnion, Lunlop Workers' Union and Dunlop Workers Association. It is not disputed by the appellant that the concerned workman was a member of the Dunlop Workers' Union, which was not a party to any such agreement with the appellant. If the age of retirement at 58 had been fixed in the Standing Orders of the E Comany after following the procedure ndicated in the relevant statute, as the appellant originally did in 1955, then the position may be different.\n\nOn the other hand, what the appellant did was to enter into llin agreement with the Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour Union, which represented only one section of the staff employees. When that is so, such an agreement will bind only such of the staff employees who were members of the Dunlop Rubber Factory . 11' Labour Union, which was a party to the agreement. The concerned workman who was not a member of the said union was justified in contending that he was lll.Ot bound by the agreements of 1961 and 1966 and the Tribuna] was also justified in upholding that contention.\n\nMr. Pai then urged at the agreeme-nts of 1961 and 1966 conferred very many benefits on the employees and those benefits have als been availed of by the concerned workman. Therefore, he urged that the workman was bound by the provisions contained in those agreements relating to the age of retirement. The mere fact that an employee gets the benefit of higher wages fixed under the agreement, in our opinion, caltlllot be considered to operate as a bar to his disputing the right of the management to retire him at the age of 58 years.\n\nIt is only when the clause relating to the ae of retirement is sought to be enforced that he can raise a contro-.\n\n\nversy.\n\nThe other provisions regarding gratuity and other retirement benefits will accrue to the workman only on his retirement and therefore it cannot be said that the concerned workman had taken the benefit of those provisions before he was due to retire.\n\nTherefore, we are not impressed with this contention of Mr. Pai.\n\nThe second contention is also to be rejected. .\n\nThe last contention of Mr. Pai need not detain us very long.\n\nWhen the order of the management directing the workman to retire! on his attaining the age of 58 years was being challenged as illegaJ,\n\nthe Tribunal had necessarily to consider what is the p, roper retirement age for the concemed workman.\n\nIt is onl:Y when a finding is given that the concerned workman i~ entitled to continue bejrond 58 years that the Tribunal can hold the order of the Company directing his retirement at 58 years as illegal.\n\nSo the Tribunal was justified in going into that aspect.\n\nThe Tribunal has relied on the decisions of this Court in Guest, Keen, Williams Private Ltd. v. P. J. Sterling and others(!) and W e?rkmen of Kettlewell- Bullen & Co. Ltd. v. Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. (2) for holding that the concerned workman who had joined service at a time when there were no rules, regulations, agreements or Standing Orders regar~ ing the age of superannuation, was entitled to continue in service till he attained the age of 60 years. J'h()Se decisions prima facie\n\nupport the view of the Tribunal that the concerned workman, in the present case, is entitled to cntinue in service till he attained\n\nthe age of 60 years.\n\nWe have already referred to the fact that the & said decisions have n explained by this Court in Agra Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. Sri Alladin and others(!).\n\nHowever, the finding of the Tribunal that the concertDed workman was entitledto continue in service till.he attained the age of . 60 years can be supported on other grounds. We already referred to the decision of this Court in The Dunlop Rubber Co. (India) Ltd. v. Workmen and others(4 ) relating to the age of retirement\n\nbeing .60' years in respect of the appellant's staff employed in Bombay region.\n\nThough that decision related to the empl()yees of the appellant in Bombay region; it should be mted that this Court rejected the contention of the Company that it being an all\n\n India concern it should have uniform conditions of service thr.ough~ out the couJltry for its employees. It was further emphasised_by this Court that industrial adjudication in India being :bqed on industry-cum-region basis, the Industrial Tribunals hive jc tion to make necessary changes in a unifoni:t scheme so that it migb~ accord. witp. e prevailing c<>n, ditions in the region where ·· the employees were working. as the cha111.gea found necessary bjy. the Tribunal .were to ensure fair conditio:QS of se~. .\n\n . Q\n\n(1) [1960] I S.C.R. 348.\n\n(2) [1964] 2 L.I..1. 146.\n\n(3) [19?0J 1 S.C.R. 808.\n\n(4) [1%0] 2 S.C•R. 51.\n\nDUNLOP INDIA V. WORKMEN (Valdialingam, J.) 753\n\nWe have also referred to the inter office letter dated December 6, 1962 which further shows that even according to the appellant the concerned workman is entitled to continue in service till the age of 60 years.\n\nMr. Pai has referred us to certain decisions to show that the trend in West Bengal is to fix the age of retirement as 58 years for clerical and subordinate staff.\n\nMr. Sen Gupta also referred us to certain decision$ in other regions to show that the trend is t~ fix the age of rtirement for staff members at 60 years.\n\nBut it is not necessary for us to refer to those decisions cited either by Mr. Pai or by Mr. Sen Gupta.\n\nWe will only refer to the decision of this Court in M/s British Paints (India) Ltd. v. IJs Workmen( 1), which relates to West Bengal region wherein this Court fixed the age of retirement both for factory workmen and the staff members in the Company concerned at 60 years. No doubt, it is pointed out in the said decision that lhe uniform age was fixed for the. factory workmen also j, nl that case because of the particular nature I\n\nof work the factory workmen had to do, but one thing is clear, the trend in West Bengal region is to fix the age of retirement at 60 ' years for the clerical and subordinate staff. From this point of view the direction of the Tribunal that the appellant was entit1ed to continue in service till 60 years is justified.\n\nThe result is that the Award ot the Industrial Trib:unal is confirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs.·\n\nK.B.N.\n\nAppeal. dismissed.", "total_entities": 66, "entities": [{"text": "S8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2562, "end_char": 2564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1970] 1 S.C.R. 808", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3278, "end_char": 3297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5148, "end_char": 5153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "752 E]\n\nThis Court had emphasised that industrial adJudication in India beina based on industryi-Cum-region basis, industrial tribunals have jurisdiction to make nece~Sary chanaea in a Uniform Scheme so that it might accord wih the prevailin1 conditions in the repon where the employees were G working, as the changes found necessary by the tribunal were to ensure fair conditions of service."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5505, "end_char": 5516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1752 H]\n\nFurther the trend in West Bengal region is to fix the aae of retirement at 60 years for the clerical and subordinate staff. ["}}, {"text": "DUNLOP INDIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5684, "end_char": 5696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1490 of 1968 ..\n\nDUNLOP INDIA V. WORKMEN (Valdialingam, J.) 743\n\nAppeal by special Leave from the Award dated the 29th Feb ruary, 1968 of the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, Calcutta in Case No.", "canonical_name": "DUNLOP INDIA LIMlTED"}}, {"text": "Valdialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5709, "end_char": 5721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1490 of 1968 ..\n\nDUNLOP INDIA V. WORKMEN (Valdialingam, J.) 743\n\nAppeal by special Leave from the Award dated the 29th Feb ruary, 1968 of the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, Calcutta in Case No.", "canonical_name": "Valdialingam"}}, {"text": "G. B. Pai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5884, "end_char": 5893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai and D. N. Gupta, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "G. B. Pai"}}, {"text": "D. N. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5898, "end_char": 5909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai and D. N. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B D. L. Sen Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5931, "end_char": 5948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B D. L. Sen Gupta, Janardan Sharma a.nd S. K. Nandy, for the ."}}, {"text": "Janardan Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5950, "end_char": 5965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B D. L. Sen Gupta, Janardan Sharma a.nd S. K. Nandy, for the ."}}, {"text": "S. K. Nandy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5971, "end_char": 5982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B D. L. Sen Gupta, Janardan Sharma a.nd S. K. Nandy, for the ."}}, {"text": "Vaidialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6052, "end_char": 6064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the award dated February 29, 1968 of the Fifth Industrial\n\nTribmal, West Bengal, in Case No.", "canonical_name": "Valdialingam"}}, {"text": "appellant is a Joint Stock Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6390, "end_char": 6467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hari Nath Bhattacharjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6616, "end_char": 6639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It carries on business throughout India as manufacturers a)tld dealers of tyres, tubes for motors, trucks and tractors etc~ The workman concerned, Hari Nath Bhattacharjee, was appointed in 1944."}}, {"text": "April 26, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6737, "end_char": 6751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 26, 1955, the Company framed and brought into force under s. 7 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, standing ordersrelating to its staff employees."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6801, "end_char": 6805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellant is a Joint Stock Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "The appellant is a Joint Stock Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6813, "end_char": 6862, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "clause 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6918, "end_char": 6927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellant is a Joint Stock Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "The appellant is a Joint Stock Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour G Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7521, "end_char": 7557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was entered into between the appellant and its workmen represented by the Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour G Union."}}, {"text": "Clause 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7559, "end_char": 7568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 20, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7853, "end_char": 7867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of a staff ployee was 55 years, the appellant issued a Circular on April 20, 1960\n\nto the effect that the management will ; not ask any employee to."}}, {"text": "June 29, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8347, "end_char": 8360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 29, 1961, an agreement was entered into between the appellant and the Dunlop R.ubbec Factory Labour Union regarding the terms of engagement a, n.d conditions of employment of staff employees."}}, {"text": "Dunlop R.ubbec Factory Labour Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8422, "end_char": 8457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 29, 1961, an agreement was entered into between the appellant and the Dunlop R.ubbec Factory Labour Union regarding the terms of engagement a, n.d conditions of employment of staff employees."}}, {"text": "Clause 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8587, "end_char": 8596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8830, "end_char": 8839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st Jnuary, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8889, "end_char": 8905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause 27 provided that the agree~ was to take effect from 1st Jnuary, 1961 and was to remain in force for five years from that date."}}, {"text": "December 6, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9080, "end_char": 9096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view ot the C expiry ol the above agreement, the appellant and the same Union entered into a fresh agreemen( on December 6, 1966."}}, {"text": "Clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9230, "end_char": 9238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9380, "end_char": 9389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st January, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9446, "end_char": 9463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause 32 provided that the agreemetn't was to have effect D from 1st January, 1966 and was to remain in force for five years from that date."}}, {"text": "August 2, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9526, "end_char": 9540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 2, 1966 the Company informed the concerned workman that as per the Company's Regulations, he was due to retire on February 28, 1967 as he will be attai; tiing the age of 58 years E on February 15, 1967."}}, {"text": "February 15, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9717, "end_char": 9734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 2, 1966 the Company informed the concerned workman that as per the Company's Regulations, he was due to retire on February 28, 1967 as he will be attai; tiing the age of 58 years E on February 15, 1967."}}, {"text": "September 7, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9759, "end_char": 9776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The workman replied on September 7, 1966 stating that he was not bound to retire on completion ot 58 years as he had entered the service.of the Company long before the Standing Orders fixing the age of retirement at the age of 55 years were framed."}}, {"text": "February 29, March 30 and May 4, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10185, "end_char": 10222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this reply p he had also referred to the minutes of the meetings of the Works Committee held on February 29, March 30 and May 4, 1956, wherein fixtig of age of retirement at 55 years was disputed."}}, {"text": "Novemr 4, 9 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10396, "end_char": 10412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant sent a further communication on Novemr 4, 9 1966 reiterating its stand that the workman was to retire as mentioned ian the letter dated August 2, 1966."}}, {"text": "H. N. Bhattacharyya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11623, "end_char": 11642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As cOnciliation proceedings faile~ the GovellJlment of West Bengal referred to the Industrial Tribunal concerned for adjudication the (iJuestion :\n\n\"whether the retirement of Shri H. N. Bhattacharyya c is justified: ?"}}, {"text": "Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12019, "end_char": 12053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact the Company raised a plea that 1he concerned workman was bound by the agreeme, nt of 1956 entered into between the appellant and the Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour Union fixing the age of retirement of its employees at 55 years on, the ground that the workman was a member of the said Uniqn."}}, {"text": "April 20, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12806, "end_char": 12820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union further pleaded that the agreement of 1956 had not been given effect to by the appellant as will.be seen from its Circular dated April 20, 1966."}}, {"text": "Edward", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13199, "end_char": 13205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the time of the appointment of e wQrkinan~ an assurance had been given by Mr. Edward, Employment Officer ortJie Company, that the."}}, {"text": "Dunlop Workmen's Ujn.ion", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13767, "end_char": 13791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time when the agreements of 196t and 1966 were entered 4nto, there were three Unions, namely, Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour Union, Dunlop Workmen's Ujn.ion and Dunlop Workers' Association; but the agreements were entered into only with one union, namely, Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour Union."}}, {"text": "Dunlop Workers' Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13796, "end_char": 13823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time when the agreements of 196t and 1966 were entered 4nto, there were three Unions, namely, Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour Union, Dunlop Workmen's Ujn.ion and Dunlop Workers' Association; but the agreements were entered into only with one union, namely, Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour Union."}}, {"text": "Dunlop Workers' Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14085, "end_char": 14106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, the workman was an active member of the Dunlop Workers' Union, which was not a party to either of the agreemelnts, and therefore, the workman was ."}}, {"text": "cl. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14502, "end_char": 14508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. B. Pai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15419, "end_char": 15428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. G. B. Pai, learned counsel for the appellant, raised three contentions : ( 1 ) The Tribunal, having held that the concenned workman.", "canonical_name": "G. B. Pai"}}, {"text": "cl. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15680, "end_char": 15686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15717, "end_char": 15726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D. L: Sen Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16522, "end_char": 16537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DUNLOP INDIA v. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, J.) 74.7\n\nMr. D. L: Sen Gupta, learned counsel for the Union, pointed out that the findings of the Tribunal that the agrement of 1956 was."}}, {"text": "cl. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16950, "end_char": 16956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17001, "end_char": 17007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sen Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17387, "end_char": 17396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sen Gupta further pointed out that when once the action of the appellnt in retiring the concerned workman on his attaining 58 years was being challenged, the Tribunal had to consider till what date the, workman was entitled to continue in service."}}, {"text": "Pai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19515, "end_char": 19518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "748 SUPREME COURT REPoRTS\n\ntion Mr. Pai pointed out that the above two decisions relied A on by the Tribunal have been explained by this Court in a recent decision in Agra Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. Sri Alladin and others(l)."}}, {"text": "Clause 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23306, "end_char": 23315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24239, "end_char": 24245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25087, "end_char": 25097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25140, "end_char": 25149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 6, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26149, "end_char": 26165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even on December 6, 1962 there is an inter office letter issued by the appellam.t stating that those staff employees who are over 52 or will attain the age of 52 on 1st January, 1963, will continue\n\nto work until the age of 60 years and all others will retire at 58."}}, {"text": "January 1, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26428, "end_char": 26443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c Admittedly, as on January 1, 1963, the concerned workman was over 52 years and as such bly , virtue of this letter he was titled to continue in service till the age of 60 years."}}, {"text": "clause 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27160, "end_char": 27169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27214, "end_char": 27220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gopi Nath Seal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27729, "end_char": 27743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8, Gopi Nath Seal, who was born on April 8, 1894 retired on Al}ril 1, 1956, i.e., at about the age of 62 years."}}, {"text": "Dasurathi Bose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27866, "end_char": 27880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1'2, Dasurathi Bose, who was born on May 22, 1.891 retired only on April1, 1956, i.e., wh~ he was about 65 years."}}, {"text": "Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour Qnion", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29658, "end_char": 29692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time when this agreement was entered into, there is no controversy, D that there were three labour unions, namely, Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour Qnion, Lunlop Workers' Union and Dunlop Workers Association."}}, {"text": "Lunlop Workers' Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29694, "end_char": 29715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time when this agreement was entered into, there is no controversy, D that there were three labour unions, namely, Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour Qnion, Lunlop Workers' Union and Dunlop Workers Association."}}, {"text": "Dunlop Workers Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29720, "end_char": 29746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time when this agreement was entered into, there is no controversy, D that there were three labour unions, namely, Dunlop Rubber Factory Labour Qnion, Lunlop Workers' Union and Dunlop Workers Association."}}, {"text": "Dunlop Rubber Factory", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30426, "end_char": 30447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When that is so, such an agreement will bind only such of the staff employees who were members of the Dunlop Rubber Factory ."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33509, "end_char": 33515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We already referred to the decision of this Court in The Dunlop Rubber Co. (India) Ltd. v. Workmen and others(4 ) relating to the age of retirement\n\nbeing .60' years in respect of the appellant's staff employed in Bombay region."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_754_769_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "UNITED PROVINCES ELECTRIC. SUPPLY CO. LTD., A\n\nALLAHABAD\n\nT. N. CHATTERJEE March 13, 1972\n\n[S. M. S1KRI, C.J., A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY, D. G. PALEKAR\n\nAND M. H. BEG, JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Employmen~ (Standing Orders) A.ct, 1946, s. 4 and $chedule items 8, 9 and 'UC and U.P. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1946-Model S/llnding Orders, para 13-A.pp/icability of Standing Order re : age of retirement to emp/oYees 1'n service before the C certifying of Stmding Orders--Framing .of Standing Order regarding retirement before amendment, of Schf!dule--Certifying Officer, J' could -certify the standirig order a.s• fair or reasonable before ame men~ of s. 4-High Court der:iding question and remanding-When operates as res judicata. ·\n\nIn accordance with the provisions of the . Industrial Employmnt D (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and the U.P. Industrial Employment-(Sianding Orders) Rules, 1946, the appellant submitted draft standing orders. defining the conditions. Qf employment of its employees and they W'!re certified by (he Certifying Offirer in 1951. Clause 32 of the Standing Orders provided that an employee who bs served 30 years or who has reached the age of 55 years will be retired, but, exemption from t):iis may be granted by the company in special case. In 1959, notices were served on the respondent-workmen that they were retired byreason of their bav\n\n:E . ing attained the age of superannuation ..s per cl.· 32. The workmen contended that the clause was not binding or enfor\"'iable as far as tbev were concerned, because, they bad entered the 9'rvice of the appellant prior to the crtification of the Standing Orders '3Dd there was no condition that they would be liable to retirement after attaining any prescribed age or any fixed period of service, and that they were entitled to continue in service as long as they were physically fit.\n\nTOO industrial dispute was referred to the Industrial Tnbu!l'.li and the Tribunal held in favoulr of F the appellant. The respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court.\n\nThey also applied in 1960, under s. 10(2) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, for amendment and modification of cl. 32 claiming fixation of retirement age at 60. The Certifying Offil:er modi tied the clause and fixed the age of retirement <1t 58, but the appellate authority refixed it at 55. ·\n\nThe High Cour~ in the writ petition, on the basis, of the decision of G this Court in Guest Keen WU/iams Pvt. Ltd., [1%0) 1 S.C.R. 348 bd<I that Cl. 32 was not applicable to the employees and directed the Tribunal to rehear the case.\n\nThe Tribunal thereafter held that the respondent workmen were wrongfully and unjustifiably retired.\n\nIn appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : (1) It was not intended by the Legislature that .dill'eblnt H sets of conditiol)s should apply to employees depending on whether a workman was employed before the Standink Ord~ were cer!ified or after, as t!:iat would defeat the object of the legislation. \"The obi:<\\t an<!\n\nU.P. E, J.ECTRIC co. v. T. N. CHATTERJEE (Grover, J.) !755\n\nsheme of the Act is that the employers must define precisely too cond111ons of employment of '111 the employees and have tlx:m certified by the Certifyi\":g Officer.\n\nThe right given to be workmen to e<press their views, to raise ObJect1ons, to appeal to the appellate authority and to ask for modification of the Standing Orders under s. 10 of the Act, show that every possible safeguard has teen provided in the interests of the workmen.\n\nMoreover, the individual items in the Schedule to the Act show that there cannot be different conditions for different employees depending upon the point of time when , they came to be employed, f<lr that would result in a great deal of hesrt burning between the employees inter se. [762 R-H; 763 A-DJ\n\nSalem Erode El<etriclty Distrlburion Co. Ltd. v. Its Workers; [1966] 2 S.C.R. 498, and Agra Elecl'ric Supply Co. Ltd., v. Sri Al/adin 4c Ors. [1970] I S.C.R. 808, followed. •\n\n(2) The decision in Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd. that the Industrial Tribunal had to consider not only the propriety, reasonableness and fairness of a Standing Order but that it had also to deal with the question as to whether a particular Standing Order could be made applicable to employees who had already been employed without any limit as to age of retirement Was delivered under the unamended s. 4 of the Act, under which the Certifying Officer or the appellate authority could not go into the reasonableness or fairness of the Standing Orders. But after the amendment of the section in 1956, the Certifying Officer and the appellate authority are bound to examine the question of fairness of the standing orders, and therefore, there o:m be no justificaioil now for not giving effect to the p<inciple of uniforniity of conditions of servic,; which is clearly contemplated by the provisions of the Act. [763 D-F]\n\n(3) But d. 32 of th Standing Ord!rs as certified in 1951 _,)as not valid and could not be binding on~ respondents, because, there was then no item in the Schedule to the ct covering cases of superannuation or retirement, with respect to w \"ch Standing Orders col, lld be made. [766 E-F, G-.li]\n\nItem 8 and 9 of the Schedule deal with the termination of employment and _notice thereof, and suspension or dismial for miscpnduct. The language of item 8 shows that it does not cover the case of 1 superannuation \\\\'hich does not depend on any notice and which covers an e\\-ent whih is automatic and which must be given effect to without aliy volition on the part of the employer or workmen. If tennination is to be read in a widC:-sense as meaning 'employment coming to an end' there Was no necessity to have item 3, because,• dismissal would then be covered by termination. From paragraph 13 of the Model Standing Orders contained in the Schedule to the Rules it is apparent that item 8 is confined to termination of employment by notice in writing and does not refer to superannuation or retirement. It was only in 1959 that item 11 (C) wa• introduced in the Schedule enabling the framing of Standing Orders in relation to the age of retirement and superannuation. [765 F-H; 766 A-CJ\n\nSaro; Kumar v. Orissa State Electricity B()ard, A.I.R. 1970 Orissa, 126, approved.\n\nManagement of the 'Hindu' v. Secretary Hindu O{fici! 4c National Press Employees Union, A.LR. 1961 Mad. 107, disapproved.\n\n(4) No assistance can be derived by the rise of the woi'd 'retire!llent' in para, 16 of the Model Standing Orders, because, it may well refer to\n\n1·56\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[197,2] 3 S, C, R,\n\nretirement under the terms of the contract of employment entered into between the employer and the employees, [765 A-B, El\n\n(5) Sine>,, before !he amendment of s, 4 the Certifying Officer and the app, llate auhority were debarred from adjudicating upon the fairness or reasonableness of the Standing Order., the Certifying Officer at, that time, could not certify any Standing Order on the ground that it was reasonable or fair, Therefo're, in 1951, when the Standing Orders were certified, cl, 32 could not have been framed becau\"\" there was no irem in the Schedule relating to superannuation and the Certifying Offic'r could not certify it on the ground it was fair and reasonable because he hail no power to do so, [766 D-F]\n\n(6)• The Certifying Officer, however, when he modified cl, 32 and fixed the retirement age at 58 (after s, 4 was amended) could have validly certified such clause as modified , by him, This Court could also give an appropriate difection with regard to fixing the age of superannuation.\n\nIn the circumstances of this case the age of superannuation should be 58 years, Therefore, the concerned workman should be deemed to have cbntinued in service of the appellant till they had attained the age of 58 yearn, [767 A-C, G-HJ\n\n( 7) The order of the High Court in the writ petition did not finally terminal•' the proceedings t all, The proceedings were terminated only by the award of the Industrial Tribunal after remand, Therefore, the order of the High Court following Guest Keen William's case did not debar a fresh consideration of too question by virtue of the rule or principle of res ; udicata, [768 A-B, E-FJ\n\nSatyadhyan Ghosal v, Smt, Deorajan Devi, ~1960], 3 S, C, R, 590, followed,\n\nManagement, of N. Railwll)I o-operative Society v, Industrial Tribunal, [,1967] 2 S, C, R, 476, explained,\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No, 1734 of 1967. ,\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Award dated the May 19, 1967 of the Industrial Tribunal (I) at Allahabad in Adjudication . Case No. 15 of 1960. s, V. Gupte, D. N. Mukherjee and Gautam Banerjee, for the appellant.\n\nG. C. Bhattacharya and M. V, Goswami, for respolldpnts Nos. 1 and 3 to 8.\n\n0. P. Rana, for respondent No. 9.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGrover, J, This is an appeal by special leave from an award of the Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad, dated May 19, 1967.\n\nThe material facts may be stated.\n\nThe appellant, which is a limited liability company and which later on went ill!to voluntary !iquidatio)l, was carrying on the business or undertaking of generation, di&tribution and supply of electricity. One of such undertakings was 1the Electric Supply Undertaking at Allahabad in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Its affairs and business were being looked after and managed by Martin Bum & Co. lJtd., Calcuttlt.\n\nSome of the appellant's workmen in Allahabad and its surrounding area were members of Biili Mazdoor Sangh-a trade union registered under the Indian Trade Union Act, J 926. The U.P.\n\nState Electricity Board compulsorily acquired and took over the assets of the appellanot's aforesaid undertaking or business with effect from 16/17th September 1964.\n\nIn accordance with otpe provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 1946, hereinafter called the 'Aot' and the U.P. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules 1946 the appellant submitted draft Standing Orders defining the conditions of employment of its employees. On July 14, 1951 these D Orders' were certified by the Certifying Officer. Clause 32 of the - Standing Orders was in the following terms :- ·\n\n\"32. RETIREMENT-An employee who has served 30 years or who has reached tile age of 55 will be retired, but exemption to thls may be granted by the Company in.special cases\".\n\nThe workmen through the Bijli Mazdoor Sangh preferred an appeal under s. 6 of the Act from the order of the Certifying Officer to the State Industrial Tribunal which was the appellate jjuthority under the Act. Thait appeal, however, was dismissed.\n\nThe Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd., Agra and Benaras Electric Light & Power Co. Ltd., Varanasi, which is the appellant in the connected appeal (C.A. i64/6&) also got certified Standing Orders in similar terms. These electric undertakings were also under the management of Martin Bum & Co. Ltd. On July 16, 1959 notices were served on seven workme11 with effect from September 1, 1959 on the ground that they had attained 'the age of superannuation or completed 30 years of service and they were retired by reason of their having attained the age of superannuation. Out of these workmen one of them Haider Ali died .during the pendency of proceedings. The other six employees have been impleaded as respond.ents Nos. 1 to 6 m the present appeal.\n\nAccording to the appellant these respondents accepted all the accumulations due to them in respeot of Provident Fund contributions made by the appellant in respeot of .them and by themselves and were also paid gratuities credited to them in 1their res-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 2 S.C.ll.\n\npective Provident Fund aqcounts for their services prior to their A becoming members of the Provident Fund.\n\nBy an order dated February 22, 1960 made under s. 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act 1946 the Government of U.P. ref.erred to the Industrial Tribunal (I) at Allahabad for adjudication ari industrial dispute alleged to exist between the appel- B !ant and its workmen on the following issues :\n\n\"Wheither the employers have wrongfully and/ or unjustifiably retired their workmen, mentioned in the Annexure, with effect from 1st August, 1959 ? If so, to what relief are the workmen entitled ?\" c Respo11dents I to 6 and Haider Ali (since deceased) were the workmen mentioned in the Annexure. The case of the workmen before the Industrial Tribunal was that they had entered service of the appellant prior to the certification of the Standing Orders. At the time of their appointment there was no condition\n\nhat they would be liable to retirement after attaining any pres- D cribed age or after putting in any fixed period of service.\n\nA practice was in vogue that the workmen would continue in service till he was physically fit.\n\nAccordingly clause 32 of the certified Standin_g Orders was neither bindin_g nor enforce.able.\n\nThe Industrial Tribunal made an award on May 2, 1960 finding, inter- alia, (a) the employers were within their rights in retiring the E workmen concerned.\n\n(b) The act of the emPJoyers in compulsorily retiring the concerned workmen from service could not be characterised as wrongful, illegal or un.iustified and ( c) the workmen were entitled to no relief.\n\nOn June 14, 1960 the Biili Mazdoor Sangh moved an appli- F cation under s. 10 (2) of the Act for amendment and modification of clause 32 claiming fixation of retirement age at 60 years.\n\nOn September 20, 1960 the Union also filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court for quashing the award. On April 22. 1961 the Certifying Officer modified clause 32 and fixed the age of retirement at 58 years. On September 10, 1961 ithe appellate authority refixed the age of retirement at 55 years.\n\nSimilarly G appeals were filed by the Agra Electric Co. and the Banaras Electric Light and Power Co. Lid. in which similar orders were · made. On July 12, 1966 the High Court recorded an order quashing the award. It was held that Standing Order 32 was not applicable to the employees who had entered service before the certification of the Standing Orders. The Industrial Tribunal H was directed to rehear the case and after giving an opportunity to the parties of being heard give an award in accordance with law. Finally the award against which the appeal has been brought\n\nwas given on May 19, 1967. It was held in the award that al! the seven workmen had been wrongfully and uJijustifiably retired and that they should be deemed to have continued in service till Sep tember 16, 1964 from which date they would be taken to have been retrenched. The appellant having been taken over by the U.P. Staite Electricity Board, it was directed that-the employers should pay full wages from the' period August 1, 1959 to Septem ber 16, 1964 and retrenchment compensation within s. 25-F read with s, 25-FF and s. 25 J of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7.\n\nWhile deciding the writ petition the High Court relied on three decisions of this Court for holding that where there is no aj!,'e of superannuation prescribed for the employees of a concem a provision in the Standing Orders certified subsequent to the d!ite of employment regarding compulsory retirement will not be applicable to them. The first decision is in Guest Keen, Williams Private Ltd. v. P. 1. Sterling & Others('). In that case after the enlorcement of the Act the industrial concem submitted its draft Standing Orders for cevtification to the Certifying Officer.\n\nThat Officer certified the Standing Orders after giving the trade union of workmen an opportunity to be heard and ; ifter consider ing their objections. The Standing Orders relating to_ retirement provided that the workmen shall retire from the service of tlie company on reaching the age of 55 years. The company gave notice to forty-seven of its workmen who were over the age of 55 years retiring them and a dispute was raised about their retirement which was ferred to the Tribunal for adjudication. It was ulti mate1y held by. the Labour Appellate Tribunal that those workmen who were in employmellt. prior to !he date of certification of the Standing Orders would not be governed by it and their retirement was illegal.\n\nThis Court examined the scheme of the Act including tb.e relevant provisions. Notice was taken, in particu Jar, of the fact that when the Standing Orders were submitted to the Certifving Officer all that he could do was to. satisfy himself that they made provision.for other matters set out in the schedule to the Act and that they were; otherwise in conformity with its provisions. Under s. 4, as it was originally enacto.., d the Certifying Officer could not adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonable\n\nnes of the provisions of the Standing Orders. This section was subsequell'tly amended-in 1956 and the effect of the amendment was that the Certifying Officer was enabled to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of the Standing Orders. It was pointed out by the couit that the scope for enquiry before the Certifying Offi'cer prior to the amendment of s. 4 was extremely limited. The only way in which the employees could claim modification of the Standing Orders J21ior to the amendment of s. 4 was by raising an industrial dispute in that\n\n(I) [1960] l S.C.R. 348.\n\n780 SUPREME COURT llEPO!lTS\n\n\nbehalf. Subsequent to the amendment the employees could raise the same displl'le before 1the Certifying Officer and in a proper case they cauld apply for its modification under s. 10(2) of the Act. It was observed that the Standing Orders certified under the Acit became part of the terms of the employment by operation of s. 7 but if an industrial dispute arose in respect of such Orders and\n\nit was referred to the Tribunal by the appropriate Government B , the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to deal with rt on , the merits. It was, therefore,· held that the Tribunal had to consider not only the propriety, reasonableness and fairnes of the rule but it had also to deal with the question as to whether the said rule could and should be made applicable to employees who had already been employed without any limit as to age of retirement. The decision in J]ljs case was fo!lo\\\\ed in Workmen of Kettlewell Bullen & Co .. Ltd. v. Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. ( '). The next case in which a similar q11.estion &rose in Salem Erode Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Salem Erode Electricity Distribution Co.\n\nLtd. Empleyees Union('). It was claimed by the company which was the employer there that the urgent need for increased production and supply of electrical energy could be met if the existing rules embooi.ed in two of its certified Standing Orders relating to holidays and leave were suitably amended. The amendments proposed sought to introduce different rules relating to holidays and leave for employees wh<>. were appointed before a specified date and those who joined service after that date. Both the Certifying Officer and the appellate authority disallowed the amendments.\n\nThe company appealed to this Court and th~ scheme of the AcJ_was examined once again. It was emphasised that after the amendment of s. 4 of the Act made in 1956 jurisdiotion had been conferred on the Certifying Officer as well as\n\nthe appellate authority to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of lhe provisions of the Standing Orders. Thus the p jurisdiction had been widened.\n\nMoreover under s. 10(2) as originally enacted it 'was only the employer who could make an application to the Certifying Officer to have the Standing Orders modified. By the amendment made in 1956 even workmen were enabled to exercise that right. Addressing itself to the . questiqn whether it was permissible for an industrial establishment to have two sets of Standing Orders to goveni the relevant terms and G conditions of its employees it was laid down after an examination of !he scheme of the relevant provisions of the Act in the light of the matters specified in the Schedule that there was no scope for having separate Standing Orders in respect of any one of them, It was said :- ........ the conclusion appears to be irresistible that H !be object of the Act is to certify Standing Orders in\n\n(I) [1964] 2 L.L.J. 146. (2)\n\n\nrespect o.f all the matters covered by the schedule and having regard to these maMers Standing Orders so certified would be uniform and would apply to all workmen alike who are employed in any industrial establishment\".\n\nIt was considered that Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd.(') could afford no assistance because that matter came to this Court from an industrial dispute which was the subject matter of industrial adjudication and all that this Cclllrt did was to fixe the age of superannuation for workmen who had been employed prior to the date of the certification of the relevant Standing Orders. That course was adopted in the special and unusual circumstances of that case.\n\nIn the next decision Agra Electric Supply Co, Ltd. v. Sri Alladin & Ors.( 2 ) one of the main questions was whether three workmen who had been employed long before 1951 when the company's St; mding Orders were certified could be retired undet Standing Order which prescribed the age of superannuation as 5 5 years.\n\nThis Court took a view which seemingly runs counter -to Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd.(1). lt was held that the Standing Orders when certified would be binding on the employers as well as all the workmen who were in ernployment at the time the Standing Orders came into force and those employed thereafter as uniform conditions of service.\n\nThe process of reasoning which prevailed was ( 1 ) the Act is a beneficient piece of legislation, its object being to require employers in industrial establishments to define with sufficient precision the condtions of employment of workmen employed therein and to make them known to such workmen. ( 2) Before .the passing of the Act there F. was nothing in law to prevent an employer having diffnferent condtracts of employment with workmen which led to co usion an made possible discriminatory treatment. This was also clearly incompatible with the principles of collective bargaining. (3) Section 3 of the Act was enacted to do away with such diversity and. bargaining with each individual workman. ( 4) Section 4 indicates that particulars of workmen in the employment on the date of the submission of the draft Standing Orders or certification and not of those only who could be employed in future after certification were\" to be given. ( 5) Sections 4 and 5 show that draft orders are certifiable if they provide for all matters set out in the schedule and are otherwi11e in conformity with the Act and\n\nH if they are adjudicated as fair and reasonble by the Certifying Officer or the appellate authoriiy. The Certifying Officer has also to forward a copy .of the draft Standing Orders to the Union\n\n(!) (1960] I S.C.R. 348.\n\n(2) [1970] I S.C.R. 808.\n\n\nor to the workmen in the prescribed manner and bas to decide . A whether or not any modification or addition should be made after bearing the Union or the workmen concerned. Sections 6, 7, 9 and 10 contain provisions for appeal by aggrieved person> as also for sending of authenticated copies by Jtbe Certifying Officer to the parties where no appeal is filed and further the employer bas to post !he Standing Orders as finally certified it1. the manner B prescribe<!.\n\nThe employer or the workmen can even apply for modification after expiry of six months from the date on which the Standing Orders or the last !modification thereof comes into operation. (7) The schedule sets out the matters which the Standing Orders must provide for. c For the reasons given above this Court held that the Act was meant to enable Standing Orders to be made to bind not only those who were employed subsequent to their certification bu1 also those who were already in employment. If any other result were to follow there would be different conditions of employmen1 for different ~.Jsses of workmen which would render the conditions of their service as indefini'te and diversified as before the D enactment of the Act. Support was derived from the decision in Salem Erode Electricity Distribution case(') in which departure was made from the view previously taken in the case of 'Guest Keen Williams Pt. Ltd.(')\n\nIt has been. urged before us on behalf of the respondents that the decision in Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd.(2) still holds the E field and the point which was decided there and which arises in the present case did not come up for consideration in Salem Erode Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. (1). In our opinion the principle applied in the latter case is fully supported by the scheme of the Act and was rightly extended and applied in Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd. (3 ). We concur with the view expressed therein that it F was not intended by 'the legislature that different sets of conditions should apply to employees depending on whether a workman was employed before the Standing Orders were -certified or after, which would defeat the very object of the legislation. In the preamble it .is tated in categorical terms \"whereas it is expedient to require employers in industrial establishments to define with G sufficient precision the conditions of employment under them and\n\nto make the said conditions known to workmen employed by them\". Not only the object but the scheme of the Act is such that the employers must define preCisely Jtbe conditions of employment of all the employees and have the same certified by the Certifying Officer against whose orders an appeal lies to the H appellate authority.\n\nThe right given to workmen to express their\n\n\n(2) (1960] I S.C.R. 348.\n\n(3) (1970] I S.C.R. 808.\n\nA View and tQ. raise objections is of great significance. They can even ask for modification of the Standing Orders in accordance with s. 10 qf the Act. Every possible safeguard has been provided for keeping the workmen informpd about their conditions of service SQ ithat they can take whatever steps they desire or ar~\n\nad~ to !ake in: their interest before the Certifying Officer •Or B othe appellate authority. It is also very difficult to conceive tak\n\ning each individual item in the schedule how there can be diffe\n\nrent conditions for different employees depending upon the point of time when they came to be employed; for instance item 3 relates to shift working.\n\nIt is possible to sugget that for the same kind of work employees who were in employment before the\n\nStanding Orders were certified would have different hours of C shift from the other employees who were employed subsequently.\n\nIn -Ole very nature of things a great deal of irritation and annoy\n\nance between employees inter se would result if any such discrimination is made in any of the items in the schedule. It has been rightly pointed out in Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd. that this would only lead to' industrial unrest and not industrial peae, D the latter being the principal object of legislation.\n\nIt must be remembered that in Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd. the Certifying Officer could not gci into the reasonableness or fairness of the Standing Orders according to s. 4 of the Act as it stood at the material time. The law was changed only in 1956.\n\nPerhaps that was one of the main reasons which prompted the E court in takine; the view it did. But after the amendment of the law in 1956 the Certifying Officer and the appellate authority are\n\ndutv bound to examine the question of fairness of ithe Standing Orders and there can be no justification now not to give effect to the principk of uniformity of conditions of service which is clearly .contemplated by the provisions of the Act.\n\nF The next question for determination is whether clause 32 of the Standing Orders relating to age of retirement could be certi fied in July 1951. On behalf of the respondents it has been pointed out that there is no item in the schedule which covers the case of retirement or superannuation. Items 8 and 9 are in G these terms :-\n\n\"8. Termination of employment and the notice thereof to be given by employer and workmen,\n\n9. Suspension or dismissal for misconduct, and acts or omissions which con:stitute misconduct.\"\n\nThe model Standing Orders framed by the Central Government H and by !he Government of the \\State of Uttar Pradesh did not contain any clause relating to retirement or superannuation. It was for the first time that on November 17, 1959 item 11-C\n\nSIJPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1SJ72] 3 S.C.R\n\nrelating to superannuation and retirement was introduced by the A State of U.P. in exercise of the.rule-making powers conferred by s. 15 of the Act. In other States the item relating to age of retirement or superannuation was introduced either by legislation or by the exercise of rule making power. In 1the State of Bombay s. 19 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Order~) (Bombay Amendment) Act 1957 provided for insertion of item 10-A in B the Schedule which was \"age for retirement or superannuation\".\n\nAccording to counsel for 1he respondents there was no item until the introduction of item 11-C in Nove!llber 1959 in the schedule under which any Standing Orders could be framed and got certified relating to the age of retirement and superannuation. It has been maintained that items 8 and 9 cannot possibly include retire- C ment and superannuation and therefore till item 11 C was added in the schedule so far as the State of U.P. was collcemed in November 1959 no Standing Orders could be legally or validly framed and certified providing for age of retirement and superannuation. In Saroj Kumar Ghosh v. Orissa State Electricity Board (1) the Orissa High Court considered this question a some length and expressed the view that where a Standing Order .has D been certified by the Certifying Officer coll'taining a clause relating to superannuation not coveted. by the schedule of the Act nor by . ~- the model Standing Orders such certificationcannot be valid under s. 4 of the Act. The clause ltenitlnation of employment' in item 8 of the schedule cannot be equated with the word \"superannuation\". According to the Orissa High Court, superannua E tion is an event which comes more or less in an automatic process. An age is fixed on the reaching of which the holder of office has no option but to go out of office. There is no volition involved in that act. The employer and the employee have notice of the matter long before the event is to occur and the event is such that it cannot be arrested by either one of them if the rule is to be followed. On the other hand tetmination is a positive act F by which one party even against the desire of the other can bring about the end of employment. The judgment of the learned single judge in Management of the \"HINDU'', Madras v. Secretary Hindu Office & National Press Employees Union and t111other(') was dissented from.\n\nIn that case the expression \"tennination of employment\" in item 8 was considered to be wide G enough to include retirement of an employee at the age of superannuation. The learned Madras Judge sought support from para 16 of t\\le model Standing Orders which is as follows :-\n\n\"Every permanent workman shall be entitled to a service certificate at the time of his dismissal discharge H or retirement from service\".\n\n(I) A.l.R. 1970 Orissa 126.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1961 Mad. 107.\n\nU.P. El.ECTRIC co. v. T. N. CHATTERJI (Grover, J.) 765\n\nIn the model Standing Orc!ers there was no clause providing for superannuation or re1irement on attaining a cettain age.\n\nIn our judgment much assistance or help cannot be derived from para 16 of 1he model Standing Orders as contained in schedule I to the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Central Rules 1946.\n\nRetirem.nt which is .J)lentioned there may be ur.der tl; e , terms of contract of employment entered into between the employer and the employees. Section 2 ( oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act 194 7 throws a certain amount of light on the matter. It is reproduced below:-\n\n\"Retrenchment\" means !he termination by the employer Qf the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, oth-; rwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include-\n\n(a) voluntary retirement of llhe workman; or\n\n(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and llhe workman conc.emed contains a stipulation in that behalf;\"\n\nIt shows, firstly, that termination of service of a workman is distinct from retirement on. reaching the age of' superannuation; E secondly, retirement can take place on reachin.1 the age of superannuation uncler the terms of the contract of employment entered into between the employer and the workman. Therefore, the word \"retirement\" in para 16 cannot te regarded as conclusive of the question whether termination of employment includes retirement and superannuation. In the schedule to llhe Act i.em F 8 covers termination of employment and the notice to be iven either by the employer or the workman and i'lem 9 relates to suspension or dismissal for misconduct etc. ' Item 8 by virtue of the\n\nlanguage employed does not al)pear to cover the case of superannuation which does not depend on any notice and which covers an evel!t which is automatic and which must be gh'!n effect to without any volition on the part of the employer or the workmen G as pointed out in the Orissa judgment. If termination is to be read in a wide sense as meaning employment coming to an end there was a necessity to have i~; m 9 because dismissal would then be covered by termination. In the context in which the word \"termination\" is used in item 8 it cannot mean each and everv. form of termination or c\".s<ation of employment.\n\nFrom u para 13 of the Model S'andin~ Orders contain•; d in schedule I\n\nto the Indutrial Emolovment (Standing Orders) Central Rules 1946, it is aooarent that item 8 is confined to termination of em plovment bv notice in writing and does not contain any mentien 3-Ll06I S\"P Cl/72\n\n186 SUPREMll COURT REPORTS (1972] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nof superannuation or re.irement. It Was perhaps this difficulty wn1c11 prouwieo me :State of U.P. to introouce item 11-C in exerc1; e oi tne ru1e maKing powers conterred by s. l:i ot tho Act\n\nana tne bomoay legmaiu; e to make similar amendmen. by 1eg1slat10n. 1t would 1011ow that unless an employer can inc1u.Je a clause reiatmg to 'the age of retirement and superannuation and the Cer.ifymg Officer Cdn cerri•Y it even thou?, h no >Uh itom appears in the schedule to the Act clause 32 as certified in 1 \\I~ l, ir1 the pre>·nt cae. cou.d not be regarded to be valid.\n\nThe Madras High Court in the case of Managemenl of the 'Hindu', Mauras\\•) maae some oo>ervations to the ertect that thee was\n\nno bar to the Standin11; Orders making a provision for m1tters other than those specifically mntioned in the schedule so long us c the Certifying Officer certifies mem on .he ground that 'they a. e fair and reasonable.\n\nThe Orissa High Com t, however, in Sarojkumar Ghosh's(') case did not subscribe to thi> view.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant, apart from rolying on ·•he Madras decision, has not addressed any arguments on 1h:-hlrger and wider question as to whether even in the absenoo of any item in the schedule Standing Orders can be framed on certain matlcrs D which may be re11; arded as fair and reasonable and which may oo so certified by the Cer.ifying Officer. It is, however, unnecessary to decide this point in the present case because clau~ 32 of the Standing Ordi s on which the appellant has relied was certifi.:d in July 1951 when according to the express language of s. 4 of 'ihe Act the Cenitylnit Officer or the appellate all'thority was de- E\n\nbarr~ from adJudicatine uoon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of any Standing Orders. It is difficult to understand how •he Certifyin~ Offi:er at that Point of ime and before the amendment of s. 4 in 1956 could have possiblv certified ony\n\nS•anding Order which did not relate to any item in the schedule on the eround that it was fair or reasonable. IncJeed the lunC'io11 of the Certifying Officer, before the amendment of 1956, was very limi ed as is clear from s. 3(2) of the Act which says :\n\n\"Provision shall be made in such draft for every\n\nmatt.r set out in the <chedule which may be aool; c\"ble to the indmtrial establishment and where model Standing_ Orders have been prescribed, shall be, so far is prac- G. ticable, in conformity wi.h such model\".\n\nWe must, therefore, hold that clause 32 of the Standing Orders as certifod in July 1951 was not valid and cannot be binding on the resoond.nts. However, after i'em 11-C was intrncluced in the schedu'e so far as the State of U.P. was concerned an item was added provic1ing for the age of retirement and supernnua- H tion.\n\nThe Certifying Officer, whe.n he modified clause 32 and\n\n(I) AIR 1961 Mad. 107.\n\n(2) AIR 1970 Orrissa 126.\n\nU.J>. ELECTRIC co. v. T. M. CHATTBRJI (Grover, I.) 161\n\nfixed the re.iring age.at 58 on April 22, 1961 coµJdhave validly\n\ncertiried such clause as modified by him. The necessary comequence will be that the respondents could not have been re.ired on the JI.round of suprannuation in July 1959 and they could be validly reti~ only on or after Ap1il 22, 1961 in accordance with clause 32 as modified by lhe Certifying Officer. In other words, hose out of the present respondent' who had attained the Bl!; e of 58 years on April 22, 1961, could be regarded as hJving been validly retired having reached the age of superannuation on that da, e under fhat c\\ause.\n\nIn view of the previous decisions of this Court and in particular that o( Guest Keen Wl/liamv Pvt. Ltd.(') it has n, t been dist puled , hat in the industrial dispute which was referred it was optln\n\nto the Industrial 'tribunal or the Labour Court to dete, mm~ me age of re.irement or superannuation notwifhstanding that clause 32 of the. Sta11dinl!; Orders as certilied in 1961 had been legally and validly certified. Indeed in Guest Keen Williams _Pvt. Ltd. ( 1) it was not disputed that even this Court could give an appropriate direction which might be considered reasonable with regard to fixin.e; the aee of superannuation. As sta.ed before, according 10\n\nclause 32 of <the Standing Orders, as certified in April 1961, the age of superannuation wall. jixed at 58.\n\nThe appellant filed an appears that in the case of Agra Electric Supply.Co.(') also a appears that in the care of Agra Electric Supply' Co.(') also a similar Standinl!; Order had been certified and on appeal th~ age of retirement was reduced from 58 to 55 years by the appellate authority.\n\nThis Court in fhat case held the Standing Order fixing the age at 55 ~ars applicable not only to 1hose employees who were emP.lo.ved subsequently. but also to all workmen who were in employment at the time when the Standing Orders became legally applicable. It does not appear in tha1 case that anv such argument was raised fhat th•! matter should be remitted eithr to the Indusrial Tiibunal or the Labour Court to fix the age of superannuation or that this Court itself might do so as was fhe course followed in the case of Guert Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd.( 1) in which the age was fixed at 60 years with regard to those employees who had raised the disoute on th.~ ground that the s anding Orders could not go''m them as thev hd been employed before the Standing Orders became aoplicable.\n\nAfter considering the entire material and keeoinq in mind 'the fact that according to the appellate authority even the aee of retirement t 55 was fair and reasonable we are of the vi•!w that 'the ae of superannu1tion of the respondets, in the present case. should be 58 vears.\n\nIn other words. it will be the same as was fixed by the Certifying Officer bv modifying clause 32 on April 22, 1961.\n\n(') [1960] t S.C.R. 348. <2> [1970J 1 s.c.R. 808\n\n\nLastly we must c!eal with the contention raised on behalf of A the respondents tha• the order of the Allahabad High Court made on Ju1y 12, 1966 quashing the award after following the decision of tms Court in Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd.(1) should be deem ed to oe linal and should debar any fresh consideration or decision of that point by virtue of the rule or principle of res-judicata. It is noteworthy that the order of fr,~ Allahabad High Court was not R final against which the matder could have been taken in appeal either to a divis10n bench of the High Court or to this Court.\n\nReliance has been placed on a decision of. this Court in Management of Northern Railway Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal Rajasthan, Jaipur and Another('), where reference had been mac!·~ bv the State Government to the Industrial Tribunal on c the RailwayWorkers' Union having raised an industrial dispute againfll the Management of the Northern Railway Cooperative Society Lid. The society filed a writ petition on •the ground that the dispute having been rai&d by the Railway Workers' Union and not by th~ Society's own employees the reference to the Tri bunal was not competent. The High Court diSmissed ihe peti lion. Th{lreafter the Tribunal heard •the matter and gave its deci I> sion in favour of the workman concerned. The society appealed to this Court by special leave. It was held that the order of the\n\nHih Court was not interlocutory but was a final order in regard to tb.e proceedings under Art. 226. The appropriate remedy for the appellant in that case was to appeal against the High Court's order and that not having been done the appellant's plea rclatin2 E to the compe~ncy of the reference was barred by res judicaa as the same had been raised before the High Court and had been rejected. The present case is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as the order made by the High Court was not final and a remand hud\n\nbeen direced presumably under Art. 227 of the Constitution.\n\nThat order in fact did not finally terminate any proceedings at all. y The proceedin11s were terminated only by the award against which the present anneal has been brought by special leave. Wt; are unable to see liow tb~ decision in the aforesaid case can afford any assistance to the respondents before us. Indeed the case which is :nore apposite in Satya(ihyan Ghnsa/ & Ors. v. Smt. Deoraiin Debi & Another(3 ). There an order of remand had been made by the\n\nHiizh Court while exercisin2 Powers under s. 115 of the Code of G Civil Procedure.\n\nI•t was observed, af'er referring to the various deci<ions of the Privy Council, that the order of remand was in1erlocutorv and did not nurnort to disno<e of the case. A nrtv\n\nis not bound to appeal aizainst e''ry in'ter!ocutorv order which is a step in the procedure that leads up to a final decision or award.\n\n(') [1960) 1 S.C.R. 348.\n\n(') (1960) 3 S.C.R 590.\n\n('J {1967] 2 S.C.R. 476.\n\nU.P. ELECTRIC co. v. T. N .. CHATTERJI (Grover, J.) 769\n\nThe followin_g observations from this case may be reproduced with advanta_g.e :-\n\n\"In1erlocutory judgments which have the force of a decree must be distin_guished from other interlocutory\n\niudgmnts which are a step towards the decision of the dispute be•ween parties by way of a decree or a final order\"\n\nWe are unable, therefore, 10 accede to th.~ contention that the rule of res-judicara could be invoked by the respondent in the present case.\n\nIn the result the appeal is allowd and the order of the Industrial Tribunal is hereby set aside. Ac:ordin_g to our decision 'lhe workmen concerned could not have been retired on the ground of supi:rannuation in accordance with clause 32 of the Standing\n\nOrcJ.rs till It was certified after necessary modifica1ion on April 22, 1961. Even otherwise it has been held by us that rthe prope~ age of retirement in 1he case of those employees. who joined service prior to April 22, 1961 should be 58 years.\n\nThe award, therefore, will be that the concerned workmen should be deemed to have co!lij, uued in service of !\\le appellarit.till they had a• ained the age of 58 years. It is declared that they shall be entilled to be paid full wages and all other dues to which they are entit!d under \\he terms of ildr employmen't till they attained the age of 58 years.\n\nAs regards any payments received by the workmen pursuant to the award or after the notice of termination those shall also be adjusted accordingly and the appellant undertakes not to claim refund_ of any amounts which have already ben received by them in excess of the amounts du.~. No order as to costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 128, "entities": [{"text": "UNITED PROVINCES ELECTRIC. SUPPLY CO. LTD., A\n\nALLAHABAD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNITED PROVINCES ELECTRIC. SUPPLY CO. LTD., ALLAHABAD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "T. N. CHATTERJEE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "T. N. CHATTERJEE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 13, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 89, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A\n\nALLAHABAD\n\nT. N. CHATTERJEE March 13, 1972\n\n[S. M. S1KRI, C.J., A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY, D. G. PALEKAR\n\nAND M. H. BEG, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S1K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 134, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. G. PALEKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 149, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.G. PALEKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 169, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 224, "end_char": 228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 659, "end_char": 663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1066, "end_char": 1075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2078, "end_char": 2086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2094, "end_char": 2143, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "cl. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2179, "end_char": 2185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2508, "end_char": 2514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3402, "end_char": 3407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1966] 2 S.C.R. 498", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3872, "end_char": 3891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4006, "end_char": 4035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) The decision in Guest Keen Williams Pvt."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4386, "end_char": 4390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Keen William", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8094, "end_char": 8106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the circumstances of this case the age of superannuation should be 58 years, Therefore, the concerned workman should be deemed to have cbntinued in service of the appellant till they had attained the age of 58 yearn, [767 A-C, G-HJ\n\n( 7) The order of the High Court in the writ petition did not finally terminal•' the proceedings t all, The proceedings were terminated only by the award of the Industrial Tribunal after remand, Therefore, the order of the High Court following Guest Keen William's case did not debar a fresh consideration of too question by virtue of the rule or principle of res ; udicata, [768 A-B, E-FJ\n\nSatyadhyan Ghosal v, Smt, Deorajan Devi, ~1960], 3 S, C, R, 590, followed,\n\nManagement, of N. Railwll)I o-operative Society v, Industrial Tribunal, [,1967] 2 S, C, R, 476, explained,\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No, 1734 of 1967. ,"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8419, "end_char": 8447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the circumstances of this case the age of superannuation should be 58 years, Therefore, the concerned workman should be deemed to have cbntinued in service of the appellant till they had attained the age of 58 yearn, [767 A-C, G-HJ\n\n( 7) The order of the High Court in the writ petition did not finally terminal•' the proceedings t all, The proceedings were terminated only by the award of the Industrial Tribunal after remand, Therefore, the order of the High Court following Guest Keen William's case did not debar a fresh consideration of too question by virtue of the rule or principle of res ; udicata, [768 A-B, E-FJ\n\nSatyadhyan Ghosal v, Smt, Deorajan Devi, ~1960], 3 S, C, R, 590, followed,\n\nManagement, of N. Railwll)I o-operative Society v, Industrial Tribunal, [,1967] 2 S, C, R, 476, explained,\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No, 1734 of 1967. ,"}}, {"text": "V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8632, "end_char": 8640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s, V. Gupte, D. N. Mukherjee and Gautam Banerjee, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8642, "end_char": 8657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s, V. Gupte, D. N. Mukherjee and Gautam Banerjee, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Gautam Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8662, "end_char": 8677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s, V. Gupte, D. N. Mukherjee and Gautam Banerjee, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "G. C. Bhattacharya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8699, "end_char": 8717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. C. Bhattacharya and M. V, Goswami, for respolldpnts Nos."}}, {"text": "M. V, Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8722, "end_char": 8735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. C. Bhattacharya and M. V, Goswami, for respolldpnts Nos."}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8777, "end_char": 8784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Grover", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8853, "end_char": 8859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGrover, J, This is an appeal by special leave from an award of the Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad, dated May 19, 1967."}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9279, "end_char": 9288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of such undertakings was 1the Electric Supply Undertaking at Allahabad in the State of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9305, "end_char": 9318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of such undertakings was 1the Electric Supply Undertaking at Allahabad in the State of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Martin Bum & Co. lJtd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9384, "end_char": 9405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its affairs and business were being looked after and managed by Martin Bum & Co. lJtd.,"}}, {"text": "Calcuttlt", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9408, "end_char": 9417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Calcuttlt."}}, {"text": "U.P.\n\nState Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9596, "end_char": 9625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The U.P.\n\nState Electricity Board compulsorily acquired and took over the assets of the appellanot's aforesaid undertaking or business with effect from 16/17th September 1964."}}, {"text": "16/17th September 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9744, "end_char": 9766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The U.P.\n\nState Electricity Board compulsorily acquired and took over the assets of the appellanot's aforesaid undertaking or business with effect from 16/17th September 1964."}}, {"text": "Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9811, "end_char": 9854, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "July 14, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10059, "end_char": 10072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 14, 1951 these D Orders' were certified by the Certifying Officer."}}, {"text": "Clause 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10131, "end_char": 10140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Allahabad and its surrounding area were members of Biili Mazdoor Sangh-a trade union registered under the Indian Trade Union Act", "statute": "Allahabad and its surrounding area were members of Biili Mazdoor Sangh-a trade union registered under the Indian Trade Union Act"}}, {"text": "Bijli Mazdoor Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10398, "end_char": 10417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The workmen through the Bijli Mazdoor Sangh preferred an appeal under s. 6 of the Act from the order of the Certifying Officer to the State Industrial Tribunal which was the appellate jjuthority under the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10444, "end_char": 10448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Allahabad and its surrounding area were members of Biili Mazdoor Sangh-a trade union registered under the Indian Trade Union Act", "statute": "Allahabad and its surrounding area were members of Biili Mazdoor Sangh-a trade union registered under the Indian Trade Union Act"}}, {"text": "Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10627, "end_char": 10656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd., Agra and Benaras Electric Light & Power Co. Ltd., Varanasi, which is the appellant in the connected appeal (C.A. i64/6&) also got certified Standing Orders in similar terms."}}, {"text": "Varanasi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10708, "end_char": 10716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd., Agra and Benaras Electric Light & Power Co. Ltd., Varanasi, which is the appellant in the connected appeal (C.A. i64/6&) also got certified Standing Orders in similar terms."}}, {"text": "Martin Bum & Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10894, "end_char": 10915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These electric undertakings were also under the management of Martin Bum & Co. Ltd. On July 16, 1959 notices were served on seven workme11 with effect from September 1, 1959 on the ground that they had attained 'the age of superannuation or completed 30 years of service and they were retired by reason of their having attained the age of superannuation."}}, {"text": "July 16, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10919, "end_char": 10932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These electric undertakings were also under the management of Martin Bum & Co. Ltd. On July 16, 1959 notices were served on seven workme11 with effect from September 1, 1959 on the ground that they had attained 'the age of superannuation or completed 30 years of service and they were retired by reason of their having attained the age of superannuation."}}, {"text": "Haider Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11220, "end_char": 11230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of these workmen one of them Haider Ali died .during the pendency of proceedings."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11818, "end_char": 11822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11837, "end_char": 11865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Government of U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11870, "end_char": 11888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated February 22, 1960 made under s. 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act 1946 the Government of U.P. ref.erred to the Industrial Tribunal (I) at Allahabad for adjudication ari industrial dispute alleged to exist between the appel- B !"}}, {"text": "1st August, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12198, "end_char": 12214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ant and its workmen on the following issues :\n\n\"Wheither the employers have wrongfully and/ or unjustifiably retired their workmen, mentioned in the Annexure, with effect from 1st August, 1959 ?"}}, {"text": "clause 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12815, "end_char": 12824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act 1946", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act 1946"}}, {"text": "May 2, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12940, "end_char": 12951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Industrial Tribunal made an award on May 2, 1960 finding, inter- alia, (a) the employers were within their rights in retiring the E workmen concerned."}}, {"text": "June 14, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13261, "end_char": 13274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 14, 1960 the Biili Mazdoor Sangh moved an appli- F cation under s. 10 (2) of the Act for amendment and modification of clause 32 claiming fixation of retirement age at 60 years."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13330, "end_char": 13335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13385, "end_char": 13394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 20, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13448, "end_char": 13466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 20, 1960 the Union also filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court for quashing the award."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13511, "end_char": 13531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 20, 1960 the Union also filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court for quashing the award."}}, {"text": "April 22. 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13559, "end_char": 13573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 22."}}, {"text": "clause 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13606, "end_char": 13615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 10, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13664, "end_char": 13682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 10, 1961 ithe appellate authority refixed the age of retirement at 55 years."}}, {"text": "Agra Electric Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13790, "end_char": 13807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly G appeals were filed by the Agra Electric Co. and the Banaras Electric Light and Power Co. Lid."}}, {"text": "Banaras Electric Light and Power Co. Lid", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13816, "end_char": 13856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly G appeals were filed by the Agra Electric Co. and the Banaras Electric Light and Power Co. Lid."}}, {"text": "July 12, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13898, "end_char": 13911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 12, 1966 the High Court recorded an order quashing the award."}}, {"text": "May 19, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14341, "end_char": 14353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally the award against which the appeal has been brought\n\nwas given on May 19, 1967."}}, {"text": "Sep tember 16, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14519, "end_char": 14538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the seven workmen had been wrongfully and uJijustifiably retired and that they should be deemed to have continued in service till Sep tember 16, 1964 from which date they would be taken to have been retrenched."}}, {"text": "U.P. Staite Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14644, "end_char": 14673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant having been taken over by the U.P. Staite Electricity Board, it was directed that-the employers should pay full wages from the' period August 1, 1959 to Septem ber 16, 1964 and retrenchment compensation within s. 25-F read with s, 25-FF and s. 25 J of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7."}}, {"text": "August 1, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14749, "end_char": 14763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant having been taken over by the U.P. Staite Electricity Board, it was directed that-the employers should pay full wages from the' period August 1, 1959 to Septem ber 16, 1964 and retrenchment compensation within s. 25-F read with s, 25-FF and s. 25 J of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7."}}, {"text": "ber 16, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14774, "end_char": 14786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant having been taken over by the U.P. Staite Electricity Board, it was directed that-the employers should pay full wages from the' period August 1, 1959 to Septem ber 16, 1964 and retrenchment compensation within s. 25-F read with s, 25-FF and s. 25 J of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7."}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14824, "end_char": 14829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14855, "end_char": 14860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14870, "end_char": 14893, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16594, "end_char": 16598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17088, "end_char": 17092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17227, "end_char": 17231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17511, "end_char": 17519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17657, "end_char": 17661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19156, "end_char": 19160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19429, "end_char": 19437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd.(1", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21307, "end_char": 21332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court took a view which seemingly runs counter -to Guest Keen Williams Pvt."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22176, "end_char": 22185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22291, "end_char": 22300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22531, "end_char": 22547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 6, 7, 9 and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23117, "end_char": 23140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Salem Erode Electricity Distribution", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24188, "end_char": 24224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Support was derived from the decision in Salem Erode Electricity Distribution case(') in which departure was made from the view previously taken in the case of 'Guest Keen Williams Pt."}}, {"text": "Guest Keen Williams Pt. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24308, "end_char": 24336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Support was derived from the decision in Salem Erode Electricity Distribution case(') in which departure was made from the view previously taken in the case of 'Guest Keen Williams Pt."}}, {"text": "Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd.(2", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24420, "end_char": 24451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "urged before us on behalf of the respondents that the decision in Guest Keen Williams Pvt."}}, {"text": "Salem Erode Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24589, "end_char": 24634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd.(2) still holds the E field and the point which was decided there and which arises in the present case did not come up for consideration in Salem Erode Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. (1)."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25889, "end_char": 25894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27071, "end_char": 27094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must be remembered that in Guest Keen Williams Pvt."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27204, "end_char": 27208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27778, "end_char": 27787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28288, "end_char": 28306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The model Standing Orders framed by the Central Government H and by !"}}, {"text": "Government of the \\State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28320, "end_char": 28361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he Government of the \\State of Uttar Pradesh did not contain any clause relating to retirement or superannuation."}}, {"text": "17, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28474, "end_char": 28482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was for the first time that on November 17, 1959 item 11-C\n\nSIJPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1SJ72] 3 S.C.R\n\nrelating to superannuation and retirement was introduced by the A State of U.P. in exercise of the.rule-making powers conferred by s. 15 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28666, "end_char": 28671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28859, "end_char": 28864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29464, "end_char": 29477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been maintained that items 8 and 9 cannot possibly include retire- C ment and superannuation and therefore till item 11 C was added in the schedule so far as the State of U.P. was collcemed in November 1959 no Standing Orders could be legally or validly framed and certified providing for age of retirement and superannuation."}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29692, "end_char": 29709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Saroj Kumar Ghosh v. Orissa State Electricity Board (1) the Orissa High Court considered this question a some length and expressed the view that where a Standing Order .has D been certified by the Certifying Officer coll'taining a clause relating to superannuation not coveted."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30015, "end_char": 30019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Judge", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31101, "end_char": 31113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Madras Judge sought support from para 16 of t\\le model Standing Orders which is as follows :-\n\n\"Every permanent workman shall be entitled to a service certificate at the time of his dismissal discharge H or retirement from service\"."}}, {"text": "Central Rules 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31743, "end_char": 31761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31910, "end_char": 31919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Rules 1946", "statute": "Central Rules 1946"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31933, "end_char": 31956, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Rules 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33907, "end_char": 33925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34591, "end_char": 34600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Rules 1946", "statute": "Central Rules 1946"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34687, "end_char": 34704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras High Court in the case of Managemenl of the 'Hindu', Mauras\\•) maae some oo>ervations to the ertect that thee was\n\nno bar to the Standin11; Orders making a provision for m1tters other than those specifically mntioned in the schedule so long us c the Certifying Officer certifies mem on .he ground that 'they a. e fair and reasonable."}}, {"text": "Sarojkumar Ghosh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35064, "end_char": 35080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Orissa High Com t, however, in Sarojkumar Ghosh's(') case did not subscribe to thi> view."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35186, "end_char": 35192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for the appellant, apart from rolying on ·•he Madras decision, has not addressed any arguments on 1h:-hlrger and wider question as to whether even in the absenoo of any item in the schedule Standing Orders can be framed on certain matlcrs D which may be re11; arded as fair and reasonable and which may oo so certified by the Cer.ifying Officer."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35699, "end_char": 35703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35987, "end_char": 35991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36258, "end_char": 36265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36584, "end_char": 36593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36918, "end_char": 36927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37359, "end_char": 37368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37964, "end_char": 37973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38305, "end_char": 38314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Agra Electric Supply.Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38465, "end_char": 38489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant filed an appears that in the case of Agra Electric Supply."}}, {"text": "Agra Electric Supply' Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38528, "end_char": 38553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co.(') also a appears that in the care of Agra Electric Supply' Co.(') also a similar Standinl!;"}}, {"text": "Guert Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39230, "end_char": 39259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "matter should be remitted eithr to the Indusrial Tiibunal or the Labour Court to fix the age of superannuation or that this Court itself might do so as was fhe course followed in the case of Guert Keen Williams Pvt."}}, {"text": "clause 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39860, "end_char": 39869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 22, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39873, "end_char": 39887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it will be the same as was fixed by the Certifying Officer bv modifying clause 32 on April 22, 1961."}}, {"text": "Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd.(1)", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40155, "end_char": 40181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. 808\n\nLastly we must c!eal with the contention raised on behalf of A the respondents tha• the order of the Allahabad High Court made on Ju1y 12, 1966 quashing the award after following the decision of tms Court in Guest Keen Williams Pvt."}}, {"text": "Northern Railway Cooperative Society Lid", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40880, "end_char": 40920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this Court in Management of Northern Railway Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal Rajasthan, Jaipur and Another('), where reference had been mac!·~ bv the State Government to the Industrial Tribunal on c the RailwayWorkers' Union having raised an industrial dispute againfll the Management of the Northern Railway Cooperative Society Lid."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41448, "end_char": 41456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41903, "end_char": 41911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42437, "end_char": 42443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1960) 1 S.C.R. 348", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 42796, "end_char": 42815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1960) 3 S.C.R 590", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 42822, "end_char": 42840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1967] 2 S.C.R. 476", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 42848, "end_char": 42866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43600, "end_char": 43609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_75_84_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "NAGENDRA NAm MONDAL\n\nv. mE STATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\nJanuary 13, 1972 [1. M. SHl!LAT AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.]\n\nWest Beng4l Prevention of Violent A.ct/vlll., A.ct, 1910--Sectlon 3(2)(b)-A.cts prejudicial to the maintenonce of public. order-Tests for determining.\n\nPractice and procedure-Habeas Corpus-Grounds not urged In th• petition, if can be urged.\n\nThe petitioner was detained under the West Bengal Prevention of Violent Activities Act, 1970. The grounds for detention staled that he, along with others, on two occasions, entered the premises of eduealiotial institutions, set fire to books, registers, furniture etc., placed bombs in the building and threatened the staff with death and thereby committed \"milchief\" disturbin~ \"public order\" within the meaning of S. 3(2)(b) of the Act. The petitioner's representation was received by the State Government on May 27, 1971. On June 7, 1971 the petitioner's case was placed before the Advisory Board. The State Govel'nment considered the representation and rejected it by its order dated July 1, 1971. On July 9, 1971 the Board reported that there was in its opinion sufficient cause for the\n\nP'titioner's detention.\n\nThe petitioner sent his habeas corpus petition from jail in which he denied the allegations made ag<linst him. At the hearing of the petition, the counsel for the petitioner raised two additional grounds (i) that the grounds furnished to thll detenu did not constitute breach of public order, and therefore, the detention was illegal; and (li) that the delay in consld-M'ing the petitioner's representation was inordinate, iand ther.efore, was in violation of Artic!!e 22(5) of Con, titution.\n\nDismissing the petition,\n\nHELD : (i) According to th;: Report of the Advisory Board, there was sufficient material justifying the order and in the absence of any definite material, it is not possible to. accept the vague allegations by the petitioner. [78 El\n\n(ii) Ordinarily grounds which do not find any place in the petition would not be permitted to be raised before this Court. But since this was a habeas corpus petition and, furthermre, made by the petitioner from jail such grounds could be allowed to be raised. [78 Fl\n\n(iii) The true distinction between the area of Jaw and order and public order is ode of degree of extent of the breach of the act in question upon society.\n\nAny 'contravention of law always affects order, but before it could be said to affect 'public order' it must affect the community at large.\n\nActs similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and clrcum stances might affect the problem of Jaw and order and in another, the\n\nbreach of public order. Thll anaolgy of crimes against individuals and crimes against the public, though usdful to a limited extent, would not always be apt. [79 li-80 Bl .\n\nLohia v. State [1966] I S.C.R, 709, Pushkar Mukhtrl., v. West Bengal f,19691 2 S.C.R. 635: Arun Gho.h v. West Bengal [!9701 3 S.Gl.R. 288 and S. K. Sah• v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta [19701 3 S.C.R. '360\n\nrerred to.\n\n(iv) The distinction drawn by Clause (b) of S. 3(2) is between caus ing fire to building of an educational institution simp/iciler arid CQ!Illllitting mischief of the same nature but such that it disturbs or is likely to B disturb the even tempo of the community in that particular locality. The object of the acts complained of. as vandalism, to disturb .pie working of the institution by burning its records and to create a scare so that neitl:\\er the teaching staff, nor the pupils would , dare attend it for prosecution of studies. In these circumstances, the alleged acts did not merely constitute mischief under S. 425 of the Penal Code, but constituted such mischief which disturbed or was likely to disturb public order and, therefore, fell within the definition in Sectio~ 3(2)(b). [81 G, HJ C\n\n(v) In the circumstances of the present case, it oannot be held that the delay w .. so inordinate as to affect the validity of the detention. No doubt, the delay in deciding the representation was 34 days, but most of it was due to the fact that the representation and the record remained w; th the Board. In a given case, Government may not be able to reach a proper conclusion within a sho'rt time especially, where another authority has passed the questioned order. {83 Pl !ayanarayan Sukul v.\n\nWest D.\n\nBen!!al fl9701 3 S.C.R. and Khalrul Haque v. West Bengal, writ petition aecided on September 10, 1969, referred to.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 308 of 1971.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus.\n\nS. K. Dhingra for the petitioner.\n\nP. K. Chatterjee, G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShelat, J.\n\nOn May 7, 1971, the District Magistrate, Jalpai F guri, in exetcise of power conferred upon him by s. 3 ( 3) of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970 (Pre- 'sident's Act 19 of 1970) passed an order under sub-sec. 1 of that section directing the detenti0n of the petitioner.\n\nThe order recited that the District Magistrate was satisfied that it ha<! be come necessary to detain the petitioner ''with a view to prevent G ing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order\".\n\nOn that very day, the District Magistrate reported to the State Government the fact of his having passed the said order.\n\nIn pursuance of that order, the petitioner was arrested on May 9, 1971 and was detained in jail.\n\nThe petitioner was furnished, as required by the Act, with the grounds ff for his detention at the time when his arrest was effected.\n\nOn May 17. 1971, the State Government approved the said order.\n\nOn the same day the State Government reported the fa9t of the\n\nA passing of the said order and its approval to the Central Government.\n\nThe petitioner made his representation which he was entitled to make by ve of s. S(i). That was received by the State Government on May 27, 1971. On June 7, 1971, that is within 30 days from the date of detention, the petitioner's case was placed before the Advisory Board constitnted under s. 9 of\n\nthe Act.\n\nThe State Government considered that representation, but rejected it by its order dated July 1, 1971. On July 9, 1971, the Board reported that there was, in its opinion, sufficient cause for the petitioner's detention.\n\nThereupon, the State Government, by its order dated July 29, 1971, confirmed the detention order under s. 12.\n\nThe grounds for detention served on the petitioner stated that the. order was passed in view of his acting \"in a manner prejudi cial to the maintenance of public order as evidenced by the particulars given below\".\n\nThese particulars were :\n\n\"1. On 1-12-70 after midnight you along with other entered into the Headmaster's room of Moynaguri Higher Secondary School, Police Station Moynaguri, after breaking open the doors and set fire to books, registers, a typewriter, furnitnre etc. causing heavy loss to the school.\n\nAfter completing the operation you placed a bomb in the school premises endangering the life of the teaching staff and the stndents.\n\n2. On 5-4-1971 at about 10.30 hours you along with others forcibly entered into Moynaguri Higher Secondary School, Police Station Moynaguri and set fire to the office room and the Headmaster's room of the school with the help of kerosene oil causing damage to books, almirahs and other articles.\n\nWhile committing the arson in the above school you also threatened the teaching staff and the -duftry of the school with death if they would dare to give you any resistasnce or divulge your name to any authority holding you responsible for the arson:·\n\nG The grounds also informed the petitioner that he could make a representation to the State Government, that his case would be put up before the Board and that the Board would grant him a personal hearing, if he so desired.\n\nThe case of the detenu, as stated in the petition, was that he was at first arrested on suspicion Oil April 23, 1971 in connectioo H with G. R. Case No. 812 of 1971, but was released on bail as there was no evidence against him.\n\nThere was another case also being G.R. 2639 of 1970 in connectioo with the incident\n\n78 SUPllBME COUll T llllPOll TS\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nreferred to in ground No. 1 sot out above.\n\nThe detenu, however, A was not arrested in that connection.\n\nThe two G.R. Cases were started long before he was arrested on May 9, 1971 under the detention order dated May 7, 197 L He denied that he was connected or associated with the incidents mentioned Jn the said grounds, anJ said that the allegations made against him therein were false, baseless, motivated and vague, and that there was B absolutely no material upon the basis of which the order of detention could be made.\n\nHe also alleged that some rival parties, who were in league with the police had falsely involved him in the incidents referred to in the grounds and got the District Magistrate to issue the said detention order.\n\nThese allegations were denied in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government, the assertion therein being that there was reliable C material before the District Magistrate relating to the illegal and anti-social activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, and that it was after careful examination of that material that the impugned order was passed.\n\nThe allegations made by the petitioner were, in our view, D vague and indefinite and not backed by any material or particulars, and therefore cannot be accepted.\n\nBesides, the detenu's case was placed before the Advisory Board together with his representation and other relevant materials, and according to the report of the Board, there was sufficient ma, terial justifying the order. In the absence of any definite material before us, it is not E possible to accept the extremely vague allegations made by the petitioner.\n\nBut Mr. Dinghra, who appeared amicus curiae for the petitioner, raised two additional grounds.\n\nNeither of them was, however, raised in the petition but since this was a habeas corpus petition, and fuvthermore, made by the petitioner from F jail, he was allowed to take them though ordinarily he would not have been permitted to do so as they did not find any place in the petition.\n\nThe two additional grounds were ( 1) that the grounds furnished to the detenu did not constitute breach of public order, and therefore, the detention did not fall under sub-ss. ( 1) and G\n\n(3) of s. 3; and (2) that although the representation made by the detenu was received by the Govrnment on May 27, . 1971, it was not considered and disposed of till July 1, 1971, that the delay in doing so was inordinate and was in violation of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution, rendering the impugned order invalid.\n\nH In regard to the .first contention, counsel urged that assuming that the allegations made in the grounds for detention were true, setting fire to an educational institution and destroying thereby its\n\nA records might constitute an offence under the Penal Code, but did not constitute disturbance or breach of public order, which alone could warrant a detention order under the Act.\n\nIn support of this proposition, counsel referred to some of the decisions of\n\nthis Court.\n\nThe detention order, no doubt, mentioned that it was issued B with a view to prevent the detenu acting prejudicially to the maintenance of public order.\n\nThe contention raised by counsel, however, involves the question whether the acts alleged against the detenu constituted breach of public order or were such as would be prejudicial to its maintenance. As to what is meant by the expression, 'public order', Hidayatullah, J., (as he then C was) in Lohia v. State('), said that any contravention of law always affected order, but before it could be said to affect 'public order', it must affect the community or the public at large.\n\nHe considered three concepts, viz., \"law and order'', \"public order\" and \"the security of the state\" generally used in preventive detention measures and suggested that to appreciate the scope and extent of each of them, one should imagine three concentric cir- D cles, the largest of them representing \"law and order\", the next representing \"public order\" and the smallest representing \"the security of the state\". An act might affect \"law and order'', but not \"public order\", just as an aot might affect public order but not \"the security of the state\".\n\nTherefore, if the detention order\n\nwere to use the expression \"maintenance of Jaw and order\", that would be widening the scope of the detaining authority, if the statute concerned confined that power in relation to acts prejudicial to \"the maintenance of public order\".\n\nA similar distinction was also drawn in Pushkar Mukherjee v. West Benga/( 2 ), where Ramaswami, J., observed that , the expression \"public order\" in s. 3 ( 1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 did not take in every kind of infraction of law.\n\nAn assault by one on another in a house or even in a public street might create disorder but not public disorder, for the latter was one which affected the community or the public at large.\n\nTherefore, a line of demarcation must be drawn between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest.\n\nA mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder was, thus, not necessarily sufficient for action ' under tho Preve.ntive Detention Act but a disturbance which would affect public order fell within the. scope of the Act.\n\nBut in Arun Ghosh v. West Bengal('), it was pointed out that the true distinction between the areas of \"law and order\" and\n\n(I) [1966) I S.C.R. 709.\n\n(2) (19691\n\n2 S.C.R. 635.\n\n(3) [1970]\n\n3 S.C.R. 288.\n\n\"public order\" was one of degree and extent of the reach of the A act in question upon society.\n\nActs similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions; in one case it might affect the problem of the breach of law and order, and in another the breach of public order.\n\nThe analogy resorted to by Ramaswami, J., of crimes\n\nagait !ndividuals and crimes against the public, though useful 8 to a !Im1ted extent, would not always be apt.\n\nAn assault by one individual upon another would affeot Jaw and order only and cause its breach.\n\nA similar assault by a member of one community upon a leading individual of another community, though similar in quality, would differ in potentiality in the sense that it might cause reverberations which might affect the even tempo of the life of the community.\n\nAs the Court pointed out, \"the act C by itself is not determinant of its own gravity.\n\nIn its quality it may not differ but in its potentiality it may be very different\". At the same time, the power of detention having been permitted to the State under the Constitution as an exceptional power, its exercise had to be scrutinized with extreme care and could not be used as a convenient substitute for the normal processes of the D criminal law of the country. (cf. S. K. Saha v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta(').]\n\nThese are all cases under the Preventive Detention Act, IV of 1950, which by s. 3 of it confers power of detention on specified grounds which include acts prejudicial to the maintenance E of public order.\n\nThe present Act likewise confers such power with a view to prevent a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order under its s. 3 (1).\n\nThough the Act does not define the expression \"public order\", it does define the expression \"acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order\".\n\nThat expression under the definition inter alia means \"committing mischief within the meaning of s. 425 of the Indian Penal Code, by fire or any explosive substance on any property of Government or any local authority or any corporation owned or contr\\)lled by Government or any University or other educational institution, or on any public building where the commission of such mischief disturbs or is likely to disturb public order .... \" The definition itself thus draws a distinction between mischief by fire or explosive substance upon property of one of the specified categories and such mischief upon any such properties which disturbs or is likely to disturb public order.\n\nThe former, however reprehensible, would be taken care\n\nof by the Penal Code, and it is only in respect of the latter that the drastic power of detention without trial conferred by the first H sub-section can be validly exercised.\n\nBut to the extent that the\n\n(I) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 360.\n\nI';. I'!. MOl'!DAL v. WEST BEl'!GAL (She/at, J.) 81\n\nA expression \"public order\" is not defined here also, decisions under Aot IV of 1950 delineating the sphere of \"public order\" from those of \"maintenance of law and order\" and \"the security of the State'.' would still be of utility.\n\nThe acts alleged against the petitioner in the grounds for detention are acts which fall under s. 3(2)(b), in that, they cons- B titute mischief by fire and by explosive substance on property of an educational institution.\n\nBut the question is whether these acts disturbed or were likely to disturb public order; in the words Of Hidayatullah, C.1., in Arun <Jhosh v. West Bengal('), disturb the even tempo of the life of the community of that specified locality.\n\nThe distinction drawn by cl. (b) of s. 3 (2) then is between c causing fire, for instance, to a building of an educational institution simpliciter, and committing mischief of the same nature but such that it disturbs or is likely to disturb the even tempo of the community in that particular locality.\n\nThe grounds set out two acts alleged against the petitioner.\n\nThe first, of December 1, 1970, was that the petitioner and some D others trespassed after midnight into the Headmaster's room in the Moynaguri Higher Secondary School and set fire to books. registers, furniture etc., and then placed a bomb in the school building thereby endangering the life of the teaching staff and the students attending the school.\n\nThe second, of April 5, 1970, was that the petitioner along with some others again trespassed into the same school and set fire to parts of it and then threatened the E members of its stall' with death if they offered resistance or disclosed his name to any authority.\n\nThe target of arson, (assuming the allegations to be true which we have to assume) was an educational institution and particularly the registers and other papers maintained by it. The object obviously was vandalism, to disrupt its working by burning 1 its records and to create a scare so that neither the teaching staff nor the pupils would dare attend it for prosecution of studies.\n\nThe parents dare not henceforth send their wards for fear that the school might be set on fire while they are in it.\n\nThe bomb was manifestly placed in the premises for creating that scare. It could not have been intended for any other purpose after the G records and furniture had been set on fire.\n\nIn these circumstances, the alleged acts did not merely constitute mischief under s. 425 of the Penal Code, but constituted such mischief which disturbed or was likely to disturb public order.\n\nThe acts in question, no doubt, would be acts similar to those committed by a perlOD. who resorts to arson, but in the circumstances were acts different in potentiality, and therefore, fell within the definition H in s. 3(2)(b). The first argument urged on behalf of the peti tionei' must, consequently, fail.\n\n(I) [1970)3 S.C.R. 288.\n\nThe second argument related to the time taken by the State A Government in deciding the reprerentation sent by the petitioner from jail.\n\nAs aforesaid, it was received by Government on May 27, 1971, but was considered and rejected on July 1, 1971, that is to say. after a lapse of 34 days.\n\nLike s. 7(i) of the Preventive Detention Act, IV of 1950, the present Act also provides by s. 8(1) that the detaining authority .shall provide to the detenu not B later than five days from the date of detention the grounds on which tile detention order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government.\n\nIn Ja, vanarayan Sukul v. West Bengal(') where also a point as to undue delay in the light of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution and s. 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, lV of 1950 was raised, Ray, J., speaking for the Court, laid down C four principles . These were :\n\n1. that the appropriate authority is bound to give an opportunity to the detenu lei make a represention and to consider the representation as early as possible;\n\n2. that such a consideration of the representation is entirely independent of any action by the Advisory Board including consideration by it of the detenu's represen tation;\n\n3. that there should not be any delay in the matter of consideration, though no hard and fast rule can be laid down as regards the ttlne which can be taken in considering such a representation;\n\n4 •. that the appropirate government has to exercise its opinion and judgment on the representation independent of that of the Advisory Board.\n\n(cf. Khair11l Haque v. West Bengal('), which was applied in this case and where the distinctive features of the functions of the Government and the Board and their objects were discussed.) No doubt, Ray, J., at p. 232 of the report, said that the Government had to come to its decision on the representation before it seiit the detenu's case to the Bo!lfd. But, in that observation, he was not emphasising so much the point of time when the Government has to send the detenu's case including his representation to.the Board, but of the necessity of the Government considering and deciding the representation independently of and before the Boani'a decision, a point made in Khairul Haque's case(1). The delay in J.ayClrtllrayan' s case ( 1) was ol the month and twenty days, and was H\n\n\n(2) Writ Petkion No. 246 of 1969, deed. on September 10, 19611.\n\nA in the circumstances of that case held to be inordinate vitiating the detention .\n\nThe time gap between the receipt by Government of the tioner's representation aiid .the date of its decision was o~ 34 ys.\n\nB The question is whether that gap can be treated as inordinate\n\ndelay going to the root of the validity of the detention or its continuation thereafter. The counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Government, no doubt, did not contain any explanation. But that was because it answered only the allegations in the petition filed by the petitioner from jail, which had in it only general allegations. c such as the vagueness of the grounds of detention, mala {ides etc,.\n\nand did not raise specifically any point on this aspect at all. The point as to delay was for the first time taken in the course of argu ments when the peition first came up for hearing before anothet Bench of this Court. At that time, counsel for the State produced the records of the case and notings from the records were actually read out before the Court in the hearing of the petitioner's counsel.\n\nD That fact is not disputed before us and so also the fact that those\n\nICcords showed that on June 7. 1971 Government had sent tho files in connection with the petitioner's case and his representation to the Advisory Board. As soon as the representation was returned to it, Government considered it and rejected it but that was before the Board made its report and sent it to Government. But counsel E urged that this face may ex1>lain the lapse of time from the dato that the records were sent and the date when they were returned, but not the delay between May 27, 1971 and June 7, 1971 during which Government could have arrived at its decision. That argu ment has not m.uch force, because in a given case Government may not be able to reach a proper conclusion within a short time,\n\nF especially, in a case where another authority, in this c'ase the District Magistrate, has passed the questioned order.\n\nIt might have to make inquiries as to the situation in the locality, the nature of and the circumstances ia which detention was found necessarV. the previous history of the person detained etc. Therefore, it is difficult.to agree with counsel that Government should have reached it.s onclusion during .the said j, eriod. No doubt, the delay in de- G c1dmg the representation was of 34 days, but part of it was due to . the fact that the representation and the record remained with the Board. In .these circumstances, it is difficult to say that there is a iust and proper analoinr between this case and that of Khairur Haque('), or Jayanarayan(1 ) or'lhat upon such analogy we should reach, the same conclusion which was reached in those cases. As H held m Jayanarayan's caH(1) there can be no liard and fast rut~\n\nwith regard to the time which Government can or should take,.\n\n(I) W.P. No. 246 or 1969 deed. on Sept. 10, 1969.\n\n(2) 1197013 s.c.R. 22s.\n\n.and that each case must be decided on i\\is own facts. In the cir- A cumstances of the present case we are unable to hold that the delay was so inordinate as to affect the validity of the petitioner's detention.\n\nThe petition fails and is dismissed.\n\nS.N.\n\nPetition dismissed .", "total_entities": 69, "entities": [{"text": "NAGENDRA NAm MONDAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NAGENDRA NATH MONDAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "mE STATE OF WEST BENGAL\n", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 13, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 65, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NAGENDRA NAm MONDAL\n\nv. mE STATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\nJanuary 13, 1972 [1."}}, {"text": "H. R. KHANNA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANS RAJ KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "petitioner was detained under the West Bengal Prevention of Violent Activities Act, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 351, "end_char": 439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 3(2)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 763, "end_char": 773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The petitioner was detained under the West Bengal Prevention of Violent Activities Act, 1970", "statute": "The petitioner was detained under the West Bengal Prevention of Violent Activities Act, 1970"}}, {"text": "May 27, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 858, "end_char": 870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner's representation was received by the State Government on May 27, 1971."}}, {"text": "June 7, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 875, "end_char": 887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 7, 1971 the petitioner's case was placed before the Advisory Board."}}, {"text": "July 1, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1035, "end_char": 1047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Govel'nment considered the representation and rejected it by its order dated July 1, 1971."}}, {"text": "July 9, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1052, "end_char": 1064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 9, 1971 the Board reported that there was in its opinion sufficient cause for the\n\nP'titioner's detention."}}, {"text": "S. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3069, "end_char": 3076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 425", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3643, "end_char": 3649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3657, "end_char": 3667, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4514, "end_char": 4524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4532, "end_char": 4553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. K. Dhingra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4598, "end_char": 4611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Dhingra for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4633, "end_char": 4649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chatterjee, G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "P. K. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4651, "end_char": 4667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chatterjee, G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "P. K. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Shelat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4734, "end_char": 4740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShelat, J.\n\nOn May 7, 1971, the District Magistrate, Jalpai F guri, in exetcise of power conferred upon him by s. 3 ( 3) of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970 (Pre- 'sident's Act 19 of 1970) passed an order under sub-sec."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4845, "end_char": 4849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4875, "end_char": 4900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4977, "end_char": 4983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Violent Act", "statute": "Prevention of Violent Act"}}, {"text": "May 9, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5453, "end_char": 5464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of that order, the petitioner was arrested on May 9, 1971 and was detained in jail."}}, {"text": "May 17. 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5630, "end_char": 5642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 17."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5806, "end_char": 5824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day the State Government reported the fa9t of the\n\nA passing of the said order and its approval to the Central Government."}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6118, "end_char": 6122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 29, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6409, "end_char": 6422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, the State Government, by its order dated July 29, 1971, confirmed the detention order under s. 12."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6460, "end_char": 6465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1-12-70", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6716, "end_char": 6723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1-12-70 after midnight you along with other entered into the Headmaster's room of Moynaguri Higher Secondary School, Police Station Moynaguri, after breaking open the doors and set fire to books, registers, a typewriter, furnitnre etc."}}, {"text": "Moynaguri Higher Secondary School, Police Station Moynaguri", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6798, "end_char": 6857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1-12-70 after midnight you along with other entered into the Headmaster's room of Moynaguri Higher Secondary School, Police Station Moynaguri, after breaking open the doors and set fire to books, registers, a typewriter, furnitnre etc."}}, {"text": "5-4-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7127, "end_char": 7135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5-4-1971 at about 10.30 hours you along with others forcibly entered into Moynaguri Higher Secondary School, Police Station Moynaguri and set fire to the office room and the Headmaster's room of the school with the help of kerosene oil causing damage to books, almirahs and other articles."}}, {"text": "Moynaguri Higher Secondary School", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7201, "end_char": 7234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5-4-1971 at about 10.30 hours you along with others forcibly entered into Moynaguri Higher Secondary School, Police Station Moynaguri and set fire to the office room and the Headmaster's room of the school with the help of kerosene oil causing damage to books, almirahs and other articles."}}, {"text": "7, 197", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8477, "end_char": 8483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two G.R. Cases were started long before he was arrested on May 9, 1971 under the detention order dated May 7, 197 L He denied that he was connected or associated with the incidents mentioned Jn the said grounds, anJ said that the allegations made against him therein were false, baseless, motivated and vague, and that there was B absolutely no material upon the basis of which the order of detention could be made."}}, {"text": "Dinghra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9918, "end_char": 9925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Mr. Dinghra, who appeared amicus curiae for the petitioner, raised two additional grounds."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10490, "end_char": 10494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 27, . 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10589, "end_char": 10603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) and G\n\n(3) of s. 3; and (2) that although the representation made by the detenu was received by the Govrnment on May 27, ."}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10728, "end_char": 10738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11050, "end_char": 11060, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11685, "end_char": 11697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As to what is meant by the expression, 'public order', Hidayatullah, J., (as he then C was) in Lohia v. State('), said that any contravention of law always affected order, but before it could be said to affect 'public order', it must affect the community or the public at large."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12822, "end_char": 12831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar distinction was also drawn in Pushkar Mukherjee v. West Benga/( 2 ), where Ramaswami, J., observed that , the expression \"public order\" in s. 3 ( 1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 did not take in every kind of infraction of law."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12886, "end_char": 12890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12903, "end_char": 12933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1970]\n\n3 S.C.R. 288", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13904, "end_char": 13924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "These are all cases under the Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15295, "end_char": 15349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15372, "end_char": 15376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These are all cases under the Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "These are all cases under the Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15689, "end_char": 15693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These are all cases under the Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "These are all cases under the Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "s. 425", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15990, "end_char": 15996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These are all cases under the Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "These are all cases under the Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16004, "end_char": 16021, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16641, "end_char": 16651, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 S.C.R. 360", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16839, "end_char": 16858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17242, "end_char": 17252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17647, "end_char": 17651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 5, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18346, "end_char": 18359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second, of April 5, 1970, was that the petitioner along with some others again trespassed into the same school and set fire to parts of it and then threatened the E members of its stall' with death if they offered resistance or disclosed his name to any authority."}}, {"text": "s. 425", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19370, "end_char": 19376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19384, "end_char": 19394, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19699, "end_char": 19709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20114, "end_char": 20121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20200, "end_char": 20207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20587, "end_char": 20597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20622, "end_char": 20626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20683, "end_char": 20686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22(5) of the Constitution and s. 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, lV of 1950 was raised, Ray, J., speaking for the Court, laid down C four principles ."}}, {"text": "Khairul Haque", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22110, "end_char": 22123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, in that observation, he was not emphasising so much the point of time when the Government has to send the detenu's case including his representation to.the Board, but of the necessity of the Government considering and deciding the representation independently of and before the Boani'a decision, a point made in Khairul Haque's case(1).", "canonical_name": "Khairul Haque"}}, {"text": "J.ayClrtllrayan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22148, "end_char": 22163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The delay in J.ayClrtllrayan' s case ( 1) was ol the month and twenty days, and was H\n\n(2) Writ Petkion No."}}, {"text": "September 10, 19611", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22266, "end_char": 22285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on September 10, 19611."}}, {"text": "June 7. 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23468, "end_char": 23480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D That fact is not disputed before us and so also the fact that those\n\nICcords showed that on June 7."}}, {"text": "Khairur Haque", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24894, "end_char": 24907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In .these circumstances, it is difficult to say that there is a iust and proper analoinr between this case and that of Khairur Haque('), or Jayanarayan(1 ) or'lhat upon such analogy we should reach, the same conclusion which was reached in those cases.", "canonical_name": "Khairul Haque"}}, {"text": "Jayanarayan(1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24915, "end_char": 24928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In .these circumstances, it is difficult to say that there is a iust and proper analoinr between this case and that of Khairur Haque('), or Jayanarayan(1 ) or'lhat upon such analogy we should reach, the same conclusion which was reached in those cases.", "canonical_name": "Jayanarayan(1"}}, {"text": "Jayanarayan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25040, "end_char": 25051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As H held m Jayanarayan's caH(1) there can be no liard and fast rut~\n\nwith regard to the time which Government can or should take,.", "canonical_name": "Jayanarayan(1"}}, {"text": "Sept. 10, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25195, "end_char": 25209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on Sept. 10, 1969."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_770_783_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "ATIC INDUSTRIES LTD. ETC. ETC. v.\n\nWORKMEN ETC. ETC. (Wilh Connec'.ied appeals)\n\nMarch 14, 1972\n\n[C. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND I. D. DUA, JJ.]\n\nIndus.'Tial Dispute-Transport Allowance Award of Tribunal making\n\nmptoyers liable to pay 15 pa se per day to entployee who had to tr vel more than five mile!:.' to place of work-Awa. d jutified-Tribun1l when may take into account principles of social justice and region-cum-1\n\nindust.~.\n\nThe appellant companies cai'ried on the busines of manufac\\!uring chemk:al in a vil:agr3.\n\nThere were disputes bet\\\\-een the companLs and t.Uir workmen regarding dearness allowance, trans; iort al owance '3Dd other demands.\n\nIn regard to transpdrt allowance the Tribunal in its award directed the employers to pay 1$ pabJ per day to workmen who lived more th'3.n five miles away from the place of work exo~:::>t on days when a workman was on leave.\n\nIn doing so the Tribunal took into ac .. count the fact that in tl\".e same region a pharmaceut'cal company was paying transport allow:.lnce to its workmen.\n\nThe Tribunal rej.ec.ted the contention of the companie that it was not t1e ob igafon of an em ployer le provide transport facili cies for the wc:irkmen or to pay in whole or in part their transport expemes.\n\nIn appeal by special leave,\n\nHELD : ( i) The principle that in \" proper case the Industrial Tribunal can imp<Y.c new obligation on the employer in the interest of social justiee a'ld can also involve the parties in a new co., tract has bee'l ac:. cepted by this Court. There can be no doubt that an Jndmtrial Tribti .r h:i jurisdiction to make a propelr and reasonable order in an indJJs ..\n\nJrial dispute. [779 F; 780 Bl\n\n(ii) Tu,, Tribunal was justified in having regard to the ]Jracti¢ ob ta\"1ing_ in the region on the principle of regon-cum industry when considering the claim of the workmen for payme'1t of tra\"'sport allowaice.\n\nTb.e foundation of the princi., Je of regioncum-industry is that as far as possible the1•! should be uniformity of conditions of service in com-oarable concerns in the indu try in the region as that thefe is no :m'iaJance in the conditions of rr.rvice between workmn in one 1!stablishment and those in the rest.\n\nThe. danger otherwise would be migrafon of labour to 'he one wt.ere th\"'re are more rvonrable conditions from those where conditions are less favourable. (780 B-C; 781 A-Bl\n\n(iii) When tbe Tribunal w:is fixing the wage scales and d,.rne-s al lowanCe it was aware that it had also to arljudi ate on a claim for .transport allowance.\n\nHavin~ reg?rd to this claim it m11st h'lve fixr>..d the W\"g~ sc<1Jes anrt dearness allowance.\n\nJn the scale of deafness allowance fiX\"d by the Tribunal complete neutralisation ha~ \"Ot beeri. awarded. The Tribunal had also proceeded on the basis that the \\VOrkmen must bear, from and out 'of the wages earned by them, a part of trans'\"'IOrt exrr, nses.\n\nIt w•< only when the Tribunal found tht te ext>en<e ; ncurred bv the workmen for transport was rather high that it had afforded some lelief.\n\nAT!C INDUSTll!ES v. WORKMEN (V'aidialingam, J.) 771\n\nA No material had been placed before this Court on behalf of the com panies concerned to how that in the prepafat.on of the cos~ of l1v ng inOOx in the arf3. concjerned transport expense can be taken int a ... ,...... n .\n\nl/ol D-F; 777 GI\n\n(iv) In the circumstances of the case it could not be stated that I.le award of th.e sum of 15 paise per day was in any man.ier tor aion .. ble 8 or arbitrary. The paynt had ':l!so beon hedipd in by the conJiiion ~. that the employer had to be satisfied that the workman was s:ay'ing at a piace five mile and over from the p'ace of work and that it n.id not be paid on days when the workman was either on earned leave or any type of leav~ authorised or- Otherwise. The Tri -iunal had also 'aken into account the financial capacity of the appellants and there was no flow in its reasoning. [782 F; 783 Al\n\nC Ahmedabad Mill Owners' Associa•ion e'c, v. The Tedfo Labour Association, [19661 I S.C.R. 382; The Patna Electric Supoiy Co. Lt1.\n\nPaino v. The Patna. Electrlc Supply Worker< Union, [19B] Supp'. 2, S.C.R. 761; Mohamed and Sons v.\n\nTheir Workmen,\n\n[1968] 1 LL.I. 536, Remington Rand of Jnd'a Ltd. v. Workm•n, [1969] ( IY I\n\nF.L.R. 46 and The New Maneck Chowk Spinning/ and W•aving Co, Ltd.\n\nAhmedabad and others v. The Textile Labour Association Ahmedabad,\n\nD f19611 3 S.C.R. I, applied. .\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 742 of. 1968.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Award dated November 15, 1967 of tl!e Indus; trial Trib, unal, Gujarat In Reference (l.T.) No.\n\nE 65 of 1966.\n\nAND CIVIL APPEAL No. 809 OF 1968.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Award dated October 16, '1967 of the Industrial Tribunal, Gujarat in Reference (l.T.) No. r 60 of 1966.\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL No. 2086 OF 1968.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Awards Part I & II dated G September 27, 1967 aiid Novembei 1$, 1967 of the Inchistri-1\n\nTribllllal, Gujaat in Reference (I.T.) No. 65 of 1966.\n\nA •. K. Sen, V. B. Patel, I. N. Shroff and M. N. Shroff, for the appcJJant, (in C.A. No .. 742 of 1968).\n\nM. C. Setalvad, V. B Patel and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 809 Of 1968).\n\nNat/ml G. Phillinis, Janardmi Sharma and Indira lai Sing~. fllr Ike appellants (in C.A. No. 2086 of 1968) respolldenls (in C . .A.\n\n. No. 742 of 1968) and respondent No. 1 (in C.A. No. 809 of 1968).\n\nM. C. Setalvad, V. B. Patel, I. N. Shroff and M. N. Shroff, for respo'.ldent No. 1 (in C, A. No. 2086 of 1968).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J.-Civil Appeal Nos. 742 and 2086 of 1968, by spcial leav~, arise out of the decision regardmg demand No. 4 under Award Part II, dated November 15, 1967 of the Industrial Tribunal, Gujarat, in Reference (IT) 65 of 1966.\n\nAs Alic Industries Ltd., and its workmen could not settle the various demands made by the latter, on the joint application of both, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Ahmedabad, by order dated February 19, 1966 referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Gujarat, nine demands made by the workmen.\n\nThe\n\ndemands cover various matters and have been elaborately set out\n\nin the Schedule annexed to the order of reference. It is enough to note that the demands covered revision of wage scales, dearness rulowance, shift allowance, vacation travelilng allowance, housing facilities etc. Demand No. 4, with which we are concerned was as follows :\n\n\"All workmen who make use of the S.T. Bus Service shall be paid Rs. 20/- j)er month as Bus Allowance and those workmen who come Cycling from places where S. T. Bus Service is not available shall be oaid Rs. 15 /- per month as Cycle Allowance and also those workmen who come by train shall be paid Rs. 10 /- per month as Train Allowance.\"\n\nThe Industrial Tribunal by its Award, Part I, dated Seotember 27, 1967 disnosed of demands Nos. I, 2, 3, 6 and 9. By iis Award, Part H, dated November 15, 1967, the Tribunal disposed of ch-n°nd Nns. 4. 5. 7 ancl 8. Jn resnect of demand No. 4, the Tribunal directed the Company (A tic Industries Ltd.) to pay an allowance of 15 paise per day to every employee who siavs at a distonr.e of five miles or more from villae Atul.\n\nThe Tribunal directed this payment to be made with effect from fanuarv I,\n\n1968. The Tribunal further directed that the allowance need not be paid for days on which the wor1<man is on earTJed leove or any tvne of foave authorised or otherwise.\n\nAtic Industries Ltd. has fil•d Civil Apneal No. 742 of 191'i8 challenqing the grat\\t of this allowance to its workmen.\n\nThe workmen have filed Civil A'>n•al No. 20% of 1968 chollenqinrr the various m\"tters covered bv the Award Parts I and. JI, reqarding warre scales, dearne<s\n\nallowance etr.. in <O far•• the Aw.rel was \"\"\"inst them. In narticular, regarding demand No. 4 they have claimed, in the appeal,\n\nATJC INDUSTRIES v. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, !.) 773\n\nthat a higher allowance should have been granted by the Tribunal.\n\nBut this Court, by its order dated September 24, 1.968 has restricted the Special Leave only to the question of transport ailowance.\n\nTherefore, the various other points raised by the workmen in their ar:ieal no longer survive. While the Company in its appeal No. 742 of 1968 wants the allowance granted under demand No. 4 to be set aside, the workmen, on the other hand, in their appeal No. 20~ 5 of 1968 require the aHowance to be enhanced.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 809 of 1968 i> by special leave; and the appellant therein is Atul Products Ltd., which also is an industry located h Atul village.\n\nHere again, on the joint application of the said Company and its workmen, nine demands were referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Gujarat, by order dated June 30, 1966 of the Deputy Commissioner of Labour,.\n\nAhmedabad.\n\nThe demands related to dearness allowance, shift allowance, housing facilities, vacation travelling allowance etc.\n\nDemand No. 6 wW1 which we are concerned in this appeal was as follows :\n\n\"Company shall provide free transport facility to all workmen. Till such time free transport is made available every workmen shall be paid an allowance of Rs. 15/- per month.\"\n\nThe Industrial Tribunal, by its. Award Part I, disposed o! demand Nos. 1 to 4 and 7. By its Award Part II, dated October\n\n16, 1967, the Tribunal disposed of demand Nos. 5, 6, 8 and 9.\n\nThe decision of the Tribunal under its Award Parts I and II in resoect of demand Nos. 1 to 5 and 7 to 9 is not the subject of consideration before us. In resoect of demand No. 6, the Trib1rnal rejected the demand rearding the Comnany b 0in~ made to nrovide free transport facilities.\n\nHowever, the Tribunal directed the Com., anv to nay an allowance of 15 naise ner dav to everv employee who stays at a distance of five miles and above from village A•uL The said nayment was made effective from December 1,\n\n1967. Here a2ain a llirection was 2iven that the Comna11v need not nay allowance to i's worl<:men who is either on earned leave or any tvne of leave authorised or o•herwi, e. The Co111,., anv de<ires in, thi, anneal to ]love the direction given by the Tribunal under this demand set aside.\n\nFrom the facts stated above, it will be se 0 n that the common que, tio'l that ari, es fnr con'ierati<ln in all the'e three anne1ls rehtes to the claim of the workmen for navme\"t of transoort allowanre t() enflhl~ them to ~O from thPif T'lll\"e Of rec:ir1t1\"P, to-thP: nlqcc Of WOT1<-, W~ Jl1RV fll~O t3tP that the fPferf\"nrP,~ in both the l''lqf+CfS were made by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Ahmedahad,\n\nas such a power had been delegated to him by the State Govern- A ment under s. 39 of the lndusmal Disputes Act, 1947 ..\n\nBoth Atic Industries Ltd. and Atul Products Ltd., are public limited compames.\n\nThey manufacture dyes and chemical and o.ther 1menhed, a, es. Both thJ compames were havmg tneir factories m village Atul.\n\nThe basis of the claim made by the workmen of bolh these Companies for payment of transport allowance B and the defence raised by the two concerns were substantially the same. ln support of its demand .the Union had stated that the majority of the workmen employd in the two Companies come from a distance of about five to ten miles .. As the factories are not situateJ in a place where labour force ii available easily, the majority of the workmen have to come from distant villages or c the town of Bulsar. The.re is no adequate transport reaching the site of the factories. The Stare Road Transport Corporation runs buses to reach the site of the factories, but the service is not regular or adequate. A workman has to incur a bus fare of 40 pai; e per trip from Bulsar to Atul and another 40 paise for the return journ:y. Therefore, each day a workman had to incur 80 paise as bus fare in going to village Atul from Bulsar and this was too much of an ex., ense which could not be borne by an employee from and out of his wages.\n\nIn the case of Atul Products, the demand was for a uniform allowance of Rs. 15/- per month, though in the case of Atic Industries Ltd., the demand was slightly different. The Union in this connection relied on the Award in the case of Cynamid India Ltd., which was a pharmaceutical industry in Atul region.\n\nBoth the Companies opposed the demands of the workmen on the ground that it is not the function or dutv of an employer to provide transport facilities for its workmen to come to their place of work. It was further pleaded that there is a good road from Bulsar to village Atul and the State Transport Service, which was running buses on the said route was easily available to all the workmen both for coming to vi!lage Atul and also for going bak home. In addition to t)le bus service, there was also a tram service which was available to the workmen. The Com1'anies further nleaded that most of the workmen employed in the two Com,, anies were Iivin11; in the nearby villaes and they ne.ver\n\ndoended upon ei•her the bus service or the train service. Even at the time when the workmen took ll\" emnlovm 0 nt in the far.tories, thev should have known that thev will have to go •o their Plce of work at their own ex.,,, mes. On all the<; e grounds the claim of the workmen was resisted by both the Comnanies.\n\n, It is seen that in re<'.)ect of Cynamid India: Ltd., .which was in the same region, though in the pharmaceutical mdustry, the\n\nTribunal had occasion to consider a claim made by its workmen for free transport facllites or for paymnt of fixed transport altowance at the rate of Rs. 15 /- per month. It is further seen that Cynamid lndla Ld., was already paymg 15 pahe per day for\n\nevry wrokmen who was staying five miles and more from village Atul.\n\nThe workmen demanded that whole of the transp()rt expmses incurred by them, which was of 80 paise per day, must be paid.\n\nThis demand ws considered by the Tribunal in its Award published in State Gazette on September 3, 1966. In t)lis award, a copy of which has been placed before us, it is seen that the Tribunal has rejected the claim of the workmen for directing the Company concerned to provide free transport. But in respect of the further claim for increasing the transport allowance, the Tribunal has ultimately.increased the allowance from 15 pise to 3 7 paise per day to every employee who was staying at a distance of five miles and more from village Atul. The Tribunal has also granted an allowance of 12 paise per day to the workmen of Cynamid India Ltd., who were staying beyond three miles but less than five miles.\n\nAs we have mentioned earlier, the claim for transport allowance was made by the Unioµ mainly on the basis of the award of the Industrial Tribunal in the case of Cynamid India Ltd. Though the Tribunal did 11ot grant the enhanced allowance fixed by it in the case of Cynamid India Ltd. and also the further allowance granted therein to employees Staying beyond three miles but less than five miles, the Tribunal in the case of Atic Jndustries Ltd. and Alu! Products Ltd. has awarded only a sum of 15 paise per dav for those workmen who were staying five miles and more from village Atul.\n\nIn Civil Appeal No. 809 of 1968 Mr. M. C. Seta!vad, learned counsel for the appellant, apart from conte, ting the grant 0f transport allowance to the emnloyees on the ground that it is not the function of an employer to provide transnort facilities or to pay allowance for the same, has raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to give any such direction.\n\nWe have already referred to demand No. 6, which is the subject ef consideration in this apneal.\n\nAccording to Mr. Se'alvad, the demand is to the effect that the Com,, any should provide free trans'10rt facilities to its workmen and till such facility is provided the wor1<men should be paid an allowance of. Rs. 15 /- per mon•h. The counsel further poin•ed out that in. this case the Tribunal has rejected the d0 mand of the workmen for provision for free transnort. Once this claim wa, reiected on the ground that •he emoloyee are no• entitled to be nrovided free tran<nori. no further question arose for consideration before the Tripunal.\n\nAccording to Mr. Setalvad the claim for payment of an allowance of Rs. 15 /- per month is only for the interim period th3t will necessarily be ta\\cen by the Com!:Jany to make arrangements for providing free transport, if the claim in that regard of the workmen had been accted. The latter part of the demand beipg only for an interim period, had to be straightaway rejected when ·once the main demand providing free transport made by the workmen was rejected. Therefore, it is the contention of Mr. Setalvad that the Tribunal's direction regarding payment of allowance under demand No. 6 is without jurisdiction.\n\nThe above contention of Mr. Setalvad has been controverted by Mr. Phadnis, learned counsel for the Union. According to the learned counsel, the demand is really in the alternative, namely, that the Company should be made to provide free transport facility. If this is not feasible, the Company should pay an allowance of Rs. 15/- per month.\n\nThe counsel has also drawn our attmtion to the reasons given by the Tribunal in the case of Cynamid India Ltd. for rejecting the claim for orovision of free transport.\n\nThe Tribunal has itself referred to those reasons in the present Award in resoect of both the Com-ianies. Therefore, even though the claim for provision for free transoort was rejected, the Tribunal had to deal with the alternative claim for payment of Rs. 15/- per month.\n\nWe are not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Setalvad that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider the quantum of trans'lort allowance to be oaid to the workmen when once it has rejected.the claim of •:he Union for provision of free transpcirt.\n\nThe cbim was a very t~U one, namely, that the Company should provide free transport facilities to all its workmen.\n\nThe latterpart of the demand should really be understood as an alternative claim if free transport is not provided by the Company. If the Company was wiiling to provide free transnort facilities, then there will be no question of any transport aliowance being paid to the workmen and the second par: of the deman:I may not arise for consideration. But it does not follow that when the claim for fre, transport facilities is rejected, the clim for transoort allowance no longer survives.\n\nIn our opinion, the proper way of looking at the demand is to treat the claim as one for provision of free\n\ntransort facility and in the alternative for payment of an allowance of Rs. 15/-per month. The claim for payment of allowance is not, as contended by Mr. Setalvad for an interim stae covering the period taken by the Company to make arrarigement' for providing transport facilities, when once it has been directed to the so by the Tribunal.\n\nA The contention of Mr. Setalvad that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to give direction for paying transport aliowance after rejecting the claim of the Union for the Company making provision for free transport, will have considerable force, if the Tribunal had rejected the claim for free transport on the ground that the employer is not under any circumstance liable to make any such B arrangement or bear transport expenses incurred by the workmen either in whole or in part. As we will show presently the ground on which the Tribunal rejected the claim of the Union that the employer should provide free transport was not on the ground that the employer is under no circumstance liable to provide the same, but because of the fact that a sound transport system existed c on the route and as such was conveniently available. to the workmen.\n\nIt will be pertinent to note the reasons given by the Tribunal in Cynamid India Ltd. for rejecting the claim of the workmen in that concern for making provision for free transport facilities. We are . referring to this aspect because the Tribunal in the case of Atul Products Ltd. has rejected the claim for free transport on the same ground as given by it in Cynamid India Ltd. The reason given by the Tribunal is that there whould be justification for a Company being made to provide free transport only if a sound public transport sytem did not exjst or was not conveniently available. The Tribunal has held that for going to village Atul from E Bulsar, public transport is available. It is on this ground that the Tribunal held that it will not be justified in conceding the demand for free transport. It may be mentioned that Cynamid India Ltd. was admittedly providing free transport for its supervisory staff and for that purpose it was maintaining a fleet of vehicles. But,\n\nnevertheless, the Tribunal rejected the claim of . the workmen therein for provision being made for free transoort. It was represented by Mr. Phadnis, learned counsel for the union, that Atul Products Ltd. and Atic Industries Ltd. give a special conveyance allowanee to their sunervisory staff. But so far as this is concerned, the counsel also frankly admitted that no material in this regard\n\nhas been placed in the record of these appeals. Hence we leave that aspect out of consideration.\n\nNow coming to the attack on behalf of the two Comoanies regarding the grant of transnort allowance, Mr. A. K. Sen and Mr. V. B. Patel, who followed him, urged, that the workmen when thev took uo em11loyment in the factories at village Atul knew full H well that they have to incur expenses for going to their place of\n\nwork. It wa, also noin•ed out that the derne's allowance had been revis•d by the Tribunal by its award Part I and that is sufficient to enable the workmen to meet the transport charges that\n\nSUPREME COURT IU!PORTS [1972] l S.C.R.\n\nthey will have to incur for going to their place of work. In any\n\neven~, it was urged, it is not the obligation of the employer to provide transport taciiites or to bear either in whole or in part the transport expenses of an employee incurred by him for going to his place of work.\n\nOn the other hand, Mr. Phadnis, learned counsel for the Union pointed out that ihe Tribunal has QOt accepted the entire clam; made by the Union, nor has it gran.~ transport allowance at the same rate given by it in the case of Cynamid India Ltd., The counsel pointed out that Atul Products Ltd. and Atic Industries Ltd. and Cynamid India Ltd. are all situated in village Atul.\n\nAtic Industries Ltd. and Atul Products Ltd. are no doubt doing business in manufacturing dyes, whereas Cynamid India Ltd. is a pharmaceutical industry.\n\nThe employees working in the same region should have the same facilities and it is on this principle that the Tribunal has awarded transport a!lowane and that to a lesser degree than that prevailing in Cynamid India Ltd. The Tribunal itself has held that the workmen must share a part of the expenses and it is on that ground that though a workmen has to incur 80 paise per day, he has been granted only 15 paise per day.\n\nAccordin~ to the learned counsel, the circumstances of the case also justify the said grant.\n\nWe are of the opinion that the grant of 15 paise per day as transport allowance to those employees staying live miles and beyond is justified in the circumstances of this case. The Tribunal itself has held that the Company must be satisfied that the workmen come from a place like Bulsar or places equally distant und no allowance need be paid on days when the workman is on earned leave or any type of leave authorised or otherwise.\n\nOn behalf of the Companies it was stated that in calculating the cost of living index, bus fare also is taken into account. No doubt in Ahmedabad Mill Owners' Association Etc. v. The Textile Labour Association,(1) it is stated that In the preparaiiail of the wst of livincr inucx, various items including lius fare ure taken into\n\naccont. But it is to be noted that the observation in the said decision is that ucually the items mcnioned :hcr.::in inc!u<ling •he bus fore urc tal; c:i in•o a:couqt.\n\nBut Mr. Phac:!nis, roimeJ out by reference to the book \"Cost of Living Incle' Numbe.r; in Ind'a'' a Mong; aph, published by the Lnbour Buronu, Mn!rsr; y of Lab-:iur, Gov::rnin-:nt of India that so far as /-\\hn1cdab:.tJ is co; icerned, bus .far~ is r.ct ta!en into account in th•~ pre~\"!ora.;.ion of cost of Jiving i:1d x. In contrast, he referr~<l us to the R<tnr:hi area w1'ere trave]ii'g cxc.•'lse is taken into a:cou1t in 'he p eparaion of cost of living index.\n\nNo material has been rbced\n\nbfore us on behalf of the Companies concerned to show that in\n\n(1) [1966] I S.C.R. 382.\n\nAtl<: ~DUSTR!ES \\I. WORKMEN (Vaidialingam, !.) 779\n\nthe preparation of the cost of living index m the area concerned trans,, on expense IS ta..cn mto account.\n\nl'ne dec.s10ns m 1'he Patna Electric Supply Co., Ltd. Pama\n\nv. 1'ne t'Wflu c..OClrtC ;:, upp1y workers' Umon\\ 1) and Mohammea a/Id .JOflS v. l'netr Workmen(•) we.e rererreJ to us oy Mr. P •tel wn.:rern n has been he1d that proviu,115 or noushlg\n\naccommodauon is qot tile dmy o! an e1npioyer amt u1at tne rcspons.oJ,.y ror the same is tnat of the uovernmem. ln our opm.on, a c.atlll wr providing housing accommodauon is totaJy\n\ndilferent from a 1:1aim maoe ror tran.port allowance, 1n fact m\n\nth~ presenc awaros, th~ Tnbunal has rejected the claim or the wor.:H\\e,, 10r nousrng tacmues being providedby both the Companies. Similarly, the decision in l<em.ng1on Rand of India Lid.\n\nv. workmen ( •) of this Court regarding lunch allowance does not also assist the Companies before us.\n\nIt was held in tM said decision that normally when the wage structure iS fair and dearness ailowance is paid to the workmen lm.:ed with the index of . cost of living, they must take care of the rise in the cost of living from time to time and therewre a company cannot be compelled to pay lunch allowance to all workmen.\n\nIn that decision, it wt!J be noted, that the lunch allowance was bing paid by the company _concerned .to workmen who had to go to distant places\n\nand could not remm to the office during lunch oeriod. But the rate of allowance to such employees was raised by this Co<lft no douDt by consent of the Company.\n\nBut the extension of that allowance to other employees who had to work only in the factory or office premises was rejected. In this connection it was observed that the financial ability of an employer to ar the , dditfonal burden is not criterion. The principle that in a proper case the Industrial Tribunal can impose 1.ew obligation on the employer in the interest of social justice and can aiso. involve tht parties in a new contract has b;:en recognised by this Court in The Patna Electric Supply Co., Ltd. f'.atna v. The Pa; na Electric Supply. Workers' Union('), and The New Maneck Chowk Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. Ahmedabad and others v.\n\nTe Textile Labour Associatio~. Ahmda?ad('). No doubt the said jurisdiction of the Tribunal is condi•ioned by l\"e l.aws . and judicial pronouncements. In fois ccnec1ion the lullowm3 oo>ervation of Ludwig Teller in \"Lab:im Disnutcs & L.:ollecuve Bargaining\" (Volume I, page 536) is r.pposite :\n\n\"Industrial arbitration may involn the extension of an existin~ areement or the m~•'--in.~ o~ a new on'., or, in general, the creation of new ob1Ig1t1ons o'. md1lica•ion of old ones while commercial arb; trat10n\n\n(i)[1959] Suool. 2 S.C.R. 761.\n\n(') [1969] (19) F.L.R. 46.\n\n(') [19681 TL.L.J. 536.\n\n(') 119611 l S.C.R. I.\n\n780 SUPRl!ME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\ngenerally concerns itself with interpretation of existing A obligations and disputes relating to existihg agreemenJ.s.\" . The ab~:>Ve observations have been quoted with approval by this Court m some of its earlier decisions. Therefore, there can be no doubt that an Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to make a proper nd easonable order in any, industrial dispute. It should be borne m mmd that the foundation of the principle of industrycum-region is that as far as possible there should be uniformity of conditions of service in comparable concerns in ihe industry in the region so that there is no imbalance in the conditions of a service between workmen in one establishment and those in the\n\nrest.\n\nThe danger otherwise would be migration of labour to the c one where there are more favourable conditions from those where conditions are less favourable.\n\nIt is pertinent to note that though this Court in °1{emington Rand of India Ltd. v. Workmen(') declined to extend the benefit of lunch allowanee to employees who had no occasion to go for out door work, nevertheless it recognised in a limited measure the obligation of an employer to provide medical facilities for its workmen.\n\nThe demand for provision for medical facilities made by the workmen was contested by the Company therein on the ground that making provision for medical facilities is the responsibility of the Government and not of the employer.\n\nEven on the basis that it is the obligation of the employer, it \\\\as further contended that medical expenses which a workman would ordinarily have to incur are looked after aµd taken into account when fair wages are settled. This Court accepted as correct the contention that the primary responsibility for providing medical facilities for citizens is that of the State. This Court also accepted the contention that while fixing fair wages, medical expenses which may have to. be ordinarily incurred by a workman will be taken into consideration. But on the basis that the expenses for medical facilities would have been taken into account in the fixation of wages only to a. ln_tlted extent artd as the tte can!lot discharge its full respons1b1hty in te mattei: of pro\".1d1!1g.rn.ec1ic:U facilities, this Court held that a Tnbunal will have 1unsd1cuon m a proper case to .call un an emoloyr to shoulde~ a part of the.burden regardmg medical expenses mcurred by his v; orktnan in the in•erest of industrial harmony and good co-onerat1\".e relations. We are emohasisin~.the said decision which reco.gmsed an emolover being maae to s)toulder a o.art of the burdn •.n respet of medical exoenses, as more or ls the same prmcmle will apply in the matter of an emoloyer bein~ asked to reimburse the workman at least to a limited exten~ regard!ng the transoort H expenses incurred by the latter for gomg to htS place of work.\n\n(') [1969] (19) F.L.R. 46.\n\nI••\n\nWe have already pointed out that in Atul village apart from the !WO C.ompani~. there is another ~Onern also.. Though Cynamtd India Ltd. 1s m the pharmaceutical mdustry, m our opinion the Tribunal was justified in having regard to the practice obtain'. ing in that region on the principle of region-cum-industry when considering the claim of the workmen for payment of transport 8 allowance. It is no doubt true that in the case of Cynamid India Ltd. that Company was already paying 15 paise per day to every one of its workmen as transport allowance and that amount has\n\nbeen raised by the Tribunal to 37 paise per day.\n\nIt has also granted even to workmen living beyond three miles but less than five miles a sum of 12 paise per day. But the very fact that C Cynamid India Ltd. was paying even originally 15 paise per day was a relevant factor to be taken into account as the said industry was also in the same region and most of its employees were also coming from distant places like the workmen in the case of the two Companies before us.\n\nIt should also be remembered that the Tribunal, in the awards in question, was not considering an o isolated claim for payment of transport allowance. That demand was only one of the demands, which was being dealt with by the Tribunal along with various other demands such as revision of wage scales, dearness allowance etc. The Tribunal can certainly be expected to be aware of the fact, when it was fixing the wage scales and dearness allowance that it has also to adjudicate ori a E claim for transport allowance. Having due regard to this c'!aim, it must have fixed the wage scales and dearness allowance. We have gone through the scale of dearness allowance fixed under the two awards and it is to be seen that complete neutralisation has not been awarded. The Tribunal has also proceeded on the basis that the workmen must bear, from and out of the wages earned by them, a part of transport expenses. It is only when F the Tribunal found that the expense incurred by the workmen for transport was rather, very high and excessive that it has afforded some relief. If the entire body of workmen come from dist?nt places and they all have to incur heavy expenses for using tran~ port, the question may pertinently arise whether it is not a case for revision of wage scales or dearness allowance in such a man- G ner as to include also this item of expense. The Companies have provided some accommodation in the village itself for about 25 % of its workmen on a nominal rent. Some other are living near about the village itself and they have no necessity to spend any amount for transport. In resnect of these two categories of work111en, there cannot be a general rise in the wages paid to them. On the other hand, the case of workmen who come from H distant places, due to no fault of theirs, stands on di.fferent footing, It is not oossible for them to cover the entire distance walking and they have necessarily to use some transport for 4-L!06!Sup Cl/72\n\ncoming to their place of work.\n\nQuite naturally, one can expect the workmen to choose only that type of transport which will cost them the minimum. Even if they choose the train service, which will be compartively cheaper, they will have to incur additional expense for coming to their place of work and return home.\n\n, It must be noted that though the claim was for payment of 80 paise per day per worker to cover the entire cost of transport to and fro, the Tribunal has awarded only a moderate sum of 15 paise which was the amount that was being paid by .Cynanud India Ltd. originally.\n\nIn_ the case of Atul Products Ltd. as against the claim made for an allowance of Rs. 15 /- per month, for every workman, the Tribunal has allowed only 15 paise per day and that too op the days when the workman comes for duty.\n\nSimilarly, in the cace of Atic Industries Ltd. the demands were :\n\n(a) Rs. 20/· per month to be paid to every workman using State Transport Bus Service; (b) Rs. 15/- per month to be paid to every workman coming by cycle from places where State Transport Bus Service was not available; and ( c) The workmen who come by train should be paid Rs. 10/- per month as train allowance. As against these varying demands, the Tribunal has only allowed 15 paise per day and that too on the days wijen the workman comes for work.\n\nThus it will be seen that even on the basis that a workman staying at a distance of five miles or more comes for work for 30 days in a month, the allowance he ge~ is only a sum of Rs. 4.50 p under the Award.\n\nIn the circumstances mentioned above, it cannot be stated that the award of the sum of 15 paise per day is in any manner unreasonable or arbitrary.\n\nThe payment has also been hedged in by the condition that the employer has to be satisfied that the workman is staying at a place five miles and over from Atul village and that it need not be paid on days when the workman is either on earned leave or any type of leave authorised or otherwise.\n\nTherefore, We are satisfied that the direction given by the Tribunal under demand No. 4 in Civil Appeal No. 742 of 1968 and demand No. 6 in Civil Appeal No. 809 of 1968 is justified.\n\nThe Union in Civil Appeal No. 2086 of 1968 has asked for enhanced rate of transport allowance being given to the Cmployee in Atic Industries Ltd.\n\nIts claim is that 80 paise has to be paid to every workman per day or in the alternative the allowance .must be, as directed by the Tribunal in Cynamid In<tia Ltd. All these aspects have been discussed by the Tribunal when it fixed the quantum in the case of Atic Industries Ltd. Though the Tribunal cannot impose any new obligation on an employer merely on the ground that the financial capacity of the employer is sound, nevertheless the Tribunal when imposing the new obligation has also\n\nA to consider the capacity of the employer to bear the burden. In the case of Atic Industries Ltd. the Tribunal has held that it does not want to cast additional financial burden and that is why it has fixed the allowance at a very reduced scale. We see no error in this reasoning of the Tribunal and as such Civil Appeal No. 208 6 will have to be dismissed.\n\nB In the result, the Awards of the Industrial Tribunal in respect of demand No. 4 in Civil Appeal No. 7 42 of 1968 and demand No. 6 in Civil Appeal No. 809 of 1968 are confirmed and both the appeals are dismissed.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 2086 of 1968 is also dismissed.\n\nParties will bear their own costs in .all the C , appeals.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed:.", "total_entities": 56, "entities": [{"text": "ATIC INDUSTRIES LTD. ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ATIC INDUSTRIES LTD. ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "WORKMEN ETC. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WORKMEN ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DUA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. Sen", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5007, "end_char": 5013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A •. K. Sen, V. B. Patel, I. N. Shroff and M. N. Shroff, for the appcJJant, (in C.A. No .. 742 of 1968)."}}, {"text": "V. B. Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5015, "end_char": 5026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A •. K. Sen, V. B. Patel, I. N. Shroff and M. N. Shroff, for the appcJJant, (in C.A. No .. 742 of 1968).", "canonical_name": "V. B. Patel"}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5028, "end_char": 5040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A •. K. Sen, V. B. Patel, I. N. Shroff and M. N. Shroff, for the appcJJant, (in C.A. No .. 742 of 1968).", "canonical_name": "I. N. Shroff"}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5045, "end_char": 5057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A •. K. Sen, V. B. Patel, I. N. Shroff and M. N. Shroff, for the appcJJant, (in C.A. No .. 742 of 1968).", "canonical_name": "I. N. Shroff"}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5108, "end_char": 5122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, V. B Patel and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant (in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Setalvad"}}, {"text": "V. B Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5124, "end_char": 5134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, V. B Patel and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant (in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "V. B. Patel"}}, {"text": "G. Phillinis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5206, "end_char": 5218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nat/ml G. Phillinis, Janardmi Sharma and Indira lai Sing~. fllr Ike appellants (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "Janardmi Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5220, "end_char": 5235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nat/ml G. Phillinis, Janardmi Sharma and Indira lai Sing~. fllr Ike appellants (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "Indira lai Sing~.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5240, "end_char": 5257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nat/ml G. Phillinis, Janardmi Sharma and Indira lai Sing~. fllr Ike appellants (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5399, "end_char": 5413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, V. B. Patel, I. N. Shroff and M. N. Shroff, for respo'.ldent No.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Setalvad"}}, {"text": "V. B. Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5415, "end_char": 5426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, V. B. Patel, I. N. Shroff and M. N. Shroff, for respo'.ldent No.", "canonical_name": "V. B. Patel"}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5428, "end_char": 5440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, V. B. Patel, I. N. Shroff and M. N. Shroff, for respo'.ldent No.", "canonical_name": "I. N. Shroff"}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5445, "end_char": 5457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, V. B. Patel, I. N. Shroff and M. N. Shroff, for respo'.ldent No.", "canonical_name": "I. N. Shroff"}}, {"text": "Vaidialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5556, "end_char": 5568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J.-Civil Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "Alic Industries Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5794, "end_char": 5814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Alic Industries Ltd., and its workmen could not settle the various demands made by the latter, on the joint application of both, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Ahmedabad, by order dated February 19, 1966 referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Gujarat, nine demands made by the workmen."}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5958, "end_char": 5967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Alic Industries Ltd., and its workmen could not settle the various demands made by the latter, on the joint application of both, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Ahmedabad, by order dated February 19, 1966 referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Gujarat, nine demands made by the workmen."}}, {"text": "Industrial Tribunal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6787, "end_char": 6806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Industrial Tribunal by its Award, Part I, dated Seotember 27, 1967 disnosed of demands Nos."}}, {"text": "Atul", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7201, "end_char": 7205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, the Tribunal directed the Company (A tic Industries Ltd.) to pay an allowance of 15 paise per day to every employee who siavs at a distonr.e of five miles or more from villae Atul."}}, {"text": "Atic Industries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7453, "end_char": 7473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atic Industries Ltd. has fil•d Civil Apneal No."}}, {"text": "September 24, 1.968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8014, "end_char": 8033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But this Court, by its order dated September 24, 1.968 has restricted the Special Leave only to the question of transport ailowance."}}, {"text": "Atul Products Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8502, "end_char": 8520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "809 of 1968 i> by special leave; and the appellant therein is Atul Products Ltd., which also is an industry located h Atul village."}}, {"text": "Atul village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8558, "end_char": 8570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "809 of 1968 i> by special leave; and the appellant therein is Atul Products Ltd., which also is an industry located h Atul village."}}, {"text": "Industrial Tribunal, Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8698, "end_char": 8726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here again, on the joint application of the said Company and its workmen, nine demands were referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Gujarat, by order dated June 30, 1966 of the Deputy Commissioner of Labour,."}}, {"text": "June 30, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8743, "end_char": 8756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here again, on the joint application of the said Company and its workmen, nine demands were referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Gujarat, by order dated June 30, 1966 of the Deputy Commissioner of Labour,."}}, {"text": "October\n\n16, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9288, "end_char": 9305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its Award Part II, dated October\n\n16, 1967, the Tribunal disposed of demand Nos."}}, {"text": "December 1,\n\n1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9855, "end_char": 9872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "anv to nay an allowance of 15 naise ner dav to everv employee who stays at a distance of five miles and above from village A•uL The said nayment was made effective from December 1,\n\n1967."}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10645, "end_char": 10650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10667, "end_char": 10685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Atic Industries Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10695, "end_char": 10715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the facts stated above, it will be se 0 n that the common que, tio'l that ari, es fnr con'ierati<ln in all the'e three anne1ls rehtes to the claim of the workmen for navme\"t of transoort allowanre t() enflhl~ them to ~O from thPif T'lll\"e Of rec:ir1t1\"P, to-thP: nlqcc Of WOT1<-, W~ Jl1RV fll~O t3tP that the fPferf\"nrP,~ in both the l''lqf+CfS were made by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Ahmedahad,\n\nas such a power had been delegated to him by the State Govern- A ment under s. 39 of the lndusmal Disputes Act, 1947 ..\n\nBoth Atic Industries Ltd. and Atul Products Ltd., are public limited compames.", "canonical_name": "ATIC INDUSTRIES LTD. ETC. ETC"}}, {"text": "Atul Products Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10720, "end_char": 10738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the facts stated above, it will be se 0 n that the common que, tio'l that ari, es fnr con'ierati<ln in all the'e three anne1ls rehtes to the claim of the workmen for navme\"t of transoort allowanre t() enflhl~ them to ~O from thPif T'lll\"e Of rec:ir1t1\"P, to-thP: nlqcc Of WOT1<-, W~ Jl1RV fll~O t3tP that the fPferf\"nrP,~ in both the l''lqf+CfS were made by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Ahmedahad,\n\nas such a power had been delegated to him by the State Govern- A ment under s. 39 of the lndusmal Disputes Act, 1947 ..\n\nBoth Atic Industries Ltd. and Atul Products Ltd., are public limited compames."}}, {"text": "Bulsar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11395, "end_char": 11401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ln support of its demand .the Union had stated that the majority of the workmen employd in the two Companies come from a distance of about five to ten miles .. As the factories are not situateJ in a place where labour force ii available easily, the majority of the workmen have to come from distant villages or c the town of Bulsar."}}, {"text": "Atul Products", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11942, "end_char": 11955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Atul Products, the demand was for a uniform allowance of Rs."}}, {"text": "Cynamid India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12162, "end_char": 12180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union in this connection relied on the Award in the case of Cynamid India Ltd., which was a pharmaceutical industry in Atul region."}}, {"text": "Cynamid India: Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13275, "end_char": 13294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", It is seen that in re<'.)ect of Cynamid India: Ltd., .which was in the same region, though in the pharmaceutical mdustry, the\n\nTribunal had occasion to consider a claim made by its workmen for free transport facllites or for paymnt of fixed transport altowance at the rate of Rs."}}, {"text": "Cynamid lndla Ld", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13564, "end_char": 13580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is further seen that Cynamid lndla Ld.,"}}, {"text": "September 3, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13898, "end_char": 13915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This demand ws considered by the Tribunal in its Award published in State Gazette on September 3, 1966."}}, {"text": "Atic Jndustries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14947, "end_char": 14967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As we have mentioned earlier, the claim for transport allowance was made by the Unioµ mainly on the basis of the award of the Industrial Tribunal in the case of Cynamid India Ltd. Though the Tribunal did 11ot grant the enhanced allowance fixed by it in the case of Cynamid India Ltd. and also the further allowance granted therein to employees Staying beyond three miles but less than five miles, the Tribunal in the case of Atic Jndustries Ltd. and Alu!"}}, {"text": "Alu! Products Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14972, "end_char": 14990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As we have mentioned earlier, the claim for transport allowance was made by the Unioµ mainly on the basis of the award of the Industrial Tribunal in the case of Cynamid India Ltd. Though the Tribunal did 11ot grant the enhanced allowance fixed by it in the case of Cynamid India Ltd. and also the further allowance granted therein to employees Staying beyond three miles but less than five miles, the Tribunal in the case of Atic Jndustries Ltd. and Alu!"}}, {"text": "M. C. Seta!vad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15145, "end_char": 15159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "809 of 1968 Mr. M. C. Seta!vad, learned counsel for the appellant, apart from conte, ting the grant 0f transport allowance to the emnloyees on the ground that it is not the function of an employer to provide transnort facilities or to pay allowance for the same, has raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to give any such direction.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Setalvad"}}, {"text": "Se'alvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15595, "end_char": 15603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mr. Se'alvad, the demand is to the effect that the Com,, any should provide free trans'10rt facilities to its workmen and till such facility is provided the wor1<men should be paid an allowance of.", "canonical_name": "Se'alvad"}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16140, "end_char": 16148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mr. Setalvad the claim for payment of an allowance of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Se'alvad"}}, {"text": "Phadnis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16803, "end_char": 16810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The above contention of Mr. Setalvad has been controverted by Mr. Phadnis, learned counsel for the Union."}}, {"text": "E Bulsar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20325, "end_char": 20333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal has held that for going to village Atul from E Bulsar, public transport is available."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21258, "end_char": 21267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now coming to the attack on behalf of the two Comoanies regarding the grant of transnort allowance, Mr. A. K. Sen and Mr. V. B. Patel, who followed him, urged, that the workmen when thev took uo em11loyment in the factories at village Atul knew full H well that they have to incur expenses for going to their place of\n\nwork."}}, {"text": "s10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24723, "end_char": 24726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pama", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24768, "end_char": 24772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'ne dec.s10ns m 1'he Patna Electric Supply Co., Ltd. Pama\n\nv. 1'ne t'Wflu c..OClrtC ;:, upp1y workers' Umon\\ 1) and Mohammea a/Id .JOflS v. l'netr Workmen(•) we.e rererreJ to us oy Mr. P •tel wn.:rern n has been he1d that proviu,115 or noushlg\n\naccommodauon is qot tile dmy o!"}}, {"text": "Mohammea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24831, "end_char": 24839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'ne dec.s10ns m 1'he Patna Electric Supply Co., Ltd. Pama\n\nv. 1'ne t'Wflu c..OClrtC ;:, upp1y workers' Umon\\ 1) and Mohammea a/Id .JOflS v. l'netr Workmen(•) we.e rererreJ to us oy Mr. P •tel wn.:rern n has been he1d that proviu,115 or noushlg\n\naccommodauon is qot tile dmy o!"}}, {"text": "P •tel wn.:rern n has been he1d that proviu,115 or noushlg\n\naccommodauon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24900, "end_char": 24972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'ne dec.s10ns m 1'he Patna Electric Supply Co., Ltd. Pama\n\nv. 1'ne t'Wflu c..OClrtC ;:, upp1y workers' Umon\\ 1) and Mohammea a/Id .JOflS v. l'netr Workmen(•) we.e rererreJ to us oy Mr. P •tel wn.:rern n has been he1d that proviu,115 or noushlg\n\naccommodauon is qot tile dmy o!"}}, {"text": "Ludwig Teller", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26971, "end_char": 26984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fois ccnec1ion the lullowm3 oo>ervation of Ludwig Teller in \"Lab:im Disnutcs & L.:ollecuve Bargaining\" (Volume I, page 536) is r.pposite :\n\n\"Industrial arbitration may involn the extension of an existin~ areement or the m~•'--in.~ o~ a new on'.,"}}, {"text": "Cynamtd India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30425, "end_char": 30443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "WO C.ompani~. there is another ~Onern also.. Though Cynamtd India Ltd. 1s m the pharmaceutical mdustry, m our opinion the Tribunal was justified in having regard to the practice obtain'."}}, {"text": "C Cynamid India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31066, "end_char": 31086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the very fact that C Cynamid India Ltd. was paying even originally 15 paise per day was a relevant factor to be taken into account as the said industry was also in the same region and most of its employees were also coming from distant places like the workmen in the case of the two Companies before us."}}, {"text": ".Cynanud India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33871, "end_char": 33890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", It must be noted that though the claim was for payment of 80 paise per day per worker to cover the entire cost of transport to and fro, the Tribunal has awarded only a moderate sum of 15 paise which was the amount that was being paid by .Cynanud India Ltd. originally."}}, {"text": "Cynamid In<tia Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35778, "end_char": 35797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2086 of 1968 has asked for enhanced rate of transport allowance being given to the Cmployee in Atic Industries Ltd.\n\nIts claim is that 80 paise has to be paid to every workman per day or in the alternative the allowance .must be, as directed by the Tribunal in Cynamid In<tia Ltd. All these aspects have been discussed by the Tribunal when it fixed the quantum in the case of Atic Industries Ltd. Though the Tribunal cannot impose any new obligation on an employer merely on the ground that the financial capacity of the employer is sound, nevertheless the Tribunal when imposing the new obligation has also\n\nA to consider the capacity of the employer to bear the burden."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_784_795_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS.\n\nHARINARAYAN JAISWAL AND ORS.\n\nMarch 14, 1972\n\n(l(. S. HEGDE AND P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ.]\n\nBihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915 \"\" amended upto October 6; 1970, Ss. 22 and 29-Scope of--Order made under s. 29 giving power to\n\nGovernmen~ to accept or reject bid without assigning any retJSon-1/ violative of Arts. 14 and 19(1) (g)-Power of Government lo sell the privi'fege of selling country liquor by private negotiation-Scope of.-\n\nThe first respondellt was carrying on business of selling country liquor.\n\nIn exercise of the powers conferred by s. 29(2) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915, the appellant issued an Order and in pursuance of that Order a date was notified for selling by public auction the exclusive privilege of <oiling by retail,. country liqudr in 8 hops. The respon. dent was tl1' highest bidder but his bid was rejected because the Gov ernment was of the view that inadequate prices had been offered as a result of collusion between the bidders.\n\nThereafter, tenddrs were called for and the appellant accepted the tender in respect of one shop and rej!cted the others a• it was o.gain of the opinion that the price offered was inadquate. Thereafter, the remaining 7 shops were sold by private negotiation for substantially higher prices.\n\nA writ petition filed by .the respondent in tho High Court was allowed mainly on the ground that the power confered on the Goveirnment by\n\ncl. (vi) of the Order, that no sale sh\"11 be deemed to be !Ina! unless confirmed by tho State who shall be at liberty to accept or rejjoct without assigning any reason, was an unguided power violative of Arts. 14 and 19(1) (g).\n\nAllowing the apP''\"l to this Court,\n\nHELD : (I) Section 22 of tht Act confers power on thi: Govern ment to grant to any person on such cpnditions and for such period as it J11ay think fit the exclusive privilege of selling in retail country liquor; afld s. 29 empowers the Govemi:nent to accept payment in consijeration of the grant either by calling. teiiders or by auction or other- , vise as it may by general order direct.\n\nThe powers conf, erred on the State Governmen.t by ss. 22 and 29 are absolute.\n\nThe Government Cannot be said to have conferred on itself arbitmry power under cl. (vi) of its Order,/assed under s. 29(2), because, the power that the Government reserve for itself under th.at clause is nothing more than what was conferred on it by the Legislature under the sections. Since the validity of the sections was not challenged the validity of the Order could not also be challenged. [792 BFJ\n\n(2) Even otherwise, one of the important purposes of selling the exclusive right to §ell liquor in wholesale or tail is to raise revenue; and excise revenue forms an important part of every State's reVenue.\n\nThe Government is a guardian of the finances of the Stale and is expected to protect its financial interests.\n\nThe fact that the prices fetched by the sale of the privilege to sell country liquor is an excise revenue does not change the nature of the right in the G<>Vemment.\n\nTherefore, the\n\nlegislature has empowered the Government to se~ that there is no leakage in the revenue. It was for the Government to OOcide whether the price offered in an auction is a<k!quate and the conclusion readhed by ihe Government does not affect anyone's rights. [793 D-F; 794 F-0]\n\n(3) Public auctions are held to get the best possible price and there is no completed contract till the bid is accepted.\n\nThere is, therefore, no basis for contending that the owner of the privileges who had offered to sell them cannot decline to accept the highest bid if he thinks that the price offered' is inadequate, and, it makes no difference that the Government was the seller. [.793 G-H; 794 AJ\n\n( 4) If the Government is exclusive owner of the privileges, the respondent could not rely on Art. 14 and 19{1)(g), because; citizens cannot have any fundamental right to trade or carry on business in the properties or rights belonging to Government, nor can there be any infringement of Aft. 14 if Oovernment tries to t the best available price for its valuable rights.\n\nFurther there is no inherent right in a citizen to sell intoxicating liquor by retail. [793 A; 794 A-Bl\n\nCoverjee B. Bharucha v. The Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner, Ajmer and Ors., .[1954] S.C.R. 873 and Union of India and O>S. v. M/s. Bhimsen Walaiti Ram, [I970] 2 S.C.R. 594, followed.\n\n( 5) Assuming that the question of arbitrary or unguided power can be raised it should be remembered that the power to accept or reject the highest bid is given to the highest authority in the State, n=Iy, the Govel1lment, which is expee'/; ed to safuguard the finances of the State and it is not a case of delegated power but of pawer conferred by the Legislature.\n\nWhile accepting or rejecting a bid Government is per forming an executive function and the correctness of its conclusion is not open to Judicial review where the power is not used for any colla teral purpose. [793 F; 794 C-El\n\n( 6) The real conclusion of the Government was that the price fixed \\.\\'as inadequate and hence High Court erred in thinking that the Gov emment was bound to satisfy the Court that there was collusion between the bidders. [794 E-F] Barrium Chemicals Ltd. a11d Anr. v. Co1npany Law Board and Ors. [1966] Supp. S.C.R. 311 and Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S. T.\n\nAgarwal, [1969] I S.C.C. 325 referred to.\n\n(1) The Government was not precluded, having had recourse to the auction method once, from either calling for tende'rs or selling by n\"gotiations.\n\nOnce the Government declines to accept the highest bid or the tender price offered, the government was free to have recourse to other methcxls.\n\nThe power given to the Government to seU in such other manner as it thinks fit is a very wide and unrestricted power and inc]udes wit\n\n1in it the power to sell the privilege by private negotiation.\n\n[795 A-BJ\n\n(8) The Government is not required by s. 29(2) (a) to make an order thal the privilege will be sold by private negoitation, since, it makes no sense to require Government to first make an .order that it is going to negotiate.\n\nThe section only s.ays that the State Government 'm-:iy by general or special order direct' and the direction contemplated is one to subordinate officials and not to itself. [795 D-F]\n\nCNIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 2024 _ and 2025 of 1972.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, R. C. Misra, Advocate-General for the State A of Orissa, Santosh Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the appellants (in both the appeals).\n\nM. C. Setalvad and Vinoo Bhagat, for respondent No. 1 (in C.A. No. 2024 of 1971).\n\nVinoo Bhagat, for respondent No. I (in C.A. No. 2025 of 8\n\n1971).\n\nThe Judgment oi the Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J. These appeals by certificate raise common questions of law for decision.\n\nThe questions of law arising for decision c can be more conveniently brought out if the material facts are first set out.\n\nIt is sufficient, if we refer to the facts in Civil Appeal No. 2024 of 1971.\n\n.The 1st respondent in Civil Appeal No. 2024 of 1971 is carrying on the business of selling country liquor. In pursuance of the order made by the State of Orissa, the Excise Commissioner notified D on January 8, 1971 that the exclusive privilege of selling by retail the country liquor in the eight specified shops in the Cuttack Dis trict for the period from April 1, 1971 to March 31, 1972'will be sold by public auction on February 15, 1971 and on the following days.\n\nThe auction was accordingly held oil the notified day. The 1st respondent was the highest bidder for those eight shops. His E bids were provisionally accepted by the Collector su1Jject to confir. mation by the Government.\n\nThe Government rejected those bids being of the view that inadequate price had been offered as a result of collusion between the bidders. It ordered the Excise Commissioner to call for tenders in respect of those shops. .After the tenders were duly received, the Government accepted the tender in respect of one shop and rejected the other tenders as it was again F of the opinion that the price offered was inadequate.\n\nThereafter it sold the seven shops by negotiating with some of the tendeters.\n\nThe price ultimately' fetched was substantially more than that offered either at !he auction or as per tenders.\n\nThereafter the 1st respondent moved the High Court of Orissa G under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a direction to the Govern ment to confirm his bids and cause the necessary licences to be issued to him.\n\nVarious pleas were taken in support of the relief asked for. Such of them that were pressed before us . will be referred to later.\n\nThe Government resisted that application. 'l1le High Court came to the conclusion that the Government had no power to refuse to confirm the bids of the highest bidders except H\n\non good grounds and the ground that had commended itself to the Government for refusing to confirm the bids were irrelevant. It\n\nA also opined that the absolute power conferred on the Government to confirm or refuse to confirm the highest bids with.out giving any reason was an unguided power and consequently violative of Arts. 14 and 19 ( 1 ) ( g) of the Constitution. The High Court was further of the opinion that monetary considerations were irrelevant for deciding the question whether the highest bid should be confirmed JI or not.\n\nAggrieved by that decision, the State of Orissa has come up in appeal.\n\nBefore proceeding to pronounce on the co.ntentions advanced at the hearing, it is convenient to set out the relevant provisions of law as well as the orders passed by the Government under s. 29 C of the Bihar a.nd Orissa Excise Act, 1915 (as amended upto October 6, 1970) (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act). The preamble to the Act reads :\n\n\"Whereas it is expedient to amend and re-enact the law in the Province of Bihar and Orissa relating to the import, export, transport, manufacture, possession, a.nd sale of certain kinds o{ liquor and intoxicating drugs;\n\nAnd whereas the previous sanction of the Governor.\n\nGeneral has been obtained, under section 5 of the Indian Councils Act, 1892, to the passing of this Act;\n\nIt is hereby enacted as follows : \"\n\nSection 22 deals with the grant of exclusive priviJege of manufacture and sale of country liquor or intoxicating drugs.\n\nTo the extent it is material for our present purpose, it reads :\n\n\"The State Government may grant to any person, on such conditions and for such period as it may think fit, the exclusive privilege-\n\n(a) (b) (c) (d)\n\n( e) of manufacturing and supplying wholesale and selling retail, any country liquor or intoxicating drug within any specified local area :\n\nProvided that public notice shall be given of the intention to grant any such exclusive privilege, and that a.ny objections made by any person residin~ within the area affected shall be .considered before an exclusive\n\nprivilege is granted.\"\n\nSub-s. (2) says : ''No grantee of any privilege under sub-s. ( 1) shall exercise the same unless or until he has received a license in that behalf from the Collector or the Excise Commissioner.\"\n\nSection 29 deals with payment for grant of exclusive privilege.\n\nIt reads :\n\n\" (I) Instead of or in addition to, any duty leviable under this Act, the State Government may accept payment of a sum in consideration of the grant of any exclusive privilege under section 22.\n\n(2) The sum payable under sul:i;-s. (1) shall be determined as follows :\n\n(a) by calling tenders or by auction or otherwise as the State Government may, by general or special order direct; a.nd\n\n(b) by such authority and subject to such control as may be specified in such order.\" Excise revenue is defined in s. 2(9) :\n\n\" \"Excise-revenue\" means revenue derived or derivable from any duty, fee, tax, payment other than a fine imposed by a Criminal Court or confiscation imposed or ordered under this Act or any other law for the time being in force relating fo liquor or intoxicating drugs 11Ild includes any payment to be made to the State Government under s. 29.\"\n\nIn exercise of the powers conferred by s. 29(2) of the Act, the State Government issued an order on January 6, 1971 directing that any sum payable under the aforesaid section for grant of the exclusive privilege of manufacturing and selling 1:fy retail of country liquor shall, unless otherwise directed by the State Government, in any particular case or cases for any reason, be determined by auction to be held in accordance with the procedure specified below :\n\n\" ( i) the dates and centres for the auction shall be fixed and notified by the Excise Commissioner with the prior approval of Government and the Collector shall then issue notice for auction and give wide publicity to the same in such manner as he considers necessary, 15 days before the date fixed for commencement of the auction;\n\n(ii) the auction shall determine tlie amount of monthly consideration money and shall ordinarily\n\nbe conducted by tbe Collector and in his absence by tbe Additional District Magistrate; Provided that tbe State Government may depute an officer from head-quarters to aid and advise the officer conducting such sales;\n\n(iii) the officer conc4icting the auction may satisfy himself as to the solvency of any bidder and may not allow a person of doubtful solvency or a person to whom grant of a licence for retail sale of any intoxicant is prohibited under Orissa Excise Rules, 1965 to offer bids in the auction;\n\n(iv) the officer conducting tbe auction shall be at liberty to close the auction if he is satisfied that tbere has not been sufficient or fair compeiition in which case he may publicly adjourn the auction to a specified hour on the followtng day or on some other convenient day to be notified by him in the auction hall;\n\n( v) the highest bid in an auction shall ordinarily be accepted provisionally by tbe Collector subject to confirmation 1:fy the State Government and in case where the officer conducting the auction refuses to accept the highest bid a's offered, he' shall record the reasons for such non-acceptance and shall repori forthwith tbe same to the Excise Commissioner for further action after receipt of advances from the highest bidder;\n\n(vi) when any bid in an auction for an exclusive privilege or privileges is provisionally accepted by the Collector, the bidder shall deposii two months' consideration money as an advance deposit which will bie refunded in case the provisional acceptance is not confirmed by the State Government.\n\nNo sale shall be deemed to be final unless confirmed by the State Government who !!l\\all be at liberty to accept or reject any bid without assigning any reason therefor;\n\n(vii) no licence for any exclusive privilege shall be granted until acceptance of the bid is confirmed by the State Government;\n\n(viii) when any bid in an auction for any exclusive privilege is provisionally accepted but the advance deposit is not paid, the exclusive privilege shalf\n\nbe put to reauction as soon as possible at the A risk and loss of the defaulter;\n\n(ix) all bids in an auction shall be offered by the bidder in person or by his agent legally authorised for the purpose.\"\n\nAs mentioned earlier in pursuauice of the above order the B Collector held an auction in respect oi the shops mentioned ei:rlier.\n\nThe highest bidder had made the necessary deposits.\n\nBut the Government did not accept his bids.\n\nOn March 7, 1971, the Gover.nment issued the following order :\n\n\"Whereas for' determining the s'ums payable for the grant of exclusive privilege of manufacturing and selling by retail of country liquor auction had been held in the district of Cuttack in accordauice with the procedure laid down in the order of the Government of Orissa in the Excise Department No. S.R.O. 12/71, dated the 6th January 1971;\n\nWhereas due to collusive bids among the bidders at the said auction it is not possible to determine the said sums in the aforesaid manner;\n\nNow, therefore, in exercise oi the powers confered by sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915 (Bihar and Orissa Act 2 of 1915) read .with the Order No. S.R.0. 12/71, dated the 6th January, 1971, the State Government do hereby direct that the procedure for determining the aforesaid sum in respect of the gra, nt of exclusive privilege of manufacturing and selling by retail of country liquor in the local areas specified in the Schules I for the year 1971-72 shall be as laid down in' Sehedule Ir hereof-\n\nSCHEDULE I\n\nSCHEDULE II\n\n1. The sum payable under sub-section (1) of Section 29 of the said Act for grant of exclusive privilege of manufacturing and selling by retail of country liquor in the aforesaid local areas shall be determined by the -:Excise Canunissioner by cailing tenders which may be\n\nfor individual local area or for lots of such area as the Excise Commissioner may consider proper;\n\n2. Tender notice shall be issued by the Excise Com missioner and published in the Notice Board of his office the Cuttack Collectorate and the offices of Sub Divisional Officers in that district and shall also be widely published in such manner as the Excise Commissioner considers necessary.\n\n3. The tender notice shall, among other things, mention that it is open to the State Government not to accept any tender or to order for calling fresh tenders or otherwise for such reason as they deem proper in the public interest;\n\n4 to 8:\n\n9. The Excise Commissioner shall prepare a list of all the tenders received and submit the list with his recommendations of any particular tender with sufficient reasons alongwith the tender papers to the State Govern . ment for approval.\n\nThe tenderers whos~ tenders have been recommended for acceptance shall deposit two month's consideration money as an advance deposit which will be refunded in case their tenders are not approved by Government.\n\n10. \"\n\nAs mentioned earlier, the Government accepted the tender in respect of only one shop and sold the exclusive privilege to sell country liquor in other shops by negotiation.\n\nBefore us the writ petitioners did not challenge the validity of any of the provisions in the Act; possibly in their own interest.\n\nThey are not interested in raising any contention which might vitiate the auctions held.\n\nThe contentions urged on behalf of the writ petitioners have to be examined in the background that the provisions of. the Act are not contended to be invalid.\n\nOne of the contentions taken on behalf o[ the writ petitioners was that the power retained b!y the Government \"to accept or to reject any bid without assigninJ!: any reason therefor\" in cl. ( 6) of the order made by/1he Government on January 6, 1971 in exercise of its powers under s. 29(2) of the Act was an arbitrary power and therefore it is violative ol Arts. 14 and 19(1 )( g). This contention lras been upheld by the High Court. It was urged on behalf of the writ petitioners that they have a fundamental right to carry on trade or business in country liquor.\n\nThat right can\n\nbe regulated only by imposing reasonable restrictions in the interest o_f the general pupli~. Restrictions imposed by the order in quesl!on cannot be considered as reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general pubilic.\n\nIt was further urged that the power ; etained by the Government to accept or to reject the highest bid without assignin, g any reason is an unguided power and hence it is violative of Art. 14.\n\nThese contentions were accepted by the High Court.\n\nTo us, none of these contentions appear to be well founded.\n\nAs seen earlier s. 22 of the Act confers power oo the Government to grant to any person on such conditions and for such period as it may think fit the exclusive privilege of selling in retail any country liquor.\n\nSection 29 empowers the Government to accept payment of a sum in consideration for the grant of any exclusive privilege under s. 22 either by calling tenders or by auction or otherwise as it may by general or special order direct.\n\nThe powers conferred on the State Government by s. 22 and s. 29 are absolute powers.\n\nAs seen earlier, the validity of those provisions has not been challenged before us.\n\nUnder s. 29(2) the Government had power to dispese of any of the exclusive privileges mentioned in s. 22 either by calling for tenders or by auction or otherwise as it may by general or special order direct.\n\nThat ing the amplitude of the power of the Govermnent, we tail to see how the Government can be said to have conferred on itself arbitrary power under clause (6) of its order made on January 6, 1971, when it pmvided that :\n\n\"No sale shall be deemed to be final unless confirmed by the State Government who shall be at liberty to accept or reject any bid without assigning any reason therefor.\"\n\nThe power that the government reserved for itself under that clause is nothing more than what was conferred on it by the legislature under s. 22 and s. 29 of the Act.\n\nIt is not possible to challenge the validity of the order made without challenging the validity of s. 29 itself.\n\nIt is true that this Court has ruled that the right to trade in intoxicating drugs is also a right to carry on any trade or business within the meaning of Art,, L9(1)(g)-see Krishna Kumar Narula\n\nv. Jammu Kashmir State and ors(').\n\nAt the same time, it was held by this Court ln Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. The Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner, Ajmer and ors.(') that for determining reasonable restrictions within the meaning of Art. 19(6) of the Constitution on the riht given under cl. 19(1)(g~, regard must !::¢ had to the nature of the business and the conditions prevailing in a particular trade; State has power to prohibit trades which are illegal or immoral or injurious to the health and\n\n(I) [1967] 3 S.C.R. 50. (2)\n\n[1954] S.C.R. 873.\n\nORISSA v. HAR! NARAYAN (Hegde, J.) 793\n\nwelfare of the public and there is no i.nherent right in a citizen to sell intoxicating liquors by retail.\n\nIn that .case the court held that the provisions in ti\\e Excise Regulation I of 1915 purporting to regulate trade in liquor in all its different spheres are not invalid. It was fuvther held in that case that the charge of licence fee by public auction is more in the nature of a tax than a licence fee though it is described as a licence fee.\n\nOne .of the purposes of the Regulation is to raise revenue.\n\nRevenue is collected by the grant of contracts to carry on trade in liquor and these contracts are sold by auction.\n\nThe grantee is given a licence on payment of the auction price. The Regulation specially authorises this.\n\nThe decision in Lala Harichand Sarda v. Mizo District Council and anr. (1) relied on by the writ petitioner does not bear on the point under consideration. It deals with power to gra.nt or refuse to grant licence to trade in some ordinary commodity under Lushai Hill Distt. Regulation.\n\nEven apart from the power conferred on the Government under ss. 22 and 29, we fail to see how the power retained by the Government under cl. (6) of its order dated\"' January 6, 1971 can be considered as unconstitutional.\n\nAs held by this Court in Cooverjee Bharucha's case (supra), one of the important purpose of selling the exclusive right to sell liquor in wholesale or. retail is to raise revenue.\n\nExcise revenue forms an important part of every State's revenue.\n\nThe Gove11IlUlen~ is the guardian bf the finances of the State. . It is expected to protect the financial interest of the' State.\n\nHence quite naturally, the legislature has empowered the Government to see that there is no leakage in its revenue.\n\nIt is for the Government to decide whether the price offered in an auction sale is adequate. ~While accepting or rejecting a bid, it is merely performing an executive function.\n\nThe correctness of its conclusion is lllOt open to judicial review.\n\nWe fail to see how the plea of contravention of Art. 19(1) (g) or Art. 14 can arise in these cases.\n\nThe Government's power to sell the exclusive privileges set out in s. 22 was not denie4. It was also not d1spu , , . .. s cou~ ¥ sold y public aucfion.\n\nPublic auctions are held to get the est poss1 le price.\n\nOnce these as ectS are recognised, there a ars to be no basis for conten mg t at t e owner o e pnv1 eges Ill question w o had offered to sell them cannot decline to accept the highest bid if be thinks that the price offered is inadequate.\n\nThere is no concluded contract till the bid is accepted.\n\nBefore there was a concluded contract, it was open to the bidders to \"'.ithdraw the_ir bids-see Union of India and ors. v.\n\nM/s. Bh1msen Wa(aitl Ram('). By merely giving bids, the bid~rs had not acquired any vested rights.\n\nThe fact that the Government was the seller\n\n(1} [1967] l S.C.R. 1012.\n\n\ndoes not change the legal position once its exclusive right to deal with those privileges is conceded.\n\nIf the Government is the exclusive owner of those privileges, reliance on Art. 19( I )(g) or Art. 14 becomes irrelevant.\n\nCiti:ziens cannot have any fundan:iental right. to trade or carry on business in the properties or nghts bfelongmg to the Govemment, nor can there be any infringement of Art. 14, if the Government tries to get the best available price for its valuable rights.\n\nThe' High Court was wholly wron\" in thinng that purpose of ss. 22 and 29 o{ the Act was not t~ raise revenue. Raising revenue as held by this Court .jn Cooverjee Bharucha's case (supra) was one of the important purposes of such provisions.\n\nThe fact that the price fetched by the sale of Country liquor is an excise revenue does not change the nature of the right.\n\nThe sale in question is but a mode of raising revenue.\n\nAssuming that the question of arbitrary or unguided power can arise in a case of this nature, it should not be forgotten that the power to accept or reject the highest bid is given to the highest authority in the State i.e. the Government which is expected to safeguard the finances of the State.\n\nSuch a power cannot be considered as an arbitrary power.\n\nIf that p.ower is exercised for any collateral purposes, the exercise of the power will be struck down. It may also be remembered that herein we are not dealing with a delegated power t with a power conferred by the legislature.\n\nThe High Court erroneously thought that the Government was bound to satisfy the Court that there was collusion between the bidders.\n\nThe High Court was not sitting on appeal against the order made by the Government.\n\nThe inference of the 9overnment that there was a collusion among the bidders may be right or wrong.\n\nBut that was not open to judicial review so long as it is not proved that it was a make-believe one.\n\nThe real opinion formed by the Government was that the price fetched was not adequate.\n\nThat conclusion is taken on the basis of Government expectations.\n\nThe conclusion reached by the Government dces not affect any one's rights.\n\nHence, in our opinion the High Court misapplied the ratio of the decision of this Court in Barium Chemicals Ltd. and anr. v. Company Law Board and ors.(') and Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S. T. Agarwal(').\n\n It was next urged that having had recourse to the auction method once, the Government was precluded from either calling for tenders or to sell by negotiation.\n\nThe High Court has. accepted that contention.\n\nWe are unable to agree with the High Court in its conclusion.\n\nNei, ther the provisions of the Act nor the order issued by the Government lend any support to such a conclusion.\n\n(I) [1966] Supp. S.C.R. 311.\n\n(2) [1969] t s.c.c. 325.\n\nOR!SSA v. HARi NARAYAN (Hegde, J.) 795\n\nA Once the Government declines to accept the highest d, the auction held became useless.\n\nSimilar is the effect when the Government refused to accept the highest tender.\n\nThat left the Government free to have recourse to other methods.\n\nThe power given to the Government by the Act to sell the exdusive privilege in such other manner as it thinks fit is a very wide power.\n\nThat B power is unrestricted.\n\nIt undoubtedly includes the power to sell the privileges in question by private negotiation.\n\nIt was urged that before adopting the method of selling the privileges by private negotiation.\n\nThe Government is required by s. 29(2) (a) to make an order that the privileges in question will c be sold by private negotiation.\n\nThe Government has failed to make such an order.\n\nHence the sales effected are invalid. We are unable to accept these contentions. ln the cases of public auctions or, .in the case of calling for tenders, orders from the Government directing its subordinates to notify or hold the auctions or call for tenclers is understandable.\n\nPublic auctions as well as calling for tenders are done by subordinate officials.\n\nD Further due publicity is necessary in adoptin~ those methods. To require the Government to make an order that it is going to sell one or more of the privileges in question biy negotiating with some one is to make a mockery oi the law. If the Government can enter into negotiation with any person, as we think it ca.n, it makes no sense to require it to first make an order that it is going to E negotiate with that person.\n\nWe must understand a provision of law reasonably.\n\nSection 29(2)(a) does not speak of any order.\n\nIt says that \"the State Government may by general or special order\n\ndirect\".\n\nThe direction contemplated by that provision is a direction to subordinate officials.\n\nIt is meaningless to say that the Government should direct itself.\n\nF In the result these appeals are allowed and the writ petitions dismissed.\n\nNo costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeals al/owed ..", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HARINARAYAN JAISWAL AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARINARAYAN JAISWAL AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "l(. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ss. 22 and 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184, "end_char": 197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915", "statute": "Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 225, "end_char": 230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915", "statute": "Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 329, "end_char": 347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915", "statute": "Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "s. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 570, "end_char": 578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915", "statute": "Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 586, "end_char": 619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1633, "end_char": 1651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1706, "end_char": 1716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1912, "end_char": 1917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 22 and 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2137, "end_char": 2150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2280, "end_char": 2288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3848, "end_char": 3862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5966, "end_char": 5974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CNIL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6340, "end_char": 6344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "795 D-F]\n\nCNIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "R. C. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6430, "end_char": 6441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, R. C. Misra, Advocate-General for the State A of Orissa, Santosh Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the appellants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Santosh Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6487, "end_char": 6505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, R. C. Misra, Advocate-General for the State A of Orissa, Santosh Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the appellants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6510, "end_char": 6526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, R. C. Misra, Advocate-General for the State A of Orissa, Santosh Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the appellants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6571, "end_char": 6585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and Vinoo Bhagat, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Vinoo Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6590, "end_char": 6602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and Vinoo Bhagat, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6765, "end_char": 6770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment oi the Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J. These appeals by certificate raise common questions of law for decision."}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7196, "end_char": 7211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of the order made by the State of Orissa, the Excise Commissioner notified D on January 8, 1971 that the exclusive privilege of selling by retail the country liquor in the eight specified shops in the Cuttack Dis trict for the period from April 1, 1971 to March 31, 1972'will be sold by public auction on February 15, 1971 and on the following days."}}, {"text": "January 8, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7251, "end_char": 7266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of the order made by the State of Orissa, the Excise Commissioner notified D on January 8, 1971 that the exclusive privilege of selling by retail the country liquor in the eight specified shops in the Cuttack Dis trict for the period from April 1, 1971 to March 31, 1972'will be sold by public auction on February 15, 1971 and on the following days."}}, {"text": "February 15, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7476, "end_char": 7493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of the order made by the State of Orissa, the Excise Commissioner notified D on January 8, 1971 that the exclusive privilege of selling by retail the country liquor in the eight specified shops in the Cuttack Dis trict for the period from April 1, 1971 to March 31, 1972'will be sold by public auction on February 15, 1971 and on the following days."}}, {"text": "High Court of Orissa G", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8398, "end_char": 8420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the 1st respondent moved the High Court of Orissa G under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8427, "end_char": 8435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9199, "end_char": 9214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9676, "end_char": 9681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Orissa Excise Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9702, "end_char": 9725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "October 6, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9743, "end_char": 9758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before proceeding to pronounce on the co.ntentions advanced at the hearing, it is convenient to set out the relevant provisions of law as well as the orders passed by the Government under s. 29 C of the Bihar a.nd Orissa Excise Act, 1915 (as amended upto October 6, 1970) (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act)."}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9921, "end_char": 9927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The preamble to the Act reads :\n\n\"Whereas it is expedient to amend and re-enact the law in the Province of Bihar and Orissa relating to the import, export, transport, manufacture, possession, a.nd sale of certain kinds o{ liquor and intoxicating drugs;\n\nAnd whereas the previous sanction of the Governor."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10143, "end_char": 10152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Excise Act, 1915", "statute": "Orissa Excise Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Indian Councils Act, 1892", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10160, "end_char": 10185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10253, "end_char": 10263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Councils Act, 1892", "statute": "the Indian Councils Act, 1892"}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11170, "end_char": 11180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Councils Act, 1892", "statute": "the Indian Councils Act, 1892"}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11429, "end_char": 11439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11752, "end_char": 11759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Court or confiscation imposed or ordered under this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11881, "end_char": 11945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12100, "end_char": 12105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Court or confiscation imposed or ordered under this Act", "statute": "Criminal Court or confiscation imposed or ordered under this Act"}}, {"text": "s. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12148, "end_char": 12156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Court or confiscation imposed or ordered under this Act", "statute": "Criminal Court or confiscation imposed or ordered under this Act"}}, {"text": "January 6, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12209, "end_char": 12224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of the powers conferred by s. 29(2) of the Act, the State Government issued an order on January 6, 1971 directing that any sum payable under the aforesaid section for grant of the exclusive privilege of manufacturing and selling 1:fy retail of country liquor shall, unless otherwise directed by the State Government, in any particular case or cases for any reason, be determined by auction to be held in accordance with the procedure specified below :\n\n\" ( i) the dates and centres for the auction shall be fixed and notified by the Excise Commissioner with the prior approval of Government and the Collector shall then issue notice for auction and give wide publicity to the same in such manner as he considers necessary, 15 days before the date fixed for commencement of the auction;\n\n(ii) the auction shall determine tlie amount of monthly consideration money and shall ordinarily\n\nbe conducted by tbe Collector and in his absence by tbe Additional District Magistrate; Provided that tbe State Government may depute an officer from head-quarters to aid and advise the officer conducting such sales;\n\n(iii) the officer conc4icting the auction may satisfy himself as to the solvency of any bidder and may not allow a person of doubtful solvency or a person to whom grant of a licence for retail sale of any intoxicant is prohibited under Orissa Excise Rules, 1965 to offer bids in the auction;\n\n(iv) the officer conducting tbe auction shall be at liberty to close the auction if he is satisfied that tbere has not been sufficient or fair compeiition in which case he may publicly adjourn the auction to a specified hour on the followtng day or on some other convenient day to be notified by him in the auction hall;\n\n( v) the highest bid in an auction shall ordinarily be accepted provisionally by tbe Collector subject to confirmation 1:fy the State Government and in case where the officer conducting the auction refuses to accept the highest bid a's offered, he' shall record the reasons for such non-acceptance and shall repori forthwith tbe same to the Excise Commissioner for further action after receipt of advances from the highest bidder;\n\n(vi) when any bid in an auction for an exclusive privilege or privileges is provisionally accepted by the Collector, the bidder shall deposii two months' consideration money as an advance deposit which will bie refunded in case the provisional acceptance is not confirmed by the State Government."}}, {"text": "Orissa Excise Rules, 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13460, "end_char": 13485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 7, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15462, "end_char": 15475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 7, 1971, the Gover.nment issued the following order :\n\n\"Whereas for' determining the s'ums payable for the grant of exclusive privilege of manufacturing and selling by retail of country liquor auction had been held in the district of Cuttack in accordauice with the procedure laid down in the order of the Government of Orissa in the Excise Department No."}}, {"text": "Cuttack", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15702, "end_char": 15709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 7, 1971, the Gover.nment issued the following order :\n\n\"Whereas for' determining the s'ums payable for the grant of exclusive privilege of manufacturing and selling by retail of country liquor auction had been held in the district of Cuttack in accordauice with the procedure laid down in the order of the Government of Orissa in the Excise Department No."}}, {"text": "Government of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15774, "end_char": 15794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 7, 1971, the Gover.nment issued the following order :\n\n\"Whereas for' determining the s'ums payable for the grant of exclusive privilege of manufacturing and selling by retail of country liquor auction had been held in the district of Cuttack in accordauice with the procedure laid down in the order of the Government of Orissa in the Excise Department No."}}, {"text": "6th January 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15848, "end_char": 15864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.R.O. 12/71, dated the 6th January 1971;\n\nWhereas due to collusive bids among the bidders at the said auction it is not possible to determine the said sums in the aforesaid manner;\n\nNow, therefore, in exercise oi the powers confered by sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915 (Bihar and Orissa Act 2 of 1915) read .with the Order No."}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16080, "end_char": 16090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16098, "end_char": 16131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar and Orissa Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16133, "end_char": 16153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16613, "end_char": 16623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar and Orissa Act", "statute": "Bihar and Orissa Act"}}, {"text": "s. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18772, "end_char": 18780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 19(1 )( g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18848, "end_char": 18871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19486, "end_char": 19493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19625, "end_char": 19630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19822, "end_char": 19832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19948, "end_char": 19953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20102, "end_char": 20107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20112, "end_char": 20117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20232, "end_char": 20240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20325, "end_char": 20330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20969, "end_char": 20974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20979, "end_char": 20984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21097, "end_char": 21102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21553, "end_char": 21563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1967] 3 S.C.R. 50", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 21826, "end_char": 21844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 22 and 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22995, "end_char": 23008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cooverjee Bharucha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23182, "end_char": 23200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As held by this Court in Cooverjee Bharucha's case (supra), one of the important purpose of selling the exclusive right to sell liquor in wholesale or."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23947, "end_char": 23957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23965, "end_char": 23972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24067, "end_char": 24072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19( I )(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24983, "end_char": 24998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25002, "end_char": 25009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25201, "end_char": 25208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 22 and 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25351, "end_char": 25364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28262, "end_char": 28270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 29(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29254, "end_char": 29270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_796_804_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "ISHWAR CHANDRA\n\nv .\n\n.SATYANARAIN SlNHA & ORS.\n\nMarch 14, 1972\n\n[K. S. HEGDE AND P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ.)\n\nUniversit; y of Saugar Act, 1946, s. 13(2)-Comml•tee of three to select pan\\ll of names for pose of Vice.Chancel/or-Only two members of com1nittee present at meeting to selecl panel-In the absence of any provision as to quorum the recommendations of majority of members who are presenfl at the meeting is valid.\n\nFrom a panel of names recommended by a Selection Cpmmittee eonstituted under s. 13(2) of the University of Saugar Act, 1946 the then Chancellor of the University appointed the appellant \"' Vice- Chancellor.\n\nUnder Ordinaiu:e No. 1 of 1970 the Governor of Madhya Pradesh !>came the Chancellor of the Cniversity. Exercising bis powers of review under s. 43A of the Act the Governor, as Chancellor, after notice to the appellant, set aside bis appointment as Vice..Cbancellor on the ground that only two out of the three members of the Selection Committee were present when bis name was included in the panel. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court.\n\nThe High Court called fur too correspondence between the Chairman of the Committee and the member who was absent at the mting. On the lnsis. of a Jetter written by the absent membelr to the Chairman, the High .Court came to the conclusion that the member had been deliberately kept out of the meeting and held that the Chancellor was justified in the opinion formed by him under s. 43(A).\n\nAllowing the appeal, this 8ourt,\n\nHELD: (i) The High Court sustained the order of the ChaI)cellor on grounds other than those relied upon by him in that order, [for dismissing the writ petition in Ii mine]. The order made by the Chancellor was based entirely on the legality of the meeting where only two of the three mpmbers were present. There was nothing to show that the correspondence was persued l>y the Chancellor.\n\nFurther, the correspondence did not support the assumption in the High Court's order that the Chairman. was trying to keep out any member from the meeting. [803 D-Gl\n\n• 1 (ii)' If for one reason or the other one of the members of th! Committee, after due notice, could not attend; it did not make the meeting of the others illegal.\n\nIn such circumstances where there was no rule or regulation or any other provision for fixing quorum in the presence of the majority of the member_s would constitute a valid meeting and matters considered thereat could not be held to be invalid. [80l HJ\n\nC1VIL Al'!'ELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 243 of '1971.\n\nAppeal biy special leave from the judg!llent and order dated September 3, 1970 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Miscellaneous Petition No. 256 of 1970.\n\nJSHWAR CHANDRA v. s. SINHA (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.) 797\n\nA C. K. baphtary, L. M. Singhvi, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and\n\nK: R. Nagaraja, for the appellant.\n\nB. Sen and/. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos. 1, 3 and 4.\n\nS. S. Khandujd, S. K. Dhingra and Promod Swaroop for res~ pondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nP. Jaganmohan Reddy, 1.\n\nThis is an appeal by special leave\n\nagainst the summary dismissal Of a Writ Petition filed by the appel!i; nt against the order cf the Chancellor of the Saugar University dated the 15th June 1970 by which his appointment s Vice-Chancellor of that University was cancelled.\n\nIt may at the outset be mentioned that the appointment of th~ Vice-Chancellor of the Saugar University is made by the Chancellor of that University under section 13 of the University of\n\n0 Saugar Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as \"the Act\") from \"\n\npanel of net less than three persons recommended by the Committee constituted under sub-section (2) of that section.\n\nThe Committee to be constituted under sub-section (2) was to co.nsis1 of three persons, two of whom shall ])~ elected by the Executive Council by single transferable vote from amongst pe•sons nt connected with the University or a College and the third shall b~ I. nominated by the Chancellor who was also empowered to appoint one of them as Chairman of the Committee.\n\nIt is unnecessa · to refer to other provisions of this section because these are not relevant for the purpose of this appeal.\n\nIt appears that under the above provisions a Committee to submit a panel of names for the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor for the University was duly F collstituted consisting of two persons elected by the . executive Committee of the University, namely, G. K. Shinde, Retired Chief Justice and Justice T. P. Naik of the MaciliyaPrade>h High Court while the third member Shri C. B. AgarWaIFRetired Judge of the Allahabad Hih Court was nominated by the Chancellor, Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia who also appointed G. K. Shinde as the.\n\nG Chairman of the Committee.\n\nThe Chairman thereafter appears to have carried on a correspondence to fix a convenient place and time for the meeting, which was ultimately fixed at Indore on the 4th of Aoril 1970.\n\nJustice Naik was, however, unable to attend the meeting and in his absence the other two pe•sons, Shri Shinde and Shri. Aawal met a~ a Committee and submitted a panel of names from which the Chancellor apooinied the •appe1lant on 7th H April 1970 as a Vice Chancellor with effect friim. the 22nd June\n\n1970. for a -period .of five years. The ari,, eilimt t 1.he. -tim~ c.f. t!:~ appointment, it seems, was acting as Vice-Chancellor. 5-LI06!SupcI/72\n\nOn the 9th of April 1970, the Governor of Madhya Pradesh, A Shri K. C .. Reddy .promulgated Ordinance No. 1 of 1970 . by section 2 of which s_ub-section ( 1) of section 11 was substituted by a new sub-sectio11 ( 1) whereunder the Governor of Madhya Pradesh was made an ex officio Chncellor of that University.\n\nBy section 3, it was provided that as from the date of the coming into force of that Ordinance, the Chancellor in office immediately n before the date aforeiaid shall cease to hold office of the Chancellor and the Governor of Madhya Pradesh shall assume the said office. By virtue of this Ordinance. Rajma!a Vijaya Raje Scindia ceased to be the Chancellor.\n\nOn the 23rd April 1970, the Governor again passed another Ordinance by section 2 of which he substituted section 43 of the Act by a new section 43. By §ection c 3 a new section 43A was also added.\n\nSection 4 made the amendments made by sections 2 and 3 to ope, ate retrospecitvely as from the commencement of the original Act.\n\nThe amended sections 43 and 43A are as foJJows :-\n\n\"43. If any question arises whether any person h\"' been duly appointed, elected, nominated or coopted as, or is entitled to be, a memltr of any authority or other body of the University or any officer of the University, ihe matter shall be referred to the Chancellor wl]ose decision thereon shall be final.\n\n43A. The Chancellor may, either on his own motion or on the application of any party interested, review any order passed by himself or his predecessor in office if he is of the opinion that it is not in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the statutei, the Ordinance o;· the Regulations or is otherwise improper and pass such orders in reference thereto as he may think fit.\"\n\nAfter the above Ordinances were promulgated, the Secetary to the Governor of Madhya Pradesh wrote on the 20th May 1970 to the appellant as follows :-\n\n\"The question has come up before the. Chancellor whether the meeting of the committee constituted by his predecessor under section 13 ( 2) of the Act held on 4th April 1970 at Indore at which only two members out of the three were present was legal, and whether the recommendations made by the committee at that meeting were legally valid The Chancellor has been advised that tb.e meeting held on the 4th April with only two meQ!bers present and the decisions taken at the meeting were not legal.\n\nAs a consequence, the orders issued by the University oftice dated 14th April would have to be rescinded.\n\nISllWAR CHANDRA v .. s. SINHA (Jaganmohan Reddy; J.) 79!\n\nBefore the Chancellor takes action in accordance with legal advice, he has desired that you should be asked if you have anything to state why such action s.hould not be taken.\n\nI am desired to request you to send your reply as early as possiple, and at the latest within a week\".\n\nTo this letter the appellant sent a reply on the 9th June 1970\n\nafter having earlier obtai~d an extension of time. In that reply he tried to make out a case that the recommendation of the Committee of two members out of three was perfectly valid and in support of it he cited various authorities and also a precedent of the same Governor who as the Chancellor of Indore University seems to have maintained the selection made by his predecessor in similar circumstances.\n\nThe Governor did not, however, accept the appellant's plea but passed the following impugned orders oh the 15th June 1970 :-\n\n\"WHEREAS, on applications made in that behalf, the Chancellor is of the opinion that order dated the 7th April 1970, passed by his predecessor in office appointing Shri Tshwar Chandra as Vice-Chancellor of the University of Saugar with effect from the 22nd June 1970, for a period of five years is not in acco dance with provisions of sedan 13 of the University of Saugar Act, 1946 (XVI of 1946) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act);\n\nNOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 43A of the said Act, I, the Chancellor of the University of Saugar, hefeby-\n\n( i) cancel the aforementioned order datd the 7th April 1970 appointi.ng Shri Ishwar Chandra as Vice- Chancellor; and\n\n(ii) direct that the committee be constituted for submission of panel in accordance with the provi; ions of section 13 of the said Act\".\n\nG On the !st July 1970, a Writ Petition was filed in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and it appears that on the 3rd July 1970 the Court directed the appellant to produce the correspondence retween the Chairman and the members of the Selection Committee in respect of the meeting to be held to recommend the\n\n~.ames for the appointment of a Vice-Clia111cellor.\n\nThe appellant, 1t seems, produced the correspondence with an affidavit on the 25th July 1970 stating that he had obtained the correspondence from the Chairman of the Committee. the former Chief Justice Shinde.\n\nOn the 3rd of September 1970, rule nisi was refused.\n\nOn the 19th September 1970 the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was also rejected.\n\nIn the latcer order two facts had been stated which have been challenged as incorrect.\n\nThe first one was that the Chairman had at first fixed Bhopal as the venue of the meeting and secQndly that as thl' working Vice- Chancellor of the University, the petitioner had accfl6s to all the documents relating to the meeting and his detailed reply given to the Chancellor was grounded 01n some of them.\n\nThough there is some justification in these contentions what has to be seen is whether the order rejecting the Writ Petition was justified, and if so, now that the order of the Chancellor has been impugneJ, L that order valid.\n\nIt is clear from the Governor's impugned orde:· that the appellant's appointment was held to be invalid becmso only two .members of the Committee we:e present at the meet>ng.\n\nThe High Cour~ while holding that in the absence of any provision in the relevant enactment or the rules or regulations made thereunder, a majority of members of a selection committee like ihe one in the case before them would constitute the quorum, however, presumed that the question for consideration of the Chancellor was not merely one relating to the existence of the quorum requisite for a valid meebng but something diffecent., On that a•sumption it examined the correspondence which ensued between the Chairman and Justice T. P. Naik to asceta1n whether in fact a valid meeting had been called.\n\nAi;:cordjng to the leamed Judges, Justice Naik had written to the Clnh:ian to say that he, the Chairman, was determined to hoict the m etiiJg presumably in his absence, and, therefore, the High Couct thought' that if the Chan cellar, acting under section 43A of lhe Act formed the opinton that the meeting held on that date was not legal, it cannot be said that there was no prima facie material for the formation of that opinion, reached by him after giving to the petitioner an opportunity to state why the action propose4 should not be taken.\n\nThe assumption in this order rejecting the Writ Petition is not warranted, firstly, because the correspondence does not show that there was any deliberate attempt made by the Chairman to ex- ' elude one of the members in this ca<e, Justice T. P. Naik, and\n\nsecodly, that the Chancellor had, because of this exclusion, declared the meeting held on the 4th April 1970 as not beip.g valid 0 We have already pointed out that the Chancellor was merely concerned with the legality of the recommendation made by two out of three members and n()t th'at any attempi was made by the Chairman to exclude one of the members.\n\nNeither the show. cause notice, nor the reply given blV the appellant to that notice, nor even the O•der of the Chancellor indiCates any such ground as that assµmed lw the Hih Cn,;,.,: to 'fmm th?. basi• of the Chl!II' cellor's. order. 'The corresp00dence shows thai the ChairmaT\n\nISHWAR CHANDRA v. s. SINHA (Jaganmohah Reddy, 1.) 801\n\nhad written a letter on the 12th February 1970 in which he inquired of Justice Naik whether the 7th' and 8th March 1970\n\nwould suit him to meet at Bhopal to consider the names for the panel.\n\nLater on the 20th February 1970, he wrote another letter saying that the other member was abroad, and therefore, the meeting whiclt was proposed to be held on the 7th or 8th cannot be held and that he would let him know when a new date was fixed.\n\nIn .fact, Justice Naik replied o.n the 27th February 1970 acknowledging these letters and asking him to let him know the date of the meeting as and when fixed.\n\nOn the 8th March 1970 Mr.\n\nShinde again wrote to Justice Naik fixing the meeting on the 12th March 1970 at 10.30 a.m. at Indore and also suggested that if nece; sary they may meet the next day, the 22nd March 1970. On the ! 6th March 1970 Shinde sent a telegram to Justice Naik asking him to wire if 4th April was suitJble at Indore. On the 18th March 1970, he again sent a telegram to him saying : )'Doctors Forbid travel stop wire whether 4th & 11th April suitable for Indore\".\n\nJustice Naik sent two telgrams, one on the 21st March 1970 saying that 4th is suitable at Saugar or Bhopal and another on the 27th March 1970 stating that both 4th and 11th suitable at Saugar or Bhopal.\n\nHe also wrote two letters on the 26'h and 27th to Shinde.\n\nShinde had earlier written on , the 24th March 1970 to Justice Naik in which he said as follows:- ' \"The contents of your te!egram were conveyed to, me on the phQne today. It appears that 4th and 11th April both a\"e suitable to you at Saugar and ahopal. As I told you before, I am recovering from th~ attack of virus fever and am, therefore. not strong enou2h to undertake a car journey of 120 miles to Bhopal. Thee is no convenient plane to come to Bhopal either.\n\nLf I come by nlane I shall have to stay ove• the night at the Circuit House and as I am still on diet, the Circuit House food will not suit me.\n\nAs you can come up to Bhopal you can easily come to Indore ei•her bv Car or 'by Plane.\n\nThe plane leaves Bhopal at about 9.00 a.m. and reachs Indore at about 9.30 a.m.\n\nAfter attending the !peeting you can leave by plane which leaves for Bhooal at about 2.00 p.m.\n\nAs far as Lunch is concerned, if vou let me \\mow if you are veetarian or .non-vegeta'1an, .I can arrane to give you lunch at mv place.\n\nIf it h impossible for you to come. to Indore I would reaue; t you to send me your suetfons l\"\\ard\n\nin~ suitable names for the pJst of Vice-Chancellor of the sugar University by the 3rd of Aoril.\n\nI would. however, request you to m-ake it convenient to atte!\\d the meetin~ at Indore.\n\nI have al-eady sent you a tel\"- gram to the effect that •he meeting iS fixed on the 4th\n\nof April at Indore in the Meeting Room of the University of Indore at 10.30 a.m.\"\n\nHoping to hear from you b(y the return of post and with kind regards\".\n\nBefore this letter reached to the tclegrnm received by him, Justice D Naik wrote a letter to Shinde as follows :-\n\n\"I am in receipt of your telegram intimating to me that you have fixed the meeting to consider panel of names for Saugar .University on the 4th of April 1970, at 10.30 a.m. at Indore in the Indore University.\n\nI regret my inability to be present at Indore on the date and time specified, though I may be 3ble to attend the meeting if the venue is changed to Bhopal.\n\nIt is very surprising that you should have fixed the meeting on the 4th of April at Indore, even though I had informed you by a telegram on the 17th ci March\n\n1970, that it would not be possible for me to attend it there on that date.\n\nAnyway, knowing fuli weli that it would not be possible for me to be present at Indore at 10.30 a.m. on April 4, 1970, you seem determined to hold the meeting there presumably in my absence.\n\nI can only regret your decision.\n\nIf you are still interested in having my pres¢nce for the meeting, you may fix it either on the 4th or the 11th April 1970 at Saugar or Bhopal, though Bhapal would be more convenient to me personally.\n\nI hope you have recovered from the effects of your illness biY now\".\n\nThis letter shows that though Justice Naik knew about the illness of Shinde, he somehow seems to have assumed, and ii we may say so, without justification that Shinde was determined to hold it there presumably in his absence.\n\nOn the 27th Ma-ch 1970, the next day, he however, after the receipt of the letter cf the 24th instant from Shinde did not take up the attitude that the meeting was being held presumably to keep him away from attending it.\n\nJustfoe Naik, however, tried to explain his difficulty.\n\nHe said :-\n\n\"I am in receipt of your letter dated 24th March 1970.\n\nI am sorry to note that you have not yet recovere<! from the effects of your illness.\n\nI do hope you shall soon get well.\n\nISHWAR CHANDRA v. s. SINHA (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.) 8 Ol\n\nAs for my coming to Indore, I had c0nsidered the possibility of my going there by air from Bhopal. but I am informed that the journey is very bumpy these days due to weather conditions and I do get terribly sick if the journey is bumpy.\n\nI had, therore, togive up the idea of going by air, and as I cannot spare more than a day. for the meeting, I had intimated to you that it would not . be possible for me to come to Lndore for the meeting scheduled for the 4th of April 1970 at 10.30 a.m. in Indore University.\n\nAs for your kindly suggestion that I may lfy: a letter suggest names to you for your consideration, I am of opinion that it would not only not be fair to the perscms whose names I may suggest but also not be in keeping with the letter and spirit of the Saugar University Act.\n\nWith kind regards\".\n\nThis letter clearly negatives the assumption in the High Court'i order that Shinde was trying to keep out Justice Naik from the meeting.\n\nOn the other hand, Shinde in that letter had requested Justice Naik to suggest names cl persons to be considered which prima facie negatives any iintention on his part to keep Justice Naik away from the meeting.\n\nThere is also nothing in the materials on the record to show that the correspondence cited above was persned by the Chancellor either at the time when the show cause notice was given to the appellant or at the timeof making the impugiied Order. It cannot, therefore, be assumed that the Governor was inJluenced by the above correspondence.\n\nIt is rather unfortunate that the appellant's Writ Petition was dismissed in /imilfe and without a proper appreciation of all the relevant, facts.\n\nThere is little doubt that the impugned Order made by the Chancellor was b\"!Sed entirely on the legality of the meeting where only two out of three members were present when the ame of the appel'ant was recommended.\n\nThe High Court delved into the correspondence to sustain the order of the Chancellor on grounds othr than those relied upon by him in that order for di, missiITTg the Writ Petition in limine, which in our view, was not justified. It is also not denied that the meeting held bly two of the three members on the 4th April\n\n1970 was Ie-ral because sufficient notice was given to all the three membe's.\n\nIf for ooe reason or the other one of them could not attend, that does not make the meeting of others illegal.\n\nIn such circumstances, where there is no rule or regu1ation or any other provision for fixing the quorum, the presence of the majority of the members would con.titute it a va!in meeting and matters considered there at cannot be held to be invalid.\n\nThis proposltion is well recognised and is also so stated in A Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Editi011 (Vol. IX, page 48, para 95). It is, therefore, unnecessary to refer to any decisions on the subject.\n\nIn the view we have taken, the appeal is allowed with costs against respondent 3, the Order of the Chancellor revoking the appointment of the appellant is set aside and the appe'la.nt is declared to have been validly appointed as Vice-Chancellor o'. ll the Saugar University as from the 22nd June 1970.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 86, "entities": [{"text": "ISHWAR CHANDRA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ISHWAR CHANDRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SATYANARAIN SlNHA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SATYANARAIN SlNHA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 14, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 62, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 14, 1972\n\n[K. S. HEGDE AND P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Saugar Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Saugar Act, 1946", "statute": "Saugar Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "s. 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 498, "end_char": 506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Saugar Act, 1946", "statute": "Saugar Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "University of Saugar Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 514, "end_char": 544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 676, "end_char": 690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 of 1970 the Governor of Madhya Pradesh !"}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 770, "end_char": 776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the University of Saugar Act, 1946", "statute": "the University of Saugar Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "s. 43(A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1463, "end_char": 1471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the University of Saugar Act, 1946", "statute": "the University of Saugar Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "A C. K. baphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2761, "end_char": 2777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JSHWAR CHANDRA v. s. SINHA (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.) 797\n\nA C. K. baphtary, L. M. Singhvi, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and\n\nK: R. Nagaraja, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "L. M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2779, "end_char": 2792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JSHWAR CHANDRA v. s. SINHA (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.) 797\n\nA C. K. baphtary, L. M. Singhvi, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and\n\nK: R. Nagaraja, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2794, "end_char": 2805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JSHWAR CHANDRA v. s. SINHA (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.) 797\n\nA C. K. baphtary, L. M. Singhvi, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and\n\nK: R. Nagaraja, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2807, "end_char": 2818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JSHWAR CHANDRA v. s. SINHA (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.) 797\n\nA C. K. baphtary, L. M. Singhvi, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and\n\nK: R. Nagaraja, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Nagaraja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2827, "end_char": 2838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JSHWAR CHANDRA v. s. SINHA (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.) 797\n\nA C. K. baphtary, L. M. Singhvi, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and\n\nK: R. Nagaraja, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2860, "end_char": 2866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and/. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2873, "end_char": 2882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and/. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "S. S. Khandujd", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2918, "end_char": 2932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. Khandujd, S. K. Dhingra and Promod Swaroop for res~ pondent No."}}, {"text": "S. K. Dhingra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2934, "end_char": 2947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. Khandujd, S. K. Dhingra and Promod Swaroop for res~ pondent No."}}, {"text": "Promod Swaroop", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2952, "end_char": 2966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. Khandujd, S. K. Dhingra and Promod Swaroop for res~ pondent No."}}, {"text": "P. Jaganmohan Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3036, "end_char": 3055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nP. Jaganmohan Reddy, 1.", "canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ."}}, {"text": "Saugar University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3420, "end_char": 3437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may at the outset be mentioned that the appointment of th~ Vice-Chancellor of the Saugar University is made by the Chancellor of that University under section 13 of the University of\n\n0 Saugar Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as \"the Act\") from \"\n\npanel of net less than three persons recommended by the Committee constituted under sub-section (2) of that section."}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3489, "end_char": 3499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Saugar Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3524, "end_char": 3540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "G. K. Shinde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4458, "end_char": 4470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "executive Committee of the University, namely, G. K. Shinde, Retired Chief Justice and Justice T. P. Naik of the MaciliyaPrade>h High Court while the third member Shri C. B. AgarWaIFRetired Judge of the Allahabad Hih Court was nominated by the Chancellor, Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia who also appointed G. K. Shinde as the.", "canonical_name": "G. K. Shinde"}}, {"text": "T. P. Naik", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4506, "end_char": 4516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "executive Committee of the University, namely, G. K. Shinde, Retired Chief Justice and Justice T. P. Naik of the MaciliyaPrade>h High Court while the third member Shri C. B. AgarWaIFRetired Judge of the Allahabad Hih Court was nominated by the Chancellor, Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia who also appointed G. K. Shinde as the."}}, {"text": "MaciliyaPrade>h High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4524, "end_char": 4550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "executive Committee of the University, namely, G. K. Shinde, Retired Chief Justice and Justice T. P. Naik of the MaciliyaPrade>h High Court while the third member Shri C. B. AgarWaIFRetired Judge of the Allahabad Hih Court was nominated by the Chancellor, Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia who also appointed G. K. Shinde as the."}}, {"text": "C. B. AgarWaIFRetired", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4579, "end_char": 4600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "executive Committee of the University, namely, G. K. Shinde, Retired Chief Justice and Justice T. P. Naik of the MaciliyaPrade>h High Court while the third member Shri C. B. AgarWaIFRetired Judge of the Allahabad Hih Court was nominated by the Chancellor, Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia who also appointed G. K. Shinde as the."}}, {"text": "Allahabad Hih Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4614, "end_char": 4633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "executive Committee of the University, namely, G. K. Shinde, Retired Chief Justice and Justice T. P. Naik of the MaciliyaPrade>h High Court while the third member Shri C. B. AgarWaIFRetired Judge of the Allahabad Hih Court was nominated by the Chancellor, Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia who also appointed G. K. Shinde as the."}}, {"text": "Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4667, "end_char": 4694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "executive Committee of the University, namely, G. K. Shinde, Retired Chief Justice and Justice T. P. Naik of the MaciliyaPrade>h High Court while the third member Shri C. B. AgarWaIFRetired Judge of the Allahabad Hih Court was nominated by the Chancellor, Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia who also appointed G. K. Shinde as the.", "canonical_name": "Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia"}}, {"text": "G. K. Shinde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4714, "end_char": 4726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "executive Committee of the University, namely, G. K. Shinde, Retired Chief Justice and Justice T. P. Naik of the MaciliyaPrade>h High Court while the third member Shri C. B. AgarWaIFRetired Judge of the Allahabad Hih Court was nominated by the Chancellor, Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia who also appointed G. K. Shinde as the.", "canonical_name": "G. K. Shinde"}}, {"text": "Indore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4916, "end_char": 4922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chairman thereafter appears to have carried on a correspondence to fix a convenient place and time for the meeting, which was ultimately fixed at Indore on the 4th of Aoril 1970."}}, {"text": "4th of Aoril 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4930, "end_char": 4947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chairman thereafter appears to have carried on a correspondence to fix a convenient place and time for the meeting, which was ultimately fixed at Indore on the 4th of Aoril 1970."}}, {"text": "Naik", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4958, "end_char": 4962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Naik was, however, unable to attend the meeting and in his absence the other two pe•sons, Shri Shinde and Shri."}}, {"text": "Shinde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5053, "end_char": 5059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Naik was, however, unable to attend the meeting and in his absence the other two pe•sons, Shri Shinde and Shri.", "canonical_name": "Shinde"}}, {"text": "Aawal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5070, "end_char": 5075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aawal met a~ a Committee and submitted a panel of names from which the Chancellor apooinied the •appe1lant on 7th H April 1970 as a Vice Chancellor with effect friim."}}, {"text": "7th H April 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5180, "end_char": 5196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aawal met a~ a Committee and submitted a panel of names from which the Chancellor apooinied the •appe1lant on 7th H April 1970 as a Vice Chancellor with effect friim."}}, {"text": "22nd June\n\n1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5241, "end_char": 5256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the 22nd June\n\n1970."}}, {"text": "Governor of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5430, "end_char": 5456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5-LI06!SupcI/72\n\nOn the 9th of April 1970, the Governor of Madhya Pradesh, A Shri K. C .. Reddy .promulgated Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "K. C .. Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5465, "end_char": 5478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5-LI06!SupcI/72\n\nOn the 9th of April 1970, the Governor of Madhya Pradesh, A Shri K. C .. Reddy .promulgated Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5521, "end_char": 5530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5561, "end_char": 5571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5714, "end_char": 5723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajma!a Vijaya Raje Scindia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6011, "end_char": 6038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajma!a Vijaya Raje Scindia ceased to be the Chancellor.", "canonical_name": "Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia"}}, {"text": "23rd April 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6076, "end_char": 6091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 23rd April 1970, the Governor again passed another Ordinance by section 2 of which he substituted section 43 of the Act by a new section 43."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6140, "end_char": 6149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6174, "end_char": 6184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6205, "end_char": 6215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6238, "end_char": 6249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6267, "end_char": 6276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 2 and 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6305, "end_char": 6321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 43 and 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6409, "end_char": 6428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "20th May 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7246, "end_char": 7259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the above Ordinances were promulgated, the Secetary to the Governor of Madhya Pradesh wrote on the 20th May 1970 to the appellant as follows :-\n\n\"The question has come up before the."}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7415, "end_char": 7425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4th April 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7450, "end_char": 7464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chancellor whether the meeting of the committee constituted by his predecessor under section 13 ( 2) of the Act held on 4th April 1970 at Indore at which only two members out of the three were present was legal, and whether the recommendations made by the committee at that meeting were legally valid The Chancellor has been advised that tb.e meeting held on the 4th April with only two meQ!bers present and the decisions taken at the meeting were not legal."}}, {"text": "9th June 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8285, "end_char": 8298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To this letter the appellant sent a reply on the 9th June 1970\n\nafter having earlier obtai~d an extension of time."}}, {"text": "Indore University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8599, "end_char": 8616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that reply he tried to make out a case that the recommendation of the Committee of two members out of three was perfectly valid and in support of it he cited various authorities and also a precedent of the same Governor who as the Chancellor of Indore University seems to have maintained the selection made by his predecessor in similar circumstances."}}, {"text": "Tshwar Chandra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9002, "end_char": 9016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Governor did not, however, accept the appellant's plea but passed the following impugned orders oh the 15th June 1970 :-\n\n\"WHEREAS, on applications made in that behalf, the Chancellor is of the opinion that order dated the 7th April 1970, passed by his predecessor in office appointing Shri Tshwar Chandra as Vice-Chancellor of the University of Saugar with effect from the 22nd June 1970, for a period of five years is not in acco dance with provisions of sedan 13 of the University of Saugar Act, 1946 (XVI of 1946) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act);\n\nNOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 43A of the said Act, I, the Chancellor of the University of Saugar, hefeby-\n\n( i) cancel the aforementioned order datd the 7th April 1970 appointi.ng Shri Ishwar Chandra as Vice- Chancellor; and\n\n(ii) direct that the committee be constituted for submission of panel in accordance with the provi; ions of section 13 of the said Act\".", "canonical_name": "ISHWAR CHANDRA"}}, {"text": "University of Saugar Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9184, "end_char": 9214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9328, "end_char": 9339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the University of Saugar Act, 1946", "statute": "the University of Saugar Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Ishwar Chandra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9491, "end_char": 9505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Governor did not, however, accept the appellant's plea but passed the following impugned orders oh the 15th June 1970 :-\n\n\"WHEREAS, on applications made in that behalf, the Chancellor is of the opinion that order dated the 7th April 1970, passed by his predecessor in office appointing Shri Tshwar Chandra as Vice-Chancellor of the University of Saugar with effect from the 22nd June 1970, for a period of five years is not in acco dance with provisions of sedan 13 of the University of Saugar Act, 1946 (XVI of 1946) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act);\n\nNOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 43A of the said Act, I, the Chancellor of the University of Saugar, hefeby-\n\n( i) cancel the aforementioned order datd the 7th April 1970 appointi.ng Shri Ishwar Chandra as Vice- Chancellor; and\n\n(ii) direct that the committee be constituted for submission of panel in accordance with the provi; ions of section 13 of the said Act\".", "canonical_name": "ISHWAR CHANDRA"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9640, "end_char": 9650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the University of Saugar Act, 1946", "statute": "the University of Saugar Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9727, "end_char": 9755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st July 1970, a Writ Petition was filed in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and it appears that on the 3rd July 1970 the Court directed the appellant to produce the correspondence retween the Chairman and the members of the Selection Committee in respect of the meeting to be held to recommend the\n\n~.ames for the appointment of a Vice-Clia111cellor."}}, {"text": "Shinde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10234, "end_char": 10240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the former Chief Justice Shinde.", "canonical_name": "Shinde"}}, {"text": "3rd of September 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10250, "end_char": 10271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 3rd of September 1970, rule nisi was refused."}}, {"text": "19th September 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10304, "end_char": 10323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 19th September 1970 the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was also rejected."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10367, "end_char": 10380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 19th September 1970 the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was also rejected."}}, {"text": "Bhopal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10544, "end_char": 10550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first one was that the Chairman had at first fixed Bhopal as the venue of the meeting and secQndly that as thl' working Vice- Chancellor of the University, the petitioner had accfl6s to all the documents relating to the meeting and his detailed reply given to the Chancellor was grounded 01n some of them."}}, {"text": "section 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12056, "end_char": 12067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "8th March 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13914, "end_char": 13928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 8th March 1970 Mr.\n\nShinde again wrote to Justice Naik fixing the meeting on the 12th March 1970 at 10.30 a.m. at Indore and also suggested that if nece; sary they may meet the next day, the 22nd March 1970."}}, {"text": "Saugar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14478, "end_char": 14484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Naik sent two telgrams, one on the 21st March 1970 saying that 4th is suitable at Saugar or Bhopal and another on the 27th March 1970 stating that both 4th and 11th suitable at Saugar or Bhopal."}}, {"text": "Bhooal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15500, "end_char": 15506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "peeting you can leave by plane which leaves for Bhooal at about 2.00 p.m.\n\nAs far as Lunch is concerned, if vou let me \\mow if you are veetarian or .non-vegeta'1an, .I can arrane to give you lunch at mv place."}}, {"text": "D Naik", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16260, "end_char": 16266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before this letter reached to the tclegrnm received by him, Justice D Naik wrote a letter to Shinde as follows :-\n\n\"I am in receipt of your telegram intimating to me that you have fixed the meeting to consider panel of names for Saugar .University on the 4th of April 1970, at 10.30 a.m. at Indore in the Indore University."}}, {"text": "Saugar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16421, "end_char": 16427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before this letter reached to the tclegrnm received by him, Justice D Naik wrote a letter to Shinde as follows :-\n\n\"I am in receipt of your telegram intimating to me that you have fixed the meeting to consider panel of names for Saugar .University on the 4th of April 1970, at 10.30 a.m. at Indore in the Indore University."}}, {"text": "17th ci March\n\n1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16818, "end_char": 16837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is very surprising that you should have fixed the meeting on the 4th of April at Indore, even though I had informed you by a telegram on the 17th ci March\n\n1970, that it would not be possible for me to attend it there on that date."}}, {"text": "April 4, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17014, "end_char": 17027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anyway, knowing fuli weli that it would not be possible for me to be present at Indore at 10.30 a.m. on April 4, 1970, you seem determined to hold the meeting there presumably in my absence."}}, {"text": "4th or the 11th April 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17232, "end_char": 17258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If you are still interested in having my pres¢nce for the meeting, you may fix it either on the 4th or the 11th April 1970 at Saugar or Bhopal, though Bhapal would be more convenient to me personally."}}, {"text": "Bhapal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17287, "end_char": 17293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If you are still interested in having my pres¢nce for the meeting, you may fix it either on the 4th or the 11th April 1970 at Saugar or Bhopal, though Bhapal would be more convenient to me personally."}}, {"text": "27th Ma-ch 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17642, "end_char": 17657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 27th Ma-ch 1970, the next day, he however, after the receipt of the letter cf the 24th instant from Shinde did not take up the attitude that the meeting was being held presumably to keep him away from attending it."}}, {"text": "Justfoe Naik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17858, "end_char": 17870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justfoe Naik, however, tried to explain his difficulty."}}, {"text": "Lndore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18581, "end_char": 18587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "be possible for me to come to Lndore for the meeting scheduled for the 4th of April 1970 at 10.30 a.m. in Indore University."}}, {"text": "4th of April 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18622, "end_char": 18639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "be possible for me to come to Lndore for the meeting scheduled for the 4th of April 1970 at 10.30 a.m. in Indore University."}}, {"text": "4th April\n\n1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20342, "end_char": 20357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also not denied that the meeting held bly two of the three members on the 4th April\n\n1970 was Ie-ral because sufficient notice was given to all the three membe's."}}, {"text": "22nd June 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21288, "end_char": 21302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ll the Saugar University as from the 22nd June 1970."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_805_814_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "BALLARPUR COLLIERIES CO,\n\nTHE PRESIDING OFFICER, C.G.I.T. DHANBAD AND A.l.lt.\n\nMarch 14, 1972 [C. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND I. D. DuA, JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947-S. 23(b) and S. 23(c)-During pendenc)' of proceedings befo;-e Tribunal c.nd during a settlement workers struck-Whether S. 23 (b) or S. 23 (c) is attracted.\n\nIn 1956 the \"Majumdar Award'\" was published and to this Award the appellant' was also a party. In January/February, 1960 the workers of the appellant Colliery had gone on strike. The efforts of the ma'lagement failed to persuade the workers to resume duty. On the intervent:on of the Regional Labour Commissioner (C), Bombay, the matter was resolved as a result of which the workers resumed their duty and also got their dues etc., irilm the management. In the report o'f what had transpired during the negotiation! (Ex.D) it was stated, inter a/'a, that the Regional Commissioner had also been assured by the workers that they would see that \"such strikes are not resorted to in future and would adopt all consftutio'1al means to get their grievances redressed\". Later, due to certain d:fficulties in interpreting the terms df the Maiumdar Award, the Central Government, under s. 36A .of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, referred to Shri Palit. the Chairman of the Central Government Indlls,. trial Tribunal, Dhanbad, the necessary question seeking interpretation of certain provisions of the' said Award.\n\nThi~ reference is dated May 23, 1960. ' It) 'the Award riven by Shri' Palit it was mentioned that all the l)Brtie8 who were impleaded in the Majumdar Award would be bound by. the Ia ter 1\\.,.ard.\n\nDuring the. pendency of the proceedings before Shri Palit. the workers of the applant went on strike from October, 4, 1960, the cause for the strike being dismissal of 6 workmen. No notice of the strike, as requ:red by Sta'1dhg Order .no. 32, was given. The .aooellant, therefo.re, filed an ap~Hcation. belfo•e the Regio, al Labour Commissioner (Centra1) on October 31, 1960 for a 'declaration that the str:'ke was illeal. The Regional Commissioner he4f the strike to be leal and an apt>eal to the Industrial Tr{bu', al by tl'le apoellaTit also failed. Thereafter. the appellant filed a wtit \"Detition before the Hillh Court but it was dism'ssed. On appeal to this Court, two main points wee raised by 'the a-ppellant : ( 1) that the strike took place during the pend•mcv of the _reference before Shri Palit and t1, erefore under cl. (b) of s. 23 of t11J Industrial Dispu'e5 Act, the strike was .meal; (2) in anv case, the ' atrke took place\n\nduri11~ the Ml\\dency ot the aettlemel1t tected b~ th, e Re\n\nlonal Commissioner, Bombay a11d, tberefo\"e, und r el. (e) of s. 23 of the Industrial Dlaoutea Act, the strike wu llleaal.\n\nAll owina the at)'j)ell, H&.D: (l) nte lepl tftect of rerere11ce under 1. 36A ol th~ lfldUI trial Dlsoutes Act Ia to.. reonen the narller reference termlnatln~ i11 the ¥•1umdq,. Award, thouQh olv for the llmlted nt1mos\" nf t.l:!e interoreta. hn of .the provision~ of the award. i\" resDf!ct of the dtftlcultiet or d()nJ, ta\n\n~vlniZ rise o the refere'lce. S'nee the .. .,, ellaflt wa1 a Mrty to the Pallt Award, Its a., licatio; to wltMrAw and it1 non-nllici.,•tlo'' .If) the proceedln\"S notw1thatandn~, 1. 2'(b) nf tl, e Indutr1al Dieputet Act wu attracted and the ttrike was illepl. (813 E] ;\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\n\n(ii) The assurance of the workers to the Commissioner that they would not resort to such strikes in future and that , they would adopt all constitu.tional means to get their gr, evances redressed, neither amounted to a contract nor was it a matter covecd by the said settlment with the Regional Labour Commissioner.\n\nTherefore, s-: 23 (c) was not attracted H in the facts and circumstances of the present c3se. In order to be hit by s. 23(c) the strike must be in breach of contract in respect df a matter covered by a settlemnt which is in operation at the time of the strike. rs11 Gl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C.A. No. 876 oi 1968.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 28, 1965 of the Patna High Court in M.J.C .. No. 721 of C 1962.\n\nM. N. Phadke and Bhuvnesh Kumar_i, for the appellant.\n\nThe Judgment of the_ Court was delivered by Dua, J. Facts giving rise to this appeal by special leave may briefly be stated : f) Qn May 18, 1956 an award was made by Shri Majumdar, which is popular1y known as the M1jumdar Award.\n\nOn May 23, 1960 the Central Government, in exercise f the power conferred by s. 36A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 14 of 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) referred to Shri G. Palit, Chainnan, Central Govenunt Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad the question E \"Whether 'traffic' is to be placed in Grade II of the clerical service in tenns of the said Award the award\n\nbeing the award of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Colliery Disputes) published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary Part II, Section 3 .dated the 26th May, 1956 (S.R.O. No. 1224 dated 18-5-56).\n\nF 'Traffics' are a category cf clerical s_taff covered by the award of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Colliery Disputes), popularly known as the 'Majumdar Award', and it appears that in the opinion of the Government a\n\ndifficulty or doubt had arisen with regard to the interpretation of the provisiCitlS of the said award in so far as G it related to the scale of pay etc. for 'Traffics' and accord.; ingly, the question had been referred for terptation to the Dhanbad Central Government Industnal Tnbunal,\n\nthen presided over by Shri G .. Palit. TIPs order of the Central Government gave rise to Reference No. 27 of 1960.\" H During the course oi the hearing. of this refen.ce some c~Uiery owners including the appellfi:nt Ballarpu!' Collienes Co., whtch IS a private partnership, in whose collieries there were mo workmen ·\n\nBALLARPUR COLLIERIES V. PRESIDING OFFICER (Dua, J.) 8 07\n\nwith the designation of 'Traffic', wanted to be excluded {rom t11e reference altogether on the ground tlrat they were not interested in the dispute pendihg before the Ttiblinal presided over by Shri Palit.\n\nThe appellant presented an application in August, 1960 stating :\n\n, \"So far as the petitioner is concerned this dispute does not concern these collieries because thy have not got any traffic in employees coming under this .category. As such the presence of the petitioner before this Tribunal is not necessary.\" It appears that tbe Tribunal did not record any express order either. pennitting the appellant to withdraw from the dispute or declining such pennission. The Appellant, however, did not take part in the proceedings thereafter and the workers of the appellant's colliery also did not take any steps to participate therein. In the Award\n\nJl; iven by Shri Palit known a~ 'Palit's Award' which was publishqd in the Gazette of India on November 22, 1960, it is not , disputed that the case of these collieries as well, including the appellant's colliery at Ballarpur where the workmen described as 'Traffic' did not exist for the e being; was dealt with.\n\nReference to the application presented by the appellant and other colliery owners. was made in the Award in the followinR terms:\n\n\"Then with reference to the contention ot. some of the . collieries that where the workmen designated >as 'traffic' do not occur, their names should be omitted from the present reference under section 18 ( 3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. But this section has been wrongly invoked here.\n\nIn the present case I have not summoned them in pursuance of the .said section. So the question does not arise whether they were so sum~ moned without proper cause.\n\nThey have been summoned in the present case becuse they were parties to the orinal award.\n\nI haye to summon all the parties who were impleaded in the original coal Award.\n\nSo this contention is ov_er ruled.\n\nIn an omnibuo; or industrywise reference it .is not necessary that the disoute must relate to each one of them O\" the cause of action muc; t exist in all cases.\n\nEven if the dispute i~ not there but they are made parties in the reference, all that mav be said is that they are under no oblieation to imnlement the Award.\n\nBut the award will be bindinq on all of them all the same.\n\nSo lam unable to. exclude them.\"\n\nDurinQ\" the oendencv of the omceedings befMe' Stiri Pali~ the worlc.ers of the aooellant's collierv we'lt on strilc.e from October 4.\n\n1960. the cau'\\e for the strike beinl!: dismissal of six workmen. No l)otice was givep. of the strike though, accordin~ to the judgrrient . . '\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS f1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nof the_ High Court uder appeal under standing Order No. 32 of the A Standmg Orders pproved by the Statutory Authority, the workmen were bound to give 14 days' notiCe before going on strike. The appellant, theeore, filed an application, b~:ore the Regional Labour Comtruss10ner (Central), on October 31; 1960, in pursuance of Paragraph 8 ( 1 ) of the Coal Mines Bonus Scheme for a declaration that the strike was illegal. The Regional Commissioner, B however, _held the_ strike to be legal with the result that the appel- 1ant preferred an appeal before the Industrial Tribunal under paragaph 8 ( 4) of the said Scheme. This appeal filed a.nd the appellant approached the Patna High Court by means of a writ petition\n\nas~ ailing the legality of the strike. The following three points were raised by the appellant in challenging the strike before the High c Court:-\n\n( 1) The strike took place during the pendency of\n\nRe-:erence No. 27_ of 1960 before Shri Pali•, and consequently clause (b) of secticn 23 woul_d apply.\n\n(2) The strike took place durin~ the pendency of th~\n\nsettlement effected by the Regional Labour Comm; ssioner, BombJy, while settling the dispute which arose out of the strike in January /Febru ary, 1960 and consequently clause (c) of ~ction 23 of the Act woul)l apply. ( 3) In any vie~ of the case, as the Labourers resorted to strike without iving due notice as requited by Standing 0\"der No. 32, the strike .W!$ i.n breach of a contract between the employer. and its .workmen and was, therefore, illegal. - The High Court did not agree wilh the appellant's c~entions and dismissed the writ petition. . F\n\nBef-ore us .the same thre_e points were. -raisd. by Shri Phadke,\n\n1eaed c(!unsel.for th~ appellant. The third Joint was veiy fai.rly not pressed by Shri Phadke becau)e mere breach. of a Standmg Order. could not render the strike illegal under ss. 23, and 2~. a.f the Act: Only th~ first two points were presse~. In so far as S: 23 (c) C is concet111ed Sh\"i Phdke made a refereq~ to the settltnent, a . copy of which was annexed with thewrit'petition in the ltft.'Court.\n\nIt aopears that the worken of the. aopeUant's ~1liezy had qone on strike in the months of January/February, 1960 and ef!orta of the\n\nmanaement had failed to persuade the workers to ores_urhe duty ..\n\nThe Regional Labour ComntiMioner(C) Bombav, thertupon.e a D.0.1~\\ter dated February 4. 1960. toSh~ Haldltar. ~U:t R Of the Warke\"s' Unibn, ift '+et)ly ttHhe said P~~1dent'a, t.el~m of the .same date,'in which 'thel; abolir CdmlSSIOner h~. ··~ that hewas going to visit Nagpuroh Peb!fllary 9,.1960 and would\n\nBALLARPUR COLLXERIES v. Pl\\ESIDING OFFICER (Dua, J.) 809\n\nA look into. the matter.\n\nThe Regional Labour Commissioner had in that letter requested Shri Haldulk:ar to make it convenient to see him at the office of the Conc.iliation Officer at Nagpur.\n\nThe Regional Labour Commissioner then used his good offices in getting the matter resolved as a result of which the workers resumed their duty and got their dues etc., from the management.\n\nThe report B Of what transpired at the time of the visit of the Regional Labour Commissioner was recorded in 'annexure D' annexed to the writ petition filed in the High Court. It appears from \"annexure D\"\n\nthat after discussing t~1e matter with the appellant and the _Jvork\n\nmen, the Regional Labour Conunissioner induced both sides to\n\nadopt a reasonable attitude and the strike was called off.\n\nThe C relevant portion of annexure 'D' may here be reproduced :·\n\nlt was on lOth February, 1960, th1tt 1 visited Chanda and had talk:> with Shri Zallaram, Vice-President of the\n\nUnion and other important workers of the Col1ie y.\n\nA representative of the Management Shri S. V. Kanade,\n\nPersonnel Officer was als9 present at the tim! of discussion.\n\nI impressed upon the Union Officials and the workers that going on strike would not solve their problems but would on the other hand create complications and bitter relations between the Management and the workers.\n\nI also emphasised upon the Management that they should also see that the grievance of the workers were not allowed to accumulate and full justice was given to them.\n\nConsiderable discussions continued on this issue and I asked the Union Officials that they would withdraw the strike immediately so that the relations between workers and management could be restored to normalcy ...... The lJnion thereupon stated that owing. to_ the strike the workers were likely to lose their bonus and continuity of service for purposes of annual leave. I\n\ntld them that I would take up the matter with the Management provided they call off the strike first to which they agreed.. I was also assured that they would see that such strikes are not resol'ted to in future and\n\nwotild adopt 'all constitutional means to get their griev-\n\n<mces tedressed.\n\ni saw Shri Jamnadas Daga, this morning on my retum\n\nftom<GlJ4n~:aud infoim~ him ofthe discioo which\n\nhad tans¢roi i at Qband.a\\ H~ agreed to .. CODSider the m.att.er favQW'abcy'; wllenJ infcmnod.hi.m .that.tne workers had already agreed to call off the strike onthe 1Oth\n\nSUPREME COURT 1EPORTS\n\n[1972) 3 S.C.R..\n\nFebruary, 1960 the Ma.nagement agreed to the following:\n\n( i) that the 3 suspended workers would be allowed to join their duties within a peiiod of 24 hours to 48 houi:s and possibly within .24 hours after the resumption of wo&\n\n( ii) tb4lt the workers will not be deprived of the Annual leave under 'the Mines Act 52 with wages on account of this stoppage of work if they are otherwise eligible.\n\n(iii) That although the strike'rs are not entitled to bonus as a special case, which will not form a C precedent, the Management has agreed to reduce the qualifying period from 65 to 60 attendances to 50 and 45 attendances in the quarter ending March, 1960 only.\n\nAs regards the amount of bonus it would be calculated at.one-sixth of the earned basic wage instead of one-third nonnally D paid under the Bonus Scheme. ·\n\n(iv) Workers who have left the colliery for their homes, would be allowed to join their duties within a period of 15 days from the resumption of w()'rk.\"\n\nAccording to Shri Phadke this report embodies a settlement btetween E the appellant and the workmen and the assuran~ given by the workmen not to resort to strike but to adopt constitutional means\n\nfor getting their grievances redressed being one of the matters coveted by the settlement, s. 23(c) of the A, ct was attracted rendering the strike illegal.\n\nLet us see if s. 23 supports this submission. That section F Teads: .\n\n\"23 General prohibition of strikes alld lock-outs;\n\nNo workman who is employed in any industrial\n\ntal:iishment shall go on strike in breach of oontrt and n6 employer of any such workman shall declare a lock-\n\nG out;_\n\n(a) during the penncy of concillatiQn l)rocetdings\n\nbefore a Board and c; even days after the conctusion of suchl?f()(; eedinp;\n\n(b) during the pendency of g! beft)re a Labour Court, Tribunal or N~~ Tn~ -~ two months after the conckisiotf or~~- -i\"'g-;:\n\n' ~~~\n\n\" ' ..\n\n' •,\n\n: (\n\nBALLARPUR COLLIERIES v. PRESIDING OFFICER (Dua, J.) 811\n\n(bb) during the pendency of arbitration proceedings before an arbitrator and two months after the condusion of such proceedings, where a notification has been issued under sub-section (3A) of section 1 OA; or\n\n(c) during any period in which a settlement or award\n\ni; in operation, in respect of any of the matters\n\ncovered by the settlement o: award.\" In support of his contention Shri Phadke relied upon a recent decision of this Coun in Workmen of the Motor Industries Co. Ltd. v.\n\nManagement of Motor Industries Co. L'd. Bangalore(l) specific c reJia.nce being placed on the following passage at pp. 31 0~ 1 J :\n\n\"Read in the c.ontext of the other provisions of Part I of the seitlement of which it is part~ cl. 5 was intended to prohibit (a) direct action without notice 'by or at the instance of the association, and (b) strikes 1Sy W9rkmen themselves without the approval of the as; ociatioo. The words 'in no case' used in the clause emphasise that direct action by either party without notice should not be resorted to for any reason whatsoever.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the settlement was cae as defined by s. 2 ( p) ct the Lndustrial Disputes Act and was binding on the\\\n\nworkmen under s. 18 ( 3 )' of th..: Act until it was validly terminated and was in fore\" wr .. n he said strike took\n\nplace.\n\nThe strike was a lightning one, was resorted to, without noiice and was not at the call of the association' and was, therefore, in breach of cl. 5 .''\n\nIn this Judgment rderence was also made 1o an earlier unreported decision of this Court in Tata Engineering & Lacomotlve Co. Ltd.\n\nv. C. B. Mittere) in supp<>q of the conclusion arrived at therein.\n\nIn our opinion, it is difficult to hold that in the circumstances o( the present case the assurance stated to have been given by-the workmen to the Regional Labour Commissioner that they (the workmen) would see that they do not resort to sU, ch strikes in .future and that they adopt all constitutional means to get their grj¢vances G redressed amount to a term of the settlement, breach of which wquld\n\nattract Cl. (c) of s. 23 of the Act. In order to be bit by s. 23 (c) the strike must be ill breach of contract in respect of a matter\n\ncovered by the settlement which is in operation at the time of the strike. Tb.e &Ssurance referred to in the Regiomil Labour Gommissioner's report neither amounts to a contract nor is it a matter covered by -the aforesaid settlerrient.\n\nH This cotention, therefore. must fail.\n\n(1) [1970} I S.C.R. 304.\n\n(2) C.A. No. 633 of i%3, d/2.4.1964.\n\n\nThe appellant's learned counsel next submitt,.ed that the present A case cleany fell within s. 23 (b). The High Court decided this point against the appellant principally on the ground that during the pepdency Gf reference No. 27 of 1960 the appellant had applied before Shri Palit in August, 1960 to be discharged from the proceeding5 on the ground that the dispute penling in that Tribual did [lOt concern the appellant's cJllieries.\n\nAfter the application n the appellant took no part in the proceedings and as appeared 1rom the judgment of the appellate authority the workmen also had not taken any steps in the said refereqce.. The appellant and the workmen having not taken part in the reference pending before Shri Palit the High Court felt that they , were •U:it parties to those proceedings though in the opinion of the High Court the appellant c and the workmen were bound by the decision in those proceedings.\n\nOn this reasoning s. 23 ( o) was also ruled out by the High Court and the writ petition was dismissed on the ground that there was no error appare.nt on the face of the record because there was no statutory provisicm dealing with the circumstances like the preseriL Reference was made t.ly the High Ccurt to a decision cl this Court in Hochtief Gammon v. lndustrial Tribunal, Bhubaneshwar(l) a D case in which s. 18 (3) (b) of the Act had come up for construction.\n\nBut that decision was considered to be unhelpfdul became, accordihng\n\nC::: .. '.~ to the High Court. Shri Palit's Tribunal ha not summoned t e (;~' ahppella 1 n 1 t undecr s 1 . 1 .t8.( 3 )C(b) but had called tfhehappelnt 1 becase ll t e Ba arpur o 1enes ompany was one o t e ongma parttes -.~ to the award known as M:>jumdar Award.\n\nThe High Court, how- E ever, inferred from the folbwing observation in the Palit Award:\n\n\"In an omnibu~ or industrywise reference it is not neces£ary that the dispute must relate to each one of them or the cause cl action must exist in all cases.\"\n\nthat there was no dsoute between the appellant and its workmen l pending before Shri Palit's Tribunal.\n\nThis view of the High Court was seriously assailed tefore us by Shri Phadke.\n\nAccording to him the reference under s .. 36A of the Act requiring consideration of any provision of an eadier award or settlemt:ltlt J1.1Ust relate back to the earlier reference culminating in the award or settlement and, therefore,· if the appellant was a G party to the original reference which resulted in the 'Majumdar Award', then the appellant must necessarily be.considered to be a party to the later reference of which Shti Ph-lit was seized. And if that be so, theu, the appellant, in Shri Phadke's submission;· must be considered to be a party to the reference under s. 36f\\.~ notWith~ standing its desire not to take part.m those procee4ings or, even an Hi exprec; s anplication bY it to the Tribunalfor.p, enni, ssion .to withd(aw therefro.m..\n\n(l) [l964J 7 S.C.ll ~96.\n\nBALLARPUa. COLLIERIES v. PRESIDING OFFICER (Dua, J.) 81_3\n\nA In our view, there is force in Shri Phadke's submission and the High Court was wrong in holding that s. 23 (b) is inapplicable to the present case. Section 3 6A provides :\n\n\"36A Power to remove difficulties :\n\n( 1) If in the opinion of the appropriate Government, .J any difficulty or doubt .arises as to the ipterpretation of any provision of an award or settlement, it may refer the question to such Iaoour'Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal as it may think fit.\n\n(2) The Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal c to which such question is referred shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard.,\n\ndecide such question and its decision shall be .final and binding on all such parties.\"\n\nNow, quite clearly proceedings for removing difficulties or doubts\n\narising as to the interpretation of any provision of the Majumdar D Award must be construed to have the effect of reviving those earlier proceedings for the limited purpose of considering the removal of such difficulty or doubt. It is only by virtually reopelling the proceedings of the earlier reference that the purpose and object of correct interpretation of that Award and of the removal of difficulties or doubts arising therefrom could ble achieved. The legal E effect of reference under s. 36 A must, therefore, in our opinion be to .reopen the earlier reference procedings which terminated in the MajQmdar Award, though only for the limited purpose of the interpretation of the provisions of that Award in respect of such difficulties or doubtS as required removal. Now, it that be the\n\nsco~ of s. 36A ?~ the Act then thre can be lil!ledoubt !hat all parties to the ongmal reference which resulted m the MaJumdar F Award must as a matter of law be deemed necesSarily to be parties to the proceedings to t, he reference under s. 36A •as well.\n\nThis seems to us to be implicit in the very scheme and bt of this section as would be cleat from the fact that the decision of the question referred under this section has been rendered final and binding on all parties who have been given an opportunity of being G heard. This does not contemplate con.sideration of the question whether any party was in fact feeling interested in the particular subject matter of difficulty or doubt. In this connection it has to be borne in mind that proceedings or industrial adjudicatin are not considered as proceedings purely between two private parties having no impact on the industry as such. Such proceedings involve larger 'II publlc interest in which the industry as such (including the em~\n\nployer.and the labour) is vitally interested. The scheme of the law of industrial adjudication designed to promote industrlal peace\n\nand harmony so as to increase production and help the1 groWth and 6-L1061Sup.CI\n\n\n. al conomY has to considered in the ooc~. A progress of na.tiO.n tiional set up according to '!'hich the tatt !)as gc~ of our cons d effectively protect a stal order m which to stnve to scc.ure a:l political justice must info, rm all institutions social.. en:lfe•r the material resources of the community are so\n\no~ ntton best to subserve the cOIWJ?-OD. $ood . The appellant disbut~ :hcrelore, by merely expressmg tts. des.ue even. if that 1 ir! fs0 e ressed by presenting a formal applicauon to WI!hdraw\n\nthe xp eedings cease to be a party to those procee<hngs so fa avofcfilie legal' consequences which, according to legisltive d t flow by reason of the pendency of those proceedmgs. mten men' . . L-- fo e be h l.d to h The appellant, in our op!DlOD, must wge r e _ ave continued to remain party to th~ reerence fore the nbunat C presided over by Shri Palit, its a.pplicauoa !O Withaw and 1ts nonparticipation in tbe proceedings notw1tbstanding.\n\nEven :r; onparticipation of workmen would not change the legal posttton.\n\nOnce it is held that the appellant was a party to those proceedings then there can be no difficulty in holding that s. 23(b) would be attracted to those proceecllogs and if that sub...section is attracted then obviously the strike has to be held to be illegal. The refer- D enre (No. 27 ot 1960) it may he recalled, was made in May, 1960, and the Award was published on November 22, 1960 : the work men went on strike on October 4, 1960 which was clearly during the pendency of those proceedings..\n\nWe are, therefore, of the view that the fmpugood strike was ille~ and the High Court, saking respect, was not right i.n holding to the contrary. The appeal I IS accordingly allov; od and reversing the judgment of the High Court we q~USh the order of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal dated April 16, 1960 as ilio tho order of the Regional Labour ~r (Central) Bombay dated November t9, 1960 bich bad held the c; trlke of the workmen not to be illegal. venom~ aU these orders w~ bold th& the workmen's strike Wll! illegal~ ia violation ot ' 23-(b) o( the Act. The a!'Ptat b ' :crordlllgiy ail~ and the workmen's strike held illegal. [t is i.onfnate d!a~ the respondeat! aro not rtpresent~ before us th . ptto ?f SCI'Vl<:e and we, therefore, did not hav~ the benefit of\n\nr,;,::~ ~~~re i& no Jef'retatlon on behal! of the :e WI no orde~ u f.() ts .\n\nS.C.\n\nG Appeal aiiOVffd.", "total_entities": 72, "entities": [{"text": "BALLARPUR COLLIERIES CO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BALLARPUR COLLIERIES CO,", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE PRESIDING OFFICER, C.G.I.T. DHANBAD AND A", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE PRESIDING OFFICER, C.G.I.T. DHANBAD AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 14, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 93, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 14, 1972 [C. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND I. D. DuA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "I. D. DuA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 23(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 165, "end_char": 173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "S. 23(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178, "end_char": 186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "S. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 284, "end_char": 289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "S. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 297, "end_char": 302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 640, "end_char": 646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the intervent:on of the Regional Labour Commissioner (C), Bombay, the matter was resolved as a result of which the workers resumed their duty and also got their dues etc.,"}}, {"text": "s. 36A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1200, "end_char": 1206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1215, "end_char": 1244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Palit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1263, "end_char": 1268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, due to certain d:fficulties in interpreting the terms df the Maiumdar Award, the Central Government, under s. 36A .of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, referred to Shri Palit."}}, {"text": "October, 4, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1735, "end_char": 1751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the workers of the applant went on strike from October, 4, 1960, the cause for the strike being dismissal of 6 workmen."}}, {"text": "October 31, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1987, "end_char": 2003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "belfo•e the Regio, al Labour Commissioner (Centra1) on October 31, 1960 for a 'declaration that the str:'ke was illeal."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2470, "end_char": 2475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2693, "end_char": 2698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "UI trial Dlsoutes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2844, "end_char": 2865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 23(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3823, "end_char": 3831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "UI trial Dlsoutes Act", "statute": "UI trial Dlsoutes Act"}}, {"text": "M. N. Phadke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4161, "end_char": 4173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Phadke and Bhuvnesh Kumar_i, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Bhuvnesh Kumar_i", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4178, "end_char": 4194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Phadke and Bhuvnesh Kumar_i, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Dua", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4260, "end_char": 4263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the_ Court was delivered by Dua, J. Facts giving rise to this appeal by special leave may briefly be stated : f) Qn May 18, 1956 an award was made by Shri Majumdar, which is popular1y known as the M1jumdar Award."}}, {"text": "Majumdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4387, "end_char": 4395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the_ Court was delivered by Dua, J. Facts giving rise to this appeal by special leave may briefly be stated : f) Qn May 18, 1956 an award was made by Shri Majumdar, which is popular1y known as the M1jumdar Award."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4466, "end_char": 4484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 23, 1960 the Central Government, in exercise f the power conferred by s. 36A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 14 of 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) referred to Shri G. Palit, Chainnan, Central Govenunt Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad the question E \"Whether 'traffic' is to be placed in Grade II of the clerical service in tenns of the said Award the award\n\nbeing the award of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Colliery Disputes) published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary Part II, Section 3 .dated the 26th May, 1956 (S.R.O. No."}}, {"text": "s. 36A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4523, "end_char": 4529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4537, "end_char": 4560, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "G. Palit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4619, "end_char": 4627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 23, 1960 the Central Government, in exercise f the power conferred by s. 36A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 14 of 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) referred to Shri G. Palit, Chainnan, Central Govenunt Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad the question E \"Whether 'traffic' is to be placed in Grade II of the clerical service in tenns of the said Award the award\n\nbeing the award of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Colliery Disputes) published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary Part II, Section 3 .dated the 26th May, 1956 (S.R.O. No.", "canonical_name": "G .. Palit"}}, {"text": "Central Govenunt Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4639, "end_char": 4684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 23, 1960 the Central Government, in exercise f the power conferred by s. 36A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 14 of 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) referred to Shri G. Palit, Chainnan, Central Govenunt Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad the question E \"Whether 'traffic' is to be placed in Grade II of the clerical service in tenns of the said Award the award\n\nbeing the award of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Colliery Disputes) published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary Part II, Section 3 .dated the 26th May, 1956 (S.R.O. No."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4939, "end_char": 4948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "18-5-56", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4998, "end_char": 5005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1224 dated 18-5-56)."}}, {"text": "Dhanbad Central Government Industnal Tnbunal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5474, "end_char": 5518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ingly, the question had been referred for terptation to the Dhanbad Central Government Industnal Tnbunal,\n\nthen presided over by Shri G .. Palit."}}, {"text": "G .. Palit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5548, "end_char": 5558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ingly, the question had been referred for terptation to the Dhanbad Central Government Industnal Tnbunal,\n\nthen presided over by Shri G .. Palit.", "canonical_name": "G .. Palit"}}, {"text": "Ballarpu!' Collienes Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5736, "end_char": 5760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of this refen.ce some c~Uiery owners including the appellfi:nt Ballarpu!'"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6838, "end_char": 6843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Award\n\nJl; iven by Shri Palit known a~ 'Palit's Award' which was publishqd in the Gazette of India on November 22, 1960, it is not , disputed that the case of these collieries as well, including the appellant's colliery at Ballarpur where the workmen described as 'Traffic' did not exist for the e being; was dealt with."}}, {"text": "November 22, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6847, "end_char": 6864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Award\n\nJl; iven by Shri Palit known a~ 'Palit's Award' which was publishqd in the Gazette of India on November 22, 1960, it is not , disputed that the case of these collieries as well, including the appellant's colliery at Ballarpur where the workmen described as 'Traffic' did not exist for the e being; was dealt with."}}, {"text": "Ballarpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6968, "end_char": 6977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Award\n\nJl; iven by Shri Palit known a~ 'Palit's Award' which was publishqd in the Gazette of India on November 22, 1960, it is not , disputed that the case of these collieries as well, including the appellant's colliery at Ballarpur where the workmen described as 'Traffic' did not exist for the e being; was dealt with."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7390, "end_char": 7400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7413, "end_char": 7442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "October 31; 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8893, "end_char": 8909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, theeore, filed an application, b~:ore the Regional Labour Comtruss10ner (Central), on October 31; 1960, in pursuance of Paragraph 8 ( 1 ) of the Coal Mines Bonus Scheme for a declaration that the strike was illegal."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9273, "end_char": 9289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This appeal filed a.nd the appellant approached the Patna High Court by means of a writ petition\n\nas~ ailing the legality of the strike."}}, {"text": "Phadke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10287, "end_char": 10293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Shri Phadke,\n\n1eaed c(!unsel.for th~ appellant.", "canonical_name": "Phadke"}}, {"text": "ss. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10473, "end_char": 10479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Haldulk:ar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11360, "end_char": 11370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Regional Labour Commissioner had in that letter requested Shri Haldulk:ar to make it convenient to see him at the office of the Conc.iliation Officer at Nagpur."}}, {"text": "Chanda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12159, "end_char": 12165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The C relevant portion of annexure 'D' may here be reproduced :·\n\nlt was on lOth February, 1960, th1tt 1 visited Chanda and had talk:> with Shri Zallaram, Vice-President of the\n\nUnion and other important workers of the Col1ie y.\n\nA representative of the Management Shri S. V. Kanade,\n\nPersonnel Officer was als9 present at the tim!"}}, {"text": "Zallaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12191, "end_char": 12199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The C relevant portion of annexure 'D' may here be reproduced :·\n\nlt was on lOth February, 1960, th1tt 1 visited Chanda and had talk:> with Shri Zallaram, Vice-President of the\n\nUnion and other important workers of the Col1ie y.\n\nA representative of the Management Shri S. V. Kanade,\n\nPersonnel Officer was als9 present at the tim!"}}, {"text": "S. V. Kanade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12316, "end_char": 12328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The C relevant portion of annexure 'D' may here be reproduced :·\n\nlt was on lOth February, 1960, th1tt 1 visited Chanda and had talk:> with Shri Zallaram, Vice-President of the\n\nUnion and other important workers of the Col1ie y.\n\nA representative of the Management Shri S. V. Kanade,\n\nPersonnel Officer was als9 present at the tim!"}}, {"text": "Jamnadas Daga", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13459, "end_char": 13472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i saw Shri Jamnadas Daga, this morning on my retum\n\nftom<GlJ4n~:aud infoim~ him ofthe discioo which\n\nhad tans¢roi i at Qband.a\\ H~ agreed to .. CODSider the m.att.er favQW'abcy'; wllenJ infcmnod.hi.m .that.tne workers had already agreed to call off the strike onthe 1Oth\n\nSUPREME COURT 1EPORTS\n\n[1972) 3 S.C.R..\n\nFebruary, 1960 the Ma.nagement agreed to the following:\n\n( i) that the 3 suspended workers would be allowed to join their duties within a peiiod of 24 hours to 48 houi:s and possibly within .24 hours after the resumption of wo&\n\n( ii) tb4lt the workers will not be deprived of the Annual leave under 'the Mines Act 52 with wages on account of this stoppage of work if they are otherwise eligible."}}, {"text": "Mines Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14066, "end_char": 14075, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 23(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15022, "end_char": 15030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15103, "end_char": 15108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15908, "end_char": 15917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Phadke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16102, "end_char": 16108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of his contention Shri Phadke relied upon a recent decision of this Coun in Workmen of the Motor Industries Co. Ltd. v.\n\nManagement of Motor Industries Co. L'd.", "canonical_name": "Phadke"}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16427, "end_char": 16432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16835, "end_char": 16839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16915, "end_char": 16920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17168, "end_char": 17173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17801, "end_char": 17806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17841, "end_char": 17846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Regiomil Labour Gommissioner", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18026, "end_char": 18054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tb.e &Ssurance referred to in the Regiomil Labour Gommissioner's report neither amounts to a contract nor is it a matter covered by -the aforesaid settlerrient."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18352, "end_char": 18357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19200, "end_char": 19205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19592, "end_char": 19597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19820, "end_char": 19823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20991, "end_char": 20996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21359, "end_char": 21364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21406, "end_char": 21415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22531, "end_char": 22536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 36A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22840, "end_char": 22846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 36A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23070, "end_char": 23076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25181, "end_char": 25189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 4, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25486, "end_char": 25501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27 ot 1960) it may he recalled, was made in May, 1960, and the Award was published on November 22, 1960 : the work men went on strike on October 4, 1960 which was clearly during the pendency of those proceedings..\n\nWe are, therefore, of the view that the fmpugood strike was ille~ and the High Court, saking respect, was not right i.n holding to the contrary."}}, {"text": "Central Government Industrial Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25818, "end_char": 25856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal I IS accordingly allov; od and reversing the judgment of the High Court we q~USh the order of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal dated April 16, 1960 as ilio tho order of the Regional Labour ~r (Central) Bombay dated November t9, 1960 bich bad held the c; trlke of the workmen not to be illegal."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_815_834_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "SESJIAMMAL 4 OlilS. ETC. ETC.\n\nY. srATE OF T~MIL NADU March 14, 1972\n\n8l$\n\n{S. M. SIKIU, C.J., A. N. GtOVER, A. N, RAY D G p\n\nAND M. H. BEG, JJ.] • . .\n\nALEKAR.\n\nThe Tc.-mil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitabl End (Tamil Nadu 12 of 1959) a.l' amerrde-d by Anuntling ct 0 /'i<; nlf/ls g~ 55, .56 and J1.6-J:!ereditary right of sc<c,:ession ro offictt of A::i.~ abohrTu!d-JJ VJolat•ve of Arts. 25 and 26 of Constitution.\n\nSection 55 t:>f the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious . an.d Ch:uitablc Ell dowments Act, 195~, gave the trusree of a temple the power to appoint the officr.l holders_ or. servan~ of the temple and also provided that where the of!ice or s.erYJce IS hereditary, tlle perwn ne:tt in the lice o( succession .shall be entitled t1> sw:.cce.d. In Ollly CXQ:pti9Q.il as.c:s the trustee was\n\ns:ntitled Lo &part from the principle of ncl!tinthe line of sua:cs.sioo, but even iO, the trustee was under an oblijption to appoint a fit rson to perform the service after having due: rgard\"to the dJ.iau of the members of the family.\n\nSection 116(2) (xxiii) of the Act gave power to the Government to make rules pro'Viding for tbe qualification.• 1o bo pos£-essed by the ~rs ~Ud rvant.s and their conditions o{ oetvio:.\n\nThe State GovemmeQt tram.e.d tho Madras Hindu Religious lnstir.wi.oos\n\n(()fliul'$ and Servanr&) Service RuLes, 1964. Rul.c 12 provided that .lLil An:J}ab, whetb, er bm:ditacy. or non-hereditary whose. duty it L$ !.0 perlorm Pujai, shall, before succee$1111g t.o the offi~ or ajlpOmtJneot. to dJoe office, obt;.in a certificate 0( fune&.$ C.or perfQrmmg the dulles of hiS office from the! head ,:X ill i~Mion imprtttiog instrtu:ti?DS in Apmas cr !Tom the ad of i math recognised by the CommiSS!oru:r or from sudl olDer pef'50il may dcsiiWit.cd by Jh.e Comrmsslon.er.\n\nThe 1\\J:i Wall l!y the Am\"oding Mt of tno. The Amald ~ , did away ..-jj:.b t.Q, e hecodilary ri~ of su=~.on to tbe b f .Acchalca. The peti!ioaers .., ho were Ar.cbalqw of S; uvue and Y~~\n\ntemples and Mathadbipatis to wllose Maths LefJIP~S :ll'e J.Ullebed fi.W 5 p:titions in is Court contending tha.t the amendment! v•olated ArtS. - •1111 26 pi tl)(i stirutiop .\n\nPia mi.Q.a 4le pctiliPna.\n\nJiEJ,..D : (1) Tbe Pr¢ecijdon ~>f ~~ ie, dth;; ~!te~ ~'1ra: is not limited to matts of octr1noe or ' ull1':Ultee for done in p~USuance of religion. IIDd tbereore nt~~ •ol religi.cn. )Vbat rituals anJ observas tc. which -~ e~!igi~' pracliee ba.s !JJ be ~1tu1n an 1'5t!tial part of a '~· Sl the doctrine of a parocuhr deJ:ided by .the Courta with r:eJ'l:rnce to ckd by the community .u J1 religion lndudinjl prnctices wlucb are repr PJ!I1 of iu religion. {827 B-Dj\n\n196 , 1 &mar l}'rJM TaJrrr Bal/uddirr 8alub v. Th# Stare PI po, rbay, l &up, t. 2 S.C.R. 496, rt'fCI'red to. .\n\n~A~ m With tile --'lilbii.Wuc, nt 9l fl:IJl tW .,-.:wbe ~~Aga8lJ.$. llws je tfot !OJJW)Pf, j~ QB ntiJalf i¥ele COIJll) the 'I'(Ofjppets .aU (j) Tilmll ~~Vf • f4NI> !Qjsl , JlSpec.l, W _, li.aJ; t\n\nI \\ l ! i\n\nI I I\n\nI I I I I\n\nI I I i I l i\n\n,_. J-\n\nEME COURT REPORTj\n\nSUPR ·\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.R..\n\nS16\n\nDeity from pOllution, deftlement or desecration preserve the image C>~ thay take place in a. variety o~ ways and according Pollution or decrat!on ge becomes defile& Jf there 1.! any departure or to the Agarnas, an Jma latin to worship. .er, in all the temple~ in violation of the roles re crate~ the Agamas JDSJSted that only the qualified which iroages are ~d the sanctum sanctorum after observing certain Arc~a all step Jnsl Agam~. Hence the Achaka of such a temdisclp~ !IDJ'?Sed ficient in the Jit\"uals. appronate to the _worship of ple, besi.des bemg} must also belong to. a particular denommation; be.. the part1cular hDelcl y, of a different do; nom1nanoo would defile the image cause an Arc a a E-Gl by hi; touch. [825 F-H; 826\n\ns . y~ kataramana Devaru v. The State of Mysore, U958] S.C.R. 895 nn 'Holins Perla Kovil Kelvl A.ppean Thiruvenkato Ramanuja Pedda ; fyyangcrlu V arlu v. Prath ivaJhi Blrayf; mam Venka1acharlu, 7J I .A. 156 and Mohan Lalji v. Gotdhan LolJI Maharaf, 35 Allahabad P. C. 283, referred to,\n\n(3) Tb:: hereditary principle in the appointrr>..ent of an Archaka had been adopted and accepted from antiquity and bad also been .fu!Jy recognised in the unamended s. 55. But the change effected by the amnU. ment to a. 55, namely, the aboliticm of the principle of nt-in-theline f succe.Mion is however, not invalid, because, the usage is a culr and\n\nnot a religious wage. [833 A-C)\n\n(a) An archah bas never been regarded as a spiritual head however acromplished and weU-vers.ed in the agamas and rituals he may be. He is a s:rvant or the temple su&ject to the discipline and qorurol of the trustee aa recognised by the unamended s. 56 of the Act. Tb:lt being h~ position the act o! liis appOin'tment by the trustee is essentially secular,\n\nthougll. after ;~ppointnr.nt he performs some religious functions. '11lat\n\nater hta .appotnent. he perfors. wonhip is no ground I or holdin~ !!Jat hta &ppoillt etther a reilgous practic-e or a matter of religon.\n\nHe owe1 h~ apPQ:Ullmnt to a se.cular authonty. Any lay founder of a kmpk: may appotnt him and the Shebail$ and l-fana&'!rs of temples\n\ne:~~.ese an e\"SeotJany secular function in choosing and appointing tbe\n\n~fb ... k~ .. '11le act that in 11ome tt.'1llples tb.o bereditazy principle w:lS poi~e 1D. miliz the appointn.=nt would DOt make the suive ap-\n\n. men\"- anything but sccutur. 1!!32 A-G)\n\nJ(aJ~.K~'f':adr~ Alyanagar v. Rmlga Bhattar. I.L. R. 35' Mad. 631, Naflllbhai Naro ay v • Male han LaJ Mookerfu, l.L. R. 50 CIIL 233, ( UM:portcd amdtM v • Trimb\"* Balwant BhandaT~ (187B-SO) Vol. 4 Mal!4rane~ pnnted judgments of the Bombay Hight Court p. 169) and 89, referrel 11~r}eet Koer v. Chundemun- Misser, XVI Wy R.-portn-,\n\n{b} The power i1 appoint any body . Vtn to tho tr\\1.\\k:(! under the nd•'d s..-..-tiou fic&le untJcr t. 12. a!n Arctw.a lo oni as he poo;.;..\"'<'\\i os titn~~.~~ to be read with a. 2.8 nut lln unqlft.::l.l power, bcc.lU.\"-' 1M powe~ b tnute to lldmlntsl.c<>f he Ac~ which cootrol(.:.J it. ~00 ~8 d~ rma of the trut or r e a!fal~ ?f tho rnrh in ~rd:.Ul~ wltb f the Arc.bab .will h!lvof the Jlllltltulion. Therefore, the pP?urtmc:D! E.,~ 111 rJancc with :had~ . fro'!l the •rcitlect <knqaunauon,. sed thll ih--ywo, ln 'tic~ ()f th e l.hrtctlO!l<i 0 thol Agam:u £0VeTlllUg in o e nu.tter of llPPolnnn~ ' ~S(l), choi.ce of the trOste the pcratiQq ot nt-in-llne of or an cha Is no Jon~ limited: by w\"\n\nSU~1on I.Q tem.ol~ w.bero .the Utla.il'\n\nSESHAMMAL v. TAMIL NADU (Palekar, /.) Si7\n\nA to Qppoint the Archaka on the bertditaiy principle. To that extent the trustee is released from the obligation imposed on him by s. 28 to ad tninis1er the affairs in accordance w'ith that Part of the u8age of a templo\n\nwhich enjoined hereditary appointments . . But the .legislatioa in this fact does not interfere with any religious practice. [832 H~833 q ·\n\n( 4) The other changes effected .i, n the other provisions of the Act B are merely consequential, and therefore, the Amendment Act u t whole\n\nmust be regarded as valid. [833 FJ\n\n(5) The rule-making poWer is c; onfeiled by s. 116 on .the. Govern .. ment with a view to carry out t.lM! purposes of the Act which are ~· tially secv.tar.\n\nThe Act nowhere givea the indication that one of its purposes is to eft'ect a change in th, e rituals and ceremonies follOwed iD the temple&. Section lOS and 107, on the contrary, empha&ize that there C ahall not be any contravention of the rights conferred o~ any religious de. nominations of any section thereof,' by Art. 26 of the Olnstitution. Rule\n\n12 5till holds the 1'leld ang there is no reason to think that . the State Government would f~ rules tO revolu>lonise temple WOI$hip by intro-<\n\nducing methods of worship not cumnt in the several temPfe&. If any such rule is framed by GOvel'lUDe'nt . Which ptrports to interfd'e with the\n\nl'ituals and ceremonies of the temples, it will .be liable to be challenged by those who are interested. in the temple worship. [834 CG) D\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions Nos. 13, 14,. 70, 83, 43.7, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442. 443 and 444 of 19.71.\n\nUndor Article 32 ofthe Constitution of India for. the enforce. mont of the Fundamental Rights,\n\nR. Gopaltlkrlshnan, for the petitioners (in W.Ps. Nos. 13 and 14 of 1971). ' .\n\n K.. Parasaran and K. Jayara~, lor the petitionrs (in W :P. No. 70 of 1971). .\n\nM. Natesan flJld K. Jayaram, for the petitioners in. (W .P. No. r 83 of 1971).. · K. Parasa#zn an4 M. S. Narasimha11, for the petitioners (in\n\nW.P. ; o~ 437 of 19712_.\n\n• . V; G... Ramchlmdrtn aod M.S. Narasimhlln, for the.petitiollel( (in W.P. Nos. 438 ar444ol.1971). ·\n\nG · M. Nt/Jesan and M. S; Nimhan, for th~ Petitioners (in W.Ps.\n\nNos. 439 and 443 of 1971,. .\n\nS. Annadurai Ayyangar d M. S. Narasimhan, for the petitioners (in W.P. No. 441 Of 1~1) . .\n\n : N. A.. Palkhiwa/4,. A. I. Rana and M. S. Naraaimhalt, for tbe H peti~ (in W.P. No, 442 of 1971). •. . . . . . . . . i . ' M. S. Narl18imlfitn;. 'tor the. petitine~ .(in \"f/.P. No: 440 Of\n\n1~:7,1). . . . . ' ·. . ..\n\n818 SUPllEMB COURT RBPOUS\n\n\ns. Govind Swaminndhan, AdVocate-General fat the State of It Tamil Nadu, S. Moliiin, N. S. Sivan and A. Y. Rartgam, fot the respottdertt (in all the petitions) .\n\nThe Judgment' of the Court was delivered by\n\nPalelwf j. In these 12 petitions under Article 32 of tile Constitution filed by the hereditary Archakas and Mathadhipatis B of some ancient Hindu Publi_c temples .in Tamil Nadu the validity of the Tamil N adu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments\n\n(Anumdment) Act, 1970 (heteht.after referred to as the Admend ment Act, 1970) is called in question, prlndpally, on the ground that it vif?1ates tliit freedom of religion seured to them under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The validity of the C Amendtnent Act had been also impugned ofi the ground tat if ittterfered with certain m.her ftirtental rifhts of the petitiobets but that case was not pressed at the time o the hearing.\n\nTlie tempies with wich e are oncemod are Saivite and Vaishnavite temples in Tamil Nadu. Writ Petitions 70, 83, 431, I) 438, 439, 440j 441, 442, 443 artd 444/71 a~ filed by the Archakas and Wtit Ptdiion!l 13 ind 14/1971 ate :fi1ed by tfte Mathadhipatis to whose Math some temples are attached. As, comrttful questiorts were involv~ in all thse pe, tltiObi, atts were addressed principally in Writ rre~ 13;19'71 and 442/ 1971, and we are assured by counsel for both sides that they covet the points irtvolVed in all the other petitions. •\n\n. Tbe State Legislature of Tamil Niuiu enacted The Tamil Nadu du Religious and Charitable ndowments Act, 19S9 'MiDI\n\n(Tamil Nadu Act XXII of 1959) hereinafter referred to as the Prlft.clpill At'. It e~ intb force on n.cotnt 2, 1959. It .was an Act to amend and consolidate the law relatmg to tb6 p\n\nadministratio~ and governance of Hindu :Religious and Charitable ittstittitions aii:d ildowments in the Sfate of Tamil Nadu. It\n\naPJ>lied to all Hindu religious public institutions and endowments in tile Stata: mTJunil Nadu Mld' re)'tale4 IIIVUal A\"5 which :had previausly governed the adrnfuisttatfon Oi ltind.u Publi~ R•Ilgious\n\n11\\Stiutions. It is sucient to say here that the provisiODi oi. the Prlntipal Act appl1M to the temples in the preiltmt petltiOllSI and o the petitioners have no complaint against any of its provisions.\n\nSection 55 ot that Act proVided for appoiont of. oftiGe~ l.lolders and servants in such temples and section 56 provided for\n\nthcs pU.ni111uhetlt of dffi~Jjglders tnd 'Snt~. tion 55, broadly speaking, gave the t'rttlttee of the temple tht powet to 0 appoint the office--holders or servants of the temple and a1sQ pro-- Vided that wher~ the offic~ 6r sl'Vict ts h6redifai'y' the pe~ iaHt in the line of succession shall be entitled to succeed. Iri . only\n\nSESHAMMAL v. TAMIL NADU (Pa/ekar, J.) 119\n\nA exceptiOnal cases the: trustee was entitled to depart from the principles of next-irtthe-line of succession, but even so, the trustee was under an obligation to appoint a fit person to perform the functions of the office or perform the service after having due regard to the claims of the members of the family. a Power to make rules was given to Government by sectioa 116 ( 2) ( xxiii) and it was open to the Government to make rules providing for the qualifications to be possessed by the Officers and servants for appointment to non-hereditary offit~ in religious institutions, the qualifications to be possessed by hereditary, servants for succession to office and the conditions of service of all such officers and servants. Under this rule making power the C State Govetnment made the Madras Hindu Religioll8 Institutions\n\n(Officers and Servants) Service Rules, 1964. Under these rules an Archak or Pu jari of the deity came under the definition of 'Ulthurai, servant'. 'Ultburai servant' is defi:Md as a servant whose duties relate mainly to the performance of rendering assistance in the perfonnance of pujas, rituals and other services to D the deity, the recitation of mantras, vedas, prabandas, thevarams and similar invocations and the performance of duties connected with such performance of recitation. Rule 12 ptOVided that every 'ulthurai servant', whether hereditary or non-hctdditary\n\nwhose duty it is to perform pujas and recite JIWltnw, vedas, prabandllrtlS, thevarruns and other inva<:ations shall, before stu:ceed- • ing, or ap}X)intment to an offi.c:e, obtain a certificate of fitness for performing his office, from the head of an instltutkm imparting\n\ninstruc:tiotls in Aga.m~ and ritualistic matten re®gniSed by the C'\"1lmissionetj by gentral or 11pecial order or from the bead of a math recognised by the Commissioner, by general or special order j ot' such other ptr'SOn a& may be designate<~ by the Commisr sionet, from ilirle to time, for the purpose. By this tult the proper worship in the temple was secured whether the Arehaka or\n\nPjari was a hereditary Archaka or Pujari or not. Section 107 of the Act emphasized that n<illting conUtined itt the Act Shan, save as otherwise pr<Mded in section I 06 and in clause ( 2) of Article 25 of the Constitution, be deemed to oonfet any power or\n\nimpose any duty in contravention of the ngbts 001Ifetred on any G rellgiou~ denomination Or any section thereof by Article 26 C1f tbe Constitution. Section 106 deals with , the removal of discri1nblation in the matter of distribution of prasadam or theerfhatn to the Hindu worshippers. That was a reform in the right direction aftd there is no challenge to it. The AcJ as a whole, it is conetded , did .not interfere with the religious usages and practices of th~ • .temples,\n\nThe Principal Act of 1959 was amended in rtain respects by the Amendment Act of 1970 which came into forte 011 January\n\nsuPREME coURT REPORTS 820\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.It\n\nts were made to sections 55, 56 and 116 ()f A .g 1971.\n\nAmendme~ some consequential provisions were made the ?rincipal Act ndments. The Amendment Act. was enacted. hi VIeW of those am ocial reform on the recommendation of the as a stp tow; rtnouchability, Economic and Education:ai -Deve- Coronllttee 0 Scheduled Castes. The Statement of ObJects and loproent ofht_h~ are reiterated in tbe counteraffidavit filed on be B Reasons w tc Nad • follows half of the State of Tarotl u IS as .\n\n\"In the year 1969 the . Committee on Untouchabi lit Economic and Educational Development of .the s!heduled Castes has uggested_ in its re_Port that the hereditary priesthood m the Hindu Society should be abolished, that the sytem can be replced by e.cclesiastical organisation of men possessmg the requtsite educational qualifications who may be trained in recognised institutions in priesthood and that the line should be open to all candidates irrespective of caste, creed or race'. In Tamil Nadu Archakas, Gurukk.als and Poojaries are all Ulthurai servants in Hindu tem~ ples. The duties of Ulthurai servants relate mainly _to the performance of poojas, rituals and other services to the cteity, the recitation of mantras, vedas, prabandas, thev~ and similar_invocationsand the performance of dutlc!> connected With such performance and recita\n\ntio~.. Sections 55 and 56 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Relig1?W and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (Tamil Nadu Act 22 of 1959) provide for appointment of office holders and servants in the religious institutions\n\n~Y the trustees by applying the rule of heredltacy succes on also. As a step towards social reform Hindu temples\n\nf ve already been thrown open to aU Hindus iqespective o caste ••.•• • \" ·\n\nIn the light of the r\n\nA_ • . ot the ~--· ecommentions of the Committee and in view Ulw~1S1on of this Court G ,\n\nSt<Ue of Alldhra Prad h & tn awla Dizsaratlza Rama. R(JQ v. wards social reformes Ors.(~) and also as a further step -ditary principle of a Government coosi<kred that the here temple\\ should be ~lit of all office holders in the Hindu G amend tions 55 56 and accordingly it p~ to gious and Charitabl and•ll6 of the Tamil Nadu tfindu ReU' XXII of 19S9). 0 Endowments Act, 19.59 (Tamil Nadu Act\n\nIt is tho m 1 . introdu .\n\nP :unt of th~ petiti l.1ld P ce ~1a1 reform. ln. tho onet'9 that by purpc; nWtg . to t{ - uJans, tho State has mat.ter of apPointment of ArcJial!S U} U9dtf u.c.a.. Y.Jt. r_::illy lnte.rfertd with the relfgioU'\n\nSESHAMMAL V. TAMIL NADU (Palekar, /.) 821\n\nA practices of Saivite and Vaishnavite temples; and instead of intro~\n\nducing social reform, taken measures which would inevitably lead to defilement and desecration of the temples.\n\nTo appreciate the effect of the Amendment Act, it would be more convenient to set out the original sections 55, 56 and 116 B of the Principal Act and the same sections as they stand after the\n\namendment. ·\n\nUnamended Section Amended Section\n\nSec. 55 Stc. SS\n\nAppointment of office-holders and servants Appointment of office-holders and in relig[ous institutions. servants in religious institutions.\n\n(1) Vacancies, whether permanent or tem- (1) porary, among the office-holders or servants of a religious institution shall be filled up by the trustee in cases where the office or service is not here, ditary.\n\n(2) In cases where the office or service (2)\n\nis hereditary, tho person next in the line of succession shall be entitled to succeed.\n\nVacancies, whether permanent or temporary among the office holders or servants of a religious institution shall be filled up by the trustee in all cases.\n\nExP_lanation : The expression 'Office-holdm or servants shall include archak:as and poojaris.'\n\nNo person aball be entitled to appOintment to any vacancy referred to in n1b-scction (l) merely on the around that he 11 next in the line of succeasion to the laat\n\nholder Of Offic:e.\n\n(3) Where, however, there is a dispute (3) Omitted. respecting the right of succession, or where such vacancy cannot be filled up immediately or where the person entitled to succeed is a minor without a guardian fit and willing to act as such or there is a dispute respecting the person who is entitled to act as guardian, orwhere the hereditary office. holder or servant is on account of incapacity illness or otherwise unable to perform the .functions of the office or perform the service, or is suspended from his office under aubscction (1) of section .56,\n\nthe trustee may appoint a fit person to perform the functions of the office or perform the service, until the dis ability of the office-holder 1lr servant ceases or another person succeeds to the office or service, as the case may be.\n\n822 SUPREME COUJt.T REPORTS [1972] 3 S.C.lt\n\nEirpfanatian : Ill tnaklna any appoint ment under this subsection, the ustee hall b!lvc due regard to the clauJ!.S of\n\nmembers of the family, If any, entttled to the succession.\n\n(4} Any erson aggrieved by an order of the trustee under suf>.section (3) may, within one month from the date of the receipt of the order by him, appeal against the order to the Deputy Com missioner.\n\nsc. S6\n\n(4) Any person _aggrieved by an order r tee ull£1cr s\"tion {l) may Within ne montb from tbe date of receipt of the order by him appeal against the order of the Deputy Commissioner.\n\nsc. S6\n\nPunishment of office-holders and servants Punishment of office-holders and serio rcliglo~ institutions. vants in religious institutions-\n\n(1) All Office..holders and servants at tached to a religious imtitutioo or io reCeiPt of anY emolument or prequisite therefrom shaU, 'Whtther tiu of!1ce or Sl\"'lct 1.1 heruli tory or not, be controlled by the trustee; and tbe trustee may, after followinc the prescribed procedure, if any, fine, suspend, n:move or dismis.t ny of them for the breach of trU3t, mc:apacity, disobedience of orders negt~ or duty, misconduct or oth~ auffiaeot awe.\n\n(1) All olfic.e holders and servants\n\nattached to a n:ligious institu. tioo or in receiPt of any emolu. rnent or perquisite there!rom aball be controlled by the Trustee and the trustee may after followinc tbe prescribed proce<lun:, it: any, fine, swpend, remove or diSilliss\n\nany of them for breach of rrust\n\nincapacity, disobcdicnc:e of ord: ers, neglect of duty, misconduct or other sufficient cause.\n\n(2) Any oiJiclr-hold.tr or ervant punish- {2) ed b~ lei under sub-eection(l) m, ay, Wllh'!l Oot trwnth from tho date\n\nAny office liotdcr or servant punished by a trustee under auf>. section (l) may within one month from the date of receipt ot order by him appeal a&aillst th' order to tho Deputy Commissioner.\n\n0 the teccJpt of tho order by him ap..\n\nCo peaJ •f1i!11t the order to tho Deputy mtnlSS!ooer.\n\n(3) A fl:UY olfic:c-holdcr or servant\n\n::ry, WI~ one mnth from tho date I bet~ Reletpt by of the order of IC>Ct. uty Cornnusstoner under aub- Co •oo_ (2), J)refor an ap~J to the\n\nllllnas•oncr •aalnst aucb order.\n\n(3) Omitted.\n\ns, e. 116 Cull()\n\nsc. 116 (xxl/i) b\"'ment may, by notifica.\n\n(I)\n\nPOleS or th~~-to carry out the Pur\n\n(2) Without pr j d'-- or the t e u. \"\"\" to tho aenerality on:aotoa power h may provldo for- • sue rules\n\n(Jr..r/U)\n\nTbo,..~ i6catfon1 to be 0\"\"\"\"\" and ee pod by tht to DDI\\-ben:<!Jt rvant, for appointment atltutlons, tho ll.l~= In rcllf !oua ln. by heredit ons to bt 1!01 .. ton to offlco an'cfY Jervants for auece... v~ of all auch 0~C:OndJtloJU of acr.:\n\nand lletvants.\n\n(u/11)\n\nThe quall!lcalon.s to be , a.sessed by the O!Hoers and servart11 for ap- Pointment to oflk:el 111 rella!ou.s ln.lltutlon •nd tho condltlom of M:tvloo o( afJ ruch offic:en and aer• \\lan~. ·\n\nSESHAMMAL V. TAMIL NADU (Palekar, /.) 823\n\nA It is clear from a perusal of the above provlsiorts that the Amendmant Act does away with the hereditary right of succession to the Office of Archaka even if the Archaka was qualified under Rule 12 of the Madras Hindu Religious Institutions (Officers and Servants) Service Rules, 1964. It is claimed on behalf of the petitioners that as a result of the Arne.ndment Act., their B fundamental rights under Article 25 ( 1) and Article '26 (b) are violated since the effect of the amendment is as follows :\n\n(a) The freedom of hereditary succession to the office of Archaka is abolished although succession to it is an essential and integral part of the faith of the Saivite and Vaishnavite worshippers.\n\n(b) It is left to the Government in power to prescribe or not to prescribe such qualifications us they may choose to adopt for ap})licants to this religious office while the Act itself gives no indication whatever of the principles on which the qualifications should be based. The statement of Object& and Reasons which is adopted in the\n\ncounter•affidavit on behalf of the State makes it clear that not only the scope but the object of the Amendment Act is to oveNide the e.xdu sive right of the denomination to manage their own affairs in the matter of religio.n by appoint~ ing Archakas belonging to a specific denoniination for the purpose of worship.\n\n(c) The Amendment Act gives the right of appointment for the first tiine to the trustee who is under the control of the Government under the provisions of the Prittcipal Act and thH is the very negation of freedom of religion and the principle of non-interfetance by the State as regards the practice of religion and the right of a denomination to manage its own affairs in the matter\n\nof religion. ·\n\nBefore we turn to these questions, it will be necessary to refer to certain concepts of Hindu religious faith and practices to understand and appreciate the position in law. The temples with which we ate concerned are public religious institutions estabilshed in olden times.\n\nSome of them are Saivite temples and the others are. Vaishnavitt temples, which means, that in these tem- ·.\n\nples God Shiva and Vishnu in their several. manifestations are wotshipped. The image 0f Shiva is worshipped by his worshlppers who are called Saivites and the image of Vishnu is worshipped by his worshippers who are known as Vaishnavites. The institu\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1972] 3 i.C.f\n\ntion of temple worship has an ancient history and, according to A Dr. Kane, temples of deities had existed even in the 4th or 5th ce.ntury B.C. (See: History of Dharmasastra Vol. II Part-ll page 710.) With the construction of temples the institution of Archakas also came into existence, the Archakas being professional men who made their livelihood by attending on the images. Just when the cult of worship of Siva and Vishnu started and developed into B two distinct cults is very difficult to say, but there can be no doubt that in the times of the Mahabharata these cults were separately developed and there was keen rivalary between them to such an extent that the Mahabharata and some of the Puranas endeavoured to inculcate a spirit of synthesis by impressing that there was no difference between the two deities. (See page 725 c supra.) With the establishment of temples and the institulion of Archakas, treatises on rituals were compiled and they are known as 'Agamas'. The authority of these Agamas is recognised in several decided cases and by this Court in Sri V enkataramana Devaru v. The State of Mysore(l). Agamas are described in the last case as treatises of .ceremonial law dealing with such matters as the construction of temples, installation. of idols therein and D conduct of the worship of the deity.\n\nThere are 28 Agamas relating to the Saiva temples, the important of them being the Kamikagama, the Karanagama and the Suprabedagama.\n\nThe Vaishnavas also had their own Agamas. Their principal Agamas were the Vikhanasa .and the Pancharatra. The Agamas coptain elaborate rules as to how the temple is to be constructed, where the E principal deity is to be consecrated, and where the other Devatas are to be installed and where the several classes of worshippers are to stand and worship. Where the temple was constructed as per directions of the Agamas the idol had to be consecrated in accordance with an elaborate and complicated ritual accompanied by chanting of mantras and devotional songs appropriate to the 11' deity.\n\nOn the consecration of the image in the temple the Hindu worshippers believe that the Divine Spirit has descended into the image and from then on the image of deity is fit to be worshipped.\n\nRules with. regard to daily and periodical worship have been laid down. for securing the continuance of the Divine Spirit. The rituals have a two-fold object. One is to attract the lay worshipper to participate in the worship carried on by the priest or G Archaka. It is believed that when a congregation of worshippers partiCipates in the worship a particular attitude of aspiration and devotion is developed and confers great spiritual benefit. The second object is to preserve the image from pollution, defilement or desecration. It is part of the religious belief of a Hindu worshipper that when the image is polluted or defiled the Divine Spirit H in the image diminishes or even vanishes. That is a situation\n\n(1) [19S8] S.C.R. 89S.\n\nSESHAMMAL V. TAMIL NADU (Palekar, /.} 825\n\nwhich every devotee or worshipper looks upon with horror.\n\nPollution or defilement may take place in variety of ways. According to the Agamas, an image becomes defiled if there is any departure or violation of any of the rules relating to worship.\n\nIn fact, purificatory ceremonies have to be performed for restoring the sanctity of the shrine [1958 S.C.R. 895 (910)]. Worshippers lay great store by the rituals and whatever other people, not of the faith, may think about these rituals and ceremonies, they are a part of the Hindu Religious faith and cannot be dismissed as either irrational or superstitious.\n\nAn illustration of the importance attached to minor details of ritual is found in the case of His Holiness Peria Kovil Kelvi Appan Thiruvenkata Ramanuja Pedda Jiyyangarlu Varlu v. Prathivathi Bhayankaram Venkatacharlu and others(l) which went up to the Privy Council. The contest was between two denominations of Vaishnava worshippers of\n\nSouth India, the Vadagalais and Tengalais.\n\nThe temple was a Vaishnava temple and the controversy between them involved the question as to how the invocation was' to begin at the time of worship and which should be the concluding benedictary verses.\n\nThis gives the measure of the importance attached by the worshippers to certain modes of worship.\n\nThe idea most prominent in the mind of the worshipper is that a departure from the traditional rules would result in the pollution or defilement of the image which must be avoided at all costs, That is also the rationale for preserving the sanctity of the Garbhangriha or the sanctum saneforum.\n\nIn all these temples in which the images are consecrated, the Agamas insist that only the qualified Archaka or Pujari step inside the sanctum sanctorum and that too after observing the daily disciplines which are imposed upon him by the Agamas.\n\nAs an Archaka he has to touch the image in the course of the worship and it is his sole right and duty to touch it. The touch of anybody else would defile it.\n\nThus under the ceremonial law pertain ing to temples even the question as to who is to enter the Garbhagriha or the sanctum sanctorum and who is not entitled to enter it and who can worship and from which place in the temple are all matters of religion as shown in the above decision of this Court.\n\nThe Agamas have also rules with regard to the Archakas.\n\nIn Saivite temples only a devotee of Siva, and there too, one belonging to a particular denomination or group or sub-group is entitled to be. the Archaka.. If he is a Saivite, he cannot possibly be an Archaka in a Vaishnavite Agama temple to whatever c.aste he may belong and however learned he may be.\n\nSimilarly, a Vaishnavite Archaka has no place as an Archaka in a Saivite temple.\n\nIndeed there is no bar to a Saivite worshipping in a Vaishnavite temple as a lay worshipper or vice versa. What the Agamas pro-\n\n(1) 73 Indian Appeals 156.\n\nSUPREME COURT I.EPORTS\n\n\nhibit is his appointment as an Archaka in a temple of a different\n\ndenomination.\n\nDr. Kane has quoted the Brahmapurana on the topic of Punah-pratistha ·(Re-consecration of images in temples) at page 904 of his History of Dhannasastra referred to above. The Brahmapurana says that \"when an image is broken into two or is reduced to particles, is burnt, is n; moved from its pedestal, is insulted, has ceased to be worshipped, is touched by beasts like donkeys or falls on impure ground or is worshipped with mantras of other detities or is rendered impure by the touch of outcastes and the like-in these ten contingencies, God ceases to indwell therein.\" The Agamas appear to be more severe in this respect.\n\nShri R. Parthasarthy Bhattacharya, whose authority on Agama literature is unquestioned, has filed his affidavit in Writ Petition No. 442 of 1971 and stated in his affidavit, with special reference to the V aikhanasa Sutra to which he belongs, that according to the texts of the Vaikhansa Shastra ( Agama), persens who are the followers of the four Rishi traditions of Bhrigu, Atri, Marichi and Kasyapa and born of V aikhanasa parents are alone competent to do puja in Vaikhanasa temples of Vishnavites.\n\nThey only can touch the idols and perfonn the ceremonies and rituals.\n\nNone others, however, high placed in society as pontiffs or Acharyas, or even other Brahmins could touch the idol, do puja or even enter the Garbha Griha.\n\nNot even a person belonging tQ another Agama is competent to do puja in Vaikhanasa temples.\n\nThat is the general rule with regard to all these sectarian denominational temples. It is, therefore, manifest that the Archaka of such a temple besides being proficient in the rituals appropriate to the worship of the particular deity, must also belong, according to the Agamas, to a particular denomination.\n\nAn Archaka of a different denomination is supposed to defile the image by his touch aDd since it is of the essence of the religious faith of all worshippers that there should be no pollution or defilement of the image under any circumstances, the Archaka undoubtedly occupies an important place in the matter of temple worship.\n\nAny State action which pennits the defilement or poilution of the image by the touch of an Archaka authorised by the Agamas would violently interfere with the religious faith and practices of the Hindu worshipper jn a vital respect, and would, therefore, be prima facie invalid under Article 25(1) of the Constitution.\n\nThis Court in Sardar Syadna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of Bombay( 1) has summarised the pOSition in law as follows (pages 531 and 532).\n\n''The content of Arts. Z5 and 26 of the Constitution\n\ncame up for consideration before this Court in the H Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments Madras\n\n(I) [1962) 2 Suppl. S.C.R. 496.\n\nSESHAMMAL V, TAMIL NADU (Palekar~ J.) 827\n\nv. Sri Lakshmindr(l Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirnr Matt(!); Mahant Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. The State of Orissa( 2 ); Sri Venkatamona Devaru v. The State of\n\nMyore( 3); Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali(4 ) and several other cases and the main principles underlying these provisions have by these decisions been placed beyond controversy.\n\nThe first is that the protection of these articles is not limited to matters of doctrine or belief they extend also to acts done in pursuance of religion and therefore contain a guarantee for rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of wor~\n\nship which are integral parts of religion.\n\nThe second is that whaf constitutes an essential part of a religious or religious practice has to be decided by the courts with ·\n\nreference to the doctrine of a particular religion and include practices which are regarded by the community as a part of its religion.\"\n\nBearing these principles in mind, we have to approach the controversy in the present case.\n\nSection 55 of the Principal Act as it originally stood and Rule 12 of the Madras Hindu Religious Institutions (Officers and Servants) Service Rules, 1964 ensured, so far as temples with hereditary Archakas were concerned, that there would be no defile~ ment of the image. By providing in sub-section (2) of section 55 that \"in cases, where the office or service is hereditary, the per~ son next in the line of succession shall be entitled to succeed\", it\n\nensured the personal quaJification of the _Archaka that he should belong to a particular sect or denomination as laid down in the Agamas. ay Rule 12 it also ensured that the Archaka would be proficient in the mantras, vedas, prabandams, thevarams etc. and thus be fit for the prefonnance of the puja, in other words, that he would be a person sufficiently qu3.lified for perfomring the rituals and ceremonies. As already shown an image becomes defiled if there is any departure or violation of any of the rules\n\nrelating to worship, and this risk is avoided by insisting that the Archaka should be an expert in the rituals and the ceremonies.\n\nBy the Amendment Act the principle of nextin-the-line of succeasion is abolished.\n\nIndeed it was the claim made in the statement of Objects and Reasons that the hereditary principle of appointment of office-holders in the temples should be abolished and that\n\nthe office of an Archaka should be thrown open to all candidates trained in recognised institutions in priesthood irrespective of caste, creed or race. The trustee, so far as the amended section\n\n55. went, was authorized to appoint any l?odY as an Archaka in\n\n(1) {l9S4] S.C.R. 1005.\n\n(2) [1954) S.C.R. 1046.\n\n(3) [1958] S.C.R. 895.\n\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\nan¥ temple 'Yhether Saivite or Vaish.nav.ite .as long as he possessed a fitness certlflcate from one of the Institutions referred to in rule\n\n12. Rule 12 w~ a rule made by the Government under the Principal Act.\n\nThat rule is always capable of being varied or cha!!ged. It was also open to the Government to make no rule\n\nat all or to prescribe a fitness certificate issued by ap. institution which did not teach the Agamas or traditional rituals.\n\nThe result would, therefore, be that any person, whether he is a Saivite or Vaishnavite or not, or whether he is proficient in the rituals appropriate to the temple or not, would be .eligible for appointment as\n\nan Archaka and the trustee's discretion in appointing the Archaka without reference to personal and other qualifications of the Archaka would be unbridled.\n\nThe trustee is to function under the control of the State, because under section 87 of the Principal Act the trustee was bound to obey all lawful orders issued under the provic; ions of the Act by the Government, e Commissioner, the Deputy Commjssioneror the Assistant Commissioner. It was submitted that the innocent looking amendment brought the State right int9 the sanctum sanctorum through the agency of the trustee and the Archaka.\n\nIt has been recognised for a long time that where the ritual in\n\na temple cannot be performed except by a person belonging to a denomination, the purpose of worship will be, defeated : See Mohan Lalji v. Gordhan Lalji Maharaj(l).\n\nIn that case the claimants to the temple and its worship we, re . Brahmins and the E daughter's sons of the founder and his nearest heirs under the Hindu law.\n\nBut their claim was rejected on the; ground that the temple was dedicated to the sect following the principles of Vallabh Acharya in whose temples only the Gossains of that sect could perfonn the rituals and ceremonies and, therefore, the claimant$ had no right either to the temple or to perform the worship.\n\nIn view of the Amendment Act, end its avowed object there F was nothing, in the petitioners' submission, to prevent theGovemment from prescribing a standardized ritual in all temples ignoring the Agamic requirements, and. Archakas being forced on temples from donommations unauthorised by the Agamas. Since such a departure, as already shown, would inevitably lead to the defile~ ment of the ilnage, the powers thus taken by the Govemment G under the Amendment Act. would lcitd to interference with religious freedom guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.\n\nThe force of the above submissions made on behalf of the petitioners was not lost on the learned Advocto General of Tamil Nadu who appeared on behalf of the State. He, however, side tracked the issue by submitting that if we were to . consider in\n\n(1) 35 Allahabad (P.C.) 283 at page 289.\n\nE f ,\n\nSESHAMMAL v. TAMIL NADU (Palekar~ J.) 829\n\niolation. only the changes introduced in section 55 by the Amend~ ment Act the situation as described on behalf of tht; petitioners could conceivably arise. 'He did not also admit that he was bound by eith!r the,. statement of Objects and Reasons or the reite~ ration of the same:in the counter ... affidavit filed on behalf of the\n\nState.\n\nHis submission was that we have to take the Principal Act as it now stands after the .amendment and see what is the true effect of the same.\n\nHe contended that the power given to the\n\ntrust~ under the amended section 55 was not an unqualified power \"because, jn his submission, that power had to be read in the context of secti'on 28 whiCh controlled it.\n\nSection 2 8 ( 1 ) provides as follows :\n\n\"Subject to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Temple Entry Authorization Act1 1947, the trustee of eVfEY\n\nreligious institution is bound to administer its affairs and to apply its funds and properties in accordance with the terms of the trust, the usage of the institution and all lawful directions which a competent authority may issue in respect thereof and as carefully as a man of ordinary prudence. would deal with such aft'airs, funds and properties if they were his own.\"\n\nThe learned Advocate General argued that the trustee was boum.\n\nunder this provision to administer the affairs of the temple in accordance with the terms of the trust and the usage of the institution. If the usage of the institution is that the Archak.a or Pujari of the temple must be of a particular denomination then the usage would be binding upon him and. he would be bound to make the appointment under section 55 in accordance with the usage of appointing one from the particular denomination.\n\nThere was nothing in section 55, in his submission, which released him from his liability to make the appointment in accordance with the said usage. It was true that the principle of the next-in-line of succession was not binding on bim when making the appointment of a new Archa}{a, but in his submission, that principle. is no part of the usage, the real usage being to appoint one from the denomination. Moreover the amended section, according to him, does not require the trustee to. exclude in every case the hereditary principle if. a qualified successor is available and there was . no\n\nreason why the trustee should not make the appointment of the nel:t heir, if found competent.\n\nHe, however, agreed, that there was no such legal obligation on the trusteew.tder that .. section.\n\nHe further contended that if the next in-linef-succession principle is regarded as a usage of any particular temple it would be merely a secular usage on which legislation was competent under Article 2S(2)(a) of the Constitution.\n\nGoing further, he contended that if the. hereditary principle was regarded as a religious 7-L1061Sup Cl/72\n\n\n[1972) 3 S.C.R.\n\np1tice that would be also amenable to legislation under Article A\n\n~5{2) (b) which. penn!ts egislation for the purpose of social welfare and reform.\n\nHe 1nv1ted attention to the report of the Hindu Religious Endowments Commission ( 1960-1962) headed by Dr.\n\nC. P. Ramaswami Aiyar and submitted that there was a crying need for reform in this direction since the hereditary principle of appoin!ment of Arcakas had led to grave malpractices practically 8 destroymg the sanctity of worship in various religious institutions.\n\nWe have found no. difficulty in agreeing with the learned Advocate General that section 28 ( 1 ) of the Principal Act which directs the trustee to administer the affairs of the temple in accordance with terms of the trust or the usage of the institution, would control the appointment of the Archaka to be made by him under the amended section 55 of the Act.\n\nIn a Saivite or a Vaishnavite temple the appointment of the Archaka. will have to be made from a specified denomination, sect or group in accordance. with the directions of the Agamas governing those temples.\n\nFailure to do so would not only be contrary to section 28 (1) but would also interfere with a religious practice the inevitable result of wh.ich would be to defile the image.\n\nThe question, however, remains whether the trustee, while making appointment from the specified cJenomination, sect or group in accordance with the Agamas, will hi bound to follow the hereditcuy principle as a usage peculiar to the temple.\n\nThe learned Advocate-General contends that there is no such invariaple usage.\n\nIt may be that, as a matter of. convenience, an Archa.ka's son being readily available to perform the wru:ship may have been selected for appointment as an Archaka from times immemorial.\n\nBut that, in his submission, was not a.\n\nusag~, The principle of next-in-line of succession has faile<; l when\n\nthe svccessor was. a female or had refused to accept the appointment or was u, nder some disability.\n\nIn all such cases the Archaka was appointe~ from he .Particulr. denomination, sect or roup and tbe. worship was earned on With the lp. of such a. subsbute. lt, however, appears .to us that it is now too .late in the day to contend .that the hereditary principle in appointment was not a usag~.\n\nF'ot whatever reasons, whether of convenience or othetwise, $is hereditary principle might have beeu adopted, thre .cap be · n<,> doubt that the principle had been a.ccepted from antiquicy and had G aliop beei) ft; ily recognised in the unamended sec(ion 55 of the\n\nPrlncipl Act.\n\nSub-section (2) of section 55 provid.ed.tat where the :office or .service is. hereditary, the person next in the line of succession shall beentitled.to succeM and only a limited nghtwa£ given under. sul;>section. ( 3) to te trustee to apoint a suhstiutc ..\n\nEven. io such cases the explanatto, n to sub-secti_on ( 3) provted that in maln_g'th.e appoinmentof the .substitute the t1Jl.e bouiQ have d1,1e regard to the.clatms of th.e rne'!'bers o( the fan:n~, tf ny, entitled to the successton.\n\nTherefore, it cannot be den~ as a\n\ns£Sl1AMMAL V. TAMIL NADU (Pafekar, /.) .\n\n1 t that there are several temples in Tamil Nad A a~ ointment of an Archaka is governed by the usa where . the\n\n:~cession. The rea~ question, therefore, is whethr ~JceedJtary\n\nhould be regarded e1ther as a secular usaoe or a rei' . usage s l 't . b . . e JgiOus usage If it is a secu ar usage, 1 ts o v10us. legJslation would be . ·\n\nible uner. Arti.cl~ 25 ( 1) (a) and n it is a religious usage l'~,:;~\n\n8 be penmsstble If It falls squarely under sub-section 25(1)(b).\n\nMr:. PJlkhivala on behalf of the petitioners insisted that the\n\n:; ppointmnt of a. pe:son. to. a religiou~ ffice in accordance with the hereditary pnnctple IS Itself a rehgwus usage and amounted to a vital religiou:; practice and hence falls within Articles 25 and\n\n26. In his submission. priests, who are to petfonn religious cere- C monies may be chosen by a temple on such basis as the temple\n\nchooses to .1dopt. It may be election. selection, competition. nomination or hereditary succ:essioo.\n\nHe, therefore, contended that any lav. which interferes with the aforesaid basis of appointment would violate religious freedom guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.\n\nIn b.\\s submission the right to select o u priest h;, s an immediate bearing on religious practice and the\n\nlight of a denomination to manage its own affairs in r:PUtters . of religion. The priest is more important than the ritual and nothing could more vital than chasing the priest. .Under the rtext of\n\nocial refonn_ he contt\":nded, the Stlte cannot refonn a rehgt, o~ out ofe'!\"tence and if any denomination has accepte~ e heredl~ E J'tllctple for c.hosing its priest that would be a rehgtous practtcd Vttal .w the religious faith and cannot be caned on the gt'()~d that It leads to social refonn. Mere substltuo~ of on~ f.Ile 00 of ppointment of the priest by another was. m hts submiSSIOn, \\Octal refonn.\n\n•· · h ppointed has to r . 14 1s true that a priest or ao. Archaka w en .a . hether the perfo.nn sorne rcugious (unctions but the questton .15 w or a reliappomtment of a prie!t is by itself a secu.lar funuof the spiri\n\n~Jous Practice:.\n\nMr. Palkhival;1 gave the lluratio~ a Hindu sect 1.uat h~:; W o[ a math bclonoing to a denommatton ° 'clca. that lrke th Sh ~- norrvr at the 1 d d e :tnkaracharaya nnd expressed h d recommen .e c . uch. a spiritual head could be ch.osen by a nlet the traditions i the State thouh in conflict wlth the usage ~. a 5uccsot .of 0 the particular tnstitution.\n\nWhere, for ~:taJ1?P by giving 111111\n\n~ Mathadhipati is chosen by the MathadJ; ipan osen by his inuneun:tra:de.eksha or where the Mathadhipadu IS x~a-ardinar)' .cor th~ S e dJclples it would be he contende • e _.~ of appotnttne~ late t . • ' ther muue d. d' thlS lt ~. 11o Mo Interfere and direct diat some 0 • 1 reform to eB t we\n\nrna~ st ollowed o'; l the $rou?d of s~::er of religiOfl rtng a ne one as an Ul.Struston Jn. the 01 we are cA' • hn' th~ atfnuct such an illustration i!i tnapt whn 'Tbe Afch:tka\n\ne appointment of an Archa\\ca of a temP e.\n\nI \\I\n\nI I 1.1 I\n\nI .·\n\n' ..\n\n\nnever been regarded as a spiritual bead of any institution.\n\nHe may be an accomplished person, well versed in the Agamas and rituals necessary to be perfonned in a temple b:ut he does not have the status of a spiritual head.\n\nThen again the assumption made that the Archak:a may be chosen in a variety of ways is not correct. The Dharam-karta or the Sheibait makes the appointment and the Archaka is a servant of the temple. It has been held in K. Seshadri Aiyangar v. Ranga Bhattar( 1) that even the position\n\nt)f the hereditary Archaka of a temple is that of a servant subject to tha disciplinary power of the trustee. The trustee can enquire into the .conduct of such a servant and dismiss him for misconduct.\n\nAs a servant he is subject to the discipline and control of the lrustee as recognised by the unamended section 56 of the Principal Act which prov_ides \"all office-holders and servants attached to a religious institution or in receipt of any emolument or perquisite therefrom shall, whether the office or service is hereditary or , not,\n\nbe controlled by the trustee, and the trustee may, after following the prescribed procedure, if any, fine, suspend, remove or dismiss any of-them for breach of trust, incapacity, disobedience of orders, neglect of duty, misconduct or other sufficient cause.\" That being the position of an Archaka, the act of his appointment by the trustee is essentially secular. He owes his appointment to a secular authority. Any lay founder of a temple may1lppoint the Archaka. The Shebaits and Managers of temples exercise essentially a secular function in choosing and appointing the Archaka.\n\nThat the son of ail Archaka or the son's son has been continued in the offi-ce from generation to generation does not make any difference -to the principle of appointment and no such hereditary Archaka can claim any right to: the office.\n\nSee : Kali Krishna Ray v. Makhatz Lal Mookerjee( 2 ); Nanabhai Narotamdas v.\n\nTriinbak Balwant Bhandare(8 ) and Maharanee lndur; eet Keoer v; Chundemun Misser(4 ). Thus the appointinent of an Archaka\n\ni., a seular act and the fact that in some temples the hereditary principle was followed in making the appointment would not make the successive appointments anything but secular. It would only mean that in making the appointmt:nt the trustee is limited in res~ pect of the sources of recruitinent. Instead of casting his. net wide for electing a proper: candidate, he appoints the next heir of. the last bolder of the office. That after his appointment the Archaa\n\nf10ffi1s worship is no ground for holding that the app9inttnent is either a religious practice or a.matter of religion.\n\nln view of sub-section (2) of section 55, as it now stands ame, nded, the choice of the trustee in the matter of appointment of\n\n(1). I.LR. 35 Madras 631.\n\n(2) I.L.R. SO Cal. 233.\n\n(3) (18'78-SO)Vol. 4 Unreported Printed Judgments of the Bombay High Court\n\n' . page 169.\n\n(4) XVl Weekly Reporter, 99.\n\nSESHAMMAL v. 'PAMIL NADU (Paltkar, J.) 8'33\n\nan Archaka is no longer limited by the operation of the rule of\n\nnext~!nline of succession in temples where the usage was to appomt the Archaka on the hereditary principle. The trustee is not bound to make the appointment on the sole ground that the candidate is the nextin-line of succession to the last hOlder of Office.\n\nTo that extent, and to that extent alone, the trustee is released from the obligation imposed .on him by section 28 of. the Principal Act to administer the affairs in accordance with that part of the usage of a temple which enjoined hereditary appointments. The legislation in this respect, as we have shown, -does not inter(ere with any religious pratice or matter of gion and, therefore, is not invalid.\n\nWe shall now take separately the several .amendments which were challenged as invalid. Section 7 of the Amendment Act\n\namended section 55 of the Principal Act and the important change wJP, ch was impugned on bdhalf of the petitioners related to the abolition of the hereditary principle in the appointment of the Archaka.\n\nWe have shown for reasons already mentioned that the change effected by the Amendment is not invalid. The other\n\nchaagac; effected in the other provisions of the Principal Act appear to us to be merely consequential. Since the. hereditary principle w~ done away with the words \"wJwther the office or service is hereditary or not\" found in section 56 of the PrinCipal Act have been oniitted by section 3 of the Amendment Act. By section 4 of the latter Act clause (xxiii) of sub--section (2) in section 116\n\nis suitably amended with a view to deleting the. reference to the\n\nqualifications of hereditary and non-hereditary offices which was the:re in clause (xxili) of the Principal Act. The change is only\n\nconsequential on the amendnient of section. 55 of the Principal Act.\n\nSec:; tion.s S and 6 of the Amendment Act are also conseqtial on the a.m.endment of sections 55 and 56. These are-all tbe sections in .the Amendment Act and in our view the Amend ment. Act as. a whole. must be regarde(i aa valid.\n\n. If was, however. subniitted .. before us that the State had tak.en r under section 116(2) clause (xxill) to prescribe qualifications to be.~ by the Archakas and,. in view of avowed ob]ect of the State Government to create a class of Archakas irres\n\npective of caste, creed or race, it would be open to the Government to prescribe qualifications for the office of an Archaka which w~ in conflict with Agam.as.\n\nUnder Rule 12 of the Madras Hindu Religious Institutions (Officers and Servants) Service Rules, 1964, proper provision has been made for qualifications of tile Archakils and the petitioners have no objection to that rule.\n\nThe rule still continuac; to be in force.\n\nBut the petitioners apprehend that it is open to the Government to substitute any other rule for rule 12 and prescribe qualifications which were in conflict with\n\n\n[1972) 3 S.C.R.\n\nAgamic injunctions. For example t present e tnhurai ser~ A vant whose duty it is to perfofll_l pujas and. rectte vedtc mantras etc. has to obtain _the !Jtness rtlficae fo: rus Office from e ~~ of institutions wh1ch 1mpart mstructlo~ 1_n Agaas and ntualisttc mattas.\n\nThe Government, however, .It IS sumJtted, may hereafter change its mind and prescribe qualifications which take no note of Agamas and Agamic rituals an~ direct that the_ Achka B candidate should produce a fitness certificate from n mstltUtiOI} which does not specialize in teaching Agamas a, nd ntuals. It is\n\nsubmiued that the Act does not provide guidelines to the Government in the matter of prescribing qualifications with regard to the fitness of an Archaka for performing the rituals and ceremonie$ in\n\nthese temples and it will be open to the Government to prescribe C a simple s_tandardized curriculum for pujas in the several temples\n\nignoring the traditional pujas and rituals followed in those temples.\n\nIn our opinion the apprehensions of the petitionen are unfounded.\n\nRult- 12 referred to above still holds the field and tllero is no good r .:ason to think: that the State Government wants to revolutioni.e temple wonhip by introducing methods of not current in the several temples. The rule making power COl\\- ll\n\nfned oo the Government by section 116 is only intended with a.\n\nvew to carry out the ptupOSes of the Act which are essenlial!y fo.eW!ar.\n\nTbe Act no whet gives the indication. that one of the purpmtt; of the Act is to effect ll change in the rituals and e~· monies f~Jo_wed in the tompie$. On the other hand, section 107 oC the Pnnctpal Act empha&izes that nothing contained in the Act E woukl deemed to confer any power or impose any duty 1ft contraventtoo <!f the ribts conferred on any rdi!,\\005 denominatiOn or any twn thereof by Article 26 of the Constitution. Simiar}y !le(:llon 105 ovide, that nothing cont2ined ln the Act sbfttl rna; ave a, otberwtSe expresoJy provided in me Act or the ndes which nder, ffect. aay honour, emolmnetrt trr perquisite to r\n\n. . ~an 111 enttUcd by custom or otherwise ift any reUgtous lruitJtUtJOn, or i~ estabti!.lbed usaae in -o.ro y <ldK'r matter. Moreover if an\n\nI . e-· • r;, whkh pufllOm t .' Y ru e lS framed by the Government tempk& the Ia 0\n\n•tetter~ ..-ith the rituals and cere'rno!rieS of the intere5tl!d WJfi lrable to be chaUented by those who are apprdlt:ns!: now temple wcmhip.\n\nIn our opinion. therefore; 1fte (i prcnnature. epressed by the petitioners are groundless if\\tl\n\nlnlhe resuiL tbe5e ...... . . • c<U.C there !>haJj 1'w'dlllons fa1l blU: tn the circtml.8tlHl~ oi the no or er a& to cos~\n\nV.P.S.", "total_entities": 114, "entities": [{"text": "RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Arts. 25 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 385, "end_char": 400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 419, "end_char": 429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 116(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1032, "end_char": 1046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3046, "end_char": 3049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4239, "end_char": 4244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4705, "end_char": 4710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6664, "end_char": 6669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7117, "end_char": 7123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7549, "end_char": 7556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8133, "end_char": 8143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8150, "end_char": 8171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "R. Gopaltlkrlshnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8223, "end_char": 8241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "mont of the Fundamental Rights,\n\nR. Gopaltlkrlshnan, for the petitioners (in W.Ps."}}, {"text": "K.. Parasaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8304, "end_char": 8317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.. Parasaran and K. Jayara~, lor the petitionrs (in W :P. No.", "canonical_name": "K.. Parasaran"}}, {"text": "K. Jayara~", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8322, "end_char": 8332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.. Parasaran and K. Jayara~, lor the petitionrs (in W :P. No.", "canonical_name": "K. Jayara~"}}, {"text": "M. Natesan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8383, "end_char": 8393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Natesan flJld K. Jayaram, for the petitioners in. ("}}, {"text": "K. Jayaram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8400, "end_char": 8410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Natesan flJld K. Jayaram, for the petitioners in. (", "canonical_name": "K. Jayara~"}}, {"text": "M. S. Narasimha11", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8482, "end_char": 8499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r 83 of 1971).. · K. Parasazn an4 M. S. Narasimha11, for the petitioners (in\n\nW.P. ; o~ 437 of 19712_.", "canonical_name": "M. S. Narasimha11"}}, {"text": "S. Annadurai Ayyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8750, "end_char": 8771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Annadurai Ayyangar d M. S. Narasimhan, for the petitioners (in W.P. No."}}, {"text": "M. S. Narasimhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8774, "end_char": 8790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Annadurai Ayyangar d M. S. Narasimhan, for the petitioners (in W.P. No.", "canonical_name": "M. S. Narasimha11"}}, {"text": "N. A.. Palkhiwa/4", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8845, "end_char": 8862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ": N. A.. Palkhiwa/4,."}}, {"text": "A. I. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8865, "end_char": 8875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. I. Rana and M. S. Naraaimhalt, for tbe H peti~ (in W.P. No, 442 of 1971). •. . . . . . . . ."}}, {"text": "M. S. Naraaimhalt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8880, "end_char": 8897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. I. Rana and M. S. Naraaimhalt, for tbe H peti~ (in W.P. No, 442 of 1971). •. . . . . . . . .", "canonical_name": "M. S. Narasimha11"}}, {"text": "M. S. Narl18imlfitn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8967, "end_char": 8986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S. Narl18imlfitn;. '"}}, {"text": "Govind Swaminndhan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9092, "end_char": 9110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "818 SUPllEMB COURT RBPOUS\n\ns. Govind Swaminndhan, AdVocate-General fat the State of It Tamil Nadu, S. Moliiin, N. S. Sivan and A. Y. Rartgam, fot the respottdertt (in all the petitions) ."}}, {"text": "S. Moliiin", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9161, "end_char": 9171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "818 SUPllEMB COURT RBPOUS\n\ns. Govind Swaminndhan, AdVocate-General fat the State of It Tamil Nadu, S. Moliiin, N. S. Sivan and A. Y. Rartgam, fot the respottdertt (in all the petitions) ."}}, {"text": "N. S. Sivan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9173, "end_char": 9184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "818 SUPllEMB COURT RBPOUS\n\ns. Govind Swaminndhan, AdVocate-General fat the State of It Tamil Nadu, S. Moliiin, N. S. Sivan and A. Y. Rartgam, fot the respottdertt (in all the petitions) ."}}, {"text": "A. Y. Rartgam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9189, "end_char": 9202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "818 SUPllEMB COURT RBPOUS\n\ns. Govind Swaminndhan, AdVocate-General fat the State of It Tamil Nadu, S. Moliiin, N. S. Sivan and A. Y. Rartgam, fot the respottdertt (in all the petitions) ."}}, {"text": "Palelwf", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9296, "end_char": 9303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment' of the Court was delivered by\n\nPalelwf j. In these 12 petitions under Article 32 of tile Constitution filed by the hereditary Archakas and Mathadhipatis B of some ancient Hindu Publi_c temples .in Tamil Nadu the validity of the Tamil N adu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments\n\n(Anumdment) Act, 1970 (heteht.after referred to as the Admend ment Act, 1970) is called in question, prlndpally, on the ground that it vif?1ates tliit freedom of religion seured to them under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9335, "end_char": 9345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Admend ment Act, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9603, "end_char": 9624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 25 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9740, "end_char": 9758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Admend ment Act, 1970", "statute": "the Admend ment Act, 1970"}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10644, "end_char": 10658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11360, "end_char": 11370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tamil Nadu Act", "statute": "Tamil Nadu Act"}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11460, "end_char": 11470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tamil Nadu Act", "statute": "Tamil Nadu Act"}}, {"text": "Service Rules, 1964", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12712, "end_char": 12731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13972, "end_char": 13983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14113, "end_char": 14123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14294, "end_char": 14304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14327, "end_char": 14338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 55, 56 and 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14836, "end_char": 14859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15794, "end_char": 15804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Tamil Nadu Archakas, Gurukk.als and Poojaries are all Ulthurai servants in Hindu tem~ ples."}}, {"text": "Sections 55 and 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16161, "end_char": 16179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Charitable Endowments Act, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16217, "end_char": 16248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16250, "end_char": 16264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17043, "end_char": 17057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SESHAMMAL V. TAMIL NADU", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17297, "end_char": 17320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r_::illy lnte.rfertd with the relfgioU'\n\nSESHAMMAL V. TAMIL NADU (Palekar, /.) 821\n\nA practices of Saivite and Vaishnavite temples; and instead of intro~\n\nducing social reform, taken measures which would inevitably lead to defilement and desecration of the temples.", "canonical_name": "SESHAMMAL V. TAMIL NADU"}}, {"text": "To appreciate the effect of the Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17523, "end_char": 17568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 55, 56 and 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17622, "end_char": 17645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To appreciate the effect of the Amendment Act", "statute": "To appreciate the effect of the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Sec. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17765, "end_char": 17772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To appreciate the effect of the Amendment Act", "statute": "To appreciate the effect of the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "S6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19930, "end_char": 19932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20120, "end_char": 20122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SESHAMMAL V. TAMIL NADU", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22417, "end_char": 22440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(u/11)\n\nThe quall!lcalon.s to be , a.sessed by the O!Hoers and servart11 for ap- Pointment to oflk:el 111 rella!ou.s ln.lltutlon •nd tho condltlom of M:tvloo o( afJ ruch offic:en and aer• \\lan~. ·\n\nSESHAMMAL V. TAMIL NADU (Palekar, /.) 823\n\nA It is clear from a perusal of the above provlsiorts that the Amendmant Act does away with the hereditary right of succession to the Office of Archaka even if the Archaka was qualified under Rule 12 of the Madras Hindu Religious Institutions (Officers and Servants) Service Rules, 1964.", "canonical_name": "SESHAMMAL V. TAMIL NADU"}}, {"text": "Service Rules, 1964", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22727, "end_char": 22746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22866, "end_char": 22876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Service Rules, 1964", "statute": "Service Rules, 1964"}}, {"text": "Vishnu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24628, "end_char": 24634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ples God Shiva and Vishnu in their several."}}, {"text": "Shiva", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24697, "end_char": 24702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The image 0f Shiva is worshipped by his worshlppers who are called Saivites and the image of Vishnu is worshipped by his worshippers who are known as Vaishnavites.", "canonical_name": "Shiva"}}, {"text": "Kane", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24969, "end_char": 24973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The institu\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1972] 3 i.C.f\n\ntion of temple worship has an ancient history and, according to A Dr. Kane, temples of deities had existed even in the 4th or 5th ce.ntury B.C. (See: History of Dharmasastra Vol."}}, {"text": "Siva", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25310, "end_char": 25314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Just when the cult of worship of Siva and Vishnu started and developed into B two distinct cults is very difficult to say, but there can be no doubt that in the times of the Mahabharata these cults were separately developed and there was keen rivalary between them to such an extent that the Mahabharata and some of the Puranas endeavoured to inculcate a spirit of synthesis by impressing that there was no difference between the two deities. (", "canonical_name": "Shiva"}}, {"text": "G Archaka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27394, "end_char": 27403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One is to attract the lay worshipper to participate in the worship carried on by the priest or G Archaka."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT I.EPORTS", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30826, "end_char": 30848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT I.EPORTS\n\nhibit is his appointment as an Archaka in a temple of a different\n\ndenomination."}}, {"text": "R. Parthasarthy Bhattacharya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31564, "end_char": 31592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri R. Parthasarthy Bhattacharya, whose authority on Agama literature is unquestioned, has filed his affidavit in Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "V aikhanasa Sutra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31763, "end_char": 31780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "442 of 1971 and stated in his affidavit, with special reference to the V aikhanasa Sutra to which he belongs, that according to the texts of the Vaikhansa Shastra ( Agama), persens who are the followers of the four Rishi traditions of Bhrigu, Atri, Marichi and Kasyapa and born of V aikhanasa parents are alone competent to do puja in Vaikhanasa temples of Vishnavites."}}, {"text": "Bhrigu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31927, "end_char": 31933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "442 of 1971 and stated in his affidavit, with special reference to the V aikhanasa Sutra to which he belongs, that according to the texts of the Vaikhansa Shastra ( Agama), persens who are the followers of the four Rishi traditions of Bhrigu, Atri, Marichi and Kasyapa and born of V aikhanasa parents are alone competent to do puja in Vaikhanasa temples of Vishnavites."}}, {"text": "Atri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31935, "end_char": 31939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "442 of 1971 and stated in his affidavit, with special reference to the V aikhanasa Sutra to which he belongs, that according to the texts of the Vaikhansa Shastra ( Agama), persens who are the followers of the four Rishi traditions of Bhrigu, Atri, Marichi and Kasyapa and born of V aikhanasa parents are alone competent to do puja in Vaikhanasa temples of Vishnavites."}}, {"text": "Marichi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31941, "end_char": 31948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "442 of 1971 and stated in his affidavit, with special reference to the V aikhanasa Sutra to which he belongs, that according to the texts of the Vaikhansa Shastra ( Agama), persens who are the followers of the four Rishi traditions of Bhrigu, Atri, Marichi and Kasyapa and born of V aikhanasa parents are alone competent to do puja in Vaikhanasa temples of Vishnavites."}}, {"text": "Kasyapa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31953, "end_char": 31960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "442 of 1971 and stated in his affidavit, with special reference to the V aikhanasa Sutra to which he belongs, that according to the texts of the Vaikhansa Shastra ( Agama), persens who are the followers of the four Rishi traditions of Bhrigu, Atri, Marichi and Kasyapa and born of V aikhanasa parents are alone competent to do puja in Vaikhanasa temples of Vishnavites."}}, {"text": "Article 25(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33307, "end_char": 33320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SESHAMMAL V", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33677, "end_char": 33688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SESHAMMAL V, TAMIL NADU (Palekar~ J.) 827\n\nv. Sri Lakshmindr(l Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirnr Matt(!);"}}, {"text": "TAMIL NADU", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33690, "end_char": 33700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SESHAMMAL V, TAMIL NADU (Palekar~ J.) 827\n\nv. Sri Lakshmindr(l Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirnr Matt(!);"}}, {"text": "Lakshmindr(l Thirtha Swamiar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33727, "end_char": 33755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SESHAMMAL V, TAMIL NADU (Palekar~ J.) 827\n\nv. Sri Lakshmindr(l Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirnr Matt(!);"}}, {"text": "Section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34721, "end_char": 34731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Service Rules, 1964", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34855, "end_char": 34874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35028, "end_char": 35038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Service Rules, 1964", "statute": "Service Rules, 1964"}}, {"text": "section\n\n55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36268, "end_char": 36279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 36416, "end_char": 36437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nan¥ temple 'Yhether Saivite or Vaish.nav.ite .as long as he possessed a fitness certlflcate from one of the Institutions referred to in rule\n\n12."}}, {"text": "section 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37331, "end_char": 37341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vallabh Acharya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38202, "end_char": 38217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But their claim was rejected on the; ground that the temple was dedicated to the sect following the principles of Vallabh Acharya in whose temples only the Gossains of that sect could perfonn the rituals and ceremonies and, therefore, the claimant$ had no right either to the temple or to perform the worship."}}, {"text": "Articles 25 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38933, "end_char": 38951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39355, "end_char": 39365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "His submission was that we have to take the Principal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39655, "end_char": 39712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39864, "end_char": 39874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "His submission was that we have to take the Principal Act", "statute": "His submission was that we have to take the Principal Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40011, "end_char": 40020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "His submission was that we have to take the Principal Act", "statute": "His submission was that we have to take the Principal Act"}}, {"text": "Subject to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Temple Entry Authorization Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40053, "end_char": 40127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40940, "end_char": 40950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Subject to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Temple Entry Authorization Act", "statute": "Subject to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Temple Entry Authorization Act"}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41054, "end_char": 41064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Subject to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Temple Entry Authorization Act", "statute": "Subject to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Temple Entry Authorization Act"}}, {"text": "Article 2S(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42014, "end_char": 42030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hindu Religious Endowments Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42371, "end_char": 42408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He 1nv1ted attention to the report of the Hindu Religious Endowments Commission ( 1960-1962) headed by Dr.\n\nC. P. Ramaswami Aiyar and submitted that there was a crying need for reform in this direction since the hereditary principle of appoin!ment of Arcakas had led to grave malpractices practically 8 destroymg the sanctity of worship in various religious institutions."}}, {"text": "C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42437, "end_char": 42458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He 1nv1ted attention to the report of the Hindu Religious Endowments Commission ( 1960-1962) headed by Dr.\n\nC. P. Ramaswami Aiyar and submitted that there was a crying need for reform in this direction since the hereditary principle of appoin!ment of Arcakas had led to grave malpractices practically 8 destroymg the sanctity of worship in various religious institutions."}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42782, "end_char": 42792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43038, "end_char": 43048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43319, "end_char": 43329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44765, "end_char": 44775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45768, "end_char": 45784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PJlkhivala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 45792, "end_char": 45802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PJlkhivala on behalf of the petitioners insisted that the\n\n:; ppointmnt of a. pe:son."}}, {"text": "Articles 25 and\n\n26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46036, "end_char": 46055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 25 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46428, "end_char": 46446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49172, "end_char": 49182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51046, "end_char": 51056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "an Archaka", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 51363, "end_char": 51373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SESHAMMAL v. 'PAMIL NADU (Paltkar, J.) 8'33\n\nan Archaka is no longer limited by the operation of the rule of\n\nnext~!nline of succession in temples where the usage was to appomt the Archaka on the hereditary principle."}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51792, "end_char": 51802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52181, "end_char": 52190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52221, "end_char": 52231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52756, "end_char": 52766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52810, "end_char": 52819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52845, "end_char": 52854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52911, "end_char": 52922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 55 and 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53278, "end_char": 53296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 116(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53502, "end_char": 53516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Service Rules, 1964", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53918, "end_char": 53937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55606, "end_char": 55617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55889, "end_char": 55900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56114, "end_char": 56124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_835_840_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "SIBVGOVIND\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH March 14, 1972\n\n. [A, N. GROVER AND M. H. BEG, JJ.J\n\nCrin1inal trial-Enha11cen1e11t-Enlu1nce11u!nt of sentence by appellate Court-Principles goierning.\n\nA question of scnteno.:: is a matter of di~•cretion. It is well settled that when cliscreti.on has been properly exercised along accepted judicial Jines, an appellate court should not interfere to the detriment of anaccused person.\n\nSuch interference 'Viii be justified only by strong reasons \\Vhich must be disclosed on the fact of the jud_gimnt.\n\nJn a matter \"f enhancement there should not be interfen.:ncc wllen the sentence passed\n\nimposes substantial punishment.\n\nJnterfen!nc.e is only called for when: it is manifestly inadequate. [839 BJ\n\nWhere the trial court after taking into acC:Ount a11 the circumstances anJ nlso the discr;!pancies in the pro=ecution v!Jrsion convicted the appellant to one year's imprisonment under s. 366, Pen:ll Code, and the High court in appeal, enhanced the sentence to seven years' im:i.1)risonment.\n\nHEl:D : that the High Court !>ad not noticed a number of facts duly <:onsidered by the trial court and. therefore, the exercise of the power of enhancement could not be justified. [839 OJ\n\nBed Raj v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [19551 2 S. C.R. 583; and AlamRir & Anr. v. The State of Bihar, L19S9J Supp. I S.C.R. 464, refernd to.\n\nNabi Bux mrd Or.r. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, A.l.R. 1972 S .C. 495, distinguished.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 3 of 1972.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 25, 1971 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench.in Criminal Appeal No. 391 of 1969.\n\nS. K. Gambhir, for the appellant.\n\nG M. N. Shroff, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Cqurt was delivered by\n\nBeg, J, Shiv Govind, the appellant , has obtained SJieelal Leave to appeal against only that part of the Judgment and order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh by which his sentence of H one year's Rigorous 'Im:priSOll!llent, passed by the Additional Sessions' Judge, lnilote, upon \" conviction under Section 366 Indian Penal Code, was enhanced to seven years' Rigorous Imprisonment\n\n' '\n\nand a fine of Rs. 100 / -, and, in default of payment of fine, to three A months' further rigorous imprisonment.\n\nThe appellant, aged about 20 yearn at the time of ihe alleged offence of 9th of August, 1969, was the youngest of three persons who were jointly charged and tried for offence$ punuhable under Section 366 and 354\n\nI.P.C.\n\n....\n\nThe prosecution case was : Kumari Seema, a girl below 18 years of age, was offered a lift on his bicycle by the accused, Kamal Singh, aged 30 ye; irs, while she was returning to her home from her School on 9th August, 1969.\n\nThe girl.hesitated.· But,\n\nas she reposed confidence in Kamal Singh, whom she looked upon as her uncle, she accepted the offer.\n\nKamal .Singh took Kumari Seema on his bicycle to the Regal Cinema where she part-took of C some. refreshment ordered by Kamal Singh.\n\nMeanwhile, the appellant Shiv Govind and the accused Punam, aged 26, arrived in a car.\n\nKamal Singh asked Kumari Seema to go with the two younger men in their car.\n\nSeema refused.\n\nTheo, Kamal Singh asked her to go on his bicycle to Y ashwant Talkies.\n\nShe complied with this request.\n\nAt this Cinema, Kamal Singh deposited his Cycle at the Cycle stand.\n\nThe appellant Shiv Govind and his companion Punam had followed in their car.\n\nThe three men succeeded in persuading Seema, despite her initial refusal, to sit in the car and to go for a short pleasure trip in it on the definite assurance that. she will soon be reached home. . After the girl had\n\nsat in the car she was driven to a place called Mandow, a number J: of miles away from Indore, and was made to alight at a tourist's bungalow.\n\nThere two rooms were engaged by the accused.\n\nKamal Singh occupied one of the two rooms and the girl was closeted in the other room with the appellant and his companion Punam, who.were both drunk.\n\nOne of the two youngmen caught hold of the hands of the girl while the other tried to undress her with the object of raping her.\n\nKumari Seema, at this point, F feigned sudden indisposition. so that the two youngmen had to bring her out into the gallery for fresh air.\n\nShe managed to escape while the accused went inside to fetch some water for her.\n\nShe rushed into the house of one Babula! Kamdar and complained to:him about the incident. This led to a COlillllunication of information Of the offences to the Police which went to the tourist's bungalow and arrested the three accused who were brought to Police Station Nalcha where a First Information Report was lodged.\n\nThe Trial Court had examined evidence given. in support of the case stated aoove.\n\nThis 4nc1uded modi.cal evidenco on Uie questionof the age of the girl, beeause, while the prosearticn :alleged that she was below 16 years of age, the acc11Sed pleaded tb8t she was above 18 years of age. 13vidently, the case of the accused\n\nJ:I\n\nSHIV GOVIND V. STATE (Beg, J.) 837\n\nwas that Kumari Seema was a consenting party to whatever took . place.\n\nAlthough the girl was attending a School, the entry of her age in the School Register was not disclosed.\n\nDespite some discrepancies in the evidence relating to the age of the girl, the trial court came to the conclusion that it was between 16 to 19 years.\n\nIt relied mainly on expert evidence of Doctors who had used the\n\nossification test.\n\nThe Trial Court had also noticed the discrepancies between the prosecution version, as set out above by Kumari Seema in her evidence in Court, and the story given out by her in the First . Information Report where she had stated that she had joined the\n\nparty of the accused at the crossing of Bijasan Road.\n\nThe earlier version suggested that the girl had herself gone to meet the party\n\nof the accused by appointment.\n\nThe consent of the girl was, however, immaterial in view of the finding of the Trial Court about the age of the girl.\n\nThe fact that she was taken to Mandow, where something happened at 'the tourist's bungalow which she disapproved of, was corroborated by the evidence of Babula! Kamdar, and Kailash Sharma, in addition to the two police constables of Mandow-OUt-post.\n\nThe Trial Court which had the advantage of watching the demeanour of the girl, had come to the conclusion that, although the girl may have tried to improve her version and pretend that she was unwilling to accompany Kamal Singh, who had come in a car for her according to the first version, yet, the charge under Sec. 3661.P.C., was established against each of the three accused and the charge under Sec. 354 I.P.C. was established against Shiv Govind, appellant, and his companion Piinam. The three accused were, therefOte, convicted under Sec. 366, and each was sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment. The two accused Shiv Govind and Punam were also eoilvicted under Sec. 354 l.P .<:., and sentenced to four months rigorous. imprisonment, but the two sentences were ordered to .run concurrently.\n\nWhen the case came up in appeal to the High ourt; a notice of enhancement of the sentence under Sec, 366 I.P.C. was issued to each of the three appellants, and their sentences were enhaDced, as indicated above, after the appellants had•been heard.\n\nIt is only Shiv Govind who has appealed to this Court. Shiv Govind had also applied under Sec. 561A. Criminal Procedure Code to the High Court, after the dismissal of his appeal and enhancement of the sentence by the High Court, claiming the benefit of Sec. 6 and 11 of the Probation of Offender's Act. B\\lt, this application was rejected by the learned Judge who had enhanced the stntence passed upon the appellant, although }le\n\nfound that the report of the Probation Officer about the conduct of the accused while undergoing the sentence, which was sent for, was favourable to the appellant. It appears from the two Judgments given by the learned Judge who enhanced the sentence of .the appellant and who subsequently dismissed the application under Sec. 56 IA Criminal Procedure Code also, that the view taken by him was that, having regard to the facts and circumstances and of the case and the offence committed by the appellant, :the enhanced sentence was deserved by him.\n\nWe have, therefore, examined the Judgment of the High Court under appeal before us in order to discover the special reasons which induced the learned High Court Judge to differ from the opinion of the Trial Court about the appropriate sentence to be imposed upon the appellant The only reason given by the learn- .ed Judge for enhancing the sentence was that Kumari Seema had reposed confidence in Kamal Singh, whom she regarded as an Unde, so. that she could not expect foul play from him. The learned. Judge thought the girl's trust and confidence in l(amal Singh explained why she did not protest when she was taken in the car and then made to get down at the tourist's bungalow. It s.eems, however, from the account of the occurrence given in the\n\nJudgment under appeal, that the learned Judge was shocked by !he plight of K umari Seema, due to the perfidy of Kamal Sinjh, and by a -contemplation of the possible consequences to her if she had not behaved in a .particularly brave and intelligent ma~ 80 as to escape from her predicament.\n\nThe learned Judge mentioned that the girl had risked her life to escape.\n\nWe, however, find. that there was no suggestion in the evidence anywhere that any threat to the life of Kumari Seema was ~Id out.\n\nThere was no evidence that the girl had seriously struggled to escape or had raised shouts for help which would have brought people around to lier aid.\n\nNor was there any evidence that the accused tried to obstruct her or to chase her when she escaped from the tourist's bongalow allegedly by resorting to a ruse.\n\nThe High Court was .so .improssed by the girl's uncorroborated version of her own heroism, which did not tally with her first version in the First Jnfonnation Report, that it overlooked the infinnities in the girl's .evidence discussed by the trial court. We find the trial court's view\n\nof the whole case to be quite balanced and objective.\n\nWe do not thillk that the severer view of the High Court could be reasonably j1111ified.\n\nIt seems clear to us that the High Coun had overlooked the principles, laid down 'by this Court repeatedly, which shoUld\n\nSHIV GOVJND v. STATE (Beg, J.) 839\n\ngovern the exercise of powers of the High Court to enhance sentences imposed by trial courts.\n\nJn Bed Raj v. The State of Uftar Pradesh(') this Court observed at page 588-589 :-\n\n\"'A question of a sentence is a matter of discretion and it is well settled that when discretion has been properly exercised along accepted judicial lines, an appellate court should not interfere to the detriment of an accused person except for very strong reasons which must be disclosed on the face of the judgment; See for example the observations in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab (1954 S.C.R. 146, 156) and Nar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1955(1) S.C.R. 238, 241].\n\nIn a matter of enhancement there should not be interference when the sentence passed imposes substantial punishment.\n\nInterfP.rence is only called for when it is manifestly inade- 1Juate.\n\nIn our opinion, these principles have not been ; Jbserved.\n\nIt is impossible to hOld in the circumstances described that the Sessions Judge did not impose a substantial sentence, and no adequate reason has been assigned by the learned High Court Judges for considering the sentence manifestly inadequate.\n\nIn the circumstances, bearing all the considerations of this case in mind, we are of opinion that the appeal (which is limited to the question of sentence l should be allowed and that the sentence imposed by the High Court should be set aside and that of the Sessions Court restored''.\n\nWe think that what was laid down by this Court in Bed Rai's case (Supra) is fully applicable to the case before us.\n\nWe may also mention the similar views expressed by this Court in Alamgir & Anr., v. The State of Bihar( 2 ).\n\nWe may observe that decision of this Court in Nabi Bux and Ors. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(\"), is distinguishable from the case before us.\n\nIn that case the High Court had enhanced a sentence having regard to all the facts and circumstances justifying the enhancement. In the case before us we find that the High Court had not noticed a number of facts duly considered by the trial Court so that the exercise of power of enhancement of the sentence under Sec. 366 I.P.C. could not be reasonably justified here.\n\nConsequently, we allow this appeal by setting aside the order of enhancement of sentence by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand restore the sentence of one year's rigorous imprisonment\n\n(I) [1955] (2) S.C.R. p. 583. (2) [1959] Supp. (I) S.C.R. 464. (J) A.l.R. [1972]S.C. 495.\n\npassed upon the appelant by the learned Sessions Judge for the offence under Sec. \"366 I.P.C. of which the appellant was convicted.\n\nThe concurrent sentence of four months rigorous imprisonment under Sec. 354 I.P.C., which was not interfered with by the High Curt, is maintained.\n\nWe understand that the appellant has alfeady undergone more than one year's imprisonment awarded to him and that he is in jail as his application for bail was rejected.\n\nIf this is so, the appellant will be released forthwith unless wanted in some other case.\n\nK.B.N.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 50, "entities": [{"text": "SIBVGOVIND", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 10, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Shiv Govind", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 14, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 54, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SIBVGOVIND\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH March 14, 1972\n\n. ["}}, {"text": "N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 924, "end_char": 930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. K. Gambhir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1679, "end_char": 1692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Gambhir, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "G M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1714, "end_char": 1728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G M. N. Shroff, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Beg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1795, "end_char": 1798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Cqurt was delivered by\n\nBeg, J, Shiv Govind, the appellant , has obtained SJieelal Leave to appeal against only that part of the Judgment and order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh by which his sentence of H one year's Rigorous 'Im:priSOll!llent, passed by the Additional Sessions' Judge, lnilote, upon \" conviction under Section 366 Indian Penal Code, was enhanced to seven years' Rigorous Imprisonment\n\n' '\n\nand a fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "Shiv Govind", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1803, "end_char": 1814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Cqurt was delivered by\n\nBeg, J, Shiv Govind, the appellant , has obtained SJieelal Leave to appeal against only that part of the Judgment and order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh by which his sentence of H one year's Rigorous 'Im:priSOll!llent, passed by the Additional Sessions' Judge, lnilote, upon \" conviction under Section 366 Indian Penal Code, was enhanced to seven years' Rigorous Imprisonment\n\n' '\n\nand a fine of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Shiv Govind"}}, {"text": "Section 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2096, "end_char": 2107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2108, "end_char": 2125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 366 and 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2490, "end_char": 2509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2511, "end_char": 2516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Kumari Seema", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2552, "end_char": 2564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, aged about 20 yearn at the time of ihe alleged offence of 9th of August, 1969, was the youngest of three persons who were jointly charged and tried for offence$ punuhable under Section 366 and 354\n\nI.P.C.\n\n....\n\nThe prosecution case was : Kumari Seema, a girl below 18 years of age, was offered a lift on his bicycle by the accused, Kamal Singh, aged 30 ye; irs, while she was returning to her home from her School on 9th August, 1969.", "canonical_name": "K umari Seema"}}, {"text": "Kamal Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2646, "end_char": 2657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, aged about 20 yearn at the time of ihe alleged offence of 9th of August, 1969, was the youngest of three persons who were jointly charged and tried for offence$ punuhable under Section 366 and 354\n\nI.P.C.\n\n....\n\nThe prosecution case was : Kumari Seema, a girl below 18 years of age, was offered a lift on his bicycle by the accused, Kamal Singh, aged 30 ye; irs, while she was returning to her home from her School on 9th August, 1969.", "canonical_name": "Kamal .Singh"}}, {"text": "Kamal .Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2879, "end_char": 2891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamal .Singh took Kumari Seema on his bicycle to the Regal Cinema where she part-took of C some.", "canonical_name": "Kamal .Singh"}}, {"text": "Kumari Seema", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2897, "end_char": 2909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamal .Singh took Kumari Seema on his bicycle to the Regal Cinema where she part-took of C some.", "canonical_name": "K umari Seema"}}, {"text": "Punam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3066, "end_char": 3071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile, the appellant Shiv Govind and the accused Punam, aged 26, arrived in a car.", "canonical_name": "Punam"}}, {"text": "Seema", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3178, "end_char": 3183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seema refused."}}, {"text": "Mandow", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3713, "end_char": 3719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the girl had\n\nsat in the car she was driven to a place called Mandow, a number J: of miles away from Indore, and was made to alight at a tourist's bungalow."}}, {"text": "Indore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3752, "end_char": 3758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the girl had\n\nsat in the car she was driven to a place called Mandow, a number J: of miles away from Indore, and was made to alight at a tourist's bungalow."}}, {"text": "Punam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3978, "end_char": 3983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamal Singh occupied one of the two rooms and the girl was closeted in the other room with the appellant and his companion Punam, who.were both drunk.", "canonical_name": "Punam"}}, {"text": "Babula! Kamdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4392, "end_char": 4406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She rushed into the house of one Babula!"}}, {"text": "Police Station Nalcha", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4614, "end_char": 4635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This led to a COlillllunication of information Of the offences to the Police which went to the tourist's bungalow and arrested the three accused who were brought to Police Station Nalcha where a First Information Report was lodged."}}, {"text": "Babula! Kamdar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6155, "end_char": 6169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that she was taken to Mandow, where something happened at 'the tourist's bungalow which she disapproved of, was corroborated by the evidence of Babula!"}}, {"text": "Kailash Sharma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6175, "end_char": 6189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamdar, and Kailash Sharma, in addition to the two police constables of Mandow-OUt-post."}}, {"text": "Sec. 3661", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6566, "end_char": 6575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6653, "end_char": 6661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6662, "end_char": 6667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Piinam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6735, "end_char": 6741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "354 I.P.C. was established against Shiv Govind, appellant, and his companion Piinam."}}, {"text": "Sec. 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6794, "end_char": 6802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Shiv Govind", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6880, "end_char": 6891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two accused Shiv Govind and Punam were also eoilvicted under Sec.", "canonical_name": "Shiv Govind"}}, {"text": "Sec. 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6929, "end_char": 6937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7164, "end_char": 7169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7398, "end_char": 7407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7409, "end_char": 7432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 6 and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7561, "end_char": 7574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Sec. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8061, "end_char": 8068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "IA Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8069, "end_char": 8095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K umari Seema", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9116, "end_char": 9129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he plight of K umari Seema, due to the perfidy of Kamal Sinjh, and by a -contemplation of the possible consequences to her if she had not behaved in a .particularly brave and intelligent ma~ 80 as to escape from her predicament.", "canonical_name": "K umari Seema"}}, {"text": "Kamal Sinjh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9153, "end_char": 9164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he plight of K umari Seema, due to the perfidy of Kamal Sinjh, and by a -contemplation of the possible consequences to her if she had not behaved in a .particularly brave and intelligent ma~ 80 as to escape from her predicament.", "canonical_name": "Kamal .Singh"}}, {"text": "Bed Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11931, "end_char": 11938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We think that what was laid down by this Court in Bed Rai's case (Supra) is fully applicable to the case before us."}}, {"text": "Sec. 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12567, "end_char": 12575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12576, "end_char": 12581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12720, "end_char": 12748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequently, we allow this appeal by setting aside the order of enhancement of sentence by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand restore the sentence of one year's rigorous imprisonment\n\n(I) [1955] (2) S.C.R. p. 583. ("}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12990, "end_char": 12995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13103, "end_char": 13111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13112, "end_char": 13117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "K.B.N.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13445, "end_char": 13451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.B.N.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_841_854_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "RAJ NARAIN\n\nv •.\n\nSMT. INDIRA NEHRU GANDHI AND ANR •.\n\nMarch 15, 1972\n\n(K. S. HEGDE, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND K. K. MATHEW; JJ.J\n\nRepresentation of the People Act, 1951-Section\n\n86(5)-SCOP<- Pleadings relming to corru.'1t .Dractice-Better particulars of charges ma\\' he introduced by amendment of pladings. ·\n\nElection Petition-Interrogatories-Code of Civil Procedure 1908- 0rder XI r, 1-lnterroga:pries 1nust have reasonable close connecti'on with \"any n1atters in question.\"\n\nWhile 3 corrupt practice has got to be strictly proved it does not follow that a pleading in an election petition should receive a strict construction. The object of section 86(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, is to see that a person acused of a corrupt practice must know p!'OCisely what he is accused of so that hemay have the opportunity to meet the allegations JM.de against him. If the accusation made is nebulous and is capable of being made use of for establishin~ more than one charge or if it does not make out a corrupt plractice at all then the charge fails at the threshold.\n\nSo Jong as the charge levelled is beyond doubt, s. 86(5) is satisfied; rest is mere refinement; they either pertain to the region of particulars or evidence.\n\nUnder s. 86(5), if corrupt practice is alleged in the p~Otion, the particulars of such corrupt practice may b~ amended or amplified for ensui'ing a fair and effec\n\ntive trial that is, more and better particulars of the charge may be given later, even after the period ef limitation; but if a corrupt practice is not previously \"lleged in the petition, an am!ndment which will have the effect of introducing particulars of such. a corrupt practi<', o will not be permitted, after the period of Jimimtion. because, it would tantamount to making a fresh petition. [847 GJ ·\n\nThe appellant, in his election petition, challenging the validity of tbe election of respondent No. I, alleged that the respondent obtained the assistance of K when he was still a Gazetted Officer in the Go\"\"ruwmt\n\nof India for tbe furtherance <if the prospects of her election. and that K organised the electioneering work for her during the entire period even before the filing of the nomination paper. The petition did not\n\nsct out specifically that when the respondent obtained tlr> a5si0 tancie of K, she was a \"candidate\", nor did it state the date on which X was entrusted with the electioneering work.\n\nThe respondent filed an application under 0. XI, Code of Civil Procedure, for sitting aside the interrogatories served on her by th! appellant. The trial court set aside some of the interrogatories and struck out the isaue& relating to cor\\\"uot oractice on the basis that the facts stated in the petition did not discli>oe the corrupt practice which were the subject matter of the issues. Thi! Court also dismissed the \"poellant's application for amending the election petition, on the ground that the appellant was seeking to add material facts and hence they could not be accepted after the period of limitation for filing the election. petition. ·\n\nHELD : ( i) that the trial court was not juslified in strikin~ out the issues relating to corrupt practice. The allegations in the petition bring\n\nout al! th.: ingredients ot the corrupt practic; e alleged though they are A lacking in better particulars such as the date on which the respondent hc.:-can1e a candidate and the date on which K w:is entrusted with the\n\nr<?ponsibility of organising the clcction:!cring 'W'Ork of the respondent.\n\nTheabsence of these particulars does not per se invalidate the charge.\n\nIS49 Gj\n\nHarish Chandra Bajpui v. Triluki Singh, ~1957] S.C.R. 370; Sa111ar1t .\\J. Balakrishna etc. v. George Fernaridcz and ors. etc. [11969] 3 S.C.R.\n\nD 60.l and Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh. [1972] S.C.C. 214, referred to.\n\nl ii) that the question as to when K's resign\"J.tion bcca.nc effective\n\nh1.1~ to be examined \\Vith rr.:ferencc to his c'onditions of service <ind this\n\nh~1\\ing not been done the conclusion of the trial judge in this regard had to he ignored. 1852 D-E]\n\nR11j K111ne1r v. Union of India, [19681 3 S.C.R. 857. referred 1o.\n\nQuaere : \\Vhcth.::!r a government servant's resignation can he acceptd \\'1.-ith effect from '3.n earlier date and whether such an acceptance has an,· 1alidity in con•idering a corrupt practice under s. 123(7).\n\n(iii) that the amendments asked for should have been allowed. ek:ccion petition is not liahlc to be disn1isscd in limine because full partic\n\nClJiafs of c'orrupt practice alleged arc not set out.\n\nIf an objection wa~ D taken and the tribunal was of the view that the full particulars have nol hecn set out, the petitioner has to be given an opportunity to amend or ;.1mplify the purticulars. f,853 Bl ,\n\nShri Balwan Singh v. Shri Lalo:h111i Narain and or:.· .. [19601 3 S.C.R. 91, referred to.\n\n(iv) that the, trial courl was right in striking out the interrogatorie!I..\n\nTh~ intcrrog:itorics ~.crvd must have reasonable close connection with --any nlattcrs in question.\" Questions that n1ay be f'levant during Cros:-. cx:1mination are not necessarily relevant as interrogatories. [853 H]\n\nCiv1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 108 a.nd I 09 o.f 1972.\n\nAppeals biY special leave from the. orders dated November 27. 1971 and December 22, 1971 of the Allahabad High Court in Applications Nos. A-112 and A-141 in Election Petition No. 5 of l 971 respectively.\n\nS. V. Gupte, J. P. Goyal, K. N. Tripathi, R. C. Srivastava, S. S. Khanduja and R. A. Gupta, for the appellant (in both the appeals).\n\nC. K. Daphtary, S. C. Khare, Yageshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga nod S. Bagga, for respondent No. 1 (in both the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J.\n\nTheso appeals by special leave arise from the eleciion petiti.on filed by .he appellant challenging the validity of the election of respondent No. I (who will hereinafr be referred to\n\nas the respondell1) to the Lok Sabha, from Rae Bareilly coastituency, in the General Election to the Lok Sabha held in March,\n\nI 971.\n\nAftr the pleadings of the parties were completed and the issues framed, 'the appellant applied to\" the court under Order XI of the Civil Procedure <; ode for leave to deliver interrogatories, in writing for th.e examination of the respondent.\n\nThe respondnt objected to the same on the ground that the provisions of 0. XI,\n\nC.P.C. cannot be applied to electi9n petitions. In her objectionstatement, the respondell't reserved her right to ob_ject to tire interrogatories sought to be s.erved at a later stage.\n\nThe application filed by the appellant for !·ave to serve interrogatories on the respondenl was heard by Broome J.\n\nThe_ learned Judge by his order dated September 14, 1971 overruled the objections of the respondent and directed as follows :\n\n\"Accordmgly i allow the application A-29 and grant leave to the petitioner to deliver !he accompanying interrogatoris for the examination of respondent No. 1.\n\nThe affidavit in reply shall be filed by 4-10-1971.\"\n\nThe resoondent appealed against that order to this Court after obtaiiiing special leave.\n\nThat appeal was withdrawn during the cours.c of the bearing.\n\nDuring the pendency of that appeal, the respondent filed an app!ic3'lion before the High Coun undr rule 7, Order XI.\n\nC.P.C. praying that the interrogatories served on her may be se.t\n\naside as thy were \"unreasonable, vexatious, oppressive, unneo.:ssary and irrelevant\".\n\nAs many as 31 interrngatories had been served on the respondent.\n\nAll these interrogatories related to f lssues 1 to 3. The appellant objected to each one of them. At the hearing of that petition, it appears it was contended on behalf of the respondent that the allega'tions in the election petition did not afford any basis for Issues 1 to 3.\n\nConsequently th~ interrogatories served were irrelevant as well as unnecessary.\n\nTh~ entire argument before 'the trial judge proceeded on th~ basis\n\nG that the facts stated in. the petition did no! disclose the corrupt praC'tices which were th~ subject-matter of fasues I to 3. The Ieamect. judge accepted that contention and set aside some of the\n\ninterrog; itories srved on 1he respondent. Proceeding further, h~ struck out Issues 1 'to 3. Thereafter the appellant applied to that court for amendment of paragraphs 2 and 5 of the election Jl'ti\n\ntion by giving better particulars.\n\nThe learned judge rejected H that application on the sole ground that by the a.mendmenl in queition, the appellant was seeking to add to material facts and hence they cannot be accepted after the period of limitation for\n\nfili!J~ the electicm petition.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 1 08 of 1972 is\n\ndirected against the order setting aside the interrogatories served A and the striking out of Issues 1 to 3 and Civil Appeal No. 109 of 1972 ar!§es from the order rejecting the application seeking permission to amend the e~ction petition.\n\nIssue No. 2 had not been pressed before <the trial court nor was it pressed before us. Therefore we nerd not consider whether B that issue should be restored.\n\nIssue No. 3 is largely consequential to Issue No. 2 though a portion of that issue bears on Issue No. 1. Hence at present we are only concerned with Issue No.· 1 and that portion of ili~ third issue which has a bearing on Issue No. 1. Both those aspects will be covered if issue No. 1 is recast thus : c\n\n\"Whether respondent No. 1 obtained and procured the assistance of Yashpal Kapur in furtherance of the prospec'ts of her election while he was still a Gazetted Officer in the service of Government of India. If so, from what date ?\"\n\nWe can now leaw out of consideration Issue No.· 3.\n\nThe main question to be decided in these appeals is whether the allegtions made in the election petition can be said to disclose the corrupt practice which is the subject matter of Issue No. 1.\n\nSection 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (to be hereinafor referred to as the 'Act') begins by saying that '\"The followin~ shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act\". ·\n\nSub-s. (7) of s. 123 to the extent material for our present F purpose reads :\n\n\"The obtaining or procuring or abetting or attempting to obtain or procure by a candidate or his agent or, by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent, _any assistance (other than the giving of vote) for 'tire furtherance of the prospects of that G candidate's election, from any person in the service of the Government and belonging to any of the following class_es, namely :\n\n(a) gazetted officers; ..\n\nThe appellant's contention is that the respondent after she be- . came a candidate in lhe election in question obtained the services.\n\nA of Yashpal Kapur when he was still a gazetted officer in the Government of. India for the furtherance of the propects of her election. In order to establish that plea, he must plead and prove :\n\n(1) That the respondent obtained the assistance of Yashpal Kapur when he was a gazetted officer;\n\n(2) That the assistance obtained by her was for the furtherance of the prospects of her election and\n\n' ( 3) Jhat she obtained that assistance after she became a candidate. c A candidate is defined ins. 79(b) of the Act. That section\n\nsays :\n\n\" 'candidate' means, a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate at\n\nany election and any such person shall be deemed to have been a candidate as from the time when, with the election in prospect, he began to hold himself' out as a prospective candidate.\"\n\nThe respondent became a candidate within the first part of s. 79 (b) when she was nominated on February 1, 1971. But if she had held herself out as a prospective candidate with the election in prospect before her nomination, she must be deemed to have become a candidate from the date she so held out.\n\nIn order to estabijsh his plea, the appellant has ito establish that the assistance of Yashpal Kapur was obtained when he still was a government servant and at the itime such an assistance was\n\nobtained, the respondent had become a \"candidate.\"\n\nNow let us turn to the averments in the' election. petition which alone is relevant for finding out whether the corrupt practice referred to in Issue No. 1 is made out. Relevant averments are said to be in pa_ragraphs 2, 5 and 6. They read as follows :\n\n\"2 .. That the respondent No. 1 Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi and the respondent No. 2 Swami Advaifa Nand we1e also candidates in the said election from the 22-Rae Bareili Parliamentary constituency for the Lok Sabha.\n\n5, That the said Shri Yashpal Kapur was Gazetted Officer in the Government of India, holding the post of an officer on Special Duty.\n\nThe respondent No. i..,.\n\nShrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi obtained and procured\n\ntflc assistance of the said Shri Yashpal Kapur for the furtherance of the prospects of her election from the 8-Lt06!Sup.Cl/73\n\ncrnstituency aforesaid inasmuch as the said Shri Yahpal i<apur was a gazetted officer in the service of the Government of India when his assistance was obtained and procured (a corrupt practice under section 123 ( 7) of the R.P. Act, 195 l was committed by the respondent No. I Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi.\n\nThe said Shri Yashpal Kapur on the directions of Shrim<rd Indira Nehru Gandhi organised the electione.ring work for her in 1he constituency as her elction agent during the entire period from even before the filing of the nomination paper 1he filing ('I) the counting and the declaration of the result of the election. The eleciion of •the\n\nrespondent No. I is liable to be declared void on the 1?round of the commission of this corrupt practice under section l 00 ( I ) ( b) of lhe Representation of Peoples\n\nAct, J 951.\n\n6. That as the petitioll!r's candidature was being supported not only by Samyukta Socialist Party to which !he pelitioner belonged but also by the Jan Sangh, the Indian National Congress (Organization), Bhartiya Kranti Dal and the Swatantra Parties and since the candidature of respondent No.\n\nI. Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi was being supported by the Muslim Majlis, Muslim !Jague and the Communist Party of India (it was apprehended by Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi and her election agent Shri Yashpal Kapur •that an overwhelming majority of Hindu voters miht cast 1fieir votes for the petitioner against ShdrMtl Indira Nehru Gandhi.\n\nIt was accordingly de¢lded by them to induce the respondent No. 2 Swami\n\nAdvaita Nand to also stand as a candidate in the elec- 1ion. The said Shri Yashpal Kapur, the election agent of Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi offered and paid a sum of Rs. 50,000Ito the respondent No. 2 Swami Advaitanand as a gift with the object of directly including him to stand as a candidate at •the said dection. The offer and payment of the amount of Rs. 50,000Iwas made\n\nby the said Shri Yashpal Kapur to Swami Advaita Nrtnd on the 28th January 1971 in the town of Rae Bareili.\n\nA corrupt practice of 'bribery under section 123(1) (A) (a) was thus committed by Shri Yashpal Kapur, election agent of Sm. Indira Nehru Gadhi and her election is therefore liable to be declared void under <ection 100(1) of thi R.P. Act.\" ...\n\nIt is true tha'. 'the election petition nowhere specifically say; .as to when the appellant became a \"candidate\".\n\nBut it is clear\n\n...\n\nRAJ NARAIN v. IND!Jl.A. GANDHI (Hegde, J.) 847\n\n:rwr; a readinil of paragraphs 5 and 6 that according to the appell11nt, the respondent became a \"candidate\" even before she was nominated on February 1, 1971. The petition proceeds on thJt basis.\n\nIt is not clear from the petition that how long before her nomination 'the respondent held herself out as a prospective candidate.\n\nBut all the sam~, it is obvious from those avermcnts that the respondent is alleged to hav.~ obtained the assistance ot Y ashpal Kapur when he con•tinued to be a gazetted officer for crganizing her electioneering work. The expression \"electionc.r in.e\" is explained in Universal English Dictionary as \"aci of canvassing for votes, speaking in public and otherwise promoting the election of a particular candidate for Parliament\".\n\nReference. to Yashpal Kapur as an election agent on a date prior to rthe date when he was appointed as such-his nomination as an eleetion agent could not have been done before February 1.\n\n1971-is clearly a misnomer but that is irrelevant. The men; ion in paragraph 5 of the election pdtion that Y ashpal Kapur ur- _ganised th~ electioneering work in the constituency at the direction of the respondent even before her nomination and again the reference to her candidature in January in paragraph 6 shows that according •to the petitioner •the rspondent was a ''candidate\" even before her nomination and further that she obtained the assistance of Yashpal Kapur when he was still a gazeHed officer.\n\nThere is no gainsaying the fact •that the election petition was not ar<istically drawn up.\n\nThat unfortunately is the case with most of our pleadings. But if the petition is read reasonably, as it should b~. it is clear that the allegation of the petitioner is that the servic.~ of Yashpal Kapur were obtained by the respondent when she had already become a candidate and when she so obtaine:t his assistance, Yashpal Kapur was still a gazetted officer.'\n\nIt is true chat one of the ingredients of tho~ corrupt practice alleged i.e. that when •the respondent obtained the assistance of Kapur, she was a candidate is not specifically set out in the petition but from 'lhe allegations made; it flows as a necessary implication.\n\nWhile a corrupt practice has got to b~ strictly proved but from that it does not follow that a pleading in an election proceeding should receive a s'lrict construction.\n\nThis Court has held that even a defetive charge does not vitiate a criminal trial unle5' it is proved that the same has prejudiced the accused. If a plading Ol'l a reasonable construction could sustain the action, the court should accept that cons'truction.\n\nThe courts are reluctant to t frustrate an action on technical grounds. The charge of corrupt oractice in an elction is a very serious charge. Purity of election is the very essence of real democracy.\n\nThe charge in question .J has heen denied by the respondent. It has yet to be proved.\n\nIt ·-' may or may not be proved. The alle_galions made by the appellant may ultimately be proved to be wholly devoid of truth. But . . '\n\nthe question is whether the appellant should be refused an opportunity to prove his allegations ? Should the court refnse to enquire into those allegations merely because 1the appellant or someone who prepared his brief did not know the language of the law.\n\nWe have no hesitation in answering those questions in the negative. The implications of the rule of law are manifold.\n\n' It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the relevant proYisions of the Act precluded the appellant from proving his allegations.\n\nTherefore let us look at those provisions in the Act i.e. Clauses (a) and (b) of s. 83(1) and cl. (5) of s. 86 for finding out whether the charge has to be rejected in limine.\n\nSection 83 (1 )(a) and (b) read :\n\n\"(1 ) An election petition-\n\n( a) shall contain a concise statement of the materia 1\n\nfacts on which the petitioner relies;\n\n( b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as fnll a statement as possible of the names of 'the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice.\n\nSub-s. ( 5) of s. 86 prescribes :\n\n\"The High Court may upon such terms as to costs and otllerwise as it may deem fit. allow the particulars of ny corrupt practice alleged in the petition to be amended or amplified in such manner as may in its opinion be necessary for ensuring a fair and effective trial of •the petition but shall not allow any amendment of the petition which will have the effect of introducing 'particulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition.\"\n\nFrom thse two provisions, it follows that if the allegations made regardin~ a corrupt practice do not disclose the constituent pans of the corrupt practioe alleged, the same will not bo allowed to be proved and further th9se allegations cannot be amended after the period of limitation for filing an election petition: but the court may allow particulars of any corrupt practice alleged in the petition to be amended or amplified.\n\nThe 1 scope of these provisions has been considered in several deci- \\\\ sions of this Court. The leading decision on this point is Barish Chandra Bajpai v. Tri/ok Singh( 1).\n\nIt is not necessary to go to that decision as the ratio of •that decisions has been elaborately\n\nill [1957] S.C.R. 370,\n\nRAJ NARAIN V, JNDIRA GANDHI (Hegde, !.) 849\n\nexplained by this Court in Samant N. Balakrishna etc. v. George Fernandez and ors. etc.( 1). Dealing with !be scope of ss. 83 and 86(5), 'this Court observed thiit s. 83 requires that the petition must contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies and the fullest possible particulars of the corrupt practice alleged. 'Material facts' and 'particulars' may overlap but the word 'material' shows that the ground of corrupt practice and the facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action must be s•tated.\n\nThe function of !be particulars is to present as full a picture of the cause of action as to make the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet Under s. 86(5), if cqrrupt practice is alleged in the petition, !be particulars of such corrupt practice may be amended or amplified for ensuring a fair and effective trial, that is, more and better pani culars of the charg>~ may be given later, even after the period 01 limitation; but if a corrupt practice is not previously alleged in the petition, an amendment which will have the effect of intro ducinJ? particulars of such a corrupt practice will not be permit ed, after the period of limitation, because, it would tantamount to making a fresh petition. The same view was iaken by this Court in Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh('). From these dci sions. ir follows that facts stated in rthe petition relating to a1ly corrupt practice must be sufficient to constitute a cause of action.\n\nJn other words the facts must bring out all the ingredients of th~ corrupt practice allged. If the facts stated fail to satisfy foat requirement then they do not give rise to a triable issue. Such a defect cannot be cured by anv amendment after the period of limitation for filinJ? the election petition.\n\nBut even if all the material facts are stated in the election petiition.\n\nFor a proper trial better particulars may still be required. If !base particulars are not set out in the election petition, Ibey may be incorporaled into the election petition wilb the permission of the court even after the period of limitation. The controversy in 'this case is whether the election petition discloses a cause of action for trying Issue No. 1. We think it does. The allegations made in paragraphs 2, .5 and 6 of the petition, if read together do show that the alle gation against the respondent is that she obtained the assistance of Yashpal Kapur, a gazetted officer, to support her candidature by organising her electioneering work.\n\nThese allegations bring out all the igredients of te corrupt practice alleged though they are lacking m better par!lculars such as the date on which the respondent became a candidate and the date on which Yashpal Kapur was entrusted with the responsibility of organizing the electioneering work of the respondent.\n\nThe absence of thoje particulars does not per se invalidate the charge. They can be supplied even now wi'th the permission of the Court. In this con-\n\n(I)\n\n[19691 3 S.C.R. 603.\n\n(2) [1972] s.c.c.: 14,\n\nnection ii is necessary to mention that the respondent in her written statement did not say 'that the allegations in questiton did not raise a triable issue. No such objection appears to have been taken at the time of 'the framing of the issues or in any of her pleadings. It seems that the objection was taken up for the first time when the pe:tition to set aside the interrogatories was hard ..\n\nWe are sying all these only 1o show as to how the parties umlerstood the allep,,!!tions at the eatlier stages, of the proceedings.\n\nRules of pleadings are intended as aids for a fair trial and for reaching a just decision.\n\nAn action at law should not be equated to a game of chess. Provisions of law are not mere formulas to be observed as rituals. Beneath the words of a provision of law, generally speaking, there lies a juristic principle.\n\nIt is the duty of the court to ascertain that principle and implement it.\n\nWhat\n\ntbn is •the principle underlying s. 86(5)? In our opinion the.aim of •that section is to see that a person accused of a corrupt prac.- tice must know precisely what he is accused of so that he may have the opportunity to meet the allegations made against him.\n\nIf the, accusation made is nebulous and is capable of ting made use of for e_stablishing more than one charge or if it does not make out a corrupt practice at all then the charge fails at the very threshold.\n\nSo Jong as the charge levelled is beyo!ld doubt. s. 86(5) is satisfied; rest is mere refinement. They either pertain to the reion of particulars or evidence.\n\nThat section is not designed to interdict a mere clumsy pleading like the petition before us.\n\nThe purpose of that section is to see that every charge of corrupt practice should be brought before the court before the prescribed period of limitation and none thereafter so tllat the trial of the case may not be converted into a persecution by adding more and more charges or by convertinii, one charge into another as the trial proceeds. The best illustra1ion of the prob !em thats. 86(5) tries to meet is found in Hardwari Lal's case (supra). The allegations made in paragraph 16 Of the .petition therein wer.e as follows :\n\n\"That the respondent committed the corrupt practice of obtaining and procuring or attempting to obtain and procure the assistance for the furtherance of the prospects of his election from the following. persons who are in the service of the Government and belongfog to the prohibited classes within the meaning of section 123'\n\nr7) of tho~ Act-\n\n1. Shri Chand Ram Rathi, Lecturer in Political' Science, Government College, Gurgaon.\n\n2. Shri Gulab Singh, B.A., B.Ed., Govt. High Sclioo[\n\nJharsa ( Gurgaon).\n\n3. Pt. Bltim Singh, Asstt.\n\nSub-Inspector, Police- Securitv Lines, Lytton Road, w Delll.i.\n\n4. Ch. Chhatar Singh, M.A., B.T., Toaoher, V.& P.O.\n\nBharai via Bahadurgarh, District Roh.tak.\n\n5. Ch. Mukhtiar Singh, Inspector of Police, Delhi.\n\n6. Ch. Ra11; hbir Singh, M.A., B.T., Bahadurgarh.\n\nThe respondent has writ\\en letters under his own signatures to the above Government servants soliciting\n\ntheir help and assistance in furtherance of the prospects of his election.\"\n\nThese were all the material facts s'tated in the pe1ition. From those a.verments, it was net possible to make out from whom among the government servants mentioned, the returned candidate alleged to have obtained or procured assistance for the furtherance of the prospects of his election; and who are thoso from whom he is alleged to have attempted to obtain and procure the assistance for the said purpose. That petition was also silent as re11; ards the type of assistance obtained or procured or attempted to be ob.ained or procured. In that case, it was necessary\n\nto state. the type of assistance obtained or procured or attempled to be obtained or procured because a candidate can take the assistance of 11, overnment servants in certain respects. The allegations made in the petition were so elastic that it could have been used for establishing multitude of charges, leaving it free to the petitioner to pick and choose the charge he is in a position to establish. That was an intolerable position for his opponent.\n\nIn substance, 'the petitioner therein had merely quoted the relevant provision of law; he had failed to state the material facts to\n\nbring out the charge sought to be Levelled. He had Clll!t a wide net. This is not so in the case before us. Herein all the ingredients of the corrupt practice viz. ( 1) that the respondent obtained the assistance of Kapur; ( 2) Kapur was a goterDment serva.nt and ( 3) his services were obtained in suppon of the c~1dature of .the reSpondent .by organising her election compa1gn, are mentioned in the petition. The question whn the respondent became a candidate is merely a matter of evidence\n\nFor the reasons mentioned above, we think that the learned 1ud11; e was not iostified in striking out Issire No. 1. -On the other hand, he sh.ould .have reframed that issue, as mentioned earlier refore 4e:?icthi$ question, it is necessary to mention one othe;\n\ntct. Iii a~ I . ap~~ appears to have tendered his resignation to ofe 3ie ce tifiw~.boli!m2 on !anuary 13, 1971. The certified copy . . no . ca on produced shows that the President accepted..,..( his res12natK\"1 on the 25th of January '71 and the same was\n\n...\n\ngazetted on February 6, 1971. The order of the President shows that he accepted Yashpal Kapur's resignation with effect from January 14, 1971. The learned trial judge without examining the true effect of the President's order has abruptly come to the conclusion that Yashpal Kapur's resignation became effective as from January 14, 1971. This conclusion, in our opinion, requires reexamination.\n\nH is necessary to examine whether a government servant's resignation can be accepted with effect from an earlier date.\n\nAt any rate whether such an acceptance has any validity in considering a corrupt practice under s. 123 (7). If such a course is permissible, it might enable the government to defeat 1the mandate of s. 123(7). The question as to wlPn a government servant's resignation becomes effective came up for consideration by this Court in Raj Kumar v. Union of India(!).\n\nTherein this Court ruled that when a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation the determination of his employment, his service normally stands terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority and, in the absence of any law or statutory rule governing the conditions of his service, to the contrary, it will not be open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority. Hence the question as to when Yashpal Kapur';\n\nresignation became effective will have to be examined with reference to his ci:mditions of service. This examination having not been done. the conclusion of the learned trial judge that it .became effective on January 14, 1971, has to be ignored.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we set aside the order of the trial judge striking out Issue No. l and the last part of Issue No. 3 and restore Issue No. I as amended by us.\n\nNow coming to the appeal against the order on the amendment application, the foamed trial judge disallowed the amendments sought on t!J.~ sole 1ground that if <those amendments are allowed, it will amount to amending the statement of material facts and 1the same is not permissible in view of s. 86(5). We have already found that that conclusion of the learned trial judge is not correct. The amendment application was moved even before the trial of the case commenced. It is not shown how the amendments sought in respect of paragraphs 2 and 5 of the petition can prejudice the case of the respondent. They are merely clarifica- 1 tory in charater. !his Court uled in Shri B_alwan .ingh v.\n\nShri Lakshmi Narain and ors.(·) that an electton petition was\n\n. not liable to be dismissed in limine because full particulars of corrupt practice alleged were not set out.\n\nIt further observed '- that if an objection was taken and the tribunal was of the view . ~that the full particulars have not been set out, the petitioner had\n\n-Ol-[l96iJ 3 S.ER. 857. ----\n\n(2) [1960] J s.c.R. 91.\n\nto be .R)ven an opportunity 'to amend or amplify the particulars.\n\nIt was only in the event of non-compliance with the order to supply the pal'liculars that the charge which remained vague could be struck out. In that case 1he amendment was sought after the evidence was closed in the case.\n\nTi\\is Court allowed the same.\n\nCourts are ordinarily liberal in allowing amendment of pleadings B unless it results in prejudicing the case of the opposite party. Any • inconvenience caused by an amendment can always be compensated by costs..\n\nWe think that the amendments asked for, should . have been allowed and we allow the same.\n\nThe election peti , tion will be accordingly amended and the respondent will be\n\nafforded an opportunity to file any additional written statement, if c she so desires.\n\nThis leaves us with the question of interrogatories. As many as 31 interrogatories have been served on the respondent as mentioned earlier.\n\nOut of them Nos. 24 to 30 have been allowed.\n\nHence we need not consider them.\n\nInterrogatories Nos. 19 to 23 relate to Issue No. 2.\n\nTherefore they are rightly struck out.\n\nWe now come to in~rrogatories Nos. I to 18 and 31. We have carefully ex!!!!).ined those interrogatories.\n\nNone of them' 1ouch the core of the allegations relating 'to commission of the corrupt practice which is the subject matter of Issue No. 1. They merely tourh the frin2.e of the matter.\n\nOrder XT, r. I, C.P.C. provides :\n\n\"In any wit the plaintiff or defendant by leave of '>the Court may deliver interrogatories in writing for the examination of the opposite parties or any one or more of such parties and such interrogatories when delivered shall have a note at the foot thereof stating whicn of\n\nuch interrogtories each of such person. is required to\n\nlnswer; Providd that no party shall deliver more than one set of interrogatories to the same party without an order for that purpose.\n\nProvided, a\\so that interrogatories which do not rejate to. any matters in question in the suit shall be\n\nde4)e~ melevant, notwithstanding, 'that they might be admtssible on the oral cross-examination of a witness.\"\n\nQu~ion~ that may be :elevant during cross-examination me not neceanly relevant as rn~rrogatories. The only questions that are .relevant. as, injrrogatories are those relating to \"any matters m quest10n'.\n\nThe interrogatories served must h\n\nreasoab!y close onnection with \"matters in question\".\n\nVie~~~ !bus, mterro2atones I to 18 as well as 31 mu51 be held t ,_, 1rrelevarrt. o \"'\"\n\nIn the result Civil Appeal No. I 08 or 1972 is allowed to the A extent mentioned abov.~. In other respects the same is dismissed.\n\nCivil App;:al No. 109 of 1972 is .allowed in full. In the circumstances of 1hese cases, we make no order as to costs.\n\nK:B.N.\n\nCivil A ppea/ No. !08 of 1912 allowed in part.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 109 of 1972 allowed. : B\n\n/, '\n\n' J", "total_entities": 86, "entities": [{"text": "RAJ NARAIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 10, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJ NARAIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "INDIRA NEHRU GANDHI AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "INDIRA NEHRU GANDHI AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 15, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 69, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "INDIRA NEHRU GANDHI AND ANR •.\n\nMarch 15, 1972\n\n(K. S. HEGDE, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND K. K. MATHEW; JJ.J\n\nRepresentation of the People Act, 1951-Section\n\n86(5)-SCOP<- Pleadings relming to corru."}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. K. MATHEW", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section\n\n86(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 343, "end_char": 371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 86(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 643, "end_char": 656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Civil Procedure 1908", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure 1908"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 664, "end_char": 702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 86(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1130, "end_char": 1138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 86(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1247, "end_char": 1255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2473, "end_char": 2496, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 123(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4338, "end_char": 4347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5420, "end_char": 5431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, J. P. Goyal, K. N. Tripathi, R. C. Srivastava, S. S. Khanduja and R. A. Gupta, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "J. P. Goyal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5433, "end_char": 5444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, J. P. Goyal, K. N. Tripathi, R. C. Srivastava, S. S. Khanduja and R. A. Gupta, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "K. N. Tripathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5446, "end_char": 5460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, J. P. Goyal, K. N. Tripathi, R. C. Srivastava, S. S. Khanduja and R. A. Gupta, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. C. Srivastava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5462, "end_char": 5478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, J. P. Goyal, K. N. Tripathi, R. C. Srivastava, S. S. Khanduja and R. A. Gupta, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. S. Khanduja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5480, "end_char": 5494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, J. P. Goyal, K. N. Tripathi, R. C. Srivastava, S. S. Khanduja and R. A. Gupta, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. A. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5499, "end_char": 5510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, J. P. Goyal, K. N. Tripathi, R. C. Srivastava, S. S. Khanduja and R. A. Gupta, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5554, "end_char": 5568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, S. C. Khare, Yageshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga nod S. Bagga, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. C. Khare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5570, "end_char": 5581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, S. C. Khare, Yageshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga nod S. Bagga, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Yageshwar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5583, "end_char": 5599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, S. C. Khare, Yageshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga nod S. Bagga, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. K. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5601, "end_char": 5612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, S. C. Khare, Yageshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga nod S. Bagga, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Bagga"}}, {"text": "S. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5617, "end_char": 5625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, S. C. Khare, Yageshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga nod S. Bagga, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Bagga"}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5716, "end_char": 5721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J.\n\nTheso appeals by special leave arise from the eleciion petiti.on filed by .he appellant challenging the validity of the election of respondent No."}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6371, "end_char": 6376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Broome", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6662, "end_char": 6668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ave to serve interrogatories on the respondenl was heard by Broome J.\n\nThe_ learned Judge by his order dated September 14, 1971 overruled the objections of the respondent and directed as follows :\n\n\"Accordmgly i allow the application A-29 and grant leave to the petitioner to deliver !"}}, {"text": "September 14, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6711, "end_char": 6729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ave to serve interrogatories on the respondenl was heard by Broome J.\n\nThe_ learned Judge by his order dated September 14, 1971 overruled the objections of the respondent and directed as follows :\n\n\"Accordmgly i allow the application A-29 and grant leave to the petitioner to deliver !"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7284, "end_char": 7289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Yashpal Kapur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9426, "end_char": 9439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 obtained and procured the assistance of Yashpal Kapur in furtherance of the prospec'ts of her election while he was still a Gazetted Officer in the service of Government of India.", "canonical_name": "Yashpal Kapur"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9545, "end_char": 9564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 obtained and procured the assistance of Yashpal Kapur in furtherance of the prospec'ts of her election while he was still a Gazetted Officer in the service of Government of India."}}, {"text": "Section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9839, "end_char": 9850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9858, "end_char": 9896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10067, "end_char": 10073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11587, "end_char": 11592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 1, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11623, "end_char": 11639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent became a candidate within the first part of s. 79 (b) when she was nominated on February 1, 1971."}}, {"text": "Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12363, "end_char": 12391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi and the respondent No."}}, {"text": "Swami Advaifa Nand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12417, "end_char": 12435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 Swami Advaifa Nand we1e also candidates in the said election from the 22-Rae Bareili Parliamentary constituency for the Lok Sabha.", "canonical_name": "Swami\n\nAdvaita Nand"}}, {"text": "Yashpal Kapur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12571, "end_char": 12584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5, That the said Shri Yashpal Kapur was Gazetted Officer in the Government of India, holding the post of an officer on Special Duty.", "canonical_name": "Yashpal Kapur"}}, {"text": "Yashpal Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12794, "end_char": 12807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi obtained and procured\n\ntflc assistance of the said Shri Yashpal Kapur for the furtherance of the prospects of her election from the 8-Lt06!Sup.", "canonical_name": "Yashpal Kapur"}}, {"text": "Yahpal i<apur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12937, "end_char": 12950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cl/73\n\ncrnstituency aforesaid inasmuch as the said Shri Yahpal i<apur was a gazetted officer in the service of the Government of India when his assistance was obtained and procured (a corrupt practice under section 123 ( 7) of the R.P. Act, 195 l was committed by the respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Yashpal Kapur"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13088, "end_char": 13099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indira Nehru Gandhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13255, "end_char": 13274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Shri Yashpal Kapur on the directions of Shrim<rd Indira Nehru Gandhi organised the electione.ring work for her in 1he constituency as her elction agent during the entire period from even before the filing of the nomination paper 1he filing ('I) the counting and the declaration of the result of the election.", "canonical_name": "INDIRA NEHRU GANDHI AND ANR"}}, {"text": "Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13706, "end_char": 13709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Samyukta Socialist Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13792, "end_char": 13816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That as the petitioll!r's candidature was being supported not only by Samyukta Socialist Party to which !"}}, {"text": "Jan Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13866, "end_char": 13875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he pelitioner belonged but also by the Jan Sangh, the Indian National Congress (Organization), Bhartiya Kranti Dal and the Swatantra Parties and since the candidature of respondent No."}}, {"text": "Indian National Congress (Organization)", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13881, "end_char": 13920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he pelitioner belonged but also by the Jan Sangh, the Indian National Congress (Organization), Bhartiya Kranti Dal and the Swatantra Parties and since the candidature of respondent No."}}, {"text": "Bhartiya Kranti Dal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13922, "end_char": 13941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he pelitioner belonged but also by the Jan Sangh, the Indian National Congress (Organization), Bhartiya Kranti Dal and the Swatantra Parties and since the candidature of respondent No."}}, {"text": "Swatantra Parties", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13950, "end_char": 13967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he pelitioner belonged but also by the Jan Sangh, the Indian National Congress (Organization), Bhartiya Kranti Dal and the Swatantra Parties and since the candidature of respondent No."}}, {"text": "Indira Nehru Gandhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14025, "end_char": 14044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi was being supported by the Muslim Majlis, Muslim !", "canonical_name": "INDIRA NEHRU GANDHI AND ANR"}}, {"text": "Communist Party of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14109, "end_char": 14133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jague and the Communist Party of India (it was apprehended by Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi and her election agent Shri Yashpal Kapur •that an overwhelming majority of Hindu voters miht cast 1fieir votes for the petitioner against ShdrMtl Indira Nehru Gandhi."}}, {"text": "Indira Nehru Gandhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14166, "end_char": 14185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jague and the Communist Party of India (it was apprehended by Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi and her election agent Shri Yashpal Kapur •that an overwhelming majority of Hindu voters miht cast 1fieir votes for the petitioner against ShdrMtl Indira Nehru Gandhi.", "canonical_name": "INDIRA NEHRU GANDHI AND ANR"}}, {"text": "Swami\n\nAdvaita Nand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14421, "end_char": 14440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 Swami\n\nAdvaita Nand to also stand as a candidate in the elec- 1ion.", "canonical_name": "Swami\n\nAdvaita Nand"}}, {"text": "Swami Advaitanand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14630, "end_char": 14647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 Swami Advaitanand as a gift with the object of directly including him to stand as a candidate at •the said dection.", "canonical_name": "Swami\n\nAdvaita Nand"}}, {"text": "Swami Advaita Nrtnd", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14840, "end_char": 14859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50,000Iwas made\n\nby the said Shri Yashpal Kapur to Swami Advaita Nrtnd on the 28th January 1971 in the town of Rae Bareili.", "canonical_name": "Swami\n\nAdvaita Nand"}}, {"text": "28th January 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14867, "end_char": 14884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50,000Iwas made\n\nby the said Shri Yashpal Kapur to Swami Advaita Nrtnd on the 28th January 1971 in the town of Rae Bareili."}}, {"text": "Rae Bareili", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14900, "end_char": 14911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50,000Iwas made\n\nby the said Shri Yashpal Kapur to Swami Advaita Nrtnd on the 28th January 1971 in the town of Rae Bareili."}}, {"text": "section 123(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14951, "end_char": 14965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indira Nehru Gadhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15038, "end_char": 15056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indira Nehru Gadhi and her election is therefore liable to be declared void under <ection 100(1) of thi R.P. Act.\" ...", "canonical_name": "INDIRA NEHRU GANDHI AND ANR"}}, {"text": "Y ashpal Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15793, "end_char": 15807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But all the sam~, it is obvious from those avermcnts that the respondent is alleged to hav.~ obtained the assistance ot Y ashpal Kapur when he con•tinued to be a gazetted officer for crganizing her electioneering work."}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17390, "end_char": 17395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true chat one of the ingredients of tho~ corrupt practice alleged i.e. that when •the respondent obtained the assistance of Kapur, she was a candidate is not specifically set out in the petition but from 'lhe allegations made; it flows as a necessary implication."}}, {"text": "s. 83(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18988, "end_char": 18996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19012, "end_char": 19017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19084, "end_char": 19094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19534, "end_char": 19539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "JNDIRA GANDHI", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20751, "end_char": 20764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not necessary to go to that decision as the ratio of •that decisions has been elaborately\n\nill [1957] S.C.R. 370,\n\nRAJ NARAIN V, JNDIRA GANDHI (Hegde, !.)"}}, {"text": "ss. 83 and 86(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20901, "end_char": 20917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20946, "end_char": 20951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 86(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21494, "end_char": 21502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 86(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24784, "end_char": 24792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 86(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25270, "end_char": 25278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hardwari Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25895, "end_char": 25907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "em thats. 86(5) tries to meet is found in Hardwari Lal's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26320, "end_char": 26331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chand Ram Rathi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26360, "end_char": 26375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Chand Ram Rathi, Lecturer in Political' Science, Government College, Gurgaon."}}, {"text": "Gulab Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26447, "end_char": 26458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Gulab Singh, B.A., B.Ed.,"}}, {"text": "Bltim Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26520, "end_char": 26531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bltim Singh, Asstt."}}, {"text": "Ch. Chhatar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26608, "end_char": 26625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ch."}}, {"text": "Ra11", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26760, "end_char": 26764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ra11; hbir Singh, M.A., B.T., Bahadurgarh."}}, {"text": "February 6, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29173, "end_char": 29189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ca on produced shows that the President accepted..,..( his res12natK\"1 on the 25th of January '71 and the same was\n\n...\n\ngazetted on February 6, 1971."}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29773, "end_char": 29779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29875, "end_char": 29884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 14, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30783, "end_char": 30799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the conclusion of the learned trial judge that it .became effective on January 14, 1971, has to be ignored."}}, {"text": "s. 86(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31284, "end_char": 31292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33490, "end_char": 33495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_848_954_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "PABITAR SINGH\n\nSTATE OF BWAR\n\nMarch 22, 1972\n\n[A. N. GROVER AND M. H. BEG, JJ.J\n\nIndian Arms Act (UV of 1959), ss. 25 and 35-Premises in joint 0CcU11ation of two ot'rsons-Gun concealrd in one room'-Conviction ,, f One of the perso.'ls-Yalidity.\n\nThe appellant and another, Loco employees of the Railway, were in joint occupation of certain quarters consisting of a bed-room and a kitchen.\n\nThey were chared with offences under ss. 25 and 26 of the C Indian Arms Act, 1959. The trial court convictejl\"both the accused. The first appellate Court coovicted the appellant but acquitted the othi:r accused.\n\nIn revision by theappe1lant, the High Court set aside his conviction under s. 26, but upld his coiviction U'lder s. 25, on the bas:s that a J?Un was found i n:Side the kitchen room in which the - appellant concealed himself bolting the room from inside, and that the appellant was the sole occupant of that room at the time when the' police raided the D premises.\n\nAllowing the appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : (I), Th• Courts below h•d not considered the P.rooecution evidence in the light of the gross exaggeratio, which had been 1ntroduoed\n\nabout the door nl tho kitchen-room having been bolted or chai\"ed from inside by the appellont. Once that vital'fact is disbelieved !he ent're story .c; f the apoellan havi.1~ concealed himself in that room had to be rejected. t\n\n!953 C.El\n\n(2) On Ibo evidence, the quarters m.u•t be held to be In the join~ possession of both the accused.\n\nU.1der s. 35 of the Act wluch was never considered by the courts below where any arms or ammunition are Or is 1ound in any premises in he joint oxupation or u.1der the joint con .. trol ni: several J)Cfsons, ea.ch oi such persons in respect of whom Jnere is rra., ntJ to believe that he was aware of the txistcnce of the arms and F ammunition in the premises unless the contrary is proved wiJl be liable\n\nfor tne offence under s. 25 { l) of bei.1g in possession df an unhce .. sed fite arm.\n\nBut, in the preseat; case the prosecUtion had -not established the essentiW ingredients of the offence in the light of the prov15.ons of s. 35.\n\nAs the u.1 was concealed in such a manner that it was not visible to the naked eye, it could not be urged that when the appe1Jant was using the kitchen he would be aware of its existence in that rocm. (953 F-Hl G\n\n(3) In cases of this nature involvin.e liberty and carer of a citizen .s:reat care and attention .should be devO'led by the courts to all questions or Jaw and tact. 954 A-BJ\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 128 of 1969.\n\nAop~I by Spcial Leave from the judgment and order dated February 6, 1969 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Revisicn No. ,541 of 1968.\n\nPABITAR SINGH v. BIHAR (Grover, J.-) 949\n\nA S. C. Agrawala and V.\".J. Francis, for the appellant.\n\nU. P. Singh, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment qf the Patna High Court.\n\nOriginally two persons B Paoitar Singh (the present appellant) and Ram Ashray Sharma who were both Loco employees of the Railway were tried under 25 and 26 of the Indian Arms Act 1959, hereinafter called the \"Act\".\n\nThe learned Assistant Sessions Judge found each one of them guilty under both the sections.\n\nThe sentence imposed was 3 years rigorous imprisonment under s. 26 and one year's rigorous \"imprisonment under s. 25 of the Act.\n\nThe sentences were to run C concurrently.\n\nThe.convicted persons filed an appeal to the court of Seisions.\n\nThe Additional Sessions Judge, Gaya, who heard the appeal found the appellant guilty under both the sections of the Act.\n\nHe maintained the sentence imposed on him.\n\nRam khray Sharma was given the benefit of doubt ana acquitted.\n\nPabitar Singh moved the High Court in revision.\n\nHis conviction under D s. 26 of the Act was set aside by the High Court but his conviction and sentence under s. 25 of the Act were upheld.\n\nIt is necessary to state a few facts.\n\nThe appellant and Ram Ashray Sharma were in joint occupation of quarter No. 490-A of the Loco Colony at Gaya.\n\nSome confidential information was conveyed by Bishrampore police station to the Kotwali police station nt Gaya that stolert properties connected with a dacoit}' were lying concealed in the aforesaid auarter.\n\nConseauent\\y Rama Shankar Upadhyay Station House Officer, Gaya Kotwali pQlice station raided the quarter at 5.45 a.m. on November 5, 1962.\n\nHe took with him two .witnesse• P.W. 1 Vijay Kumar Duhev nd PW. 5 Deonndan Ram.\n\nThe quarter was found locked from outside.\n\nRam Ashray Sharma was reported to be on duty.\n\nHe was sent for and he opened the outer lock of the quarter with his key.\n\nIt was alleged that when the search was made. inside the quarter the apnellant was found in the quarter, c0nce1E\"\" him, elf in the kitchen room which was b<ilted from in•ide.\n\nThat room was got onened.\n\nA countrv made gun was\n\nfoun~ l\"inq in between tw0 hricli:< on the ton' of which a tin containing flour in a bag covere\"d with a brass thali was placed.\n\nThe beJ room.ws searched aqd two live 12 bore cartridges were found wrappd m a small cloth.\n\nThese had been placed behind a framed picture of Lord Shiva.\n\nTim lelrne'.! judge of the High Court formed the view that the appellant could not be convicted in respect of the cartridges which were found in the bed room which was in joint occupation of Ram\n\nAhrav Sharma and the apoellant.\n\nAccording to the learned judge the inference of conscious possession of the appellant had\n\nbeen drawn by the couts below from tl!P, fact that the picture A benrnd wn1ch the cartridges were found was just above the cot.\n\nThe fact that that cot belonged to Pabitar Singh had been stated by P.W. 1 alone.\n\nNo reliance could be placed on that witness as he had to be declared hostile.\n\nIn view of the fact that the room was in joil)t possession of two persons .the learned judge held that no inference of the appellant's conscious possession of the cart 8 ridges and their concealment by him could be drawn.\n\nSo far as the gun was concerned the learned judge observed that it was found inside the kitchen room in which Pabitar Singh was found having concealed himself.\n\nHe was the only occupant of the room at the moment.\n\nHe. had bolted the IDC\\ffi C from inside.\n\nIn spite of certain serious discrepancies and other matters which. will be presently discussed the lea\\'lled judge accept ed the pndiqg based mainly on the evidence of the Sub-In5pector that the appellant had .concealed himself in the kitchen room and •the gun was found conceaed there and an infer., nce cou'd, therefore, be drawn that he was in conscious possession of that gun.\n\nD We may at this stage refer to the relevant provisions . of the Act and the changes which appear to have been made in the In, iian Arms A'ct 1878 by the Act with wlrich we are concerned, namely the Anns Act 19 5 9.\n\nSection 14 of the Act or 18 7 8 provided that no person shall have in his possession or . under his control any cannon or firearm or any ammunition or military E stores except under l1 license and in the man11er and to the extent permitted thereby.\n\nSection 15 related to possession of arms of any clesription without license proh!'bited in certain places. Section\n\n19 ( 1 ) ( f) to the extent it is material was in these terms : ,.....\n\nS. 19 (1) \"Whoever commits any of the following ojknces (namely) :- F ....................... '\\' • .......... .\n\n(f) has in his possession or under his control any arms, ammunition or military stores in contraventidh of the orovisions of section 14. or section\n\n15;\" .\n\nshall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine, or with both\"\n\nThe Act came into force on the_ first dav of October 1962 as it\n\nwas OJ\\ that date that tbe requisite notification was macle. Under , sub-s. ('3) of s. 1.. ction 3 reads :-\n\n H . \"No ponon shall acquire, have in his possession or carry any . fireann or ammunition unlesa be holds in tbls\n\nD )\n\n. 'I\n\n~.i\n\nPABITAR SINGH v.\n\n0B!HAif (Grover, J.) 951\n\nbehalf a license issued in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder : .\n\nProviC:.d that . . . . . .\" '\n\nSection 7 relates to prohibition of acquisition or possession etc. of prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition.\n\nChapter III contains provisions relating to licenses, Chapter IV to power and procedure and Chapter V to offences and penalties. , Section 25 to the exte.nt it is relevant for this case is as follows :\n\nS. 25 (1) \"WhQever-\n\n( a) acquires, has in his possession or carries in any firearm or ammunition in contravention of section 3 ; or•\n\nshall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years. or with fine or with both\".\n\nSection 35 provides :-\n\n\"Where any arms or ammunition in respect of which . any offence under this Act has been or being conrmitted a1 e or is found _in any prtlmises, vehicle or other place .in the joint oc¢u9ation or under the joint control of\n\nseveral persons, each. of such per8ons in respect of whO)ll there is reason to beliew that be was aware of the existence of the aims or ammunition iI\\ the premises, vehicle or other place shall, unless the contrary is -proved, be liable for'that offence in the same manner as if it has beeii or is g poquni\\ted b, y hijn alone\".\n\nIn s. 25( i )(a) only the W<irds \"has .in his possession\" have been retained and the other worils which appeared disjunctively in s. 19 (I)( f) namely, or under his control\" have beeti. omitted.\n\nSection 3 5 l\\ppears to have been newly iilsetted to clarify the true position where at\\Y 1aims or ammunition are or is found , in any premises etc. in the joint occupation or under the joint control of several persons.\n\nEach of such persons in respect of w)lqm tltere is reason to believe that he was aware of the existence of the armt and ammunition in the preQlises unle!ls .the contrary is proved will be liable for that offence.\n\nIt is abundantly clear from a perusal of the judents of the courts belaw including the High Court that the case was neither tried nor examin_ed from the point of view of the provisions contained in s . .35 of the Act.\n\nIn the present case the .quarter wu admittedlv in joint occupation Of botll the allant and Ram Ashray Sharinl. It is tiue that at the time of tho raid llam\n\nAshray Sharma was not present but the mere presence of the A appellant was not sufficient to make him guilty of the offence unless the court could come to the conclusion that thete was reason to believe that be was aware of the existence of the gun in the premises.\n\nIf the view of the courts below is accepted that the appellant had concealed himself after having' locked the kitchen\n\nwhen the raid took place and that be was in exclusive posses, ion B of the kitchen it might have been possible in the light of other tacts and circumstances to come to the conclusion that the conditions laid down in s. 35 were satified. The courts have, however, ignored wme salient facts which were proved and which completely negatived the case of the prosecution that the appellant bad locked himself in the kitchen and was in sole occupation C thereof.\n\nThe learned trial Judge pointed out that the story that lhe appellant had locked himself in the. kitchen was not supported by P. W. 1.\n\nIn his view that witness had displayed considerable sympathy fo;· the accused person.\n\nHe therefore took into consideration the statement made by the witness to the police. P.W: I had been declared hostile. It has not been shown on behalf of the\n\nState how such a course could be followed and any statement made D by him could be relied on particularly, when the aforesaid witness had been , declared hostile and had to be cross-examined by the prosecutor.\n\nThe appellant had also moved the trial judge for local inspection an.cl it was pointed out to the judge that there was no device at all in the door of the kitchen by which it could be dosed from inside.\n\nOther inaccuracies in the de, criotion of the E room which were to be found in the statement of P.W. 14 Rama Shankar Upadhaya_:_the Investigating Officer-were also pointed out.\n\nThis is what the trial judge stated in his judgment :\n\n'; It cannot, therefore, be denied that the de, criotion of the room as given bv by the I.O. applied to the latrine of the quarter rather than the kitchn excent for its loc•tion i.e. th•t it wa' situate1l adjacent ea•t to the northo'rn end nf the inner varandah.\n\nThe. latrb.e, it may be pointed out is at some distance east of the varandah\".\n\nAfter stating a few fact' the trial judge came to the conclusion that the fnve, tieatine Officer had made some confu, ion in the G description of the kitchen.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judee acceoted the finding thai the appellant had decided to \"close himself in the kitchen\".\n\nNow the story that the appellant had concealed him•elf inside the kitchen was ba•'lrl sub•tantiallv on the evirlence of PW. 14, .H the TnvQStigating Pfficer.\n\nA perusal of hi' st!ltement would not satMv any court that imnlicit reliance could be nlAc'ld on his evidence.\n\nHe had deposed in catgorical terms that he found the\n\nPABITAR SINGH v. B!HAR (Grover, J.) 953\n\ndoor of the kitchen closed from inside.\n\nHe stated in crossexamination that the. hains were fitted in the door from inside as also from outsi.de.\n\nThe hinge for chaining the door was not fitted to the door frame but 1t was fitted to the door plank.\n\nHe also gave description of the kitchen which was found to be different when the inspection was made by the trial judge nor were any chains or marks of any chains wa~ found in the door of the kitchen as deposed to by P:W. 14.\n\nP.W. 2 Ram Swarath, officer-incharge, polic; e station Daltonganj who accompanied the raiding party also stated that the door of the kitchen room was closed which was got unfastened. It is implicit in his statement thatthere was some bolting or chaining device in the door of the kitchen room by which it had been secured by the appellant.\n\nThis is not at all supported by the inspection note.\n\nThe allegation that the kitchen had. been bolted from inside by the appellant who had concealed himself there at the time of the raid finds mention in the first information report as well.\n\nThe comts below do not appear to have looked at the prosecution evidence in the light of this gross exaggeration which had been introduced about the door having been bolted or chained from inside by the appellant where he was alleged to have concealed himself.\n\nOnce that vital fact is disbelieved the entire story of his having concealed himself in the kitchen becomes doubtful and worthy of rejection.\n\nIt has also been suggested in some of the judgments of the courts and this fact has been relied upon on behalf of the State before us that the kitr.hen was used only by the appellant and not by Ram Ashray Sharma, the other occupant.\n\nHowever, there is absolutely no material on which any such suggestion could be justified or based.\n\nWe are wholly at a loss to understand hi1w a quarter which consisted only of a bedroom and a kitchen would not be in the joint possession of both these persons, namely, the appellant and Ram Ashray Sharma.\n\nThe next and .the crucial question that arises is whether the prosecution has established the essential inredients of the offence in the light of the provisions of s. 35 of the Act. It has been urged that when the appellant was using the kitchen it was legitimate to expect that he-would be aware of the existence of the gun which was concealed there.\n\nThe gun was concealed in such a maMer that it was not visible to the naked eye.\n\nAlthough there may be 'very grave suspicion that the appellant was aware of the existence of the gun the prosecution is bound to establish facts from which the court could have reason to believe that he was aware of the existence of the unlicensed fire-ann.\n\nWe are not satisfied in the present case that any such facts have been established.\n\nLastly it cannot be ov.er-emphasised that in cases of the pre- A sent nature where not only the. liberty of a citizen is involved but also his whole career on conviction a person in service is bound to be dismissed great care and attention should be devoted by the courts to all questions of law and fact which unfortunately had not been done in the present case.\n\nThat has Jed to miscarriage of justice.\n\nThe appellant, is en.titled to the 1-enefit of doubt and he B is hereby acquitted.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 62, "entities": [{"text": "SINGH\n\nSTATE OF BWAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 22, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 44, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF BWAR\n\nMarch 22, 1972\n\n[A. N. GROVER AND M. H. BEG, JJ.J\n\nIndian Arms Act (UV of 1959), ss."}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 96, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 25 and 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Arms Act", "statute": "Indian Arms Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 25 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 427, "end_char": 440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Arms Act", "statute": "Indian Arms Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Arms Act, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 450, "end_char": 471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 678, "end_char": 683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Arms Act, 1959", "statute": "Indian Arms Act, 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 716, "end_char": 721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Arms Act, 1959", "statute": "Indian Arms Act, 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1491, "end_char": 1496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1911, "end_char": 1916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2113, "end_char": 2118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2658, "end_char": 2674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aop~I by Spcial Leave from the judgment and order dated February 6, 1969 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Revisicn No. ,"}}, {"text": "S. C. Agrawala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2759, "end_char": 2773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PABITAR SINGH v. BIHAR (Grover, J.-) 949\n\nA S. C. Agrawala and V.\"."}}, {"text": ".J. Francis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2781, "end_char": 2792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PABITAR SINGH v. BIHAR (Grover, J.-) 949\n\nA S. C. Agrawala and V.\"."}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2814, "end_char": 2825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. P. Singh, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Grover", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2891, "end_char": 2897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment qf the Patna High Court."}}, {"text": "B Paoitar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3002, "end_char": 3017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Originally two persons B Paoitar Singh (the present appellant) and Ram Ashray Sharma who were both Loco employees of the Railway were tried under 25 and 26 of the Indian Arms Act 1959, hereinafter called the \"Act\"."}}, {"text": "Ram Ashray Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3046, "end_char": 3063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Originally two persons B Paoitar Singh (the present appellant) and Ram Ashray Sharma who were both Loco employees of the Railway were tried under 25 and 26 of the Indian Arms Act 1959, hereinafter called the \"Act\".", "canonical_name": "Ram Ashray Sharinl"}}, {"text": "Indian Arms Act 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3142, "end_char": 3162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3349, "end_char": 3354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Arms Act 1959", "statute": "the Indian Arms Act 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3399, "end_char": 3404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Arms Act 1959", "statute": "the Indian Arms Act 1959"}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge, Gaya", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3530, "end_char": 3561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Additional Sessions Judge, Gaya, who heard the appeal found the appellant guilty under both the sections of the Act."}}, {"text": "Ram khray Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3692, "end_char": 3708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram khray Sharma was given the benefit of doubt ana acquitted."}}, {"text": "Pabitar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3756, "end_char": 3769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pabitar Singh moved the High Court in revision.", "canonical_name": "PABITAR SINGH"}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3828, "end_char": 3833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Arms Act 1959", "statute": "the Indian Arms Act 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3915, "end_char": 3920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Arms Act 1959", "statute": "the Indian Arms Act 1959"}}, {"text": "Ram Ashray Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4003, "end_char": 4020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant and Ram Ashray Sharma were in joint occupation of quarter No.", "canonical_name": "Ram Ashray Sharinl"}}, {"text": "Gaya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4089, "end_char": 4093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "490-A of the Loco Colony at Gaya."}}, {"text": "Bishrampore police station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4142, "end_char": 4168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some confidential information was conveyed by Bishrampore police station to the Kotwali police station nt Gaya that stolert properties connected with a dacoit}' were lying concealed in the aforesaid auarter."}}, {"text": "Rama Shankar Upadhyay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4318, "end_char": 4339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Conseauent\\y Rama Shankar Upadhyay Station House Officer, Gaya Kotwali pQlice station raided the quarter at 5.45 a.m. on November 5, 1962."}}, {"text": "Gaya Kotwali pQlice station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4363, "end_char": 4390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Conseauent\\y Rama Shankar Upadhyay Station House Officer, Gaya Kotwali pQlice station raided the quarter at 5.45 a.m. on November 5, 1962."}}, {"text": "November 5, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4426, "end_char": 4442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Conseauent\\y Rama Shankar Upadhyay Station House Officer, Gaya Kotwali pQlice station raided the quarter at 5.45 a.m. on November 5, 1962."}}, {"text": "Vijay Kumar Duhev", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4484, "end_char": 4501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He took with him two .witnesse• P.W. 1 Vijay Kumar Duhev nd PW."}}, {"text": "Deonndan Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4511, "end_char": 4523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 Deonndan Ram."}}, {"text": "Shiva", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5196, "end_char": 5201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These had been placed behind a framed picture of Lord Shiva."}}, {"text": "Tim lelrne", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5204, "end_char": 5214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tim lelrne'.!"}}, {"text": "Ahrav Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5400, "end_char": 5412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "judge of the High Court formed the view that the appellant could not be convicted in respect of the cartridges which were found in the bed room which was in joint occupation of Ram\n\nAhrav Sharma and the apoellant."}}, {"text": "Pabitar Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5688, "end_char": 5701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that that cot belonged to Pabitar Singh had been stated by P.W. 1 alone."}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6894, "end_char": 6904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7144, "end_char": 7154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7251, "end_char": 7262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7332, "end_char": 7337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7571, "end_char": 7581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7586, "end_char": 7597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7860, "end_char": 7864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8196, "end_char": 8205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8440, "end_char": 8450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8512, "end_char": 8517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8630, "end_char": 8639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8754, "end_char": 8764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25( i )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9334, "end_char": 9347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9461, "end_char": 9466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9527, "end_char": 9536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Ashray Sharinl", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10272, "end_char": 10290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case the .quarter wu admittedlv in joint occupation Of botll the allant and Ram Ashray Sharinl.", "canonical_name": "Ram Ashray Sharinl"}}, {"text": "Ashray Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10338, "end_char": 10351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is tiue that at the time of tho raid llam\n\nAshray Sharma was not present but the mere presence of the A appellant was not sufficient to make him guilty of the offence unless the court could come to the conclusion that thete was reason to believe that be was aware of the existence of the gun in the premises."}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10940, "end_char": 10945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rama Shankar Upadhaya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12084, "end_char": 12105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Other inaccuracies in the de, criotion of the E room which were to be found in the statement of P.W. 14 Rama Shankar Upadhaya:the Investigating Officer-were also pointed out."}}, {"text": "Ram Swarath", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13682, "end_char": 13693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 2 Ram Swarath, officer-incharge, polic; e station Daltonganj who accompanied the raiding party also stated that the door of the kitchen room was closed which was got unfastened."}}, {"text": "Daltonganj", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13730, "end_char": 13740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 2 Ram Swarath, officer-incharge, polic; e station Daltonganj who accompanied the raiding party also stated that the door of the kitchen room was closed which was got unfastened."}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15370, "end_char": 15375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_85_98_EN", "year": 1972, "text": ".AGRAWAL TRADING CORPORATION & ORS.\n\nCOLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS AND ORS.\n\nJanuary 17, 1972\n\n[K. S. HEGDE, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND D. G. PALEKAR, JJ.J •\n\nForeign Exchange Regulations Act, 1941-Section 8 and 23A-lt• scope-Sea Customs Act S. 19, 167(3), (8) (37)-Does the word 'goods' i11 the said Sections include Currency Notes.\n\nThe appellant, a partnership firm having 2 partners, carried on busi ness of importers and exporters, etc. The Cashier of the firm handed over a wooden case to the Swiss Airways at Dum Dum for being sent to Hong Kon& by air.\n\nAccording to .the consignment note, the consignment was being sent by one R. of Karnani mansions, Calcutta, who was a fictitious person. The shipping bill showed that the consignment purported to contain food and dried vegetables and was sent to I, of Hong Kong, al!o a fictitious person.. After the consignment was accepted and when customs examined it for clearance, it was found that it contained Rs.\n\nSl,000 in Indian currency... On investigation, a search warrant was issued by the Presidency Magistrate and the office of the firm and the residence of partners wre searched. In the course of search, accounts books and other documents were seized.\n\nInvestigation revealed that the Cashier, had signed the consignment note as Rs, which, as the subsequent writings showed; were in his hand. Even the consignment note appears to have been typed on the type-writer of the appellant firm.\n\nThereafter, Customs authorities served a notice on the appellant pointing out that exportation of Indian currency out of India was in contravention of S. 8\n\n(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947 read with Reserve Bank Notification dated 27-2-1951 as specified therein and it was asked to show cause and to produce within 4 days the permit, if any, of the Reserve Bank of India, failing which, it would be liable for prosecunon under Section 23(1) read with S. 8(2) of the Foreign Excbanae Regula !ions Act. The appellant denied that the firm had anything to do with\n\nthe case.\n\nApart from criminal prosecutions against the partners, a fine of Rs. l,000 under section 167(3) of the Sea Customs Act with a further personal liability of Rs. 1,000 u/s. 167(37) of the Act was imposed against the firm. It was further fined Rs. S!,000 u/s. 167(8) of the Act reac! with s. 23 ( 1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act. Apart from these, the currency notes of Rs. 51,000 which were seized, were also con fiscated.\n\nThis order was challenged before the single judge of lhe Calcutta High Court who issued a rule but later discharged it. An appeal against that order was also dismissed. In appeal to this Court, three points, raised before the Appellate Court were also reiterated : (I) Currency Notes are not 'goods' and therefore, the provisions of s. 167(3), (8) and\n\n(37) of the Sea Customs Act are not attracted.\n\n(2) A firm is not a legal entity and therefore, it cannot be a 'person' within the meaning of\n\nany of the abQ¥e provisions of law. (3) Even if a 'firm' be a 'perspn', no penalty can .be imposed on the firm or any of its members unless the members have consciously taken any step to violate the provisions of Jaw;\n\neven so, only the partnermember against whom there is evidence of guilt can be held liable.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : (i) s. 23A of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, incor porates, by reference, the provisions of the Sea Customs Act by deeming the restrictions under section 8 of the Foreign &change Regulations Act, to be prohibiting and restricting under s. 19 of the Sea Customs Act. The legislature ca.n always incorporate by reference, the pro, isions of some other Act, if they are relevant for the purposes of the scheme and object of that Act. Restrictions specified in s. 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act are deemed to be prohibitiona and restrictions mentioned under s. 19 of the Sea Customs Act. The prohibitions mentioned under s. 8 are not necessarily confined to goods alone but must be deemed, for the purposes of Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, to include therein restrictions in respect of tho articles specified in s. 8 thereof, including currency notes as well. [94 BJ\n\n(ii) Although there is no definition of the word 'person' in either of the Acts, the definition in s. 2(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 or Section 2(3) of tho Act of 1863 would be applicable to the present Acts, in both of which, person bas been defined as including any Company or association, or body of individuals whether incorporated or not. Further, tho explanation to s.\n\n23C clearly envisages that a company for the purposes of that Section is defined to mean any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals and a Director in relation to a firm also means a partner of the firm.\n\nTherefore, for the purposes of Foreign Exchange Regulations Act and Sea Customs Act, a ro111sterea partnersn1p flmi is a 'legal entity'. [94 G)\n\n(iii) From the evidence, it was clear that tho appellant attempted to hoodwink the customs officials (currency notes secreted in a cavity), that the consijlllet and consi4nee were not shown as real persons, the charges and expenses Incurred 1n connection with the de1patch wore found ill tho entry in the books of account of tho fir, m that tho amount. sought to be sent was half a lakb of rupees which could ibardly be within the means ;:if tho Cashier and tho Court was riaht in holding that It was the firm which was Interested 1n sending the currency notes out of India in a clandestine manner. f98 Al\n\nRadha Krishna Bhatia v. Union of India & Ors., (1965) .2 S.C.R. 213.\n\nThorrw Dana v. The State of Punjab, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 274 and Additional Collector of Customs v. Sita Ram Agarwal, C.A. No. 492 of 1962 decided on 14-9-1962 referred to ancl distinguished.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 357 of 1967.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated December 9, 1963 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Order No.\n\n110 of 1960. ·\n\nB. Sen, Sadhu Singh, lagmohan Khanna, R. N. Kapoor and H S. K. Dho/akla, for the appellants.\n\nG. L. Sangh/, B. DI tta and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents.\n\n' ..\n\nAGRAWAL TRADING CORP. v. COLLECTOR (Jaganmohan 87 Reddy, 1.) A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nP •. Jaganmoban Reddy, J. This is an appeal by certificate under Article 133 ( 1) (b) of the Constitu!ion against the judgment of the Calcutta High Court which dismissed an appeal from an order of the single Judge of that Court discharging a rule granted B by it to the appellants calling on !he respondents-tire Collector of Customs and others-to show cause why certain orders under various sections of ithe Sea Customs Act and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Aot should not be quashed and why a writ!en complaint made by the rspondents. under tire Foreign Exchange Regulation Ac.t and the case pending in the Court of the Presidency Magis- C trate, Calcutta, should not be stayed.\n\nThe appellant is a registered partnership firm carrying on business of importers, exporters, commission agents, brokers and p; eneral merchants.\n\nIt consists of two partners, Girdhari Lal Gupta and Pooran Mal Jain.\n\nOn the 25'.h October 1958, tire Cashier of, the appellant-Bhag\\Vandeo Tiwari handed over a D consignment of wooden case to the Swiss Airways at Oum Dum Airport for being sent by air freight to Hongkong. According to the consignment note, the consignment was bein)1; sent by one Ramghawan Singh of Kamani Mansions, Park Street, Calcutta, who in fact was a fictitious person.\n\nThe Shipping Bill showed !hat the consignment purported to contain Rassogolla, Achar, Papar and dried vegetaes and it was being sent to one Ishwar Lal; E 41, Wyndham St., Hongkonii: who is also alleged to be a fictitious person.\n\nAfter the consignment was accepted and when the Customs examined it for clearance on 25th October 1958 before i!s onward despatch to Honl!; kong, ithere was found concealed in a specially made secret cavity on the batns nailed to the inner sides of the case, Indian currency notes of Rs. S 1,0001 •.\n\nAn F in\\'estigation was set on foot and on 22nd January 1959 a search warrant was issued by the Presidency Magistrate, pursuan! to which the Customs Officers caused a search to be made of the office of the firm and the residences of the appellant's partners. In\n\nthe course of search account books and other documen!s were seized.\n\nThis investigation revealed that the Cashier, Bhagwandeo G Tiwari had signed the consignment note as Ramchandra which, as\n\nthe subsequent writings showed, were in his hand.\n\nEven the consignment note appears to have been typed on the typewriter of the appellant firm.\n\nIt was further alleged that from a compa• rison of the consignment no~ with a letter admittedly sent out by the appellant firm and signed by one of its partners, Girdhari Lal Gupta, it became evident that the slip seized from the office of H the appellant firm had contained entries, to show that Bhagwandeo Tiwari was tho person who actually transported and booked the oflendinp; consignment in question and that he 111ade an entry\n\nof Rs. l..23.73 being the Air freight paid for its transport to A Hongkong which was the exact amount shown on the consignment the account slip was in his handwriting, and that the expenses note. Bhagwandeo Tiwari, it was said, had in fact admitted that and charl(es shown therein were also found in the books of account of the appellant firm.\n\nIn view of this evidence, the customs awthorities served a natice on the appellant firm on April 2, 1959 B by which after setting out in detail the aforesaid facts and after pointing out that the exportation of lindian currency out of India was in contravell'tion of section 8(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act 194 7 read with the Reserve Bank of India Noti fication dated 27·2-1951 as specified therein, it was asked to show cause and to produce within four days of the receipt (>f the notice, 11he permit, if any, of the Reserve Bank of India, for C export of the Indian currency and if it did not do so, it would be liable for prosecution 1mder section 23 ( 1) read with Eection 8 (2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act.\n\nOn 13·4-1959, the appellant firm replied to the notice denying that the firm had anything to do with the despatch of the box containing currency notes; that i.t was not aware of any person by the name of D Ramghawan Singh or Ishwar Lal, or that Bhagwandeo Tiwari had ever despatched the consignment in question or visited any Air office in connection therewith.\n\nIt may be mentioned en passant that in the High Court, in the reply affidavit affirmed on\n\n11-1-1960 to the affidavit in opposition, Girdhari Lal Gupta, one of the partners of the firm went even to extent of den}ing E that Bhagwandeo Tiwari was the Cashier of the firm, notwithstanding the fact that in' the earlier reply to the show cause notice as also in the Writ Petition, it was tacitly assumed that he was the Cashier.\n\nApart from the criminal prosecutions that were launched F against the partners, in the penalty proceedings which were initiated by the aforesaid show cause notice, the firm was held to be knowingly concerned in the offence and accordingly, a fine of Rs. 1,000/· was imposed on it under section 167(3) of the Sea Customs Act with a further personal liability of Rs. 1,000/-\n\nunder section 167 ( 37) of the said Act.\n\nIt was further fined G Rs. 51,000/- under section 167(8) of the Act read with sei; tion 23 (I ) of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act.\n\nApart from these fines, the currency notes of Rs. 51,000/- which were seized wen confiscated.\n\nH This order was challenged before the. single Julge of the Calcutta High Court who, as already stated, had issued a rule but later discharged it.\n\nAgainst that order an appeal was filed\n\nAGRAWAL TRADING CORP. v. COLLECTOR (Jaganmohan 89 Reddy, I.) A but that also was dismissed.\n\nOf the four points that were urged in that appeal, the first three have been reiterated before us on behalf of the appellant. viz. :-\n\n(1) Currency notes are not 'goods' and ilierefore\n\nthe provisions of section 167(3), (8) and (37) of the Sea Ctistoms Act are not attaroted;\n\n(2) A 'firm' is not a legal entity and therefore it cannot be a 'person' within the meaning of any of the above provisions of law;\n\n(3) Even if a firm be a person within the meaning\n\not the said provisions no penalty can be imposed on 1te firm or any of its members unless it appears from the evidence that the members of the firm had consciously taken any steps to violate the provisions of law; even so only the particular member a~ whom there is evi dence of guilt can be held liable.\n\nBefore dealing with the above contentions it will be necessarY to consider the relevant provisions of he Foreign E Exchange Regulations Aot as also those under the Sea Customs\n\nAct, Sections 8(1), 23(a), (b), (IA), 23A, 23B and 23C of\n\nthe Foreign Exchange Regulations Act and section 19, 167(3),\n\n(8) and (37) of the Sea Customs Act are relevant for •the purpose of this appeal. These are iven below :-\n\n\"8(1). The Central Government may, by notification in he Official Gazette, order that, sub.iect to such exemptions, if any, as may be contained in the notification, no person shall, except with the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank and on payment of the fee, if any, prescribed bring or send into India any gold or silver or any currency notes or bank notes or coin whether Indian or forei)!n. ,\n\nExplanation-The bringing or sending into any port or place in India of any such article as aforesaid H inttnded \\Q be taken out of India without being removed from the ship or conveyance in which it is being carried shall nonetheless be deemed to be a bringing, 7-864Supcl(72\n\nor as the case may be sending, into India of that article\n\nfor the purposes of this sec!ion.\n\n(2) '\n\n23 (I). If any person contravenes the provisions of section 4, section 5, section 9 or sub-section (2) of section 12 or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder, he shall -\n\n(a) be liable to such penalty not exceeding\n\nthree times the value of the foreign exchange in respect of which the contravention has taken place, or five thousand rupees, whichever is more, as may be adjudged by the Director of Enforcement in the manner hereinafter provided, or\n\n(b) upon conviction by a Court, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.\n\n23(1A) Whoever contravenes -\n\n(a) any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder, other than those referred to in subsection (1) of this section and section 19 shall, upon conviction by a court. be punishable with imprisonment for a lel\"m which may extend to tw0 years, or with fine or with both;\n\n(b) any direction or order made under section 19 shall, upon conviction by a court, be punishable with fine which mav extend to two thousand rupees.\n\n23A. Without prejudice to the provisions of section 23 or to any other provision contained in this Act, the restrictions imposed by subsections (1) and (2) of section 8, sub-section\n\n(1) of section 12 and clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 13 shall be deemed to have been imposed under section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (8 of 1878), and all the provisions of that Act shall have effect accordingly except that section 183 thereof\n\nAGRAWAL TRADING CORP. v. COLLECTOR (Jaganmohan 91 Rtddy, J.) shall have effect as if for the word 'shall', therein the word 'may' were substituted.\n\n23B. Whoever attempts to contravene any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder shall be deemed to have contravened that provision, rule, direction or order, as the case may be:\n\n23C(l) If t:he pern committing a contri¥vention: is a company, every person who, at the time the Cl>ntravention was committed, was incharge of, and was responsible, to the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly :\n\nProvided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to punishment, if he proves that the contravention took place without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), where a contravention under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the contravention has taken place with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly''.\n\nSea Customs Act : \"19. The Central Government may from tiine to tiine, by notification in the official Gu.etlle, prohibit or restrict the bringing or taking by sea or by land goods of any specified description into or out of India across any customs frontier as defined by the Central Government.\n\n167. The offences mentioned in the first column of the following schedule shall be punishable to the extent mentioned in the third column of the\n\nsame with reference to such offences res- A pectively :-\n\nOffences Section of this Act to which offe nee bas reference.\n\nI 2\n\n3. If any person ship or land goods, or General\n\nd in the shipment or landing of goods, or knowiagty keep or conceal, or knowingly permit or procure to be kept or concealed, any goods shipped or landed, or intended to be shipped or Janded, contrary to provisions of this Act; or\n\nif any person be found to have been on board of any vessel liable to cou&<ation on account of the commission of an offence under (No. 4) of , this section, while such vessel is within any bay, river, creek or arm of the sea which is not a portfor the shipment and landing of goods.\n\n8. If any goods, the importation or\n\nexportation of which is for the time being prohibited or restricted by or under Chapter IV of 4bis Act, be im ported into or exported from India contrary to such prohibition or restriction or\n\nif any attem~ be made so to import or export any such goods; or\n\nif any such goods be found in any pacli:- DJO produced to any officer of Customs as containlna no such aooda; or\n\nif any sncb aoods, or any dutiilblo aoods, be found either before or after landing\n\nor shipment to have beeo concealed in any manner on board of any vessel within the linlits of any port in India; or\n\nif any '-oods, tho exportation of which is prohibited or restricted as aforesaid, be brouahl to any wharf in order to be put on 6olrd of any voesel for export&• lion con11'11'y to sUch problbillon or mtriclion.\n\n18 & 19\n\nPenalties.\n\nsuch pe.rson shall be liable lo a penalty not exceedin& one thousand rupees.\n\nsuch aoods shall be lia\n\nble to confitcation; and\n\nany person concerned in\n\nany such offence shall be liable to a penalty\n\nDOI teXCCedina throe limes the value of the aoods, or DOI oceedina one thou sand rupees.\n\nAGRAWAL TRADING CORP. v. COLLECTOR (Jaganmohan 93 Reddy, I.)\n\nI 2\n\n37. If it be found, when any goods are 86 & 137\n\nentered at, or brought to be through, a custom house, either for importation or exportation, that-\n\n(a) th• packages in which they are\n\ncontained differ widely from the description given in the bill-of• entry or spplication for passing them; or\n\n(b) the contents thereof have been\n\nwrongly described in such bill or application as regards the denominations, characters, or conditions according to which such goods are chargeable with duty or arc being imported or exported; or\n\n(c) the contents of such packages have been miwtated in rcaard to sort, quality, quantity or value; or\n\n(d) goods not stated in the bill-of.entry\n\nor application have been concealed in1 or mixed with, the articles specined therein, or have apparently been packed so as to deceive the officers of Customs.\n\nand such circ nnstance is not accounted for to the satisfaction of the Customs Collector.\"\n\nsuch packagea, together\n\nwith the whole of the goods contained therein, shall be liable to confiscation, and every person concerned in any such offence shall be liable to a penally not exceeding one thousand rupees.\n\nA perusal of these provisions would show that no gold or silver or any currency no~ or Bank notes or coin, whether Indian or foreign, can be sent to or brought into India, F nor can any gold, precious stones or Indian currency or foreign-exchange other than foreign exchange obtained from an authorised dealer can be sent out of India without the general or special pennission of the Reserve Bank of India. These restrictions by virtue of section 23A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act are deemed to have been imposed under section 19 of the Sea Customs Act and all the provisions of the latter Act shall G have effect accordingly, except seC'tion 183 thereof shall have the effect as if for the word 'shall' !herein the word 'may' were substituted. What section 23A does is to incorporate by reference thn\n\nprovisions of the Sea Customs Act by deeming he restrictions under section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act to be prohibitions and restrictions under section 19 of the Sea Customs H Act. The contention is 'that since section 19 restricts the bringing or talcing by sea or by land goods of any specified description into or out of India, these restrictions are not applicable to the bringing in or taking out the currency notes which are not goods\n\nwithin the meaning of that section, and, therefore, the appellant A is not guilty of any contravention of section 19 of ithe Sea Customs Act and cannot be subjected to the penal provisions of the said Act. This ar.gument, in our view, is misconceived, because firstly, it is a well accepted Legislative praotice to incorporate by reference, if the Legislature so chooses, the provisions of some other Act in w far as they are relevant for the purposes of and B in furtherance of the scheme and objecls of that Aot and secondly,\n\nthat merely because the restriotions specified in section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act are deemed to be prohibitions and restri.ctions under section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, those prohibitions and restrictions are not necessarily confined to goods\n\nalone but must be deemed for the purposes of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act to include therein rei!rictions in respect C of the articles specified in section 8 thereof, including currency notes as well.\n\nThe High Court thought that there is no definition of goods in the General Clauses Act and that contained in the Sale of Goods Act which excludes money is inapplicable inasmuch as that Act was a much later statute than the Sea Customs Aot It is, however, unnecessary to consider this aspect because even D if ·!he currency notes are not goods, the restrictions prescribed in section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Act cannot be nullified by section 23A thereof which incorporates section 19 of the Sea Customs Act. We cannot attribute to the Legislature the intention to obliterate one provision by another provision of the same Act. On the other hand, we construe it as furthering ithe object E of the Act whiCh is to restrict the import into Or export out of India of currency notes and to punish contraventions of such res!rlctions.\n\nThe second contention that because the firm is not a legal entity, it cannot be a person within the meaning of Section 8 of f the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act or of section 167 (3), (8}\n\nand (37) of :he Sea Customs Act, is equally wrtenable. There is of course, no definition of 'person' in either of these Acts but the definition in section 2 (42) of the Genera,! Clauses Act 1897, or section 2(3} of the Act of 1868 would be applicable to the said Acts in both of which 'person' has been defined as including G any company or associatioo or body of individuals whether incorporated or not. It is of course contended that this definition does not apply to a firm which is not a na:tural person and has no legal existence, as such clauses ( 3) , ( 8) and ( 3 7) of section 167 of the Sea Customs Act are inapplicable !O the appellant firm.\n\nIn our_ view, the explanation to section 23C clearly negatives this H contention, in that a company for the purposes of that section i5: defined to mean any body corporate and includes a firm or otherassociation of individuals and a Director in relation to a firm\n\nAGRAWAL TRADING CORP. v. COLLECTOR (Jaganmohan 95\n\nReddy, J.) A means a partner in the finn.\n\nThe High Court was clearly right in holding that once it is found that there has been a contravention of any of th.e provisions of the ForeiAD Exchange Regulation Act\n\nread with Sea Customs Act by a finn, the partners of it who are in-charge of its business or are responsible for the conduct of the same, cannot escape liability, unless it is proved by them that B ·!he contravention took place without their knowledge or they exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention.\n\nThere is, also no warrant for the third submission that unless it appears from the evidence that members of the finn had consciously taken any steps to viola!e the provisions of law and even C then only the particular members against whom there is evidence Of guilt, can alone be held liable. This contention was said to be based on a decision of this Court in Radha Krishlln Bhatia v.\n\nUnion of India and others,(') that as the 'person concerne4' specified in section 167 ( 8) of the Sea Customs A\" is the persdb actually involved or engaged or mixed up in conttavelliq tbe D restrictions imposed under the Foreign Exchange Act or IJte S..\n\nCustoms Act, he must be the person who must be sllown to be actually concerned. That was also a case under section 167 ( 8) of the Sea Customs Act where, in fact, a number d. gold bars held to be smuggled were recovered from the person of the\n\nappellant.\n\nThe single Bench of the Punjab , lfigh : Court hid allowed the Writ Petition of the appellant on .ftle l!Qlllif that die E Collector had not recorded a finding that the ajlpdlant was connected with the act of smuggling gold into the country. This finding was set aside on a Let+.ers Patent Appeal and the writ l>Ctition was dismissed. This Court held that the concern of the appellant in the commission of the offence must be at a stage ,\n\nJ)rior to the compjeon of the offence of illegal importation of; gold into the country. The mere finding of fact recorded bf; the Collector of Customs about the smuggled ~Id being rec0vere1f\n\nfrom the person of the appellant was not sufficient to concl~ .. that the appellant was ooncerned in the illegal importation al goJil::: into the country and, therefore, liable for penalty under _.. tion 167 ( 8 ) of the Act.\n\nWhat the order of the Collecbof Customs must show is that he had considered thcquestion o~ tile G person being concerned in the commission of the offence ol. illeal\n\nimportation. of the p.oods.\n\nIt should further indicate that the matters he had considered had a bearing on the question a, nd the reasons for his arriving at that conclusion. This has really no bearing on the question before us because under section 23B, even\n\nail attemp! to contravene any of the provisions of the Act or of H any rule, direction or order made thereunder shall be deemed to have contravened that provision, rule, direction or order as the\n\n(I) (1965! 2 S.C.R. 213,\n\ncase may be. In respect of this very incident where the petitioo:iers A were prosecuted i! was held by this Coun in Girdhari Lal Gupta and another v. D. N. Mehta, Assistant Collector of Customs and\n\nanother,(') that Girdhari Lal Gupta, one of the itwo partners and Bandeo Tiwari, Cashier, have been rightly convicted under the provisions of !he Foreign Exchange Regulation Act for contravention of the restrictions imposed under section 8 ( 2) read wiih B section 23(1A) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Acl In that case it was contended that there is no evidence to show that the contravention took place with the knowledge of Girdhari Lal Gupta or that he did not exercise due diligence to prevent such contravention. That contentiOD was negatived because he had not only stated under section 342, that he alone looks-after 1the affairs of the firm but it had been found that there were entries C in his acco11nt books. It is itrue, that tbt relevant provisions of the Sea Customs Act are penal in character and the burden of proof is on the Customs authorities to bring home the guilt to 1he person alleged to have committed a particular offence under the said Act by adducing satisfactory evidence. But that is not to say that the absence of direct evidence to connect a person wilh D tho offence will not attract the penal provisions to establish the guilt in a criminal proceedmg ol the type which the customs authorities have to take. The evidence of the kind which has been adduced in this case would bie sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the partner of the firm was interested in or involved iin attempting to export Indian currency notes out of India.\n\nAs observed by this Conn in Thomas Dana v. The State of Punjab('). while dealing with section 167 of the Sea Customs Act, that \"All criminal offences 'are offences but all offences in the sense of infringement of law are not criminal offences. Likewise, the other expressions have been: used in their generic sense and not as the)' are understood in the Indian Penal Code or other laws relating to criminal offences. . . . Out of more than 82 entries in the schedule to section 167, it is ooly about a dozen entries which contemplate prosecution in the crirnitial sense, the remaining entries contem.- plate penalties other than punishments for a criminal offence\".\n\nIn the Additional Collector of Customs v. Sita Ram Agarwal('), to which the High Court has referred, while dis- G missin11: the _appeal from the judgment of the Calcutta High Court, this Court had stated that \"the High Conn was right when--!it observed that if any one is interes!ed or consciously takes any step whatever to promote the object of illegally bringing bulljon into the country, then even if no physical connection is established between him and the !hin11: brought, he will be guilty.\" In thl!t case, the respondent, Sita Ram Agarwal who was seen moving H\n\n(I) [1970) 2 S.C.C. 530.\n\n(2) [1959] Suppl. (I) S.C.R. 274.\n\n(3) Civil Appeal No. 492/62 decided on 14-9-62.\n\nAGRAWAL TRADING CORP. V, COLLECTOR\n\n(Jaganmohan Reddy,/,) 97\n\nin the company of one Bhola Nath Gupta on the western pavement of J atindra Mohan Avenue, Calcutta, had proceeded in the direction of a taxi which had come to the place where they were, and on a sigrial being flashed, a Chinese national alighted\n\ntherefrom, shook hands, with the respondent after which all the three boarded the taxi.\n\nA police constable who was on the spot raised an ala_rm and secured the respondent and his companion with the help of the members of the public. All of them were taken to th~ police station for the purpose of interrogation but the Chinese national tried to get away and started to run. He was chased and eventually secured. Before his apprehension, . however, he was seen to drop three packets which were found c to contain ?.3 bars of illicit gold. The respondent was charged as a person concerned in the offnce of attempting to import contraband gold' under sec!ion 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act.\n\nThe High Court while holding that there was no evidence to establish that he was in conscious relation with the gold, observed,\n\n\"in order ithat a person may be said to be'ro concerned, some facts have to be proved which will es!ablish that he was in cons- D cious relation with the gold in one or other of the several successive steps preceding its actual receipt into the country''.\n\nIn order <that he was concerned in the offence, <; he High Court further winted out that there need be no physical connection\n\nbetween the J!Old and the person charged and \"if the offence did\n\nE not relate to his being concerned in '1le importation of the gold, but related to his having something to do with smuggled gold, the l>OSition might have been different''. The facts of •the instant case clearly disclosed, as was observed by the High Court, \"a well laid plan\". We have earlier stated that the currency notes were secreted in a cavity and were sought to be despatched out of the country in a package which ostensibly looked inocuous, F containing eatables. The manner in which the attempt was made was to hood-wink the Customs officials and escape their detection. Further, the consignor and the consignee were not shown as real persons but were fictitious so that even if the a!tempt to smuggle out of the country the currency nates was detected, the real persons could not be traced. The charges and\n\nexpenses incurred in connection with the despatch found in tthe entries in the books of account of the firm were the same as those relating to the offending package which was being despatched to Hongkong. The freight mentioned in ithe account slip is the exact amount which appears on the consignment note in respect of that offending package. The amount sough! ito be sent is half a lakh of rupees which can hardly be within the means of the Cashier, leading to the inescapable Inference that the firm through its partners was concerned in the attempt to transl!Iess ithe restrictions under section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and liable to penal action by virtue of section 23A\n\nunder !he provisions of the Sea Customs Act. On these facts as A eatablished, the IDgh Court caine to the conclusion and in our view rlditly, that it was not unreasonable to infer that it was the finn which was interested in sending !he currency notes out of India in a clandestine r.\n\nIn this view, the appeal has no merits and it is dismissed with\n\nJI. costs.\n\nS.N.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 160, "entities": [{"text": "AGRAWAL TRADING CORPORATION & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AGRAWAL TRADING CORPORATION & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 17, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 84, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 17, 1972\n\n[K. S. HEGDE, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND D. G. PALEKAR, JJ.J •\n\nForeign Exchange Regulations Act, 1941-Section 8 and 23A-lt• scope-Sea Customs Act S. 19, 167(3), (8) (37)-Does the word 'goods' i11 the said Sections include Currency Notes."}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. G. PALEKAR, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 141, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.G. PALEKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1941", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 8 and 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 186, "end_char": 203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1941", "statute": "Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1941"}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 214, "end_char": 229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 19, 167(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 230, "end_char": 243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sea Customs Act", "statute": "Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "Swiss Airways", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 487, "end_char": 500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Cashier of the firm handed over a wooden case to the Swiss Airways at Dum Dum for being sent to Hong Kon& by air."}}, {"text": "Dum Dum", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 504, "end_char": 511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Cashier of the firm handed over a wooden case to the Swiss Airways at Dum Dum for being sent to Hong Kon& by air."}}, {"text": "Hong Kon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 530, "end_char": 538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Cashier of the firm handed over a wooden case to the Swiss Airways at Dum Dum for being sent to Hong Kon& by air."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 647, "end_char": 655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to .the consignment note, the consignment was being sent by one R. of Karnani mansions, Calcutta, who was a fictitious person."}}, {"text": "Hong Kong", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 801, "end_char": 810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The shipping bill showed that the consignment purported to contain food and dried vegetables and was sent to I, of Hong Kong, al!o a fictitious person.. After the consignment was accepted and when customs examined it for clearance, it was found that it contained Rs."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1560, "end_char": 1565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, Customs authorities served a notice on the appellant pointing out that exportation of Indian currency out of India was in contravention of S. 8\n\n(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947 read with Reserve Bank Notification dated 27-2-1951 as specified therein and it was asked to show cause and to produce within 4 days the permit, if any, of the Reserve Bank of India, failing which, it would be liable for prosecunon under Section 23(1) read with S. 8(2) of the Foreign Excbanae Regula !"}}, {"text": "S. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1590, "end_char": 1594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1607, "end_char": 1645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "27-2-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1688, "end_char": 1697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, Customs authorities served a notice on the appellant pointing out that exportation of Indian currency out of India was in contravention of S. 8\n\n(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947 read with Reserve Bank Notification dated 27-2-1951 as specified therein and it was asked to show cause and to produce within 4 days the permit, if any, of the Reserve Bank of India, failing which, it would be liable for prosecunon under Section 23(1) read with S. 8(2) of the Foreign Excbanae Regula !"}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1806, "end_char": 1827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, Customs authorities served a notice on the appellant pointing out that exportation of Indian currency out of India was in contravention of S. 8\n\n(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947 read with Reserve Bank Notification dated 27-2-1951 as specified therein and it was asked to show cause and to produce within 4 days the permit, if any, of the Reserve Bank of India, failing which, it would be liable for prosecunon under Section 23(1) read with S. 8(2) of the Foreign Excbanae Regula !"}}, {"text": "Section 23(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1884, "end_char": 1897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947", "statute": "the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "S. 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1908, "end_char": 1915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947", "statute": "the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 167(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2110, "end_char": 2124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947", "statute": "the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2136, "end_char": 2147, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 167(37)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2197, "end_char": 2207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947", "statute": "the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 167(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2283, "end_char": 2292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947", "statute": "the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2315, "end_char": 2320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947", "statute": "the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2519, "end_char": 2538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was challenged before the single judge of lhe Calcutta High Court who issued a rule but later discharged it."}}, {"text": "s. 167(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2795, "end_char": 2804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2831, "end_char": 2842, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3305, "end_char": 3311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3408, "end_char": 3419, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3454, "end_char": 3463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3544, "end_char": 3549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3561, "end_char": 3572, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3765, "end_char": 3769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3873, "end_char": 3878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3890, "end_char": 3901, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3936, "end_char": 3940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foreign Exchange Regulations Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4025, "end_char": 4057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4131, "end_char": 4135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Foreign Exchange Regulations Act", "statute": "Foreign Exchange Regulations Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2(42)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4286, "end_char": 4294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Foreign Exchange Regulations Act", "statute": "Foreign Exchange Regulations Act"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4302, "end_char": 4327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 2(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4331, "end_char": 4343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "s.\n\n23C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4567, "end_char": 4574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Foreign Exchange Regulations Act and Sea Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4838, "end_char": 4890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6020, "end_char": 6026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, Sadhu Singh, lagmohan Khanna, R. N. Kapoor and H S. K. Dho/akla, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Sadhu Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6028, "end_char": 6039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, Sadhu Singh, lagmohan Khanna, R. N. Kapoor and H S. K. Dho/akla, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "lagmohan Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6041, "end_char": 6056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, Sadhu Singh, lagmohan Khanna, R. N. Kapoor and H S. K. Dho/akla, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "R. N. Kapoor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6058, "end_char": 6070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, Sadhu Singh, lagmohan Khanna, R. N. Kapoor and H S. K. Dho/akla, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "H S. K. Dho", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6075, "end_char": 6086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, Sadhu Singh, lagmohan Khanna, R. N. Kapoor and H S. K. Dho/akla, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "G. L. Sangh/", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6114, "end_char": 6126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sangh/, B. DI tta and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "B. DI tta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6128, "end_char": 6137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sangh/, B. DI tta and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6142, "end_char": 6153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sangh/, B. DI tta and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "P •. Jaganmoban Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6290, "end_char": 6311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nP •. Jaganmoban Reddy, J. This is an appeal by certificate under Article 133 ( 1) (b) of the Constitu!ion against the judgment of the Calcutta High Court which dismissed an appeal from an order of the single Judge of that Court discharging a rule granted B by it to the appellants calling on !"}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6355, "end_char": 6366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6703, "end_char": 6714, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Foreign Exchange Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6840, "end_char": 6867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Court of the Presidency Magis- C trate, Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6901, "end_char": 6949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "under tire Foreign Exchange Regulation Ac.t and the case pending in the Court of the Presidency Magis- C trate, Calcutta, should not be stayed."}}, {"text": "Girdhari Lal Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7149, "end_char": 7167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It consists of two partners, Girdhari Lal Gupta and Pooran Mal Jain."}}, {"text": "Pooran Mal Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7172, "end_char": 7187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It consists of two partners, Girdhari Lal Gupta and Pooran Mal Jain."}}, {"text": "25'.h October 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7197, "end_char": 7215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 25'.h October 1958, tire Cashier of, the appellant-Bhag\\Vandeo Tiwari handed over a D consignment of wooden case to the Swiss Airways at Oum Dum Airport for being sent by air freight to Hongkong."}}, {"text": "Bhag\\Vandeo Tiwari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7248, "end_char": 7266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 25'.h October 1958, tire Cashier of, the appellant-Bhag\\Vandeo Tiwari handed over a D consignment of wooden case to the Swiss Airways at Oum Dum Airport for being sent by air freight to Hongkong.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwandeo G Tiwari"}}, {"text": "Oum Dum Airport", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7334, "end_char": 7349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 25'.h October 1958, tire Cashier of, the appellant-Bhag\\Vandeo Tiwari handed over a D consignment of wooden case to the Swiss Airways at Oum Dum Airport for being sent by air freight to Hongkong."}}, {"text": "Hongkong", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7383, "end_char": 7391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 25'.h October 1958, tire Cashier of, the appellant-Bhag\\Vandeo Tiwari handed over a D consignment of wooden case to the Swiss Airways at Oum Dum Airport for being sent by air freight to Hongkong."}}, {"text": "Ramghawan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7468, "end_char": 7483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the consignment note, the consignment was bein)1; sent by one Ramghawan Singh of Kamani Mansions, Park Street, Calcutta, who in fact was a fictitious person.", "canonical_name": "D Ramghawan Singh"}}, {"text": "Ishwar Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7705, "end_char": 7715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hat the consignment purported to contain Rassogolla, Achar, Papar and dried vegetaes and it was being sent to one Ishwar Lal; E 41, Wyndham St., Hongkonii: who is also alleged to be a fictitious person."}}, {"text": "Hongkonii", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7736, "end_char": 7745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hat the consignment purported to contain Rassogolla, Achar, Papar and dried vegetaes and it was being sent to one Ishwar Lal; E 41, Wyndham St., Hongkonii: who is also alleged to be a fictitious person."}}, {"text": "25th October 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7880, "end_char": 7897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the consignment was accepted and when the Customs examined it for clearance on 25th October 1958 before i!s onward despatch to Honl!;"}}, {"text": "S 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8083, "end_char": 8086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "22nd January 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8139, "end_char": 8156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S 1,0001 •.\n\nAn F in\\'estigation was set on foot and on 22nd January 1959 a search warrant was issued by the Presidency Magistrate, pursuan!"}}, {"text": "Bhagwandeo G Tiwari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8474, "end_char": 8493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This investigation revealed that the Cashier, Bhagwandeo G Tiwari had signed the consignment note as Ramchandra which, as\n\nthe subsequent writings showed, were in his hand.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwandeo G Tiwari"}}, {"text": "Ramchandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8529, "end_char": 8539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This investigation revealed that the Cashier, Bhagwandeo G Tiwari had signed the consignment note as Ramchandra which, as\n\nthe subsequent writings showed, were in his hand."}}, {"text": "Bhagwandeo Tiwari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8994, "end_char": 9011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further alleged that from a compa• rison of the consignment no~ with a letter admittedly sent out by the appellant firm and signed by one of its partners, Girdhari Lal Gupta, it became evident that the slip seized from the office of H the appellant firm had contained entries, to show that Bhagwandeo Tiwari was tho person who actually transported and booked the oflendinp; consignment in question and that he 111ade an entry\n\nof Rs.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwandeo G Tiwari"}}, {"text": "April 2, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9567, "end_char": 9580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of this evidence, the customs awthorities served a natice on the appellant firm on April 2, 1959 B by which after setting out in detail the aforesaid facts and after pointing out that the exportation of lindian currency out of India was in contravell'tion of section 8(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act 194 7 read with the Reserve Bank of India Noti fication dated 27·2-1951 as specified therein, it was asked to show cause and to produce within four days of the receipt (>f the notice, 11he permit, if any, of the Reserve Bank of India, for C export of the Indian currency and if it did not do so, it would be liable for prosecution 1mder section 23 ( 1) read with Eection 8 (2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act."}}, {"text": "section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9743, "end_char": 9755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India Noti", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9816, "end_char": 9842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of this evidence, the customs awthorities served a natice on the appellant firm on April 2, 1959 B by which after setting out in detail the aforesaid facts and after pointing out that the exportation of lindian currency out of India was in contravell'tion of section 8(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act 194 7 read with the Reserve Bank of India Noti fication dated 27·2-1951 as specified therein, it was asked to show cause and to produce within four days of the receipt (>f the notice, 11he permit, if any, of the Reserve Bank of India, for C export of the Indian currency and if it did not do so, it would be liable for prosecution 1mder section 23 ( 1) read with Eection 8 (2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act."}}, {"text": "27·2-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9858, "end_char": 9867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of this evidence, the customs awthorities served a natice on the appellant firm on April 2, 1959 B by which after setting out in detail the aforesaid facts and after pointing out that the exportation of lindian currency out of India was in contravell'tion of section 8(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act 194 7 read with the Reserve Bank of India Noti fication dated 27·2-1951 as specified therein, it was asked to show cause and to produce within four days of the receipt (>f the notice, 11he permit, if any, of the Reserve Bank of India, for C export of the Indian currency and if it did not do so, it would be liable for prosecution 1mder section 23 ( 1) read with Eection 8 (2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10133, "end_char": 10143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "13·4-1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10218, "end_char": 10227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 13·4-1959, the appellant firm replied to the notice denying that the firm had anything to do with the despatch of the box containing currency notes; that i.t was not aware of any person by the name of D Ramghawan Singh or Ishwar Lal, or that Bhagwandeo Tiwari had ever despatched the consignment in question or visited any Air office in connection therewith."}}, {"text": "D Ramghawan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10419, "end_char": 10436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 13·4-1959, the appellant firm replied to the notice denying that the firm had anything to do with the despatch of the box containing currency notes; that i.t was not aware of any person by the name of D Ramghawan Singh or Ishwar Lal, or that Bhagwandeo Tiwari had ever despatched the consignment in question or visited any Air office in connection therewith.", "canonical_name": "D Ramghawan Singh"}}, {"text": "section 167(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11290, "end_char": 11304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11316, "end_char": 11327, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11384, "end_char": 11395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 167(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11462, "end_char": 11476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 167(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12138, "end_char": 12152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 8(1), 23(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12882, "end_char": 12902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19, 167(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12977, "end_char": 12995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13022, "end_char": 13033, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13116, "end_char": 13134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government may, by notification in he Official Gazette, order that, sub.iect to such exemptions, if any, as may be contained in the notification, no person shall, except with the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank and on payment of the fee, if any, prescribed bring or send into India any gold or silver or any currency notes or bank notes or coin whether Indian or forei)!n. ,"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13948, "end_char": 13957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13959, "end_char": 13968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13970, "end_char": 13979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14002, "end_char": 14012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14679, "end_char": 14689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14866, "end_char": 14876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15022, "end_char": 15032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15137, "end_char": 15146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15168, "end_char": 15178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15215, "end_char": 15225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15269, "end_char": 15279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act, 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15287, "end_char": 15308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15399, "end_char": 15410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16913, "end_char": 16928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Offences Section of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17415, "end_char": 17443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20828, "end_char": 20839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20917, "end_char": 20927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20939, "end_char": 20950, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21148, "end_char": 21159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21223, "end_char": 21234, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21268, "end_char": 21277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21359, "end_char": 21369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21426, "end_char": 21436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21763, "end_char": 21773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21786, "end_char": 21797, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22236, "end_char": 22245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22339, "end_char": 22349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22361, "end_char": 22372, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22604, "end_char": 22613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22725, "end_char": 22744, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22771, "end_char": 22788, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23033, "end_char": 23042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23094, "end_char": 23105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23133, "end_char": 23143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23155, "end_char": 23166, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23601, "end_char": 23610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We cannot attribute to the Legislature the intention to obliterate one provision by another provision of the same Act", "statute": "We cannot attribute to the Legislature the intention to obliterate one provision by another provision of the same Act"}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23658, "end_char": 23669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We cannot attribute to the Legislature the intention to obliterate one provision by another provision of the same Act", "statute": "We cannot attribute to the Legislature the intention to obliterate one provision by another provision of the same Act"}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23696, "end_char": 23711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23827, "end_char": 23836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sea Customs Act", "statute": "Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "Clauses Act 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23858, "end_char": 23874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24258, "end_char": 24269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Clauses Act 1897", "statute": "Clauses Act 1897"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24281, "end_char": 24292, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 23C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24367, "end_char": 24378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Clauses Act 1897", "statute": "Clauses Act 1897"}}, {"text": "Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24650, "end_char": 24655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. COLLECTOR (Jaganmohan 95\n\nReddy, J.) A means a partner in the finn."}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24875, "end_char": 24886, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25642, "end_char": 25653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25823, "end_char": 25834, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25930, "end_char": 25941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25958, "end_char": 25969, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26103, "end_char": 26109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The single Bench of the Punjab , lfigh : Court hid allowed the Writ Petition of the appellant on .ftle l!Qlllif that die E Collector had not recorded a finding that the ajlpdlant was connected with the act of smuggling gold into the country."}}, {"text": "section 23B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27347, "end_char": 27358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bandeo Tiwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27854, "end_char": 27867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was held by this Coun in Girdhari Lal Gupta and another v. D. N. Mehta, Assistant Collector of Customs and\n\nanother,(') that Girdhari Lal Gupta, one of the itwo partners and Bandeo Tiwari, Cashier, have been rightly convicted under the provisions of !"}}, {"text": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27934, "end_char": 27965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28018, "end_char": 28027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act", "statute": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act"}}, {"text": "section 23(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28045, "end_char": 28059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act", "statute": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act"}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28378, "end_char": 28389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act", "statute": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28566, "end_char": 28577, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29348, "end_char": 29359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29371, "end_char": 29382, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29616, "end_char": 29633, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29732, "end_char": 29743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sita Ram Agarwal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30460, "end_char": 30476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In thl!t case, the respondent, Sita Ram Agarwal who was seen moving H\n\n(I) [1970) 2 S.C.C. 530."}}, {"text": "14-9-62", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30600, "end_char": 30607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "492/62 decided on 14-9-62."}}, {"text": "AGRAWAL TRADING CORP. V", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30610, "end_char": 30633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AGRAWAL TRADING CORP.", "canonical_name": "AGRAWAL TRADING CORPORATION & ORS"}}, {"text": "Jaganmohan Reddy,/", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30647, "end_char": 30665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V, COLLECTOR\n\n(Jaganmohan Reddy,/,) 97\n\nin the company of one Bhola Nath Gupta on the western pavement of J atindra Mohan Avenue, Calcutta, had proceeded in the direction of a taxi which had come to the place where they were, and on a sigrial being flashed, a Chinese national alighted\n\ntherefrom, shook hands, with the respondent after which all the three boarded the taxi."}}, {"text": "Bhola Nath Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30694, "end_char": 30710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V, COLLECTOR\n\n(Jaganmohan Reddy,/,) 97\n\nin the company of one Bhola Nath Gupta on the western pavement of J atindra Mohan Avenue, Calcutta, had proceeded in the direction of a taxi which had come to the place where they were, and on a sigrial being flashed, a Chinese national alighted\n\ntherefrom, shook hands, with the respondent after which all the three boarded the taxi."}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31594, "end_char": 31605, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33599, "end_char": 33608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33688, "end_char": 33699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33733, "end_char": 33744, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_865_873_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "ltAJLWAY BOARD, GOVT. OF INDIA\n\nMIS OBSERVER PUBLICATIONS (P) LTD.\n\nMarch 16, 1972\n\n[S. M. SI~RI, C.J., A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY, D. G. PALEKAR\n\nAND M. H. BEG, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India Art. 14-Indian Railway Code, Clause 742iVels-weekl, v-Sold by licensees at rai/wc..y bookstalls-Ban on sale of sucll ilews-wPekly-Ban is no1 ju.ti{i:Jd under c.'ause 742 sub-clause (V) if. the matter is not found tip be obscene but only bordering on obscenity- S1milar publications not banned-Ban is violative of Art. 14 of Constituiion.\n\nThe sale of the Indian Observer, a news \"v-eekly, at railway platform5 was bunn-ed by an order of the appellant board in March 1965. The respondent \\Vho was owner '3Ild publisher of the lndian Obser filed a writ petition in the High Court alleging that the ban had been imposed because the I!CV.'.~ weekly had carried certain articles which were critical of the Railway administration. The appellant's case in the High Court was that the ban had been imposed because the news eekly carried sexy and obscne matter. The High Court allowed the writ petition holding that similar publications were cllowed to be sold by the licencees of railway bookstalls and the ban on Indian Observer was tberefore discriminatory. The High .Court also held that under clause 742 of the Indian Railway Code the appelhnt had no authority to impose the ban. -In appeal against the High Court's decision.\n\nHELD : (i) In the Indian Railway Code the policy and principle laid down in categorical terms in sub-clal!M> (viii) of Clause 74~ is that tlul contractor should Provide equal opportunity to a1J the popular news-- papers for £ale in lbeir atal!S on the same terms. This was subject to certain conditions one of wbil:l! in sub.clause (v) was t)lat tlul sale of\n\nobscne books and pictures and publications by the government should be strictly b!l!llled. fj:ver lhP letter written by tho railway dared March 26, 1965 did not imDOSe the Inn on the 2round that Indian Observer was an obscene publication which had been prohibited by the government.\n\nJn that letter there wa. first a recital of what had come to the Board's notice i.e., that the articles written in the said news weekly well' in vry low taste bordering on obsi:eqity.\n\nTpere was no finding or\n\ndcisipn Jbat it w::is ' pul>!ic.aton Wh.iCh J'I~ obscene.\n\nTlie conclusion of the Board simply was that the lndjap. Obsorver was not fit for al.e at Railway stations.\n\nThe other condition laid down in sub-clause (v) that its sale has been prohibited by the Government was neither m.entione~ nor had it l!een shown th~ anysuch order had been made by the gpvernment prol)ibiting the sale of t)le lndjan Observer on the ground that it was obscene.\n\nThe Central Government was not shown to have any po\\\\er under the Railways Act or rules thereunder to ban the sale of anv obscene book or publication and it was not claimed t})'3t the Railway Board could impose the ban under any other enactment. For the above reasons the order imp0sing the ban could not be justified under clause 742 of the Indian Railway Code.\n\n(ii) The High Court had found as a fact that publications which were freely on sale :on the bookstalls to whom iicenc_e~ has been given were\n\n•uch that they were hardly distinguishable from the Indian Observer on the ground of obsctmity. . It was not disputed before the High Court that 1he news weekly in question had been sold on railway platforms since 1963 nor .was it suggested that the Railway Board had ever acoorded individual sanction .for the sale of every single book and publication at the book stalls of the Railway Administration. The Railway Administration had itself directed th\".lt the boOk stall cOntractors who were its licencees should provi<:le equal opportunity to all the popul!ll\" newspapers for\n\nale in their stalls.\n\nThese vefy Coriractqrs were now being directed to discriminate betweenthe respondent and owners or publishers of other popular nwspaprs on grounds whi_ch had no legal basis or justification.\n\nThe administrative ct or order of the Railway Board ( whic\\ll fell within the definition of 'State' in Art. 12 of the Constitution), could, therefore be challeng.ed by the appellant in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution as violative of Art. 14.\n\nSince no proper or valid grounds had been shown for sustaining the discrimination made, the view of the• High Court that the impugned order of the Railway Board ms discriminatory must be upheld.\n\nRoi/way Board v. Niranjan Singh, [19o9] 3 S.C.R. 548, distinguished.\n\n(iii) Judicial propriety and decorum demand that a Bench while consi- <lering the question of granting a certificate for •appeal to this Court ought not to be critical of or express any dissent from the judgment appealed D against because it has not such jurisdiGtion and all that it has to decide is whether tl].e requirement of the Articles of the Constitution on which a certificate can be gr3nted have been satisfied.\n\nC1v1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2097 of 1968.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated August i1, 1965 E -Of the Delhi High Court in C.W. No. 197-D of 1965.\n\nJagdish Swarup, Solicitor-General of India, S. N. Prasad, B. D.\n\nSharma and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant.\n\nS. C. Manchanda, S. Balakrishrlan and P. N. Lekhi, ibr the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGrover, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by certificate from a judgement of the Punjab High Court by which the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent was allowed and the ban imposed on the sale of a news weekly called \"The Indian Observer\" by the licensees of the Railway Book Stalls throughout the country under directions issued by the appellant was set aside.\n\nA9cording to the writ petition, the petitioner was the owner and publisher of a weekly newspaper known as \"The Indian Observer\" which had a wide 'sale in India, its weekly circulation being approximately 1,3.5,000 copies. Till March 1965 the aforesaid news weekly was being sold at all the railway stations\n\nA which were managed and were under the administrative control of the Railway B.oard. It was 'alleged that the policy of the news weekly was to publish a constructive criticism and fair comment in public interest on the working of different departments of the Government and to suggest remedial measures.\n\nIn some of the copies of the news weekly, certain matters regarding the mal- B administration of the Railway had been published.\n\nReference was made in particular to the issue of II th September, 1964 in which allegations were made about the black-marketing in deluxe train tickets.\n\nIt was stated to have attained the magnitude of a big racket operating in the country resulting in lot of gain by . corrupt means to the Railway staff.\n\nIt is unnecessary to give the c details but according to the allegations made in the news weekly, the Railway staff was corrupt and the reasons for the corruption were also given.\n\nOther comments we_c made which reflected adversely on the working of the Indian Railways.\n\nAccording to the petitioner all these statements and resolutions annoyed the Railway Authorities and on 22nd September, 1964, the Circulation Manager of the Petitioner company received a letter from D M/s. M. Guiab Singh (P) Ltd., one ol the licensees, of the Railway Board for sale of printed matters intimating that the Northern Railways administration had banned the sale of \"The Indian Observer\" on the Railway Book Stalls.\n\nSubsequently, when the petitLoner took up the matter with the authorities concerned, the General Manager, Northern Railways, wrote to him informing E him that temporary permission had been given to the railway contractors of printed matters to sell the news weekly subject to proper review of that paper and final orders which would be given later.\n\nThe General Manager asked the petitioner to supply copies of 12 old issues which was done.. Finally, the petitioner was informed by means of a letter datea the 16th March 1965 that the .F sale of the weekly \"The Indian Observer\" could not be permitted on the railway stations.\n\nIn the return which was fi_le.d by the Joint Director, Traffic (General), Railway Board, it was not denied that the news weekly \"The Indian Observer\" was being sold at the railway stations by the licensed contractors. It was asserted that the petitioner had been publishing \"sexy and obscene literature'.' and the licensees had been raiing objections on this score.\n\nThe articles published in the news weekly were considered to be of low taste and it was decided that it would not be in public fnterest to allow its sale at the railway platforms by the licencees.\n\nThe allegations made in the petition abcut the statements relating to corruption and mal-administration in the Railways which had been published in some of the issues of the news weekly was not denied. It was, howex\\lr, maintained that the Railway Board had taken the action\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nnot because of the publicauon of those articles but bc; cause of the sexy and obsceile literature of low taste which was being published in the news weekly.\n\nBefore the High Court, s. 28 of the Indian Railways Act 1890, hereinafter called the \"Act\"; and the relevant sub-clauses of clause 742 of.the Indian Railway Code were pressed into service for chalienging the ban which had been imposed on the sale of the news weekly.\n\nThe High Court was of the view that the petitioner before it had cited and produced instances of publications which were freely on sale on the bookstalls on the railway platforms to show that the material which was sought to be excluded 011\n\nground~ on obscenity, was hardly distinguishable from the othe1 popular magazines of foreign and Indian origin.\n\nReliance was placed on the provisions of clause 742 of the Indian Railway Code which established that a publication to attract the ban imposed by the Railway Board must have been previously prohibited by the Government.\n\nAs the Railway Board was not authorised to exclude any publication from sale on its own determination that it was obscene, it was held that the order whiCh was made by that Board was without authority.\n\nThe ban had hit the writ petitioner who had been made the object of discriminatory treatment.\n\nConsequently, the restriction imposed on the sale of \"The Indian Observer\" was quashed.\n\nSection 120A of the Act which was inserted for the first time by Act No. 13 of 1959 provides that if a person canvasses for any custom or hawks or exposes for sale any article whatsoever, in any railway carriage or upon any part of arailway except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence by the railway administration shall be punishable with fine which may extend to two hundred and fifty rupees.\n\nHe can also be removed from the carriage or any part of the railway by any railway servant so authorised. It appears that prior to the insertion of this section, rules had been framed under s. 4 7 (1) of the Act.\n\nRule 17 of Part II of the. Ru]es .laid clOwn that no person could canvass for any custom or hawk or expqse for Sale any article whatsoever, on any train, station, platform or premi, ses without a licence granted by the railway administrati9n.\n\nClause I of Rule 17 has been incorporated ins. 120A(l) of the Act in 1959, that clause having been deleted from the rule.\n\nThe bookstalls on the railway platforms where books, manazines and newspapers are sold, belong to the licencees who have en\\ered into an agreement with the President. of India-. It is not disputed that according to the usual clauses in these agreements of licence, the sale of newspapers shall not be stopped by the licencees at any ' time save When it is due to causes beyond the control of the\n\nRAILWAY BOARD v. OB\"SERVE!t PUBLICATIONS (Qrbver, J.) 869\n\nA licensee.\n\nThe !tamed Solicitor Ocnerit1 pl!OOuoed a sample agree-- meilt iri court which was not objected to by the oounsel for the respondent.\n\nAccording to clause 3(b) thereof the licensor can reserve to bimself the right to reqilire the licencee to sell specitied books or types of books and periodicals and the lice!lCet was bound to comply with such requirements, Under clause 5 the B licensor had the right of prdhibitiilg the sale ot exhibition of any\n\npubli, cation of an obscene or scurrilous nature and of any publication to which good, sufficient, and reasonable objections co9ld be shown and the decision of the licensor was to be final and binding on the licensee .\n\nThe Railway Board whicli is the appellant bef01e us has issued certain instructions and laid down essential principles and policy directions which have been oublimed in the form of a Code called the \"Indian Railway Code\" -for the Traffic Department ( Coinmercial). It may be mentioned that the Solicitor General himself maintained that aUthose were of a mandatory nature and it is ,:i stated in the preface to the Code.\n\nChapter VII, Part A of this Code de!ils With . catering and vending services.\n\nPart n relates fo book-stalls, sale of npapers and _periodicals on railway platforms. Clause 742 to the extent it is material is reproduced below:\"--\n\nG ..\n\n( v) The sale of obscene books and pictures and 'pub-\n\nJ:'icatit\\ns iproln'bited by the Government sh®ld. be strictly banned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. • ...... . (viii) Tlte contractors mot!ld prO'Viile equal opportu- .niW to. all the popular newspapers for sqle in\n\ntherr. stal~ on_ the same term~. A list -6f popular newspaJlCrs a_nd maga.ifues shou_ Ia be drawn up\n\nb~ the 'Railway Adiriiriistra:iion 'ih OODSUltatioo with the ZOnal 'Railway Boeiksta11 AdviSOryCommitte'e\".\n\n. the ml)in argument <if j; lie jean!Ctj. Stlli¢1tor '6enersl 011 behalf _of the appellant is that sale of ljooirson Pailway pllltfbnns or In\n\nrailway -i; arrias is a ni.atter filch Is regUtated by tlie terms of the agreement of licence between the bookstall contractots alUI the railway authorities and it 'is open to the appropriate authOtity . to S!OP the sale of any newspaper or 'pnbncation Which was considered obscene or urriloos or to wlilch suflfoiertt and reasonaMe\n\nobjection~ could be SbOWI!. li1 t:he letter of tt1e Railway. \"Soard elated March 26; I965 it was stated that it had come to the Board's\n\nnotice that the \"Indian Observer\" generally contained \"articles A written in very low taste bordering on obscenity\". It was further stated that after a perusal of few copies of the said weekly the Board had come to the conclusion that it wa~ not fit for sale at railway stations.\n\nIt was desired that the book stall contractors should be instructed to stop with immediate effect the sale of the \"Indian Observer\" from their bookstalls as well as on the plat- B forms as also along train side and in station premises.\n\nAccording to the Solicitor General the action taken by the Railway Board was petfectly competent and was taken in accordance with the terms of the licence grnated to the book stall contractors. It is urged that the respondent had no right or locus standi to insist on or ask for the sale of the Indian observer on the platforms etc., which are the private property of the railway and where the sale c of any publication could only be subject to such terms and conditions as obtained between the licensor or licencee.\n\nBefore the High Court and before us the main complaint of the present respondent is based on an infraction of Article 14 of the Constitution and it has been asserted that the news weekly D \"Indian Observer\" was singled out for discriminatory treatment inasmuch as publications containing similar material were not prohibited from sale by the Railway Board on the book-stalls at the platforms and in the trains etc.\n\nThe High Court had found as a fact that publications which were freely on sale on the bookstalls to whom licences had been given were such that they were hardly distinguishable from the \"Indian Observer\" on the ground of obscenity. It was not disputed before the High Court that the news weekly in question had been sold on railway platforms since 1963 nor was it suggested that the Railway Board had ever accorded individual sanction for the sale of every single book and publication at the book stalls of the Railway Administration.\n\nNow in the Indian Railway Code the policy or the principle laid down in categorical terms in sub-clause (viii) of Clause 742 is that the contractor should provHle equal opportunity to all the popular newspapers for sale in their stalls on the same terms. This was subject to certain conditions, one of which was that the sale\n\nof obscene books and pictures and publications prohibited by the G Government should be strictly banned. (vide sub-clause v).\n\nThe letter written by the railway itself to which a reference has been made, does not impose the ban on the ground that the \"Indian Observer\" is an obscene publication which has been prohibited by the Government.\n\nIn that letter there was first a recital of what had come to the Board's notice i.e. that the articles written in the said news weekly were. in very low taste bordering H on obscenity.\n\nThere was no finding or decision that it was a publication which was obscene.\n\nThe conclusion of the Board\n\nA simply was that the \"Indian Observer\" was not fit for sale at the Railway stations.\n\nThe other condition laid down in sub-clause ( v) that its sale had been !Jrohibited by the government was neither mentioned nor has it been shown that any such order !iad been made by the government prohibiting the sale of the \"Indian Observer\" on the ground that it is obscene.\n\nThe learned Solicitor 11 General contends that the word 'Government' in sub-clause' ( v) means the Railway Board because according to s. 2 of the Indian Railway Board Act 1905, Central Government may by notification in the official gazette invest the Railway Board either absolutely or subject to conditions with all or any of the powers or fonctions of the Central Government under the Act.\n\nOur attention has not C been draw_n to any provision in the Act or the rules framed there under by which the Central Government can prohibit the sale of any obscene book, picture or publication.\n\nIt appears that the aforesaid clause has reference to a prohibition imposed by the Central Government und'er some enactments other than the Act.\n\nIt is not claimed that the Railway Board could impose a ban under any other enactment.\n\nNor has it been suggested that the Central D Government had passed any order prohibiting the sale of the Indian\n\nObserver under any statutory provision. \\ ' Even on the assumption that the Board could make such an order as is contemplated by sub-clause (v) of clause 742 it cannot take any advantage of that provision because in the letter dated March 26, 1965 it was nowhere stated that the publication of.the. news weekly was being banned on the ground of obscenity.\n\nIt is thus apparent that the High Court was fully justified in taking the view that the \"Indian Observer\" had been singled out for being banned and this clearly amounted to a discriminatory treatment.\n\nThe question that has next to be resolved is whether Art. 14 could be invoked by the respondent in the present case. It has not been and indeed cannot be disputed that the Railway Board will fall within the definition of \"State\" as given in Art. 12 of the Constitution.\n\nThe learned Solicitor General has relied on Railway. Board v. Niranjan Singh('). It was laid down that there was no fundamental right under Art. 19 ( 1) for anyone to hold meetings in government premises.\n\nThe Northern Railway was the owner of the !Jremises and was entitled to enjoy its property in the same manner as any private individual, subject to any such restrictions as the law or the usage placed on them.\n\nWe are unable to appreciate how the ratio of that decision could be applied to the present case.\n\nThe meetings of workers which had taken place there had been held inside workshops, stores and depots and within office compounds.\n\nRailway platforms may be the property\n\n(!). [1969.J 3 S.C.R, 548.\n\nof the railways, but it cannot be disputed rtlat every bona fide tra• A veller or every other member of. the public who buys a platform ticket can have access to tire railway platforms. h is true that under Rule 15 of the General Statutory Rules and Orders, a railway administration may exclude and, if necessary, remove from the station paltform or any part of the railway premises any person who is not a bona fide passenger and who does not have any business connected with the railway or any person who having arrived at a station by train and having no business connected with the railway refuses to leave the' railway premises when required to do so.\n\nBut that is a right which is reserved for being exercised only in the circumstances mentioned in the rule. There is no analogy between a station platform and a government office.\n\nEven otherwise the crux of the matter is that the respondent is not c\n\n seeking to use the station platform or any part of the railway premises by sending any of its own representatives to hawk or sell the news weekly there.\n\nAll that the respondent says is that the railway administration has itself directed that the bookstall contractors who were its licensees should •provi<je equal opportunity to all the popular newspapers for sale in. their stalls.. These very D contractors ; tre now being directed to discriminate between the respondent and owners or publishers of other popular newspapers on grounds which have no legal basis or justification. The administrative act or order of the Railway Board can, therefore, be challenged under Art. 14.\n\nThe respondent is not asking for the enforcement of any such fundamental right as would come within. E the rule laid down in the previous decision of this Court.\n\nIn other words what the present respondent is ch.allenging is the order of the Railway Board which led to the stoppage of 'the sale of the news weekly on the Railway platforms etc. If that order is discriminatory and cannot be justified on any of the well known grounds. the res!JOndent can challenge it in a oetitiori. under Art. 226 of the Constitution as violative of Art.\n\n14. There is no parallel between the facts of this case and the deeision relied upon . by the learned Solicitor General.\n\nWe concur with the view of the High Court that the impugned order of the Railway Board was discriminatory.\n\nNo proper 9r valid grounds have been shown for sustaining the discrimination made.\n\nA certain amount of discussion took place before us with regard to the applicability of s. 28 of .the Act which contains prohibition against undue preference being shown by the Railway Administration in any respect whatsoever. In the. view that we ll have taken about the applicability of Art. 14 we do not consider it necessary to decide whether the respondent could take advantage of the provisions of that section.\n\nLastly, we may refer to a preliminary objection which was raised on behalf of the respondent to the certificate which was granted by the High Court. It has been urged that the certificate is defective because in the order dated July 7, 1968 granting it the Bench has Virtually given a decision as if an appeal was being entertained against the judgment dated August 11, 19.65 by which B the writ petition was allowed. It does appear that hpande J ., who delivered the order of the Division Bench granting the certificate :has made certain observations which seem to suggest that the previous decision was incorrect.\n\nAlthough such an order will not per se vitiate the certificate, both judicial propriety and decorum demand that a Bench while considering the question of grant- C ing a certificate for appeal to this Court ought not to be critical of or express any dissent from the judgment apaled against because it has no such furisdiction and all that it has to decide is whethet the requirement of the Articles of the Constitution on which a certificate can be granted, have been satisfied.\n\nThe appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 70, "entities": [{"text": "ltAJLWAY BOARD, GOVT. OF INDIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAILWAY BOARD, GOVT. OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MIS OBSERVER PUBLICATIONS (P) LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S OBSERVER PUBLICATIONS (P) LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 16, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 82, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 16, 1972\n\n[S. M. SI~RI, C.J., A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY, D. G. PALEKAR\n\nAND M. H. BEG, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. G. PALEKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 142, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.G. PALEKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 162, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 165, "end_char": 186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 187, "end_char": 194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 195, "end_char": 214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Clause 742", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 216, "end_char": 226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Railway Code", "statute": "Indian Railway Code"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 448, "end_char": 450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Railway Code", "statute": "Indian Railway Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 500, "end_char": 507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Railway Code", "statute": "Indian Railway Code"}}, {"text": "clause 742", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1276, "end_char": 1286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1529, "end_char": 1538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 26, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1908, "end_char": 1922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fj:ver lhP letter written by tho railway dared March 26, 1965 did not imDOSe the Inn on the 2round that Indian Observer was an obscene publication which had been prohibited by the government."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2714, "end_char": 2732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government was not shown to have any po\\\\er under the Railways Act or rules thereunder to ban the sale of anv obscene book or publication and it was not claimed t})'3t the Railway Board could impose the ban under any other enactment."}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2776, "end_char": 2788, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "clause 742", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3034, "end_char": 3044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4112, "end_char": 4119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4211, "end_char": 4219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4256, "end_char": 4263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jagdish Swarup", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5130, "end_char": 5144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdish Swarup, Solicitor-General of India, S. N. Prasad, B. D.\n\nSharma and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5174, "end_char": 5186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdish Swarup, Solicitor-General of India, S. N. Prasad, B. D.\n\nSharma and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. D.\n\nSharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5188, "end_char": 5201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdish Swarup, Solicitor-General of India, S. N. Prasad, B. D.\n\nSharma and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5206, "end_char": 5217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdish Swarup, Solicitor-General of India, S. N. Prasad, B. D.\n\nSharma and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. C. Manchanda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5239, "end_char": 5254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Manchanda, S. Balakrishrlan and P. N. Lekhi, ibr the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. Balakrishrlan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5256, "end_char": 5272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Manchanda, S. Balakrishrlan and P. N. Lekhi, ibr the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. N. Lekhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5277, "end_char": 5288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Manchanda, S. Balakrishrlan and P. N. Lekhi, ibr the respondent."}}, {"text": "Grover", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5355, "end_char": 5361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGrover, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by certificate from a judgement of the Punjab High Court by which the petition under Art."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5424, "end_char": 5441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGrover, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by certificate from a judgement of the Punjab High Court by which the petition under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5470, "end_char": 5478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5891, "end_char": 5896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A9cording to the writ petition, the petitioner was the owner and publisher of a weekly newspaper known as \"The Indian Observer\" which had a wide 'sale in India, its weekly circulation being approximately 1,3.5,000 copies."}}, {"text": "II th September, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6530, "end_char": 6551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made in particular to the issue of II th September, 1964 in which allegations were made about the black-marketing in deluxe train tickets."}}, {"text": "Indian Railways.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7042, "end_char": 7058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Other comments we_c made which reflected adversely on the working of the Indian Railways."}}, {"text": "22nd September, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7164, "end_char": 7184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the petitioner all these statements and resolutions annoyed the Railway Authorities and on 22nd September, 1964, the Circulation Manager of the Petitioner company received a letter from D M/s. M. Guiab Singh (P) Ltd., one ol the licensees, of the Railway Board for sale of printed matters intimating that the Northern Railways administration had banned the sale of \"The Indian Observer\" on the Railway Book Stalls."}}, {"text": "Northern Railways administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7382, "end_char": 7414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the petitioner all these statements and resolutions annoyed the Railway Authorities and on 22nd September, 1964, the Circulation Manager of the Petitioner company received a letter from D M/s. M. Guiab Singh (P) Ltd., one ol the licensees, of the Railway Board for sale of printed matters intimating that the Northern Railways administration had banned the sale of \"The Indian Observer\" on the Railway Book Stalls."}}, {"text": "Northern Railways,", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7595, "end_char": 7613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, when the petitLoner took up the matter with the authorities concerned, the General Manager, Northern Railways, wrote to him informing E him that temporary permission had been given to the railway contractors of printed matters to sell the news weekly subject to proper review of that paper and final orders which would be given later."}}, {"text": "16th March 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7999, "end_char": 8014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The General Manager asked the petitioner to supply copies of 12 old issues which was done.. Finally, the petitioner was informed by means of a letter datea the 16th March 1965 that the .F sale of the weekly \"The Indian Observer\" could not be permitted on the railway stations."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 S.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8958, "end_char": 8995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, howex\\lr, maintained that the Railway Board had taken the action\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 S.C.ll."}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9179, "end_char": 9184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Railways Act 1890", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9192, "end_char": 9216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "clause 742", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9280, "end_char": 9290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Railways Act 1890", "statute": "the Indian Railways Act 1890"}}, {"text": "clause 742", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9820, "end_char": 9830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Railways Act 1890", "statute": "the Indian Railways Act 1890"}}, {"text": "Section 120A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10387, "end_char": 10399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11003, "end_char": 11007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause I of Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11271, "end_char": 11287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12011, "end_char": 12022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Clause I of Rule", "statute": "Clause I of Rule"}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12228, "end_char": 12236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Clause I of Rule", "statute": "Clause I of Rule"}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12733, "end_char": 12752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Part A of this Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12967, "end_char": 12986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Clause 742", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13119, "end_char": 13129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part A of this Code", "statute": "Part A of this Code"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15441, "end_char": 15451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Now in the Indian Railway Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16283, "end_char": 16313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Clause 742", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16397, "end_char": 16407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Now in the Indian Railway Code", "statute": "Now in the Indian Railway Code"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17746, "end_char": 17750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Board Act 1905", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17758, "end_char": 17787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central D Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18470, "end_char": 18490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor has it been suggested that the Central D Government had passed any order prohibiting the sale of the Indian\n\nObserver under any statutory provision. \\ '"}}, {"text": "clause 742", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18695, "end_char": 18705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Railway Board Act 1905", "statute": "the Indian Railway Board Act 1905"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19160, "end_char": 19167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19348, "end_char": 19355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19518, "end_char": 19525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Northern Railway", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19588, "end_char": 19604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Northern Railway was the owner of the !"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21673, "end_char": 21680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22172, "end_char": 22180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22217, "end_char": 22225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22625, "end_char": 22630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22826, "end_char": 22833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "August 11, 19.65", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23315, "end_char": 23331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been urged that the certificate is defective because in the order dated July 7, 1968 granting it the Bench has Virtually given a decision as if an appeal was being entertained against the judgment dated August 11, 19.65 by which B the writ petition was allowed."}}, {"text": "hpande", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23394, "end_char": 23400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It does appear that hpande J .,"}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_874_880_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "GANGADHAR NARSINGDAS AGARWAL\n\nP. S. THRIVIKRAMAN & ANR.\n\nMarch 16, 1972\n\n[S. M. S!KRI, C.J., A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY, D. G. PALEKAR\n\nAND M. H. BEG, JJ.]\n\nTariff Act 1934-S. 44-Whether notification under S. 44 is appli cable to the facts and circum.tances of the case.\n\nThe appellant on 26th July 1966 filed shipping bill in triplicate before the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports for the purpose of obtaining export licencs in respect of 10,160 metric tonnes of iron ore.\n\nOn 28 July 1966 export licenee was granted to the appell'111t.\n\nOn 30 July 1966 the agents of the vessel made an application to the Asst!. Collector of Customs, for the grant of entry outward to the said vessel to load i!ron ore, which was granted on the same day with pennission to ship cargo on board the soid vessel.\n\nOn 1 August, the appellant presented to the Customs authority under section 50 of the customs Act, 1962, shipping bills in triplicate and the Customs authority made several endorsements on the shipping bill on the sami~ day. On the 2 August 1966, further endorsements on the shipping bill was made by the Customs authofity indicating that the shipment was inspected, checked and payment was made in full.\n\nOn 2 August 1966, \":l rrotification was isswd by the Ministry of Com, .. merce imposing ; i duty at the rate of Rs. 10 per metric tonne on lumpy iron ore. and on 28 January 1967, the Customs authority issued a notice to the appellant notifying that goods actually shipped by the appellant were subject to '!xport duty and the appellant W\":l.S liable to pay Rs. 98044 and the appellant was called upon to show cause as to why the amount should not be recovered from him.\n\nThe appellant contended that the shipping bill was presented to the Customs authority and the entry outward to -the ship was given prior to 2 August, 1966 when the notification came into force and so, the notification under S. 4A of the Tariff Act 1934 was not applicable to the consignment in question.\n\nThe Customs authorities held that the appellant was !\\able to Jl'IY the export duty.\n\nThe appellant impeached the order b::fore the Judicial Commissioner who also upheld the order of the Customs authorities.\n\nThe only question •.vhich arose for d'!cision before this Court was whether the shipment and export of iron ore by the appellant became liable to the said duty introduced on 2 August 1966. The appellant contended th1t th•\" shipping bill was presented on 1 August, 1966 and the order of the Customs authorities for entry outw\".lrds to the vessel was also given on 1 August 1966 and so, the export in the present case was not liable to payment of duty imposed on 2 August 1966.\n\nThe Customs authoriti-es however contended that the vesel arrived at Marmagoa harbour on 3 August 1966 and the vessel commenced loading on 3 August, 1966, and therefore, under s. 16(i) rif the Customs Act 1962, the shipping\n\nbill which had been presented before the date of entry outwards \"shall be deemed to be presented at the earliest on 3 August 1966 when the vessel in question arrived,\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : Jn the present case, the Customs authorities acted withoui jurisdiction in impo1ing duty on the expon by holding that the date of entry outwmds of the vessel was the dale when the vessel, arrived.\n\nSection 38 of the Sea Customs Act 1878 was_the Counter-part of Sec. 16 of the Customs Act, 1962. Section 38 h.ad two provisos.\n\nUnder the first proviso to tbat oJd section where shipment was permitted without a. shipping bill, the rate of duty was to be the rate in force at the time when the shipment of goods commenced.\n\nUnder the second proviso, the shipping bill must be deemed to have been delivered on the date on which that vesSel arriVed or entry outWardS was given which ever was later.\n\nUnder the provisos of S. 38 of the old Act, the Customs authorities had power to apply the rate in force on the date o'f the arrival of the vessel. Under S. 16 of the 19.62 Act, it is not permissible to do so. The statute does not contain such a provision. S. 16 of the 1962 Act speaks of the fictional date only in e_Jatiqn to the order of date of entry outwards of the veSse1.\n\nIn the-present case, the order of entry outwards of the vessel v1as made prior to 2 August, 1966. Therefore, the Customs auti)oritJes acted without jurisdiction in imposing the duty in question. 'f.879 G-880 CJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE 1URISD!CTJON : Civil Appeal No. 2137 of 1968.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated April 5, 1968 of the Judicial Commi$sioner's Court, Goa, Daman and Diu in Writ Petition No. 9 of 1967.\n\n&Ii Sorabjj, P. C. 1Iharlari, B. D. Bharucha, J. B. Dadachmrji and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.\n\n1agadish Swarup, Solicitor-General of india, Govind Das and B. D. Sharma, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRaj, J. This is an appeal by certiiicatie from the judgment dated 5 April, 1968 of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Goa, Daman and Diu at Panaji.\n\nThe appellant challenged the leV)' of export duty of Rs. 98044 on .9804-40 mertic tonnes of iron ore &hiPI?ed on S:S. 'Ardenode'\n\nQI! 3 August, 1966 at the rate of Rs. 10 per metric tonne.\n\nThe appellant on 26 July, 1966 filed .shipping bill in triplicate before the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports PanaJi, Goa for the 11urpose of obtaining 'eXport licence in respect of\n\n10,160 metric tonnes of iron ore. On 28 July, 1966 export licence was granted to the appellant. on. 30 July, 1966 M/s.\n\nHiralal & Co. agents of the vessel S. S. ·rdenode' made an application to the Assistant Collector of .customs, Marmagoa for the grant of entry outwards to the said vessel to load iron ore.\n\nOn 30 July, 1966 the Assistant Collector of Customs, Marmagoa made an order granting entry outwards to the said vessel S.S.\n\nArdenode and also gave permission to ship cargo on board the said vessel.\n\nOn 1 August, 1966 the appellant presented to the Customs authorities under section 50 of the Customs Act, 1962, (hereillafter called the Act), shipping buts in triplicate, dated 26 July, 1966.\n\nThe appellant ill accordance with the provisions of section 50 of the Act at the foot of the shipping but subscribed to a declaration as to the truth of the contents of the shipping buts.\n\nOn 1 August, 1966 the Customs authorities made these entries on the shipping bill 'rotation No. 730 Sd/ 1 August, 1966' 'Let export after (7amination if necessary Sd/ 1 August, 1966' and 'E.F.- No. 3/1/8/1966'. The abbreviation 'E.F.' means Export Fee.\n\nOn 2 August, 1966 the Customs authorities made further endorsements on the shipping bill.\n\nThese endorsements were 'PI as usual and checked. des'; 'lnspec, ted the lot-2-barges-checked des'; and 'Pd in full'.\n\nOn 2 August, 1.966 there was a notification issued by the Ministry of Commerce in exercise of powers conferred by section 4-A of the Indian Tariff Act, 1934 amending , the second schedule to the Tariff Act.\n\nThe relevant item in the said schedule introduced by way of amendment is 28 and the name of the article is lumpy iron ore and the rate of duty is Rs. 10 per tonne.\n\nThe S.S. Ardenode arrived at Marmagoa at 23.20 hours on 2 August, 1966.\n\nThe vessel arrived at Marmagoa Inner Harbour on 3 August, 1966 at 07.50 hours. The vessel commenced loading the cargo on 3 August, 1966.\n\nThe Customs.authorities on 28 January. 1967 _iss11ed a notice to the appella!lt. notifying that the goOds actually shipped by \\he appellant were subject to export .duty at the rate of Rs, . 10 per metric tonne and the custom duty amounting to Rs.· 98044 which was not Je\\'.ied in .respect of tjle consignment was due from the appeUant and \\lie appellant was called upon in accordance with section.28, of the Act. as to why the runoWlt should not be;, recovered from the appellant .\n\nThe appellant contended before die Gtistoms autfu!irities that the shipping bill was presented to the Customs authcirltic!s-and the -entry outwards to. the sh_!p S.S. Ardenode .was given .prior to 2 August, 1966 .when Ill? duty was payable m respectof. the export of the goods m question.\n\nThe appellant, therefore, .conted\n\nA that the notification Wider section 4-A of the Tariff Act 1934 was not applicaNe to the consignment and no duty was payable in respect of the export of the goods having regard to the Qrovisions ot r.ection 16 of the Customs Act. It may also be stated that the\n\nappellant impeached the vires of the notificatiQn.\n\n1 The Customs authorities on 19 April, 1967 held that by virtue of the provisions of section 16 ( 1 ) of the Act the shipping bill shall be doe, med to have been presented at the earliest on 3 August, 1966 when the vessel in question arrived. The export duty was levied with effect from 2 August, 1966. The Customs\n\nauthoritic~ therefore held that the appellant was liable to pay the C 11xport duty.\n\nThe appellant impeached the order of the Customs authorities under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Goa, Daman and Diu, Panaji.\n\nThe Judicial Commissioner upheld the order of the Customs authorities.\n\nThe entire controversy in the present appeal is whether ship- O ment and export of iron ore by the appellant became liable to the said duty introduced on 2 August, 1966.\n\nThe relevant provisions for the purpose of the present appeal are to be found in section 16 which deals with date for determination of ra!e of duty and tariff valuation of export goods and E sections 39, 50 and 51 which deal with loading of export goods on vessel and clearance of goods for exportation.\n\nSection 16 is as follows :-\n\n\"16( l). The rate of duty and tariff valuation, if any, applicable to any export goods, shall be the rate F and valuation in force-\n\n(a) in the case of goods entered for export under section 50, on the date on which a shipping bill or a bill of export in respect of such goods is presented under that section;\n\n(b) in the case of any other goods, on the date of payment of duty;\n\nProvided that if the shipping bill has been presented before the_ date of entry outwards of the vessel by which the goods are to be exported, the shipping bill shall be deemed \\o have been presented on the date of such entry outwards.\n\n(2) The provisions of this seclivn shall not apply to baggaee and aoods exported by post.\" 10-Lt061SupCl/27\n\nThe appellant contended that the shipping bill was presented A on 1 August, 1966 and the order of the Customs authorities for entry outwards to the vessel was also given on 1 August, 1966, and, therefore, the export in the present case was not liable to payment of duty imp<ised on 2 August, 1966. The Customs authorities on the other hand contended that the vessel arrived at Marmagoa on 3 August, 1966 and the vessel commenced loading B on 3 August, 1966, and, therefore, the shipping bill which had been presented before the date of entry outwards 'shall be deemed to be presented at the earliest on 3 August, 1966 when !li:e vessel in question arrived'.\n\nThe shipping bill under the Customs Act means a shipping bill referred to in section. 50 of the Act.\n\nSection 50 is as follows :-'- C\n\n\"50 (1). The exporter of any goods shall make entry thereof by presenting to the proper officer in the case of goods to be exported in a vessel or aircraft, a shipping bill, and in the case of goods to be exported by land, a bill of export in the prescribed form.\n\n( 2) The exporter of any goods, while presenting a shipping bill or bill of export, shall at the foot thereof make and subscribe to a declaration as to the truth of its contents\".\n\nIn the present case, it is common case that the shipping bill was E presented to the Customs authorities on 1 August, 1966 and the Customs authorities made several endorsements on the shipping bill. on the same day.\n\nThese endorsements permitted export after examjnation, if necessary.\n\nThe_ further endorsements on the shipping bill on 2 August, 1966 indicated that the shipment was inspected, checked and payment in full was made.\n\nSection 51 of the Act is as follows :-\n\n\"Where the proper officer is satisfied that any goods entered for export are not prohibited goods and the exporter has paid the duty, if any, assessed thereon and any charges payable under this Act in respect of the same, the proper officer may make an order permitting clearance and loading of goods for exportation\".\n\nIn the present case, the Customs authorities made endorsement on the shipping bill on 1 August, 1966 permitting export after examination, if necessary.\n\nThe shipping bill described the goods as 'free goods'.\n\nExport licence was also granted on that shipping :u bill.\n\nSections 50 and 51 of the Act deal with entry of goods for exportation and clearance of goods for expOrtation. The word\n\n'entry' is defined in section 2 ( 16) of the Act in relation to good~ exported in a vessel to mean an entry made in a shipping bill.\n\nEntry outwards of a vessel is dealt with in section 39 of the Act. Section 39 is as follows :-\n\n\"The master of a vessel shall not pennit the loading of apy export goods, other than baggage and mail bags, until an order has been given by the proper officer granting entry-Outwards to such vessel\".\n\nProper officer mentioned in section 3 9 of the Act is defined in section 2 ( 34) of the Act in .relation to any functions to be per- C formed under this Act to mean the officer of customs who is assigned those functions by the Board or the Collector of Customs.\n\nSection 39 contemplates an order by the proper officer granting entry outwards to such vessel. In the present case, the agents of the ship made an application 30 July, 1966 for entry outwards of the vessel.\n\nThe Assistant 'Collector of Customs, Marmagoa granted permission on 30 July, 1966 to ship cargo on board the D vessel.\n\nUnder section 39 of the Act loading of goOds is not permissible until an order is made granting entry outwards to the vessel.\n\nIn the present case, the Customs authorities on 30 July, 1966 made an order granting entry outwards to the vessel.\n\nUnder section 16 of the Act the date of presentation of a E shipping bill is the relevant date for detennination of rate of duty and tariff valuation applicable to export goods.\n\nUnder the proviso to section 16 of the Act however there is a fictional date for determination of such duty.\n\nThe fiction is introduced by providing for the date of entry outwards of the vessel to be relevant date in case where the shipping bill has been presented before the date of entry outwards. of the vessel.\n\nThe date of entry outwards of F the vessel is the order made under section 39 of the Act.\n\nSection 38 of the Sea Customs Act 1878 was the counter-part of section 16 of. the Customs Act, 1962.\n\nSection 61 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 was the counter-part of section 39 of the Customs Act, 1962.\n\nUnder section 38 of the 1878 Act the rate G of duty was the rate in force when the shipping bill was delivered under section 137 of the 1878 Act.\n\nSection 137 of the 1878 Act provided for clearance of goods for shipment by delivery of shipping bill, payment of duties and the passing of the shipping bill by the Customs authorities.\n\nSection 38 of the 1878 Act had two provisos.\n\nUnder the first proviso to that old section where ll the shipment was permitted without a shipping bill, or in anticipation of the delivery of a shipping bill, the rate of duty was to be the rate in force at the time when the shipment of goods commenced.\n\nUnder the second proviso to section 38 of the 1878 Act\n\n880 SUPR!iMB COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 s.c.R.\n\nwhere the shipping bill was m anticipation of the arrival of aay A. vessel or before an order was given for entry outwards of the vessel the shipping bill must be deemed to have been delivered on the date on which that vessel arrived or entry outwards was given whichever was later.\n\nUnder the provisions of section 38 of the 1878 Act the Customs authorities had power to apply the rate in force on the date of the arrival of the vessel.\n\nUnder section 16 B of the 1962 Act it is not permissible to do so.\n\nThe statute does not contain such a provision.\n\nSection 16 of the 1962 Act speaks of the fictional date only in relation to the order of date of entry outwards of the vessel.\n\nIn the pre.sent case, the order of entry outwards of the vessel was made prior to 2 August, 1966. Therefore, the Customs authorities in the impugned order acted without C\n\njurisdiction in imposing duty on the export by holding that the date of entry outwards of the vessel was the date \"when the vessel arrived\".\n\nFor the foregoing reasons the appellant is entitlt<d to an order cancelling the notice dated 28 January, 1967 by which the Customs authorities demanded duty from the appellant.\n\nThe order D of the Judicial Commissioner is 5et aside.\n\nThere will be a writ setting aside the _notice dated 28 January, 1967 and an order for bearing the respondents from taking any steps or proceedings pursuant to the notice dated 28 January, 1967.\n\nThere will also be an order quashing the order of the Assistant Collector of Customs dated 19 April, 1967 which gave effect to the notice and E. held the appellant liable to pay the export duty.\n\nThe appeal Is allowed.\n\nIn the facts and circumstances of the case each party will pay and bear their own costs. s.c.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 90, "entities": [{"text": "GANGADHAR NARSINGDAS AGARWAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GANGADHAR NARSINGDAS AGARWAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. S. THRIVIKRAMAN & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. S. THRIVIKRAMAN & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 16, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 71, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 16, 1972\n\n[S. M. S!KRI, C.J., A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY, D. G. PALEKAR\n\nAND M. H. BEG, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. G. PALEKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.G. PALEKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 151, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Tariff Act 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 154, "end_char": 169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170, "end_char": 175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tariff Act 1934", "statute": "Tariff Act 1934"}}, {"text": "S. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 203, "end_char": 208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tariff Act 1934", "statute": "Tariff Act 1934"}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 874, "end_char": 884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tariff Act 1934", "statute": "Tariff Act 1934"}}, {"text": "customs Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 892, "end_char": 909, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "2 August 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1038, "end_char": 1051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 2 August 1966, further endorsements on the shipping bill was made by the Customs authofity indicating that the shipment was inspected, checked and payment was made in full."}}, {"text": "28 January 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1374, "end_char": 1389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and on 28 January 1967, the Customs authority issued a notice to the appellant notifying that goods actually shipped by the appellant were subject to '!"}}, {"text": "2 August, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1823, "end_char": 1837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant contended that the shipping bill was presented to the Customs authority and the entry outward to -the ship was given prior to 2 August, 1966 when the notification came into force and so, the notification under S. 4A of the Tariff Act 1934 was not applicable to the consignment in question."}}, {"text": "S. 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1907, "end_char": 1912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tariff Act 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1920, "end_char": 1935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2850, "end_char": 2858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tariff Act 1934", "statute": "the Tariff Act 1934"}}, {"text": "Customs Act 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2867, "end_char": 2883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3294, "end_char": 3304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act 1962"}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3312, "end_char": 3332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3357, "end_char": 3364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act 1878"}}, {"text": "Customs Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3372, "end_char": 3389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3391, "end_char": 3401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "S. 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3813, "end_char": 3818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "S. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3945, "end_char": 3950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "S. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4048, "end_char": 4053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "&Ii Sorabjj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4591, "end_char": 4602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "&Ii Sorabjj, P. C. 1Iharlari, B. D. Bharucha, J. B. Dadachmrji and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. C. 1Iharlari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4604, "end_char": 4619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "&Ii Sorabjj, P. C. 1Iharlari, B. D. Bharucha, J. B. Dadachmrji and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. D. Bharucha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4621, "end_char": 4635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "&Ii Sorabjj, P. C. 1Iharlari, B. D. Bharucha, J. B. Dadachmrji and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "B. D. Bharucha"}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachmrji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4637, "end_char": 4653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "&Ii Sorabjj, P. C. 1Iharlari, B. D. Bharucha, J. B. Dadachmrji and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4658, "end_char": 4673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "&Ii Sorabjj, P. C. 1Iharlari, B. D. Bharucha, J. B. Dadachmrji and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "1agadish Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4695, "end_char": 4710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1agadish Swarup, Solicitor-General of india, Govind Das and B. D. Sharma, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Govind Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4740, "end_char": 4750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1agadish Swarup, Solicitor-General of india, Govind Das and B. D. Sharma, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4755, "end_char": 4767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1agadish Swarup, Solicitor-General of india, Govind Das and B. D. Sharma, for the respondents.", "canonical_name": "B. D. Bharucha"}}, {"text": "Raj", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4835, "end_char": 4838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRaj, J. This is an appeal by certiiicatie from the judgment dated 5 April, 1968 of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Goa, Daman and Diu at Panaji."}}, {"text": "28 July, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5412, "end_char": 5425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 28 July, 1966 export licence was granted to the appellant."}}, {"text": "30 July, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5475, "end_char": 5488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "30 July, 1966 M/s.\n\nHiralal & Co. agents of the vessel S. S. ·rdenode' made an application to the Assistant Collector of .customs, Marmagoa for the grant of entry outwards to the said vessel to load iron ore."}}, {"text": "Hiralal & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5495, "end_char": 5508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "30 July, 1966 M/s.\n\nHiralal & Co. agents of the vessel S. S. ·rdenode' made an application to the Assistant Collector of .customs, Marmagoa for the grant of entry outwards to the said vessel to load iron ore."}}, {"text": "1 August, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5888, "end_char": 5902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1 August, 1966 the appellant presented to the Customs authorities under section 50 of the Customs Act, 1962, (hereillafter called the Act), shipping buts in triplicate, dated 26 July, 1966."}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5960, "end_char": 5970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5978, "end_char": 5995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6131, "end_char": 6141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "2 August, 1.966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6735, "end_char": 6750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2 August, 1.966 there was a notification issued by the Ministry of Commerce in exercise of powers conferred by section 4-A of the Indian Tariff Act, 1934 amending , the second schedule to the Tariff Act."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Commerce", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6790, "end_char": 6810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2 August, 1.966 there was a notification issued by the Ministry of Commerce in exercise of powers conferred by section 4-A of the Indian Tariff Act, 1934 amending , the second schedule to the Tariff Act."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6846, "end_char": 6855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Indian Tariff Act, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6865, "end_char": 6888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.S. Ardenode", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7109, "end_char": 7122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The S.S. Ardenode arrived at Marmagoa at 23.20 hours on 2 August, 1966."}}, {"text": "Marmagoa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7134, "end_char": 7142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The S.S. Ardenode arrived at Marmagoa at 23.20 hours on 2 August, 1966."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8154, "end_char": 8163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tariff Act 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8173, "end_char": 8188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8342, "end_char": 8353, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8524, "end_char": 8534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tariff Act 1934", "statute": "the Tariff Act 1934"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8907, "end_char": 8918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tariff Act 1934", "statute": "the Tariff Act 1934"}}, {"text": "Judicial Commissioner, Goa, Daman and Diu, Panaji", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8959, "end_char": 9008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant impeached the order of the Customs authorities under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Goa, Daman and Diu, Panaji."}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9335, "end_char": 9345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 39, 50 and 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9445, "end_char": 9467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9559, "end_char": 9569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9771, "end_char": 9781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "3 August, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10702, "end_char": 10716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Customs authorities on the other hand contended that the vessel arrived at Marmagoa on 3 August, 1966 and the vessel commenced loading B on 3 August, 1966, and, therefore, the shipping bill which had been presented before the date of entry outwards 'shall be deemed to be presented at the earliest on 3 August, 1966 when !"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11000, "end_char": 11011, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11074, "end_char": 11084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11987, "end_char": 11997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 50 and 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12615, "end_char": 12633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12758, "end_char": 12767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12914, "end_char": 12924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12937, "end_char": 12947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13196, "end_char": 13205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13233, "end_char": 13242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13431, "end_char": 13441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13765, "end_char": 13775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14008, "end_char": 14018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14202, "end_char": 14212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14564, "end_char": 14574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14588, "end_char": 14598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14606, "end_char": 14626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14651, "end_char": 14661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act 1878"}}, {"text": "Customs Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14670, "end_char": 14687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14690, "end_char": 14700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act, 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14708, "end_char": 14729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14754, "end_char": 14764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "Customs Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14772, "end_char": 14789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14798, "end_char": 14808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "section 137", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14909, "end_char": 14920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Section 137", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14939, "end_char": 14950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15126, "end_char": 15136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15456, "end_char": 15466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15836, "end_char": 15846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15973, "end_char": 15983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16083, "end_char": 16093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_881_897_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "STATE OF JAMMU AND XA.SJJMIR\n\nM. S. F ~ROOQl AND Ol'HERS\n\nMarch 17, 1972 rs. M. SIKRI, c.r., A. N. GR.ovila, A. N. RAv, n. o. PALBKAR\n\nAND M. H. BEG, J.t.)\n\nConstitution of lrtdia, 1950, Art. 254 as applied to Jammu and Kashmir in 1962....:..Scope of.\n\nJammu and Kashmir Government Servants' Prevention of Corruption C (Commission) Act, 1962-/f repugnooo to All India Services Act, 1951, and Rules made thereunder-Repugnahcy-Test$ for.\n\nThe respondent, a member of the Indian Police Service, wu borne on the Jammu and Kashmir Cadre. The Cottunission 8et up under the Jammu and Kashmir Government Servants'' Prevention of Corruption (Commission) Act 1962, directed investigation into a complaint received by t~ Comminlon again&t the respondent. He cballenaed the jurisdic D tion of the Commission, and the High Court allowed the petition, holdl.QJ tmot th.e members of an All Ina Service, serving in a State, are govern ed by the All India Services Act, 1951 and the Rules made thereUndet, and the Commission Act was not applicable to them.\n\nDismilaing the ap~ to this Court,\n\nHELD : Asaumina that the Conunisaion Act is, in pith all.d substaooe, a law with respect. to cOrruption of Governm.ent servants, it ia repugnant to the provisions of the All India Se!rvis Act and the All Indn ServiefS\n\n(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955_.....and hence, under Art. 2'4 as it existed when the Commiasion Act came into force (July, 16, 1962)j the Commission Act must give way to the All India ServJoea Act and tm\n\nRules made therunder. [883 C-D. 887 B-C; 897 FJ\n\n(a) The position when the Commission Act came into force was that F Parliant could legislate on it~:m 70, List I, cteruin~ with 'UniCill Public Servicee, All India Services and Union Public Serv1ce Commission, .and Art. 254, as appliqable to Jammu. and Ka&hmir at that time provided that, if any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a StAte is . repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament iJ compmnt to enact the law made by Parliament, whether d before or after the Jaw made by the Legislature of tbcl State, &hall prevail G . and the law made by the Legislature Of the Sta~ aha.ll, to the extent of repugnancy, be void. It therefore follows that if provision of the Commission Act is repugnant to a provision of the Discipline '3IId Appeal Rules, I9SS, then tl!e law made by the State of Jammu and Kashmir must give way. , L884 HS85 F]\n\nA. S, KrirhM v. State of MGJras,· [1957) S.C. a. ~99; , Deep Charld.\n\nv. State of Uttar Pradesh, [19591 Supp. 2 S.C.R. 8 and Prem Nath H Kaul v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir, [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 270, explained.\n\n(b) Repugnancy arises when (i) there is inoonsi$tency in the a~~ terms of the Act enacted by Parliament and the impugned State ..Act,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nor (ii) the law enacted by Parli-ament was intended to be a complete and A. exhaustive code, (or) (ih) the law enacted by Parliament was innded expressly or impliedly to cover the whole field. L887 FPH] ,\n\nCh. Tika Ram ji v. Stat.e of U.P., [1956] S.C. R. 393, f<>llowed.\n\nDeep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1959) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 8; ref.erred to.\n\n(c) It could be said '3. law enacted by Parliament was intended to -cover the whole field, where by reason of the subject ma.tter dealt with, and the thod of dealing with it, and the nature and multiplicity of the regulations prescribed, Parliament had adopted a plan or scheme which would be hindered and obstructed if '3.0y additional regulations whatever are prescribed upon the subject by any other authority, that is, if the subject is either touched or trenched upon by the State authority. [888 D-Fl\n\nO'Sullivan v. Noarlunga Meat Ltd .. , [1957] A. C. 1: Attornczy General, Canada v. Attorney-General, British Columbia, i1930] A.C. 1:t 1; Subrahmanyan Chattiar v. Muthuswami Goundan, t1940] F.C.R. 188 and Ukha Kolha v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1531, referred to.\n\nMegh Raj v: Allah Rakhia, [1947} F.C.R. 77; Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce; [1947] F.C.R. 28 and CalcuUa Gas Company v. Ste of West Bengal, [1962] Supp. 3 S.C. R. 1 ; explained\n\nWynes, Legislative Executive and Judicial Power~ in Austral1'a~ 4th ed. p. 101, referred to.\n\n(d) From the perusal of the provisions of the two statutory laws, namely, the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, and the Jammu and Kashmir Government Servants Prevention of Cctruption (Commission) Act, 1962 it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the two cannot go together.\n\nThe impugned Act pro. vides for addition-al punishments not provided for in the Discipline and Appeal Rules; and in so far as the Commission Act deals with the infliction of disciplinary punishment it is repugnant to the Disdpline and Appeal Rules.\n\nParliament had occupied the field and given clear indication that the only manner in which any disciplinary action could re taken against the members of the All India Service, was und-er the AU India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. [897 B-D]\n\nIn so far as the Commission Act deals, with a preliminary enquiry for the purposes of enabling any prosecution to be launched it may be within the legislative competence of the Jammu and Kashmir State and not repugn'ant to the provisions of the Discipline and Appeal Rules. But '8S the provisions dealing with investigation for possible criminal prosecution are inextricably interwined with the provisions dealing with infliction of disciplinary punishment the whole Act mut be read so as to leave the mPmbers qf the All Jndia Services outside its purview. f1897 D-F]\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C.A No. 1572 of 1968.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated the 31st October, 1966 of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court m Writ P€tition No. 130 of 1966.\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi, Ram Panjwani and R. N. Sachthey, for the H appellant.\n\nG. L. Sanghi, for the respondents.\n\nJ. & K. STATE v. M. s. FAROOQI (Sikri, C.}.) .883\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSikri, C.J. This is an appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Jammu and ashmir from its judgment dated October 31, 1966 allowing the writ petition filed by the petitioner.respondent, M. S. Farooqi of the In4ian Police Service, and restraining the State of I ammu and Kashmit, appellant before us, from proceeding against him under the Jammu and Kashmir Government Servant<~'\n\nPrevention of Corruption (Commission) Act, 1962-hereinafter referred to as the Collliliission Act. The High Court held that the members of an All India Serviee serving in a State are governed by the All India Services Act, 1951, and the Rules made thereunder, and the Commission Act was not applicable to them. The High Court further held that the Commission Act was hit by art. 14 of the Constitution as \"there is a c~.:.ar discrimina:tion between the members of All India Services posted else where and the members of the same Servic~ postled in the State inasmuch as inquiry against the former for .acts of corruption is to be hel4 under the Central Act and the rules made thereunder while against the latter o for the same acts of corruption enquiry is to be held under the Commission Aot, the px:_ovisions of which are for more drastic than the Central Act and tl_le rules made thereunder.\"\n\nWe may briefly state the releyant facts which necessitated the filing of the writ petition. The respondent before us, M. S. Farooqi, hereinafter referred to as the petitioner, is a member of the Indian E Police Service which is in All India Service. He is borne on the Jammu & Kashmir cadre. On March 12, 1964, an anonymous complaint was received by the Commission, set up undet:. the Commission Act.\n\nOn March 20, 1964, the Commi§sion asked for a report from the Deputy Inspector General of Police. The Deputy\n\nInspector General of Police (Anti Corruption Organisation) raised the question of the juriSqiction of the Commission. The Commis4 sion, however, held that the Commission Act was applicable in its entirety to Government servants belonging to Jammu and Kashmir cadre of the All India ervices. The objection raised by the In4 vestigating Agency was thus overruled. The Investigating Agency was directed to continue Investigation of the. case and submit a report. Thereupon the Qetitioner filed the writ petition in the High Court challenging the .jurisdiction of the Commission. As stated above, the High Court allowed the petition, but later granted certificate of fitness and the appeal filed on behalf of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is now before us.\n\nThe learned counsel for the State contends that :\n\n(l) The Commission Ad is in pith and substance a law in respect of corruption of Government servants of 'Jammu ; and Kashmir and only incidentally deals with memberi; of the All India\n\nSUPREME COUJ.T RBPOilTS\n\n(1972) 3 S.C.R.\n\nServices, and is therefore valid in its entirety.\n\n(2) If such a legislation ia valid, t:be Act ilnot discriminatory because aBservants of Jammu and Kamii Government are treat ed alik\"!! aDd the same procedure applied to them for the trial of oftences corruptionj\n\n(3) There is valid' classification on 1lbe basis of territory; and\n\n( 4) In any event, the procedure under the Commission Act is not more prejudicial than that under the All India Services Act, 1951, and the rules made thereunder.\n\nThe first pointraised by the learned counsel does not meet the. real objection to the applicability of the Commission Act to mem- C bers of the Indian Police Service serving in Jammu and Kashmir.\n\nThis objection is that,. assuming that the Commission Act is in pith and substance a law with respect to corruption of Qovernment servants, it is repugnant to the provisions of the All India Service Act, 1951, and the All India Services (lmcipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955-horeinafter referred to as the Discipline and Appeal D Rule., and it must give way to the statUtory provisions.\n\nIt seems to us that there is force in the objection raised on be half of the. petitioner an\"). in that view it is not necessary to decide the four points raised by the learned counsel.\n\nWe are here coricef!lled with. the Constitution Of India as applicable to the State of Jammu and Kaibm.ir at the relevant time. Arti- _cle 3 70 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, provides that \"the\n\npowers of-Parliament to make laws for the State (of Jammu and Kashmir) shall be limited to those matters in the Union J., ist and the Concurrent List whih, in consultation with the Government of\n\nthe State~ are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Acce8sion. governing the Accession r of the State to the Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion. Legillature may make laws for the State, and (ii) such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence\n\nof the Government of the State, the President may~ by order epecify.\" .\n\nG In exercise of the powers onferred by cl. (l) of art. 370, the President, with the concrrence ot the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, made . the Cqnstitution (Applicatton to Jammu andJ Kashmir) Order; 1954.\n\nWe are concerned in this case with the position as it existed onJuly 16, 1962 when e Com missiqn Act received he assent of the Sadari-Riyasat. nte posi 1:1 1ion was that Pailiametlt coald legislate on List I, entry 70, which reads: .. Union Public Services, AU•Ind.ia Servicesj UniOn. Public Sttvice commission... .\n\nJ. & K. STATE v. M. s. FAl\\OOQI (Sikri, C.J.) 88.5.\n\nArticl~ 246 of the Constitution, as applied to Jammu and Kashmir, then read:\n\n\"246 ( 1) Parliament has exclusive power to .~ . laws with respect t9 any of the matters enumera~ in\n\nList I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution re-- ferred to as the \"Union List\".\"\n\nArticles 248 and .249 of the Consditution had not been mado applicable to the Stat~ of Jammu and Kashmir and, therefore. all the residuary powers resed with the State of Jammu and Kashmir.\n\nEntry 97 of List I, dealing with residuary powers~ had abo been omitted.\n\n. Article 254, as applicae to the State of Jammu and Kashmir at the relevant time, provided :\n\n\"254. If any provision of a law made by the Legi~ lature of a State is rpugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of the State, shall prevail and t.he law made by the Legislature of the State shal11 to the extent of repugnancy, be void.''\n\nAt the relevant time there was no concurrent list. Certain entries in the Concummt 'List eem to have been applied by the order J No. CO 66 of 1963 dated September 25,-1963, for the first time.\n\n. Fr9m this constitu.tiQnal scheme it follo\\vs tha• if a. provision 6f the Conuuission Act repugnant to a provision of the Discipline and Appeal Rules, 19S5, then the law made by the State of Jammu and Kashmir must give way. r Article 254 o( the Consrtitution as applied abOw, is similar to section 109 of e Al:!tralian Constitution which provides that \"when a Jaw of the State is inconsist&nt with a law ol the Coni monwealth, the latter Shall prevail, and the fonner shall to the extent of inconsistency, be invalid.\"\n\nG The ]earned counsel for the State relied on various deei&ions of\n\nthi~ Co.urt interpreting art. 2S4, as it existsin the Indian Consti\n\ntuhon. · ·\n\nIn A . s. Krishna v. State of M atltas.( 1) while nteq?rettfig s. 107 of the Govent of' India Act, 1935,, which is similar tO art. 254(1) of the Constitution, Venkatarama Ayyar, J, o~~ :\n\n\"For tbia section to apply, :two eonditians ttlott be f\\IUilled: (1) the provisions of the Provincial law d\n\n(1) [l9S7J S.(:.R. 399.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS.\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R..\n\nthose of the_ Centr~ Legislation must bOth be in respect of a matter which is enumerated in the Concurrent List.\n\nand (2) they must be repugnant to each other. It is only when both these requirements are satisfied that t:he provincial law will, to the extent of repugnancy, become void.\"\n\nIn Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh(!), SubbaRao, J., as he then was, seems td read cl. (2) of art. 254 in a similar manner.\n\nIn Prem Nath Kaul v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir( 2 ), Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was, observed:\n\n\"Besides, it is clear that the esnrtial condition for the application of Art. 254( 1) is that the existing law must be with respect to one of the matters enumeJrated in the Concurrent List; in other words, unless it is shown that the repugnancy is between the provisions of a sub~ sequent law and those of an existing law in respect of the specified matters, the Article would be inapplicable;\n\nand, as we have already pointed out, Schedule Seven which cont; ains the three Legislative Lists was not then extended to the fa;.te; and. it is, therefore, impossible to predicate that the matter covered by the prior law is one .of the matllers enumerated in the Concurrent List. That is why Art. 2S4 cannot be invoked by the appelf.ant.\"\n\nArt. 254, as applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, at the time this judgment was delivered, was in the same form as in the Indian Constitution. This Court was not then dealing with. art. 254 in the form wit~ which we have to deal with.\n\nWe may mention that this Court left open the questjon regarding the interpretation of art. 254(1) in the following words in Ch. Tika Ramji v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(8 ) :\n\n\"We are concerned here with the repugnancy, if any, arising by reason of both Parliament and t!be State Legislature having operated in the same field inrespect of a matter enumerated in the Concurrent List, i.e., food~ stuffs comprised in Entry 33 of List III and we are, therefore, not ca1Le4 upon to express any opinion on the controversy which was raised in regard to the exact . scope and extent of article 254(1) in regard to \"a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact\", as to whether the lgislative power of Parlia~ ment therein refers to List I, List lli and the residuary power of legislation vested in Parliament . under article\n\n1 [t<m] SJp>. 2 S.C.R. 8~1.\n\n(2) [1959} Supp. 2 S.C.R. 270; 300.\n\n(3) {1956) S.C.R. 393; 424.\n\n.A.\n\nJ. & K. STATE v . . Jd; .s, FAR.OOQI (Sikri, C.J.) ' 881'\n\n248 or is confined merely to. the matters enumerated.inth$\n\nCpncurrent List (V.ide A.I.R. 1942 Cal. 587 contra,. pet Sulantiut, J., in 1940 F.C.R. 188 at p. 226).\"\n\nIt seems to us that the above cases are not applicable as the language of Art. 254 as appliable J. & K. is different .\n\nOn the wording of art. 254, as it existed when the Cssion Act was enacted, it seems to us that there is no escape from the clear wording of the article. It says in plain words tb.at if there is any repugnancy between the law made by the State and the law made by Parliamnt the law made by the Legislature of .the State must give way.\n\nSo, the only question to be determined is whether there is any repugnancy between the Discipline and Appeal Rules and the Commission Act.\n\nWe may state that we are not concerned with the meaning ascribed to art. 254, as it exists in the Indian Constiw tution and which was interpreted by the judgments referred to above.\n\n In Ch. Tika Ramji v. The State of Uttar Prade5h( 1) this., Court examined the question of. repugnancy. It referred to various authorities and concluded that either there mus~ be inconsistency in the actual terms of the Act. enacted by Parliament and the impugned State Act or 1he law enacted by Parliament be intended to be a complete and exhustive code; in other words, expressly or impliedly evince an intention to cover the whole field. Various tests have been suggested by various authorities as to how to dmmine whether there is any inconsistelicy or repugnancy. Bhagwati, J.,\n\nreferred to Nicholas-Australian Constitution, 2nd ed. p. 303who bad suggested three tests of inconsistency or repugnancy, namely:- ·\n\n(1) There must be inconsistency in the actual terms of the c6nlpeting statutes. ·\n\n(2) Though thre may be no direct conflict, a Statt: G law may be inoperative because the Cooimblf..: •\n\nwealth law~ or the award ofth6 CoininonWealth Court, is intended to be a complete exhauStive code.·\n\n(3) Even in *e absence pf intenon, a conftict:tnay ·\n\narise when both State and Conurionwealth-seek to exercise their powers over the same sject matter.\n\n(1) (1956] S.C.R.. 393.\n\n. SUPReME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.R .\n\nIn Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh(!) Subba Rao, 1., as he then was, speaking for the Court, observed on the question of re-- pugnancy:\n\n\"Repugnancy 'between two statutes may thus be as\n\ncertain\"~ on the basis of the following .three principles :\n\n( 1) Whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions;\n\n(2) Whether Parliament intended to iay down .an exhaustive code in respect of the subject matter\n\nreplacing the Act of the State Legislature; and ( 3) Whether the law made by Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature occupy the same field.\"\n\nWe may also refer to the observations of Evatt, J., in Stock Motor Plough Ltd. v. Forsyth(2 ), which were extracted in Tika Ramji's\n\ncase( 8) :\n\n\"It (the test of covering the field) is no more than a cliche for expressing the fact that, by reason of the sub ject matter dealt with, and the method of dealing with it, and the nature and multi.plicity of the regulations prescribed, the ederal authority has adopted a plan or\n\nscheme which will be hindered and obstructed if any additional regulations whatever are prescribed upon thesuiect by any other authority; if, in other words, the subject is either touched or trenched upon by Stale\n\nauthority.\"\n\nIt has been held in Australia that s. 109 of the Australian Constitution is not limited in its application to cases where both B sets of provisions deal with the same subject matter.\n\nWynes in his \"Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia\" 4th ed. states the general principles as applicable to Australia at page\n\n101, . Some of these p_rinciples may be set out :\n\n\"1. Itis essential to consider first whether the questiM of incOnsistency arises. Th:us;· if the Commonwealth have no power to pass th6 law under considera- G tion or the law is otherwise invalid, the matter is ended and sec:. 109 doesnot arise. Similarly, sec.l 09 does not\n\narise where the State law is invalid on other grounds.\n\n• • 1 t t ..\n\nI I t t o t t t\n\n3. It matters not which Act is first in point of time ..\n\n~ ·~ • ... , ....... .\n\n(1) ~19~91 Supp. 1S:d.k.·~1. .\n\n(2) : [1932)48 C.L.R. 128,)47:.>\n\n(1) ·(I9S6J s.c.a. m.\n\nJ. & K. STATE v. ~. $. FA.ROOQI (Sikri, C.J.)\n\n.88&\n\n. 7. Where the is t a direct conHict or <liscrimina.- uoo, there tnay still be UJ.c006iy if the SWe Utell1pts to govern conduct or to de.aJ. with a mattu which hM ~!ready been dealt with by a law of the Commonwealth mtcnde<l to expres CO!llpUlt!!lY elhau.tively or exc111Siv~ ly th~ law goven:ug a certaL~ subject matter. TI; c question m every ca6e 1s : What \" the intion of the a:nn~ monwealth Parliam.ent ? Is it an intention to lay dGWn the .wble f the .J.e.w on a ccctain subject'! II so, that subJect IS Withdrawn from State control, but, as we have see fo~ t.he reasoning of Dixon 1., in the 44-hour CO:t\", 1t JS wtthdrawn, not from any or all State legislation wh1ch may affect or h.wc some connection with it, but only from Store legislation which attempt5 to govern it in the character in virtue of which it is regulated by Commonwealth law.\n\n8. It is not essential to ihe operation of sec. I 09 that the two Acts comidered as a whole should be upon or \"wilh respect to\" the Jame &ubject matter, but where the inconsistency sou.Rht to be established is between Commonwealth intention to deal exclusively with a certain 5ubject and Scate law dealil\\l: with conduct which may conceivnbly fonn a portion of that 5ubject, the question is whether tho State Act deal• with such conduct as for ming an dcrru:nt in the subject intended to be e.telusi\\'l:ly governed by Commonwenllh law. This question is ooe which must be decided in the circumstances of each Pllrticulor case.\"\n\nThe Judicial Committee of the Privy Council_. in sullivan v. r Noarrlunga MaJ Ltd. (I) approved of the follov.ang lines from the\n\njudgment of Dixon 1. in Ex part~ Mc/(an(') :\n\n\"The inconsistency does not lie! .in the mere~ tence of two l11ws wflich nre 5Uscept!ble. of simultaneous obedience. It depends upon th7 mtent1on of the p:tra mount legu!arure tu exss by fls eructment, CO!IJple~ ly, ellhoustlvely, or cxclwively, what shall be.J; f h'i~\n\novn-n.Iog the partlcnlar conduct or rpatter to _.,_ c 1 .\n\nI d' ._..\n\nWtren a Pda'sl st3tute \"c os r.ttenltOf! ' 'rec'\"'-' . m It (I}( the law of till~ an ml'e!tltlcn, it lnoonmtent W1 ft .. a Stt!te to tovcn the ra~ condaet or ma er,\n\n. tromt.r ti and l11 Cued.l 1lli• Q'11eJti~ .+tas lll'ISCS Ul a l\\OOillcy i6 .sa.14 to .H those c~ are revt bccnse .. ln Can.nd3 .Pa: IIIIIC of tAo four . be tied up with dte &rng Qoc&r!AO .w ..... 4'! ._\n\n(I) (19HJ A.C. I; 28. ()) -4) c....... .• •\n\n\n\\ [1972] 3 S.C.lt.\n\npropositions. laid down in the Fish Canneries case-Attorney General, Canada v. Attorney-General, British Columbia(!) and the fourth proposition was in these words :\n\n\"There can be a domain in which provincial. and Dominion legislation may overlap in which case neither legislation will be ultra vires if the field is clear, but if the field is not clear and the two legislations meet the Dominion legislation must prevail.\" {see G.T.R. v. A.G.\n\nCan.( 2)]•·\n\nSulaiman, J., examined this question in Subrahamanyan C Chettiar v. Muthuswami Goundan( 3 ). He observed:\n\n\"lt seems to me that the principles of interpretation laid down by their Lordships. in the Canadian cases cannot be brushed aside by simQly saying tpat they relate to .a different Constitution. Those principles are not only , of the greatest weight but must be a guide to us even in interpreting the ndian Constitution. Of course, we cannot interpret the. language of any section in the Indian Act in the light of the interpretation of the corresponding section in the Canadian Constitution. That has to be ayoidedi but the principles of interpretation that have been established cannot be ignored. At the same time it would be dangerous to impon only a part of the doctrine and exclude another part. Partial application may frustrate the very object for which the rule of law was deduced.\n\nThe two doctrines of incidental encroachment and unoccupied field are closely related. I would go further and say that they are indissolubly connected.\n\nWe cannot import the doctrine of incidental encroachment in favour of the Provinces, and refuse to import the doctrine of unoccupied field which is in favour of the Centre. The two must go hand in hand. To allow Provincial legislatures to encroach upon the exclusiv~ Federal field, even though in an indirect way, when there . is a Central legislation already occupying -the fJ.eld,\n\nwould be to give the former a free hand in nullifying Central Acts relating to matters in the Federal List Such a carte blanche could hardly have been contemplated. The scheme of s. 100 of the Act is to exclude completely from the authority of the ProVincial Legis- . l.ature the power to legislate with respect' to subjects in\n\n(1) (19~ A.C~ lll.\n\n(2) (1907] A.C. 6S~ •Sei LUkin canadian Constitutional Law 3rd ed, p, lOS.\n\n(3) {l940) ~.C.R. 1881 231, 240, 241.\n\n. • ; t\n\n, . •\n\nJ, &: K. STATE ll. M. S. FAROOQl (Sikri, C.J.) 891\n\nList I. .If in consequence of certain difficulties that Provincial Legislatures would experience by a rigid enforcement of such an exclusion we must in interpreting\n\nthe words \"with respect to\" import the Canadian doctrine of permissibility of incidental encroachment, we must then at the sa:me time import the other allied doctrine also that such an encroachment is permissible only when\n\nthe field is actually unoccupied. It is only in this way that actual clash between the Centre and the Provinces can be avoided, which I think we must. This will also explain the apparent gap in s. 107 ( 1) of the Act, that gap being filled in by the provisions of s. 1 00''.\n\nVaradachariar J., left open the point whether the provisions of the impugned Act may also be VQ.id under s. 107 of the Constitution Act insofar as they are repugnant to the provisions of the\n\nNegotiable Instruments ;\\ct. He observed :\n\n\"The validity of this contention will depend upon the import of the expression \"federal law\" occurring in the opening part of sub-section (1) of s. 107. It may be conceded that the words \"which the Federal Legislature is competent to enact\" may refer to the first List also and they need not be qualified by the words occurring later and referring to the Concurrent Legislative List; because, if these later words were intended to qualify the opening words of the sub-section also, it .would not have been necessary to use the words \"which the Federal Legislature is competent to enact\" in the earlier portion.\"\n\nHe further saw a possible anomaly in the operation of s. 107, viz.,\n\n\"that while provincial legislation in respect of subjects in the Concurrent List cannot override \"existing Indian law'' except when\n\nassented to by the Governor General, such legislation in respect of subjects enumerated in List II may without any such safeguard override pre-existing enactments even of the Central Legislature if they relate to subjects specified in List 1.\"\n\nThe learned counsel for the State relies on the decision of the G Privy Council in Megh Raj. v. Allah Rakhia(l) in support of his proposition that if the impugned legislation is a law not with respect to All India Servics but a law with respect to Corruption of Public Officers it is within the jurisdiction of the State Legislature, and no question of repugnancy arises. He relies paiticuhirly on. the\n\nH following observations :\n\n\"Thus both patties\" rightly construed s. 1 07 .as )ul.ving .no appUcation in a case where the province CO\\Ikl s~ ·\n\n(1) U947} P.C.R. 77, 8S, 88.\n\nSUPREME COURT JlEPOltTS\n\n\nthat it was acting wholly within its powers under the Provin.ciill List and was not relying on any power conferred on it by the Concurrent List.\"\n\n\"It follows that in their Lordships' judgment there is not sufficient ground for holding that the impugned Act, or any part of it, was invalid. As. a whole it fell within the powers given to tJ:te province by items 2 and 21 of\n\nlist U, without any necessity to invoke any powers from the Concurrent List, List III. Accordingly questions of\n\nregnancy under s. 107 of the Constitution At do not\n\nanse and need. not be consideml here;\"\n\nBut if facts are examined it would be clear that these obs\"vations do not assist the appellant.\n\nThe Act which was impugned was the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1938, and it was\n\nargued that the provisions of the impugned Act were repugnant to certain existing Indiari Laws, viz., Indian Contract Act and the Code of Civil Procedure, which fell within en&ies 8 and 10 of List\n\nm tho Government of India- Act, 1935.\n\nEntry 8 dealt with \"transfer of property other than agricultural land; registration of deeds and documents\" and entry 1 0 deJlt with \"COjlltracts, including partnership, agency, contracts of carriage, and other special forms of contract, but not including contracts relating to agricultural land.\" The Privy Council came to the conclusion that the impugned Act was within items 2 and 21 of List n. Their Lordlilhips observed : K\n\n\"If, as their Lordships think, the impugned Act is limited to agricultural lad, items 7, 8 and f 0 of List Ill do not affect the position, since agncultural land is ex4 cl'uded in these entries. But in any event, the Act does\n\n:not deal with wills or the transfer of property at an; it does certainly deal with mortgages, but as their Lordships lrave already stated, mortgages, though not expressly mantioned in the Constitution Aot, are properly to bo classed not under the head of contrac~. but as special transactions ancillary to the entry of \"land.\".\"\n\n, _\n\nIll this cue it was obvious that there was no conflict between legis- G lation entries in List ll and JePlation on entries in List m; the conftic:t if at all was with the existing ll!dian laws. The Privy CoucU had not lO deal -M.th the matter with Which 'We are con~ cened, viz., wbaa a Yalid .Sr. legislation eomes iDto caatUct with\n\na competemt legislation of Parliament under List 1 · hhrly, in P~ KlnMr Mw/cMrfN -.. kNk of Com- • JMrce(t) tMI'e was alltlei ~'1 MtwteR t1Je Blllpl Money\n\n(l) [1941] P.C.R. 28, 34.\n\nJ, & K. STATE v. M. s. FAROOQI (Sikri, CJ,) 8~3\n\nLenders Act, 1940, and an existing Indian Law, namely, Negotiaable I!nstruments Act. It was u,:ged before the Privy Council that \"if outside the authorized field the impugned Act con1licts with a Federal law-in the sense in which the words are 'used in s. 107 of the Constitution Actt may be that its provisions would be ineffective.\n\nThe answer to the suggestion that there is any such conflict here is threefold : (i) There is no conflict or inconsistency between the impugned Act and the !egotiable Itruments Act;\n\n(ii) If there is a conflict, then the Negotiae Instruments Act is not a Federal law within the meaning of s. 107 of the Cqnstitution Act;\n\n(iii) If there is a conflict, and if the Negotiable Instruments Act is a Federal law then the conflict is with that part of the Fed.eraj Law which is in the field Of contract, which is within the power conferred by List m, the Cqncurrent List, and the conflict is cured by the provisions of s. 107, sub-s. 2, of the Constitution Act, because this is a case where the Act was reserved for the consideration of the Governor-General, and therefore the Provincial law in the province would prevail.\"\n\nThe Privy Council posed three questions. ( 1) Does the Act in question deal in pith and substance with money lending? (2) It\n\nit does, is it valid though it incidentally trenches on matters reserved for the Federal legislature ? ( 3) Once it is determined whether the pith and substance is money lending, is the extent to which the Federal field is invaded a material matter ? They ootswered the first question in the affirmative.\n\nDealing with the second question, the Privy Council o'bserYed :\n\n''Moreover, the British Parliament when enacting the Indian CQnstitution Act had . a long experience of the working of the British North America Act and the Aus~ tralian Commonwealth Act and must have known that it is npt in principle possible to ensure that the powers entrusted to the several legislatures will never overlap.\"\n\nThe Privy Cooocil approved of certain obserVations of Sir Maurice\n\nGwyr, C.J. and then observed:\n\n\"But the overlapping of subjecttnatter is not avoided by substituting three lists for two, or even Jtr arranging for a hierarchy of jurisdictions. Subjects must still overlap, and where they do, the question must be. asked what\n\nin pith and substance is the effect of the enactnient of which complaint is made, and in what list is its true nature and characttr to be found.\n\nIf these questions. could not be asked;· much benefiCient legislation would. be stifled at birth, and many oi the subjects entruSd to il-L1061SupCI/72\n\n. ,\n\n\nProvincial legislation could never effectively be dealt .4 with.\"\n\nDealing with the third question, the Privy Council observed :\n\n\"No doubt it is an important matter, not, as their Lordships think, because the validity of an Act can be determined by discriminating between degrees of invasion. butJor the purpose of determining what is the pith and substance of the impugned Act.\n\nIts provisions may advance so far into Feral territory as to show. that its true nature is not concerned with provincial matters, but the question is not, has it trespassed more or less, but is the trespass, whatever it be, such as to sho'Y that the pith and substance of the impugned Act is not money lending but promissory notes or banking ?\"\n\nTheir Lordships further observed :\n\n\"Does the priority of the Federal legislature prevent the Provincial legislature from dealing with any matter which may incidentally affect any item in its list, or in each case has one to consider what the substance of an Act is and, whatever its ancillary effect, attribute it to the appropriate list according to its true character ?\"\n\nin this case there was no conflict alleged with the Federal legislation on an item in List I and what they were considering was conflict with the existing law. ·\n\nIn A. S. Krishna v. State'oj Madras( 1) the conflict alleged was between the Madras Prohibition Act, 193 7, on the one hand atld the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 on the other. This Court held that the impugned Act in question was a law with respect to. entry 31 List II, and observed :\n\n'The Madras Prohibition Act is thus in its entirety a law within the exclusive competence of the Provincial Legislature, and 'the question of repugnance under s. 107 (1 ) does not arise.\"\n\nThe Court did not address itself to the question whether assuming that it was a law with respect to entry 31 List IT a, nd not a law with respect to entries 5 and 2 respectively. of List m, yet what is to happen if the existing laws, namely, the Evidence Act and the Criminal Procedure Code, were in fact repugnant. At any rate, this Court was then not concerned with Parliamentary legislation under List I and also was not concerned with art. 254 in the form as it existed at the relevant tim~ as awlic•bl~ . to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.\n\n(1) [19S7] S.C.R. 399.\n\n' '\n\n. B\n\nJ. & K. STATE v. M. s. FAROOQI (Sikri, C.J.) sgs\n\nWe may mention that this Court upheld the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, under art. 254(2) in Ukka Kolhe\n\nv. State of Madras (1) insofar as they were consistent with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant referred to Calcutta Gas Company v. State of West Bengal(2), but we are unable to see how it helps the appellant's case.\n\nIn that case the Court was concerned with reconciling certain entries and observed that \"entries in the lists are only legislative heads or fields of lslation; they demarcate the area over whichthe appropriate legislature cal' operate. It is well settled that wide:; t amplitude should be given to the language of the entries.\n\nBut some of the entries in the different List or in the same List may overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with each other.\n\nIt is then the duty of this Court to reconcile the entries and bring harmony between them.\" But in this case we are not concerned with any question of harmonising the entries because we have on the one hand a specific entry in List I and on the other hand a residuary List.\n\nNow it remains to be seen whether the impugned Act is repugnant to the provisions of the All India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955.\n\nWe may first notice the provisions of the Discipline and Appeal Rules.\n\nRule 3 prescribes certain penalties, which may for good and sufficient reasons. and as hereinafter pro. vided be imposed on a member of the Service.\n\nThe penalties include censure, withholding of increments or promotion; reduction in rank, removal from service and dismissal from service, etc. The authority to institute proceedings and to impose penalties is mentioned in r. 4.\n\nIt is the Government, under whom the member is serving At the time of the commission of an act or omission which renders him liable to any penalty, which is competent alone to institute disciplinary proceedings and that Government can also impose all the penalties specified in r. 3 except the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement which order can only be passed by an order of the Central Government.\n\nRule 5 prescribes the procedure for imposing penalties.\n\nThe gro\"Jnds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the fonn of definite\n\ncharge or charges which shall be communicated to the member of the Service charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and of any other circumstances which it,'is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders on the B . case. A member of the service is given reasonable time to 'put in a written statement of defence. It enables him to be, heard if he\n\n(1) A.l.R. £1963} S.C. 1531. {2)' £1962f Supp. 3 S.C.R. 1.\n\n896 SUP.Rl!MB COUllT REPORTS [1972]'3 S.C.ll.\n\nso desires. The member of the Service is entitled to have acce8s A to official records.\n\nAfter the written statement is received, if such is filed, the Government may appOint a Board of Inquiry or an Inquiry Officer to enquire into the . charges or the Government enquires into the charges itself.\n\n' In brief, detailed rules are laid down regarding the manner of B holding the enquiry. Rule 6 provides for consultation with the Union Public Service Commission.\n\nRule 7 deals. with suspension during disciplinary proceedings and r. 8 deals with subsistence allowance during suspension. Rule 9 deals with payment of pay and allowances and treatment of service on reinstatemnt. A right of appeal is given against certain orders and r. 20 provides for a C . memorial to be submitted to the President.\n\nThese rules are a complete code as far as infliction of penalties prescribed in r. 3 is concerned.\n\nThe Commission Act provides for the constitution of one or D . more Commissions to be known as the Anti-Corruption Commis~\n\nsions to hold enquiry into the charges of corruption -and misconduct, as defined in s. 3 and 4 of the Coqunission Act, against all government servants including members of All India Services. The Commission is provided with an investigating agency to investigate into the charges. Section 10, before its amendinent, provided for E\n\nan inquiry by the Commission either suo motb or on a report in writing by certain officers. Under s. 11 every person is entitled to complain to the Commission against a Government servant. Section 12 provides for' a preliminary examination of the complaint.\n\nThe Commission may either dismiss the complaint or, if in its opinion there are sufficient grounds for taking further proceedings in the complaint, the Commission shall cause the sutance of. the I' allegations to be drawn into distinct articles of charges and summon the accused to appear beibre it. Under sub-s. (5) of:s. 12, as it existed before its amendment in 1969, the government servant had to be placed under suspension after the charges were drawn up\n\nagainst him by the .commission. Section 13 provides for procedure at the enquiry.\n\nSection 17 requires the Commission to record G its findings on the various articles of the charge and submit its recommendation to the Sadar-i-Riyasat. H any of the charges are held to have been established against the accused, the Commission has to recommend the punishment mentioned in this section. Under sub-s. (2) of s. 17 the Commission may, in addition to the punishment referred to in sub-s. ( 1), recommend that the accused be H declared for ever or for any shorter period of time to be specified, incapable or being appointed to any public office. Sub-section ( 3) provides that in a fit case the Commission may recommend that\n\nz.-' E. STATB v. M, S. FAllOOQI (Sikri, C.J;) 897\n\nthe accused be prosecuted for any o1fenee in a Cpun of law.\n\nSubsection (7) specifically deals with members of the All India Services\n\nand provides that in their case the Sadar-i-Riyasat may recommend the imposition of the punishment to the appropriate authority.\n\nThere are various other incidental provisions which we need not detail.\n\nFrom the perusal of the provisions of the two statutory laws, namely, the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,\n\n1955, and the Jammu and Kashmir Government Servants' (Prevention of Corruption (Commission) Act, 1962, it is impossible to escape from the conclusion that the two cannot go together. The impugned Act provides for additional punishments not provided in the Discipline and Appeal Rules. It also provid~ for suspension 'I!Jld infliction ofsome punishments.\n\nIt seems to us that insofar as the Commission Act deals with the inftiction of disciplinary punish• ments it is repugnant to the Discipline and Appeal Rules. Parliament has occupied the field and given clear indication that this was the only manner in which any disciplinary action should be taken against the members of the All India Service.\n\nInsofar as the Commission Act deals with a preliminary enquiry for the purposes of enabling any prosecution to be launched it may be within the legislative competence of the Jammu and ashmir state and not repugnant to the provisions of the Disciplme and Appeal Rules.\n\nBut as the provisions dealing with investigation for possible criminal prosecution are inextricably intertwined with\" the provisions\n\ndealin~ with infliction of disciplinary punishment the whole Act must be read down so -as to leave the members of the A1l India Service outside its purview. -\n\nWe accordingly hold that the provisions of the Commission Act do not apply to the memblers ol e All India Services. Accordinglv we dismiss the appeal. As the respondent was not represented , there would be no order as to costs.\n\nWe thank Mr. G. L. Sanghi for assisting us as amicus curiae.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 110, "entities": [{"text": "M. S. F ~ROOQl AND Ol'HERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. S. FAROOQl AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "1972 rs. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG, J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 151, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 187, "end_char": 195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Scope of.\n\nJammu and Kashmir", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 242, "end_char": 270, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "All India Services Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 358, "end_char": 386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "All India Services Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 929, "end_char": 957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Asaumina that the Conunisaion Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1083, "end_char": 1116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1353, "end_char": 1359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Asaumina that the Conunisaion Act", "statute": "Asaumina that the Conunisaion Act"}}, {"text": "July, 16, 1962)j", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1417, "end_char": 1433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2'4 as it existed when the Commiasion Act came into force (July, 16, 1962)j the Commission Act must give way to the All India ServJoea Act and tm\n\nRules made therunder. ["}}, {"text": "Union Public Serv1ce Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1731, "end_char": 1762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "883 C-D. 887 B-C; 897 FJ\n\n(a) The position when the Commission Act came into force was that F Parliant could legislate on it~:m 70, List I, cteruin~ with 'UniCill Public Servicee, All India Services and Union Public Serv1ce Commission, .and Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1769, "end_char": 1777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Asaumina that the Conunisaion Act", "statute": "Asaumina that the Conunisaion Act"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1953, "end_char": 1963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament iJ compmnt to enact the law made by Parliament, whether d before or after the Jaw made by the Legislature of tbcl State, &hall prevail G ."}}, {"text": "IId Appeal Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2323, "end_char": 2339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2373, "end_char": 2399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It therefore follows that if provision of the Commission Act is repugnant to a provision of the Discipline '3IId Appeal Rules, I9SS, then tl!e law made by the State of Jammu and Kashmir must give way. ,"}}, {"text": "1940] F.C.R. 188", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3865, "end_char": 3881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1947] F.C.R. 28", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4044, "end_char": 4060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Wynes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4146, "end_char": 4151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 S.C. R. 1 ; explained\n\nWynes, Legislative Executive and Judicial Power~ in Austral1'a~ 4th ed."}}, {"text": "All India Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4951, "end_char": 4968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parliament had occupied the field and given clear indication that the only manner in which any disciplinary action could re taken against the members of the All India Service, was und-er the AU India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. ["}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5736, "end_char": 5764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and order dated the 31st October, 1966 of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court m Writ P€tition No."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5799, "end_char": 5815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, Ram Panjwani and R. N. Sachthey, for the H appellant."}}, {"text": "Ram Panjwani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5817, "end_char": 5829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, Ram Panjwani and R. N. Sachthey, for the H appellant."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5834, "end_char": 5848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, Ram Panjwani and R. N. Sachthey, for the H appellant."}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5872, "end_char": 5884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6003, "end_char": 6008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".883\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSikri, C.J. This is an appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Jammu and ashmir from its judgment dated October 31, 1966 allowing the writ petition filed by the petitioner.respondent, M. S. Farooqi of the In4ian Police Service, and restraining the State of I ammu and Kashmit, appellant before us, from proceeding against him under the Jammu and Kashmir Government Servant<~'\n\nPrevention of Corruption (Commission) Act, 1962-hereinafter referred to as the Collliliission Act."}}, {"text": "M. S. Farooqi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6198, "end_char": 6211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".883\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSikri, C.J. This is an appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Jammu and ashmir from its judgment dated October 31, 1966 allowing the writ petition filed by the petitioner.respondent, M. S. Farooqi of the In4ian Police Service, and restraining the State of I ammu and Kashmit, appellant before us, from proceeding against him under the Jammu and Kashmir Government Servant<~'\n\nPrevention of Corruption (Commission) Act, 1962-hereinafter referred to as the Collliliission Act.", "canonical_name": "M. S. Farooqi"}}, {"text": "Kashmit", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6282, "end_char": 6289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".883\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSikri, C.J. This is an appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Jammu and ashmir from its judgment dated October 31, 1966 allowing the writ petition filed by the petitioner.respondent, M. S. Farooqi of the In4ian Police Service, and restraining the State of I ammu and Kashmit, appellant before us, from proceeding against him under the Jammu and Kashmir Government Servant<~'\n\nPrevention of Corruption (Commission) Act, 1962-hereinafter referred to as the Collliliission Act."}}, {"text": "art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6765, "end_char": 6772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The High Court held that the members of an All India Serviee serving in a State are governed by the All India Services Act, 1951", "statute": "The High Court held that the members of an All India Serviee serving in a State are governed by the All India Services Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "M. S. Farooqi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7406, "end_char": 7419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent before us, M. S. Farooqi, hereinafter referred to as the petitioner, is a member of the Indian E Police Service which is in All India Service.", "canonical_name": "M. S. Farooqi"}}, {"text": "Indian E Police Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7483, "end_char": 7506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent before us, M. S. Farooqi, hereinafter referred to as the petitioner, is a member of the Indian E Police Service which is in All India Service."}}, {"text": "March 12, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7583, "end_char": 7597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 12, 1964, an anonymous complaint was received by the Commission, set up undet:."}}, {"text": "March 20, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7693, "end_char": 7707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 20, 1964, the Commi§sion asked for a report from the Deputy Inspector General of Police."}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8041, "end_char": 8058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commis4 sion, however, held that the Commission Act was applicable in its entirety to Government servants belonging to Jammu and Kashmir cadre of the All India ervices."}}, {"text": "Commission Act is not more prejudicial than that under the All India Services Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9209, "end_char": 9296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jammu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9507, "end_char": 9512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "real objection to the applicability of the Commission Act to mem- C bers of the Indian Police Service serving in Jammu and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "All India Service Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9708, "end_char": 9735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10249, "end_char": 10270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "art. 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10960, "end_char": 10968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11696, "end_char": 11712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11773, "end_char": 11785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12039, "end_char": 12050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12935, "end_char": 12946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12999, "end_char": 13010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 2S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13322, "end_char": 13329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13441, "end_char": 13447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13466, "end_char": 13481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "art. 254(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13504, "end_char": 13515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13537, "end_char": 13554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "254(1) of the Constitution, Venkatarama Ayyar, J, o~~ :\n\n\"For tbia section to apply, :two eonditians ttlott be f\\IUilled: (1) the provisions of the Provincial law d\n\n(1) [l9S7J S.(:.R. 399."}}, {"text": "SubbaRao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14075, "end_char": 14083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SubbaRao, J., as he then was, seems td read cl. ("}}, {"text": "art. 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14130, "end_char": 14138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14219, "end_char": 14233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Prem Nath Kaul v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir( 2 ), Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was, observed:\n\n\"Besides, it is clear that the esnrtial condition for the application of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 254( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14339, "end_char": 14351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 2S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14954, "end_char": 14961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15002, "end_char": 15010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15033, "end_char": 15059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "254, as applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, at the time this judgment was delivered, was in the same form as in the Indian Constitution."}}, {"text": "art. 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15192, "end_char": 15200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 254(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15333, "end_char": 15344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 254(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15826, "end_char": 15840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article\n\n1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16075, "end_char": 16085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "1940 F.C.R. 188", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16378, "end_char": 16393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16482, "end_char": 16490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16546, "end_char": 16554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17070, "end_char": 17078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament and the impugned State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17421, "end_char": 17458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17754, "end_char": 17762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati, J.,\n\nreferred to Nicholas-Australian Constitution, 2nd ed."}}, {"text": "Evatt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19027, "end_char": 19032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may also refer to the observations of Evatt, J., in Stock Motor Plough Ltd. v. Forsyth(2 ), which were extracted in Tika Ramji's\n\ncase( 8) :\n\n\"It (the test of covering the field) is no more than a cliche for expressing the fact that, by reason of the sub ject matter dealt with, and the method of dealing with it, and the nature and multi.plicity of the regulations prescribed, the ederal authority has adopted a plan or\n\nscheme which will be hindered and obstructed if any additional regulations whatever are prescribed upon thesuiect by any other authority; if, in other words, the subject is either touched or trenched upon by Stale\n\nauthority.\""}}, {"text": "Australia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19659, "end_char": 19668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been held in Australia that s. 109 of the Australian Constitution is not limited in its application to cases where both B sets of provisions deal with the same subject matter."}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19674, "end_char": 19680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sulaiman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23500, "end_char": 23508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2)]•·\n\nSulaiman, J., examined this question in Subrahamanyan C Chettiar v. Muthuswami Goundan( 3 )."}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25114, "end_char": 25120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. STATE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25421, "end_char": 25429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J, &: K. STATE ll."}}, {"text": "M. S. FAROOQl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25434, "end_char": 25447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S. FAROOQl (Sikri, C.J.) 891\n\nList I. .If in consequence of certain difficulties that Provincial Legislatures would experience by a rigid enforcement of such an exclusion we must in interpreting\n\nthe words \"with respect to\" import the Canadian doctrine of permissibility of incidental encroachment, we must then at the sa:me time import the other allied doctrine also that such an encroachment is permissible only when\n\nthe field is actually unoccupied.", "canonical_name": "M. S. Farooqi"}}, {"text": "s. 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26051, "end_char": 26057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26121, "end_char": 26125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Varadachariar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26133, "end_char": 26146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Varadachariar J., left open the point whether the provisions of the impugned Act may also be VQ.id under s. 107 of the Constitution Act insofar as they are repugnant to the provisions of the\n\nNegotiable Instruments ;\\ct."}}, {"text": "s. 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26238, "end_char": 26244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26514, "end_char": 26520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27036, "end_char": 27042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27899, "end_char": 27903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28536, "end_char": 28542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act which was impugned was the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28715, "end_char": 28793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act and the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28909, "end_char": 28941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Lenders Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30604, "end_char": 30621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30857, "end_char": 30863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lenders Act, 1940", "statute": "Lenders Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31228, "end_char": 31234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lenders Act, 1940", "statute": "Lenders Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Negotiable Instruments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31302, "end_char": 31328, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31552, "end_char": 31558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lenders Act, 1940", "statute": "Lenders Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31564, "end_char": 31568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lenders Act, 1940", "statute": "Lenders Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "British Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32271, "end_char": 32289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with the second question, the Privy Council o'bserYed :\n\n''Moreover, the British Parliament when enacting the Indian CQnstitution Act had ."}}, {"text": "Maurice\n\nGwyr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32643, "end_char": 32656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Privy Cooocil approved of certain obserVations of Sir Maurice\n\nGwyr, C.J. and then observed:\n\n\"But the overlapping of subjecttnatter is not avoided by substituting three lists for two, or even Jtr arranging for a hierarchy of jurisdictions."}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34614, "end_char": 34639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34648, "end_char": 34680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34965, "end_char": 34971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "art. 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35434, "end_char": 35442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "may mention that this Court upheld the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35628, "end_char": 35713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "art. 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35721, "end_char": 35732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We may mention that this Court upheld the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949", "statute": "We may mention that this Court upheld the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35830, "end_char": 35856, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "may first notice the provisions of the Discipline and Appeal Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36921, "end_char": 36987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37769, "end_char": 37787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the Government, under whom the member is serving At the time of the commission of an act or omission which renders him liable to any penalty, which is competent alone to institute disciplinary proceedings and that Government can also impose all the penalties specified in r. 3 except the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement which order can only be passed by an order of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38877, "end_char": 38908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 6 provides for consultation with the Union Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "s. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39555, "end_char": 39565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "All India Services", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39643, "end_char": 39661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "more Commissions to be known as the Anti-Corruption Commis~\n\nsions to hold enquiry into the charges of corruption -and misconduct, as defined in s. 3 and 4 of the Coqunission Act, against all government servants including members of All India Services."}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39752, "end_char": 39762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39901, "end_char": 39906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39992, "end_char": 40002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40382, "end_char": 40387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40555, "end_char": 40565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40606, "end_char": 40616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40928, "end_char": 40933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "accordingly hold that the provisions of the Commission Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43024, "end_char": 43082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_898_905_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "BACHAN SINGH & ANR.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\nMarch 17, 1972\n\n[S, M. S1KJU, C.J., A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY, D. G. PALEKAR B\n\nAND M. H. BEG, JJ.] Alilitary Engineer Service Class I (Recruitment, Promotion, and Seniority Rules) 1951, Rule 3-Recruitment by i'nterview whether re~\n\ncruitmen~ by competition within meaning of ruie--Quoras for promotion and confirmtltion of direct recruits and promotees-Direct \\T'tcruits irecruitd whether coui•d_ be confirnted in permanent. posts earlier than pro- . C motees who had been promoted to Class 1 before their recruitment.\n\nThe two appellants were promoted in the years 1958 and 1959 respectively to the Military Engineer Service Class I. Some of the respondents were appointed to the said.class I Service.after they had appeared at the competitive examination while the rest were appointed by direct\n\nrecruitmnt after having been interviewed by the Union Public Service Commission.\n\nAll the r.!spondents were appointed to the service in the . D years 1962, 1963 and 1964. The respondents were confirmed in thir pools before the appellants. The appellants filed writ petitions in the High Court which were dismissed.\n\nJn appeal before-this Court the appellants contended (i) that .the respondents who we.re directly appointed to class I scrvic~ by interview \\Verenot v.ithin the purview of r:cruitment to Class I service by competitive examination under the Military Engineer 9-!rvice Cla<.:s I (Rcruitm.ent Promotion and Seniority) Rules; (ii) that the respondents were recruited to Class I Service by interview and competitive ,.E examination after the appellant had been promoted to Class I Eervice and were therefore not to be confirmed in permanent posts before the appe} ...\n\nJanis.\n\nHELD, (i) The appointments to Class I &rvice by interview were made by the. Government in consultation with the Union Public Service\n\nCommision.\n\nThe selection was made by the Union Public Service Commission.\n\nThe appointment by competitive eXamination. proved fruit F less.\n\nThe country was in a state of emergency.\n\nThe appointment and selection by interview was the only course possible. It could not be said that all .appointments should1 have been m'lde by promotion; that would not be in the interest of the service.\n\nThe Service Rules were administra .. tive in character. The Government relaxed the rules.\n\nThe ameridments of the rules in 1967 recognised the !reality of the situation of apPoint.. ment by interview.\n\nThat is why the 1967 amendment recognised that 50% of \"the direct recruit:: by competitive ad hoc appointments were to G be reserved for graduate engineers who were commissioned in the Armed Forces on a tmporary basis\" Ultimately, when the rules were amended in 1969 and the rules became statutory in character, not only the recruitment by interview but also the relaxation of rules was regularised. The result is that the rt:spondent-: who were appointed by interview fell within the Class I direct recruits. [901 F-902 Al\n\n(ii) The 'lppellants could have no grievance with regard to confirma H tion. Departmental promotees bad heen confirmed against permanent posts '''ithin their quota in order rf s~11iority. The <leoartmental promotecs who had been confirmed up to th•! year 1970 had been promoted to\n\n, Jass I Servrc.::: b;.;.'.\"v.:e t;:.;;! a.ppel!ants.\n\nOn the Other hand direct recruits\n\ncon~.isting of those !recruited by competitive examination -'3.S well as by interview had been confirmed against permanent vacancies within their quota.\n\nAs a matter oi fact between the years 1959 and 1963 inclusive the quota fixed for departmer.tal promotees was increased from 10 to 50% and tercby corJi.:-rnati.o:i cf dp<1.rtmcntal promotees and direct recruits was equally balanced. [905 D-FJ\n\nAccordingly, the appeal must fail;\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1499 of 1971. .\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated August 23, 1971 C of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 517 of 1971.\n\nM. C. Chag/a and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellants.\n\nJagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General cf India, G. L. Sanghi, B. D. Sharma and S. P. Nayar, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\n\nA. K. Sen and H.K. Puri, for respondents Nos. 15, 39 to 4g, D 51, 103 and 123.\n\nJ. D. Jain, for respondent No. 55.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRay, J.\n\nThis in an , appeal by certificate from the judgment E dated 23 August, 1971 of the High Court of Delhi dismissing the\n\nwrit petitions of the appellants.\n\nThe two appellants were promoted in the years 1958 and 1959 respectively to the Military Engineer Service Class I (hereinafter referred to -as the Class I Service).\n\nThe appellant No. 1 joined the Military Engineer Service as a temporary overseer on 1 May, 1942.\n\nF He was promoted to the grade of Superintendent Grade I on 1 May, 1949.\n\nIn the month of April, 1957 he was selected to be promoted to thegrade of temporary Assistant Executive Engineer in Class I Service and he was promoted in fact in the month of April, 1958.\n\nRespondents Nos. 4 to 21, 107 to 122 and 124 to 126 were G appointed to the said Class I Service after they had appeared at competitive examination while the rest were appointed by direct recruitment after having been interviewed by the Union Public Service Commission.\n\nAll the respondents were appointed to the said Class I Service in the years 1962, 1963 and 1964.\n\nH The appellants contended first that the respondents who were directly appointed to Class I Service by interview were not within the purview of recruitment to Class I Service by competitive examination.\n\nThe Military Engineer Service Class I (Recruitiilent,\n\nPromotion and Seniority) Rules which came into force on 1 April, A 1951 speak in rule 3 of recruitment to the Class I Service (a) by competitive 11Xamination in accordance with Part II of the Rules and (b) by promotion In accordance with Part III of the Rules.\n\nThe appellants conte)lded that appointment to Class I Service by interview was not one of the methods of recruitment contemplated in the Rules, and, therefore, the respondents who were appointed B by interview could not boe said to be validly appointed in accordance with the Rules.\n\nThe second contention of the appellants was that the respondents were recruited to Class I Service by interview and competitive examination after t.he appellant had been promoted to Class I Service and were therefore not to be confirmed in permanent posts C before the appellants. •\n\nClass I Rules mention recruitment by competitive examination and by promotion. In 1961 on the results of the competitive examination no candidates were available for allotment to Class I Service against temporary posts.\n\nIn 1962 there was a state of emergency.\n\nEngineers were immediately required to fill the temporary posts in Class I Service.\n\nTo meet the emergency the Union Government in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission decided to recruit candidates by advertisement and selection by the Union Public Service Commission.\n\nThe Government with the aid of selection and interview by the Union Public Service Commission directly recruited some respondents to Class I Service in the years 1962, 1963 and 1964.\n\nThe candidates were selected after viva-voce examination.\n\nIt, therefore, follows that the method of recruitment b!Y inter' view was adopted to meet the emergency specially when the mode of appointment by competitive examination failed.\n\nThe candidates who were selected were iiut through a period of probation of 2 years.\n\nOnly on a satisfactory completion of probation the candidates were allowed to continue in service.\n\nOn completion of 3 years continued service in the grade and after qualifying the necessary departmental test the respective officers were declared quasipermanent in the grade in terms of Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules.\n\nG During the years 1962, 1963 and 1964 particularly and until the year 1969 the Class I Seniice Rules were not statutory in character.\n\nThe Union Government relaxed the Rules both in regard to res:ruitment by interview and in regard to the quotas fixed by the Rules for direct. tcruitment and recruitment by promotion to Class I Service. • In the year 1967 rule- 20 of Part II of Class I Service Rules was amended by introduction of sub-rules (h), (i), (j) and (k)'.\n\n....\n\nRule 20 referred to the period of probation in the case of recruitment by competitive examination. Sub-rule (i) stated that \"50 per cent of thepermanent vacancies to be filled through the competitive ad hoc recruitment conducted by the Commission after 17 May, 1963, shall b~ reserved for graduates engineers who are commissioned in the Armed Forces on a temporary basis during the present emergency and later released,\" subject to certain conditions enumerated therein.\n\nRule 24 was also introduced by way of amendment in the year 1967. Rule 24 occurs in Part IV of the Rules.\n\nIt may be stated here that Part II of the Rules deals with recruitment to Oass I Service by competitive examination, Part III with recruitment to Class I Service by promotion and Part IV deals with miscellaneous Rules. Rule 24 stated that where the Central Government was of opinion that it was necessary or expedient so to do, it might by order, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing and after consultation with the Union Public Ser\\.ice Commission relax all or any of the rules with respect to any class or, category of persons or posts.\n\nIn 1969 the Class I Service Rules were amended.\n\nThe important amendments were rule 4 and substitution of rule 21 in place of rules 21, 22 and 23.\n\nRule 4 dealt with the quotas fixed for - direct recruitment and promotion to Class I Service.\n\nThe substituted r, ule 21 stated that appointment by promotion was to be made, !:tr selection and promotion was not to be as a matter of right.\n\nThe real importance of the amendments of the rules in the year 1969 lies in the fact th_at the amendments were made by the President in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. As a result of the 1969 amendment it follows that the entire body ol rules of Class I service became statutory rules by incorporation.\n\nThe appointments to Class I Service by iterview were made by the Government in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission.\n\nThe selection was made by the Union Public Service Commission.\n\nThe appointments by competitive examination proved fruitless.\n\nThe country was in a state of emergency.\n\nAppointment and selection by interview was the only course possible. It could not be said that all appointments should have been made by\n\npomotion. That would be not in the interest of the Service.\n\nThe Service Rules were administrative in character. The Government relaxed the rules.\n\nThe amendments of the rules in 1967 recognised the reality of the situation of appointment by interview.\n\nThat is the 1967 amendment recognised that 50 per cent of \"the direct recruits b.Y <'.ompetitive/ ad hoc appointment were to be reserved for\n\ngraduate\"englhee\\'s who were commissioned in the Armed, forces\n\n_. on ternP, O(ary basis.\" -\n\non a temporary basis.\" Ultimately, when the rules were amended A in 1969 and the rules became statutoiy in character not only the recruitment by interview but also the relaxation of rules was regu. larised. The result is that the respondent who were appointed by . interview fell within the class of direct recruits.\n\nThe only other contention on behalf oi the appellants was that B they were promoted to Class I Service in the years 1958 and 1959 respectively and were thus senior to the respondents who were recruited to the Service subsequently, and, therfore, the appellants should be confirmed in Class I Service in priority to thi: respondents.\n\nThe promotion ofi the appellants was to temporary posts in Class I Service.\n\nThe appellants were to be confirmed in perma. c nent posts.\n\nThe respondeiits wilo were appointed lfy competitive examination and by interview were also appointed to temporary posts.\n\nThey were also to be confirmed in permanent posts after having served the period of probation in accordance with the rules.\n\nThe recruitment to Class I Service during the years 1951 to 1958 was on the quotas fixed by rule 4 of the Class I Rules on the rj!tiq 0 of 10 per cent for departmental promotion and 90 per cent fQr.\n\ndirect recruitment.\n\nThough rule 4 fixed the quotas on the/ ratio of 10 per cent for departmental promotion and 90 per ce/tt for direct recruitment the Union Government in consultation with the\n\nUnion Public Service Commission relaxed the rules and revised as. an interim measure the existing quota oi 10 per cent of departmental candidates for promotion to 50 per cent in the years ! 959 E to 1963 inclusive.\n\nFrom 1964 to 1968 the quota fixed by rule 4 was followed again.\n\nFmally, in 1969 the rules were amended and the quota for departmental promotion was 25 per cent and for direct recruitment at 75 per cent.\n\nIn this background the recruitmellt against temporary posts F between the years 1951 and 1971 was indicated by a chart prepared by the Government and accepted to be correct.\n\nThe recruitment against temporary posts indicated the following features : Between 1951 and 1956 the total recruitme11t against temporary posts was 84 whereof 75 were allocated for direct recruits and 9 for departmental promotees.\n\nBut in fact the recruitment by inter- G view was for 29 and by departmental examination.\n\nDuring the years 1957 and 1963 the number of vacancies for recruitment to temporary posts was 675 whereof 339 were allocated for direct :ecruits and 336 for departmental promotees.\n\nOnly 20 were recruited biy competitive examination and 171 by interview and the remaining 484 were instances of departmental promotion. Be- H tween the years 1964 and 1968 the total recruitment was 264 whereof 23 8 were tllocated for direct recruits and 26 for departmenta.l. , Promotees.\n\nIn fact, recruitment was of 139 persons by\n\ncompetitive ellamination and of 98 by interview and 27 by departmental promotion.\n\nBetween the years 1969 and 1971 there were 45 vacancies to temporary posts whereof 33 were allocated fordirect recruits and 12 for departmental promotees. 11 were recruited by competitive examination and 34 were promoted departmentally.\n\nThe recruitment against temporary posts during the years 1951 and 1971 shows that dnring the relevant years 1959 to 1963 the Union Government relaxed the quota and increased the quota of 10 per cent to 50 per cent for departmental promotion.\n\nIt cannottherefore be said that any injustice was done to the departmental promotees or that any advantage was gained by the persons who were recruited by interview.\n\nIt is because of the conditions of emergency that the quota' for filling the temporary posts was half for departmental promotees and half for direct recruitment.\n\nThe confirmation against permanent posts was also in accordance with the quotas fixed by rule 4 for the years 1951 to 1958, namely, 10 per cent for departmental promotion and 90 per cent D for di_rect recruitment.\n\nDuring the years 1959 ti> 1963 inclusive the Union Government in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission relaxed the quota rule and increased the quota for departmental promotees from 10 per cent to 50 per cent and reduced the quota of direct recruitment from 90 per cent to 50 per cent.\n\nIn the year J 959 126 permanent posts were available £ whereof 63 were allocated for direct recruits and the other 63 were for departmental promotees. In 1960 there were 14 permanent .posts and 7 were allocated for direct recruits and 7 for departmental promotees: Again, in 1961 there were 23 permanent posts available. 12 were allocated for direct recruits and U for departmental promotees.\n\nFor 1962 there were 20 permanent posts whereof 10 were allocated for direct recruits and the other 10 for departmental promotees.\n\nIn 1963 there were 11 permanent posts whereof 5 were a!located for direct recruits and 6 for departmental promotees.\n\nIn 1964 there were 9 permanent posts whereof 8 were allocated for direct recruits and one for departmental promotee. In 1965 there\n\n• were 15 permanent posts whereof 13 were allocated for direct recruits and two for departmental promotees.\n\nIn 1966 there were G 113 permanent posts whereof 82 were allocated for direct recruits and 11 for departmental promotees and 20 for released officers in accordance with the revised rule in the year 1967. ln 1967 there were 45 permanent posts whereof 40 were allocated for direct recruits and 5 for departmental promotees.\n\nIn 1968 there were 14 permanent posts available whereof 13 were albcated for direct H recruits and one for departmental promotee.\n\nThe position with regard to filling of permanent posts shows that during the years 1951 to 1958 the quota was 10 per cent-for\n\n904 SUPREME COURT Jµ!PORTS [1972] 3 s.c.R.\n\ndepartmental promotees and 90 percent for direct recruitment but during the years 1959 to 1963 the quota was changed with the result that half of the permanent posts were filled by. departmental promotion allld the other half by direct recruitment. From 1964 to 1968 the old quota of 10 per cent for departmi:ntal promotion and the remaining 90 per cent for direct recruitment was resorted to. In 1969 rule 4 was changed with the result that there were 25 per cent for departmental promotion and the remaining 7 5 per cent for direct recruitment.\n\nIn the year 1959 the direct recruits who were confirmed in permanent posts were recruited by the Union .\n\nP.ublic Service Commission by interview during the years 1951 to\n\n1956. In 1960 the direct recruits through interview who were . confirmed had been selected through interview by the Union Public Service Commission betwen the years 1953 and 1956. In 1961 the direct recruits who were confirmed in permanent posts were those who had been selected by the Union Public Service Commission through interview during the years 1956 to 1957. In 1962 the direct recruits who were confirmed in permanent posts were those who had been selected by the Union Public Service Commission through interview during the years 1956 to 1958.\n\nIn 1963 the direct recruits who were confirmed in permanent posts were those who had been selected by the Union Public Service Commission through interview between the 'years.1958 to 1961. In 1964\n\nthe direct recruits who were confirmed in permanent posts were those recruited in 1962 by the Unfon Ptiblic Service Commission through interview. In 1965 the direct recruits 'who were confirmed in permanent posts were those recruited by the Uniqn Public Serviee Conimission through interview in 1962 and 1963.\n\nIn 1965 13 direct recruits were confirmed and they included s.ome of the respondents.\n\nIn 1966 82 direct recruits were confirmed against permanent posts and they were persons who had been selected by the Union Public Service Commission throu, gh interview during the F year 1963 and they included some of the respondent!i.\n\nIn the year 1959 when the Government in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission revised as an interim measure the increase of the quota of departmental promotion of candidates from 1 O to 50 per cent and followed that system .up to the end of 1963 a question arose as to how the then existing permanent vacan- G cies were to be filled and the Union Public Service Commission advised that the same might be filled by confirmation of direct recruits, namely, those recruited on the basis of competitive xami nation and by advertisement and selection ood promotees m the ratio of 1 : 1.\n\nThe advice of the Union Public Service Commissioi; i was...Jlccepted and the Departmental Promotion Committee R actcid, oii that bijSjs.\n\nIt is .apparent that during those years there was a relaxaiin: in the observance of rules in the case of appellants , and the ether departmental promotees. The Union Government\n\nA. all throughout acted in consultation with the Union Public Service\n\nCommission.\n\nThe departmental promotees gained considerable advantage by relaxation of the rules. The direct recruits were not shown any preference at all.\n\nThe proportion of confirmation of departmental promotees and of direct recruits by interview was. 1 : 1.\n\nB In. the year 1967, the Government was again faced with the question of confirmation of direct recruits by interview as well as by competitive examination against permanent vacancies in the grade falling in the direct recruitment quota prescribed in the rules.\n\nThe Union Public Service Commission advised that direct recruits c by interview and by competitive examination could be confirmed against permanent vacancies within the fixed quota of direct recruits.\n\nThe result was that in 1969 the Class I Service Rules were amended aind the quota for departmental promotion was raised from 10 to 25 per cent and the quota of direct recruits was reduced from 90 to 7 5 per cent.\n\nD The appellants can have no grievance with regard to confirm&· tion.\n\nThe departmental promotees have l:leen confirmed against permllJlent posts within their quota in order of seniority. Departmental promoteeS who have been confirmed up to. the year 1970\n\nhad been promoted to Class I Service before the appellants.\n\nOn the other hand, direct recriuts consisting of those recruited by com-.\n\n• E petitive examination as well as by interview have been confirmed against permanent vacancies within their quota.\n\nAs a matter of fact between the years 1959 and 1963 inclusive the quota fixed for departmental promotees was increased from 10 to 50 per cent and thereby the confirmation of departmental promotees and direct recruits was equally balanced.\n\nF The direct recruits who were appointed by interview fell within the class of direct recruits. The quota fixed for direct recruits was never infringed by absorbing direct recruits by interview beyond the quota. The confirmation of direct recruits and departmental promotees against permanent vacancies was in accordance with the quota fixed.\n\nBy reason of relaxation of rules in regard to increase G ol quota for departmental promotees they gained advantage durin~\n\nthe years 1959 to 1963 when because of the emergency direct recruits by interview were selected by the Union Public Service Commission.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons the appeal fails and is dismissed. In view of the fact that there wa5 no order as to costs in the High Court parties will bear their own costs.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 33, "entities": [{"text": "BACHAN SINGH & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BACHAN SINGH & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 17, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 58, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 17, 1972\n\n[S, M. S1KJU, C.J., A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY, D. G. PALEKAR B\n\nAND M. H. BEG, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S1K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 70, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. G. PALEKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.G. PALEKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 889, "end_char": 920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two appellants were promoted in the years 1958 and 1959 respectively to the Military Engineer Service Class I. Some of the respondents were appointed to the said.class I Service.after they had appeared at the competitive examination while the rest were appointed by direct\n\nrecruitmnt after having been interviewed by the Union Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3786, "end_char": 3814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "905 D-FJ\n\nAccordingly, the appeal must fail;\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "R. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3992, "end_char": 4009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag/a and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Jagadish Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4032, "end_char": 4047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General cf India, G. L. Sanghi, B. D. Sharma and S. P. Nayar, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4077, "end_char": 4089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General cf India, G. L. Sanghi, B. D. Sharma and S. P. Nayar, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4091, "end_char": 4103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General cf India, G. L. Sanghi, B. D. Sharma and S. P. Nayar, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4108, "end_char": 4119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General cf India, G. L. Sanghi, B. D. Sharma and S. P. Nayar, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4152, "end_char": 4161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and H.K. Puri, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "H.K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4166, "end_char": 4175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and H.K. Puri, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "J. D. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4232, "end_char": 4242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. D. Jain, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4312, "end_char": 4315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRay, J.\n\nThis in an , appeal by certificate from the judgment E dated 23 August, 1971 of the High Court of Delhi dismissing the\n\nwrit petitions of the appellants."}}, {"text": "Military Engineer Service Class I (Recruitiilent", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5582, "end_char": 5630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Military Engineer Service Class I (Recruitiilent,\n\nPromotion and Seniority) Rules which came into force on 1 April, A 1951 speak in rule 3 of recruitment to the Class I Service (a) by competitive 11Xamination in accordance with Part II of the Rules and (b) by promotion In accordance with Part III of the Rules."}}, {"text": "Xamination in accordance with Part II of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5780, "end_char": 5830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Class I Service by interview was not one of the methods of recruitment contemplated in the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5941, "end_char": 6037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Class I Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6463, "end_char": 6476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Part II of Class I Service Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8226, "end_char": 8258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "17 May, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8584, "end_char": 8596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-rule (i) stated that \"50 per cent of thepermanent vacancies to be filled through the competitive ad hoc recruitment conducted by the Commission after 17 May, 1963, shall b~ reserved for graduates engineers who are commissioned in the Armed Forces on a temporary basis during the present emergency and later released,\" subject to certain conditions enumerated therein."}}, {"text": "Part IV of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8887, "end_char": 8907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Part III with recruitment to Class I Service by promotion and Part IV deals with miscellaneous Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9027, "end_char": 9127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9159, "end_char": 9177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 24 stated that where the Central Government was of opinion that it was necessary or expedient so to do, it might by order, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing and after consultation with the Union Public Ser\\.ice Commission relax all or any of the rules with respect to any class or, category of persons or posts."}}, {"text": "Union Public Ser\\.ice Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9333, "end_char": 9365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 24 stated that where the Central Government was of opinion that it was necessary or expedient so to do, it might by order, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing and after consultation with the Union Public Ser\\.ice Commission relax all or any of the rules with respect to any class or, category of persons or posts."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10032, "end_char": 10043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part III with recruitment to Class I Service by promotion and Part IV deals with miscellaneous Rules", "statute": "Part III with recruitment to Class I Service by promotion and Part IV deals with miscellaneous Rules"}}, {"text": "Unfon Ptiblic Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18488, "end_char": 18520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1964\n\nthe direct recruits who were confirmed in permanent posts were those recruited in 1962 by the Unfon Ptiblic Service Commission through interview."}}, {"text": "Uniqn Public Serviee Conimission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18635, "end_char": 18667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1965 the direct recruits 'who were confirmed in permanent posts were those recruited by the Uniqn Public Serviee Conimission through interview in 1962 and 1963."}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commissioi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19646, "end_char": 19677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The advice of the Union Public Service Commissioi; i was...Jlccepted and the Departmental Promotion Committee R actcid, oii that bijSjs."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_906_909_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "CHHAJULAL\n\nTHE STATE OF RAJASTHAN March 17, 1972\n\n[A. N. GROVER AND M. H. BEG, JJ.]\n\nIndian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), ss. 65 and 406 and Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898), ss. 32 and 33-Sentence in 'default of payment of fine-Powers of Firt Class Magistr(ue.\n\nThe appellant was convk'ted by a first class Magistrate under s. 406, I.P.C., and was sentenced to tvlo ye3fs regorous imprhonment, a fine\n\nC • of Rs. 2000/ - ahd, in default to one year's further rigorous imprisonment.\n\nOn the question of the priod of imprisonment that could be imposed in d, efault of. payment of fine.\n\nHELD : Even if s. 65, l.P.C., could be applied the period of imprisonment in default of payn1ent of fine could not exceed nine months since an offence under ~. 406 I.P.C. is punishable with imprisonment up to th!ree years. But reading ss. 32 and 33, Cr. P.C. together the Mgis trate could not have awarded more than six months imprisonment in default of payment of fim. The terms s. 33 Cr. P.C. and s. 65 I.P.C., must therefore be harmonised.\n\nH'!nce it must be held that while a Magistrate's power are specifically limited by section 33 Cr. P.C.· they must also be exercised so as not to contravene s. 65 I. P. C. (908 D-Gl\n\nTherefOire, just as a First Class Magisrate trying an offence punishable under s. 406 I.P.C., cannot impose the maximum sentence of imprisonment prescribed by tte section, because his powers of awalrding imprisonment are pecifk13lly limit.ed .. to a term not exceeding two years by s. 32, Cr. P.C. so also he cannot. by resorting to s. 65 I.P.C., award a period oJ imp:rbonment in default of payment of fine, OJ! the erroll!Ous assumption tht he has the noWer to award the maximum sentence prescribed bys. 406 l.P.C. (908 G-H; 909 Al\n\nHence, the sentence of imprisonment in default of fine cannot exceed six months.\n\nReg v. Muhammad Sahib, I.L.R. 1 Mad. 277 (F.B.); Queen-- Empress v. Venkatesagadu, I.L.R. 10 Mad. 165 and E1npress of India v.\n\nDarba, I.L.R. I All. 461, referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 117 of 1971.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Order dated February 11 1971 of the Rajasthan High Court in S.B. Criminal Misc. Application No. 152 of 1971.\n\nSobhag Mal lain, for the appellant.\n\nK. Baldev Mehta, for the respondent.\n\nCllliA.JU LAL v. RA.JASTHAN (Beg, I.) 907\n\nA The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeg, J. The appellant was convicted under Section 406 Indian Penal Code and sentenced to six month's rig01'()Us imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500/-, and, in default of payment of fine, to . three months further rigorous impriSonment, by the Munsif B Magistrate'of Karoli, District Bharatpur, Ra, iasthan. On an appeal by him to the Court of Sessions, his conviction was set aside,' but the Trial Court was directed to pr9ceed with the case afresh from the stage at which the appellant should have been properly examined under Section 342 Criminal Procedure Code. The appellant was 1hen given a full opportunity, under Section 342 C Criminal Procedur~ Code, to explain the facts and circumstances appearing against him in the case. Thereafter, he also produced five witnesses in defence. He was, however, convicted again and sentenced to two .years rigorous imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs. 2,0001-, and, in default to undergo one year's further rigorous imprisonment.\n\nThe appellant again appealed to the Court of Sessions which dismissed his appeal.\n\nThe appellant then filed a D Revision application which was dismissed summarily by the High Court of Rajasthan. Soon after that, the appellant made another attempt to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, by applying under Sec. 561A Criminal Procedure Code, to get at least an illegality in the sentence. corrected, but this also failed.\n\nA prayer for a certificate of fitness of the case to appeal to this E Court was also rejected by the High Court: The appellant then applied under Art. 136 of the Constitution to this Court. That application was admit1ted only on the question of the period of imprisonment awarded in default of payment of fine.\n\nIt is this question only which has been argued before us.\n\n Section 33 of the Criminal Procedure Code runs as follows :\n\n\"33(1) The Court of any Magistrate may award such terms of imprisonment in default of payment of fine as it authorised by law in case of such default :\n\nProvided that-\n\n( a) the term is not in excess of the Magistrate's powers under this Code;\n\n(b) in any case decided by a Magistrate where imprisonmell't has been awarded as part of the substantive sentence, the period of imprisonment awarded in default of payment of the fine shall not exceed one-fourth of the period of imprisonment which such Magistrate is competent to inflict as punishment for the offence otherwise than. a~ hnprisonment' in default of payment of the. fine.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1972] 3 S, C.R.·\n\n(2) The imprisonment awarded under this section may be in addition to a substantive sentence of imprisonment for the maximum term awardable by the Magistrate under Section 32''. ·\n\nThe Munsif Magistrate who convicted the appellant had the powers of a MagiSltrate J st Class which are restricted, by Section B 32, sub.s(i) (a), to imposing imprisonment for a term not exceed\n\ning two years and fine not. exceeding Rs. 2,000/-. R<:ading Section 32 and 33 togefuer, it was clear that, in the case before us, the Munsif Magistrate could not aw.ard more than six months imprisonment in default .of payment of fine.\n\nIn answer to the appellant's contention, based on Section 33 of l(he Criminal Procedure Code, learned Co=! for the State of Rajallthan placed Section 65 Indian Penal Code beofre us. This Section reads as follows :\n\n\"65. The term for which the Court directs the\n\no!j'ender to be imprisoned in default of payment of a fine D .shall not exceed one-fourth of the term of imprisonment which is the maximum fixed for the offence, if the olfe.nce be punishable with finprisonment as well as 'fine\".\n\nIt will be seen that even where Section 65 Indian Penal Code is applied by a Coun the term of hnprisi>nment in default of pay- E ment of fine cannot exceed one fourth of the term of imprisonment which is the maximum period which can be awarded for an offence of which an accused is convicted. An offence under Seotion 406 Indian Penal Code is punishable with imprisot which can extend t<J' only three years rigorous imprisonment and a fine. Thus, even if Section 65 Indian Penal Code could be applied, the period F of imprisonment in default of payment of fine could not exceed nine months.\n\nIt is clear that Section 65 only fixes a maximum period of imprisonment which can be awarded for default of payment of fine whenever any court convicts.\n\nOn the other hand, Section 33 Criminal Procedure Code governs specifically the powers of 1st Class G Magistrates on this matter. Section 33 Criminal Procedure Code also contains the principle embodied in Section 65 Indian Penal Code in its application to Magistrates. J.ust as a 1st Class Magistrate trying an offence punishable under. Seotion 406 Indian Penal Code cannor'impose the maximum amount of imprisonment prescribed by this Section, because his powers of awarding imprison II .i1ent are specifically limited to those conferred to Section 32 Criminal Procedure Code, so also he cannot, by resorting .to Section 65 lnrlian Penal C\"!e, award a period of imprisonment in\n\nCRHAJULAL V. RAJASTRAN (Beg, /,) 909\n\nA default of payment of fine on the erroneous .assumption that he\n\nhas the power to award the maximum sentence prescribed by Sec tion 406 Indian Penal Code.\n\nSection 6S of the Indian Ponal Code was enacted in 1860.\n\nIn 1872 Section 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1872 en B acted : \"where a person ia scntenc.ed to fine only the Magistrate may award such terms of imprisonment in default of payment of fine as is allowed by law proVided' that the amount does not exceed the Magistrate's powers under this AcC'.\n\nIt was held in Reg. v. Muhammad Saib('), that Section 309 of the Code of 1972 over-ruled the provisions of Section 65 C Indian Penal Code.\n\nOIJ a parity of reasoning, Section 3 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898, with which we axe concerned\n\nhere, would over-ride Section 65 Indian Penal Code, or, to be more accurate, apply more specifically to Magistrates.\n\nIn Queen-Empress v. Venkatesagadu & Ors.('), it was held D that Section 33 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1882 did not authorise a Map; istrate to pass sentence in default of payment of fine in excess of the term prescribed by Section 65 Indian Penal Code. Here, reliance was placed upon a decision of Full Bench ofthe Allahabad High Court in the Empress of India v. Dtirba & Ors.(8).\n\nE No case has been cited before us in which an attempt was made to justify an order o{ a Magistrate, whose jurisdiction to punish is limited by Section 33 Criminal Procedure Code, by applying .section 65 Indian Penal Code. It is obvious that the two Sections\n\nmust be hannonised. This means that, while a Magistrate's powers are specifrcally limited by Section 3 3 Criminal Procedure r Code; they must also be so exercised as not to contravene Section\n\n65 Indian Penal Code.\n\nAs the t.ence of one year's rip; orous imprisonment in default of payment of fine passed by the Munsif Magistrate was in excess of his powers, we allow this appeal to the extent that we reduce only the sentence of one year's rigorous imprisonment awarded in G default of payment of fine to six months rigorous imprisonment.\n\nThe rest of the sentence, which is quite legal, must stand. We may observe here that it would have been better if llhis obvious illeality and exces8 of POwet could have been corrected by the High Court when the matter was brought to its notice by means of an aPJlli cation under .Section 56IA Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nV.P; S;\n\n(I) l.LK 1. Mad. 277 (FB).\n\n(2) I.LR. 10 Mad. loS.\n\n(3) l.L.R: I All. 461 12-L!C61 Su~./72", "total_entities": 83, "entities": [{"text": "CHHAJULAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 9, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHHAJULAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11, "end_char": 33, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 17, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 48, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHHAJULAL\n\nTHE STATE OF RAJASTHAN March 17, 1972\n\n[A. N. GROVER AND M. H. BEG, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 65 and 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 166, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 32 and 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184, "end_char": 197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 334, "end_char": 340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 342, "end_char": 347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 610, "end_char": 615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 759, "end_char": 764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 32 and 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 830, "end_char": 843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 975, "end_char": 980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 994, "end_char": 999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1000, "end_char": 1005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1122, "end_char": 1132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1195, "end_char": 1200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1300, "end_char": 1306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1307, "end_char": 1312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1503, "end_char": 1508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1554, "end_char": 1559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1560, "end_char": 1565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sobhag Mal lain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2217, "end_char": 2232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sobhag Mal lain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. Baldev Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2254, "end_char": 2269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Baldev Mehta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Beg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2381, "end_char": 2384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CllliA.JU LAL v. RA.JASTHAN (Beg, I.) 907\n\nA The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeg, J. The appellant was convicted under Section 406 Indian Penal Code and sentenced to six month's rig01'()Us imprisonment and a fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "Section 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2423, "end_char": 2434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2435, "end_char": 2452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2908, "end_char": 2919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2920, "end_char": 2943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3000, "end_char": 3011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "High Court of Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3524, "end_char": 3547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant then filed a D Revision application which was dismissed summarily by the High Court of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Sec. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3674, "end_char": 3683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3684, "end_char": 3707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3936, "end_char": 3944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4162, "end_char": 4172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5062, "end_char": 5072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 32 and 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5333, "end_char": 5350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5559, "end_char": 5569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5578, "end_char": 5601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5651, "end_char": 5661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5662, "end_char": 5679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6034, "end_char": 6044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6045, "end_char": 6062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6324, "end_char": 6341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6457, "end_char": 6467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6468, "end_char": 6485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6611, "end_char": 6621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6767, "end_char": 6777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6778, "end_char": 6801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6877, "end_char": 6887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6888, "end_char": 6911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6952, "end_char": 6962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6963, "end_char": 6980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7096, "end_char": 7113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7288, "end_char": 7298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7299, "end_char": 7322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7360, "end_char": 7370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "CRHAJULAL V. RAJASTRAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7426, "end_char": 7448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seotion 406 Indian Penal Code cannor'impose the maximum amount of imprisonment prescribed by this Section, because his powers of awarding imprison II .i1ent are specifically limited to those conferred to Section 32 Criminal Procedure Code, so also he cannot, by resorting .to Section 65 lnrlian Penal C\"!e, award a period of imprisonment in\n\nCRHAJULAL V. RAJASTRAN (Beg, /,) 909\n\nA default of payment of fine on the erroneous .assumption that he\n\nhas the power to award the maximum sentence prescribed by Sec tion 406 Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7602, "end_char": 7619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 6S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7622, "end_char": 7632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7688, "end_char": 7699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7707, "end_char": 7735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8025, "end_char": 8036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code 1872", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code 1872"}}, {"text": "Section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8086, "end_char": 8096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code 1872", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code 1872"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8099, "end_char": 8116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8146, "end_char": 8155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8249, "end_char": 8259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8260, "end_char": 8277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8409, "end_char": 8419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8575, "end_char": 8585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8586, "end_char": 8603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8667, "end_char": 8687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here, reliance was placed upon a decision of Full Bench ofthe Allahabad High Court in the Empress of India v. Dtirba & Ors.(8)."}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8878, "end_char": 8888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8889, "end_char": 8912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8927, "end_char": 8937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8938, "end_char": 8955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9087, "end_char": 9096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure r Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9099, "end_char": 9124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section\n\n65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9178, "end_char": 9189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure r Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure r Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9190, "end_char": 9207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 56I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9815, "end_char": 9826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_910_921_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "BIJLI COTTON MILLS (P) LTD.\n\nTHE PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL . .II & .\n\nORS.\n\nMarch 20, 1972\n\n[C. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND I. D. DUA, JJ,]\n\nU.P.\n\nIndustriaA Establishments (National) Holidays Act, 1961- No provision for payment of wages for festival holidays-Wherher pco- :c.ble in the .facts and circumstances o0f the case.\n\nAn industrial dispute arose between the appellant and its workmen as to whether the employers were required tC' pay wages for the festival hOlidays allowed to their workmen in a yeJr.\n\nThe appellant contested the workmen's claim mainly on the ground> that neitmr in law nor in\n\n-pracicc was there any provision for festival holidays with wages, that the appell-ant was already paying wages for three holidays allowed to the workmen undo:T the U.P. Jndustrial Establishnt (National Holidayll)\n\nAct, 1961 and that in the entire region in which this mill is situated, no textile mill pays wages for festival holidays. The mill was stated to be an uneconomic unit and, therefore, not in a position to be-ar an extra burden. The workmen, on the other hand, in their separate written statements, filed through three Unions, pleadd that the grant of holidays without wages was illegal and against social justice. In their rejoinder the 'lPPellant pleaded that the holidays mentioned by the Unions were granted because the workmen had demanded the same and thosr~ holidays were substituted by other days in lieu of holidays and as they were paid\n\nfor the days on which tht.!y worked on account .of those holidays there\n\n.w~ no loss of wages caused to them.\n\nThe Tribunal by its award m'3de the appellant liable to pay to their daily-rated and piece-rated workmen for 17 festival holidays, besides three national holidays, plus arrears, on the ground that too Seci'etary of the appellant mill 'ldmitted that the festival holidays were paid holidays in the sense that workers were allowed to work on their unpaid l'.!st days in substitution of the said festival holidays.\n\nThe appellant being aggrieved by the award presented a writ pr.!tition before the High Court which was dismissed by a single Judge.\n\nSpecial le:1ve to a Divisional Bench of the.'.High Court was di.smissed in limirre, but the Bench cm'tified tm case to be fit for appeal to this Court. The appellant was held oatitled to\n\ncrrifitate either under cl. (a) or cl. '(b) of Art. 133(1) of the. Consti tution on the ground that value 9f the subject matter of dispute or claim was Rs. 20,000 or more. .\n\nTbe respondent in the Supreme Court objec.,~ t() the competence of the c'ertiflcate en the ground that .. though the judgment of the Diision Bench was one of affirmance the certificate did not disclose on. its face the existence of any substantial question . of Jaw.\n\nThis objection was upheld but as the case was considered fit for_ .U special leave, on oral !'.!quest special le-:1ve was grap.ted on the condition that. theappellallt :\"old file a form~ I application for special leave accom-· pamed by an appl!cati, on for condemn g the delay. ·\n\nBIJLI COTTON MILLS v. INDUSTRIAL TRfBUNAL (Dua, J.) .911\n\n/ AllowiJli the: app¢al 'Oil the merits,\n\n. HELD : -By reading the statem:nt of the Secretary of the appellant along with the pleadings as disclosed in the respective statement of cases of: the parucs, it is JiQt .potsible to hold tt te . appelJ.ant . d .admitted that the 17 festival holidays were hei11g given by them as paid holidays dispensing with the enquiry into the question referred for adjustment to the Industrial Tribunal. Even the workl'llen did not plead that the festi val holidays were treated as p:1id holidays.\n\nThe Secretary'~ statemel)t that . no festival holidays were paid in tl12 sense , that the workers were allowed to work on unpaid rest days in substitution of the said festival holidays. This staterrunt c!C'lrty ex plains that sense in which the Secretary meant to say that the festival holidays . were paid. The facts contained in the explanation lead to the onlY conclusion Jht fr:stival holidays are not paid as the festival holidays are. This statement read with the detailed explanation could not logically serve as a sround for ignoring the unequivocal denial in the written' statement. The Industrial Tribunal;· was therefore,. wrong in holding that the statement made by the Secretary was 'an admission on behalf of the appel !ant. The learned single Judge also missed the real point and held that the- Secretary's. statement constituted an admission and all :facts evidence was therefore, excluded. The Division Bench fell into the-same error in summarily ismissina .. the appeal in limin~. l920 A-El\n\n( ii) The., U .P. Industrial EstabJishmeill s (National Holidays) Act, 1961 and' rules provide for p:1id National Holidays bul that Act dos not deal .with festival hqlidays.\n\nIn determining the .number of paid festival holidays per year, certam facts, like custom; practice and uniformity in .the 'industry without prejudicially affeeting efficiency and incased pi'oduC:tion are some of the relevant hctors to be taken into account. The question affects national economy and does not remain confiR.!d only to the. establishment concerned but has its impact on other concerns as weU.\n\nTJ'lis _aspect _has bee)l completely ignored by tb~ Industrial Tribunal. Fur ther the Tribunal proceeded solely on the basis of misreading of the Secretary's stteinent. 'thereby ignoring the plea taken by. he appellant. There is, thus the manifest error of Jaw apparent on .the fact of the record which bas. resulted. in grave failure of justice, because evidence on tlronly ml\\tet'ia_l.P.Pint wasillegally s.hut out. [921 AI ·\n\nThe Diitlict Board (afterwordr_' Zila _Paris.had' Allah(.•bad \\t : Syed Tcdrir Husain & Ors. C.A. Ne>. 578 of 1963 decided on July 23. l ()65, followed.\n\nSIM Dur!(ri Prasad & •! ' r ' . Tlrt• Ba . ., aras Bank Ltd., [1964] 1 S.C; R.\n\n475. r:de'rred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil. Appeal No. 1611 Qf 1968:\n\nH Appeal from the judgment and order dat~ Decem\\jer 5, 19~6\n\nofthe Allahalta~· High.Counin Special Appeal No. 760 of .1966\n\nandPetition for Special t.eave to appe<:d ·(civil) No. 676 of. 1972.\n\n912 S.UPRIME COURT R.EfOi, TS'\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nY. M. Tarkunde, J, P. Goyal and SDbfla~ Mal Jain, fOr the A appellant.\n\nE. C. Agarwala and A. T. M. Sampat, for respondent No.2.\n\n The Ju4i!nen't of the Court was delivered by Dua, J~ The following dispute between Mls. Bijli Cotton Mills B (P) Ltd.~ and their workmen was referred o. the Industrial Tribu- nal II, U.P . .fpr adiudication :\n\n\"Should the employers be required to pay wages for the festival holidays allowed to their workmen in a year ? Jf so, from which date and wi!fu what other details?\n\n Accordin~ to the workmen the employers had been givin~ 17 fe9tival holidays to their workmen in a year and though those\n\nholiays should have been paid ones the employers were not .mak\n\nin~ anv payment..\n\nThe disput~ was ori.1dnally espoused at the instance of Hathras Mazdoor Panchayat but later three other unions namely Sooti Mi11 Mazdoor Pancbayat, Congress Mazdoor Sangh and Suti MUl\n\nKannachari Sangh were also acconied right of represen1a1ion on their applications. The employer mills coJ.lltested the claim . on various grounds. The olea on the merits in substance was to the effect that neither in law nor in practice was there any provisiou,\n\nfot: feslival holidays with waes. The Mill, it was averred, was\n\nal.rady paying wages for three holidays allowed to the workmen\n\nu-nder the U.P: Industrial Establishments (National Holjdays) Act\n\n(U, P. Act XVUI of 1961) and in the entire Agra region in which this Mill is situar..d to textile mill pays wages for festival holiys. l't was added that the Mill was an uneconomic unit and was ni;)i in ll. position to bear anv extra burden. The Congress Maz door Sangh, the Sooti MilL Kaqn.achari . Sl}ngh and the Hthr.as\n\nMazdoor Panchavat filed separate written statements on behalf of tho wqdanen and. plded thaJ.t tbe grant of holidays without wages was illegal and aJ!, ainst social iustice.\n\n'The employer Mill filed rejoinder statement to 1the written statements of all the Unions, pleadine: that the holidays mentioned by the Unions were not allowed to the workmen at the employer's initiative but were granted because the workmen demanded the same and these holidays w.e~ suituted: bY. or ays in lie.u of holidays, and as they were paid for the days on which they workec\\ on account of these holidays there was no loss of wages caused\n\nto~ th~. workmen~\n\n On, Ju}v. lS, 196.5 the. parties made theit statemontg, under r. 12of the UP. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1.957, which-l)rovides\n\nBIJLI COtTON MILLS V. INDUSTRIAL TIUBUMAL (Dua, J.) Sl ~\n\nA [or procede a:t first. sittings of the f'ribunal requiring the parties ·\n\nto state the1r resphve ces. Shrt M. P. Jaiswal, on behal~ of the employers adnutted that the company gives 17 feStival holidays to all its employees, 15 of which ar~ those mentioned in the written statement. of the Congress Mazd<?or Sangh and two others being Sankrantt -and Baldev Chat observed on Bhadon Sukla Chnt. - All B - these holioays were stated by him to be paid holidays in 1he sense that the workers were allowed to work on their unpaid rest days in substitution of the said festival holidays. The unpaid rest days were the same as those provided and observed under s. 52 of the Factories Act as unpaid holidays. It was admitted that tM monthly raters were .Qald for 365 days in a year whereas piece-raters were c paid accordin2 to the quantum of work done by them on working days in a month. Tile national holidays given by the employer are not substituted on any rest day and if any national holiday falls on a rest day the employer pays s.in~~ day's waes if no work i->\n\ndone. If a holiday is substituted on rest day then only one day's\n\nwacs are paid.\n\nAfter this statemen1 four representatives of the contesting unions stated that v.henever the management takes work from the workers on a test day only one day's wages are paid and it was .zmphaticallv denied that holidays were substituted on a rest day.\n\nMonthly raters, accordin~ to these representatives, f/; Ct their wages\n\nfor all 365 days. - After these statements the Presidio~ Officer f '!he Tribunll put the (ollowin~ question to Shri Jai$wal : Q : Whether the festival holidays observed in the Mill are paid or unpaid ?\n\nA : They are paid holidys and payment is made by substitution ns ~1ated earlier.\n\nThereafter it appears that the workmen did not kad any evi~nc_e but Shri M.P. Jaiswat, Secretary of the Mil!.s appeare~ a,; a w•ncs\n\non behalf of 1M employer. He fikd two charts sbowtn~ the etl\n\nal holidays observed in he Mills in the year 19~ and upto 0 lJ\n\n1965. He proved these cb:uts stating that they had en pteparr from the Mills' Muster Rolls and that they were true coptes c J f th M.ills These two charts rectly prepared from the Jccor s 0 •2 ~When~ 'the wiss tried to were m.-uked ai Ex. ~- 1 an~ Ex. E, T til Mills the , ques d_(puse 21bo\"( the hohdayi_.Jn. lh¢ Kanp~!-f_ e.x. \\ B. D. Sethi, tlon_ was qisa1Jowed, 'Yt'h!le, cross-~ .n1nt~~ by .S n .\n\nE~-£-1 o-n behalf of t~ work:motr. 'Mr. Jrusw!lt st.!:ted -~ F ·· cy'-23 only two bolkil..ys for Ho~ u• substituted. onc.0!' w~ot be~\n\n~ ~~ and the other on Mar4 L, 9~ .. tb_c ~olida~ v.-crc m~ substilR~ •. lAthe ca.sc (lf_ Otwali eho two J• -\n\nl l 1 I\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972]'3 s.t.R.\n\nsubstituted leaving unsubStituted the remaining. two holidays. 0~ beingcr<JSs-examinedby Shri 0. P. Gautam also on behalf of the.\n\nworkn1ert the. witness. stated that in 1965 as well only two holidays on. account of Holi were substituted, the remaining two being lin substituted. In the preceding years also the position was stated to be 1he same in regard to Holf holidays.\n\nThe followin)!; two auestions and answers may also be reproduced :\n\nQ -: When you .take work on Sunday which is weekly holiday on which date you ' give the festival hQliday? · A: As such we do not give the weeklyrest day on the day on which the festival falls within the limits . allowed under the Factories Act.\n\nQ : Is there any limit for festival holidays in Factories Act?\n\nA : There is no such limit nor any such direction in the Factories Act. For substitution there is a restriction in Sections 51 and 52 of the Factories Act.\n\nExhibi'ts E-1 and E-2 show festival holidays for h.; l years 1964 and 1965 and these charts corroborate the answers elicited from Shri Jaiswal that for Holi and Diwali only two days on which substitution was allowed were paid for, the remaining two holidays bein, g unpaid.\n\nIt may b.~ pointed out that •the Tribunal: after the statements of the parties under r. 12, framed the following issue :\n\n\"Whether the festival holidays are given to the work .. men in the form of substituted holidays on weekly rest days ? If so are 'lhe workmen other than the m~>nthly raters entitled to only om~ day's wages or two days' wages . i.e., one day's wages for the work done on the week\\Y . rest day and one day's wages for the substituted holiday?\"\n\n. It appears that the language of his Issue was not objected to by either party and this appears to be the real crux of the controversy which emerd after the statements of rthe parties requiring decision by <the TribunaL It was not disputed before the Tribunal that the employers had been giving, 17 festival holidays to all the 'workmen besides three national holidays. The plea taken by the employers. in their pleadings that the holidays are not paid holidays Was in the· opinion of. the Tribunal ven the )tO-by fu he-\n\nBI, JLI COTTON MILLS V, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUN (0\n\n' AL ua, I.) 9 15\n\nA - tatement of Shri Jaiswal recorded under r 12 0 1 1 lS The Tribunal ten dealt with that statement. and oc~:d tht 1:·\n\nththat&sta!em 1 ehnt 1 dt was fr the mployers to show how payment fo~ e 1esuva o 1 ay~ was made by thenr. To reproduce the . ds\n\nof the award . \\lor\n\n.\"In 'the. written statement without statin_g whether the fcs.uval .holidays w.ere pai~ or unpaid they pleaded that nett.her m lw nor J? pracUce there was any provision for festtyal ·.holiday~ wttt wages an? that in the eniire Agra Re, IUon no textile mtll was paymg wa, ges for the festival holidays. Originally it appeared that the employers wanted to set up that the festival holidays were unpaid\n\nbut at the time of the statement under rule 12, Shri Jaiswal took a contrary po6ruon and stated that all the festival holidays wer;: paid holidays R11d tho payment was made in the sense that they were substituted on rt days.\n\nI have already shown how this statement is incorrect and no impanial mind will be wrong in drawing a legitimate inference that the purpose. f tb.e empl?yers in settin~ up inconsistent pleas or in glVIDl! m-consJStent\n\nstatemms was only to conceal the truth or it may be thlt the purpose was to confuse. the issue.\"\n\nA little lower down, after observin~ that Shri Jaiswal w~ not the kind of witness who would rive straight answers to. stra1~M quc!Stions and that the witness had to be warned for this altitude observed :\n\n\"From the employers own ple3dings th~ st~!e':~~~ Shri Jaiswal recorded unda ruh: 1~ and~ 'd P th~ it is evident that 17 fe51ivul h?hdays 51 es lo ers National Holiday~ ore nil P.ai.d holhldys ~~~~ner their\n\nhad been wrongfully depnVJng t ctr w dues in this behalf.\" b- . e f monthly raters o 1be Tribunal, while denlin, g wsth the cas\n\n1~ f because they \\\\ere served that they' were not entitled to the re tese of daily rate~ or P&ld for all the 36.5 days in 8 year. Th: ~cording to ihe nompice¢ raters beinst different (they were ptd uantum of worlc theY ber of days on which they WC!rked orf 1 t Ql holidays with wa,~:e~. turned out) they were held entttlcd to. es\n\n1~ 0 yment on the basts DaUy r111e~ were accordinRIY beld entitled 0 P held entitled to llet or tht:i,(. d:.ily waj!e whereas piece mterstets of the 8\\'\"erJge of the avcra)!C c:aroinl% to be calculated ond. ihe holiday. 'Ibe rethe la't one month immediately preceh\n\n1 ~1! •• li<'( f'r:.sJted h the award was st.:~ ted 1 u · sball . • h t the c:mployeri \"My award, therefore, u t ad ieee raied workffic:G pay wun to their dJily ra1ed an P\n\ngJ6 SVPIENB Cf>VRT R:&POllTS\n\n[1972].3 S.C.R.\n\n. l'da -icles 1hr.ae Nationa1 Holid~ A for. 17 fesnval hO 1• ys ibnen who arc daily raters ancl\n\n~eta~!~: :J:::eo~'!fl'Oln the 1st January., 1965~ For the holidays which -have accrued _from the .1st Janu\n\n1965 till the date of. enforcement of the award aiWl :%ich .are gj\\'.\"!n in .the list Ex. E-2 th~ employers shall .pay the arrears and in future a~ the fe$tial holidays and B National Holidays shall be .patd for. If the employers , ub9litute festival holidays on a rest day, for that day they .iball :pay double 'the wages.''\n\nThe irppellant, fling aggrieved by Uris award, presented a writ tion in the A1lail.abad High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution complaining that the Industrial Tribunal had mis- C read and , misinterpreted Zhe statement of the parties recorded under r. 12 particularly the statement of Shri Jaiswal. It wu also averred that the QU.estian of festiv.al holidays depends on so many other factors particularly custom and usap; e and the Industrial Tribunal had -com.mitted a serious error in shutting out evidence in\n\nre_tard to the practice prevalent at Kanpur in l'e!pect of the cus- I) tom and usage rltt'di~ 'festival holidays in the te-xtile industry there. The maiB tetile industry m 'the State of Uttar Prash according to the appellant's averme!it is concentrated at Kanpur.\n\nThe lle_ged admission by Shri Jaiswal contrary to the appellant•s pleadmg al}d contrary to 'the case set np 'by bot'h -parties ccm'ld not wnclustve .and tlle Industrial Tribunal ntegatly based its findr: m_g; on such alle£ed admission. ·\n\nJbe High Court. dismi.ssed the writ petition holding that it was tc:> the ldustnal Tribunal to allow or disanow any question whtc~ ?t cmde; r~ revant -or irrelevant and the High Court, in\n\nexrcJst~£ tts rarudiction tmder Art. !26 of the Constitution, could no 11:0. tnto the crrectness or otherwise of the order disallowing f\n\n!eft:!i\n\n1iar question to be Pot toa witness such function being Tribunal .;.:- 3? appellate court. The ~~; rounds that the Industrial he bad made ::read.~· statement of Shri Jaiswal in hOlditlg tliit iaR .allowed to tb adnnson that 17 paid festival holidays were be sible in tbe h eor n as also considered (O bo impennisto Clte \"Pilioltion ott wnt iurisdiction because tbat l)eins o Jw.U \\l:nder r l2 v' :U:e. The statement made by Sbri the in'-rpret.l~ tkat . or 10&, to tlle High Court, was capable of pJ.oya-s. Were ~V~ l7Jt ~~o:d n roiision that the . tnt- Not be1nR isfed that tt-r! . esuv.u holidays to their work.Jn.oo. enor of iud.sdictioa oc £ • unpaed award su.tre.red from anY t>elition was dismissed. om auy manifet error of law the writ u\n\nS~] from th to a of~ J~ 0 tad~t Ol the learned le Judge\n\n~ ltti!y ~We\" 4l't• DooftnbeC -\n\nBIJLI: OOTTON MlLLS'i\\1; INDllSTklAL Tl\\l'IUNAL (Dua, /,) 917\n\nA 5, 1966. However, leave tto appeal to thi!i Court was granted by the Division Bench on February 16, 1968, the petitionr having been held, to gpote the words of t.he High Court \"entitled to a certificate either under cl. (a) or . (b) of Art. 13 3 ( 1 ) of the\n\nCon9titution 11 • The Hi~ Court also certified \"that the. value of the subiect matter of dispute before the High Court and in appeal B is not less than Rs. 20,000/ -; alternatively, it is certified that the\n\niudent.of 1tbis Court involves directly or indirectly a claim res\n\npectin~ wages amo1,1nting to more than Rs. 20,000/ -.\"\n\nBefore us the respondents raised an objection that the certificate anted by the High Court was incompetent and, therefore, c should be cancelled. Out attention was drawn to Art. 133(l)(a) . and (b) of the Constitution and it was pointed out that the High\n\nCourt misse~ that part of sut>.Art. 133 (1) where it is stated: that ''where the iudment, decree or final order appealed from affinns the decision of the court immediately below in any ca~ other than a case referred 'to in sub-clause (c), if the High Court nirtber • certifies that the appeal involves some substantial question of law.\" 0 Merely because the value of the sub; ect matter in dispute is more than Rs. 20,000/-, the respondent contended, it does not by itself justify the I!Tant of a certificate under cl. (a) or cl. (b). In the application for the requisite certificate the prayer included cl. (c) of Art. 133(1) as well, bUll: apparently at the time of arguments the submission was confined to cis. (a) and (b) alone.\n\nE The appellant, when faced with this. difficulty, submitted that this Court should, on its oral request, rant scialleave to appeal after eondonin~ delay and it also filed a formal written application for special leave to appeal accompanied with an application for condonation of delay. For adopting such a course the appellant F relied on an unreported decision of this Court in The District Board (afterwards lila Parishad), Allahabad v. Syed Tahir Hussain & ors. ('1) There 1he appellant had come to this Court on a certificate purportin~~: to have been granted under Art. 133 of the Constitution. At the time of hearin~ it was objected on behalf of one of the respondents 1here that the certificate could only be G granted if thue was a substantial question of law and ince the certificate did not disclose on its face the existence of any such\n\nqustion, the appeal was incon1petent. This Court, in view of i1s earlier decision in Shri Durga Prasad & anr. vs. The Banaras Bank\n\nLtd.(2), su&itained this objection and in the absence of a certificate of the High Court showing the existence of some substantial H question c:if law held the appeal to be incompetent. The appellant in that case when faced with a similar situation, had made an ornl ruest prayin, g for special leave, undertaking to file a written\n\n.(l~ £,-A, No. 57S ofi963 eel on lu\\y 23,1965. (2) {1964) 1 S.C.R, 475.\n\nSUPREME COURT .REPORTS\n\n[1972] 3 S:C.R.\n\npetition for that purpose supported by an affidavit and accompa:nieCI A by an application for condonation of delay: This Court considered the CJ!.Se to' be firt and. proper fOr granting speiaJJeave whic)li wits granted on oral prayer but the appellant th~'re ws directed tb :tile special leave petition in this. Court within a week. The appellant in the present cas•; also filed during lthe c6urse of hearing special leave petition no. 676 of 1972 duly supported by an affidavit and B Civil MisceUaneous Petition . no.· 1319 of 1972 with a supportin, g affidavit praying for (i) condonation of delay, (ii) treating-, court fee paid on C.A. No. 1611 of 1968 as court fee on special leave t& appe~ and (iii) the security deposit in the earlier appeal being treated as security in the scialleave apoeal .• We heard all the matters together.\n\nWe consider the case to be covered by the precedent cHed and accordin.gly held the certificate granted by the High Court to be incompetent and, therefore, liable to be cancelled. With the cancellation of the certificate C.A. no. 1611 of 1968 must be dismis.- Sed; but in the circumstances there would be no order as to costs.\n\nWith reg, ard to the prayer for ranting special leave to appeal there can be no dispute that this Court is fplly competent to entertain this prayeJ:\" and if the cause of justice so demands, to grant\n\nthe same and consider the special leave to appeal on the mrits.\n\nArticle 13 6 is couched in very wide terms and it vests this Court with discretionary power for setting right grave injustice in fit E cases. ln Shri Du~:ga Prasad's case (supra), this Court, having\n\nregard to all the circumstances, did not consider that to be a fit case for graning special leave to appeal whereaS i.ti the later case of the District Board (afterwards Zila Parisha4) Allahabad (supra), it m;1y be recalled, this Court granted speCial leave tq appeal on oral request, dinctin~ that a fonnal spialleavc appli- F cation be filed within a week.\n\nAfter considering all the circum-. stances we consider the present case to be fit for granting sial leave to appeal and for condoning the delay.\n\nWe order:acoord~ ingly .. : The appellant, however, must pay full court fee payable within 'two weeks but the security already deposited inCA:~·\n\nl 611 of 1968 my .e treate~ as security in the special leave appeal. The result, therefore, is that now we have the fresh. appeal G by sPe¢hll1e.ave before us for decision. ' • . . .\n\nThe apellant's learned counsel drew.ur attention to'tbe' slate~. ml; lnts of t~~ respective cases of the parties before the lndu5ldal Tribunal and also to the statement of Shri Jaiswal under r . .t2~ lit ouf ''Vie~' .the statement of'.Shri J aiswal had~ as a matter of Iaw/o H be td as. a whole and alSo in the background and along .with tf)e\n\npleadinJ!; s as disclosed in the respective statements of cases. of: file parties-.fn order to: understand whether Shri Jatswal's .statement\n\n. I\n\n. BWLI.COTtON MILLS y. lNDUSTaiAL TanmNAL (Dua, J.) 919'\n\nA amounted to a clear and. oonscious admission eliminating a cruciat\n\nprrt' of the controversial issue.\n\nRedtn~ them as a Whble we doo not 'consider it pOssible to bold tha( Jtl1e 'apPellant. had admitted 1hat the 17 feStival holidays were beirik'given. by' tnem as paid\n\nholidays dispensing with the enquiry into the question referred fo1 adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal B\n\nIt may in this connection be pointed out that the real p.urpose <:ind object of r. 12 is only to pinpoint he precise comroversy by requiring the Qarties to state their respective cases at the .very .fil\n\nsittirt~ of the Tribunal. This sta'tement is not like ilie testimony of a witness, part of which can be accepted and the rest rejoc; te.d. . It c was only in th.e nature of a supplementary pleading designed\n\nmai.nly 1o remove vagueness and to clear ambiguities or indefiniteness in the pladings. This statement had, therefre, to be reao\n\nand considered .as a whole. If it was considered unsati5factory in some respects this factor could be taken into account in. appreciat:-- ing the pleadings and evid•;!nce led in the case while coming i.O the o final decision but it could not debar the appeUant from leading evidence on the controversial issue as if such issue did not arise.\n\nIt is noteworthy that even the workmen did not plead that the festi\n\nval holidays were treated as paid holidays but no payment was as. a matter of fact being made.\n\nThe holidays were of course allowed to the workmen but thewritten statement on behalf of the appellant unequivocally denied that there was any provision in law or practice for allowing festival holidays wi!th wages and it also denied that in the Agra region where the appellant's mill is situated any textile mill was paying wages for festival holidays. The appellant Mill it was emphasised could not be treated on a different footing. It was further pointed out that the appellant Mill was a highly uneconomic mill and was not in a position to take any extra buren. The statement made by Shri Jaiswal under r.- 12 could on no reasonable hypothesis be\n\ncoidered to have replaced this ur.equvoca1 and clear' , lea; It is true that Shri Jaiswal tried to be sorriewht clever by stati11~ that the festival holidays were paid in the sense tbat the workers were G . allowed to work on unpaid test days in substitution of the sajd'\n\nfestival holidays. But this statement clearly explains in Linainbiguous termLti!e sense in which Shri Jaiswal meant to say that the festival holidays were paid. The facts contained in the explauaion lead to the only conclusion that festival.holidays are not paid s the National Holidays are. This statement read with the. deta.iled' H explualiOn which constitutes its real core .could not logically serv~\n\nas a nd for ignorin~ tlie unequivocal> denial in the . written stattment uarticularly when even tbc workmen did not set up this case. Industrial tribunal hJI.d,· in. 0\\11:-0pinicin,- erroneo'usly\n\n920 SUPIU!'NI! COU.IlT REPORTS\n\n[1972) 3 :&C:R.\n\nino~ the real plea and had on the basis of this manifest blatant A error. whicla is clear on the face of the record, disallowed the .evidence on the question of the practice and custom in the textile industry in Kanpur. In Shri Iaiswal's statement we find a cleardistinction drawn that three National Holidays were paid holidays and the other festival holidays were such for which the workers\n\n1Vere allowed to work on substituted rest days. It was also clearly B mentioned in iha't statement that if a holiday is substituted on a rest day then the workmen gets only one day's wages. This important put of the statement was virtually hnored by tt).e Tribunal. 'The facts bein~ clearly stated, in our view, he Industrial Tribuna I\n\nwas wron~ in law in holdin~ that the appellant's written plea was modified by reason of the staement under r. 12 or that there was C .a clear admission supetsedimz the earlier plea. The learned single Jude of the Hih Courtt, in our opinion, also missed the real point; and if the real plea was ignored and it was erroneously held 1hat Shri Jaiswal's statement under r. 12 cortstituted an admission\n\n1 <>verrldiQi the earlier olea and as a result evidence on that plea was excluded, then it was an eminently fit case for interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the error being gross and palpable D which wa• manifest on the face of the record and the same having\n\nresulted in failure of justice by excludin~ evidence on 1he most vital point. The Division Bench on special appeal from the judgment of the learned single Judge fell into the same error in summarily dismissing the appeal in limine without even recording a speaking order on the crucial point of substance arising in the case E which went to the root of , the matter. .\n\nThe question of fes'tival holidays requires consideration from -several aspects. Employers and workers have always differed in\n\ntt SUJ~; Jilestions about the level at which unifonnity in the number of holidays should g; enerally be achieved. In the Report of F the National Commission on Labour prepared in August, 1969 we find .at p. 105 that the workers' organisallions generally favour a minimUill of 7 to 12 paid holidays in a year without makin, l! any diffel'.entiation as between: different categories of employees. Em-\n\n-ployer~; on the other hand, feel that the number of paid holidays\n\nenjoyed by workers in India is already on the high side, al').d, G there(ore, uniformity should be achieved t a much lower level.\n\nThe opiniqn of the Commission contained in its Report supported. the. view of its Study Gro9u on Labour Legislation which rem\n\nJOOn~_ed three paid National Holidays viz. 26th 1anuary (Republic Day), lth Auust (Independence Day.) and 2nd Qtober (Mahatma Gandhi's Birth Day) and five paid festival holidays as H may be fixed by 'the appropriate Government in consu1tatio11 with the representatives ol employer• and employees. The Report also satRelti that there is a trend towards industrywiae uniformity in\n\nBIJLI COTTON MILLS V, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL (Dua, J.) 921\n\n~ A the matter of holidays, as in the case of jute and coaL lnciden·\n\ntally it may be mentioned that in U.P., the U.P. Industrial Estab-· lishments (National Holidays) Act No. XVIII of 1961 and rules made. under s. 9 thereof provide for .paid National Holidays but. that Act does not deal with festival holidays.\n\nIn the case before us, according to the appellant, the 17 festi- B val holidays as directed by the award would impOSe on the appel\n\n!ant industry an additional burden to the extent of about Rs. 1,49,600 as was stated in 'the order of the Allahabad High Cou1't while granting leave. Custom, practice and uniformity in the industry without prejt, tdicially affecting efficiency and in- creased production are some of the relevant factors' which have C to be taken in't9 account in determining the number of paid festi\n\nval holidays. per year. The question affects national economy and the present instance may well be cited in future in deciding similar questiops in other allied cqncerns in the region. The effect of such instances, therefore, does not remain confined only to the establishment concerned but has its impact on other con• D cerns as well. This aspect has been completely ignored by the\n\nIndustrial Trib_unal which has proceeded solely on the basis of the statement of Shri Jaisal as interpreted by it. This statement\n\nbeing the sole .basis of the Tribunal's conclusion if it is not.\n\npossibl~ to read in this statemem any admission having the effect of giving up the only crucial plea that the workmen have no r.ight E to 17 paid holidays than this is clearly a misreading of that statement and the Tribunal's order mu&t be held to be tainted by a manifest error of law on the face of the record which has resulted in gr!!ve failure of justice as evidence on the only material point in issue was illegally shut out. In our view, the High Court also fell into the same er.ror and did not apply its mind •to the real point which .arose for decision in the case. We accordingly F aUow this appeal, set aside •the orders of the High Court aud of the Industdal Tribunal and remit the case back to the Tribunal for a fresh decision on the merits after permitting the parties to lead releva~ evidence in accordance with law and in 'the light of\n\nthe observations made above. As the whole trouble arose 00caus~\n\nof the un.stisfctory nature of the statement made by Shri G Jaiswal, who was also found by the Tribunal aS a person who was\n\n not inclined to give straight answers to straight questions, it is only just and proper that the appellant should pay the respondents' costs both in th.is Court and in the High Court. The coul't\n\nfee, as already directed, must be paid by the appelJant within two weeks.\n\nS.C.\n\nAp, wl aUowM.", "total_entities": 64, "entities": [{"text": "BIJLI COTTON MILLS (P) LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJLI COTTON MILLS (P) LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL . .II & .\n\nORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL II & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 20, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 20, 1972\n\n[C. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND I. D. DUA, JJ,]\n\nU.P.\n\nIndustriaA Establishments (National) Holidays Act, 1961- No provision for payment of wages for festival holidays-Wherher pco- :c.ble in the .facts and circumstances o0f the case."}}, {"text": "I. D. DUA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 142, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Holidays Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 189, "end_char": 207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2363, "end_char": 2374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2513, "end_char": 2526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tbe respondent in the Supreme Court objec."}}, {"text": "National Holidays bul that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4743, "end_char": 4773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Syed Tcdrir Husain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5718, "end_char": 5736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "921 AI ·\n\nThe Diitlict Board (afterwordr' Zila Paris.had' Allah(.•bad \\t : Syed Tcdrir Husain & Ors."}}, {"text": "Y. M. Tarkunde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6212, "end_char": 6226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "912 S.UPRIME COURT R.EfOi, TS'\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nY. M. Tarkunde, J, P. Goyal and SDbfla~ Mal Jain, fOr the A appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Goyal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6231, "end_char": 6239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "912 S.UPRIME COURT R.EfOi, TS'\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nY. M. Tarkunde, J, P. Goyal and SDbfla~ Mal Jain, fOr the A appellant."}}, {"text": "E. C. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6284, "end_char": 6298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E. C. Agarwala and A. T. M. Sampat, for respondent No.2."}}, {"text": "T. M. Sampat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6306, "end_char": 6318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E. C. Agarwala and A. T. M. Sampat, for respondent No.2."}}, {"text": "Dua", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6388, "end_char": 6391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Ju4i!nen't of the Court was delivered by Dua, J~ The following dispute between Mls."}}, {"text": "Hathras Mazdoor Panchayat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6978, "end_char": 7003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordin~ to the workmen the employers had been givin~ 17 fe9tival holidays to their workmen in a year and though those\n\nholiays should have been paid ones the employers were not .mak\n\nin~ anv payment..\n\nThe disput~ was ori.1dnally espoused at the instance of Hathras Mazdoor Panchayat but later three other unions namely Sooti Mi11 Mazdoor Pancbayat, Congress Mazdoor Sangh and Suti MUl\n\nKannachari Sangh were also acconied right of represen1a1ion on their applications."}}, {"text": "Sooti Mi11 Mazdoor Pancbayat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7040, "end_char": 7068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordin~ to the workmen the employers had been givin~ 17 fe9tival holidays to their workmen in a year and though those\n\nholiays should have been paid ones the employers were not .mak\n\nin~ anv payment..\n\nThe disput~ was ori.1dnally espoused at the instance of Hathras Mazdoor Panchayat but later three other unions namely Sooti Mi11 Mazdoor Pancbayat, Congress Mazdoor Sangh and Suti MUl\n\nKannachari Sangh were also acconied right of represen1a1ion on their applications."}}, {"text": "Congress Mazdoor Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7070, "end_char": 7092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordin~ to the workmen the employers had been givin~ 17 fe9tival holidays to their workmen in a year and though those\n\nholiays should have been paid ones the employers were not .mak\n\nin~ anv payment..\n\nThe disput~ was ori.1dnally espoused at the instance of Hathras Mazdoor Panchayat but later three other unions namely Sooti Mi11 Mazdoor Pancbayat, Congress Mazdoor Sangh and Suti MUl\n\nKannachari Sangh were also acconied right of represen1a1ion on their applications."}}, {"text": "Suti MUl\n\nKannachari Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7097, "end_char": 7123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordin~ to the workmen the employers had been givin~ 17 fe9tival holidays to their workmen in a year and though those\n\nholiays should have been paid ones the employers were not .mak\n\nin~ anv payment..\n\nThe disput~ was ori.1dnally espoused at the instance of Hathras Mazdoor Panchayat but later three other unions namely Sooti Mi11 Mazdoor Pancbayat, Congress Mazdoor Sangh and Suti MUl\n\nKannachari Sangh were also acconied right of represen1a1ion on their applications."}}, {"text": "Congress Maz door Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7812, "end_char": 7835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Congress Maz door Sangh, the Sooti MilL Kaqn.achari ."}}, {"text": "Sooti MilL Kaqn.achari .", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7841, "end_char": 7865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Congress Maz door Sangh, the Sooti MilL Kaqn.achari ."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8610, "end_char": 8635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. P. Jaiswal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8828, "end_char": 8841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shrt M. P. Jaiswal, on behal~ of the employers adnutted that the company gives 17 feStival holidays to all its employees, 15 of which ar~ those mentioned in the written statement.", "canonical_name": "M. P. Jaiswal"}}, {"text": "Sankrantt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9055, "end_char": 9064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Congress Mazd<?or Sangh and two others being Sankrantt -and Baldev Chat observed on Bhadon Sukla Chnt. -"}}, {"text": "Baldev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9070, "end_char": 9076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Congress Mazd<?or Sangh and two others being Sankrantt -and Baldev Chat observed on Bhadon Sukla Chnt. -"}}, {"text": "Bhadon Sukla Chnt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9094, "end_char": 9111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Congress Mazd<?or Sangh and two others being Sankrantt -and Baldev Chat observed on Bhadon Sukla Chnt. -"}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9373, "end_char": 9378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Rules", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Rules"}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9386, "end_char": 9399, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jai$wal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10307, "end_char": 10314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he Tribunll put the (ollowin~ question to Shri Jai$wal : Q : Whether the festival holidays observed in the Mill are paid or unpaid ?", "canonical_name": "G Jaiswal"}}, {"text": "M.P. Jaiswat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10549, "end_char": 10561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter it appears that the workmen did not kad any evi~nc_e but Shri M.P. Jaiswat, Secretary of the Mil!.s appeare~ a,; a w•ncs\n\non behalf of 1M employer.", "canonical_name": "M. P. Jaiswal"}}, {"text": "s 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10921, "end_char": 10924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ". P. Gautam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11526, "end_char": 11537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "0~ beingcr<JSs-examinedby Shri 0."}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12105, "end_char": 12118, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Is there any limit for festival holidays in Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12125, "end_char": 12182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "is no such limit nor any such direction in the Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12195, "end_char": 12255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 51 and 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12300, "end_char": 12318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no such limit nor any such direction in the Factories Act", "statute": "There is no such limit nor any such direction in the Factories Act"}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12326, "end_char": 12339, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jaiswal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12477, "end_char": 12484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibi'ts E-1 and E-2 show festival holidays for h.; l years 1964 and 1965 and these charts corroborate the answers elicited from Shri Jaiswal that for Holi and Diwali only two days on which substitution was allowed were paid for, the remaining two holidays bein, g unpaid.", "canonical_name": "G Jaiswal"}}, {"text": "INDUSTRIAL TRIBUN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13628, "end_char": 13645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Tribunal ven the )tO-by fu he-\n\nBI, JLI COTTON MILLS V, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUN (0\n\n' AL ua, I.) 9 15\n\nA - tatement of Shri Jaiswal recorded under r 12 0 1 1 lS The Tribunal ten dealt with that statement."}}, {"text": "Jaiswal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14930, "end_char": 14937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A little lower down, after observin~ that Shri Jaiswal w~ not the kind of witness who would rive straight answers to."}}, {"text": "Jaiswal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15142, "end_char": 15149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "stra1~M quc!Stions and that the witness had to be warned for this altitude observed :\n\n\"From the employers own ple3dings th~ st~!e':~~~ Shri Jaiswal recorded unda ruh: 1~ and~ 'd P th~ it is evident that 17 fe51ivul h?hdays 51 es lo ers National Holiday~ ore nil P.ai.d holhldys ~~~~ner their\n\nhad been wrongfully depnVJng t ctr w dues in this behalf.\"", "canonical_name": "G Jaiswal"}}, {"text": "A1lail.abad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16850, "end_char": 16872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The irppellant, fling aggrieved by Uris award, presented a writ tion in the A1lail.abad High Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16879, "end_char": 16887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17331, "end_char": 17337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It wu also averred that the QU.estian of festiv.al holidays depends on so many other factors particularly custom and usap; e and the Industrial Tribunal had -com.mitted a serious error in shutting out evidence in\n\nre_tard to the practice prevalent at Kanpur in l'e!pect of the cus- I) tom and usage rltt'di~ 'festival holidays in the te-xtile industry there."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Prash", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17471, "end_char": 17491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The maiB tetile industry m 'the State of Uttar Prash according to the appellant's averme!it is concentrated at Kanpur."}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19270, "end_char": 19277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19798, "end_char": 19812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19912, "end_char": 19920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20496, "end_char": 20507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21186, "end_char": 21194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23475, "end_char": 23485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Du~:ga Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23625, "end_char": 23638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ln Shri Du~:ga Prasad's case (supra), this Court, having\n\nregard to all the circumstances, did not consider that to be a fit case for graning special leave to appeal whereaS i.ti the later case of the District Board (afterwards Zila Parisha4) Allahabad (supra), it m;1y be recalled, this Court granted speCial leave tq appeal on oral request, dinctin~ that a fonnal spialleavc appli- F cation be filed within a week."}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23860, "end_char": 23869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ln Shri Du~:ga Prasad's case (supra), this Court, having\n\nregard to all the circumstances, did not consider that to be a fit case for graning special leave to appeal whereaS i.ti the later case of the District Board (afterwards Zila Parisha4) Allahabad (supra), it m;1y be recalled, this Court granted speCial leave tq appeal on oral request, dinctin~ that a fonnal spialleavc appli- F cation be filed within a week."}}, {"text": "J aiswal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24751, "end_char": 24759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri J aiswal had~ as a matter of Iaw/o H be td as.", "canonical_name": "G Jaiswal"}}, {"text": "Jatswal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24975, "end_char": 24982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of: file parties-.fn order to: understand whether Shri Jatswal's .statement\n\n.", "canonical_name": "G Jaiswal"}}, {"text": "lNDUSTaiAL TanmNAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25025, "end_char": 25043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BWLI.COTtON MILLS y. lNDUSTaiAL TanmNAL (Dua, J.) 919'\n\nA amounted to a clear and."}}, {"text": "Agra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26739, "end_char": 26743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The holidays were of course allowed to the workmen but thewritten statement on behalf of the appellant unequivocally denied that there was any provision in law or practice for allowing festival holidays wi!th wages and it also denied that in the Agra region where the appellant's mill is situated any textile mill was paying wages for festival holidays."}}, {"text": "Iaiswal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28299, "end_char": 28306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Shri Iaiswal's statement we find a cleardistinction drawn that three National Holidays were paid holidays and the other festival holidays were such for which the workers\n\n1Vere allowed to work on substituted rest days."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29341, "end_char": 29349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30462, "end_char": 30467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Em-\nployer~; on the other hand, feel that the number of paid holidays\n\nenjoyed by workers in India is already on the high side, al').d, G there(ore, uniformity should be achieved t a much lower level."}}, {"text": "Mahatma Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30816, "end_char": 30830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and 2nd Qtober (Mahatma Gandhi's Birth Day) and five paid festival holidays as H may be fixed by 'the appropriate Government in consu1tatio11 with the representatives ol employer• and employees."}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31239, "end_char": 31243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Report also satRelti that there is a trend towards industrywiae uniformity in\n\nBIJLI COTTON MILLS V, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL (Dua, J.) 921\n\n~ A the matter of holidays, as in the case of jute and coaL lnciden·\n\ntally it may be mentioned that in U.P., the U.P. Industrial Estab-· lishments (National Holidays) Act No."}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31347, "end_char": 31351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jaisal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32437, "end_char": 32443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This aspect has been completely ignored by the\n\nIndustrial Trib_unal which has proceeded solely on the basis of the statement of Shri Jaisal as interpreted by it.", "canonical_name": "G Jaiswal"}}, {"text": "G Jaiswal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33526, "end_char": 33535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the whole trouble arose 00caus~\n\nof the un.stisfctory nature of the statement made by Shri G Jaiswal, who was also found by the Tribunal aS a person who was\n\n not inclined to give straight answers to straight questions, it is only just and proper that the appellant should pay the respondents' costs both in th.is Court and in the High Court.", "canonical_name": "G Jaiswal"}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_922_928_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "FetMS AMAR NATH BASHESHAR DASS .\n\n'.v.\n\nTEK ClfAND\n\nMarch 21, 1972-\n\nP JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J\n\n[K. S.\n\nEGDE, • . u b Rtlll Rtrriction Act, 1949, Ss. J and 13 read with , PficllnJ:!b d '1 adnJuly 13 l965..,..-Exemption from provision of &ection 13 ;11011 at ton a e • 1 · {il d ·.' .5 hefh b claimtd in CP.l't.t where sull or ttvrctlon e ww1t11 ; ars e;, ccC::mpletion of building but d.:cree obtained after\" expiry of mid\n\n' year:t • . Under the Pnjab Rent. Restricon, Ac_t, 1949 a landlord can evict a tenant only on the grounds and ac, ordmg to the procedullJ provided\n\n. A\n\nin section 13 of the Act. Section 3 of the A.ct provides. for exemption t~ be ranted bv Government from the opel':ltlon of sect1on 13. By noli ficauon dated July 30. 1965 t!YJ Government of Punjab granted su::h exemption in rcsp:ct of building constructed during the year 1959 to D J963 !or a period of S years from the date of their completion, on the , condition that during the aforestid period of exemption suits for eject\n\nment of tenants in respect of those buildings \"were or are\" institutes in .civil courts and dec~ ol e:ectment \"were or are\" passed. The re.spon . dent had let out to the appellant a building which was completed in 1960. _ ·- ·\n\nA. tuit for ejectment of the appellant was tiled in 1963 and deere:: '11as obtamed in l ~69. In procediog for execution the question was whether the dr!_e, havmg hcq1 obtam-:u mre thon 5 years after completion of the\n\nE --\n\nu•ldmg, was exempt from operation of section 13. The High. Court '\" 5eCOnd npal hld in favour of the .respondent.\n\nIn appeal to this !Aurt by spc:t•al i.eaYe, the appellant contend.!<! that the decree in' the su•t. avmg been. paW!d tftcr a period of 5 yeah from the date of cons- chon, e11o; molJon from restrictions plac.t:d by s 13 will not be avaikibc\n\ncahlh \"':t ... only tb~ uit . !hould be filed but 'the decree for eviction ~. ou e <ml:uned wtth1n the sajd pcrio<l of S )•!an. - ·\n\n' liELD : The tiling o! fh It ·. h' h . , . .1.1.. -only condition that is . c sutb Wit •n t e penod o( el(empt'ion I!;· me uem, tion tbe other t necsary 6atMy otltot the requlremeilttcf the\n\n~~ qf. whii; h no t i~ 6utr..!ent lnloa. the pa~•lng of tbe decreein shy 'dle ·appellant, bas;;, ~\\ •· en prescnbe~. If t.he,, d\\:r!:e. •~ CO!J!ell<kd wes:ill>\" netd to \\elf th~ . obtulnc~ w!thtn tb: period of S )'.!at$.\": there bco:li!U!•: the e:emption fr~! the ~Uit. had to be fifed wthin tha(?eriod G\n\n{>{ lhc ducr.:e •n..J pot tile suit. ~9~8qflerneoh of s .. I 3 !$ only in respe.::t\n\nTt•~. U\"<: of !he v.· . -~~· 'we •· . . ' \\UIIt ~Ul'YQCl\\ the aho'1.:· \\n\" tr f: r. lire Ill l\\;~P,:<:l O[ J.:tno~ U , i\\<JI(~\"IS Of Ue. t*r<bfltr, t.1 ~-~ Hf~:t p nb~IOO, e SUU shuu!J ba\\·-' . b.;.:f\\. -~ P•\\<cd cr w~ htT(.':1flt:r t . l•kew•·~ deere~~ of elcmcr.t 4t bj:o I~ t.!d on th: !:J •t dy of lh • JW\\\\t<l. ifUrtr •. I\\ . 'llt mav 't9n:HV\"'.lf>t\\'\n\n~· 11 ~;· t>, urJ I•> pv, tu[ijh: lie; pH)~ uf lhe Years t:\\.:n•rtioo .. :.:-1( -~ it lJ\n\n:r~ • . ,,., u th; at .... oul<l be u;~ . t:O.:ree woul<i b.: gheo muu.; Jjately \"'- ~~. 1br Mu !l'rouiJ be reult, If the contotiun that both tho:\n\nIH:cpld~ . l'J27 1-1·928 E) N•MJ within the pcrie>J (Ji ucmptior(,\" 1s\n\n .\n\ni I\n\nFlRM AMAR NATH v. TEK CHAND (Jaganmohan Reddy,/,) W~J\n\nA A statu:e rnust: be JntiJ~ete? m lhe lil)t ·:O~· i'l' ,.~.bct. The vry purpose of the exemption of buddmgs trom the operat1on of s, 13 was to give landlords the 1 ight which as owners of buildings they had under\n\nthe ordinary law, namely, to give them on lease at rents which they thouJ}!t remunerative and to evict te.nan.s during that period without any fotteQ impose;! by the Act.\n\nIf na pr.ovision wus >made for exempting such de~ rees in respect of the •!xempted building, the exemption granted w1Jl B be illusory. 1.926 H-927 EJ ·\n\nAccordingly the appeal must fail.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C.A. No. 1052 of 1971.\n\nApeeal by special leae from the judgmn.t and or?er dated May 27, 1971 of.the PunJab and Haryana Htgh Court mExecu c tion Second Appeal No. 1783 of 1970. ·\n\nM. C. Chag'la, V. C. Mahajan, S. K. Mehta K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, 0. c. Mathur, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent.\n\nD The Judgment of 'the Court was delivered by P. Jagamnoban Reddy, . .J.\n\nThe respondent who was constructing~ buildjng, had leased it out on a monthly tenancy to the appellant on the 1st November 1959. The building was uhimately complejed in March 1960. On 14-1-1963 he filed a suit\n\nan.d .I!:Ot a decree for ejectment on 14-8-196~. On 29-8-1969 he E filed an .execQion petition but the executing court dismissed it on 16-4-1970 on the ground that the conditions .Prescribed in th•.!\n\nnotification of the Government of Punjab under section 3 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 (hereinafter called the Act') dated ~0-7 -1965, exempting such decrees from sect ion 13 of the said Act were not complied with. An appea~ aszJin'1t this F iudgment was unsuccessful. On a second appeal 'the High Court\n\nheld tha1 th~ decree was executable inasmuch as that decree was\n\nexempted, under the notification. _This appeal is by special leave against th.at judgment..\n\nBefore we notice the conditions prescribed for the exemt>tlon of decrees of eviction against tenants from the provisions of the G Act, it is necessary to refer to section l3 of the Act in so far a5\n\nit is relevant and •the notification exe1npting decrees obtaid by certain categories of landlords from tho, se provisions.\n\nIL is well known that due to the nonavailability of housing accpn:ul)Odation in urban areas and the consequent hardship to tenants who were already occupying buildings on lease, almost all'the States enacted H legislation by and under which the landlords' rights to evict\n\ntt.!nants as well as the ri, ght to recover higher exorbitant rents were considerably cut down. The main scheme of these Act~ genera1!y was to make i't obligatory on landlords intending to\n\n924.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 s.c.R.\n\neviot tenants to make applications before the authority prescrid\n\nUJlder the Act only on the grounds specified in the particular\n\nleislation, the Rent Control Authority alone could make an enquiry and order eviction. The jurisdiction of the civil courts was ten away. In some of the States, such as in .Uttar Pradesh, civil courts were allowed to entertain eviotion suits but subject to prior leave being obtain from the District Magistrate. ln other words, in that State two rounds of litigation were provided for.\n\nSimila.d:y, aexmcations for fixation of fair rent where the rent charged was considered to be exorbitant. could also be made be fore these authorities. These restriotions could not, however, serve as a panacea for solvin~ the accommodation problem in urban cities consequent on tht ptrenoroenal migration of population into thos~ areas which was further aggravated by large scale exodUs due to the partition of India. It, therefore, became necessary for each of the State Governments not only to undertake\n\nbuildin~ schemes itself but also to encourage persons who had the means to build by exempting newly constructed buildiug which were let out to tenants from rent control restrictions for a particular period. One of such lep; islations is the Act with which we are now concerned. Unlike other Rent Control legislations, this Act adopts r:ather a novel method, in that while it pern1Hs suits beinp; filed and decrees obtained, it places restrictions against their execution except on specified grounds.. In this case, however, we are not concerned with the novelty of the 1egislation or the bardship, expense and delay which is caused to the landlord or the tenant by the innovation. adopted by i't.\n\nWe may now reaGl the relevant provijons of section 13 which are as under :-\n\n\" 13 ( 1) . A tenant in possession of a bu'ildinJ?, or rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy. except in accordance with the provisions of this section, or in pursuance of an order made under section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1947, as subsequently amendttd.\n\n(2_). A landlord who seeks te> evict his tenantshall apply to .the Controller f-or a dire:ction in that behalf.\n\nIf the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the applicant, is satisfied-\n\n( here the grounds upon which. he should be satisfied have bn set Qut)\n\nth\"! ontroller may. make an order directinJ?;' the tenant to. f>;'t the landlord' in J)OSSeSSion. oo the building or\n\nFIRM AMAR NATH v., TBK CHAND (Jaganmohan Reddy,/.) 92S\n\nrented land and if the Conrtroller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application : ·\n\nProvided that the ContfQiler may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possio.n\n\nof the building or rented land and may exttend such time so as not to exceed three months in the aggreate.\n\n(3) (_a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tennt to put the landlord in possession-\n\n( The 2rounds on which he can apply have been set out)\n\n(b) The Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide make an order direct~\n\ning the tenant to_ put the landlord in possession of the building or rented land on such date as may be speci~ fied by tq~ Controller and if othe Controller is not s~\n\nsatisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the applica~ tion :\n\n(c) x X X X X\n\n Provided that the Controller may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of E the building or rented land and may extend such time so as not to exceed three months in the aggregate.\n\n(4) X\n\n(5) X\n\nX X\n\nX x\"\n\nThe Government tinder sectio.n 3 has been empowered to direct that. all or any of the provisions of the Act shall nor apply to any particular building or rented land ot any class of building or rented lands.\n\nPursuat to this power,; the State. Government was notifyin, g exmptions. from time to e during a period of 2,0 years, the :first notification it appears having been issued on G the 8th March 1951 which exemp!P.., d buildings constructed in\n\n1951 and 1952 from the provisions of the Act for a period of S years with effect from the date of completion of any such build ing.\n\nThereafter followed . several notifications which exempted buildings constructed in each of the years after 19$2. The\n\nnotification with which we are now concerned was issued on\n\n30-7-1965 and is in the following terms:.:.._:_ H ·\" . . . . In exercise of the powers conferred by .&ec~ tion 3 of the Punjab Urban Re.nt Restri~ion Act 19.4~\n\nand aU other powers enablin~ hi.m: in this behalf, tho . ' 13-L1061 Sup. C I/72\n\n• 926\n\nSUPREME .CQVRT REPORTS . [1972] 3 s.s.R.\n\nGoyerrlor of Punjab is pleased to direct that the provi A sions of section 13 of the said Act shall not apply .in respect of decrees for e.iectment of tenants in possession of building which satisfy the following conditions, namely:- ·\n\n(a) Bildings constructed during the years 1959, B .1960, 1961, 1962 and 1963 are exempted from\n\nall the provisions .of the said Act for a period of five years to be calculated from the dates of their completion. and\n\n(b) During the aforesaid period of exemption suit~\n\nfor eiectment of tenants in possession of 'those c buildings were or are instituted in civi} t:ourts by the landlords against the tenants and decrees\n\nof ejectment were or are passed\".\n\nUnder the above notification, the provisions of section 13 are made inapplicable to decrees in respect of buildings constructed during the years specified in (a) for a period of 5 years to be cal culated from the dates of their completion provided during the said period uits had been institU'ted by the landlords against the tenants.\n\nThere is no doubt, from the facts set out above, the building in respect of which exemption from the application of section 13 is being claimed, was comple'ted in March 1960 and a suit had also been filed on 14th January 1963 before the ex~ picy of the period of 5 years from that date. It is contended by the learned Advocate for the appellant that the decree in that suit having been passed on 14th August 1969 after the period of 5 years from the date of construction, the exemption from the restrictions placed by section 13 will not be available, because according to him not only the suit shouldbe filed but the decree for eviction should be obtained within the said period of 5 years.\n\nThis conten1ion on the very face of it would lead to incongruity m: would, if accepted, have the effect of nullifying the very purpose for which the exemption was being given.\n\nWe were reminded wit)J a somewhat emphatic assertion what appears to us\n\nto b; e unexceptional that the Courts are not concerned with J:he\n\npolicy, of the legislature or with the result, whether injurious of G otherwise, by giving effect to the language used nor is it the func~\n\ntion of the Court where the meaning is .clear not to give effeot to it merely because it would lead to hardship. It cannot, however, be gainsaid that one of the duties imposed on the Courts in interpreting a particular provision of law. rule or notification is to ascertain the meaning and intendment of t.hte legislature or of 'the delegate, which in exercise of the powers conferred ori it; has made the rule or notification in question. In doing so, we must always presume that rthe impugned provision was designed to\n\n~RM A:MAR NATH V, TEl: CHAND(Jaganmdum Reddy, J.) .~27\n\nA effectlfate a particular object or tb 'il)eet a particular requirement\n\nand not that it was intended tt6 negative that which it sought to achieve. It is clear that the Government intended to grant certain i.ti.ducements to J)ersons who had the means to construct\n\nbuildings by exempting any such . building so constructed tor a period o~ 5 years. . The period of 5 yers. could commence from the date of construction or from some other date. Initially, as the earlier notifications would show,. that exemption of 5 years was given from the d:ate when the building was constructed but by the impugned notification it was intend.ed to confer the benefrt . by giving exemption of 5 years from a subsequent datr.!, namely, the date of the institution of a suit, provided it was instituted within a period of 5 years from the date of the eonstruction of C the building. A closer reading of the notification would show\n\nthat. it was intended to clarify and provide a workable solution in\n\nrespect of building constructed in 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962 and\n\n1963. These buildings had already ben exempted from the provisions of section 13 by two earlier notifications, the first one in\n\n1960 givin, g exemption upto 31-12-1963 and the seond. iq 1963 D for 5 years from the date of completion of the building. It is\n\nclear from the language of the notification that , what is exempted is . the decree for ejectment of a tenant from ihe applicartion of se£:tion 13. The very purpose of exemption of buildings from the operation of s.ection 13 was to , give landlords the rights which a~\n\nowners of buildings they had under the ordinary law, namely, to E give them on lease at rents which they thought were remunerative and to evict tenants during th1tf period without any fetters imposed\n\n. by the Act. If no provision was made for exempting such decree:;\n\nin respect of the exempted buildings, the exemption granted will be illusory, Clause (b), therelore, provided for the time during which th~ suit in which the. decree has been passed should be filed. The decrees pasSed in such suits will be executable free from the fetters imposed by section.13 of the Act. It is obvious that the filin, g of a suit by itself does not confer any exemption because what is exempted from the provisions of seotion 13 is the decree; A suit filed, 'therefore, must end in a decree though that decree may be passed subsequent to the expiry of the 5 years' period during .hich exemption from the application of section 13 G has been granted. ·\n\nThe leamed Advoca1e for the respondent has suggested 3 construction which is consistent witfu our reading of th~ notification and that is that the. words 'were' or 'are' used in clause (b) both in respect of the filing of the suits and tthe passing of the decrees would indicate that 'these suits should have been filed or are hereafter to be filed and likewise decrees of ejectment had been passed or are hereafter to be passed. In other words, the suns must have been already filed during the period of emption\n\nSUPREME. COURT REPORTS.\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nor are to be instituted during such period.\n\nThis language had to be used because 'the 5 years' exemption in respect of the buildings constructed in 1959 would end in 1964 while the notification was issued in 1965. There is no question of suits being filed in respect of these buildings hereafter, as such decrees in suits filed before 1964 would be exempted. In respect of the buildings constructed in 1960, !there would be some buildings in res- B pect of which the five years' exemption period would have expired before the notification and, therefore. the suits in respect of such buildings during the relevant period in 1960 should have b.een. filed before that period expired and where the exemption expires after the notification, suits could be filed thereafter but before the exemption exnires. In respect of 1961, 1962 and 1963 there is C of course no difficulty because there is sufficient period for filing suits if they had not been filed by the time the notification was. issued.\n\nTaking the typical case of a building constructed in 1961, the period of 5 years' exemption would expire in 1966 and under the first part of clause (b) it would be open to the lap.dlord to file a suit for ejectment even on the last day of 'the expiry of the 5 years' exemption. If so, it would be absurd to postulate D that a decree would be 11; iven immediatey thereafter, as tht would be the result, if the contention that both the suit and me decree should be passed within rthe period of exemption, is accepted. This could not have been th.e intention of the Oovemment in publishing the notification under section 3.\n\n~ E It is clear to our minds, as it was to the High Court that under clause (b) the filing of the suit within th~ period of exemption is the only condition that is necessary tp sa~fy one of the requirements of the exemption, the other requirement being the passing of the decree in respect of which no time has been prescribed. If the decree, as contended by the learned Advocate for the appellant, has to be obtained withirl the period of 5 years, F there was no need to specify that the .suit had to be filed wiihin that period because the exemption from the requrements of section 13 is only in respect of the decree and not the uit There\n\nws. therefore, no need to mentiotl about the time of the filing of the suit.\n\nIn the view we have taken, the construction placed by the G High Court is the only construction '!hat is possible on the language of the notification. This appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 37, "entities": [{"text": "FetMS AMAR NATH BASHESHAR DASS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "FIRMS AMAR NATH BASHESHAR DASS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. Jagamnoban Reddy", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Rtlll Rtrriction Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 597, "end_char": 607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rtlll Rtrriction Act, 1949", "statute": "Rtlll Rtrriction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 620, "end_char": 629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rtlll Rtrriction Act, 1949", "statute": "Rtlll Rtrriction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1511, "end_char": 1521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1803, "end_char": 1807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "TEK CHAND", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3241, "end_char": 3250, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TEK CHAND", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Jaganmohan Reddy,/", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3252, "end_char": 3270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i I\n\nFlRM AMAR NATH v. TEK CHAND (Jaganmohan Reddy,/,) W~J\n\nA A statu:e rnust: be JntiJ~ete?", "canonical_name": "P. Jagamnoban Reddy"}}, {"text": "M. C. Chag'la", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4063, "end_char": 4076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag'la, V. C. Mahajan, S. K. Mehta K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "V. C. Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4078, "end_char": 4091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag'la, V. C. Mahajan, S. K. Mehta K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4093, "end_char": 4116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag'la, V. C. Mahajan, S. K. Mehta K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. R. Nagaraja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4121, "end_char": 4135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag'la, V. C. Mahajan, S. K. Mehta K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4157, "end_char": 4171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, 0."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4190, "end_char": 4203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c. Mathur, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4208, "end_char": 4223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c. Mathur, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. Jagamnoban Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4292, "end_char": 4311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D The Judgment of 'the Court was delivered by P. Jagamnoban Reddy, .", "canonical_name": "P. Jagamnoban Reddy"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4779, "end_char": 4788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4796, "end_char": 4834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": ".Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6344, "end_char": 6358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In some of the States, such as in .Uttar Pradesh, civil courts were allowed to entertain eviotion suits but subject to prior leave being obtain from the District Magistrate."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6970, "end_char": 6975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These restriotions could not, however, serve as a panacea for solvin~ the accommodation problem in urban cities consequent on tht ptrenoroenal migration of population into thos~ areas which was further aggravated by large scale exodUs due to the partition of India."}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7807, "end_char": 7817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8186, "end_char": 8196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8204, "end_char": 8242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jaganmohan Reddy,/.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8727, "end_char": 8746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "oo the building or\n\nFIRM AMAR NATH v., TBK CHAND (Jaganmohan Reddy,/.) 92S\n\nrented land and if the Conrtroller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application : ·\n\nProvided that the ContfQiler may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possio.n\n\nof the building or rented land and may exttend such time so as not to exceed three months in the aggreate.", "canonical_name": "P. Jagamnoban Reddy"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10970, "end_char": 10980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11643, "end_char": 11653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12047, "end_char": 12057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14th January 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12139, "end_char": 12156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no doubt, from the facts set out above, the building in respect of which exemption from the application of section 13 is being claimed, was comple'ted in March 1960 and a suit had also been filed on 14th January 1963 before the ex~ picy of the period of 5 years from that date."}}, {"text": "14th August 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12327, "end_char": 12343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is contended by the learned Advocate for the appellant that the decree in that suit having been passed on 14th August 1969 after the period of 5 years from the date of construction, the exemption from the restrictions placed by section 13 will not be available, because according to him not only the suit shouldbe filed but the decree for eviction should be obtained within the said period of 5 years."}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12449, "end_char": 12459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CHAND(Jaganmdum Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13626, "end_char": 13647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In doing so, we must always presume that rthe impugned provision was designed to\n\n~RM A:MAR NATH V, TEl: CHAND(Jaganmdum Reddy, J.) .~27\n\nA effectlfate a particular object or tb 'il)eet a particular requirement\n\nand not that it was intended tt6 negative that which it sought to achieve."}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14776, "end_char": 14786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16141, "end_char": 16151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18336, "end_char": 18345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18924, "end_char": 18934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_929_947_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "BOMBAY GAS CO. LTD.\n\nJAGAN NATH PANDURANG AND ORS.\n\nMarch 22, 1972\n\n[C. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND I. D. DuA, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, 1950-Article 133( 1)(b)-$cope-Appeals -Certificate to dppoeal to Supreme Court.\n\nIn order to attract article 133(1)(b) the essential requirement is that there must be involved in the appeal to this Court a claim or question respecting property of the value of not less than Rs. 20,000/- in addition to or other than the subject matter 0f the dispute; if there i9 no question or claim raised respecting property other •.han the subject matter, then, clause (a) of article 13 3 will apply. Adding future interest or possible further claims to the original value of the subject matter till the date of the judgment of the High Court and which items are not the subject of consideration by the High Court .will not enable a party to plead that the claim so calculated exceeds Rs. 20,000. {~40 OJ\n\nThe respondent had filed applications under the 'Payment of Wages Act 1948, claiming overtime wages for the period 1957 to 1958 and wages for weekly off days for the period 1962 to 19·63.\n\nAgainst the judgment of the High Court setting aside the order of the appellate authority holding the claim as time barred, the appellants filled appeal to this C(}urt on the basis of a certificate issued by the High Court under article 133 (l ){b). In its application before the High Court the appellant had prayed for the grant of a certificate that the amount or value of the subject matter before all the authorities, in the appeals, as well as in the High Court and still in dispute in the proposed appeal to this Court was Rs. 20,000/- and upwards, and, in the alternative on the\n\nround that the ce was fit one for appeal to this Court. On the basis of the claims made by the workmen as overtime wages and weakly off days was for the particular periods, the appellant had calculated at the same rate for subsequent periods till the judgment of the High Court and claimed that the amount or value in dispute in appeal to this Court was ove-r Rs. 20,000/-. The appellant had also urged that it would have\n\nto meet in future also claims from its workmen and, as such, it will have to face a recurring IiabiHty. On this basis the apPellant had raised the plea that the judgment of the High Court involved directly or in~ directly a claim or a question in respect of prc>perty of the value of Rs. 20,000/- and more.\n\nThe respondents moved this Court for revocation of the Certificate. 'Illey urged that what weighed with the High Court 'for granting a ce-rtificate under article 133 (1 )(b) was the circumstance that the nature cf\n\nthe demands by the workmen were such as they wete l'Jcurring claim arising in the future also and as such the final judgment and order of the High Court involved , directly or indirectly a claim respecting property of the value not less than Rs. 20,000/. and that this view of the High Court was erroneous.\n\nHELD :that the certificate issued by the. High Court under article 133 ( 1) (b) was not proper and valid and hence the appeal was unsu~ tainable. ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS.\n\n(1972} 3 S.C.IL\n\n(i) The High Court bas not given any ipdication as to bow it issued the certificate under article 133(1)(b): it is clear that it did not grant the certifkat.e on the claim made by the appellant, under clause (a) or clause (c) of article 133(1), [937 Al\n\n(ii) In view of the fact that the High Court granted the certificate under .article 13 3 (1 )(b) , it has to be presumed that it has accepted the appellant's plea that a certificate could be granted under the clause when there is a recurring liability, which, if calculated 'for subsequent years, will be Rs. 20;000; .. or more. {1937 CD]\n\n(iii) But, the present case is not one where the decision of the High Court, apart from dealing with. the subject matter in dispute before it, has the effect cJf affecting. the rights of the appellant regarding other properties, including money. The judgment of. the High Court bas. only adjudicated upon the subject matter of the specified claim of the work~ men which was for a particular period. The 'judgment does not involve directly or indirectly, 3-?art . from the subject matter of the writ petition, any claim or question respecting property or money of the value of Rs. 20,000/~ and more.\n\nThe appellant was not entitled to notionally add, to the- . amount originally claimed by the workmen for particular periods any further AUnOUiltSI on the ground that they must be nsidered to have accrued due to the workmen till the date of the judgment of the High Court. (.945 E, 946 E]\n\n(:haitarmal v. M/s. Pannallal Chandulal, [19651 2 S.C.R. 751, applied'.\n\nA. V. Subramania Ayyar v. Sellammal, I.L. R. 39 Madras 843, Meghji Lakhamshi an'd Brothers v. Furniture Workshop, £19541 Appeals Cases 80; Smt. Rajah Kishore Devigaru v. Bhaskara Gouta Chorani and others, A. I. R. 1960 A. P. 286; Commissioner oJ Income-tax; Madras v.\n\nS. L. Mathias, A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 352; G. Appuswamy Chettiar and another v. R. Sarangapani Chettiar and orhers, [1965] (1) l.LR.\n\nMad. 361: Moti Chand and others v. Ganga Parshad Singh and another, 29 Indian Appeals 40 and Surapati Roy and others v. Ram Narayan Mukherji and others, 50 LA. 155, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 158 of 1968. . .\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Order dated February 6, 1967 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1987 of .1965. .\n\nWITH Civil Misce.l!ilneous eiition No. 1300 of 1972.\n\n(Application by the Respondemts for revocation of certificate granted by the High Court.) G Soil Sorabji, K. D. Mehta, P. C. Bhariari and 0 .. C. Mathur for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Bhandare, Sunanda Bhandare and K. Rajendra Chowdhary, for respondents Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5,' 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 95, 96,\n\n98. 100, 101 to 104 ad 108. .\n\nThe.Judgment of the, Court was delivered by H Vaidtalingam, J.\n\nTis ppeal~ on certificate, by the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd., is directed against the judgment and order dated\n\nBOMBAY GAS CO. v. JAGAN NATH (Vaidia/ingam, J.) . 931\n\nFebruary 6, 1967 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1987 of 1965.\n\nTh~ High Court set aside the decision of the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, in Payment of Wages Appeals Nos. 162 and 163 of 1962 and remanded the 'proceedings to the Aqditional Authority for calculating and awarding over-time wages that may be due to the responden~· Nos. 1 to 80 herein.\n\nThe High Court further reversed the decision of the Court of Small\n\nCauses, Bombay, in Payment of Wages Appeal No. 61 of 1963 and restored the orders passed by the Third Additional Authority in favour of the respondents Nos. 81 to 118 herein, regarding their right to get wages for weekly off days. C.M.P. No. 1300 of 1972 is an application filed ~Y the respondents in the civil appeal for C revoking the certificate for leave to appeal to this Court granted by the High Court to t; Qe appellant herein.\n\nWe will-briefly state the circumstances under which the appeal has co111.e to this c;::ourt on certificate : The respondents Nos. I to 14 who \\\\ere employed under the appellant as Syphon Pumpers filed on March 3, 1958 before the Additional Authority 14 ap- D plicatioris under s. 15-of the Payment of Wages Act (hereinafter to be referred as the Act) claiming over-time wages for the period February 1957 to January, 1958. On the same date the respondents Nos. 15 to 80, wf.lo were employed under the appellant as Mains workers filed before the same Authority 66 applications\n\nclaiming over-time wages for the same period.\n\nThe claim was E substantially based under the provisions of the Bombay Shops and Establishments ACt, 1948 {hereinafter to be referred as tihe Establishments Act). The appellant raised two grounds of defence: (a) The claims were barr~ by the Award, Part 1I of the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay dated March 30, 1950 in Reference (IT) No .. 54 of 1949; and (b). l'he applicants were not workmen covered by the Establishments Act. On October 13, 1962, the Additional F Authority held that the Award, referred to, by the Company was no bar to the said employees claiming over-time wages.\n\nBut the said Authority accept~ the contion of the Company that the applicants are not cover~ by the Estalishments Act, which gives them the benefit of weekJy off days with waes under s. 18(3 ). In this view the applications filed by the respondentls Nos. 1 to 80 G herein were dismissed. J'he said applicants filed before the: Court ·\n\nof Small Causes. Bombay, which was the J\\.ppellate Authority, Payme11t of Wages Appeals Nos. 162 and 163 of 1962 challenging the decision dated OctQber 13, 1962 of the. Additional Authoricy,\n\ndismissing their applications. ·\n\nH During the years 1962-63, the respondents Nos. 81 to 118 herein, in the Civil Aj:>peal filed 38 applications before. the. Third Additional Authority under s. 15 of the Act claiming wages, for weekly . off. days.\n\nTh~ said respondents were working ¥t Mains,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 s.c.R.\n\nHeating Appliances and Fitting Departments of the appellant.\n\nA ii.ere again, the basis of the claim was under the provisions of the Establishments Act. The appellant raised the same two defences as in respect of the claim for overtime wages. The Third Addi~ tional Authority, by its judgment dated April 26, 1963, held that the Award, Part II of the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, dated March 30, 1950 in Reference (IT) No. 54 of 1949 is no bar to B entertain the appliations of the said employees. The said authority further held that the district office in which the said applicants were employed is a \"Commercial Establishment\" under the Establishments Act and as such they were entitled to wage}. for weekly off days under s. 18(3) of the said Act. Accordingly, the said authority directed the appellant to pay the amounts mentioned in C the judgment to respondents Nos. 81 ro 118 and also to pay certain amount by way of cgmpensation. The appellant filed Payment of Wages Appeal No. 61 of 1963 before the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, which was the Appellate Authority, challenging the decision of the Third Additlional Authority dated April 26, 1963 re.· garding payment of wages for weekly off days.\n\nAll the three appals_, namely, Payment of Wages Appeals Nos. 162 and 163 of 1962 telating to over-time wages, filed by the res- ' portdents Nos. 1 to 80, and Payment of Wages Appeal No. 61\n\nof 1963 filed by the Company relating to wages for weekly off days decreased to respondent~ Nos. 81 to 118 were heard together and disposed of by a common judgment dated February 11, 1965 by E the Appellate Authority, the Court of Small Causes, Bombay. It was held that the claims of all the workmen for over-time wages and wages for weekly off days were barred by the Award, Part II dated March 30, 1950 _of the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, in Reference (IT) No. 54 of 1949 and that the said award was still in force and binding on the parties.\n\nAccordingly, the Payment of Wages Appeals os. 162 and 163 of 1962 were dismissed and F Payment of Wages Appeal No. 61 of 1963. was allowed. Theresult was that the apQ!ications filed by the employees before the Additional Authority and the Third Additional Authority stood dismissed.\n\nIt must, however, 1:le stated that though the Appellate Authority, G the Court of Small Causes, Bombay held that the claims of all the workmen, both for over-time wages and weekly off days wages were barred by the Award, nevertheless it also considered the questlion whether the workmen are employed in a \"Commercial Establishment'' so as to claim relief under the Establishments Act.\n\nThe\n\nAppellat~ Author.ity. held that the district office of the Company H tJ:ough sJtu.ated wtthm the compound ?f the factory is a \"Commer- . cu'll Estabhshment\" under the Estabbshments. Act. Accordingly, the. Court of Small Causes agreed with the finding of the Third\n\nBOMBAY GAS CO, V. JAGAN NATH (Vaidia/ingam, J.) 933\n\nAdditional Authority that the workmen were governed by the provisions of the Establishments Act and as such are entitled to the benefit conferred on them by that Act. However, in view of the fact that the claims of all the workmen were held to be barred in view of the award m Refence (IT) No. 54 of 1949, the workmen's appeals were dismissed and the appeal filed by the Company was allowed.\n\nA~ stated earlier, the decision of the Court of Small Causes resulted in the dismissa~ of all the applications filed by the workmen before both the Additional Authority and the Third Additional Authority.\n\nAll the 118 workmen filed before the Bombay High Court, Special Civil Applicatiq_n, No. 1987 of 1965 under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution for quashing the judgment of the Court ot Small Causes, Bombay; dated February 11, 1965. By its judg ment and order dated February 6, 1967, the High Court held that neither the claim of the respondents Nos. 1 to 80 for over-time wages, nor the claim of the respondents Nos. 81 to 118 for wages\n\nfor wkly off days Wa§ barred by the Award, Part II, dated March 30, 1950 in Reference (IT) No. 54 of 1949. So far as the respond ents Nos. 1 to 80 were concerned, the High Court! has set aside the judgment of t.Qe Court of Small Causes, BombayJ as well as the order dated October 13, 1962 of the Additional Authority and remanded their applcations to the latter for -ascertaining and decreasing the amount _of over-time wages that may be due to them.\n\nRegarding the respondents Nos. 81 to 118, the High Court has set aside the judgment of the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, and restored tlie order dated April 26, 1963 of the Third Additional Authority recognising their claim for wages for weekly off days.\n\nIt is seen from the judgment of the High Court that the Company did not challenge the finding of the Court of Small Causes that the workmen are employed jn a \"Commercial Estab1ishment\" and as such are entitled to the benefitS of the provisions of the Establish ments Act. The High Court has also stated that the reason given by the counsel appearing for the Company for not challenging that :fincling was 11h.at it was not open to the Company, which was a respondent in the writ petition to challenge the said finding in those proceedings. Therefore, 'the High Court has adjudicated upon the only question whether the Award bars the claims of the workmen I$ held by the Court -~ Stnall Causes. On this point, as pointed\n\nout~ earlier, the High Court disagreed with the decision of the Coun of Small Causes.\n\nthe appellant filed on April 6, 1967 in the High Court Appli~ caUOit No. 869 of 1967 praying for the grant of a certificate of\n\nfi~~~ to enable it to appeal to this Court In the applicatiOn. of the appellant, after setting out the nature of the applications filed before\n\nSUPREME cOURT REI'ORTS\n\n(1972) S.C.R..\n\nAdd't' al and Third Additional Authoriti:s, the amount~; A the I 1on · f th d tw A th · claimed by the workmen, . the decision o e sa1 o u ontJes 11 as the judgmen~ and order of the Court of Small Causes,. dwfue High Court, it was stated a~ th~ amount or vue of the subject matter before all the Authontles, m e appeals, as well as m the Hioh Court and still in dispute in the prop, osed appeal to this\n\nCourt, was Rs. 20,000 !l:lld upwards. It further tated at in B any event the case is a fit one for appeal to s Court. Accordmgly, the appellant prayed for the grant of certifiate ~~ the amun_t or value of the subject matter irl the srud Spec1at C1vil Applicauon, applications before the Additional and Third Additional Authorities, in the appeals before the Court of Small Causes and in dispute in the proposed appeal to-this Court was.Rs. 20,0~ and upwards or. in the alternative oa .the ground that the case IS a fit one for C. appeal to this Court.\n\n It 'will be seen, that thbugh the appellant did not specify under which clause of Art: 133(1) the certificate was asked for, neverth~ less a Pe-rusal of tJ:le.avcijnents made in the Petition and the prayers\n\nmade therein show that the appellant was asking for a certificate p\n\nunder clauses (a) and, or (c) of Art. 133(1). The High Court after hearing all parties, by i1s order dated Octpber 19, 1967 directed a certificate to issue under .Art. 133(l)(b) of.the Constitution. On the basis of the said ce_ttifica~. th~ petition of. appeal has been lodg.:. ed. by the appellant in this_ Co~ .. 6n December 16, 1967.\n\nThe respondent bas.filed C.M.P. No. 1300 of 1972 requesting E this Court to revoke th~ certifieate gtanted to ihe appellant by the High <;:ourt on October 19, 1967. If the c<; tificate is re-voked. that will result in our holding that the appeal is not compet.en~.\n\nHence we will deal with the application for revocation of the certificate. ·\n\nIn the affidavit filed in support of the application for revocation, Itt folowi.ng averments are rna~ i The appeal refers to two sets of. ~~ which are separate and independent of each other- ODCJ for over-time wages -and the other for wages for weeklv off days:··111e applications in respect of these two different claims . filed by the concerned workmen before two different Autht>- ntsn. ur the Act and were also disposed of separately by those G A\\ltbontu:s. Separate appeals were preferred before the Court of .\n\nSmall Causes. . Though a common judgment was delive-red by the oarN>f Small Causes, the two sets of cla.ims have been dealt with .\n\nmdc::pendetly. and parutcly in the: judi!ment. as there were sepa~ . rate and d1ffcrent appeals. The claim for wkly off days wages com~ oaJy t£1, Rs. 661~ and that was the value of the subject H matter .before the Thud .Additional Authority and in: the apPeal bdure the! .Crt of Small Caus~ as wen p. in tho wnt petition bdore the H1gh CoUrt. Tho same is-. thevalue of tho..suhjed\n\nBOMBAY GAS co. v. JAGAN NATH CV.aidialingam, J.) 935\n\nA matter of the appeal to this Court. The value of the subjec~ mattoc\n\nof the' claim in: respect of over-tlime wages was only Rs. 10660 before the Additional Authority and in the appeals before the Court of Small Causes, i!). the High Court, as well as in the appeal . before this Court! Th.e value of the subject matter of neither of the two separate and distinct claims is Rs. 20,000; and even if B both the claims.are added, tqe value of the subject matter is less\n\nthan Rs. 20,000. ltwas, in view of this circumstance, that the High Court did n:ot grant a cetificate under Art.133(1)(a).\n\nThe High Court diq not consider the case as a fit one for appeal to this Court, and hence no <;:er; tificate was granted under Art.133(1)(c). What has weighed with the High Court in granting a certificate under Art.133(1)(b} is the circumstance that the nature ofthe C. demands made by the workmen were such that they e recuning\n\nclaims arising in the future also and as such the final \\udgment and order in the writ petition involve directly .or indirectly a claim respecting property of the value of not less than Rs. 20,000. This: view of the High Couri is erroneous and contrary to the decisions of this Courtd as such the grant ofcertificate by the High Court D iserroneQus.\n\nAlong with the application, the respondents havejiled a stat-· ment to show that the value of the subject matter of the laim re-· garding over-time wages does not exceed Rs. 1Q660.\n\nAt this stage it may be mentioned that according to the appellant this schedule deals only with the claims made by the Mains workers and' E it does not include the amount cJaimed by the 14 Syphon Pumpers.\n\nOn behalf of the am_>ellant, an affidavit has been filr-<1 opposing the application for revocation of the certificate.\n\nIn this affidavit the averments made ar~ as follows. : Though the appeal has beenpending in this Court f()r a considerable time, llhe respondents have F filed the application for revocation ofthe certificate only when the appeal was about to be heard. It is pointed out that the res-· pondents opposed before the High Coun the application for grant of certificate .on the groWJ, d:that the. am.egate 'of all claw..& l'Ut together ; amounts only tn''!Rs,.17678.80 P,,:·:d hence .no certifi. cate s&o.uldbe granted .... ,'; f.he; appellant had:· filed a rejoinder giving details :regarding the: vahio-Of: the subject~ matter of (he appeal G to this Coutt.\n\nAs per the particulars given therein, :the .value :of the subjeCt niatter of theentire claim in ~.spect of over.., time:wages, weekly'off.days wagesarul.compensation. iS of the .. value' of Rs,.26822.<W.\n\nTherefui~·, the ainountor value of.the subject matter in dispute in the ·court of the. firSt insra.nce and still in dis-· pute.in the appeal is Rs: 26822.09, w)lichiswell over the.prescrib- H ed limit of: .. Rs.: 20,000. ·.·:The claim, for weel<ly off days wages at the rate. claimed by the~:workmen on the date of the judgment or the High ,(OOuh,. that i.~ February.6, l96l.became.crystalised in,\n\ntbe:ate .amorin• of; over Rs. 30~000. : :Sitiillar1y, the' claim:\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nfor over time wages as a result, and effect or the judgmeht of the A High Court, as on the date of the decision in the writ petition, also exceeds the sum of Rs. 20,000.\n\nThe respondents raised a contrcr versy regarding the all!..OUnt or value of the subject matter in dis pute before the High Court in applicationNo. 869 of 1967.\n\nBut, inasmuch as the recurring claims of both weekly off days wages and overtime wages, at the time of the High Court's judgment in B the writ J}etition on February 6, 1967, had crystalised into amounts exceeding Rs. 20,000, __ the High Court issued the certificate under\n\nArt: 13 3 ( 1 )(b) and that the certificate so issued under the said Article is perfectly valid;\n\nWe have set out faJrly elaborately the claim made by the respondents in C.M.P. No. 1300 of 1972 for revoking the certificate c granted by the High Court as well asthe defence pleaded by the appellant to that. appijation. In itfS application before the High Court, the appellant did not specify under what clause of Art. 133 (1) the certificate was prayed for. But froni the material aver ment!l made by .the appellant in its application before the High Court for grant of certificate, it is to be gathered that the prayer J) was substantially on tho ground that the amount or value of the subject matter of the applications befo~ the' Payment of Wages Authorities, in the appeals before the Court of Small Causes, in the writ petition before the High Court and still in dispute in the proposed appeal to this Court was Rs. 20,000/ and upwards ..\n\nThis prayer will bring the applicaWm under Art. 13 3 (1 ) (a).\n\nIn the alternative, the certificate was prayed for on the ground .E that the case is fit one for appeal to this Court. This prayer will eome under Art. 133(l)(c). The request of the appellant for grant of certificate on the above basis was opposed .by the respondents herein on the ground that the amount or value of the subject matter before all the Authorities, the Court of Small Causes, the High Court and in dispute in the proposed appeal before this Court :t was far below Rs. 20,000/. and as such the matter does not come under Art. 133(1)(a). It was also averred that. there w:as no substantial question of law of any great importance arose for consideration so as to attract Art. 13 3 ( 1 )(c).\n\nAfter givjng .details l'Cgarding the nature of the claims made by the workmen, boh as over-time wages and weekly off days wages, it was stated that !he G -claim 'fell far short of the sum of Rs. 20,000/ ·.\n\nAs the H1gh Court had only adjudicated upon that claim in the wri~ petition. the respondents pleaded tht the judgment of the High Court doe~\n\nnot involve directly or. indirectly any claim r question respecting property of the value of .Rs. 20,000/ • or more. - The High Court on October 19, 1967 granted the ceiti&ate 1n tht following terms .: _ - \"Cer~ to lSsue under Att. 135 ( i)(b) of the\"C<:m!\n\nII . stitutiQtt. Costs in the Supreme Court appeal.\" ' · ·\n\nBOMBAY GAS co. v. JAGAN NATH (Vaidialingam, 1.) 937-·\n\n/ '\n\nA From the above it )Vill be seen that the High Col!rt has not giVen any indication as to how it issued the certificate under Art. l33(1)(b). But one thing is clear that it did not grant the certi~ ncate on the basis of th~ claim made by the appellant either under\n\n~1. (a) or cl. (c) of Art. 133(1). On the basis of the claims made\n\nby the workmen as over-time wages and weekly off days wages for B the particular periods, the appllant had calculated at the same rate\n\nfor even subsequent periods till the qate of the judgment of the High Court and claimed that the amount or value in dispute in appeal to this Court is over Rs. 26822.09 p.\n\nThe....appellant had also raised a point in its further affidavit before the High Court that it will have to meet in future also claims from its workmen C and as such it will have to face a recurring liability.\n\nOn this basis the appellant has raised a plea tat the judgment of the High\n\nCourt involves directly or indirectly a claim or question respecting property of the value of Rs. 20,000/ - and more. In view of the fact that the High Court has granted the certificate under Art. 133(1)(b), it has to be presumed that it has accepted the appelHmt's plea that a certificate could be~ granted under the said clause when 0 there is a recurring liability, which, if calculated for subsequent years will be at least Rs. 20,000/- and more. The question is whether under circumstance& the certificate granted under Art. 133(1)(b) by the Hig, h-Court,, is proper and valid. ·\n\nIt is significant to note that in paragraph 7 of the petitl.on of E appeal filed in this Court, the appellant has statd that it is Jil)t\n\npossible to estimate at a money value the subject matter of dispute in the appeal. Accordingly, it has paid. only a fued court fee of\n\nRs. 250/- as per the rules.\n\nIn the claim statement filed by the appellant before the High Court, it has stated tat Rs. 6675.84 is claimed as weekly off wages bv t:lJ.e respondents Nos. 80 to 11~\n\nand a sum of Rs. 18221.25 is claimed by the respondents Nos. 1 F to 80 as over-time wages.. Thesv two different claims were not consolidated before the Authorities because the claim for weekly off wages was dealt with by the Third Additional Authority and the claim for over-time wages. ws dealt y.rith by the Additional Authority. ·\n\nG According to the Union the claim for ovr-time wages dC>es not exceed Rs. 10660/-. But it is not neooss~ for us to go furthe~ into this aspect as Art.· 133(1)(a) is out of the picture .. . . ' The appellant, relying on the calculat~(>n . filed by it bef9re the High Court, has further stated in its affidavit dated Febrqary 18, H 1972, tiled in opposition to tn~ application for revocation, that on thtl basi~ of the elaim for weekly Qft wages in the sum. of Rs. 6675;84 p,. for one yar. if cal<; ula, ta for Jbe sueqnt years upto February 6, 1967-, tm date of tiw. judgment of the Htgb. Co-qrt ..\n\n93S\n\n\n. (197'2J3S.C.R.\n\nthe amount will aggragate nearly Rs. 30,000/-. S'unilarly'; in res- A pect. of over-time wage§, on. the basis. of the .claim made by tl_ie workmen, if calculated upto February 6, 1967, the amount Will exceed the sum of Rs. 20,000./-.. It will be seen that if the claims made before each of .the_Autorities for the particular periods aloj}e are taken into account, the total cla!ms Will be less than Rs. 20,000/-.\n\nIt is really that claim hch was the subject of consideration by the B High Court in the writ petit, ion. Is it open to. the appellant to add to the original claim made by the workmen, the further amount calculated by it till the .date of the judgment of e High Court: and establish that as the total amount so arrived at is not less than Rs. 20,000/-, Art. 133(l)(b) can be invoked on the ground that the judgment of the High Court directly or indirectly involves a c claim in respect of property of the value of not 1ess than Rs. 20,000 1-?\n\nEven on the basis of the valuation worked out by the appellant, it is seen that the claim for over-time wages which was filed befor:e the Additional Authority was valued only at Rs, 18221.25 p. as per the amended claim at 1 J times of wages, though according to the respondents the amo_gnt of claiin does not exceed Rs. 10660/-.\n\nSimilarly, the claim for weekly off wages filed by another set, of workmen before the Third Additional Authority, even as per the appellant's calculation was only Rs~ 6675.a4 p.\n\nThe claim for over-time wages and weekly off wages, each of them takes separately does not exceed Rs. 20,000/-.\n\nThough the appeals against the decision of the two Authorities were filed before the Court of Small Causes, it is to be not~ that separate appeals were filed by different workmen and the appellant in r~_pect of these two different categories of claims. Though the Court of Small Causes disposed of\n\nall the appeals by a eommon judgment, nevertheless the claim in respect of over-time wap; es -was dealt with apart and different from y the. claim for weekly off wages.\n\nEven before the High Court, though one writ petitiQn. was tiled by all the workmen,-the claims un:der two different headS for -OVer time wageS and weekly off wages\n\nwer~. dealt with parately by the .High .Court. It is not as if that the reasons given by the High Court for upholding the claims for ov~ -time wages automatically resulted in the allowing of the claim for_ weekly off wages alo. In fact entirely different considerations G apply for the two different sets of claims and that has been kept in view by the High Court. Though, ultimately, the High Court has delivered only a common judgment,· nevertheless the decision\n\nrelat~ to two differen(sets of claims each having nothing in common with the other. . ~'Therefore, it was not open f.o the appellant to ask this Court to prpceed on the basis that there was only one single :l!ld common claim dealt with by the 'High Court in itS j'udg~ ment. Therefore, there was no question of any consolidation of all the claims before the High Court .. ·· In this view it Wilfbe seen\n\nBOMBAY GAS CO. V • .JAGAN NATH (Vaidialingam, J.) 939\n\nA that even according to e. calculations made by the appellant, the value of the subject mt4:r of the ch:i.im with respect to over-time wages cail. only be the.sru.ne as was before the Additional Authority, namely, Rs. 18221.25 p: which is less than Rs. ~0,000/-. Similarly, the amount or value of tl}e claimwhich was adjudicated upon by the. High Court in respect of weekly off wages was also of the B same value as Rs. 6675.84 p. as was the case before the Third Additional Authority, which-d\"aim is also less than Rs; 20,000/-.\n\nTherefore, considering the matter from this point of . view, it is clear that the value of tihe subject matter of the claim before the High Court in respt of each of these matters was less: than Rs. 20,000/-.\n\nC The appellant, as mentioned earlier, has calculated at the same rate as cJaimed for over-time wages and weekly wages. for subsequent years upto the date of the _judgment of the High Court and has stated that so calculated the amount or value of the subject matter of the claim relating-- to weekly off wage~ exceeds Rs. 30,000/-. Similarly, the amount or value of the subject matter D of the claim of over-time wages exceeds s. 20,000/- and hence it is stated that the judgment of the High Court involves d.iNctly or indirectly a claim o_r question respecting property of the value • of Rs. 20,000/- and more ..\n\nMr. M. C. Bhandare, learned counsel for the respondeqts,. in support of the application filed for revocation of the certificate ha~\n\nurged that before the H_igh Court there was no claim or question arising for consideration excepting the subject nl.atter of over-time wages and weekly off wages claim for a particular period by the workmen. No claim for any further period has been made by them; nor did it arise fo-r consideration before either the Authori- . ties, the Court of Small Causes. or the High ourt. Nor does such F a claim arise for consideration in the appeal to this CQ].lrt. Therefore, he pointed out that thy judgJI}enu of the High Court does not either, d_itectJ y or indirectly mv<;>lve any ~Iaim apart froin -wa.at. was\n\nthe sub.fecttter of dispute_. between the p)ltties: e High C¢-qrt not having granted the ertificate under A.tt.: 133(1)(a)~ it foHoWs that the amount or val~ of the subject matter of the dispute befOre it or on appeal to thts Court WliS not Rs~ 20,000/- or\".jti~:V~.\n\nG Clause (c) of Art. 133(1) also stands excluded as~ High .Court\n\nhas not granted the certifitate on the ground that the caeds' a fit one for appeal to this Court, and asMr. Sorabji, learned coill, iiei for the apj)ellant, has represented that h~ is' not relYing bri tfrat .clause. In order to attract Art. 133(1)(b), under which ~:certi-\n\n. ficate has been granted,.the essential reqment is that thre must be inv9Iv~ in the appeal to this Cou~ a.' laim or questi()n resPecting property of the value of not less tba~(Rs; 20,000/- miufruti~ to or other than Jhe subject matter of the dispute. .In .lflis ease this conditiOn is not satisfied. ·: · ·\n\n\n[1972] S.C.R.\n\nIn support of the alx:>Ve proposition, Mr. Bhandare, referred us A to the decision of this Court in Chhitarmal v. M/ s Shah Pannalal Chandulal (1). It is laid down in that decision as follows. :\n\n\"The variation in the language used in cls. (a) and\n\n(b) of Art. 133 pointedly Jllghlights the conditions which attract the application of the two clauses. Under cl. (a) what is decisive is the amount or value of the subject-! matter in the court of the first insance and \"still in dispute\" in appeal to the Supreme Court : under cl. (b) it is the amount or value of the property respecting which a claim or question is involved in the judgment sought to be appealed from.\n\nThe expression . \"property\" is not defined in the Code, but having regard to the use of the expression \"amount\" it would apparently include money.\n\nBut the property respecting which the claim or question arises must be property in addition to or other than the subject-matter of the dispute. If in a proposed appeal there is no ciaim or question raised respecting property other than the subject-matter, cl. (a) will apply; if there is mvolved in the appeal a claim or question respecting property of an amount or value not less than Rs. 20,000/ - in addition to or other than the subject matter of the dispute c1. (b) will apply.\" ·\n\n. From the facts stated in the above decision it is seen that the appellant therein pleaded on an alternative basis that the claim in E the appeal exceeded Rs. 20,000/-. That alternative claim was on the basis of adding interest at 6% per annum to his original claim as awarded by the trial court whose decree he wanted 1Jo be restored in the appeal. That againwas rejected on the ground that the original claim of the appellant therein, which formed the: subject-matter of dispute before the trial court, was itself the subject F of 9, ispute in the appeal and therefore by adding interest to th~ original claim, it was not open to the appellant to plead that the valuation in the appeal exceeds Rs. 20,000/\n\nFrom the decision, cited above, the following principles emerge:\n\n(l) In order to attra, ct Art. 133(J)(b) the property respecting which the claim or question: arises, must be property in addition to or other than the subject-matter of the dispute;\n\n(2) If in the appeal to this Court there is no ques. tion 9r claim raised respecting the property other than tl; le sut.>.iect-matter~,. then cl. (a) of Art. 133 (1) wlll apply.\n\n\n, ..\n\nBOMBAY GAS CO. v. JAGAN NATH ( Vaidia/ingam, f.) 941\n\n(3) Adding future interest or possible further claims to the original value of the subject-matter till the date of the judgment of the High Court and which items are not the subjeet of , consideration by the High Court will not enable . a party to plead that the claim so calculated exceeds Rs. 20,000/-. This is not permissible as the ad- B dition of imerest or calculation of further possible claims arc all related only to the original subject-matter, which\n\nis still in dispute.\n\nIn A. V. Subramania Ayyar v. Sellammal(i), under s. U <J of the Code of Civil rocedure it was pleaded that though the C subject-matter of the dispute in the court of first instanCe was Jess\n\nthan Rs. 10,000/-, the final decree of the High Court involved a claim to property of over Rs. 10,000/- in value. This value at the relevant time was for purposes of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privv Council. The appellanr. added the mesne protits, which according .to him must be considered to have accrued subsequent to the date of the original claim made in the suit. So D uddiog, the ppe.llant therein pleaded that: the decision of the High Court must b.e considered as involving a claim to property of over Rs. 10,000/~ in value.\n\nThough, if the amount of mesne orofits wus added the value was over Rs. 10.000 I-, the High Court re.iected the p!ea on the ground that the claim for mesne profits has not been awarded by the decree, nor was it the subject matter of dispute in E the appeal. It was further held that the decision of the High Court has not affected the rights of the appellant therein in any prooerty other than the one that was the subject matter in dispute. In this view, it was held tha~ the judgment of the High Court did not directly or indirectly involve any question to any prooertv other than the subject maHer of dispute. On this ground, certificate waS F refused.\n\nMr. Sorabii, learned counsel for t.he appellant, acceoted the vrincrple that to attract Art. 133(1 )(b) the orooerty, referred to therein, mc.st be property in addition to or other than the subiect matter of the dispute. In fact, he cannot but acceot this orinciTl]e\n\na~ it has been so laid down by this Court in Chhitarmal v. M 1 s G Sh(Jh Panna/a/ Chandulalf~). The counsel did not relv on Art.\n\n133 ( i)(~) or (c) Ior the ouroose of this aoDrat He nointe-d out that as laid down by this Court in th~ df>cision, refl\"rred to ahoveth~ .expression \"property'' in Art. 133(l)(b) would al\"o take ;~ claims re!Wrdinl! monev. He pointed our. that t?e aooellant in this case is oreiudicPd hv th~ jud(Tment of the High Court as it will ha?e 1:1 to face recurrin!! liabilitv in future at the hand~; of its worlrmn. on\n\nth~ basis of the. clllint~ ~1~~~ bv th.Pm as ove'r-time wa(7~\" and ''\"'lr:ly olf wages. It IS that hbthty whtch the appellant will have to face\n\n1, l L.~. 1<J Madras 843. 14-L!O(I Sup Cl/72\n\n\n.942\n\n\n[1972] 3 S C R\n\nA and wbich llas been imposed upon it to its prejudice by the , iudgment of the High Court, that is souht to be got rid of in the ap.peal to this Court As the recurring liability or cla,1m will be more than Rs. 20,000/- .the matter squarely falls unaer Art. 133(I)(b) and the certificate granted by the High Court is correct.\n\nHe further pointed out that it is not necessary that the jud~uent of the High Court should directly involve othe.r properties, including money. Clause (b) of Art. 133(1) will be attracted even if the judgment indirectly involves a claim in respect of properly or money of not\n\nlec; th'ln Rs. 20,000/-. He referred us to the decision in Meghji\n\n1A1rhamhi anrl Brothers v. Furniture Workshop(l) where the Judicial Committee had to construe Art. 3(a) of the Eastern African (Appeal to Privv Council) Order in Council, 1951. The tatter pari of this Article was as follows : C\n\n. \" .. , ... or where the appeal involves directly or indirectly some 'claim or question to or resoectin~ property or some civil right amounting to or of the said value or upwards.''\n\nThe Judicial Committee held that the value referred to in the said Article must be looked at from the ooint of view of the aooel- ·\n\nlant.\n\nIt is no doubt true that the value has to be considered from the point of view of the appellant. The orooerty may also include money. But it is essential under Art. 133(1)(1>) that the .claim must. be in respect of property 01\\money which prooerty or money must be different from the subiedt matter of theIitiation. Therefore, 'E the decision of the Judicial Committee is no! of much assistance lO the appellant. ' . . -Mr. Sorabji, then referred us to the decision of the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt. Rajah Kihore pevigaru v.\n\nBhakara Gouta Chorani and others(2).\n\nDealing with cls. (a) r and (b) of Art. 133(1) the High Court says :\n\n\"In our opinion, clause (b} of Art. 13 3(1 )'is intended to meet a .situation essentially different from that arising under clause (11). Under clause (a) we have to look at the . value of the reliefs obtainable in the suit. arid in the aP,.- peal. . Under clause (b) we have to look Rt the effect of the ji.; dgment appealed agaimt from the point of view of the aMellant.\n\nA thing is said to be involved in another wh, en it is a necessary resultant of that other. (Stroud's Jurlicial Dictionary). The matters adjudtcated uoon in the iudgment aooealed from may have fa:r reaching conse, uence~ detrimental to the orooertv of the , apoellant, although they were not comprised in the' cause of action\n\n(l)JPS4J App:al Case->.80. . (2~ A.l.R. 1960 A.P. 286.\n\nBOMBAY GAS CO. v . .JAGAN NATH (Vaidia/ingam, J.) 943\n\nof the plaintiff and cannot be regarded as being \"still in dispute'' on appeal::\n\nFrom the facts in that case it is clear that the High Court was dealing with the que9tion whether the decision of the High Court wlll have far reaching effect on the other properties of the appel- B !ant therein, though those properties were not the subject-matter of dispute in the appeal. Tpis decision in lac<, emphasises quite rightly that to attract cl. (b) of A~C 133 ( 1) one has to look to the effect of the judgment sought to be. appealed against on other properties which are not the subject matter of dispute and are not comprised as such in the litigation.\n\nC Similarly, the decision of the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax Madras v. S. L. Mathias(!) is also of no assistance to the appellant. The facts of the said decision show that the High Court was of the view that there is a difference of opinion between the High Courts on the effect of the Proviso 2 to s. 4(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The High Court w.-.s of the 0 view that \"there can be no doubt that the question involved is a substantial question of law\", and on this bais granted a certificate of fitness. It is clear that the High Court granted the certificate on the_ground that there was a substantial question of Jaw involved in the aopeal and as such it was a fit one for appeal to the Judicial\n\nCommittee. ·\n\nMr. Sorabji then referred us to the decif>ion of the Madras High Court in G. Appuswamy Chettiar and another v. -R. Sarangapani Chettiar and others( 2 ). In that ce the suit was for a declaratory relief regarding the invalidity of the adoption of .a particular' person. The certificate was asked for on the ground that the decision of the High Court involves directly or indirectly a claim or question respecting property of the value of Rs. 20,000/- and more.\n\nIt was accepted by the High Court that if leave to appeal was not granted ta the petitioners therein, they will lose an estate worth more than Rs. 68,000/- though the estate itself was not directly .\n\nth~ sub.fect matter of dispute either in the trial court-of the High Court. The Hih Court further held that in a suit for a declaration of adoption a claim made by the reversioners to the property C cannot be considered to be too remote. It is on this ground that the certificate was granted. It is clear from the judgment of the\n\nHih Court that the final decision of the Hi!th Court in that case\n\ndid affect the righ's of the petitioners therein -to properties of the value of more than Rs. 68,000/-. It is on that basis that the certificate was granted unde~ Art.l33(1 )(b).\n\nH ... In our opinion, tho decisions relied on by Mr .. Sorabji do not suoport his contention that th~- _certificate granted bv the High\n\n(I) A.l.R. 193S M1d. 3S2 (tJ (1965) (I) I.L.R. Mad. 361.\n\n94~\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 s.c.R.\n\nCourt, in the case before us, under Art. 133(1)\\b) is proper and valid. In fact the said decisions clearly bring out the distinction between cls. (a) and (b) of Art. 13 3 (1) .and they lay down that only when the judgment or final order affects property which is not the subject matter of the litigation that Art. 133(1)(b), will apply.\n\nThose decisions are in conformity with the princioks laid down by this Court in Chhitarmal v. M/s Shah Pannalal Chandulal(l) .\n\nIt is clear that interest, unless granted by the decree of the trial court, cannot be notionally added to inflate the value of the .claim in the appeal so as to make it appear that on the date 6f the judgment of the High Court rt.'fJ.e value is not less than Rs. 20,000/-.\n\nOn the same principle, we have already pointed out that mesne profits, which have not been decreed by the trial court, cannot be (; added to the original claim made in the suit, so as 1jO enable a party to plead that the value in the proposed apoeal on the ~; late of the judgment of the High Court is more than Rs. 20,000/-.\n\nWe may refer to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Moti Chand and others v. Ganga Parshad Singh and another(2) where interest awarded under the decree of the trial court was taken into account for the purpose of considering the value in the appeal befor~ the High Court. The suit was for recovery of a certain amount together with interest. The trial court passed a decree for Rs. 9496/- and awarded interest to the plaintiff at Rs. 570/- per year on the decreed amount until realisation.\n\nBy the time the High Court's decree was made, the amount at issue had reached toRs. 10636/- with further contingent increment. Under s. 596 of the old Civil\n\nProcedure Code, certificate was asked for from the High Court for leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee. The High Court declined to grant the certificate on the ground that the amount or\n\nl(alue of the subject matter of the suit in the court of first instance\n\nwas not Rs. 10,000/- as required by the said section. thoui!h the amount or value of the matter in dispute on apoeal to Her Majesty F in Council was above Rs. 1 O, OuO, I.\n\nNo doubt, his decision is not. on the question regarding matters covered by cl. (b) of Art. 133(1). But we are only referring to this decision to show that intetest can be taken into account .. for the ourpose of considerin~ the value in an appeal, provided the decree itself has awarded interest.\n\nWe may also refer to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Surapati Roy & others v. Ram Narayan Mukherjf & otherse). ln that dci!'ion the question arose under s. 110 ~)f the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding the validity of the certifkate granted by the High Court. Thouyh the rent claimed in the suits was less than Rs. 10,000/ - the High Court had granted a certificate of fitness on the ground that the value of the subject matter\n\n-·~-·--- .\n\n(I) (1965]2 S.C.R. 751. (2) 29 Indi::n Appeals 40.\n\n(3) 50 Indian Appeal> 155.\n\nBOMBAY GAS CO. v. JAGAN NATH (Vaidia/ingam, /,) 945\n\nA was over Rs. 10,000/-. The objection taken before tlie Judicilil • Committee regarding the validity of th.e certificate on the ground that the subject matte_r was below the appealable value was re- .• jected as follows : ' ' \" ...... The subject matter in pute relates to a .n recurring liability and is in respect of a property considerably above the appealable value. The certificate in the circumstances is quite in order.\"\n\nIt is to be noted that the liability which was being denied as due to the landlord, by way of rent from the lands in question was in res1Ject of the properties in question and it was on that basis C that the certificate was held to be valid.\n\nBoth the above decisions of the Ju . .'icial Committee have no application to t!, e facts C:~ the present case on hand. The princiole that a claim made by oe party and resisted by another is ordinarily the subject matter of the dispute in the trial court and continues D to be the subject matter in the Appellate Courts.\n\nIn the case . before us the claims for over-time wages and weekly off wares before the Auhorities ..VCre for a specified period. The claims for the identical periods were the subject matter in the appeals befoe the Court of Small Causes. The Hf!!:h Court h::d also to consider the correctness of the decision of 4he Court of Small Causes regarding the claims made by tf!e workmen for the oarticular periods. The F. apoellant was not entitled to notionally add on to the amount originally cJaimed. by the workmen for partipular periods, any further amounts on the ground t1iat they must be cosidered to have accrued due to th~ workmen till the date of the judgment of the High Court. If t1le subsequent additions made to the ori2inal\n\nclaim are accepted as correct, then the position would be that if :F it is an ordinary civil litigation, the subiect matter of the suit and its value would vary with the lenh of time during which the suit may be pending in tM Courts.\n\nSuch a oosition is not warranted by the provisions qf Art. 133 (1) as laid down by this Court in Chhitnrml'fl v. M I~ Shah Pann'alal Chanrlulal (1). If in the proposed appeal to. this Court there is no claim or question raid\n\nrespectin~ prooertv, other than the subject matter of dispute, G dause (a) of Article 133(1) will aooly.\n\nThat clause has not-been invoked in this case by the High Court.\n\nIt is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Sornbii that as the appellant will have to face from its workmen in ~· future cl•1ims similar to the one recoenised bv the Hhth Court, .there ls H .involv\"'d a cJRim or OllPtion in rt;~\"\"ct of propertv of th~ value of riot less than Rs. 20,000/· in addition to or other than . th& .. . o > {H6SJ 2 s.c.R. 7~1.\n\n946 SUPREME COUJ.T lEfOitTS [1972]3 s.c.R.\n\nsubjt matter of appeal.\n\nIn the first place, this contentiqn pr<r A cceds on tne assumptiOn that the judgmeni of the High Court directs tue appellant to pay m IULUre-amiJums not less than Rs. 20,000/-.\n\nT11is assumption 1s oas1caHy erroneous, as there is no such direction given by the High Court. The payment ot wages as for over-time , or weekly off days will depend upon severaL circumstances. lf over time work is not taken, then no payment need be made. lf B over time work is_ taken for a lesser time, then the amount to be paid will also be less.\n\n. _In our opinion, this is not a case where the decision of the High Court, apart from dealing wtth the subJect malter in dtsputc before it, has the effect of affecting the rights of the appellant regarding c oilier properties, including money. We may give an instance where\n\na final judgment may have an impact or affect properties, other than the sut>ject matr in dispute. In a suit for mandatory injunction directing a defendant to vacate a land, the subject matter of the suit may be only of the value of Rs. 1500/- but the decree granted by the High . Court may result in the defendant therein being obliged to remove buildings worth more than Rs. 20,000/..\n\nD so as to give vacant possession of the Jand in accordance with the decision of the High Court. In such a case, though the valu.~ of the subject matter iri dispute before the High Court may be only Rs. 1500/-, the judgment, can be considered to involve indirectly a claim or qut:stion respecting property (in this case the buildings) of the value oHnot less than Rs. 20,000/ ~.\n\nSuch a case may E. attract An. 133(1)(b). The position before us is entirely different.\n\nThe judgment of the High Court has only adjudicated upon the subject matter of the specified claim. of the workmen which was, as mentioned earlier, for a particular period. That iudgm-!n1 does not involve directly or indirectly apart from the subject matter of the writ petition, any claim or question resoecting property or F money of the value of Rs. 20,000;- and more. In this view. we are of the opinion that the certificate granted by the High Court under Art. 1 33(1)(b) is not ; valid and proper.\n\nIn the view that-we take_ that the certificate granted by the High Court is not valiJ and that the appeal l.lrot•ht on such a G . certificate is not sustainabk, we do not express any opinion on the merits, though arguments were h.!ard on lhe same.\n\nAs the' certificate issued by the Hi11:h Court under Art. 133 (1)\n\n(b) is not orol>er and valid, the only course open to us is to tevoke the crtficate and set aside the order of the High Court H grantine; the s'anie.\n\nThe result is, the apoeal has become unsustain!tble. a~ it has been brou2ht to thi~ Court on a certific\"te whi9h, as held by us, has not been properly and validly ~.ranted.\n\nBOMBAY GAS CO. V. JAGAN NATH (Vaidia}ingam, J.) $47\n\nIn the result, C.M.P. No. 1300 of 1 '}72 is allowed, and the appeal is held to be not maintainable and as such dismissed. lnt C.M.P. No. 1300 of 1972 the respondents will be entitled to costs.\".\n\nIn the appeal here will be no ord•.!r as to costs. ,\n\nK.B.N.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 98, "entities": [{"text": "BOMBAY GAS CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BOMBAY GAS CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGAN NATH PANDURANG AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAGAN NATH PANDURANG AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 22, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 66, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 22, 1972\n\n[C. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND I. D. DuA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "I. D. DuA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 133( 1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 133(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 233, "end_char": 250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 595, "end_char": 605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 974, "end_char": 999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1343, "end_char": 1354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Payment of Wages Act 1948", "statute": "Payment of Wages Act 1948"}}, {"text": "Illey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2501, "end_char": 2506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Illey urged that what weighed with the High Court 'for granting a ce-rtificate under article 133 (1 )(b) was the circumstance that the nature cf\n\nthe demands by the workmen were such as they wete l'Jcurring claim arising in the future also and as such the final judgment and order of the High Court involved , directly or indirectly a claim respecting property of the value not less than Rs."}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2586, "end_char": 2597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3014, "end_char": 3025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 133(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3235, "end_char": 3252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3374, "end_char": 3388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3475, "end_char": 3485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "G Soil Sorabji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5620, "end_char": 5634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G Soil Sorabji, K. D. Mehta, P. C. Bhariari and 0 .. C. Mathur for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. D. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5636, "end_char": 5647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G Soil Sorabji, K. D. Mehta, P. C. Bhariari and 0 .. C. Mathur for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. C. Bhariari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5649, "end_char": 5663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G Soil Sorabji, K. D. Mehta, P. C. Bhariari and 0 .. C. Mathur for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5673, "end_char": 5682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G Soil Sorabji, K. D. Mehta, P. C. Bhariari and 0 .. C. Mathur for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5703, "end_char": 5717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, Sunanda Bhandare and K. Rajendra Chowdhary, for respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Bhandare"}}, {"text": "Sunanda Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5719, "end_char": 5735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, Sunanda Bhandare and K. Rajendra Chowdhary, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "K. Rajendra Chowdhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5740, "end_char": 5761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, Sunanda Bhandare and K. Rajendra Chowdhary, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "H Vaidtalingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5899, "end_char": 5913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judgment of the, Court was delivered by H Vaidtalingam, J.\n\nTis ppeal~ on certificate, by the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd., is directed against the judgment and order dated\n\nBOMBAY GAS CO."}}, {"text": "Court of Small Causes, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6214, "end_char": 6243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ High Court set aside the decision of the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, in Payment of Wages Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7240, "end_char": 7245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7253, "end_char": 7273, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Industrial Tribunal, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7850, "end_char": 7877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant raised two grounds of defence: (a) The claims were barr~ by the Award, Part 1I of the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay dated March 30, 1950 in Reference (IT) No .. 54 of 1949; and (b)."}}, {"text": "March 30, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7884, "end_char": 7898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant raised two grounds of defence: (a) The claims were barr~ by the Award, Part 1I of the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay dated March 30, 1950 in Reference (IT) No .. 54 of 1949; and (b)."}}, {"text": "October 13, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8015, "end_char": 8031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 13, 1962, the Additional F Authority held that the Award, referred to, by the Company was no bar to the said employees claiming over-time wages."}}, {"text": "s. 18(3 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8352, "end_char": 8361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8888, "end_char": 8893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 26, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9329, "end_char": 9343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Third Addi~ tional Authority, by its judgment dated April 26, 1963, held that the Award, Part II of the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, dated March 30, 1950 in Reference (IT) No."}}, {"text": "s. 18(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9756, "end_char": 9764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 11, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10598, "end_char": 10615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "81 to 118 were heard together and disposed of by a common judgment dated February 11, 1965 by E the Appellate Authority, the Court of Small Causes, Bombay."}}, {"text": "BOMBAY GAS CO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11915, "end_char": 11928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court of Small Causes agreed with the finding of the Third\n\nBOMBAY GAS CO, V. JAGAN NATH (Vaidia/ingam, J.) 933\n\nAdditional Authority that the workmen were governed by the provisions of the Establishments Act and as such are entitled to the benefit conferred on them by that Act.", "canonical_name": "BOMBAY GAS CO. LTD"}}, {"text": "V. JAGAN NATH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11930, "end_char": 11943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court of Small Causes agreed with the finding of the Third\n\nBOMBAY GAS CO, V. JAGAN NATH (Vaidia/ingam, J.) 933\n\nAdditional Authority that the workmen were governed by the provisions of the Establishments Act and as such are entitled to the benefit conferred on them by that Act."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12604, "end_char": 12621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All the 118 workmen filed before the Bombay High Court, Special Civil Applicatiq_n, No."}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12674, "end_char": 12691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Court ot Small Causes, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12745, "end_char": 12774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 and 227 of the Constitution for quashing the judgment of the Court ot Small Causes, Bombay; dated February 11, 1965."}}, {"text": "t.Qe Court of Small Causes, BombayJ", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13216, "end_char": 13251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "has set aside the judgment of t.Qe Court of Small Causes, BombayJ as well as the order dated October 13, 1962 of the Additional Authority and remanded their applcations to the latter for -ascertaining and decreasing the amount _of over-time wages that may be due to them."}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16104, "end_char": 16115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16234, "end_char": 16248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.133(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18415, "end_char": 18428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.133(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18558, "end_char": 18571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "February 6, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21474, "end_char": 21490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, inasmuch as the recurring claims of both weekly off days wages and overtime wages, at the time of the High Court's judgment in B the writ J}etition on February 6, 1967, had crystalised into amounts exceeding Rs."}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22004, "end_char": 22012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22579, "end_char": 22586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22747, "end_char": 22761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23135, "end_char": 23149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23284, "end_char": 23291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "October 19, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23791, "end_char": 23807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court on October 19, 1967 granted the ceiti&ate 1n tht following terms .: _ - \""}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24320, "end_char": 24331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25155, "end_char": 25169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25488, "end_char": 25502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27744, "end_char": 27758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31285, "end_char": 31290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. C. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31477, "end_char": 31491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20,000/- and more ..\n\nMr. M. C. Bhandare, learned counsel for the respondeqts,.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Bhandare"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32498, "end_char": 32509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sorabji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32656, "end_char": 32663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sorabji, learned coill, iiei for the apj)ellant, has represented that h~ is' not relYing bri tfrat .clause.", "canonical_name": "Sorabji"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32784, "end_char": 32798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33190, "end_char": 33198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[1972] S.C.R.\n\nIn support of the alx:>Ve proposition, Mr. Bhandare, referred us A to the decision of this Court in Chhitarmal v. M/ s Shah Pannalal Chandulal (1)."}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33403, "end_char": 33411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 33651, "end_char": 33664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "matter in the court of the first insance and \"still in dispute\" in appeal to the Supreme Court : under cl. ("}}, {"text": "Art. 133(J)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35254, "end_char": 35268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35565, "end_char": 35573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sorabii", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37536, "end_char": 37543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sorabii, learned counsel for t.he appellant, acceoted the vrincrple that to attract Art.", "canonical_name": "Sorabji"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1 )(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37620, "end_char": 37635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37924, "end_char": 37933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38095, "end_char": 38109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(I)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38812, "end_char": 38826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39044, "end_char": 39055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Meghji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39222, "end_char": 39228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He referred us to the decision in Meghji\n\n1A1rhamhi anrl Brothers v. Furniture Workshop(l) where the Judicial Committee had to construe Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 3(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39324, "end_char": 39333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)(1>)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39943, "end_char": 39958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 40270, "end_char": 40295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sorabji, then referred us to the decision of the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt."}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40403, "end_char": 40414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40469, "end_char": 40476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Stroud", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40904, "end_char": 40910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stroud's Jurlicial Dictionary)."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 41934, "end_char": 41951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C Similarly, the decision of the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax Madras v. S. L. Mathias(!)"}}, {"text": "s. 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42220, "end_char": 42227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42235, "end_char": 42255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 44082, "end_char": 44117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "94~\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44157, "end_char": 44168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44282, "end_char": 44289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44430, "end_char": 44444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 596", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45818, "end_char": 45824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45843, "end_char": 45857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46368, "end_char": 46379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil\n\nProcedure Code", "statute": "Civil\n\nProcedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46743, "end_char": 46749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil\n\nProcedure Code", "statute": "Civil\n\nProcedure Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46758, "end_char": 46786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49187, "end_char": 49195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49437, "end_char": 49451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sornbii", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49582, "end_char": 49589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Sornbii that as the appellant will have to face from its workmen in ~· future cl•1ims similar to the one recoenised bv the Hhth Court, .there ls H .involv\"'d a cJRim or OllPtion in rt;~\"\"ct of propertv of th~ value of riot less than Rs.", "canonical_name": "Sorabji"}}, {"text": "Art. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52086, "end_char": 52092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52432, "end_char": 52440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "BOMBAY GAS CO. V. JAGAN NATH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52771, "end_char": 52799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BOMBAY GAS CO."}}, {"text": "Vaidia}ingam,", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52801, "end_char": 52814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. JAGAN NATH (Vaidia}ingam, J.) $47\n\nIn the result, C.M.P. No."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_955_972_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "VIRENDRA KUMAR SAKLECHA\n\nJAGJIWAN AND ORS.\n\nMarch 22, 1972\n\n!A. N. GROVER AND A. N. RAY, JJ.J\n\nE/ection'Peti.donorrupt practices under s, 123 (2), <3) and (4) alle1?ed-Proof_.:._Atfidavit i.'1 suvvort of petition alle1?in1? a fact on in}orn1ation must give .source of i11for1nation. (-) There is. no inconSistency between form 25 of Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 and Rule 7 of Madhya Pradesh HiRh Court Rules.\n\nThe appellant and the three respondents were candidates for election to the Madhya Pradesh Assembly at the general election held in. 1967.\n\nThe appellant was succe¥ful at the eleotion.\n\nRespondent no. I challenged .bis election in an election pet:tion charging him with corrupt practices. It was alleaed by the election petitioner that in speeche. made to the voters on the basis of religion w.thin the meaning of s. 123 (3) of the Representation of the People Act 195 J; the voters were threatened with divine displeasure within the meaning of s. 123 (2), a•d also &tale meots were made about the election petitioner within the meaning of s. 123 ( 4). The affidavit in support of the petition did not disclote the source \\Of information whereby respoident no. 1 learnt the speeches ton stituting corrupt practice.\n\nThe High Court however believed the ma! ev:dence produced on behalf of the respondent, disbel eved that produced on behal'f of the appella\"t and allowed the election petition. Appeal to this Court was fi:ed under s. 116-A of the Representatio~ of the People Act, 1951.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD: (i) The affidavit filed by the respoodent aloog with the election petition ~'d not disclose the source of information in respect of the speeches alleged to have beei made by Jhe appellant. Although the res F p. an(fent c. !aim. ed in his evidence that he am. e to know. of the speeohes\n\ntJir<zilg!i notes made by certain persons wh6 heard them, neither the \\11Q.t.etnor these perso'ls were produced in Court. The non-, prodU'\"'HO., of\n\nthee notes and the persons who made them must lead to an irresistible inference against -the monde\"t th•t the same would not have supported , responde_nt's cas~. [959 H; 962 A-BJ\n\nRule 7 of the Madhya_ Pradesh High Court Rules states that every G affidavit should clearly express how much is a statement and declaratioi\n\nfrom knowledge and\" how much .is a statement made on information or :belief.and must also state the source or l!rOU\"ds of info•mation or belief\n\nwill! sufficient particularity. Form No. 25 of •he Conduct of Ele\"fon Rules, 1961 requires the deoonent of an affidavit to set out which statements are true to the knowledge of the depcMent and wltich sta•e mentil are true tn his i.rforma'ion.\n\nJn so far as form No ... 25 requireil the deoondent to state which stateme, ts are true .to knowledge there is 01lno soei:iftc mentioi of the sources of informaticm in the form. The form of the affidavit and the Hieb Court Rules are not ;, co\"si•te0 t. 'fhe 1\"'eh Court Rliles l!iv, e effect topto'lisions of Order 19 of the Code of Cid Procedure .. [960 C-1'] . '\n\nThe non-disclosure of grounds or sources of information in an election A peti 'ion which is to be fi1ed within 45 days from the date of elec; tion of the returned candidate, will have to be scrutinised from two points of view. 'fhe non-d, sclosu -e df the grounds will indicate that the elect:on petitioner did not come forwa d with the sources of information at the first oppor-tunit~! The real 1n1portance of setting QUt th~ sources of informatio 1 at the time of the presentation. of the peti'rion is to give the other side notice of the co.1temporaneous evidence o:i. which the elet- B tion petition is based.\n\nThat will give an opportunity to the other s:de to test the genuineness and varacity of the sources of informati;)1. T~ other point of view is that he election petitioner will not be able to make any departure from the sources of grou'lds.\n\nIf there is any embellis~ ment of the case it wJl be discovered ... 961 E-F]\n\nState of Bombay v .. Parshottam Jog Naik, [19521 S.C.R. 674, Padmabati Das\" v. Ra ik Lal Dhar, I.L.R. 37 Cal. 259, Barium Chemicals Ltd. & C Anr. v. Company Law Board and Ors., [19661 Supp. S.C.R. 331 ad A. K. K. Nambiar v. Union of India, f.1970] 3 S.C.R. 121, referred to.\n\n(ii) The High Court was wrong in pronouncing observations O'l the First Informafon Report relating to an incident at one of election meetings in question when a criminal case based on that Report was pending.\n\n,964 F-0]\n\n(iii) The overwhelming impresSio':J. produced by the witnes.ses on behalf of the respondent is that they were all prepared O'l the' S\"m~ pattern of evide'lce.\n\nOn the entireevidence it could not be held that the allegations constituting corrupt pract:ce were proved .. L971 H-972 A]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C.A. No. 2509 of 1969.\n\nAppeal under Section 116-A of the Representa•ion of the People Act, 1951 from the Judgment and Order dated the 30th September, 1969 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench in Election Petitions NJs. 19 and 19A of 1967. -\n\nS. L. Sibbal, A iyocate-General for the S ate of Punjab, S. L.\n\nGarK and S. K. Gambhir, for the appellant.\n\nM. N. Phadke. U. N. Bachawat, P. C. Bhar•ari, J. B. Dad+i- ' chanfi, O. C. Mathur, Ravinder Narain, for respondent No. 1.\n\nN. K. Shejwalla, Pramod Swarup, S. S. Khanduja and lalita Kohli, for respondent No. 4.\n\nThe fudgment of the Court was delivered by G\n\nRay, J.\n\nThis is an appeal from the judgment dated 30 September, 1969 of the High Court of Madhya Pradl'Sh setting aside the election of the appellant.\n\nThe High Court held the appellant to .be guilty of corrupt practice under section 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinfater referred\n\no as the Act) with reference to a speech at Singoli on 29 Januaty, H 'l-9e'r speech at Athana on 9 February, 1967 and a speech at 1hatla, ®.o-1.2 Fbruary, 1967. , :J'he High Court further held the\n\n'; ..\n\nappellant to be guilty of corrupt practice of appealing on !he ground of religion as defined in section 123 (3) of the Act and also threatening the electors with divine displeasure being a corrupt practice as defined in section 123(2) of the Act in regard to the speech at Jhatla oh 12 Febiuary, 1967. The High Court also held the appellant to be guil!Y of corrupt practice of appealing on the ground of religion and threatening with divine\" displeasure those who voted for the Congress in the three speeches delh'.ered on 15 February, 1967 at Morwan, SiiJ.goli and Diken by the Swamiji of Bhanpura at. the instance, and in the presence, and after introduction by the appellant of the Swamiji of Bhanpura to the audience at those three places.\n\nOn 31 January, 1972 'we delivered the order holding that we did not agree with the finding of the High Court and we also held the appellant to be not guilty of any corrupt practice.\n\nWe stated then that we would give the reasons later.\n\nWe now give those reasons. ·\n\nThe appellant and the respondent Jagjiwan Joshi and the other two respondents were four. candidates from Jawad Constituency f?r electin to the Madhya radesh ssembly at the general e.loc- !ion held m the year 1967. i'lie appellant was successful at the election.· The respondent Joslji cnallenged the election of the appellant. ·\n\nThe allegations under section 123 ( 4) of the Act falf under two classes.\n\nThe first.relates to the speech delivered by the appellant at Singoli on 29 January, 1967 and a speech delivered by the &ppellant at Athana on 9 February, 1967.\n\nThe speech at Singoli was alleged to be as follows : :-\n\n\"The Congress candidate has on payment of Rs. 5000 set up Kajod Dhakad ...... so that the Jan Sangh votes may be split and he might . win. If he practises such corruption even now what service can he do to the public later on.\n\nYou, should not vote for such . corrupt men\".\n\nThe speech at Athana in addition to the allegations already made , in respect of the speech at Singoli was as follow8 :-\n\n. \"Joshi has set up Kajod Dhakad on payment of Rs. 5000.\"\n\nThe other allegations of corrµpt praotlce under section 123 ( 4) of the Ac~ were in relatiOO to the. wne. speech at Athamt on 9 •• 14--,.l.lo61SupCIJ72 ·\n\nFebruary, 1967 and a speech at Jhatla on 12 February, 1967.\n\nThe alleged speech at Athana was as follows :-\n\n\"Shri Joshi has set up a man to hit me with a knife.\n\nAccordingly, if he becomes a legislator the rule of violence (goonda gardi) would be permanently established.\n\nTherefore, the public should not only defeat such bad characters ( badmash) of the Congress but also see that their deposit is forfeited\".\n\nThe alleged speech at Jhatla was as follows :-\n\n\"This Congress candidate gave a knife to Moham-. mad Kasai and got him to attack me.\n\nBut I have the strength of the janata janardhan and my life is dedicated to you.\n\nIt lies with you whether to save such goondas who try to commit murder or to get their deposit . forfeited.\"\n\nThe allegations of corrupt practice as defined in sections 123(2) and 123(3) of the Act in relation to the same speech at Jhatla on 12 February, 1967 were as follows :-\n\n\"The votes shall be cast on the 20th and it is fortunate that it is a sacred day being a Monday gyaras. To give a vote to the cow-killing Congress on that day is equivalent to cutting down ot\\e cow and it will be on you to bear the responsibility for this sin\".\n\nThe. allegations of corrupt practice within the meaning of sections 123(2) and 123(3) of the Act against the appellant in regard to three speeches delivered on 15 Fel:lruary, 1967 at N'.orwan, Singoli and Diken by the Swamiji of Bhanpura were as follows:-\n\nAt Morwan :-\n\n\"Today the Hindu dharma is being destroyed.\n\nSadhus and sanyasis are being shot.\n\nThe Congress is killing the cow-progeny (go-vansh) of Bhagwan Gopal. so this time you should cast your invaluable vote for uprooting that government. You put your seal on the deepak symbol (Jan Sangh symbol) on the 20th which '1.s Monday gyaras. To vote for the Congress on such a sacred day is to commit the sin of cow-killing\".\n\nAt Singoli :-\n\n- '.'In the. Congress Government sixteen cows are being killed every minute.\n\nHow long will this cow-killing .\n\nCongress rule the country?. How long will it show indifference to 'the feelings of the overwhelming Hindu\n\nmajority just on the strength of the support of a handful of cow-eating Musalmans ? If you love the Hindu dharma, if there is Hindu blood in your veins, do not vote for the Congress; but uproot it.\n\nForm a new Government by putting your seal on the Jan Sangh deepak.\n\nShri Saklecha is your Chief Minister to be.\n\nThe 20th February as a sacred day being Monday gyras.\n\nDo not on such a sacred day vote for the cow-killing Congress and bring yourself td hell ( narak ke bhagi na bane)\".\n\nAt Diken :-\n\n\\ 'There was a yagna for putting an end to the cow killing in this country.\n\nMany sadhus and sanyasis have sacrificed their life for this, but the Congress, intoxicated with power has along with cow-killing killed sadhus also. It is the dharma of every Hindu not / to vote for such murderous Congress.\n\nThe 20th is Monday gyaras and a sacred day.\n\nSo put your seal on the deepak and make the Jan Sangh successful.\n\nThe Jan Sangh will put an end to the cow-killing and you will get merit (punya) and endlless Bliss (akhand sukh)\".\n\nWith regard to the speech at Athana on 9 February, 1967 the E allegations within the meaning of section 123 ( 4) of the Act were twofold.\n\nFirst that the appellant published the false allegation that the respondent had bribed Kajod Dhabad with Rs. 5000 and had set up him as a candidate. The second allegation was tht at the same speech the appellant publisheq the false story that the respondent had set up a man to hit the appellant with a knife. The High Court accepted the oral evidence of tlie respondent and four F witnesses Kishan. Lal Teli P.W. I, Ghisa Dhakad P.W. 2. Laxmi Lal P.W. 5 and Chand Mohammad P.W. 6.\n\nThe High Court did not accept the oral evidence of the appellant or of the witnesses on behalf of the appellant.\n\nThe High Court found the witnesses on behalf of the respondent to be straightforward and impartial.\n\nOn the other hand, the High Court found the witnesses on behalf G of the appellant to be persons who knew what they had come for and asserted general statements of denial.\n\nThe respondent filed an affidavit along with the election petition.\n\nThe affidavit did not disclose the source of information in respect of the speeches alleged to have been made by the appellant Section 83 of the Act requires an affidavit in the prescribed form H in support of allegations of corrupt practice.\n\nRule 94-A of the Conduct of Election Rules 1961 requires an affidavit to be in form No. 25.\n\nForm No. 25 requires the deponent to state which statements are true to knowledge and which statements are true to\n\ninfonnation.\n\nUnder section 87 of the Act very election petition shall be tried by the High Court as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure to the trial of suits.\n\nUnder section 102 of the Code the High Court may make rules regulating their own procedure and the procedure of the Civil Courts subject to their supervision an..; may by such rules vary, alter or add to any of the rules in the First Sched.ule to the Code.\n\nRule 9 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules in respect of election petitions states that the rules of the High Court shall apply in so far as they are not inconsistant with the Representation of the People Act, 1951 or other rules, if any, made thereunder' or of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of all matters including inter alia affidavits.\n\nRule '7 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules states that every affidavit should clearly express how much is a statement and declaration from knowledge and how much is a statement made on information or belief and must also state the source or grounds of information or belief with sull)cient particularity.\n\nForm No. 25 of the Conduct of Election Rules requires the deponent of an affidavit to set out which statements are true to the knowledege of the deponent and which statements are true to his information. The source of information is required to be given under the provisions in accordance with Rule 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Hjgh Court Rules.\n\nIn so far as form No. 25 of the Conduct of Election Rules requires the deponent to state which statements are true to knowledge there is no specific mention of the sources of information in the form.\n\nThe form of the affidavit and the High Court Rules are not inconsistant.\n\nThe High Court Rules give effect to provisions of Order 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nThe importance of setting out the sources of information in affidavits came up for consideration before this Court from time to time.\n\nOne of the earliest decisions is State of Bombay v.\n\nParshottam Jog Naik, [1952], S.C.R. 674, where this Court endorsed the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Padmabati Dasi v. Rasik Lal Dhar, I.L.R. 37 Cal. 259, and held that the sources of information should be clearly disclosed.\n\nAgain, in Barium Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. v. Company Law Board and Ors., [1966] Supp. S.C.R. 331, this Court deprecated 'slip short verifications, in an affidavit and reiterated the ruling of th.is Court in Bombay, case (supra) that verification should. invariably be modelled on the lines of Order 19 rule 3 of the Code 'Whether the Code applies in terms or not'.\n\nAgain, in A. K. K.\n\nV. K. SAKLECHA v. JAGJJWAN (Ray, J.) 961\n\nA Nambiar v. Union of India, (1970] 3 S.C.R. 121 this Court said that the importance of verification is to test the genuineness and authenticity of allegations and also to make the deponent responsible for allegations.\n\nCounsel on behalf of the appellant contended _ that non-!lis- B closure of the sources of information in the affidavit was a fatal dcfei:t and the petition should not have been entertained. rt is not necessary to express any opinion on that contention in view of the Uict that the matter was heard for several months in the High Court and thereafter the appeal was heard by this Court. The grounds or sources of, information are to be set out in an affidavit c in_ an election petition.\n\nCounsel on behalf of the respondent submitted that the decisions of this Court were not on election petitions.\n\nThe rulings of this Court are consistent. The grounds or sotirces of information ilre to be set out in the affidavit whether the Code a:pplies or not.\n\nSection 83 of the Act states that an election petition shall be verified in the manner laid down in the Code.\n\nThe verification is as to information received.\n\nThe affidavit is to D be modelled on the provisions contained in Order 19 of the Code.\n\nTherefore, the grounds or sources of information are required to be stated.\n\nThe non-disclosure of grounds or sources of information in an election petition which is to be filed within 45 days from the date of election of the returned candidate, will have to be scrutinised from two points of view.\n\nThe non-disclosure of the grounds will indicate that the election petitioner did not come forward with the sources of information at the first opportunity.\n\nThe real importance of setting out the sources of information at the. time of the presentation of the petition is to give the other side notice of the contemporaneous evidence on which the election peti_tion is baied.\n\nThat will gj¥e an opportunity to the other side to test the genuineness and veracity .of the sources of inforination.\n\nThe other point of view is that the election petitioner will not be able to m-0 l; e any departure from the sources or grounds. If there is any emJellishment of the case it will be discovered.\n\nThe non-disclosure of grounds or sources of information in the affidavit of the election petitioner in the present case assumed importance by reason of the fact that the respondent said that he had a written report about the alleged speech at Athana and the\n\nreport was given to the respondent by Ram Kumar Aggarwal.\n\nRam Kumar Aggarwal was also a candidate of the Congress party at the same election from the same constituency which is the subject matter of the appeal.\n\nRam Kumar Aggarwal was not examined <ts a witness.\n\nThe written notes of Ram Kumar Aggarwal were admitted by the responde_nt to be with him.\n\nThe respondent gave the explanation for non-production of Ram Kumar Aggarwal that he produced only such wimesses who either opposed him in the election or were independent.\n\nAs to persons who opposed him in the election the respondent stated that they were summoned by him through court and those who were independent\n\nwer~ brought by him personally to court. The . non-production\n\nof Ram Kumar Aggarwal and of the notes made by him at the B meeting at Athana raises as irresistible. inference against the respondent that the same would not have supported the respondent's case.\n\nWitnesses on-behalf of the respondent Kishan Lil Tell, Ghisa Dhakad, Laxmi Lal, Chand Mohammad and Bansi Dhar Bairagi gave oral evidence in identical words and language that the respondent had instigated Mohd. Kasai to attack the appellant with a knife and that the respondent had set up Kajod Dhakad paying Rs. 5000 and if Joshi became a legislator there will be rule of goondas.\n\nKishan Lal Teli was the polling agent of the respondent.\n\nHe denied that he was one.\n\nHe was shown the polling agent forms Exhibits R-1/39 and .R-1/40.\n\nH~ stated that the signatures might be his.\n\nThe respondent admitted that Exhibits R.1/S9 and R-1/40 were signed by him but Kishan Lal as not prepared to admit his own signatures on the polling agent forms.\n\nKishan Lal Teli was neither straightforward nor impartial.\n\nKishan Lal Teli said that there were 5 or 6 metings in the village during the time of the election but the only meeting which he attended was at Athana.\n\nThat is indeed strange and significant.\n\nKishan Lal Teli said that there were 6 speakers and he remembered the sequehce in which the speaker spoke.\n\nKishah Lal Teli said that he spoke entirely from memory.\n\nGhisa Dhakad also spoke from piemory.\n\nHe mentioned about 6 speakers.\n\nGhisa Dhakad also happened to be a. witness who attended the meeting at Athaµa only.\n\nA curious feature of Ghis.a Dhakad's evidence is that he did riot speak about the speech\n\nto anybody till he gave evidence in court. It would be beyond comprehension as to how the respondent would cite Ghisa Dhakad . G as a witness to support the allegations , wjlen Ghisa Dhakad remained silent and unknown. It is also in i:\\tidence that Ghisa Dhakad was the worker of the appellant's opponents . .\n\nLaxmi Lal P .W. 5 also happened to have attended the solitary meeting at Athana and no other meeting.\n\nLaxmi Lal also mentioned the speakers in the same sequence as the other witnesses H did.\n\nLaxmi Lal said that he remembered the speeches of everybody who spoke.\n\nLaxmi Lal in cross-examination stated t!Jat the appellant also talked of 'Lagan'. When he was asked as to why\n\nA he did not meµtion this fact in his examination-in-chief, his ans\"1er was that the appellant had mentioned of 'Lagan' at the end of the speech, and, the.refore, he did not speak about it in examination in-chief.\n\nThis indicates as to how Laxmi Lal tried to impart oti ginality to his version of remembrance of things.\n\nB Chand Mohammad was believed by the High Court with regard to his presence at Athana but was disbelieved with regard to his presence at Sarwania Masania.\n\nIt may be stated here that the High Court did riot accept the case of the respondent with regard to Sarwania Masania.\n\nChand Mohammad happened to be a casual witness with regard to the meeting at Athana.\n\nHis evi C dence was that he was going to the house of Dhakad J(heri and he stopped for a minute or two to listen to Jaq Sangh speakers.\n\nThat is how he heard the appellant peaking. The fortuitous manner in which Chand Mohammad attended the meeting at Athana shows that he was introduced to support the respondent by rej>eating what the previous witnesses said about the Athana meeting.\n\nThis will be apparent in view of the fact that when D Chand Mohammad was examined for the second time like some other witnesses he said that he heard the speech of th apllant for a minute or two but he left th~ meeting before tlie appellant's speech was over. When Chand Mohammad was confronted with his previous statement his explanation was that on the earlier occasion he was thinking about the meeting of Kajod Dhakad, yet the High E Court accepted the evidence of Chand Mohammad to be impartial and impressive.\n\nBansi Dhar Bairagi P. W. 4 was found by the High Court to be angry with the appellant's party.\n\nBut the High Court accepted . the evidence of Bansi Dhar Bairagi on the ground that his evidence was corroborated by the statements of Laxmi Lal, Ghisa Dhakad and Chand Mohammad.\n\nBansi Dhar Bairagi proposed the name of Ram Kumar Aggarwal who was supposed to have taken notes of the Athana meeting and who never came to the witness box.\n\nBansi Dhar Bairagi was also associated with Kajod Dhakad. Bansi Dhar Bairagi's evidence was that he went to propose the name of Kajod Dliakad but when he was going to propose the name his G hand began' to shake.\n\nThat is indeed a very shaky explanation.\n\nA curious part of the evidence of Bansi Dhar Bairagi is that the appellant spake of cow killing at the Athana meeting.\n\nThat was not the case even of the respondent.\n\nBansi Dhar Bairagi's evi dence in respect of his presence at Sarwania Masania was not accepted by the Court on the ground that he was a casual witness.\n\nH Banst Dhar Bairagi was the election agent of Kajod Dhakad. The nomination paper ()f Kajod Dhakad was proposed by Ram Chand\n\nNagla brother of Badri Nath Nagla the President of Jawad Mand Congress. Badri Nath Nagla was the proposer and the counting\n\nagent of the respondent.\n\nThese features point to the inescapable A conclusion that the witness was not only interested but also partisan.\n\nThe witnesses on behalf of the respondent appeared to be present only at the Athana meeting.\n\nThey did not attend any other meeting.\n\nThey spoke entirely from memory.\n\nTheir version of B the speeches was in the same words and language. One of the witnesses was unknown to the respondent and the respondent also did not know anything about him until he gave evidence in court.\n\nThe witnesses on behalf of the respondent seemed to have phenomenal memory.\n\nEach witness spoke in the same sequence.\n\nEach . witness spoke in the same language.\n\nEach witness mentioned the C names oi the speakers in the same order.\n\nThe entire evidence on behalf of the respondent is tutored and prompted to support the respondent. The High Court was wrong in relying on the oral evidence of the respondent and his witnesses.\n\nI.n the ckground of the entire oral evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent it is apparent as to why the respondent did not mention the grounds or sources of information in the affidavit.\n\nThere were no real sources.\n\nSources were fabricated.\n\nThere is not a single piece of D documentary evidence to support.the ca8e of the respondent.\n\nThe alleged notes of the meeting at Athana wh\\ch were admitted by the respondent to be in existence never saw the light oi the day. The withholding of that document gives a J, ie to the respondent's case.\n\nIt is obvious that if there were in exislence any notes the respoO:- E. dent would have exhibited them at the earlier opportunity.\n\nThe High Court not only disbelieved the witnesses produced on behalf of the appellant with regard to the meeting at Athana but also made certain observations about the first information report lodged by Sunder Lal Petlia R.W. 35. with regard to an incident F at Athana at the day of the meeting .. A criminal case is pending as a result of that report lodged by Petlfa.\n\nThe High Court held that the first information report is a forgery.\n\nIt is true that the High Court in one part of the judgment stated that whateve( was stated by the High Court abput the first information report should not affect the judgment of the Magistrate.\n\nThe High Court was wrong in pronouncing observations on the report lodged by Petlia.\n\nG We are unable to accept the views o4' the High Court on the report lodged by Petlia inasmuch as the criminal case is pending.\n\nThe respondent's allegations with regard to the meeting at Jhatla on 12 February, 1967 are under two heads.\n\nFirst, that the apoellant is guilty of corrupt practice as defirned in section 123 ( 4) H pf the Act inasmuch the appellant published falsely that the respondent had set up somebody armed with a knife to attack the appellant.\n\nThe second head was that the appellant was guilty of cOITUpt\n\npractice as defined in sections 123(2) and 123(3) of the Act by appealing to voters on the ground of religion and threatening them with divine displeasure if they voted for the Congress candidate.\n\nThe speech alleged to be made by the appellant at Jhatla on 12 February, 1967 was that 20 February, 1967 was the sacred day bemg a Monday gyaras and to give a vote to the cow killing Congress on that day was equivalent to cutting doWill one cow and it would be on the voters to bear the responsibility for the sin. The High Court accepted the oral evidence of the respondent and his witnesses.\n\nThe respondent said that Mohan Lal Ramji Lal took notes of the meeting at Jhatla.\n\nMohan Lal Ramji Lal was not examined by the respondent.\n\nThe alleged notes were also not produced.\n\nThese features indicate that there were no such notes for if the notes were in existence the relipondent would have produced the same in proof of the allegatfons.\n\nThe respondent is a lawyer.\n\nThe respondent not only understands but also appreciates the importance of documents if they happen to be contemporaneous documentary evidence.\n\nThe witnesses on behalf of the respondent with regard to the speech at JJratla were Daulat Ram Sharma P.W. 12, Kastur Chand Jain P.W. 13, Ratan Lal Jain P.W. 14 and Prabhu Lal P.W. 15.\n\nThe common features of all these witnesses are that each witne><\n\nspoke in identical words and in the same sequence about the speeches of the appellamt.\n\nDaulat Ram Sharma admitted that he had no occasion to repeat the speech to anybody except when he came to depose\\in court.\n\nDaulat Ram Sharma went in search of his cattle to the pond at Jhatla.\n\nHe could not find his cow.\n\nHe went to purchase tobacco.\n\nWhen he reached the shop he saw a meeting oi Jan Sangh going F on.\n\nHe heard the speech of the appellant.\n\nHe does not belong to Jhatla but lives at Jhabarka Rajpura at a distance of 3 furlongs . from Jhatla.\n\nIt is indeed remarkable that a person who by chance walked to the meeting would not only remember the entire speech ascrited to the appellant in the election petition but also depose to it in court without ever !raving mentioned the speech to anybody G . and in particular the respondent.\n\nDaulat Ram Sharma stated that this was th~ only meeting attended by him in his life.\n\nSuch a witness cannot inspire any confidence.\n\nKastur Chand Jain was the polling agent of the respondent. He discussed with the respondent the latter's defeat about two months after the election.\n\nHe told the respondent that he would give evidence in court without any summons.\n\nHe attended the Congress Session and is associated with the organisation.\n\nAs an instance of his power of memory he said tlrat he could repeat the speech of\n\nthe Congress Parliamentary candidate delivered on 24 February, 1967.\n\nThis witness appears to be partisan.\n\n. Ratan Lal Jain was also associated with the Congress organisat10n.\n\nHe went to the extent of saying that he did not know that voting for Congress meant voting for the respondent who was a Congress candidate. ' Prabhu Lal came to give evidence along with Ratan Lal Jain P.W. 14 and Kastur Chand Jain P.W. 13.\n\nThey all stayed together at Mahalaxmi Lodge. 'They also met the respondent though they denied that they h_ad any talk with the respondent about the evidence.\n\nIt is incomprehensible as to how the respondent would cite such persons as witnesses unless the respondent knew what they were going to spe, ak about. A witness is not called by a party unless the party knows that the person can testify to the facts in the <:ase.\n\nWitnesses on behalf of the respondent gave the impression that they never mentioned to anyone about what they knew. If that be the position it would not be possible for the respondent to cite them as witnesses.\n\nThese features indicate that the witnesses appeared to give a semblance of disinterestedness whereas in fact they were all tutored to support the case of the respondent. . The impression produced by the witnesses is that their version of the speeches was similar to reading cyclostyled copies of the speech.\n\nWe are uinable to accept the conclusion reached by the High Court about the speeches ot the appellant at Jhatla.\n\nThe respondent alleged that the appellant delivered a speech .· at Singoli on 29 January, 1967. The allegations are that the appellant committed the corrupt practice within the definition of section 123 ( 4) of the Act by publishilll.g the false allegations that the respondent had paid Rs. 5000 to Kajod Dhakad to set him up as a candidate. The respondent also alleged that besides the appellant one Swami Brahmananda of Himach!l] Pradesh and Khuman Singh of Nimech also spoke at the meeting at Singoli on the same day.\n\nThe High Court accepted .the oral evidence of P.W. 16 Paras Ram, P.W. 17 Bhanwar Lal, P.W. 18 Ram Chandra Sharma, P.W. 19 Nathu Lal and P.W. 22 Mange Lal Pancholi.\n\nP.W. 18 Ram Chandra Sharma admitted his signatures on Exhibits R-1/5 and R-1/6.\n\nThese two documents are minutes of meeting of the Congress party of Singoli helg in the months of August and October, 1966.\n\nRam Chandra Sharma's _name appears in the notices of the meetings of the Congress Party m the months of August and October, 1966' at Silll.goli which are J?-xhibiits R-1/7 and R-1/8.\n\nRam Chandra Sharma appears as a signatory to. the minutes.\n\nAfter having admitted the signatures Ram Chandra\n\nA Sharma made attempts to disown his signatures. Exhibits R-1/9,\n\nR-1/10, R-1/11, R-1/12, R-1/13 and R-1/14 are receipts signed by the witness Ram Cham.dra Sharma. These receipts relate to expenses for meals and refreshments arranged for the workers near about th~ time of the election.\n\nRam Chandra Sharma denied his signatures but he admitted that the Congress workers and other B customers paid him for the meals. He denied that he gave the ' respondent any receipt.\n\nR:am Chandra Sharma obviously wanted to extricate himself from the receipts which nullified his oral evidence.\n\nRam Chandra Sharma was a very interested , witness and he was directly associated with the respondent.\n\nRam Chandra Slrarma said that the only meeting he attended in his life was the c one at Singoli on 29 January, 1967.\n\nSuch singular attendance is not only suspicious but also mendacious.\n\nRam Chandra Sharma not only gave from! his memory the speech of the appellant at Singoli but also added a gloss to it by stating that the appellant spoke about tax on sugar.\n\nIt was not even the case of the respol)- dent that the appellant spoke about tax on sugar.\n\nD P.W. 22 Mange Lal also suppbrted the case of the respondent about the appellant's speech at Singoli on 29 January, 1967. •Like Ram Chamdra Sharma he also said that the appellant talked about tax on sugar.\n\nThis shows how this pair of witnesses played the parrot in giving evidence. Mange Lal was confronted with Exhibit R-1/19 and Exhibit R-1/19A.\n\nThese two receipts are in respect E of rent of the building owned by Mange Lal.\n\nThe receipts are on account of rent from the respondent. Mange Lal said that he gave the receipts at the instance of Radha Kishan.\n\nThe further explanation given by the witness was tliat the house was mortgaged with Radha Kishan.\n\nNo document was produced to prove the\n\nF mortgage.\n\nRadha Kishan is Mange Lal wife's uncle.\n\nMange Lal's attempt to explain away the receipts for rent was futile.\n\nMange Lal also appears to be one of the conveners of the Congress meeting as' will appear from Exhibits R-117 and R-118. He is also signatory to the minutes Exhibits R-1/6. Mange I.:al said that the only meeting he ever attended was at Singoli on 29 February, 1967. He had never any talk with the respondent about the G speech at Singoli.\n\nThese wilinesses establish wjthout any doubt that they were not truthful witnesses but came prepared to support the respondent's case.\n\nThe other witnesses P.W. 17 Bhanwar Lal and P.W. 19 Nathu H Lal. also spoke about the appellant's alleged speech at Singoli on 29 January, 1967.\n\nThese two witnesses also gave evidence about the speech of Swamiji of Bhanpura at Singoli on 15 February,\n\n1967. The High Conti accepted the evidence of these witnesses.\n\n~UPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nWe are unable to accept the evidence of Bhanwar Lal and Nathu A Lal for the reasons to be given while discussing their evidence in connection with the meeting at Singoli on 15 February, 1967.\n\nThe respondent alleged that the appellant was guilty of corrupt practice within the meaning of sections 123(2) and 123(3) of the Act by reason of the three speeches delivered by the Swamiji of B Bhanpura on 15 February, 1967 at Morwan, Diken and Singoli.\n\nThe respondent alleged that the speeches were at the insta/lce of audie; nce.\n\nWith regard to the speech at Morwan apart from the respondent there were three witnesses on his behalf. They were P.W. 7 Manek Lal, P.W. 8 Ratan Lal Gaur Banjara and P.W. 9 Gulzari Lal Mahajam.\n\nManek Lal gave evidence twice.\n\nThe second time he gave evidence was in accordance with the understanding given by the respondent before this Court to produce some of the witnesses at his own cost.\n\nThat undertaking was giv(Jll at the hearing of an application by the appellant in this Court for transfer of the case to another court.\n\nWhen Manek Lal gave evidence on the first occasion he did not mention that Swamiji of Bhanpura said at the meeting at Morwan on 15 February, 1967 that 20 February was a sacred day and to vote for CQtlgress on such a sacred day would be to commit the sin of cow killing.\n\nManek Lal said that he attended the meeting of the Congress and of the Jan Sangh and he voted.\n\nGulzari Lal said that the Morwan meeting was the o.nly meeting he ever attended.\n\nBoth Manek Lal and Gulzari Lal like other witnesses gave evidence about the speecb. of Swamiji of Bhanpura in identical language and in the same sequence.\n\nThe hollowness of the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent is revealed by the testimony of Ratan Lal Banjara: He was confronted with Exhibit R-1/27.\n\nThe Higb. Court described this document to be \"purloined brief.\" Exhibit R-1/27 is a docu- . ment which contains the date and hour of the meeting at Morwan, the text of the speech at Morwan.\n\nThereafter there are 7 questions\n\nand answers.\n\nThe questions are as to when did Swamiji come; how be came; who came with him; and it is also written in that document that the appellant came and listened to the speech and expressed gratitude and thanks to the public.\n\nRatan Lal Banjara denied that he was tutored through that document The alleged speech of Swamiji of Bhanpura is typed in Hindi.\n\nOne of. the notes in that document is that Moti Khema Jat and Gordhan Smgh were not seen at the meeting.\n\nThose two persons were cited by H the appellant as witnesses.\n\nIt is indeed curious. that witnesses would spcifically say as to who were not present and the names of such persons who were not present are those who are cited by the\n\nV. K. SAKLECHA v. JAGJ!WAN (Ray, J.) 969\n\nrespondent as witnesses.\n\nIt is not only unnatural but extraordinary that witnesses would notice as to who were not present at the meeting which, according to the witnesses, was attended by 500 persons.\n\nThe respondent was shown Exhibit R-1/27.\n\nHis explanation was that the notes were prepared for instructions to his counsel.\n\nThe tenor of the document and the que 'lions and answers point with unerring accuracy that the documer. t was prepared to coach witnesses.\n\nThe respondent said that he had prepared such note's for every meeting.\n\nOther documents did not see the light of the day.\n\nThat would support the conclusion that other witnesses had been similarly prepared. It explains why all witnesses spoke the same language.\n\nAll witnesses were coached.\n\nThe respondent said that Jai Ram Jat had taken notes of th meeting at Morwan and gave the same to the respondent.\n\nThe respondent said that the notes were not of significance, and, therefore, he did not take the notes from Jai Ram Jat. If the notes D were not significani the Morwan meeting also ame insignificant.\n\nThe non-production of the notes and of the author of the notes are additional features to establish the vacuity of the respondent's allegations about the speech of Swamiji of Bhanpura at Morwan.\n\nThe High Court referred to an article published in 'Sudesh' in the issue dated 30 November, 1966. There was an article written by Swamiji of Bhanpura. The High Court observed that Swamiji of Bhanpura wrote in that article that the killing of cow was one manner of killing God, and, therefore, it was exfremely probable that a person who held that view would while speaking of cow protection give a deeply religious complexion and would condemn those who did not share his views.\n\nThis is a strange logic.\n\nWe are unable to accept the evidence of the respondent and his witnesses that there was any speech at Morwan that to vote for the Congress would be to commit the sin of cow killing.\n\nThe respondent's further case is that Swamiji of Bhanpura delivered a speech at Singoli on 15 February, l967. This speech was illso alleged by the respondent to be an appeal on the ground of religion and a threat that the voters. would incur divine displeasure if they voted for the 'cow killing Congress'.\n\nThe High Court relied on the evidence of P.W. 16 Paras Ram and P.W. 17 Bhanwar Lal.\n\nParas Ram was confronted with a document Exhibit R-1/50. That document contains the minutes of the meeting of the Congress party at Singoli on 26 August, 1966.\n\nThe name Of Paras Ram is mentioned there.\n\nThe name of one Ratan Lal is also mentioned there.\n\nThe High Court held that Paras Ram was a common name and there was nothing to show that Paras\n\nRam in Exhibit R-1/50 was the same Paras Ram who appeared A as a witness.\n\nParas Ram said that Madan Lal Sharma a Jan Sangh worker made an announcement about the meeting.\n\nMadan Lal Sharma R.W. 16 gave evidence on behalf of the appellant and denied that he made any announcement.\n\nThe High Court relied on the crossexamination of Bhanwar Lal P.W. 17.\n\nBhanwar Lal in his evidence stated that Madan Lal Sharma of Singoli made the announc~ ment.\n\nIt was suggested to Bhanwar Lal in cross-examination that there was no such announcement.\n\nThe High Court read that suggestion to mean that there was no person of the name of Madan Lal Sharma in existence.\n\nThat is totally misreading the suggestion.\n\nIr is also not reading the evidence of Madan Lal Shanna R.W. 16 in the correct perspective.\n\nParas Ram was living at Nimech for the last 15 years.\n\nThe respondent also admitted that Paras Ram lived at Nimech.\n\nParas Ram said that he never attended any meeting excepting the one\n\nat Singoli.\n\nParas Ram .narrated the speech oi Swamiji from D memory.\n\nHe also said that he never had any discussion with any witness or even with the respondent about the speech. 'If that were so, the respondent would not be able to call Paras Ram as a witness.\n\nThis attitude is typical of almost all the witnesses on behalf of the respondent.\n\nThe witnesses wanted to give the appearance of detachment and disinterestedness.\n\nThe evidence indicates that they were coached and they were not only interested in the Congress E organisation but also in the case of the respondent.\n\nParas Ram denied that there was any case pendinii: against him under section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nWhen he was confronted with Exhibit R-1/4 he admitted that he WR$ prosecuted.\n\nHe also admitted that the respondent was his counsel in suits which F were pending against him.\n\nParas Ram also admitted that his father went on a pilgrimage and Bha.nwar Lal P.W. 17 was taken by his father.\n\nParas Ram said that he came to court in the company of Bhanwar Lal.\n\nBhanwar Lal was known to the respondent.\n\nThe respondent ivas his lawyer.\n\nBhanwar Lal cooked for Congress workers.\n\nHe G came to Singoli for election purposes.\n\nBhanwar Lal admitted that he went with the father of Paras Ram on a pilgrimage.\n\nBhanwar Lal remembered the speech of the appellant at Singoli, on 29 January, 1967 as also the speech of Swarniji of Bhanpura.\n\nBhanwar Lal and all other wilJlesses who spoke about the speech , H of Swarniji narrated the same in the same language and :Hi 'the same order. The first pan of the speech related to cow, the second\n\npart being an appeal to religion and the third part related to. ah\n\n-.-~\n\n::t\n\nappeal to voters that voting for Congress would amount to a sin.\n\nReading the evidence in print one gets the impression that each witness came prepared to play the part assigned to him.\n\nExhibit R-1/8 dated 26 August, 19fi6 is a notice for a meeting of the Congress Committee at.Singoli.\n\nExhibit R-1/50 dated 26 August, 1966 is the draft resolution of that committee meeting. It is written biy the respondent.\n\nExhibit R-1/5 dated 26 August, 1966 contains the minutes oi the meeting at Singoli.\n\nExhibit R-1/6 contains the minutes of the meeting of the CQ!lgress committee at Singoli on 2 October, 1966.\n\nThese documents show that Paras Ram, Bhanwar Lal and Ram Chandra Sharma were connected with the Congress organisation.\n\nThe respondent was also associated with the Congress committee: The minutes showed that Ratan Lal Petlia was a member of the committee.\n\nThe respondent's witnesses stated that Ratan Lal Petlia was a worker of the Jan Sangh.\n\nThe reason for saying so was that Ratan Lal Petlia was cited by the appellant as a witness.\n\nTue records show that Ratan Lal Petlia was associated with the Congress organisation.\n\nD Ratan Lal Petlia R.1 W. 10 said that he was associated with the tongress organisation at Singoli.\n\nHe denied that Swamiji of Bhanpura made any appeal to the voters that voting for Congress would amount tiJ the sin of killing cow.\n\nThe respondnes witnesses wanted to condemn Ratan Lal Petlia by saying that Ratan Lal Petlia made arrangements for Jan Sangh.\n\nThat is another illus- E\n\ntration of the partisan character of the respondent)_.witnesses.\n\nNathu Lal P.W. 19 was believed by the High Court.\n\nIt transpired in the evidence that N athu Lal became liable to pay Rs.· 372.06 to Krishi Sewa Sehkari Samiti and also to account for 73 bagHlf super-phosphate.\n\nNathu Lal signed the document R-1/15, At the ume of giving evidence he said it was Chhote Lal who promised to pay and account for the phosphate. He did not rest content with that position.\n\nHe said. that he signed the document as a member.\n\nThe High Court did not consider these justi-· tied criticisms of the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent.\n\nManna Lal P.W. 20 gave evidence not only about the speech of Swamiji of Bhanpura at Singoli on 15 February, 1967 t also of the speech of the appellant at Singoli on 29 January, 1967. As tiJ the appellant's speech Manna Lal said that the appellant talked of 'cow killing Congress 10 times' and !hat is how he remembered the speech.\n\nHe narrated the speech of !he appellant like other witnesses. in the same language.\n\nManna Lal said that Swamiji of Bhanpura spoke about voiing for dharrna and cow.\n\nManna Lal came to court from Singoli along with Ram Chandra Sharma.\n\nThe overwhelming impression produced by the witnesses on. behalf of the respondent is that they were all prepared on the same\n\npattern of evidence.\n\nWe are unable , o hbld on the entire evidence A that there was any appeal on the ground of religion or that there was any threat to voters of divine displeasure if they voted for the Congress.\n\nThe respondent alleged that there was a meeting at Di.ken on 15 February, 1967 where Swamiji of Bhanpura spoke.\n\nThe al!e- B gations are that there was an appeal o.n the ground of religion.\n\nThe respondent produced two witnesses Shanti Lal P.W. 10 and Ram Bilas P.W. 11.\n\nShanti Lal's evidence was that the cow slaughter should be stopped and Monday gyaras was a holy day and all should vote for Jan Sangh and thus earn happiness an.d bliss and it was the duty of every Hindu not to vote for cow killing Congress.\n\nThis evidence does not support the respondent's case.\n\nShanti Lal said that his family left on 10 February, 1967.\n\nHis family members went to Byama in Rajasthan to attend a marriage ceremony.\n\nShanti Lal however said that he stayed on.\n\nHe left on 16 February, 1967 and returned on 28 February, 1967. This was to make it possible for him to l:je present at Di.ken on 15 February, 1967.\n\nRam Bilas P.W. 11 narrated the speech.of Swamiji of Bhanpura.\n\nHe however said that he had no talk with the respondent.\n\nIt becomes difficult to follow as to how the respondent would know about the presence of the witness at Diken and then cite him as a witness.\n\nThe respondent gave an undertaking to this Court to produce the witness for cross-examination.\n\nThe witnesses however were not produced.\n\nThat is another reason to hold that the-respondent's case was not true.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons the judgment of. the High court is F set aside.\n\nThe election petition is dismissed.\n\nThe trial in the High Court lasted over 180 days.\n\nBoth parties should .have conducted the case with precision and clarity.\n\nThe parties could have shortened the matter. Both parties are to pay and bear their own costs in the High Court as well as in this Court.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 187, "entities": [{"text": "VIRENDRA KUMAR SAKLECHA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIRENDRA KUMAR SAKLECHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGJIWAN AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAGJIWAN AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 22, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 58, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 22, 1972\n\n!"}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Conduct of Election Rules, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 333, "end_char": 364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh HiRh Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 379, "end_char": 410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 827, "end_char": 833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh HiRh Court Rules", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh HiRh Court Rules"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 845, "end_char": 877, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 958, "end_char": 964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh HiRh Court Rules", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh HiRh Court Rules"}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1053, "end_char": 1059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh HiRh Court Rules", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh HiRh Court Rules"}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1442, "end_char": 1448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1480, "end_char": 1496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pradesh High Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2165, "end_char": 2189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1970] 3 S.C.R. 121", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4216, "end_char": 4234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4822, "end_char": 4833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4865, "end_char": 4881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. L. Sibbal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5038, "end_char": 5050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. L. Sibbal, A iyocate-General for the S ate of Punjab, S. L.\n\nGarK and S. K. Gambhir, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. L.\n\nGarK", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5095, "end_char": 5106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. L. Sibbal, A iyocate-General for the S ate of Punjab, S. L.\n\nGarK and S. K. Gambhir, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Gambhir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5111, "end_char": 5124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. L. Sibbal, A iyocate-General for the S ate of Punjab, S. L.\n\nGarK and S. K. Gambhir, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. N. Phadke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5146, "end_char": 5158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Phadke."}}, {"text": "U. N. Bachawat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5160, "end_char": 5174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. N. Bachawat, P. C. Bhar•ari, J. B. Dad+i- ' chanfi, O. C. Mathur, Ravinder Narain, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. C. Bhar•ari,", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5176, "end_char": 5191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. N. Bachawat, P. C. Bhar•ari, J. B. Dad+i- ' chanfi, O. C. Mathur, Ravinder Narain, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. Dad+i- ' chanfi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5195, "end_char": 5213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. N. Bachawat, P. C. Bhar•ari, J. B. Dad+i- ' chanfi, O. C. Mathur, Ravinder Narain, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "O. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5215, "end_char": 5227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. N. Bachawat, P. C. Bhar•ari, J. B. Dad+i- ' chanfi, O. C. Mathur, Ravinder Narain, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5229, "end_char": 5244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. N. Bachawat, P. C. Bhar•ari, J. B. Dad+i- ' chanfi, O. C. Mathur, Ravinder Narain, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "N. K. Shejwalla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5269, "end_char": 5284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. K. Shejwalla, Pramod Swarup, S. S. Khanduja and lalita Kohli, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Pramod Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5286, "end_char": 5299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. K. Shejwalla, Pramod Swarup, S. S. Khanduja and lalita Kohli, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. S. Khanduja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5301, "end_char": 5315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. K. Shejwalla, Pramod Swarup, S. S. Khanduja and lalita Kohli, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "lalita Kohli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5320, "end_char": 5332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. K. Shejwalla, Pramod Swarup, S. S. Khanduja and lalita Kohli, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "G\n\nRay", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5400, "end_char": 5406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fudgment of the Court was delivered by G\n\nRay, J.\n\nThis is an appeal from the judgment dated 30 September, 1969 of the High Court of Madhya Pradl'Sh setting aside the election of the appellant."}}, {"text": "section 123(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5630, "end_char": 5644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5652, "end_char": 5690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6015, "end_char": 6026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 123(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6139, "end_char": 6153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Jhatla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6192, "end_char": 6198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he ground of religion as defined in section 123 (3) of the Act and also threatening the electors with divine displeasure being a corrupt practice as defined in section 123(2) of the Act in regard to the speech at Jhatla oh 12 Febiuary, 1967."}}, {"text": "Morwan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6463, "end_char": 6469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court also held the appellant to be guil!Y of corrupt practice of appealing on the ground of religion and threatening with divine\" displeasure those who voted for the Congress in the three speeches delh'.ered on 15 February, 1967 at Morwan, SiiJ.goli and Diken by the Swamiji of Bhanpura at."}}, {"text": "SiiJ.goli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6471, "end_char": 6480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court also held the appellant to be guil!Y of corrupt practice of appealing on the ground of religion and threatening with divine\" displeasure those who voted for the Congress in the three speeches delh'.ered on 15 February, 1967 at Morwan, SiiJ.goli and Diken by the Swamiji of Bhanpura at."}}, {"text": "Diken", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6485, "end_char": 6490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court also held the appellant to be guil!Y of corrupt practice of appealing on the ground of religion and threatening with divine\" displeasure those who voted for the Congress in the three speeches delh'.ered on 15 February, 1967 at Morwan, SiiJ.goli and Diken by the Swamiji of Bhanpura at."}}, {"text": "Bhanpura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6509, "end_char": 6517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court also held the appellant to be guil!Y of corrupt practice of appealing on the ground of religion and threatening with divine\" displeasure those who voted for the Congress in the three speeches delh'.ered on 15 February, 1967 at Morwan, SiiJ.goli and Diken by the Swamiji of Bhanpura at."}}, {"text": "31 January, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6667, "end_char": 6683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 31 January, 1972 'we delivered the order holding that we did not agree with the finding of the High Court and we also held the appellant to be not guilty of any corrupt practice."}}, {"text": "Jagjiwan Joshi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6964, "end_char": 6978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant and the respondent Jagjiwan Joshi and the other two respondents were four."}}, {"text": "Jawad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7036, "end_char": 7041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "candidates from Jawad Constituency f?r electin to the Madhya radesh ssembly at the general e.loc- !"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7283, "end_char": 7294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Singoli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7398, "end_char": 7405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first.relates to the speech delivered by the appellant at Singoli on 29 January, 1967 and a speech delivered by the &ppellant at Athana on 9 February, 1967."}}, {"text": "Athana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7469, "end_char": 7475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first.relates to the speech delivered by the appellant at Singoli on 29 January, 1967 and a speech delivered by the &ppellant at Athana on 9 February, 1967."}}, {"text": "Kajod Dhakad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7613, "end_char": 7625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5000 set up Kajod Dhakad ...... so that the Jan Sangh votes may be split and he might .", "canonical_name": "Kajod Dliakad"}}, {"text": "Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7955, "end_char": 7960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Joshi has set up Kajod Dhakad on payment of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8059, "end_char": 8070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Moham-. mad Kasai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8669, "end_char": 8686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The alleged speech at Jhatla was as follows :-\n\n\"This Congress candidate gave a knife to Moham-."}}, {"text": "sections 123(2) and 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8956, "end_char": 8982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12 February, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9038, "end_char": 9055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allegations of corrupt practice as defined in sections 123(2) and 123(3) of the Act in relation to the same speech at Jhatla on 12 February, 1967 were as follows :-\n\n\"The votes shall be cast on the 20th and it is fortunate that it is a sacred day being a Monday gyaras."}}, {"text": "sections 123(2) and 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9398, "end_char": 9424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15 Fel:lruary, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9499, "end_char": 9518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "allegations of corrupt practice within the meaning of sections 123(2) and 123(3) of the Act against the appellant in regard to three speeches delivered on 15 Fel:lruary, 1967 at N'.orwan, Singoli and Diken by the Swamiji of Bhanpura were as follows:-\n\nAt Morwan :-\n\n\"Today the Hindu dharma is being destroyed."}}, {"text": "N'.orwan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9522, "end_char": 9530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "allegations of corrupt practice within the meaning of sections 123(2) and 123(3) of the Act against the appellant in regard to three speeches delivered on 15 Fel:lruary, 1967 at N'.orwan, Singoli and Diken by the Swamiji of Bhanpura were as follows:-\n\nAt Morwan :-\n\n\"Today the Hindu dharma is being destroyed."}}, {"text": "Bhagwan Gopal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9746, "end_char": 9759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Congress is killing the cow-progeny (go-vansh) of Bhagwan Gopal."}}, {"text": "Saklecha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10530, "end_char": 10538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Saklecha is your Chief Minister to be."}}, {"text": "Diken", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10746, "end_char": 10751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At Diken :-\n\n\\ 'There was a yagna for putting an end to the cow killing in this country."}}, {"text": "9 February, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11326, "end_char": 11342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With regard to the speech at Athana on 9 February, 1967 the E allegations within the meaning of section 123 ( 4) of the Act were twofold."}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11383, "end_char": 11394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kajod Dhabad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11513, "end_char": 11525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First that the appellant published the false allegation that the respondent had bribed Kajod Dhabad with Rs.", "canonical_name": "Kajod Dliakad"}}, {"text": "Kishan. Lal Teli", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11818, "end_char": 11834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court accepted the oral evidence of tlie respondent and four F witnesses Kishan."}}, {"text": "Ghisa Dhakad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11843, "end_char": 11855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Teli P.W. I, Ghisa Dhakad P.W. 2."}}, {"text": "Laxmi Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11864, "end_char": 11873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Laxmi Lal P.W. 5 and Chand Mohammad P.W. 6."}}, {"text": "Chand Mohammad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11885, "end_char": 11899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Laxmi Lal P.W. 5 and Chand Mohammad P.W. 6."}}, {"text": "Section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12493, "end_char": 12503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Conduct of Election Rules 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12627, "end_char": 12657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12839, "end_char": 12849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Conduct of Election Rules 1961", "statute": "the Conduct of Election Rules 1961"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12987, "end_char": 13014, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13045, "end_char": 13056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Conduct of Election Rules 1961", "statute": "the Conduct of Election Rules 1961"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13476, "end_char": 13514, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13562, "end_char": 13589, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14639, "end_char": 14666, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14944, "end_char": 14963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the earliest decisions is State of Bombay v.\n\nParshottam Jog Naik, [1952], S.C.R. 674, where this Court endorsed the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Padmabati Dasi v. Rasik Lal Dhar, I.L.R. 37 Cal."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15296, "end_char": 15302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C.R. 331, this Court deprecated 'slip short verifications, in an affidavit and reiterated the ruling of th.is Court in Bombay, case (supra) that verification should."}}, {"text": "Order 19 rule 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15382, "end_char": 15397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1970] 3 S.C.R. 121", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15546, "end_char": 15565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16489, "end_char": 16499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Kumar Aggarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18023, "end_char": 18041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The non-disclosure of grounds or sources of information in the affidavit of the election petitioner in the present case assumed importance by reason of the fact that the respondent said that he had a written report about the alleged speech at Athana and the\n\nreport was given to the respondent by Ram Kumar Aggarwal."}}, {"text": "Kishan Lil Tell", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18958, "end_char": 18973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Witnesses on-behalf of the respondent Kishan Lil Tell, Ghisa Dhakad, Laxmi Lal, Chand Mohammad and Bansi Dhar Bairagi gave oral evidence in identical words and language that the respondent had instigated Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Kishan Lil Tell"}}, {"text": "Bansi Dhar Bairagi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19019, "end_char": 19037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Witnesses on-behalf of the respondent Kishan Lil Tell, Ghisa Dhakad, Laxmi Lal, Chand Mohammad and Bansi Dhar Bairagi gave oral evidence in identical words and language that the respondent had instigated Mohd."}}, {"text": "Mohd. Kasai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19124, "end_char": 19135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Witnesses on-behalf of the respondent Kishan Lil Tell, Ghisa Dhakad, Laxmi Lal, Chand Mohammad and Bansi Dhar Bairagi gave oral evidence in identical words and language that the respondent had instigated Mohd."}}, {"text": "Kishan Lal Teli", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19302, "end_char": 19317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kishan Lal Teli was the polling agent of the respondent.", "canonical_name": "Kishan Lil Tell"}}, {"text": "S9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19542, "end_char": 19544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kishan Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19579, "end_char": 19589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent admitted that Exhibits R.1/S9 and R-1/40 were signed by him but Kishan Lal as not prepared to admit his own signatures on the polling agent forms.", "canonical_name": "Kishan Lil Tell"}}, {"text": "Kishah Lal Teli", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20026, "end_char": 20041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kishah Lal Teli said that he spoke entirely from memory.", "canonical_name": "Kishan Lil Tell"}}, {"text": "Ghis.a Dhakad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20262, "end_char": 20275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A curious feature of Ghis.a Dhakad's evidence is that he did riot speak about the speech\n\nto anybody till he gave evidence in court.", "canonical_name": "Ghis.a Dhakad"}}, {"text": "Ghisa Dhakad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20580, "end_char": 20592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also in i:\\tidence that Ghisa Dhakad was the worker of the appellant's opponents . .", "canonical_name": "Ghis.a Dhakad"}}, {"text": "Laxmi Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21258, "end_char": 21267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This indicates as to how Laxmi Lal tried to impart oti ginality to his version of remembrance of things."}}, {"text": "B Chand Mohammad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21339, "end_char": 21355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B Chand Mohammad was believed by the High Court with regard to his presence at Athana but was disbelieved with regard to his presence at Sarwania Masania."}}, {"text": "Sarwania Masania", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21595, "end_char": 21611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be stated here that the High Court did riot accept the case of the respondent with regard to Sarwania Masania."}}, {"text": "Dhakad J(heri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21754, "end_char": 21767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His evi C dence was that he was going to the house of Dhakad J(heri and he stopped for a minute or two to listen to Jaq Sangh speakers."}}, {"text": "Chand Mohammad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21912, "end_char": 21926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fortuitous manner in which Chand Mohammad attended the meeting at Athana shows that he was introduced to support the respondent by rej>eating what the previous witnesses said about the Athana meeting."}}, {"text": "D Chand Mohammad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22139, "end_char": 22155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This will be apparent in view of the fact that when D Chand Mohammad was examined for the second time like some other witnesses he said that he heard the speech of th apllant for a minute or two but he left th~ meeting before tlie appellant's speech was over."}}, {"text": "Bansi Dhar Bairagi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22880, "end_char": 22898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bansi Dhar Bairagi proposed the name of Ram Kumar Aggarwal who was supposed to have taken notes of the Athana meeting and who never came to the witness box.", "canonical_name": "Bansi Dhar Bairagi"}}, {"text": "Bansi Dhar Bairagi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23038, "end_char": 23056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bansi Dhar Bairagi was also associated with Kajod Dhakad.", "canonical_name": "Bansi Dhar Bairagi"}}, {"text": "Kajod Dliakad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23166, "end_char": 23179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bansi Dhar Bairagi's evidence was that he went to propose the name of Kajod Dliakad but when he was going to propose the name his G hand began' to shake.", "canonical_name": "Kajod Dliakad"}}, {"text": "H Banst Dhar Bairagi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23613, "end_char": 23633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H Banst Dhar Bairagi was the election agent of Kajod Dhakad."}}, {"text": "Ram Chand\n\nNagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23728, "end_char": 23744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The nomination paper ()f Kajod Dhakad was proposed by Ram Chand\n\nNagla brother of Badri Nath Nagla the President of Jawad Mand Congress."}}, {"text": "Badri Nath Nagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23756, "end_char": 23772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The nomination paper ()f Kajod Dhakad was proposed by Ram Chand\n\nNagla brother of Badri Nath Nagla the President of Jawad Mand Congress."}}, {"text": "Jawad Mand Congress", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23790, "end_char": 23809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The nomination paper ()f Kajod Dhakad was proposed by Ram Chand\n\nNagla brother of Badri Nath Nagla the President of Jawad Mand Congress."}}, {"text": "Sunder Lal Petlia", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 25692, "end_char": 25709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court not only disbelieved the witnesses produced on behalf of the appellant with regard to the meeting at Athana but also made certain observations about the first information report lodged by Sunder Lal Petlia R.W. 35."}}, {"text": "Petlfa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25851, "end_char": 25857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "with regard to an incident F at Athana at the day of the meeting .. A criminal case is pending as a result of that report lodged by Petlfa.", "canonical_name": "Petlfa"}}, {"text": "Petlia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26201, "end_char": 26207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court was wrong in pronouncing observations on the report lodged by Petlia.", "canonical_name": "Petlfa"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26519, "end_char": 26530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 123(2) and 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26760, "end_char": 26786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "20 February, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27022, "end_char": 27039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The speech alleged to be made by the appellant at Jhatla on 12 February, 1967 was that 20 February, 1967 was the sacred day bemg a Monday gyaras and to give a vote to the cow killing Congress on that day was equivalent to cutting doWill one cow and it would be on the voters to bear the responsibility for the sin."}}, {"text": "Mohan Lal Ramji Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27355, "end_char": 27374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent said that Mohan Lal Ramji Lal took notes of the meeting at Jhatla.", "canonical_name": "Mohan Lal Ramji Lal"}}, {"text": "Mohan Lal Ramji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27413, "end_char": 27428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohan Lal Ramji Lal was not examined by the respondent.", "canonical_name": "Mohan Lal Ramji Lal"}}, {"text": "JJratla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27922, "end_char": 27929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses on behalf of the respondent with regard to the speech at JJratla were Daulat Ram Sharma P.W. 12, Kastur Chand Jain P.W. 13, Ratan Lal Jain P.W. 14 and Prabhu Lal P.W. 15."}}, {"text": "Daulat Ram Sharma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27935, "end_char": 27952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses on behalf of the respondent with regard to the speech at JJratla were Daulat Ram Sharma P.W. 12, Kastur Chand Jain P.W. 13, Ratan Lal Jain P.W. 14 and Prabhu Lal P.W. 15."}}, {"text": "Kastur Chand Jain", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27962, "end_char": 27979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses on behalf of the respondent with regard to the speech at JJratla were Daulat Ram Sharma P.W. 12, Kastur Chand Jain P.W. 13, Ratan Lal Jain P.W. 14 and Prabhu Lal P.W. 15."}}, {"text": "Ratan Lal Jain", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27989, "end_char": 28003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses on behalf of the respondent with regard to the speech at JJratla were Daulat Ram Sharma P.W. 12, Kastur Chand Jain P.W. 13, Ratan Lal Jain P.W. 14 and Prabhu Lal P.W. 15."}}, {"text": "Prabhu Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 28016, "end_char": 28026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses on behalf of the respondent with regard to the speech at JJratla were Daulat Ram Sharma P.W. 12, Kastur Chand Jain P.W. 13, Ratan Lal Jain P.W. 14 and Prabhu Lal P.W. 15."}}, {"text": "Daulat Ram Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28315, "end_char": 28332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daulat Ram Sharma went in search of his cattle to the pond at Jhatla."}}, {"text": "Jan Sangh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28489, "end_char": 28498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When he reached the shop he saw a meeting oi Jan Sangh going F on."}}, {"text": "Kastur Chand Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29077, "end_char": 29094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kastur Chand Jain was the polling agent of the respondent."}}, {"text": "Prabhu Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29787, "end_char": 29797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prabhu Lal came to give evidence along with Ratan Lal Jain P.W. 14 and Kastur Chand Jain P.W. 13."}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31136, "end_char": 31147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Swami Brahmananda", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31346, "end_char": 31363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent also alleged that besides the appellant one Swami Brahmananda of Himach!l] Pradesh and Khuman Singh of Nimech also spoke at the meeting at Singoli on the same day."}}, {"text": "Khuman Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31389, "end_char": 31401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent also alleged that besides the appellant one Swami Brahmananda of Himach!l] Pradesh and Khuman Singh of Nimech also spoke at the meeting at Singoli on the same day."}}, {"text": "Nimech", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31405, "end_char": 31411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent also alleged that besides the appellant one Swami Brahmananda of Himach!l] Pradesh and Khuman Singh of Nimech also spoke at the meeting at Singoli on the same day."}}, {"text": "Paras Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 31521, "end_char": 31530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court accepted .the oral evidence of P.W. 16 Paras Ram, P.W. 17 Bhanwar Lal, P.W. 18 Ram Chandra Sharma, P.W. 19 Nathu Lal and P.W. 22 Mange Lal Pancholi."}}, {"text": "Bhanwar Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 31540, "end_char": 31551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court accepted .the oral evidence of P.W. 16 Paras Ram, P.W. 17 Bhanwar Lal, P.W. 18 Ram Chandra Sharma, P.W. 19 Nathu Lal and P.W. 22 Mange Lal Pancholi."}}, {"text": "Ram Chandra Sharma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 31561, "end_char": 31579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court accepted .the oral evidence of P.W. 16 Paras Ram, P.W. 17 Bhanwar Lal, P.W. 18 Ram Chandra Sharma, P.W. 19 Nathu Lal and P.W. 22 Mange Lal Pancholi."}}, {"text": "Nathu Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 31589, "end_char": 31598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court accepted .the oral evidence of P.W. 16 Paras Ram, P.W. 17 Bhanwar Lal, P.W. 18 Ram Chandra Sharma, P.W. 19 Nathu Lal and P.W. 22 Mange Lal Pancholi."}}, {"text": "Mange Lal Pancholi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 31611, "end_char": 31629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court accepted .the oral evidence of P.W. 16 Paras Ram, P.W. 17 Bhanwar Lal, P.W. 18 Ram Chandra Sharma, P.W. 19 Nathu Lal and P.W. 22 Mange Lal Pancholi."}}, {"text": "Ram Chandra Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31838, "end_char": 31856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Chandra Sharma's _name appears in the notices of the meetings of the Congress Party m the months of August and October, 1966' at Silll.goli which are J?-xhibiits R-1/7 and R-1/8.", "canonical_name": "Ram Chandra\n\nA Sharma"}}, {"text": "Ram Chandra Sharma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32022, "end_char": 32040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Chandra Sharma appears as a signatory to.", "canonical_name": "Ram Chandra\n\nA Sharma"}}, {"text": "Ram Chandra\n\nA Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32119, "end_char": 32140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After having admitted the signatures Ram Chandra\n\nA Sharma made attempts to disown his signatures.", "canonical_name": "Ram Chandra\n\nA Sharma"}}, {"text": "Ram Cham.dra Sharma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 32275, "end_char": 32294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibits R-1/9,\n\nR-1/10, R-1/11, R-1/12, R-1/13 and R-1/14 are receipts signed by the witness Ram Cham.dra Sharma."}}, {"text": "R:am Chandra Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32603, "end_char": 32622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R:am Chandra Sharma obviously wanted to extricate himself from the receipts which nullified his oral evidence.", "canonical_name": "Ram Chandra\n\nA Sharma"}}, {"text": "Ram Chandra Slrarma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 32819, "end_char": 32838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Chandra Slrarma said that the only meeting he attended in his life was the c one at Singoli on 29 January, 1967."}}, {"text": "Mange Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 33284, "end_char": 33293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D P.W. 22 Mange Lal also suppbrted the case of the respondent about the appellant's speech at Singoli on 29 January, 1967."}}, {"text": "29 January, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33379, "end_char": 33395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D P.W. 22 Mange Lal also suppbrted the case of the respondent about the appellant's speech at Singoli on 29 January, 1967."}}, {"text": "Ram Chamdra Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33403, "end_char": 33421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "•Like Ram Chamdra Sharma he also said that the appellant talked about tax on sugar.", "canonical_name": "Ram Chandra\n\nA Sharma"}}, {"text": "Mange Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33558, "end_char": 33567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mange Lal was confronted with Exhibit R-1/19 and Exhibit R-1/19A.\n\nThese two receipts are in respect E of rent of the building owned by Mange Lal.", "canonical_name": "Mange Lal"}}, {"text": "Radha Kishan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33823, "end_char": 33835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mange Lal said that he gave the receipts at the instance of Radha Kishan."}}, {"text": "Mange I.:al", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34274, "end_char": 34285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mange I.:al said that the only meeting he ever attended was at Singoli on 29 February, 1967."}}, {"text": "Nathu H Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 34629, "end_char": 34640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other witnesses P.W. 17 Bhanwar Lal and P.W. 19 Nathu H Lal."}}, {"text": "Swamiji of Bhanpura", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34782, "end_char": 34801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These two witnesses also gave evidence about the speech of Swamiji of Bhanpura at Singoli on 15 February,\n\n1967.", "canonical_name": "Swamiji of Bhanpura"}}, {"text": "Bhanwar Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34974, "end_char": 34985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~UPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nWe are unable to accept the evidence of Bhanwar Lal and Nathu A Lal for the reasons to be given while discussing their evidence in connection with the meeting at Singoli on 15 February, 1967."}}, {"text": "Nathu A Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34990, "end_char": 35001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~UPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nWe are unable to accept the evidence of Bhanwar Lal and Nathu A Lal for the reasons to be given while discussing their evidence in connection with the meeting at Singoli on 15 February, 1967.", "canonical_name": "Nathu A Lal"}}, {"text": "sections 123(2) and 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35222, "end_char": 35248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B Bhanpura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35320, "end_char": 35330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent alleged that the appellant was guilty of corrupt practice within the meaning of sections 123(2) and 123(3) of the Act by reason of the three speeches delivered by the Swamiji of B Bhanpura on 15 February, 1967 at Morwan, Diken and Singoli."}}, {"text": "Manek Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 35583, "end_char": 35592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were P.W. 7 Manek Lal, P.W. 8 Ratan Lal Gaur Banjara and P.W. 9 Gulzari Lal Mahajam."}}, {"text": "Ratan Lal Gaur Banjara", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 35601, "end_char": 35623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were P.W. 7 Manek Lal, P.W. 8 Ratan Lal Gaur Banjara and P.W. 9 Gulzari Lal Mahajam."}}, {"text": "Gulzari Lal Mahajam", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 35635, "end_char": 35654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were P.W. 7 Manek Lal, P.W. 8 Ratan Lal Gaur Banjara and P.W. 9 Gulzari Lal Mahajam."}}, {"text": "Manek Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35998, "end_char": 36007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Manek Lal gave evidence on the first occasion he did not mention that Swamiji of Bhanpura said at the meeting at Morwan on 15 February, 1967 that 20 February was a sacred day and to vote for CQtlgress on such a sacred day would be to commit the sin of cow killing.", "canonical_name": "Mange Lal"}}, {"text": "Swamiji of Bhanpura", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36068, "end_char": 36087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Manek Lal gave evidence on the first occasion he did not mention that Swamiji of Bhanpura said at the meeting at Morwan on 15 February, 1967 that 20 February was a sacred day and to vote for CQtlgress on such a sacred day would be to commit the sin of cow killing.", "canonical_name": "Swamiji of Bhanpura"}}, {"text": "15 February, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36121, "end_char": 36138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Manek Lal gave evidence on the first occasion he did not mention that Swamiji of Bhanpura said at the meeting at Morwan on 15 February, 1967 that 20 February was a sacred day and to vote for CQtlgress on such a sacred day would be to commit the sin of cow killing."}}, {"text": "Gulzari Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36360, "end_char": 36371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gulzari Lal said that the Morwan meeting was the o.nly meeting he ever attended."}}, {"text": "Gulzari Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 36461, "end_char": 36472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both Manek Lal and Gulzari Lal like other witnesses gave evidence about the speecb."}}, {"text": "Ratan Lal Banjara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36697, "end_char": 36714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The hollowness of the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent is revealed by the testimony of Ratan Lal Banjara: He was confronted with Exhibit R-1/27.", "canonical_name": "Ratan Lal Banjara"}}, {"text": "Swamiji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37029, "end_char": 37036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The questions are as to when did Swamiji come; how be came; who came with him; and it is also written in that document that the appellant came and listened to the speech and expressed gratitude and thanks to the public.", "canonical_name": "Swarniji"}}, {"text": "Moti Khema Jat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37389, "end_char": 37403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the notes in that document is that Moti Khema Jat and Gordhan Smgh were not seen at the meeting."}}, {"text": "Gordhan Smgh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37408, "end_char": 37420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the notes in that document is that Moti Khema Jat and Gordhan Smgh were not seen at the meeting."}}, {"text": "Jai Ram Jat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38513, "end_char": 38524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent said that Jai Ram Jat had taken notes of th meeting at Morwan and gave the same to the respondent."}}, {"text": "30 November, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39079, "end_char": 39096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court referred to an article published in 'Sudesh' in the issue dated 30 November, 1966."}}, {"text": "15 February, l967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39780, "end_char": 39797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent's further case is that Swamiji of Bhanpura delivered a speech at Singoli on 15 February, l967."}}, {"text": "Paras Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40082, "end_char": 40091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paras Ram was confronted with a document Exhibit R-1/50.", "canonical_name": "Paras\n\nRam"}}, {"text": "26 August, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40225, "end_char": 40240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That document contains the minutes of the meeting of the Congress party at Singoli on 26 August, 1966."}}, {"text": "Paras Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40255, "end_char": 40264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The name Of Paras Ram is mentioned there.", "canonical_name": "Paras\n\nRam"}}, {"text": "Ratan Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40302, "end_char": 40311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The name of one Ratan Lal is also mentioned there.", "canonical_name": "Ratan Lal Banjara"}}, {"text": "Paras\n\nRam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40426, "end_char": 40436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court held that Paras Ram was a common name and there was nothing to show that Paras\n\nRam in Exhibit R-1/50 was the same Paras Ram who appeared A as a witness.", "canonical_name": "Paras\n\nRam"}}, {"text": "Madan Lal Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40528, "end_char": 40544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paras Ram said that Madan Lal Sharma a Jan Sangh worker made an announcement about the meeting."}}, {"text": "Madan Lal Sharma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 40605, "end_char": 40621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madan Lal Sharma R.W. 16 gave evidence on behalf of the appellant and denied that he made any announcement."}}, {"text": "Madan Lal Shanna", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41168, "end_char": 41184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ir is also not reading the evidence of Madan Lal Shanna R.W. 16 in the correct perspective."}}, {"text": "section 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42058, "end_char": 42069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bha.nwar Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 42344, "end_char": 42356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paras Ram also admitted that his father went on a pilgrimage and Bha.nwar Lal P.W. 17 was taken by his father."}}, {"text": "Swarniji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42808, "end_char": 42816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhanwar Lal remembered the speech of the appellant at Singoli, on 29 January, 1967 as also the speech of Swarniji of Bhanpura.", "canonical_name": "Swarniji"}}, {"text": "Ram Chandra Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 43769, "end_char": 43787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These documents show that Paras Ram, Bhanwar Lal and Ram Chandra Sharma were connected with the Congress organisation.", "canonical_name": "Ram Chandra\n\nA Sharma"}}, {"text": "Ratan Lal Petlia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43924, "end_char": 43940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent was also associated with the Congress committee: The minutes showed that Ratan Lal Petlia was a member of the committee.", "canonical_name": "Ratan Lal Banjara"}}, {"text": "Jan Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44049, "end_char": 44058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent's witnesses stated that Ratan Lal Petlia was a worker of the Jan Sangh."}}, {"text": "D Ratan Lal Petlia", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 44241, "end_char": 44259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D Ratan Lal Petlia R.1 W. 10 said that he was associated with the tongress organisation at Singoli."}}, {"text": "Swamiji of Bhanpura", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44357, "end_char": 44376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He denied that Swamiji of Bhanpura made any appeal to the voters that voting for Congress would amount tiJ the sin of killing cow."}}, {"text": "N athu Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44778, "end_char": 44788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It transpired in the evidence that N athu Lal became liable to pay Rs.·"}}, {"text": "Krishi Sewa Sehkari Samiti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44825, "end_char": 44851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "372.06 to Krishi Sewa Sehkari Samiti and also to account for 73 bagHlf super-phosphate."}}, {"text": "Nathu Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 44904, "end_char": 44913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nathu Lal signed the document R-1/15, At the ume of giving evidence he said it was Chhote Lal who promised to pay and account for the phosphate.", "canonical_name": "Nathu A Lal"}}, {"text": "Chhote Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44987, "end_char": 44997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nathu Lal signed the document R-1/15, At the ume of giving evidence he said it was Chhote Lal who promised to pay and account for the phosphate."}}, {"text": "Manna Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 45261, "end_char": 45270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manna Lal P.W. 20 gave evidence not only about the speech of Swamiji of Bhanpura at Singoli on 15 February, 1967 t also of the speech of the appellant at Singoli on 29 January, 1967."}}, {"text": "Manna Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45678, "end_char": 45687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manna Lal said that Swamiji of Bhanpura spoke about voiing for dharrna and cow."}}, {"text": "Shanti Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 46400, "end_char": 46410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent produced two witnesses Shanti Lal P.W. 10 and Ram Bilas P.W. 11."}}, {"text": "Ram Bilas", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 46423, "end_char": 46432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent produced two witnesses Shanti Lal P.W. 10 and Ram Bilas P.W. 11."}}, {"text": "Shanti Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46741, "end_char": 46751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Lal said that his family left on 10 February, 1967."}}, {"text": "Byama", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46828, "end_char": 46833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His family members went to Byama in Rajasthan to attend a marriage ceremony."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46837, "end_char": 46846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His family members went to Byama in Rajasthan to attend a marriage ceremony."}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_973_972_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "~·\n\nD. N. BHATIACHARJEE & ORS.\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.\n\nMarch 22, 1972\n\n[A. N. GROVER AND M. H. BEG, JJ.]\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898), s. 203-Power of Magis trate to dismiss complaint.\n\nAn order of dismissal of complaint under s. 203 Cr. P.C .. has to be made on judicially sound grounds.\n\nIt can only be made where the reasons given disclose .that the proceedings cannot terminate \\luccessfully in a convicton. A Magistrate is not debarred, at this stage, from goi'lg into .the merits df the ev; denee produced by the complainant, but the object of such consideration could only be to determi 1e whether 1here are sufficient grnund!i for proceeding furtoor.\n\nThe mere existence of some grounds which would be material in deciding whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted does not generally indicate that the case must necessary fail.\n\nOn the other hand, such grounds indicate the need for proceeding further in order to discover the truth after a full and 'proper investigation. If, however, a bare perusal of a complaint or the evidence led in supjll)rt of it show that the essential ingred'ents of the offences alleged are ab6ent or that too dispute is only of a cvil nature or that there are such patent absurdit es in the evidence produced that it would be a waste of time to proettd further, the complaint _could be properly dismissed under the section. [9'76 E-Hl\n\nWhere, therefore, the Magistrate dismies a complaint on a misread .. ing df the oral evidence and 'he evidence, in fact, does not reveal a'ly absurdity so as to merit a forthright dism:&sal of too complaint under the section, such an order is fit to be set aside by the High Cotirt.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 156 of 1969.\n\nAppeal b!y. special leave from the judgment and order dated April 15, 1969 of the Calcutta High Coutt in Criminal Revision No. 1114 .of 1963.\n\nC. K. Daphtary and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellants.\n\nG I>. K. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, tor respondent No. I.\n\nP. K. Mukherjee, for respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeJl, J.\n\nOn 1f .. 7 -1963 Sunilakshva Choudhry a :Oirector of the Metropolitan Indu1trial Corporation Ltd., CIcut a, havi\"g\n\nbeen authorised by its Boa•d of Directors, filed a complaint agaiqst the appllant Debndra Na•h Bhattacharjee (or Bhattacharya), a former Director, and Banamali Pathak, Cashier of the Bengal 16-L106ISupcin2 .\n\nLuxrni Cotton Mills Ltd., and Hiran Roy, Chief Accountant of the Bengal Luxmi Cotion Mills Ltd., alleging offence punishable under Sec.ions 406/409/467/471/477A/109 JndiJn Penal CJde.\n\nThe c:mplainant alleged that, when the Life Insurance business was natioiialbeJ in 1956 the Metrvp !Lan Insurance Co. Ltd.\n\n(hereina, ter referred to as 'the Oimpany') received a sum of about Rs. 10,25,523/· as compensation, a.nd the Company was transformed in.-.:i Metropohtan Industrial Corporaiion (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation').\n\nThe bu; iness of the Corporation wa; s\"id to be c:mfined to making of loans, and dea ings in socks and shares. The complainant was Director of the Company in 1957 and the accused app:llant D. N. Bhattasharjee was albged to be its Managim Di ec or with abs'.llu\\e control over the funds of the Company and the only person au'horised to operate the t11anking account of the Company with the Metropolitan Bank Ltd. Jloundabbut October, 1958, alth. ui; h. th: appellant Bhattach1rj 'e was said to have ceased to be the Managing Di-ector, yet, he is alleged to have continued to exrcise the powers he had possessed a; M 1n1ging Director.\n\nAf•er the Company became the Corp ration certain activities of the appellant D N. Bhattacha•jee ae al'eged to hwe come to light and ccmpelbd his resignation on 28-2-1963 so that he hande1 over s0me of the B01ks and reco•ds of the Corporation to the complainant.\n\nThe c'>mnlainant, after having examined the records hmded over by D. N. Bhattacharjee, claimed to have found m 1n'bly pay shee•s containing mimes of certain\n\nem~Joyees who were not emnloyees d the Corporatio.n at n and who wee smpced to be fictitiouc as they could not be trased. The comphinant alleed that, .., n furthe• enquiry, he 'qurid that the Corporation had not employed anybbdy at all but h 0 d taken occasional holp from cera•n empJyees of sister concerns which hqd th•ir cfli\"es in the s1me building.\n\nTn o•her words. •he c0mrlainant claimed to have disc've•e1 that the pay-<h~;~ of the Co-voration were totallv f1lse and fabri\"ated.\n\nHe also comuhined that Jictitious signatures of suppose0ly different persons appeare1 to him to have been m1de by a single pe•s0n so as to appear as signatures of diffre>lt actually existing individuals.\n\nThe comota'nant al'eed that his susnicions were confirmed by sending these alloge'1 sigoatur_es t~ a H •ndwriting Exuert f\"r ouinion: Accoding to the comulainant, all •hh was dne at the instance of or with the complicity of D. N. Bhattach1riee and wi•h the aid of the two other co-accused.\n\nTt was asser•e<i that D. N. Bb<i.•t•charjee h•d full lmowled•e f'f what was taking place and had disbonestlv misanoro. priated e.nd c 0 nver'e'1 to his own ue lare sums of money relongilllr .to the cmoration. He aiid •lie .. two cO-•ccmed, who are said ti;) /iil.ve actually Jll'a'de >the e11•iies, wee alleged to have been tJ'eaRed in a GOfl<.nlr'l.C:.V. . 'l'b\"- comtill>inant gWe a tis• of five Wis, :lncJudliig µiat .d. • ):land~ &flert, -..id he ielied\n\nD. N. BHATTACHARJEE v. WEST BENGAL (Beg, J.) 97$\n\nupon a number of account books, documents, and records of the Company and the CorporatiJn.\n\nAfter an enquiry into the allegations contained in the complaint a Presidency Magistrate found p. ima facie evidenc.e of a conspiracy to commit beach of trust by foring receipts and use of forged receipts and falsification of accounts.\n\nOn 2-8-1963, the Presi-· dency Magistrate, ordered the case to l6e put up before the Chief Presidency Magistrate for further orders.\n\nOn 10-8-1963, the Chief Presidency Magistrate, after giving particulars of the prosecution case and the evidence produced to support it, went on to observe : \"In assessing the evidence adduc; d C for the purpose of taking out a process, certain broad tacts and circumstahces and probabilities cannot, in my opinion, be overlooked\".\n\nThe Chief Preiidency Magistrate . then mentioned the reasons which, in his opinion, justified a dismiss1l of the complaint\n\nwihout issue of process.\n\nHe pointed out : firs•ly, that the Company, which was admitted to be a going concern, 'must have had D some of its own employees who must have been taken ove~ by the Corporation in 1960; secondly, that D. N. Bhattacharjee, at the time of his resignation on 28-2-1963 had handed over the records and accunt books of the Company to the complainant which fact indicated that he \"probably\" did not know th'at any of these were\n\nfored for fabricated; thirdly, that it was \"improbable\" that the E Corporation could carry on its business without its own emrybyees; fourthly, that evidence had not been led to show what enquiries were made to indicate that .the names on the pay sheet were fictitious; fifthly, that the complainant had h; mself admitted that one or two persons shoMI in the pay sheet might have been employed by the Corporation and that this demoliihed\" the wh0]e prosecution ca'e of fictitious entries; and~ six'hly, that the opinbn of the F Handwriting Expert \"does not appear to be empJiatic\" and w1s. \"]\"' not supported by \"sufficient reasons''. On...trrese grounds, the Chief Presidency Magistrate, after holding thilt there were \"rea11v, no sufficient grounds to proceed furth\"t'\" dismissed the complaint under Sec. 203 Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nG The complainant then invoked the Revisional jurisdition of the Calcutta High Cou-t. That Court, af'er an examination o.f the com'l!aint, the evidence produced for the purpose of i; suing proce's to the accused persons, and the order of the Chief P•esidency Magistrate, came to the conclusion •hat the order of dismiss1! of the complaint under Sec. 203 Criminal Procedure Code was imoroner. ll The High Court held that the o•der contained a pre-mature verdict on the merits of thP, case.\n\nFurthermore, the High Court pointed out that the Chief Presidency Magistrate had .misread the oral evidence in findinp; that the complainant said that one or two persolll'\n\nmentioned in the pay sheets might have been employed by the _A Company sometimes. . A correct reading of the evidence of the complainant, which we have also examined, was that one <Jr two persons may have been employed by the Company from time to time but none of the persons whose names appeared in the pay sheets were any of those persons.\n\nEven if the complainant Jiad said that some of the entries in the account books appeared to be R deliberately false, the complaint would . not have merited a forthright dismissal without further enquiry. The High Court, in our opinion, rightly considered the order pronouncing a judgment on the merits of the case on bare probabilities. and surmises to be premature. The High Court, very rightly, did not express any opinion on merits of the. prosecution case beyond saying \\hat the C case call'ed for further enquiry.\n\nJt, therefoe. set aside the order · of dismissal under Section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code and' sent back the case for farther enquiry in accordance with law.\n\nThe accused have come up to this Court by Special leave against the above--mentioned order of the High Court for further enquiry into the case. It is urged that the High Court should not have, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, set aside the Chief Presidency Magistrate's order. We are unable to accept this contention because we think that the Presidency Magistrate had not cor ectly understood the scope and pupose of the powe.r to dismiss a complaint under Section 203 Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nIt has to be remembered that an order of dismissal or a complaint under Section 203 Criminal Procedure Code has to be made on judicially sound grounds.\n\nIt can only be made where the reasons given disclose that the poceedings cannot terminate successfullv in a conviction.\n\nIt is true that the Magistrate is not debarred, at this stage, from going into the merits of the evidence produced by the complainant.\n\nBut, the object of such considera-. lion of the merits of the case, at this stage, could only be to determine whether there are sufficient grounds for poceeding further or not.\n\nThe mere existence of some grounds which would be mate•ial in deciding whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted does not generally indicate that the case must necessaily fail.\n\nOn the other hand, such grounds may indicate the need for. proceeding further in order to discover the truth after a full and proper investigation.\n\nIf, however, a bare perusal of a ccmolaint or the evidence led in supprt of it shw that essen•ial in°redients of the offences alleged are absent or ti)at the dispute is only of a civil nature or that there are such patent absurditi 'S in evidence produced that it would be a waste of time to proceed further, the comphint could be properly dismissed under Section 203 Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nD '\n\nD. N. BHATTACHA!lJEE v. WEST BENGAL (Beg, /.) 977\n\nIn the case before us, the learned Magistrate Wl!S in error in assuming that merely because the names of one or two former employees of the Company may be mentioned in the pay-sheets the whole prosecution case was actually demolished. Moreover, as the High Court had rightly pointed out, the complainant's actual evidence had fully supported and not contradicted any part of the complaint.\n\nNo such ab urdity was rev, i!aled by .he complainant's evidence as to merit a forthright di-missal of the complaint under Section 203 Criminal Pocedure Code.\n\nWhat the M gi; trate had to-determine at the stage of issue of proccis was not the correctness or the probability or improbability of individual items of evidence on disputable grounds, but the existence or otherwise of a prima facie ca5e on the assumption that \"'hat was stated could be true unless the prosecution allegations were so fantastic that they could not reasonably held to be true.\n\nAs e. in agreement with the High Court, think that the 6rder Of the Chief Presidency Magistrate in dismissing the complaint was pre-mature and was also based 01!_ obvious misconceptions, we dismiss this appeal.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed:", "total_entities": 47, "entities": [{"text": "D. N. BHATIACHARJEE & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D. N. BHATIACHARJEE & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 22, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 75, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 22, 1972\n\n[A. N. GROVER AND M. H. BEG, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 138, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 248, "end_char": 254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1899, "end_char": 1913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1918, "end_char": 1933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "G I>. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1956, "end_char": 1975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G I>."}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1980, "end_char": 1996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, tor respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. K. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2021, "end_char": 2036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nP. K. Mukherjee, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "BeJl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2105, "end_char": 2109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeJl, J.\n\nOn 1f .. 7 -1963 Sunilakshva Choudhry a :Oirector of the Metropolitan Indu1trial Corporation Ltd., CIcut a, havi\"g\n\nbeen authorised by its Boa•d of Directors, filed a complaint agaiqst the appllant Debndra Na•h Bhattacharjee (or Bhattacharya), a former Director, and Banamali Pathak, Cashier of the Bengal 16-L106ISupcin2 ."}}, {"text": "Sunilakshva Choudhry", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2132, "end_char": 2152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeJl, J.\n\nOn 1f .. 7 -1963 Sunilakshva Choudhry a :Oirector of the Metropolitan Indu1trial Corporation Ltd., CIcut a, havi\"g\n\nbeen authorised by its Boa•d of Directors, filed a complaint agaiqst the appllant Debndra Na•h Bhattacharjee (or Bhattacharya), a former Director, and Banamali Pathak, Cashier of the Bengal 16-L106ISupcin2 ."}}, {"text": "Debndra Na•h Bhattacharjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2313, "end_char": 2339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeJl, J.\n\nOn 1f .. 7 -1963 Sunilakshva Choudhry a :Oirector of the Metropolitan Indu1trial Corporation Ltd., CIcut a, havi\"g\n\nbeen authorised by its Boa•d of Directors, filed a complaint agaiqst the appllant Debndra Na•h Bhattacharjee (or Bhattacharya), a former Director, and Banamali Pathak, Cashier of the Bengal 16-L106ISupcin2 ."}}, {"text": "Luxrni Cotton Mills Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2440, "end_char": 2464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Luxrni Cotton Mills Ltd., and Hiran Roy, Chief Accountant of the Bengal Luxmi Cotion Mills Ltd., alleging offence punishable under Sec.ions 406/409/467/471/477A/109 JndiJn Penal CJde."}}, {"text": "Hiran Roy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2470, "end_char": 2479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Luxrni Cotton Mills Ltd., and Hiran Roy, Chief Accountant of the Bengal Luxmi Cotion Mills Ltd., alleging offence punishable under Sec.ions 406/409/467/471/477A/109 JndiJn Penal CJde."}}, {"text": "Metrvp !Lan Insurance Co. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2717, "end_char": 2747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The c:mplainant alleged that, when the Life Insurance business was natioiialbeJ in 1956 the Metrvp !"}}, {"text": "D. N. Bhattasharjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3164, "end_char": 3183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complainant was Director of the Company in 1957 and the accused app:llant D. N. Bhattasharjee was albged to be its Managim Di ec or with abs'.llu\\e control over the funds of the Company and the only person au'horised to operate the t11anking account of the Company with the Metropolitan Bank Ltd. Jloundabbut October, 1958, alth.", "canonical_name": "D. N. BHATIACHARJEE & ORS"}}, {"text": "Bhattach1rj", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3441, "end_char": 3452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ui; h. th: appellant Bhattach1rj 'e was said to have ceased to be the Managing Di-ector, yet, he is alleged to have continued to exrcise the powers he had possessed a; M 1n1ging Director."}}, {"text": "D N. Bhattacha•jee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3686, "end_char": 3704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Af•er the Company became the Corp ration certain activities of the appellant D N. Bhattacha•jee ae al'eged to hwe come to light and ccmpelbd his resignation on 28-2-1963 so that he hande1 over s0me of the B01ks and reco•ds of the Corporation to the complainant.", "canonical_name": "D. N. BHATIACHARJEE & ORS"}}, {"text": "28-2-1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3769, "end_char": 3778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Af•er the Company became the Corp ration certain activities of the appellant D N. Bhattacha•jee ae al'eged to hwe come to light and ccmpelbd his resignation on 28-2-1963 so that he hande1 over s0me of the B01ks and reco•ds of the Corporation to the complainant."}}, {"text": "s0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3802, "end_char": 3804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D. N. Bhattacharjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3938, "end_char": 3957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The c'>mnlainant, after having examined the records hmded over by D. N. Bhattacharjee, claimed to have found m 1n'bly pay shee•s containing mimes of certain\n\nem~Joyees who were not emnloyees d the Corporatio.n at n and who wee smpced to be fictitiouc as they could not be trased.", "canonical_name": "D. N. BHATIACHARJEE & ORS"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4369, "end_char": 4371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4644, "end_char": 4646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D. N. Bhattach1riee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4947, "end_char": 4966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The comota'nant al'eed that his susnicions were confirmed by sending these alloge'1 sigoatur_es t~ a H •ndwriting Exuert f\"r ouinion: Accoding to the comulainant, all •hh was dne at the instance of or with the complicity of D. N. Bhattach1riee and wi•h the aid of the two other co-accused.", "canonical_name": "D. N. BHATIACHARJEE & ORS"}}, {"text": "D. N. Bb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5036, "end_char": 5044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tt was asser•e<i that D. N. Bb<i.•t•charjee h•d full lmowled•e f'f what was taking place and had disbonestlv misanoro."}}, {"text": "2-8-1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5855, "end_char": 5863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2-8-1963, the Presi-· dency Magistrate, ordered the case to l6e put up before the Chief Presidency Magistrate for further orders."}}, {"text": "Chief Presidency Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5937, "end_char": 5964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2-8-1963, the Presi-· dency Magistrate, ordered the case to l6e put up before the Chief Presidency Magistrate for further orders."}}, {"text": "10-8-1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5989, "end_char": 5998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10-8-1963, the Chief Presidency Magistrate, after giving particulars of the prosecution case and the evidence produced to support it, went on to observe : \"In assessing the evidence adduc; d C for the purpose of taking out a process, certain broad tacts and circumstahces and probabilities cannot, in my opinion, be overlooked\"."}}, {"text": "Sec. 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7695, "end_char": 7703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7704, "end_char": 7727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Calcutta High", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7795, "end_char": 7808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G The complainant then invoked the Revisional jurisdition of the Calcutta High Cou-t. That Court, af'er an examination o.f the com'l!aint, the evidence produced for the purpose of i; suing proce's to the accused persons, and the order of the Chief P•esidency Magistrate, came to the conclusion •hat the order of dismiss1!"}}, {"text": "Sec. 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8075, "end_char": 8083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8084, "end_char": 8107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jiad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8760, "end_char": 8764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if the complainant Jiad said that some of the entries in the account books appeared to be R deliberately false, the complaint would ."}}, {"text": "Section 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9311, "end_char": 9322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9892, "end_char": 9903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9904, "end_char": 9927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10002, "end_char": 10013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10014, "end_char": 10037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11212, "end_char": 11223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11224, "end_char": 11247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11819, "end_char": 11830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Pocedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11831, "end_char": 11853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_978_990_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "GARIB SINGH & ORS.\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB\n\nMarch 22, 1972\n\n[A. N. GROVER A:ND M. H. BEG, JJ.]\n\nA.vrJreciation of Evidence-Prin-:iples-Reversal of judgment f acquittal by High Court when just(lied-Indian Penal Code. s. 34, appl1• caoiuty of. ·\n\nFive persons including the three apj>ellants were jointly charged .and tried for rioting and offences comrn.tted m the coutse of it. The Sess16ns C Juuge acqu.lted. au tne accused oe..; au:ie he found th~ .prosecu ion stry to be art ficial.\n\nHe also took into account the de.ay in lodg.ng the first information report and the fact tha there were no blood mar ks foo.ld where the injured peiSons were alleged to have fallen down.\n\nThe H gh Court in appeal filed by the State re-assessed the evidence and reversed the judgment of acquittal in respect of the th ee appellants. The appellants had been charged in respect of v:carious offences uniter .s. 149 of I> the Indian Penal Code, but the High Court, in v:ew di the acquittal of two of the five accused, convicted he. appella'lts in respect of those offences under s. 34 of the Code.\n\nIn appeal by special leave this Court had to consider (i) whether the reversal of the judgment of the trial d>urt by the High Court was justified with .reference to pr.nciplcs 'di appreciation of evidence and the decisions of the Court; (ii) whether the conviction of the ppellants by recourse to ~. 34 was justified on the facts of the case.\n\nHELD: (i) Perhaps there is no uniform method of arriving at correct or at least satislfactory conclusio11s upon veracity of versions placed before the Court wh ch cart be applied to all cases.\n\nIt may be possible to decide ffiany cases by detenni!ling the main or crucial poin~ on which the dec:sion of the case Me way or the other may tur1. In other cases,\n\nwhre mariy disputable points are i., vo!ved, none of which is conclusive, a more elaborate and cotnprchensive treatment of the var:ous points F involved in the whole case may be necessar)'. Courts have, hov.'ever, to attem\"Jt to separate the \"chaff from the grain\" in every case.\n\nTI1ey ca'l not abandon this attemp· on the ground that the case is baffling unless the evidence is really so confus:ng or conflicting that the process cannot be reasonably carried nut. r983 H~984 Bl\n\nChet Ram v. State, [1971] 1 S.L.J. 153, referred to.\n\n(ii) In judging the credibility of a version the Court must apply the standards of a reasonable and prudent man. r983 F]\n\n(i'i) In the present case the High Court had u\"doubtedly corrected the erroneous approach of the learned Sessions Judge by poi'lting out obviou<i answers to the poi., ts which. the Ses-.ions Ju'.dge seemed to regard\n\na~ riddles iiicpable of solution.\n\nFor example, the delay in lodging the First Informatton Reoo\"rt. although susoicious, could certai11ly be safsfactorily exo1aiT\"ted by the fact that the stab wound in the stomach of O\"\"'e of the victims was so ser'ou! th':!t his statement could not be taken for several days afterwards. The absence of blood at the place of occurrence\n\nA was given undue importance by the trial court inasmuch ; is the ~<><!d might have got soaked in the clothes of the victims. Secondly, after tlic occu.rence, a numoer ot persons must have passed to and tro over the path, where the occu.rei.1ce took place, be1ore the arrival of the police next day. The principles Ja:d down by this Court were applied by the High Court in dealing with the case and interference by this Court in respect of the appraisal of evidence by the H.gh Court would not be B just.fied. i,984 F-G; 986 A-BJ\n\nKhed11 Mohton & Ors. v. State of Biliar, [19711 1 S.C.R. 839 and Laxman Kalu Nikalie v. The State of Maharashtra, [19681 3 S.C.R. 685, referred to.\n\n(iv) The High Court bowewr erred in applying s. 34 I.P.C. to the facts of the present case.\n\nTaking the total.ty of circumstances, parti- C cul.arly the nature of injilries, the Oiwa; i night, and the place . of occur.eilce on a public thorouJhfare iJto account, the pattern of the case was not that of a pre-planned attack.\n\nMC,.e carrying of spears which was not unusual for Sikhs would not establish pre-planning.\n\nThe convict' on of the appellants with reference to. s. 34 must therefore be set\n\naside. j,987 D-G; 989 G-Hl\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Cr:imilial Appeal No. 165 of 1969.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 15, 1969 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 876 of 1966.\n\nNur-ud-dht Ahmed and J. P. Aggarwal, for the appellants.\n\nV. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeg, I, Garib Singh, aged 36 years, Mohinder Singh, aged 15 years, Bhagat Singh, aged 25 years, Ram Singh, aged 65 years, Gurdial Singh, aged 66 yeur, were jo'.Jitry charged and tried by the Additional Sessions Judge of Patilila for rioting and offences committed in the course bf it. Garib Singh Wlls charged separately under Sections 148 and 307 Indian Penal Code for an injury he was allllJ.ed t<> have given in the abdomen of Sarwan Singh (P.W. 1rWith a Barthha:, and for offences.punishable under Sections 324 and 323 Indian Penal Code With the aid of Section 149 Indian Penal Code. Mohinder Singh WaS separately charged under Sections 148 and 324 Indian Penal Code for.inflicting an incised wound on Chanan Singh (P.W. 8) with a spear, and, under Sections 307 and 323 read with Section 149 Indian Penal Code. Bhagat Siugh was separately charged under Sectionsl47 and 323 Indian Penal Code for causing simple injuries with a Jathion Gurdev Singh (P.W. 9) and Ralla Singh (P.W. 10) and with the aid of section .149. Ind\\an Penal Code for offences pu,., hh•\n\nabie under Sections 307 and 324 Indian Penal Code.\n\nRam Singh\n\n980 SUPREME COURT REPOll.TS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nand Gurdial Singh, who were also .said to have been members of A an unlawfill assembly which caused injuries to the party of the complainant Sarwan Singh at about sunset on 24-10-1965, the date on which the festival of Diwali fell, were alleged to have only instigated their companions by giving lalkaras and saying that,.\n\nSarwan Singh should not be spared.\n\nThey were, therefore, charged separately only under Section 14 7 ndian Penal Code and B for qffences under.Sections 323, 324, and 307. Indian Penal Code. with the help of Section 149 Indian Penal Code.\n\nNone of the accused persons was, however, charged with any offence with the aid of Section 34 Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe learned Sessions' Judge who tried the accused persons had, C after elaborately examining the prosecution and defence versions, found the prosecution case to be \"shroded in mystery as to how all the accused got together, armed variously in the house of Ram Singh and assaulted him (i.e.- Sarwan Singh) all of a sudden by darting out of the house of Ram Singh\".\n\nThe picture thus paint- .ed by the learned Sessions' Judge to convince himself of the mclo- D dramatic artificiality of the prosecution version did not really accord . with prosecution evidence which was that, when Sarwan Singh\n\nwas passing in front of the house of Ram Singh, the accused came out and surrounded him, and that Sarwan Singh thereµpon raised an alarm which brought the other injured witnesses, who had tried to save him, to the scene.\n\nIt was only when Ram Singh.and Gurdlal Singh gave, 'lalkaras' or instigated the others to attack and E not to spare Sarwan Singh that the assault was alleged to have begun. It is not unlikely that even this version did not bring out the whole truth.\n\nThe defence version, put forward through Kartar Singh (D.W. 2), was that, on the Diwali night of 24-10-1965, at about 8 p.m., one Gurdev Singh (P.W. 12) son of Mangal Singh, had come with Chanan Singh (P.W; 8) the injured artd Ralla Singh (P.W. 10) and:Gurdev Singh Harijan and had a ijuarrel with Sarwan Singh (P; W. 7) injured, and with one Gurbux Singh (parentage not given) over the ownership of a tractor which was parked nearby.\n\nIt was stated by Kartar Singh that both sides were drunk and that G Gurdev Singh son of Mangal Singh had given a barchha blow to Sarwan Singh and Gurbux Singh had given a barchha blow to Chanan Singh. It was sought to be proved by the defence,· through other witnesses, that, after this incident, there was a compromhe between the two si.des so th•t Gurdev Singh son of MangalSingh, at the instance, of Sarwan Singh, agreed to forego the unpaid price of the tractor,. amounting to Rs. 5.000/-, and to oatch uo the quarrel. It was not even attempted to be explained by the defence version how an'!igreement could emerge so suddenly not\n\nGARIB SINGHV, PUNJAB (Be-g; J,) 9_81\n\nonly. to patch up a quarrel in which a very serious injury was sus~\n\ntained by Sarwan Singh but also to involve accused persons in place of the actual assailants of Sarwan Singh and others.\n\nThe suggestion, however, was that the prosecuti6n case, according to which .there was litigation between Ram Singh and Bhagat Singh accused on one side and Sarwan Singh (P.W. 7) on the other, and the intervention of Chanan Singh (P; W. 8), who had his.own scores to settle with Garib Singh, explained the implication of all .the accused persons.\n\nThe learned Sessions' Judge was, we find, more mystified by certain features in the prosecution case than impressed by the very unnatural and incredible defence version.\n\nHe had, therefore, acquitted all the accused persons for what )\\e considered to be .the weaknesses of!he prosecution case, but he had . also mentioned the defence version as though it could con• ceivably contain some truth.\n\nOn an appeal filed by the State of Punjab, a Division Bench of the High Court listed and then examined each of the features :n of the evidence in the case which had baffied the learned Sessions .Judge.\n\nIt then re.assessed the whole prosecution evidence itself.\n\nIt came to the c0nclusion that the injured eye witnesses, namely, 'Sarwan Singh (P.W. 7), Chanan Singh (P.W. 8), Gurdev Singh\n\nson of Sadda Ram (P.W. 9), Ralla Singh(P.W. 10) must be believed, at any rate with regard to the three accused persons, namely, Garib Singh, Mohinder Singh, and Bhagat Singh who were alleged to have actually caused injuries to them.\n\nIt, therefore, convicted the three appellants before us by special leave by applying Section 34 LP .C. Garib Singh was convicted under Section 307 l.P.C. separately, for the injury caused to Sarwan Singh (P.W. 7) and sentenced to five years' rigorous imprisonment and he was also .convicted and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment under F, Section 324/34 and to three months' rigorous imprisonment under Section 323/34 I.P.C. Mohinder Singh was convicted separately 'imd.,.sentenced to one y~'s rigorous \"imprisonment under. Section 324 LP .C., to .three years' rigorous imprisonment under ·. Section 307 /34 Indian Penal Code, and to three months' rigorous/imprisonment _under Section 323 /34 LP .C.\n\nBhagt Singh was convicted separately and sentenced to three months' rigorous imprion ment under Section 323 I.P .C., to Jive years' rigorous imurisonment under Section 307/34 LP.C., and to one year's rigorous imprisonment under Section 323/34 I.P.C.\n\nAll the .sentences were directed to run concurrently.\n\nThe High Court had sustained the acquittal of Ram Singh and Gurdial Singh for two reasons : firstly, 'because the delay, in the making of the First Information Report, which was shown to have beenJodged on the next day i.e. to say 25-10-1965 at .11.30 a.m .\n\nat Po!ice Station .Ghanaur District Patiala at a distance of only 1 t m!les from Village Burki where the occurrence was shown to have taken place; and, secondly, because both Ram Singh arid Gurdial Singh \"are said to have been empty handed at the time of the occurrence and to neither of whom ariy injuries are atiri buted\".\n\nIt may be recalled here that these two accused persons were only sai~ to have participated by giving lalkarasand. saying that Sa.rwai; Smgh sh?ul~ n<?t be spared. .The High Court thought that this ev1\\lence of mstJgatJon was not enough to establish beyond\n\nrasonble doubt . the prticipation of Ram Singh and Gurdial Smgh m the assault which took place upon the irijured persons.\n\nSuch allegations of participation by giving lalkaras are sometimes made only to show additional. overt acts so as to take in at leas't\n\nfive persons and make out the ingredients of an offence . under\n\nction 147 ai; ainst all of them.\n\nWhen delayed lodging of the First InformatJon Report indicated that deliberation and consultation for implication of some innocent persons with guilty ones 'was possible, this distinction made by the High Court could not be said to be unreasonable.\n\nThe High Court had, after examining the evidence of each of the defence witnesses, emphatically, rejected the unnatural defence version as utterly unworthy of credence. .It had rejected the testimony of Kartar Singh (D.W. 2), the only alleged eye witnes$ of the defence version, on the ground that he st-ated that he had not, before he appeared to give evidence in the witness box oil 7-4-1966, disclosed anything about the incident to anyone.\n\nIt considered this statement of the witness to be wholly unnatural.\n\nOn examining the evidence of this witness, we find that he had also stated that he was not examined by the Police, and. presum- . ably to explain this allegation, he had even stated that the Police had not come to the village.\n\nFurthermore, he had stated . that Gurbux Singh (whose identity is uncertain, as there are more than on.e Gurbux Singh mentioned in the evidence on record, and, for al(we lnow, there may be others with this name) had gi.ven a barchha blow to Chanan Singh on his umblicus which is quite\n\nabsurd as there was no iniurv at all on the um.blicus of f'hanan .Sirigh.\n\nThe witness stated that, although SarWan Singh, Chanan Singh, Ralla Sjngh, Gurdev Singh. were all armed with hthis no blow with lathis were given bv them.\n\nHis evidence does not explain the lathi.injuries of anv of the injured per; ons at alL flis statement could not, therefore. be characterised as even.an attemot to satifactorily exolain injuries.\n\nWe have no doubt, after examining his evidence. that he could not be an eve .witne., of the occurrence at an.\n\nThe remalninq defence witnesses, .. Gurbux Singh CDW. !) Babu Singh ID W 3). and Vishnu Sarno (D W, 4}, either made statements based on hear-say or ltemnted to nrnve\n\nthe highly unnatural alleged agreement ot compromise between\n\nSarwap Singh wh<>se condition. disclosed by medical evidence; was such !Mt he could not be in a position to say .much about anything for several days let alone enter into negotiations .and compromise.\n\nWe have, therefore, no doubt in our minds that the\n\nHig~ Court was quite righ, t in completely rejecting the defence \".ersion which coul~ not even pass muster. as a possible explanatton, for whatever 1t may be worth, .as the learned Sessions Judge wrongly seemed to think that it could.\n\nWe have only disposed of the defence version first because the learned Counsel for the appellants placed it in the forefront and tried to convince us that it ; was not as incredible as the High Court thought it to be.\n\nLearned Counsel for the appellants .asserted that truth is stranger than fiction.\n\nWe think that, at any rate in appraising evidence Jed in Jaw Courts, suqh an assumption would be extremely hazardous oi1e to adopt.\n\nIf it were. ad(lpted it would introduce an illegal criterion for appraising . evidence.\n\nSection 3 of the Indian Evidence Act enables a Court to employ only tile standards of a pruent man in judging wat is to be deemed to be proved accordmg to law.\n\nAnd, Sechon 114 of thy Evidence Ai::t enables Courts to presume only that wliich accords with tlie ordinary course of events and human nature and not what would be an ab\\<lrration from such a course.\n\nIndeed, if such a principle was to be applied in judging some of the features of the prosecution case before us, wliich are itssaifed by the.· learned Counsel for the appellants, these features will appear to be more and not less credible.\n\nThe degree which proof must reach, bef()re a Court trying, a. criminal case Will convict is no doubt that which. a prudent mail .will employ in reacfiing a. condilsi~ beyond rea- . sonable doubt whereas an accused need not prove his, case to the same extent in order to succeed.\n\nBut, the standards employed ID, judging each .version are those of. a reas.onaj)Je al)d pl'\\1<1e11t man.\n\nSuch .a man can only adopt what Is natural to expect and . what accords with common sense and ordinarv experience but not what Is extraordinary al}d unexpected as a reliable test of credibility of witnesses. .· ·\n\nThe approach of the learrted Sessions Judge to the wilole case seems to us to have beeti aJfected by an over-emnhasis of minor points .emergh1g from yvidence in the cae whjch -\\,'\\'ere magnified into major defects of the prosecution case... Perhans there is no uniform method of arriving. at correct or at least atisfctory conclusions upon veracity of versions. plai; ed before the Court whih can be apolied to all cases. It may be oossible to . decide many\n\ncase~ !iv determining the main or crucial no)nt on which the .de\\:iion of the case one w.ay or the other may turn.. lo othe( cases,\n\nwhere manv disputable point~ are involved'., noile of which IS conclusive, a more elaborate and comprehensive treatment of thevarious points involved in the whole case may, became necessary.\n\nA Courts have, however to attempt to separate the \"chaff from the grain\" in every case.\n\nThey cannot abandon this attempt on the ground that the case is baffling unless the evidence is really so confusing or conflicting that the process cannot be reasonably carried out.\n\nThe method to be employed in making this attempt was stated as follows by one of us (Beg, J.) in Chet Ram v. 8 State(');\n\n\"Courts, in search of the core of truth, have to beware of being misled by half truths or individually defective pieces of evidence.\n\nFiritly, undeniable facts and circumstances should be examined.\n\nSecondly, the pattern qf the case thus revealed, in the context of a whole sequence of proved f11cts, must be scrutinized to determine whethera natural; or probable and, therefore, a credible course of events is disclosed.\n\nThirdly, the minutias of evillence, including established discrepancies, should be put in the crucible of the whole context of an alleged crime or occurrence and tested, particularly with reference to the proved circumstances which generally provide a more reliable indication of truth than the faulty human testimony, so that the prpcess of separating the grain from the chaff .may take place.\n\nFourthly, in arriving at an assessment of credibility of individual witnesses, regard must be .had to the possible motives for either deliberate mendacity or subconscious bias.\n\nLastly, the demeanour and bearing of a witness in Court should be carefully noticed and an appellate Court should remember that a trial Court has 'had, in this respect, an advantage which it does not possess\".\n\nIt seems to us that the High Court had undoubtedly corrected the erroneous approach of the learned Sessions Judge by pointing out .obvious answers to the points which, the learned Sessions Judge seemed to regard as riddles incapable of solution: For example, the delay in lodging the First Information Reoort, although suspicious, could certainly be satisfactorily explained by the fact that the stab wound in Sarwan Singh's stomach was so serious that his statement could not be taken for several days afterwards.\n\nDr. Prem Nath (P.W. 1), who examined him at 5.25 a.m. on 25-10-1965 found that a small portion of the omentum was protruding from the wound, 5 c.m. X 3.5. c.m., and the injured was found in severe pain.\n\nThe only other injury on his body was an abrasion 1 c.m. X t c.m. on the margin of tl)e right elbow joint.\n\nDr. H. M. Nahar (P.W. 2), stated that the ioiured remained under the effect of morphine sulphate upto 26-10-1965,\n\n(I) (197 J) (I) Simla Law Journal p. 153 @ p. J57.\n\nafter which his condition iinproved.\n\nThe abdominal injury was considered by the Doctor to be dangerous to life.\n\nAnother in jured person Chanan Singh (P.W. 8), whose brother was said to have filed a 'Civil, suit against Nand Singh, the father of Garib Singh appellant, and Jaiinal Singh, brother of Gufdial accused, was not shown to be connected with Sarwan Singh.\n\nIndeed, as already mentioned above, the suggestion of the defence was that he had come to the scene with persons opposed to Sarwan Singh.\n\nHe had an oblique incised penetrating wound It\" X t\" X 4\" on the right side of his chest and a swelling on the left elbow.\n\nJust as Sarwan Singh was taken in a cart to Patiala after the occurrence, he had been taken to Rajpura alongwith Ralla Singh (P.W. 10) c who had received three simple injuries with a blunt weapon.\n\nGurdev Singh (P.W. 9), who had received two contusion and a faint contusion with blunt weapons had also gone with Chanan Singh and Ralla Singh to Rajpura, where they were all medically examined.\n\nIt, therefore, appears thai the injured were, quite naturally, more concerned with getting their injuries attended to\n\nthan with lodging a report immediately at the nearest Police Station.\n\nThe High Court had in these circumstances, .not given undue importance to the delay in the lodging of a First Information Report on 25-10-l965 signed by Chanan Singh.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge had used another fact against the prosecution without looking at the obviously good answer to it found in the evidence. This fact was that, on 25-10-1965 at\n\n8.30 a.m.\n\nHead Constable Kartar Singh (P.W. 14) had been given the injury reports and the First Information Report signed by Chanan Singh, when Gurdev Singh met him but did not tell him that he had himself. witnessed the occurrence.\n\nKartar Singh (P.W. 14 ), had said that' he had waited: to ascertain facts from Chan an Singh himself, who was lying injured in a. hospital . at Rajpura, before sending the, First Information Report to the Police Station so that the case may be registered.\n\nIn these circumstances, we think that the High C, ourt was quite right in not using ... $ome delay in the lodging .6f the First Information Report, iii tb.e' same, way as. the learned Sessions Judge had done it.\n\nThe High Court used it, no doubt, as one of the grounds for finding hllegl\\tions against the alleged inst:i<tators as possible exaggerations brit. it had not doubted the bona' {ides of the whole prosecution case on. this ground ..\n\nAnother fact which had impressed the trial court very, much was. the failure of the Police to find any marks of blood on the H path in front of ihe houiie of Ram Singh where the oecufiehce was Shown to have taken place. It had to be remembered that there were oii!y two injurie8,- one on the body of Sarwan Singh.' and\n\nanother on the body of Chanan Singh,\"which could bleed and tJiat\n\nSUPREME COURT REl'ORTS [lg72] 3 S.C R.\n\nthe blood would first get soaked in the clothes of the 'injured. ..,.\n\noreqver, by the time the police had come to the spot nextday quite a nu.mber of people and vehicles may have passed to and fro over the path.\n\nAfter the occurrence, even during the preceding night, which was that of Diwali, a number of persons must have passed over the path.\n\nHence the failure of the police to find any bl<;>Gd in front of the house of Ram Singh was also not so B inexplicable as the learned Sessions Judge seems to have thought it to be.\n\nAnother feature on which considerable emphasis was placed, m the course of arguments. before us, was that Garib Singh appellant was alleged te have inflicted the most serious injury of all in c this case, on the abdomen of Sarwan Singh, when this accused was an important witness of the case of Sarwan Singh against Ram Singh and Bhagat Singh who had challenged the adoption of Sarwan Singh.\n\nGarib Singh was said to be a witness of the adoption deed put forward by Sarwan Singh. It was, therefore, contended .that Sarwan Singh would not have liked to displease I) Garib Singh.· It was also urged that there was no reason why . Garib Singh shoutd take it into his head to suddenly attack Sarwan\n\nSingh, whose alleged adoption deed had. been witnessed by him.\n\nThis may appear to be a somewhat peculiar feature in the case.\n\nBut we have no evidence before us to sh9w what Garib Singh was qoing in the company of Ram Singh and Bhagat Singh.\n\nIt is not inconceivable that either these two told him something to put him\n\nI!; up against Sarwan Singh; or, Sarwan Singh, finding him in the company of his adversaries, had said something.\n\nGarib Singh, who denied participation in the occurrence, could not be expected _to say what had incensed him.\n\nWe think that, the High Court had taken a correct and reasonable view in\"holding that, unless Garib Singh had actually caused the injury to Sarwan Singh, it would be I! most unnatural for Sarwan Singh, situated as he was in his litigation with Ram Singh and Bhgat Singh, to make such an allegation against Garib Singh.\n\nThis interence was far more . natural and reasonable than that Garib Sinh was falsely implicated by all the witnesses simply to oblige Chanan Singh.\n\nAn overall consideration of all the facts and circumstances in G the case, the important features of which have been noticed by us, and' a reading of the Judgments of the Sessions Judge as well as of the H'.igh Court have led us to the conclusion that, whatever error tbere was in the apprmi£h of the learned Sessions Judge in apprais• jug the worth of the prosecution and defence versions, was recti- H by the High Coun.. We are of opinion that those features of the case to wl:iich the learned Sessions.Judge bad attached q.isprop.Qrtionate importance were put in their prope; .perspectiv.e by .tli.e Uil!h Coun. We, therefore, do not .think that tbiS is a fit case for\n\ninterference by this Court in this appeal by special leave with the view of the High Court aboui the substantial truthfulness of the prosecution case and the utter incredibility of the defence version.\n\nThere is, however, one essential aspect of the case which seems to have escaped the attention of the High Court.\n\nIt is that the B whole pattern of the case indicates that there was very little likelihood of any pre-concert.\n\nThe High Court haQ, itself rejected the version that Ram Singh and Gurdial Singh hall instigated and said that Satw3l)c Singh should not be spared. If this instigation was there and had been acted upon Sarwan Singh would have c\n\nreceived many more injuries.\n\nThe nature of the injuries, proved by the medical evidence, indicated umnistakably that the occurrence was a short and sudden affair.\n\nSuch a short and sudden occurrence could take place on the evening of Diwali at a chance meeting when Sarwan Singh found Garib Singh in the company of his adversarie~, Ram Singh and Bhagat Sipgh. It is possible that something Wns said to Garib Singh either by Sarwan Singh when he found him in the company of his adversaries. or. before that, by Ram Singh and Bhagat Singh which impelled Garib Singh\n\nto attack Sarwan Singh.\n\nThese, however, are matters of pure conjecture. Nevertheless, taking the totality of facts and circumstances particularly the nature of injuries, the Diwali night, and the place. of occurrence on a public thoroughfare, into account, we are inclined to believe that the pattern of the case was not that of a pre-planned attack.\n\nThere was some force in the submission, which was noticed by the Sessions Judge, that a pre-planned attack was more likely to have taken place .elsewhere and not on a public thoroughfare in front of the house of Ram Singh.\n\nThe learned Counsl for the appellant also submitted that Ram Singh and his associates were not_!ikely to know the time at which Sarwan Sin?hwould pass Rani Singh's house that evening.\n\nThe prosecution evidence is that Sarwan Singh was going to untie his cattle. It is possible that it was known in the village that Sarwan Singh passed the house of Ram Singh at that time every evening, but there was no evidence led to show that this was so and that. therefore, the accused were waiting for him to come.\n\nMere carrying of spears, which is not unusual for Sikhs, would not establish pre, planning.\n\nA consideration of the above mentioned asJ>!!ct, which was not pus~ by the High Court. leads us to the conclusion that thiS oti .was not a case in which Section 34 Indian Penal Code, for :which'\n\n#I.ere was not even a. charge framed against the appellants, could\n\n.~ ._ppli, ed s. o !lnbesita'jingly as the High .. _co.urt .had . done. It\n\nV/QiJJd he been possible to apply it ~VeQ th<>µgh no c; lillf~Cj I!'i!S\n\nframe<Hor it if the evidence establishing it had been clear and free from doubt. ·\n\nWe may also mention the two cases cited before us to contend that the High Court should not have interfered at all with the appraisal of evidence by the trial Court.\n\nTh!lSe were : Khedr1 Mohton & Ors. v. State of Bihar('), and Lilxman Kalu Nikalje a\n\nv. The State of Maharashtra(').\n\nIn Khedr1 Mohton's case( 1 ), an appellate court had set aside the conviction of the accused persons on certain grounds including that the four eye Witnesses of the alleged occurrence were unreliable because they were interested persons.\n\nThe High Court had interfered with an acquittal by an appellate Court.\n\nThis Court had said, with regard to the conclusion reached in that particular case by the acquitting Judge :\n\n. \"Unless the conclusions reached by him are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or that his decision is likely to result in grave injustice, the High Court should be reluctant to interfere. with his conclusions. If two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on record then the view in support of the acquittal of the accused should be preferred.\n\nThe fact that the High Court is inclined to take a different view of the evidence on record is not sufficient to interfere with the order of acquittal\".\n\nWe. think that the present case is distinguishable from that case in as much as the approach of the Trial Court, in the case before us, .shows that it was misled by attaching undue importance to il)dividual features of the case which hac! been viewed in their correct perspective by the High Court.\n\nThe Trial Court had ignored the very important fact that it is contrary to the ordinary course of human nature for injured persons, without ,.showing strong grounds for it, to omit the names of their actual assailants and to substitute wrong persons in their places.\n\nImplication of the innocent with guilty ones is more easily credible than a wholesale substitution, out of enmity, of the innocent for the , actual assailants.\n\nSuch quick substitution was not, f<>r the reasons already mentioned, conceivable in the present case.\n\nAs we have already indicated, the High Court, in the case before us, had corrected an error in the approach and in the reasoning of the Sessions Judge rather than upset the findings of the Sessions' Judge ·\n\non the credibility of witnessess at the trial.\n\nThe trial Court had not held that the injured eye witnesses could not be believed. It H .had not weighed evidence so much as given a catalogue of reaSori~ .for .suspecting the prosecution case without considering . what\n\n• (I) I 19711 S:C.R; .ll39 @ 840·841. . . (2) rt968f (3) s.c.R: 68S:!\n\nGt&IB SINGH v:. PUNJAB ·(Be.a,/.) 889 .\n\nCf))Jld be said in answer. Appraisement involves weighing of on1 set of.facts or inferences from them against the opposite one fair!: and reasonably. . Irr Laxman K; alu Nika/je's case( 1) it was laid down by ihi Court at page 688 : . / \"We may say here that it is now the settled law that the powers of the High Court in an appeal against the acquittal are. not different from the powers of the same cour1 in hearing an appeal against a conviction. The.\n\nHigh Court in dealing with such an appeal can go into\n\nall questions of fact and law and reach its own conclusions on evidence provided it pays due regard to the fact that the matter had been before the Court of Sessions and the Sessions Judge had the chance and opportunity of seeing the witnesses depose to the facts.\n\nFurther the High Court in reversing the judgment of the Sessions Judge must pay due regard to all the reasons given by the Sessions Judge for disbeliewing a particular witness and must attempt to dispel those reasons effectively before taking a contrary view of the matter. It may also be pointed out that an accused starts with a presumption of innocence whe:1 he is put up for trial an<l his acquittal in no sense weakens that presumption, and this presumption must also receive adequate consideraion from the High Court.\"\n\nWe \\!.link that the principles laid down above by this Court were applied by the High Court in dealing wiih the case before us. It had not set aside, as already indicated, the verdict of a Court of trial based upon the special advantage it derives from watching witnesses depose.\n\nAs we have already observed, we think that the High Court had erred in applying Section 34 Indian Penal Code to the facts and 'Circumstances of the .. case before us.. . As we are satisfied that the occurrence which led to the prosecution of the appellants must have arisen out of a sudden quarrel over some exchange of words in circumstances which have not b_een brought out by the evidence in the case, we are unable to hold the appellants guilty of any offence with the aid of Section 34 Indian Penal Code.\n\nWe, therefore, set aside the convictions and sentences of Garib Singh under Section 324/34 and 323/34 Indian Penal Code but\n\nwe maintain his conviction under Section 307, and, in the special circumstances of this case, reduce his sentence to three yem rigorous imprisonment from five years rigorous imprisonment. We also set aside the convictions and sentences of the appellant Bhagat Singh under. Section 307 /34 and 324/34 Indian Penal\n\n(I) [1968) 2 S. C.R. 685.\n\n17-1061Sup Cl/72 .\n\nSUP1lBMB COU1T RBPOllTS\n\n[19'72] 3 S.C.R.\n\nCode, but maintain his conviction under Section 323 Indian A Penal Code and sentence of three months rigorous imprisonment for that offence. As regards Mohinder Singh appellant, a youngster who was bound to have been misguided by the example of older people and against whom no previous conviction is disclosed, while setting aside his conviction and sentence under Section 307 /34 and 323/34 Indian Penal Code, we maintain his convicii tion under Section 324, Indian Penal Code, but reduee his ' sentenceurider Section 324 India Penal Code to the period already undergone.\n\nThis appeal is partly alli5wed to the extent indicated above.\n\nf!.C.\n\nApp.ea/ allolfled in part.\n\n...", "total_entities": 140, "entities": [{"text": "GARIB SINGH & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GARIB SINGH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 22, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 51, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF PUNJAB\n\nMarch 22, 1972\n\n[A. N. GROVER A:ND M. H. BEG, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER A:ND M. H. BEG, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 190, "end_char": 207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 209, "end_char": 214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 885, "end_char": 891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 902, "end_char": 919, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1055, "end_char": 1060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3748, "end_char": 3753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3754, "end_char": 3759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4174, "end_char": 4179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "-ud-dht Ahmed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4451, "end_char": 4464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nur-ud-dht Ahmed and J. P. Aggarwal, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "J. P. Aggarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4469, "end_char": 4483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nur-ud-dht Ahmed and J. P. Aggarwal, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "V. C. Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4506, "end_char": 4519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4524, "end_char": 4538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Garib Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4614, "end_char": 4625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeg, I, Garib Singh, aged 36 years, Mohinder Singh, aged 15 years, Bhagat Singh, aged 25 years, Ram Singh, aged 65 years, Gurdial Singh, aged 66 yeur, were jo'.", "canonical_name": "GARIB SINGH & ORS"}}, {"text": "Mohinder Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4642, "end_char": 4656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeg, I, Garib Singh, aged 36 years, Mohinder Singh, aged 15 years, Bhagat Singh, aged 25 years, Ram Singh, aged 65 years, Gurdial Singh, aged 66 yeur, were jo'.", "canonical_name": "Mohinder Singh"}}, {"text": "Bhagat Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4673, "end_char": 4685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeg, I, Garib Singh, aged 36 years, Mohinder Singh, aged 15 years, Bhagat Singh, aged 25 years, Ram Singh, aged 65 years, Gurdial Singh, aged 66 yeur, were jo'.", "canonical_name": "Bhagat Singh"}}, {"text": "Ram Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4702, "end_char": 4711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeg, I, Garib Singh, aged 36 years, Mohinder Singh, aged 15 years, Bhagat Singh, aged 25 years, Ram Singh, aged 65 years, Gurdial Singh, aged 66 yeur, were jo'.", "canonical_name": "Ram Singh.and"}}, {"text": "Gurdial Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4728, "end_char": 4741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBeg, I, Garib Singh, aged 36 years, Mohinder Singh, aged 15 years, Bhagat Singh, aged 25 years, Ram Singh, aged 65 years, Gurdial Singh, aged 66 yeur, were jo'.", "canonical_name": "Gurdial Singh"}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge of Patilila", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4797, "end_char": 4834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jitry charged and tried by the Additional Sessions Judge of Patilila for rioting and offences committed in the course bf it."}}, {"text": "Garib Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4891, "end_char": 4902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Garib Singh Wlls charged separately under Sections 148 and 307 Indian Penal Code for an injury he was allllJ.ed t<> have given in the abdomen of Sarwan Singh (P.W. 1rWith a Barthha:, and for offences.punishable under Sections 324 and 323 Indian Penal Code With the aid of Section 149 Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "Sections 148 and 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4933, "end_char": 4953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4954, "end_char": 4971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sarwan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5036, "end_char": 5048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Garib Singh Wlls charged separately under Sections 148 and 307 Indian Penal Code for an injury he was allllJ.ed t<> have given in the abdomen of Sarwan Singh (P.W. 1rWith a Barthha:, and for offences.punishable under Sections 324 and 323 Indian Penal Code With the aid of Section 149 Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "Sections 324 and 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5108, "end_char": 5128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5129, "end_char": 5146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5163, "end_char": 5174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5175, "end_char": 5192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mohinder Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5194, "end_char": 5208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohinder Singh WaS separately charged under Sections 148 and 324 Indian Penal Code for.inflicting an incised wound on Chanan Singh (P.W. 8) with a spear, and, under Sections 307 and 323 read with Section 149 Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "Sections 148 and 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5238, "end_char": 5258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5259, "end_char": 5276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Chanan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5312, "end_char": 5324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohinder Singh WaS separately charged under Sections 148 and 324 Indian Penal Code for.inflicting an incised wound on Chanan Singh (P.W. 8) with a spear, and, under Sections 307 and 323 read with Section 149 Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "Sections 307 and 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5359, "end_char": 5379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5390, "end_char": 5401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5402, "end_char": 5419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bhagat Siugh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5421, "end_char": 5433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagat Siugh was separately charged under Sectionsl47 and 323 Indian Penal Code for causing simple injuries with a Jathion Gurdev Singh (P.W. 9) and Ralla Singh (P.W. 10) and with the aid of section .149.", "canonical_name": "Bhagat Singh"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5483, "end_char": 5500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jathion Gurdev Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5536, "end_char": 5556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagat Siugh was separately charged under Sectionsl47 and 323 Indian Penal Code for causing simple injuries with a Jathion Gurdev Singh (P.W. 9) and Ralla Singh (P.W. 10) and with the aid of section .149."}}, {"text": "Ralla Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5570, "end_char": 5581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagat Siugh was separately charged under Sectionsl47 and 323 Indian Penal Code for causing simple injuries with a Jathion Gurdev Singh (P.W. 9) and Ralla Singh (P.W. 10) and with the aid of section .149."}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5633, "end_char": 5643, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sections 307 and 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5679, "end_char": 5699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5700, "end_char": 5717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sarwan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5918, "end_char": 5930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nand Gurdial Singh, who were also .said to have been members of A an unlawfill assembly which caused injuries to the party of the complainant Sarwan Singh at about sunset on 24-10-1965, the date on which the festival of Diwali fell, were alleged to have only instigated their companions by giving lalkaras and saying that,.", "canonical_name": "Sarwan Sin?hwould"}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6189, "end_char": 6199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6208, "end_char": 6218, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sections 323, 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6244, "end_char": 6261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6272, "end_char": 6289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6308, "end_char": 6319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6320, "end_char": 6337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6423, "end_char": 6433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6434, "end_char": 6451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ram Singh.and", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7287, "end_char": 7300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was only when Ram Singh.and Gurdlal Singh gave, 'lalkaras' or instigated the others to attack and E not to spare Sarwan Singh that the assault was alleged to have begun.", "canonical_name": "Ram Singh.and"}}, {"text": "Gurdlal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7301, "end_char": 7314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was only when Ram Singh.and Gurdlal Singh gave, 'lalkaras' or instigated the others to attack and E not to spare Sarwan Singh that the assault was alleged to have begun.", "canonical_name": "Gurdial Singh"}}, {"text": "Kartar Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7562, "end_char": 7574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defence version, put forward through Kartar Singh (D.W. 2), was that, on the Diwali night of 24-10-1965, at about 8 p.m., one Gurdev Singh (P.W. 12) son of Mangal Singh, had come with Chanan Singh (P.W; 8) the injured artd Ralla Singh (P.W. 10) and:Gurdev Singh Harijan and had a ijuarrel with Sarwan Singh (P; W. 7) injured, and with one Gurbux Singh (parentage not given) over the ownership of a tractor which was parked nearby."}}, {"text": "24-10-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7618, "end_char": 7628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defence version, put forward through Kartar Singh (D.W. 2), was that, on the Diwali night of 24-10-1965, at about 8 p.m., one Gurdev Singh (P.W. 12) son of Mangal Singh, had come with Chanan Singh (P.W; 8) the injured artd Ralla Singh (P.W. 10) and:Gurdev Singh Harijan and had a ijuarrel with Sarwan Singh (P; W. 7) injured, and with one Gurbux Singh (parentage not given) over the ownership of a tractor which was parked nearby."}}, {"text": "Gurdev Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7651, "end_char": 7663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defence version, put forward through Kartar Singh (D.W. 2), was that, on the Diwali night of 24-10-1965, at about 8 p.m., one Gurdev Singh (P.W. 12) son of Mangal Singh, had come with Chanan Singh (P.W; 8) the injured artd Ralla Singh (P.W. 10) and:Gurdev Singh Harijan and had a ijuarrel with Sarwan Singh (P; W. 7) injured, and with one Gurbux Singh (parentage not given) over the ownership of a tractor which was parked nearby."}}, {"text": "Mangal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7681, "end_char": 7693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defence version, put forward through Kartar Singh (D.W. 2), was that, on the Diwali night of 24-10-1965, at about 8 p.m., one Gurdev Singh (P.W. 12) son of Mangal Singh, had come with Chanan Singh (P.W; 8) the injured artd Ralla Singh (P.W. 10) and:Gurdev Singh Harijan and had a ijuarrel with Sarwan Singh (P; W. 7) injured, and with one Gurbux Singh (parentage not given) over the ownership of a tractor which was parked nearby.", "canonical_name": "Mangal Singh"}}, {"text": "Gurdev Singh Harijan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7774, "end_char": 7794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defence version, put forward through Kartar Singh (D.W. 2), was that, on the Diwali night of 24-10-1965, at about 8 p.m., one Gurdev Singh (P.W. 12) son of Mangal Singh, had come with Chanan Singh (P.W; 8) the injured artd Ralla Singh (P.W. 10) and:Gurdev Singh Harijan and had a ijuarrel with Sarwan Singh (P; W. 7) injured, and with one Gurbux Singh (parentage not given) over the ownership of a tractor which was parked nearby."}}, {"text": "Gurbux Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7864, "end_char": 7876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defence version, put forward through Kartar Singh (D.W. 2), was that, on the Diwali night of 24-10-1965, at about 8 p.m., one Gurdev Singh (P.W. 12) son of Mangal Singh, had come with Chanan Singh (P.W; 8) the injured artd Ralla Singh (P.W. 10) and:Gurdev Singh Harijan and had a ijuarrel with Sarwan Singh (P; W. 7) injured, and with one Gurbux Singh (parentage not given) over the ownership of a tractor which was parked nearby."}}, {"text": "Kartar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7974, "end_char": 7986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was stated by Kartar Singh that both sides were drunk and that G Gurdev Singh son of Mangal Singh had given a barchha blow to Sarwan Singh and Gurbux Singh had given a barchha blow to Chanan Singh."}}, {"text": "G Gurdev Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8023, "end_char": 8037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was stated by Kartar Singh that both sides were drunk and that G Gurdev Singh son of Mangal Singh had given a barchha blow to Sarwan Singh and Gurbux Singh had given a barchha blow to Chanan Singh."}}, {"text": "Gurbux Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8103, "end_char": 8115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was stated by Kartar Singh that both sides were drunk and that G Gurdev Singh son of Mangal Singh had given a barchha blow to Sarwan Singh and Gurbux Singh had given a barchha blow to Chanan Singh."}}, {"text": "Chanan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8144, "end_char": 8156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was stated by Kartar Singh that both sides were drunk and that G Gurdev Singh son of Mangal Singh had given a barchha blow to Sarwan Singh and Gurbux Singh had given a barchha blow to Chanan Singh.", "canonical_name": "Chanan Singh,\"which"}}, {"text": "Gurdev Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8307, "end_char": 8319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was sought to be proved by the defence,· through other witnesses, that, after this incident, there was a compromhe between the two si.des so th•t Gurdev Singh son of MangalSingh, at the instance, of Sarwan Singh, agreed to forego the unpaid price of the tractor,.", "canonical_name": "Gurdial Singh"}}, {"text": "MangalSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8327, "end_char": 8338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was sought to be proved by the defence,· through other witnesses, that, after this incident, there was a compromhe between the two si.des so th•t Gurdev Singh son of MangalSingh, at the instance, of Sarwan Singh, agreed to forego the unpaid price of the tractor,.", "canonical_name": "Mangal Singh"}}, {"text": "GARIB SINGHV", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8593, "end_char": 8605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was not even attempted to be explained by the defence version how an'!igreement could emerge so suddenly not\n\nGARIB SINGHV, PUNJAB (Be-g; J,) 9_81\n\nonly.", "canonical_name": "GARIB SINGH & ORS"}}, {"text": "Bhagat Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8941, "end_char": 8953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suggestion, however, was that the prosecuti6n case, according to which .there was litigation between Ram Singh and Bhagat Singh accused on one side and Sarwan Singh (P.W. 7) on the other, and the intervention of Chanan Singh (P; W. 8), who had his.own scores to settle with Garib Singh, explained the implication of all .the accused persons."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9591, "end_char": 9606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On an appeal filed by the State of Punjab, a Division Bench of the High Court listed and then examined each of the features :n of the evidence in the case which had baffied the learned Sessions .Judge."}}, {"text": "Sadda Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9962, "end_char": 9971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It came to the c0nclusion that the injured eye witnesses, namely, 'Sarwan Singh (P.W. 7), Chanan Singh (P.W. 8), Gurdev Singh\n\nson of Sadda Ram (P.W. 9), Ralla Singh(P.W. 10) must be believed, at any rate with regard to the three accused persons, namely, Garib Singh, Mohinder Singh, and Bhagat Singh who were alleged to have actually caused injuries to them."}}, {"text": "Ralla Singh(P.W.", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9982, "end_char": 9998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It came to the c0nclusion that the injured eye witnesses, namely, 'Sarwan Singh (P.W. 7), Chanan Singh (P.W. 8), Gurdev Singh\n\nson of Sadda Ram (P.W. 9), Ralla Singh(P.W. 10) must be believed, at any rate with regard to the three accused persons, namely, Garib Singh, Mohinder Singh, and Bhagat Singh who were alleged to have actually caused injuries to them."}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10274, "end_char": 10284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Garib Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10292, "end_char": 10303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It, therefore, convicted the three appellants before us by special leave by applying Section 34 LP .C. Garib Singh was convicted under Section 307 l.P.C. separately, for the injury caused to Sarwan Singh (P.W. 7) and sentenced to five years' rigorous imprisonment and he was also .convicted and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment under F, Section 324/34 and to three months' rigorous imprisonment under Section 323/34 I.P.C. Mohinder Singh was convicted separately 'imd.", "canonical_name": "GARIB SINGH & ORS"}}, {"text": "Section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10324, "end_char": 10335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10539, "end_char": 10550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10603, "end_char": 10614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10618, "end_char": 10623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10724, "end_char": 10735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10792, "end_char": 10803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10808, "end_char": 10825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10877, "end_char": 10888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Bhagt Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10901, "end_char": 10912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 307 /34 Indian Penal Code, and to three months' rigorous/imprisonment _under Section 323 /34 LP .C.\n\nBhagt Singh was convicted separately and sentenced to three months' rigorous imprion ment under Section 323 I.P .C., to Jive years' rigorous imurisonment under Section 307/34 LP.C., and to one year's rigorous imprisonment under Section 323/34 I.P.C.\n\nAll the .sentences were directed to run concurrently.", "canonical_name": "Bhagat Singh"}}, {"text": "Section 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10997, "end_char": 11008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11061, "end_char": 11072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11129, "end_char": 11140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11144, "end_char": 11149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "25-10-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11438, "end_char": 11448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court had sustained the acquittal of Ram Singh and Gurdial Singh for two reasons : firstly, 'because the delay, in the making of the First Information Report, which was shown to have beenJodged on the next day i.e. to say 25-10-1965 at .11.30 a.m ."}}, {"text": "Burki", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11555, "end_char": 11560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at Po!ice Station .Ghanaur District Patiala at a distance of only 1 t m!les from Village Burki where the occurrence was shown to have taken place; and, secondly, because both Ram Singh arid Gurdial Singh \"are said to have been empty handed at the time of the occurrence and to neither of whom ariy injuries are atiri buted\"."}}, {"text": "Gurdial", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12100, "end_char": 12107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the prticipation of Ram Singh and Gurdial Smgh m the assault which took place upon the irijured persons.", "canonical_name": "Gurdial Singh"}}, {"text": "7-4-1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13042, "end_char": 13050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".It had rejected the testimony of Kartar Singh (D.W. 2), the only alleged eye witnes$ of the defence version, on the ground that he st-ated that he had not, before he appeared to give evidence in the witness box oil 7-4-1966, disclosed anything about the incident to anyone."}}, {"text": "SarWan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13794, "end_char": 13806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness stated that, although SarWan Singh, Chanan Singh, Ralla Sjngh, Gurdev Singh.", "canonical_name": "Sarwan Sin?hwould"}}, {"text": "Ralla Sjngh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13822, "end_char": 13833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness stated that, although SarWan Singh, Chanan Singh, Ralla Sjngh, Gurdev Singh.", "canonical_name": "Ralla Sjngh"}}, {"text": "Babu Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14280, "end_char": 14290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Babu Singh ID W 3)."}}, {"text": "Vishnu Sarno", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14304, "end_char": 14316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Vishnu Sarno (D W, 4}, either made statements based on hear-say or ltemnted to nrnve\n\nthe highly unnatural alleged agreement ot compromise between\n\nSarwap Singh wh<>se condition."}}, {"text": "Sarwap Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14452, "end_char": 14464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Vishnu Sarno (D W, 4}, either made statements based on hear-say or ltemnted to nrnve\n\nthe highly unnatural alleged agreement ot compromise between\n\nSarwap Singh wh<>se condition.", "canonical_name": "Sarwan Sin?hwould"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15466, "end_char": 15475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15483, "end_char": 15502, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Beg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17810, "end_char": 17813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The method to be employed in making this attempt was stated as follows by one of us (Beg, J.) in Chet Ram v. 8 State(');\n\n\"Courts, in search of the core of truth, have to beware of being misled by half truths or individually defective pieces of evidence."}}, {"text": "Prem Nath", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19575, "end_char": 19584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Prem Nath (P.W. 1), who examined him at 5.25 a.m. on 25-10-1965 found that a small portion of the omentum was protruding from the wound, 5 c.m."}}, {"text": "H. M. Nahar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19887, "end_char": 19898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. H. M. Nahar (P.W. 2), stated that the ioiured remained under the effect of morphine sulphate upto 26-10-1965,\n\n(I) (197 J) (I) Simla Law Journal p. 153 @ p. J57."}}, {"text": "26-10-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19985, "end_char": 19995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. H. M. Nahar (P.W. 2), stated that the ioiured remained under the effect of morphine sulphate upto 26-10-1965,\n\n(I) (197 J) (I) Simla Law Journal p. 153 @ p. J57."}}, {"text": "Nand Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20271, "end_char": 20281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another in jured person Chanan Singh (P.W. 8), whose brother was said to have filed a 'Civil, suit against Nand Singh, the father of Garib Singh appellant, and Jaiinal Singh, brother of Gufdial accused, was not shown to be connected with Sarwan Singh."}}, {"text": "Jaiinal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20324, "end_char": 20337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another in jured person Chanan Singh (P.W. 8), whose brother was said to have filed a 'Civil, suit against Nand Singh, the father of Garib Singh appellant, and Jaiinal Singh, brother of Gufdial accused, was not shown to be connected with Sarwan Singh."}}, {"text": "Gufdial", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20350, "end_char": 20357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another in jured person Chanan Singh (P.W. 8), whose brother was said to have filed a 'Civil, suit against Nand Singh, the father of Garib Singh appellant, and Jaiinal Singh, brother of Gufdial accused, was not shown to be connected with Sarwan Singh.", "canonical_name": "Gurdial Singh"}}, {"text": "Patiala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20724, "end_char": 20731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Just as Sarwan Singh was taken in a cart to Patiala after the occurrence, he had been taken to Rajpura alongwith Ralla Singh (P.W. 10) c who had received three simple injuries with a blunt weapon."}}, {"text": "Rajpura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20775, "end_char": 20782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Just as Sarwan Singh was taken in a cart to Patiala after the occurrence, he had been taken to Rajpura alongwith Ralla Singh (P.W. 10) c who had received three simple injuries with a blunt weapon."}}, {"text": "Ralla Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21009, "end_char": 21020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurdev Singh (P.W. 9), who had received two contusion and a faint contusion with blunt weapons had also gone with Chanan Singh and Ralla Singh to Rajpura, where they were all medically examined.", "canonical_name": "Ralla Sjngh"}}, {"text": "25-10-l965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21396, "end_char": 21406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court had in these circumstances, .not given undue importance to the delay in the lodging of a First Information Report on 25-10-l965 signed by Chanan Singh."}}, {"text": "Chan an Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21931, "end_char": 21944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kartar Singh (P.W. 14 ), had said that' he had waited: to ascertain facts from Chan an Singh himself, who was lying injured in a. hospital .", "canonical_name": "Chanan Singh,\"which"}}, {"text": "Chanan Singh,\"which", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22897, "end_char": 22916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and\n\nanother on the body of Chanan Singh,\"which could bleed and tJiat\n\nSUPREME COURT REl'ORTS [lg72] 3 S.C R.\n\nthe blood would first get soaked in the clothes of the 'injured. ..,.", "canonical_name": "Chanan Singh,\"which"}}, {"text": "Sarwan\n\nSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24197, "end_char": 24210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Garib Singh shoutd take it into his head to suddenly attack Sarwan\n\nSingh, whose alleged adoption deed had.", "canonical_name": "Sarwan Sin?hwould"}}, {"text": "Bhgat Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25010, "end_char": 25021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "most unnatural for Sarwan Singh, situated as he was in his litigation with Ram Singh and Bhgat Singh, to make such an allegation against Garib Singh.", "canonical_name": "Bhagat Singh"}}, {"text": "Garib Sinh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25135, "end_char": 25145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "natural and reasonable than that Garib Sinh was falsely implicated by all the witnesses simply to oblige Chanan Singh.", "canonical_name": "GARIB SINGH & ORS"}}, {"text": "Bhagat Sipgh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26900, "end_char": 26912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a short and sudden occurrence could take place on the evening of Diwali at a chance meeting when Sarwan Singh found Garib Singh in the company of his adversarie~, Ram Singh and Bhagat Sipgh.", "canonical_name": "Bhagat Singh"}}, {"text": "Sarwan Sin?hwould", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27824, "end_char": 27841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Counsl for the appellant also submitted that Ram Singh and his associates were not_!ikely to know the time at which Sarwan Sin?hwould pass Rani Singh's house that evening.", "canonical_name": "Sarwan Sin?hwould"}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28447, "end_char": 28457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28458, "end_char": 28475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mohton", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29086, "end_char": 29092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Khedr1 Mohton's case( 1 ), an appellate court had set aside the conviction of the accused persons on certain grounds including that the four eye Witnesses of the alleged occurrence were unreliable because they were interested persons."}}, {"text": "Laxman K", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31621, "end_char": 31629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Irr Laxman K; alu Nika/je's case( 1) it was laid down by ihi Court at page 688 : . / \""}}, {"text": "alu Nika", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31631, "end_char": 31639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Irr Laxman K; alu Nika/je's case( 1) it was laid down by ihi Court at page 688 : . / \""}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33129, "end_char": 33139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33140, "end_char": 33157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33529, "end_char": 33539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33540, "end_char": 33557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33636, "end_char": 33647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33662, "end_char": 33679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33718, "end_char": 33729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Bhagat Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33938, "end_char": 33950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We also set aside the convictions and sentences of the appellant Bhagat Singh under.", "canonical_name": "Bhagat Singh"}}, {"text": "Section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33958, "end_char": 33969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "[1968) 2 S. C.R. 685", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 34003, "end_char": 34023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34129, "end_char": 34140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian A Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34141, "end_char": 34160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mohinder Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34241, "end_char": 34255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards Mohinder Singh appellant, a youngster who was bound to have been misguided by the example of older people and against whom no previous conviction is disclosed, while setting aside his conviction and sentence under Section 307 /34 and 323/34 Indian Penal Code, we maintain his convicii tion under Section 324, Indian Penal Code, but reduee his ' sentenceurider Section 324 India Penal Code to the period already undergone.", "canonical_name": "Mohinder Singh"}}, {"text": "Section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34455, "end_char": 34466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian A Penal Code", "statute": "Indian A Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34482, "end_char": 34499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34537, "end_char": 34548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34550, "end_char": 34567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34601, "end_char": 34612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "India Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34613, "end_char": 34629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_991_999_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "PRABHAWATI\n\nDR. PRITAM KAUR\n\nMarch 22, 1972\n\n[K. S, HEGl>E, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND G. K. MITTBR, JJ.]\n\n. . U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1941-S. 3- /ts scope-.Qrder of the HIRh •Court dil't!ctinR the State Govt. to rehear a rtvislon pttltlon-R<spondent filed eviction suit before rehearing--\n\nWhether the tuit for eviction maintainable,\n\nThe. appellant,' a tenant, was sought to be evicted by Respondent.\n\nShe applied to the Distri<:t Magistrate, who was also the Rent Controller under s .. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act\n\n1947, for permission to sue the appellant for her eviction and the permission was granted.\n\nAs against that order, the appellant went up iii revision to the State Government.\n\nDuring the pendency of that proceeding, the State Government passed an order staying the operation of the permission granted by the Commissioner pending consideration of the case by the State Government. La•er, the State Government allowed the revision petition and set aside the premission granted.\n\nRespondent challenged the legality of the order made by the .. State Govt. before I/le High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The High Court set aside the order of the Government on the ground that the State Govt. in deciding the revision petition had allowed itself to be inftuenced by irrelevant considerations.\n\nIt directed the State Govt. to rehear the appellant's revision application according to law. This order was passed on February 28, 1967. On the very next day, the respondent filed a suit for eviction of the appellant. When the revision petition came up for hearing before the State Govt., the Respondent submitted that in view of the institution of the suit, the State Govt. was not competent to hear the revision petition and accordingly, the State Govt, dismissed the petition on the sole ground that the proceeding be'fore it became infl'l;'ctunus in view of the institution of the civil suit.\n\nThe appellant challenged thai order of the State Government by means of a writ petition before the High Court. The High Court held that the stay grnnted _by the State Govt. had lapsed when the revision petition was\n\ndispOSCd of.\n\nTherefore, on the institution of the civil suit for. e\\iction, her revision petition before the State Govt. became infructuous.\n\nAs against that order, this appeal. has been brought by special leave. Allowing the appeal, and directing 'the State Govt. to restore and decide the revision petition according to law.\n\nHELD : The State Government and the High Court were not justified in dismissing the revision petition as being infructuous because of the institution of the suit. One of the implications of the order di the High Court directing the State Government to rehear the revision petition of the appellant was that the respondent was precluded from filing the intended suit for eviction till .the State Government heard the rvision petition. Otherwise, the direction given by the High Court would remain unobeyed.\n\nThe respondent cannot be permitted 'o obotruct the implellMll!tation of that direction and that too, a direction given at her instance.\n\n~11)1. Ir n()! open to the t te ~ .Wt befo~\n\nSUPREME C<:JUR T REPORTS\n\n[1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe revision petition was disposed of by the State Government.\n\nThe A suit filed by the respondent was a premature one. Such a suit did not bar the State Government from disposing of the revision pet:tion in pur~ •uance of the order made by the H; gh Court. [999 BJ\n\n\nParas Nath, , 1969] 2 S.C.R. 297 a;:d Mohammad Ismail v. Naney Lal, rt 9691 3 .S. C.R. 894, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1813 of 1971. '\n\nAppeal by special leave from the jud 0 ment and decree dated February 5, 1971 of the Allahabad High Court. in Special Appeal No. 1116 of 1969.\n\nM. V. Ta.k1mde and S.S. Shukla, for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Chag/a and Rameshwar Nath, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J. though this appeal relates to a comparatively small maiter, it has exposed several disturbing features.\n\nHence it is necessary to set out the facts of the case in some detail.\n\nThe appellant is a tenant of the respondent.\n\nShe is occupying one of the premi 0.es belonging to the respondent.\n\nThe respondent is seeking to evict her from the said premises.\n\nFor that purpose she applied to the District Magistrate. Dehradun, who is also the Rent Controller, under s. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act,_ 1947 (to the hereinafter referred to as the Act) for permission to sue the appellanv for her eviction.\n\nThe permission asked for was granted by the Rent Controller.\n\nAs against that order, the appellant went up in revision to the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut who affirmed the order of the District Magistrate.\n\nThereafter the appellant went up in revision to the State Government.\n\nDuring th~ pendency of that proceeding the State Government passed an order of stay which reads :\n\n\"Operation of the permission under s. 3 of the Act granted by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut to the opposite party, landlady to tile the suit for the petitioner's ejectment from the house in question is stayed pending consideration of the case by the State Government.\"\n\nLater the State Government allowed the revision petition and set aside the .Permiss.ion granted. , The respondent challned the legalitj 'of: the O'rilet, made by the State Government 1:1efore the\n\n•' PRA!IHAWAU v .. PRIIAM KAUR .(Hegde, _J,) i-U\n\nA High Court of Allahabad in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The High Court set aside the order of the Government on the ground that the State Government in deciding the revision petition had allowed itself to be influenced by irrelevant considerations. The concluding portion of the order of the High Court reads : B \"The petition is allowed.\n\nThe order of the ·-State Government dated 14-6-1966 ( Annexure E to the peti tion) is quashed. The State Government is directed to rehear Smt. Prabhawati Devi's revision under section 7F of (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, according to law. The petitioner shall get costs of this petition from respondent No. 1.\"\n\nThis order was passed on Februa17 28, 1967. On the very next day, the respondent filed a suit for eviction of the appellant. _ When the n; vision petition came up for hearing before the State\n\nGovernment, the respondent submitted before the State Govem- 0 ment that it was not competent to hear the revision petition in view of the institution of the suit and for that purpose, it relied on a decision of the High Court holding that a revision petition pending before the State Government becomes infnlctuous orice a suit for eviction is filed in pursuance of the permission gi\\len by the Commissioner. The State Government accepted that contention and dismissed the revision petition on the sole ground that the E proceedi n$ before it became infructuous in view of the institution ot the civil suit. The appellant challenged _that order by means of a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court. The High Court came to the conclusion that the stay granted by the State\n\nGovernment had lapsed when the revision petition was disposed\n\nF of and the same did not stand revived when the High Court direct ed the State Government to rehear the matter and dispose of the same according to Jaw.\n\nConsequently, on the institution of the . civil suit for eviction of the appellant, her revision petition before the State Government became infructuous. As agamst that order, . this appeal has been brought by special leave. ·\n\nG Before proceeding to discuss the points arising for decision, ft will be convenient to read the relevant provisions of the Act.\n\nThough the Act purports to be a temporary measure, It hu continued to be in force from 1947. This Is but a smlll anomaly\n\ncompared with the difficulties created. by some of ita. provisions.\n\nNow let us have a look at thoie provisions. They read : ll \"Restrictions on eviction.- . (I) Subject to any order passed under sub- !lilctiOJ1_(3 ), iio suitshall, without the permissiQ11 of the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nDistrict Magistrate be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds :\n\n(a) that the tenant is in arrears OL rent for more than three months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of notice of demand;\n\n(b) that the tnant has wilfully caused or permitted to be caused suhstantiul damage to the accom modation;\n\n(c) that the tenant has, without the p.ermission in writing of the landlord, made or permitted to he made any such construction as, in the opinion of the court, has materially altered the accom modation or is likely substantially to dimi; h its value;\n\n(d) that the tenant has created a nuisance or has done any act which is inconsistent with the. pur pose for which h~ was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodntion, or which is likely to affect adversely and substar.tially the landlord's interest therein;\n\n( e) that the tenant has on or after the I st day of October, 1946, sub.let the whole or any portion of the accommodntion without the permission of the landlord;\n\n(f) that the tenant has renounced this character as such or denied the title of the landlord and the\n\nlatter has not waived his right or condoned the F conduct of the tenant;\n\n(g) that the tenant was, allowed to occupy the accommodation as a oart of his contract of employment under the landlord and his employment has been determined.\n\nExp/anation.-For the purposes of sub-section (e) lodging a person in a hotel or a lodging house shall not be deemed to be subletting.\n\n2. Where any application has been made to the District Magistrate for permission to sue a tenant for eviction from any accommodation and the District Magistrate grants c;>r refuses to grant the permision, the\n\ni'tY , a1'1'1e~ by his order. may withln.<10 clays ftW1\n\n' B\n\nPRABl!AWATI V. PRITAM .KAUR (tf6gde,'J,) ~6\n\nthe date on which the order is communicated to him apply to the Commissioner to. revise the order.\n\n3. The Commissioner shall hear the application made under sub-section ( 2), as far as may be, within six weeks from the date of making it, and he may, if he is not satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order passed by the District Magistrate' or as to the regularity of proceedings held before him, alter or reverse his order or make such other order as may be just and proper.\n\n4. The order of the Commissioner under sub-section ( 3) shall, subject to any order passed by the State Government under section 7-F be fin~!.\"\n\nThe only other relevant section for our present purpose u s. 7-F which says : / ·\n\n\"Power of State Government-The State Government may call for the record of any case granting or .refusing to grant permiflsion for the filing of a suit for eviction referred to in section 3 or requiring any accOl!l modation to be let or not to be let to any person under section 7 or directing a person to vacate any accom!llOdation under section 7 -A and may make such order as appears to it necessary for the ends of justice.\" .\n\nProviding against unlawful eviction is undoubtodly a laudable object. It is necessary in social interest that improper eviction of tenanats should be prohibited.\n\nVarious States have enacted laws prohibiting the landlords from evicting . their tenants except\n\non grounds mentioned in those laws.\n\nThe implementation of those measures is left in the handiifof either regular courts or regularly constituted tribunals who are the principal repositories of the judicial power of the State and not with execuive authorities burdened with other duties.\n\nBut strangely enough under the Act two rounds of litigations are provided for.\n\nA landlord sebkillg to evict a tenant must first go to the District Magistrate fer pet mission.\n\nAs against the order of the District Mastrate the aggrieved party can go up i11 revision to the Commiss1oncr. The order of the Commissioner, subject to any order .passed by the State Government under section 7-F of the Act, is final.\n\nSection 7-F empowers the State. Government to revise the order of the order of the Commissioner at any time it pleases. There Is no time limit for exercising that power.\n\nThis .entire Iona drawn out process is only for the purpose .of decidini.whther tho perminlon should:be granted to !he landlord to sueibls wn0n(f91' -.i1G11Dent.\n\n'SUPll!ME OOlJRT REPORTS [1!172] 3 s.c.a.\n\nIf the permission sought is granted then starts another round of A litigation from one court to another.\n\nThe principal function of courts and tribunals is to settle the dispute between the parties and thereby give a quietus te the .social frictions generated by the un- . resolved disputes.\n\nAs long as a litigatiort )asts, the tension coli tinues and useful energies will be wasted. . 'fhis is not all.\n\nEvery litigation means heavy financjal burden.to the.parties.\n\nThe merryll go-round of litigation provided by the Act instead of helping the tenants who ordinarily belong to the weaker sectionsof the society is likely to result in their ruination. These problems are for the legislatures to consider.\n\nThe power conferred on the District Magistrate, the Commissioner an\\! the State Government has been .held to be a judicial C power by this Court-see Shri Bhagwan and anr. v. Ramachand and anr. (1).\n\nTherefore let us see how that power is required to be exercised.\n\nNeither s. 3 nor s. 7; p prescribes under what cir cwilstances the pemiission asked for should be granted and on what grounds the same can be refused.\n\nPrima facie the power conferred on the authorities under ss. 3 and 7-F has no limits. It r.. is neither controlled nor guided.\n\nThe validity of that p0wer cannot be and was not challenged in these proceedings.\n\nHence we\n\nhall not go into it. If one desires to know how and to what extent the power conferred on the. authorities under those rrovisions can be misused, one has only to look to the facts I) this case.. E The appellant filed the revision petition before the State Gov~ enunent on April 2, 1965.\n\nOn the same day she sent a.copy of ihat petition alongwith an application to the Minlster.foYlrrigation whO had nothing to do with the revision petition in question as revision petitions under s. 7-F were being dealt with by the Ministty .of Civil Supplies.\n\nIt is reasonable to infr that she.m)lst have done so because either she or. some of her fnends or relations had F SOllle influence with that Minister.\n\nOtherwise there was no pui' Pose in sending a copy of. the rvision petition to the Ii:rigation\n\nMil)ister.\n\nThe Irrigation Minister sent the copy received by him to the Secretary, Civil Supplies after making the following .note thereon;\n\n \"Pl. look into it.\n\nSo much Is In mY knowledge that occupants are vetl very old tenant . of this shop. l .hope .•. proper view will be taken of the dispute.\"\n\nThereafter some official in the Secretariat prepared a detailed note • giving the history of the case.\n\nThat office note concluded thus : l\n\n\"In this connection observations of Minister for\n\n. Irrigation and Power on serial No. 12 and orders of J.S.\n\n1rfi§~513 s-:-'c:-'R.. 21s. ··\n\nA at the bottom thereon may also please be seen, submitted. , J(.R may please see for orders.\"\n\nIn due course the Government allowed the revision petition. That order has its own special features.\n\nIt reads :\n\n\"GOYERMENT OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nRENT CONTROL DEPARTMENT No. 1696/E-1(10)II965,\n\nDated Lucknow, June 14, 1966.\n\nORDER\n\nC Subject : Smt. Prabhawati versus Dr. Pritam Kaur.\n\nregarding a portion of premises No. 11 Rarnpur Mandi Road, Debra Dun.\n\nWith reference to her petition dated April 2, 196.5.\n\nSmt. Prabhawati is informed that after a careful examination of the records of the case and consideration of the version of the opposite party and also in view of other facts relevant to the case, it appears expedient in the ends of justice that the petitioner should not be dispossessed from the disputed premises.\n\nTherefore, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 7-F of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 194 7, the Governor is please(! to _ revoke the permission under section 3 of the said Act granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer Debra Dun and confirmed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, vlde his orders dated March 30,\n\n1965, passed in revision No. 13, to file a civil suit of ejectment . against the petitioner from the premises in dispute.\n\nSd - B. N. Chaturvedi Anu Sachiv.''\n\nOne would search this order in vain for the reason that persuaded the State Government to allow the revision petition. Not a single reason is given for setting aside the order of the Commls-·\n\nioner. But if one delves into the records of the Government as High Court of Allaha\\>ad did, one is left with a feeling that the note of the Irrigation Minister must have weighed heavily on the H concerned authority. Our ellperience in dealing with litigations of this type does not embolden us to say. that what happened in this case is a rare ellception to the rule;\n\n998 SUPR5'4B GOUR}' lllil10R'lll [i.972] 3 S.C.R.\n\nIi!llilY also be noted that when tjle re~OJJ.p, etition was pend- ·\"- ing before te State Government, some i>Q$y bOdy by . name Ramesh Pun wrote a letter to the Minister for Fciod and Civil\n\nSuply on May 16, 1966 recommending the case of the appellant.\n\nIn his letter he set forth his qualifications as a \"'social worker aad a lighr. for freedom .since childhood''. T)iat letter appears to have found a resPeCtable place in .the records qf the case. One 11: can only regret for this sorry state of alfaitS. ·\n\nThe appellant has found a match in the res]:>oni!Cnt.\n\nIt is' interosting to note how the respondent cleverly queered the pitch against the appellant.\n\nWe h~YF wlier noticed that it was at her instance the High Court had quashed the order of the State Govent and directei! the State Oovent to re)l!l!ll' 1111d dis- '. pose of tµe revision petition according to Jaw.\n\nSoon after getting that order, she tried to over-reach tl)at order by filing a suit' for eviction the very next day after the High court passed its order.\n\nThe High C!>µrt of Allahabad as we!! as th~ O:>urt have held that a suit validly instituted after obtaining the required permission under s. 3 ( 1) does not cease to be maintainable because of any order made by the State Government under s. 7-F during the pen dency of the suit-see Bhagw(ln Das v. Paras Noth( 1) and' Mohamm(ld Ismail v. Nanney Lal('). In a rather desperate bid' to take some advantae from those decisiOns, tho re!!Jioodent ·\n\nappears to have rushed to the Civil court even before the ink on the I:ligh C<iint's. order had drie4. IJP F111vjpg h1stit11~ the suit she mnwd to Government what. aj w jle. r ws a fait acco(l!pli; Tue State Oovepup~111111 pienttqne4 eiµ-Jier flt that\n\n.the r~. yis10. n ti\\ipn before it be~.Ml!P. illfructµl)Us aus~ of the . :illltitu!i<, lll pf the suit. l!nfortµMf.ly gh COi!~ ~!!~ with ttit view. ·\n\nMr. Taunde, lemed Counl for the apl?\"'llant ended before us tht no sooner the Hi~ Court set asiae the order of the Goveinment and directed the State Government to and dispOsC of the matter accor!fing to law, the inte$1 enler of stay passl!ll by . t)I~ St Ille. Government stood. revived. In s}lppOtt of that contn!iP!l of ts, he hs placed reliance on the dectSlon of the Patna High Court m Bilnk1m Chandra and ors. v. Chand/ Prasad(•); the decisions of the Mi1dr; lll ffigil (:q9~ jn Tqvvple Veeraswami \"· Pulim Raman1ia and ors.(') ll!l!l Sfll'.qngthn 4iYQllil!I' v ..\n\n. Muthiah Mooppanar and Rf'S.(') .an!! the i~Qll qf,.. ~\"\"~'\n\nHigh Court in Sushi/a Bali . .Pasi v. G.uest J;, een WUli@Ws 44.(•).\n\nWe do not think it is necessary to cOl)S. i\\ler tht CQllte.n.. . ti()!! .P, i. J1'js appeal. The principle of law cpnt, ond!ICJ fgr by Mr .. 'fl\\l'li:., fl\n\n\" (I) ji9'69j '2. s.c.i\\.' 297; '(2)' [1969) 3!'S.C.R. 894; (3) AIR 19,6 l'lt.f27t.\n\n(4) 1:L.ll. ls, Mad. 721; (S) 6l, M.L.J. 844; . {6) T.L.R. (1949) Vol. J Cal. 177.\n\nhas several facets; but there is no need to go into those facets in A this appeal. In our opinion this appeal has to succeed on a much broader ground. No party to a litigation can be permitted to frustrate the decision rendered by having recourse to trickery. The true effect of the order made by the High Court in the writ petition was that the question whether the respondent should be permitted to tile a suit tor ejectment of the appellant or not must be gone B into and decided afresh by the State Government.\n\nOne of the\n\nunplicatins flowing from that order is that the respondent is precluded from filing the intended suit for eviction till the Sta, te Government decides the revision petition. Otherwise the direction given by the High Court would remain unobeyed.\n\nThe respondent cannot be permitted to obstruct th~ implementation of that c direction and that to a direction given at her instance.\n\nConsequently it was not open to the respondent to file the suit before the\n\nrevision petition was disposed of by the State Government.\n\nIn our opinion, the suit filed by the respondent was a premature one.\n\nSuch a suit does not bar the State Government from disposing of the revision petition in pursuance of the order made by the High Court. The State Government. was not justified in dismissing the o\n\nrevision petition as being infructuous.\n\nIn the resuit this appeal i.s allowed, the order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition as well as the order of the State Government dismissing the revision petition are set aside. Further the State Government is directed to restore the said revision and E dispose of the same according to law. 'This, has been a long drawn out litigation.\n\nHence it is necessary fell' us to direct the State Oovernmeat to dispose of the revision petition within four months frpm the date of the receipt of this order. Meanwhile it is open to the respondent to move the court in' which she has filed the civil suit to stay further proceedings. In the circumstances of F the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs both in the High Court as well as in this Court.\n\ns.c.\n\nA />f'eal allowed.", "total_entities": 59, "entities": [{"text": "PRABHAWATI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 10, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Prabhawati Devi", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PRITAM KAUR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PRITAM KAUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 22, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 43, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PRITAM KAUR\n\nMarch 22, 1972\n\n[K. S, HEGl>E, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND G. K. MITTBR, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1941", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 164, "end_char": 168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1941", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1941"}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 539, "end_char": 571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1154, "end_char": 1162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act\n\n1947", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act\n\n1947"}}, {"text": "February 28, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1491, "end_char": 1508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was passed on February 28, 1967."}}, {"text": "1969] 2 S.C.R. 297", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3530, "end_char": 3548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3622, "end_char": 3650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3772, "end_char": 3792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the jud 0 ment and decree dated February 5, 1971 of the Allahabad High Court."}}, {"text": "M. V. Ta.k1mde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3831, "end_char": 3845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. V. Ta.k1mde and S.S. Shukla, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S.S. Shukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3850, "end_char": 3861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. V. Ta.k1mde and S.S. Shukla, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Chag", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3883, "end_char": 3893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag/a and Rameshwar Nath, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3900, "end_char": 3914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag/a and Rameshwar Nath, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3981, "end_char": 3986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J. though this appeal relates to a comparatively small maiter, it has exposed several disturbing features."}}, {"text": "District Magistrate. Dehradun", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4383, "end_char": 4412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For that purpose she applied to the District Magistrate."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4453, "end_char": 4457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4482, "end_char": 4514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5042, "end_char": 5046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5538, "end_char": 5561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent challned the legalitj 'of: the O'rilet, made by the State Government 1:1efore the\n\n•' PRA!IHAWAU v .. PRIIAM KAUR .(Hegde, _J,) i-U\n\nA High Court of Allahabad in a petition under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5582, "end_char": 5590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14-6-1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5938, "end_char": 5947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of the ·-State Government dated 14-6-1966 ( Annexure E to the peti tion) is quashed."}}, {"text": "Prabhawati Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6039, "end_char": 6054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prabhawati Devi's revision under section 7F of (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, according to law.", "canonical_name": "Prabhawati Devi"}}, {"text": "section 7F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6072, "end_char": 6082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6098, "end_char": 6130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Februa17 28, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6248, "end_char": 6265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was passed on Februa17 28, 1967."}}, {"text": "V. PRITAM .KAUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10076, "end_char": 10091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "may withln.<10 clays ftW1\n\n' B\n\nPRABl!AWATI V. PRITAM .KAUR (tf6gde,'J,) ~6\n\nthe date on which the order is communicated to him apply to the Commissioner to."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10733, "end_char": 10742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10815, "end_char": 10819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11020, "end_char": 11029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11111, "end_char": 11120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11179, "end_char": 11188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12198, "end_char": 12207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12233, "end_char": 12242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13591, "end_char": 13595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13600, "end_char": 13604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13792, "end_char": 13803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 2, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14228, "end_char": 14241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "authorities under those rrovisions can be misused, one has only to look to the facts I) this case.. E The appellant filed the revision petition before the State Gov~ enunent on April 2, 1965."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14437, "end_char": 14441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.\n\n1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15300, "end_char": 15305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "GOYERMENT OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15547, "end_char": 15573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads :\n\n\"GOYERMENT OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nRENT CONTROL DEPARTMENT No."}}, {"text": "Prabhawati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15678, "end_char": 15688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prabhawati versus Dr. Pritam Kaur.", "canonical_name": "Prabhawati Devi"}}, {"text": "Pritam Kaur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15700, "end_char": 15711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prabhawati versus Dr. Pritam Kaur.", "canonical_name": "PRITAM KAUR"}}, {"text": "Prabhawati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15844, "end_char": 15854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prabhawati is informed that after a careful examination of the records of the case and consideration of the version of the opposite party and also in view of other facts relevant to the case, it appears expedient in the ends of justice that the petitioner should not be dispossessed from the disputed premises.", "canonical_name": "Prabhawati Devi"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16209, "end_char": 16218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16245, "end_char": 16277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16344, "end_char": 16353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "Debra Dun", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16419, "end_char": 16428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to _ revoke the permission under section 3 of the said Act granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer Debra Dun and confirmed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, vlde his orders dated March 30,\n\n1965, passed in revision No."}}, {"text": "B. N. Chaturvedi Anu Sachiv", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16650, "end_char": 16677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sd - B. N. Chaturvedi Anu Sachiv.''"}}, {"text": "High Court of Allaha\\>ad did", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16938, "end_char": 16966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But if one delves into the records of the Government as High Court of Allaha\\>ad did, one is left with a feeling that the note of the Irrigation Minister must have weighed heavily on the H concerned authority."}}, {"text": "Ramesh Pun", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17424, "end_char": 17434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "name Ramesh Pun wrote a letter to the Minister for Fciod and Civil\n\nSuply on May 16, 1966 recommending the case of the appellant."}}, {"text": "High C!>µrt of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18333, "end_char": 18357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High C!>µrt of Allahabad as we!!"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18467, "end_char": 18471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18567, "end_char": 18571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Taunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19181, "end_char": 19187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Taunde, lemed Counl for the apl?\"'llant ended before us tht no sooner the Hi~ Court set asiae the order of the Goveinment and directed the State Government to and dispOsC of the matter accor!fing to law, the inte$1 enler of stay passl!ll by ."}}, {"text": "Pulim Raman1ia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19683, "end_char": 19697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Chand/ Prasad(•); the decisions of the Mi1dr; lll ffigil (:q9~ jn Tqvvple Veeraswami \"· Pulim Raman1ia and ors.(')"}}, {"text": "Muthiah Mooppanar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19750, "end_char": 19767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muthiah Mooppanar and Rf'S.(') .an!!"}}]}
{"document_id": "1972_3_99_103_EN", "year": 1972, "text": "STATE OF UITAR PRADESH & ORS.\n\nRAJA nTENDRA SINGH\n\nJanuary 18, 1972\n\n[S. M. SIKIU, C.J., A. N. RAY AND M. H. BEG, JJ.]\n\nU.P. Lar11e fand Ho/din[l3 Tax Act No. 31 of 1951 and Rules mad• thereund•l<-Rule 6-A coming into force 011 23 AprU 1958-RJ.le whether app/ir.able to assessment year 1365 Fasli-Jurisdiction of High Court in ntatter of construction of Rule.\n\nC The Uttar Pradesh Large Land Holdings Tax Act No. 31 of 1357 came into force on I July 1957. The Rules under the Act were pub!Wied in the U.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 23 November 1957.\n\nRule 6-A was added to the Rules by anamendment on 23 April 1958. Rule 6-A states that where any land holdings has been legally sub-let by a disabled landholder mentioned in sub-section ( !) of section 157 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 the holdina tax D rJlall be remitted to the extent of thar chargeable on the land sub-Jet if ita annual value was arrived at by mul~ng the rent by 10}. The respondent was prior to the abolition of indari in Uttar Pradesh, the Raja of properties consistlru! of 28 villages in District Rai Bareilly. He was a mmor till 3 Mal'ch 1°§58 and attained majority on 4 March 1958.\n\nThe properties were under the management of the Court of Warda from\n\n1945 to 1953, and, thereafter, under the management of the District Judge Rai Bareilly up to 4 March 1958. On I April, 1958, the Tax E Assessment Officer sttved a notice, under s. 7(2) of the 1957 Act on the respondent, for the assessment Fasli year 1365 commencing on 1 July 1951 and ending on 30 June, 1958. The respondent filed a return ana claimed benefit of exemption under Rule 6-A of the said Rules in respect of land which had been sub-let to tensnts under the order of the Court of Wards and the District Judge when the respondent's pl'operties were under their management. The claim was rejected. The Commissioner in appeal held that Rule 6-.A was not applicable to assessment for F t~ year 1365 Fasli year. The writ petition filed by the respondent challel)glnf the. Commi88ioner's order was allowed by the Sinale Judge. n lll'Pt• by special leave the State contended before this Court that (1) '111e tax was to 'be assessed on the armuaJ value of the landholding as on 1 Jillv 1957, and,' in as much as Rule f>.A did not come into existence on I !u!y. 1957, the respondent waa not entitled to the benefit of the rule; (ii). l\\l!le 6-A was not applicable because it was not proved that the llllld was la#Qlly. sub-let; (iii) The High Court was wrong in issu\\na the writ. !>\" G the sround of mionstructlon of Rule 6-A by the assess10g autbonties because it was not a petent error.\n\n•HeJd: (i) (a) Rule 6-A is to be l'ead with sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Act. Assessme11t was for the entire agricqJtural year from 1 July 1957 30 June 195&. The land whii:h had been lawfully sublet by the Olllrt of Ward, and the District Judge could not be in the pooseooi()ll of the resPQDdent in the &WSlilllent year. Therefore, in assesain& the IJ.Dct W holfor the year 1365 Fasli, th: respondent wss entitled to claim \"-'\"\n\njt, Rule 6-A in respect of land which had been legally sub-let. The fact tb.ilt! he beaime a major from 4 March 1958 did not deprive hlm of' the benefit. u 02 J>.FJ\n\n(b) The Act came into force on 1 July 1957.\n\nThe assessmeat was A to be made for the year commencing 1 July 1957. Rules were made under s. 29 of the Act.\n\nRules, obviously came into existence subsequent to the Act coming into force.\n\nRules are procedural.\n\nRules relate to assessments. The assessment is for the '1'ntire year. The assessment in the particular instance was made after Rule 6-A came into force.\n\nTile assessment was pursuant to notice which was delivered on 1 April 1958.\n\nThe assessment was for the whole year ending 30 June 1958. Therefore, B Rule 6-A would be applicable to the assessment which was not only pending but would be upto 30 June, 1958 within which period the rule became effective for the assessment yea~. The contention that Rule 6-A was not made retrospective and therefore did not apply for an assessment for Fasli 1365 was devoid of merit. r102 H-103 Cl\n\n(ii) Jn the High Court, the State did not dispute the legality of subletting. It was, therefore, not open to the State to raise the contention c that the land had not been legally sub-let. f103 D1\n\n(iii) The respondent raised a contention as to the application of Rule 6-A. This is a question of construction of the statute and rules in respect of assessment.\n\nThe High Court was justified in issuing u.e writ. [103 El\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 238 of D 1967.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated February 9, 1965 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 310 of 1960.\n\nG. N. Dikshit and 0. P. Rana, for the appellant.\n\nJ. P. Goyal and R. A. Gupta, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRay, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment dated 9 February, 1965 of the High Court at Allahabad F dismissing the_ appeal filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh against the judgment of the learned Single Judge quashing the assessments of the respondent under the Uttar Pradesh Large Land Holdings Tax Act No. 31 of 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and further holding that the respondent was entitled to the benefit\n\nunder rule 6-A of the Uttar Pradesh Large Land Holdlngs Rules, G 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules) .\n\n. The respondent Raja was prior to the abolition of 1.amindari in the State of Uttar Pradesh the Raja of the properties known as Chandapur Raj consisting of 28 villages in the Tahsil Maharajganj in the District of Rae Bareli. The re5pondent was a minor .till 3 March, 1958 and he attained majority on 4 March, 1958. H The properties were under the management of the Court of Wards from 1945 to 1953 and thereafter under the management of the District Judge, Rae Bareli up to 4 March, 1958.\n\nU.P. STATE V. JlTENDRA SINGH (Ray, ],) l 01\n\nA O:n 1 April, 1958 the Tax Assessment Officer, Maharajganj Sub-Division served a notice under section 7(2) of the 1957 Act on the respondent for the assessment Fasli year 1365 oommencing on 1 July, 1957 and ending on 30 June, 1958. The respondent was required by thci said notice to file a return for the agricultural year of the land holding of the respondent. The respon- B dent filed a return and clainled benefit of exemption under rule 6-A of the said Rules in respect of the agricultural land which had been sub-let to tenants under the orders of the Court of Wards and the District Judge when the respondent's properties were under their management. On 16 July, 1958 the Sub-Divisional\n\nOfficer, Maharajganj being the Assessing Officer dismissed the c respondent's claun for exemption in respect. of the land holding\n\nsub-let and passed an assessment order imposing tax on the land holding of the respondent for the sum of Rs. 62,011.39. It may be stated that the assessment according to the respo.ndent should have been Rs .. 34,274-6-10 as a result of the exemption under rule 6-A. The respondent preferred an appeal before the Commissioner, Lucknow Division. The appeal was dismissed. On 9 D September, 1958 the Commissioner held that rule 6-A was not applicable to assessment of tax for the 1365 Fasli year.\n\nThe respondent thereafter on 29 September, 1958 filed a writ yetition in the High Court at Allahabad challenging the validity of the Act and for quashing the assessment orders.\n\nThe learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court on 2c; February,' 1960 held that the Act was valid and allowed the writ petition in part by holding that the respondent was entiled to the benefit of rule 6-A and therefpre quhed the assessment order.\n\nThe State filed an appeal. The High Court dismissed the appear and upheld the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge.\n\nCounsel on behalf of the State raised three contentions. First, it was said that tax was to be assessed on the annual value of land holding as on 1 July, 1957 and inasmuch rule 6-A did not come into existence on i July, 1957 the respondent was not entitled to the benefit of the rule. Secondly, it was said that rule 6-A was not at all applicable because it was not proved that the G land was lawfully sub-let. Thirdly, it was said that the Hig!J\n\nCourt was wrong in issuing the writ on the ground of mis-construction 0£ rule 6-A by the assessing authorities because it was not a patent error.\n\nThe 1957 Act came into force on 1 July, 1957. Section 2'i H of the Act empowered the State Governnient to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. The rules were published in the U.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 23 November, 1957.\n\nRule 6-A was added to the Rules by an amendment on 23 April,\n\n1958. The contention on behalf of the State was that because A rule 6-A was not made retrospective with effect from 1 July 1957 .but that rule 6-A came into existence on 23 April 195S the .said e would not be applicable in respect of asse'ssmcnt' commencmg 1 July, 1957. This contention is unacceptable as it is unsound.\n\nUnder section 3 of the Act holding tax at the rate& specified in the Schedule of the Act is levied for the agricultural B _year on the annual value of each land holding. Section 4 of the Act defines 'land holding'. Section 5 of the Act deals with annual value of the land. Rule 6-A states that where any land holding has been legally sub-let by a disabled land-holder mentioned in sub-section ( 1) of section 157 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 19 50 the holding tax shall be remitted to the extent of that chargeable on the land sublet if its annual C value were arrived at by multiplying the rent payable by lOt.\n\nThe respondent was a disabled land-holder within the meaning of section 157 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,\n\n1950. The land had been lawfully sub-let while the properties were under the management of the Court of Wards and thereafter\n\nthe District Judge. The contention of the appellant that the res- D pondent became a major on 4 March', 1958 and therefore.he could not get benefit of the rule is untenable.\n\nRul~ 6-A refers to land which has beein legally sub-let. Therefore; the sub-letting must be anterior to the making of the rule on. 23 April, 1958. The entire fallacy of the appellant is that to make rule 6-A effective from 23 April, 1958 would be to rob rule 6-A of its extent and content in respect of assessment. Rule 6-A is to be read with sections 3, E 4 and 5 of the Act. The assessment was for the entire agricultural year from 1 July, 1957 up to 30 June, 1958. Tiie land whii:h had been lawfully sub-let could not be in the possession of the respondent in the assessment year. Therefore in assessing the land holding for the year 1365 Fasli the respondent was entitled to claim benefit under Rule 6-A in respect of land which had been p 1egally sub-let.\n\nRules are made for carrying out the purposes of the Act. One of the purposes is to assess the land holding for the agricultural year. Rules are in regard to filing of the return and manner and mode of computation of annual value. Exemption under rule 6-A is a benefit in relation to assessment by reason of the process ol G computing the valuation of land holding.\n\nThe contention on behalf of the State that Rule 6-A was not made retrospective and therefore it does not apply is devoid of merit.\n\nTo accede to the contention of the State would mean that the rules which came into existence on 23 November, 1957 W9lJ\\d not at all the applicable to the assessment which commenced on ff 1 July, 1957. That would be am absurd position. The Act came into force on 1 July, 1957. The assessment was to be made for the\n\nU.P. STATE v. JITENDRA SINGH (Ray, J.)\n\nI 03\n\nA year commencing 1 July, 1957. Rules were made under section 29 of the Act. Rules obviously came into existence subsequent to the Act coming into force. Rules are procedural. Rules relate to the assessments. The assessment is for the entire year. The assessment in the particular instance was made after rule 6-A came into effect. The assessment was pursuant to notice which B was delivered on 1 April, 1958. The assessment was for the whole year ending 30 June, 1958. Therefore, rule 6-A would be applicable to the assessment which was not only pending but would be up to 30 June, 1958 within which period the rule became effective for the assessment year. It is also important to notice that the benefit under rule 6-A enures to the land holding which has been C legally sub-let. The land holding fulfils that character during the assessment year with the resulf that rule 6-A is attracted by the quality of land for quantifying the assessment.\n\nThe second contention of the State that the land had not been legally sub-let cannot be entertained. In the High Court the State did noi dispute the lel!ality of sub-Jetting. It is, therefore, not D open to the State to raise that contention. .\n\nThe third contention of the State that there is no patent error and therefore the High Court was wrong in issuing a writ is un atable. The respondent Raja raised a contention as to the application of rule 6-A. This is a question of construction of the\n\n-~ statute and rules in respect of assessment. The High Court was E justified in issuing the writ.\n\nThe appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 40, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF UITAR PRADESH & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAJA nTENDRA SINGH\n", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJA JITENDRA SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BEG, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Fasli-Jurisdiction of High Court in ntatter of construction of Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 291, "end_char": 358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "23 April 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 603, "end_char": 616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 6-A was added to the Rules by anamendment on 23 April 1958."}}, {"text": "section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 746, "end_char": 757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Fasli-Jurisdiction of High Court in ntatter of construction of Rule", "statute": "Fasli-Jurisdiction of High Court in ntatter of construction of Rule"}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 770, "end_char": 816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1024, "end_char": 1037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent was prior to the abolition of indari in Uttar Pradesh, the Raja of properties consistlru!"}}, {"text": "Rai Bareilly", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1101, "end_char": 1113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of 28 villages in District Rai Bareilly."}}, {"text": "s. 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1435, "end_char": 1442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "sections 3, 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2694, "end_char": 2713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3379, "end_char": 3384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4683, "end_char": 4703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated February 9, 1965 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No."}}, {"text": "0. P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4758, "end_char": 4768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Dikshit and 0."}}, {"text": "J. P. Goyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4790, "end_char": 4801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. P. Goyal and R. A. Gupta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. A. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4806, "end_char": 4817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. P. Goyal and R. A. Gupta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Rae Bareli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5656, "end_char": 5666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent Raja was prior to the abolition of 1.amindari in the State of Uttar Pradesh the Raja of the properties known as Chandapur Raj consisting of 28 villages in the Tahsil Maharajganj in the District of Rae Bareli."}}, {"text": "V. JlTENDRA SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5944, "end_char": 5961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.P. STATE V. JlTENDRA SINGH (Ray, ],) l 01\n\nA O:n 1 April, 1958 the Tax Assessment Officer, Maharajganj Sub-Division served a notice under section 7(2) of the 1957 Act on the respondent for the assessment Fasli year 1365 oommencing on 1 July, 1957 and ending on 30 June, 1958."}}, {"text": "section 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6073, "end_char": 6085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lucknow", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7130, "end_char": 7137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be stated that the assessment according to the respo.ndent should have been Rs .. 34,274-6-10 as a result of the exemption under rule 6-A. The respondent preferred an appeal before the Commissioner, Lucknow Division."}}, {"text": "9 D September, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7177, "end_char": 7196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 9 D September, 1958 the Commissioner held that rule 6-A was not applicable to assessment of tax for the 1365 Fasli year."}}, {"text": "29 September, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7328, "end_char": 7346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent thereafter on 29 September, 1958 filed a writ yetition in the High Court at Allahabad challenging the validity of the Act and for quashing the assessment orders."}}, {"text": "High Court at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7376, "end_char": 7399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent thereafter on 29 September, 1958 filed a writ yetition in the High Court at Allahabad challenging the validity of the Act and for quashing the assessment orders."}}, {"text": "2c; February,' 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7533, "end_char": 7552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court on 2c; February,' 1960 held that the Act was valid and allowed the writ petition in part by holding that the respondent was entiled to the benefit of rule 6-A and therefpre quhed the assessment order."}}, {"text": "1 July, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8486, "end_char": 8498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 1957 Act came into force on 1 July, 1957."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8500, "end_char": 8509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "23 November, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8678, "end_char": 8695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rules were published in the U.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 23 November, 1957."}}, {"text": "23 April 195S", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8930, "end_char": 8943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention on behalf of the State was that because A rule 6-A was not made retrospective with effect from 1 July 1957 .but that rule 6-A came into existence on 23 April 195S the .said e would not be applicable in respect of asse'ssmcnt' commencmg 1 July, 1957."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9088, "end_char": 9097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9252, "end_char": 9261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9297, "end_char": 9306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9483, "end_char": 9494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9507, "end_char": 9547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9784, "end_char": 9795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9803, "end_char": 9843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10490, "end_char": 10500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,\n\n1950", "statute": "the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,\n\n1950"}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11822, "end_char": 11832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30 June, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12223, "end_char": 12236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessment was for the whole year ending 30 June, 1958."}}, {"text": "Raja", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13113, "end_char": 13117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent Raja raised a contention as to the application of rule 6-A. This is a question of construction of the\n~ statute and rules in respect of assessment."}}]}